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IN THIS ISSUE:

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From a plantation along the Cooper River, to imprisonment in the Tower of London, the story of Henry Laurens and his contribution to our early diplomatic history.

Henry of the Tower

RALPH HILTON

Ralph Hilton has been living on Hilton Head Island, S. C. since his retirement as an FSO in 1964. He is now writing his second book for the World Publishing Company, a volume about the southeast for their American Regions series.

ON a crisp London day in the autumn of 1780 a thickset, firm-jawed South Carolinian stood unhappily beside the Thames River, looking upward at the stones of the ancient fortress known as the Tower of London.

The day was October 6, and the man was Henry Laurens of Charleston. A month earlier the English had encountered upon the high seas the brigantine *Mercury*, enroute from Philadelphia to Europe, and had seized and sailed away with Laurens, the newly commissioned Minister to the Netherlands in the fledgling foreign service of the Continental Congress. It was a commission he had accepted reluctantly, for he was 56 and had spent many years in public life, during which he had served the revolutionary government of South Carolina, and the Continental Congress as president.

Laurens, ailing and resentful over his consignment as a prisoner to the Tower, gazed with melancholy eyes upon the Thames, a puny stream, as he might well have reflected, compared to the wide sweeps of the Ashley and Cooper back home. His guards stepped forward and the silent procession moved inside. They led him over a footing of slick stones to cramped prison quarters and left him, coughing and adjusting his cape against the Tower chill.

The South Carolinian was one of a handful of notables dispatched abroad in the diplomatic service of the nascent American nation. Among them were Benjamin Franklin in Paris, John Jay in Madrid, and John Adams at The Hague. It was an eminent little group whose resourcefulness would be commemorated in history books of the future. Whatever achievements and errors of judgment might be attributed to each in his turn, all were then engaged, with honor and sacrifice, in helping to lay the cornerstone of their country's foreign service. It was Laurens alone, however, who was to have the rueful distinction of residence in the Tower of London.

A cosmopolitan product of the South Carolina plantation and mercantile society of the times,

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Laurens was no stranger to England. In 1771 he had taken his sons John and James abroad to join another son, Henry, for schooling, and he had spent the years from 1771 to 1774 principally in England, France, and Switzerland on private matters.

He had formed many friendships in London where he frequently discussed American affairs with members of Parliament. Now his imprisonment raised questions and brought pressure from influential Englishmen for his release.

To protests that international law had been violated by imprisoning a diplomat with Laurens' credentials, Lord North replied to Parliament that he had been confined as a state prisoner on suspicion of high treason, instead of being held as a prisoner of war subject to exchange, to prevent his release and subsequent diplomatic activity in Europe.

Laurens, who had made strong protests of his own, wasted no time in futile hopes. Deep within the Tower, he obtained writing materials and started a flow of smuggled letters to friends and opposition members of Parliament, and to the so-called "rebel" newspapers in London. His unattributed articles in these newspapers, in which he presented an American point of view of the Revolutionary struggle and the certainty of a United States victory, stirred interest in both private and unofficial circles in England. For many months the imprisoned diplomat operated effectively one of his country's first overseas propaganda programs.

Meanwhile, the British government had made much of one of the documents Laurens had failed to send to the bottom of the sea at the time of his capture. A weighted sack of letters had been kept afloat by a pocket of air, and an English sailor had fished them out. The item prized by the British was a copy of a draft of a proposed treaty of amity and commerce between the United States and the Netherlands, for promulgation after the establishment of American independence. England had seized upon it as a pretext for declaring open hostilities December 20, 1780 against the Netherlands, which had developed a highly profitable trade, via the tiny island of St. Eustatius in the Caribbean, with the United States.

Laurens knew nothing of the extent of the efforts being made by individuals in Paris and London, and by Congress to arrange his release. A daring scheme was proposed from Madrid by the 35-year-old Jay. Writing to Laurens' son John, at the age of 27 a distinguished Colonel of the American army visiting Paris briefly to seek aid for his government, Jay proposed a surprise coastal raid by a commando type group to seize in England or Ireland some ministerial-level Britishers. Such prisoners, Jay believed, could be exchanged for the imprisoned Laurens. No such American expedition was ever reported, however, and the elder Laurens, unable to stand without

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crutches, was released from prison on parole December 31, 1781, two months and twelve days after Lord Cornwallis had surrendered his entire force at Yorktown, to help arrange his own exchange for Cornwallis. Laurens remained in England several months to regain his strength. He saw old friends and held many informal conversations with Lord Rockingham, later to become Prime Minister, and with other members of Parliament to convince them that the United States would not make a separate peace with England.

It was during this period that Adams, who regarded Laurens as an old friend, said of him:

"Neither the air of England, nor the seducing address of her inhabitants, nor the terrors of the Tower have made any change in him," and described him as possessing "the most exact judgement concerning our enemies, and of the same noble sentiments in all things which I saw in him in Congress."

He left England May 11, 1782 for southern France and further recuperation. The news from Philadelphia was that Congress had established at last a Department of Foreign Affairs. Robert R. Livingston had been elected Secretary the previous August and was now conducting the business of the new department from a front room of a small residence at 13 South Sixth Street in Philadelphia, assisted by one clerk and an interpreter. Reflecting upon this report, Laurens, it may be assumed, hoped that the Secretary would do something to improve the communications system with the field, for he had found that it required from six weeks to six months to get a despatch to Europe, with an estimated thirty percent of diplomatic correspondence being lost enroute.

Rested and strengthened, Laurens was back in England in October to arrange passage to America. Before he could leave, however, Congress ordered him to Paris to join the peace commissioners, Adams, Franklin, and Jay.

Although severely afflicted by gout, he made his way to Paris as fast as possible, but he arrived only two days before the signing of the preliminary agreements.

"I was very happy that Mr. Laurens came in," Adams wrote in his journal. ". . . He had an opportunity of examining the whole, and judging and approving; and the article he caused to be inserted at the very last, that no property should be carried off . . . was worth a longer journey, if that had been all. But his name and weight is added, which is of much greater consequence."

For several months Laurens shuttled painfully between Paris and London, where he negotiated with the Prime Minister and the foreign ministry on pressing matters connected with the peace arrangements, and on the terms of a proposed commercial treaty. He was on such a mission when the definitive Peace Treaty was signed by all of the belligerents September 3, 1783, and thus missed the opportu-

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nity to have his name on that historic paper.

Laurens' services to America before his departure for home from London June 6, 1784, "were of great importance," according to Historian David Duncan Wallace, "and entitle him in a very true sense to be considered the first minister of the United States to England . . . The subjects of his negotiations were the same as those of John Adams when accredited to that court a little later, and, it may be added, his success was also the same."

He arrived in New York August 3, ten days after his 39-year-old colleague, Jay, had landed to learn, without enthusiasm, of his own election as Secretary for Foreign Affairs to succeed Livingston.

Laurens reported some weeks later in person to Congress in Trenton before traveling overland to Charleston.

He came back home with the appearance of an old man, tired and broken in health. His wealth was gone and his Charleston home wrecked, his plantation house at Mepkin, thirty miles up the Cooper, destroyed. He moved to an overseer's cottage at Mepkin where he lived until he could revive the plantation and rebuild the big house.

His heart was no longer in public affairs, although his fellow-citizens elected him to Congress, to the State Legislature, and to the Federal Convention in 1787.

He died December 8, 1792, and following his instructions, his body was placed on a funeral pyre atop a river bluff, the first instance of cremation in America in recorded times. His ashes were placed in the family burial plot at Mepkin beside the grave of his son, Colonel John Laurens, who had fallen in a skirmish near the Combahee, one of the last American soldiers to die in the Revolution.

A decade had passed since Henry Laurens, diplomat, had hobbled out of his London prison, but in the Carolina Low Country the story of his experience still lived. Before he died, and long afterwards, Laurens was known along the reaches of the Cooper and beyond as "Henry of the Tower."

A Communication re "Russia and the Middle East"

I HAVE read with interest Melvin Goodman's article on Russia and the Middle East in the April issue. There are a number of points in it which require comment.

The first of these is Mr. Goodman's assertion that Czarist dreams of influence in the Middle East were limited to Iran, Afghanistan and Asia. He apparently ignores the long history of Czarist involvement in the eastern Mediterranean arising out of perennial conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Two centuries ago, in 1769, the Russians sent a sizeable fleet from the Baltic into the Mediterranean and the fleet remained in the eastern Mediterranean until 1775, most of its time being spent in the Aegean and Ionian Seas. It had clear naval superiority after destroying the Turkish fleet at Chesme in 1770, but it had no land forces. The Russians therefore resorted to support of local rebels against the Turks (Ali Bey in Egypt and Dahir al-Umar in Palestine and Lebanon) and in this effort engaged in a number of actions along the Levant and Egyptian coasts. They attacked Beirut in both 1772 and 1773 and in the latter year blockaded and bombarded the town for three months until its garrison surrendered. The town was then plundered.

In the late 18th and the 19th centuries the Russians also pursued an active policy of supporting the Orthodox Church in Lebanon and Palestine. The treaty of Kutchuk Kainarji (1774), ending the war with Turkey for which the Mediterranean fleet had been created, formally recognized the Russians as protectors of the Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire. A subsequent Franco-Russian dispute over the respective rights of the Orthodox and Latin churches in the holy places was one of the causes of the Crimean War. Russian politico-religious interest in the area continued strong until World War II, and one physical evidence of it is the impressive Russian church properties in and around Jerusalem. In view of all this, I think we can say that Russian interest in this area is definitely not a new phenomenon.

Russian interest in the Persian Gulf has also been of long standing. In the 1890s there were reports of Russian interest in acquiring a coaling station and possibly a railroad terminus in Kuwait. A Russian official surveyed the island of Hormuz in 1895 and other Russian emissaries turned up at Bandar Abbas about the same time. In 1899 there were published reports of Russian designs on the island of Kishm, adjoining Hormuz. Russian naval squadrons visited the Gulf during the same period: the cruiser *Gilyak* called at Aden and Bandar Abbas in 1903. This call prompted rumors that the Russians were attempting to establish a coaling station. While the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 served to limit Czarist interest, the Soviets were not long in reviving it.

The second is Mr. Goodman's remark that the British withdrawal from Egypt in the 1950s gave Moscow its first opportunity in the Middle East. Moscow's opportunity was the Palestine issue, which the Soviets opted not to exploit until after Stalin's death. The departure of the British had little to do with it. The Soviet arms deal was the result in the

first place of Egypt's decision, following the Israeli raids on Gaza and Khan Yunis in 1955, that it must have more arms, of its subsequent decision that it would not accept the terms being offered by the United States, and of Soviet willingness to supply the weapons wanted on easy terms.

The third is his statement that the Soviet intervention in Hungary in 1956 made a greater impact on the Arab political mind than millions of dollars of Soviet economic and political aid. The sad fact is that the Soviet intervention made almost no impact on the Arabs, who were totally preoccupied with the concurrent Tripartite attack on Egypt.

The fourth is the statement that the Soviets, taking advantage of the announced British troop withdrawal east of Suez, American involvement in Vietnam, and Egyptian insolvency, added three new military aid customers after the June war—Yemen, South Yemen, and the Sudan. It is true that *South* Yemen was a new customer, created by the British withdrawal. Yemen, however, was not a new customer; it had been receiving Soviet arms for years. Sudan was a new customer, but this had nothing to do with British withdrawal, American involvement in Vietnam or Egyptian insolvency. The Sudanese signed an arms agreement with the Soviets because they were offered easy terms by the Soviets at a time when relations with the West were at a low ebb, essentially because of the Palestine question.

The fifth is the section on Soviet activities in the oil industry, which describes a much greater involvement than actually exists. Thus it is true that there are between two and three thousand Soviet advisors in Egypt as the article states, but less than 25 of them are working in the oil industry and those are engaged in some desultory prospecting near Siwa. They have produced nothing to date. The notable expansion of Egyptian oil production in the past two years is due almost entirely to the efforts of two American companies, Pan American, a subsidiary of Standard of Indiana, and Phillips, which have between them about 150 American workers in Egypt. Nor are there any significant numbers of Soviet oil workers in Arab State oil companies elsewhere (there may be a handful in Iraq and Syria, but that is all). Nor is it true as the article states that the Soviets are helping with the marketing of Iraqi oil. The Soviets and Iraqis signed an agreement in 1968 under which they were to work out agreement on cooperation in the oil business, but so far it has come to nothing.

The sixth is the assertion that "despite Western withdrawal from the Middle East and the serious decline in western prestige, there has not been a countervailing rise in Soviet stature." Soviet prestige and influence in the area are clearly greater than they were before the June war, largely because of the political support the Soviets have given the Arabs at the United Nations. As for the thesis that a Soviet gain in one area state leads to an exacerbation of relations with others, "witness Iran's worried reaction to Soviet participation in the Yemeni civil war," this has not prevented the Iranians from continuing their policy of improving relations with the Soviet Union.

The seventh is that the writer appears to be unaware of current Soviet naval activity in the Persian Gulf.

The eighth is the statement that the Soviets must pursue their goal without the assistance of indigenous Communist parties, which are outlawed in every Middle East state except Israel. There are in fact small but well-organized Communist parties in operation in most of the Arab states, with status ranging from one of complete illegality and clandestine operation, to official toleration and open activities, e.g., they publish a newspaper in Beirut.

There are some other comments I could make, but which I forego in order to avoid going into too much detail.

RICHARD B. PARKER

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		As of March 1		
		1967	1968	1969
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Group Life in Force (exclusive of Reversionary)		$56,519,200	$60,213,600	$59,578,300
Enrolled in Foreign Service Benefit Plan		9252	9600	9273
Claims paid during year:				
Group Life,	Number	14	24	25
	Amount	$211,600	$371,240	$294,000
Family Coverage,	Number	12	10	11
	Amount	$10,500	$10,000	$16,000
Accidental Death,	Number	0	2	4
	Amount	—	$35,000	$43,750
Foreign Service Benefit Plan		$1,062,644.76	$1,307,026.91	$1,516,052.49

II. NEW BENEFITS ADDED DURING YEAR

1. Effective September 1, 1968 the Family Coverage was doubled without increase of premium. Now it amounts to $2,000 on the spouse and up to $2,000 on each covered child.

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"I would argue that we too often select our policies in order to avoid involving officials of the State Department in unwelcome controversy with disagreeable people."

The American

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH

The author, who entered government service from academe during World War II, served in the Department of State from 1946 to 1948, then as economics professor at Harvard before his appointment as Ambassador to India in 1961. Dr. Galbraith, Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard, is well-known as the author of "American Capitalism" and "The Affluent Society," as well as innumerable magazine articles, including "How to Control the Military," HARPER'S, June, 1969.

WHATEVER the merits of the Ameriean system of diplomatic representation, it produces an exceptionally large number of men who are qualified, in their own view, to comment on its merits and shortcomings. Other advanced countries have, predominantly, a career service. This means that it is only after retirement that a man ean sit down and refleet on the eeeentricities of the organization in which he has spent his life. By then the habit of careful speech, and possibly also of careful thought, is likely to be well ingrained. That is why diplomatie memoirs usually laek even the modest exuberance of a State Department press briefing whieh in general style they otherwise resemble.

Our system, by contrast, absorbs with each new administration a large number of politieal ambassadors and in due course extrudes them to law firms, aeademic positions, eorporation presideneies, punditry, legislative office, mutual funds or researeh projeets of the Council on Foreign Relations all well in advance of tabular senility. All feel qualified to report in depth, and with the confidenee born of grave practieal experience, on the foreign service of the United States. That is my situation.

However I do not wish entirely to disparage my credentials. India, where I served for over two years, presents a large and complex problem in diplomatic representation. The Chinese attack of 1962 increased by perhaps twentyfold the responsibilities of the post. This was also my second tour with the Department of State. (In the period immediately following World War II I was nominally in charge of eeonomie policy in Germany and Japan. I say nominally, for our two pro-eonsuls in the field, General Lueius Clay in Germany and General Douglas MaeArthur in Japan, effeetively prevented anyone in Washington from having a damaging sense of personal power.) So I had some grounds for eomparison. Finally, of the seven ambassadors who have represented the President of the United States in India sinee that country gained independence, my tour of two years and four months was the second longest. It may be suggested that this was not unduly long and that the others were too short. I think that is right.

With quite a few of the problems that are held to afflict American ambassadors I had no experience. That is partly because some are imaginary and others can be eliminated with a little energy. But it is also because India is, in important particulars, a special case. I would be doing a disservice to my former colleagues in other eapitals were I to suggest that my experience was in all respects typieal.

Thus in India we had no personal financial problems. We did not quite live on our salary of $27,500 (which would now in 1969 be $42,500) but we could have done so. Our entertainment allowanee was not quite sufficient but only beeause I absorbed the deficit of the less well-paid officers. And that was only a few hundred dollars. But, by the standards of Paris or London, the soeial life of New Delhi is exeeedingly austere. Most high government offieials avoid alcohol; one or two will not come to parties where it is served. There is a good deal of entertaining around among members of the diplomatie eommunity but this is a waste of time. Although often exeellent and devoted publie servants, many are not elosely in toueh either with Indian affairs or their own governments. The Ameriean ambassador is commonly believed to be one of the most relentlessly driven people in India. This pressure of work served admirably as an exeuse for not going to diplomatic dinners; as it became known that we did not accept such invitations, they ceased to come. The loss was nil.

I am not entirely decrying the soeial aetivities that are associated with diplomaey. Doubtless at the United Nations, in Moscow, Washington and elsewhere they civilize and mellow what might otherwise be a touchy and aeid relationship. But their importance can easily be exaggerated. The importance of deft

Ambassador

entertaining is greatly stressed by the man who is no good for anything else. Also it is a simple fact that most people enjoy giving or attending parties and human vanity is served in some odd way by the undemanding rites of the reception line. What is so much enjoyed is easily canonized as high official duty. During my time in New Delhi, while we extensively entertained and were entertained by Indians, I don't believe I ever transacted any business at a party that wouldn't have been accomplished in due course at the office or picked up any information which, in the by no means certain event that it was important or accurate, wouldn't have reached us through regular channels. An ambassador is primarily a spokesman, political negotiator, administrator and guide to his own government on policy toward the country where he is located. If he is preeminently a social figure, he is either no good at his job or in a capital where it is unimportant.

As I have said, ambassadors in Paris, Tokyo, London, or Bonn may well feel the wind financially and trying to save money on their allowances is something that appeals only to legislators with a queer sense of financial proportion. But it was in Washington that people in the last years needed more pay. Unlike an ambassador, a man accepting a Cabinet or sub-cabinet position and moving to Washington must pay for his house and for household staff if he can find any. He receives no educational allowances for his children and he must stand the cost of his entertaining, official and otherwise, except in the rare case where he looks after an overseas visitor. And his salary is less than that of an ambassador in a leading capital.

It is also commonly imagined that the American ambassador has become a rather pathetic ceremonial figure who is treated with amused tolerance by his AID mission, the CIA, the military mission if there is one, the United States Information Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Library of Congress and the Peace Corps. It is these agencies that divide and on frequent occasion fight over the real power. Nothing of this sort happened in India. My predecessors in office had taken for granted that they were in charge of all American activities in the country. They had exercised this power firmly and without anyone imagining that it was for the purpose either of nourishing their own ego or bolstering the jurisdictional position of the State Department. I found no real problem in continuing and where necessary strengthening this tradition.

It is my impression that where the ambassador is not in charge it is usually his own fault. He regards himself not as the representative of the President but as the partisan of the State Department. The heads of the other agencies then feel that they must fight for their independence from a bureaucratically partisan figure. Or, in another common case, the ambassador does not really take responsibility for the operations of the AID organization, the military, the information services or the CIA. He yearns to be the head of the show but he is unwilling to get his back into the difficult and unglamorous problems of agricultural education, new fertilizer plants, military procurement, or how to get better space for the USIA libraries. And when something goes wrong, he tells Washington (and maybe with suitable discretion the local American correspondents) that it was USIA or CIA men acting with their usual fecklessness. If an ambassador is to be in charge he must be prepared to take the rap for his people in Washington (and, unless security is involved, in public as well) when something blows.

I am persuaded that the local staffs of the various overseas agencies—AID, the military, USIA, the others—very much prefer an ambassador who does take charge and who fights their battles in Washington. The Washington agencies, or some of them, may not like it quite so well. But they will not quarrel with a determined ambassador for they know he can be a very awkward enemy.

It is also believed that American missions abroad are sadly overstaffed and with people who are neither very responsible nor very smart. Our public activities are, perhaps, more extensive in India than in any other country in the world. Including food we were, during my years, providing about $800 million worth of economic assistance, much the largest to any country. Our information program, which cost just under six million was also the largest. There is a large and varied task of diplomatic representation. When I left in the summer of 1963 the AID organization had 106 Americans in New Delhi, the State Department 40 and the United States Information Service 33. The military mission numbered about 100. Other agencies had about 70 including the staffs of the military attachés and the men who flew the embassy Convair, the 12 Marines who guarded the Chancery, the two employees of the

Treasury and the four who ran the Peace Corps. In the country as a whole about five hundred Americans manned the embassy and three consulates, provided a wide range of technical services, ran libraries, reading rooms, newspapers and magazines, and supervised civilian and military expenditures totaling around a billion dollars. Harvard uses a somewhat larger number of people to run its student dining halls.

Again, however, India is not typcal. A large number of responsible, highly-educated and extremely diligent Indians are available at (by our standards) very modest pay for tasks for which in other countries Americans would be hired. Moreover the social life in New Delhi—and other Indian cities—is pedestrian, the food does not appeal to all tastes, there are no wines and no winter sports, and for six months of the year the weather is insufferably hot. So India does not appeal to the public expatriate—the civil servant who finds Paris, Rome or Wiesbaden far more agreeable as a residence than Falls Church and who once ensconced and on an overseas payroll could not be dislodged by Alaric. And it must be said that numbers were kept down only by eternal vigilance. During the Chinese border attack, when India was much in the news and dozens of people in Washington thought it their moment to make rendezvous with destiny, my deputy and I met every morning to turn down the proposals for new helpers that had come in overnight.

As compared with twenty years ago the younger State Department officers with whom I worked struck me as impressively better educated, in far closer and more sympathetic touch with the people of the country, more imaginative and just as hard-working and disciplined. The staff of the United States Information Agency is almost as good. Since it has no contracts to cancel and a suspiciously intellectual and artistic preoccupation, this agency naturally arouses the antipathy of statesmen who stopped with the McGuffey Readers. The rest of us should know that it is a devoted organization of exceedingly competent people. In the early sixties it underwent a rejuvenation of spirit under Edward R. Murrow. He showed what intellectual courage and good leadership can accomplish on matters of foreign policy.

The military staff which launched the new aid program following the Chinese attack was alert and professional and quickly won the confidence of their Indian colleagues. The AID organization, in its technical ranks, left a good deal to be desired. In principle all Americans agree that our best talent should go abroad to work on the great tasks of economic development. In practice the best can't be budged. Men in mid-career want to stay close to American laboratories, professional colleagues, salaries, their children's schools and their prospect for promotion. The best source of technical talent for AID has come to be men who have passed retirement age in the United States. Some of these are very good; some are not the best for 120-degree heat. The only solution, I fear, is to tailor our efforts to the manpower available. In India and Pakistan which are moderately well-supplied with technical talent, I would cut back sharply on our technical assistance program and use the best of the talent so saved in Africa or other areas of greater need. This would not, of course, affect our loans in support of industrial, transport and agricultural development. This is overwhelmingly the largest part of our aid program and the part that really counts.

The American community in New Delhi is also exceedingly responsible and well-behaved. During my time there I did not have to deal with a single instance of pugnacity, intoxication, reckless driving or other public misbehavior and only one case of seduction. Doubtless there were more lapses than this implies but they achieved no notoriety. The officers, NCOs and airmen of the 322 Air Division who were based in New Delhi to fly support for the Indian forces in Ladakh for some nine months, were not charged in that time with a single act of public impropriety or indiscipline. A leftwing paper, which kept them under thoughtful surveillance, once charged that a beer can had been tossed from a window of Kotah House, the princely palace where an appreciative Indian government had billeted them. The charge was not substantiated.

FINALLY we were not especially bothered by Congressional visitors who, according to folklore, are the bane of an ambassador's existence. A number came but they applied themselves rather diligently to their investigations and, I think, went away better informed as a result. Businessmen, real and bogus, were more of a problem. They swarmed into the Chancery in the travel season to consult the economic staff about markets or investment prospects with a view not to increased commerce and industry but to making their junket tax deductible. This annoyance diminished perceptibly when the Treasury, at my behest, began looking into the racket and especially at entrepreneurs who were deducting the cost of travel on cruise ships.

The major offender on travel is, in fact, the State Department. When no one in the Department knows quite what to do, or whether anything at all can be done, a show of energy is always possible by dispatching some official of suitable rank to the scene. This is sometimes, one suspects, the result of a plot by subordinates against their superior. "This is a very difficult situation. It will take someone of your rank and ability to solve it." With proper reluctance the great man so urged agrees to go. He then fails. However this is not fatal for, fortunately, the standards of performance in diplomacy are not demanding. The exercise helps the world to understand the first principle of American overseas operations. It is that while we may not have policies we do have airplanes. And one can always say that one had talks and that the talks were useful. A communique which merely says there were talks means that nothing was accomplished. If it adds that the talks were useful it could mean that someone's conscience was troubled by the absence of accomplishment.

OUR tendency to substitute mobility for decision may be thought something of a criticism of our conduct of our foreign policy and, lest I be thought to be giving too perfect a bill of health, there are others I would offer. The standards of promotion of the career services are still ambiguous. In principle it favors the clear-headed, determined operator who knows what should be done and has a strong desire to do it. In practice such a man has usually been involved in controversy. As a result preference often goes to the well-honed, socially graceful and politically-tranquilized figure who is an efficient conduit for clichés. He seems safe right up to the moment when strong political judgment is required and then, of course, he is a disaster. Our troubles in the Congo and Laos, to cite two examples of my period, were much complicated because, initially, we had the wrong men on the job. When effective men were put in charge things took a marked turn for the better.

Political innocence stemming partly from the above causes underlies the most persistent error of American foreign policy which is the tendency to identify our fortunes with dictators in their brief moment of glory. Thus we manage, time after time and in place after place, to share in the animosity which these men arouse in their own people. To the superficial eye these road company Caesars always seem more popular and more powerful than they really are. Our people, or some of them, react to them as amateur politicians once reacted to the presumed power of Carmine DeSapio. The whitewashing of the paper strongmen to Washington is invariably based on a strong conviction of political acumen and *realpolitik*. In 1961, at the request of the President, I went briefly to Saigon to add my thoughts to the many reports from there. Without any particular feeling of foresight I urged that we take note of the unpopular and the transitory character of the Diem regime and begin to detach ourselves. Especially we should let it be known in the South Vietnam Army and elsewhere that we would find an alternative acceptable. It was many months before my reputation recovered from the extreme irresponsibility of these recommendations.

BUT while it is the fashion of those who are discussing the State Department to dwell on the shortcomings of the career service, rather more needs to be said of those of us who are brought in for shorter periods. If there is any function for the non-career official, either in Washington or in the field, it must be to assume risks that career men, whose life is committed to the service, cannot afford. Anyone who concedes the continued existence of the Chinese, is clear that the future of Africa is not with Portugal, makes it clear that some of our friends are as devoted to democratic socialism as we ostensibly are to capitalism, stamps on those who suggest that rich countries can best live side by side with the poor by cutting down on aid appropriations, takes the same calm view of trade with the Communist countries as do the western Europeans, and fights the more violent, gruesome or myopic ideas of the American right is certain to induce a certain amount of political static. It is the prime function of the non-career man who is not placing his whole life on the line to absorb this animosity.

Alas, quite a few political appointees persuaded themselves that it was their function to set the career service a sound example in political caution. They greatly enjoyed their jobs; they did not relish the rough and tumble of political controversy; they wished to avoid trouble. A very large part of the cable traffic to New Delhi was devoted to warning me that this or that action, admittedly meritorious, would cause criticism in Congress. No one in this world need go around picking quarrels. But nothing worthwhile is ever accomplished without controversy and certainly not in the United States. George Kennan, one of the wisest and most literate men of our time, has taken the Congress to task for its failure to accept informed guidance on foreign policy. I am inclined to think that Congress on these matters is what we make it. It will not be very good if State Department officials, in their desire to avoid trouble, yield to Congressional prejudices instead of fighting them. There would have been no test ban agreement if Averell Harriman, one of the several who is notably exempt from my criticism, had yielded to the likelihood that Richard Russell would oppose it. And there would have been fewer votes for the treaty if he hadn't fought like a lion for its ratification. In contrast with Mr. Kennan, who suggests that our foreign policy is conducted for the convenience of the Congress, I would argue that we too often select our policies in order to avoid involving officials of the State Department in unwelcome controversy with disagreeable people. The modern foreign policy expert is a man who knows what should be done about China, Eastern Europe, the Portuguese colonies and the other places where

our policy is on dead center, but has exceptionally sophisticated reasons for not wishing to risk criticism by Senator Karl Mundt or Senator Barry Goldwater. Less probably, of course, his mother may have been frightened just before he was born by John W. Bricker.

In passing, I might say that the function of the modern liberal when he assumes State Department responsibilities—again there are important exceptions—is especially interesting. Partly he gives a new and sophisticated sanction to the more moth-eaten foreign policy positions which he previously criticized. For the rest, by the ingenious intransigence with which he reacts on all matters which concern the Communist countries, he proves that the suspicions of the American Right, growing out of his earlier advocacy of a more conciliatory policy, are really quite groundless.

THE State Department is also slow in its responses, especially on lesser matters which, however, have the capacity of becoming serious. By resorting, as necessary, to crude and even vulgar language one can always get attention for some important problem and, with energy, one can usually get the answer one wants. But lesser issues, or those concerning, say, Ceylon or Nepal, cannot claim the attention of the top officials of the Department. So they get lost in endless meetings in the office of the Assistant Secretary or some subordinate official.

The slowness of its response means that in time of crisis, such as that of the Chinese attack, the Department resigns much of its authority to the man on the spot. If he is a vacuous time-server the consequences can be pretty bad.

Many of the diplomatic techniques on which we rely are also archaic. The most precious conviction of the State Department is that great things can be accomplished by having an ambassador call on the foreign minister of the government to which he is accredited and tell him the facts of life as these are seen by Washington. The comparatively rare Washington meetings that do not break up with a decision for travel invariably agree to instruct the relevant ambassador to seek an appropriate official and inform him firmly of the wishes of the United States. The telegram is duly dispatched; it includes the beloved phrase ". . . you should leave the Government in no doubt." On receipt of the message the ambassador makes an appointment, mounts his Cadillac and delivers the message. Then he telegraphs back that the mission is accomplished, not omitting to mention that he did not mince words. Otherwise when nothing happens it will be assumed that he did not speak with sufficient force.

Thus we seek to influence the course of policy of other nations in our favor. In all but routine matters —where a letter would suffice—it is a terrible waste of time. For it assumes that highly placed officials in other governments are both uninformed and omnipotent. When they are forcefully informed of the wishes of the United States they will use their power and act in accordance with our wishes. In this ritual there is also a desire to believe that all foreign office officialdom is more important than it really is.

In fact, if the Indian Government is a fair example, officials usually know exactly what we want. And whether they act in accordance with our wishes depends not at all on the rank of those making the appeal or the eloquence with which the case is made. Any Indian official who was swayed by such shallow considerations should obviously be sacked. Whether we are successful or not—minor matters still excluded—depends on whether the action is in accordance with Indian self-interest and how it will be interpreted by the politicians, press and the public, and on what one has to offer as part of the bargain. It follows that one's success depends not on whether one persuades some bureaucrat but whether one can persuade political leaders, newspapermen and the public at large. These hold the power to which the official is beholden.

Even in the Communist lands, I would gather, there is some chance of getting through to the public. In India it is vital. In 1963 we worked out with the Indians a proposal for joint air exercises as a protective measure in the event of a new Chinese attack. It put the Chinese on warning were they considering a new adventure; it postponed, at least for the time being, the need for the Indians to build up a force of high-performance aircraft. This would have been prohibitively expensive for them and formidably so for us. It was also the sort of step which, in light of past Indian policy, could easily be misunderstood. I spent hours and days putting our point of view on the merits of the arrangement before Indian political leaders and the press. There was similar effort on the Indian side. Without this explanation the step would have been bitterly attacked and much of the attack would have been based on a misunderstanding or misconstruction of our motives. In the end even the constitutionally suspicious leftwing papers were only formally critical. Partly because of the time devoted to this, I gave little thought to explaining a comparatively minor agreement which we had entered into with the Indians for joint use of radio facilities to reach southeast Asia. As a consequence of this error it encountered bitter criticism as an impairment of the non-alignment policy and a suspected Yankee trick. It had to be abandoned.

ONE must be selective about the efforts one makes at understanding. One cannot see political leaders or the press on everything. One must explain, but not seem to be mounting a campaign. And if something is palpably bogus one had better leave it alone. At the time of the Bay of Pigs, Washington dispatched reams of guidance, all of it unconvincing, on how to explain our actions to the politicians and press. I decided that silence was best. That would favor those of our friends who wanted to overlook or ignore what everyone thought a mistake. A few days later we got a telegram from the State Department reversing signals and urging this course. Each summer the Department gets

(*Continued on page* 52)

"The achievements of diplomacy are hard for the public to discern. The position of the diplomatist, on the other hand, is such that he constitutes a ready target for blame when things go wrong."—George F. Kennan

The Professional Diplomat

Characteristics, Norms, Attitudes

JOHN E. HARR

A newspaperman and USIA officer early in his career, Dr. Harr later served as Statewide Director of Communications Programs of the University of California and then as research associate on the staff of the Committee on Foreign Affairs Personnel (the Herter Committee).

THE CONCERN of this chapter is to describe some of the characteristics of FSOs, the norms and values that influence their behavior, and the attitudes of officers on a number of subjects. Stereotypes abound about the FSO corps, as is the case with every distinctive group. Like many stereotypes, they are dangerous, in that at best they are half-truths, and may convince many observers that there is no need to probe deeper. My purpose in this chapter is to probe more deeply.

Because any attempt to discuss the behavior of a group necessarily consists of generalizations, of extrapolation from sets of individual behavior to group behavior, it is obvious that there will always be exceptions, whether the generalizations have praiseworthy or pejorative connotations. One must deal in trends, in tendencies, in general qualities, in order to try to understand how FSOs as a group view themselves and their work. In doing so, it is clear that none of the observations represents a rigid mold for the behavior of all officers.

Personality Orientations

A good foundation is to review briefly the work of behavioral scientist Regis Walther who studied groups of FSOs in 1962 in comparison to other occupational groups by use of a survey instrument Walther developed, called the "Job Analysis and Interest Measurement" (JAIM).[1] The JAIM is a self-administered questionnaire containing some 125 multiple choice items having to do with attitudes, interests, beliefs, and preferences. The responses can be organized into 22 different scales measuring behavioral style in such areas as orientations, work content preferences, interpersonal behavior, formal organizational behavior, information processing behavior, and success criteria. The objective of JAIM is to measure the "personal qualities of the worker" (as differentiated from his skills and knowledge) that have "an influence on success or failure in a job." Walther explains part of the theoretical rationale for JAIM as follows:

> In order to function adequately, it is necessary for each individual to organize his experience. The nature of this organization gives rise to characteristic types of performance, conscious and unconscious, in various life situations. These behavioral styles are determined, in part, by the innate characteristics of the individual; by his experience with what works and with what does not work for him; and by the social standards and values to which he has been exposed.[2]

Walther compared groups of brand new FSO recruits to other groups of similar age, such as USIA recruits, Peace Corps volunteers, Civil Service management interns, and junior research engineers. He compared senior FSOs to junior FSOs, and he compared officers independently identified as high performers with those identified as low performers. He reported the results for FSOs in general:

> Compared with other occupational groups, the FSOs report that they like the kind of work that includes interpretation of data and the influencing of other people. Their style for analyzing information tends to be impressionistic and intuitive rather than formal, methodical, and statistical. Their preferred style for working with a formal organization is to do the work themselves rather than to work through a hierarchy. They greatly value personal intellectual achievement and place a moderate value on formal status, social service, and the approval of others.[3]

As an example of the comparisons between groups,

[1] Walther, *Orientations and Behavioral Styles of Foreign Service Officers,* Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 5 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965).
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Walther reported that "USIA officers are much more concerned about the opinions of other people; the junior FSOs value resourceful accomplishment. The USIA officers are more sympathetic and accommodating and value social service; the junior FSOs are more self-assertive and aggressive and value formal status."[4]

The junior FSOs are very different from the Peace Corps volunteers and the research engineers and very much like the management interns. Junior FSOs and senior FSOs are very much alike, except that the latter identify more with authority and show willingness to fit into an authoritative structure. At the same time, they are more self-assertive and exerted more personal leadership than the junior officers.

In comparing high and low performers within the FSO corps, Walther found that the high performers exhibit most of the same characteristics of the general group of FSOs, cited above, but to a more pronounced degree, except that they are much less concerned with social service than they are with formal status and resourceful accomplishment as success criteria. By comparison, the low performers are more concerned with social service and approval from others, with working in a hierarchial structure rather than an autonomous situation, and with a systematic-methodical approach to information in contrast to the empirical-intuitive approach of the high performers.[5]

The Young Officers

A useful concept for attempting to understand the norms, values, and attitudes of a distinctive group is *socialization*, meaning in general the process by which individual members of that group selectively come to learn "correct" behavior as sanctioned by the group. It is the process by which they learn the norms, values, and attitudes—hence the behavioral styles—which in large measure form the culture of the group.

The starting place is to look at what newcomers bring to the group. Our attention here is on the main source of recruitment, the orthodox method of the basic entrance examination. Lateral entrants will be considered later.

Walther's data provide us with an image of the personality orientations of young officers. It is possible to step back further and examine some personality characteristics of the population of college seniors interested in foreign service careers by means of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) 1961-62 surveys cited in the last chapter. In terms of what students consider to be of major importance in their jobs, Frances Fielder and Godfrey Harris report NORC data showing that those interested in a Foreign Service life differed from all other graduates in the following ways.[6] They were:

(a) much more likely to pick a career which involves "getting away from the city or area" in which they grew up.

(b) more likely to value opportunities "to work with people rather than things."

(c) more likely than all other graduates to consider as important "opportunities to be helpful to others or useful in society."

(d) more likely to seek the "chance to exercise leadership."

(e) less likely than all other graduates to value "making a lot of money."

(f) less likely to be attracted by "opportunities for moderate but steady progress rather than the chance of extreme success or failure."

In choosing self-descriptive adjectives, students interested in foreign service differed from all other graduates in the following ways:

(a) more likely to see themselves as cultured, intellectual, sophisticated, and idealistic, and less likely to be "middle-brow."

(b) more likely to be outgoing and talkative, and less likely to be cautious and quiet.

(c) more likely to see themselves as dominant, impetuous, and rebellious and less likely to be cooperative, obliging, fun-loving, and methodical.

A number of factors suggest that self-selection and strong career motivation are characteristic of those who pursue their interests and eventually enter the Foreign Service as junior officers. These factors include: the very small percentage in the NORC survey of those interested in a Foreign Service life, the view of Fielder and Harris that the interest does not seem very much related to the Department of State's formal recruitment effort, and the difficulty of the examination and the fact that long delays can occur between the time an applicant begins the process and the time he is actually appointed.

Both the Walther and the Fielder-Harris studies hold that the oral examining panels tend to select from among those who have passed the written examination "young people they consider most like the successful officers already in the system."[7] This, of course, is not surprising. As Theodore Caplow points out, any functioning hierarchy will "evaluate the candidate as a potential in-group member, and will therefore give special attention to his congeniality in the broadest sense," including "his ability to conform to the habits and standards of his elders."[8]

Passing the basic examination process has a profound impact on the young applicant, so much so that one hears it referred to as a "puberty rite" by critics of the corps. The fact that so few pass out of so many applicants heightens the impression that one is joining a

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[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11. As an example of the statistical reliability of the differences between the two groups, most of them were statistically significant at the .1 percent level, meaning that the differences could occur as the result of chance less than one time out of one hundred.

[5] Walther, *Orientations*, p. 34.

[6] Frances Fielder and Godfrey Harris, *The Quest for Foreign Affairs Officers—Their Recruitment and Selection*, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 6 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1966), pp. 15-16.

[7] Walther, *Orientations*, p. 71. The quotation is from Frances Fielder and Godfrey Harris, *The Quest for Foreign Affairs Officers—Their Recruitment and Selection*, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 6 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1966), 60.

[8] Caplow, *The Sociology of Work* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954), p. 71.

very select company.[9] As in the case of all recognized professional groups, the new members feel that they are embarking on a lifelong career, an occurrence, as Caplow points out, usually marked by "great expense, great ceremony, and the taking of oaths."[10]

Entering the corps via the basic examination is the Foreign Service equivalent of graduating from the military academies. The young FSO is brought into the Service in a "class" of 20 to 80 other officers much as the military academies produce a graduating class: "Since graduation from an academy means entrance into a group which disperses very gradually—the officer is always associated with a particular graduating class—academy education means acquiring lifetime colleagues and the necessity of accommodating to them."[11] The importance of his class is not so pronounced for the FSO, but for many years afterward he will know where his classmates are serving and how well they have fared in the promotion process compared to himself. The entering group *does* constitute a "class" in the basic orientation course which all must take at the Foreign Service Institute. Indoctrination is perhaps too strong a word for what happens in this course, but socialization is not. Within a very short time, the newcomer, who might have been quite vague about the details of the career, has picked up much of the language, the concerns, the ambitions. Terms like "mainstream" and "substantive work" quickly become permanent additions to his vocabulary, and he becomes concerned about such matters as lateral entry and the promotion system.

The entire process yields a rich source of talent. FSOs themselves believe this. An SDP question asked officers to evaluate the quality of junior recruits to the FSO corps in recent years, and the results were highly favorable.

TABLE 29
Quality of Junior FSO Recruits

Evaluation	*Number*	*Percent*
Poor	1	0.2
Average	21	3.6
Mixed—some poor, some brilliant	112	19.1
Generally very good	388	66.1
Outstanding	65	11.0
Totals	587	100

Interestingly enough, the more highly-ranked an officer, the more likely he is to have a very positive impression of the quality of recent entrants. Only 70 percent of the officers at levels 5 and 6 chose "generally very good" or "outstanding," compared to 85 percent of officers at levels 1 and 2 and 100 percent of the Career Ambassadors and Career Ministers. Also, a highly favorable impression of recent entrants is slightly more prevalent among lateral entrants compared to examination entrants.

The author's impression, based on frequent opportunities to observe incoming groups of junior officers in recent years, is that they fall in the "generally very good" to "outstanding" range. The Walther portrait of junior officers rings true, as does much of the image presented by NORC. Almost all the junior officers observed appear to be highly intelligent and articulate. Many appear to have good leadership potential. They are quite career conscious, understandably, or they might have chosen the Peace Corps instead of the FSO corps. There is an impression of vitality, of restrained excitement at being chosen to be among the select few to embark on a great adventure. As a result, the new officers are eager to learn and ready to adapt.

Career Motivations

One question in the SDP asked officers their opinion of the main attraction for the thousands of young persons who take the basic Foreign Service examination every year. The largest percentage of respondents (46.2 percent) chose the "desire to participate in the making of American foreign policy" as their answer. About a quarter (26.2 percent) saw the status and prestige of being an FSO as the main attraction, and 16 percent chose the "desire to live and work in foreign countries."

There probably is a certain vague idealism and romantic expectation among young applicants regarding "making foreign policy." One officer commented in his SDP response that it was a "traumatic experience" among younger officers "when we found out that international realities (a jungle world) did not conform to our idealistic teachings (university courses)."

When officers were asked *their own* reasons for taking the basic examination, 50 percent responded, "the desire to participate in the making of foreign policy" (with 20 percent choosing the status and prestige of the FSO corps, and 20 percent the desire to live and work abroad).

Certainly over time any romanticism about making foreign policy turns into a much more modest notion, but one that is nevertheless real for many FSOs. They rarely *make* foreign policy, but in their assessment of the local situation, in negotiating with foreign representatives, in reports sent back to Washington, in advice given to high-ranking officials, FSOs have frequent opportunities to *influence* foreign policy decisions.

More light is shed on career motivations in SDP questions as to whether FSOs would encourage interest in the FSO corps on the part of a son or daughter and reasons for that encouragement. More than 90 percent of the officers responding (579) said they would passively or actively support a son's interest in the Service, but the figure drops to 60 percent in the case of a daughter. The reasons for the support provide some indirect evidence on the officers' own career motivations.

The question was open-ended in the sense that officers could choose more than one reason, but if so they were to rank-order them. The composite scores were achieved by awarding five points for a first place

[9] For example, in calendar year 1964 only 198 persons were certified for appointment as FSOs, out of 10,957 who applied. Only 1,184 passed the written examination, and of these only 280 passed the oral test. See U. S. Department of State, "Department of State Manpower," Fiscal Year 1966 Statistical Report by the Management Reports Staff.

[10] Caplow, *Sociology of Work*, p. 106.

[11] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), p. 127.

TABLE 30
Reasons for Supporting Career Interest in the FSO Corps

Reasons	Number of responses	Composite score	1st place votes	2nd place votes
Relatively good remuneration and degree of financial security	359	764	6	37
Social status and prestige of the diplomatic profession compared to alternative occupations	365	878	20	33
Relatively good opportunity for FSOs to make an important contribution to the public service	503	2,205	293	138
Relatively good opportunity to continue personal intellectual growth and development	506	2,098	185	249
Relatively good opportunity to enjoy life	415	1,110	30	54

vote, four points for second place, and so on. Among the five reasons, two clearly stand out as highly important in the minds of FSOs—the opportunity for public service and the opportunity for personal growth. Public service received 293 first-place votes.

The idea of public service should not be confused with "social service" in the Walther study, on which FSOs did not score as highly as Peace Corps volunteers and other groups. Social service implies a direct helping relationship to other individuals, whereas the FSO deals as much or more in ideas and abstractions in his public service roles of observer, reporter, negotiator, advisor. His idea of public service is more likely to be connected with "participation in the making of foreign policy" than with direct help to individuals.

When dealing with self-image, one cannot expect complete objectivity. Yet there is no reason to doubt that many FSOs genuinely see themselves as dedicated and self-sacrificing. FSO Glen H. Fisher writes of this sentiment: "The Foreign Service officer realizes that he may never achieve the salaries of some of his college classmates who have gone into other professions or business, and he may have to face certain stress situations abroad which are indeed 'foreign' to friends at home."[12]

A strong emphasis on public service as a career motivation is probably typical of career services, if not of the general government employment. Janowitz makes the case for a strong public service tradition as the self-image for at least "a substantial minority" of military officers, in contrast to the widespread notion that they are simply finding a secure home in the military.[13] In contrast, a major study of the public service found that only eight percent of a sample of government employees saw "opportunity to be of service" as a reason to become a federal civil servant, and this is a considerably larger percentage than in the general public. Three-fourths of the government employees cited "security and fringe benefits" as the reason. Only among the more highly educated persons outside of government, and among Federal executives and scientists, did public service receive as high as 16 percent of the choices.[14]

Pride and Prestige

The fact that the prestige associated with being an FSO is not rated as highly as public service as a motivating force for entering the career should not be taken to mean that this is an unimportant factor. Myron Lieberman states its importance trenchantly: "The influence of occupational status on the practitioner is both pervasive and fundamental. It affects who will enter the occupation and what specializations within it they will seek. It affects the quantity and quality of the work that is done, the job satisfaction of the practitioner, and the dress, manners, outlook, and moral ideas of the practitioner."[15]

It is clear that FSOs take strong pride in their service. This emerges in SDP reactions to statements comparing the British and American foreign services. Historically the British service has had a high reputation; as noted in Chapter 2, it formed the model for development of the American service. Yet nearly 67 percent of FSOs disagreed with the statement that the British officer is generally a more competent representative of his government because of the longer tradition of diplomatic professionalism. Almost the same percentage of FSOs agreed with the statement that American FSOs are as well qualified or better than any diplomats in the world, including the British. This should not be read as denigration of Her Majesty's Diplomatic Service, which maintains a high reputation, but more as an indication of the strength of the confidence and pride FSOs have in their own service.

In another question, FSOs were asked to react to the following statement: "The FSO corps has steadily increased in competence and is today probably the best diplomatic corps in the world." The response was less bullish but still very positive—48.4 percent agreed; 16.3 disagreed, and 35.3 were not sure.

On all three of the foregoing questions there is a definite correlation with seniority. The more senior an officer, the more likely he is to take pronounced pride in the Service. The pride in the Service shows clearly in the responses to an SDP question on how officers would identify their occupation when introduced to a stranger at a party during home leave in the United States.

Officers overwhelmingly prefer the words "Foreign Service" to "State Department" or "government" or any other words for occupational self-identification. Almost half chose "Foreign Service Officer" and almost 30 percent chose "Foreign Service" for identification purposes.

Apparently the general public's attitude toward the professional diplomat is somewhat ambivalent, which

[12] Fisher, "The Foreign Service Officer," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 368 (Nov. 1966), 75.

[13] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, Chapter 6, p. 107 and Chapter 11.

[14] Franklin P. Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings, Jr., and M. Kent Jennings, *The Image of the Federal Service* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1964), pp. 224-34.

[15] Myron Lieberman, *Education as a Profession* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1956), p. 445.

TABLE 31
Occupational Identification

Response	*Number*	*Percent*
I'm in the Foreign Service.	173	29.6
I work for the State Department.	71	12.1
I'm a Foreign Service Officer.	288	49.2
I work for the government.	5	0.8
I'm in the diplomatic service.	40	6.9
Other	8	1.4
Totals	585	100

FSOs sense. On the one hand, FSOs are prone to lament the lack of understanding and the reflexive criticism they often encounter. George Kennan sees these "popular attitudes" as a major occupational hazard: "The achievements of diplomacy are hard for the public to discern. The position of the diplomatist, on the other hand, is such that he constitutes a ready target for blame when things go wrong. The popular concept of the social habits of diplomacy and of the nature of diplomatic life continues to arouse jealousies and resentments."[16] On the other hand, more than 60 percent of respondants disagreed with the statement that "the general public estimation of the professional diplomatic corps has declined since the end of World War II" (less than 20 percent agreed, and 21 percent were not sure).

The majority is probably right, at least in the sense that the general public attaches very high prestige to the diplomatic profession, although its ranking in one set of surveys declined slightly from 1947 to 1963. In 1963 the National Opinion Research Center duplicated a 1947 study of the prestige accorded 90 occupations by a national sample of the adult population.[17] The occupations ranged from U.S. Supreme Court Justice at the top to shoeshiner in 90th place. The major conclusion is that "there have been no substantial changes in occupational prestige in the United States" over a long period of time.

The occupation of "diplomat in the U.S. foreign service" declined slightly from an NORC score of 92 in 1947 to 89 in 1963, dropping from a 4.5 ranking among the 90 occupations to 11th place.[18] In 1947 the only occupations rated higher were Supreme Court Justice, physician, state governor, and a tie at 4.5 with "Cabinet member in the federal government." This is impressive company. By 1963 such occupations as scientist, government scientist, college professor, and U.S. Representative in Congress had moved ahead. Chemist and lawyer were tied at 11th place with diplomat. However, the researchers pointed out that "changes of one or two points in the NORC score of an occupation could hardly be adequate for establishing a real change in prestige or even the direction of change in prestige (if any)."

[16] Kennan, "Diplomacy as a Profession," *Foreign Service Journal*, May 1961, p. 24.

[17] Robert W. Hodge, Paul M. Siegel, and Peter H. Rossi, "Occupational Prestige in the United States, 1925-63," *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. LXX, No. 3 (Nov. 1964), 286-302.

[18] The NORC score is a composite, a weighting of the possible responses—excellent, good, average, below average, poor.

Except for the somewhat vague grouping of "government scientists," this extraordinarily high prestige rating of the diplomat appears to be unique among groups of government employees (as differentiated from the highly rated political positions such as Cabinet member, Congressman, etc.), even among career services. Apparently the prestige of the military officer is not particularly high, and the Kilpatrick study was generated by concern for the relatively low prestige of government service in general.[19]

FSOs are certainly not unaware of their high prestige rating; it helps offset the burden of misunderstanding and criticism they feel they are bearing. The high prestige is very apparent when they are serving abroad, as well as at home, if not so much in Washington then certainly in home communities when officers are on leave. The sensing of high prestige has an important bearing on the behavior of FSOs. One must live up to the image and maintain it, and this reinforces notions of correct conduct, of sanctions for those who do not, and the stake one has in the career.

Status and Ambition

Elements of formal status, many of them unique in character, are important in the diplomatic career, and doubtless much of the prestige of the career is derived from them. As implied in the earlier discussion of young officers, one achieves a measure of status merely by entering the FSO corps. FSOs receive presidential commissions for appointment at every grade, not only upon initial entry. Thus promotion lists must be confirmed every year by the Senate. The Herter Committee contemplated recommending the abandonment of commissions for the junior grades, but this touched a sensitive nerve.

Some of the unique elements of formal status available to the FSO are inherent in long-standing customs of diplomacy, sanctioned by international law, such as diplomatic immunity. Two important status symbols assured to the FSO are the diplomatic passport and having one's name on the diplomatic list. A source of irritation to many FSOs is the fact that these privileges must be widely (although unevenly) shared with many non-FSOs, the employees of other agencies as well as some FSRs and Staff corps personnel, thereby, it is feared, debasing their currency.[20] The diplomatic passport usually guarantees the holder quick entry to a foreign country, even in difficult circumstances, and freedom from customs inspection. Being on the diplomatic list can be important because in many cases the host

(*Continued on page* 46)

[19] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, pp. 226-28, discusses the apparent "relatively low" prestige of military officers and their own belief that "they are not adequately recognized." In the 1963 NORC study, "Captain in the regular army" received a low ranking of 27.5, but this is not a fair comparison, since captain is a relatively low rank. Presumably an occupational designation of "military officer" would be more comparable to "diplomat." For a discussion of how the FSOs rate the professionalism of the military, see the next chapter.

[20] Not only must the privileges be shared, but at many of the larger U. S. embassies the diplomatic list has become so big that even FSOs might not automatically appear on it, particularly the younger officers.

Part II of "The H-Bomb Decision" proceeds from the point where President Truman requested the recommendations of the Special Committee on "the technical, military and political factors . . . of 'super' atomic weapons."

THE H-BOMB DECISION

R. GORDON ARNESON

The author, a retired Foreign Service officer, became involved in atomic energy affairs quite by chance during World War II when, as a newly commissioned 2nd Lieutenant, he reported for duty in the spring of 1945 in the Office of the Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson.

PRESIDENT TRUMAN'S directive of November 19, 1949 to State, Defense, and the AEC "as to whether and in what manner the US should undertake the development and possible production of 'super' atomic weapons," set the national security policy machinery in motion. In the Department of State the first major attempt to come to grips with the problem was a 128-page memorandum which Kennan submitted to the Secretary on December 15.

An authentic "egghead," tall, intense, little given to frivolity, George Kennan was the Department's foremost authority on the Russian people and their rulers. He had spent most of his 25 year Foreign Service career in the Soviet Union or in countries on its periphery. Fluent in Russian, he had a deep understanding and affection for the Russian people, their energy, creativity, and friendliness; for the Soviet government, hearty dislike. When there had been some discussion after the war about sharing atomic energy knowledge with the Soviet Union, he was shocked. As recorded in his "Memoirs" he hurriedly wrote a despatch in late September 1945 which said in part: "There is nothing —I repeat nothing—in the history of the Soviet regime which could justify us in assuming that the men who are now in power in Russia . . . would hesitate for a moment to apply this power against us if by so doing they thought that they would materially improve their own power position in the world."

Much of Kennan's memorandum was devoted to the specific question, as raised by the Secretary of State, whether there was any hopeful change that might be made in our position in the United Nations on international control. The answer was essentially "No." He went on to discuss at length the question of the status of atomic weapons in our security posture. He was concerned that the military establishment was placing increased reliance on such weapons at the expense of conventional forces. He urged a clear definition of use-policy, i.e. for retaliation and deterrence only which he favored instead of all-out use in event of war. He recommended that until the question of policy was resolved, the thermonuclear program should not proceed. A main aspect of his argument was his assessment that the Soviet Union placed chief reliance on nonmilitary means: subversion, political action, economic pressure, terror, etc., to gain control over other peoples. He doubted the Soviet Union would deliberately initiate atomic warfare and thought the Soviet Union would not proceed with a thermonuclear weapons program if we did not. He urged we strengthen our nonmilitary means of countering Soviet power moves.

These views stand in sharp contrast with his opinions expressed in 1945. In discussion with the Secretary he pressed his argument with evangelical zeal. Dean Acheson, not given to evangelics in the conduct of foreign affairs, flatly rejected the Kennan position.

Over the years, Kennan had often found that his views had been given scant attention or had been ignored. Again he was destined to find himself on the losing end of the argument. Four years later when asked whether the Soviet Union would have proceeded with the development of the H-bomb whether we had or not, he said he thought in 1950 they would not have but he "may have been in error on that point."

Paul Nitze—prematurely white haired, a hard-nosed realist—was soon to replace Kennan as Director of the Policy Planning Staff. The Secretary asked him to do a critique of the Kennan argument. Nitze shared Kennan's opinion that the United States required greater conventional military forces and should build up its capacity

to counterpunch Soviet nonmilitary moves by nonmilitary means. However, on the question of a thermonuclear program his argument ran:

(1) If tests should prove thermonuclear weapons were not feasible (but nothing short of extensive testing could demonstrate this), the world probably would be better off.

(2) If thermonuclear reactions appeared likely to succeed, one would necessarily have to assume the Soviet Union was working in this area.

(3) Our work in the field would in all probability speed Soviet efforts.

(4) But for foreign policy and strategic reasons we could not permit the Soviets to forge ahead.

(5) Therefore, we should proceed to test feasibility.

With these two sets of views before him, and having in mind the general lines of argument that had been developed in a preliminary meeting of the Special Committee on December 22 and the several talks he had had with Lilienthal, Oppenheimer, and General Omar Bradley, Secretary Acheson pondered these matters over the Christmas weekend. He came to the conclusion that while we could hardly hold off feasibility testing, we must also reexamine our overall military posture with particular regard to the question of conventional forces.

In Defense, meanwhile, studies had been going forward belatedly on the possible military uses of thermonuclear weapons. These studies concluded that suitable targets would include (1) strategic airfields which could not be taken out by atomic weapons and (2) battlefield concentrations of enemy troops of divisional strength. Given the inability to deliver bombs with pinpoint accuracy, the larger yield of thermonuclear weapons would greatly increase the chances of knocking out specified targets.

During these weeks, Strauss, who did not appear to believe that the duly constituted machinery of decision-making would produce the results he espoused, was busy rallying support in other quarters. He spent considerable time bolstering the resolve of Secretary Johnson who was torn between his mandate to reduce military expenditures, on the one hand, and the prospect of a costly program of thermonuclear development, on the other. Temporarily, at least, Johnson's way out of the dilemma was to doubt whether the Soviet Union had really exploded a test atomic weapon.

Curiously enough, Strauss never pressed his argument with the Secretary of State or anyone else in the Department of State. Enlisting the help of Dr. E. O. Lawrence, Dr. Edward Teller, and other strong advocates of a "crash" program, Strauss urged Senator Brien McMahon, Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, to weigh in on the argument. The Senator sent a long, impassioned letter to the President urging an all-out program, and set about marshalling support from other members of his Committee. Characteristically, the President commented: "We'll answer Brien in due course, after we've made up our own minds." McMahon was given an interim reply that the matter was under active and urgent consideration in the executive branch.

The time was approaching to gather up the arguments. The General Advisory Committee had been fully heard. The Atomic Energy Commissioners had expressed their views severally. Defense had completed its studies and made up its mind. The Hill had been heard from. Others had had their say. State had done its homework.

After Secretary Acheson had reviewed the situation with Nitze, Fisher, and me, he asked me to draw up a summary paper which he as Chairman of the Special Committee could place before that body as its report to the President. The main points were:[5]

The central issue:

The question presented is whether the United States should undertake at this time an accelerated program to determine the feasibility of a thermonuclear weapon, should continue its research at the present rate, or should place a moratorium on further work in this field.

Impact on the atomic weapon program:

An all-out effort leading to both a feasibility test and quantity production of "supers" would seriously impair the efficiency and output of the fission bomb program, but there appear to be no advocates for [such an] effort. Technical studies of the Atomic Energy Commission indicate that an accelerated research and development program to test the feasibility of such a weapon (as distinguished from a quantity production program) would require time; that other weapon developments now under way, principally the lighter and smaller weapons aimed at improved deliverability by aircraft and guided missiles, could probably still be carried out, but not with the care and refinement originally planned; that this probable decrease in refinement would not be sufficiently important to serve as a deterrent to an accelerated effort on thermonuclear research and development. The important consideration from a military point of view appears to be that the most advantageous rate and scale of effort would be such as to produce a weapon for testing as soon as possible without significant impairment to the quantity output of fission weapons.

Prospects of success:

In the present state of knowledge, it appears that there is at least a 50-50 chance that a thermonuclear weapon will be feasible, but this cannot be determined except by actual test. It is estimated on the basis of technical studies made by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense that an accelerated program, including ordnance and carrier development, is within the capabilities of the United States from the point of view of money, materials, and industrial effort.

Relevance to military and foreign policy planning:

Knowledge as to whether the thermonuclear bomb is or is not feasible and knowledge as to its potentialities and limitations, if feasible, are of importance to military planning and foreign policy planning.

Stockpiling and use-policy:

It must be considered whether a decision to proceed with a program directed toward determining feasibility prejudges the more fundamental decisions: (a) as to

[5]Declassified at my request. Minor deletions have been made to omit certain data still classified. These deletions in no way alter the main lines of the argument or the final recommendations.

ERRATUM: Footnote 2, page 29, in the May JOURNAL should read "thermonuclear weapons."

whether, in the event that a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, such weapons should be stockpiled, or (b) if stockpiled, the conditions under which they might be used in war. If a test of a thermonuclear weapon proves successful, the pressures to produce and stockpile such weapons to be held for the same purposes for which fission bombs are then being held will be virtually irresistible.

Reassessment of US strategic plans and objectives:

The question of use-policy can be adequately assessed only as a part of a general reexamination of this country's strategic plans and its objectives in peace and war. Such reexamination would need to consider national policy not only with respect to possible thermonuclear weapons, but also with respect to fission weapons—viewed in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and the possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union. The moral, psychological, and political questions involved in this problem would need to be taken into account and be given due weight.

Examination of the Kennan position:

There is evidence which leads to the belief the Soviet Union prefers to put its chief reliance on winning the cold war rather than precipitating a hot war. There is also ground for the belief the Soviet Union would prefer not to use weapons of mass destruction except in the event of prior use by others. These assumptions might appear to argue for renunciation by the United States of work in the field of thermonuclear weapons. We cannot safely assume, however, that these hypotheses are correct. Even if they are correct, it cannot be assumed that the Soviet Union would forego development of this weapon any more than she has been willing to forego the development of the fission bomb. Sole possession by the Soviet Union of this weapon would cause severe damage not only to our military posture but also to our foreign policy position.

Likely Soviet reactions:

The theoretical possibilities of a thermonuclear reaction have long been known; as early as 1932 there were suggestions by Russian scientists and others that thermonuclear reactions might release enormous amounts of energy. The Soviet Union probably has felt it could not make any other assumption than that the United States is working on such a weapon, especially in view of the public discussion that has already taken place. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the Soviet Union will make an intensive effort to produce thermonuclear weapons. A decision to accelerate our program may cause the Soviet Union to increase the priority of these efforts. Knowledge by the USSR that we had successfully completed development of a thermonuclear weapon might have the effect of increasing the probability that the USSR would successfully develop a similar weapon. These are risks which are difficult to measure, but which we must frankly face up to if a decision is made to accelerate our development program. It does not appear likely that the character of United States military developments will have a decisive effect on Soviet military developments or be the cause of an arms race. The Soviet decision to reequip its armies and devote major energies to developing war potential, after the end of the war and at a time when we were disbanding our armies, was based on considerations more profound than our possession of the atomic weapon.

The problem of effective international control:

The possibility of the Russians' developing a thermonuclear weapon capability, added to their probable growing fission bomb capability, reemphasizes the importance of effective international control of the entire field of atomic energy. Even if we can find a new approach to the control of atomic energy which would be acceptable to us and to our allies, and which offers greater prospect than the UN plan of being negotiable with Russia, the necessary negotiations probably could not be completed in less than a year and a half to two years. But to delay an accelerated program of development for such a period in the absence of adequate assurance that work in the Soviet Union has been similarly delayed, would measurably increase the prospect of prior Soviet possession of thermonuclear weapons.

It has been suggested that a decision should be deferred until an approach has been made to the Soviet Union proposing that both nations forego work in the field of thermonuclear weapons. If such a proposal were coupled with a plan for the necessary safeguards to insure that the renunciation was in fact being carried out—these safeguards necessarily involving an opening up of Soviet territory—it is the view of the Department of State that the proposition would be unacceptable to the Soviet Union to the same degree that the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy is unacceptable. If not coupled with such safeguards, it is not believed that sufficient assurance would be gained from such an agreement to make it worthwhile.

The study concluded with the recommendations set forth earlier. On approval by Secretary Acheson it was sent to other members of the Committee and the secretariat on January 24, 1950.

Three days later came startling news. On January 27, Sir Derek Hoyar-Millar, the Counselor of the British Embassy who served as liaison with us on atomic energy matters, asked urgently to see the Undersecretary, Robert Murphy. This was clearly no run-of-the-mill matter, for if it had been he would have come to see me, entering my office with his customary greeting: "Any fresh horrors today?" This time he had his own to tell. Ashen of face, his usual casual aplomb quite collapsed, he told us Klaus Fuchs had that day admitted to espionage on behalf of the Soviet Union. His espionage had been targeted at our work at Los Alamos from 1942 through 1946, including the so-called "final" sessions on the state of our knowledge of thermonuclear phenomena in mid-summer of 1946. He had been an important contributor to those discussions.

When Sir Derek had finished, there was nothing to say. We all knew what a devastating blow this development was to free-world security and that it marked the end, certainly for the foreseeable future, of joint US-UK efforts to expand areas of cooperation in atomic energy activities.

The Fuchs matter was in the back of everyone's mind—but not dominant—as the Committee met in the old State-War-Navy building at 11:00 a.m. on January 31. Looking out on a lovely winter's day through the windows on the 17th Street side, Acheson was in the chair—flanked by Adrian Fisher and me. Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson and his aides, Undersecretary Stephen Early, General Burns, and Robert LeBaron,

were on the same side of the table. David Lilienthal was opposite, accompanied by Dr. Henry Smyth. The Executive Secretary of the Committee, Admiral Sidney Souers, and his Deputy, James Lay, were also present.

Rather wearily, I thought, Acheson opened the meeting. He pointed out that the members of the Committee had seen the staff papers that had been prepared and circulated and had had the benefit of an earlier meeting on the matter. Assuming no objection, he proposed, and it was agreed, that the State draft be accepted as the basis for discussion. Discussion centered on the recommendations to be made to the President.

In the course of the meeting Lilienthal made a strong plea for a fundamental reexamination of our entire military posture. A highly respected public servant, Lilienthal was now in his third major government assignment. He had previously served with the Public Utilities Commission in Wisconsin. He then became Chairman of the TVA. Now, reluctant armorer to the nation, when he took the chairmanship of the AEC he had high hopes for the peaceful atom: radioisotopes, constructive uses of atomic explosions, and nuclear power. In these hopes he was to be disappointed. In later years he ruefully concluded that the position of the AEC in relation to the Department of Defense was that of any other large contractor.

His plea for a fundamental reexamination of our security posture constituted flogging a dead horse. One of the recommendations of the Committee stipulated that: "the President direct the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to undertake a reexamination of our objectives in peace and war and of the effect of these objectives on our strategic plans, in the light of the probable fission bomb capability and possible thermonuclear bomb capability of the Soviet Union." What more did he want?

He also spoke of a new initiative with the Soviet Union—"A Pact for Human Survival"—renunciation by the United States of the H-bomb coupled with the opening of Soviet borders. Where had he been during the four years we had tried in the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to accomplish just this—on the basis of the brilliant Acheson-Lilienthal Report?

In the end, Lilienthal joined Acheson and Johnson in signing the agreed recommendations. The Committee adjourned at 12:30 p.m. The members—lost in thought—walked over to the White House.

A DECISION vital to the security of these United States and the free world had been taken in an orderly way by the officials duly constituted to do so, notwithstanding highly exaggerated accounts of the Oppenheimer-Teller squabbles and the importunations of Senator McMahon and Admiral Strauss.

The policy machinery of the National Security Council now moved into action. With Nitze and his Policy Planning Staff in State taking the laboring oar, the policy paper, NSC-68, was produced in less than six weeks. It called for a building up of "situations of strength" with which to confront the Soviet Union—anywhere in the world. More specifically, while urging further strengthening of our atomic arsenal, it strongly recommended a rapid build-up of conventional forces to handle situations short of all-out war. And that build-up began and was on its way before the Korean War broke out on June 25, 1950.[6]

On the thermonuclear front the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were pressing for all-out development of thermonuclear weapons including facilities for quantity production and the means of delivery. Again the Committee met and reported March 9, 1950, that Los Alamos was under maximum effort to test as soon as possible—the first test scheduled for the Spring of 1952. Its report concluded "There are no known additional steps which might be taken for the further acceleration of the test program."

As for production, the President declared H-bomb research to be "of the highest urgency" and directed the Commission to plan for quantity production. Construction of five additional plutonium-tritium reactors at Savannah River, Georgia, was the result.

An enterprise of this magnitude raised serious questions among some scientists, who were painfully aware how far existing concepts of a thermonuclear device were from a deliverable weapon. Oppenheimer had expressed his reservations earlier in a letter to Conant. "The miserable thing" probably could not be gotten to target "except by oxcart." The first test to contain thermonuclear elements, "Operation Greenhouse," took place in the Spring of 1951 on the Pacific atoll of Eniwetok. It was a start; a thermonuclear reaction was produced. Meanwhile, Dr. Teller—fired by some ideas of his associate, Dr. Ulam—made a brilliant scientific breakthrough. In the second test on November 1, 1952, "Operation Ivy," the test device, called "Mike," produced an explosion of 10 megatons (10,000,000 tons of TNT).

On August 8, 1953, less than a year after "Operation Ivy," Georgi M. Malenkov, Soviet Premier, uttered these ominous words, ". . . the United States of America has long since ceased to have a monopoly in the matter of the production of atomic bombs . . . *the United States has no monopoly in the production of the hydrogen bomb either.*"[7]

(*Continued on page* 43)

[6]A highly fortunate spin-off, indeed. While the question was raised several times whether atomic weapons should be used in Korea, the answer was always, "No." And primarily for two reasons: (1) conventional forces should be adequate and (2) there were really no suitable targets for atomic weapons. To use them ineffectually would seriously damage their deterrence value. As General Kenneth D. Nichols put it, to use a single atomic weapon against an inappropriate target would have the psychological effect of cutting our stockpile in half or worse. Today, the same arguments have been sensibly put forward with respect to the use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam.

[7]Emphasis supplied.

An Inspector's view of the Department of State's difficulties in adjusting traditional methods and values to a changing society.

Problems of the Foreign Service

RUFUS BURR SMITH

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Out of the welter of studies and criticisms of the performance of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, three major problems emerge. In essence, they concern the ability of the present organization to comprchend and analyze the diverse factors now changing the world environment, the effectiveness of senior officers as exccutives in giving leadership and direction to the many international activities conductcd by the United States and the efficiency with which the enlarged facilities and personnel of the Department are being utilized.

It must be recognized and appreciated that few organizations and professions have been subjected to greater or more rapid changes than the Department of State and the Foreign Service in the period since World War II.

Thus, it is to be anticipated that adjustments have lagged behind the dcmands, have been imperfect in their nature and have frequently failed to meet the standards set by informed critics. The resistance of some tradition-minded career officers who see in change a threat to their conventional wisdom, prestige and values has contributed to the lag.

The Intellectual Problem. The foreign relations of the United States are no longer limited to the traditional political, diplomatic and consular functions. Today, nearly every department and agency of the Federal Government is engaged to some extent in foreign relations and programs. The international environment in which foreign policy operates is being modified drastically and at an increasing pace by the impact of non-political activities. Satellite research, climate modification, desalinization, the multi-national corporation, birth control techniques, and improved seeds promise changes not only in the immediate activity of which they are a part, but also in underlying international political and economic relationships.

Many of these changes are influenced in their development, application and timing by the conscious decisions of the US Government transmitted via the programs of Defense, AID, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, HEW, ESSA, NASA, and other agencies. They comprise not only a vital part of US foreign policy but may be determinants, in the long run, of the success or failure of more immediate political objectivcs of the Department of State.

No more difficult or challenging intellectual problem exists than that of attempting to coordinate and unify these separate activities into a cohcrent foreign policy. It will never be done to full satisfaction, nor should an attempt be made to place an overall policy strait jacket around autonomous developments. At the same time, an understanding of the overall dynamics involved is essential to any long range foreign policy analysis, while control and direction of certain major elements constitute vital tools of diplomacy.

Responsibility for this task rests clearly with the Department of State. The 1961 directive of President Kennedy, subsequently strengthened by President Johnson placed responsibility on the Department of State for the coordination of overseas activities of major departments and agencies.

Viewed organizationally the changes, both in Washington and the field, have been substantial. Departmental staffs have been created to handle educational, cultural, scientific, labor, and population problems, for example. Additional coordinating machinery has bccn established through SIG, IRG, and the Country Director. Parallel developments have taken place abroad in the broadening of staffs to include labor, scientific, cultural and educational attaches and the expansion of economic and commercial functions. "Country Teams" have sought to bring together the staffs of independent agencies.

Nevertheless, the Department has, in two notable instances, refused to recognize its expanded responsibilities. As a consequence separate agencies to handle informational and economic assistance activities were formed outside of the Department. The rationale behind these refusals throws light on the problem of the intel-

lectual readiness of the career foreign service to comprehend present day problems. In both cases, the Department concluded that the activities proposed were operational and technical in character and therefore not suitable; and that the Department by continuing to make "foreign policy" would remain in control of the decision-making apparatus. This viewpoint continues to be advanced frequently to justify lack of concern and involvement in non-political international activities of other departments.

No case can be made for the assumption by the State Department of technical and professional problems in the international field that flow from the domestic responsibilities of other departments. Equally, it is the responsibility of State to bring such activities into its analysis of foreign policy and its direction of US activities abroad. This demands comprehension and breadth of outlook if not technical expertness.

At this point the intellectual problem of the foreign service comes clearly into focus. By tradition, training and experience, the typical foreign service officer is oriented narrowly to analysis and consideration of the immediate political factors in a foreign situation. Such officers staff the senior policy making positions of the Department, and dominate policy making. The newer functional staffs, mentioned above, are manned to a larger degree by non-foreign service personnel who lack prestige, and are tolerated in the Department rather than brought into the main stream. Much the same relationships exist abroad.

What are the characteristics and experience of these "political" officers who remain the core of the career service? Typically they have received a good general education but have done only limited graduate work. In their overseas assignments, the largest part of their experience has been concentrated on political matters of immediate concern. Terms of duty of from two to four years accentuate a short range outlook.

In Washington, positions on "country" desks are the assignments most sought. In these positions the spate of communications from overseas posts and of immediate operating demands almost entirely preempt an officer's time, leaving little for reading background or research material. Such officers commonly complain that they have no time to think. Successive Presidents have complained of the lack of new ideas emanating from the Department of State. Attempts to solve the problem of analysis by separate planning staffs contradict the basic dictum that planning cannot be effectively separated from the main flow of operations.

To broaden their experience, junior officers are now required to spend limited periods in their first assignment on economic, consular and administrative functions. The desirability of cross fertilization by service with the Defense Department, USIA and AID is recognized. However these efforts make but limited headway against the conviction of officers that the way to power and advancement is through the political channel. Assignments out of this main stream are avoided, while exposure to the important economic considerations in foreign policy is limited by the hesitancy of many officers to work in a field in which they do not feel academically qualified.

Thus the main effects of experience, advancement and individual reactions to the foreign service career are to continue to produce an intellectual emphasis on narrow political analysis rather than broad thinking on the overall problems of foreign relations. If this trend continues the result may well be to reduce the Foreign Service to the status of a technical political cadre in the foreign affairs field on a par with others specializing in such fields as finance, development, public affairs, labor and science. The need for broad integrative thinking will remain however, and will be more critical because of the failure of the Foreign Service. That this is no remote prospect is evident from the comments of many informed critics, inside and out of the service.

The Executive Problem. The crux of the capacity of any organization to adjust to change lies in the ability of its executive leadership. The Department of State and the Foreign Service have unusually heavy requirements for executives and suffer from peculiar limitations in the diffusion of international responsibility within the US Government.

These requirements have been analyzed in greatest depth in the position of the ambassador. All agree that the executive competence of the personal representative of the President of the United States abroad must be high if the multiple interests and organizations involved in US foreign affairs are to be effectively directed and coordinated.

A single example will suffice to illustrate this point. Guatemala is a typical moderate-sized post. In 1965, the following agencies had resident personnel—AID, USIA, Defense (both military attaches and a sizable military assistance staff), Peace Corps, Agriculture, Coast and Geodetic Survey and Bureau of Public Roads. The ambassador thus was concerned with political, military, economic, commercial, development assistance, agricultural, informational, educational, cultural, labor, youth and scientific policies and staff. Of the over 300 official US personnel in his country, about ten percent were employed by the Department of State. His executive role consumed more time than his diplomatic role, and the latter was dependent on his effectiveness as an executive. Despite President Kennedy's directive, coordination and unified direction of US policy and operations within a country remain serious problems.

Is the service training its officers to assume executive duties? At the time most officers reach executive rank they commonly lack both the experience and outlook necessary to effective performance of functions now falling under ambassadorial authority. Evidence of this is found in the high rate of failure of Deputy Chiefs of Mission to advance to ambassadorial rank. Too many,

faced with broad responsibility retreat into the confines of their past experience—political work.

Foreign service experience in the middle grades gives little training in the management of personnel, the allocation of resources, or other functions of executive management. Frequently an officer reaches senior grade with his executive experience limited to the direction of a secretary and a very few junior officers. A short course in executive management at such time is no adequate substitute for prior experience.

Although an attempt is being made to recognize executive ability in the promotion system, it is most difficult to identify without demonstration. The foreign service has no profit and loss statement to justify judgments. Its promotion and assignment system are in many respects antagonistic to the demonstration of executive ability. Reliance on subjective reports of superiors places a premium on the avoidance of negative comments. Yet of necessity a strong executive must solve problems, discipline staff and, on occasion differ with his superiors. Under the system the "good guys" who accept the conventional wisdom tend to be promoted; they do not necessarily make good executives.

Even more fundamental is the continuing failure of many senior officers to recognize that they are in fact executives. In his study, Dr. Chris Argyris of Yale University compared the problem-solving techniques and reactions of senior Foreign Service officers and business executives. He found that the approach to problems of the typical Foreign Service officer was characterized by indirection, compromise and avoidance of "rocking the boat" as contrasted with the more direct, open and forceful reactions of business executives.

The reactions of many Foreign Service officers to this study were most illuminating and entirely consistent with Dr. Argyris' thesis. They found solace in the fact that some other professions approached problems similarly, took heart from their claimed successes and criticized the professional value of the conferences conducted by Dr. Argyris. The basic thesis that senior Foreign Service officers *are* executives and must face the same problems of decision making in their jobs that confront corporate executives was avoided.

Unless executive performance is greatly strengthened, the Foreign Service may find senior positions increasingly filled by non-service appointees. More importantly, the public will continue to have reason to criticize leadership by individuals unable to command the tools now available, or to comprehend the forces at work in the international arena. To achieve such strengthening requires, as a beginning, improved recognition of the importance of characteristics necessary to leadership in the selection, training and promotion of officers.

The Management Problem. Repeatedly, the charge has been made that Presidents and Secretaries of State have failed to "get on top of the State Department." The professional leaders of the Foreign Service are aware that their capacity to meet obligations and to serve the White House and Congress is under attack yet the basic problems persist and lack of effective management remains a major unsolved problem. No one—the President, the Secretary of State, or the career officers of the Foreign Service—can manage the Department effectively in its present administrative condition. To attempt to do so would be like grasping fog.

The heart of the matter lies in the basic nature of the functions performed by the Department and the attitudes of its officers. The primary attention of the Secretary, his staff, and of the career officer is centered on *external* problems. Neither Secretaries of State or Foreign Service officers are selected for their management ability. Neither is much concerned with *internal* administration so long as the phones work and staff is provided. Short of a crisis breakdown, management is regarded as a secondary housekeeping problem to be dispensed with by substantive officers as quickly as possible.

This divorcement of the functional product from the management of the facilities necessary to produce it, while not unique, is exceptional. In the modern corporation, or in the Department of Defense, the relationship of management to product is direct and clearly identifiable. Perhaps the closest parallels to State's problems are in the academic and medical service fields in which management also is a perennial issue.

Since management activities have no clear professional relationship to their main interests the Foreign Service officer avoids them with determination. The newly appointed officer on his first assignment is forced to spend a few months on administrative duties. This is a chore to be endured. Later in his career, he may be required to serve for a limited time in a personnel assignment in the Department. He will seldom be exposed to other administrative duties until he becomes a Deputy Chief of Mission. At that point, through disinterest and inexperience he probably will rely on his administrative officer to the maximum extent possible to keep the house running.

Under these circumstances, management, or more properly "housekeeping," activities in the Department are delegated largely to the "administrators." Relegated to second class status, administrative functions have failed to attract first class officers. Few have entered through the highly selective process by which functional officers are chosen. Most are former clerks, civil service administrative personnel, ex-mid-grade military officers who were passed over for promotion or even ex-policemen. Most remain throughout their career in administrative functions.

Thus the separation of substantive functions from management is accentuated. The ability of administrative officers to relate their support activities to the performance of the primary duties of the Department is limited.

For twenty years, the Department and the Foreign Service have faced increasingly complex management problems with inadequate attention and with personnel who would not be considered of executive calibre in a smaller, stable organization. In the process, the career Foreign Service and the senior leadership of the Department have largely abdicated control over their own organization. Yet the obtaining of adequate budgetary resources, the direction of personnel, the control of communications remain as important to the effective functioning of the Department as to any other large organization, and failure to integrate decisions on such

(*Continued on page* 44)

A Poet in Thailand

WILLIAM A. SOMMERS

Khun Chang

I chased desire with all a fat man had,
nor did I blush or grovel in the ground
because my head shone in the sun; sad,
I did not win complete, yet did confound
the restless, vacant hold he left on her,
that peacock of the bed who sought delight
in taking love whenever chance concurred,
to flee before the day brought harder light.
My envy matched the progress of my lust:
I lied on him and wove a tale or two
that finally brought him prisoned in the dust.
I'd do again as much for love. Would you?

But now my gain is loss and so is his:
Two fools would rather spite than share what is.

Khun Phan

I took each moment, heedless, as it came:
She passed my novice door, I tossed my vow;
When arms called out, I fought to fame.
And then he tricked me in that well staged row.
I lost my love but never loved regret
and moved to other hearts and other wars.
Though he had won, he hated still and set
to kill our son. (An elephant should do more
than live the past.) I conjured spirits to save
the boy. The King, grown weary of our spite,
called stop. Her love again had me enslaved.
Emboldened, I pushed too far my right:

He ruled that she must choose or lose her head.
Regret unites us all: we love the dead.

The Poet of Muang Klaeng

Alone he might have watched the wind
skip foam across the blue-green sea
near Klaeng; yet calm would never be
for long, head spinning in the din
of patterns forming whole before
they found the pen. But quarrels, fights,
drinking to the wrong muse, flights
from out the royal rage and more,
did not confound his inborn gifts.
He crashed the gate of tinkle words,
demanding that his works be heard
as people spoke. And through the shifts
of fickle taste his sound rings true,
as does the man, Sunthorn Phu.

Pim

When he preached a way of hope through prayer,
my heart discounted creed. I only saw
a passion bright, a yearning free of care.
The world was then sunfettered, not raw,
as soon it came to be. He gave his heart
to each distraction. Each breast cloth
was a challenge, each war an ego's tart:
He saw himself the flame and I the moth.
Alone, left with his child, the second came
and made me truly what I had become.
I shared his bed. For him it was the same
as love; for me a prayerless world grown numb.

Now death has shown me what my life was of:
a cry of pity on the rack of love.

From Ted Olson

Washington Letter

TRADITIONALLY June is the month of roses, romance and commencements. The roses are doing very nicely this year, and romance seems to survive every vicissitude, though its folkways change bewilderingly. But at this writing the outlook for commencement looks somewhat precarious. We may see baccalaureate processions pacing between a double phalanx of National Guardsmen, and commencement speakers intoning the mandatory platitudes from behind missile-proof plexiglas.

If you've been wondering, as you read about Harvard, Cornell and other status institutions, whether Washington-area collegians had manned the barricades too, we can set your doubts at rest. They did. Strikes, demonstrations, sit-ins, ultimatums—American U., George Washington, Georgetown, Howard, Federal City College all had one or all of them. Happily no guns, and few bloodied pates.

Naturally, considering Washington's ethnic makeup, black studies programs are foremost among the demands. Here as elsewhere students are also insisting on more say in every phase of university affairs. Here as elsewhere they demand severance of any link with "the military-industrial complex."

In Washington that hits not only the ROTC but Pentagon think-factories operating under university auspices. The Human Resources Research Office at George Washington and the Center for Research in Social Systems at American have both lost their campus cover—or operational base, if you prefer. HUMRRO severed its ties with GWU earlier and is continuing as a private non-profit corporation — same place, same staff, same work. Though the disclosure that AU and CRESS were parting company followed SDS seizure of the president's office, the University says the separation had been under consideration for some time. AU is no longer sponsoring non-publishable research, and CRESS work—most of it, anyway—is classified. The Foreign Area Studies Program (FASP) has decided its country reports need no security stamp, and will probably remain at the university.

Two other Pentagon-financed projects at GWU are continuing, despite SDS demands that they be terminated. They are the Sino-Soviet Institute and the Navy Logistics Research Project.

Quite a few of you may be familiar with one or all of these programs. CRESS used to be known as the Special Operations Research Office (SORO); it changed its name after one of our Ambassadors discovered it was conducting social studies in his country without his knowledge or approval, and made an understandable fuss about it.

Whatever you call it—dissent, protest or revolution—the unruliness of the young has become Topic A at any gathering of more than two people. It's hard to believe that only yesterday (in the perspective of somebody well over 30) we were deploring the political apathy of the college generation, its preoccupation with job security and early retirement, its refusal to make commitments. As between docility and pugnacity, abstention and confrontation, one is impelled to opt for the latter. But does the polarization (this year's fashionable word) have to be so complete? More and more persons, by no means reactionary, are remarking on the frightening similarity between the behavior of some of these young folk and that of young Germans in the late 20s and early 30s.

3 Bdrs., 2 Bths., Fully Air-Cond.

A friend wrote in recently to request some small assistance in finding quarters when he returns for a Washington assignment. His letter, and the research involved in answering it, started us reflecting anew on the problem every Foreign Servant faces sooner or later, and perhaps several times in his career: where to live while on stateside duty?

The definitive treatise on the subject appeared in the JOURNAL's issue of May, 1967—Si Nadler's "Buying a House You Can Live With, as Well as In, Without Having to Start Taking Your Lunch to Work in a Little Brown Bag." (Nobody but Si could think up a title like that.) If you didn't file that issue, look it up; it has most of the answers. The notes that follow assume as given the basic truths that Mr. Nadler expounded; here we merely offer a few of the findings and observations, as of May, 1969, that we relayed to our friend.

Prices vary roughly in inverse ratio to distance from the middle of things. A few figures from the Saturday real estate sections—three-bedroom houses—are illustrative:

Westmoreland Hills—$46,500
Chevy Chase—$38,750
"Close-in Fairfax"—low 40's
St. Charles, Md.—from $21,300
Dale City, Va.—$21,930 up

Of course those are asking prices. The owners might take less.

The bargain ads tend to play up monthly payments—"as low as $162." (Our friend, working through a higher bracket, encountered figures ranging from $228 to $290.) The promise of "7 percent mortgages available—no closing costs" appears frequently. (Our friend had been "a little discouraged by the high prices and even higher rates of interest—7¾ percent and 8 percent seems to be normal." Happily, he found that existing trusts could be taken over at considerably lower charges.)

Some of those way-out ads look enticing, but one caution is in order: read the fine print. If the directions for getting there run to six or seven lines—e.g., "From Capital Beltway, take Exit 26 North (Rte. 313 toward Hooperstown), continue to Rte. 197, left 7 miles to Plimpton's Mill, right uphill to red mailbox, left ¼ mile to house"—you may want to think twice. Anyway, better do a couple of trial runs, in rush-hour traffic, before you sign anything. Also find out about parking facilities, and costs, near your office.

Still, if your spirit parches when deprived of space, greenery and the challenge of crabgrass, the morning-and-evening safari may prove worth the price. A friend of ours, now retired, swears that what kept him sane during a long stint in the Department was a scrap of land out on the Leesburg road, where he grew gladioli. Made money at it, too.

If you're all thumbs and none of them is green you may prefer the convenience of an apartment. Here again distance is a factor in price. It's very pleasant to be five minutes from work: set the alarm for 8:15 and stroll into the office, shaved, coffee-and-toasted, and smug, punctually at

8:45. But it costs money. Columbia Plaza, a biscuit-toss from New State, asks $450 for a three-bedroom apartment, $321 to $386 for two bedrooms. Of course you can find more modest addresses, but you must expect to pay $250 upward—mostly up.

Finally, a couple of caveats for home-buyers:

Try to outguess the freeway builders. We know a family who sit quaking in their Virginia home, aware that if ever the Three Sisters bridge is built it will disgorge a torrent of traffic practically into their back yard.

Try to visualize your prospective home at every season of Washington's capricious climate. How will it look after one of those Big Storms? How many yards of driveway will you have to shovel? Will that hilltop view lose some of its enchantment the morning you step out onto a glaze of ice and toboggan down to the street on your fundament?

If all this discourages you, reflect that nobody is entirely exempt from housing problems. The WALL STREET JOURNAL disclosed recently that the roof leaks into Watergate's penthouses —even on Mrs. Chennault.

New Constitution for Virginia, Too

Virginia, like Maryland, has been overhauling an over-age constitution. The new charter draft goes to voters in 1970 (Marylanders will ballot on theirs next fall). The POST describes it as "one of the most advanced" anywhere in the nation. Among other things it reasserts—in Jefferson's own words—the responsibility of government to provide education of high quality to "every eligible child of appropriate age," and puts an end to the ingenious devices by which earlier state administrations tried to circumvent the school desegregation decision of 1954.

Of special interest to FS homeseekers is the provision lowering the residence requirement for voting to six months, and empowering the Assembly to lower it even further for presidential elections.

Both states, however, rejected proposals to lower the voting age. It's still 21.

P.S.—Montgomery Taxes Up Again

We hate to bring bad news, but there seems to be so much more of it. The Montgomery County Council has increased the property tax rate by 7 cents—on a $27,500 house that figures out at $11.55 more a year—and the income tax by 10 percentage points. Even so, there have been heavy cuts in school expansion plans.

Reader's Guide

Three on Cuba: HARPER'S, April—"Castro's Cuba: Drums, Guns and the New Man," by John Corry. New York TIMES MAGAZINE, March 30 — "We Should Start Talking With Castro," by John Plank. SATURDAY REVIEW, May 3—"The Price of Achievement Under Castro," by Paul Kidd (a review of Herbert L. Matthews's "Fidel Castro.")

ATLANTIC, May—"The Road Back to Internationalism," by Harlan Cleveland. Multilateral diplomacy as the alternative to withdrawal and anti-commitment. "Secrets of the Nazi Archives," by David Kahn. How we recovered them; how historians are using them.

WASHINGTON MONTHLY, May — "The Missing Ambassador," by James C. Thomson, Jr. The author, who used to work in the Department, thinks we need an Ambassador in Peking to stimulate fresh thinking on China.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April—"The Green Revolution: Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" by Clifton R. Wharton, Jr. The promise and the possible dangers of increased food production in impoverished lands.

ODDMENTS

• Two days after city-planner Edward Logue reminded AFSA that Reston residents had no access to the Dulles airport road, the FAA announced that they were going to get it. Not much help to commuters, though. They still can't enter Washington-bound lanes; if they're headed for the office they have to drive to the airport and then double back.

• Without waiting for the FCC to act, Washington's WTOP/TV has dropped all cigarette advertising, except for a few contracts that do not expire until September 1. One estimate sets the possible revenue loss at $700,000.

• For sale, cheap: one roller-coaster and other equipment. Glen Echo Amusement Park has gone out of business after 66 years. Blame changing tastes in entertainment, and a spot of racial trouble a few years ago.

• That Peter Hurd portrait—the one Lyndon Johnson didn't want—is now hanging in the Johnson room at the National Portrait Gallery.

• The ABCD signs are coming off downtown mail boxes, and along with them the assurance that if you "put it here by 11 a.m.," the P.O. service will "get it there by 3 p.m." Costs too much, the official spokesman explains, and occupies too many clerks who might be doing something else. The other postoffice acronym, ZIP, is still going strong.

• Window-sign at Rinaldi & Sons, cleaners, 1730 Pennsylvania:

We invite you to join THE ELITE
We do work for the NOBLEST
The White House
The Blair House
The State Department
Members of the Cabinet
Jergensen's Redskins
the Wash Senators

(But not, they're complaining at 1750 and 1776, for USIA, apparently.)

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

by S. I. Nadler

"Workers take over factories. Students take over universities. It's time we FSSs began taking over embassies!"

Second Secretary James Bond

WHO says the diplomatic profession doesn't get its share of fictional glamorizing?

In this 60¢ paperback novel we join James Retief, newly promoted and assigned as Second Secretary to the diplomatic mission in Quopp. Our hero quickly discovers that his ambitious chief, Ambassador Longspoon, aided and abetted by the dim-witted defense attaché, Colonel Underknuckle, is encouraging the formation of a meaningful central government in tribal-oriented Quopp by helping the ambitious Voion tribe to attain a clear technological and organizational superiority over the others. Such a development would, in the Ambassador's eyes, not only improve the lot of the Quoppina (the inhabitants of Quopp) but would improve the Ambassador's own lot by multiplying the personnel of the operating agencies on his Country Team and hence enlarging his bureaucratic empire.

But Prime Minister Ikk, the Voion leader, has a trick or two up his sleeve, and the Opposition's subversive agencies are involved to such an extent that Ambassador Longspoon finds himself in the role of a Frankenstein. Just to complicate things, the Voion turn on Retief's private businessmen fellow-citizens on Quopp, and a pleasure yacht full of beautiful girls is wrecked somewhere in the jungle.

Like a hesitant James Bond, Retief outwits and outdares his opponents through a siege of the Embassy, a civil war in which he rallies the anarchic tribes to unite against their common enemy, a final peace conference, and an Embassy ball.

It all sounds too good to be true, doesn't it? It is too good to be true. Retief lives in the 27th Century, he is an officer of the Corps Diplomatique Terrestrienne, Quopp is a planet, and the Quoppina are wheeled insects.

Retief's various adventures are not entirely unfamiliar to us, though. For example: "That's the trouble with uplifting the masses; they get to believing it themselves."

When some of the locals query Retief as to the motive of his Embassy in promoting various half-baked schemes of social reform, Retief tells them that the nasty Groaci (the Reds of the 27th Century) started it, and "Of course no self-respecting diplomat could let the challenge pass without making an effort to out-enlighten the opposition. Whatever the Groaci do, we have to do bigger."

"Why?"

"Why does a golfer have to hit the golf ball? Such is the challenge of diplomacy."

Or when Retief tells First Secretary Magnan that Prime Minister Ikk's new legislature is full of Ikk's senile uncles, Magnan replies, "Yours is a distorted view of the evolution of representative government here on Quopp. Closer attention to your Daily Bulletin from the Bird's Nest would go far toward homogenizing your thinking on the subject."

"I thought that was something they did to milk."

"The term refers to voluntary alignment of viewpoint toward a group-oriented polarity; a sort of linkage of moral horsepower for maximal thrust toward the objective."

The book is full of such gems. Can it be that the author has served in the Foreign Service? Or perhaps a close relative. . .?

Readers who want the full flavor of Retief's struggle to the middle ranks of his chosen profession will wish to begin with "Galactic Diplomat," a collection of short stories, and work on to our hero's latest exploits as recounted in "Retief's War."

—JOHN W. BOWLING

GALACTIC DIPLOMAT, *by Keith Laumer, X-1240, Berkeley Medallion Books, $.60.*
RETIEF'S WAR, *by Keith Laumer, X-1427, Berkeley Medallion Books, $.60.*

African Dilemmas

WHILE these three books have little in common in an obvious sense, they all reflect aspects of Africa's current problems. Gray Cowan in "The Dilemmas of African Independence," a revision of an earlier survey, summarizes in 80 pages the political and economic problems facing the new African nations. An additional 80 pages contains supporting social, economic and political statistics. This is a neat and tidy primer by a knowledgeable Africanist from Columbia. It contains nothing new for the expert, but it gives the uninitiated a balanced introduction to the continent's current prospects.

Rosalynde Ainslie surveys one particular facet of Africa in "The Press in Africa: Communications Past and Present." A journalist herself with southern and French African experience, her thesis is clear: Africa is still struggling to free itself from the predominance of foreign press, radio and television. Caught between the theoretical desirability of having free communications and the practical necessity of using these media for national purposes, most African countries have been driven to try to control the dissemination of information reaching their people. Absence of good communications and trained journalists, and the continued dependence on foreign sources for finance and news material, make consistent policy on this issue impossible. Miss Ainslie's survey of sub-Sahara and southern African past and present news media was completed three years ago and is already dated. Her definition of the underlying problem is still relevant.

Ndaboningi Sithole's autobiography and commentary, "African Socialism," is a very personal view of African events. A Rhodesian nationalist, espousing a blend of Christianity and socialism, he describes the dilemmas of black aspirations in a firmly dominated white society. A decade ago when he wrote the first edition, Sithole was a moderate among African nationalists. A decade later, although in detention in Rhodesia, he is essentially unchanged. His story is still moving. His proposals are still moderate. But expectation for their fulfillment can hardly be considered promising.

—FRED L. HADSEL

THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE, *by L. Gary Cowan. Walker & Co., $5.95.*
THE PRESS IN AFRICA: *Communications, Past and Present, by Rosalynde Ainslie. Walker and Co., $7.50.*
AFRICAN SOCIALISM, *by Ndaboningi Sithole. Oxford Press, $5.00.*

Moral Force

SEVERAL months ago I reviewed for the JOURNAL a book by Paul Ramsey on the relationship between morals and the use of force. William V. O'Brien, a professor at Georgetown University, has written a similar book, which is both briefer and more easily read.

Professor O'Brien starts from the assumption that the use of force in self-defense and in revolution is both a reality and moral. He believes, therefore, that we cannot fail to think about how force should be used. This leads him into a hard-headed examination of such contemporary prob-

lems as deterrence of nuclear war, the prospects for arms control, and revolutionary war and intervention.

While his presentation is generally fairly straightforward, Professor O'Brien does not shrink from making controversial statements. To quote just one example, in discussing the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, he says, "If . . . the NATO states are not prepared to meet (a Soviet attack) with conventional means, as they are perfectly capable of doing if they make the necessary plans, preparations, and sacrifices, then the first post-1945 nuclear war is, in my view, too high a price for the defense of an area which has been criminally remiss in not making adequate conventional defensive plans and preparations."

If you are one of the diminishing tribe still interested in thinking about—rather than just condemning—the use of force, you could do worse than read this book.

—JOHN C. AUSLAND

WAR AND/OR SURVIVAL, *by William V. O'Brien. Doubleday, $5.95.*

The Role of Violence

IN the present state of our world we need no one to tell us that violence is here to stay and we owe it to ourselves to better understand violence and terrorism. This volume can be of help. The first few chapters, relating to violence in regard to resistance, war, punishment, authority, power and force, provide an excellent review of the historical use of terror and its results. Linked with the last chapter on counter-resistance they form a short primer for the hurried reader.

The bulk of the book, however, concentrates on the specific role of terror in African tribal societies and particularly that practised by the Zulus and their despotic leader, Shaka. Considering the great shock experienced by many Americans—and some Foreign Service personnel—when the "great experiment" of Nigerian unity erupted into bloody tribal conflict, any solid reading on African tribal violence is useful and important. This detailed study of the harrowing but practical role of violence in a primitive society helps to clarify certain aspects of modern Africa too often clouded by the inability of Africa's well meaning friends to accept the role of violence in her culture.

One note of irritation: the book jacket leads the reader to believe that he is picking up a book on modern terror and resistance. It is only on the inside title page that one finds, in smaller print, the sub-head "With Case Studies of Some Primitive African Communities." Considering that

". . . the first post-1945 nuclear war is, in my view, too high a price for the defense of an area which has been criminally remiss . . ."

these case studies make up the bulk of the text such a presentation smacks of promotional expediency.

—HOWARD R. SIMPSON

TERROR AND RESISTANCE: *A Study of Political Violence by E. V. Walter. Oxford University Press, $8.50.*

A Timely Explanation

INDIVIDUALS occasionally surface in various foreign services who are head and shoulders above their colleagues. Recent examples that come to mind are Livingston Merchant of the American Foreign Service and Jules Leger of the Canadian Foreign Service. One of the Finnish counterparts of these two extraordinarily talented individuals is Max Jakobson, a statesman of comparable stature and ability. He is at present Finland's Permanent Representative to the United Nations and represents Finland on the Security Council. His book regarding Finnish foreign policy and Finnish neutrality is the forthright and perceptive account the reader has every right to expect from such an author.

The general lack of knowledge as well as the numerous misconceptions concerning Finland and Finland's relations with other countries, require correction particularly at this time when Finland is beginning its term as a member of the Security Council. This comparatively short book (110 pages) objectively and accurately describes Finland's status as an independent sovereign western democracy, its policy of neutrality and non-involvement in the conflicts of the great powers and its intention as a member of the Security Council to support the principles of the United Nations in the same manner it has since it became a member in 1955.

Ambassador Jakobson's handling of the evolution of Finland's policy of neutrality in the post-war period, the crises of 1958 and 1961-1962 with the Soviet Union, its associate membership in the European Free Trade Area, and its role in the United Nations, are based on intimate familiarity with these events and with most of the principal figures involved. His book can be considered in itself a primary source of diplomatic history. A fascinating account of the winter war between Finland and the Soviet Union is contained in his earlier book, "The Diplomacy of the Winter War."

His current book is not a translation, but was written in English. The facts about Finland contained in it are essential to an understanding of Europe and yet are known to few people who have not actually lived in Finland.

—TYLER THOMPSON

FINNISH NEUTRALITY, *by Max Jakobson. Praeger, $5.95.*

Ambivalent Kiwis

MAN-AND-WIFE writing team James and Margaret Rowe have given us a brief (but adequate) survey of New Zealand to meet the growing need for up-to-date references on South Pacific areas.

Being native New Zealanders has not inhibited the Rowes in writing frankly when describing Kiwi attitudes on any subject.

A sample:

"The prospect of greatly increased numbers of overseas visitors is not regarded generally with pleasure although their foreign currency would be very acceptable."

Another:

"The present General Assembly Library is an awe-inspiring example of Gothic run wild, and deserves to be preserved if only as a warning to future generations."

Despite its brevity (less than 200 pages), this volume gives the reader a candid picture of the "regulated" (welfare) state, the racial (Maori) situation, and assorted economic problems. There are, of course, the usual surveys of history, culture, and so on.

The last chapter, appropriately entitled "Ambivalent Internationalism," is the most relevant to an understanding of where New Zealand stands in today's complex world. This section is not just a script of the country's effort to maintain its British ties while edging closer to Australia and the US. It also depicts the New Zealander who rates his country's scenic beauty as second to none—but who, at the same time, is probably the world's greatest international traveler.

Here, too, is the citizen who readily admits his country's needs for more and better industries, but who is fearful of large scale foreign investment. Finally, here is a land—once secure in its insularity—that now realizes (it has troops in Vietnam) the smallness of the globe—and that with this realization must come a greater sharing of its problems.

Excellent photographs, maps, bibliography, and an index combine to make this new work a useful addition to the Kiwi bookshelf.

—JAMES O. MAYS

NEW ZEALAND, *by James W. and Margaret A. Rowe. Praeger, $6.50.*

Insight into the European Community

THERE is a pronounced tendency on the part of some Americans to be conceptual and prescriptive about the affairs of other countries and other continents. This has been peculiarly true of the attitudes of some toward Western Europe. While disclaiming any intention of telling other people how to manage their affairs, the American Europeanist (a very good Europeanist indeed) has had precise ideas about how and when and for what purpose Western Europe should organize itself. We can all think of examples. I suppose that George Ball would be near the top of everybody's list. The passages on Europe in his book "The Discipline of Power" are illuminating—about Mr. Ball's thinking but unfortunately not about Europe itself.

"Anatomy of Europe" by Anthony Sampson is in sharp and refreshing contrast to this approach. Mr. Sampson, in this highly informative and lucidly written account, approaches Europe (he means the Six of the European Community plus Britain) not with "any particular preconception, but rather as an enquiring traveler." In introductory chapters, Sampson outlines the different ideas about Europe and its future of three men, Jean Monnet, Charles de Gaulle, and Franz-Joseph Strauss, and briefly describes the European organizations, particularly the European Community. He then proceeds to his central purpose, a factual description of the main trends in Europe today. He writes about the land and agriculture, energy sources, corporations and the multi-national company, cars, bankers, technology, Euro-Americans, defense, consumers, tourists, transport, languages, press, television, films, workers, students, politics, and politicians.

Sampson, in all this descriptive material, does not lose sight of the bigger problems. He provides some interesting and provocative insights. Here are a few examples:

—Unlike Servan-Schreiber, Sampson does not believe that the so-called American challenge will necessarily stimulate a European response, forcing companies and countries to come together. On the contrary, the giant American corporations, by luring European companies to collaborate with them, and not with each other, can be more divisive than unifying.

—The preoccupation with the American challenge of the past few years may diminish: first, because the technology battles in certain fields have already been lost by the Europeans, at least for the immediate future; second, and more important, because the American political dream shows signs of losing its splendor. Thus, while Europeans may look Westward for their technology, America may look to Europe for political ideas.

—In their search for ways of unifying the continent, Europeans have recently been preoccupied with the giant companies, joint technology, and international finance. But in none of these economic fields does a purely European movement at present make much sense.

—"To anyone who feels tempted to generalize about 'the Europeans,' it is a useful corrective to glance at a stall-full of European newspapers with their parochial headlines and loyalties, their introverted presuppositions, and their language-puzzles."

—"The assumption over the last twenty years that the ideologies were dying, and that the Western countries were all gravitating toward the same kind of 'post-industrial society,' now seems much less convincing."

Sampson ends his book with some speculative thoughts on the possibilities of a new and different kind of regionalism in Europe, based on local loyalties, and a strong expression on his conviction that Britain should join Europe when the issue again becomes relevant.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

ANATOMY OF EUROPE, *by Anthony Sampson. Harper & Row, $7.95.*

Her Majesty's Government

THE value of this admirable work on "The Government of Modern Britain" lies in its comprehensive up-to-dateness, practicality, and informed good sense. Senior Lecturer in Government at the University College of Swansea in Wales, the author writes about major developments in the British political system since 1945, complete with careful documentation, helpful chapter summaries and bibliographies. Although essentially a guide for British students, the book should interest anyone who seeks a reliable guide to what has happened or is being discussed in the field of British government, much of it highly fluid, controversial, and unsettled. Mr. Stacey does full justice to a large number of critics and reformers of the traditional system, without always agreeing with them. He discusses suggested electoral reforms and various changes in voting procedures and habits; the role functions of Commons and Lords today; the political parties, the civil service, and administration; the influence of public opinion polls, pressure groups, and the place of the Omsbudsman; specialist committees, and many other aspects of political decision-making, communication, and the results. Stacey handles his subject well, he is thorough, probing, and stimulating, and, in the end, he is sanguine about the future.

—ALBERT E. IRVING

THE GOVERNMENT OF MODERN BRITAIN, *by Frank Stacey. Oxford University Press, 45 shillings.*

"Well, it's just not my idea of the thing to do on a honeymoon in Venice, that's all."

Another Look at Churchill

HERE is Churchill exposed in a book without an editor. Instead the foreword tells us that, "The Publishers . . . see 'Churchill Revised' as a necessary complement to the existing literature. They have assembled four eminent historians and a distinguised psychiatrist. . . ." etc., (two Oxford and three Cambridge men) to tell us how it was. Thus by implication we are informed that it has been all roses for Winston up to now when the truth will out.

Yet the book is not entirely a hatchet job. Since all of the contributors are brilliant, provocative men with a vigorous command of the Queen's English, the essays are immensely readable. In all, attention is centered on the darker, more devious side of Churchill's character, how it affected his judgment and actions; yet somehow one knew all those warts and weaknesses were there.

Perhaps the most original and controversial essay, "The Man," is by Dr. Anthony Storr who wrote "Human Aggression," Atheneum, 1968. The four other writers judge Churchill separately as a statesman, a politician, a historian, and a military strategist. Recommended for quick, stimulating reading.

—LUREE MILLER

CHURCHILL REVISED, *by A.J.P. Taylor, Robert Rhodes James, J.H. Plumb, Basil Liddell Hart, and Anthony Storr. The Dial Press, $5.95.*

The Book of London

THIS is the kind of presentation volume that bright young British diplomats will presumably be sending to their more prestigious and/or helpful contacts. Americans who could conceivably fall into one of those two categories might wish to take a Britisher to lunch, with just that possibility in mind. If that fails, one might even purchase a copy because, at $14.95, the price of this handsome volume, containing more than 300 pages of eye-filling photographs, is not unreasonable. You might even give a copy to a loved one at Christmas, especially if the loved one is you.

Iain Macmillan is one of those rare photographers who seems to demonstrate equal talent in depicting architectural splendors and ordinary human faces, the more ordinary the better. Some of the colo(u)r photographs, in particular, are breathtaking and the occasional shots of streets dampened by rain are sure to produce instant nostalgia in the hearts of all of us who once lived or worked in Grosvenor Square. One caution, however; these photographs were made in London, by and for Londoners. Accordingly, they may not convey more than a pallid impression of that city to those who have not lived there for the requisite length of time. Moreover, there is virtually no text and the picture captions are uninspiring, not very informative and rather bureaucratic in style. However, for those who have trudged London's streets in fog, or better still in the wartime blackouts, Macmillan's vivid camera artistry will evoke an acute renascence of "the pain, the calm, and the astonishment" of their earlier love affair with the city.

—EDWARD L. KILLHAM

THE BOOK OF LONDON, *by Roger Baker, author, Iain Macmillan, photographer. Taplinger, $14.95.*

New Word for the Lexicon

SERIOUS concern over the influence of the US military establishment in foreign policy decisions and of the political weight of the "military-industrial complex" within the country has been expressed by numerous thoughtful Americans from President Eisenhower to Senator Fulbright. Juan Bosch, who has never regarded the Pentagon as being on the side of the angels, has attempted to construct a theoretical framework to analyze the military-industrial influence in the United States and to describe its effect both on Americans and on other peoples of the world.

But if Bosch selects his targets well, his choice of weapons is rather disappointing. His thesis, basically, is that the United States operates on an economy permanently geared to making war and that its "pentagonized" society has come to accept the waste of men and material abroad, a process which keeps the economy going. Bosch's model, although interesting, is shakily constructed, and his scholarship is slipshod. He constantly leaps to unfounded conclusions, considering, for example, that the "proof" of his thesis is the fact that military-related expenditures are higher in the federal budget than civilian-related expenditures.

In many ways, Bosch does discredit to his own case by offering an argument so vulnerable to attack. It would be a great mistake, however, not to take this book seriously, because it is likely to find widespread acceptance in the underdeveloped world. Also, Bosch has probably added a word to the political lexicon.

—AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

PENTAGONISM, A SUBSTITUTE FOR IMPERIALISM, *by Juan Bosch. Grove Press, $5.00.*

The Forced Brain Drain

COMMUNIST CHINA'S rapid strides toward a nuclear-missile capacity have been due, in considerable degree, to indispensable assistance from the United States and the Soviet Union.

American assistance was, of course, inadvertently given.

How in the early 1950s some 80 talented Chinese scientists, students and teachers in our most prestigious universities, were humiliated, hounded out of their positions and driven back to Communist China there to provide the expertise in nuclear physics, metals, and aerodynamics crucially needed for the manufacture of atomic and hydrogen bombs and their delivery systems is told in detail by two senior AP correspondents in a carefully researched and absorbing book.

They recount the obtuse, heavy-handed treatment "security" investigators gave Tsien Hsue-shen, former Goddard Professor of Aeronautics at Caltech (now a leading rocket expert in China), and Chao Chung-yao, another Caltech alumnus (now Deputy Director of China's Institute for Atomic Energy), as well as what these two scientists have contributed to the Chinese atomic program.

A readable complement to this report on China's atomic developments is a concise account of political and economic events in Mao's China during the past decade and especially during the convulsions of the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution."

The enormous, irreparable damage "McCarthyism" did to America's good name abroad is well, and sadly, known to the Foreign Service; the incalculable harm it did to US national security is responsibly set forth in "The China Cloud."

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

THE CHINA CLOUD, *by William L. Ryan and Sam Summerlin. Little, Brown, $7.95.*

For the Graduate Student

THE third edition of the "Annual Guide to Graduate Study," edited and published in Princeton, N.J., by Mr. and Mrs. Peter Hegener, is intended primarily for advisers of potential graduate students. To help widen the range of choice among degree-granting professional schools and universities, the "Guide" now lists some 13,000 programs in ten disciplines. Given the often pitifully meager information on which most college seniors select a graduate school, any addition is an improvement. Unfortunately, fewer than 900 of the listings contain much beyond number of de-

grees recently conferred, and even the more informative full-page listings (written by a current faculty member of each department) do not answer any but the most general questions. However, the volumes of the 1969 edition (one for each of the ten disciplines covered) contain additional useful, detailed information: a statement on accreditation of graduate institutions prepared by the American Council on Education, a list of professional associations, and publications of interest to the student who may be considering graduate school. The last include, generously, other more selective guides which may be more helpful if not as up-to-date. For those who are looking for a less turbulent academe than, say, Berkeley, Harvard or Columbia, the "Guide" can offer unexpected possibilities. It is available for use in the office of Mr. Clarke Slade, Educational Consultant to the Foreign Service.

—Hope M. Meyers

Annual Guide to Graduate Study, *edited by Karen C. Hegener. Peterson's Guides, Inc., $55.00. (Individual volumes priced from $3.50 to $10.00.)*

The Core of Asia's Problem

This collection of essays on Asian and Australian population problems derives from an international youth seminar held at Melbourne in 1963, which revealed the need for a scholarly survey of this subject for both the expert and the lay reader. The editor, who is currently India's Minister of Family Planning and a persuasive advocate of voluntary sterilization, contributed a general chapter plus chapters on India and China. Other specialists contributed studies on Japan, Indonesia, Pakistan, Taiwan, Malaysia and three chapters on Australia, with one explaining its immigration policy and another proposing to make it somewhat less restrictive.

The chapters on China and Taiwan are perhaps the most interesting, in spite of the dearth of reliable population data on the former. Chandrasekhar, after noting that China's traditional desire for expansion, Communist ideology and population pressure are an alarming combination, concludes that China's population is Asia's problem. Taiwan is interesting as a rare example of an underdeveloped country having excellent demographic statistics and as one in which there has been a sharp decrease in fertility rates in recent years. The book warns against counting too strongly on that trend continuing.

The magnitude of the birth rate problem in some countries is illustrated by Anwar Iqbal Quereshi's statement that a main goal of the third Five Year Plan in Pakistan is to bring the birth rate down from an incredible 55 per 1,000 to 45. This compares with current rates of about 40 in India and China and 18 in the United States. Although a fairly high death rate acts as a check on growth, Pakistan's population is nevertheless increasing at the rate of about 2.6 to 2.8 per cent per annum, meaning that it doubles about every 24 years. As underdeveloped countries go, this is by no means a record rate (Egypt's is 3 percent and Malaya's is 3.2).

The book is a useful survey and reference volume, although its value as a source book is lessened by the fact that the statistics given by one contributor sometimes do not match those given by another. It is not light reading, but neither is it too technical nor so full of economics as to be unintelligible. Recommended reading for the Asian specialist.

—R. B. Parker

Asia's Population Problems, *edited by S. Chandrasekhar. Praeger, $8.50.*

Fortress America

The central theme of Professor Tucker's book seems to be that US policy makers have been leading us toward imperialistic goals ever since the Truman Doctrine was formulated. The argument proceeds from an assumption that protection of Western Europe from Communist encroachment was and is necessary and sensible, whereas extension of that same protection further eastward was and is neither necessary nor sensible. The author carries this several steps further and questions all overseas commitments, because he believes our physical security may be "no longer dependent on what transpires outside the North American continent."

Turning his neo-isolationist analysis to Asia, the author assures us that expansion of Communist Chinese influence in the south "cannot by itself decisively affect the Asian, let alone the world balance of power." As for China and the bomb, nuclear proliferation in Asia "is perhaps the one prospect for creating an indigenous Asian balance of power, a balance that would clearly permit us to divest ourselves of our great responsibilities in that region."

The US is termed imperialistic because of its "overweening sense of purpose." My dictionary defines empire as "supreme power in governing . . . supreme control . . . absolute sway," and I don't think our leaders have such illusions. The author seems to believe we are omnipotent now, and he calls the 1940s a time when an imbalance of power could have threatened our physical security. Since we had the atom bomb then and our present opponents didn't, it seems that his timing is backwards. Certainly it seems rash to state that a threat to our physical security "is no longer a meaningful possibility."

—A. M. Bolster

The Debate over American Foreign Policy, *byRobert W. Tucker. The Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, $2.75.*

Karachi Bazaar by Bruce Laingen

"I find the combination of history, folklore and folk art expressed in these marionette theatres (dating back to the 16th century in Brussels) irresistible," writes Anne Sue Hirshorn.

Brussels Lost and Found:

THE TOONE MARIONETTES

ANNE SUE HIRSHORN

The author is the wife of M. Bruce Hirshorn, an FSO assigned to the US Mission to the European Communities in Brussels. Mrs. Hirshorn received her M.A. in history of Art at the University of Pennsylvania and practiced interior design in Philadelphia and Washington.

BRUSSELS is a city so confusing that not even its oldest inhabitant would drive out for an evening without a little map book of 64 or so pages which will show his destination, though not how to arrive at it. If a friend is to visit, one says, "I'm on page 32 Aab," and lets him work out his own special route which neither of you can quite explain to the other. The original irregularly shaped city was fortified. The walls exist now in only a few fragments, more of which might have been preserved if only the workmen could have found them.

It is a city full of surprises. One should impulsively investigate an interesting little shop that one happens across on a back street. Who knows? You may never find it again. And then, in some odd and illogical way, two streets that seem to be separated by a vast conglomerate of alleys, squares and blank facades turn out to be contiguous.

In Brussels one can turn a corner and enter the Middle Ages, or look through the trees at an 18th century roof line and then lean, exhausted, against an Art Nouveau lamppost. The skies are Magritte, the faces Brueghel, and there are at least 52 kinds of beer. Hemmed in by clusters of stores on the rue Neuve, which is not new, is the dignified Theatre de la Monnaie, where, in the same 19th century surroundings still garnished by the red velvet that so impressed Charlotte Bronte, people sip champagne at intermission. Down by the Eglise de la Chapelle, parts of which date back to the 12th century, one can buy steamed mussels from a vendor's stand on a crisp fall morning. There is an outdoor market, too, which packs up and vanishes at noon.

In my hand is a sleeve of cream colored silk damask that might have come from a church. It is ornamented with bits of faded gilt which could have brightened an actor's costume at the Monnaie. It is actually part of the costume of an object which is and has been a part of Brussels life for hundreds of years, a marionette; a figure that once spoke the flawed poetry of its folk, in an accent Bruxellois.

If one hears it again, it is not the half-heard words of the imagination, but real clump and clatter across the boards. The marionettes have come to life again in Brussels, every night at 8:30 except Sundays.

The marionette theatre was conceived as protest and nurtured underground. It was a reaction to the hated reign of Philip II of Spain who brought the dreaded inquisition to Brussels in the 16th century. Actors on the legitimate stage dramatized the hatred and the fears of the people and incited revolt. The theatres were closed. Immediately, improvised theatres were set up in secret. Small stages were built in the cellars of private houses. The confined spaces called for small actors, and so the marionette theatre was born.

The oldest extant "document" of Brussels is the marionette, who himself is documented by a letter of Charles V, father of Philip II, who requested that some of the Brussels marionettes be sent to him at his residence in Spain.

The 200 years of Spanish occupation of the Low Countries was ended by the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 which handed them over to Austria.

Souvenirs of the Spanish occupa-

tion remain in the repertoire of the marionette theatre in Brussels. Even now, Spanish soldiers appear in martial scenes, and in the background of such scenes in "Till Ulenspiegel" or in the very old religious play, "The Passion."

Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries puppets in all their variants, marionettes and hand puppets, became part of the life of England, France, Germany and Italy, playing in the market place and the palace.

In 1700 the Brussels marionette theatre was given a new impetus. The Grand Theatre de la Monnaie was built, and once again because of political problems, all performances by any actors except those officially approved at the Monnaie were forbidden. Puppet showmen were omitted from the interdiction, and they flourished in cabarets, cellars and neighborhood meeting places throughout the city.

This theatre which has found itself again is one indigenous to Brusscls. It is the Toone, now Toone VII, for the seventh impresario now entitled to carry on the tradition, which has been consecutively played for 130 years, and, until the present time, has mostly always played in one small quarter of the town. Toone l'Ancien established his theatre in the Impasse Liserons in 1830, in a vaulted cellar, the cellar having become traditional to the theatres since the Spanish days. It was in this same year that Belgium gained its independence after a series of riots and revolt.

It had become part of local tradition since the 18th century for each quarter or neighborhood to have one or two small puppet theatres. Antoine Genty's Toone, a corruption of his own name, Antoine, became the theatre of the Marolles, that quarter in Brussels which has not only been a home for the poor, but its haven. It is in the Marolles that one finds the first waves of immigrants, Italians, Spaniards, and also those institutions which aid the poor. The Leprosarium has given way to the Salvation Army and the area is neither densely populated nor, today, conspicuous for slums like those of New York. As of old it is

A performance of "Pitje le Mort" in progress.

the place where the rag and old clothes vendors live and where they sell from their pushcarts on or near the Jeu de Balle. Here the Flea Market is in full operation on Sundays, doing a brisk trade in dubious antiques and bits of unidentifiable metal and where the Black Market also thrived during World War II. It was also near here that Toone was closed by the Germans because the puppeteers were active in the Resistance.

The language was as savory as the cauliflower stumps and mashed carrots that were thrown at the heads of the performers on a rowdy night at the theatre.

It was in the theatre of Toone l'Ancien, Antoine Genty, and those of his successors that the old legends were performed again and again in the little side streets where the theatre moved from time to time, but always in the same quarter and always carrying the name of Toone. The theatre was never passed from father to son, but to the best of the puppeteers who had worked for the preceding master.

The marionettes themselves, like those of Liege, are distinctive in their style and particularly, their weight. They are related to the Sicilian type, the first, which were developed in the 16th century, but they differ from them in that they are operated from the side, not from overhead. In the illustration of a performance of "Pitje le Mort," above, you will see four flats, each staggered behind the other. For a large and complicated performance, an operator can stand behind each one, and since there are four on the opposite side as well, there are eight working positions on the deep stage.

The marionette is not operated on a system of strings. There is a metal rod attached to his head from which his head and his whole body can be made to move and to walk. The rod is held in one hand, and a supplementary pair of strings attached to the wrists, held in the operator's other hand, works the arms. The hands of the Toone puppets, barely discernible in the illustration, are kept in a closed position with a hole in the middle. This was to enable a sword to be slipped easily in or out.

Toone VII says that after a half hour even the lightest of these seems to weigh a ton. For the less proficient, this is true after two minutes, since the average marionette weighs from eight to twenty pounds, and the heaviest, in full armor, weigh nearly thirty-seven pounds. The marionettes are around three feet tall, though their size may vary.

Puppeteers set their own conventions and Toone has become a melange of written and primarily oral tradition which has been synthesized into dramatic folk art. The audience to whom these were played was often illiterate, and Toone l'Ancien himself was considered a bit of an intellectual because he could read and write. He kept a journal in which was written a basic plot outline, perhaps anywhere

from ten to thirty lines long. His handwriting was crude, his spelling nearly phonetic, and the language a combination of French and Flemish.

Here is a typical extract: "The King Campaert comes by on his horse near the window and sees Esclermonde who is sleeping, and he carries her off and rides away with her for the camp of Brandezire." That's all. The dialogue was improvised. But because the plays were repeated over and over again the improvisations were learned by heart, and each successor was able to present an elaborate repertoire which was carried in his head, with the journal of Toone l'Ancien as a reminder.

Toone recited all of the parts himself, though there might be several people manipulating the puppets; as many as eight. The key to the early plays was action, and lots of it. A card of invitation issued in 1897 by Toone of Locrel invites the Mossieu family to a special one night gala presentation at which the cup will overflow. The program will consist of "a grand drama in five acts (word misspelled 'akes') and 27 scenes, with two duels, one abduction, three assassinations and seven 'sangements' (a word which doesn't appear in the dictionary, but probably means bloody battles or blood lettings)."

Historical fact and legend intertwined provided plenty of material for Toone, whose audiences loved to watch knights in armor do battle. The Charlemagne that you see illustrated belongs to this genre. He is a marionette about 125 years old who comes from Liege, not Brussels. (Notice that his hands are open.) Charlemagne provides another focus for one of the best known and most ancient plays in the old repertoire, but this time he is the heavy and not the hero. The play is called "The Four Sons of Aymon" and is going to receive a handsome new production at Toone VII in September.

The historical plays were augmented by free borrowings from the popular historical romances of the day, from Feval, whose "Borgia" is in the present repertoire at Toone, as is another great favorite, "The Three Musketeers" of Dumas.

Another winner in the same style was "Les Pardaillans," a story of chivalry laid in the days of King Henry IV. This was indeed a forerunner of the Saturday serial at the movies, since it took 72 consecutive evenings to perform, with very little repetition. This, incidentally, must have provided quite a challenge to the manipulators of the marionettes who had to follow signals from Toone as subtle as the blink of an eye, as he narrated.

There were, in addition, the religious plays which were performed for special occasions, such as "The Passion," which was played during Easter. Toone IV acted this for a playwright named Michel Ghelerode who transcribed and reconstructed it. This, too, is part of the repertoire of Toone VII.

The theatre gave color, romance, diversion and glimpses into the lives of the aristocracy as imagined by one of the men of the Marolles. It kept alive the history and legends for these uneducated people, and told them the story in their language, this patois of French and Flemish. But there is in addition to all of these things something more,

The Emperor Charlemagne from the author's collection

and that is style and form. Toone communicates today just as it always has, across national and social lines. It was not necessary to the audiences of the Marolles that the play be played with elaborate nuances of character and complicated theatrical machinery. They accept the limitations on reality and the stylization of the marionettes because Toone is a narrative theatre. What the audience and the actors are involved in is the plot. Surprisingly, one may follow though he may barely understand a word. In fact, even a Bruxellois who is unfamiliar with Marolles dialect may have difficulty in understanding every word.

Toward the end of the 19th century, opera was added to the repertoire. Grand opera had been part of the truly elaborate marionette theatre of Italy since the 18th century, but the opera at Toone was the grand doings at the Monnaie enacted for the barrow crowd. One of these operas was "Faust" (which will also be played in the coming months at Toone VII.)

The last of the golden days of Toone, those of its greatest prosperity, were nearly gone. Toone III, who enjoyed enormous success, played in the original cellar of Toone l'Ancien until 1911. But for reasons never made clear he retired and, not long after, in a mood of deep despair, ended his own life in 1914. Two World Wars caused disruption and destruction. Toone V disappeared between the two wars, and Toone IV came out of retirement to play once again. He passed his mantle to Toone VI, who played for 28 years. Toone VI knew many vicissitudes. A flying bomb destroyed his theatre, his scenery and 75 of his marionettes. His last theatre, on the Place de la Chapelle, was closed when his health began to fail, and the bulldozers, one of the dire menaces to Brussels, found his theatre.

Magically, Toone lives again, not as a mummified museum piece of anachronistic survival, but as a reconstructed theatre animated by the personality of Toone VII, with assistance from Toone VI. The new theatre of Toone VII is, as one might suspect, very old. The building probably dates from the 18th century. True to tradition, but now

in the heart of Brussels near the Grand Palace, the theatre is entered from a narrow street down an even narrower impasse which is sheltered by two large buildings leaning towards each other that are mercifully separated by a few arched supports. Pass under the tiny shrine of the Madonna set into one of these, and you have entered into the tavern of the theatre and the special ambiance of Toone, past and present.

On the bar are a few hardboiled eggs in a rack. A huge fireplace is set deep into one wall, where a red fire keeps out the damp, even in summer. Along one wall at a long table one is apt to find a cluster of students with a guitar, and sometimes the music is pretty good. Folk. A pair of heavy doors lead into the theatre, which, like the tavern, is small and welcoming. Upstairs in the museum the crumbling book of Toone l'Ancien is preserved but dormant because the work of reconstruction is being done by Mr. Geal himself. The 15 plays of the repertoire comprise a cross section of three basic types: historical, swashbuckling romance and opera, some of which have already been described briefly to you. Toone VII follows the tradition of having a play acted out for him by Toone VI. Toone VII then transcribes it, adapts it and has it mounted with sets and marionettes. Some old marionettes are mixed with the new, but the new are made in the old way. The heads are carved from wood or made from papier mache, and are formed so that the head and neck comprise a single unit.

Toone traditionally does not make the marionettes or the sets himself. He is the impresario. He is also the producer, the narrator or actually multi-actor, and, now, often writer and historian as well. Jose Geal, Toone VII, wears the workman's cap in his theatre. But, although he is a Bruxellois who has known this theatre from childhood days, his training and experience as a legitimate actor and professional puppeteer is broad, as is his understanding and grasp of his art. He projects his integrity unconsciously in conversation.

If you walk today through the Marolles, some street names evoke the past: rue de l'Eventail (fan), rue de l'Epee (rapier), but the old buildings on them are gone. The old homes of the theatres in the vaulted cellars and cafes have perished. Toone VII had searched for two years until he found the building in which he has made his theatre, hoping it would finally be a permanent one, as it deserves to be. He told me that each impresario has a favorite play that he performs best, and that "Le Bossu" (The Hunchback), another of the old stories, is the specialty of Toone VI. I was a bit awed by Toone VII and forgot to ask which was his. There'll be plenty of time to find out, all through the year, any night but Sunday, at 8:30. ■

H-BOMB DECISION

Continued from page 27

The announcement caught Washington flatfooted. Our detection system, now fully manned around the clock with reconnaissance aircraft and augmented by a world-wide net of seismic and acoustic detectors, had picked up nothing. We were baffled. Was it a propaganda hoax? In a few days matters began to clarify: seismic and acoustic readings confirmed a large explosion in Soviet Siberia. Reconnaissance aircraft picked up the radioactive debris. It was a thermonuclear explosion. The answer to our initial bewilderment was that the Soviet leaders had been so certain the test would be successful that Malenkov could confidently announce it several days before the event.

Work was stepped up to produce a deliverable weapon. "Operation Castle" took place at Eniwetok on March 1, 1954. It turned out to have twice the yield that had been predicted. On one of the several planes carrying a large troop of VIPs to the "shot" Dr. John Wheeler of Princeton sat next to Robert LeBaron, Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee (Defense—AEC). "Bob," he said, "We've miscalculated. The thing is going to be twice as big as we thought. It'll be 15 megatons. What should we do?" LeBaron said it was too late to turn back. And so it went. And 15 megatons it was.

The United States would soon have deliverable thermonuclear weapons ready and waiting not only for souped-up B-36s and other bombers, but Minuteman, Polaris, and Poseidon missiles as well. Whatever the outcome of today's arguments on our defense posture, the megatonnage is available.

WAS all this right to do? Surely we would all have preferred other ways. Niels Bohr's "Open World" in which no nation would have any deadly scientific, technological, or military secrets from any other would have been much to be preferred. In the present state of affairs, think of the horrible waste of material resources, national treasure, and—most important—skills lost to more constructive human activity, betterment, and happiness.

Yet man's aggressive qualities when canonized in national purpose are such that, lacking the power to incinerate, he has tried to bleed the world to death about every 20 years or so.

Today we are learning to live in that situation of mutual deterrence so arrestingly described by Churchill in 1955: "It might well be that, by a process of sublime irony, we shall have reached a stage in this story where safety is the sturdy child of terror, and survival the twin brother of annihilation." Earlier, in the House of Commons on November 3, 1953, he had mused:

> Indeed, I have sometimes the odd thought that the annihilating character of these agencies may bring an utterly unforeseeable security to mankind. It may be . . . that when the advance of destructive weapons enables everyone to kill everybody else nobody will want to kill anyone at all. . . .

At least not with these weapons. For if Minutemen should loft from their silos and Hydra-headed Poseidons should burst from the sea, would the Phoenix ever again rise from the ashes? ■

PROBLEMS *Continued from page* 30

matters with overall functions weakens performance, lowers morale and produces wasteful use of resources even at times of overall stringency.

In the past four years, numerous attempts have been made to reorganize the Department along more modern lines and to introduce new management techniques. Progress, however, has been halting, uncertain, and inadequate. Weak support by administrative personnel, lack of appreciation of problems by Foreign Service officers, inattention by senior officials, and some ill-conceived reforms have resulted in failure to achieve an effective management system for the Department. As one senior officer put it, the result is as though the hospital manager were directing the doctor.

A few illustrations are necessary to support what otherwise would appear too sweeping and condemnatory a conclusion.

Personnel management is at the heart of the functioning of any organization, yet the Department of State lacks many of the basic elements of an effective system. During some twenty years of expansion it has recruited, trained and promoted without the most elementary knowledge of its requirements. As of June 1967, it did not even know how many senior officer positions it had, let alone having a reasonable projection.

Recent attempts to remedy this lack of knowledge failed because of poor planning and management. In 1964-65, a project was undertaken to assemble personnel information for machine data processing, thus permitting rapid, informed identification of persons qualified for vacancies, analysis of personnel skills against requirements and other basic audits. Individual data sheets were filled out by all officers, then coded for machine processing. As a result of faulty planning and quality control an unacceptable rate of error resulted. A second "corrected" run was made without improvement. After some two years, and large investment, the project was temporarily abandoned.

As a consequence the Service has become seriously imbalanced both in grade and function. At the top, the policy of promotion and lateral entry without regard to requirements has resulted in a serious oversupply of senior officers. In the past ten years, the number of senior officers has increased at many times the rate of the service as a whole. This problem was not foreseen, corrective action was not taken and many officers of ability and experience are now engaged in "make work" projects because of the lack of suitable positions. The Department is desperately engaged in attempting to increase the rate of retirement of such officers. While offering a potential quantitative solution, such remedies are expensive in monetary terms, destructive of morale and frequently have the wrong result in that the officer who retires early is the one with attractive alternative employment opportunities rather than the marginal officer or the officer whose skills are in surplus.

A similar over-supply exists with regard to senior secretaries. For years, executives have been permitted to select, promote or recruit their secretaries at high grades without regard to the limited number of such positions. Each secretary so added has become a permanent

esponsibility, continuing after the departure of the xecutive.

In functional terms, the situation is equally serious. Due to the rapid growth of economic responsibilities, the demand for trained officers has increased at all levels. Recruitment has not been geared to these requirements. A recent study of the qualifications of economic officers found that less than 25 percent of the senior officers serving in economic positions possessed minimal academic qualifications. Recruitment policy is so poorly geared to need that very few new economic officers are entering at the bottom, and the Department has been reduced to the expensive alternative of training presently employed officers.

Programing was recognized as a potentially useful new management tool by the Department some five years ago. Despite shortage of funds for operations, the management of the Department allocated substantial sums to the establishment of staff and facilities and accorded the highest priority to the application of programing techniques to Embassy operations. To date, the product has been of questionable value. Ignorance of programing procedures, failure to employ expert personnel and lack of basic data appear at the root of an expensive experiment which has set back the adoption of modern practices within the Department.

These illustrations point to several conclusions. The Department of State is lacking in much of the basic personnel data and procedures for modern mangement. Its administrative staff does not possess the education, training or experience to fulfill its responsibilities or to adjust to new techniques. Its performance is seriously limited by the separation of substantive and management matters. Management cannot be relegated to second-class housekeeping in an organization as large, complex and increasingly technical as the Department of State without consequences that handicap seriously the performance of its duties and the effectiveness of its personnel.

Adjustment of traditional methods and values to a changing society is never easy, and often painful to individuals. Within the Foreign Service it has become customary to blame problems on the parsimony of Congress or the lack of appreciation by the public of the peculiar nature of international relations. While such views have merit, the service too often has failed to recognize that much of the external criticism arises from evident internal weakness and is increased by the inability of the service to present a solid case based on demonstrable facts about itself. The desirable solution is for the Department and the career foreign service to solve their problems internally. No other course would be fully effective—special consultative boards or committees have at best limited utility in situations involving broad issues. The first requirement is to recognize frankly and openly the nature of the problems, beginning with the Secretary of State and working down through the ranks. If the Foreign Service is to perform its stated functions, if the nation is to receive the leadership from it that world conditions demand, it is essential that the career service cease sweeping its problems under the rug and begin the process of honest self-evaluation. ■

country may limit the granting of duty-free import privileges to those on the list. This is a deep-seated irritation, for example, to Staff corps personnel who thus may not be able to bring an automobile into the country because of a prohibitive duty.

The official status of the FSO at his post abroad provides access to three communities—composed of other Americans residing or traveling abroad, host nationals, and the multinational diplomatic community. In the case of the last two, being on the diplomatic list can be crucial. In many countries even young officers are able to move freely within the political, military, cultural, and other elites of the host society. In case of need, the FSO *is* the United States Government to the nonofficial American abroad. In his article on the FSO "subculture" Glen Fisher writes that the diplomatic "community reflects a pattern of living and working which has grown out of many years' experience as diplomats have represented their governments in foreign countries, have learned and practiced the conventions of international diplomacy, and have shared the common experiences and problems which diplomats face regardless of nationality."[21] These factors are also highly important status determinants within the FSO culture, but to these one must add a third and crucial factor—the general reputation of an officer among his colleagues for sheer competence. The pecking order is clear as to rank, title, and function, moving from the low-ranking titles such as Vice Consul and Second Secretary on up to the high-ranking titles such as Consul General, Counselor, Minister, and, of course, the pinnacle—Ambassador. A Counselor for Political Affairs within an embassy has much more status than a Counselor for Administrative Affairs. For a younger officer a prized assignment is "principal officer" in a smaller post, even if it is a two-man consulate. One hears FSOs speak of getting their "own post" much as naval officers speak of getting their "own ship."

It is hardly possible to exaggerate the status of an Ambassador.[22] Fisher's description is so apt that it is worth quoting at length:

> Foreign Service society has a definite social structure. At the top is the career Ambassador and his wife. This is so by formal rank, and informally so, as this position implies recognition of the top qualities of the Service, the Ambassador's years of experience with exposure to the great variety of contingencies one must meet in the Service, and his repeated endorsements by the promotion system. He has direct responsibility for all official Americans in his country. The prestige of the United States rests on his shoulders at all times; he is the

[21] Fisher, "Foreign Service Officer," p. 75.

[22] Still another ranking of occupations, an older one, shows "U. S. Ambassador to a foreign country," second only to "Supreme Court Justice" (and ahead of cabinet member, senator, and governor of a state). See Mapheus Smith, "An Empirical Scale of Prestige Status of Occupations," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Apr. 1943), 185-92. The lowest ranked occupation in the Smith survey was 'prostitute"; FSOs are fond of referring to diplomacy as the "second oldest profession."

personal representative of the President of the United States. Both the social ethics of FSO society and the necessity for a clear chain of command require loyalty and deference to the Ambassador. Once an FSO is named Ambassador, his social role changes as his status affects his personal relationships with other officials. The casual and easy friendship is not so easily established, and his previous friendships are handled more carefully. He is "Mr. Ambassador" at his post and retains a right to the title thereafter.[23]

In many countries a high standard of living goes along with the status, and in fact is part of it. Often it is of a nature—elegant residence, staff of servants, chauffeured limousine, use of an air attaché's plane, and so on—that a man quite literally would have to be a millionaire to emulate at home.

It is small wonder, then, that many FSOs are ambitious to become an ambassador. This, of course, is not just a matter of status and emoluments, but of the substance which they symbolize, the influence and leverage which becoming an Ambassador affords the individual as a professional. With approximately 85 out of 118 ambassadorships held by career officers, as distinct from political appointees, the prize is by no means an unreal and remote possibility for the competent, careful officer. Roughly, the FSO has three times the chance of becoming an ambassador that a military officer has of achieving flag rank.[24] Asked in the SDP if young entering FSOs "normally should aspire to become an Ambassador," 72.3 percent answered in the affirmative. Only 14.4 percent said "no" and 13.3 percent were not sure. A slightly greater percentage of examination officers than lateral entrants (75 percent to 67 percent) answered "yes."

Following this question, officers were asked to rate their own chances of achieving the ambition. Enough realism enters the picture here to make one wonder if the strong endorsement of the ambition is not perhaps dysfunctional.

TABLE 32
Self-rating of Possibility of Becoming an Ambassador

Rating	*Number*	*Percent*
No possibility	119	20.2
Barely possible	149	25.3
Possible	182	31.0
A good chance	100	17.0
Very likely	20	3.4
I am serving or have already served as an ambassador	18	3.1
Totals	588	100

More than 45 percent of the respondants said it was not possible or only barely possible that they would

[23] Fisher, "Foreign Service Officer," p. 79.

[24] Janowitz shows (*Professional Soldier*, p. 67) that .8 percent of Army officers are generals and the same percentage of Naval officers are admirals, which compares to 2.4 percent of FSOs serving as ambassadors.

become an ambassador. Only 120 officers were quite optimistic (those choosing "good chance" or "very likely" for their response). Yet if one extrapolated the 20 percent SDP sample, it would mean that about 600 officers in the total corps would see themselves as being in a good position to compete for approximately 85 ambassadorships.

Only 33 percent of the examination entrants in the total sample ruled themselves out ("no possibility" or "barcly possible"), compared to 70 percent of the lateral entrants. Political officers were the most optimistic among the functional specialists (excluding program directors), with 28 percent choosing "good chance" or "very likely" compared to about 20 percent for the total sample. Among the area specialists, the Arabists stand out as very optimistic, with 48 percent choosing either of these same two responses, followed by African specialists (33 percent) and Atlantic Affairs specialists (27 percent).

In sum, prestige and status are potent factors in the FSO career. A young, former FSO in an interview explained one reason for his resignation: "The trouble with most FSOs is that they are too concerned about *being* something or *becoming* something—being a DCM or becoming an Ambassador—and not concerned enough with *doing* anything." This is certainly exaggerated, but it does point up a danger: prestige and status are so potent in the FSO career that they often can become ends in themselves.

Elitism

Prestige and status are closely related to the elitist ideology of the FSO corps. This ideology manifests itself in a number of ways, in the issue of the representativeness of the Service, as discussed in the last chapter, and in attitudes on the character of the profession, its role, and its future as discussed in the next chapter.

Elitism is manifested in the essentially defensive posture of most FSOs in regard to the Service. If one is a member of an elite group there is a strong tendency toward having a stake in protecting the eliteness of that group. This is done in a number of ways, by replenishing the group with new members who conform to the elite standards, by maintaining that conformance internally, by avoiding control by outsiders of a kind that could significantly affect the elitencss of the group, and by avoiding to the maximum extent possible incursions by outsiders.

The last is seen, for example, in the attitudes of FSOs on the extent to which career officers should occupy the top jobs in diplomacy. An SDP question asked officers to indicate the approximate percentage of career officers they felt should hold the ambassadorships and deputy chief of mission positions.

The response for the DCM position is as close to consensus as anything in the SDP, with almost 90 percent of all respondants saying that *all* deputy chiefs of mission should be career officers. This is probably related to the fact that, with a certain air of realism, the great majority of FSOs subscribe to the view that not all ambassadors can be career officers, although respondants would prefer a larger proportion than is actually the case. If an ambassador is not a career man, the

TABLE 33

Percentage of Career Officers
Who Should Hold Top Positions

	Ambassador		*DCM*	
	No.	*Percent*	*No.*	*Percent*
60 percent	14	2.4	0	0.0
70	88	15.2	0	0.0
80	200	34.5	5	0.9
90	209	36.0	51	8.9
100	32	5.5	514	89.2
Not sure	37	6.4	6	1.0
Totals	580	100	576	100

strong belief is, then a professional should be right behind him.

Dr. John E. Harr's examination of the professional diplomat, his characteristics, norms and attitudes continues in the July issue with sections on success, behavior and the processes of the service.

FORTY YEARS AGO

In a discussion of Department of State appropriations in the Congress, Representative Frederick M. Davenport of New York made a case for higher salaries for the home service of the Department. The JOURNAL of February 1928 reprinted part of the record of the proceedings. Some of Mr. Davenport's remarks are quoted below for the picture they give of the time:

> Whatever reorganization and better salary classification and democratization may ultimately do for the Foreign Service, the field of the Department of State at home in Washington is as yet untouched. And here is the brain center of our foreign affairs. Here they tell the Foreign Service what to think and what to do, after being fed with the facts by the Foreign Service. But here men engaged upon foreign affairs are underpaid and overburdened because their offices are undermanned. . . . Salaries in the Department at home are still on the old-time basis. Young men are brought in from the higher schools of the country and started at $1,320 a year. The natural tendency is for a bright young man to get a little experience at the expense of the Government and go out in private practice to profit by it. A few utterly devoted souls hang on, together with those who can do no better elsewhere, and in the course of 15 or 20 years of faithful or inefficient service, as the case may be, attain to the maximum salary of $6,000 a year, and this in the city of Washington! . . .
>
> I am reliably informed that a responsible officer of the State Department has long been in the habit of getting up at 5 o'clock Monday morning to do the family washing, and he does not like the job, either. I say, more honor to him for doing it and more shame to the Government of the United States for permitting good minds in the most critical and vital Department of the Government to be harried to such a degree by inadequate provision for ordinary material needs. [Applause]
>
> In the Act of 1906 there is an absurd limitation of $1,000 a year on the salaries of foreign clerks in the Department of State. The Department of Commerce is hampered by no such statute. The result is that the Department of Commerce is drawing these young men, who come to be good consular clerks, away from the Department of State.

Justice Denied

Your April editorial, "Tardy Justice," with respect to John Paton Davies, troubles at least one reader.

It is, of course, both a well-known and an almost self-evident legal principle that "justice delayed is justice denied." It is moreover particularly apparent, one would have thought, that the effects, not merely of the "grotesque inquisition" to which you refer, but of the action taken fourteen years ago in Mr. Davies' case, have scarcely been remedied—the object of "justice"—by a decision that he may now be granted a security clearance. It is possible that this decision may have some practical, operational significance. But it is hard to see that even in that event Mr. Davies has been given redress for the destruction of his professional career, or the Foreign Service compensated for the loss of his talents and his services.

Therefore it is something less than apparent that "we can have more faith in the justice of our administrative procedures," except in the TV-commercial sense that "Sudzo washes three shades whiter" than, perhaps, asphalt.

But it is the note of satisfaction (is the tinge of irony intentional?) in the third and fourth paragraphs of your editorial which really jars me. There is a touch of smugness, it seems to me, in the notion that we really do report and advise "without fear or favor," that our country is well served by its diplomats "precisely because" we have "by and large" tried to go on making "objective" reports and recommendations.

In the darkness of the night, can each of us honestly say that he has always tried to tell it like it is, regardless of the views of his superiors and irrespective of the impact of his reports and recommendations in Washington? Or do not many of us often find it more politic, more advantageous to our professional progress, to recognize instantly in the suggestions of our superiors a significant improvement? And is not the danger that we do the more insidious when we are honestly unaware that we are doing it?

It might be worthwhile to ask ourselves (very privately, of course) just how many times we have honestly and openly stood up and fought, not with outsiders, but with those who are perfectly capable in all honesty of considering continuing opposition the sign either of stubbornness (*aliter* tactlessness, lack of adaptability) or of stupidity—and of saying so on an efficiency rating. Have we not, rather, at least on occasion, been inclined to fudge things so as not to rock the boat?

Are we, in short, really justified in having faith that our administrative processes will not only not penalize but will rather actively promote and defend intellectual integrity on the part of members of what some of us hope may be a truly professional diplomatie service?

I should like to be able to answer this question with a resounding "Yes." But I can't. Not from my experience and knowledge. And "Tardy Justice" does not persuade me otherwise.

William N. Turpin

Washington

For an Ombudsman

Now that AFSA has the reorganization of the Department and of our Foreign Policy in hand, perhaps they would be interested in taking on a new task, one with more tangible benefits to the membership.

In my ten years in the service I have seen too many cases where personnel, because of time and distance, have been unable to look after their own affairs when they run afoul of Departmental bureaucracy. I am thinking for example of the secretary who receives a notice that she has been overpaid for the past year and is requested to *immediately* remit the overpayment in the amount of $250. Or the case of the clerk who is told that "due to the Department's error" (that'll be the day!) the household effects shipment was overweight and to please remit $300. Then there is the case of $640 overpayment in per diem. (This latter case was my own and was resolved in my favor only after six months of going from office to office and a decision from GAO. Had I not been assigned in Washington at the time with the oportunity to work on the matter I would have been out $640.)

These and similar cases I feel could have been resolved in favor of the employee or the conditions of repayment eased were the Department personnel disposed or able to do so. Sometimes it is a question of interpretation of regulations and fear of error, or GAO, results in a decision against the employee.

What I would have AFSA do is set up an office in the Association staffed with qualified personnel who can look into such problems for us when we are abroad. They could check out regulations, precedents, possibilities for appeal, legal remedies possible after administrative efforts have been exhausted, names of reputable lawyers experienced in such matters, estimates of costs involved for comparison with the amount involved in the first instance, etc.

This may be the kind of job retired FSOs could take on, especially those experienced in administrative matters and perhaps DACOR might be interested in cooperating with AFSA. It is also that type of service that could be expanded to include retired FSOs with legal experience. For example we are often encouraged to make out wills but do not know reputable and competent lawyers.

The staff I propose will cost money and I do not doubt that the membership would be prepared to support an increase in membership fee if they believed they could receive the kind of assistance that I am proposing. Why not ask them?

Richard F. King

La Paz

P.S. An alternative could be that members taking advantage of this service could pay a nominal fee.

Editor's Note: For the past year AFSA has been pushing State, AID and USIA to set up just such an "ombudsman" mechanism (see F.S. Journal of March and April, 1968). We hope for early action from the new Administration.

Balpa As Seer

For the past year, we have all presumed that "BALPA" was created out of whole cloth by some Washington wordsmith.

But now the March National Geographic has tracked him down. Balpa Dolo, a Dogon diviner from the village of Sanga, Mali, predicts the future from fox tracks made on sand drawings. And what did he tell author Pamela Johnson Meyer? "*You will return* to Sanga before the year is out."

Douglas J. Harwood

Kinshasa

A Reply to "How to Shape A Pyramid"

I was greatly disturbed to read the letter from an anonymous correspondent in the May issue of the JOURNAL stating that it appeared from the 1969 FSO/FSR promotion list that there had been an unannounced but radical change in the Service's promotion system. The writer posed questions which called into question both the integrity of the promotion system and management's good faith, and I feel it incumbent upon me as Director General to reply.

I can state categorically that the promotion system was not changed last year in any significant respect, let alone radically. The principle of promotion on the basis of merit was not abandoned; Selection Board rankings continued to be the basic factor that determined which officers would be promoted.

Last year, as in previous years, all Boards were instructed to identify in rank-order form those officers whom they recommended for promotion. The exact number of officers whom management subsequently decided to promote at each level was dependent on various factors, especially budgetary availabilities and the needs of the Service at each level. As in the past, however, management's discretionary authority related only to numbers. Once a decision is made on this score, management is bound by the rank-order lists submitted by the Boards. It cannot and does not skip over or omit names on these lists, except in regard to officers who are under a security investigation or who have not fulfilled the 3-3 proficiency requirement in a world language before a second promotion can be gained (officers in both categories are subsequently promoted if the necessary requirements are fulfilled before the next Selection Boards meet).

The inference of your correspondent that a whole group of Class 3 officers was arbitrarily earmarked for selection out in order to realign the structure of the Service is incorrect. The promotion pattern shown by the figures provided by the writer is nothing new. This pattern, in which the bulk of promotions occur during a few middle years of an officer's time-in-class, is one of long standing applicable to most classes of the Service, certainly at Class 4 and above. It has perhaps been accentuated by the inclusion of language in the Precepts since 1964 which has enjoined the Boards to deliberate with particular care before recommending for promotion officers who are nearing maximum time-in-class. This language was added to the Precepts to guard against what was found to be a tendency of Selecttion Boards to recommend such officers for promotion on compassionate grounds. The result in many cases was that the officers were ranked by subsequent Selection Boards in the bottom percentiles of their new classes and consequently became subject to selection out. This was considered not to be in the interests either of the Service or of the officers themselves.

I also wish to emphasize that the 1968 Selection Boards were not given, either in writing or orally, any instructions other than those contained in the Precepts. As always, management was required, usually in response to requests from the Boards, to interpret the Precepts. But such interpretative guidance in no way altered the letter or spirit of the Precepts themselves.

JOHN M. STEEVES
Director General of the Foreign Service

Washington

The Gap Widens

Is there some apologist for either the Bureau of the Budget or the Civil Service Commission who can explain the rationale behind the new Foreign Service pay scales?

The pay increase proposed for July 1969 is intended to "close the gap" between government salaries and those paid by private industry. The pay line or point at which government salaries become comparable is set at step four of each grade. Because of the four-year time in class provision, FSOs in class six—and to a limited degree in classes seven and eight as well—are fired as soon as they begin to earn what they would in private industry. The effect of all of this is that the Foreign Service is rewarding only those officers who are deemed by the system itself to be marginal performers.

For officers in classes five, four and three (where the maximum allowable time in class is 8 years), pay comparability is only meaningful for those whose careers are not going very well. Some figures from the 1969 promotion list illustrate this point. For officers promoted from class five to four, the average time in grade was 1.7 years; from class four to three, it was 3.5 years and from class three to two, the time was 3.9 years.

Such a salary schedule is not only illogical but insulting to the Service in that it punishes competent officers with salaries which are never comparable with private industry. We understand that the employee associations have been asked to comment upon the proposed pay increases and we strongly urge AFSA to apprise the Civil Service Commission of the above-mentioned inequities.

WILLIAM P. KELLY
KEITH C. SMITH
THOMAS W. SONANDRES
JAMES C. TODD
VERNARD A. LANPHIER

Washington



"Sire, we have a problem."

Continued from page 18

out a lengthy, tortured and spectacularly unpersuasive telegram on reasons and strategy for keeping the Chinese out of the United Nations. The ultimate reason which is that the Department fears not Mao but the American right wing is thoughtfully omitted. The public cannot be persuaded on this. Once my next door neighbor, Mr. Henry Stebbins, our ambassador in Kathmandu, simply wired back that the only man in the Royal Government of Nepal capable of following the Department's logic was in Calcutta having his teeth fixed.

Pamphlets, speeches and official magazines and newspapers are all of some importance for persuasion although in past years our material lost credibility because it was too obviously written to impress not foreigners but American conservatives. It was great on free enterprise and the original and ineradicable sins of the Russians. By far the most persuasive document readily available to an ambassador during my service was the transcript of the President's press conference. It was also the best read.

Speeches by the ambassador are of some value but they must be husbanded for important issues. This requires far more restraint than is commonly imagined. One can elucidate the American position on, say, colonialism or atomic controls and, if it is well-stated and interesting, the audience will listen and the papers will report what you have said to their much larger audience. But with repetition before other audiences the press begins to ignore you and pretty soon it forms the habit of ignoring everything you say.

Speeches on the virtues of virtue, international goodwill, the importance of common undersanding, the unity of the free world, the future of the free world, our common commitment to liberty, the need to resist Communist aggression, the importance of ideals and the momentary inconvenience of idealism are even more dangerous. They not only lose the audience and the press but they establish your reputation as a man with nothing to say. Quite a few American ambassadors have the reputation of being inarticulate. It is a far, far better reputation than that of being a windbag.

In some ways the hardest job I had in India was to limit the number of my public appearances to the occasions when I could—by some reasonable stretch of the imagination—say something. This couldn't, in practice, be more than once a month. As a partial solution, I worked up a set of addresses on economic development because it was a subject on which the State Department would not worry lest I was making policy, on which the AID organization would not quite dare to disagree, about which the Indians were naturally interested and on which, since I had long taught the subject, I had lots of material. ■

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$ 3,700	$ 59.80
$ 3,900	$ 62.60
$ 4,100	$ 65.40
$ 4,300	$ 68.20
$ 4,500	$ 71.00
$ 4,700	$ 73.80
$ 4,900	$ 76.60
$ 5,100	$ 79.40
$ 5,300	$ 82.20
$ 5,500	$ 85.00
$ 5,700	$ 87.80
$ 5,900	$ 90.60
$ 6,100	$ 93.40
$ 6,300	$ 96.20
$ 6,500	$ 99.00
$ 6,700	$101.80
$ 6,900	$104.60
$ 7,100	$107.40
$ 7,300	$110.20
$ 7,500	$113.00
$ 7,700	$115.80
$ 7,900	$118.60
$ 8,100	$121.40
$ 8,300	$124.20
$ 8,500	$127.00
$ 8,700	$129.80
$ 8,900	$132.60
$ 9,100	$135.40
$ 9,300	$138.20
$ 9,500	$141.00
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$1,700	$ 7.00
$1,900	$ 8.00
$2,100	$ 9.00
$2,300	$10.00
$2,500	$11.00
$2,700	$12.00
$2,900	$13.00
$3,100	$14.00
$3,300	$15.00
$3,500	$16.00
$3,700	$17.00
$3,900	$18.00
$4,100	$19.00
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AFSA NEWS

June, 1969

published by the

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037

AFSA Welcomes Revitalization of Foreign Service Board

At a special meeting held in the Department May 12, AFSA Board Chairman Launon Walker declared the Association's strong support for the revitalization of the Board of the Foreign Service announced by the Secretary five days earlier.

Excerpts from Walker's speech, delivered to a packed house in the West Auditorium, follow:

Last Wednesday, the Secretary announced, and I'd like to read the entire press release because it's worth your while: "Secretary of State, William P. Rogers, today announced the appointment of four new State Department members of the Board of the Foreign Service. The appointments were described as an initial step toward major and comprehensive review by the new administration of the foreign affairs personnel structure. Named to the Board were Elliot L. Richardson, Under Secretary who will be the Chairman; Idar Rimestad, Deputy Under Secretary for Administration; Philip Trezise, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs-designate; and Martin Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs. An official representing the Agency for International Development will be named shortly.

"Other agencies represented on the Board are USIA, the Departments of Commerce and Labor, and the Civil Service Commission.

"The Board of the Foreign Service, which was established by Presidential Executive Order #11264 in December 1965, is charged with advising the Secretary on policies relating to the function, selection, assignment, rating, and promotion of professional foreign affairs officers and the general personnel management of the foreign affairs establishment.

"In making the announcement, Secretary Rogers said: 'The President is deeply interested in the processes by which foreign policy is determined and executed. The efficient operation of these processes is heavily dependent on well-organized and properly rationalized personnel systems in the foreign affairs agencies.

" 'The systems in question have grown rapidly in the post-war years and changing needs have imposed new tasks and burdens on them. We believe it is time to see what changes may be required in order to make sure that our unique personnel resources are being used in the most effective manner possible.

" 'The examination will take place under the auspices of the Board of the Foreign Service and involve all of the foreign affairs agencies.' "

Now, the new Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service, Under Secretary Richardson, has said that this is not just another study group that's been set up. He said, on the contrary, that it's the first step in an action program of reform. If the Association thought any differently, it would not be here today to support what has taken place. We can support this today because the intent that has been voiced by Under Secretary Richardson is one in which we have confidence.

For the first time in 20 years the Board of the Foreign Service intends to fulfill its mandate. To aid it in this task the Director General will become the Executive Director of the Board with a staff drawn from the foreign affairs agencies. For those of us who have called for fundamental personnel reform, it is clear that any program must include all the foreign affairs agencies. The Board of the Foreign Service is the only interagency mechanism designed for this purpose and now for the first time in 20 years it has the tools to do it with. For the first time we have a coherent structure with a broad mandate running across agency lines which can deal with the personnel problems which have plagued us and which can begin upon a program of reform.

For example, the last time we met here we talked about the Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited program. We did not oppose the implementation per se of that program; we asked that more studies be undertaken. We asked especially that it be regarded as it is—as a personnel category—like a Foreign Service officer or a Foreign Service Staff officer, and that in that sense all the agencies that were to use this category use it in the same way and not fall once again back into the old pattern of using FSO and FSR and FSS in six or seven different ways, and in ways which prevent interchange and the utilization of our foreign affairs personnel resources across agency lines.

Now we have a Board of the Foreign Service that is structured, that has leadership at the highest level, staff that can look into this, take into account the fact that USIA has already implemented FSRU as basically a transitional device, take into account the fact that the Department of State has yet another proposal, another way —different from USIA's, and we would hope to take into account the recommendations of the Association. When that issue comes before the Board of the Foreign Service, we will state clearly that this new personnel category should not be used for those skills and positions which can be recruited from the bottom or trained from within, but where there is a continuing need that cannot be brought in from the bottom, cannot be developed from within, this is a legitimate use, an imaginative use of the FSRU.

Take the question of recruitment. While the Department of State's recruitment for foreign service officers has dropped off drastically in the last year or two, USIA, which uses the same examination and recruits essentially the same kinds of people, continued its recruitment, even increased it at certain times. That's patently ridiculous. The Board of the Foreign Service can look at the whole question of recruitment; could indeed, the Association believes, provide that com-

mon facility for all the agencies. Recruitment might well be a joint function.

While we're talking about that, so too can training. FSI might indeed come under the Board of the Foreign Service, but at a minimum, this is the platform from which the questions of training and training resources across the foreign affairs agencies can and should be looked at. We now have the kind of structure and staff that can look at these problems—the Inspection Corps, just in passing, might well be an interagency corps, once again, out of the Board of the Foreign Service.

The whole dilemma of maximum time in class—as we watch ourselves day after day releasing officers, a generation of experience, because for some reason they have not shown at that crucial time in their career that they have that certain spark, that aggressive assertiveness, or whatever it's called, that makes for an ambassador. Usually the gentleman in question had no intention of becoming an ambassador. He's not even asking to be promoted. On the contrary, he's a specialist and an expert in a field without which we cannot do, and yet we boxed ourselves in with maximum time in class in a way that we must willy-nilly release these people.

Now, you don't get at the question of maximum time in class by dealing with it on an individual case basis and you don't get at it by dealing with it on an individual agency basis. You relate it to the whole question of specialization, expertise, and continuity. You relate these things together and from the Board of the Foreign Service talk about specialist *cones* perhaps across agency lines, talk about a more flexible use of maximum time in class that would allow us to keep the kind of expertise that we so badly need.

At the same time how do you find and promote younger talent? How do you identify within the specialist corps the people that have that certain something else in policy and executive leadership, and how do you train them and give them the kinds of broad experience that they're going to need if, indeed, they ever reach the highest positions in our career service? Obviously, they're going to have to have the kinds of experience that are found in all the agencies. You're going to have to have an executive cone or track that goes across agency lines. You can't run that out of anything other than something like the Board of the Foreign Service. Now we have it. This is an issue that can be brought there.

We can start to attack the question of specialists. We can start to attack the question of executive talent, of youth, and of maturity, but in an important and fundamental way from the stance of the Board of the Foreign Service.

We also have through the new Board of the Foreign Service ways in which to fulfill the very legislation under which we work—Foreign Service Act of 1946 and the USIA Career Bill, to name the two that are now available to us. The USIA Career Bill, when it was passed, said in essence that the agencies would consult together to forge common personnel policies. This is crucial if you're going to have interchange, if we're going to have compatibility, if ultimately, as we think you should, you're going to have a unified Foreign Service. The Board of the Foreign Service now provides the place where studies like this can go on, where the policies that guide all of us—recruitment, promotion, assignment, training—can be put into balance.

Now, there are some who said to me, when they saw the press stories, that you can't run personnel business out of the committee. The Board of the Foreign Service will not run the day-to-day business of personnel. It lays down policies, it monitors activities, it provides a forum for debates, staff work, common facilities. Within this framework of policies, the personnel systems of each agency run themselves.

Now there are people who would say that structures don't mean very much and that what's important is intent. They fear that the corps principle will suffer and that the career service will be destroyed.

Let's talk about intent a little bit. The Board of the Foreign Service is advisory to the Secretary of State. The Association is convinced that the intent of the Secretary, the Under Secretary, of President Nixon, is to do well by the Foreign Service. I'd like to read from the Republican Platform Statement: "We strongly support the Foreign Service and will strengthen it by improving its efficiency in administration and by providing adequate allowances for personnel." It's been a long time since we've seen a statement like that in any platform, Republican or Democratic. Soon after the new administration took over, it named to the number three position in this Department a career man, U. Alexis Johnson. Five career officers are now serving as Assistant Secretaries of State and the number of career men being appointed to ambassadorial positions grows every day. More importantly, the Secretary and the Under Secretary themselves have committed themselves to problems of management and personnel for the first time in 20 years. Under Secretary Richardson knows exactly what it means when he says that he's going to be the Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service. He understands full well—he's said so—that he's going to commit time and resources of his own; he's going to have to pass up some of the substantive issues that we all know and understand and he's willing to do that. This is perhaps the most crucial thing, the thing that makes the Association pleased and tremendously encouraged today, because the leadership of this Department understands what they've embarked upon. It's never been done before; we've always delegated things. Now we've got people who are committed and have said that they're going to work and work hard. They think that personnel and management is important and so do we.

Now the Association leadership is probably the most skeptical group in Washington when it comes to promises about reform, but we're convinced that this Administration is serious. Now it's true that a revitalization of the Board of the Foreign Service is only the beginning of a beginning, but I pledge the Association's complete cooperation to what we hope will be a creative and successful undertaking. But more is involved than the Association as a professional organization. The Foreign Service itself, every employee in the foreign affairs agencies must be creative and constructive in reaction to those initiatives.

Last May 2 Under Secretary Richardson sent a memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, to all Assistant Secretaries and Bureau Chiefs. I'd like to read part of that to you. It begins: "this administration is committed to a thorough re-examination of the foreign affairs establishment with a view toward a more effective use of the unique human resources found there." It goes on: "As first steps, we wish among other things to 1) identify younger officers of exceptional ability within the career service and move these officers into positions of higher responsibility; 2) promote an even greater interchange of talent among geographical and functional areas of expertise within the Department; 3) expand interchange among the several foreign affairs agencies—State, AID, USIA, ACDA, and the Peace Corps; 4) increase opportunities for career officers to move temporarily into other disciplines — business, universities, foundations, and the like—without loss of career contact with the Foreign

Hours of Operation

The Club is open for luncheon from 12 noon until 3:00 p.m., and for light suppers from 5:00-7:30 p.m. Drinks are available from noon until 8:00 p.m. The Club is closed on Saturdays and Sundays except when reserved for private parties.

One of the most popular attractions in the Club has been the buffet served in the second floor lounge each noon. Both hot and cold specialties, as well as drinks, are available for those who wish a change of paec or simply a quicker meal than is available in the main dining room.

Billing

The Club's membership rolls and billing operations have been taken over by the computer for greater speed and accuracy. Bills are rendered monthly, and there is a service charge for bills overdue.

Cash is not accepted at the Club, except for tips. As a result, members must sign and note their Club number on all checks; they may, in lieu of cash, simply add a tip to the check.

Meetings and Private Parties

The facilities of the Foreign Service Club are available for private parties, luncheons, dinners, receptions and other social gatherings. For groups of 20 or more, the library can be reserved and offers privacy for pre- or post-dining meetings. Private dinner parties will be arranged for 25 people or more. Cocktail parties with open bar and hors d'oeuvres are $5.50 per person. The Club rooms offer complete flexibility for large or small parties and Mr. John Scheidenberger, phone 338-5730, will be glad to assist and advise on arrangements.

A La Carte

The Club's menu features a daily special, as well as other entrees, many with a continental touch. Salads and sandwiches are available for members with limited lunch periods and desserts include assorted French pastries, fruit, cheeses, sherbet or ice cream and a special chocolate dessert. The kitchen is under the capable direction of Bill Weeks, who has worked in France and Switzerland and the Shoreham here in Washington.

Guests

Guests accompanied by members are welcome at the Club—and, indeed, are encouraged to join both the Association and the Club if eligible for membership in AFSA. Application forms for both are available at the AFSA Reception Desk on the second floor of the Club building.

Wives (or husbands) of Club members have full Club privileges, but must have the member's card with them when using the facilities. Wives may request cards if desired from the Club Secretary, Mrs. John Feissner.

Club Committee

A Club Committee, responsible for the full range of the Club's activities, is in operation. It will establish house rules and would welcome written comments on food or service, as well as complaints and suggestions. These may be left either with the Club Manager, John Scheidenberger, or at the AFSA Reception Desk on the second floor.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

Attn: Membership Secretary

2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037

1969-1970 MEMBERSHIP APPLICATION

(Print or Type Name) _____ (Signature) _____

(Mailing Address) _____ (Agency) _____

(City, Country, APO, ZIP) _____ (Grade) _____

—Dues include $5.00 for a subscription to the Foreign Service JOURNAL and AFSA News.
—Dues of government employees are deductible for income tax purposes.
—Dues year runs from July 1 to June 30.
—Dues for new members joining after December 31 are one-half annual dues.

CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX

	Salary or Annuity Over $15,000	Salary or Annuity Under $15,000
ACTIVE MEMBERSHIP All Foreign Service Employees (Except Agriculture and Treasury), whether active or retired	☐ $30	☐ $15
ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP All Civil Service Employees (Including Agriculture and Treasury), whether active or retired	☐ $30	☐ $15
Other	☐ $30	☐ $15

LIFE MEMBERSHIP ☐ $300

FOREIGN SERVICE CLUB

2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037

Only members of the American Foreign Service Association are eligible to join the Foreign Service Club.

(Print or Type Name) _____ (Signature) _____

(Mailing Address) _____ (Agency) _____

(City, Country, APO, ZIP) _____ (Grade) _____

CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX

Salary or Annuity Over $15,000	Salary or Annuity $9,000-$15,000	Salary or Annuity Under $9,000
☐ $70 Resident	☐ $35 Resident	☐ $15 Resident
☐ $10 Non-resident	☐ $10 Non-resident	☐ $10 Non-resident

FOREIGN SERVICE Club NEWS

Foreign Service Club Opens in Foggy Bottom

The new Foreign Service Club, on the northwest corner of 21st and E Streets, N.W., is the latest ornament to Foggy Bottom, the section of Washington which has made the most progress in the past 25 years. The gas tanks, outdoor privies and ramshackle rooming houses have all disappeared in favor of luxury apartments, GWU's fine new buildings and New State (no longer properly called so).

The Club is housed on the first and second floors of the American Foreign Service Association Building which has been remodeled and renovated for the purpose. Well-planned plantings and ornamental pavement surround the double doors at 2101 E Street which open into the dining room. Royal blue carpeting, pristine white walls, comfortable chairs, fine china and glassware, with paintings by Foreign Service artists establish the ambience of the public rooms, which include a bar lounge and library. The library is planned to feature the published works of members of the foreign affairs agencies and many volumes are already on the shelves. For the future, the Association hopes to establish a complete collection of such books through gift or purchase to make a fine reference library available to members.

Membership

Membership in the Foreign Service Club is open to all current members of the American Foreign Service Association; those who are not members of AFSA can join both the Club and the Association simultaneously and without further formality upon payment of dues.

There are three categories of membership in the Club: **resident**; **non-resident** members residing on an assignment within the United States outside the Washington metropolitan area; and **inactive** members who have joined the Club but are on assignment abroad.

Members in the inactive category who are reassigned to Washington automatically convert to active membership during the month for which they are first billed for drinks or meals; the dues they have prepaid will carry their membership for twelve months thereafter.

Inactive members in Washington on consultation or home leave may use the Club facilities for 30 days without changing their status providing they inform the Club office of their status, *and* purchase scrip for use in the Club. Inactive members on consultation or home leave should *not* sign food checks, otherwise they convert automatically to active membership.

The dues rates are given on the application blank overleaf.

Reservations

The House Committee regrets that it is not possible to accept reservations for luncheon. However, if you are bringing foreign or business guests to the Club, John Scheidenberger will be as helpful as possible in assuring you a table—in turn, your cooperation in meeting your commitment will be appreciated.

Club Claims Continental Manager

John Scheidenberger, the Club's Austrian-born manager and host, came to the United States in 1956. Mr. Scheidenberger trained in hotel management in Austria and worked in France, Switzerland, Scandinavia and Italy. Upon his arrival in this country he was employed by Henry Ford for four years in Grosse Pointe, managing the estate and arranging private parties. In Washington, Mr. Scheidenberger has managed one restaurant for Associated Restaurants, Inc. and then operated his own which closed due to the after-effects of the 1968 riots.

In his leisure hours, our host enjoys swimming, skiing and woodworking. Married, with one child, and a resident of Arlington, he confesses that he does the cooking for his family only on weekends.

Service system; 5) bring into the Department selected individuals of exceptional talent from outside the career system."

Now, what's happened between this memo and the Board of the Foreign Service announcement is that the Nixon administration has given all of us, regardless of agency, a unique opportunity to participate in shaping our own organizational future. I doubt we'll get another chance. Now is not the time, really, to hem and haw. Now is the time for the Assistant Secretaries in the personnel system to respond quickly and creatively to Under Secretary Richardson's memo of May 2. Now is the time for each employee to encourage Assistant Secretaries and the personnel system to do so. Now is the time to applaud and encourage the new Board of the Foreign Service as it begins its work. The road down which the administration is going is likely to be marked by controversy, perhaps even conflict. It is inevitable that some of the comfortable habits and verities of the past will be shaken and perhaps even discarded. I have faith, however, that if we all respond constructively to these initiatives, we will be equally comfortable, even excited and satisfied with what emerges.

Membership Campaign

Early reports from keymen in Washington and the field suggest that the membership campaign is well on the way to being a great success. As of June 11, dues revenues received totaled $83,450.00 with only scattered returns in from abroad. This figure represents approximately one-half of the revenues necessary for the Association's projected activities during the coming year.

The Membership campaign committee has been greatly encouraged by the number of new members signing up from AID, USIA and the staff corps. It appears, for example, that by the end of the campaign almost 50 percent of the eligible active members in USIA will have joined the Association.

On page 6 of this issue is a membership application form. If you have misplaced your dues renewal notice, please use this form to renew your membership *today*, thus saving AFSA the considerable expense of a formal second notice.

If you have already renewed your membership, use the form to find one *new* member who might have been overlooked during the campaign.

Make that effort *your* contribution to the future of *your* Association. Do it today!

Marriages

VILLARD-BORCHGRAVE. Alexandra Darielle Villard, daughter of Ambassador and Mrs. Henry C. Villard, was married to Arnaud de Borchgrave, senior editor of NEWSWEEK, on May 10, in Nassau. They will live in Geneva.

Births

MONTGOMERY. A daughter, Emily Randolph, born to Mr. and Mrs. Robert J. Montgomery, on April 24, in Washington.

Deaths

COOK. Vashti S. Cook, wife of Ambassador Mercer Cook, died on April 28 in Washington. Mrs. Cook accompanied her husband on his ambassadorial assignments to Niger and Senegal. She is survived by her husband, now Professor of French at Howard University, and two sons.

DULLES. Janet Pomeroy Avery Dulles, widow of the late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, died on May 14, in Washington. She is survived by three children, John Watson Foster Dulles, Austin, Texas, Mrs. Robert Hinshaw, New York, and the Reverend Avery Dulles, S.J., Woodstock, Maryland, and a sister, Mrs. Kenneth M. Seggerman, New York. Contributions in memory of Mrs. Dulles may be made to the American Foreign Service Scholarship Fund.

FINLEY. Harold D. Finley, FSO-retired, died October 19, 1968, in Asheville, North Carolina. Mr. Finley joined the Foreign Service in 1920 and served at Havre, Naples, Edinburgh, San Salvador, Panama, Bordeaux, Port-au-Prince, Mexico City and Managua and as Consul General at Genoa and Algiers, before his retirement. He is survived by his wife, Virginia, 19 Hilltop Road, Biltmore Forest, Asheville, North Carolina, a son and two grandsons.

LANCASTER. Helen Lancaster, widow of Nathaniel Lancaster, Jr., died on March 30, in Silver Spring, Maryland. She is survived by two sons of an earlier marriage, Etienne and Francois Didot.

FSO Junior Wins Morehead Award

Don Parks Foster, son of Consul General and Mrs. Seaborn P. Foster, has received a Morehead Award to study at the University of North Carolina. Don is a student at The Hill School of Pottstown, Pa. His award is worth $10,000 for four years of study at UNC. The Morehead Awards are granted on the basis of outstanding merit as reflected in academic ability, character and leadership.

AFSA—International Studies Association Dialogue

Two more sessions in the continuing dialogue between the Association and the International Studies Association were held over the past weeks.

Meeting at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy April 18-19, representatives of the two organizations discussed a wide range of concepts designed to encourage interchange between the academic community and the foreign affairs agencies. These concepts included the holding of citizen-diplomat seminars in Washington and the universities, exchanges of personnel between government and the campus, and expanded research in the foreign affairs field.

The two Associations drafted and sent to the Secretary on May 5 a letter embodying several of these concepts.

Another session of the two groups was held in Washington on May 23 and 24. Among the subjects discussed was the forthcoming Foreign Service Day Conference, which AFSA plans to hold again this fall.

AFSA participants in the sessions with ISA, held under the aegis of the Association's Openness Committee, included Committee Chairman Erland Heginbotham, Lannon Walker, Charles Bray, Robert Caldwell, George McFarland, Stephen Rogers, David Biltchik, Warren Clark, James Baker, and Howard Schaffer.

The Committee is working now toward additional affiliations with other types of organizations such as associations in business, labor, and other sectors of national life. These would follow the pattern established by our successful dialogue with the ISA. State, AID, and USIA employees interested in participating in these new undertakings should contact Erland Heginbotham, DU 3-3384.

Douglas Henderson, Honorary Fellow, Adlai Stevenson Institute

Douglas Henderson, career FSO and former Ambassador to Bolivia, was appointed an Honorary Fellow of The Adlai Stevenson Institute of International Affairs by Institute Director William R. Polk.

The Adlai Stevenson Institute was founded on February 5, 1967 as an autonomous, non-profit, non-partisan educational organization, headquartered at Frank Lloyd Wright's historic Robie House on the campus of The University of Chicago. It is dedicated to the development of programs which promise to have powerful and immediate impact on critical issues of domestic and international affairs.

Letter to AID Administrator

Honorable John A. Hannah
Administrator
Agency for International
Development
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Hannah:

I am writing to you on behalf of the Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Association, a professional organization of some 7,800 foreign service personnel from the Department of State, the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency. The Association has learned that you are considering requesting legislation that would place career foreign service personnel of AID under the retirement provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946.

The Board has asked me to convey to you the strong endorsement which such an initiative would receive from the Foreign Service Association. When a similar proposal was made two years ago, the Association wrote to the House Foreign Affairs Committee supporting it. Since that time, the position of the Association has evolved further. There is now an entire generation of foreign service officers from the three agencies, who have worked in close daily association with each other throughout their entire careers, and who recognize the indispensable part each plays in carrying out the total foreign affairs responsibilities of the United States. The Association is on record as favoring a single unified Foreign Service of the United States, in which personnel from all three agencies would serve under the same conditions of employment and with maximum opportunity for interchangeability of assignments. It regarded the passage of the Pell-Hays Bill, which gave full career status to USIA personnel last year, as an important forward step, and would consider any legislation extending essentially the same conditions to AID personnel as a sensible and logical move in the direction of an effective and streamlined foreign service establishment.

The Association on its own has formulated a number of other proposals for consideration of the Executive Branch, and we would be most happy to discuss these with you at some time when it is convenient for you.

Sincerely yours,
Lannon Walker
Chairman
Board of Directors

Report on Meeting with Personnel Director of AID

On April 22, members of the Association met with Mr. Joseph S. Toner, Director of AID's Office of Personnel and Manpower, and members of his staff to discuss the Association's proposal for improved allowances and benefits. A copy of the Association's letter to Mr. Rimestad of March 6, 1969 was sent to AID as some of the proposals would also affect AID members of the Association. Our discussions with AID showed the following: 1. *Displacement allowance.* Mr. Toner agreed that the Association appeared to have a reasonable proposal. He said that AID would be happy to follow any proposal the Department wished to make to remedy the situation. 2. *Out-patient treatment.* It was agreed that legislation would be required. The AID officials noted, however, that it might be difficult to make a convincing case in view of the generally positive administration of what might be seen by some as a liberal medical program. 3. *Leave due to injury or illness occasioned by official duty.* AID had also been unaware of any cases in which personnel were penalized because of a narrow definition of the regulations. 4. *Separation allowance.* Mr. Toner said he thought the proposal was reasonable. 5. *Capital gains tax.* AID agreed that the benefits should be extended to foreign affairs community personnel, but that legislation would be required. 6. *Travel advances; and 10. Trip reimbursement.* AID would support the Department in setting up advance temporary lodging allowance disbursements. 7. *Claims for personal property.* Mr. Toner said that AID supports the Department's attempts to increase the ceiling to $10,000 and would be in favor of eliminating the $50 deductible feature. 8. *Federal savings program.* AID believes that such a program would be attractive for its employees and that the Association's efforts should be supported. 9. *Eligibility for home leave.* AID does not have the same problems as the Department. 11. *Temporary lodging arrangements for home service transfer.* AID agreed that the temporary lodging regulations should be liberalized. 12. *Temporary lodging for single employees.* Mr. Toner said that AID was not aware of any problem, but would be willing to consider the problem should there be evidence that single employees have been penalized by the shorter period of time allowed them. 13. *Retirement benefits.* At the present time AID employees are not covered by the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System.

Mr. Toner pointed out that in many cases AID is governed by the Department's Regulations and legislation affecting these. Within the administrative areas where AID has its own competence, it is ready to discuss any reasonable proposals.

American Foreign Service Association
2101 E St. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037