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JULY 1969 • SIXTY CENTS

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Senator Fulbright on Dimensions of Security

An American Diplomatic Style?

Kowtow: Un-American Protocol



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
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EDITORIALS

Observations on a Predicament

THE valedictory article by the retiring Director General raises some interesting questions. The article, which appears in this issue, might more aptly have been titled "The Predicament of the Career Service," for the problems which afflict the senior ranks of the Department's Foreign Service are to be found in an only slightly attenuated form at all levels.

Barring a substantial redefinition of the role and functions of the Department's Foreign Service, it seems increasingly clear that the supply of able officers is greater than the demand for their services. In part this reflects an undisciplined promotion system which has pushed able officers ahead without regard for the positions available to them. In part, it also reflects the simpler fact that the Foreign Service has been unwilling to prune redundant positions and people or to expose its officers to training and other unconventional situations which would make them effective public servants of the kind that any President has the right to expect in an elite service.

In his brilliant book, "The Professional Diplomat," John Harr quotes a young former FSO as saying, "The trouble with most FSOs is that they are too concerned about *being* something or *becoming* something . . . and not concerned enough with *doing* anything." We agree. Unfortunately, those who do resign from the service are too frequently the officers concerned with doing something; those who remain beyond their time (whatever their grade) are too frequently concerned with being something.

This leads us to the most interesting point in the Director General's article: while the Foreign Service Act of 1946 made it clear that officers accepting Presidential appointments in fact leave the career system to accept greater rewards and risks, the career has too often wished to have it both ways. We cannot think of more than two or three occasions in the past 23 years on which the Foreign Service did not exercise its prerogative to reappoint a Presidential appointee to the career. So we have the rewards and excitement that come with the exercise of political power, as well as the security of tenure accorded the bureaucrat. The results, in large measure, have produced the predicament the Director General vividly describes.

Should we have it both ways? ■

Salute to a Colleague

THE National Civil Service League is to be congratulated for recognizing Marshall Green as an outstanding public servant.

The award, introduced by Under Secretary Elliot Richardson and presented on June 13, was richly merited and one that all of his colleagues can applaud. A tough-minded planner in time of crisis, a skilled and effective diplomat in a difficult post, and now responsible for this country's relations with a critical area of the world, Marshall Green is an outstanding example of the very best our profession can produce.

The Association salutes a distinguished professional at what we hope is only the mid-point of an equally distinguished career. ■

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
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From Ted Olson

Washington Letter

OUR town has never had the effrontery to call itself a "summer festival," as the city at the other terminus of the Metroliner claims to be. Just the same, there's no lack of entertainment during the hot, humid months, and the bill of fare lengthens year by year.

On the third of this month the National Symphony inaugurates a Summer Fiesta (yes, it does sound slightly imitative)—eleven concerts "in the air-conditioned comfort of historic Constitution Hall; no weather problems—no airplane noise," to quote the ads. That last enticement recalls those long-ago summers when the symphony played on the float at Watergate, with sound effects that Beethoven and Tchaikovsky never intended.

There will be concerts July 3, 5, 10, 12, 24 and 26 and August 7, 9, 14, 16 and 31. Guest conductors will be Morton Gould, Lloyd Geisler, William S. Hart (no kin, we presume) and Franz Allers. Soloists include pianists Leonard Pennario, Ronald Turini and Jorge Bolet, violinist Masuko Ushioda, soprano Elisabeth Schwarzkopf, a quartet of guitarists called the Romeros, and the incomparable Duke Ellington.

The orchestra will be playing also at the Merriweather Post Pavilion out in Columbia—ten Sunday evenings, with some of the same conductors and soloists. The summer season there is already under way. You've missed Dorothy Kirsten, but there's still time, if you're in the neighborhood, to hear Van Cliburn, Miss Schwarzkopf, Gordon MacRae, Victor Borge, and P.D.Q. Bach with Peter Schiekele, and to see the New York City Ballet and the Wayne Newton Show. Something for nearly every taste.

The Carter Barron Amphitheatre's bill is mostly pops, except for an engagement of the American Ballet Theatre July 21-27: Diana Ross and the Supremes, Jose Feliciano, Ray Charles, the Four Tops and David Ruffin, Ella Fitzgerald, Henry Mancini and Johnny Mathis, and Peter, Paul and Mary, with a couple more not yet announced.

Though both the National and the Arena theaters will take summer breaks, other playhouses will pick up the slack. We have a brand-new one, St. Alban's Repertory Theater—so new, indeed, that the first reviews hadn't appeared when we went to press. As the name suggests, it's on the grounds of Washington Cathedral; it seats 276; it's air-conditioned; and the professional casts will be augmented on occasion by students in SART's theater school. The first-season bill is promising: "Albert's Bridge," by Tom Stoppard, and "Not Enough Rope," by Elaine May, both American premieres; Robert Anderson's "I Never Sang for My Father," Ionesco's "A Stroll in the Air," and Peter Shaffer's "The Royal Hunt of the Sun."

The National will be dark during July. "The Boys in the Band" is scheduled for August 4-30. The Arena knocks off July 13, when "Jacques Brel Is Alive and Well and Living in Paris" ends its run, and will be closed until Oct. 28. Another Arena hit is Broadway-bound: Arthur Kopit's "Indians," which the STAR described as "a combination Wild West show, comedy of the absurd and drama with a message." You may remember Kopit as the author of "Dad, Poor Dad . . ." etc., a few seasons ago.

If you or any of the family have a secret itch to act, the Arena will give you a tryout. It's conducting "improvisational theatre workshops," taught by members of the troupe,



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and "open to talented children, teenagers and adults." July 14-August 29.

The Smithsonian's Theatre-on-the-Mall leaves experimentation to the more venturesome. Here's its summer bill: "Annie Get Your Gun," July 15-27; "Of Thee I Sing," July 30-August 10; "Guys and Dolls," August 13-September 1. A jazz festival is scheduled for the Labor Day weekend. There's a children's theater too.

Moving out into the countryside (consult your road maps):

Olney: "The Rehearsal," by Jean Anouilh, through July 13; "Joe Egg," by Peter Nichols, July 15-August 3: "Who's Afraid of Virginia Woolf?" August 5-24; "Christabel and the Rubicon," a new comedy by H. J. Moorman, August 26-September 14.

Shady Grove (where "You're a Good Man, Charlie Brown" has finally moved on after a record run of 270 performances): "Mame," with Edie Adams, July 1-20; "Golden Rainbow," with Buddy Greco and Aliza Kashi, July 22-27; Jack Benny and Shani Wallis, July 29-August 2; "Hello Sucker," with Martha Raye, August 5-10; The Temptations (whoever they are) August 11-17; "The Student Prince," with John Gary, August 19-24; "On Time," with Alfred Drake and Lana Cantrell, August 26-31; "This Was Burlesque," with Ann Corio, September 2-7.

Our Senators: an Interim Report

It used to be baseball folklore that the teams in the lead on the Fourth of July were likely to stay there. A good many photo finishes and a few post-season playoffs have demolished that notion, but Independence Day is still a convenient perch from which to look around and see how the actual standings compare with the forecasts.

It doesn't appear unduly rash to say right now that the Senators are not going to win the pennant. (Ruling out supernatural intervention, *vide* "Damn Yankees.") Pennant-winning demands reasonably consistent competence, and consistency is one virtue Ted Williams hasn't been able to instill. Sometimes the Nats look wonderful. Then again they revert to Senatorial tradition: pitchers walk the bases full and then groove one to the opposition's cleanup hitter; infielders play hot-potato with easy grounders; outfielders let flies float past, and then, after chasing down the ball, fling it wildly into the stands. Probably no team in the majors leaves more men stranded on base.

Just the same, we're going to cast prudence to the winds and go on record with the reckless prediction that our team isn't going to finish last. When the final percentages are figured it may even be a couple of rungs up the ladder.

Last April we promised to go out to the Stadium some nice day to see whether Ted Williams really could teach Eddie Brinkman to hit. Well, we went, and we couldn't have picked a better occasion. Frank Howard and Mike Epstein hit home runs. Ed Stroud stole second, which was to become a habit. And Brinkman drove in the winning run. (As of this writing, Eddie is batting .280.)

Whatever happens, our boys and their charismatic generalissimo are getting themselves talked about. See John Corry's "The Return of Ted Williams" in the June HARPER'S.

License to Non-Conform

The other day as we waited for the light to change at a busy corner horns began squawking irascibly. A haughty long black car had stopped in the middle of the intersection, in serene disregard of the NO LEFT TURN sign. When a break in the traffic permitted it to come round on the port tack we saw the DPL on the license tag. We wondered how many of the horn-blowers had seen it too, and growled something like "One of those foreigners! Wouldn't you know it?"

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Of course everybody has seen D.C. or Virginia or Maryland cars do exactly the same thing. With much less excuse, because local drivers are supposed to know where you can make a left turn and where you can't, and which lane gets you in position for what maneuver. It's easier, though, to work up a tantrum at the outsider, whether he be from Zenda or North Dakota. We are all to some degree xenophobes.

Relations between the diplomatic colony and the resident population have always been a bit edgy. It could hardly be otherwise, with so many foreign missions seeking living-space and parking places in this densely congested town. We like to believe we are a hospitable people. But even a T.H.I.S. volunteer may gulp when she learns that the mansion two doors up her quiet street is to become the residence and chancery of a newborn state. All those diplomatic parties, going on to all hours! And it's hard enough already to park anywhere near the house!

This little aggravation will be somewhat relieved, one assumes, when the old Bureau of Standards site becomes a diplomatic enclave. That's still the plan, although nothing much seems to have happened recently. There's progress, however, on another front. The Soviet Union and the United States have finally signed that agreement so long in negotiation: we get a site in downtown Moscow, and the USSR builds a new embassy on the Mount Alto grounds on Wisconsin Avenue, where the old veterans hospital buildings were pulled down quite a while ago.

That little episode at Wisconsin and Albemarle started us ruminating. There was a time when we too had diplomatic immunity, proclaimed to all within eye-shot by the CD on the rear of the car. Had we ever exploited it—not flagrantly, of course, but just a little—parking, for instance, where the international pictograph said "Don't," in the serene assurance that there wouldn't be a ticket under the windshield wiper when we returned?

Our foreign friends used to rib us gently with their own interpretations of that magic monogram: "Crazy Driver" . . . "Chauffeur Drinks." One FS mama, asked by her six-year-old what CD meant, told him: "It means that when your car knocks somebody down he gets up and apologizes." And would you believe it? A few weeks later it happened. Not exactly according to her impromptu script, but close. An elderly gentleman, with the sun in his eyes, jaywalked into the side of her slow-moving car and bounced off undamaged. He swept off his hat and begged her pardon.

Reader's Guide

HARPER'S, July—"How to Control the Military," by John Kenneth Galbraith. Ten-point program for bridling the Pentagon and its allies in Congress, State and elsewhere.

WASHINGTON MONTHLY, June—"Defense—or Offense?" Three more articles on the same subject: "Our First-Strike Capability," by Morton M. Kondracke: "The Cold-War College Think Tanks," by Berkeley Rice; "Laird of Defense," by James G. Wieghart.

SATURDAY REVIEW, May 24—"After Vietnam: The Dollars and Cents of Peace." Articles by Senator Muskie, Murray L. Weidenbaum, John R. Stark and James M. Gavin.

ATLANTIC, June—"International Conflict for Beginners," by Roger Fisher. Taking the Pueblo seizure as an example, Harvard law professor suggests criteria for judicious application of both stick and carrot to get what we want from an adversary.

NEW YORKER, May 24 and 31—"Indonesia," by Robert Shaplen. Further sample of veteran NEW YORKER correspondent's new book on Asia, which is getting good reviews. (If you missed Stevenson's cartoons on "Foreign Policy" in the May 10 issue, look them up.)

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And in the Galleries

The National is showing another sumptuous sample of the Paul Mellon collection. Constable this time—66 landscapes, seascapes and portraits. Through November 2.

The Corcoran's Dupont Center has a novel British import, "Cybernetic Serendipity." It's an experiment in putting space-age gadgetry to unorthodox and mostly non-utilitarian tricks, some of which may be art and all of which are fun.

Also:

National Collection of Fine Arts: "The Art of Tibet," July 3-September 1.

National Portrait Galley: TIME magazine covers, through August 24.

Oddments

• It's comforting (though not very) these sweltering summer afternoons to learn that our subway system will be air-conditioned—not only trains but stations. When it's built, that is, if ever.

• Some years back this department, reflecting mournfully on the current emphasis on NEWness, in merchandise and men, remarked that the only product in which mellow maturity was still valued seemed to be whisky. Now a well-known brand of Scotch advertises: "The bottle's new. And what's really important, what's inside is new too." Next thing we know we bourbon fanciers will be sipping New Taylor and New Grand-Dad.

• In case you've been wondering whatever became of Walter Winchell, he's on the masthead of the Washington EXAMINER as associate editor. That's O. Roy Chalk's weekly, passed out free on his buses every Thursday.

• Metaphor of the month: The Drummonds, Roscoe and Geoffrey, think Dr. Hayakawa is "using the kind of backbone other university administrators need . . . two-edged—firmness against violence and responsiveness to needed change without violence."

A Communication on Modern Diplomacy

TOWARD A MODERN DIPLOMACY is, no doubt, a useful contribution to the continuing dialogue as to what is necessary to improve the efficiency with which our foreign affairs are conducted. In particular, one can admire the thoroughness with which the various sub-committees tackled their respective assignments and also have a feeling of gratitude that our Foreign Service contains not only such able, but such unselfish men and women.

I felt, however, a flicker of disappointment at the apparently irrepressible surfacing of certain presuppositions, the validity of which being not immediately apparent. It is also unfortunate, although I believe it was entirely necessary for effective study, that subcommittees two through seven had to approach their tasks by ignoring one of the basic assumptions of subcommittee one.


It certainly does not stand as proven, and "Toward A Modern Diplomacy" did not engage in any examination of the matter, that it serves the national interest to have a "Unified Foreign Service to meet the needs of the principal foreign affairs agencies of the Government." (Paragraph B-E. Annex A (1), page 23.)

Specifically of interest to one who might be regarded as having a "parochial" viewpoint is the two paragraph statement, (page 24), which reads as follows:

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
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pertaining to their functional area or areas of interest. They should be enabled to recommend the temporary assignment of employees of their respective agencies to the Foreign Service, participate in the development of specialized training programs be represented on promotion panels, and, in most cases, be represented on the Board of the Foreign Service. Such participation, we believe, is essential if the concept of a unified Foreign Service is to succeed.

With the foregoing in mind, the relationships with the Department of Commerce and Labor should be reaffirmed. The needs of the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Treasury Department Attache system should be served by the Foreign Service of the United States.

The nub of the issue lies in subcommittee one's assessment of the role to be played by "allied" agencies in the servicing of those agencies' interests and, in a larger sense, based upon a properly structured foreign affairs service, the ability to arrive at a determination of what, on balance, is the national interest. No discussion or argumentation is adduced to support the subcommittee's recommendation. The problem is assumed away.

In regard to this issue, Working Group I of the Subcommittee on Organization and Leadership does have something to say (See Area of Consensus, paragraph two, page 48). Here the Subcommittee rightly notes:

> The foreign affairs community can be defined in two categories: first, there is that community which consists of the agencies fully concerned with foreign affairs: State Department, AID, USIA and the Peace Corps. Secondly, there is a larger community which includes those agencies which have important interests in foreign affairs but which are primarily oriented otherwise: Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior. Defense is a special case but falls mainly in the second category. The importance of making this distinction is that the State Department might legitimately expect, under some arrangements, to exercise authority over the activities of the first category, whereas its relationship to the agencies in the second category will be that of first among equals where foreign affairs are concerned. In the latter case, these major Departments are heavily oriented towards domestic considerations. *They and State represent different facets of policy which must be balanced in arriving at national policy. State cannot expect its particular set of criteria, derived from foreign policy needs, to be controlling with regard to questions it shares with these Departments. National policy must be arrived at through a process of bargaining among the various interests, with final positions to be made by the President."**

With the above background from the report, let us approach the question of a foreign affairs establishment, equipped to operate effectively and to serve the national interest, from a different set of postulates. Let us grant that these postulates may be in error but also let us grant that they are worthy of examination.

It has been assumed that the national interest is best served, with given exceptions, by a "unified Foreign Service." Is this assumption valid? First, organizationally, is it reasonable to burden a foreign service officer with the task of being all things to all agencies and to have the duty of forcibly representing all components of the complex balance of interests which must be achieved in a determination of what is the national interest on a specific issue?

Secondly, fairness aside, is it possible to design a unified

*Emphasis supplied.

personnel system and, especially, to create an attitude of mind in both junior and senior officers which will not result in the automatic subordination of "other agency" interests to the Department of State's "particular set of criteria, derived from foreign policy needs?"

It seems inevitable under a "unified Foreign Service" that a lack of balance is automatically assured. Institutional organization along the lines recommended will produce, as it has in the past produced, distorted assessments of what course of policy or negotiating stance to assume.

A knowledgeable bureaucrat with considerable first hand experience in US overseas missions is not prepared to doubt that the Department of State exercises substantial institutional dominance in the determination of foreign affairs issues. This is as it should be and, in most instances, this position of preponderant weight is exercised wisely. However, dissolution of "other agencies" quasi-independent foreign representation, and the resulting effective blocking of "back channels" of communication to other Departments, would immediately assure the Department of State additional ascendancy in imposing its particular set of criteria in Washington departmental debates over decisions and operating actions. It would also remove an existing restraint upon the Department of State's willingness to consider other Departmental viewpoints in its recommendations. Such a position of absolute dominance, I submit, is not in the national interest.

As was succinctly stated in paragraph one of the steering committee's summary, "Those who will not learn from history are condemned to repeat it." It is a flaw in the report "Towards A Modern Diplomacy" that it does not explore the history of a "unified Foreign Service" either in fact or in theory before recommending its reconstitution.

May I once again affirm my admiration for the dedicated men and women who have given of their time and talents in the formulation of the study, "Toward A Modern Diplomacy." May I also urge further examination and discussion of the concept of "a unified Foreign Service."

—BRICE K. MEEKER

The Hague

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by S. I. Nadler



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"I think that we have perceived more menace in the world around us than is actually there. I believe that we have had more choice than we have known."

Dimensions of Security

J. W. FULBRIGHT

A statement by Senator J. W. Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, before the National War College on May 19, 1969.

In the old Western movies there was a standard climax in which the villain emerged from his hideout shielded behind the captive heroine and snarling: "Shoot me and the girl dies!" I perceive in this old melodrama a kind of analogue to my own relations with the military. In these years of criticizing our war policy in Vietnam, I have thought a number of times that I had my fellow politicians in the executive branch cornered—intellectually, that is—only to have them burst out of their hideout shielded behind the military in the role of the heroine, and snarling: "Shoot me and the girl dies!"

I am tired—as I expect you may be—of seeing the military used as a hostage for policies made by civilian officials. I am tired of having my criticism of the war in Vietnam interpreted as an attack on our soldiers in the field. In fact it is no such thing. The courage and endurance of our fighting men command the respect of all Americans; the fault in our war policy lies not with them but with the political decisions which committed them to an impossible task. We have been trying to defeat a nationalist insurgency on behalf of a government which has shown itself incapable of inspiring either the support of its people or the fighting spirit of its army. For reasons having nothing to do with the fighting abilities of our GIs or the leadership qualities of their officers, that task has been found impossible—not in the sense that it is beyond our military means but because it is beyond any military means that we have been morally and politically willing to employ.

Some of us have perhaps not been as aware as we should of the anguish that Vietnam has involved for our professional soldiers. In the two World Wars, and even the Korean War, our armed forces were bolstered by stalwart allies and strong public support at home. Both of these are lacking in Vietnam: our client is a weak reed and the American people are divided and demoralized. These, I am well aware, are heavy psychological burdens for an army facing a resourceful and tenacious enemy.

In addition, there is the specter of having to settle for something less than victory, perhaps even something less than a standoff. That would be a new experience for American soldiers, whose morale has been built not only on their unbroken history of success but on their "can-do" spirit in the face of any challenge. That spirit has served the American people well but it also contains a pitfall: it can lead an army to misjudge its prospects, by gauging them more on the basis of its own elan than a cold appreciation of the facts of the situation.

We politicians have a different standard. In our dealings with each other victories are rare; standoffs are routine; and sometimes we get beaten. Quite obviously soldiers cannot conduct wars by the pliant standards of parliamentarianism. But there is value in the experience of settling for less than you had hoped for, of trimming your sails, and carefully distinguishing between what you can do and what you cannot do. More than a few wars have been lost—I think of France in 1870 and Germany in 1914—in part because soldiers told their civilian chiefs that they could do more than it turned out they could do. And more than once in history a peace has been lost because politicians persuaded themselves that they could do more than it turned out they could do. In this connection, it occurs to me that few Presidential advisers, military or civilian, ever served their country and President better than General Ridgway did when he advised President Eisenhower in 1954, not that we could not intervene and win in Indochina, but that we could not do it at reasonable cost, or to any useful end. I think it is a great misfortune that there were no such persuasive "no-men" serving the Johnson Administration in 1964.

Mistakes are not liquidated with glory, and Vietnam, I believe, has been a mistake. At such time and by whatever means this war is ended, we are all likely to emerge somewhat sobered. There will be little for any of us to be proud of—except for the soldiers who fought so hard in so unpromising a cause. I stress this point to you as soldiers not only because I believe it to be true



but, frankly, because I have had the fear that, out of an exaggerated feeling of their own responsibility for the stalemate in Vietnam, some of our military leaders have been professing an unwarranted optimism about the war, thereby encouraging its continuation.

The Dilemma of Ends and Means

Having emphasized as clearly as I know how that I have no criticism to make of military *men*, or their performance in Vietnam, I turn now to the influence in our affairs that I *do* criticize: not the military but *militarism*, and its effects upon American life. I do not propose to belabor you with a discourse on the military-industrial-labor-university complex. I expect you have heard something about it already—more perhaps than you have cared to hear. Nor do I propose to recite the list of our foreign installations and the names of the countries to which we have committed ourselves militarily by one means or another. I propose instead to suggest some of the ways in which our far-flung military commitments are bringing about profound changes in the character of our society and government—changes which are slowly undermining democratic procedure and values, and which, taken together, have set us on the path toward authoritarian government.

My theme is the relationship of ends to means, the connection between the objective of our foreign relations and the nature of the policies we pursue. The ultimate test of any foreign policy is not its short-term tactical success but its effectiveness in defending the basic values of the society. When a policy becomes incompatible with, or subversive of, those values, it is a bad policy, regardless of its technical or tactical effectiveness. I think we would all agree that the central, commanding goal of American foreign policy is the preservation of constitutional government in a free society. My apprehension is that we are subverting that goal by the very means chosen to defend it.

Confronted in the last generation with a series of challenges from dynamic totalitarian powers, we have felt ourselves compelled, gradually and inadvertently, to imitate some of the methods of our adversaries, seeking to fight fire with fire. I do not share the view that American fears of Soviet and Chinese aggressiveness have been uniformly paranoiac, although I think there have been a fair number of instances of that. My point is that the very objective we pursue—the preservation of a free society—proscribes certain kinds of policies to us even though they might be the most tactically expedient. We cannot, without doing to ourselves the very injury that we seek to secure ourselves against from foreign adversaries, pursue policies which rely primarily on the threat or use of force, because policies of force are inevitably disruptive of democratic values. Alexis de Tocqueville, that wisest of observers of American democracy, put it this way:

> "War does not always give democratic societies over to military government, but it must invariably and immeasurably increase the powers of civil government; it must almost automatically concentrate the direction of all men and the control of all things in the hands of the government. If that does not lead to despotism by sudden violence, it leads men gently in that direction by their habits.
>
> "All those who seek to destroy the freedom of the democratic nations must know that war is the surest and shortest means to accomplish this. That is the very first axiom of their science."[1]

For more than a decade out of the last three we have been engaged in large-scale warfare, and for the rest of that period we have been engaged in the cold war and in ever more costly preparations for war. In the wake of our disappointment with the United Nations in the 40s, we have taken it upon ourselves to preserve order and stability in much of the world, purporting to do on our own the things that Wilson and Roosevelt hoped to accomplish through world organization but never dreamed of America doing on its own. As I have said, I am not one of those who believe that these vast commitments were taken on out of delusion or the conscious lust for power. The threat, though exaggerated and distorted in some instances, has been real enough in others, but in either case the effect has been the same for our internal life. War, and the chronic threat of war, have been carrying us, "gently" by our "habits," toward despotism.

The dilemma involved in all this for a soldier must be a particularly agonizing one. It must sound as though he is being asked to fight with one hand behind his back, accepting limits upon his own stock in trade of which his adversary is free. And that is exactly what you, as soldiers, are being asked to do. You are asked to conceive of security in a dimension broader than that of your own trade. You are asked to conceive of security in terms of ends as well as means, in terms of the procedures and values of a free society as well as the most efficient means of thwarting an adversary.

There are times, to be sure, when a threat may seem so great and imminent as to warrant the circumvention of democratic procedure. There are times when war is thrust upon you. But there are times when a threat turns out in retrospect to have been less ominous than it seemed; there are times when we have some choice in

[1]Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1966), Vol. II, ch. 22, p. 625.

the matter of war and peace. Psychologists tell us that our perceptions are only partly reflections of the real world; the other part is determined by our own expectations. I think that we have perceived more menace in the world around us than is actually there. I believe that we have had more choice than we have known. Korea was perhaps forced upon us; Vietnam was not. Pearl Harbor left us with no choice; the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin left us with ample choice. The Cuban missile crisis may have warranted unusual procedures; the Bay of Pigs and the Dominican Republic patently did not.

Because of the kind of country we are, we cannot, except in the most exceptional circumstances, allow foreign policy to take priority over domestic and constitutional requirements. Given a choice between the use of force and less certain but peaceful methods, it is in our interests to take a chance on the latter. Given a choice between efficient emergency procedures and cumbersome democratic ones, it is in our interests to gamble on the latter—in full consciousness of the possibility that our democratic procedures may cost us embarrassment or worse in our foreign policy.

It is quite beside the point to contend, as some of the advocates of the anti-ballistic missile contend, that it is safer to "err on the side of security," because security is involved on both sides of the argument. One has to do with the security of *means*, the other with the security of *ends*.

For three decades we have been erring on the side of the security of means. The consequences of that error are only now coming clearly into view. I should like to suggest what some of these consequences have been—economic, political and moral—and how they have undermined our security in its broader dimension.

The Price of Empire

Every nation has a double identity: it is both a *power* engaged in foreign relations and a *society* serving the interests of its citizens. As a *power* the nation draws upon but does not replenish its people's economic, political and moral resources. The replenishment of wealth—in this broader than economic sense—is a function of domestic life, of the nation as a society. In the last three decades the United States has been heavily preoccupied with its role as the world's greatest power, to the neglect of its societal responsibilities, and at incalculable cost to our national security. The economic cost is reflected in the disparity of almost ten to one between federal military expenditures since World War II and regular national budgetary expenditures for education, welfare, health and housing. The political cost is reflected in the steady concentration of power in the hands of the national executive, in a long-term trend toward authoritarian government. The moral cost is reflected in the unhappiness of the American people, most particularly in the angry alienation of our youth.

SPEAKING first of the economics of our global role: I have been told many times that, in terms of our gross national product, we can well afford to do the things that need to be done at home without reducing our activities abroad. The answer to that assertion is that we are *not* in fact rebuilding our cities; we are not overcoming poverty and building schools and houses on anything approaching a scale commensurate with the need; nor are we effectively combating crime, pollution, and urban and suburban ugliness.

Even if the economic resources were there, the psychological resources are not. The war in Vietnam has drained off not only money but political energy and leadership, and public receptiveness to reform. The war has totally altered the atmosphere of a few years ago, when hopes and confidence were high and the American people seemed willing to embark upon an era of social reform. An excellent start was made with the landmark legislation of 1964 and 1965, but Vietnam cut that short, dividing the country and the Congress, and inciting dissent and disorder. These in turn have given rise to a middle class reaction based on the fear of violence and anarchy. The result is an atmosphere uncongenial to reform, urgently needed though it is. Until the war in Vietnam is ended, there can be no prospect of the nation's more sober and generous instincts reasserting themselves, no prospect of a renewal of the nation's strength at its vital domestic source.

Having promised not to lecture you on the military-industrial-labor-academic complex, I confine myself to this one observation: With military expenditures providing the livelihood of some 10 percent of our work force; with 22 thousand major corporated defense contractors and another 100 thousand subcontractors; with defense plants or installations located in 363 of the 435 Congressional districts; with the Department of Defense spending $7.5 billion on research and development this year, making it the largest consumer of research output in the nation—millions of Americans whose only interest is in making a decent living have acquired a vested interest in an economy geared to war. These benefits, once obtained, are not easily parted with. Every new weapons system or military installation soon acquires a constituency—a process which is aided and abetted by the perspicacity with which Pentagon officials award lucrative contracts and establish new plants and installations in the districts of influential Members of Congress. I have not the slightest doubt that, if the anti-ballistic missile is deployed, it will soon acquire its own powerful constituency, and then we will be saddled with it—for reasons wholly independent of its ostensible military utility.

According to current intelligence calculations, made in terms of equivalent real purchasing power, the Russians are spending only three-fourths as much as we are on defense. Nonetheless, we are told, they threaten to pull ahead of us in strategic weapons and we must be prepared to counter that threat. I do not understand why they should be getting so much more for their money than we are. Perhaps the fault lies in inferior American efficiency—a disconcerting thought. Perhaps it lies in the lack of legislative oversight of the defense budget comparable in rigor and thoroughness to that exercised over the much smaller budgets of the other departments.

Be that as it may, by any standard the amounts spent on defense have become staggeringly disproportionate to the rest of the economy. It fills me with dismay when

Department of Defense officials suggest that, as part of a "grand design" for strategic policy, we may be forced to "win" an arms race with the Russians by relying on our superior resources to spend them into bankruptcy. Such a strategy puts me in mind of the practice among the Indians of the Pacific northwest known as the "potlatch." Starting as a rivalry in gift-giving for the sake of prestige, the practice degenerated, as the tribes became wealthier, into competitive orgies of waste and destruction. An anthropologist describes it as follows:

> ". . . No longer did the potlatch serve its traditional functions of redistributing wealth, validating rank, and making valued alliances. The wealth of these new rich seemed limitless, more than they could ever consume at a potlatch. So they instead destroyed vast amounts of wealth before the horrified eyes of the guests, as well as the other contenders, to dramatize the extent of their holdings. Fortunes were tossed into potlatch fires; canoes were destroyed; captives were killed. The competing claimants had no alternative but to destroy even more property at *their* potlatches.
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> * * * * *
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> "A contender for rank ultimately found himself in a position whereby the only way he could humiliate a wealthy rival was to destroy one of the precious coppers"—a kind of bank note representing vast wealth. "The act was equivalent to wiping out all the debts owed to him. It was an incredible price to pay, but the man who made such a dramatic gesture no doubt rose meteorically in rank."[2]



QUITE as inevitably as if it were deliberate, our imperial role in the world has generated a trend toward authoritarian government.

Vested by the Constitution *exclusively* in the Congress, the power to initiate war has now passed under the virtually exclusive control of the executive. The "dog of war," which Jefferson thought had been tightly leashed to the legislature, has now passed under the virtually exclusive control of the executive. The President's powers as commander-in-chief, which Hamilton defined as "nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces," are now interpreted as conferring upon the President full constitutional power to commit the armed forces to conflict without the consent of Congress. On the one hand it is asserted that the initiation of an all-out nuclear war could not possibly await Congressional authorization; on the other hand it is contended that limited wars are inappropriate for Congressional action. There being, to the best of my knowledge, no other kinds of war besides "limited" and "unlimited," it would seem that the Congressional war power has been effectively nullified.

The treaty power of the Senate has also been effectively usurped. Once regarded as the only constitutional means of making a significant foreign commitment, while executive agreements were confined to matters of routine or triviality, the treaty has now been reduced to only one of a number of methods of entering binding foreign engagements. In current usage the term "commitment" is used to refer to engagements deriving sometimes from treaties but more often from executive agreements and even simple, sometimes casual, declarations.

Thailand provides an interesting illustration. Under the SEATO Treaty the United States has only two specific obligations to Thailand: to act "in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event that Thailand is overtly attacked, and to "consult immediately" with the other SEATO allies should Thailand be threatened by subversion. But the presence of 50 thousand American troops in Thailand, assigned there by the executive acting entirely on its own authority, creates a *de facto* commitment going far beyond the SEATO Treaty. In addition, on March 6, 1962, former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman issued a joint declaration in which Secretary Rusk expressed "the firm intention of the United States to aid Thailand, its ally and historic friend, in resisting Communist aggression and subversion." This, obviously, goes far beyond the SEATO Treaty.

An even more striking illustration of the upgrading of a limited agreement into a *de facto* military obligation is provided by the series of agreements negotiated over the last 16 years for the maintenance of bases in Spain. Initiated under an executive agreement in 1953, the bases agreement was significantly upgraded by a joint declaration issued by Secretary Rusk and Spanish Foreign Minister Castiella in 1963 asserting that a "threat to either country" would be the occasion for each to "take such action as it may consider appropriate within the framework of its constitutional processes." In strict constitutional law, this agreement, whose phrasing closely resembles that of our multilateral security, treaties, would be binding on no one except for Mr. Rusk himself; in fact it is what might be called the "functional equivalent" of a treaty ratified by the Senate. Acknowledging even more explicitly the extent of our *de facto*

[2]Peter Farb, *Man's Rise to Civilization as Shown by the Indians of North America from Primeval Times to the Coming of the Industrial State* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1968), pp. 150, 151.

commitment to Spain, General Wheeler, acting under instructions from Secretary Rusk, provided Spanish military authorities in 1968 with a secret memorandum asserting that the presence of American armed forces in Spain constituted a more significant security guarantee than would a written agreement.

Quite aside from questions of the merit or desirability of these commitments, the means by which they were incurred must be a matter of great concern to anyone who is concerned with the integrity of our constitutional processes. For at least thirty years power over our foreign relations has been flowing into the hands of the executive. So far has this process advanced that, in the recently expressed view of the Committee on Foreign Relations, "it is no longer accurate to characterize our government, in matters of foreign relations, as one of separated powers checked and balanced against each other."[3] To a limited extent this constitutional imbalance has come about as the result of executive usurpation; to a greater extent it has been caused by the failure of Congress to meet its responsibilities and defend its prerogatives in the field of foreign relations; but most of all it has been the result of chronic warfare and crisis, of that all but inevitable concentration of powers in time of emergency of which Alexis de Tocqueville took notice over a century ago.

Under circumstances of continuing threat to the national security, it is hardly surprising that the military itself should have become an active, and largely unregulated, participant in the policy making process. Bringing to bear a degree of discipline, unanimity and strength of conviction seldom found among civilian officials, the able and energetic men who fill the top ranks of the armed services have acquired an influence disproportionate to their numbers on the nation's security policy. The Department of Defense itself has become a vigorous partisan in our politics, exerting great influence on the President, on the military committees of Congress, on the "think tanks" and universities to which it parcels out lucrative research contracts, and on public opinion. I was, quite frankly, disturbed to learn some weeks ago that the Department of the Army actually planned a national publicity campaign, involving exhibits and planted magazine articles to be solicited from civilian scientists, in order to "sell" the ABM to the American public and to counteract the criticisms of Congressmen and the scientific community.

Again, let me emphasize that the danger I perceive here is not military men but *militarism*. Applying the same principle to the executive as a whole, the danger of executive dominance over our foreign relations has nothing to do with the wisdom or lack of it of individual officials. A threat to democracy arises from *any* great concentration of unregulated power. I would no more want unregulated power to be wielded by the Congress than by the executive or the military—not even by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. The principle is an old and familiar one, and is just as valid today as it was when Jefferson expressed it in the simple maxim: "Whatever power in any government is independent, is absolute also."

In recent months the Senate has shown a growing awareness of the need for restoring a degree of constitutional balance in the making of our foreign policy. To a great extent this new attitude has been reflected in the debate on the anti-ballistic missile and a general disposition to bring the military budget under the same scrutiny that has always been applied to the budgets of the civilian agencies. In addition, the Senate is about to debate a "national commitments" resolution, the essential purpose of which is to remind the Congress of its constitutional responsibilities both for the making of treaties and the initiation of war.

These, I believe, are hopeful and necessary steps, but in the long run it is unlikely that constitutional government can be preserved solely by the vigorous exercise of legislative authority. No matter what safeguards of attitude and procedure we employ, a foreign policy of chronic warfare and intervention has its own irreversible dynamic, and that is toward authoritarian government. A democracy simply cannot allow foreign policy to become an end in itself, or anything more than an instrument toward the central, dominating goal of securing democratic values within our own society. I would indeed lay it down as a fairly confident prediction that, if American democracy is destroyed within the next generation, it will not be destroyed by the Russians or the Chinese but by ourselves, by the very means we use to defend it. That is why it seems to me so urgent for us to change the emphasis of our policy, from the security of means to the security of ends.

FINALLY, I would like to say a word about the moral price of our imperial role in the world. The success of a foreign policy, as we have been discovering, depends not only on the availability of military and economic resources but, at least as much, upon the support given it by our people. As we have also been discovering, that support cannot be gained solely by eloquent entreaty, much less by the devices of public relations. In the long run it can only be secured by devising policies which are broadly consistent with the national character and traditional values of the society, and these—products of the total national experience—are beyond the reach of even the most effective modern techniques of political manipulation.

History did not prepare the American people for the kind of role we are now playing in the world. From the time of the framing of the Constitution to the two World Wars our experience and values—if not our uniform practice—conditioned us not for the unilateral exercise of power but for the placing of limits upon it. Perhaps it was a vanity but we supposed that we could be an example for the world—an example of rationality and restraint. We supposed, as Woodrow Wilson put it, that a rational world order could be created embodying "not a balance of power but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."

Our practice has not lived up to that ideal but, from the earliest days of the Republic, the ideal has retained its hold upon us, and every time we have acted inconsist-

(*Continued on page* 45)

[3] *National Commitments*, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Res. 85, United States Senate, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 7.

"Diplomacy is the expression of national strength in terms of gentlemanly discourse"—McClintock

WANTED:
An American Diplomatic Style

KINGDON W. SWAYNE

The author is a retired FSO, most of whose 20 years in harness (1946-66) were spent in the Far East. He tells us that his return to his native heath in Bucks County happily coincided with the founding of Bucks County Community College, with which he has established, he says, "a beautiful, symbiotic relationship." He has taught history, geography and political science.

IN 1963 the author had an opportunity, during a sabbatical break from his normal routine as a Foreign Service officer, to undertake a broad study of American diplomatic method. The study was made possible by the cooperation of 70 of the 89 "country desk officers" in the Department of State, each of whom completed a 13-page questionnaire about the country with which he dealt and the techniques employed by the United States in dealing with that country. Since the subject is of some delicacy, the information was supplied to the author on a privileged basis. The full study must remain privileged, but it is now possible to publish some extracts.

The main body of the study was addressed to fairly specific questions about the impact of differences in national power, ideology, and culture on the processes of communication between governments. This essay, drawn from the final chapter of the study, will be addressed to the broader question of creating a coherent American diplomatic style.

Of all the thousands of commentators on international politics who have found their way into print, Harold Nicolson stands preeminent as the authority on the special world of the diplomat. He exhibits a frank nostalgia for the good old days, when the world of diplomacy was characterized, in his words, by ". . .the conception of Europe as the center of gravity; the idea that the Great Powers, constituting the Concert of Europe, were more important and more responsible than the Small Powers; the existence in every country of a trained diplomatic service possessing common standards of professional conduct; and the assumption that negotiation must always be a process rather than an episode, and that at every stage it must remain confidential."[1]

Nicolson detected in this world two competing diplomatic styles, the "warrior or heroic" and the "mercantile or shopkeeper."[2] As the names imply, the "warrior" school looked on diplomacy as a deadly business in which victory is the objective, while the "mercantile" school sought to create a durable relationship to the mutual benefit of both parties. But over a span of several centuries this incipient dichotomy was usually muted by the unifying forces mentioned above. These forces fostered the development of a single set of diplomatic "rules of the game" which all great powers in Europe found it in their interest to follow.

When we turn to the mid-twentieth century, however, we see a diplomatic world characterized by ideological conflict, cultural diversity, rapid technological innovation, irresponsibility, inexperience, egalitarianism, the widespread use of propaganda, and intense public scrutiny demanding quick results from highly dramatized episodes. Nicolson chides the American failure to maintain a consistent diplomatic style under the changed circumstances, in these words:

> "It may be, for all I know, that the President, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the Foreign Affairs (sic!) Committee of the Senate, are unanimous regarding the aim to be achieved: but they are not unanimous as to the means to be adopted. The variability of the diplomatic method employed suggests opportunism rather than continuity: this is an unfortunate impression, a Machiavellian impression, for a great good giant to convey."[3]

The study from which this essay is drawn reached the general conclusion that the United States was in fact reacting to the "warrior" diplomacy of the Communist Bloc with a "warrior" diplomacy of its own, while following a predominantly "mercantile" style in its dealings with the rest of the world. The tentative beginnings of a third, "cross-cultural" diplomatic style were also noted. By contrast with the "good old days," factors tending to foster an overarching consistency of diplomatic method now appear to be overridden by the demands of policy in a vastly more complicated world.

Assuming for the moment, as Nicolson does, that consistency of diplomatic method is both possible and desirable in today's world, let us survey briefly the various diplomatic arenas that such a consistent diplomatic method would have to encompass.

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[1] Nicolson, Sir Harold, *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*. New York, Macmillan Co., 1954, p. 77.

[2] Nicolson, Sir Harold, *Diplomacy*. 2nd ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1950, p. 52 ff.

[3] *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, p. 92.

First and easiest arena is the major nations of the West. The basic factors that governed the development of the traditional "mercantile" style in Western Europe have changed somewhat, but remain sufficiently stable to permit us to carry on diplomatic relations in that region in substantially the old style, a style that has over the centuries demonstrated its usefulness. One could argue that this category of the "major nations of the West" is unrealistic, for by contrast with the power of the United States the power of Britain and Germany is so small that we should treat them as friendly small nations rather than as friendly equals. For the present, at least, this argument should be rejected on the pragmatic ground that traditional diplomacy as among equals works well in Western Europe and generally works to our advantage. It would be dangerous to try to replace this diplomacy with an untested alternative based on some kind of specific acknowledgement of inequality. Even if such an alternative were perfected, it would probably develop, as suggested below, from a donor-donee relationship inapplicable to US relations with the aid donor nations of Western Europe.

Second, because of its power and hostility to us, the Soviet Union stands alone in a special category. There appears for the present little alternative to regarding US-USSR political intercourse as "a continuation of war by other means," to turn Clausewitz's famous dictum upside down. However, unless one accepts outright war with the Soviet Union as inevitable, a truculent, "warrior"-like stance must be tempered with elements of "mercantilism" to take advantage of opportunities to affirm such common interests as exist and to influence the development of attitudes consistent with the kind of world order we hope to create.

Third, relations with the Soviet satellites require the same mixture of the "warrior" and the "mercantilist," though in different proportions. Polycentrism in the Bloc is clearly in our interest. To help it flourish, there must always be an actively expressed readiness to rebuild ties between the satellites and the West, requiring as much emphasis as feasible on "mercantilism."

Fourth, there is the ever growing arena of relations with the small nations of the Free World. Here we appear to lay ourselves open most frequently to charges of inconsistency in diplomatic style and method. This is a particularly troubling area, in which traditional diplomacy offers few guidelines, for the old diplomacy was developed by a community of equals in a period when small European nations were seen but not heard and small nations elsewhere were conquered and colonized. It has little to say on the subject of relations between nations that are sovereign equals in theory but not at all comparable in fact.

Perhaps a clue to the creation of a consistent diplomatic style in this arena lies in one definition of diplomacy suggested by Ambassador Robert McClintock.[4] "Diplomacy is the expression of national strength in terms of gentlemanly discourse." This definition suggests that it might be possible to base a diplomatic style on a realistic recognition of differences in national power, but combined with the qualities of patience, tact, understanding, probity, intelligence, discernment, and charm implied in the word "gentlemanly." In this era when the major powers are all aid donors and the lesser states mostly aid recipients, perhaps such a style could be developed out of a more realistic recognition of foreign aid as a prime instrument of national power. The Alliance for Progress illustrates the concept, on paper at least. It commits aid recipients to policies consistent with our concept of the direction in which the world community should develop, thus employing our national power to help achieve our national objectives. But the central idea of the Alliance has so far been expressed mostly in hortatory form. A clear and consistent diplomatic method to give concrete substance to its noble blueprint has not yet emerged.

[4] *Thoughts on an American Diplomatic Style,* Foreign Service Journal, February 1962.

Finally, there is the great group of countries, a few important but most small, and representing all parts of the ideological spectrum, whose cultural backgrounds differ sharply from our own. The ideal diplomatic style for dealing with these countries may contain elements of the styles discussed above, to reflect the relative importance or ideological similarity of the country concerned. But it should also include a special element to meet the problem of establishing both social and intellectual rapport across cultural barriers. Social rapport is relatively easy to manage if Western gentlemanliness is judiciously blended with the social amenities of the other culture. Intellectual rapport is a far greater challenge. It demands not only a profound knowledge of the thought patterns of the traditional culture. It also requires a precise judgment of the extent to which the individual foreign diplomat has departed from the thought pattern of his traditional culture and adopted those of the West, not only in actuality but in his own concept of himself. The American diplomat presently has little to support him in this difficult area except his intuition. We must find a better method.

These, then, are the elements which a successful, consistent diplomatic style in the modern world must encompass. Our examination of these elements shows two major areas where improvement is needed: the development of a consistent style for dealing with small nations, and the development of a reliable method of establishing intellectual rapport across cultural barriers. But beyond these questions of detail lies the basic question: need we, and can we, merge all these elements into a consistent, understandable diplomatic style?

As to the need for such a diplomatic style, it could be argued that the demands on diplomacy in the modern world are so diverse that a search for coherence and consistency may produce only an unnecessary strait jacket not only for our diplomacy but also for our policy. On the other hand, the leadership role of the United States imposes special responsibilities. An effective leader must be many things, but

above all he must give coherence to the group he leads and must communicate to them a sense of this coherence. This requirement of leadership demands of the United States both a coherent style of diplomatic communication and a willingness to accept some constraints on complete flexibility of policy. Furthermore, coherence and continuity of diplomatic method are essential to the establishment of mutual confidence and trust between leader and followers, another *sine qua non* of effective leadership. Confidence and trust are impossible if the parameters of diplomatic method, both as used by the leader and as acceptable to the leader when practiced by others, are not well defined and well understood. There thus appears to be a clear need to develop a new continuity and coherence of diplomatic method as a necessary tool of effective world leadership.

What are the elements from which this new continuity and coherence can be developed? The elements we have examined so far in our *tour d'horizon* point up the need for diversity in our diplomatic style. Where can we look for countervailing elements promoting unity?

First, we must look to our ultimate foreign policy goals, beyond the immediate policies for dealing with a world in the massive flux of several simultaneous revolutions. For if we do not look to these goals, we may find that we have fallen into the Marxist fallacy that the ends justify the means, and discover to our sorrow that we have lost our goals by choosing the wrong means to attain them. The major goal of US policy is a world in which all are free to pursue their own destinies, and no country tries to dominate any other. A diplomatic method consistent with this goal must establish definite bounds beyond which it will not seek to interfere in or dominate the affairs of others.

Secondly, we must look to the foundation on which the new diplomatic method will be erected. This foundation can be no other than the traditional "mercantile" method, for this is the traditional method of the United States and its major allies, and a clean break with the past is neither feasible nor desirable. This is the method which to quote Nicolson again, rests on "moral influence" and demands of its diplomats the virtues of "truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty,"[5] and prefers gullibility to suspicion.[6]

Finally, we must look to the national character of the American people. The diplomatic style of a democracy must reflect its "national style." If it fails to do so, it risks both loss of contact with those it seeks to represent and confusion in the minds of those abroad who would see one American image projected through public media and another through American diplomacy. But where in the national character can we seek our inspiration? The American is almost schizophrenic in his simultaneous devotion to generosity and the hard bargain, to egalitarianism and a sense of racial and cultural superiority, to optimism and a deep suspicion that communism can be eradicated only by force, to humanitarianism and a massive indifference, to peace and emotional outbursts of violence.

There are some Americans who would sincerely employ the darker virtues in this catalog as the dominant element in our diplomatic style. But those who would rely on the darker virtues become conspicuously scarce as we move through the spectrum of American society toward those individuals who have experienced responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs. Those who have had to face the reality of decision have found that successful diplomacy must be based on the bright virtues of our vision of a peaceful world, of traditional diplomatic method, and of the American character. Perhaps uppermost in their minds as the recurrent postwar crises have been faced has been the urge not only to assure the security of our society but also to improve its inner qualities.

Opponents of this view rightly ask whether a diplomatic style dominated by the bright virtues will be strong enough to meet the demands of the struggle against communism. It is impossible to give a direct affirmative answer to this question, but several helpful things can be said. First, it must be remembered that we are talking about diplomatic style, not about policy. Such a diplomatic style need not impose any greater constraints on policy than those imposed by our ultimate goals, our tradition, and our character. It is quite possible to be firm without being rigid, to seek accommodation without appeasement. Secondly, if we should abandon these bright virtues in order to win the struggle with communism, we will, by that very act, have lost the struggle, for we will have voluntarily abandoned what we are fighting for. So we have no choice but to seek to create a diplomatic style dominated by the bright virtues of our own culture, but equal to the task of dealing with alien cultures and ideologies.

One of these bright virtues is optimism, so it is appropriate to end this essay with Harold Nicolson's prediction that we will be successful in this task, a prediction he puts in these words:

> Now that the old disciplines of Pope and Emperor, the old correctives of the Concert of Europe and the Balance of Power, have been dispensed with, it is regrettable that the authority exercised by the United States is not more consistent, convincing and reliable.
>
> Yet I am not pessimistic about the evolution of their diplomatic method. I know that the Americans possess more virtue than any giant Power has yet possessed. I know that, although they pretend to deride the lessons of history, they are astonishingly quick at digesting the experience of others. And, I believe that the principles of sound diplomacy, which are immutable, will in the end prevail, and thus calm the chaos with which the transition between the old diplomacy and the new has for the moment bewildered the world.[7]

[5] *Diplomacy*, p. 104.

[6] Nicolson quotes Lord Grey to this effect. *The Evolution of Diplomatic Method*, p. 93.

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

Part II of Chapter 6 of "The Professional Diplomat" continues with "On Being a Success," and covers "Prescribed Behavior," "The Processes of the Service" and "Conclusion/A Model of Socialization."

The Professional Diplomat

Characteristics, Norms, Attitudes

JOHN E. HARR

Part II of Chapter 6 of "The Professional Diplomat" by John Ensor Harr (copyright © 1969 by Princeton University Press) is excerpted with permission of Princeton University Press. Mr. Harr's book is divided into three parts "The Background and Forces of Change," "The Professional Group" and "Conclusion."

If the main ambition is to become an ambassador, it is instructive to examine how FSOs think one should go about attaining it. An SDP question asked officers to rate 16 attributes or experiences "in terms of importance or usefulness to attaining the top ranks of the Foreign Service and possibly becoming an Ambassador." They were asked to make their ratings according to the real world of what it takes to be a "success," not the ideal of what should be. In evaluating the 16 elements of the question, the responses tended to form into three groups. Four qualities or experiences fell toward the low side of the scale, as unimportant to success in the FSO corps: (d) other agency experience; (e) several tours in administration; (g) entry at the bottom; (j) extensive preservice work. Six other qualities or experiences fell toward the high end of the scale, as important to success in the FSO corps: (b) extensive Washington experience; (c) concentration on political work; (h) managerial experience; (m) winning respect of colleagues; (n) mastering a foreign language; and (p) good political connections. The remaining six qualities (a, f, i, k, l, o) were roughly in the middle band of "useful," but perhaps not essential.

It takes a rather high percentage of the vote toward the polar extremes to place one of the 16 subparts in either the "unimportant" or "important" groups. For example, more than two-thirds of all responses were either "negative" or "not important" for "several tours in administrative work." Conversely, nearly 80 percent of all responses were either "important" or "crucial" for "winning respect of colleagues in the corps."

At the margins, this division into three groups becomes a little arbitrary. For example, "senior training" and "a good basic understanding of economics" are only a shade away from being in the "important" group.

For subgroup variations, the more senior an officer, the more likely he is to think that weighing each assignment carefully (i) is not important, that preservice experience (j) is important, that understanding economics is important, (o), and that political connections (p) are not important. If an officer entered laterally, he is more likely than examination entry officers to think that the following are important: political work (c); managerial experience (h); a graduate degree (k); and experience in all major fields of FSO work (l).

On the question of entry at the bottom (g), there was little variation, with lateral entry officers only slightly more inclined than examination officers to see this as important. This response may seem curious, since there is such strong emphasis in the corps on entry at the bottom and resistance to lateral entry. The explanation probably is that respondants here are simply being realistic and responding, as they were asked to do, in terms of past and present reality, not in terms of what should be or what would normally be the case. In point of fact, as we shall see in detail in Chapter 8, quite a few lateral entrants have been very successful in the Service. Yet, more than twice the proportion of lateral entrants than examination entrants virtually rule themselves out in respect to the main ambition within the Service.

The item with the highest score—"winning respect of colleagues in the corps"—is indeed critical to success. Earlier it was mentioned that one of the major elements of status is the reputation of an officer among his colleagues. The FSO corps is like virtually all professional groups in that it is at the same time strongly collegial and strongly individualistic. The individualism is inherent in developing one's own professional qualifications, in making choices that advance one's own career, in taking pride in one's own accomplishments, and it is reinforced in the semi-nomadic life style the FSO must carry on. Yet equally strong is the collegial and fraternal character of the group. It is one's colleagues who sit on the assignment and promotion panels.

that are crucial to one's career advancement. George Kennan sees one of the great rewards of a diplomatic career precisely in its fraternalism: "One looks for these rewards, first of all, in the understanding and respect brought to one's work by one's own colleagues—in the sheer professional comradeship they afford. This is true of many professions: it is to the colleague, not to the outsider or the client, that one looks for real appreciation."[25] Kennan goes on to draw the behavioral implications, the obligation on the individual officer to help create "the collegial atmosphere," to "recognize a responsibility for the morale of those around him, just as he has to draw on them for his own morale."

Prescribed Behavior

There does not exist a generally accepted, fully articulated code of ethics, of prescribed behavior, for the professional diplomat.[26] One reason certainly is that much of the prescribed behavior is obvious and pervasive, either in the long-standing mores of the profession or in the public service standards of modern-day America. Included would be such concepts as honor, integrity, loyalty, and good moral character. That such qualities are widely distributed among FSOs is assured by the weight of tradition and by such devices as the security clearance investigation and the self disciplining processes of the Service.

In an effort to achieve some idea of what FSOs think about at least some values and modes of behavior, an SDP question was phrased thus:

> Every professional group tends to develop its own code of ethics—its values, ideals, prescribed behavior. How would you rate the following styles of behavior in terms of their propriety and importance for the professional diplomat?

The results are shown in Table 36 with percentages for the four possible choices reading across for each of the 10 styles of behavior rated.

The most strongly held mores, those with close to or more than 90 percent of the respondants citing as usually imperative or always imperative, are (a) placing the good of the Service over one's personal good; (c) readiness for worldwide service; (g) following political decisions even if one personally disagrees; (h) and maintaining proper dress and manners.

Three others are also strongly endorsed in the 70 to 80 percent range: (d) acting rationally and avoiding emotional display; (e) helping to strengthen the professional group; (i) and advocating unpopular positions which one feels to be important.

Again, the sense of service, of dedication and self-sacrifice, comes through strongly in the responses to a, c, g, and i. One officer said: "In a crisis, every citizen might be a patriot—an FSO must be a conscious patriot all his career. Not a flagrant type, just a quiet dedication—something like a priestly vocation."

On the question of carrying out political decisions with which one personally disagrees, one officer wrote: "If the officer feels the political decision is positively harmful to U.S. interests in a *crucial* way, he should squawk loud and long, but in the final analysis, as a professional, he is bound to carry out the President's orders." The difficulty of the possible dilemma involved is expressed in the comment of another officer: "I feel that in extreme cases one should resign if one disagrees with political decisions."

TABLE 36
FSO Evaluations of Behavioral Styles

	Irrelevant or unimportant to the professional diplomat	*Completely optional—this behavior depends entirely on the situation*	*Usually imperative—most officers should act this way most of the time*	*Imperative—an FSO should always act this way*
a. Placing the "good of the service" over one's own personal good	0.9	8.5	61.0	29.6
b. Not being completely frank in negotiations if it helps win one's point	8.5	78.7	10.6	2.2
c. Readiness to serve anywhere in the world in any job at the discretion of the Secretary of State	0.9	10.1	61.3	27.7
d. Acting rationally and avoiding any display of emotion	1.0	21.7	55.7	21.6
e. Taking whatever steps one can to strengthen the professional group	5.4	23.9	45.7	25.0
f. Entertaining regularly as part of the job	1.2	40.9	48.2	9.7
g. Following political decisions fully even when one personally disagrees	0.0	5.0	43.5	51.5
h. Maintaining proper dress and manners	0.9	9.9	50.9	38.5
i. Advocating positions which may be unpopular but which one feels to be important	1.4	17.9	46.7	34.0
j. Avoiding the use of political influence for one's own career	9.6	32.9	27.2	30.3

To capture something of the flavor of the strong emphasis on honesty and integrity, following is a sampling of written comments generated by the SDP question on prescribed behavior:

FSO-3: "Unquestioned personal honesty."

FSO-6: "Total personal honesty and integrity."

FSO-3: "Utter integrity! An FSO must be completely reliable at home and abroad. Any FSO who lacks integrity should be selected-out."

FSO-5: "Complete honesty in communications with colleagues and superiors."

FSO-6: "In-service honesty, i.e., avoiding moralisms or debating-type arguments in reports and

[25] Kennan, "Diplomacy as a Profession," p. 24.

[26] In attempting to follow up on a remark by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, that the Foreign Service should have a "Hippocratic Oath," the Committee on Career Principles of the American Foreign Service Association tried in 1966 to develop a code of ethics, but the project was not completed.

internal correspondence or discussions."

The item about "not being completely frank in negotiations if it helps win one's point" elicited a number of comments, illustrating some of the inner subtleties of diplomacy. The high moral premium placed on honesty comes through again, but so does a certain touch of operational realism.

FSO-3: "It is of absolute importance that an FSO *not* be dishonest in negotiations even if it helps him win his point."

Career Minister: "Frankness is the best diplomacy in general, but one cannot afford to disclose his hand completely when dealing with others who are not frank. Deception, however, is almost never wise."

FSO-4: "We work with a limited number of people abroad. 'Slipperiness' in negotiations determines future negotiations re the individuals involved."

FSO-2: "We are often advocates, and no advocate makes his opponent's case for him. It is a well-established principle that the only permissible lie a diplomat may tell another diplomat is 'I don't know.' It is permissible because disbelief in it is permissible."

Other qualities—discretion, ethical behavior, fairness emerge in the written comments:

FSO-5: "Keeping personal opinions, such as the wisdom of US policy or the legitimacy of the Ambassador's parents, if not to oneself at least in the official family. This is a serious failing, especially among junior officers."

FSO-1: "Invariable courtesy and fairness toward local employees who have much influence in their countries on the reputation of the United States for whom they work."

FSO-3: "Fairness to subordinates and peers, candor with superiors."

FSO-3: "Ethical behavior in one's personal, family, and financial affairs; willingness to recognize talent at all levels of advancement."

Several officers stressed the importance of a wide-ranging interest in the world and in the specific country of assignment. An FSO-4 stated the point this way: "Taking pains to learn the language of the country, travel to far interior places and making contact with all classes of people, showing genuine interest in their ways, traditions, and culture; becoming articulate about their art, music, and literature; having at least one or two intimate friends among them—and advising the American colony in this direction."

Another officer, an FSO-2, questioned whether many officers could "remain in the service for the full-life career" in the absence of a "wide ranging, even electric interest in all sorts of aspects of the world."

The strong endorsement of "maintaining proper dress and manners" in Table 36, and the moderately strong acceptance of "entertaining regularly as part of the job" are indicative of another area of important behavioral influence—the etiquette and prescribed sociability of Foreign Service life. Janowitz' description of the social code of the military system is very applicable to the Foreign Service in most particulars. After pointing out that entrance into the system assures the officer of essential social acceptance, Janowitz comments: "The essence of the social code is not its exclusiveness, but its pervasiveness."[27]

For the Foreign Service officer and his wife serving abroad the social code is indeed omnipresent. In the minds of many, protocol is virtually synonymous with diplomacy. FSO Glen Fisher, however, makes the point that the social code goes far beyond the formalities of protocol:

> Some of the customs and conventions of the diplomatic community are formalized in practices of protocol, in use of diplomatic titles, in formats for official correspondence, and the like. Much more of it is less formal, and represents skills, attitudes, values, and styles of living and dealing with other people which have grown out of the diplomat's cumulative experience over many years and generations of diplomatic personnel.[28]

Some idea of the pervasiveness of the social code emerges here and there in a handbook put out by the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration in 1964. An interesting compilation of ideas and techniques that have worked well for various US Ambassadors, the handbook is mainly concerned with managerial and task-oriented ideas, but it deals with social conduct as well. The vignettes are anonymous and in the first person as contributed by various chiefs of mission:[29]

> When my wife and I are giving a large party, I expect members of the mission to arrive a few minutes ahead of time and to remain, unless permission is obtained, until the official closing hour. If there is a receiving line, several officers and their wives are responsible for greeting incoming guests, introducing them to enough other people in the party that they have someone to talk to.
>
> I let each officer know that I expect him to assume primary responsibility for certain areas of our overall representational needs. This includes areas which the Embassy assigns him and others he himself proposes. I also impress on him the fact that representing the United States in the Foreign Service is a 24-hour-day, 7-days-a-week job.
>
> The wives of our officers have welcomed the direction of their energies into constructive channels in the community. My wife works actively with them, encourages them "to do something extracurricular," and gives suggestions and guidance in this regard.

[27] Janowitz, *Professional Soldier*, Chapter 10.
[28] Fisher, "Foreign Service Officer," p. 76.
[29] U.S. Department of State, *This Worked for Me . . .*, 1964.




TABLE 37
Evaluation of Administrative Processes of the Service*

	Don't know	Definitely needs improving	Acceptably done	Very well done	Must be done by FSOs: Yes	Must be done by FSOs: No
a. Recruitment at Junior Officer level	14.1	13.5	51.2	21.2	66.6	33.4
b. Recruitment for lateral entry	24.5	53.3	21.7	0.5	73.5	26.5
c. Training	3.4	31.1	58.1	7.4	25.8	74.2
d. Assignment	1.4	46.1	50.5	2.0	75.3	24.7
e. Promotion	0.9	33.1	58.7	7.3	80.5	19.5
f. Selection-out	23.1	40.4	34.6	1.9	79.0	21.0
g. Inspection	7.3	19.5	55.8	17.4	85.1	14.9

* Read percentages across for each of the two parts of the table.

The Processes of the Service

The administrative processes of the Foreign Service have a profound influence on behavior in the dual and related sense of serving as generalized instruments of control and sanction for the group as a whole and in providing constraints and guidelines for individual behavior.

The major processes are arrayed in Table 37, which shows the responses of officers to two SDP questions. The main body of the table deals with an evaluation of how well the seven functions are being performed. On the righthand side are responses to the question of whether or not each function should be performed by FSOs or by groups in which FSOs form a majority.

Officers gave two of the functions—recruitment at the junior officer level and inspection—very high marks, with more than 70 percent at the "acceptably done" or "very well done" levels. Two other functions, training and promotion, score nearly as highly. Opinion was pretty well divided on whether assignment procedures need definite improvement or are acceptably done; the remaining two functions, recruitment for lateral entry and selection-out, received preponderantly negative votes. About the only marked variation among subgroups was that examination entry officers were generally more favorable about the assignment process than the lateral entrants (58 percent choosing "acceptably done," to 38 percent of the lateral entrants).

The two negative votes, on lateral entry and selection-out, are difficult to interpret. Other SDP data (as we shall see in Chapter 7) strongly suggest that more should be read into the negative votes than merely the view that two processes are not well-handled. In a broad sense, the data suggest the not unrelated ideas that there should be less lateral entry and more selection-out.

On the question of whether the processes should be managed by FSOs or groups in which FSOs form a majority, respondants were very clear that they should be so managed in six out of seven cases, offering some confirmation of the observation that a strong tendency toward self-government is a marked characteristic of career systems. The exception was training, in which the ratio was nearly reversed. By slight margins, examination entry officers voted more strongly than lateral entrants that the functions should be managed by FSOs, again with the sole exception of training.

This configuration suggests that training stands apart from the other administrative processes as not vital to the self-discipline and control of the FSO corps. In the military, "career officers look upon training as a primary responsibility, accepted without question."[30] This is definitely not the case in the Foreign Service. In comparative rankings of three professional groups (discussed in detail in Chapter 7), FSOs rated themselves the lowest on two indices of professionalism: "a relatively set pattern of preparatory education," and "a belief that members should stay abreast of new knowledge relevant to the profession, often involving formal training." There has been increasing interest in training over the years, but in the main it is still largely incidental to the career.

Recruitment, whether at the bottom or laterally, and selection-out are obvious control mechanisms in determining who is qualified to enter the profession and who is not qualified to remain in it. The control and disciplining functions of the Inspection Corps are obvious in its title. This body of approximately 20 senior FSOs makes on-site inspections at overseas posts, rendering an important administrative service in terms of the standards of conduct of the corps, helping to give those standards form and substance and to propagate them. The inspectors evaluate the performance of every officer at the post, and these evaluations, along with the efficiency reports turned in annually by supervisors, form the basis for the judgments of the promotion panels.

The assignment and promotion processes have a crucial impact on the behavior and career progress of the FSO. In a previous work, the author described these processes in detail.[31] The importance of the assignment process was stated as follows: "For the FSO, the question of his next assignment can be vital. He may feel that it will affect, for good or bad, the future course of his career, his wife's disposition, the health and education of his children, whether or not he can save money, and a host of other personal considerations."

Assignments and promotions are the administrative life-blood of the corps and are very much interrelated. In both cases, "winning the respect of colleagues in the corps" is critical to the individual officer, producing in turn intense pressure on the individual to live up to what he perceives to be the norms of his colleagues. An officer's reputation among his colleagues, often passed by word of mouth, is more important in making assignments than is the formal, written record on his performance. The formal record is more important in the promotion process, but it, too, is an expression of the officer's reputation, although written in artful language that takes experience to master and even more experience to interpret. Because rated officers are able to see most of the efficiency reports written by their supervisors, a negative report is more likely to consist of

[30] John W. Masland and Lawrence J. Radway, *Soldiers and Scholars* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 53.

[31] John E. Harr, *The Development of Careers in the Foreign Service*, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 3 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), Chapter 2, "The Assignment Process" and Chapter 3, "The Promotion System."

damning by faint praise than outright criticism."[32]

Since certain functional fields and types of assignments are likely to result in faster promotions, these are avidly sought. In turn, faster promotions are likely to place one in an excellent competitive position for the more choice assignments. There is thus very powerful circular reinforcement for staying in the "mainstream." This, of course, is not an arbitrary business, but a reflection of what is considered to be important work, the "substantive" work of the FSO corps as discussed in Chapter 4; It is the work that attracted officers—most of the examination entrants, at least—to the FSO corps in the first place.

One can hardly fault the system for rewarding what its members regard as the most important work, but a major problem is the slowness of this kind of system to respond to new needs. For example, with respect to the role challenge to the FSO corps to manage all operations in foreign affairs, it would make sense for many officers to obtain operational experience in the newer programs such as information and development assistance. Assignment panels have tried to find good officers for assignment to other agencies and the precepts to the promotion panels have stressed for years that such duty should be rewarded. Progress has been very slow, though accelerating in recent years. Many officers still fear that such assignments will not be considered in the "mainstream" and that supervisors in the other agencies will not be sufficiently skilled in the artful language of the FSO promotion system.

Table 36 shows that "readiness to serve anywhere in the world in any job" is a strongly held norm of the Foreign Service. It is regarded as bad form for an officer to be excessively petulant and choosy about an assignment that is pretty much set, which is why "weighing each assignment carefully before accepting" was not rated very highly as leading to success. However, few officers allow themselves to become the helpless pawns of the assignment process. Although an officer cannot control his exact assignments, he can do a great deal to precondition their general nature. The result was summarized by the author as follows: "In summary, the ideal of world-wide commitment does have operational significance. It is misleading only if it conjures up an image of a selfless group of men who silently go their appointed ways. The correct image is one of a group of men who are highly vocal about their assignments, but who are generally willing to deliver when the chips are down."[33]

The importance of the promotion system to the Service as a regulatory and governing process, and its impact on individual members, can scarcely be exaggerated. Promotion panels for each grade level of the Service are convened each fall amid considerable pomp and ceremony. Half or more of the senior officers comprising the panels are brought to Washington from their overseas posts for the two or three months of deliberations.[34] The product of their labors is the promotion list of some 600 to 700 names which will go from the White House to the Senate for approval the following spring. In Glen Fisher's words: "For the FSO community, the annual announcement of the promotion list—like an early spring rite—is the formal reinforcement of the social structure." Those promoted are "understandably jubilant," and they are likely to receive letters of congratulation from friends from all corners of the world. For those who hoped to be promoted but who are not, it is a "time for sober reappraisal," and "the threat of still not being on the list next year helps keep performance high."[35]

As Caplow points out, "The official ideology of any hierarchy includes the insistence that all promotions are determined by merit and achievement." Competence and the type of work performed are certainly major factors in determining who gets promoted. Probably even more important is an image of general suitability for an FSO career. In Caplow's words: "The most important selective elements, however, are those which have to do with the workings of the hierarchical system itself. Thus, the elders are inclined to select those who are like themselves in general appearance, and who, in addition, have demonstrated specific ability to conform to hierarchical expectations, to render personal service to their sponsors, to conduct themselves prudently in internecine conflicts, and to maintain the interests of the group against all outsiders."[36] The net effect is to bring to the fore persons who have carefully shaped themselves to conform to group norms: "Such persons will be extremely conservative, will hesitate to take unprecedented actions, and will, in general, reserve their heaviest condemnation for those who violate the fraternity rules of their own group."

In Arthur Schlesinger's view, the FSO promotion system "was in effect a conspiracy of the conventional against the unconventional." His vivid, though perhaps overstated, idea of the result is: "At times it almost looked as if the Service inducted a collection of spirited young Americans at the age of twenty-five and transmuted them in twenty years into bland and homologous denizens of a conservative men's club."[37]

In an SDP comment an FSO-2 cited what he believed to be the area "of most importance and costly weakness" to the Service:

> The premium put on getting along well with one's colleagues—particularly one's superiors—rather than on effective performance; the inhibiting influence of the fact that errors of commission are much more dangerous to an individual than errors of omission.

Thus many FSOs are deeply ambivalent about "the system." In intimate conversation many officers will bitterly criticize the system and its pressures for conform-

(*Continued on page* 42)

[32] There has been a long-standing controversy over whether efficiency reports should be seen by rated officers—how and when they should be seen, and to what extent they should be seen. The latest compromise is that the main body of the rating is to be shown to the employee, but a "Development Appraisal Report" attached to the main report is not to be shown to him.

[33] Harr, *Development of Careers,* p. 52.

[34] FSOs comprise a majority of each promotion panel, but also included are public members and a USIA member, as well, as observers from other agencies.

[35] Fisher, "Foreign Service Officer," pp. 80-81.

[36] Caplow, *Sociology of Work,* pp. 71-72.

[37] Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), pp. 411, 415.

Head-knockings and hard-headedness in the days of
"Great Emperor Buchanan's" minister to the Heavenly Capital.

Kowtow: Un-American Protocol

K. C. TESSENDORF

A native of Neenah, Wisconsin, Mr. Tessendorf says his interest in the Foreign Service dates from his tour as a diplomatic courier in 1952-54. He set aside a successful career in the travel industry last fall to devote full time to writing, has nearly finished a novel and is at work on an anthology of amusing quotations regarding the social values of the Victorians. "I have great expectations—and a working wife."

I KNEEL only to God and Woman." Thus spoke American Minister John E. Ward at the Court of Imperial China in Peking in 1859.

"The Emperor is the same as God." Thus retorted the protocol mandarin from the Empire Office of Barbarian Affairs.

Ward was in Peking to exchange formal ratifications of the Treaty signed, under duress by the Chinese, at Tientsin in 1858. He had reached an impasse, as had others, in Chinese insistence on "kowtow." Ward was mindful of Department thinking about foreign representation: "The Ambassador symbolizes the sovereignty of the United States of America and represents the person of the President of the United States in the country to which he is accredited." Exit unkneeling, Mr. Ward from Peking.

Kowtow by foreign dignitaries before the Emperor was an extension of long-established Eastern customs of submissive prostration before acknowledged superiors. This ceremony of diplomatic calisthenics consisted of kneeling, falling forward on the hands and knocking head three times to the ground, arising; then repeating the exercise twice more for a total of nine head-knockings—the Emperor looking on sedately in the meantime.

There had been a lot of European kowtowing at the Court of the Emperor over the centuries. The Jesuits who long held favor there performed kowtow readily, as did occasional trade delegations penetrating to Peking. Representatives of a Dutch East Indies Company in 1655 kowtowed six times without ever clearly seeing the Emperor, much less conversing with him. For all their anxiety to please, they were only allowed one ship every eight years.

At the official level of representation, most Western nations were obdurate about the prostrations. A British nobleman seems to be the only barbarian diplomat to escape kowtow before the Emperor. In 1793 Lord Macartney voyaged to China with 600 cases of presents. Although he was aware a pennant on the vessel bearing him to interior China read: "Ambassador bearing tribute from country of England," he steadfastly refused a unilateral kowtow. He had brought with him a portrait of George III in regal attire, and offered his kowtow if a mandarin of equal rank kowtowed to the portrait. Eventually the Emperor, the half-christianized Chien Lung, allowed Lord Macartney to advance carrying the credential box above his head, go to one knee (as he would in England) and present his Sovereign's letter directly. They chatted amicably on several occasions, but no spectacular concessions were granted. Chien Lung's letter to George III observed in part:

"You, O King, live in a distant region, far beyond the borders of many oceans, but, desiring humbly to share the blessings of our civilization, you have sent an Embassy respectfully bearing your letter. To show your devotion, you have also sent offerings of your country's produce.

"Our dynasty's majestic virtue has reached every country under Heaven and kings of all nations have sent their tribute by land and sea. We possess all things; we are not interested in strange and costly objects and we have no use for your country's products. I have accepted your tribute offerings only because of the devotion which made you send them so far."

Insulated from evolving reality by centuries of splendid isolation, the Chinese Establishment regarded all barbarians as boorish and boring, and did not wish to see them in the "Heavenly Capital" except as temporary tribute bearers. Informed Chinese opinion of the marauding British was particularly vile. A nineteenth century specialist in barbarian demonology wrote: "These island barbarians from ancient

The Embassy on the road to Peking.



times onward have known only love of gain and fundamentally are not different from dogs and sheep." Americans fared a little better, but were considered untrustworthy "wolf-cubs with wild natures."

An ill-starred British embassy in 1816 seeking establishment of permanent diplomatic relations foundered completely on the rocks of kowtow. Lord Amherst expected the same courtesies extended to Macartney. The new Emperor Chia Ching was a traditionalist, however. The embassy was rudely expelled from China, although Amherst offered in addition to bowing to kiss the Emperor's hand—a suggestion which seems particularly to have nauseated the mandarins. The humiliated mission ended in shipwreck off Java.

The British and other interested European powers thereupon abandoned persuasion for coercion. The next, and last, diplomat to attempt audience with a sovereign Emperor was our Minister Ward.

Throughout most of the nineteenth century the Americans fished in the troubled waters stirred up by the British and others along the China coasts. Whenever a major concession was wheedled or extorted from China, the Americans quickly secured a similar advantage. At no time was it United States policy to participate in warlike activities in China, prior to the Boxer Rebellion.

In this way, several trade treaties had been negotiated at port cities with Chinese officials. In 1858 the British and French decided to have a real bash at the Chinese, and thus it was that American Minister Reed was an interested bystander as the Anglo-French force blasted past the Taku riverforts and penetrated to Tientsin where the frightened Chinese signed over ten more ports to Western trade, and most reluctantly agreed to Western diplomatic residence in Peking. It was agreed that the representatives would return the following year to ratify the agreements. Reed secured a similar treaty on behalf of the United States.

The Americans had been stiffly correct about their sovereign prerogatives. Reed refuscd to accept the Emperor's letter to the President on his knees. In negotiations at Shanghai the same year, the American negotiator became incensed when he detected the mandarin's reference to the President as "Vassal Prince." He insisted they pronounce "President." "Po-le-si-tien-teh" was the best extracted, so our chief of state wound up as "Great Emperor Buchanan" in the documentation.

In 1859 the Allies gathered again before the Taku forts. The Chinese had regained confidence during the year and blocked the river. The Americans on their small flotilla stood back as the British attacked. To the astonishment of all, they were sharply repulsed, their Admiral wounded. It was then that Commodore Tattnall, USN (soon CSN) became a personal instrument of US policy, and enriched Bartlett's Quotations by vowing "Blood is thicker than water." He added "he'd be damned if he'd stand by and see white men butchered before his eyes." Minister Ward acquiesced in the towing of a British troop barge up to the action. Tattnall had himself rowed through shot and shell to visit the wounded commander. At the British flagship the gig was splintered by shot and sank; an American sailor was killed. While aboard the ship Americans assisted at a British gun position.

To their discomfiture, the British and French envoys had to withdraw for a season. However, the Chinese offered Ward a Peking trip on their terms. Pleased with the opportunity of securing the purpose of his mission, Ward accepted their arrangements.

The American flotilla proceeded up-river to the village of Peh-Tang. Here the Emperor's gifts were distributed—20 sheep, 20 hogs, 189 chickens and ducks, plus quantities of flour, rice, and fruit. Pork, whiskey, and bread were laid on in return. As the mandarins had specified their protocol did not allow sedan-chairs, the embassy of 20 proceeded in long, narrow-bodied carts without springs or seats, driven tandem and shielded by an awning which extended out to protect the driver seated upon the shafts.

Forty-six miles of atrocious road were covered in this spine-jolting fashion. The party was then installed in comfortable Chinese vessels and towed for five days up the Pei-Ho river. The last 12 miles to Peking was trekked again by cart. The road here being roughly paved, the rigid carts were impossible to ride in, and the Americans were allowed to ride horseback or walk until in sight of Peking.

All had then to reboard the carts, for as an eyewitness remarked: They were to be "represented as prisoners or rather as a vanquished enemy who had come to make submission." The American entrance into Peking was thus recounted:

"The avenue within is over 100 feet wide and unpaved, and the center of it, in consequence of recent rain, was now a quagmire through which horses, carriages, and drivers floundered in great confusion. The scene was disappointing to all who had entertained high expectations of the glory of the metropolis of China; yet the vast crowds of men, women, and children standing in dense multitudes in front of the houses, and lining the side of the carriageway in an unbroken row, most of them well-dressed in white or blue garments, together with the yellow-tiled temples, honorary gateways, and shops ornamented with pillars and fancy sign-boards rendered it an interesting and animated sight."

The embassy was lodged in rather bleak quarters, and restricted there. The Barbarian Affairs mandarins were surprised Ward refused to kowtow. Why else had he come to Peking? The treaty ratifications could have been exchanged on the coast. It was an embarrassing situation for them. They offered compromise.

First, a two-thirds reduction was made—only three head-knockings for the American Minister. When this discounted kowtow was passed up, they put forward an elaborate scheme. The Table on which the President's letter was to be laid would have a sash hanging down concealing most of Ward from the Emperor. As he approached, he would bow low (as he had offered) and a chamberlain would rush in from either side crying "Pu Kwe, Pu Kwe!" (don't kneel) and grasp him by the arms to prevent his doing so.

The Minister seems to have agreed to this contrivance which might well have resulted in the chamberlains pushing him onto his knees. However, the Emperor insisted on standard kowtow, in sincere repentance for having aided the British at Taku. Having delivered President Buchanan's letter through intermediaries, Ward returned unkowtowed to Peh-Tang by cart; another tortuous journey in which a member of the delegation who had sickened at Peking, died. And the treaty ratifications were duly exchanged on board one of the American vessels.

The following year the Allies occupied Peking and set up their permanent legations there, and the Americans followed. Although the back of Imperial China had been broken, the "Audience Question" was not answered until 1873 when Emperor Tung Chih came of age. After protracted dispute, all foreign envoys were received in a group (including American Minister Low) and laid their credentials before the Son of Heaven and bowed three times. But court etiquette had not been completely shattered, for the Emperor had not acknowledged their presencc by movement or speech, and the audience had occurred in the Pavilion of Purple Light, the historical site for the reception of vassals.

Kowtow is dead, but there are modern survivals. In 1967 Mao's Red Guard pillaged the British Embassy in Peking and seized Chargé D'Affaires Donald Hopson by the hair, forcing him into a position of obeisance. It was reported members of the Russian legation had to crawl under portraits of Chairman Mao. Who knows what niceties of protocol await the next intrepid American diplomat resident in Peking? ■

Too little correlation between career seniority and senior responsibility? The Director General of the Foreign Service says "yes."

The Predicament of the Senior Career

JOHN M. STEEVES

Ambassador Steeves entered on duty with the Department of State in 1946, after service with the OWI in India. He served as Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1962 to 1966 and has been Director General since 1966.

THOSE of us who administer the career Foreign Service must come to realistic grips with an all too obvious fact of career life, which is that there is too little correlation between career seniority and senior responsibility. Historically (certainly at the time the principles of the career service were codified in the 1946 Act) there can be little question that those responsible for concepts embodied in the Act thought that there should be. In brief, top credentials would almost automatically be equated with top responsibility. That this principle is no longer recognized in practice must be cause for concern.

The anomaly of this dichotomous approach is not as difficult to analyze as it is to explain or find a solution. To clarify the predicament in which we find ourselves one has to compare two chains of action both emanating from the office of the Secretary of State. On the one hand, as the implementing officer of the 1946 Act and the regulations which he himself sanctifies, an elaborate system of evaluation and career discipline is applied. Believing in the professional lifetime principle, an officer is required to accept all of the refining experiences which, in the wisdom of the system, are thought to be just those experiences which train and test an officer for the apex of his service when he will be given the supreme responsibilities his government can entrust to him. These include assignments across the functional spectrum. Provision is made for a balance between overseas and Washington experience, knowledge of an area is acquired through service in the countries concerned and academic studies to make certain that he is no longer a novice. The acquisition of language is considered an important tool. Officers are not only encouraged but required to measure up to our high language standards. To all of these technical qualifications is added the requirement for personal deportment and conduct in order that the personal life of an officer and his family will always stand up to the closest scrutiny. The most effective mechanism for ensuring that all of these processes are kept in train is the Selection Boards which annually review an officer's performance with all of the objectivity they can command. In the process the winnowing action takes place. The least competent are selected out. Even adequate officers passed over for the maximum number of years in each class are involuntarily retired if in the minds of the Boards they do not measure up to the best. By all the rules of the game the assumption must logically be made that those that survive are in every sense the fittest. Under the law, the practices growing out of its implementation, the final stamp of approval is the nomination of a senior officer as Career Minister and, for a very select few, Career Ambassador.

If the career principle is sound and if the selection up procedures have been followed effectively, it would be logical to assume that these then would be the career officers one would expect to find applying their expertise gained from this long experience as Ambassadors, Assistant Secretaries or in comparable responsibilities. It is here, however, that we come face to face with a strange contradiction. For while on the one hand this selection up has been accomplished, with the other hand selections are made which in essence proclaim a lack of faith or confidence in these decisions. It would almost seem that another set of criteria are established in designating those we actually choose for high responsibility than those we use for promotion to the top.

At the moment, out of the 65 Career Ministers (this figure includes those now before the Senate) on the rolls, 27, or approximately 40 percent, are not currently Chiefs of Mission, Assistant Secretaries or in equivalent positions. One can stretch this comparative rule of thumb a bit to include a few others who, although not strictly recognized at this level of responsibility, are relatively near it. Making the greatest allowance possible, it is impossible to explain where the system is at fault in not matching up to its two lines of responsibility.

When the actual assignment process is taking place, there is heard, for instance, for the first time the need for emphasis on youth, which has a cosmetic appeal, for it creates an image thought advantageous for political and public relations reasons. Likewise it is thought to bolster morale of Junior Officers, etc., but in catering to this seemingly laudable urge, we forget that with the other hand, we have ordered a series of experiences, enumerated previously, which when added together make it chronologically impossible to achieve short of real maturity. All too often those standards we have professed to hold

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. . . of pheasant hunting along the Sava in Slovenia and, not incidentally, of earlier hunts for bigger game.



December Frost

William Crisp

The JOURNAL'S *short story writer has his Master's from the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies in Washington and Bologna. This was followed by a year in Vietnam as rifle platoon leader with the First Cavalry Division—an experience which served as conditioning for the rigors of Serbo-Croatian language training at FSI. Mr. Crisp is now serving on his first F.S. assignment in Zagreb.*

BUT you will see soon enough. Pheasants look slower than quail and are not as fast as the other bird, dove, but they are a little bit mad, it seems, and it is very difficult to predict their flight." The doctor pulled on his pipe, put the little gray Volkswagen into the left-hand lane passing a tandem diesel truck.

"Don't they fly straight up for about three meters? Then dart away?" asked Fritz.

"Oh, sometimes, yes; but look, you can't make a general rule. Just wait. So much depends on the land." Doctor Markovic pushed into third gear to brake as the road narrowed. They drove over a small bridge. The water was high from the first snowfall which had melted the day before. "We shall hunt probably in heavy cover. They should hold for a long time. When Jak points the pheasants will flush high."

Fritz Standwell scratched the head of the English setter balled up between them on the floor of the Volkswagen. Jak was cramped and impatient; he tried to stand up, pushing his gray nose out the window. "Jak; behave. Get down," Fritz said, pressing the dog back and stroking his black ears. The setter beat his bushy white tail against the floor and sat down reluctantly.

"He'll calm down; takes about half an hour in the field. It's cold too, so he'll not range as far." Doctor Markovic took a long puff and a thick rope of blue smoke rose slowly from his pipe. Good Balkan Sobraine. It made Fritz think of walnuts and hickory smoke in autumn.

They drove north, talking about quail, grouse, pheasants, and the predators. Foxes and hawks. Fritz thought about the growing pressure of hunters in the eastern states of America. He told the doctor about filling breeding marshes in Canada and the startling decline of canvasback and Canada geese.

"You Americans have about ten years left. If you're lucky. What in hell are you going to do? When I came over for those two years study I was disgusted." Drago Markovic slapped his thigh. "Your rivers are full of oil . . ."

"Here in Slovenia the Sava is already polluted . . ."

"Cutting superhighway through the best hunting land."

"That's true." Fritz wondered if they had started to bulldoze down Spout Run and bridge the Potomac at Three Sisters' Island.

"Sure. The Sava is full of oil, but it doesn't add up the same. At least we're not butchering all our wildlife."

"Ah, my friend, caught you," laughed Fritz. "Why do you allow the Italians to come over from Trieste and Udine to slaughter your game? How many pheasants did they kill last year in Slovenia? Five, ten thousand? Well?"

"Those people." Drago pushed the old green felt hat back on his head and drew on his pipe. "Shooters. Shooters, Fritz, not hunters. There's a great difference."

The road followed the deep river along the base of a hill heavily wooded with russet oaks. Drago showed Fritz where peasants held a great hunt every October for bear that ranged in the foothills and wandered occasionally down to the river valley, attacking cattle. Across the river the land was gentle and rolling. Peasants were raking the last hay of the year, heaping it on horse-drawn wagons; beyond, oxen grazed in a field bordered by tall poplars. Several families were gathering pumpkins to feed the swine later in the winter. The early morning haze had dissolved and it was still cold. A gray sky was striped with blue.

Fritz pointed to the rounded stone turrets of an old walled town standing in the distance above the Sava.

"Brezice," Drago nodded.

They crossed the Sava on a stone bridge with a steel trestle in the center which the Partisans had dynamited in the winter of 1944. It was market day in Brezice, and inside the stone walls cobbled streets were crammed with horse-drawn carts, oxen and geese. A heavy beamed wagon full of cabbages blocked the road.

"Lord God of us all," moaned Drago rubbing a hand through his gray hair, "these peasants will keep us from ever hunting. It'll be four in the afternoon." He rolled down the window, flailing his arms, "Move the cart, man!" A tall Slovenian shouted something then tried to make the horse back up. Three cabbages tumbled off the wagon and bounced on the fender of the Volkswagen. Drago groaned, driving cautiously through the tangle of horses and shouting men in front of the old baroque church. At last they stopped at a farmhouse on the edge of town.

As they opened the doors Jak burst onto the dirt road. Two Slovenians strode out of the house, greeted Dr. Markovic enthusiastically and shook hands with Fritz; they were speaking a dialect of Slovenian he could not un-



derstand. "They are saying we must come inside just for one little drink only. Of course," laughed Drago opening the door of the little house that led to a low-beamed living room. The walls were covered with trophies of earlier hunts. A log fire burned in the porcelain stove.

"Look, Fritz, there is the bear Stefan took in the hills we passed before entering Brezice."

"And this? Mountain sheep?" Fritz pointed to thin antlers hung on the oak beam.

"Chamois. Farther north. High mountains. Jozef," the doctor spoke in Slovenian, "please show Fritz the shotgun." The tall hunter carefully slid his gun from its leather case. The walnut stock had been worn smooth and the bluing was gone, but the gun was oiled and the bore not pitted. Heads of roebuck, stag and flying grouse were engraved on the breech.

"It must be a hundred years old. Please tell Jozef that it is a beautiful gun and very well kept."

"Yes, he is happy that you see this. But, now, Sljivovica." Stefan poured two small glasses from a brown flask.

"My lord," gasped Fritz, "I'll go blind. Can't see a thing."

"You've an excuse now," roared the doctor, "do you know what this is?"

"Gasoline?"

"It's about hundred fifty proof. With gentian roots floating inside for spice."

Jozef pummeled Fritz on the back. With an effort he finished the glass. "Do they still smash glasses on the floor?

"Whew," panted Drago. "Probably would explode. But let's stop wasting time. Start hunting."

Jozef and Stefan put the gun cases in their Skoda and went ahead of the Volkswagen down a muddy road, through bottom land where thousands of pine seedlings had been planted the year before. Small plastic bags were placed on the tips of each seedling. Drago explained that this had been done to keep roebuck from nipping the young trees. The road was full of potholes and soft from melted snow. They crossed the low ground and passed a wagon piled with corn shucks drawn by two gray horses, then drove through a small forest of second growth oaks and birches.

"Those two fellows have been hunting long as I can remember. Almost every day." Doctor Markovic was driving slowly on the pitted road. "Jozef, green corduroy coat who owns that beautiful shotgun, is one of the best shots I have known."

"They farm still?"

"Some. A few hectares."

"What happened during the Occupation?"

"Oh, I'm not sure. What difference does it make now?"

"Interested to know." Fritz shifted his long legs to give Jak more room on the floor. "Wondered if they were in the Resistance?"

"I think Stefan, heavier one, was badly wounded in an attack against a Fascist supply train. He still has a slight limp."

"He squints with his left eye."

"That's only from shooting pheasants every day for twenty years." Drago relit his pipe. "But see here, this is a pheasant hunt and not a political colloquium. What does it matter about the Occupation?"

"It's not that long ago."

"Now my dear friend, you are going to be offended . . ."

"No Drago . . ."

"Yes, you will be offended, but you American diplomatic officials never stop thinking about politics. Never. Wars and invasion. You come all the way up here from Beograd for a rest and expect intrigue around every bend. Now just wait . . ."

"Go ahead."

"I think sometimes you almost construct events. Really I do. So keen on crisis you don't understand. People like Stefan and Jozef. Had enough. Just want to be left alone. Free. Poof. Like that. No Americans, no God damned Russians. Can't you see? The best thing for this country is quiet for a long time."

"Now doctor," laughed Fritz, "Slow down. Absolutely. I agree. But," he argued, scratching Jak's ear, "can you stay untouched? Has it ever happened before?"

"That's the whole point. It's behind us, the Turks and Kosovo and Sarajevo and the Nazi invasion. Gone. Through. Dead past."

"Going to be left alone?"

"We must."

"You know, Drago, what would happen if somebody brought Comrade Leonid from the Kremlin down to Ljubljana? Let him see the girls in miniskirts, all the Fiats and television sets?"

"Thrombosis! Doctor! quick, a last drink of my Rooshian Voodka!"

"Sure. But if he survived the tanks would come across the next day to stop such nonsense."

"Very well. Don't let him out of the Kremlin. No invitation."

"You're caught. Up in the Carolina mountains they say 'between a rock and a hard place.' "

"Don't translate. You're prone to exaggerate."

Drago pulled his Volkswagen off the road and stopped on a rutted logging trail. He snapped a leash on Jak while Fritz unzipped the gun cases. The two Slovenians spoke quietly with Drago about hunting the thick brush. Jak pulled at his collar.

"Enough shells?" Drago turned, slipping the leash off his dog.

"We'll see. Number six shot."

"Good pattern and shot big enough for pheasant. That your new gun?"

"Winchester; automatic twelve. Twenty-eight inch barrel modified." Fritz pushed two shells in the magazine, slamming the bolt forward to chamber a third cartridge. "Catherine gave it to me last Christmas. Haven't you seen it before?"

"First time. Let Jozef look."

The thin Slovenian carefully balanced Fritz's shotgun and sighted an imaginary pheasant. He chuckled, then hefted his double barrel. They spread out twenty meters apart, following Jak through the second growth oaks. The dog hunted slowly in the scrub trees, squirming under the tangled limbs left by woodcutters five years before.

Fritz squinted to follow the white tail flailing in the brown oak leaves. He lost Jak, but heard him moving cautiously. A blur of white as Jak broke through the cover and returned to Drago. Fritz swallowed. Throat acrid. Too long not hunting. Better shoot bloody well. Listen. Drago calling Jak closer; telling Stefan turn towards corn field. Yes do it right. No use coming all this way and not react. Long time since shooting birds. When? Carolina. Roundtree's farm near Matamuskeet that winter the geese came in early. Then Drago shouted as two pheasants exploded from a brush pile, the Doctor taking his on the rise but Fritz a bad angle shooting behind the second bird.

A thin wisp of blue smoke hung in the cold air as the roar of the shotguns reverberated down the river bottom. Jak gave a yelp, traced the dead bird, bringing it to Drago. Sorry, slow reaction, thought Fritz, biting his lip, ramming a new shell in the magazinc.

"A beauty, ha, good," the Doctor

(*Continued on page* 44)

Not Washington's messenger boy, not a puppet on the end of a telephone, ambassadors are alive and well in foreign climes

The Ambassador's Role in Foreign Policy Making

ROBERT W. RINDEN

The author, FSO-retired, recently received a Ph.D. from the University of Colorado in Boulder and an appointment as Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple Buell College, Denver. There he will teach Asian politics and international relations. As a graduate student for the past five years, he found that American diplomatists often received a rough going-over in Academe; in his lectures, they will receive tender, loving care and, for them, everything will be coming up roses.

A NUMBER of students of the decision-making process in foreign policy has shown a tendency to see the American ambassador no longer a key actor in the process but to cast him in the role of Washington's messenger boy.

Two examples of this tendency may suffice. C. Delisle Burns finds: "Much is still left to personal initiative where no great issue is involved, but in a crisis the diplomatist tends to become simply an office boy at the end of a wire."[1]

In discussing the impact of technology on diplomacy, R. N. Rosecrance states: "Today . . . negotiations are largely conducted by foreign offices, and diplomatic representatives are utilized only for transmission of requests and responses."[2]

There were, it seems, giants in those days—those golden days before the transoceanic cable—and ambassadors, unconstrained by instructions from the Department of State, boldly made career-risking decisions on high policy. As Mr. Dooley observed: "Them was the days when ye'd have a good time as an ambassadure."

Now, the ambassador is often written off as a mere puppet dangling on the end of a telephone line.

The rationale for the ambassador's fallen estate is usually found in the technological revolution in communications: almost instantaneous electronic communications (the radio-telephone, teletype, and various forms of telegraphy) and the jet airplane. Nowadays, according to this school of thought, virtually nothing is left to the ambassador's judgment, policy decisions are made in Washington without his participation, and detailed instructions are sent the ambassador on the policy he is to implement.

That the ambassador, whose position as the *alter ego* of his chief of state was once high indeed, has now fallen so low is an astonishing revelation. But is it true?

The notion that Washington is the giver of every good and perfect gift when it comes to handing out foreign policy decisions and that the envoy overseas is but the passive beneficiary of this largesse does too much honor to the Washington *apparat* and too little to the ambassador. Moreover, it manifests a lack of familiarity with how foreign policy decisions are really made.

Implicit in this thesis of ambassadors-don't-count-anymore is the idea that when an ambassador reports to the Department of State on a developing situation abroad that may call for a policy decision, he ends his despatch with: "Help! What do I do now?"

In real diplomatic life, the ambassador accompanies his description, analysis and interpretation of the situation with specific, concrete recommendations on what policy his government should adopt to preserve or advance United States interests in the apprehended circumstances. The policy recommendations—the proposed courses of action—normally would have been formulated after he had full exchanges with the "Country Team" he captains.

The ambassador's recommendations are not taken lightly in Washington—nor are they regarded as gratuitous. After all, he is the man on the spot. Like a military commander *sur place*, he is credited with intimate, up-to-the-minute knowledge of local conditions—conditions which may be in rapid flux. Such knowledge perforce cannot be the possession of those back home. The ambassador is not only there, he is also the one to bear great responsibility for implementing whatever policy is adopted. Accordingly, his interpretation of events, his appraisal of foreign intentions, his assessment of the foreign potential—all are of much value to the decision-makers in the capital.

The manner in which a question is posed does much to predetermine its answer. The envoy's description and interpretation of the developing foreign situation tends, in some degree, to set the terms of reference for the Washington policy-makers.

"An ambassador is reporting from the scene and the way in which he structures his alternatives will have an important bearing on which one is chosen, even if he does not make that choice himself. This element in the diplomatic

[1] C. Delisle Burns, "Diplomacy." *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. V, p. 150.
[2] R. N. Rosecrance, "Diplomacy." *New International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, vol. IV, p. 188.

process has often been overlooked by those who discover in the march of technological forces an inevitable shrinkage in the shadow that diplomats cast."[3]

So, the ambassador's assessment of the situation as immediate or eventual, of vital or marginal importance to American interests, *et cetera*, will have significant bearing on the ultimate policy decision reached in Washington. If opinions are no better than the facts on which they are based, neither do policy decisions transcend the data on which they are founded. And it is the ambassador who is a principal, authoritative source of these data.

On occasion, the ambassador's description of threatening developments in a foreign country may just about determine the policy decision. For example, Ambassador Bennett's telephone conversation with President Johnson on April 28, 1965, reportedly punctuated by the crackle of gunfire in the Dominican capital, seems to have been decisive in causing the President to order a large troop commitment to the Dominican Republic and thus to modify considerably long-standing policy on military intervention in Latin America.[4]

In a crisis situation, the ambassador *makes* policy—he does not merely share in its formulation. In today's turbulent world, there arise many emergency situations in which rapid-moving events make it impossible for officials in Washington to direct the United States response by remote control—on an hour-by-hour basis. In such circumstances, the envoy must make the decisions. His operational decisions thus amount to policy-making.

"Policy-making requires more than decisions on general lines. Such decisions may, in fact, be made implicitly as operations proceed . . . policy grows as execution proceeds."[5]

Those who denigrate the ambassador's role in policy-making seem bemused with the speed by which a Secretary of State can fly to a remote foreign capital and there personally take charge of diplomatic negotiations. This can, of course, be done and it has been done. John Foster Dulles was a famous practitioner of peripatetic diplomacy, in the course of which he traveled 560,000 miles. As a wag said: "He had an infinite capacity for taking planes."

Such diplomacy is not, however, without drawbacks. Talks conducted under the pressure and hurry of a brief stop-over by the Secretary may not prove as fruitful in the long run as those carried out by the resident ambassador in an unhurried, relaxed ambience. For one thing, there is in the former type of negotiations increased chance for misunderstandings; for another, there is no opportunity for follow-up by the distinguished negotiator, for he has flown away.

"The captains and the kings depart, still stands thy ancient sacrifice . . ." The ambassador remains to tidy up, to "clarify" what was misunderstood in the flurry of "instant" negotiations, and perhaps to dampen down the too great expectations aroused by the personal appearance of the Secretary of State himself.

The news-making arrival of a Secretary of State in a foreign capital to handle the crucial or final phase of important negotiations does little for the standing of the resident ambassador in the eyes of the authorities with whom he has been dealing and with whom he must continue to deal. If he must be replaced as chief negotiator for his government, there is a strong implication that his own authorities are not impressed with his professional competence. Such a suggestion cannot but impair his future effectiveness.

There is no assurance, of course, that the Secretary's taking over will inexorably lead to a more successful outcome to the negotiations. The sudden visitor from on high may, in fact, be less successful. He lacks the close, personal relations and knowledge of his *vis-à-vis* that the ambassador has—nor is he as familiar with the peculiarities of the local situation. Fatigue—even constipation—brought on by his long, arduous journey, may diminish his negotiating skill.

When the Secretary of State is away from Washington, urgent and vital decisions may have to be held up until he returns. Such enforced delays in the decision-making process may be costly—their costs may far exceed any gains achieved by the Secretary's personal diplomacy in a distant land. In short, while the Secretary can fly quickly to distant spots of the world, this does not mean that he does, nor that American interests would be served by his doing so.

The marvels of electronic communications and jet aircraft are not, needless to say, denied the ambassador. As a matter of course, when an important policy question is to be discussed in Washington, it is routine for the envoy to be ordered back "on consultation" so that he may help formulate policy. It is also possible for him to have a rapid exchange of views with officials in Washington through the use of radio-telephone, teletype and telegraph. Unlike the days of sailing ships, today the envoy can quickly intervene and share in making policy.

The ambassador's responsibility for the successful implementation of policy decisions ensures him a meaningful role in the decision-making process. However sound a policy might seem to its formulators in Washington, its effectiveness in practice must depend, in large measure, upon the forcefulness and finesse with which the ambassador seeks to execute it abroad. Ambassador Briggs in "Farewell To Foggy Bottom" points out that *how* an ambassador delivers a message can be as important as the message itself. "What the ambassador says when he delivers the views of his government can cause the representations to prosper or to fail, regardless of the eloquence of the prose confected in Washington."

Another unrealistic assumption in the ambassador-as-clerk thesis is that ambassadors meekly accept whatever policy instructions they have received from the Department of State and forthwith deliver the prescribed message *à la Western Union*. In actuality, not a few envoys rejoin with strongly-worded objections to their instructions and are successful in having the policy decision reconsidered—at least in part.

In this *essai* to show that the ambassador is one of "the key inputs to the policy-making process"—and not the little-man-who-isn't-there—there is no intent to suggest that Washington is not the focal and final point for making decisions on United States foreign policy. The Department of State, with its global views, its ability to evaluate the many factors in a policy decision (including opinion in the Congress and among the American people), and its capacity for weighing the elements in the particular foreign situation that concern the ambassador against relevant considerations in other countries is much better situated to make policy decisions than any envoy in a foreign capital. Nonetheless, the ambassador is an integral and important participant in the making of a foreign policy. As Sir Harold Nicolson has said, it is an "empty gibe" to find, in the development of communications, the ambassador "reduced to the status of the clerk at the end of the telephone line." ■

[3] Chadwick F. Alger and Steven J. Brams, "Patterns of Representation in National Capitals and Inter-Governmental Organizations." *World Politics*, July 1967, p. 648.

[4] "At the time of the Dominican crisis of 1965, Ambassador Bennett made assessments of crucial significance concerning the need for United States military interventions; these were heeded and acted upon in Washington." Rosecrance, *op. cit.*, p. 188.

[5] Norman L. Padelford and George A. Lincoln, *The Dynamics of International Politics*, p. 222.



On Reviewing Books

"CERTAIN subjects," Fred Charles Iklé has written, "seem quite clear as long as we leave them alone."

To this category of things, I have long felt, belongs the reviewing of books. What is clearer than the practice of periodicals dismissing books by a single review? What is a less troubling subject as long as one does not question it? It does not trouble publishers who have long ago learned not to expect more. So, too, with authors, the most down-trodden, exploited and abused people in the world, who have attracted no commiseration whatever from the reformers, do-gooders, dissenters and militants. Nor do editors of periodicals find it anything other than a good, practical, trouble-free practice.

Who, then, is to be so bold as to refuse to leave the subject alone? Me, that's who. And why? Because the one person whose needs are not being met by this time-honored procedure is the reader of books, and I am a reader of books. Rarely is my need met by a single review. To be helpful, a review has to be wise, perceptive, and meet my own particular need to be informed in a particular field. How many reviews are all that? Not many, I say.

Besides, who really thinks a *good* book can be disposed of in a single review? That is like pretending a good stand of grass can be disposed of by a single swish of a scythe. (A scythe is an ancient instrument used for mowing. It consists of a long curved blade fixed at an angle to a long bent handle or snath. It can still be seen in remote, backward communities like Appalachia and Annandale, both in Virginia.)

Of course, the idea of giving more than one swipe at a book will be met by a variety of objections from the book-review establishment, which, of course, is the way with all establishments. One obvious objection is that there are many periodicals and if a reader wants more than one viewpoint he can look up the other reviews. But that is closely akin to research. Who wants to engage in that kind of activity? Who has time for it? Besides, who wants to be seen in a library?

More serious is the objection of editors of periodicals that they do not have the space for more than one review of a book, even a good book. But this is just an old knee-jerk, instinctual response. Who has more space to fill than editors? Besides, I am not really concerned with *them*. Editors should be the servants of readers, not their masters. As Ellis Briggs says, they should be the pants pressers, not aspire to wear the pants of readers. They just should find the space to bring really good books to the attention of readers more than once.

Readers *want* to be reminded of a good book. Especially in this day of the deluge. A good book can easily be lost in that. A single review does no more than stir a good intention: "Hmmm. Worth reading. Must get to that." But, as everyone knows, good intentions have to be nurtured, stimulated, reawakened. Who, I ask, ever bought a new toothpaste on a single notification? And *that* costs only 67¢. The cheapest hardback now costs $5.95 (I know, mine was so priced—a good book, by the way) and others run all the way to astronomical amounts. But who, I ask, is going to pay $5.95 for a book if he won't pay 69¢ for a new kind of toothpaste just on the basis of one attention-drawer?

The solution, editors of periodicals will say, is for readers to keep a reading list. But who can keep a list on the basis of a single review? Who knows whether the review is any good? Even when one knows the reviewer and is willing to trust his judgment, who is disposed to keep a list based upon such rarities? For myself, I know this solution is not practical. I can never find the list when I want to add to it and I never have handy a 5x8 card. Some people claim success at this but invariably I have discovered on investigation that such people find this practice "easy" only in the sense Mark Twain found it "easy" to give up smoking. "It's not difficult to give up smoking," he maintained. "I've done it lots of times." There you are. That's the secret. People who keep reading lists do so "lots of times" and the omissions are often more important than the jottings. What kind of a "list" is that?

My proposal to have more than one review—or reminder, at least—of good books in a given periodical has a profound, philosophical basis. Why should *one* reviewer preempt so much authority? Doesn't that in fact smack of the one thing all of us agree should be avoided—authoritarianism? I know full well I have been steered away from books I should have read just because one reviewer wasn't up to the book.

I have in mind not just current books. Many people have foregone the pleasure of reading Addison's essays or What's-his-names' just because, not being current they are not reviewed any more. How much better off would we be if we were constantly reminded of the *best* and not strive—as we consider it the most practical thing we can do—simply to read the best of the current mish-mash?

This brings me to a *coup de grace*. People are up in arms these days against the vulgar trash being published. Decent people are looking for a way of reducing or eliminating it. What better way than for reviewers to ignore it? No constitution is involved. No Supreme Court. Nothing complicated. Charles Lamb really proposed this. He said, "Every time a new book is published, I read an old one." Every time a new book is published, let reviewers review an old one. That would settle all the trash in short order.

Since reiteration is necessary in this day of hubbub, I repeat the quotation with which I commenced. "Certain subjects," Fred Charles Iklé has observed, "seem quite clear as long as we leave them alone." Do you know where that comes from? It comes from a book reviewed in these columns—just once—and which, because of its title you put on your list for reading. But you can't find the list and, the book having been reviewed only once, with no subsequent reminder, you have forgotten all about. It is called "How Nations Negotiate." Which, of course, just proves my point.

And thus, without the editor of this periodical being aware of it. I have subtly accomplished what I maintain is needed: a second notice of a good book. To get it by her eagle eye, I have not italicized the title. Oddly enough, it cost $5.95, the same as mine (which makes a second reminder of that one, too). Such is the ingenuity we diplomats possess. It just goes to prove you can get anything across if you are just subtle enough.

—SMITH SIMPSON

Eternal Greece

THIS rather old publication is an excellent introduction to classical Greece. However extensive one's background in the history of ancient Greece may be, one is reminded both visually, by the excellent photographs, and textually by Mr. Warner of just how amazing the "Greek experience" was. As the author says: "One cannot cease being astounded at the fact that in this small city some three generations of men not only laid the foundations, but in many ways set the standard for the whole subsequent civilization of Europe."

The reader is treated to an excellent selection of items culled from the ancient writers—in particular from Thucydides Peloponnesian Wars—as well as from more recent travelers who appreciated the truly great accomplishments of these remarkable people. One may regret the Latinization of certain place names such as Sunium for Sunion but this can be overlooked after enjoying the eloquent descriptions of the great monuments. Our tastes would seem to coincide with the exception of the narrator's objection to the Erectheum as a monstrosity—admittedly the idea of the female figure as a support for a roof sounds odd—but I would say the overall impression is not objectionable.

The description of Mycenae is perhaps the most moving of all—it captures so well the mood of the place—the photos put the readers *in situ* and one can easily imagine the atmosphere of power and artistic accomplishment which to us, given our new-found knowledge of the era, typifies those early Greek speakers who fought the Trojan Wars. My only regret is that the author has not, in my estimation, done justice to that great shrine of Delphi. Perhaps he only saw it in the bright sunshine which does such justice to most of Greece. Delphi must be seen in the rain's mist also to be fully appreciated—to have its full impact on the senses and the intellect.

In short, in substance—text and photos—"Eternal Greece" puts the message across and whets the appetite to read more but, above all, to go there to see for oneself. Despite some minor faults in the binding, which seem to be symptomatic of Thames and Hudson's larger volumes, it is well worth owning.

—T. G. B.

ETERNAL GREECE, *text by Rex Warner, photographs by Martin Hurliman. Produced by Thames and Hudson. Viking Press, $12.00.*

Ambassadorial Attributes

INFORMED curiosity about the origins and evolution of the diplomatic profession is no doubt less common than it once was. This is not surprising, in an occupation now loaded down with a variety of improbable bearers of diplomatic passports and holders of all of the usual honorific diplomatic titles—bogus diplomats like Security Officers and others with equally narrow interests and outlooks who may pass an entire professional lifetime with scarcely any contact at all with the traditional business of diplomacy. But this learned study by Professor Queller of the University of Southern California has in it items of information relevant even to the occupational concerns of Security Officers. Thus, we learn here that the fifteenth century Republic of Venice required its ambassadors to leave their wives at home, the better to preserve the secrets of their missions. A harsh rule, indeed, and out of fashion in Services anxious to protect unattached males from seduction and subversion. And yet, Professor Queller writes, despite these so ill-considered security rules, "no indication of betrayal of the Republic by a Venetian ambassador has [ever] been discovered [by modern scholars]."

There is, of course, much else in the book too. On ambassadorial functions, the author gives us this opinion of a legal commentator of the late middle ages: "For just as a magpie speaks through himself, and not from himself, and just as an organ does not have a sound by itself, so an ambassador says nothing from his own mind or by his own activity." . . . This unflattering but not everywhere outmoded conception of an ambassador's capabilities is more than offset, however, by other citations more agreeable to ambassadorial egos.

Perhaps, then, the Office of the Deputy Undersecretary for Administration can be induced to send out copies of Professor Queller's book to our current Chiefs of Mission. It would make a good companion piece to William J. Crockett's 1964 volume entitled "This Worked For Me. . . . —Mission Chiefs Pool Useful Ideas and Techniques." What better way, when so much else is now forgotten, to keep green the memory of that remarkable O Area virtuoso!

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

THE OFFICE OF AMBASSADOR IN THE MIDDLE AGES, *by Donald E. Queller. Princeton University Press, $7.50.*



Thira (Santorin) Greece by Daniel Lee McCarthy

Arms and the Soviets

THOMAS B. LARSON, formerly a Foreign Service officer and later a senior fellow at the Russian Institute, Columbia University, has written a scholarly and painstaking analysis of what is to most readers a murky area . . . Soviet arms control policy since the fall of Khrushchev.

The book resulted from a research project sponsored by the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and in a sense is a sequel to Dallin, "The Soviet Union and Disarmament" (1965) and Bloomfield, Clemens, and Griffiths, "Khrushchev and the Arms Race" (1966) which also grew out of ACDA research contracts.

The Larson volume is based on a cooperative approach in which various specialists prepared papers analyzing trends in the USSR since 1964, held a five-day conference to discuss the papers, and then reviewed Larson's attempt to synthesize these divergent pieces. Larson, however, has gone beyond a rapporteur's job and has produced a volume that bears the imprint, in both style and substance, of a single expert explaining with clarity and balanced judgment what the post-Khrushchev leadership is apparently trying to make of arms control as an instrument of national policy. While the book was made possible by a government contract, it is devoid of official flavor; indeed, many of its conclusions run counter to favorite arms control ideas.

Larson presents perhaps a minimum of new material on Soviet policy in general, but offers an exhaustive account and fresh interpretation of the arms control aspects of that policy. Just about every conceivable subject is covered, from ideology and economics to secrecy, strategy and European security.

The author is not optimistic about the prospects for US-Soviet arms agreements. He concludes that "trends in Soviet policy and in Soviet society . . . support only modest expectations of future progress toward significant disarmament and arms control agreements"; notes that existing agreements, e.g., the partial test ban and the outer space treaty may even be in some jeopardy from pressures for new weapons; and points out that partial measures in one field can lead to accelerating the arms race in another. In particular, Larson thinks a US-Soviet agreement to limit strategic nuclear capabilities is unlikely, primarily because the USSR will never consent to formal and permanent inferiority to the US in this area. Whether Larson's conclusions are "dated" in the light of possible strategic arms limitation talks in 1969 remains to be seen.

While pessimistic on strategic limitations, Larson feels that agreement might be possible on a comprehensive test ban, the use (as distinct from the possession) of nuclear weapons, regional "suppliers agreements" to slow down the arms race in underdeveloped regions, non-armament of the seabed, and, somewhat surprisingly, political-cum-arms-control settlements concerning Germany and Europe. Larson also believes that arms control negotiations produce a betterment of the political climate, a factor which must be weighed against his pessimism in order to avoid "an unjustifiably dark assessment of future prospects."

—MARION W. BOGGS

DISARMAMENT AND SOVIET POLICY, 1964-1968, *by Thomas B. Larson. Prentice-Hall, $6.95.*

Egypt Since the Revolution

THIS is a short (195 pages) collection of papers on the economy, and political and cultural developments in Egypt since the Revolution. The papers were originally given at a 1966 seminar at the University of London. Those on the economy are the least interesting.

David Cowan's paper on literary trends since 1952 is a useful survey in a field which remains completely unknown to most foreigners, perhaps because, as he notes, the Egyptian literary scene since 1952 is one of bustling activity in which quantity seems to outweigh quality. Malcolm Kerr also gives a useful account of the pragmatic and non-ideological nature of Egyptian foreign policy, pointing out the problems this leads the Egyptians into when their own foreign interests clash with one another.

Kerr's paper calls forth a rebuttal from Egyptian Marxist Khalid Muhieddin, who gives a classic statement of the Egyptian split-level approach:

> ". . . Egypt's position seems, but only seems, somewhat contradictory. Revolutionary Egypt attacks Malaysia and condemns her policy in every conference while, as a State, Egypt maintains ordinary diplomatic relations with her.
>
> "Similarly, the Egyptian delegation in the conference of the three continents at Havana has systematically attacked several countries with which Egypt maintains normal diplomatic relations. This situation was apt to lead to rupture if it had not been recognized by all parties that there is a distinction between Egypt as a nation-State with traditional interests and revolutionary Egypt."

Mr. Muhieddin does not identify the "all parties" who recognize this distinction. He may not have bothered to count.

—RICHARD B. PARKER

EGYPT SINCE THE REVOLUTION, *edited by P. J. Vatikiotis. Praeger, $6.95.*

Managing National Security

IF you are interested in the national security process, this book is required reading.

Early in 1968, the Institute for Defense Analysis launched a study of the management of our national security. The study was prepared by a group of former US officials who were well qualified to undertake it. The primary author of the chapter on the State Department, for example, was former-FSO Joe Yager.

The group soon found itself locked in a debate as to whether the organizational arrangement should be centered in the White House or the State Department. As a result, it developed three options, the third one a compromise between being State or White House centered. (It is worth noting that the solution which was adopted comes close to the intermediate arrangement.)

The Institute for Defense Analysis made a classified version of the study available to the Nixon administration shortly after the election. The published version, however, is in all essentials identical with the classified.

If, therefore, you want to read one of the studies which helped shape our current National Security Council machinery, you will find this book worth reading. You will also find it a good account of the problem of squaring the eternal White House—State—Pentagon triangle.

—JOHN C. AUSLAND

THE PRESIDENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY, *A report of the Institute for Defense Analysis, edited by Keith C. Clark and Laurence J. Legere. Praeger, $6.95.*

Cooke's New Menu

ALISTAIR COOKE is one of those rare reporters who through sheer personality of voice succeeds in endearing himself to his radio listeners.

When one adds other qualities like Cooke's clarity and wit, the Manchester-born commentator emerges as the top essayist of the air. No wonder John Crosby once remarked: ". . . no one in this country is doing anything remotely comparable to these literate, sensible talks."

Since Cooke's broadcasts about America have been beamed by the

"How did it come about that this country, led successively by a soldier, then by an alert foreign affairs student, and then by the shrewdest of politicians, committed itself to play St. George to forty-three dragons?"

BBC to the far corners of the globe, few permanent residents of the United States have heard them regularly. That sad state of affairs was remedied once before—in 1952 when Cooke put together a volume of his radio scripts for his best-selling "One Man's America."

He has again obliged his admirers by compiling a second book of essays based on his BBC broadcasts. The new volume contains 41 scripts, ranging from his intimate description of a New England town meeting ("the original backbone of local government and initiative in the United States") to one explaining that all-American sport, "Beizbol."

Cooke deals candidly with the subjects he has chosen, be it the Watts racial incident or "LBJ." He relates in picturesque fashion facts, often unknown to the natives, about Thanksgiving, George Washington, Alcatraz, Robert Frost, Charles Lindberg—and dozens of other topics.

In his epilogue he ventures into the political. He clearly doubts the ability of the US—however much inspired by idealism— to live up to 43 treaty obligations. In typical Cooke prose, he asks:

"How did it come about that this country, led successively by a soldier, then by an alert foreign affairs student, and then by the shrewdest of politicians, committed itself to play St. George to forty-three dragons?"

—James O. Mays

Talk About America, *by Alistair Cooke. Alfred A. Knopf, $5.95.*

Le Saint Siege et la Guerre Mondiale July 1941-October 1942

This is the fifth in a series of volumes of documents concerning Vatican activities in World War II, collected by a group of priests directed by the American Jesuit, Robert Graham. The latest volume is of particular interest to American readers, dealing in large part with the mission of Myron Taylor, President Roosevelt's personal envoy to the Vatican, and the correspondence between the President and Pope Pius XII. On Taylor's arrival in Rome September 1941, Roosevelt was anxious to get papal approval of US aid to the Soviet Union. Roosevelt believed "that the survival of Russia is less dangerous to religion, to the Church, and to humanity in general than the survival of the German form of dictatorship."

Many in the Vatican Curia, including Pius XII but in particular Monsignor Tardini, in the Extraordinary Affairs office, disagreed. Tardini comes through as a remarkable personality and his tough, mordant, and wry thought dominates this volume, as it did much of Vatican affairs in this period. Monsignor Montini, later Pope Paul VI, is shown as a more cautious but still impressive figure.

The documents—with marginal comments by Tardini, Montini, and others—are published in chronological order, and cover Vatican relationships throughout the world. Even with the excellent index it is difficult to trace the thread of any particular subject. Nevertheless, this is a splendid volume for browsers—though the price is off-putting and a knowledge of French and Italian essential—and an indispensable one for World War II historians.

—Goodwin Cooke

Le Saint Siege et la Guerre Mondiale, *July 1941-October 1942. Vatican Press, $12.50.*

On Open Economy

This book will be difficult reading for those who aren't at ease with mathematical symbols. And it isn't exactly inexpensive. But it will be read with interest and profit even by those who aren't mathematically trained if they want to learn about some important new research in international economics. It is No. 1 of Columbia Studies in Economics. In it is summarized research sponsored by the International Economics Workshop at Columbia University. Not although but *because* most of the essays are the work of students, it gives access to good new research (confirming the reviewer's intuitive belief that most economists never improve on their doctoral dissertation).

The book's three parts deal with three areas: the effect of skills on trade, adaptation, growth and trade and international financial policies.

Under the first heading there are, for example, new—or newish—explanations of trade based on the skills of the population of the trading countries as well as an account of the way in which direct investments affect host countries. Both are of considerable relevance to current problems—like the US trade balance and the need for skills in developing countries.

In the second part there is an extremely interesting attempt to document the association between R & D and export performance, an analysis of the growth of Japanese export trade in manufacturers in relation to imports of technical knowledge, and an example of industrialization and exports in Korea, Taiwan and Japan, etc.

Part III contains, among other things, an examination of the costs and benefits of being a reserve currency country and an exploratory attempt to explain why countries prefer one form of reserve asset to another.

—Jo W. Saxe

The Open Economy Essays on International Trade and Finance, *edited by P. B. Kenen and R. Lawrence. Columbia University Press, $12.50.*

Terror Bombing

Histories of wars come in waves. First are the personal accounts, written mostly by commanding generals and admirals. These authors are intent on vindicating themselves, making money, or filling days suddenly become void. The next wave is composed of the official histories. These vary widely in quality but in recent years the average has been quite high. They are usually much longer, more detailed, drier, and more objective than the first wave histories. However, the official histories are usually considerate of the authors of the first wave—unless the former are of a different nationality or military service.

Finally come the versions written by professional historians, usually non-military writers or professors. These authors are less inclined to pull punches. Time has elapsed. Some principals have left the scene and the authors are more interested in correcting earlier and hastier impressions and sifting fact from legend. This last wave, in respect to World War II, is now upon us. We recently had one on the US Air Navy. Now we have one on the bombing of Germany.

Anthony Verrier, a British military correspondent, has written a detailed book on the bomber offensive, with emphasis on the British Bomber Command and more particularly on the British command structure. Verrier does adequately cover the American offensive. In fact, American commanders are given better marks than are the British. Verrier finds that the American Air Force commanders in World War II were more flexible and more reasonable about what could be done with air power than were their British counterparts. Furthermore, he finds postwar American theories of air power still comprehensible and rational except for ". . . the misuse of air power today in Vietnam." Doubts about the continued rationality of US air strategy are raised in Verrier's

mind by "the almost blind belief that air power 'will bring Hanoi to the negotiating table.'"

He wonders if the frustrations of guerrilla warfare are leading US air commanders to follow the path down which Trenchard led the RAF. For Verrier blames Trenchard for the RAF's almost mystical faith in the bomber. As the founder of the independent RAF in the twenties, his views on this subject were loyally followed by commanders like Arthur Harris in the thirties.

When the war began, Harris believed only in area bombing; "wrecking Germany from end to end." Very little thought was given to what this would cost or what it would accomplish. In the early frustrating years of the war, it was the only way to hurt the Hun. Harris pretty much ignored directives, but who could gainsay the only Commander who was hurting Germany?

At first the equipment did not permit accurate bombing. Later, when precision was possible, Harris continued to bomb cities anyway. Even the famous dam-busting raid accomplished little more than to make great headlines. Germany, imperfect as was her organization for war, continued to maintain, and even increase, production of war materiel almost to the bitter end.

Eventually even the Americans followed Harris' lead on area bombing partly from the dearth of precise targets. Thousands of young air crew died in an effort of dubious value.

The book is interesting and well illustrated. Verrier's syntax does seem a bit involved at times, but this is not a fatal error. The book is likely to stir enough controversy to justify reading it.

—Albert W. Stoffel

The Bomber Offensive, *by Anthony Verrier. Macmillan, $8.95.*

Guerrilla View of Insurgency

The Guatemalan insurgency has been notable for a number of reasons: its durability, the fact that its original leaders were Guatemalan Army officers, the vicious counter-terror campaign launched against it by Guatemala's neanderthal Right and because its casualties have included Ambassador John Gordon Mein and two officers of the US Milgroup. This brief report, written by a young Uruguayan journalist, provides a polemical view of the insurgency from the perspective of the guerrillas and within the orthodoxy of the Castro school of Latin American revolution. It propounds a familiar thesis: Guatemala is "occupied" by the American imperialists acting through its surrogate, the Guatemala Army, and can be "liberated" only through violent revolution. While it contains many factual errors, it is of some interest to specialists in the area, chiefly for its sketches of the guerrillas in the field and its view of the counter-terror campaign of the Right. However, it may be rather quickly outdated by events, in view of some recent indications that Latin guerrillas may be abandoning their long and generally fruitless effort to create revolution in the *campo* and are returning to the cities.

—Victor B. Olason

Guatemala: Occupied Country, *by Eduardo Galeano. Monthly Review Press, $5.95.*

In Brief

If there was ever any doubt as to the obscurity of the thought of Gurvitch, this book will settle it. There is more in this book than I or anyone else in the foreign service community could ever possibly want to know about Gurvitch—or Bosserman. My God.

—A.L.

Dialectical Sociology, *An Analysis of the Sociology of Georges Gurvitch, by Phillip Bosserman. Porter Sargent, $7.95.*

Latin American Development

This thoughtful work on Latin America by a widely known and highly respected student of that area for many years merits careful reading by all those interested in the developmental problems of the neighboring countries that lie south of the Rio Grande. While much has been written on the economic and social life of Latin America, few studies, if any, reflect the detailed consideration that Professor Adams has given to the importance of power relationships and their role in development.

He views the population of Latin America as divided into a lower sector characterized by individuals who are mainly concerned with survival within that sector (and who clearly have no access to power) and an upper sector characterized by individuals who have entered that sector by virtue of the accumulation of wealth (and who do hold power or have access to it).

Professor Adams defines primary development as that which "produces technological inventions and discoveries and elaborates social and economic forms to handle the consequences." Secondary development implies "the importation of basic processes and the attempt to graft them onto a social structure already specifically organized to carry on a different kind of process," in the Latin American case, an agrarian society.

Governments in Latin America are viewed as deriving power from within the boundaries of their respective countries from various types of organizations as in the case in Mexico, or from external sources as Cuba does from the Soviet Union. The author feels that Latin American governments have no choice but to take advantage of all possible derivative power and to push economic development as rapidly as possible. The lack of access to power (and wealth) on the part of the lower sector is regarded as leading to chronic instability in



"Cut out some of the sex, Bisby, and we'll publish it."

Latin American societies, a viewpoint with which few would care to differ.

One of the most surprising features of this book is the scant attention given to the Alliance for Progress. Despite the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars for highways, ports, industries, schools, hospitals, etc. by AID, the Agency's efforts are dismissed in two brief paragraphs.

Of particular interest to many readers will be the last chapter entitled "Postscript: A Policy for Social Change." Here, Professor Adams places great emphasis on the needs of the lower sector to gain power, which he feels can only be accomplished without violence through training and development of leadership.

The author makes no mention of AID's many efforts throughout Latin America to develop leadership through such programs as forming cooperatives and credit unions, creating peasant leagues and trade unions, providing training in public administration and in local government, and others too numerous to mention.

It must be added that the latter paragraphs reflect the reviewer's pride in his Agency and his disappointment that Professor Adams appears not to share this feeling. It is in no way meant to detract from what is a scholarly and thought-provoking analysis of the importance of power relationships and their implications for the future of Latin America and for US foreign policy.

—DONALD W. MACCORQUODALE, M.D.

THE SECOND SOWING: *Power and Secondary Development in Latin America, by Richard Newbold Adams. Chandler, $5.50.*

Post Foreign Service

The JOURNAL used to ask "what do Foreign Service officers do after they have completed their foreign service?" Much of the answer is reflected in an excellent history of Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired, Inc. (DACOR) just completed by Richard Fyfe Boyce, one of its founders who served ten years as its Secretary and member of the Board of Governors. It covers the development of Dacor from the earliest suggestions for a retired officers' association at the beginning of the last decade, and is accompanied by an account by its incumbent President, George V. Allen, of the distinguished predecessor group at 1718 "H" Street known as "The Family" which occupied the building during the first half of this century.

In recording the development of Dacor and Dacor House, replete with dates and the names of those who participated in the work, the History's 186 pages reflect the interests and activities of retired officers generally. They summarize Dacor-sponsored legislation, some of which benefits both active and retired officers as well as service widows, and Department of State regulations affecting officers after they retire. They describe activity in the fields of legislation, placement, employment projects, welfare, public speaking and writing. There are chapters on the Dacor lecture programs, cooperation with AFSA and the Department, the Educational Consulting Service, the Foreign Service League, and the Foreign Service Cemetery in Washington where a handsome monument is to be erected to the memory of those who have dedicated their lives to the service of their country, in peace and in war, in the Foreign Service.

—WARE ADAMS

A HISTORY OF DACOR, *by Richard Fyfe Boyce. Dacor House, $3.00.*

The Constitution

THESE two volumes, taken together, explain the philosophical foundations and legal development of the US Constitution, but say little about the politics that created it or were nurtured by it.

Eidelberg's book is the more readable of the two, and though marred by a slight pomposity of style ("What will be the effects of these principles on the American Soul? Once again, I say . . ."), offers more challenging material. He believes the "Founders" intended to create, and did, a regime of mixed democratic and aristocratic principles. This mix fosters tension in the "American soul" which creates a healthy balance between unity/diversity, permanence/change, and acquisitiveness/public spirit. Eidelberg makes his point, and not badly, by analyzing the debates at the Federal Convention of 1787. His analysis of other constitutional theories is worth reading on its own.

Pritchett's contribution really ought to be titled "Legal Development of the American Constitution," because it sticks closely to case law and the legal history of the Constitution. Though it is an indispensable, comprehensive reference book, it is not very exciting and one finds oneself hoping Pritchett will move from case citations towards political dynamics. The hope is forlorn.

—JOHN D. STEMPEL

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, *by Paul Eidelberg. The Free Press, $6.95 hardbound, $2.95 paper.*
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, *by C. Herman Pritchett. McGraw-Hill, $11.50.*

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PREDICAMENT OF THE SENIOR CAREER

from page 29

sacred in area knowledge, language proficiency, and functional experience in order to make promotion, suddenly become meaningless in assigning officers to responsibilities for which they presumably should have been trained.

In this treatise I am not particularly thinking of the non-career appointments to senior responsibility as against the career, although, parenthetically, one would wish that while fully accepting the need for accommodating ourselves to the utilization of the non-career we could come closer to observing the same standards in their selection as we apply to the career, including age. I am thinking primarily at the moment of the illogical approach within the system itself practiced by officers who are products of the career service that fall into this very dichotomy, possibly without realizing it. The very Country Director or Assistant Secretary will take one viewpoint as a member of a selection board and quite another when exercising his Bureau responsibilities in choosing Ambassadors.

To illustrate the incongruity of the situation described so far, there are at this time 31 Class 1 Officers appointed as Ambassadors which is roughly equivalent to the number of Career Minister Ambassadors. In observing this phenomenon, several questions immediately arise: (1) Have we exercised poor judgment in those we have selected for the category of Career Minister; or (2) so far as the career is concerned is a Class 1 or 2 level in the Service all that we need, making the class of Career Minister completely superfluous; (3) should we imaginatively search for some solution not yet tried to solve the problem that faces us with this unseemly eclipse of the senior officers of the Service? Living very close to this situation for now nearly three years, I cannot honestly understand why many of those now occupying well-earned places on the Career Minister list have been persistently rejected. Allowance for faulty judgment in promoting a small percentage that in the light of hindsight might have been unwise could provide some explanation, but from the record of performance and proven potential I am convinced that choosing others in preference to those upon whom the system has placed its highest stamp of approval cannot be justified if merit is to be the sole rule.

In answer to my second question, practice would overwhelmingly indicate that elevation to Class 1 would seem to be quite adequate for our purposes. If there were some correlation between appointments to Chief of Mission and relative rank, we might here find logic, but even this correlation does not hold in practice. Likewise, there is apparently no hestitancy in appointing Career Ministers to Class 3 or 4 Embassies and Consulates General. In sum it would seem that while there is considerable disregard of rank in relationship to assignment all the way up through the Service, it becomes more glaringly apparent in the senior-most positions.

As we look back into past history (possibly 15 years ago and beyond) the pattern in general recognized a climb to the top of the Service both in rank and assignment where a senior officer had a tendency to stay until circumstances dictated his retirement.

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The pattern now changes. All too commonly the career officer ascends to the apex and then a gradual decline while being used in less prestigious ways, often not fully utilizing the investment in him nor capitalizing on the carefully engineered experience to which he has been exposed.

It may be too early to suggest that this is a pattern of career life which is now so generally accepted that we should accommodate ourselves to it. Some have suggested that the imperatives associated with the recognition of youth are now so fully accepted that we should plan for the average career to peak at about age 50 with retirement planned soon thereafter. Such a decision would mean, among other things, the restructuring of the class ladder and the adapting of the required experiences in the Service to take this shortened career life into account.

There is, however, a different approach which may have merit. It is not new, for it has been suggested before, but thus far has been vigorously and successfully opposed by those in favor of protecting the concept of a longer lifetime career. This concept would recognize that the acme of recognition in a career Service like ours is achieved at the time of the first Presidential appointment, whether that be overseas or in the domestic establishment. The career officer essentially surrenders his career protection and status at that point. Emoluments, titles and recognition would be completely associated with that status enjoyed only so long as he holds a Presidential appointment. It would allow for a succession of Presidential appointments, of course. When his status as a Presidential appointee expires he would then be retired on the basis of years of service accumulated, calculated on the basis which the law now provides. In instances where his services were sought in capacities other than within the Presidential appointment system, he would be treated like any non-status officer, but, for remunerative purposes, revert to a salary status not in excess of the top step of Class 1.

Under such an arrangement the career officer would retire on the completion of his Ambassadorships, Secretaryships or equivalent Presidential appointments to which might be added a clearly codified number of senior billets at the Secretary's discretion and beyond that there would be a clear incentive to seek another career at a time when he would probably be of an age to do it. Or he could accept what in many ways would be the equivalent of retirement, although employed in the Department with the satisfaction of having achieved his highest mark and thus willing to spend his serviceable years in a lesser capacity. In all probability such a system would solve the present problem surrounding the under-utilized senior officer now in a post-Presidential appointment status. Like any other retired officer from any service or group he could accept subsequent Presidential appointments if the current administration desired.

Such a plan would solve our anomaly in a far more logical way than turning to a reduced age for Career Minister retirement. It would be practical for it woud recognize once and for all that career status is a meaningless guarantee to the senior officer if the administration to which he must be subject is not inclined to use him appropriately. ■



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ity. Yet virtually all will agree that some such system is essential. There have been frequent minor tamperings with the workings of the system, but no widespread sentiment for radically altering its character.

Conclusion/A Model of Socialization

In this chapter I have tried to describe some of the characteristics, attitudes, and behavior of FSOs and some of the causative influences. The picture that emerges is one of a sophisticated, status-conscious, highly intelligent, ambitious, and dedicated group, one that is simultaneously awarded high prestige and much criticism from the larger society. Organizationally and professionally the group is conservative and slow to change, and individual members are under strong influence to conform to group norms.

Out of the many aspects of behavior examined in this chapter, a model of the socialization process within a group of this kind can be delineated. The steps are:

1. *Self-selection.* Because of the difficulty of entering the professional group, it is chiefly persons who are highly motivated and who sense that their own interests and values are congruent with those of the group who are likely to persist; such persons are predisposed to adapt readily.

2. *Formal selection.* Those entrusted with selecting newcomers to the group generally take care to search for qualities that are prized within the group; in large measure, they tend to reproduce themselves. This provides added insurance that the newcomers will fit in well and will adapt readily.

3. *Indoctrination.* In formal training and in less formal interaction with veteran group members, newcomers quickly become aware of what is expected of them in terms of social and professional conduct.

4. *Weeding-out.* There is a strong tendency for the separation of members who are not suited to the group, either by the individual's own choice or by formal group action. Although this can happen throughout the career, there is a tendency for separation to occur in the early years when neither the group nor the individual has invested too much in the association.

5. *Reinforcement in the career experience.* Throughout years of work experience and exposure to the group's culture, the individual's assimilation of group norms becomes progressively deeper.

6. *Increasing stake in the career.* At some point, usually in the mid-career years, the member's investment in the career and in the group reaches the stage at which any possibility of separation is severely threatening. As the individual's mobility decreases and his dependence on the group increases, his tendency to conform to group norms becomes pronounced.

7. *The influence of status and prestige.* As the individual rises in the career, achieving higher status and greater prestige, his self-esteem and welfare become inextricably bound up with the welfare of the group.

8. *The influence of esprit de corps and professional mystique.* Progressively, shared experience and initiation into the mysteries of the profession tend to separate

the individual member from the outside world and increase his identification with the group.

9. *Organizational pressures.* In frequent contrast to the "free" professions, the organizational context of a career system tends to generate additional pressures that work toward group cohesiveness, as in more direct constraints and sanctions (a promotion system) and the proximity of perceived rival groups (the "administrators").

10. *Paternalism in the senior ranks.* By the time the individual achieves "success" as generally recognized within the group, usually in his senior years, he is no longer under pressure to conform, but is now one of those who is exerting pressure. He is a "success," he has reaped honors, and he can retire at any time with a handsome annuity; consequently he feels freer in expressing himself. But he is now a product of the socialization process: he is a leader, he is influential, and he tends to take direct responsibility for the welfare of the group.

This model, of course, is essentially neutral; it merely describes what is likely to happen in a career system such as the FSO system. Whether the processes involved are functional or dysfunctional, in the case of a particular career system or for particular individuals, is another question. Some members of the group may at times see the processes as sinister and manipulative; others will see them as quite natural and supportive of their own interests. ■

STYLES IN FOREIGN SERVICE SELF CRITICISM

Warsaw Domestic Service in Polish 0600 GMT 19 Mar 68

The employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in their resolution demand that the most severe political and administrative consequences should be paid by those responsible for the shocking events. They align themselves with the universal demands for a merciless purge of party without any exceptions, particularly in the foreign service.

Prague CTK International Service in English 2032 GMT 13 Mar 68

In a statement made public after a conference of the Communist Party at the Foreign Ministry, it is noted that not even Czechoslovak foreign policy, although it achieved several successes, was spared the deforming influence of the past period when the party Central Committee did not deal in a complex way with foreign policy problems, and when most questions were dealt with by the Central Committee Presidium.

Thus, foreign policy was marked by subjectivism, and the creative initiative of ministry officials was to a certain extent weakened, because not even the top echelons of the Ministry exerted sufficient effort to correct the state of affairs, the statement said. . . .

The communist conference at the Foreign Ministry recommended that the party Central Committee perform a critical appraisal of the work of all leading functionaries, and relieve of their posts those who are responsible for the grave shortcomings in individual sectors of party and state life.



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DECEMBER FROST *from page 31*

gasped, out of breath, laughing, "Jak, smell. Your's down, Fritz?"

"Perfect miss."

"But you couldn't see in time."

"Too slow." Shake it, Fritz told himself, easy, loosen up.

"Jak was wonderful! See his point, Stefan?" Drago shouted, "Fine hold."

Doctor Markovic took the pheasant from Jak's mouth and slipped it into the chamois leather game bag. He rubbed his dog's nose. The men followed the setter out of the brush, down a small ravine breaking the ice skim on a shallow creek. They hunted through a grove of tall oaks where someone had erected a granite monument, crossed a cut-over corn field, and skirted a hedgerow. Jak raised his head, snuffed, froze, tail quivering. Stefan eased a finger to the trigger, prodding the undergrowth with his boot. Two pheasants flashed low and fast from the hedge; Fritz led his well, bringing it down with a clean shot.

Drago clicked his safety on. "Bravo! You Americans can still shoot! Jak. Hunt dead birds; Stefan killed the other one!"

The bird dog plunged into thc hcdgerow and found the two dead pheasants. Then they hunted slowly, keeping Jak in front. Near a thicket Drago took his second pheasant. Jozef shot a hare. An hour later, on the edge of a forest three pheasants flushed, Fritz and Jozef killing two. Then they had enough shooting, snapped a leash on Jak, and walked through the tall oaks for the dirt road, Above the ice-skimmed creek Fritz saw the tall stone monument with a red Partisan star. He stopped before the granite slab, squinting to read the weathered inscription as the other hunters climbed the ridge.

"Drago," Fritz called, "what happened . . ."

Doctor Markovic looked back, his hand falling slowly. "After they destroyed the bridge. Wounded who couldn't escape. Captured and shot here by the Fascists."

"Did you know the men . . ."

"What God damned difference? I know their families." Drago snatched at Jak's choke leash. "Come on."

"No, wait."

"Forget it. We'll be at the car. It's cold." He pulled at the dog, catching up with Stefan who had begun to limp.

That's what's wrong, Fritz spat out bitterly. Wounds. Can't get away. Too many wounds. Dynamited bridges and mass graves. Twenty-year limp. He looked at the gray stone. Drago is right. Need ten more years. Fiats and television. But.

Then Fritz was very tired. He dropped his head and saw the rounded, overgrown mounds of earth at the foot of the granite monument. Forgetting is not enough he said, finally, icily. Drago can't just forget. And hope there won't be a next time. Hope alone is thin protection when half the butchery of the last five hundred years started here. It is going to happen all over again. Unless. What?

Fritz Standwell read the last five names cut into the stone

Janez Korosec
Stefan Burjek
Anton Dornik
Pavel Brejc
Alojz Zupanc

and the date

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then the inscription

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ently with it—not just in Vietnam but every time—a hue and cry of opposition has arisen. When the United States invaded Mexico, two former Presidents and one future President[4] denounced the war as violating American principles. The senior of them, John Quincy Adams, is said even to have expressed the hope that General Taylor's officers would resign and his men desert.[5] When the United States fought a war with Spain and then suppressed the patriotic resistance to American rule of the Philippines, the ranks of opposition were swelled with two former Presidents, Harrison and Cleveland, with Senators and Congressmen including the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and with such distinguished individuals as Andrew Carnegie and Samuel Gompers.

The dilemma of contemporary American foreign policy is that, while becoming the most powerful nation ever to have existed on the earth, the American people have also carried forward their historical mistrust of power and their commitment to the imposition of restraints upon it.[6] That dilemma came to literal and symbolic fulfillment in the year 1945 when two powerful new forces came into the world. One was the bomb at Hiroshima, representing a quantum leap to a new dimension of undisciplined power. The other was the United Nations Charter, representing the most significant effort ever made toward the restraint and control of national power. Both were American inventions, one the product of our laboratories, the other the product of our national experience. Incongruous though they are, these are America's legacies to the modern world: the one manifested in Vietnam and the nuclear arms race, the other in the hope that these may yet be brought under control.

The incongruity between our old values and our new unilateral power has greatly troubled the American people. It has much to do, I suspect, with the current student rebellion. Like a human body reacting against a transplanted organ, our body politic is reacting against the alien values which, in the name of security, have been grafted upon it. We cannot—and dare not—divest ourselves of power, but we have a choice as to how we will use it. We can try to ride out the current convulsion in our society and adapt ourselves to a new role as the world's nuclear vigilante. Or we can try to adapt our power to our traditional values, never allowing it to become more than a means toward domestic, societal ends, while seeking every opportunity to discipline it within an international community.

We cannot resolve this dilemma by choosing to "err on the side of security," because security is the argument for both sides. The real question is: which represents the more promising approach to security in its broader dimension? ■

[4]John Quincy Adams, Martin van Buren and Abraham Lincoln.
[5]Charles A. Barker, "Another American Dilemma," *Virginia Quarterly Review*, Spring 1969, pp. 239-240.
[6]The theme here developed, the dilemma posed by American power as against the commitment to an equality of rights in a community of world power, is adapted from an article by Professor Charles A. Barker of the Department of History of Johns Hopkins University, *ibid.*, pp. 230-252.

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
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Planning for Academe

As an FSO on study detail at an academic institution, I cannot agree too strongly with the suggestion of Messrs. Gerlach and Beach in the January issue, that FSOs be assigned as full-fledged faculty members at various universities to improve Foreign Service—academe relations. Actually I recall at least one senior FSO who participated in such a program several years ago, as a visiting instructor in Middle Eastern affairs at a university.

However, an obstacle to broader extension of this program in the past has been the reticence of academe itself to accept such temporary instructors, both because they may lack the Ph.D. or other prerequisites, and because they displace academics. For it is fair, and I hope not unkind, to note that the national academic fraternity is prone to espouse with much greater vigor various proposals to leaven government, foundations, and other non-academic organizations with temporary infusions of academics than it would espouse proposals for reversing this process.

University deans and other administrators, on the other hand, seem often more sympathetic to such a reverse flow. This is especially true when it can save the university money. To maximize acceptance of the proposed FSO teaching program, therefore, I have a few suggestions.

First, no effort should be made to obtain a university contribution to the FSO's salary, beyond the allocation of research and travel allowances appropriate to the faculty of the particular institution. This simply requires that the Foreign Service recognize an academic assignment as often more useful to the officer and to the Service in the long run than an assignment in the relatively well staffed Washington bureaucracy; the same salary will be paid either way.

Second, individuals chosen should have a geographic or functional competence specific and deep enough to provide substance for at least one university-level course over the two semesters of their assignment. Otherwise they will be viewed by academe as "typical practitioners," good for one or two meaningful lectures before they begin to repeat themselves.

Third, the designees should be given several months' advance notice of selection and be moved in June or July rather than September. This will enable them to outline their course and piece together a bibliography before the time to teach is fully upon them.

Fourth, the entire program will be more beneficial to the inviting university as well as the Foreign Service if a specific "slot" and a specific course is allotted for FSO teachers over a period of several consecutive years, rather than on a buckshot basis year-by-year. This will provide more time for advance career management planning by the Department, as well as more incentive to the university to offer a course regularly in its curriculum without recruiting a full-time academic. This will not, on the other hand, rule out possible *ad hoc* appointments to fill temporary openings created by sabbaticals if the university so desires and a suitable candidate appears.

Finally, I cannot end without a word recommending even greater use of present programs, including assignments of FSOs as students and as diplomats-in-residence. Although diplomats-in-residence have been prevented from teaching courses in some cases by the academic bars mentioned above, the academic community is decentralized enough to permit considerable free-lancing if the individual officer is so minded. By the same token, I disagree (mildly) with Messrs. Gerlach and Beach in their suggestion that the status of student "greatly limits" an FSO's opportunities in academe.

Different programs serve different purposes. Just as diplomats-in-residence can have considerable influence on fellow faculty members and researchers, mid-career students can be very effective on a "colleague" basis inside and outside of class with younger students, as well as with some members of the faculty. Either group can add to its contribution by giving guest lectures.

It is true, nevertheless, (as Messrs. Gerlach and Beach assert) that assignment to teach a specific course will add a new dimension to the impact of FSOs on academe and vice versa. It would not, however, make the erroneous, assumption that FSO teachers need be young, so as to communicate better with the students. That kind of impact exists, and should be expanded, in present programs. Academically-oriented senior officers will in many cases make very effective teachers, and should welcome the opportunity to test their effectiveness and gratification in this kind of life as a prelude to "what to do after retirement."

GEORGE B. LAMBRAKIS
Medford, Massachusetts

Promotion and Ability

One kind of error which statistical-minded outsiders are constantly making in their mathematical probings of the diplomatic establishment appears in Carroll R. McKibbin's article in the May JOURNAL. He makes an assumption which vitiates one of his important conclusions. The assumption is that promotion is a suitable criterion of ability; the conclusion, since 35 percent of the "Career Group" he studied reached FSO-3 rank within thirteen years and only 21 percent of the "Attrition Group" did, the "Career Group" was abler. This conclusion, says Professor McKibbin, is "obvious." Unfortunately, those of us who have been career officers, can testify that the conclusion is not obvious.

Promotion in the period 1924-46, as subsequently, was often influenced by considerations other than ability, such as conformity, clique-ism and ingratiation, not to add back-stabbing. Another factor—discrimination against consular officers—became so rampant and demonstrable after 1924 that the Departmental protector of the consular officers, Wilbur J. Carr, as well as the officers themselves, were able to reach Congressmen who insisted upon a rectification of this particular abuse and some headway was gradually made along this line.

A basic need to which this article attests once more is that of closer relationships between practitioners and academicians in the study of diplomacy and the diplomatic establishment. The one can provide corrections of fact; the other, corrections of perspective and scholarship. Such relationships could be promoted in a continuous, systematic fashion through a Center for Research in Diplomacy.

R. SMITH SIMPSON
Washington

Accent on Youth

We are told that it is a young man's world and that the future, if not the present, belongs to youth. There is ample evidence to support this on all sides. Age and experience appear for

the moment to be out of style, even in the Foreign Service. It is not the purpose of this letter to debate the relevance of these two qualities to the practice of diplomacy but to raise certain questions concerning the relationship of age to promotion.

Many of us who entered the Service in the late 1940s and early 1950s after military service in World War II and a considerable wait after passing our written and oral exams, were concerned as to the effect our advanced years (30 in my case) would have on our future advancement. We were assured that our maturity and experience, both military and civilian, should help us and certainly would not in itself weigh against us. The first years of our service coincided with the McCarthy era and promotions were few. In 1956 most of us who had recently reached class 4 were dropped back to class 5 due to the creation of classes 7 and 8. We were told that our concern over this apparent retrogression in our forward progress was groundless. After all, a ladder with eight rungs would clearly be easier to climb than one with only six.

Wristonization more than doubled the size of the FSO corps within a period of about five years. Again concern was expressed by some as to the effect of this massive infusion of new plasma on future jobs and promotions in the upper grades. No problem here either, we were told. The lateral entrants would bring their jobs with them thus opening up more areas of assignment for the career FSO, and stimulating competition. With an expanded service promotion would obviously be facilitated.

Now a decade later we find that strangely enough there is not enough room at the top. Classes 1, 2 and 3 are overstaffed. Promotions for budgetary and other reasons are restricted to less than 10 percent per year in the top three classes. This makes it almost inevitable that several hundred officers now in class 3 will not be promoted before their time in grade runs out. We all accept the fact that the Foreign Service is a highly competitive career. Satisfactory, or even superior, performance does not assure promotion to the top ranks. But what kind of a race is it when some of the horses are given an extra impost without notice because of age?

To the best of my knowledge there is nothing in the precepts which guide the Selection Boards in placing a premium on youth or a penalty on age. Nevertheless the promotion statistics of the last few years show a downward trend in the age of those promoted. For example, the average age of those advancing this year from class 3 to 2 was 43.7 (March NEWS LETTER), below the average age of the class as a whole which was 46.5. I believe both figures are lower than previous years' averages. A healthy trend perhaps; but is it the result alone of the superior performance of the younger officers? Are the Boards using age as a factor in itself? I suspect they are. The NY TIMES in a May 6 article on the forthcoming reorganization of the Foreign Service states that one of the objectives will be to "identify younger officers of exceptional ability." It then goes on to note that "the unstated corollary [was] that more senior Foreign Service officers might be passed over in promotions." The Young Turks of AFSA are said to endorse warmly the reorganization drive. Where do they stand on the subject of age?


According to rumors emanating from Washington, the new Administration wants nominees for Chief of Mission from the career service to be officers under 55. Appointments to date tend to confirm this. Is this purely coincidental?

The Foreign Service can and will survive another reorganization. It might even emerge stronger and rejuvenated. If in the process its more senior members (in all classes) are to be jettisoned, so be it. I believe, however, that in fairness to all concerned the rules of the competition should be clarified. If some have already been disqualified due to their age or given unspecified handicaps, they should be told.

MALCOLM THOMPSON

Istanbul

The Foreign Service child returns to her homeland . . .



Nurturing Specialists

THE recent premature retirement of Donald S. Macdonald ends a chapter in the history of specialization in the Foreign Service. All three of the first group of FSOs selected by the Department for specialization in Korean affairs have now left the Service without having attained their original objectives.

These three separations took place quite separately over a period of nearly two decades. Each officer was devoted to and deeply interested in his specialty and was quite willing to invest in extra service and effort to Korean affairs.

During the span of their service, Korea saw independence, invasion, war, reinvasion, revolution, military coup and the coming or going of five governments, one of them American; in all of them the United States and its interests were deeply involved. In the twenty-year period from 1947 onward, no other country absorbed so much American blood and treasure.

Could the Department of State, then, successfully absorb no single specialist in Korean affairs? Could it devise no way to avoid wasting the talents of subsequent Korean specialists in protracted assignments in Perth and Chieng Mai, barren ground, to put it mildly, for the scattering of Korean specialist seed? What inner generalist persuasion appoints as Korean Country Directors men who have never more than visited Korea and mans their staffs and those in Seoul with non-specialists while those whom the Department has selected for Korean training lose their effectiveness in an often unsought and unwelcome separation from Korean affairs?

There may be answers to these questions. May I express the hope that Mr. Richardson, in his review of the Department's activities, will ferret them out, *inter alia* by interviewing past and present specialists so that ways can be found not only to train but also to nurture, reward and retain the specialist in the affairs of medium-sized nations. Since 1945, we have fought our wars and faced our greatest threats in the belt of medium-sized countries which girds the great Sino-Soviet land mass through Asia and Europe: Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, Thailand, Burma, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and central Europe. Korea was only the first to explode; Vietnam the next. The evident failure of Korean specialization casts long shadows over the possibilities of specialization throughout these countries, where we most need its continuous existence.

Since universities also encounter difficulties in supporting specialization in these areas, may I suggest that consideration be given to the establishment of an Institute with mixed governmental-academic backing (on the model common in Europe) which specializes in the affairs of this belt of countries and to which the Foreign Service officer specialist might sometimes be assigned when not on duty in his own area?

GREGORY HENDERSON
New York (*former FSO*)

Quote Without Comment

CONSUMER REPORTS, the monthly magazine of the Consumers Union, carries a column headed "Quote Without Comment." Should the Foreign Service JOURNAL wish to introduce a similar column, I have a starter—a quote from my "retirement" TM, paragraph 11, "Remarks".

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
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
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AFSA NEWS

July, 1969

published by the

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Members' Views Needed

It is clear that AFSA members—and potential members—want the Association to lend a more active and aggressive hand on the whole range of "pocketbook issues" of interest to those in foreign affairs. These range from pay comparability, to allowances and benefits, to individual grievances.

With this in mind, the Board of Directors has asked a small committee to explore the advantages and disadvantages of seeking some form of recognition as "a lawful employee organization" under the terms of Executive Order 10988, which regulates employee-management relations in the Federal Government. The committee's report will be of great interest to the entire membership and is, hence, being printed in its entirety in this issue of the AFSA NEWS.

The present Board of Directors—and presumably its successors—are committed to the concept of AFSA as a *professional organization*, with all that the phrase implies for style and substance. The question that is now before the Board, as a result of the membership's views alluded to above, is whether the Association can remain a professional organization, *and also* serve a function which has traditionally been the purview of other types of organizations. The Committee's view, as the report makes clear, is that there is no basic incompatibility between the two functions.

Your views on the subject should be communicated to Frank Wisner, Room 4511, Department of State, so that they may be brought before the Board of Directors.

Report of the Sub-Committee on Employee-Management Relations

TO: *The Board of Directors, American Foreign Service Association*

FROM: *Frank Wisner, Robert Pfeiffer, Paul Hare*

The sub-committee on Employee-Management Relations met at the request of the Chairman of the Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Association to consider and prepare recommendations for the Board of Directors on the role of AFSA in the field of employee-management relations. Specifically, the sub-committee was asked to look into the possibility of AFSA applying for recognition under Executive Order 10988 and establishing relations with other groups within the federal service working for objectives similar to those of AFSA. The sub-committee was also asked to prepare recommendations on how the Association could assist in the resolution of grievances its membership has or may have with the Department of State, AID, USIA, and the Foreign Service.

The attached study tries to address all of the above issues. The recommendations are submitted to the Board of Directors for its consideration and decision. The sub-committee is prepared to discuss in any forum the Board chooses the recommendations included in this study and to assist the Board in carrying out the decisions it may make on the basis of these recommendations.

I. AFSA And Employee-Management Relations

I. Introduction

The Foreign Service Association has moved rapidly in the last several years to create a forum in which the objectives and structure of the Foreign Affairs community can be discussed. Equally, the Association has begun to analyze and take action to improve the profession of foreign service. The result has been a stimulating discussion, the definition of areas of concern, and initial steps towards reform of foreign affairs, particularly Foreign Service management. Of great importance during this period has been the growing participation and desire to participate of individuals throughout the foreign affairs community and specifically in the Foreign Services of AID, State, and USIA. During this period the Foreign Service Association has become an alternative forum to "in-house" discussion within the foreign affairs agencies. Inside the Association issues directly related to the profession and even the shape of the service are being discussed. In the future we can assume the Association's membership will become more outspoken and interested and as a result the Association will be forced to take a larger and more active role in working to improve the conditions of the foreign affairs profession.

At present we note AFSA is moving in two directions. First and not directly related to the subject of this study AFSA is becoming a meeting ground for a variety of audiences in the foreign affairs community. The Association has gone beyond this point to carry the ideas and concerns of the Association outside the Federal Government to the American public. Within the Federal Government AFSA has expanded its membership in State, USIA and AID and aroused the interest and attention of other government offices concerned with foreign affairs. We consider this expansion of AFSA's focus healthy and hope it will continue. We feel AFSA can develop in the next few years into an exciting and valuable forum, not only for members of State, AID, and USIA but also for other federal agencies to include Agriculture, CIA, Treasury, the Bureau of the Budget, HEW, etc, as well as the committee staffs in the Senate and House of Representatives. The Association can even look forward to helping develop a foreign affairs political constituency within the American body politic. AFSA, as this process continues, may wish to expand its membership or set up forms of associate membership.

However valuable AFSA's efforts are in creating a framework for discussion and thinking, they should not divert the Association from its respon-

sibility to its primary constituency, the foreign service personnel of State, AID and USIA. The primary resource of foreign affairs profession is the people within it. If they cannot function creatively, it is unlikely the larger issues will be addressed and resolved creatively. The Association's success in improving the profession of the foreign service and creating the kind of environment within which foreign affairs can be managed with imagination, will have an important effect on its voice in the larger forum of the foreign affairs community and indeed, in the entire public service. Foreign service personnel are in general unhappy and deeply concerned with the current state of their profession.

They are interested in more than "bread and butter" issues; recruitment, training, promotion and assignment policies and even the organizations of State, AID and USIA are subjects of immediate concern and discussion. Much of the personal dissatisfaction arises from the fact that the administration of the foreign service is responsible by and large only to itself. If the Association is to survive, it must have as a prime goal a responsible relationship between those who make the regulations and those who are obliged to live by them.

Before the Association became active there were no non-governmental mechanisms through which foreign service personnel could reform their profession. If the Association is to satisfy its membership needs and desires, we feel it must continue to work for the improvement of foreign service even at an accelerated pace. The following chapters present several ways AFSA can sharpen and improve its organization to accomplish this objective.

II. AFSA and Collective Bargaining

A. Executive Order 10988

In 1962 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10988 which established the policy and arrangements for cooperation between employee organizations and agency management in the Executive Branch of the Government. Since the issuance of this order, over one million Federal employees have chosen to affiliate with employee organizations which now have the right to negotiate agreements with agency management. At present a new Executive Order is under consideration which could be published as early as September 1969.

AFSA is not at present an employee organization within the purview of E.O. 10988. There are advantages, however, in being recognized as a true "employee organization." Consultation with management would be compulsory rather than voluntary. Management would be required to negotiate seriously with the Association. Recognized under the order, AFSA would also have more access to the administration of AID, State, USIA, and to the Civil Service Commission.

Under E.O. 10988, there are now three types of recognition: "informal," "formal," and "exclusive." In effect, AFSA already enjoys "informal" recognition and has established a habit of communicating with State, AID and USIA management, on subjects of concern.

"Formal" recognition could be accorded to AFSA because, it has "a substantial and stable membership of ten percent of the employees in the unit." Such recognition would allow the Association to set up a checkoff system arranged by voluntary participation in a payroll deduction system. The agencies involved would be required to consult with AFSA in formulation and implementation of personnel policies and working conditions. However, technically speaking, under formal recognition the Association has no right to address grievances with management.

"Exclusive" recognition would give greater power to AFSA. It would require proof the Association has enrolled over 50% of the employees in the bargaining unit. Under this form of recognition State Department management would be required to negotiate agreements with AFSA and could not recognize any other employee organization. AFSA would obtain under the Order "greater participation in the formulation and implementation of policies and procedures affecting the condition of employment." However, even under exclusive recognition AFSA could not interfere in basic aspects of personnel policy which could impair or determine the "methods, means or personnel by which (government) operations are to be conducted." Rights for the consideration of grievances and arbitration are also limited, but much greater than under "formal" recognition.

Whatever the form of recognition, the rights granted under E.O. 10988 are distinctly limited. They in no way compare to the rights of a trade union. The new Executive Order will give additional but not substantially different authority to employee organizations. Reportedly, however, it will make more rigorous the conflict of interest provisions in the leadership of the organization representing the bargaining unit. Even under the present Executive Order any officer who assigns work or writes performance evaluations *may* be excluded from holding an official position in the employee association.

We note the trend in the Federal service is towards recognition and believe the trend will continue, perhaps at an accelerated rate under a new order. In obtaining recognition under the Executive Order for State, AID, and USIA AFSA will make a significant contribution towards the unification of the foreign affairs community, towards the creation of a sense of foreign affairs professionalism, and towards uniform standards for the community. The Association has earned a hearing with the leadership of State, AID and USIA but its present position is not guaranteed. If any of the agencies choose not to consult with AFSA, they are under no obligation to do so. The Association should have legal and permanent right to consult. From the experience of other government departments, relationships between recognized organizations and department leadership have not suffered as a result of recognition. A wall of distrust between management and employees has not grown up. Without recognition AFSA might become less competitive with rivals, particularly the AFGE.

Recognition under the present or a future Executive Order does not mean the Association will become a trade union. AFSA's goals are not the same as trade unions; its constituency has different aspirations. E.O. 10988 is a limited order and recognition under it can only facilitate AFSA's attempts to improve both the professionalism and conditions of the Foreign Service. In short, the Executive Order provides the cloth; AFSA is the tailor.

The principal drawback of the Executive Order is its conflict of interest clauses. However, we find Executive departments and the Civil Service Commission have been more lenient than the letter of the law would suggest. AFSA will not know how serious the problem will be until it presents its Board of Directors for recognition. *We recommend seeking recognition under the Order and if time permits, to gain recognition under the present Order.* The Civil Service Commission tells us conditions for transition into recognition under the new Order for those already recognized will be relaxed. This could mean the AFSA board as constituted under E.O. 10988 would be able to continue to operate under the new Order.

Of the three options open we favor "formal" recognition for the moment with the possibility of "exclusive" recognition in the future. "Informal" recognition offers no advantage AFSA does not already have. "Formal" rec-

ognition would permit AFSA to represent State, AID and USIA concurrently where according to current statistics AFSA has less than 50 percent of membership enrolled. We believe the membership of AFSA would find "formal" a more acceptable way to begin because relations between the State, AID and USIA and AFSA would have less of a "militant trade union" flavor. However, once AFSA has recruited sufficient membership in State, AID, and USIA—an important objective whether "exclusive" recognition is sought or not—consideration should be given again to "exclusive" recognition. *We recommend that the decision to seek "formal" recognition be ratified in vote by the majority of AFSA's members.*

B. The Bargaining Unit

1. *Definition*

Executive Order 10988 provides a forum in which the representatives of employees and those of management have a right to converse on personnel and administrative problems. To set up this forum, AFSA must decide what type of representation it will ask for and it must designate employees who are essential to management and bar them from holding office in or representing AFSA.

If AFSA applies for formal recognition to represent its members, it need only assert that it has a stable membership of more than 10 percent of the professional employees at State, AID and USIA (the bargaining unit), that no other employee organization is qualified for "exclusive" recognition, and present to management a roster of its officers and representatives, a copy of its constitution and by-laws, and a statement of its objectives. Management will then accept AFSA's proposal or modify it, and there can be appeal from this decision. It might, for example, bar AFSA from representing certain employees engaged in security or intelligence work, or others whom it considers part of management.

If the Association were to apply for "exclusive" recognition, it would have to claim its members constituted at least 50 percent of a designated bargaining unit, and be ready to assume the responsibility of negotiating agreements with management for all the employees, including non-AFSA members, in the unit. Furthermore, management might contest AFSA's proposed bargaining unit. Management might recognize the Association as the exclusive representative of some groups of employees and reject its claim to represent others. Management, for instance, might recognize AFSA as the "exclusive" representative of FSOs but reject its claims in the case of FSS or civil service employees. If management and AFSA reached no agreement on the bargaining unit or units, the Secretary of Labor would be asked by management to appoint an arbitrator to investigate the facts and to issue an advisory opinion to management on the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining units. The arbitrator might also hold an election to determine the membership of AFSA. Under "exclusive" recognition, the bargaining unit is likely to be a matter of controversy, at least at first, reflecting larger responsibilities and a more contractual relationship than in formal recognition.

*We define the bargaining unit as FSO, FSR, FSIO, FSS and GS employees working on substantive foreign policy issues.** In other words the bargaining unit includes those employees of State, AID, and USIA who concern themselves with the substance of foreign policy or who serve or can serve in United States missions abroad in direct secretarial and staff support to substantive officers. (We include the second category, primarily FSS, as we believe secretarial and staff personnel are vital to the performance of the missions assigned substantive officers and share the same conditions of life and hardships as substantive officers).

* We do not believe AFSA should represent GS personnel in support functions. *We recommend AFSA identify those GS personnel who work on substantive issues and move urgently to increase AFSA membership among them.*

We would underline the fact that AFSA continues to welcome membership from those members of the foreign affairs community who do not fall within the bargaining unit. It should be understood, however, that AFSA cannot assume a responsibility to represent them in employee-management bargaining. AFSA should take every appropriate opportunity to represent their views.

We recommend drawing the management line at the level of Bureau EX Director, with his subordinates falling outside management. The following positions should also be considered on the management side: the Career Management and Assignments Division Chief, the Performance Evaluation Division Chief, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Personnel, for Budget, for Operations, and for Organization and Management, the Director General of the Foreign Service, the Director of the Foreign Service Institute, the Inspector General of the Foreign Service Inspection Corps, and the Director of Foreign Affairs Personnel Planning. *In USIA, we feel the management line should be drawn at the Deputy Assistant Director level, except in administration and personnel, where division chiefs should also be considered part of management. In AID, we would draw the line at the Assistant Administrator and Office Director level.*

We feel the risk that AFSA members assigned to personnel and administrative jobs might be elected as officers of AFSA is a risk worth taking. If AFSA felt it suffered from conflict of interest on the bargaining unit it could apply for a new definition



J. William Fulbright, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, speaks to the American Foreign Service Association on June 27.

of management that would include these people.

2. *The Bargaining Unit under "Exclusive" Recognition*

When the Board decides to move to "exclusive" recognition, it should understand that 50 percent of the membership of *each* of the categories (e.g. FSO, FSR, etc.) of the above defined bargaining unit will have to be recruited into AFSA. Although AFSA could now claim "exclusive" recognition for FSOs, we feel it would be better to wait and seek "exclusive" recognition with the other members of AFSA's primary constituency (AID and USIA). However, we do not believe that AFSA should unduly delay applying for exclusive recognition if one or more of the categories cannot be recruited to the 50 percent goal (i.e. we may have particular recruiting problems among the FSS and GS "substantive" personnel). *Therefore we strongly urge a vigorous membership drive for the rest of the year.*

3. *AFSA's Strategy in Seeking Recognition*

We recommend AFSA seek the membership's approval before applying for recognition under E.O. 10988. If a new E.O. is to be promulgated by September 1, AFSA will have to move quickly to take advantage of acquiring formal recognition under the 10 percent membership requirement of E.O. 10988. *We recommend a blitz campaign to educate our members to the purpose and benefits of seeking recognition.* We suggest briefing sessions for "cadre" who would help with the job of persuading enough of the AFSA membership so that a general meeting at the end of July could be expected to approve a proposal to seek formal recognition. AFSA might then apply for recognition in early August.

4. *Organization to Represent the Bargaining Unit*

We recognize that the move to formal recognition will impose greater burdens on the AFSA executive machinery than at present. At such a time that "exclusive" recognition is achieved, these demands will grow and will have to be met if AFSA is to have any continuing credibility with management or its membership. We do not have any prescription on what type of organizational change will be required to meet these new demands. However, *we do want to surface the problem and indicate that a certain number of "volunteer" members will have to be designated to cover critical areas such as pay, FS regulations, personnel policy, and the administrative matters.*

III. Relations With Other Employee Organizations in the Federal Community

AFSA is not alone in the Federal government community in facing the question of organization and trying to adjust to current desire of membership for greater participation in the management of affairs which directly concern them. Since the 1962 Executive Order, employees of all branches of government have moved into formal and exclusive arrangements. In 1967, 21 percent of Federal "white collar employees" were recognized under the order; by 1968 the percentage had grown to 28 percent. Union organization more dormant in other sectors of American life has been very active in the government; and primarily under pressure from the postal employees, the AFL-CIO has taken a leading role in working for better salaries and conditions of employment. Older professional groups, which in the past served primarily as fraternal organizations, have taken on a new spirit of militancy.

AFSA, in its efforts to improve the Foreign Service, has two choices in dealing with other employee organizations in the Federal community. It can stand aside, work independently from other organizations and from time to time join forces with like-minded groups in seeking specific goals. AFSA can also enter more formal alliances.

Two larger organizations in the Federal Community stand out. The first, the AFL-CIO, primarily through its Government Employees Council, groups a sizable segment of government employees. Its affiliate, the American Federation of Government Employees, already has a foothold in the foreign affairs community. AFGE is formally recognized in AID. Seeking a formal relationship with the AFL-CIO would present AFSA with significant problems. Few members of AFSA would wish close identity. Some of AFL-CIO/AFGE goals in Federal service, like job security, might be counter to AFSA aims. Nevertheless, we believe AFSA should maintain a sufficiently flexible strategy so that cooperation with the AFL-CIO/AFGE would be possible. In such questions as pay comparability, improved disability allowances and retirement reforms common ground can be found. AFSA should seek good relations with the AFL-CIO, consult on occasion and stay abreast of AFL-CIO initiatives. Particular attention should be paid to relations with AFGE lodges within the foreign affairs community. In certain fields AFSA and AFGE goals are not necessarily incompatible, and AFSA and AFGE can be expected to prepare cooperative démarches on questions of mutual interest. *We recommend consultations be sought as rapidly as possible.*

A second organization within the Federal community of more interest to AFSA is the National Federation of Professional Organizations. NFPO is a federation of thirteen professional associations representing over 35,000 employees. It cooperates on occasion with the 60,000 strong Nurse's Association. NFPO was formed in 1967 primarily to work for pay comparability. Its organization is informal and policy is determined on the basis of the unanimous views of the member associations. NFPO has no permanent staff; dues are $100 per annum per organization. Its aims, while not exciting, are compatible with AFSA's purely "bread and butter" goals. Its leadership and aspirations are conservative and as such may present less of a problem to AFSA members. NFPO does have access to the Hill. NFPO, more importantly, is trying to protect the status of Federal professional organizations and see that such organizations are recognized by the Executive Branch and Congress. It continues to fight for revision of the conflict of interest provisions of E.O. 10988, which could destroy the ability of professional organizations to represent their members' interest.

In the past AFSA has cooperated with NFPO. NFPO continues to welcome AFSA cooperation. AFSA can, at this point, seek formal association and would certainly be accepted. We believe AFSA will need the help of a larger constituency and will increasingly require the political leverage a larger organization can give. Further, as the struggle to protect the rights of professional organizations to represent their members becomes tougher, which is certain to be the case, AFSA has an interest, indeed a responsibility to work as part of a larger body. Association with NFPO should not rule out cooperation with the AFL-CIO. *In summation, we recommend formal association with NFPO.* Such association must be voted on by the AFSA membership. *We further recommend revision of AFSA's certificate of incorporation to permit the use of AFSA funds for lobbying.* The AFSA board or its members may choose not to join NFPO. AFSA could continue to cooperate with NFPO for specific objectives, a decision which would not require consulting AFSA membership. Whatever is

AFSA's decision, *we recommend the designation within AFSA of a permanent responsible party whose primary responsibility will be liaison with other employee organizations in the Federal community*. Only in this fashion will AFSA be able to take advantage and stay abreast of developments which are vital to AFSA's membership and future.

IV. Grievances

We believe AFSA must become involved in grievance matters. This results from our general view that the Association should be involved and organized on a variety of fronts if it is to remain at the forefront of change and reform within the Foreign Service. Even if this premise is accepted, it can be argued that AFSA should avoid the trap of "unionism" and "bread and butter" issues and only concern itself with the broader policy issues that affect our Foreign Service. We reject this viewpoint for several reasons:

a. Our organization is composed of human beings and AFSA must be prepared to meet individual as well as organizational problems which confront our Foreign Service;

b. AFSA must have an expanded rather than a restricted conception of its responsibilities if it is to survive as a dynamic organization over time;

c. It is extremely difficult to separate policy formulation from policy execution, the long from the short range, the accretion of common law precedence through grievance decision making from the more formal and removed world of policy, edict and directive. Indeed, to the extent that AFSA dissociates itself from "operational" considerations, such as the grievance system, it will have less and less to say on the broader issues;

d. The knowledge on the part of management officers at all levels that someone, aside from the employee affected, has an interest in their decisions should act as a brake and counter to precipitous or arbitrary decision making.

These then are our assumptions. They are debatable and we recognize that possibly some members of the Foreign Service would be opposed.

We have looked at the current system for resolving grievances between employee and management and have concluded that the individual employee is at the mercy of management at the present time. Recourse is to one's supervisor or the personnel officer. This is not a very satisfactory state of affairs, although it can work if management is enlightened. But this should not be depended on.

We have also noted the proposed appeal and grievance rules and machinery drawn up by the Civil Service Commission. We support these proposals and encourage their adoption within the Foreign Service community. The main features of the proposal would improve the speed and fairness in adverse action procedures (removal, suspension, reduction in rank of compensation, etc.). Grievances are separated into two categories: (a) grievances concerning the application of law, regulation, policy, or standard and (b) grievances concerning an act or failure to act on the part of management in a situation where the manager has discretion. In category b, a grievance examiner, drawn from within the agency involved, would be the deciding authority unless the decisions made are clearly erroneous, not supported by substantial evidence, contrary to law, or beyond the official's authority. We believe, incidentally, that the grievance managers should be selected from high middle grade and senior officers just as jurors are selected in order to get the Foreign Service more actively and creatively involved in its own affairs. Assignment to grievance matters should have the same value and importance as that attached to officers assigned to substantive affairs (even if it is done only on a part-time basis). In fact, it should be considered as part, and a critical part, of the overall development of our officers.

In view of the importance of the CSC proposals, *we recommend that the Board discuss the proposals with the Department and a joint course of action be agreed upon in response to the draft CSC memorandum.*

While accepting the proposals of the CSC, we do not rule out an active role for AFSA. Our concept is simple and would have to be tested and modified in light of experience. Essentially, *we propose that AFSA establish a grievance board.* (Note: According to a strict interpretation of the Executive Order, the grievance board would not have any legal standing and could even be challenged by the Department.) This board would be composed of five members (we would not quibble over numbers) and be representative of class and category within the Foreign Service. The board would meet every evening, say from 6:00 to 7:00 PM in the AFSA building, at which time it would be prepared to hear the grievances of members of the community. Membership on the grievance board would be voluntary and rotating (possibly limited to two or three months). The functions of the board would be as follows:

a. to hear grievances and determine whether they should be pursued by AFSA or not. The board's advisement could not, of course, be binding upon the grievant. He might, in the event of a negative judgment, want to seek recourse through another forum;

b. to refer the grievant to the appropriate group (grievance manager, office, personnel officer) within the agency for resolution;

c. to accompany the grievant in presenting the grievance to management, if this is deemed necessary;

d. to intercede directly with management, if this is deemed necessary.

e. to monitor follow-up action in order to insure successful resolution of the grievances and to present to management unresolved grievances on a periodic basis;

f. to monitor agency machinery and procedures for grievances and recommend change and modification if this appears appropriate (particularly for the CSC proposals if they are effected).

We would finally recommend that the recommendations contained in this section of the report be acted upon by the Board without being put to the vote of the membership. The establishment of an AFSA grievance board does not constitute a definitive act at this point in time; in fact, it is highly tentative and experimental. It should be adopted in this sense.

Club Information

The Foreign Service Club would appreciate the cooperation of its members on the following:

Please check your bills at the Club to see that the waitress has your name and number correctly.

In paying your monthly statements, please enclose your check in the addressed envelope which comes with the statement each month. Do NOT send it to the Foreign Service Club at 2101 E Street. If you have a question about your statement or wish to change your address, contact the Club Secretary at 2101 E Street, but please do not write on the statement. This causes a surprisingly large amount of unnecessary work and results in checks not being credited to the respective accounts promptly.

Suggestions on the menu or service at the club are welcome and may be turned in in writing to the Club Manager or at the business offices of the Association.

AFSA Awards for Student Excellence

Teresa Louise Amott (John C. Amott)
Timothy Howe Bahti (James H. Bahti)
James Cooper Borg (Charles Arthur Borg)
Deborah Bradford (William G. Bradford)
David Gordon (William Gordon)
Eugene Mitchell Goott (Daniel Goott)
Leigh Gidal Hafrey (Daniel J. Hafrey)
Laura Anne Ingersoll (John J. Ingersoll)
Thomas Furneaux Lennon (Harry K. Lennon)
William James Manning (Henry J. Manning)
Nancy Gene Misslbeck (James W. Misslbeck)
Lucy Anne Moore (George Curtis Moore)
Una Maria Perez (Louis V. Perez)
Cecelia Mason Rehberg (Ralph C. Rehberg)
Susan Deirdre Sandstrom (John Lyle Sandstrom)
Jean Taylor Schneider (David T. Schneider)
Miriam Rom Silverberg (Louis Silverberg)
Brian Hudson Vogel (Joe B. Vogel)
Bruce Wilcox (Stanley Wilcox)
David Thomas Wolfson (Philip J. Wolfson)

AFSA Recipients of 1969-70 Scholarship Awards

Priscilla May Allen (Francis O. Allen) AFSA
David Frederick Armstrong (The late Frederick S. Armstrong) New York *Times* Foundation
Thomas Michael Bahti (James H. Bahti) AAFSW
Timothy Howe Bahti (James H. Bahti) AAFSW
Cherilyn Ellen Barrett (Raymond J. Barrett) Carl W. Strom Memorial
Grainger Raymond Barrett (Raymond J. Barrett) Wilbur J. Carr Memorial
Philip J. Becchetti (Fred Becchetti) Charles B. Hosmer Memorial
Julia Ferne Beck (Frank V. Beck) AFSA
Michael Gerone Bennett (William W. Bennett) AFSA
Anne Elizabeth Berlin (Calvin C. Berlin) William Benton
Robert Matthew Berlin (Calvin C. Berlin) William Benton
Peter Kai Bird (Eugene Hall Bird) Charles E. Merrill Trust
Penny Sue Blowers (Jay H. Blowers) AFSA
Thomas Ernest Booth (Ernest W. Booth) Bruce
Deborah Bradford (William G. Bradford) Margaret F. Berger Memorial
Joanna Maria Brown (William A. Brown) Abe Kramer Memorial
Patricia Elizabeth Bush (Ernest R. Bush) AAFSW
George Marvin Caldwell (Robert W. Caldwell) Douglas W. Coster Memorial
Wallace Franklin Caldwell (Robert W. Caldwell) Howard Fyfe Memorial
Alexander Andrew Carey (Robert V. Carey) AFSA
Robert Raymond Carey (Robert V. Carey) AFSA
Alan Francis Cariddi (Charles A. Cariddi) Oliver Bishop Harriman Foreign Service
Ragnar Taft Chase (Robert W. Chase) AFSA
Willard Linwood Chase 2nd (Robert W. Chase) AFSA
George Randolph Churchill (George T. Churchill) AAFSW
Albert Gerald Ciaffone (Albert J. Ciaffone) AAFSW
Albert Charles Cizauskas, Jr. (Albert C. Cizauskas) Amcongen Ladies' Club of Frankfort
Margaret Elizabeth Cobb (Carroll E. Cobb) Gertrude Stewart Memorial
John Graham Collinge (Robert A. Collinge) AFSA
Michael Wayne Connor (Dewey W. Connor) AFSA
Joan Anne Cooke (Francis A. Cooke) Bruce
John Albert Davis (Roy T. Davis, Jr.) Julius Cecil Holmes Memorial
Anne Marie Daymont (Henry P. Daymont) AAFSW
Frank Bartlett Dean, III (Frank B. Dean) AAFSW
Phillippe Dumont (Donald A. Dumont) AFSA
Pamela Jean Eilers (Xavier W. Eilers) Charles E. Merrill Trust
June Elaine Ernst (Philip Ernst) Janet A. Dulles Memorial
Phyllis Grace Ernst (Philip Ernst) Hanna W. H. Woods Memorial
Barbara Virginia Fossum (Charles P. Fossum) Bruce
Carla Louise French (Graham K. French) AFSA
Judith Anne Fries (Robert T. Fries) George H. de Mange Memorial
Roy Walter Froemming (Gale A. Froemming) AFSA
Mary Anne Gawf (J. L. Gawf) AFSA
Brian Charles Gendreau (Charles A. Gendreau) AFSA
David Hunt Gibbons (Robert J. Gibbons) AAFSW
Gregory Richard Gilchrist (Wayne R. Gilchrist) Gertrude Stewart Memorial
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David Gordon (William Gordon) AAFSW
Paul Raymond Gonzalez (Raymond E. Gonzalez) Wilbur J. Carr Memorial
Norman Leslie Hall (Robert M. Hall) Charles E. Merrill Trust
Sylvia Jeanne Hall (Robert M. Hall) Charles E. Merrill Trust
Dorothy Ann Harter (Eugene C. Harter, Jr.) Charles E. Merrill Trust
John Pierre Hatcher (Pierce E. Hatcher) Amcongen Women's Group/Munich
Patrick George Hatcher (Pierce E. Hatcher) Allen W. Dulles Memorial
Peter Norris Hofmann (John R. Hofmann) AAFSW
Harrison Mark Holland (Harrison M. Holland) George Kirk Memorial
Edward Warren Holmes, Jr. (Edward W. Holmes) AFSA
Judith Diane Horner (the late Dwight B. Horner) AFSA
Judith Ann Jacyno (Joseph R. Jacyno) AFSA
Randall Nair Johnson (Alfred N. Johnson) AFSA
Carole Mary Jones (Adolph W. Jones) Foreign Service Wives in Iran
Estrellita Norma Jones (Harold M. Jones) AFSA
Kenneth Houston Jones (Adolph W. Jones) Paris Fund
Daniel Karp (Samuel Karp) William Benton
Eileen Kelly (Thomas F. Kelly) AFSA
Kevin Kelly (Thomas F. Kelly) AFSA
Rebecca Susan Kelly (Giles M. Kelly) American Women's Club of Khartoum
Stephen David Kent (Robert J. Kent) AFSA
Martha Alexandra Kiefer (Alexander F. Kiefer) AFSA
Robert Dean La Rue, Jr. (Robert D. La Rue) AAFSW
Suzanne Elizabeth Leary (John C. Leary) AFSA
Joanne Arlean Livornese (Joseph A. Livornese) AFSA
Stefan M. Lopatkiewicz (Teodor J. Lopatkiewicz) AAFSW
Lorene Elizabeth Ludy (Albert K. Ludy) New York *Times* Foundation

PATRICIA L. MALCHOW (Alfred J. Malchow) Arthur Brewster Emmons Memorial

MAUREEN ELIZABETH MALEY (Austin P. Maley) Gertrude Stewart Memorial

KEVIN LEESE MANNIX (John W. Mannix) AFSA

CATHERINE DENISE MARSHALL (Herman O. Marshall) Bruce

LAURE EMILY MATTOS (Edward H. Mattos) Charles E. Mcrrill Trust

MARIANNE JEANNE MAY (James A. May) Nicole Neuray Myerson Memorial

STUART O'DONALD ROBERTS MAYS (James O. Mays) Paris Fund

WILLIAM JAMES MCCARTHY (John R. McCarthy) American Women's Club/Berlin "John F. Kennedy Scholarship"

MICHAEL EDWARD MCKERNAN (James F. McKernan) AFSA

MICHAEL KARL MCKINNEY (Richard S. McKinney) AAFSW

WILLIAM MURRAY MILLER (William F. Miller) AFSA

ANNE LOUISE MOLINEAUX (Cyril L. Molincaux) AFSA

MARY JUDITH MOSS (Stanley D. Moss) Anne S. Burrows Memorial

ANTOINETTE MARIE MULLER (the late Carsten D. Muller) AAFSW

NANCY GABRIELLE MULLER (the late Carsten D. Muller) AAFSW

HARRY JOSEPH MULLIN (the late Harry J. Mullin, Jr.) Edwin L. Smith Memorial

PETER NICHOLAU MUNSING (Stefan P. Munsing) AAFSW

JEAN ROGERS NOLAND (John E. Noland) Vietnam Memorial

CLAIRE LOUISE NYREN (Albert V. Nyren) AFSA

JOAN CHRISTINE O'DONNELL (John Frank O'Donnell, Jr.) American Women's Group of Bonn/Bad Godesberg

JUDITH MARY O'DONNELL (John Frank O'Donnell, Jr.) American Women's Group of Bonn/Bad Godesberg

WAYNE MELVIN ONDIAK (John Ondiak) AAFSW

SUSAN ELLYN ORINGEL (Robert S. Oringel) AFSA

JAMES ARTHUR PARKER, JR. (James A. Parker) Embassy Wives/Libya "John Gordon Mein Scholarship"

CYNTHIA ANN PARR (Robert D. Parr) AFSA

JOHN CUNNINGHAM PATTERSON (John L. Patterson) John Campbell White Memorial

RALPH MICHAEL PEZZULO (Lawrence A. Pezzulo) given in memory of William Dale Fisher by an anonymous donor

PAUL MANNING PRICE (the late Darrell Manning Price) Foreign Service Journal—James B. Stewart Scholarship

ANTHONY PAUL PRINCE (Edward P. Prince) William Benton/George V. Allen Scholarship

JONATHAN JAMES PRINCE (Edward P. Prince) Selden Chapin

SYLVIA ANN QUINTANILLA (Joseph H. Quintanilla) AFSA

DEBRA BERNADETTE ROBERTS (Joseph L. Roberts) AFSA

JOSE A. RODRIQUEZ, JR. (José A. Rodriquez) AFSA

ANDREW LESLIE ROMAN (Paul Roman) New York *Times* Foundation

SANDRA GAY ROSENE (Russell D. Rosenc) AFSA

LEE ANN ROSS (Kenneth L. Ross) AAFSW

BARBARA ANN ROTUNDO (Vincent Rotundo) Paris Fund

RICHARD LEE ROTUNDO (Vincent Rotundo) Paris Fund

DIANNE ELIZABETH RUYLE (Benjamin J. Ruyle) AFSA

ROGER DICKERT SANDERS (Everett N. Sanders) AFSA

SUSAN DEIRDRE SANDSTROM (John Lyle Sandstrom) American Women's Group of Bonn/Bad Godesberg

ANDREA LEE SCHIFF (Stanley D. Schiff) Embassy Wives of Vienna

REBECCA ANN SCHROEDER (Frank M. Schroedcr) AAFSW

ANNA MARIA SHETTERLY (Howard E. Shetterly) Maurice D. Stafford Memorial

TWILA LEE SLESNICK (Irwin L. Slesnick) AAFSW

PAMELA JO HOVELL SLUTZ (Robert F. Slutz, Jr.) John Foster Dulles

CHRISTOPHER ALAN SMITH (Lawrence W. Smith) AFSA

ROBERT JOSE SMOLIK (Michael Smolik) AFSA

JOANNE MARY SPRINGER (Paul L. Springer) AFSA

JAMES BOARDMAN STEDMAN (William P. Stedman) Gertrude Stewart Memorial

LINDA MARIE STELLMACHER (Edward O. Stellmacher) AFSA

HELEN KATHERINE STOKES (William N. Stokes) AFSA

JUDITH ELINOR TIGER (M. Gordon Tiger) AFSA

REBECCA JANET TIGER (M. Gordon Tiger) AFSA

JUDITH ELSIE TURNER (Philip A. Turner) Bruce

MARK ALAN TURNER (Philip A. Turner) Bruce

SUSAN DEANNE TURNER (Allen Richard Turner) Charles E. Merrill Trust

BRIAN HUDSON VOGEL (Joe B. Vogel) AFSA

ANDREW BLANCHARD WATSON (Albert S. Watson) AFSA

STEPHEN CONRAD WATSON (Albert S. Watson) John Farr Simmons Memorial

MARK WINTHROP WELCH (Earl M. Welch, Jr.) AAFSW

DANIEL COLLIER WHITAKER (Hugh N. Whitaker) Gertrude Stewart Memorial

CHRISTINE CONARD WHITE (Ivan B. White) J. Alan Maphis Memorial

DIANE EYRE WHITE (Ivan B. White) Edward Thompson Wailes

MARGARET ANNE WHITE (Ray E. White, Jr.) AAFSW

JOAN CATHERINE WIENER (Ernest G. Wiener) Charles E. Merrill Trust

BRUCE WILCOX (Stanley Wilcox) Embassy Wives/Libya "John Gordon Mein Scholarship"

MARY JANE WITTSTOCK (Thomas M. Wittstock) AFSA

PIERRE PATRICK WOLFE (Mack C. Wolfe) William Benton

Students who wish to participate in the scholarship program for 1970-1971 are invited to write to the Committee on Education, AFSA, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037, for applications and other material to be issued in the fall.

In the initial request be sure to give the student's full name and his mailing address as of September and October, 1969. The name and address of parent or guardian is also necessary.

February 15, 1970, is the deadline for the receipt at AFSA of the student's part of the application.

New Prices for Private Parties

Information printed in the June AFSA NEWS concerning prices for private parties was inaccurate. A range of prices is available which places the cost considerably below the $5.50 quoted in that issue. The dining room area of the Club can be made available for a cost of only $1 per drink, with peanuts and potato chips. For the same cost per drink, the library or buffet lounge can be reserved for a party with cold hors d'oeuvres, providing at least twenty people attend. Cost of the food for such a party would be $1.50 per person. A variety of hot and cold hors d'oeuvres is also available, at a cost of $2.50 per person. An attractive cold buffet is available at $3.25 per person. The cost of more formal receptions would depend on the food variety desired.

Private dinner parties can be arranged with a wide variety of menus at reasonable costs per person. Prices for a complete dinner range from $3.85 to $5.25.

For the next farewell party at the office, why not make arrangements with the Club? We're just across the street and all arrangements can be made easily. Just call Mr. John Scheidenberger at 338-5730.

Marriages

BORIS-BASSIN. Eileen Susan Boris was married to Arthur Jay Bassin, son of Jules Bassin, Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, on June 7, in Manchester, Connecticut.

PARNES-JACOBS. Karen Wenda Parnes was married to FSO Martin Jacobs on May 25, in Baltimore.

ROUECHE-KRIJGSMAN. FSO Elizabeth Molin Roueché was married to Leonard Johannes Krijgsman on June 16, in Washington. Mr. and Mrs. Krijgsman will live in Amsterdam, where Mrs. Krijgsman was assigned before her marriage.

SCHLOMANN-LOWE. Elizabeth Anne Schlomann, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Ernst A. Schlomann, was married to Jonathan Allan Lowe on June 7, in Woodstock, New York.

WHITTINGTON-MIKLOS. Beverly Alice Whittington was married to Stephan D. J. Miklos, son of FSO and Mrs. Jack C. Miklos, on April 25, in Arlington, Virginia.

Births

SIMMS. A son, Eric Marion, born to FSO and Mrs. John W. Simms, on June 29, in Port-au-Prince.

STAMMERMAN. A son, Clifford Andrew, born to Mr. and Mrs. Kenneth A. Stammerman, on June 3, in Tel Aviv.

Deaths

BEACH. William H. Beach, FSO-retired, died on July 12, at his home in Snow Hill, Maryland. Mr. Beach is survived by his wife of the home address and a son, William, Jr.

BURROWS. Anne S. Burrows, wife of FSO Hugh W. Burrows, died on July 2, in Washington. Mrs. Burrows is survived by her husband and son of 1005 South 23rd St., Arlington, her parents, two sisters and a brother. The family requests that memorial contributions be made to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

CHILDS. Prescott Childs, FSO-retired, died on June 21, in Hartford, Connecticut. Mr. Childs joined the Foreign Service in 1924 and served at Canton, Montevideo, Rio de Janeiro and as Consul General at Havana, Bombay and Antwerp before his retirement in 1958. He is survived by his wife of 9 Dorset Lane, Farmington, Conn., and two sons.

MIDDLETON. Adrian T. Middleton, chief of the personnel assignment division, Department of State, died on June 6, in an automobile accident near McLean. Mr. Middleton entered on duty with the Department of State in 1951 and joined the Foreign Service in 1953. He served at Cairo, Beirut, the Department and the National War College. He is survived by his wife of 916 Westwood Dr., Vienna, a son and three daughters.

OHMANS. Elaine Ohmans, wife of FSO John L. Ohmans, died suddenly on June 25, in Washington. She is survived by her husband, diplomat in residence at the University of Pittsburgh, of 937 St. James St., Pittsburgh, a son and three daughters.

TAYLOR. Mrs. Michael J. Taylor, daughter of Ambassador and Mrs. Charles F. Baldwin of Charlottesville, Va., died suddenly in April, at her home in California. She is survived by her husband and three children.

WAILES. Edward T. Wailes, Ambassador-retired, died on June 25, in New York. Mr. Wailes entered the Foreign Service in 1929 served at Shanghai, Nanking, Brussels, Luxembourg, Ottawa and London, and as Ambassador to the Union of South Africa, Minister to Hungary, Ambassador to Iran and Czechoslovakia before his retirement in 1964. He is survived by his wife of 2804 34th Place, N.W. Memorial contributions may be made to the AFSA Scholarship Fund. The Board of Directors of AFSA passed the following resolution:

The Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Association learned with sorrow of the death of Ambassador Edward Thompson Wailes and wishes to convey its deepest sympathy to the bereaved. Because of his long and distinguished career in the Foreign Service, his interest in the Association and particularly in its Scholarship program in which he was active up to the time of his death, the Board of Directors is privileged to establish an annual scholarship in his name in perpetuity.

WARD. Angus Ward, Ambassador-retired, died on May 22, at his home in Coin, Malaga, Spain. Mr. Ward entered the Foreign Service in 1925 and served at Mukden, Tientsin, Moscow, Vladivostok, Tehran, Nairobi and as Ambassador to Afghanistan. Mr. Ward was serving as Consul in Mukden when he and his staff were made captives by the Communists in 1946. He spent more than a year under house arrest and later in jail before being deported in 1949. He is survived by his wife of Las Vistillas, Coin, Malaga, Spain.

Memorial Scholarships

The American Foreign Service Association is awarding scholarships in memory of the following individuals for the 1969-70 school year:

Anne S. Burrows
Prescott Childs
Allen W. Dulles
Janet A. Dulles
J. Alan Maphis
Nicole Neuray Myerson
Edwin L. Smith
Carl W. Strom
Edward T. Wailes
Hanna W. H. Woods

Contributions to the AFSA Scholarship Fund have been received in memory of: Mrs. Percy Allen, Eugene H. Dooman, Mrs. Warrick Elrod, Sr., Joseph N. Greene, Sr., and Carsten D. Muller.

Funds from Overseas

Scholarship funds for 1969-1970 were contributed by American women overseas through:

American Women's Group of Bad Godesberg/Bonn

American Women's Club of Berlin "John F. Kennedy Scholarships"

American Consulate General Ladies' Club of Frankfurt

American Womens' Club of Khartoum

American Consulate Women's Group of Munich

Foreign Service Wives in Iran

Embassy Wives, Libya "John Gordon Mein Scholarships"

Embassy Wives of Vienna

Reservations at Noon

Reservations can now be accepted for luncheons at the Foreign Service Club between 11:30 and 12:30. Call John Scheidenberger at 338-5730. Luncheon is served until 3:00 p.m.

Receives Murrow Award

William Henry Weathersby, Career Minister in the Foreign Service Information Officer Corps, recently was presented the Murrow Award for Excellence in Public Diplomacy by Tufts University.

The citation, from the Edward R. Murrow Center at Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, said of Weathersby, he "typifies the new breed of internationalist so characteristic of Ed Murrow's spirit and carecr . . . Weathersby brings to the American career service an ideal blend of achievement, sensitivity, awareness of reality and proficiency in that newest of diplomatic instruments—public diplomacy."

An Appreciative Farewell to Gardner Palmer

In the May 1966 issue of the JOURNAL there appeared an article "Vale Atque Ave," farewell to Julian Harrington as General Manager of the AFSA and hail to his successor Gardner E. Palmer. To continue the classical note struck in announcing Gardner's *ave*, let us borrow Caesar's *veni vidi vici* in connection now with his regretted *vale*. For, indeed, he came, he saw, he conquered in the three years plus that AFSA has been responding to his fine managerial hand, as a racing sloop answers the seasoned helmsman's touch or the racehorse its rider's eager rein. At the end of July, Gardner transmits his trust to Edward Dobyns in order to respond to the gypsy lure of travel and less burdened hours, confident that the high managerial standards that he has set will be continued.

He came and faced the difficult position of filling the shoes of his able predecessor, Ambassador Harrington. Building on his experience as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far



Eastern Affairs and his tour as Minister in Tokyo, he saw and included in his vision the need for a home of its own for AFSA, he conquered and an AFSA dream became a reality. Combining the negotiating skill of Metternich, the determination of Bulldog Drummond and the financial acumen of J. P. Morgan, Gardner leaves behind him concrete achievement not only in our AFSA headquarters but also in that flourishing gourmet rendez-vous, the Foreign Service Club. Monumental, amigos, no?

And relieving the nitty-gritty that must inevitably accompany such an accomplishment has been the fun of his association with the "boys" as Gardner affectionately refers to the Young Turks who came to power during his administration. Toujours a diplomat, he admits to enjoying his earlier association with their predecessors as well.

Yes, Gardner, and your gracious wife Mildred, all of us in AFSA have great and good reasons to express our appreciation for your unflagging efforts on our behalf and to say to you nostalgically "Happy Vale," which to us who know Hong Kong, also means may you always be the winning one!

A Welcome to Director Dobyns



Edward P. Dobyns, the new Executive Director of the American Foreign Service Association, is a career Foreign Service officer with broad experience in coordinating and directing organizations in Washington and overseas. From 1964 until the present, he has been Executive Director of the Bureau of African Affairs, which has more than 2,000 employees and 65 offices in Washington and Africa. Prior to that, he was Counselor of Embassy for Administration in Madrid (1961-64), and had previously served as administrative officer in Dublin and Copenhagen. He also has served as a Foreign Service Inspector, on the Board of Examiners for Foreign Service, and on the Board of Directors of AFSA. He was graduated from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service with the Bachelor of Science degree. He served in the Navy during World War II.

A native of Missouri, Mr. Dobyns is married, and has three grown children. Mr. and Mrs. Dobyns live at 7721 Old Chester Road in Bethesda. Active in civic affairs, Mr. Dobyns has been a member of American Men's Clubs in Dublin, Copenhagen, and Madrid, is a Rotarian, and served on the Board of Directors of the American School of Madrid. Mr. Dobyns will bring to his position as AFSA's Executive Director not only a wealth of managerial experience, but also the energy and enthusiasm required to keep AFSA moving forward.

Chapters Committee Alive and Doing Well

On May 9 the AFSA Board of Directors confirmed Albert E. Fairchild as new chairman of the Chapters Committee. The purposes of the committee are to maintain correspondence with all chapters and develop a limited set of activities in which chapters might engage. Within the very near future Al will be writing to all chapters, introducing himself and the committee, and suggesting ways to increase chapter participation in the Association's activities.

The committee feels that its greatest service can be in channelling ideas from the field to the AFSA committees active in Washington. Based on previous correspondence, service-related grievances and interest in community action programs are matters which already actively concern a number of chapters. The committee hopes that more chapters will begin using the Association as a forum for the expression of their ideas, and promises prompt action on letters from the field.

Junior Officers Elect New Leadership

The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club elected a new—and integrated—slate of officers, following earlier election for the Board of Directors. Conrad Stolzenbach, USIA, was elected President, replacing Edward Walker, State. In accepting his new office, Stolzenbach pledged his best efforts toward effective implementation of the JFSOC-AFSA working agreement on junior officer affairs. Other officers elected were Alec Liebowitz, ACDA, Vice-President, and Louise Hillson, AID, Secretary. Nathaniel Wilson, State, will continue to act as Treasurer. pending rearrangement of the Club's financial basis in accordance with recent membership changes.

Second Careers

A group of retired Foreign Service officers have formed a study and research group to serve clients on a contract or retainer basis, under the name of Foreign Service Research, Inc., at 1725 K Street, N.W., in Washington. The Chairman of the Advisory Board and President is Walter H. Dustmann, Jr. The Board of Advisors includes the Honorable Waldemar J. Gallman, the Honorable C. Vaughan Ferguson, Jr., N. Spencer Barnes, Richard B. Freund, John W. Piercy, Roy Tasco Davis, Jr., Jackson W. Wilson, John M. Kane, Grant V. McClanahan, and Ghosn J. Zogby. The organization will gather and evaluate information on foreign areas for businessmen, foundations, associations, and goverment agencies and report in whatever detail is required on events and conditions abroad. It seems possible that other ex-Foreign Service officers may have chances for assignments with this organization if there should be a project coming within the spheres of their particular knowledge and experience.

Out of the expanses of the Southwest, through various channels in the course of which the source was lost, comes news to the JOURNAL that the Honorable Fletcher Warren has been elected Mayor of Greenville, Hunt County, Texas. Greenville is the County Seat and is plenty big enough to be listed in the World Almanac,

Nominations Needed

The Awards Committee for the special Lane Bryant International Volunteers Awards is seeking nominations of Foreign Service women. For additional information, write the committee at 465 Fifth Avenue, New York 10017.

1969, from which it can be assumed that he is responsible for the welfare of 39,399 souls.

Mr. Warren entered the Foreign Service in 1921, and was made Vice Consul in Habana. He served for 39 years. Among the posts he held in the later years were those of Ambassador to Nicaragua, Ambassador to Paraguay, Director of the Office of South American Affairs, Ambassador to Venezuela, and Ambassador to Turkey.

25 Years Ago

In the JOURNAL and the BULLETIN Graham H. Stuart described some facets of the work of the Special War Problems Division. From the start of war to July 1944 the Division, first called Special Division, grew from 10 officers and clerks to over 100 and moved quarters five times. Dayle C. McDonough headed a Welfare ad Whereabouts Section. One task was getting information and pushing relief of nationals in enemy territories. Donald Smith collected information from passengers returning on exchange vessels. An American whose mother was ill from worry asked about a brother and sister held by the Japanese. Gilson Blake found information on cards sent in by Don Smith and telephoned the relatives. He promised to get a message that could be put in the mother's hands. The mother recovered. Edmund Gullion, and later Bernard Gufler, headed an Internees Section concerned with the Geneva Prisoners of War and Red Cross Conventions. There were over 100 p.o.w. camps in the United States plus seven for civilians. One of the duties of the officers of the section was to visit these camps. The section helped negotiate and carry out an agreement with Germany for exchange of seriously sick or wounded prisoners of war and "surplus" civilians. In 1939 the Representation of Foreign Interests Section was set up for the work of representing and protecting nationals and public and private property and funds of belligerents who had placed in the hands of the US representation of their interests in countries with which they were at war. On entry of the United States into the war the section was divided into four units. (1) Friendly Interests handled protection of property, transmission of documents and private messages and representation of foreign interests. (2) Enemy Interests was concerned with care of axis officials in the United States, safe conducts, and control of axis funds. (3) Repatriation. This section built up card files of US citizens in enemy territory and of enemy nationals in the Western Hemisphere. It worked on exchange of official personnel and priorities for repatriation of civilians. (4) Relief. Eldred Kuppinger, William McCahon, and others worked on sending relief supplies to American and other allied nationals in enemy custory, whether they were prisoners of war, interned civilians or civilians at liberty. At one point the Japanese agreed to consider receiving supplies for Americans in the Far East by way of the Soviet Union by ship or by land. In October 1943 the United States began to send some relief supplies to Vladivostok for this purpose. In May 1944 Japan offered to send a ship to Vladivostok to pick them up. The Soviet Union then found it necessary to specify another port. Japan agreed but imposed additional conditions. No record or recollection of the final outcome has been traced.

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