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Title IX

What Has Political Development to Do with Us?

In recent years, academic political science has become caught up with the subject of "political development." In part this was the reaction of the political science profession to all the attention given to "economic development." But it also reflected a growing awareness that the important changes in the Third World were not only economic, not even perhaps mainly so, but political. In the view of some, it is very much the political changes—flowing from independence, from economic change, from internal and external political forces—that shape our relations with this part of the world.

But do we in the US foreign policy establishment pay sufficient attention to the details of political development, or do we tend to make generalizations based on intuitive judgments? In an alert Embassy, political, economic and AID officers work together to relate changes in education, GNP, land tenure, income distribution, and urbanization to future political changes, stability and outlook. But do these officers analyze what forces are leading to a breakdown of the established set of political values in a country over, say, the next ten years? Does the average reporting officer concentrate enough on the long-term potential for representative government in the country he is in? Does he analyze what US inputs of economic and military aid are doing to economic and political conditions; how, for example, they are affecting the development—or repression—of political forces and attitudes over the long run?

We might then ask if our interests are related to the long-term political development of the Third World, to the success or failure in the next decade or so, of democratic institutions, to the ability of growing social forces in these countries to find adequate means of political expression? Or, with all our rhetoric about these things, are our interests really related to immediate trade and security matters, to the warp and woof of diplomatic relations, to the successful negotiation of this year's aid agreements—the matters on which we spend the bulk of our time and our intellectual energy?

Finally, if we did agree that we should spend more time on these long term matters, who should do it? Is it the function of the Embassy? Are political officers trained for this type of analysis? Does the Department of State allow for recruitment—or training—of specialists in political development?

Or is it more properly the function of AID as part of its concern with development per se and the role of US aid? We recall that when AID was created in 1961, there was some debate over who should do overall country economic analyses in relation to the new emphasis on long-term economic development: Embassy economic officers, or Ph.D. economists recruited by AID and supplemented by AID research contracts and consultants? The decision was made in favor of the latter. Some feel now that that decision worked to the advantage of achieving really professional economic analysis, but to the detriment of State Department ability to participate in and in the end control US aid policy in its most important economic and political dimensions. Only recently have Embassy and US AID economic sections begun to combine, in recognition of joint interests and the reciprocal value of shared professional experience.

Do we have to go through the same experience with regard to political development? We know that political reporting and political development analysis are not the same thing. Nor for that matter is occasional, if experienced, speculation about long-term political trends the same as full-time professional analysis of and research into a country's political and social forces and their effect on institutions and behavior. Where and how therefore is the expertise to be acquired in the US foreign policy establishment? Do we need to look at the recruitment and personel policies of the Service in this light, and indeed of AID?

This issue of the JOURNAL is devoted to a review of these issues. It covers some of the recent trends of academic thinking on political development. It presents some conflicting views—of Congressmen, academics and US officials—on the importance of political development to US foreign policy. It seeks finally to raise a lot of questions on this subject on which we hope to hear from you, and which we hope to explore further in future issues of the JOURNAL.

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An Introduction to Title IX

PRINCETON LYMAN

Princeton Lyman, former member of the Editorial Board and now member of AFSA's Board of Directors, joined AID in 1961, after serving as a teaching fellow in Political Science at Harvard and as research assistant to Raymond Aron in his preparation of a volume on war and international relations. Mr. Lyman is Chief of the Title IX Division, AID. Mr. Lyman suggested this issue and saw it through to completion.

TITLE IX is written in broad terms. It emphasizes "maximum participation in the task of economic development on the part of the people of developing countries," the "encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions," and "civic education." As such it has been open to a wide variety of interpretations. These fall essentially into three categories:

First, some persons, perhaps most of all academic political scientists outside the Government, have looked upon Title IX as calling for a major new emphasis on political development, i.e., opening the way specifically for new emphasis in assistance programs on the development of political institutions such as political parties, legislatures, etc.

A second quite different interpretation is that Title IX is no more, if no less than a reformation of the "people to people" emphasis that had been stated in previous provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act, such as in the amendment on Community Development in 1962 and before that on Cooperatives in 1961. To some degree in this interpretation, though not universally, there is a certain anti-economic bias, i.e., a use of Title IX for "getting back" at the economists who some feel have dominated AID in recent years.

A third interpretation, broader than either of these, is that Title IX in essence calls for a wider dimension generally of US development objectives, encompassing more explicitly social and political factors as well as economic. Unlike the first interpretation mentioned above, however, it does not necessarily fix on political institutions, *per se* (though it does not exclude them) but looks with less predetermined fashion at various social as well as political factors which proceed from and are affected by economic and technical change. Further, in distinction to the second interpretation, it does not see Title IX as necessarily reducing AID's concern with economic development, but enchancing the quality of that concern. In sum, while vague—and perhaps purposely so—in its wording, Title IX is seen here as being very far-reaching in intent: to reshape the AID and the US view of the role and objectives of foreign aid.

As discussed more fully below, it is this third interpretation that has generally come to be adopted by AID.

There are other interpretations, of course, which have been placed on Title IX, many of them focused on a single factor of development. For example, some people have said that "When you get right down to it, what Title IX is all about is redistribution of income." Another will say that the single most important factor involved is the development of private interest groups. Still others will point to the rule of law. And one person, a European employed in his country's aid program, hearing about Title IX, said to an AID official "It must be a nightmare!"

AID's Response

In the three years since Title IX has been on the books AID has done much to try to clarify the differences of interpretation and to prepare guidelines for implemening programs in response to this new directive. Much guidance and material has thus been put out by AID for its Missions and Washington personnel on Title IX—perhaps too much. Nevertheless, considerable confusion remains. The principal question that I am asked when I talk to someone in AID about Title IX is "Have you decided yet what Title IX is?"

Even more disconcerting, there are great misconceptions and suspicion within AID about what is intended in Title IX, leading to skepticism if not opposition. Some of the most common reactions to Title IX are these:

a) It deals with an area of development with which AID has long been concerned and which, therefore, needs no new emphasis.

b) It opens up a subject much too sensitive and which should not be given too great an emphasis

within the aid program lest it inhibit our effectiveness and ability to work with recipient countries not only on economic but related social issues.

c) It reflects a simpleminded notion that the United States, through economic aid, can reform basic social and political conditions in overseas countries; it is therefore both a naive and dangerous doctrine for US policy.

That some people hold and argue all three of these opinions simultaneously indicates the depth of uncertainty and uneasiness which Title IX has generated.

To come more to grip with the principal issues raised by Title IX, AID, in cooperation with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, convened in 1968 a conference made up half of academic scholars in political and economic development, and half of representatives of AID and to a lesser extent the State Department. Essentially, the Conference concluded that Title IX should be interpreted by AID along the lines of the third interpretation I described earlier. Specifically, its recommendations were these:

1. Despite earlier skepticism, the Conference concluded that emphasis in Title IX on "participation," broadly interpreted, should be accepted as the principal theme of Title IX. Participation was defined as including participation in the distribution of the benefits of economic development, decision-making in development from the local to the national level, and implementation of development programs. It was thus defined in economic, social and political terms. As such, Title IX was differentiated and broadened out from the field of political development, per se.

2. On this basis it was concluded that the objectives of Title IX should rank with economic development as the "twin pillars" of AID's objectives. The economic development objective of the aid program was not downplayed in this conclusion. Quite to the contrary, the two sets of objectives were seen as mutually reinforcing and interdependent in most cases, and in the long run in nearly all cases. In the most obvious of examples, India, it was pointed out that where a country as large and with as many problems of growth as that one has embarked upon a political system which provides much opportunity for participation in political, social and economic terms, it is almost certain that only with satisfactory economic growth can this democratic development continue. In India, therefore, our support for overall economic development as such is quite central to our support of Title IX objectives. The case may not be quite as clear in other countries, however, where different emphasis at different stages of development may be needed to bring about a reconciliation between these twin objectives of the aid program, e.g., where basic institutional foundations are needed first which will allow the population to participate broadly in any economic development effort.

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avenues of popular participation must become a dimension of all levels of AID activity and all aspects of our program. There is thus no one kind of "Title IX project" nor is the mandate of Title IX satisfied by token projects which promote participation when the larger balance of the US effort might be to discourage or at least reenforce existing obstacles to increased participation. In this light, economic policies and planning, agricultural extension services, local government administration, capital assistance, a development bank, community development, vitalization of private associations, these all are amenable to having more or less effect on increasing participation depending on the particular country situation as a whole—its needs and its social and political structure—and the way in which such programs are carried out. In other words Title IX considerations should affect our analysis at several different levels: that of the country situation, our subsequent strategy decisions on the thrust of the AID program, the planning of individual projects, and finally the ways in which we actually implement our projects or sectoral inputs.

4. In raising the consideration of Title IX objectives to this level of importance, there are implications not only for AID allocations within countries but between countries. In deciding on which countries merit more or less US support, consideration should be given to the willingness of particular countries to broaden the levels of participation as one of the principal criteria for aid along with economic self-help actions. In addition, progress made toward creating institutions which will allow for and respond to increasing popular participation must be a consideration in our terminating assistance to countries which have crossed the economic threshold.

5. Recognizing that there is much more to be learned about social and political aspects of development, the Conference concluded emphatically that there must be much new research, and new training within the Government, in order to carry out the mandate of Title IX most effectively.

Future AID Emphasis

The M.I.T. Conference helped clarify a number of the overall issues regarding Title IX. It did not answer all the questions. Moreover, while providing guidance, it did not spell out in detail how AID was to carry out this broad and in many ways very difficult mandate. Susbsequent to the Conference, AID has pinpointed five main areas of concentration for carrying forward the purposes of Title IX.

The first and foremost objective is to systematize within AID the analysis of the non-economic objectives and ramifications of economic change, and of the aid program, and to account for these effectively in our planning and programing process. Contrary to some fears this does not mean a religious crusade to reform the world through aid. It does not mean that each social and

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political problem analyzed is necessarily amenable to influence or amelioration by our program. It does mean, however, letting our right hand know what our left hand is doing, i.e. knowing more accurately what are the social and political implications of the processes of change in the countries we are assisting and even more important, more accurately how our aid programs affect those processes. It mean taking objectives, ideas and effects that are now involved in our program but which are amorphously defined or often skipped over in our analysis and planning, and instead examining them much more rigorously in developing an aid posture.

Second, in establishing new criteria and objectives in this area, we will focus not only on promoting development opportunities to broaden the avenue of both economic and political participation, but on helping develop within host countries both the institutions and the indigenous intellectual capability for analyzing the political and social results of development. In other words, it is our objective to help developing countries focus on how to harmonize, in terms of their own culture, their economic development objectives and programs with reasonably democratic political and social institutional development. The word "democratic" is interpreted broadly here without meaning a direct replica of institutions with which we are familiar in the United States. But at the same time we must face the fact that we do have both value and policy preferences in the direction of democratic development of societies.

Knowing what we do now in our own society as well as abroad about the social and political changes that come from economic and technical modernization, can we support this latter process with no assistance to the countries' capability to foresee, analyze and deal with the former? It seems to me that we can no more do this than one can build a dam without taking into account the backwater that the dam will create.

Third, in specific program terms, we aim to place the greatest stress in AID's carrying out Title IX on

(*Continued on page* 41)

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

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We need a "searching, critical appraisal" of the political changes we promote through aid.

Title IX

The Dynamics of Growth in Developing Nations

CONGRESSMAN DONALD M. FRASER

Congressman Fraser authored Title IX to the Foreign Assistance Act, calling for increased emphasis on building democratic institutions in under-developed nations. He was elected to the House of Representatives in 1962 and serves on the District of Columbia Committee, three Foreign Affairs Subcommittees and is Chairman of the Democratic Study Group.

My conviction in 1966 when I sponsored the Title IX legislation of the Foreign Assistance Act was that our foreign aid programs depended too much on a faulty bit of conventional wisdom; the hypothesis was that developing nations most urgently need economic assistance, which promotes a better standard of living, which in turn eases social tension and fosters the growth of democratic institutions.

The assumption that economic aid actually does enhance living conditions for the peoples of emerging nations is challengeable on two grounds: first, that the total amount of US economic aid to emerging nations is often too small to accomplish any general miracles, and second, that economic assistance seldom has any very direct or massive effect on the most impoverished citizens of the third world.

The first point can be substantiated by comparing the amount of our economic aid with the Gross National Product in Latin America, where we have expended more than in most sections of the world. The amount of our assistance has not equalled one and one half per cent of their GNP. Economic transfusions at that rate might keep the patient alive, but they can hardly be expected to send him quickly on his way to full recovery. The second point simply suggests the process of diffusion that occurs whenever aid is disseminated through a central government. In such cases the benefits tend to remain in a country's urban areas, where they too often accrue to an already economically advantaged class of citizens. This process of diffusion, therefore, limits the potential of economic assistance to enrich the living standards of the general population.

But faulty diffusion is not the only difficulty. Economic assistance to a society which is badly organized does not automatically lead to better organization through necessary changes in institutions, skills and attitudes. Sometimes such aid merely adds to the inertia of the status quo. Occasionally the changes may be in the wrong direction.

The question of how a society is organized and functions is our primary concern, because the internal workings of a society profoundly influence its international behavior.

Thus Title IX seeks to broaden AID's mandate from an unquestioning reliance upon the conventional wisdom to a more searching, critical appraisal of the interaction between our external aid and the dynamics of change and growth in a developing nation.

This effort to broaden the perspective on our aid programs embraces the dimension of political development which the Title IX legislation seeks to isolate for special consideration.

New nations need to develop skills for self management if they are to become stable and responsible members of the international community. Yet too much of our foreign assistance has proceeded on the myth that if only we sufficiently bolster the material resources of the emerging nations, they will discover within themselves the innate capacity to manage their own affairs. The zeal with which we follow changes in the per capita GNP suggests a single-minded devotion to the purely material side of nation building. But as Edgar Owens rightly asserts in his recent paper on political development in Southeast Asia, "physical progress, without a change in the role of man in society, is government by benevolence. But benevolence is not, and never has been throughout history, a big enough idea to guide the organization of societies and governments."

Genuine development means change, and change is often disruptive and destabilizing. Economic development usually requires social and political changes in a political environment strained by the tensions inherent in the disjunction between rising expectations and the

capacity of the new nations to meet them.

In our own country we have experienced in recent years the painful and disruptive lesions of change, and who knows yet how they will ultimately affect our national political character? What we cannot well predict from our own experience in our own land, we cannot reasonably expect to predict accurately in foreign lands subject to different social, cultural, and historical forces under conditions of especially aggravated disparity.

A second and closely related myth is that whenever Communism threatens, economic aid will provide an effective answer. This myth is nowhere more effectively denied than in Vietnam, where our hundreds of millions of dollars in economic aid have had only negligible effect on the political views of those fighting the war. Political ideology is the result of a combination of many factors, some of them emotional, some of them philosophical. Ideology emerges from a complex tangle of various personal and institutional commitments, convictions, and loyalties. One factor in this complex is, of course, the level of economic well-being, but it is no more than a single factor, and it is not necessarily a major one.

The broader perspective we seek through Title IX does not contemplate the transfer to other nations of our own sophisticated political system, nor does it seek the transfer to other nations of our own cultural and value systems. Rather, we intend to lend our technical, social and material resources to the emerging nations for whatever usefulness they may have in support of the efforts of the nations themselves to shape their own futures. In the process we are bound to pinch some sensitive nerves, and for that reason we must be especially vigilant in avoiding any direct interference in the internal political decision-making of the countries receiving our aid.

Title IX legislation does contain an explicit hypothesis to be followed in our conventional aid programs: the enhancement of socio-economic pluralism. In part this pluralism aims at the problem of creating tolerance for democratic governmental institutions in social situations complicated by the pressures of rising expectations—situations in which popular demands expressed through democratic decision-making encounter limited resources and the need for economic discipline. This kind of tolerance is not likely to be promoted best by dissemination from a central government on down; it is a change in attitudes which will be effectively promoted by creating first a tolerance for the limitations under which local democratic governmental institutions must function as demands and the resources to meet those demands are more easily comprehended. As democratic government is understood at decentralized levels, tolerance for the limitations of national governments will increase. Out of this growth in attitudes perhaps we can move toward a genuinely cooperative pluralism in the international community.

Economic institutions—trade unions, cooperatives, associations and some corporate endeavors for example—can be useful in promoting the idea of democratic government because they provide the idea with concreteness. They also center decision-making among the people affected by the results of the decision.

The principal injunction of Title IX, however, is to analyze and to be sensitive to the political, institutional, and attitudinal changes we promote by our aid. In this sense there are no such things as Title IX projects. What is involved is not necessarily any new course of action but rather a new way of looking at an old problem.

Professional perspectives tend to be narrow; poets have always noticed different things about roses than have botanists, women have always regarded them differently than have florists. It is hardly because of any physical or spiritual agility in the rose that it can at once evoke wisdom, scientific principle, romance and money; it is all a matter of one's point of view. Nor is any one response to a rose necessarily more legitimate than any other. And it is perhaps not outrageously overtaxing an analogy to suggest that it is rather the same with emerging nations: how one perceives the complex, intricate changes implicit in development is at least in one respect simply dependent upon who is looking at the process. Economists have one perspective, but political and social observers have other perspectives that demand attention, too, if the whole of a developing nation is to be fully perceived.

Our ultimate interest is in a functioning international community. The success of this international community will depend upon the power of the idea of cooperative pluralism among nations, an idea which cannot be expected to grow up in a thicket of nonpluralistic national ideologies. So, while recognizing that actual growth in the productivity of a nation may be much more difficult without external aid, we know that we cannot afford to proceed in our programs of foreign assistance without some much broader understanding of the effects of our involvement. It is even possible that, through a better understanding of what we are now doing, we might conclude that we should do nothing in preference to continuing. But in any case that understanding is imperative.

A more comprehensive look at our foreign assistance programs under Title IX would suggest these kinds of non-economic questions:

1. How does one promote the national integration of often traditionally disparate cultural and tribal groups? By what process is local loyalty transcribed into national loyalty? How does a long neglected and impoverished mass of people, who have always felt themselves to be apart from the business of a distant ruling aristocracy, begin to relate to the business of building a nation? As the internally unifying effects of the quest for independence or the struggle against external threats subside, disintegrative forces within nations may well become the prevailing problem of the 1970s. This problem is not one the world community can wisely neglect, and it is not one which comes first to the mind of an economist. This is an especially important inquiry because it is one in which outside assistance might be particularly useful. Outside observers can sometimes develop perspectives denied to the parties to the conflict.

2. What role do internal communications play in development? How can we encourage the growth of competence in communications? What combination of communications techniques will work best to bring about the common set of ideas and attitudes that will enhance democratic pluralism within the framework of a national government? How can a competent commu-

nications system support the technical and economic goals of a national development program?

3. How are economic and technical programs best administered so as to leave a residue of local skills sufficient to carry on and increase the fruits of the undertaking? For example, how does one conduct a program of community development so that the community retains the institutional capacity to carry on? Community development has always been a major thrust of our aid programs, but this development often has not been effectively institutionalized.

4. How essential is a strong legal system? How does it affect a nation's capacity to work out its internal difficulties in an orderly fashion?

5. How are the new laws and institutions encouraged that will make the effective utilization of new technology possible? As Edgar Owens has pointed out, our monetary and banking systems, the law of contracts, corporations, the law of property, our savings and credit systems, trade unions, professional associations—all these and others have been as instrumental as the great advancements in technology in carrying our own society to its present level of development. Under situations of relatively rapid technological advance, will these supporting laws and institutions be developed at an equally rapid rate?

6. What role do political parties and political ideologies play in national development? To what extent do disparities in access to political power reinforce those disparities, as in the contest between urban and rural interests in governmental decisions?

These are illustrative of the questions which Title IX legislation urges us to consider.

One phrase in Title IX deserves a further comment. This phrase refers to civic and political skills in the developing nations.

Understandably this language has not been embraced by AID with either enthusiasm or a program. The reference to political and civic skills is based on the conviction that "politics is the name of the game" in most countries, including our own. It is often rightly argued that political skills in the United States are no more advanced than those in the developing nations. If this is so, what role has the United States to play in this area, assuming that it could surmount its spine-tingling apprehensions about interfering in another nation's politics?

The answer must be found in the developing nations themselves. Any involvement by the United States must reflect ideas or proposals from political leadership in other nations—leadership which shares with us a commitment to encourage the growth of societies in which political activity is a right of the people. Unfortunately, our own major political parties in the United States are inward looking. They have no international ties and little knowledge of, or interest in, political movements in other countries. Thus our political parties cannot presently contribute much in this area.

In contrast, one might look at the role of the Christian Democratic movement. The growth of the Christian Democratic movement in most of the Latin American countries has been stimulated and encouraged by political work supported by the European Christian Democrats.

Communist parties have been even more aggressive in their efforts to provide training and ideological indoctrination. Moreover, their work often goes on in hostile environments. A conference at Havana brings together political activists from left and communist parties. But where are the conferences for political activists (not government officials) who are committed to democratic values?

Ideas for activities which could be supported or sponsored by AID in the purely political field could come from gatherings of political leaders from various nations. AID may find that a non-governmental institution could more easily carry on this kind of activity, preferably one in which both of our major political parties shared responsibility.

Any activities of this kind would carry reciprocal benefits—enabling everyone involved to gain a deeper understanding of the democratic political process. These activities should not be aimed at parliamentarians, but at other layers of political activists.

A common American myth is that politics must be kept out of our international dialogue. The legitimate concern about interference in another nation's political decision-making is generalized to create a sterility in our relationship with others that hardly does us any good. The truth is that political dialogue—the exchange of ideas—is the least sensitive of all the ways in which people of different nations can relate to one another. To discuss an idea is to assume, implicitly, a mutuality of status which is conducive to openness and frankness.

Despite its lack of response to the purely political concepts, AID has moved ahead with some skill and understanding in the other areas of Title IX concern. Title IX ideas cannot be mandated through airgrams sent to overseas missions. The problem is to create through training the deeper understanding of nation-building which Title IX seeks to encourage. AID through its Title IX division is moving toward such training, through its regional seminars for AID personnel, its contract with the Fletcher School of Diplomacy and in other ways. It will be a long process which will ultimately involve all our institutions of higher education. Broadly enough conceived, Title IX insights should influence our more traditional foreign policy approaches to other nations.

The justification for foreign aid expenditures must, in the end, be that they are in the national interest, but we must take care to define "national interest" within the broader context of the present historical situation. As the Pearson Commission on International Development recently argued, ". . . the acceleration of history, which is largely the result of the bewildering impact of modern technology, has changed the whole concept of national interest. Who can ask where his country will be in a few decades without asking where the world will be? If we wish that world to be secure and prosperous, we must show a common concern for the common problems of all peoples."

It is my continuing belief that we can effectively demonstrate our common concern, but only insofar as we work within the total economic and political dynamics of emerging nationhood, and that is, in the end, the point of the Title IX legislation. ■

A dissenting view: The US should stay out of a direct role in political development.

Title IX

American Aid and Political Development

DANIEL S. LEV

Our author is a member of the political Science department of the University of California in Berkeley. He has spent several years in Indonesia, doing research on law and political change. His publications include "The Transition to Guided Democracy" (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966) and various articles on politics and law in Indonesia. The paper was originally produced for a discussion in SEADAG held in 1966.

THESE brief comments are not meant to be a full discussion of the various theories of political development, nor an attempt to lay down a new theory. My main purpose is to stimulate discussion of a few points which I think crucial in any consideration of the relationship between AID, or any other agency of the government, and political development abroad.

The recent rash of writings on political development is not entirely new; the Greek philosophers were interested in the question, and most centuries since then have produced a few thinkers about it. What may be new about recent contributions is their foundation in increasingly sophisticated social scientific techniques—which lends to some of them a tone of confidence which I do not share—and, in some cases, a concern to translate analyses of political change into policy proposals.

I shall say a few things about political development, with warnings about the great complexity of the matter, even as some observers conceive it, which is infinitely less complex than it may actually be. But for the most part I want to raise the question whether the United States should attempt to involve itself *directly* with political development. There are issues here which have been passed over much too lightly.

Aspects of political development

"Political development" is merely a term, a great abstraction, whose content varies according to the analyst. There is a common tendency to define "development" or "modernization" in terms of our own experience and notions of what ought to be. Indeed, the very notion of development implies a strong element of "progress," a concept peculiar to Judeo-Christian civilization and quite alien to many cultures, including those of Southeast Asia. It might be helpful to use the more neutral term "political change."

Thus, much recent discussion of political development assumes that the end result of the development will be something like America, or at least Europe. We do this at times unconsciously, but the resultant notions of change are the least useful and often the most frustrating. Concepts of development which explicitly take for granted the ultimate emergence of democracy or something equally vague will therefore not be bothered with here. But many models of development do have an implicit bias towards one's own system.

There are processes of social change which are apparent, however, and which can be regarded with some neutrality as belonging to a pattern common to all societies, if certain kinds of change are occurring at all.

One major element in the process of political change during this century in Asia is the expansion of the polity to accommodate an increasing number of participants. More people are brought directly into contact with governing institutions for a growing number of purposes.

The political participation by a growing number of people may be seen partly in the light of what has been called social mobilization. That is, an existing social and political structure becomes more amenable to change when large numbers of people are mobilized in ways that transcend traditional lines of division and modes of organization. For example, it has been argued that the success of the Chinese Communist Party was secured by the Japanese invasion, which angered, terrified, and starved men into supporting the most effective anti-Japanese force. Similarly, revolutionary situations in some parts of Southeast Asia have had the effect of mobilizing men to action, thus creating new kinds of interaction and making possible greater change in their social and political circumstances than before.

Much emphasis has been put on expanding participation as an element in development. Often it has been regarded optimistically as an indication of incipient democratization, or at least of rapid change—

all change being conceived as good. It need not be the former at all, of course, unless one defines democracy solely in terms of greater participation.

Emphasis on the participation explosion, the rise of political consciousness, the emergence of new symbols of nationalism and political action, and other social and psychological processes—though all are significant parts of political change—has led to the neglect of another major facet of development, [which] must be seen primarily in terms of the growth of reasonably permanent and adaptable institutions. . . bringing people too quickly into the political process, with all the attendant disruption, might prevent the emergence of stable yet flexible and adjustable institutions.

In this much oversimplified and sketchy discussion other aspects of development should be mentioned. One of great importance to Southeast Asia is the integration of all the peoples of a state into a recognizable whole, a society and polity loyalty to which tends to transcend that to the primordial units of kin, religious, ethnic, racial, or regional group. In part, this must derive from the extension of political and economic institutions out from the center towards the farthest territorial reaches of the state, and from those areas towards the center and towards one another. It also depends on the development of intricate patterns of communication flow, connecting individuals and larger social units with one another throughout the state. This is facilitated, for one obvious example, by the spreading of a single common language.

All this has to do with creating a state in the twentieth century. There is a broader and more complex process that may be at work in most of Southeast Asia that is even more fundamental: this is the growing specialization and diversification of social, political, and especially economic institutions and forms. The special services demanded by an increasingly complex society give rise to new functions which are assumed by new or modified organizations in a never ending evolution.

In having said these few things, I have not explained much about the actual process of change. Some abstract facts have been noted of the development of less complex and fragmented societies into more complex, integrated societies and states. What has been said, however, sounds rather simple, as if all one need do is encourage or not encourage participation, expand communications facilities, improve education, protect reasonably strong institutions, and the like. No one would, I am certain, take such a view. The evolution of societies is extremely complicated. No one factor is all important, but all of them combine—with several score that have not been mentioned here—in a total process, mixed with a good deal of historical accident, to eventuate in something that remains as unique as the starting point, but different and constantly changing. No one can predict the outcome, nor foretell the character of the state—in its political style, values, level of sophistication—after ten, twenty, fifty, or more years. It is all quite uncertain.

With different mixtures of the various ingredients of change—social, cultural, economic, political—different results appear. Europe produced one type with many variations. Japan underwent a process of radical economic transformation, accompanied by significant social change, while the Japanese elite attempted to hold cultural values and the political system constant; the impact of the American occupation is well known. In some parts of Southeast Asia, change has begun in certain areas of political and social organization, and among a younger post-independence (or, in Thailand, post-1932) generation new cultural values are evident. But economic change of a recognizable and persistent sort is not yet fully under way in the region. In Thailand the reforms of Mongkut and Chulalongkorn deeply affected the political system, and less so the economic structure of the country. But it is not clear that the resultant coup of 1932, which produced a new military-bureaucratic alliance,

Political Aspects of the Alliance for Progress

Thus the pre-eminent problem for Latin America is how to evolve a new set of political institutions which will be capable of dealing with social change. The pre-eminent problem of US foreign policy toward Latin America is how to influence Latin American political development in ways not incompatible with the national interest of the United States—and always remembering that the degree of US influence is marginal at best.

It must be recognized that Latin American politics cover a much broader spectrum than that to which North Americans are accustomed. The balance is unquestionably on the left, in North American terms; but at the same time, the far right in Latin America . . . has a disproportionate share of political and economic power; it also has a disproportionate number of people who are bilingual in English and "Pro-American." The Alliance for Progress, which is about as interventionist and revolutionary a program as one could conceive, frightens these people.

. . . By no means all this needs to be done through governmental programs. Much of it is better done by private instrumentalities, and more attention needs to be given to encouraging private groups —without involving the CIA.

We have to remember, however, that the choices in all these matters are up to the Latin Americans. We can help clarify the factors involved, but the future of Latin America is going to be determined in Latin America, not in Washington—or in Moscow either, for that matter.

—Study prepared by the staff of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the House (1967)

had within it obvious seeds of another stage of change.

The United States and foreign political development

So much for political development. I want to turn now to the question of whether and to what extent the United States can make a contribution to what we may or may not agree upon as constituting political development.

In considering United States involvement in foreign political development, we ought to hold a few points constantly in mind. Perhaps the first is the need always to be aware of our interests, values, and political world-view. Only by continually testing these conceptions against other perceptions of reality can we begin, I think, to arrive at some reasonable understanding both of our responsibilities and, more importantly, our capabilities.

For example, a major difficulty in discussing "political development" is the inexorable tendency to see one's own political system as the absolute best. Even though we may be capable intellectually of dismissing so naive a notion, yet our entire pattern of thought, the complex of symbols and predilections which inform our judgments, incline us to assess all behavior in terms of our own. "Political awareness," "economic growth," "flexibility," "openness to change," and so on are no less reflections of our own views of what is politically or socially desirable than the more obscure term "democracy."



But let us assume for a while that a quite neutral view of the matter is possible, as in fact to some extent it is. That is, certain kinds of economic and social development are actually under way whose eventual consequences can be assessed in terms of patterns of growth and change. The question is whether the United States should undertake a program directed at guiding such change, and, if so, how and with what consequences.

Several scholars firmly believe that the United States has an important role to play in political development and, indeed, prescribe guidelines for such a role. I have basic disagreements with some of these views, for they seem to me to be based on oversimplified premises about Southeast Asian (to limit ourselves to that part of the world) amenability and American capability. One can raise various kinds of objections: for example, one ought to consider the moral issue of whether one state should undertake the kind of intervention necessary—with or without the prerequisite expertise. And one could also question whether American interests are really served by the kinds of activity proposed. But for the moment there is no need to discuss these problems; we can stick to the essential questions of capability, content, and consequence.

In no particular order, I want to offer a few arguments against a program of direct American involvement in Southeast Asian political development.

I. *Knowledge and action.* For all that is known in general about political development, we know very little in particular about any one of the countries within which such change may occur in Southeast Asia. Each state is unique. There are of course common patterns of change, but each state enjoys, for better or worse, its own cultural (and other) modes of behavior. And though over a period of a century or so these might tend to level out in favor of the common patterns, in shorter time periods the differences are very important indeed. Yet it is in these shorter periods of time that we must operate, and I do not think we will soon know enough to operate with finesse and discrimination. I will not argue that cultural types and values are unchangeable or that they are more important than structural matters, but unfamiliarity with them makes it most difficult, if not impossible, to devise programs of institutional and cultural change. It is all very well to say that we must encourage certain types of groups with the right kind of achievement orientation, for example, but it is quite another thing to determine precisely the nature of such bents in another culture and to treat them in a way that does not threaten the dominant culural proclivities.

II. *Program persistence.* Without a persistent program, planned and executed over a considerable length of time, one is doomed to worse than failure, for dabbling in social institutions is likely to cause more turmoil than can easily be handled. At least that is a possibility, for which the United States must assume some kind of responsibility. But even were a persistent program possible, and all the necessary knowledge available, surely no other state would permit this kind of intervention in its most intimate national life. Men will not willingly permit their cultural habits, social institutions, and political security to be challenged for any reason at all. Recent problems in the American south are indicative of this.

United States support for those modernizing political organizations which are not Communist and are most likely to become effective institutions is, I think, wise for it does not pretend to be a full scale program, only a general policy. But even here there is not much that the United States can do, both because there are some groups which we cannot support, and also because so much care must be taken to avoid tainting such organizations with the stigma of foreign connec-

tions.

III. *American interests, values and program capabilities.* In this area lies the main objection to any program directed specifically at "political development," aiming towards the evolution of particular kinds of institutions, values, and orientations.

It is necessary to clarify not only what the United States can contribute to foreign political development but also what our purposes are in seeking to make such a contribution. For there may be instances in which our goals contradict our capabilities, whatever they may be. In this case, and it may be a frequent one, we are compelled to make a choice, and perhaps to explore more deeply our conception of America's role in the world.

We are all aware that what we desire of other states stems from many different motivations. Among the more important ones behind our concern for political development in the third world are: 1) a moral or humanitarian concern, which impels us to seek betterment for other people simply because we dislike suffering; 2) national interest: that is, we now commonly assume that American security depends not only upon influencing the foreign policies of other states, but also upon determining the very character of their national social, economic, and political, not to mention cultural, life.

There is a strong ideological component in our present view of American national interests. We interpret our interests, for example, partly in terms of halting Communist expansion wherever it may occur and in whatever form. There is also a tendency to read a threat into all kinds of phenomena that seem to display characteristics common also to Communist movements. Revolutionary activity anywhere disturbs us because it represents radicalism, "leftism," and may in fact offer a foothold to bona fide Communists. Until not long ago, American leaders used to be greatly disturbed by the term "socialism" because of its associations. We have moved away from this psychology slightly, but it remains with us.

Because we are concerned with AID activities of the United States government, we ought to be quite clear that our interest in political development is in fact a political interest. There is no doubt an altruistic element in American assistance, but it is not primary. To the extent, however, that our concern with political development is motivated by self-interest, our abilities are distinctly limited, our freedom of action restricted, and our chances of success quite possibly nonexistent. On the one hand, we tend to see political development in terms of our own values, and therefore our imagination is limited. But one may perhaps get over that. On the other and more important hand, there are certain courses of action which we cannot follow, because existing interpretations of national interest will not permit them. The most obvious case is one in which a Communist party might offer the best opportunity in a country to achieve political stability, lay the foundations for further organizational development, undertake a determined program of basic economic growth, and begin to break the hold of non-modernizing traditions. It is unlikely that Washington would undertake, for the sake of another state's political development, to facilitate a Communist take-over, even in the face of the most devastating political and social turmoil.

This seems an obvious point, but it is highly significant in understanding what we cannot do in the matter of political development. The unstated assumption behind programatic suggestions in this field is that the rest of the world—to put it in extreme terms—is something of a laboratory in which the United States, with its great wealth, power and expertise, can manipulate almost at will. Yet the fact is that we are restricted not only by what other states will permit us to do, assuming that they know, but also by what our own views of American interests will permit us to do. These are limitations that must always remain, and they are so serious as to preclude any reasonable and consistent program of political development.

In the terminology of science, our laboratory is ill-equipped, the data are inadequate, there are too many variables and inconstants in the research subject, and the director of the experiment is hopelessly biased.

If anything, I am appealing here for a sense of proportion in assessing our capabilities with respect to Southeast Asia political change. To a certain extent, no doubt, we can bring influence to bear, by encouraging here and punishing there, but we should not be deceived by a notion of omnipotent science into believing that we can control the human environment of other nations.

Indirect assistance in political change

To recapitulate a bit, dabbling in political and social institutions is an attractive possibility mainly for social scientists who dream, as all of us do, of magnificent social laboratories. But, for one thing, US Government officials are not disinterested social scientists. There are distinct interests to be defended; and although some of us have justifiable bones to pick with short term interests, they do after all exist, and I hope that Washington continues to concern itself with them, Secondly, the US Government is in no position to carry on a consistent policy of institution building in other countries where it does not have consistent authority and power, such as that once held by colonial governments in Southeast Asia and elsewhere. Nor at a time when social mobilization has already begun in most of Southeast Asia, and nationalist urges have taken deep root, would such a possibility be desirable or feasible.

There are no doubt possibilities here and there for the United States government. Institutions rather than men should be supported, when that is possible and if it can be done without tainting them with the blemish of foreign support. There may on occasion be a superb opportunity to deny a traditionally oriented dictator support in the hope that a fledgling organization may benefit—so long as the organization is not Communist or opposed to American interests in other ways. Or perhaps the United States can give economic breaks to groups interested in programs that might contribute to a developing middle

(*Continued on page 51*)

Ambiguity from Congress . . .
Bureaucratic resistance in AID . . .
Obstructionism by State . . .
"The result has proven disastrous to Title IX"

Title IX

A New Dimension in US Foreign Aid?

JOHN R. SCHOTT

Mr. Schott, who has his doctorate in political science from Harvard University, has taught at Harvard and Wellesley College, and, during the academic year 1968-69 was Visiting Professor of Political Development at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He served for two years as Acting Chief of the Title IX Division in AID's Washington Office of Program and Policy Coordination.

TITLE IX of the Foreign Assistance Act may constitute one of the significant watersheds in the history of American foreign aid. Like the Marshall Plan, Point Four, and the macro-economic emphases of the sixties, Title IX responds to urgent development problems now more clearly perceived than ever before, and synthesizes a number of strands of criticism levelled at the United States foreign aid program with increasing harshness and efficacy. Despite its possible importance, however, the legislation is itself ambiguous, its objective liable to diverse interpretations, and its impact thus far in changing the programing priorities of the Agency for International Development has been practically nil.

To what can one attribute this failure of AID to respond to a mandate that some would represent as a major, Congressionally-authorized break-through in the foreign aid posture of the United States Government? What is the source and what are the prospects for this new priority item in the Foreign Assistance Act? Is Title IX to be represented as an ethnocentrically irresponsible and programatically impossible demand upon the United States foreign policy establishment, or as an eminently constructive effort to reshape an obsolete and tottering foreign aid program?

The Thrust of Title IX

Calling upon AID to assure "maximum participation in the task of economic development . . . through the encouragement of democratic private and local governmental institutions," Title IX is the first explicit legislative injunction to a United States foreign aid agency to concern itself directly with the political—not just the economic—development of the lesser developed countries. Far from being an initiative of the Executive Branch, Title IX is an almost classic example of a Congressional initiative thrust upon an unprepared and resistant Executive. When amended to AID's legislation in 1966, the reaction on the part of most AID officials was neither informed nor enthusiastic. Either the Agency had been "doing it all along" or Title IX heralded a most pernicious interference in the internal affairs of aid-recipient countries. There were some, of course, who considered it a salutary development—although almost invariably for the wrong reasons: it would prove a panacea to the public relation woes of the Agency by enlisting the messianic fervor of the American public behind foreign aid, or it would enable important special interest groups within the Agency to obtain additional funding for their pet public safety programs, "free" labor union development activities, community development operations, or participant trainee programs.

To the more sophisticated in AID, Title IX was clearly the culmination of a particular brand of

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criticism endured by the foreign aid program since Point Four days—that its activities tended to strengthen central government institutions at the expense of local, grass-roots democracy; that, in the absence of effective mediating institutions, they tended to reinforce or widen the gap between the privileged rich and the disenfranchised poor; that they strengthened the social and political forces of the *status quo* through the Agency's macro-economic program emphases, large capital projects and permissive loan agreements. Too few people in aid-recipient countries were directly benefiting from US assistance, and too few were being directly involved in the development of their country.

Besides attacking these consequences of foreign aid programs, Title IX could also be seen to attack two underlying assumptions of post-Eisenhower foreign aid programs. One of these was the assumption that the provision of aid could be "neutral." This myth did not seek to belie the obvious fact that some aid constitutes little more than politically-motivated bribery. Nor did it contend that aid did not have significant social and political ramifications in host countries or that AID did not, at times, seek to use its "leverage" to obtain host-government concessions or expressions of "self-help" in order to remove manifest social and political obstacles to the intelligent use of US funds. What it did allege is that economic aid could be and was a "technical" operation, performed in accordance with prescriptive and evaluative criteria which were so universally accepted as to be indisputable. Political biases and unforeseen consequences were at times acknowledged, but were considered by senior AID officials as "not our concern": reforms demanded of host governments as a *quid pro quo* for aid were camouflaged as "self-help" and as "technically" necessary to realize economic program objectives, rather than being considered as eminently desirable non-economic development objectives in themselves. AID strictly served the purposes of *economic* development, it was averred, and therefore it imposed no alien or inappropriate

or unwanted values on aid-recipient peoples, as would be the case if it consciously tackled the problems of social and political change.

A second and closely related myth has been that economic development constitutes a necessary precondition for—or inexorably leads to—the growth of democratic institutions. Embodied in the preamble to the Foreign Assistance Act, this publicly accepted but professionally discredited notion has conveniently provided many an AID official with a comfortable answer to the criticism that foreign aid was shoring up regressive regimes or failing to contribute to the "democratization" of aid-recipient countries.

Governed in part by these two myths, AID has scrupulously avoided activities which could be construed as motivated by political development objectives as opposed to those more easily rationalized as "economic." Unsophisticated lip-service would be paid to the presumed causal relationship between economic and political development. Short-term political and diplomatic considerations would, too, play a role in determining the allocation of resources both as between countries and within individual countries; but these considerations were perceived as clearly separable from any attempt to implement long-term political development objectives.

Problems of Interpretation

Although there are those who would consider the Alliance for Progress as the first break with these myths, it was really not until Title IX was enacted that this break became explicit and began to achieve a serious Congressional constituency. Yet, however more explicit Title IX may be in this sense, interpretation of the provision can be a complicated and often unrewarding exercise.

To whom and to what does AID respond—to the specific wording of the legislation, to the explanatory reports of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on that provision, or to the intent of the authors and sponsors of the legislation who will question the Agency on its response? Indeed, given a raft of policy priorities and increasingly limited resources, to whom on the Hill does the Agency choose to respond—a Bradford Morse or a Wayne Morse, a Fraser or a Fulbright?

The legislation itself—were it to be taken seriously—is enough to cause consternation among officials responsible for its implementation. To play upon the vagueness of the mandate and rigorously to analyze its use of language would be the height of pedantry. But key words such as "maximum participation" which is to be assured, and "democratic . . . institutions" which are to be encouraged, can bewilder rather than help.

To modify this basic mandate, initially thought to be too ethnocentric and unspecific, by stating that programs designed to carry out its purposes should "recognize the differing needs, desires, and capacities of the people of the respective developing countries and areas" does not clarify the edict.

In world-wide policy messages emanating from Washington, AID usually employs the words "as appropriate" or "where appropriate" in recognition of the diversity of the situation applying in Third World countries. No such modification appears in the language of Title IX. Yet responsible implementation of the provision requires a country-by-country approach to determine when, under what circumstances, in which sectors and geographical areas an increase in popular participation could be construed as actually desirable. In many country situations, for instance, should not primary attention be focused upon improving the *quality* of participation rather than upon means to increase the *quantity* of it?

To turn to the House Foreign Affairs Committee reports on this title and its subsequent amendment is far from helpful. Indeed, further confusion can result from an implicit expansion of the mandate. For instance, the text of Title IX refers only to "democratic private and local governmental institutions." Yet the first House report recognizes that such institutions are functionally inseparable from institutions at other levels of the society and intelligently suggests that the goals of Title IX can best be achieved "through the building of democratic private and public institutions on all levels—local, state, and national." Both the provision itself and an early section of the report suggest that popular participation is to be considered a desirable goal insofar as it contributes to "economic development." Whether participation is to be considered a "good unto itself" (as may be argued) is either not clear or irrelevant. Yet at the very end of the report, the Committee advises AID that the objectives of Title IX may involve a "change in the approach of the Agency," that it should develop new criteria in the area of institutional development to judge the success of its efforts, and that it should evaluate its assistance efforts "not only in economic terms, but in terms of the extent to which our aid encourages democratic processes." Here it appears that the Committee intends economic and political development to be seen as distinguishable, albeit reinforcing, goals, both of which should be pursued concomitantly within a restructured foreign aid program.

Obstacles to Change

Whether it be broadly defined, or whether a more modest or economically-oriented interpretation of the statute is chosen, a number of institutional obstacles face the conscientious AID official who wishes to implement this mandate. Not the least of these are the internal restraints imposed by the current organization and staffing pattern of the Agency.

From the standpoint of personnel requirements, for instance, the outlook for Title IX's implementation can appear bleak. Despite the numerous reorganizations of foreign aid agencies—all of which were in part designed to shear these agencies of antiquated skills and obsolete ideas—there lingers on in AID a large contingent of people unreceptive to the new approach to development encouraged by Title IX. For some of these, Title IX constitutes an implied criticism (if not threat) to project activities with which they have long been involved. To others, Title IX is perceived as additional Congressional encouragement of the narrow-gauged project activities to which they have devoted their lives—the promotion of cooperatives, community development, public safety programs, free labor union development. For them, AID should simply multiply and intensify these efforts as a realistic response to Title IX.

This narrow view of Title IX is ironically buttressed by many of the more sophisticated program officers and senior officials imbued with a macro-economic approach toward development. After the effort of the early sixties to depoliticize the aid-giving process and to substitute hard-nosed and politically "neutral" macro-economic criteria for the Agency's previous adhocism and security-consciousness, it has been hard for some not to see Title IX as a regressive step. To these officials, AID's development activities can be divided between those initiated as developmentally significant by AID programers, and those smaller, special-interest project activities undertaken at the insistence of Congress. Title IX was considered by many another such outside, special interest group initiative—hopefully no more than a passing fad—which could be satisfied by relabeling (or perhaps multiplying) a few appropriate grass-roots activities already undertaken by the Agency. By so doing, no significant diversion of Agency resources would be necessary and no start up or phase down costs would be incurred by this annoying but transient Title IX exercise.

To counter these and other hostile attitudes within the Agency requires the nagging persistence of interested Members of Congress. It also necessitates awareness at the most senior levels of AID—an awareness that has not yet been fully demonstrated—that Title IX is important and that its objectives should conscientiously be pursued. Even with this, however, a government agency—constrained by civil service regulations and organizational inflexibilities—requires several years to re-train existing personnel and to recruit new personnel with the requisite interest, imagination, and expertise to administer as complicated and delicate a mandate as Title IX. Beyond this, it then requires locating these innovators in critical and relatively senior line and staff positions both in Washington and the field from which vantage point the implementation of new ideas can be pressed on the Agency and actually enforced. To date, efforts to overcome these internal obstacles have not been overwhelmingly successful.

Owing to the broad policy implications of Title IX, its implementation also meets with a number of formidable obstacles outside the framework of the Agency proper. Not the least of these has been the obstructionism of the State Department. Many Foreign Service of-

ficers view Title IX either as a bureaucratic encroachment on their own prerogatives in the field of overseas political analysis, or as a significant threat to important US short-term interests in the Third World.

The result has proven disastrous to Title IX: as it is an AID mandate, State assumes no responsibility to respond to it; as it affects US foreign policy, it is a State Department matter and cannot be resigned to AID. In consequence, while AID must report to Congress on its response (or lack thereof) to Title IX, State is able to veto, in a largely irresponsible manner, any constructive initiative by AID to implement it. And given the present concept of the Country Team and Ambassadorial responsibility for all aspects of the US presence in a particular country (excepting overt military operations), this negativist posture can be effectively enforced in the field.

Fundamental to this problem is the inherent conflict which exists between the development activities of AID and the representational role of State. This dichotomy of interests and roles between the two agencies becomes manifestly evident if the broader construction of Title IX is accepted. To holders of this broader view, Title IX was intended to counter aid programs which shored up undemocratic regimes and the forces of the *status quo* in aid-recipient countries: it was designed to cause US foreign aid to seek the dispersal of political power and to support the forces of responsible social and political change. Such a construction of Title IX is understandably anathema to many State Department officials, not only because this may so fundamentally conflict with established US foreign policies, but also because those primarily responsible for implementing this mandate would be the narrow-gauged agricultural technician or the apolitical macro-economist who constitute the stereotypical AID official.

This is not to say that if State Department officials would only take a more positive view of Title IX, the Department could now provide the guidance and coordination which Title IX's implementation requires. Unfortunately, the contrary is the case; just as AID is today improperly organized and staffed to pursue Title IX objectives, so is the Department. The "change in approach" which the House Foreign Affairs Committee suggested might be required of AID will also be required of State —for the formulation of relevant policies toward individual Third World countries, for the analysis of long-run social, economic, and political forces in these countries, and for the coordination of all appropriate US foreign policy instruments as they may bear on the implementation of Title IX.

To the extent that Title IX broadens the responsibilities of AID, it must also broaden State's. Until this is clearly understood and steps taken by the Department to assume these responsibilities and actually to promote—or to permit other United States Government Agencies to promote—social and political modernization in the Third World, Title IX can never become a significant thrust of the foreign aid program.

A second major external obstacle is the paucity of operationally useful knowledge concerning the processes of social and political modernization. Despite the unabating flow of academic works with "political development" in their titles, a reading of the relevant literature is a discouraging exercise for anyone interested either in devising activities which may significantly contribute to these processes or in discovering operationally useful criteria by which to measure the success of such efforts. Hiding behind a facade of academic respectability and a desire for methodological perfection, many academicians eminently qualified to lend a hand in this important work deign not to do so. Instead, they concentrate upon describing and explaining the operations of existing political systems to the exclusion of developing concepts and techniques for improving them. Without their assistance, however, the "operator"—lacking the data and prescriptive commentary which could usefully flow from the academic research community—tends to persist in the convenient ways of the past. Unless ways can be devised to enlist the scholarly community in operational problems and to make existing knowledge available to the operator in terminology he can understand and utilize, a sophisticated approach to Title IX's implementation may prove impossible.

Presumed or actual host country sensitivity to direct United States Government activity in the field of political development constitutes another major obstacle. This "sensitivity" argument is a favorite among those who believe, for one reason or another, that United States foreign aid programs should avoid political development activities. Regrettably, to support this view, it is usually necessary to resort to supposition, or a hyperbolical stretching of the facts, or the setting up of straw men as hypothetical cases. In fact, not enough is yet known concerning the degree of host government sensitivity to such United States Government sponsored activities to support such an argument, nor has AID as yet seriously explored indirect ways to act in these areas so as to assuage potential host-government fears.

Just as individual aid-recipient countries have at times proven unreceptive to certain externally-financed economic development activities, so are they likely to be respecting certain political development activities. Yet it is reprehensible to generalize from this to the point of assuming that all political development activities will prove equally resented everywhere; not only is this a breach of common sense, but it also demonstrates a rather perverse understanding of Title IX and the field of political development. Two points need here only be made: first, the spectrum of potential political development activities is extraordinarily broad, ranging from the location of a road or similar capital project so as to contribute to national integration, to the provision of direct assistance to particular modernizing political parties. Given such a spectrum, it would be difficult not to find a way to contribute to the process of the political development of any aid-recipient country if only the interest of operators were aroused and the perspicacity of knowledgeable

advisers employed. Secondly, the implementation of Title IX in a particular country may entail doing nothing at all, e.g., when an increase in popular participation could prove counter-productive given the level of that country's institutional development, or when any form of aid through whatever US instrumentality would likely contribute to the perpetuation of an intolerably undemocratic regime or the maintenance of a closed socio-economic elite.

As long as Title IX is not so narrowly defined as to insist upon the encouragement of particular types of institutions having rigidly defined characteristics or so broadly defined as to be utterly meaningless, there is a wide range of realistic options available to US foreign aid administrators for responding significantly to Title IX. The major problem is more one of determining relative priorities among available alternatives than of identifying the alternatives themselves.

It should be unnecessary here to dwell on the supporting argument that the implementation of Title IX involves "interference in the internal affairs" of sovereign states. Yet it is remarkable how often this argument is employed by elements hostile to Title IX. Suffice it to say that in a world so highly interdependent as today, this whole line of reasoning is woefully obsolete. Non-interference has become a practical impossibility: one interferes simply by not interfering. The relevant questions concern the type, magnitude and duration of the interference, not the interference itself. Furthermore, aid programs are in fact cooperative undertakings agreed to by host-governments (however much armtwisting is often erroneously reputed to be involved) and no more politically-relevant "interference" could conceivably be incurred by implementing Title IX than has been perpetrated in the past by many of AID's rural development activities and counter-insurgency programs.

Finally, all of AID's current economic undertakings clearly have profound social and political ramifications in aid-recipient countries. It is in part Title IX's argument that both US and host-country interests can best be served by seeking to anticipate such consequences of aid programs before blindly undertaking them and by taking these presumed consequences systematically into account when programing our foreign aid activities. By so doing, however, AID becomes *ipso facto* engaged in the business of political development.

Requisites for Change

Given such obstacles as these, is it realistic to anticipate a serious and imaginative response to Title IX on the part of AID or its successor agencies? From this vantage point, there are three prerequisites to such response:

(1) *Change in the Foreign Policy Stance of the United States Government.* With rapid changes taking place within the Soviet bloc, with significant developments taking place in military hardware and its deployment, and with an increasing influence in international politics being assumed by the Third World, the strategic calculations of the fifties and the concept of Soviet containment are becoming increasingly obsolete. It has been argued that this allows for and necessitates consequent changes in the approach of the United States toward Third-World countries. In particular, it enables the United States to be less concerned with short-run, strategic considerations or the fluctuating cold-war posture of such countries; it should give AID the opportunity to consider the longer-term, broader-gauged development needs of these countries and to offer—or refuse—assistance in accordance with the degree to which Title IX goals appear realizable.

The relevance of Title IX in this new foreign policy context critically hinges upon whether US foreign policy is accommodated to this new international configuration and whether popular and Congressional pressure behind Title IX causes that provision itself to become a determinant of the manner of that accommodation. Such an accommodation would entail a major analytical effort to understand and identify the responsible forces of social and political modernization in individual less developed countries, and a search for ways to support overtly—through public or private channels—those groups that represent these forces and to promote the institutional development that will channel them in organizationally responsible and developmentally constructive directions.

For this, three things are necessary. In the first place, resources must be made available to AID, the State Department, and other internationally involved agencies to enable the requisite analytical work to be undertaken. Secondly, a resolution of the existing organizational and attitudinal conflict between the roles of State and AID toward the lesser developed countries must be sought. And ultimately, a presidential decision is required that continued United States Government association (whether inadvertent or deliberate) with the *status quo* forces in aid-recipient countries must gradually give way to a more farsighted and subtle *rapprochement* with the popular forces of change in these countries.

(2) *Broadening the Scope of the Country Planning Process.* Individual grass roots projects can in some

> "For if you think that you can manage a country without letting the people interfere. if you think that the people upset the game by their mere presence, whether they slow it down or whether by their natural ignorance they sabotage it, then you must have no hesitation: you must keep the people out. Now it so happens that when the people are invited to partake in the management of the country they, do not slow the movement down but on the contrary they speed it up."
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> —Frantz Fanon, **The Wretched of the Earth**, N.Y., Grove Press, 1966

cases contribute significantly to Title IX objectives. Yet Title IX does not encourage an *ad hoc*, project-oriented response. On the contrary, its successful implementation requires the integration of a variety of mutually reinforcing activities and the utilization, in concert, of a variety of public and private assistance instruments. Technical assistance efforts divorced from (or ineffectively dovetailed with) related capital projects, or *vice versa*, can spell the relative failure of both. Sector loans which neglect to address systematically—and often concomitantly—a variety of social, cultural, political as well as economic problems in that sector can produce institutional disequilibria and popular frustrations harmful to development already underway.

In recent years, AID has progressed far towards developing relatively sophisticated economic planning tools and procedures, although statistical imprecision still renders many of the findings suspect and of doubtful utility. Yet further refinement of the country programing approach is required so that long-term development goals are determined on the basis of qualitative assessments as well as traditional economic growth indices.

Beyond such refinement, however, is the need for the expansion of this programing approach so that a broader range of activities is considered and systematically intermeshed with host-country development goals. Simply because a given activity is a good thing is no excuse to fund it; similarly, because a given activity is likely to contribute to Title IX objectives does not imply that it should be programed at this time, or under US government sponsorship, or without supporting or ancillary activities being undertaken simultaneously. The interdisciplinary long-term planning which this approach assumes will require both personnel and organizational changes within the official foreign affairs establishment, and greater emphasis on research and evaluation than traditionally undertaken by AID and its predecessor agencies.

(3) *The Effective Coordination of US Public and Private Assistance Instruments.* Just as Title IX constitutes more than a simple package of discrete projects, so also does its implementation require resources beyond the capabilities of any one agency. Title IX should become a responsibility of the wide range of US public and private agencies that are involved, in one way or another, in the foreign aid business. As the principal coordinator of US foreign policy instruments, the State Department would assume a preeminent role in this, ideally orchestrating the instruments reposing in USIA, the Department of Defense, the Peace Corps, and AID to make certain that each performs, in a complementary and mutually reinforcing way, a developmental (rather than purely strategic, or propagandistic, or otherwise self-serving) role in the Third World. This requires within the Washington foreign affairs establishment a greater centralization of existing analytical and decision-making responsibility with respect to the Third World than is presently the case; it also involves a degree of bureaucratic self-abnegation and policy reexamination on the part of each of the concerned agencies.

In addition to this, effective procedures need be established to coordinate government-sponsored activities with those of US private organizations sponsoring or directly undertaking developmental activities in the Third World.

If Title IX is to be taken seriously, such coordination of public and private development efforts becomes more desirable than ever before. Many of the activities to which this provision draws attention can best be done by private sector organizations: it is they who can most efficiently administer small-scale projects and can maintain a high degree of flexibility in the manner in which they undertake them. They also frequently have greater access to certain countries and relevant private groups than a US public agency bound to act on a government-to-government basis.

The Prospects for Change

Given these three conditions as prerequisites of a successful effort to implement Title IX, the outlook for the implementation of this amendment seems dismal. It may be assumed that the Nixon Administration will eventually recommend organizational and perhaps substantive changes in the foreign aid program. Although to date there has been little official indication what these may be, it is likely that multilateralizing significant aspects of the foreign aid program and distributing several of its existing facets among a number of private and semi-public agencies or both will be given serious consideration. If either of these general proposals become government policy, the impulse behind Title IX should suffer.

There is thus good reason to despair of a more systematic, integrated and long-term approach to the foreign aid process ever becoming the reality which it should. Yet many would not remain in this business if they did not view it as a constant learning process and hence susceptible to significant reforms. It is, of course, possible that Title IX may act as a catalyst for future reforms, even if it should not become their principal synthesizing element. Yet, even if this were the case, these reforms may only substitute new myths for the ones Title IX has tried to dispel—ethnocentric myths of the universal applicability of pluralism, popular participation and certain types of democratic institutions; egocentric myths of the infallibility of our predictive power as regards the prospects for political development in the new states.

On the other hand, however, Title IX's main impact may be to better attune us to the actual complexity of the development process and turn us away from many of the simplistic assumptions which have governed the aid-giving process in the past. If this is so, perhaps greater modesty will be displayed as regards what can and should be done than has been the case among many of the economists and technicians now in AID. Perhaps, also, greater appreciation of the necessarily marginal impact US assistance has on the Third World's development will prevail among the American public and their Congressional representatives. It may be too much to hope that Title IX will at once broaden our horizons and limit our aspirations. It is sobering to contemplate the prospects for foreign aid if this hope is not realized. ■

Theorists differ still, but our knowledge of political development has grown tremendously in the last twenty years.

Title IX

Political Development Research

ROBERT A. PACKENHAM

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THE term "political development" has been used increasingly in recent years by scholars, government officials, and others. "Economic development" has been part of the lexicon of economics for a longer period, and courses in the subject—for example, The Theory of Economic Development—have proliferated. There are doubtless fewer courses in the theory of political development, and political scientists feel (as they should) less comfortable with this concept than economists do with "economic development." Nevertheless, the idea of political development appears much more now than it used to both in the academic literature and in the councils of government, especially with reference to the so-called emerging nations or developing areas.

One obvious reason for this usage within American political science is the growing role of the United States in world affairs, which has propelled Americans out of their traditional isolation into involvement in the political affairs of other nations. Thus involved, the United States has had to consider questions of political change in these countries. Another reason is the transition, after World War II, from the colonial to the postcolonial epoch, with the corresponding expansion of interest by the developed countries in the politics of developing areas. Yet another factor is the analogy with economic change; that is, if basic, positive economic change is called "economic development," why not call basic, positive political change "political development"?

Despite—perhaps because of—its increasing usage, "political development" is an ambiguous concept for many people. One scholar in the field recently noted ten different, though overlapping, meanings attached to it. His list could perhaps be extended. Some argue that the economic analogy is very deceptive, and that the notion of political development should be abandoned altogether.

My position is that the economic analogy is deceptive, but this does not mean that the concept should be abandoned. Political development is a more elusive concept than economic development. This is partly because political development is more controversial in normative terms, and more difficult to measure in empirical, operational terms, than economic development. Nevertheless, we believe that reasonable men with varying normative orientations can agree that some political systems are more developed than others, and that differences between such systems can be identified and measured with some precision. The progress in the literature on political development since the concept first became widespread is already impressive. We still do not know very much about political development, but we know much more than we did twenty years ago.

All concepts of theories of political development that I know about or can conceive of are both normative and non-normative (existential). Development means not only change, but implies change for the better, which makes it normative. Hence any concept of political development unavoidably has a normative aspect; but it must also be, in some measure, existential as well, insofar as it specifies or implies the empirical nature and characteristics of the good political system, and perhaps the conditions of such a system. Briefly and roughly, all concepts of political development may be regarded as normative insofar as they deal with the ends of and the justifications for good political systems; and they may be regarded as existential insofar as they define the characteristics and specify the conditions of good (developed) political systems. Though all political-development concepts and theories may be seen as both normative and existential, they vary in the amount of attention devoted to these dimensions.

Normative theorists stress that a political system develops as it approaches the good political order. They devote most of their attention to specifying the ends of, justifications for, and perhaps the characteristics of good political orders. They devote less attention to systematic statements of the conditions which give rise to and maintain political development, and are often more concerned with specifying the ends and justifications of political development than elucidating its characteristics.

Existential theorists devote relatively little attention to the normative premises on which their theories are based and which motivate

them to do their work. They spend less time on spelling out the ends of and justifications for the good political system and more time on specifying the characteristics of what they regard as politically developed systems and the conditions and processes which give rise to them.

Political Development as a Dependent Variable

Most of the literature [on this subject] up to about 1964 or 1965 treated political development as a dependent variable. Those who explicitly defined it at all usually were rough and subjective in their classifications of some political systems as more developed than others. The criteria of political development most frequently relied upon were political modernization and/or political democracy. Political modernization was defined as rationalization, participation, and integration; sometimes the measures used were precise, but more often they were not very precise. Political democracy was variously defined as political competitiveness, pluralism, polyarchy, legitimacy of elections, or "subsystem autonomy." Measures of democracy were also usually rough and subjective.

Scholars writing about political development devoted relatively little attention to specifying political-development utopias. In addition, they tended to assume that the ends of the political order in developing countries were political modernization and, if possible, political democracy. They did not spend much time or energy in justifying such definitions of political development in normative terms, nor were they very attentive to or precise in specifying the substance of political development so defined. Probably it would not be an exaggeration to say that they believed that modernization and democracy were self-evidently the goals for the political systems of peoples in the third world.

Apparently more interesting to these writers was the question of the *conditions* of political development, so defined. It was to this question that the scholars devoted most of their attention. My review and synthesis of the literature as of 1964 found five different approaches to the study of political development.

1. Political development is mainly a function of (that is, it varies with) the *legal-formal apparatus* of government, prescribing such features as equal protection of the law, the rule of law, regular elections by secret ballot, federalism, the separation of powers, single-member or proportional representation, and the like.

2. Political development is mainly a function of a *level of economic development* sufficient to serve the material needs of the members of the political system and to permit a reasonable harmony between economic aspirations and satisfactions.

3. Political development is mainly a function of the *administrative capacity* efficiently and effectively to maintain law and order and to perform governmental output functions rationally and neutrally.

4. Political development is mainly a function of a *social system* that facilitates popular participation in governmental and political processes at all levels, and helps bridge regional, religious, caste, linguistic, tribal, or other cleavages.

5. Political development is mainly a function of a *political culture*—that is, fundamental attitudinal and personality characteristics — among the members of the political system, such that they are able both to accept the privileges and to bear the responsibilities of a modern, democratic political process.

The literature summarized by these five propositions represents a major achievement in the study of comparative politics. Three decades ago, the modal approach to comparative politics was the legal-formal one. The emergence of new nations, along with many other factors, expanded the horizons of political scientists, and they began to question old orthodoxies and old knowledge. More importantly, new hypotheses began to emerge and old hypotheses gained new support.

The venerable idea that politics is largely a function of economics was reemphasized and provided with a firmer empirical base. S. M. Lipset's article on "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy" had a major impact on students of political development.

It was equally apparent, however, that economic development and political development were not perfectly correlated. Some economically underdeveloped countries were highly developed politically (such as India), whereas some economically developed countries were poorly developed politically (such as Argentina or France). By pointing out that political systems and political development have roots also in the social-structural fabric, the administrative capacity, and even the attitudinal and personality structures of society, and by specifying more carefully and comprehensively than ever before the characteristics of such roots, these writings dramatically increased understanding of the conditions of political development. One way to index the change that had occurred is to compare any pre-World War II comparative-government textbook with contemporary ones.

The literature utilizing these approaches also has shortcomings, however. Although it cannot be denied any longer that social, economic, administrative, and politico-cultural variables are relevant to political development, many of the propositions contained in this literature have not been tested adequately.

Some other weaknesses could be noted, but I shall confine myself to two. One is the paucity of attempts to justify and defend these notions of political development in normative terms. The other is that political development might profitably be looked at in a radically different way. The literature just described conceptualizes political development as a dependent variable—as political phenomena *caused* by something else. Another way to conceptualize political development is to see it as an independent variable—as phenomena that *cause* something else.

Political Development as an Independent and Intervening Variable

Among writers who have treated political development as a dependent variable, there has been a strong tendency to neglect such variables as the will and capacity of political actors and institutions. Political development was seen as something determined by massive

socioeconomic and psychological forces. Individual or group choice, skill, and capacity were, for the most part, left out of the analysis.

Recently, and especially since about 1965, writings on political development have increasingly stressed just these latter variables. There has been a strong tendency to view political development as will and capacity to cope with the issues, demands, and needs of society (or polity) that are cast up by the force of, or the imputed desire for, modernization. Writers employing this approach have avoided seeing political development as some fixed-end state; rather, they have seen it as a continuing process—in Manfred Halpern's terms, "a persistent capacity for coping with a permanent revolution." This approach goes by various names: "will and capacity" is the generic name that I shall give to it, although others use such terms as "problem-solving capacity," "institutionalization," and "ability to sustain new goals."

One of the most stimulating efforts along these lines has been Samuel P. Huntington's article "Political Development and Political Decay." Huntington defines political development as "the institutionalization of political organizations and procedures." His concept "liberates [political] development from [socioeconomic] modernization," so that countries like India, which are very underdeveloped socioeconomically, are considered highly developed politically, and countries like Argentina, which have high socioeconomic development, are considered poorly developed politically. Another virtue of Huntington's concept is that it avoids the implication, so deeply rooted in much of the previous literature, of unilinearity, or movement only toward development (and never toward decay). As Huntington points out, "institutions . . . decay and dissolve as well as grow and mature." Finally, and most significantly, Huntington's concept focuses attention on the "reciprocal interaction" between the ongoing social processes of modernization on the one hand and the strength, stability, or weakness of traditional, transitional, or modern political structures on the other.

> . . . The committee finds that despite . . . periodic [Congressional] expressions, popular participation in the tasks of development is increasing at a very slow rate. The great potential for planning and implementation of development activities, contained in the mass of the people of the developing countries, is still largely untapped, which slows down the achievement of the objectives of the foreign assistance program. On the contrary, it has become increasingly clear that failure to engage all of the available human resources in the task of development not only acts as a brake on economic growth but also does little to cure the basic causes of social and political instability which pose a constant threat to the gains being achieved on economic fronts.
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> Utilization of Democratic Institutions in Development, 1966—House Report 165 1 (1966).

Halpern defines political development as the relationship between "the structural changes and demands set loose by the uncontrolled forces of transformation" and "the will and capacity of political authority" to cope with these changes and demands.

If political development usually is defined somewhat vaguely by the "will and capacity" writers, so too is the dependent variable—perhaps more so. Usually, this variable is called "modernization." Though it can be operationalized in various ways, most conveniently in terms of indicators of economic development, such as per capita income and industrialization, often it is not. A common strategy seems to be to leave the dependent variable "open" and allow it to be defined and operationalized more precisely in context.

Another common weakness in the literature that uses the "will and capacity" approach is an overlap between definition and explanation. That is, variables used to define political development and those used to explain it are seldom clearly distinguished from one another.

Whether political development is treated as an independent or a dependent variable, it is necessary to define it and the other variables, even if only vaguely. Most theorists do this. Then there are two possibilities: (1) If political development is treated as a dependent variable, then one presumably seeks to discover variables explaining it. (2) If political development is treated as an independent variable, then the intellectual task is to see whether it explains something else, that is, the dependent variable.

Now we can summarize briefly. First of all, in defining political development, scholars using the "will and capacity" approach seem to be more explicit than, and usually as precise as, those who treat it as a dependent variable. Both groups of scholars are fairly rough and subjective in defining political development; the latter group, in contrast to the former, often does not define political development at all explicitly. Second, "will and capacity" writers have been extremely vague, in general, in defining their dependent variables. Perhaps it is time to begin to close these definitions. Third, in order for this literature to gain in conceptual clarity, greater care should be taken in distinguishing definitions from explanations. Fourth, if one treats political development as an independent variable, then he should maintain that strategy—which means using political development to explain something else. Thus, both political development and what is to be explained need to be specified with sufficient clarity so that it is possible to test concrete hypotheses. If one chooses to treat "will and capacity" as a dependent variable, that research strategy is also legitimate. However, it is a different one, and researchers should realize the difference. ■

The peasantry: the key to revolution, or—with real land reform—the key to stability.

Title IX

Revolution and Political Order

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON

This article is excerpted from "Political Order in Changing Societies," by Samuel P. Huntington, chapters entitled "Revolution and Political Order" and "Reform and Political Change." Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press, copyright (C) 1968 by Yale University. The author is the Frank G. Thomson Professor of Government at Harvard University and a Faculty Member of the Center for International Affairs, Harvard. He has published five books and numerous articles.

THE middle-class intelligentsia is revolutionary, but it cannot make a revolution on its own. That requires the active participation of rural groups [which] . . . become the critical factor determining the stability or fragility of the government. If the countryside supports the government, the government has the potential to isolate and contain the urban opposition. Given the proclivity of the dominant urban groups, any government, even one which follows a government overthrown by those groups, must find sources of support in the countryside if it is to avoid the fate of its predecessor. In South Vietnam, for instance, after the Diem regime was overthrown by the urban opposition of students, monks, and military officers, elements of these groups opposed each of the succeeding regimes. Deprived of support from the countryside by the Viet Cong, the successor regimes could find few stable sources of support in the quagmire of urban politics.

The countryside thus plays the crucial "swing" role in modernizing politics. The nature of the Green Uprising, the way in which the peasants are incorporated into the political system, shapes the subsequent course of political development. If the countryside supports the political system and the government, the system itself is secure against revolution and the government has some hope of making itself secure against rebellion. If the countryside is in opposition, both system and government are in danger of overthrow.

The peasantry may thus play either a highly conservative role or a highly revolutionary one. Both images of the peasantry have been prevalent. On the one hand, the peasantry has often been held to be an extremely traditional conservative force, resistant to change, loyal to church and to throne, hostile toward the city, involved with family and village, suspicious of, and at times, hostile to even those agents of change, such as doctors, teachers, agronomists, who come to the village solely and directly to improve the peasants' lot. Reports of the murder of such agents by suspicious and superstitious peasants are found in virtually all modernizing areas.

This image of a highly conservative peasantry coexists with a more recent one of the peasantry as a force for revoltion. Each of the major revolutions in Western, as well as non-Western societies, was in large part a peasant revolution. This was true in France and in Russia as it was in China.

If there is no revolution without the peasantry, the key question then becomes: What turns peasants into revolutionaries? If the conditions which make for peasant revolt can be ameliorated by reforms rather than exacerbated by them, a possibility exists for more or less peaceful social change rather than for violent upheaval. Clearly, in traditional societies, the peasants are generally a static conservative force, wedded to the status quo. Modernization typically has two significant impacts upon the peasant. Its initial impact is to worsen the objective conditions of peasant work and welfare. In the traditional society land is often owned and farmed communally either by the village or by the extended family.

(*Continued on page* 33)

AFSA NEWS

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AFSA Urges President Nixon Reconsider Pay Bill Deferral

In an unprecedented series of letters addressed to the President, two Congressional Committee Chairmen and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the AFSA Board of Directors registered its strong concern regarding the President's recommendation that the comparability pay raise for Federal employees be deferred from July 1970 to July 1971.

In the letter to President Nixon and other addressees, the Chairman of the Board, Charles W. Bray III, expressed the hope that the President would reconsider his recommendation. It was stated that:

"We strongly support the President's efforts to arrest the inflationary spiral and are encouraged to see that they are beginning to take effect."

However, it was pointed out,

"Like all Americans, however, members of the Association, together with other Federal employees, must try to stay abreast of the rising cost of living. During the six months that their comparability increases may be denied, prices, local taxes, the cost of education will all continue to rise, although, we hope, at a rate slower than that of the past six months. A deferral of implementation of comparability raises would mean that Federal employees would experience 18 months of inflationary pressures without effective remedy."

Stating that it was believed that members of the Association would cheerfully agree to forego pay raises if they were on the same footing as other wage-earners in the country who are free to bargain, the Board Chairman said:

"I should be delinquent in my duty to our membership if I failed to raise the question of equitable treatment."

The Chairman pointed out that the Association has fought long and hard for the principle of comparability and its acceptance by the Government, and that comparability is particularly pertinent in the recruitment for the foreign services. The larger salaries and more generous perquisites offered by private business for service abroad make government service less attractive, a situation which comparability would help alleviate.

The reasons which impelled the Association to urge reconsideration of the recommendation were advanced

"In the full consciousness of the responsibility that the President bears for all the people of the United States. . . ."

In addition to the letters sent directly to the President and the head of the Civil Service Commission, letters were also addressed to Senator Gale W. McGee and Representative Morris K. Udall, respectively Chairmen of the Senate and House Post Office and Civil Service Committees which have jurisdiction over pay bills. Copies of the letter to the President were sent to the Secretary of State, the AID Administrator, and the Director of USIA.

Congressional Replies to Pay Bill Letters

Senator Gale McGee, Chairman of the Senate Post Office and Civil Service Committee, promptly replied to Mr. Bray's Pay Bill letter and said in part:

> ". . . I share the great disappointment of a million and a half Federal employees who heard the President's announcement that the way to achieve a balanced budget is not to pay Federal employees what the citizens in private enterprise are receiving."

He added:

> "Be assured of my very strong support for achieving comparability as soon as possible."

Congressman Udall's Staff Assistant, Mr. John Gabusi, answered the letter on behalf of the Congressman, who was in his home district. He said that Congressman Udall, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Compensation, House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, is in "firm support of the principle of comparability as outlined in your letter."

Mr. Gabusi also stated that Congressman Udall

> ". . . is not in favor of a deferral of the 1970 raise as outlined in the President's budget."

The Board of Directors, on behalf of the membership and all foreign affairs community personnel, is most appreciative of this prompt and favorable response to our letters on the Pay Bill deferral as described above.

Theodore Eliot Speaks at AFSA Luncheon

It is not only a privilege to be the new President of our Association, but also a particularly exciting time to be involved in the Association's leadership. All of us at this table today are excited by the mandate you have given us to carry on where the last Board left off in building a more effective and active Association. All of us are likewise excited—although not, I can assure you, complacent—about the many signs coming from our agency heads and administrative chiefs that some of the reforms we have been promoting are receiving official support

Every two years at this luncheon meeting we take stock of our Association and review where we have been and where we are going.

During the last two and a half years, under the leadership of Philip

Habib and Lannon Walker, the Association was reinvigorated. Its achievements were significant. It is not an exaggeration to say that its character was radically changed.

The Association's insistence upon the need for a thorough reform of the Service found effective expression in the Publication of "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," the result of hard work and study by some 70 of our members under the leadership of Bill Leonhart and Graham Martin. Lannon Walker wrote a comprehensive article for the January, 1969 issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS summarizing the Association's position on reform. Board members carried on persistent discussion of personnel reform in the Government and outside, with senior Department officials, with members of Congress, the press, the academic community, the Platform Committees of both the Democratic and Republican Parties, in short, anyone of influence who would listen and many who would rather not have listened. Much of this activity was made possible by generous grants from John D. Rockefeller 3rd and the William H. Donner Foundation. AFSA's position on personnel reform was put succinctly in the Chairman's open letter of July 16, 1969, to Ambassador John H. Burns, the new Director General of the Foreign Service:

—We stand for a unified Foreign Service.
—For this unified Foreign Service, we ask that the Board of the Foreign Service administer common policies, standards and services and an executive track across agency lines, and that specialist cones be administered by each agency.
—We believe we need a home service in addition to a unified foreign service.

I believe that the AFSA Board, supported by its membership, was the principal force in obtaining general recognition of the urgency of reform. We at last seem on the threshold of action. Under Secretary Richardson made clear the Administration's intentions in a memorandum of last May. The Board of the Foreign Service has been reviewed and strengthened. Already recruitment policy has changed. Mr. Macomber has made his dramatic announcement of the Department's plans for the 70s.

The outgoing Board also actively pursued reforms and improvements in the conditions of service for Foreign Service personnel. It vigorously supported career legislation for USIA. On the Board's recommendation State, USIA, and AID have each appointed a grievance officer, or Ombudsman, with broad investigative authority. Foreign Service personnel can now obtain a 100 percent travel advance and a 100 percent advance on temporary quarters allowances. AFSA took the lead in minimizing a premium increase for subscribers to the Foreign Service Benefit Plan. It pressed for new retirement legislation for the Foreign Service and for the inclusion of AID personnel in the Foreign Service retirement system. Many other prospective improvements in quarters allowances, transfer provisions, medical coverage and tax regulations have been discussed intensively with the Administration and, where appropriate, with the Congress. A great deal more remains to be done, and the new Board intends to pursue all these matters.

Another area of AFSA concentration has been "Openness"—a shorthand word meaning improvement of two-way communications between the Foreign Service and the larger American foreign affairs community: the academic world, professional groups, business, the foundations, the media. The image of an enclosed elite service creating foreign policy in an exclusive intellectual and social atmosphere had to be shattered. This image—and we all know there has been a degree of reality behind the image—was badly out of kilter with the second half of the 20th century. Not only the Service but, more important, the nation was a loser. Much progress has been made. A creative working relationship has been established with such organizations as the International Studies Association, the Brookings Institution, and the National Council of Community World Affairs Organizations. Our first scholar/diplomat exchange program was a fine success in November. Association speakers have addressed large and enthusiastic audiences in Pennsylvania, California, and elsewhere. A new spirit of common interest is developing between the Foreign Service and our public constituency.

Finally, during the past two years the Association's own internal organization and activities have been revamped and improved.

- The membership endorsed an increase in dues to finance expanded Association activity.
- A program was launched to establish AFSA chapters at larger posts abroad.
- The Foreign Service Club was inaugurated and is in full operation in our fine quarters across the street from the Department, a far-sighted purchase by the preceding Board under David McKillop.
- The Board arranged with D.C. officials the allocation of the triangle of land inside Virginia Avenue, 21st and E Streets for a Foreign Service Memorial Park.
- The number of annual AFSA scholarship awards grew to 143 for the 1969-70 academic year.
- A Community Action Program was inaugurated and AFSA members have been working in the inner city.
- The by-laws were amended to provide for more democratic election and amendment procedures.

Officers and members of the Board of AFSA at the January 29 luncheon: l to r, Donald Easum, Richard Davies, Princeton Lyman, George Lambrakis, C. William Kontos, Theodore Eliot, Charles Bray, Erland Heginbotham, William Harrop, William Bradford, and Robert Nevitt.

Perhaps the most satisfying sign of progress in recent years is the growing interest of the membership, and the degree of member participation in AFSA programs. For example, in our Board elections in 1967 there were 1400 votes cast; in 1969 there were 1700; in the election just completed 3000 members voted for the three slates and 40 individual candidates. The members obviously care about AFSA and want a voice in its programs and policies.

The new Board has already begun to implement its platform commitments. An Action Committee of Retired Officers has been established, chaired by W. T. M. Beale and including Joseph Satterthwaite, Lucius Battle and Parker Hart. Retired members are invited to discuss with this committee their comments or proposals for AFSA consideration.

A major conference on "The Foreign Affairs Profession" will be convened in Washington next fall. Its purpose will be "to provoke fresh thinking and a broader definition of the nature of the professional in foreign affairs; to identify those in business, universities, voluntary agencies, private organization, and foundations who have as much self-interest and expertness in foreign affairs as do those in government service; to break down the barriers to freer interchange among such professionals, and to announce progress toward this goal." We will look to the membership to help prepare this conference and to participate in its work.

The Board was impressed by and would like to borrow the New Leadership Slate's plan to establish "a special advisory committee within the Association on Staff Corps career matters." Among other questions of Staff Corps concern, this committee will be requested urgently to study and recommend Board action on access to duty free import privileges, on comparability of promotion opportunities and on housing and household effects allowances for single persons. This committee will work closely with the Board in reviewing the many elements of the Macomber Program of direct interest to the Staff Corps.

AFSA now has almost 7500 active members. Despite some increase in recent years, this is only about half of those eligible to join from our three agencies. The Board will soon mount an intensive membership drive designed to reach all who are eligible but who are not yet members. We ask you all to help in this effort. AFSA acts in the interests of all Foreign Service personnel in the State Department, AID and USIA. The broader its base the more effectively is the Association able to represent its membership.

In this connection, I appeal especially to our junior officers. It is important that, no matter how few your numbers, you make your voices and interests heard. It is encouraging to note your efforts to revitalize and renew the programs of the Junior Foreign Service Officer Club which became an integral part of AFSA in 1968.

Your new Board and officers feel we have a special responsibility to look for new and improved ways of communicating with the Association's members. The importance of the issues facing us and the needs of the Association for the most active participation of its members demand that we do our best at communicating. I wish to announce that the Board has directed that a special Task Force on AFSA Communications be set up to make early recommendations for specific ways in which we can improve the two-way flow of information and ideas with AFSA members at home and abroad. At the same time, we will look for a more active interest on your part in responding to these efforts at communication.

The effectiveness of our Association depends upon the participation of its members. I urge you all to communicate with Board members. Suggest areas of interest, concern or opportunity to them. Let them know when you feel they are off base. See that they are well and currently informed of the membership's views. Volunteer for service on AFSA committees if you have the inclination and are prepared to give some of your time to the effort. I especially hope that members of the New Leadership and Fresh Start slates, as well as the independent candidates, will take part in AFSA work. They will be most welcome. If they disagree with some of the policies of the new Board, so much the better. Unanimity is an unnatural and parlous state of affairs.

A special word or two should be said about Deputy Under Secretary Macomber's program of management reform—especially in personnel policies—for the 1970s. It should come as no surprise that the Association welcomes this effort. Many of the specific proposals originated with AFSA, as Mr. Macomber courteously acknowledged. The Department of State has now made a splendid pledge of action, the first such broad commitment since Selden Chapin and others pressed through the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Those who heard Bill Macomber's talk on January 14, and all who have spoken with him about his modernization plans are impressed by his deep personal commitment and his determination to get results.

We are likewise heartened that Secretary Rogers and Under Secretary Richardson endorse the initiative. We hope it will receive the continued involvement from them which its fulfillment will require.

We are further heartened that Mr. Macomber has related his proposals to similar studies under way in USIA and AID, and that he has called for the fullest participation of Foreign Service and Civil Service employees in the task forces established to study his proposals. The Association is pleased that the task forces will include members from outside the Department. Such participation can help our planning to benefit from developments in the science of management elsewhere in America and can help us check any residual tendency toward introspection or exclusivity. The "openness" approach is as important in management as in our substantive foreign policy work.

I recommend that all our members read the Macomber speech and reflect upon its list of proposals. I hope many of you will wish to work on the task forces being created. For its part, the Association's new Board of Directors will appoint a special Career Principles Committee. It will be chaired by Margaret Tibbetts. It will review and comment to the Board upon the individual task force reports as they are prepared. We are certain that Mr. Macomber would agree that no element of his reform prospectus is beyond the reach of searching questions and constructive criticism.

I must make clear that the Association's warm support of the Macomber initiative is by no means uncritical acceptance. Mr. Macomber is the first to stress that he has outlined a skeletal program which must be fleshed out—many significant and even key particulars remain to be elaborated. Putting a program into effect will require great effort.

The Association finds in the Macomber announcement many of the new personnel approaches it has been urging. The list is a good one. On the other hand, we will want to see a cohesive philosophy binding these varied ideas together. As it studies the Department's new management proposals, the Association will reflect upon this larger question—the objectives and role of American diplomacy at this point in history.

In making judgments on the program, the Board will be guided by the recommendations and studies published in "Toward a Modern Diplomacy." In particular, the Board will focus its concern on the degree to which

proposals for reform promote the objective of a unified Foreign Service of the United States.

In this connection I should like to mention three areas of broad concern for the Foreign Service in the years ahead.

Secretary Rusk used to refer to bureaucratic power vacuums in Washington waiting to be filled by those interested in exercising leadership. Secretary Rogers, in his speech to us last month, asked us to "take charge of the doing." Mr. Macomber has deplored the fact that management has not been our bag. In short, we have been asked—even goaded—to assume leadership in carrying out foreign policy. What is required is a new spirit within the Service of taking charge. Equally important is the development of the excellence and the skills within the Service which will cause the President and our agency heads to turn to the Service to provide leadership.

Your Association will constantly bear these considerations in mind. For example, it will attach great importance to the kind of training and of interchange of personnel among foreign affairs agencies which can produce officers capable of managing programs across agency lines. Herein lies the fundamental reason for moving toward a unified Foreign Service. It is our unique responsibility to lead, and to represent, on behalf of the President, the totality of America's international interests. We must bear this central fact in mind as we discharge our daily tasks and as we strive to reform our structure and improve our effectiveness.

Secondly, it is clear that here at home there has been growing disillusionment with overseas involvements and growing concern for our domestic needs. The resources available for programs to support our diplomacy are shrinking. Yet international problems are as intractable and dangerous as ever; the United States remains the world's greatest power with important interests in every continent; our interests are ever more varied and complex as the pace of technological and economic growth quickens. In this setting, emphasis rests heavily upon the human factor, upon sheer professional competence. There is a growing requirement for traditional diplomatic skills: negotiating ability, accurate reporting, winning friends and influencing people, peering into a dimly perceived future. These skills are at the heart of our profession. The Association will continue to do what it can to nurture them. It will also do what it can to gain more widespread appreciation in this country of their importance. A major purpose of our "openness" program will continue to be the identification and improvement, in collaboration with other groups outside the Service, of these basic tools of our profession.

Finally, as Foy Kohler reminded us when he introduced the previous Board in the fall of 1967, we shall "keep in mind the public interest. For that, after all, is what our oaths of office are all about." We believe that our nation requires a strong and effective professional foreign service. It is the Association's central purpose to help make that service one that will best meet the nation's needs in the years ahead. All of our activities will be subordinate to that goal.

New Careers

The Very Reverend Francis B. Sayre, Jr., Dean of the Washington Cathedral, has announced the appointment of Wilson Thomas Moore Beale to the newly created post of Administrator, Cathedral Foundation.

Ambassador Beale, a retired Career Minister and former Ambassador to Jamaica, will be charged with general oversight of the affairs of the Cathedral Foundation, which includes the Cathedral, the National Cathedral School for Girls, St. Albans School for Boys, Beauvoir Elementary School and the College of Preachers.

Cecil B. Lyon, former Ambassador to Ceylon, is now Director of the Far East Programs of the International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Avenue South, New York. He spent three months last summer in Vietnam with the Catholic Relief Services and writes that he is also helping the Henry Street Settlement, as a member of the Arts for Living Commission. A new Arts for Living Center is being built there.

March Cover Artist

Verna Motheral, wife of Joe R. Motheral, Chief of the Agriculture Division, AID, Kabul, studied art at Texas A&M University, University of Wisconsin, with Xavier Gonzalez in New York and Arturo Luz in Manila, and at the Corcoran Gallery. She has exhibited at the World Bank, Texas Fine Arts Association, Shamrock Hotel, Cultural Arts Center in Karachi and had two one-man shows at the Korean Information Center in Seoul. Mrs. Motheral has three paintings hanging in the American Embassy, Kabul. Other overseas posts have been Manila, Karachi and Seoul.

Marriages

ATKINSON-SMOLEN. Lynn Atkinson, daughter of FSO-retired and Mrs. Kenneth B. Atkinson, was married to David Michael Smolen on December 21 in McLean.

L'HEUREUX-SWEARINGEN. Ruth Jeanne L'Heureux, daughter of FSO and Mrs. David E. L'Heureux, was married to Walter Evans Swearingen on December 13 in San Diego.

Deaths

ROBERTSON. Walter Spencer Robertson, former Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, died on January 19, in Richmond, Virginia. Mr. Robertson became chief of the lend-lease mission to Australia in 1943, then served as minister at the embassy in Chunking. In 1946 he was commissioner and chairman of the Marshall Truce Commission in Peking. He returned to private life from 1946-1953, until President Eisenhower appointed him to the Assistant Secretary post where he served till 1959. He is survived by his wife of 315 Lock Lane, Richmond, two sons and a daughter.

ROBINSON. Thomas Hastings Robinson, FSO-retired, died on December 3, in Cranbrook, Kent, England. He entered the Foreign Service in 1922 and served at Birmingham, Melbourne, Penang, Nogales, Vancouver, Barranquilla, Guatemala, Tenerife and Nassau. He retired in 1953. Mr. Robinson is survived by his wife, at Great Maytham Hall, Rolvenden, Cranbrook, Kent and two children.

Your Club

In addition to a number of private lunches, dinners and receptions the following organizations used the Foreign Service Club facilities during the past several weeks:

Department of State Federal Credit Union
American Legion Post of the Department of State
The Bourbon Institute
Philadelphia World Affairs Council
The ARA Managers

The Club Manager has flexible plans for meeting requirements for parties and varying prices according to the plan chosen. If an office party is in the offing or a home reception is getting too much for the distaff side of the family, why not inquire about the Club facilities and its new *low* prices. Only one Club member is required for sponsorship—others (even the host) need not be members.

Club Manager Michael Brandli can be reached on 338-5730.

REVOLUTION *from page* 28

Modernization—and particularly the impact of Western concepts of land ownership—undermines this system. As in southern Italy and the Middle East the nuclear family replaces the extended family: the plots which collectively had been a viable economic unit are replaced by small and often scattered individual lots which are barely sufficient to support a family and which greatly extend the risks that the family may suffer total economic catastrophe.

The impoverishing effect that modernization has upon the peasant would not be politically significant if it were not also for the elevating effect it eventually has upon his aspirations. The time lag between the one and the other may be substantial, in some cases, indeed, amounting to several centuries. In due course, however, the enlightenment of the cities becomes available in the countryside. The barriers to communication and transportation are broken down; roads, salesmen, and teachers reach the villages. The peasant's dissatisfaction stems from the realization that his material hardships and sufferings are much worse than those of other groups in society and that they are not inevitable.

The concern of the peasants with their immediate economic and social conditions does not distinguish them significantly from the industrial workers of the cities except insofar as the peasants are normally worse off than the workers. The common interest of capitalist and worker in a larger economic product does not exist between landlord and peasant. The relationship of social structure to economic development in the countryside reverses that in the city. In industrial society, a more equitable distribution of *income* is the result of economic growth; in agrarian society, a more equitable distribution of *ownership* is the prerequisite to economic growth. It is precisely for this reason that modernizing countries find it so much more difficult to increase agricultural output than to increase industrial output, and it is precisely for this reason that the tensions of the countryside are potentially so much more revolutionary than those of the city. The industrial worker cannot secure personal ownership or control of the means of production; this, however, is precisely the goal of the peasant. The basic factor of production is land; the supply of land is limited if not fixed; the landlord loses what the peasant acquires. Thus the peasant, unlike the industrial worker, has no alternative but to attack the existing system of ownership and control. Land reform, consequently, does not mean just an increase in the economic well-being of the peasant. It involves also a fundamental redistribution of power and status, a reordering of the basic social relationships which had previously existed between landlord and peasant. The industrial worker participates in the creation of an entirely new set of economic and social relationships which had not previously existed in the society. Peasant and landlord, however, coexist in the traditional society, and the destruction or transformation of their existing social, economic, and political relationship (which may be of centuries' standing) is the essence of change in the agrarian order.

The cost of economic improvement for the peasant in the countryside is thus far greater than the cost of economic improvement for his counterpart in the city. Consequently, it is hardly surprising that the more active and intelligent individuals in the countryside move to the city. They are driven there by the comparative advantages of the opportunities for economic and social mobility in the city versus the rigidities of the class structure in the countryside. The resulting rapid urbanization leads to social dislocation and political instability in the cities. These, however, are minor social and political ills compared to what would result in the countryside in the absence of such urbanization. Urban migration is, in some measure, a substitute for rural revolution. Hence, contrary to common belief, the susceptibility of a country to revolution may vary inversely with its rate of urbanization.

In addition, no recognized and accepted means exist through which the peasant can advance his claims. The right of labor to organize is accepted in most countries; the rights of peasants to organize are much more dubious. In this respect, the position of peasants in the modernizing countries of Asia and Latin America in the latter half of the twentieth century is not too different from the position of the industrial worker in Europe and North America in the first half of the nineteenth century.

The Revolutionary Alliance

The urban middle-class intelligentsia is the most constantly revolutionary group in modernizing societies. But to produce a revolution, the intelligentsia must have allies. One potential source is the lumpenproletariat in the cities, which is for many years not a very revolutionary group. Its revolutionary proclivities are, however, likely to increase, and hence at some point in most modernizing countries the alliance of the *cidade universitaria* and the *favela,* of the students and slumdwellers, may pose a major challenge to political stability. The conditions for the success of this revolutionary combination are, however, in some measure the conditions for its failure. If the society remains primarily agricultural, the intelligentsia and urban poor may be able to overthrow the government, but they cannot destroy the basic social structure of the society since their action is limited to the urban area. They would still have to add the peasants to their alliance to effect a fundamental change in social structure. On the other hand, if urbanization has reached the point where much of the population is concentrated in one or a few large cities, urban revolutionary action might be able to wreak a fundamental transformation of the society.

The rarity of revolution is in large part due to the difficulties of parallel action by intelligentsia and peasants. The gap between city and countryside is the crux of politics in modernizing societies. The difficulties which governments have in bridging this gap are almost matched by the difficulties which revolutionaries have in bridging it.

The goals of peasants and intelligentsia are also different and often

conflicting. Peasants' demands tend to be concrete but also redistributive, and it is the latter quality which makes peasants into revolutionaries. The demands of the intelligentsia, in contrast, tend to be abstract and openended; both qualities make revolutionaries out of intellectuals. The substantive concerns of the two groups often differ significantly. The urban intelligentsia is usually more concerned with political rights and goals than with economic ones. The peasantry, in contrast, is at least initially concerned primarily with the material conditions of land tenure, taxes, and prices.

Efforts by intellectuals to arouse peasants almost invariably fail unless the social and economic conditions of the peasantry are such as to give them concrete motives for revolt. The intelligentsia can ally themselves with a revolutionary peasantry but they cannot create a revolutionary peasantry.

The differences in background, perspective, and purpose between intelligentsia and peasants render revolution unlikely if not impossible in the absence of some additional common cause produced by an additional catalyst.

Peasants and Reform

The material basis of peasant dissatisfaction is of crucial importance in providing an alternative to revolution. No government can hope to satisfy the demands of rioting students. But a government can, if it is so minded, significantly affect the conditions in the countryside so as to reduce the propensity of peasants to revolt. While reforms may be the catalyst of revolution in the cities, they may be a substitute for revolution in the countryside.

The material sources of peasant unrest help to explain the conflicting images of peasant behavior. The urban middle-class intellectual has aspirations which can never be realized and he hence exists in a state of permanent volatility. There is no mistaking his role. The peasantry, on the other hand, may be the bulwark of the status quo or the shock troops of revolution. Which role the peasant plays is determined by the extent to which the existing system meets his immediate economic and material needs as he sees them. These needs normally focus on land tenure and tenancy, taxes, and prices. Where the conditions of land-ownership are equitable and provide a viable living for the peasant, revolution is unlikely. Where they are inequitable and where the peasant lives in poverty and suffering, revolution is likely, if not inevitable, unless the government takes prompt measures to remedy these conditions. No social group is more conservative than a landowning peasantry, and none is more revolutionary than a peasantry which owns too little land or pays too high a rental. The stability of government in modernizing countries is thus, in some measure, dependent upon its ability to promote reform in the countryside.

Intellectuals are alienated; peasants are dissatisfied. The goals of intellectuals, consequently, tend to be diffuse and utopian; those of peasants concrete and redistributive. This latter characteristic makes peasants potential revolutionaries: the landlord must be dispossessed if the peasant is to be benefited. The situation is a zero-sum conflict; what one loses the other gains. On the other hand, the fact that peasant goals are concrete means that if the government is strong enough to compel some redistribution of land, such action will immunize the peasant against revolution. Material concessions to the middle-class intellectual foster resentment and guilt feelings; material concessions to peasants create satisfaction. Land reform carried out by revolution or by other means thus turns the peasantry from a potential source of revolution into a fundamentally conservative social force.

Land reform, it would appear, thus has a highly stabilizing effect on the political system. Like any reform, however, some violence may be necessary to produce the reform, and the reform itself may produce some violence. The emancipation of the serfs, for instance, stimulated some local uprisings and acts of insubordination in rural Russia.

The advantages and disadvantages of land reform in terms of other criteria are not perhaps so clear-cut. The immediate impact of land reform, particularly land reform by revolution, is usually to reduce agricultural productivity and production. In the longer run, however, both usually tend to increase.

In some measure land reform probably does contribute to economic development as well as to social welfare and political stability. As with other aspects of modernization, however, these goals may at times conflict with each other. In Egypt, for instance, the land reform of 1952 was designed to produce fundamental social changes in the countryside and to be "a lever in the overthrow of the former ruling class."

The Politics of Land Reform

Patterns of land tenure obviously vary greatly from country to country and from region to region. In general, in Latin America, a relatively small number of latifundia have encompassed a large proportion of the total farm land while a large number of minifundia covered a small proportion of the total farm land. Neither large estate nor small plot has been typically farmed efficiently, and, of course, the disparity in income between the owner of one and the owner of the other has been very great. In Asia land ownership typically has not been as concentrated as in Latin America, but tenancy, absentee landlordism, and high population densities have been more prevalent. Near Eastern countries have been characterized by a high concentration of land ownership in some instances (Iraq, Iran) and by high tenancy rates in others. With the exception of tropical Africa, in one form or another the objective conditions likely to give rise to peasant unrest are common in much of the modernizing world. If, as appears likely, modernization will in due course arouse peasant aspirations to the point where these conditions are no longer tolerable, then the alternatives of revolution or land reform are very real ones for many political systems.

Under what conditions, then, does land reform become feasible? Like other reforms, changes in land tenure require the concentration and expansion of power in the political system. More specifically,

"Violence alone, violence committed by the people, violence organized and educated by its leaders, makes it possible for the masses to understand social truths and gives the key to them. Without that struggle, without that knowledge of the practice of action, there's nothing but a fancy-dress parade and the blare of the trumpets. There's nothing save a minimum of readaptation, a few reforms at the top, a flag waving: and down there at the bottom an undivided mass, still living in the middle ages, endlessly marking time."

—Frantz Fanon, **The Wretched of the Earth**, Grove Press, 1966

they involve, first, the concentration of power in a new elite group committed to reform and, second, the mobilization of the peasantry and their organized participation in the implementation of the reforms. Analysts of land reform processes have at times attempted to distinguish "reform from above" from "reform from below." In actuality, however, a successful land reform involves action from both directions. By its very nature land reform involves some element of confiscation. This may take the form of the outright expropriation of the land by the state with no pretense of compensation, as in revolutions; or taking the land at its assessed value for tax purposes which is, of course, normally far below its market value; or providing compensation through bonds or other forms of deferred payment, whose value typically is drastically reduced by inflation and the instability of the government which makes the promises. The only real exceptions to partial or complete confiscation by one of these means occur in those lucky countries, like Venezuela or Iran, which are able to carry out what might be termed "land reform by petroleum" and provide substantial compensation to owners from their oil revenues. Except in these instances land reform means the forceful taking away of property from one group of people and giving it to another. It is precisely this character of land reform, which makes it the most meaningful—and the most difficult—of reforms for a modernizing government.

In some instances land reforms may be inaugurated by traditional leaders working within the existing structures of authority. The prerequisite here is a high concentration of power within the traditional system. Typically an absolute monarch supported by elements from his bureaucracy attempts to impose reforms on a recalcitrant landowning aristocracy. Alexander II's emancipation of the serfs, Stolypin's reforms, and the Amini-Arsanjani reforms of 1961-62 in Iran are examples of changes imposed through traditional political institutions.

Finally, it is at least conceivable that land reforms may be introduced by the leadership of a political party which has won power through democratic means. Land reform measures have been passed by democratically elected governments in India, the Philippines, Venezuela, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and a few other countries. Land reform through democratic processes, however, is a long, frustrating, and often impossible task.

A basic imcompatibility exists between parliaments and land reform. In Pakistan, for instance, land reform made no progress for a decade under the parliamentary regime but was swiftly adopted and implemented once General Ayub Khan assumed supreme power. In Iran, similarly, the great landowners dominated the Majlis.

Latin American legislatures have also traditionally been the graveyards of land reform measures. In the early 1960s the Brazilian Congress, for instance, consistently refused to pass the land reform measures recommended by President Goulart, and they were eventually issued by decree in 1964.

Democratic governments are able to enact land reforms where there are vigorous and popular executive leadership and strong party organizations with a corporate interest in winning the peasant vote. In Venezuela Rómulo Betancourt plus the strong organization of the Acción Democrática and its close affiliation with the *campesino* unions resulted in the passage of a land reform law in 1960. Even under these favorable circumstances, however, parliament remained the major focus of opposition, and recourse had to be had to semi-extraparliamentary procedures.

In India land reform legislation was the product of the historical commitment of the Congress Party and its leadership. The first phase of the reforms, the elimination of the zamindars, moreover, was viewed as part of the process of independence. The land titles of the zamindars had been created by the British in the nineteenth century and hence their abolition could be held to be a necessary element in the completion of independence from British rule. Those laws which were enacted were often filled with substantial loopholes which made it difficult for the peasants to secure their rights and easy for the landlords to escape their obligations.

In the other principal democratic country in southern Asia, the Philippines, land reform suffered a similar and perhaps worse fate. The Hukbalahap rebellion and the dynamic leadership of Magsaysay induced the Philippine legislature to pass a land reform law in 1955. The law was, however, shot full of loopholes.

In any political system enactment of effective land reforms requires some other elite group to break with the landed oligarchy and to support such legislation. In an authoritarian system either a monarch, a dictator, or a military junta must take the initiative in bringing about land reforms. In a democratic system with strong political parties, the leadership of the dominant party may play this role. In the absence of strong parties with a commitment to land reform,

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Are urban poor the urban radicals? Some common myths challenged.

Title IX

Migrants, Urban Poverty, and Instability

JOAN NELSON

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(Abstracted from Joan M. Nelson's "Migrants, Urban Poverty and Instability in Developing Nations," Harvard Center for International Affairs, Occasional Paper No. 22, Cambridge, Mass., 1969. Full citations for the surveys and studies mentioned in this article may be found in the original monograph.)

THE direct and indirect political repercussions of urban growth are far-reaching, but have been little explored. Among such implications are the political effects in rural areas and small towns of sustained out-migration by the more ambitious young adults; the direct political role of newcomers to the city; and the repercussions of urban growth and dislocation among longer-established urban groups, particularly the lower middle class. This study concentrates on only one of these topics: the political role of migrants to the larger cities, and more generally of the urban poor.

Why choose this focus? Quite simply because there is widespread anxiety among both foreign observers and the elite in the developing nations themselves that the swelling masses of urban poor will prove politically destabilizing. That is, they are expected to provide mass support for radical parties of the right or left (although the left is regarded as more probable), or to take to the streets, spontaneously or in response to agitation, so often and so violently as to cripple orderly administration and perhaps to topple governments.

This study argues that such anxiety is ill-founded. Unlike organized labor, the lower strata of the urban working classes are usually politically passive. There is little evidence that they are generally resentful and frustrated, much less that they are likely to express such frustrations in the form of disruptive political behavior.

The Disruptive Migrants

Prophets of urban chaos and revolution often focus on the recent migrants who may constitute as much as a quarter or a third of the population of cities such as Bogotá. The newcomer, it is argued, has been uprooted from his stable, highly structured rural setting; he is bewildered and isolated in the impersonal city. Moreover, he has moved to the city to escape grinding rural poverty. But the city offers only low-wage, insecure employment for the unskilled. At the same time that his vision of his own future is shattered, he sees in streets and store windows undreamed-of luxuries. Small wonder, then, if he becomes disillustioned, bitter, readily persuaded to political violence or extremism.

If this reasoning is valid, we would expect to find proportionately more recent migrants than either established migrants or urban-born supporting extremist parties or taking part in demonstrations and riots. Unfortunately, the few studies which come closest to testing the hypothesis do not distinguish between more and less recent arrivals, but treat all migrants as a single category. Nonetheless, the studies are striking in that they all tend to refute the hypothesis. As an example, Glaucio Soares and Robert Hamblin explored the relation between migration, among other socio-economic variables, and radicalism on a country-wide basis for Chile. They found a negative relation between the proportion of migrants to total population in each of the twenty-five departments or states of Chile, and the proportion of the total valid vote supporting Socialist Party candidate Salvador Allende Gossens in the 1952 presidential elections. While data for entire departments may mask contrary tendencies within each department, nonetheless the Chilean statistics cast doubt on the hypothesis that migrants vote disproportionately for radical or extremist candidates.

Data which can explain where the theory goes wrong are more plentiful than evidence on the behavior itself. The assumption that migrants, particularly newcomers, tend to be politically destabilizing rests on the image of such migrants as uprooted, isolated, and deprived, hence anomic, frustrated, and prone to express frustration through political channels. Each aspect of this image can be separately examined.

Uprootedness. First, although migrants are by definition uprooted,

in Developing Nations

they may be better prepared for big-city life than is commonly assumed. By far the most important point to note is that much migration into the great cities comes from smaller cities and towns rather than from open country. In Santiago, Chile, two-thirds of a sample of economically active migrants were born in towns of 10,000 or over. Among migrants to six Brazilian cities (excluding immigrants from abroad), 23 percent came from other large cities, 56 percent from a small city or town, and 21 percent were from rural places. These figures reflect the increasingly well-documented pattern of step-migration, with rural migrants often moving not to the nearest large city but to a provincial town. Later they or their children may move on to a larger city.

Isolation. The degree of social isolation new migrants suffer may also be exaggerated. Most newcomers undoubtedly have fewer friends and more limited contacts in the city than more established residents. However, the great majority of migrants do have contacts in the city when they arrive. Among the recent migrants Gino Germani surveyed in Buenos Aires, 81 percent found friends or relatives or both upon arrival, and 60 percent received assistance in finding housing, work, or money to tide them over the first days. Two separate surveys of migrants in Santiago, Chile, found that 83 percent had friends or family in the city or received assistance in settling. Caste associations in India, tribal associations in parts of Africa and home town or province clubs in Lima may also help new arrivals.

Despite previous urban exposure, friends and relatives, and regional or caste affiliations, many newcomers undoubtedly do feel more or less uprooted and isolated. My point is merely that our picture of their plight should not be overdrawn. More specifically, assumptions of acute unhappiness and personal and social disorganization probably are not warranted. Government housing corporation (CORVI) social workers in Santiago did not find that migrants faced special problems different from those of others in their social and economic circumstances. Richard Patch described a great deal of personal and social disorganization in the center city slums of Lima, but William Mangin and Jerome Cohen found little support in the course of extensive observation and varied psychological testing in Lima lower-class neighborhoods, for the suggestion that the trauma of migration produces serious disturbance or mental illness. Most migrants are young adults, and there is some evidence that many of them are better educated and trained than the average in their places of origin. These facts undoubtedly contribute to their desire and capacity to adjust to urban life.

Economic Frustration. The assumption that migrants are disappointed and frustrated by economic conditions in the city is contradicted by the evidence. Surveys consistently show lower rates of open unemployment among migrants than among native urbanites. This is true for city-wide or more limited surveys in Bogotá, Santiago, Calcutta, Delhi, Bombay, Lucknow, and Karachi. More generally, attitude surveys are virtually unanimous on the point that most migrants consider themselves better off, and probably are in fact better off, than they were before they moved. In view of conditions in the city, this is a shocking testimonial to even worse conditions in the countryside, but the point is none the less relevant.

Venting frustration through political channels. Although most migrants feel better off, undoubtedly some are disappointed and bitter. However, there is little reason to expect those who are embittered to express their frustration politically. In Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, back-migration may provide a safety valve for the disappointed. In these regions, many migrants are married men who leave their families in their home village. They plan to send money back to them, and may bring them to the city if things go well. However, if they fail to find adequate jobs, or if a depression forces them out of work, it is not difficult to return home. Those who are disappointed but cannot or will not flee the city can express their frustration in an infinite variety of ways. They may turn their anger inward in withdrawal and defeat; they may beat their wives or quarrel with their neighbors; they may seek oblivion in alcohol or solace in religion. Moreover, the more recent a migrant's arrival in the city, the less likely he is to translate frustration over economic conditions (or any other problem) into political action. Those migrants who come directly from rural areas are likely to have little political interest or awareness, and may bring with them ingrained attitudes of fatalism and habits of deference to authority. In many countries, these general orientations are re-enforced by political loyalty to or habits of voting for moderate or conservative parties. Such parties dominate much of rural Latin America, Asia, and North Africa, although radical parties in some countries are now seriously trying to penetrate the countryside.

The probability that recent migrants will choose political means of expressing such dissatisfaction as they may feel is affected not only by the political attitudes and habits

they bring with them, but also by the political influences to which they are exposed in the city. Recent Italian experience, which contrasts sharply with that in Latin America and Asia, illustrates both points particularly clearly. Migrants from rural south and central Italy to northern Italian cities have been in the vanguard of urban demonstrations and riots, and have swelled the Communist vote. But their political behavior is neither a reflection of the trauma of migration nor of results of economic frustration. Robert Fried's study points out that some of the migrants come from rural areas which have voted for the Left since pre-Fascist times. Their Communism is a simple transfer of old loyalties to new cities. Second, in Italy, unlike most modernizing nations, urban growth and rapid industrial growth have gone hand in hand. Many migrants find factory work, and many unions are Communist. Finally, the Communists organized a highly effective campaign to aid the incoming migrants; Catholic organizations followed the Communist example only after a lag of several years.

Conclusions. To summarize, the assumptions that migrants are traumatized by migration, isolated in the city, and frustrated by economic conditions are grossly overdrawn. Moreover, the Italian case strongly suggests that such states of mind are much less important as determinants of political behavior than are the political attitudes migrants bring with them from the country, and the political influences to which they are exposed in the city. But few developing countries replicate the relevant Italian conditions. Morevoer, radical parties have no monopoly on gratitude for services rendered to migrants. Several moderate Latin American parties have developed patron-client relations in the slums and squatter settlements. There is little reason to assume an inherent or automatic radicalizing bias to the process.

The Radical Marginals

To exorcise the myth of the disruptive migrants is to raise a new spectre: that of the radical poor. Each part of the explanation for recent migrants' political passivity has a second aspect. If migrants feel an initial sense of progress as they look back on their former circumstances, what happens when their memories of earlier misery fade? If low levels of political awareness, deference to authority, and perhaps political conservatism are part of the rural baggage migrants carry with them, what happens after prolonged urban exposure?

Glaucio Soares argues that urbanization without industrialization creates a growing gap between aspirations and achievement. The resulting frustration is likely to be expressed as political aggression, specifically, radicalism. The roots of radicalism lie precisely in the lag between urban growth and industrial progress. Therefore radicalism may be expected to affect not the entire working class, but that part of it which does not find factory employment, or by implication, other reasonably steady and well-paid work. Radicalism is a function of marginality.

The "second generation theory" is a modified version of the radicalization theory. For example, Talton Ray, writing about Venezuelan barrio youths in their teens and early twenties, notes:

> Their situation will seem worse to them than it was to their parents. As a generation they will be more aware of what they want and what they do not have. Although they should be more qualified for employment, they will still find it very difficult to secure. . . . They will be more alert to their political strength and the means available for voicing their demands.

The radicalization theory. like the theory of the disruptive migrants, is hard to test directly. It is difficult to devise clear and useable indices of marginality and radicalism. Studies of class voting patterns and analyses of the social origins of those who take part in urban violence do not distinguish among degrees of urban exposure nor between established and marginal workers. Therefore they do not really test the hypothesis. Nevertheless it is interesting to note that survey data collected before the 1966 Indian national elections in Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi and Madras found that those in the lowest income group were no more and no less likely to support extremist parties of the Right or Left than were more affluent groups. An analysis of recent presidential elections in Caracas, Venezuela, and in Santiago, Chile, finds that support for Left-wing candidates is indeed higher in low income districts. However, the Socialist and Communist parties in Chile are traditionally the parties of organized urban labor, and it is fair to assume that much of their support in the working class districts of Greater Santiago comes from semi-skilled and skilled workers regularly employed in industry and modern services, as distinct from the marginal workers at the center of the radicalization theory.

Turning from elections to violence, several studies suggest that the poorest urban groups are not likely to be disproportionately involved in urban political disturbances. Myron Weiner surveying demonstrations and violent incidents in Calcutta during the 1950s, concludes:

> Demonstrators, then, come from many social classes, but the demonstrations most likely to be violent are those in which the middle classes form the core . . . Working class strikes in Calcutta only rarely involve violence and almost never involve the entire city . . . In contrast, middle class agitations in Calcutta have involved the most violence: the strike against an increase in train fares, the strike for an increase in teachers' salaries, and a small but violent agitation in 1954 of orthodox Hindus for a government ban on the slaughter of cows. It was the threatened Post and Telegraph workers' strike, the Bank Employees strike, and the Bengal-Bihar merger agitation which immediately alerted the police for possible large scale violence.

The radicalization theory, in contrast to the myth of the disruptive migrants, is probably overstated rather than wrong. The cities unquestionably heighten aspirations. There is no blinking the fact

Putting Title IX to Work . . .

In our view, the objectives of Title IX must be at the core of our development assistance. We have not tried to design a specific package of projects labeled Title IX. Instead we are trying to build Title IX objectives into the design and implementation process of the AID program. We want Title IX considerations to be weighed when we decide on the overall composition of a country program, when we prescribe the negotiating instructions for a program or an agriculture sector loan, when we decide on a particular capital assistance project, when we undertake and evaluate technical assistance activities, when we support the development efforts of private institutions.

—Former AID Administrator William Gaud (1968)

that living conditions are abysmal. The contrast between desires and reality must surely generate discontent. To the extent that the poor are exposed to political appeals through the mass media and campaigns, are placed in contact with officials and politicians, or associate with more politically sophisticated neighbors or co-workers, their political consciousness must increase. Sooner or later, frustration based on on felt deprivation must find at least partial expression in political action.

The problem lies not with the broad outlines of the theory, but with its failure to consider rates and leakages. If expectations rise more slowly than aspirations, and if small improvements are felt as real progress, or if the society is viewed as essentially open despite individual disappointments, then frustration may grow more slowly than the theorists assume. If political awareness spreads gradually, discontinuously, and unevenly among the urban poor; if the connection between political awareness and political action is less automatic and more influenced by the political and social setting than the theory implies; and if the urban poor are less disposed to blame the government for their troubles than are the more privileged, then the likelihood that frustration will be channeled into political protest is reduced regardless of the level of frustration. A great deal of discontent will "leak" out of the political system described by the model into other, apolitical responses. Finally, the probability that political protest will take the specific forms of violence and/or radicalism is strongly conditioned by the existing political climate and institutions.

Aspirations. Survey data and studies of mobility and politicization provide some clues on these points. While direct data on the effect of urban experience on aspirations is scarce, there are better documented studies of the urban poor which support the assumption that aspirations rise slowly, particularly among the poorest and least skilled. First, those in the very lowest level are primarily occupied with survival. Some of those who can think a bit beyond tonight's meal may be paralyzed by apathy and hopelessness. Many others, while far from paralyzed, may gear their goals of self-improvement to a realistic assessment of their situations. Research on lower and middle class aspirations in the United States (where the poor have long been exposed to higher living standards) shows that the less privileged seek modest occupational targets for themselves.

Achievements. Actual accomplishments and the value the poor themselves place on these accomplishments are also crucial in determining the size of the aspiration-achievement gap and the resultant degree of frustration. A sense of progress or achievement may reflect many causes—a better job, higher income, better housing, the grant of title to land and housing previously held on a squatter basis, improved community services, personal recognition and prestige within the immediate community, enhanced group or class prestige within the larger metropolitan or national community, greater personal or communal political power and influence.

Most efforts to measure mobility, however, have focused on individual occupational mobility between generations. To my knowledge, only three large scale studies are available of occupational mobility in cities in developing countries. The studies were conducted in Sao Paulo, Buenos Aires and Poona. In all three cities more than half of the sons of unskilled laborers in the sample held higher level jobs at the time of the survey. Most were semi-skilled or skilled manual workers but the substantial fractions found their way into non-manual jobs, and a few broad-jumped into higher administrative, business or professional positions.

The much-deplored squatter settlements may provide many urban poor with an additional channel of achievement. Where squatters are not harassed by the police, and where terrain and initial density of settlement permit, many shanty towns evolve over ten or fifteen years into acceptable working class neighborhoods. For example, Goldrich notes that the squatter settlement of Pampa Seca, comprising some 30,000 people on the outskirts of Lima, was begun in 1958. By 1965, "the original shacks of reed matting had been largely replaced by permanent structures in various stages of improvement and elaboration." The community had well-defined, relatively wide unpaved streets. The government had agreed to install water facilities and had laid some piping, although water was not yet available on a piped-in basis. At El Carmen, on the outskirts of Bogotá, residents have been granted permanent title, and three-fourths of the houses are one- or two-story red brick structures with tin roofs. Forty-six percent of the residents own their homes. These fragmentary observations and progress within and movement out of the lowest economic strata do not suggest a rosy picture. They do, how-

ever, indicate that modest occupational mobility and probably other types of progress are fairly widely distributed.

The incidence of small advances may help to explain an otherwise puzzling finding in a number of surveys: reports of widespread economic stagnation or deterioration, coupled with overwhelming belief that the larger economic and social system is open to talent and hard work. Surveys among lower-class urban people in several countries have asked, "in the past five years, has your economic situation improved, remained the same, or worsened?" In only one subsample—residents of the public housing project of Santo Domingo in Santiago, Chile—did more than half of the respondents report improvement.

Despite this poor showing, surveys indicate great optimism regarding the future—in several cases, among the same groups reporting that economic conditions have been deteriorating in the recent past. Surveys also show that these and other lower class groups believe their societies and economies are quite open, and prospects for their children are better than for themselves. Asked whether a child from the favela could become the owner of a large business, a lawyer, a university professor, a high government official, or a member of the Chamber of Deputies, 54 percent to 73 percent of the male favelados in Bonilla's Rio sample replied, "yes." Women were substantially less optimistic; their affirmative responses ran a steady twenty points below the men's replies on each item.

Faith in the future may make present deprivation less bitter. And even if one judges one's personal prospects as bleak, belief that the system is open may dull the edge of resentment. The myth of open opportunity prevents conversion of individual misfortune into social injustice. Many of the urban poor undoubtedly are discontented, but it is not clear that their dissatisfaction is the cumulative, driving resentment postulated in the model.

Venting Frustration through Political Channels. To the extent that frustration and resentment do rise and spread, there remains the question of their transformation into political behavior in general, and politically motivated violence or radicalism in particular. As noted earlier, frustration may find expression through many channels, individual or collective, pacific or aggressive, apolitical or political. The pattern it assumes will vary among different national cultures and social groups, but everywhere and within all groups much frustration will be diverted into non-political forms.

Moreover, resort to political modes of expression and action is less likely among the poor and ill educated than among more advantaged groups. Among the findings of survey research, few are more consistent across different studies and in different countries than the relationship between level of education (or, more generally, socio-economic status) and degree of interest, sense of efficacy, and extent of actual participation in political and public affairs. This has been demonstrated repeatedly in studies of developed countries. Surveys conducted by the Indian Institute of Public Opinion have also found that very few among the uneducated and unskilled polled in Indian cities reported an interest in politics, claimed to care who wins national elections, believed that they could do anything to influence an unjust act on the part of local or national authorities, or stated that they had actually tried to affect a local governmental decision. The CENDES surveys in Venezuela inquired into interest in politics: almost 80 percent of the Caracas rancho residents polled reported that they had not talked about politics with friends in the past six months, although the survey was taken shortly before a major national election.

There are many reasons for political apathy among the poor and ill-educated, including preoccupation with daily problems and a usually well-founded belief that the authorities are particularly unresponsive to those in their position. Many of the poor also fail to perceive the connection between government policies and programs and the general economic conditions which perpetuate their poverty. Wealthier and better educated groups may think in terms of governmental policies and their effect on economic conditions, but marginals are less likely to trace the causes of unemployment, scarcities, or inflation to governmental action or inaction. The point is neatly documented by a set of questions asked of a large urban sample in India in 1965. Respondents were asked whether they had felt a scarcity of grain, cloth, housing, and several other commodities and services during the past few years. Those replying affirmatively were asked to whom or what they attributed responsibility for the shortages. In every case the proportion attributing responsibility to the government was lowest among the poorest and least educated groups, and rose sharply among groups one step higher in the hierarchy. It seems fair to assume that groups less prone to blame the government for shortages are also less likely to regard political activity as an effective means of alleviating shortages.

Proponents of the radicalization theory might fairly protest at this point that evidence of low political awareness and participation among the urban poor is largely irrelevant to their argument. The theory does not assert that marginals are participant and radical initially or inherently. Rather, it predicts that they will become more so as the proportion of marginals with long urban experience grows. The second-generation variant suggests that participation and radicalism will increase with the rising ratio of urban-born to migrants among the marginal population. Both theories predict trends, and cannot be disproved by describing contrary conditions at any particular point in time.

True enough. But neither theory spells out clearly the mechanism which produces the predicted trend. What are the influences causing significant numbers of marginals to shift their outlook from apathetic disinterest to participant radicalism?

Simply living in the city is not enough. The careful and extensive analyses of Inkeles and his associates demonstrate that urban residence adds little to the explanation of differences in politicization and political participation among groups matched for level of education,

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the economic and social development process and our instruments for this purpose. This approach corresponds to AID's basic rationale and to its technical structure. We wish, in other words, to emphasize means by which economic development strategy and instruments can be used to maximize the opportunities for increased participation. We are particularly concerned with ways in which the private sector—in the very broadest sense of that term, to cover all segments of the population—can be stimulated and invigorated in order both to accelerate the economic development process and to provide vitality and long-run stability to the political process.

Fourth, we plan to explore the advisability of new assistance in areas somewhat more distant from the purely economic, such as to the legislative process, development of social science research institutes, the role of law, and even the role of political parties. Some of these areas are sensitive and perhaps, like political parties, out of bounds for AID. But we have now before us consideration of new training programs for legislatures of the developing countries. The legislative area is a good example of an important but heretofore largely neglected area for assistance. Legislatures can and often do deal directly with development problems, but our aid, in development and other aspects of public administration, has been almost exclusively directed to the Executive branch of host countries. Critics have suggested that this emphasis has contributed to the imbalance in political power and overall development of the different branches of government found in many of these countries. AID it seems might do well, from several points of view, to consider programs to help train key development-focused parts of legislatures, e.g., finance committees or agricultural committees (with their staffs). Training programs for whole committees would avoid problems of partisanship and would be more effective also than observation trips for individual members. This or similar activity could in turn have a favorable effect on the development of effective legislative processes and more constructive legislative support for development. Beyond that, it might also have a favorable indirect influence on the role and function of political parties.

Finally, but anything but last in our priorities, AID plans to carry out much new research into the relationships between economic, social and political factors of development. Several projects have recently been initiated looking both at overall relationships between changes in these factors over the past decade in a large number of developing countries and at specialized aspects of this relationship in particular country situations. This research is necessary to enable all of the above to be done with increasing sophistication and intelligence.

Continuing Issues

With all that has been said above about the clarification of issues and the areas of concentration which AID has chosen, many issues, and very difficult ones, remain. Some of these are:

1) Who does the type of social and political analysis that I have described relating to particular countries and to the broader effects of economic and technical change? Is this done by AID or State personnel? Do we have the proper staff expertise and the staffing arrangements in either agency to permit this kind of analysis?

2) What does this type of analysis cover? What are the particular political and social factors of most relevance in a changing society? How are they analyzed? What is the time length of our concern in the development process of any particular country, i.e. to what extent do we need to be concerned about changes in social and political development over the long run in relationship to shorter-run changes in the economic and technical and even political situation?

3) How do we overcome the sensitivity to US interest in this area on the part of host countries and in international discussions? This sensitivity affects our being able to do or commission the basic research needed for good analysis, to discuss these questions with host countries, to put forth new programs, and to make these considerations part of the explicit objective of our technical and economic aid inputs. We have to keep in mind that AID's carrying out of Title IX must and will remain consistent with the overt character of AID operations abroad, in our objectives and in the manner in which we deal with our counterparts overseas.

These issues are not to be dismissed lightly. But even recognizing the seriousness and the difficulty of these remaining issues, they should not lead us to inaction under the guise that we do not have the knowledge, the entree or the right to work on this area of develop ment.

We do need new staff, new expertise and new staffing arrangements to carry out most effectively the type of analysis that I have described. But there are also many people now in the State Department and in AID who are capable by training, sensitivity, and experience of doing this type of analysis in countries with which they are familiar, if they are given the

opportunity and the support to do so. Furthermore, we know more about these processes of social and political change than we often admit or set forth systematically in our program analysis and recommendations. Above all, we are already involved in this aspect of development through our aid program. We simply cannot pretend otherwise, nor refuse to systematize our concern and our involvement in this area when to do so might improve the results so greatly.

Finally, the issue of sensitivity, if not to be minimized, should also not be overdramatized. Host country personages are and must be concerned with these same problems. They cannot but be concerned with the nature and type of social and political change that takes place as a result of economic and technical modernization. Our concern and our interest in helping in these areas obviously must be very tactfully expressed. But we have in the past involved ourselves deeply with other countries in sensitive economic areas which we felt were very critical to the development process, such as devaluation. And we have, in our concern with internal defense and counterinsurgency, involved ourselves in very sensitive areas of social and political development. Indeed where we felt that these factors have affected our security interests, they have led in some countries to programs directly involved in promoting social and political change. Unfortunately, many of these latter programs were poorly conceived and consequently far less effective in their results than anticipated. It seems to me, therefore, that the more intelligent and analytic concern with development on a broad scale, called for in Title IX, is far better for us and for the host country who are both concerned with development in this vein and the effect of our assistance to that process.

Conclusion

Let me end this interpretation with a somewhat personal note. I entered AID in 1961 at the point where the "turnaround" was being made to establish more coordinated and more systematic emphasis on long-range economic development in our aid program. As many will recall, that was a period in which a great deal of work was expended on trying to arrive at better criteria and methods of analysis, as well as program development, to put forth a more systematically sound economic growth and development program in the less developed countries.

I joined in that effort, defended it where it needed to be defended, and consider it today to have been a major step forward, taking foreign aid out of the realm of being simply a short-term political tool or, on the other hand, an uncoordinated series of instruments of changes, or in some cases simply a collection of diverse "good works." I did not then and do not now accept the argument that that trend put AID into the hands of the macro-economists. What it did do was to give us a more intelligent framework for analyzing the economic change that everyone said aid should be helping to produce. As a political scientist, I also felt that it gave aid a better political as well as economic focus, particutarly a much more constructive long-range political objective than had existed before.

I was also, however, in a position to see the counterinsurgency concern that descended upon the US Government, including the aid program, in the early 1960s in response to conditions in Southeast Asia. I saw many of the naive, distorted concepts of political development that were very quickly and hurriedly set forth, to fit which we twisted and shaped our aid program in many countries and on which we expended fortunes.

I have, finally, spent these last two years trying to look more closely at the newly developing concepts of social and political change that many of the academic as well as operating people have been setting forth. And I have tried to see these as well in the context of our own political and social problems at home. Like most others. I have been deeply concerned with the problems of our cities. I wondered whether in face of these problems at home, we had the right to carry forward as dramatically as before programs of development abroad and particularly, with Title IX, to appear to be so presumptuous as to assist not only in the economic but the social and political transformation that economic modernization brings.

From all this, I come strongly to the conclusion that this new emphasis on facing up to and systematically focusing on the social and political aspects of development is indeed the next essential step in our foreign aid effort. Far from being warned off by our domestic problems, we should be spurred by them to take a more humble but also a more honest and comprehensive view of development with our overseas partners. Domestic problems do indeed challenge the foreign aid program, not only our budget but our justification.

But they challenge most of all the very justification for pumping capital and technical inputs of change into countries, mindless of the political and social ramifications. That this process makes any sense or has any moral or political justification at all is now rising as the most serious intellectual criticism of the aid program.

Of course, AID has never operated mindlessly of these factors. They have indeed been deeply imbedded in our program, and to a more or less degree, formalized in our stated objectives. But we have not taken up the challenge of systematically analyzing, to anywhere near the same degree of professional standards as on the economic side, these social and political considerations in the development process.

As one who believes deeply in the value of this aid program, I feel this new challenge is one to which we must now respond. We must respond as effectively as we did to the need for adding capital inputs in the late 1950s to complement our Point Four program of technical assistance, to the need for more sophisticated economic analysis and planning in the early 1960s, and to the need for tackling the once considered far-too-sensitive problem of population programs and family planning as we did in the late 1960s. I am confident that we can and must rise to this challenge, as the next basic step in the development of an effective and meaningful foreign aid program as part of US foreign policy. ■



Anatomy of Error

by Henry Brandon
Reviewed by
Charles Maechling, Jr.

ANATOMY OF ERROR (*Gambit, 1969, 169 pp.*) by Henry Brandon, the ingratiating and enigmatic Washington correspondent of the London SUNDAY TIMES, is the first of what will undoubtedly be a long line of books attempting to reconstruct what led up to the sanguinary American failure in Vietnam. The first wave of books by pundits and war correspondents was mainly about Vietnam itself, from the squalid palace politics of Saigon to the horrors of the war in the countryside. The second, now beginning, is more likely to concentrate on policymaking and decisions: how did it happen and why?

Mr. Brandon's small volume is an attempt to cover all the major Washington decisions on Vietnam from start to finish. Presumably, his object is to make comprehensible to the average reader the policy process which succeeded in transforming a low-level internal power struggle in an obscure corner of Southeast Asia into a land-war on the Asian mainland that has cost the United States 40,000 dead, $40 billion, and the good will of half the world—not to mention killing nearly a million Vietnamese, mostly non-combatants, and thoroughly devastating that hapless land. This is a tall order indeed.

What went wrong? Where did it all begin? When did a carefully structured counter-insurgency program aimed at winning the hearts and minds of the Indochinese peasantry get turned into the brutal campaign of destruction and mass slaughter that ultimately found its most debased expression in the cold-blooded murders of women and children at Songmy?

Mr. Brandon's approach is to give a lucid and detached summary of the events surrounding each step in the American involvement, starting with the Geneva Accords of 1954 and the assumption by the United States of responsibility for training and equipping the South Vietnamese army. He describes President Kennedy's mounting vexation over President Diem's inability to contain his (then) low-level rural insurgency, the Taylor-Rostow survey mission of October, 1961, and the decision to increase the military advisory Group first to 3,000 and ultimately to 16,000. He covers the assassination of Diem, the accession of Lyndon Johnson, the growing influence of Rusk and Rostow, and the Tonkin Bay resolution of August, 1964. Then there is a summary of the steps leading up to the bombing of the North in February, 1965; the despatch of United States combat units (two marine battalions) to Vietnam in May, 1965; escalation to 215,000 in July, 1965, to 483,000 in June, 1967, to 525,000 in January, 1968—and so on, until the Tet offensive, the suspension of bombing, and the election of President Nixon. What emerges is a depressing chronicle of warped judgment, miscalculation, insensate obstinacy, and collective self-delusion on the part of our highest officials.

Mr. Brandon is a distinguished reporter of unimpeachable integrity. He has excellent connections in the best official circles. His analytic capabilities are impressive and he is objective to the point of impersonality. His factual coverage of the sequence of events is irreproachable, at least to the extent that the comparative brevity of the book permits. "Anatomy of Error" is a good book—yet, as a veracious account of how we got into—and ultimately out of—the war in Vietnam, it is a failure. Too many facts have been left out and the author's bland detachment gets in the way of the truth.

This is not Mr. Brandon's fault. To write the truth about a policy failure as massive as that of the United States in Vietnam would be difficult enough for the most well-placed participant. For an outside journalist, no matter how skillful and experienced, it is well-nigh impossible.

First, no true account can be written without access to at least some of the records—and these are all classified. A historian would need to see such documents as the Taylor-Rostow report, the weekly summaries of Task Force Vietnam, the written reports of Secretary McNamara after his trips to Saigon, and the periodic military evaluations of the insurgency by the Joint Staff and the CIA. He would also want to see the written minutes of the sub-Cabinet level Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) to which so many important briefings were made during the Kennedy-Johnson era. And he would want a glimpse of at least some of the key cables between Washington and Saigon. Mr. Brandon has seen none of this material.

Second, Mr. Brandon seems to have confined his interviewing to the highest levels of officialdom—that is, to precisely those persons with a position to defend and a stake in rationalization. His book reveals innumerable instances of over-reliance on the retrospective judgments of, to put it bluntly, the architects of our present misfortunes. Throughout, the knowledgeable reader can detect the distortions, omissions and one-sided recollections which such key participants as the two Bundys, Rostow, and ex-Secretary NcNamara have relied on to justify their errors. To do the author justice he also seems to have consulted George Ball and a few others with no axe of justification to grind. But he is poor on objective sources at the working level. He does not appear to have smoked out the ex-Special Assistant for Counter-Insurgency of the Joint Staff, and the grey eminence of the Secretary of Defense on Vietnam, Lt. General Victor H. Krulak, USMC (ret.) who made 54 trips to Saigon. Or Chalmers B. Wood and Henry L. T. Koren, the ex-Directors of Task Force Vietnam. Or Benjamin F. Read, the ex-Executive Secretary of the State Department who was the principal channel of communication on the Vietnam peace moves. Or Roger Hilsman, who first as Director for Intelligence and Research, and then as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs played a key role from 1961-1963. Or Michael Forrestal, who knows better than anyone living what President Kennedy would have done had he lived. Or the ex-Director for Internal Defense and staff manager of the interdepartmental Special Group (Counter-Insurgency)—myself—who sat in most of the high-level briefings and presided over the drafting of the national counter-insurgency policy document. The book shows little evidence that the author cross-examined these participants or even knew of their existence.

Third, the apparent objectivity of "Anatomy of Error" and the impersonality of its style has the paradoxical effect of misleading the public as to the atmosphere in which the great decisions on Vietnam were reached. Mr. Brandon makes it sound like a rational process on the part of earnest, level-headed men. Nothing could be further from the truth. After President Kennedy's death these decisions were not the product of rational judgment, but of blind and obsessive compulsion. Messrs. Rusk and Rostow had constructed a semi-fictional version of the Vietnamese conflict—that of

"massive aggression by the North"—to which they were committed regardless of the cost in blood and treasure to both the United States and Vietnam. Once converted by these two, and sold on the use of modern military technology by the Pentagon, Lyndon Johnson pursued escalation in the same way that Captain Ahab pursued the White Whale—and with nearly the same consequences for the country. From 1964 on, the assumptions on which our intervention was grounded were so dogmatically sacrosanct that except for a few privileged characters like George Ball, no dissent was permitted. The few Foreign Service officers and military men who questioned whether victory was possible, and who deprecated the vicious brutality inherent in "search and destroy operations," "body counts," and "kill ratios" would have been (and were) dismissed or exiled. None of this is brought out in the book.

Finally, the evolution of our Vietnam entanglement cannot be accurately understood unless placed against the backdrop of other international events. It is important for the public to realize that President Kennedy and his brother *regarded Vietnam as a massive source of vexation and concern but not as intrinsically important in itself—only as a counter in a larger game.* As civilized, well-educated Americans they were totally devoid of the obsessive attitudes that characterized President Johnson under the influence of the "hard-liners." On the other hand, it must be conceded that the rather adolescent fascination that "special warfare" and "counter-insurgency" exercised over both the Kennedys played a very large role in increasing our initial advisory role. Mr. Brandon does not allude to either of these factors.

It was a distorted and falsified view of the situation in Vietnam and the reasons for our own intervention that was mainly responsible for our disastrous failure. A few illustrations will suffice.

From the beginning Rusk and Rostow took great pains to portray the Vietnamese conflict as unprovoked aggression from the North. The two White Papers and the torrent of press releases and speeches that dealt with Vietnam after President Kennedy's death also tried to present a picture of massive North Vietnamese assistance to the Vietcong. What they suppressed was that the insurgency originally arose only after President Diem, with the backing of Secretary Dulles, refused to permit fair elections in the South. Moreover, the so-called massive assistance in men and supplies came very much later. Anyone familiar with Communist guerrilla doctrine knows that insurgency is supposed to be a do-it-yourself operation, with arms and equipment to be captured from the government, not obtained from outside. This was always the pattern in South Vietnam right up to the massive influx of American aid. It was only *after* the United States had poured immense quantities of arms, equipment and men into South Vietnam that North Vietnam did the same.

President Kennedy was fully aware of this fact—so aware of it that he treated the State Department White Paper of 1961 as a mere propaganda tract and kept searching for hard evidence to justify the military advisers and aviation units he was sending in. Does Mr. Brandon know that in 1962 President Kennedy sent the drafter of the White Papers himself to Vietnam to make a first-hand investigation of the extent of North Vietnamese infiltration of men and supplies into the South—and that after two months in Vietnam this official reported back that there was no evidence of anything but a trickle. To the utter astonishment of those of us who heard his briefing, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy's cross-examination of him, this supposedly honest observer found nothing to indicate that the insurgency was anything but home-grown. Until 1964 all the military advisers back from Vietnam made the same report: there was plenty of instigation from the North—but hardly "massive aggression."

Secretary Rusk's later invocation of SEATO—to the effect that American obligations under the Southeast Asian Treaty required us to intervene unilaterally—was equally misleading. South Vietnam was not a signatory of the SEATO Treaty. Nor was it covered by the Treaty's terms; only by an ancillary protocol. During the Kennedy years SEATO was practically a forbidden word on the Seventh Floor at least in regard to Vietnam. Thailand and other Asian countries regarded SEATO as a residue of European tutelage, and until 1964 Secretary Rusk himself took the line that the Treaty tied our hands, since under it *we could only act in unison with the other members.*

The bombing of the North, which began in February, 1965 in retaliation for a Communist strike at the air base in Pleiku was another miscalculation. Why such supposedly stable characters as General Maxwell D. Taylor and McGeorge Bundy should have gotten excised over the perfectly understandable attempt of the Viet Cong to knock out the planes that were ferrying their enemies can only be explained in the light of the collective frustration that had begun to steal over the top figures in government. Unbelievable though it may sound, McGeorge Bundy regarded the "morale" of that preposterous goateed nonentity, General Nguyen Khanh (can anyone remember him today?) as more important to the United States than the necessity of not placing Soviet Premier Kosygin, then visiting in Hanoi, in a position where he had no alternative but to begin pouring arms and equipment into North Vietnam. (The number of American—and Vietnamese—dead that can be attributed directly to the amateurish excursions of the ex-Dean of Faculties of Harvard into the realm of high strategy will never be known.)

Then came the massive folly of troop escalation, as sold to the President by General Taylor, Walt Rostow and the two Bundys. Anyone who actually lived through this period on the Seventh Floor of the State Department can testify how impulsively this decision was reached. There was never any open discussion as to how the now totally militarized war would be fought. Not a thought was given to the havoc that full-scale warfare would wreak on the South Vietnamese population; the only factor was "saving" the latest corrupt regime of ex-sergeants of Colonial Infantry in Saigon. What Mr. Brandon does not say, because in all probability he does not know, is that by the fall of 1961 the United States had a government-wide counter-insurgency doctrine, which President Kennedy had promulgated as national policy. The essence of the policy was that insurgencies in less-developed countries would be countered by winning the allegiance of the population. The doctrine envisaged a carefully structured program of economic, military and police assistance designed to shore up the weak sectors of less developed societies in a way that would enable them to withstand both the stresses and strains of the development process and the efforts by Communists and other extremists to exploit them for their own ends. It also stressed domestic reform.

Needless to say neither President Kennedy nor the experienced military and civilian officials who drafted the doctrine ever dreamed that we would attempt to win over the peasantry of Vietnam by burning their villages, strafing them with rockets and machine guns, and then indiscriminately slaughtering the survivors simply because from time to time they were infiltrated by the Vietcong. They did not envisage using American technology to destroy the society we were supposed to be defending. Nor was it

Special Book Essay (continued)

supposed that American commanders would soon be condoning—nay, prescribing—methods of warfare reminiscent of the Japanese in China. President Kennedy would never have tolerated these methods had he lived; his civilized values would have forbidden it.

These are just a few of the reasons why Mr. Brandon has written an excellent book which, alas, is hopelessly inadequate from the standpoint of historical truth. Some day, of course, the records may be opened. More of the principal actors and eyewitnesses will have written books. There will be the usual spate of post-war Congressional inquiries. In time, by vigorously comparing conflicting accounts with the records, historians may be able to elicit some of the truth about this ghastly war which so far has been obfuscated by the guarded and misleading recollections of the principal actors. For the time being, however, all the public is likely to get are brief glimpses of the truth across a curtain hastily raised and lowered.

The Unfinished Revolution in the Arab World

DURING the early morning hours of July 22, 1952, a relatively small group of field-grade officers led by a colleague whose identity was known only to a handful, moved to overthrow the monarchy and to assume leadership in Egypt. While the initial aims of the "Revolution" were limited and in many ways politically naive, subsequent developments revealed a movement of far-reaching consequences not only in Egypt, but throughout the entire Arab world.

Harry Hopkins, a highly-articulate and perceptive British observer of the Middle East over the past fifteen years, sets out to enlighten those in Britain and the United States who have viewed this scene through a "distorting lens," their vision narrowed, in his view, by highly-effective Zionist control of communications in both countries.

Despite obvious sympathy for Egypt in these years of trial, Hopkins provides a thorough, comprehensive, unemotional and balanced account of life in "the valley of the Nile" through this period, recording both the internal achievements of the Revolution and the external disasters culminating in the 1967 June War. He sees the "Revolution" as notably gentle and aimed largely at restoring a sick society to health—its tactics based on Egypt's own political and religious traditions. He concludes that a large percentage of the population has gained a better life and wider horizons, that Nasser has attained a unique position of moral ascendancy amongst his people who have reposed in him implicit trust strong enough to surmount every catastrophe. Maintaining that the Egyptian Revolution cannot be accurately recorded without dealing with its preoccupation with the Palestine problem and the latter's place in the totality of Arab affairs, Hopkins provides at the end of his book, two provocative and hard-hitting chapters on the background of the resulting Arab-Israel conflict and the roles played by Britain and the United States in its origins and continuing intensification.

Although the author does not attempt on the evidence presently available to infer US-Israeli "collusion" at the highest level during the final days prior to the June 5 Israeli onslaught, he does however view the tremendous relief and joy with which the "brilliant" victory was hailed at top levels in Washington as evidence of our seeming conviction at the time that the West had achieved a dramatic and lasting defeat of the Soviet Union in the area.

To the fact that developments since that time would seem to indicate otherwise, Hopkins adds the observation that Israeli military success in 1967 has perhaps accelerated the pace of constructive developments in the Arab world towards greater economic and social progress and cooperation.

"Egypt, the Crucible," is a long book, but "must" reading, particularly for those not expert in the area who seek an understanding in depth of what has been going on and why, through a lens clear and sharp.

—DAVID G. NES

EGYPT, THE CRUCIBLE, *by Harry Hopkins. Houghton Mifflin Co., $10.00.*

Marchenko and Shub on Russia

CERTAINLY Solzhenitsyn's "Ivan Denisovich" and "First Circle" are the most important works of fiction on Russian prisons since Dostoevsky; and certainly in straight documentation—in testimony—"My Testimony" by the Soviet prisoner Marchenko is the most powerful work published since the elder George Kennan's expose of the Tsarist exile system. A well-written book by a prisoner is always thought-provoking, whether the prison be in Mississippi or French Guiana, whether the prisoner be Marchenko, Genet or Brendan Behan. This is because a prison reveals the ugliest things about mankind. But there is a difference between societies; and although we have prisons too, and cruel things happen in them, it is also true that with us abuses are condemned when discovered, and the system works for justice. I may sound like an elementary student of morals; but this is the sort of thing you will think about when you read Marchenko. The men who tattoo "Slave of the CPSU" across their foreheads with an ink made of burned shoe-sole and urine. The men who go on hunger strikes until on the tenth day they are taken away and fed by force, losing some teeth in the process. The men who swallow spoons; and Sergei K. who in despair nailed his scrotum to a bench. Yuli Daniel, the writer. And a host of brutal officers and guards. These are the characters in a book that rips away the facades of the new Potemkin village.

Then read Anatole Shub's book about the USSR, "The New Russian Tragedy." You may have already done so, since the ten chapters correspond to the articles Shub wrote for his newspaper after being expelled from Moscow in the spring of 1969. It is some of the best reporting on the Soviet Union that has been done in recent years. Unfortunately it is a little brief; the articles are not quite enough to make a book. At the same time, Shub is maybe a little too quick to forecast a coming cataclysm in the Soviet Union. Certainly the economic reform has not progressed, the prevailing political style must have Stalin stirring in his tomb, and, as Marchenko reports, there are increasing numbers of rebel youths in the camps. Yet many other countries in worse shape—though perhaps not such a cruel shape—are still hanging together and will.

—PETER BRIDGES

MY TESTIMONY, *by Anatoly Marchenko. Dutton, $8.95*

THE NEW RUSSIAN TRAGEDY, *by Anatole Shub. Norton, $4.50.*

EDITORIALS

Reform: A Good Start

A wind of change is blowing in Foggy Bottom; there is a sense of hope and expectancy. When this issue of the JOURNAL reaches readers, the thirteen Task Forces established to work on Deputy Under Secretary Macomber's "Program for the 70s" will have about completed the first of their allotted three months.

AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. announced on January 29* that the Association was establishing a special Career Principles Committee chaired by Ambassador Margaret Joy Tibbetts. The Tibbetts Committee is active in support of Task Force work—providing ideas, helping with drafts, participating in discussion, urging acceptance of the sort of comprehensive modernization program AFSA has advocated so insistently for three years. While furnishing maximum cooperation and input, the AFSA Career Principles Committee remains independent of the Task Forces, and will prepare a critique of the program for the Board of Directors along with recommendations for any additional Board action it believes required.

Meanwhile, AFSA urges members in the field to study the Macomber speech, and to forward comments, recommendations and new proposals either to the Tibbetts Committee or directly to the Task Forces. Your ideas will be welcome, and now is the moment to be heard.

We see two particularly encouraging signs in the Department's "Program for the Seventies." First, the drive for reform has come from within, sparked by AFSA and its membership; this promises more lasting and more effective change than the usual institutional reorganization imposed from above or from without. Second, the Task Forces include AID and USIA as well as Department employees, and expert advice from outside the three agencies and outside of Government has been sought.

As to substance, we can heartily endorse the bulk of Mr. Macomber's list of proposals, most of which AFSA has long urged. For example: true functional specialization, in recruitment, promotion and assignment policy; a rolling inventory of personnel requirements; application of modern management tools; greater emphasis upon training; expansion of outside contacts. We will look forward to the elaboration of these and other ideas by the Task Forces.

It is a good list, but does it all fit clearly together? Is it, in short, unmistakably directed toward the concept of a unified Foreign Service of the United States? We hope so. AFSA will have this goal in mind as it plays its proper role of constructive critic, of independent participant and contributor. Whatever reform action the Department takes in the next few months should be thoroughly compatible with those later steps which will require the help of Congress. We must push on to a complete reform. It looks like a good start. ■

*See March AFSA NEWS.

Budget Blues

THE Administration has recently sent its budget for 1971 to the Congress. Prior to its submission the budget was extensively reviewed to trim expenditures. It is certainly a commendable effort to lower government spending in these inflationary times.

However, included in the originally proposed budget was a recommended pay raise for federal employees (postal, "white collar" and military). The pay increase of about 5.7 percent was to be recommended for an effective date of July 1, 1970.

The raise is based primarily on the national average private enterprise level of *June 1969*. Even if the pay raise becomes effective in July of this year, government workers would still lag behind their private counterparts by a year.

The budget which was finally submitted to Congress recommends that the proposed pay raise be deferred until January 1, 1971.

We all recognize the need to make sacrifices (especially at this time of year!) for the good health of the economy. It is, however, a gross injustice to force one particular group to bear a disproportionate share of the burden of "good health." This is precisely what deferral of the pay raise would mean. Federal employees would be forced to fall even further behind the private sector which, incidentally, shows no slacking of salary increases.

We strongly urge that Congress re-evaluate the issue of a pay raise for federal workers and reinstate the July 1, 1970, date.

(*For action by the AFSA on this issue, see page* 1 *of* AFSA NEWS.)

COMMENT ON SPEECH BY DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY WILLIAM B. MACOMBER OF JANUARY 14, 1970

SECRETARY MACOMBER'S speech of January 14 on Management Strategy for the 1970s seems to be a program of action. It is important that it be just that—that the task forces being set up deal with specific measures to implement the program and not turn out to be simply new forums for discussion and debate.

The most disappointing aspect is the indication that USIA and AID are not yet fully aboard, but have only "agreed to explore" the establishment of similar personnel systems, which would be wholly "compatible and interchangeable." It seems to me fundamental that these agencies be brought along in parallel with State toward such systems and toward acceptance of the common jurisdiction of the Board of the Foreign Service in personnel matters. Unless this is done there will be no possibility of ensuring that appropriate personnel from all agencies acquire the managerial experience and develop the managerial skills essential for the top posts.

As to the specific suggestions Secretary Macomber puts forward, I assume they will be spelled out and ironed out by the task forces. I offer the following off-the-cuff comment as of possible use in this process:

Recruitment

I think it will be found impracticable to examine candidates for admission under the five-category system. I do not believe that the bulk of the candidates will know enough about the Foreign Service to make such a choice at that point.

I think it is desirable to put them on notice that these functional specializations exist and think that they should be warned that they will be placed in one of these categories on the basis of their performance in the examinations and in work experience during the probationary period.

Examinations

I agree with the definition and the idea that all officers should have "a command of the 'core' diplomatic skills." For the same reason, I think it important that the basic entry examination not be too specialized. It should at least demonstrate that the applicant has sufficient educational background and aptitudes to enable him to develop these "core" skills.

Similarly I think the oral examination panels should include officers who have demonstrated a mastery of these same "core" skills as well as mastery of a specialization. Naturally, I exempt from these remarks the really technical positions which it is proposed to man with FSRUs.

Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited Officers (FSRUs)

Perhaps it is unavoidable but I regret to see this new category adopted on a regular basis since it is subject to political and administrative abuse. The disaster of Wristonization was the destruction of the Foreign Service Staff Corps which should instead have been developed into a supporting service, offering a rewarding career to its members who did not have the inclination or qualifications for lateral entry into the Foreign Service officer ranks.

Retirement

I do think it imperative that efforts be made to restore the pyramidal shape to the Foreign Service and for this reason I would not oppose the measures proposed to encourage earlier retirement of older officers. However, in addition, consideration should be given to provide some real financial incentives. I dare say there are a lot of officers who are waiting out the effects of last year's legislative raising of pay levels and the establishment of a three-year maximum pay period as a retirement basis.

Under Secretary

I hope the principle can be established that a career officer will always occupy one of the Under Secretary's positions, that is, at least one of the top two, not of the top four.

Field Positions

I regard it as absolutely essential that the President fully support the Secretary of State in controlling "the number of American and local positions required by all agencies in the field."

Public Speaking

I would also say that the "core" skills should include the ability to appear and speak effectively before Congressional Committees, as well as public audiences.

FOY D. KOHLER

INDIVIDUALS who have viewed with alarm and despondency the decline of the authority of the State Department in the conduct of foreign affairs should be immensely encouraged by the recent speech of William Macomber on "Management Strategy: A Program for the 70s." They should be further encouraged to know that a man of Mr. Macomber's proven courage and industriousness stands behind this talk and intends to see it implemented.

I have rarely read a speech which succeeded so well in making an inherently uninteresting subject come alive. This talk elevates administration to the level of importance it deserves and should help assuage disdain for management functions which has prevailed in the Foreign Service to its own serious disadvantage.

The speech contains healthy, accurate self-analysis of the Foreign Service. It is introduced with balanced admissions of weaknesses and assertions of strengths, and accurately portrays the predicament of the Foreign Service as it faces the 1970s. It conveys a sense of greater opportunity and inspiration for the Department. In the final analysis these may be the most important ingredients of the new strategy.

The proposed management strategy, while drawing upon predecessor studies by outside commissions, is chiefly the distillation of a thorough study of the Foreign Service mounted by the American Foreign Service Association and recently published in "Toward a Modern Diplomacy." I doubt that a more objective, open, comprehensive study of the internal organization and performance of a profession by the professionals themselves has been made in the annals of bureaucracy—public or private. The recommendations in this talk accordingly must be taken seriously

since they are the prescriptions of the professionals themselves.

In commenting on this talk, the temptation is great to underline its strongest points because there are many of them and because it is high time to accentuate the positive in the Foreign Service. But presumably comment has been solicited to flag possible weak points and to add new points which can be taken into account by the proposed implementation task forces.

Mr. Macomber properly emphasizes that more studies are not needed and that the implementation phase of organizational reform is at hand. I would agree, with the important exception that more study is needed of the future environment in which foreign affairs will be conducted, of the "challenges of these decades," with which the reforms announced by Mr. Macomber are designed to cope. The discussion of the nature and dimension of United States foreign involvements in the 1970s is the weakest chapter in "Toward a Modern Diplomacy" but also the most essential to wise planning for the management of future foreign affairs. It is possible that a more studied look at the future will reveal the need for additional or alternative career specializations in, for example, international law and organization and science and technology. Certainly a more careful look at the future will be required to arrive at the rolling five-year personnel projection to which Mr. Macomber refers.

In explaining the Department's past failure to accommodate itself to the demands of increasing specialization, it would have been well to emphasize that the Department has been relatively oblivious to education. The Department has seemed opposed or indifferent to graduate education for Foreign Service aspirants. Its programs of in-service training for Foreign Service officers—especially those which utilize outside institutions—appear to be conducted in a spirit of resignation rather than of enthusiasm for new knowledge. A changed attitude toward education involving a commitment to greatly expanded in-house and out-house education will be an essential concomitant to the new specialized career structure announced by Mr. Macomber.

With respect to the proposed four category functional specialization career system, there is danger that in practice these career cones will be more like vacuum tubes with officers living and working sealed off from officers in the other tubes. Cliques may form around the specializations, with accompanying unhealthy manifestations of intra-service exclusiveness. These fears suggest that great care will have to be taken to promote inter-functional or cross-specialization contact lest the synergistic effects of the specializations be lost and each officer walks his own functional track which in isolation from the others will be a barren path. Especially important will be interaction between the political and economic specializations which already is recognized as an increasingly artificial distinction.

I hope that it was not meant that all new officers would be recruited to specializations; the examination and recruiting system should leave room for those who are well educated in the "core skills" but cannot yet boast a specialization. I would also caution against a too heavy reliance upon aptitude in the entrance examination as distinct from testing knowledge of particular subjects. As one colleague of mine has observed, there are plenty of high I.Q. morons, and no one has invented a way to measure aptitude in wisdom.

A more fortunate and accurate description of the "core skills" should be found. I prefer the term "core knowledge." The taproot of negotiation is knowledge of the country with which you are negotiating: its traditions, ways of thinking, and the factors which might influence its decisions. Nor is objective reporting a skill as much as it is knowledge, education in the discovery and identification of facts, an open mind, a desire for truth. In the understandable effort to elevate functional specialties, the qualities of character and general intellectual competence required of a diplomat should not be demoted to the level of "skills" and the need for country specialists should not be ignored.

It is hoped that the inventory of personnel needs and "levels of openings" in each specialty area will result in a body blow to the current system of job classifications and stratifications and will lead to a system which more naturally enables Foreign Service officers to rise or fall to their level of competence. More flexible job classifications will help frustrate the Peter Principle, protect against generation gaps, and foster and reward ability at all ages and grades of the service. The criteria used to determine "levels of openings" may be more important than any other element of the proposed reforms in surfacing and allocating the executive management skills which have been buried or frustrated in the current system.

Mr. Macomber may have gone overboard in bowing to, and promising to protect, the Department's Civil Service officers and in affirming the Department's "deep dependence" on them. These officers have not been known to worry overtime about the protection and promotion of Foreign Service officers. It is not clear why the Department's lawyers need to be Civil Service employees. Lawyers could be recruited to the political track or to an additional track in international law and organization. Nor is it clear why the office of Congressional relations should be staffed with Civil Service officers instead of Foreign Service officers who should be out cultivating their own congressional constituents. I would urge the Department to reassess its need for Civil Service officers and objectively assess their liabilities in, for example, clogging the lines of promotion and seconding functions in which Foreign Service officers should be proficient.

The largest question mark raised by Mr. Macomber's talk may concern the effect on the specialists of the proposed system for the development of managers or senior executives. Unless close to a revolution is wrought in human nature, the early identification of executive talent, which is equally the early identification of those who can never rise to the highest positions, will lead to a system of first and second class Foreign Service officers. The tendency to measure professional success in terms of elevation to a command position and the drive for supervisory responsibility is strong in the American ethos and will lead to frustration and loss of morale among those not marked and groomed for a senior executive position in the new system. If in the implementation and monitoring of the new personnel system the Department can maintain the motivation of those not marked for the top it will have pioneered a development with significance for all organizations concerned chiefly with human affairs.

The parenthetic suggestion that clearance procedures be examined "to see what can be done to prevent their stifling dissent and creativity" is of the utmost importance. The reorganization of the personnel and management system provides an opportunity to cut back the thicket of communications and clearances to let more light and fresh air into the policy process. Make no mistake that this task ranks in importance and difficulty with any of those proposed in Mr. Macomber's talk (and may be one in which outside consultants drawing upon comparative study of the practices of other coun-

tries could be most helpful).

The critical importance of having experienced managers at the Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretary levels is apparent to anyone familiar with the deficiencies of the Department's conduct of foreign affairs. No amount of beefing up of seventh floor staffs can obscure or compensate for the need to have broadly competent men appointed to senior positions in the Bureaus. The essential corollary to the reforms announced by Mr. Macomber is the imposition of new management oriented criteria for the political appointments and making of political appointments which compliment rather than complicate the promising new management strategy.

The announcement that the Secretary of State will issue an annual posture statement, which in the past has been prepared by default by the Secretary of Defense, is heartening to those who have watched with anguish the Department stand idly by as its foreign policy prerogatives were assumed by more aggressive individuals and institutions. The power of the Defense Department in the decision-making process can be attributed as much to the failure of the State Department to fashion a foreign policy strategy which gave real guidance to military planners as to any other factor. Action can be controlled by the Department with the best document; the Secretary's promised posture statement could be the document that would swing the action back to the Department where, in the public interest, it belongs.

None of the above points are meant to detract in any substantial way from a set of proposals and ideas which holds out such great hope for improvement in the performance and profession of the Foreign Service. Lest my comments be interpreted as overly negative, I must close by emphasizing that I have not read a talk on the State Department that so lifted my spirits and so reassured me about its future. Outsiders, like myself, can only congratulate the Service, express our confident hopes for the implementation of the proposed reforms, and stand by to make the parallel changes in the private foreign affairs community which will be required to reinforce the Department's internal efforts.

PETER F. KROGH

I WAS a Foreign Service Reserve officer in the East Asian Bureau for the past three years but recently left to join Arthur D. Little, Inc. in Cambridge.

Just as one is not bestowed with instant wisdom upon joining the Department, one does not automatically receive it upon his departure. I hope, however, that a few comments on Mr. Macomber's speech from a recently departed FSR may be of value.

The honesty, forcefulness and content of Mr. Macomber's statement represents a dynamic shift in the right direction for the Department. His statement that "management has not been our bag" is a colorful understatement and his program to improve the personnel system is impressive. I have two concerns, however.

First, it would be very easy to be misled into thinking that, by taking a great deal of necessary action to improve the Department's personnel system, a major shift in the management of foreign affairs would automatically follow. It seems clear that the Department at present plays a relatively minor role in the development of US foreign policy. The Defense Department, Congress, the White House and other agencies collectively play a more dominant role in this regard, while the Special Assistants to the President, have, by default, become the managers of our foreign policy. I hope that the Department will not become so exhausted or exhilarated by the internal management exercise that it loses the momentum which led to Mr. Macomber's speech and which will be necessary if the Department is to gain more control over the development and management of US foreign policy.

Secondly, I am a bit concerned by Mr. Macomber's suggestion that the Department should be the "manager" or "coordinator "of US foreign policy. Our problem with other US agencies has too often been that we have not taken the policy initiative and have had to spend our time trying to control actions generated by others. A general defensiveness may have developed in the process not conducive to leadership. I hope that during the current exercise the Department will focus on becoming the leader as well as the manager.

WILFORD H. WELCH

IF we're really going to make management our bag, let's face up to a basic problem on the foreign affairs community—too many officers.

As we all know, a lot of the low-priority paper that clogs our system and takes up our time is generated by people who **don't have enough to do.** Much inter-office and even inter-agency rivalry would be cut down and clearances would be expedited if there were fewer of us. Most of our bailiwicks are smaller than what we could handle. We are activists, we want to earn our pay, and **we are competing with each other.** The result is a lot of activity—including even some brilliant performances—with a relatively low pay-off.

But more important, excess manpower undermines the development of managers. Over-staffed at all levels, but particularly in the upper grades, very little direct action responsibility—let alone managerial opportunity—filters down to the younger and mid-career officers. Instead of dealing directly with even relatively minor problems, most specialists spend their time preparing memos briefing and re-briefing a host of superiors who have first crack at the issue by virtue of their rank and position. Few of us really believe this layering is necessary, but it will take extreme measures to reduce, not to say get rid of it.

The lack of managerial and direct action responsibility in most of our jobs leads to a strange paradox: even while management is not our bag, many of our best officers are leaving the Service **to take management positions** in banks or business.

Finally, unless we positively identify size as a major problem, I am afraid that the current emphasis on developing management capabilities will do little more than stimulate a new wave of empire-building, with emphasis on quantity of production rather than soundness of analysis, on "number of employees supervised" rather than effectiveness of the office.

As Mr. Macomber has said, this may be our last clear chance to address the problems of management from within the Department. To have a chance of success, we must go to the heart of the matter.

RUSSELL O. PRICKETT

THE children's birthday party game of Musical Chairs has become *the* popular game in the State Department's personnel offices. OPRED and BALPA reduced the number of jobs (chairs) but left the same number of happy players. In a clever refinement the piano stops individually as tours end but the net effect is the same. The players scramble for the ever diminishing chairs.

Admitting that this adds zest to the assignment process I suggest that it does not lead to a rational allocation of the Department's personnel resources. The pressure to find any half-way decent job forces many to take third and fourth choices—choices which often fail to utilize training and talents. And because each bureau's

personnel system is primarily concerned with serving its own members it tends to fill bureau jobs from officers available within the bureau. Since each bureau has more people than jobs only rarely must a bureau go to the central personnel system to fill a job. As a result the bureau may not choose the best man in the Department for a particular job but only the best man within the bureau.

The only way to solve this problem is to remove the pressure on jobs—to equate the number of chairs and players. I hope that Mr. Macomber's job inventory will lead to this equation. But more than an inventory is needed. After the Department's needs are determined, the number of personnel must be trimmed to meet our real needs. The alternative is a less efficient but more frustrated Foreign Service.

RICHARD J. HIGGINS

THE NEW YORK TIMES recently carried a news story on the attention the Department of State is giving to equipping the Foreign Service to shape policy. Specialization was mentioned.

Specialization, it seems to me, must rest on a certain foundation in order to make sense within the Foreign Service. To provide that foundation, I believe the following prerequisites should be expected of all officers in the Foreign Service:

1. Sufficient education to qualify as a cultivated person.
2. Sufficient personality to make a positive impression — in other words, some potential in terms of public relations.
3. Foreign language capability.
4. Ability to observe, analyze, and report.

We are fooling ourselves if we think that the public in a country of assignment considers that an officer of our Foreign Service is fulfilling expectations merely by performing his desk job. However internal an officer's function may seem to us, members of the local public will naturally conclude that he or she was sent abroad to represent the United States. Generally, local people will:

1. Take disparaging note of those officers who lack education and culture.
2. Wonder out loud why officers with little or negative personality represent the United States.
3. Wonder out loud why officers who cannot converse readily in something beside English are sent out to represent the United States.

Should we have abroad officers who are hermits? Or are misanthropes? Or taciturn? Should we send out officers who are blind or deaf in terms of our profession?

What about the sincerity of our interest in a host country's people and their culture if we have officers there who do not mingle and converse with them?

Are officers truly of the Foreign Service unless they are ready and eager to observe and understand what is going on around them, regardless of their particular internal assignments at posts? Are they truly of the Foreign Service if they do not report their observations?

I trust the Department will take care to see that officers of the Foreign Service who specialize build their specialization on a sufficiently broad foundation.

FRANCIS CUNNINGHAM

AMERICAN AID *from page* 18

class. But we ought not to get our hopes up that such opportunities will appear in any kind of persistent way, nor that we will always be able to take advantage of them in spite of more immediate American interests—or the exigencies of American domestic politics.

It has been suggested that to mount a more consistent program may be out of the question not only because of the limitations of our own interests and predilections, but also because foreign political leaders tend over time to object to foreign interventions of any kind. For example, American programs in Thailand, such as strengthening local government institutions, appear unsuccessful, both because political systems tend to reject foreign conceptions and foreign threats to their integrity and also because Thai officials do not fully appreciate foreign advisors. However, they very much favor straight technical aid.

What, then, is the role of aid in political development? The conclusion I come to is that AID has the right idea in its focus on economic assistance.

The consequences of certain kinds of economic aid do at least have the advantage of being basic: roads, communications networks, education facilities, basic agricultural improvements such as dams and irrigation systems, all these in contrast to aid to social institutions. If we agree that the process of nation building depends significantly upon opening up of communications channels between center and region, village and city, elite and non-elite, then it seems clear that roads and basic transport facilities are enormously important. I realize the arguments against an oversimplification of the impact of investment in transport, and I do not mean to imply that the United States government ought to rush about building roads everywhere space is available. But when it appears that conditions make the economic and perhaps social impact of a road worth while, it ought to be built instead of putting the same funds into less certain possibilities.

I want to emphasize at this point that I do not believe all economic aid must be planned with an eye towards its social and political consequences. Programs of economic assistance should be *programs*. Roads should be built where they have the greatest economic and social influence and only when they are needed. Investment in education is fine, though perhaps much overrated, but only when the need for it is obvious and pressing, and where it suits other needs of the economy. (For example, technical education is worse than absurd when there is no immediate demand for the technically educated.) And a good deal more could be said about levels of aid, visibility of foreigners, and so on, but this is not the place. My point is that while economic assistance is both suitable to American purposes and fundamental, it will be so only if thoroughly planned and effectively executed. ■

MIGRANTS *from page* 40

length of factory experience, age, and other factors. The length of urban residence is much less important in remolding attitudes and behavior than the range and intensity of influences bearing on the individual, among which education and occupation are two of the most important. Consider a young man who comes to the city at fifteen, gains one or two years of vocational education, and finds a job as a semiskilled mechanic's assistant in a modern and unionized factory. Compare him with an illiterate woman who comes to the city with her husband, holds no job other than taking in occasional washing, and lives in a squatter settlement where she associates primarily with relatives and almost never ventures into the city around her. The young man will have more exposure to urban influences in three or four years than the woman will have in the same number of decades.

Inkeles's studies clearly identify length of factory experience and amount of education as the two most powerful factors determining the level of participant citizenship among working class respondents To these might be added a third factor which the Inkeles surveys did not attempt to measure: activity by political parties or other explicit political agents among the groups from which the respondents are drawn. Other factors undoubtedly also contribute to or detract from politicization: among these are positive (housing, welfare services) or negative (squatter clearance) activities by government agencies.

Marginality was defined, however, partly in terms of inability to find a steady factory job or its equivalent in income, security, and status. Those who do find such employment are well on their way to integration into the urban economy and society. Some may also become more politically active as a result of exposure to political influence in their places of work. But, this pattern of politicization is not at all that described by the radicalization theory; indeed, it is its opposite.

Those who remain marginal are unlikely to become politicized through their work experiences and associates. However, political awareness and participation among urban marginals may grow with increases in the proportion of the urban poor with more than three or four years of education. The urban poor may also be encouraged to enter the political arena through the efforts of political parties seeking to mobilize their votes. In most developing countries, the established parties have campaigned in poorer parts of the cities during elections, but have made relatively little effort to develop continuing organization and sustained loyalties among the poor. Conservative elite or middle class parties view the poor as dubious allies. Even parties more ideologically disposed to organize the underprivileged may be deterred by the formidable difficulties of working among groups with few organizational ties, shifting occupations, high residential turnover, limited internal leadership, intense suspicions against outsiders, substantial mistrust even within

their own circles, and low initial levels of political interest or awareness. The political isolation of marginal groups is partially self-perpetuating: they do not participate because they have few ties to the political processes of the nation; but established political groups hesitate to try to organize the poor, in part because of their low levels of politicization.

Conclusions. As a predictive instrument, the theory of radicalization and the deprivation - frustration - aggression model on which it rests are misleading. The theory itself does not specify the pace of radicalization. But it is usually linked to predictions of political upheaval in the not too distant future. Such calculations probably exaggerate the rate at which the aspirations of the poor rise, and underestimate the incidence of modest but psychologically important progress. Therefore, proponents of the theory overstate the rate at which discontent spreads among the urban lower classes. Their calculations also imply a high rate of conversion from frustration to radical action. In fact, the bulk of economic and social frustration is likely to leak into alternative channels, including non-radical political action.

As an analytic framework, the radicalization theory is also seriously deficient. Since the poor virtually everywhere have little interest in and awareness of politics, a theory which predicts that they will come to play an active and disruptive role must explain how their attitudes and behavior are to be transformed. The radicalization theory merely assumes, without explaining, the process of politicization. I have already argued that not all frustration leads to political activity. It is also true that not all political activity among the urban poor is an expression of frustration. Individuals have many motives for taking part in political activity. Desire for sociability or for enhanced status, loyalty to friends, or the search for entertainment and excitement, as well as frustrations, may lead to political participation.

Moreover, the form of political activity is powerfully shaped by the nation's political culture and the specific political context, which should be viewed as independent of (though interacting with) the motivations underlying political involvement. The dispersion and content of education and mass media, political party activity among the urban poor, and in some cases church and local neighborhood organizations all affect the direction of political activity. All of these variables are exogenous to the deprivation-frustration-aggression model.

While the theory of the disruptive migrants is demonstrably wrong, the theory of the radical marginals may be valid under some conditions. The problem is that the theory itself contributes very little toward identifying those conditions. In short, although the radicalization theory points to processes and tendencies which are indeed important, it is too incomplete and loosely articulated a theory to be valuable, either for prediction or as a framework for research. ■

REVOLUTION *from page 35*

the enactment of such legislation normally requires a break in the ranks of the economic upper class and the support for land reform by industrialists, commercial interests, and "progressive" landowners.

A similar pattern has manifested itself in Latin America. Differences between industrialists and "progressive farm owners and operators," on the one hand, and the "semi-feudal" landowners on the other, facilitated passage of the Colombian land reform law of 1961. In Peru a similar division helped passage of the land reform bill of 1964. In the Brazilian state of São Paulo the agrarian transformation law of 1961 was in part the result of the fact that "the new middle and upper classes in the city can have a strong influence on land policies." In the absence of a strong political organization capable of forcing through land reform legislation despite the opposition of the landowning group, it would appear that industrial and commercial leaders may be necessary partners in securing the approval of land reform legislation.

"In the beginning of any undertaking," Mustafa Kemal once said, "there is a need to go from above downward; not from below upward." Many students of land reform argue to the contrary that reform can only be inaugurated by the positive action and demands of the peasantry. In actuality, however, so far as the inauguration of land reforms is concerned, neither extreme position would seem to be correct.

Land reform is not only the result of push from below. In most countries, tenants and landless peasants lack the skills and the organization to make themselves an effective political force. They are more likely to take advantage of the weakness of government and to attempt to seize land for themselves than they are likely to take advantage of the strength of government and to attempt to induce political leaders to use governmental power on their behalf.

Two organizational links between government and peasants are necessary if land reform is to become a reality.

First, in almost all cases, the government has to create a new and adequately financed administrative organization well-staffed with expert talent committed to the cause of reform. In most countries where land reform is a crucial issue, the Ministry of Agriculture is a weak, lethargic entity, with little commitment to modernization and reform, and often quite subservient to the established agricultural interests. An indifferent bureaucracy can make reform a nullity. The failure of land reform in several districts in India, for instance, was ascribed in one survey to two causes: "one is faulty legislation itself, and the second is the negative attitude of the government officials at state, district, block or village levels. With the exception of Aligarh, no serious attempt was

made to enforce the enacted land reform legislation." Virtually all effective land reforms thus involve the creation of an agrarian reform institute. Where such institutes are not created, as was generally the case in India, the reforms tend to become ineffective. In addition, it is also often necessary to mobilize a substantial bureaucratic force to implement the reform in the countryside. The Japanese land reform required the assistance of some 400,000 people to purchase and transfer 2,000,000 hectares and to rewrite 4,000,000 leases. The reform in Taiwan required an administrative force of some 33,000 officials. In the Philippines and in Iran the army has been employed to help implement the reform. In India, in contrast, in the early 1960s only about 6,000 full-time workers were concerned with land reform.

The second organizational requirement of land reform is the organization of the peasants themselves. Concentrated power can enact land reform decrees, but only expanded power can make those decrees into reality. While peasant participation may not be necessary to pass legislation, it is necessary to implement legislation. In democratic countries, in particular, land reform laws may be passed in deference to public opinion or ideological commitment. They often remain unenforced because of the absence of peasant organizations to participate in their implementation. "The clue to the failure of rural development," it was argued in India, "lies in this, that it cannot be administered, it has to be organized. While administration is something which the civil service can take care of, rural development is a political task, which the administration cannot undertake." Peasant leagues, peasant associations, peasant cooperatives are necessary to insure the continued vitality of land reform. Whatever their declared functions, the fact of organization creates a new center of power in the countryside. De Tocqueville's democratic science of association brings a new political resource into rural politics, counterbalancing the social status, economic wealth, and advanced education which had been the principal sources of power of the landowning class.

The creation of peasant associations, consequently, is a political act, and it is most often and most effectively performed by political parties, who have an interest in mobilizing peasant support and firmly binding the peasants to their party through the mechanisms of peasant organizations. Virtually every strong political party in a modernizing country is closely affiliated with a peasant organization. Such organization clearly serves the interests of the party leaders, but it also serves the interests of the peasants.

Reform, in short, becomes real only when it becomes organized. Peasant organization is political action. Effective peasant organization comes with effective political parties. ■

From Ted Olson

Washington Letter

What follows may draw some nasty letters from readers whose names, like your correspondent's, begin with the letter O, but who insert an apostrophe after that initial. If so, we shall be genuinely sorry. We write with no intent to offend, merely in an honest search for enlightenment on an American folkway that has bewildered us for more years than we care to count.

Why, please, on the 17th of March, do the Rasoumovskys, the Watahas, the Jorgensens of our polyglot society feel obligated to appear at the office with green neckties and shamrock boutonnieres? Why does New York divert workaday traffic to parallel thoroughfares so that Fifth Avenue, its lanes freshly defined in green paint, may be taken over by bands blaring "Wearing o' the Green," micro-skirted colleens twirling batons, and miles and miles and miles of members of the Ancient Order of Hibernians? Why does Mayor Daley dye the Chicago river green? Why do disc jockeys appear to have mislaid every platter in their libraries except "Mother Machree?" Why do newspaper and television reporters feel constrained to describe these goings-on in a lingo which they fondly fancy to be genuine County Kerry, but which any of our contemporaries will recognize as Gallagher and Sheen?

Why, in short, this ritual obeisance to Irishness? There are, to be sure, a lot of people of Irish descent in our country. But it may surprise you O'Boyles and O'Gradys—as it surprised us—to learn that statistically they rank no higher than seventh in the table of national origins, and are being hard-pressed for that rung by Mexico. Want to know the top six, as recorded by the 1960 census (subject to change this year, of course)? Italy, Germany, Canada, the United Kingdom, Poland and the USSR. How many of their national days or anthems can you identify?

Please don't misunderstand us. We like Eire and the Irish. As a schoolboy we discovered and devoured their marvelous mythology—Cuchulain, Oisin, Deirdre and the rest. We have no doubt whatever that Yeats is the greatest English-language poet of this century. And we still remember wistfully the black-eyed macushla who presided over the pulpit-like bar in the Glentworth hotel in Limerick during World War II, dispensing Irish whisky like a benison.

No doubt about it, the Irish have a lot going for them. Perhaps we should dust off those shopworn words *mystique* and *charisma* and leave it at that—making a note on the calendar to have our green necktie de-spotted before the third Tuesday of this month.

Pop, Pap, Paris, Galsworthy

For the benefit of overseas readers, and any others who may temporarily have lost touch, here's a quick look at what's new, what's old, and what's no longer visible on the television screen.

Rereading our preview of the new season last October, we have to rank ourself—and the critics we quoted—in the lowest 10-percentile, and therefore subject to selection out. The Leslie Uggams Show, which we all touted, was the first to fold. The Debbie Reynolds Show, which got poor marks, seems to be flourishing. Jimmy Durante and the Lennon Sisters didn't last very long, either. "The Survivors" survived

longer than they deserved, but finally succumbed. A surprising number of the new shows are still with us, however: Bill Cosby—well up among the top favorites; Doris Day, Jim Nabors, "Marcus Welby, M.D.," "Then Came Bronson," "It Takes a Thief," "My World and Welcome to It," "The Bold Ones."

Of the new entries—most of them on ABC, which, as a poor No. 3, is trying even harder than Avis—one series should be of special interest to FSJ readers. It's called, for reasons so far unexplained, "Paris 7000"; its hero, played by George Hamilton, is a Foreign Service officer. His exact job at the Embassy is difficult to determine. We encounter him first at Orly, greeting a newly-appointed Supreme Court Justice, a chore that would suggest a protocol assignment. Hordes of newspaper and television operatives have also gathered at the airport, implausibly impatient to interview the new Justice. Mr. Hamilton, effortlessly taking over as Press Officer, sets about arranging a press conference. But the judge, after reading a note that has just been handed to him, blenches and calls the conference off.

Helpful George finally extracts from him the contents of the note. It is a demand for a blackmail payoff. Against the guest's anguished entreaties, and without, so far as we are told, consulting the Ambassador, the DCM, Security, the Unmentionables or anybody else, our hero sets out to track down and frustrate the blackmailer. This he eventually does, with the aid of a high official in the Sureté, whose reluctant cooperation in such affairs he purchases with judicious infusions of vintage beverages that only he seems able to obtain.

It does make life in Paris sound exciting. A little hectic, though. The Embassy seems sadly understaffed; its motto appears to be "Let George do it." We had no idea BALPA and RIF had depleted our manpower so ruinously.

The success story of the TV year is a British import. All three major networks are reported to have turned down "The Forsyte Saga." NET—which now prefers to be called Public Broadcasting—snapped it up. Now, in countless American homes, the hour from 9 to 10 Sunday evenings belongs to Soames and Irene and Jolyon and Fleur; better not interrupt. A friend of ours, recovering from surgery, talked himself out of the hospital two days ahead of schedule so that he wouldn't miss an installment. Thoughtfully Channel 26 has reruns on Tuesday and Thursday, to accommodate addicts who had to miss the Sunday showing. The whole series will be repeated beginning April 5.

If it sends you back to Galsworthy you may discover that contemporary criticism has underrated him. All six novels are again available, in both hardback and paper, and they're selling like Jacqueline Susann.

A Handy Guide to the Morning Paper

Breakfast, American style—orange juice, coffee, toast, egg, and newspaper. In Washington the newspaper is thoughtfully sectioned; allocation of the several segments has long since been amicably agreed upon. She gets STYLE—Woman/The Arts . . . and CITY LIFE—Obituaries/Weather/Classified. He steals a quick look at SPORTS and then gets down to the substantive: Saigon, Paris, Moscow, Jerusalem and/or Cairo, and one or two normally somnolent capitals that have somehow managed to promote themselves into Page 1 date lines, and just possibly may require his attention during the day.

Interruption from across the table: "Ken, you didn't tell me!"

"Huh? Didn't tell you what?"

"About the Enderbys."

"What about them?" Are they splitting up?"

"No, stupid! They're going to Encantada. He's been

(*Continued on page* 60)

Downhill at Forty?

A former Secretary of State once remarked that we sometimes can become mesmerized by a brilliant style of prose to the extent of accepting the mediocre ideas expounded therein. I therefore suggest that we take another look at Dr. Galbraith's exhortations (advice) before taking all the remedial action he recommends for the Foreign Service (JOURNAL, December 1969).

For example, the assumption that most people do not change their minds on any subject of importance after forty is a value judgment impossible to substantiate, certainly highly questionable, and in any case hardly grounds for establishing an age limit favoring only young ambassadors. Creative and imaginative minds are not limited to the under-forty, and while maturity, perspective, and balanced judgment are not necessarily functions of age, I would speculate they are qualities more commonly found in the over-forty (and equally important as the capacity to change one's mind).

Aside from these factors, however, is the unattractiveness of a career where a man must necessarily go downhill after forty and in any case be put out to pasture by fifty. By the same token, one supposes, military officers, business executives, and even politicians would be equally inflexible after forty, and certainly by fifty. I suppose college professors above all should be susceptible to change. Thus carrying Dr. Galbraith's own proposition to its logical conclusion, most anyone of consequence should be retired by fifty.

Obedience vs. obeisance is a valid criticism, and while most of us would agree that the Department could do better to encourage dissent, the roots of the problem go much deeper than Dr. Galbraith has indicated. I have the impression, for example, that the Foreign Service still suffers the aftereffects of the McCarthy-Schine-Cohn humiliation. Suffice it to say that courage and support are always needed at the top to enable those among the lower ranks to survive when their judgment is subject to press, public, and congressional scrutiny and criticism.

I believe many will disagree—as I do—with the statement that "coworkers and subordinates are often in a far better position to judge a man's competence and his capacity for leadership than his boss." At least the boss has the advantage of some detachment and perspective that co-workers and subordinates are seldom capable of. What Dr. Galbraith suggests would degenerate into a meaningless popularity poll.

On the other hand, more could be done to protect the officer from the tyranny of an efficiency report. For example, in the case of marginal and derogatory reports, or those that have a derogatory (not just critical) statement or box rating, the report should be referred to the officer for automatic comment or rebuttal, and then for further review and even investigation if it appears that some of the problem lies with the boss. In such a case the officer could air his own grievances orally, before a review panel if necessary. This should help avoid deliberate hatchet jobs and at the least deprive the boss of complete power over his subordinate.

We should not be concerned *only* with the political ambassador, but rather with the political appointee vs. the career officer. In this respect we should assert ourselves mainly to establish a proper balance which I think is more important (than protection against the political ambassador) because it determines how we parcel out meaningful assignments at the top. What is there to aspire to if senior FSOs are reduced to searching the halls for decent jobs while non-career people are brought in for the higher level assignments?

Finally, Dr. Galbraith's point about the ritual and ceremonies surrounding an ambassador seems somewhat overstated, and if this is the sin of diplomatic corps the world over, our own is venial, not mortal.

ROBERT M. FOUCHE

Tampa

Justice or Revenge?

EDDIE HARRISON, male, Negro, 27 years old, a convict, is going back to jail—maybe. How does a convict go back to jail? It makes interesting reading.

Ten years ago at age 17, Eddie Harrison, product of the Washington ghettos, school drop out, became involved in a murder. At 18, Eddie was sentenced to death for his part in the slaying. The sentence was subsequently commuted to life.

At first bitter and hostile, Eddie became a model prisoner and a self-educated man. He was also instrumental in developing a program dealing with the problem of juvenile delinquency.

After 8½ years in the "big house," Eddie was released on his own responsibility (which indicates more than a little about his character development), pending an appeal of his case. During the past 16 months, he was employed by the United Planning Organization (UPO) as a worksite foreman in a job-training program. Both his fellow UPO colleagues and government employees in agencies having contact with him, give him exceptionally high marks for the valuable contributions he has made to the program. He has been most successful in dealing with young people who might otherwise have suffered misfortunes similar to Eddie's.

This fourth appeal of Eddie's case has been unsuccessful. Eddie is going back to jail. He will have to do seven more years before becoming eligible for parole. What a waste that would be!

But Eddie has one other out, Executive Clemency. If the goal of our penal system is rehabilitation (as it is said to be), here is a classic case of success and why not recognize it? Are seven more years on the "inside" justice—or revenge?

There is a rumor around town that someone ought to bring the facts of this case to the President's attention. Know anyone who might like to take on the assignment?

C. KENNEDY

Washington

Stillman Memorial

THE USAID Director of Laos suggested I send the following information to you in hope that it would be printed in your magazine.

Arthur D. Stillman Memorial Fund

On August 5, 1969, Arthur Stillman and three companions were killed in a communist ambush near Paksane, Laos. Arthur was in charge of the International Voluntary Services rural development team in Laos that is contracted to USAID. His parents are trying to set up a scholarship fund at Harvard in his memory. The fund is intended to finance undergraduate studies or field research relevant to Southeast Asia. The scholarship will be open to all Harvard students, but preference will be given to qualified

students from Southeast Asian countries.

Please help out, no contribution is too small. Send to:

Arthur D. Stillman Memorial Fund
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass. 02238

If you have questions concerning the fund you could contact me at the APO address, or possibly Mr. Arthur Z. Gardiner at International Voluntary Services in Washington, D.C.

ALLAN W. BEST
Deputy Director

IVS, Inc.
c/o USAID
APO San Francisco 96352

Observation on a Book Review

MAY I be permitted to express my warm appreciation of Richard Boyce's very generous and highly perceptive review of my "Foreign Service Farewell"? He may well be right that I am wrong about the North African landings. He has been so generous in his general appraisal that I venture one observation. It has to do with his comment that:

> Childs is bitter about the refusal of the American military and State Department authorities during the preparation for the American landings in North Africa in 1942 to heed his advice in dealing with the French authorities (specifically General Auguste Noguès, French Resident General at Rabat). Had they done so, he believes, some 3,000 casualties might have been averted.

The point I tried to make was NOT that my advice was unheeded as it was never solicited but that my repeated reports that Noguès would resist us seem never to have been taken into account.

I am also sorry that I seem to have given the impression that I am bitter about it all. I hope that I am far too philosophical to be guilty of bitterness. On the contrary I have a sense of deep appreciation of the privileges extended to me by my government to serve it. The State Department showed great patience with me on more than one occasion, so much so that I would be an ingrate to entertain bitterness, even if that were in keeping with my character. One of the great blessings of old age is that it develops tolerance and serenity of spirit.

A few days ago in Paris I was discussing with a former high French official and warm friend of thirty years the events about Morocco recounted in "Farewell" with which he was to some extent involved. In common with other French friends he was also doubtful of the soundness of the opinion I expressed that Noguès might have been a more appropriate choice than Darlan to lead the French in North Africa after the landings. I am sorry now that I did not express greater reservations about this.

Nice — J. RIVES CHILDS

In Appreciation

ALL too often the annual Christmas card exercise brings an unwanted return in the notice that an old and valued friend has passed away without your having known of that sad fact.

This year, my wife and I were saddened to receive from Madeleine Beylard at Nice word that her husband, Charles B. Beylard, passed away on December 2, 1969.

Charles Beylard was a real veteran of the Service. As best I can recall from old REGISTERS long discarded and from a personnel file hastily reviewed twelve or thirteen years ago, he was born in France of an American father whose birth date was 1837 and whose habitual residence was the Riviera. He first joined the Service at the then Consulate at Cannes in 1908 and, except for a few years in which he tried private business in Tunisia in the early teens, stayed with the Service until he retired in 1955. Most of this service was on the Riviera, but he had a few years in the West Indies during World War II.

The most notable talent that Charles Beylard used in behalf of the Service was a native one, the ability to convince every citizen or alien that asked him for services or merely called on him at his office that that contact was the high point of the day, that no effort had been spared and that he or she had truly received exceptional service. I am sure that he had a reserve of other talents but the sad fact is that he had never been offered any training or inducement of any kind to develop and harness them. I remember reflecting on this one day (and many times since) when he innocently remarked to me after I had explained to him why a seemingly cockeyed procedure actually made sense, "You know, Mr. Clattenburg, you are the first who ever took the time to explain to me why things are done the way they are."

The many who called on Charlie for help will remember him with gratitude, whether they were colleagues, citizens in distress or the general public. And this feeling is no inconsiderable legacy to leave to the Service.

ALBERT E. CLATTENBURG, JR.

Washington

1984 Is Here

PLEASE make only a limited distribution of your January 1970 issue, making sure that no one in the General Accounting Office sees Edward Cohen's article "Brave New World Travel Regulations." The General Accounting Office won't wait until 1984

JIM YOUNG

Managua

Life and Love in the Foreign Service — *By S. I. Nadler*

"The Department has decided it does not like your modus operandi, *and you may consider yourself through as a China Watcher."*

LETTER *continued from page 57*

named Ambassador."

"Who says so? I've certainly never heard anything about it."

"Maxine Cheshire says so. She heard it at the Albigensian Embassy. And she says Madge Enderby is furious; she thought Jerry was slated for DCM in London."

"I don't believe it. Cocktail party gossip. I had lunch with Jerry just last week. If there'd been anything like that in the wind he'd have told me."

"You wait and see."

Next morning the TIMES reports that Gerald Enderby, career diplomat, will be nominated to fill the three-month-old vacancy in Encantada. That afternoon the White House makes it official.

Nan Hainsworth says sweetly, "So it was just cocktail party gossip."

Ken, let us hope, has learned his lesson. In Washington the society pages are not to be dismissed with masculine condescension. Those girls get around; their resourcefulness, their pertinacity, their impertinence are legendary. They may not always be immediately aware of the significance of the crumbs they pick up; all the more reason to read them carefully. A few lines of apparent trivia sometimes contain a disclosure that a desk officer has been trying for weeks to pry loose.

The middle-echelon officer is unlikely to see much of this glamorous world at close hand. For the first few weeks after his return from Puerto Caballo, where practically every evening there would be at least three functions at which he ought to put in an appearance, the sense of repose is blissful. After a while, though, he may begin to feel, like the fellow in the deodorant ads, that something must be wrong. It was, we recall, in the fifth month of our first stateside tour that our wife said plaintively, "You know, I'd sort of like to go to a cocktail party."

Nan Hainsworth has reached that stage. She reads the society pages avidly, and if there has been a party at 1600 Pennsylvania—black-tie or white—she goes carefully down the column and a half of fine print listing those present. "Look!" she will exclaim accusingly. "The Tivertons were at the White House dinner last night." Ken explains wearily: "Of course. It was for the Faeroese Foreign Minister, and George is Country Director." Nan grunts, and subsides. But the warm hearthside glow of unmolested togetherness has somehow chilled.

A year ago columnists were speculating about the special quality the new Administration would bring to the capital. What would the Nixon Style be like? They are still speculating. The TIMES's Warren Weaver Jr. complained recently that there didn't seem to be any Nixon Style, at least in the social sense. The trouble, he figured, was that the Republicans "are rarely visible except at work." They don't live in the traditionally fashionable neighborhoods. They don't patronize the "in" restaurants—though he does mention three or four where with a bit of luck you might catch a glimpse of a White House personality. No 1969-73 equivalent of Perle Mesta or Gwen Cafritz has yet appeared. One man-about-town, puzzled because he and his wife didn't seem to be getting invited to parties any more, decided to investigate and "found out the answer was very simple: there weren't any parties."

Oddments

• Octagon House is open to the public again, after a $350,000 restoration job: new floors and ceilings, new heating and cooling system, among other things. The original cost, in 1800, was $13,000. The American Institute of Architects bought it in 1902 for $30,000. President Madison and Dolley lived there for nine months after those nasty British burned the White House, and the Treaty of Ghent, ending the War of 1812, was signed there.

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

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