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

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

Ombudsmen

JAMES K. PENFIELD

The author's views on the possibilities of an ombudsman system for the Foreign Service were developed as a result of his experience during a recent tour as a Foreign Service Inspector.

CAN'T we please stop talking about an "ombudsman" when what we mean (probably) is a Welfare and Grievance Officer? This is by no means to denigrate the latter position. Deputy Under Secretary Macomber's recent appointment is an important one and is to be applauded, but Robert C. F. Gordon is not an ombudsman as that title is used in the several countries where it exists.

Usually the ombudsman is an appointee of the legislative branch whose responsibility it is to protect the citizen against administrative injustice. An American Congressman is, therefore, by way of being an ombudsman, among his many other responsibilities. In a collective sense, the Comptroller General, as watchdog for the taxpayers, is also an ombudsman.

In a world of proliferating bureaucracy, which affects almost every aspect of the citizen's life, the ombudsman is gaining increasing acceptance as a public protector. The Swedes have had one for more than 150 years and their experience is useful in showing how the system operates.

The specific powers of the Swedish civil ombudsman (known as the "J.O." or *Justitieombudsman*) are not extensive. He may institute court proceedings "against those who, in the execution of their official duties, have, through partiality, favoritism or other cause, committed any unlawful act or neglected to perform their official duties properly." He has authority to require all civil servants to furnish whatever information he needs to carry out his investigations. He has considerable publicity impact; the press covers his activities closely and he submits an annual report to the Parliament, citation in which all civil servants go to some lengths to avoid. More important than these specific duties and powers is the fact that he is trustee of the Parliament and that over the years the office has accumulated enormous prestige.

The J.O., with his staff of six lawyers and three secretaries, handles some 1200 cases a year, only about

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five of which result in court prosecutions. Almost nine out of ten prove to be unfounded and those remaining are usually closed out by sending "letters of admonishment" to the offending officials. These letters, with their attendant publicity and inclusion in the J.O.'s annual report, seem to constitute effective checks on bureaucratic abuses.

In addition to investigating individual complaints, the J.O. also takes two kinds of initiatives. He makes periodical inspection visits to institutions such as prisons and hospitals where he sometimes finds situations he considers need correction; he also follows the press carefully and occasionally notes items, such as cases involving possible conflict of interest, which he takes under investigation.

Years ago, the J.O. was sometimes an energetic young lawyer but now a young ombudsman is seldom appointed, on the theory that if he is interested in moving on to a new job he might be too careful about criticizing people. The flavor of the job is illustrated by a comment reported to have been made by a J.O. a few years ago, "The ombudsman cannot be concerned about his popularity. It is no secret that high officials in Sweden—all of them—dislike the ombudsman. They say that he is always interfering in things he doesn't know anything about and that they could do their jobs better if he would stop meddling, and so on. But all their grumbling doesn't mean a thing. Everybody knows that it is necessary to have an ombudsman."

The grievance officer, like the ombudsman, investigates individual complaints. If he represents the complainant, like the labor union shop steward or the proposed AFSA grievance officer, his activity inevitably has a partisan cast to it. When he finds a complaint which has merit, he is in the same adversary position in pursuing it vis-a-vis the administration as the complainant is. If, on the other hand, the grievance officer is a member of the administration and finds, for instance, that a justified complaint stems from what he considers a discriminatory or unnecessary regulation, his ability to beat down the bureaucratic lethargy or vested interest he may find supporting it is dependent on his own persuasiveness. The ombudsman, with his independence, no hint of "conflict of interest," broad high level access and publicity powers, should in certain cases, at least, be able to be much more effective than the grievance officer who is in some measure identified with either complainant or administration.

Some may consider this point a distinction without a difference and it cannot be proven that it would not work out that way in practice. But it might also be found that the ombudsman concept is flexible enough to be usefully adapted to, for instance, the American foreign affairs community. It would obviously not turn out to be a replica of the Swedish—or any other—system and, in fact, it would only bc necessary to include two basic elements. First, because his effectiveness depends in large measure on moral suasion and personal prestige, the ombudsman must be well known within the community in which he operates as an individual of unimpeachable integrity, cminent fair-mindedness and objective, judicial temperament. Second, he must be independent of the administration whose "victims" he is charged with protecting.

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

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In considering how the concept could be applied to the American foreign affairs community, one can envisage an ombudsman whose "beat" is all Government employees stationed abroad, the public they serve, the Department and its sister agencies, USIA, AID and CIA. This would put him, *inter alia,* into such delicate and intractable matters as inter-agency discrimination, public vs. government, civilian vs. military, State vs. non-State, R.H.I.P., etc. How effective an ombudsman could be with such broad initial jurisdiction is debatable. Doubtless he would have to be a Presidential appointee for a fixed term and be subject to Senate confirmation.

A more modest start for such a departure from traditional American practice might be considered prudent and practical. The ombudsman might operate initially only in the personnel and administrative world of the Department and Foreign Service. In this case, appointment by the Secretary might be suitable, particularly if buttressed by additional protections such as a fixed term (four years?), assured access to the NEWSLETTER and other vehicles of publicity, guaranteed access to the Secretary and, perhaps, authority to convene the Board of Foreign Service. It should not be too difficult to draft an ombudsman's charter which would provide, at small cost, scope for interesting activity not possible at present. Considered personal commitment to the experiment by a Secretary of State would give the position sufficient solidity to make positive achievements possible.

Choosing the man would be more difficult. The ombudsman's effectiveness would depend on his prestige, judgment, persuasiveness and talent in the use of publicity. He would have a very delicate balance to maintain. No administration could tolerate the activity of an ombudsman who jumped to conclusions, publicized emotion laden opinions, made himself a burden on the time of the Secretary and other high officials, or otherwise displayed bad judgment in his attitude and style of operation. On the other hand, an ombudsman who got the reputation of not being willing to stand up to the "establishment" would soon lose the respect of his community and hence his effectiveness.

There are not many of our senior or recently retired colleagues who could confidently be picked to fill this bill, but they do exist. Alternatively, there must be eminent senior citizens in private life who have both the personal qualifications and adequate knowledge of the Department and the Service stemming, perhaps, from service as a political Ambassador or similar experience.

Certainly the United States today needs all the ideas and resources it can assemble to help meet the constantly mounting pressures and problems to which we are all subjected. The ombudsman concept is one such idea. If it is to be given a chance to adapt to the American environment it must be carefully transplanted and assiduously nurtured. The Department and Foreign Service could prove a fertile hothouse for this process. The operation would be an important element in AFSA's openness program. What about a little agitation for it? ■

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From Ted Olson

Washington Letter

June is a month that can blow cold—40 degrees one night in 1967—but mostly blows hot. Last year there were twelve days in the 90s, and one sizzler, the 28th, with a reading of 100. The electricity bills, which have been modest since the blankets could be turned off most nights, start climbing steeply again. You have been warned. What can you do about it? Nothing.

R.I.P. for Another Landmark

A couple of months ago, bound for Constitution Hall, we headed confidently for the parking niche on E street, behind the Walker-Johnson building, where we had long been accustomed to leave our car (illegally) during concerts. It wasn't there. Neither was the Walker-Johnson building. The entire western wedge of the block between E street and New York avenue had disappeared; all that remained was a high board wall, already accumulating graffiti. None of them indicated what eventually was to rise out of the emptiness behind it.

Somewhat agitated, we phoned the General Services Administration, and eventually were connected with an obliging young man who didn't know but said he'd try and find out. He called back later with part of the answer. The tract had been sold to the AFL-CIO, which had pulled down the existing structures some months earlier, and presumably intended to build something there; GSA didn't know just what.

We couldn't, of course, expect him to share our dismay. GSA is responsible for a lot of buildings, and can't afford to be sentimental about any of them. But to old-timers the passing of ugly, reliable old W-J will surely bring a twinge of nostalgia. Over the years it housed a great variety of functions, and nearly everybody had occasion to visit it a good many times.

A couple of blocks away is another and much older landmark—that stately, vine-festooned four-story red brick mansion at the northwest corner of 18th and F streets. For years, every time we walked past it, we've wondered torpidly who lived there and how it managed to survive while all around it sleek featureless new office buildings sprouted like mushrooms, only much more noisily. Well, thanks to the POST, now we know. It belongs to Mrs. Robert Low Bacon, widow of a distinguished New York Congressman. It dates from 1802, which means it's a contemporary of the White House. Chief Justice John Marshall lived there for a while in the 1830s. The Bacons bought it 45 years ago. Mrs. Bacon originally intended to bequeath it to the National Trust for Historic Preservation. Now, the POST says, she's thinking of giving it to the Government as an official residence for the Secretary of State.

The young man at GSA didn't know anything more about that than what was in the paper.

Modernization is munching away also at the block on Massachusetts just west of Dupont Circle. But No. 2009 is still there, and we trust will be for years and years to come, along with the great lady who lives there, sassy and irrepressible now as when she romped around the White House 65 years ago. Do we need to identify her?

Reflections on the H-2 Bus

If you happen to be in the neighborhood of Westmoreland Circle some afternoon between 4 and 5 o'clock you may see an interesting spectacle. One car after another drives up to the bus stop at the southwest arc of the circle and discharges a passenger. The car is usually large and sleek. The woman at the wheel is white. The woman who disembarks, to transfer to the bus or join the others awaiting its arrival, is black. The white woman drives off to her home, three to five minutes away. The black woman drops her token in the fare box and settles down for the long ride across town to *her* home—45 minutes if she is lucky, an hour, an hour and a half, two hours, with one or two waits at transfer points, if she isn't.

In the morning, from 8:30 to 9 o'clock, the scene is replayed in reverse. The big sleek cars are waiting at the northeast arc of the circle. The bus pulls up to the terminal stop and its passengers transfer for the last and much the most comfortable lap of their twice-daily journey.

The H-2 bus runs from Westmoreland Circle, where Massachusetts avenue N.W. crosses the District-Maryland line, to Bladensburg Road, in the far Northeast. It is one of several routes that exist chiefly to bring black people from the ghettoes

At a time like this, Bob Lynch isn't thinking about the balance of payments.

Bob Lynch and his wife, from Walla Walla, Washington, are getting a big kick out of spending their $200 duty-free allowance in London.

With Mrs. Lynch in a smashing evening gown, the furthest thing from her husband's mind is the U.S. balance of payments. And who can blame him?

What he probably doesn't know is that many of the Londoners they dealt with are customers of ours.

The owner of the boutique on King's Road in Chelsea, for instance, drives a rented Avis car on weekends.

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where they live to the homes of the affluent where they work. If you (assuming you have a white skin) board the H-2 at its western terminus you begin to feel a bit conspicuous by the time the bus crosses Connecticut and dips down into the park, noticeably conspicuous when it crosses 16th street. Conspicuous, and perhaps a trifle uncomfortable. Not because anybody is glowering at you; not from any warranted fear of affront or molestation. You feel uncomfortable because no sensitive person can be happy at the reminder that the community in which he lives is so sharply divided into people with light skins and people with dark skins, and that he and his family live more comfortably because they can count on their dark-skinned fellow-citizens to do most of the drearier and dirtier jobs.

After the millions of words that have been written about segregation, the thousands of yards of film that have rolled through television projectors, there would seem to be little more to say, and little point in repeating what has been said so often before. But constant repetition is often, in the language of bureaucracy, counter-productive. It may very well anesthetize rather than persuade. That's why impatient people sometimes turn to shock treatment—which is also likely to be counter-productive.

A ride on the H-2 bus or any other of the transit lines that link the two segments of our community is a mild form of shock treatment. It brings you face to face with the ugly reality of segregation—and whether it's *de jure* or *de facto* doesn't really seem so important. It sets you thinking of the immensity of the task facing us if we are not to become, as the Kerner Commission warned us, two nations—hostile nations, living side by side, but drawing farther and farther apart, less and less able to talk reasonably to each other. It may prompt you to ask: What can I do?

Well, there are things you can do. More than six years ago a letter in the JOURNAL suggested one of them. It recommended that Foreign Service families listing their residences for sale or rent during overseas assignments insist on "open occupancy"—that is, no discrimination against a prospective buyer or renter because of the color of his skin. The letter urged further that Foreign Service people "actively seek suitable colored tenants or purchasers—and do everything possible to facilitate their adjustment in their new surroundings."

It was from Ralph A. Jones, the writer of that letter, that we first learned about Suburban Maryland Fair Housing and similar organizations in the District, Arlington and Alexandria.

These organizations, operating on niggardly budgets and staffed largely by volunteers, were active in the long and finally successful fight for national, state and local laws forbidding real estate dealers and apartment house operators to discriminate among prospective purchasers or tenants because of race or color. The legislation is pretty good. But a law is worthless unless it is enforced, and attempts at evasion continue. The POST recently had a six-column story listing some of the dodges real estate dealers use to keep buildings and neighborhoods Caucasian—and often Aryan as well.

One sample: A Negro couple answering an advertisement will be told: "Sorry, that apartment has been rented. No, we have no other vacancies." Half an hour later a white couple answering the same ad will be shown the apartment and treated to the agent's most persuasive sales pitch.

This doesn't happen as often now as it used to. Too many agents who tried it have found themselves in court,

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with the white couple as prosecution witnesses; they were representatives of a Fair Housing organization. Here's an opportunity for FS wives with a flair for theatrics to do a little play-acting in a righteous cause. They would be eagerly welcomed by any of the three local organizations:

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Northern Virginia Fair Housing, Tel. 524-4452

They need volunteers for a variety of other jobs too.

Open housing isn't, of course, the complete answer, perhaps not even a major contribution to the answer. At best it merely guarantees people the right to buy or rent the best quarters they can afford, in the area of their choice, and helps them to break through the invisible barriers cunningly devised to deny them that right. The catch is in the words "the best they can afford." The average cost of a new house in Montgomery County is $42,000. Rents are correspondingly steep. The exodus from the ghetto therefore remains only a trickle.

A year ago the General Services Administration recognized the problem by announcing that it would not permit acquisition of land for new Federal facilities until it was satisfied that low- and moderate-priced housing was or would be available in the area. The National Bureau of Standards moved to Montgomery County four years ago. Since that time total employment has increased by 125, but Negro employment has declined by 73. Decentralization is too likely to leave many of the lower-level employees stranded in the ghetto, without feasible transportation to the new facilities, unable to find quarters nearer the job. SMFH and NVMH are campaigning for lower-cost housing, but not very successfully. One cheering development was the recent announcement that middle to low-income quarters are to be provided in future expansion at Reston.

De facto segregation will be with us a long, long time yet. The really tough problems have yet to be tackled seriously: A really good education for everybody, white, black, yellow or red. Equal opportunity for everybody to the limit of his skills. Decent housing and adequate diet for everybody, most particularly the young.

The biggest problem of all is how to stem the frightening drift toward *apartheid*, which the extremists of both races are trying to accelerate.

There was a shocking story in the newspapers a few weeks ago. A Negro family, educated, relatively affluent, bought a house in a Montgomery County suburb. In a year and a half not a single neighbor called on them. Their children had to learn to ignore racial jeers from their schoolmates—" 'coon' and 'nigger' and things like that." Their house and their car were vandalized.

This story, though, had a happy sequel. The day the newspapers reported their experience their phone and their doorbell began ringing. They have had hundreds of callers, hundreds of letters, all deploring the hostility they had encountered, all begging them to stay in Montgomery County. Some urged: "Move to our neighborhood. We'll make you welcome." They figure on staying where they are.

As we write this piece, we hear children coming home from the elementary school at the top of the road. Across the street, a couple of doors away, one cluster pauses for a farewell palaver, an exchange of banter, a friendly scuffle. It breaks up; four white children saunter on past; three brown children turn in at their own house. Here in Limbo, Md., there's one small nucleus of integration, and we pray that it grows.

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When Diplomats Become Organized

Foreign Service officers attracted by the notion of their Association becoming a tough collective bargaining agent will find it interesting to note that their Canadian colleagues' association is just that. Excerpts from an article by Clive Baxter in Ottawa's FINANCIAL POST describe how the "striped pants union" works.

NEXT fall, a small group of Canadian diplomats will sit down at the negotiating table opposite a steely eyed team of adversaries.

The diplomats will be the negotiating team from the Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers. Their opponents will be officials of the Treasury Board backed up by the top brass of the Departments of External Affairs and Industry, Trade & Commerce.

At issue will be the second contract to be negotiated covering the 700 foreign service officers of the two departments.

The talks will be long and tough, and, for the diplomats, tiring. This is because the union's negotiating team is made up entirely of fairly senior career officials who cannot possibly get away from their offices during the working day and can negotiate only at night.

The first contract negotiations stretched on for five months last fall and winter and there is little indication that the coming round will be any easier.

The diplomats are by no means completely at ease in their new role. It was, as they point out, forced on them by government legislation bringing in collective bargaining for all public servants not specifically exempted.

The diplomats weren't, so they faced the alternative of being grabbed up by one of the big public service unions or forming their own.

In terms of pay, responsibility and way of operating, the diplomats are clearly on the management side of the fence. Salaries of those covered range from $9,145 to $26,600.

"It didn't come easily to some of our more conservative colleagues," says Charles Marshall, the union's vice-president for the External Affairs group.

Marshall is a classic example of the dichotomy facing the diplomats. He is a senior officer, heading the Nato section, who all day long is deeply involved in what in business terms would be called management decision-making.

By night, he becomes a hardworking, and sometimes remarkably outspoken union executive.

The same is true of the others on the executive. The president is John Sharpe, chief of the political section of the United Nations division. The other vice-president is Armand Blum, a senior official in the trade policy division of the Department of Indus-

(*Continued on page* 60)



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PRESIDENT RICHARD M. NIXON, January 20, 1969

The Nuclear Years:
Moving to the Table

CHALMERS ROBERTS

Mr. Roberts, a long-time newspaperman, began his career with the Washington POST *in 1933. Among other awards he has received the Raymond Clapper Memorial award and the Washington Newspaper Guild grand prize.* *© 1970 by Praeger Publishers, Inc.* *From the forthcoming book, "The Nuclear Years: The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945-70," by Chalmers M. Roberts. Reprinted by permission.*

IN 1958, when Dwight D. Eisenhower was in the White House and Richard Nixon was his Vice-President, Eisenhower wrote in a letter to the Kremlin leaders that the two superpowers must deal with each other or "end up in the ludicrous posture of our just glaring silently at each other across the table."

How the superpowers deal with each other over arms control matters, however, cannot escape being affected by their political relationships. The story of the rival schemes for general and complete disarmament (G and C in the experts' lingo) illuminates that fact.

In September, 1960, after the Eisenhower-Khrushchev relationship had reached a total impasse in the wake of the U-2 affair and the aborted Paris summit conference, the Soviet leader came to the United Nations in New York, where he attempted to create a new ruling "troika" of Communist, capitalist, and neutralist heads for the world organization, indulged in a picturesque fit of shoe-banging, and put forward a Soviet plan for total disarmament. American officials discounted the plan as a grandiose propaganda move. Eisenhower would have nothing to do with it.

But President Kennedy, in August, 1962, while discussing with his UN envoy, Adlai Stevenson, the American position within the General Assembly for the coming year, accepted the importance, for propaganda purposes, of matching the Soviet proposal. Stevenson argued for, and Kennedy agreed to, the introduction of a G and C disarmament plan that would permit the United States to propose specific steps toward a general goal—a technique that Kennedy preferred. The Kennedy decision grew out of months of Soviet-American discussions, which had produced what was called an agreed set of principles, although the agreement was more semantic than real.

The American plan, like the Soviet proposal, provided for various stages of disarmament and covered nuclear and conventional weapons as well as military manpower. Not surprisingly, each scheme sought to protect national areas of strength to the last possible moment in an over-all disarmament plan.

After Khrushchev's overthrow in October, 1964, Russian interest in G and C plans quickly declined, and Moscow, like Washington, concentrated on specific issues in arms control. General and complete disarmament quite obviously represented far too big a bite for either nation, and it still does.

Through concentration on specifics, agreement had been reached, or nearly reached, on a number of issues when Richard Nixon came to the Presidency. Those achievements, and the negotiating experiences behind them, plus rapidly accelerating weapons development, made it imperative that the new President pick up where his predecessor had left off in the effort to curb the arms race.

In view of the progress made toward talks during the Johnson era and the Soviet statement of interest on Inauguration Day, Nixon faced the problem of devising a negotiating position and arranging for the talks. There were two key elements in the Nixon approach: the talks had to be fitted into a larger scheme of foreign policy, and the bargaining position had to be Nixon's own and not the legacy of the Johnson Administration. Thus delay was inevitable.

At his first press conference, on January 27, 1969, Nixon said that he favored strategic arms talks but that "it is a question of not only when but the context of those talks." He said he took a position between those who would "go forward with such talks clearly apart from any progress in political settlement" and those who felt that "until we make progress on political settlements it would not be wise to go forward on any reduction of our strategic arms, even by agreement with the other side."

Therefore, said the President, it was his belief that "what we must do is to steer a course between those two extremes." He defined his course:

> What I want to do is to see to it that we have strategic arms talks

> in a way and at a time that will promote, if posible, progress on outstanding political problems at the same time—for example, on the problem of the Mid-East and on other outanding problems in which the United States and the Soviet Union, acting together, can serve the cause of peace.

He clearly had the Vietnam War in mind, though he did not mention it.

This Nixon thesis came to be known as "linkage," although the word was assiduously avoided on the public record. The Russian reaction, quite expectedly, was negative, and there has been no evidence that the thesis has affected Moscow's position on either Vietnam or the Middle East.

At the same press conference, the President also altered his terminology in regard to the position from which he would bargain. When a reporter reminded Nixon of his campaign demands for nuclear "superiority" over the Soviet Union, the President replied, "I think the semantics may offer an inappropriate approach to the problem." He said he would settle for "sufficiency," a term used earlier by his national security adviser, Henry A. Kissinger. He added, "I think 'sufficiency' is a better term, actually, than either 'superiority' or 'parity.' " Five months later, a reporter asked Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard what the term "sufficiency" meant. "It means," replied Packard, "that it's a good word to use in a speech. Beyond that it doesn't mean a God-damned thing." In public relations terms, Packard may have been correct, but in terms of international relations, he was totally wrong.

The men in the Kremlin, especially since the advent of the nuclear age, have long sought American acknowledgment of Soviet parity with the United States, both parity in general, as befits a great power, and parity in nuclear arms—not only for psychological reasons but because of the importance of creating what Thomas W. Wolfe, in Soviet Power and Europe: 1965—69, called

> . . . a climate of acknowledged parity favorable to the pursuit of many of [the Soviet Union's] more important foreign policy objectives. Besides permitting the Soviet Union to deal politically with the United States as a strategic equal, a parity situation could be expected to undermine the remaining European faith in America's pledges to defend Europe even at the risk of nuclear war [and to limit American willingness] to intervene militarily against Third World "national liberation" movements without the backup of a superior strategic posture to deter Soviet countermoves.

That Nixon was indeed prepared to accept a posture of parity, whatever nomenclature might be used, was evident from his remark to the NATO ministers during his visit to Brussels on April 10, 1969: "The West does not today have the massive nuclear predominance that it once had, and any sort of broad-based arms agreement with the Soviets would codify the present balance."

As the Nixon era took shape, those most skeptical about coming to terms with Moscow on arms limitation began to suggest that the Russians were seeking more than parity in the nuclear field. The Communist doctrinal commitment, according to Wolfe, long has been to "the goal of quantitative and qualitative superiority, a goal often pushed into the background by stubborn realities but never foresworn." In Washington, there was talk by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird of the Soviet SS-9 missile as a "first strike" weapon, a line of reasoning reminiscent of the Eisenhower period when there was fear of a "nuclear Pearl Harbor."

Each new Administration, especially if the President is of a different political party than his predecessor, launches what it calls a complete review of policy. Shortly after taking office, Nixon asked for an appraisal of the SALT proposals inherited from the Johnson Administration. When the review was complete, Nixon's program was said to be not very different from Johnson's. However, as the arms race continued on into 1970, the Nixon Administration had to make alterations in its program to take into account technological changes and to ensure a variety of options at the bargaining table.



In his first months in office, the President had to cope with more immediate issues than launching the strategic arms limitation talks. There was the Vietnam War, the Middle East crisis, a trip to Western Europe to reassure the Allies, and domestic issues of all kinds. Not until June 11 was the arms review complete enough for the Administration to suggest a July 31 date for the start of talks. By then, the Kremlin was apparently having serious second thoughts.

One of the issues Nixon faced was what to do about the Sentinel anti-ballistic-missile defense system proposed by Johnson and McNamara. On March 14, the President announced that he had trimmed down the program and renamed it Safeguard and that it would go forward as "a measured construction on an active defense of our retaliatory forces." Furthermore, he stated, "we believe the Soviet Union is continuing their ABM development." They were most likely "making substantially better second-generation ABM components" and "continuing the deployment of very large missiles with warheads capable of destroying our hardened Minuteman forces" (a reference to the Soviet SS-9 missiles). They had "been substantially increasing the size of their submarine-launched ballistic missile force" and also were developing their fractional orbital missile.

The Nixon decision was to provide "for local defense of selected Minuteman missile sites and an area defense designed to protect our bomber bases and our command and control authorities" as well as to "provide a defense of the continental United States against an accidental attack" and "substantial protection against the kind of attack which the Chinese Communists may be capable of launching throughout the 1970s."

The decision set off a great debate in the U.S. Senate and across the nation, culminating on August 6 in Senate's approval of the Safeguard system by the margin of a single vote. A 50-50 tie on the most crucial of two roll-call votes failed to add to the bill an amendment that would have held up deployment of the system. (Amendments require a majority to carry.)

There were three main components to transform the Sentinel program into the Safeguard program and to the subsequent congressional and public debate: (1) the technical feasibility of the ABM system, (2) the additional money involved over a period of years in a military budget already under wide attack for consuming too much of the nation's resources, and (3) the effect a decision to deploy an ABM system might have on the expected arms talks with the Soviet Union.

The details of the technical feasibility argument were complex and much disputed, the central point being, then as now, that in the field of nuclear weaponry offensive capabilities have far outstripped defensive measures. Technical problems involved in the complex ABM system cited in the 1969 discussions still plague the program. Cost figures for the system, like those for so many other major weapons developments, both nuclear and nonnuclear, are apparently impossible to determine with any exactitude. These two factors have led many to believe that billions would be committed for a system of doubtful technical validity at the very moment that the national will seems to call for a reshaping of the country's priorities to give more emphasis to solving domestic problems.

The dominant issue, however, both within the Administration and in the congressional and public debate, was the potential effect of launching the Safeguard system at a moment when it appeared the United States and the Soviet Union, having reached a point of rough parity in nuclear weaponry, were about to meet to discuss how to curb the spiraling arms race. The compelling argument, both to the President and the Congress, was that approval of the beginning of the Safeguard system would add to the bargaining weight of the American position at the SALT talks. Those who took this view, including Nixon, accepted the necessity of trying for an agreement to curb the arms race, but they felt that the chances of success were probably not very great. Even if they were to succeed, it would take months, or more likely years, to reach any accord. In short, it would be too risky to put aside the ABM plans. If Johnson had not proposed the Sentinel system, if it had been Nixon who first had to decide whether to launch an American ABM system, the answer might possibly have been different. But Sentinel existed when Nixon came to office and thus already had a life of its own, which the new President and the Congress found it difficult to deny.

Nixon's decision, contained in his March 14, 1969, announcement of the Safeguard system, centered on two points: protection of America's land-based ICBMs against a direct attack by the Soviet Union and defense of the American people against a possible Chinese nuclear attack within the next decade. The first concern rested on a suspicion, later to grow into a widespread belief throughout the Administration, that the only conceivable reason the Soviet Union was building a large number of SS-9 missiles was to create a force that could destroy the land-based American missiles, including the 1,000 Minuteman missiles. Those most alarmed, taking what is known in military jargon as the "worst case" view, foresaw a potential Soviet first strike against the United States. Others, who took a more comprehensive view of Soviet-American relations, suspected that the Kremlin leaders hoped to create a situation in which the threat of a strike that could destroy all American land-based missiles would severely, if not fatally, limit the bargaining power of the American President. As to the potential Chinese threat, Nixon took the position in private conversation that he simply could not permit the possibility that his successor, a decade later, would have no instrument of protection against nuclear blackmail by Peking, a theme he was to enlarge upon in 1970.

The action-reaction phenomenon was evident again, and caution won the day in both the Administration and in Congress. To hold back on the ABM system, especially after Johnson had endorsed it, was considered too much of a risk. The only concession Nixon made to the opposition was to limit the extent of the ABM system and to promise to review, and possibly modify, his decision "as the threat changes, either through negotiations or through unilateral actions by the Soviet Union or Communist China." He insisted that the Safeguard program was not provocative, that the modifications in the Sentinel plans eliminated any reason for the Soviet Union to see it as "the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent," and that the program provided "an incentive for a responsible Soviet weapons policy and for the avoidance of spiraling US and Soviet strategic arms budgets."

As long as both the United States and the Soviet Union have nuclear weapons that each knows the other can deliver, the balance of terror is preserved by mutual deterrence. The introduction of rival ABM systems, however, if they were able to prevent the delivery of most if not all offensive missiles, would upset that balance to the degree that the defenses of one nation or the other would be superior in effectiveness. The initiation of the Soviet ABM system had produced cries of alarm in the United States; Moscow was moving to upset the balance. The beginnings of the American ABM system must surely have produced a mirror-image reaction in the Kremlin. An effective ABM defense for one side alone would, given the offensive weapons already in place, produce the conditions in which a first strike would be a thinkable risk in military terms. Hence, Nixon argued, by limiting the Sentinel system, which, despite denials, some felt was a prelude to a "thick" system to provide complete protection for the American population, he was not moving to "an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet deterrent."

The Senate debate centered on

the ABM, its technical feasibility, its cost, and whether it would upset the balance of terror on the eve of the arms talks. By the time the Senate voted, however, opponents of the Safeguard system had come to realize the importance of the other new scientific development, the multiple-headed, independently targetable warheads known as MIRVs. The congressional debate brought to light much new information on the MIRV, which provided vital data for both American and Soviet consideration of SALT talks.

MIRV was conceived in response to fears that a Soviet ABM system could provide a defense that American weapons with but a single warhead might not be able to penetrate. The strongest public proponent of MIRV development (and, indeed, of a whole spectrum of continuing efforts to assure American superiority) was Dr. John S. Foster, Jr., the Pentagon's research and engineering chief and former head of the University of California's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Livermore. Foster, referring to the Russians, declared that his aims were "to make sure that whatever they do of the possible things that we imagine they might do, we will be prepared."

While the Senate argued over the ABM issue and tried to determine the significance of MIRV, Foster and the Pentagon fought to continue and complete MIRV testing. When senators began to call for a MIRV test ban as a first order of business at the coming arms talks, Foster argued that "an effective limitation on Soviet ABMs should be a precondition to a ban on further MIRV testing." He also cast doubt, in testimony before a House Foregn Affairs subcommittee on August 4, 1969, according to the public portion of the record, on the ability of the United States to police a MIRV test ban. To Foster, the American MIRV was designed as a second strike weapon—for a retaliatory blow only—to deter a Soviet first strike and therefore "must be considered as a stabilizing influence" in the arms race.

The Soviet Union was soon made aware by the American debate that a MIRV test ban might be the initial US proposal at the talks. Furthermore, it may have been that many of the arguments in favor of the ban were found convenient by those in the Soviet Union who opposed a strategic missile agreement with the United States. That there continued to be such opponents could be deduced from Gromyko's July 10, 1969, speech, which undoubtedly reflected the will of the Kremlin majority. The arms race, he said, had long ago become a folly. Much else of what he said was reminiscent of reasoning in the United States:

> There are problems connected with disarmament that require urgent solution. Among these problems, one of the most important is the problem of the so-called strategic arms. The point of the matter is primarily whether the big powers ought to come to an agreement to arrest the race of creating increasingly destructive means of attack and counterattack, or whether each of them is to try to break out ahead in one sphere or another to obtain military advantage against his rivals, which will force the latter to mobilize even greater national resources for the arms race; and thus ad infinitum.
>
> There is another side of the matter, too, that also cannot be ignored by a state's long-term policy. It is linked to a considerable extent with the fact that the systems of the control and direction of arms are becoming increasingly autonomous, if one can put it this way, from the people who create them. Human capacity to hear and see are incapable of reacting to modern speeds. The human brain is no longer capable of assessing at sufficient speed the results of the multitude of instruments. The decisions adopted by man depend in the last analysis upon the conclusions provided by computers. The government[s] must do everything possible to be able to determine the development of events and not to find themselves in the role of captives of the events.

Once again Gromyko said the Soviet Union was ready for "an exchange of views" on arms limitations. But it was more than three months before talks began.

Meanwhile, scientific development raced on in both countries. By mid-1969, the United States had made nine flight tests of Poseidon submarine-borne missiles with MIRV warheads and nine tests of Minuteman III. The test program was scheduled to be completed in May, 1970, with first deployment following closely thereafter. The Soviet MRV and MIRV programs were thought in Washington to be somewhat less advanced. John S. Foster, Jr., said on August 5, 1969, that in his judgment the Soviet "triplet," (three bombs in a single warhead) "probably is a MIRV" designed to attack hard targets, namely American Minuteman missile sites. Furthermore, Foster assumed that the Russians "under normal circumstances would be ready to deploy the SS-9 triplet some time in the latter half" of 1970, a date not far beyond the completion date of the American schedule. Thus, by the fall of 1969, it appeared that the MIRV genie was out of the bottle. (Some officials said the genie had escaped as far back as 1962, when the Polaris A-3 missile, with a multiple but not independently targetable warhead, was first placed in service aboard an American submarine.)

Whether the American estimate of the Soviet MIRV development was overstated or understated, the gap itself may have played a part in the long Soviet delay in agreeing to start talks. Perhaps the Kremlin feared that it might be embarrassed by an American proposal at the talks for a quick freeze on further MIRV tests.

The action-reaction phenomenon once again was evident in MIRV development. Had the two superpowers met in the fall of 1968, at the time MIRV tests for Poseidon and Minuteman III missiles were about to get under way, they might have been able to agree on a mutual freeze and thus have prevented escalation of the nuclear arms race to a new, more dangerous, and more expensive level. Whether the same results would have been obtained if the Nixon Administration had been willing to start talks just after the new President took office is debatable, but perhaps not impossible. But clearly by the time the talks did begin, the problem had become far more complex.

The Nixon Administration did

act quickly on one arms control issue. Shortly after taking office, the President gave the go-head to Senate consideration of the nuclear proliferation treaty, and consent was voted, 83 to 15, on March 13, 1969. However, Moscow withheld ratification, apparently waiting for the West Germans to sign, and the United States also delayed formal ratification in hopes of concluding the process on the same day as the Soviet Union.

The West German election in October, 1969, and the subsequent choice of Willy Brandt, head of the Social Democratic Party, as chancellor, finally broke the nonproliferation treaty logjam. Brandt, as foreign minister in the previous coalition government of Kurt Georg Kiesinger, had long advocated West German signature, but in vain. Once in office, Brandt signed the treaty in Bonn on November 28, and by prior agreement the United States and the Soviet Union completed their own ratification processes, leaving only the final act of depositing their ratifications.*

Brandt, however, issued a statement saying that the German signature on the document was based on several understandings, among them that the UN resolution calling on its members for action in case of either a nuclear threat or an actual attack applied without restriction to West Germany, even though that



country is not a UN member. Furthermore, West Germany pointed out that the treaty provided an eighteen-month period for melding the IAEA-Euratom inspection provisions. Until that step had been completed, West Germany would not ratify the treaty.

Nonetheless, the West German signature, plus Brandt's new and more friendly policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, had increased the treaty's prospects. Japan, for example, signed in February, 1970, lest it lose the opportunity afforded signatory nations to play a role in formulating the inspection provisions.

On March 5, 1970, when the required forty nonnuclear nations had completed the ratification process, including deposit of their ratifications in Moscow, London, or Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union made their deposits, and the treaty at last came into force. Still, it lacked adherence from such important nuclear-potential nations as Australia, Israel, Japan, India, and Pakistan.

Nixon's general review of American post-Vietnam policy in Asia produced a new doctrine in the broad area of nuclear protection for nonnuclear nations. The new doctrine was disclosed by the President on July 25, 1969, during a stop at Guam en route to Asia. He said then that in the future Asian nations would be expected to take primary responsibility for their own military defense with a single stated exception: the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons. An anonymous White House spokesman (identified as Henry A. Kissinger) later added that the Administration would have to take into account the nature of the threat to any nation, so that a threat with nuclear weapons would have to be treated with a special gravity, whether or not a formal American commitment to such a nation existed.

Nixon's remarks at Guam could not be directly quoted, but he later put the most important phrases on public record. In his 1970 report to Congress on "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s," he formulated the doctrine this way: "We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole."

But these generalities, which left the initiative in the hands of the United States, were no more satisfactory to the nuclear-potential nations that had not acceded to the nonproliferation treaty than had been the joint Soviet-American pledges at the United Nations.

Technical arguments, the issue of on-site inspection, and the continuing arms race itself have thus far prevented agreement on extending the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty so as to include underground explosions. Since that treaty took effect, the Atomic Energy Commission has announced a total of 173 weapons-related American underground tests through December 31, 1969. The AEC also announced that its detection network had disclosed, in the same period, three Soviet underground tests and thirty-four seismic signals, which presumably represented tests. However, not all tests of either nation are announced by the AEC. To do so would disclose the degree of sophistication of the American detection system. (In the same period, the AEC reported two British underground tests, thirteen French atmospheric tests, and one Chinese underground and nine Chinese atmospheric tests.)

Once above-ground testing had been banned, American and Soviet scientists developed techniques to try out devices both more powerful and, as in the case of ABM and MIRV testing, more sophisticated

* In general, multilateral international agreements provide that one or more governments involved, usually major powers, will act as the depository (or depositories) of the document. In a physical sense, someone has to hold the document; in a diplomatic sense, there must be some specified place to which nations can direct messages affecting such an agreement, for example, either to join an existing treaty or to serve notice the document is no longer considered binding. In the United States (where the physical depository is a State Department vault), the common belief is that the Senate ratifies a treaty, but this is not technically correct. The Constitution provides that the Senate shall give its "consent" by a two-thirds vote of those present. The President then signs the instrument of consent and finally, deposits the ratification document. Only when that last step has been taken, is the treaty binding on the United States, assuming that by then it has had the number of final approvals by other nations required to bring it into force. The final two steps—signing and depositing the document—are usually *pro forma* but they can be used, as in the case of the nonproliferation treaty, for purposes of delay.

than had previously been carried out underground. Thus the test ban, while protecting the world's population from most of the contamination resulting from atmospheric testing, did not, as some of its proponents had hoped, inhibit the arms race itself. In a few of these underground tests, in both the Soviet Union and the United States, some radioactive debris escaped into the atmosphere and drifted into Canada from the United States and into China and Japan from the Soviet Union. Both Moscow and Washington, although they exchanged formal notes for the record, avoided charges of violation of the test ban treaty and proclaimed that the venting (as it was called) was unintentional and harmless to humans.

Detection devices to monitor underground tests have improved over the years but not to the point that the United States was prepared to accept the Soviet proposal for an underground ban without on-site inspection. Third countries, notably Sweden, have tried to develop compromise techniques, but to no avail. Sweden proposed a challenge-and-response system under which the nation suspecting a violation would challenge the other to disprove it, perhaps by on-site inspection, and be permitted to withdraw from the treaty if it found the response unsatisfactory. Another proposal was to ban the larger underground tests and limit tests to a specific level as measured on the internationally accepted seismic scale.

After leaving his post as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, William C. Foster declared, "The time has come for a hard look at the necessity for on-site inspections." In a speech on October 8, 1969, he argued for a comprehensive test ban (CTB):

> It is hard to believe that the security risk posed by the relatively few tests the Soviets might be able to carry out without being detected by national means would exceed the security risk of unlimited numbers of Soviet weapons tests that are permitted in the absence of a CTB. Of course, it can be pointed out that without a CTB the US also could continue testing and thereby counter-balance the Soviet tests. But would this really counterbalance the security risk or would it merely add fuel to the nuclear arms race?

Foster, with the luxury of having shed public responsibility, gave voice to the internal arguments in which he had so long been involved when he said that "the crux of the problem is how much assurance is adequate, and this is a political rather than a technical decision." So far, the rule of thumb has prevailed: where there is technical doubt, political decisions tend to be on the conservative side.

In October, 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an additional agreement on a preemptive step to avoid enlarging the locale of the arms race by ensuring that the world's seabeds be reserved for peaceful purposes only. The effort to reach this agreement, initiated in 1967, had followed the pattern of the successful effort to ban nuclear weapons from outer space.

Although both Washington and Moscow readily agreed to the principle of the treaty, each sought to protect its own interests in the final document. The Soviet Union called for complete demilitarization, a ban inclusive enough to preclude not only nuclear weapons emplaced on seabeds but also defensive mines and various submarine detection devices that the United States already had emplaced to track the expanding Soviet underwater fleet. The United States proposal was limited to a ban on nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (specifically, meaning chemical and biological weapons). In mid-August, 1969, the Russians offered to accept the American version of the treaty if the United States would accept the Soviet proposal that the ban become effective at the twelve-mile offshore limit rather than at the three-mile limit Washington had proposed.

By fall, an agreement satisfactory to Washington and Moscow had been reached, but other nations had become disturbed about their rights under the rather generalized inspection provisions and about the effects of the offshore limitation on certain coastal areas. The inspection agreement in the draft treaty permitted any nation to check for itself the international waters covered, a task so difficult that probably only the United States and the Soviet Union could or would undertake it. The UN General Assembly expressed these feelings on December 12, 1969, when it asked the two drafting powers to clear up the uncertainties when they next met at the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1970.

While Washington waited for Soviet word on when and where to start the SALT talks, the Sino-Soviet conflict appeared to be approaching the point of warfare.



A word should be said here about China, which has become increasingly important in the nuclear calculations of both the United States and the Soviet Union. The Chinese nuclear weapons and missile tests, monitored by American observation satellites and other means, have showed a high degree of technical sophistication. Although, by 1969, the program lagged behind American estimates, John S. Foster, Jr., Pentagon research chief, said on February 24, 1970, that a Chinese test of an ICBM could be expected within the year.

Exactly what the Russians knew or thought about the Chinese program is unknown, but Red Army marshals have clearly grown increasingly worried about China's nuclear growth, especially in light of the intensifying Sino-Soviet political controversies and the recent military clashes along the two countries' long common borders. Some analysts have even suggested that the Soviet ABM system was designed in part to protect against Chinese missiles. This view was acknowledged indirectly by the Nixon Administration when Henry A. Kiss-

inger, in an interview in LOOK magazine on August 12, 1969, stated, "I doubt if the Soviet Union will give up the Moscow (ABM) system, and I doubt I would urge them to."

Although the record shows that the Chinese Communists have acted in a generally prudent manner militarily since coming to power, their excessively bellicose language has engendered fears. It is not easy to totally dismiss for example, the widely printed Chinese polemic of 1960 in which Peking professed no fear of nuclear war with the United States and declared that the inevitable Communist victory "would create very swiftly a civilization thousands of times higher than the capitalist system and a truly beautiful system for [the Communists] themselves." Mao Tse-tung and his followers, verbally at least, have consistently rejected Khrushchev's warning that, although the United States may be a paper tiger, as Peking has claimed, "the paper tiger has nuclear teeth."

In September, 1969, when relations between the Soviet Union and China had reached a new high point of tension, the accident of death brought Kosygin to Hanoi for the funeral of Ho Chi-minh, the leader of North Vietnam. The Soviet leader then made a quick trip to Peking, where he met with Chinese Premier Chou En-lai. After the meeting, it was announced that the two nations would meet to talk over their border quarrel on October 20, 1969.

To Washington's surprise, on the day the Sino-Soviet talks began, Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin met President Nixon secretly at the White House. A few days later, on October 25, a joint announcement was made of the date—November 17—and the place—Helsinki, Finland—for preliminary discussions of negotiation on curbing the strategic arms race.

The coincidence of dates for the beginning of the Moscow-Peking talks and the Dobrynin call on Nixon added to the American conviction that one of the reasons for the Kremlin's delay in agreeing to the SALT talks had been to avoid jeopardizing the chances of resolving the quarrel with China. The Soviet leaders long had been aware of Peking's charges that Moscow and Washington were acting in collusion against China. The Soviet leaders had also been wary of signs that the Nixon Administration was beginning to relax American hostility toward the Peking regime. The Chinese, in turn, played upon Soviet worries by agreeing in December, 1969, to resume the Chinese-American diplomatic dialogue that Peking had broken off two years earlier. It was evident, as the 1970s began, that the triangular Washington-Moscow-Peking relationship would be critical in world affairs in general and in relation to arms control measures in particular.

On the day of the Washington-Moscow announcement of the SALT talks, Secretary of State William P. Rogers sought to bury the Nixon "linkage" thesis — anathema to Moscow — by telling a press conference that the SALT talks "are not conditional in any sense of the word. We haven't laid down any conditions for those talks." But the Administration hedged when Nixon's press secretary, commenting on the Rogers statement the following day, stated that "these talks cannot take place in a vacuum. The President's feeling is that there is a certain relation between SALT and outstanding political problems." Moscow expressed annoyance but nothing more.

At his press conference, Rogers also did what so many secretaries of State before him had done when American-Soviet talks were announced: he warned against "euphoria" and predicted long and difficult discussions. He also noted that the Moscow-Washington announcement had referred to negotiations "on curbing the strategic arms race," not on disarming the two superpowers. Rogers pointed out that Peking's nuclear program had not progressed far enough to require China joining the talks. If the two superpowers could reach agreement, he added, "We can deal with China's problem later on."

Announcement of the date for the SALT talks brought renewed congressional and public pressure on Nixon to propose at Helsinki a mutual freeze on MIRV testing while the discussions were under way, in hopes that such a step would lead to a permanent ban, perhaps in connection with a ban or limitation on rival ABM systems. But the President, on the eve of the talks, ruled out any such proposal. Indeed, the United States secretly tipped off the Soviet Union that there would be no American proposals, and Washington expressed the hope that there would be none from Moscow either. This turned out to be the case. Nixon wanted instead an exchange of views in order to define the scope of the more substantive talks to follow the preliminaries at Helsinki. In Washington, caution was the order of the day, and the same appeared to be true in Moscow.

To head the American delegation, Nixon named Gerard C. Smith, whom he had also selected to succeed William C. Foster as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Smith had been a State Department official in the Eisenhower years and a leading advocate of the ill-fated multilateral nuclear force. He now found himself in the position of his predecessors, pushing for Presidential approval of risk-taking, in contrast to those who advocated a cautious approach to arms control. The four other American delegation members were Paul H. Nitze, who had served as Deputy Secretary of Defense in the last years of the Johnson Administration; Llewellyn E. Thompson, the retired Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who had tried to get the SALT talks under way for Johnson; Harold Brown, formerly head of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, chief of Pentagon research, and Secretary of the Air Force, and at present President of the California Institute of Technology; and Major General Royal B. Allison, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who, during the previous year, had immersed himself in the nuclear arms control problem.

The Soviet delegation was comparable. It was headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladmir S. Semyonov, the top Moscow expert on Germany. He was picked in place of the top Soviet arms control ex-

pert, V. V. Kutzenov, who was then leading the Soviet delegation at the Peking talks. Sitting on Semyonov's right at the Helsinki table was Colonel General Nikolai V. Ogarkov, First Deputy Chief of the General Staff (the Soviet equivalent of the American Joint Chiefs). On Semyonov's left was Dr. Alexander N. Shchukin, a scientific academician. In all, the Soviet group of six delegates and eighteen advisers included five generals, an admiral, and two colonels. The American group of five delegates and nineteen advisors had only one general and three field grade officers. Each group included many who had lived in the other group's country and spoke its language; many had long been associated with arms control.

At the single public session in Helsinki, both sides spoke of hopes for "mutually acceptable" limitations on the arms race. In a message to the conference, Nixon repeated his concept of "sufficiency," declaring that he did not "underestimate the suspicion and distrust that must be dispelled if you are to succeed in your assignment." He alluded to his linkage theory by saying that he was "conscious of the historical fact that wars and crises between nations can arise not simply from the existence of arms but from clashing interests or the ambitious pursuit of unilateral interests. That is why we seek progress toward the solution of the dangerous political issues of our day."

The latter statement indicated, once again, how intertwined in the President's thinking about arms control were Soviet-American relationships affecting the Middle East, Vietnam, and the East-West problem in Europe.

The atmosphere at international conferences, especially at strictly Soviet-American meetings, usually provides a clue to what is occurring behind closed doors. During the five weeks of the Helsinki meeting there were constant reports by both sides of "business-like" sessions without polemics, interspersed with social events at which smiles and clinking champagne glasses were the order of the day. The end result, publicly, was a December 22, 1969, communiqué. This was the key paragraph:

> The preliminary exchange of views which took place concerning the limitations of strategic arms was useful to both sides. As a result of that exchange, each side is able better to understand the views of the other with respect to the problems under consideration. An understanding was reached on the general range of questions which will be the subject of further US-Soviet exchanges.

The two nations agreed to resume negotiations on April 16, 1970, in Vienna and to return at an unspecified date to Helsinki. The Vienna talks, as was the case at Helsinki, were to alternate between the Soviet and American embassies, thus providing a degree of secrecy satisfactory to both countries.

It appeared that at Helsinki the two sides accepted the idea of mutual deterrence—hopefully at the existing rough parity of nuclear arms. Each sought to learn how the other approached the problem and how various weapons systems, including ABMs and MIRVs, were viewed within the context of the deterrence concept. The exchanges—usually in the form of working papers read by one side to the other at the conference table and expanded on in private social conversations—were both preliminary and philosophical rather than detailed. This was made evident by the post-Helsinki feeling expressed privately by American and Soviet officials that the Vienna round of talks would have to get down to specific proposals by each side if there were to be any agreement in 1970.

On the American side, the NATO allies, as Nixon had pledged, were told what had transpired at Helsinki. Still, as 1970 began, many of these nations, with the exception of Great Britain and perhaps France, had not, in Washington's view, realized the significance of a potential agreement based on a rough Soviet-American parity in place of the long-held American nuclear superiority. Whether this realization would lead to a feeling among Western European countries that the United States—because of the increased danger to itself—would be less willing to come to their aid in the future than it had in the past remained to be seen.

One of the uncertainties at Helsinki concerned Soviet intentions in building so many massive SS-9 ICBMs. By February 20, 1970, according to Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, the Soviet Union had deployed or had under construction over 275 SS-9s. Other officials estimated that, at the current rate of deployment, the figure could approach 400 by the fall of 1970.

An official American projection issued on February 18, 1970, estimated that by the end of the year the Soviet Union would have 1,290 ICBMs, compared to 1,054 for the United States, and 300 submarine-launch ballistic missiles, compared to 656 for the United States. The President expressed concern about the multiple warhead program for the SS-9 and about the Soviet Union's "apparent interest" in improving ICBM accuracy.

In megatonnage, or what is sometimes called "throw weight" (what one side can hurl at the other), the Soviet Union was considerably ahead in terms of land-based missiles.

Moscow's potential for adding MIRV warheads to its SS-9s and for creating a force of mobile, land-based missiles ("easily camouflaged" and "hardly detected by (Americans) air and space reconnaissance," as the commander of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces had boasted in early 1968) added to worries in Washington on the eve of the Vienna meeting.

Exactly what developments produced counterpart worries in Moscow can only be surmised; certainly the far larger American nuclear submarine fleet and the apparently greater American progress in MIRV testing were among such worries. One about which there was no doubt was the development of the American Safeguard ABM system.

On January 30, 1970, President Nixon announced at a press conference that he had decided, after a review, to proceed with the Safeguard system. The first phase, begun after congressional approval in mid-1969, was deployment of the ABM system to protect two complexes of Minuteman missiles, one

(*Continued on page* 62)

"Examples of bureaucratic self-renewal are few and far between and certainly the Department of State does not have a history of success."

Environmental Change and Organizational Adaptation:

The Problem of the State Department

ANDREW M. SCOTT

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EVERY organization exists in an environment and interacts with it to some extent. When the environment changes in a significant way the organization usually goes through a process of adaptation which, allowing for time lag, corresponds in some way to the environmental change. If sufficient adaptation does not take place, strains will develop and the organization will begin to move toward irrelevance, extinction, or some form of abrupt, forced, change. Some organizations adapt to change more readily than others. This article deals with an organization—the Department of State—which has found adaptation extremely difficult.

To note that the Department has been insufficiently adaptive is not to suggest that it has been changeless. The Foreign Service Act of 1946 and the integration of State Department officers into the Foreign Service in 1953, for example, represented efforts to make the Department and the Foreign Service more effective instruments of American foreign policy. Such changes have usually resulted from external pressures rather than internal.

Interestingly enough, during the period since World War II in which the adaptation of the Department of State was altogether inadequate, the foreign affairs system as a whole showed an impressive capacity for adaptation. Foreign aid began in the post-World War II period with the modest goals of relief and rehabilitation. Governmental agencies were formed to administer aid programs, and the concept of what might be done with economic aid gradually expanded to encompass the economic rebirth of one continent and the economic development of others.

The concept of technical assistance emerged as a response to needs and when it was funded and supported, a new instrument of statecraft was born. The United States Government wanted to carry its story to other nations during the Cold War and so yet another instrument of statecraft, the United States Information Agency, came into being.

Various forms of military aid were developed—the use of military advisors, the training of foreign officers in the United States, the development of civic action programs, and so on. Just as new weapons altered the nature of war and the way that men thought about it, they also altered the way that men thought about peace: the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was created, and the White House was organized to play a more important role in the foreign affairs process. But in the midst of all these developments, the Department of State showed only minimal adaptation.

The starting point for understanding the Department lies in an appreciation of the nature and dominance of the Foreign Service corps. Only 15 percent of those employed by the Department of State are Foreign Service officers but they set the tone for the whole. The Foreign Service has the characteristics of a typical career service including entry at the bottom, resistance to lateral entry, career tenure and regular advancement through grades if qualified, competition with others for advancement, *esprit de corps,* and a tendency toward corps self-government.

The Foreign Service has developed an internal culture of its own consisting of an interrelated set of ideas, behavioral norms, and operating practices, including several of those enumerated above. The norms and ideology associated with this culture permeate the Department and govern Departmental responses in a variety of important areas.

This subculture contains elements which satisfy short-term needs of the career service and individuals in it but which do not necessarily satisfy the long-term needs of the Department of State nor the requirements of American foreign policy. These elements include hostile or condescending attitudes toward research, planning, management, and "outsiders." Their dysfunctionality often takes the form of promoting attitudes and behavior that tend to insulate the organization from full and free contact with its environment, which reduces pressure to adapt to it. The short-term functionality of these elements is usually to be found in the way in which they soothe and reassure members of the subculture, protect them from critics and criticism, help smooth interpersonal relations within the Service, and promote discipline and order.

One aspect of the Foreign Service subculture is the extent to which it encourages officers to become in-

ward looking and absorbed in the affairs of the Service. Perhaps all career services tend to do this, but the Foreign Service carries it to an extreme. When an individual finds himself in an environment that places great emphasis upon rank and status, he usually learns to concern himself with matters of assignment, promotion, the impression he makes on fellow officers, the position he takes on shifting alignments in the Service, and the like. Learning to adapt one's behavior and reactions to expectations of the organization is an important part of being molded into it. The fully adapted individual has learned the organization's norms and expected behavior patterns so well that he conforms to them without thought. If this pattern were universal, the internal affairs of the Service would move smoothly and without a hitch, but it would be detrimental to American foreign policy.

Given the importance to the individual of the internal workings of the Service it is understandable that he may become as concerned with these workings, and their relation to his career, as with the organization's success in dealing with the external world. If an officer fails to do well in internal competition he will be directly penalized, but if the organization fails to cope effectively with its environment he may not suffer personally at all because the responsibility for the failure will be diffused throughout the entire organization. It is not surprising, therefore, that an individual may become more concerned with office holding than with organizational accomplishment, more concerned with trying to *be* something rather than with trying to *do* something. There is no invisible hand that makes it inevitable that the internal processes of an organization must necessarily produce results that are in harmony with the formal objectives of the organization. The two may easily drift into conflict and when this happens it is as likely that the formal goals of the organization will suffer as that organizational imperatives will be disregarded. The very absorption with Service matters that molding encourages, and almost requires, can be coun-



terproductive from the point of view of the conduct of foreign policy.

If an organization is dealing with a relatively stable and unchanging environment, an insulated mode of operation may work fairly well, but if the environment is highly dynamic, as is the international environment, insulation is likely to entail high costs. For one thing, it hinders the development in the organization of a determination to do what it can to shape events. Attitudes toward planning provide a case in point. The ideology teaches that planning is usually futile because each situation is unique and cannot be anticipated. That being the case, the best that one can do is to play things by ear and improvise creatively when events require it. Ideology, therefore, is one reason the Department is often incapable of a serious planning effort.

A nation with widespread interests should be constantly planning for the future. Those responsible for policy must ask what actions should be taken today and tomorrow and next month in order to bring about a desired result some time in the more distant future. If the Department of State is not prepared to undertake this activity some other organization is likely to try to fill the vacuum. During the Robert S. McNamara era it was the Department of Defense, to a degree. The changing role of the President's staff has been more important. The White House is not insulated from its environment but is, on the contrary, a focal point for a great many pressures. The members of the White House staff do not belong to the State Department subculture, do not share its attitudes toward planning, and hence are free to plan. Furthermore, they are at the President's elbow and a President is likely to feel the need for effective policy planning.

The White House staff has been important in the foreign affairs field from the time that John F. Kennedy assumed office. The explanation for this is, in part, that the Presidents of the 1960s have been strong or interested in foreign affairs. At the outset President Kennedy expected to operate through the State Department and established the McGeorge Bundy operation only when that expectation was disappointed. Lyndon Johnson had great confidence in Secretary Rusk but that did not prevent W. W. Rostow from becoming a powerful figure in foreign affairs. Henry Kissinger, foreign affairs advisor to President Nixon, is shaping American policy more visibly than the Department of State and has made a point of drawing certain planning functions to himself and his staff.

Foreign affairs staff members in the White House have become important because the times have demanded action and the Department of State has not been able to gear itself for action. There is significance in President Kennedy's happy daydream of "establishing a secret office of 30 people or so to run foreign policy while maintaining the State Department as a facade in which people might contentedly carry papers from bureau to bureau."

It may seem strange to speak of the Department as insulated from its environment when its officers all over the world file millions of words annually, but the term is nevertheless appropriate. If a scale could be developed showing the extent to which public organizations interact with their environments the Department would be found toward the lower end of that scale. It is insulated in that the Foreign Service is:

- A career service with little lateral entry,
- Its members have a high level of interaction with one another and a relatively low level with significant figures in the outside environment—Congressmen, individuals in other departments and agencies, young people, corporate executives, academicians, and certain categories of foreigners,
- It is unresponsive to chang-

ing circumstances and to the emergence of new skills, new information, new ideas, and new problems.

• It defines what is relevant to its mission in a parochial way.

• It has developed ways of explaining away outside criticism and has learned to ignore or sidetrack most demands for change.

It is easy to understand why individuals in an organization may try to shield the organization from its environment. When the organization is insulated, the need for disruptive adjustments to the environment is reduced and uncertainty and felt pressure are minimized. Isolation makes life easier. Men can do things the way they are accustomed to, and they can think accustomed thoughts.

The drive toward isolation can be seen in many organizations but has been particularly apparent in the Department of State. Since changes in the international environment in which it operates are many, complex, and follow one another in rapid succession, the attractiveness of holding that environment at arm's length is particularly great. Since the Washington environment is also complex and changing and, in addition, is somewhat threatening and critical, it is not surprising that the Department should have developed fairly elaborate defense mechanisms.

Structural characteristics of the career system also impede easy adaptation. When entry into the Service is primarily at the bottom, the carriers of new ideas are apt to be young and to be low in rank, status, and influence. Power in the organization will rest in the hands of older men who are likely to be imbued with traditional ideas. During a workshop in 1966, junior Foreign Service officers identified a number of Departmental problems, including the following:

- Assignment to jobs is based more on seniority than on competence;
- The Service is not making use of modern organizational training, and assignment practices;
- Older officers prevent progressive, adaptive action by younger officers;
- The Service reserves decisions to the highest levels and suppresses ideas from lower levels;
- Fear of criticism and retaliation inhibit dissent and the expression of non-conformist ideas.

Each of these "problems" represents a feature of the Foreign Service system that is functional from the point of view of a senior officer's conception of the smooth operation of the Service, i.e., a seniority system, personalized management, caution and conservatism on the part of senior officers, deference on the part of junior officers, the absence of vigorous debate that might mar interpersonal relations. Yet each of these features is also counter-productive from the point of view of the Service's long-term future and its formal purposes. Order and discipline within the Service are purchased at the cost of imagination, flexibility and organizational drive.

The argument set forth here is that Departmental officers have crippled the Department of State by promoting insulation and by furthering a variety of counter-productive doctrines. If this line of analysis is correct, it means that the subculture these people represent will have to be substantially modified before the Department can play its proper role in foreign affairs. The historical record of the Department discourages optimism. Examples of bureaucratic self-renewal are few and far between and certainly the Department of State does not have a history of success.

Nevertheless, in recent years there have been stirrrings that may prove to be important. In 1967 a group of Young Turks in the Foreign Service gained control of the American Foreign Service Association to use it as an instrument for service reform. Some of the reforms that the Association's leadership is concerned with—improved training, more effective use of research, rapid promotion of able younger officers, altered assignment practices—would have the effect of weakening the hold of a number of the doctrines that now tie up the Department.

The leaders of the Association have also indicated that they intend to open the Foreign Service to its environment. One of the ways they propose to do this is by giving Foreign Service officers experience in the nongovernmental sectors of the foreign affairs community.

Many individuals work professionally in foreign affairs outside the government. Together with those in the government, they make up a "foreign affairs community." Members of this community not in the government represent a resource that governmental agencies could utilize more fully. Conversely, members of the community in the government represent a resource from the point of view of overseas businesses, foundations concerned with international affairs, banks, nongovernmental organizations with international interests, and academic institutions.

A larger degree of lateral movement of personnel among the various sectors of the community could be a net gain for all concerned. The attractiveness of the Foreign Service would certainly be increased and its competitive position would be improved if movement in and out of it were made much easier. At present, a young man considering the Foreign Service is asked to choose a way of life once and for all because the decision to go into the Service usually forecloses other options. An able young man would be more likely to opt for the Service if he knew that he could move out of it for a few years with comparative ease and then back in if he chose.

Perhaps, in time, young men may be able to plan for a career in foreign affairs that will involve relatively easy movement among the various sectors of the foreign affairs community. An individual's career would not have to be tied to a particular organization, such as the Foreign Service, but could be planned with an eye to the broad arena of foreign affairs. Perhaps also, in time, the Foreign Service and the other governmental services will be merged into a single foreign affairs service. This would do a good deal to overcome any tendency toward parochialism and would certainly open up the Foreign Service.

The leaders of the Foreign Serv-

(*Continued on page* 63)

On Dissent

THE period since the last issue of the JOURNAL went to press has been unique in the complexity of the controversies that have engrossed our attention and in the importance for those in foreign affairs of the issues underlying those controversies.

At stake have been the future of AID and its personnel, the direction of reform within the Department of State, the future of diplomacy in the face of the kidnapping and murder of diplomats, and the cardinal issue of dissent.

The issue of dissent arose in particularly controversial form for the official foreign affairs community following the President's decision to send American troops into Cambodia. That decision evoked expressions of concern to Secretary Rogers from various individuals and groups within the foreign affairs agencies. One such expression became public.

To counter the incorrect impression which it anticipated might result from press coverage of this matter, the AFSA Board on May 11 sent the President this letter:

> Dear Mr. President:
>
> The American Foreign Service Association is the major professional organization of foreign affairs personnel in the Government. As a matter of principle, the Association does not take positions on substantive foreign-policy issues. It does hold and hereby reaffirms the principle that, when the President has taken a foreign-policy decision, it is the duty of the Foreign Service to give him its full loyalty and support.
>
> We welcome your reaffirmation of Friday evening [May 8] that yours is an open Administration and will continue to be so, and we endorse Secretary Rogers' repeated encouragement of candid communication within the Department of State. We believe that the participation of the Foreign Service in the formulation of American goals abroad is more important now than it has ever been. In the exercise of its official duties, the Foreign Service owes you and the Secretary its best advice in the development of foreign-policy decisions. Once a decision has been made, the Foreign Service owes you and the Secretary complete support in its implementation.
>
> The Foreign Service has deeply appreciated your support over the years, both public and private. We will strive to continue to merit it.
>
> Respectfully,
> Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
> President.

Some AFSA members contend that this letter raises a false issue by linking the expression of concern to the Secretary on Cambodia to the support of the Foreign Service in the execution of foreign policy decisions. They hold that the loyalty of the Foreign Service should be considered beyond question, and that the Board's letter to the President was therefore gratuitous. They also feel that, by sending the letter when it did, the AFSA Board acted contrary to the convictions of a substantial portion of the membership and by implication repudiated the actions of some Foreign Service personnel.

The Board disagrees. Its letter was a reaffirmation of a fundamental principle, necessitated by possible press distortion and consequent misunderstanding. The purpose of the letter was to assure the President of the support we knew he could continue to expect from the Foreign Service. We were confident we could speak in this regard for all AFSA members.

The Board's letter to the President endorsed the concept of an open Administration and open channels of communications. The problem still before us—as it is also before so many different institutions in our society—is that of defining the nature of openness, the means of insuring candor, and the character of useful dissent. We are more than ever convinced that the foreign affairs agencies—and ultimately the nation's interests abroad—require increased attention to encouraging reasoned and responsible dissenting views within the decision-making system. This is, we believe, the purpose motivating this Administration's stress on the delineation of options and alternatives for NSC discussion. Some of the Macomber Task Forces can be expected to produce recommendations to this end, such as an institutionalization of the adversary procedure. The AFSA Board would support such recommendations, and is itself seeking new and better ways of insuring this kind of interchange within the Department. ■

On Kidnapping

THE incidence of kidnappings of diplomats in Latin America is cause for grave concern. Exorbitant ransoms can be demanded and host governments can refuse to pay them, as was the case in the tragedy of German Ambassador Karl von Spreti. As the murder last year of Ambassador John Gordon Mein in Guatemala showed, the very attempt to kidnap can be fatal.

In other parts of the world as well, diplomats could become targets of opportunity. Each of us is compelled to consider what he would do if he or members of his family should become such targets, and more broadly, what might be done to reduce kidnapping attempts.

Some partial solutions have been suggested. These cover a wide gamut, from appeal to world moral authorities to reprisals against the prisoners whom the kidnappers wish to have released. They include proposals to arm all diplomats and/or enclose them in guarded stockades—proposals which strike at the core of diplomatic effectiveness.

In kidnapping foreign officials, the kidnappers calculate that the victim's home government will either bring pressure on the host government to meet their demands or will itself be pressured into taking actions they desire. As long as the kidnappers believe that they can thus influence their own government or the foreign government involved, the kidnapping of foreign officials will be a tempting mode of political action.

Every government has the solemn responsibility for protecting the lives of the foreign officials it receives, and of their families. In the final analysis, however, it retains the sovereign power to decide whether or not it will accede to the demands of the kidnappers.

Governments, including that of the United States, could reduce the chances that political terrorists might continue to regard the kidnapping of foreign representatives as advantageous by agreeng in concert on the principle that they would not pay ransom—political or financial—for the lives of their officials, and that they would not bring pressure on another government to undertake steps for the return of their nationals who were kidnapped beyond those the host government would customarily take on behalf of its own officials.

The Board believes that, if such a convention were adopted, it would lay down outer limits of policy which would discourage would-be kidnappers. We urge that the United States Government take the lead.

We have not taken this position lightly. The issue is complex. There are bound to be differing opinions. The Board invites the views of AFSA members and other readers of the JOURNAL. We shall see that these are brought to the attention of the appropriate authorities. ■

AFSA NEWS

JUNE, 1970

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2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037

AFSA Joins the Space Age

Dues notices have been mailed to all AFSA members and some explanation of the change in format will perhaps be helpful. After many years of manual record keeping, AFSA's membership has increased to the point where its rolls can and should be computerized. The care of each individual member in filling out the return portion of the dues notice will enable this change to be made comparatively painless and error free. It is *especially* important that the information concerning agency and grade on the *reverse* side of the card be completed. There will of course be problems during the change-over but we hope to keep these to a minimum and we solicit the cooperation of all members in this giant step forward. Prompt responses will save a great deal of money on the mailing of second and third notices.

House Unit Approves AFSA-Supported 50% Health Plan Payment

The House Post Office and Civil Service Commission in early May approved Representative Dominick V. Daniels' (D., N.J.) Bill to have the Government pay half of high-option premium cost of employees' health benefit plans.

It will be recalled that AFSA strongly supported this legislation. A letter was written to Representative Daniels recalling AFSA's success in having the Government-proposed increase for the Protective Association (AFSPA) Foreign Service Benefit Plan reduced. Savings amounted to $89.70 on the premium for the family plan, and a lesser amount for individuals. A full account of AFSA's action is in the December 1969 issue of the JOURNAL.

If passed by the House, where it is given a good chance, and the Senate, the 50-50 payment would begin January 1, 1971. The Government now pays about 24% of the premium for Health Benefit Plans.

Home Leave Insurance

The Association is pleased to announce that in response to its inquiry to various insurance agencies, two have now arranged to provide automobile insurance for overseas personnel returning to the United States on home leave. Several members had written asking for assistance in this matter, citing instances when underwriters refused coverage on learning that the member would be returning overseas within a matter of two or three months.

The two agencies advertising in this issue of the JOURNAL and are transmitting letters and explanatory material to posts and to members who contact them.

As previously announced, AFSA also established through the Department of State an arrangement whereby overseas personnel may obtain District of Columbia driving permits. The driving permit, the insurance coverage, and the privilege members have of purchasing automobiles at $100 over wholesale, all in the greater metropolitan area, should save time and expense for those who avail themselves of these services when they report in to their agencies.

Retirees

Many a familiar face disappeared from view in the Department and in posts around the world during the month of April, as Foreign Service personnel took advantage of PL 91-201, which permitted them special retirement benefits.

This new law authorized a 9.7 percent-of-living increase effective May 1, provided that the annuitant retired on or before April 30, 1970. Other provisions of the law provide all eligible retirees with annuities based on average salary for the highest three years of consecutive service, adding unused sick leave to service credit for annuity computation purposes. Generally speaking, retirees have be at least 50 years old, and have 20 years or more of creditable service.

ANNUITY RAISE

For the benefit of all those awaiting the cost-of-living raise, AFSA NEWS *prints below the most complete and cogent explanation we have seen to date:*

Federal retirees and survivors continue to wait on a day-to-day basis for further assurances that they will be getting a cost-of-living raise in September annuity checks. Many seem to be under the mistaken impression that the raise has already been authorized, and they blame the Civil Service Commission for being slow to implement it.

Most retirees—at least the ones who call this office—don't understand the mechanism used to raise annuities. At the risk of adding to their confusion, this is how it works.

Living costs—the Consumer Price Index—must rise by at least 3 per cent over the amount of the last automatic retiree increase. The CPI for March went over the magic figure. Based on the March CPI, plus a 1 per cent bonus provided by the Daniels-McGee law, retirees are due a minimum 4.5 per cent, effective Aug. 1.

The CPI must remain at the 3 per cent high level for three consecutive months—March, April and May—before the raise becomes effective.

The April CPI figure won't be out until later this month, and May data sometime in mid-June. This adds to the frustration of retirees who keep calling CSC, the Labor Department, or newspapers for new data. It just isn't available yet.

If, as most people believe, the April and May living cost level remains constant, the raise would be made effective in August. It would show up in checks delivered around Sept. 1. The lag is necessary because there are 950,000 retirees and survivors who get the raise (whatever it is), and new scales must be computed for each.

Employees now eligible for retirement can get in on the bonus—if they retire on or before July 31.

Reprinted from the Federal Diary, by Mike Causey, Washington POST, *May 10.*

Home Leave as Tax Deduction

The January issue of the JOURNAL carried a letter from Bruce C. Stratton outlining the case he presented before the U.S. Tax Court on home leave expenses as a tax deduction. The Tax Court held that, although the expenses were reasonable (food, lodging, car rentals, tutoring expenses for children and so forth), they were personal and not deductible. Mr. Stratton stated in his letter that he had decided to appeal through the Circuit Courts to the Supreme Court if necessary, on the basis that home leave is mandatory, involves unusual, extra and heavy cash outlays and is not a personal vacation at all, but a way for the Government to provide a reorientation to the United States way of life.

AFSA has now ascertained that Mr. Stratton intends to pursue his case and, in response to AFSA's question he would be willing to accept contributions to help defray expenses which will exceed $1,000. Since the outcome will be of major interest to members, they may wish to assist in this effort. Others have raised the issue, privately and officially, but so far as is known, no one has carried it this far. Contributions may be sent to AFSA marked "Stratton," or directly to him at 7210 North Oleander Vista, Tucson, Arizona 85704.

Scholarship Report

More than 400 inquiries have been received this year about AFSA scholarships available to foreign service juniors. During the past two months the Committee on Education has been reviewing and evaluating more than 200 formal applications for this educational assistance. These applications were received by the Association by February 15, the cut-off date.

The Committee, chaired by Franklin J. Crawford, completed its work and made final recommendations to the Board by the end of April, thereby allowing notification to award winners before the end of the current academic year. Committee members are Michael Calingaert, Mrs. George A. Furness, Ralph H. Graner, William H. Hallman, Miss Theresa Healy, Ellis O. Jones, David Nalle, Mrs. Peter Roberts, Thomas J. Scotes, and Dr. W. M. Williams.

Political Development

The March issue of the JOURNAL contained an article by Professor Robert A. Packenham, entitled "Political Development Research." This article is a chapter from a book "Approaches to the Study of Political Science," edited by Michael Haas and Henry S. Kariel, copyright 1970 by Chandler Publishing Company, An Intext Publisher, and reprinted by permission.

Marriages

GEORGE - KAUFMAN. Lois Margaret George, daughter of FSO and Mrs. Scott George, was married to Dr. Paul Kaufman on April 12, in Washington. Dr. and Mrs. Kaufman will be living in St. Louis where he will serve as resident at Barnes Hospital.

PU-TAYLOR. Ching-Wen Pu was married to FSO Carl Taylor, Jr. on March 20, in New York. Mr. Taylor is in Burmese language training at FSI.

Mrs. William Rogers joins Board members and Committee Chairmen of the AAFSW for luncheon in the library of the Foreign Service Club.

Births

BOONSTRA. A daughter, Alexa Kathleen, born to Ambassador and Mrs. Clarence A. Boonstra, on March 16, in Boulder, Colorado. Ambassador Boonstra is serving as diplomat in residence at the University of Colorado.

Deaths

ABERT. Kenneth G. Abert, FSS-retired, died on March 20 in Wisconsin. Mr. Abert joined the Department in 1957 and served at Rabat, Nairobi, Salisbury and Cairo. He is survived by his wife of R.R.2, Shawano, Wisconsin.

DOLLEY. Robert D. Dolley, AID-retired, died on April 7 in Cocoa Beach, Florida. Mr. Dolley served as education adviser for AID from 1952 to 1968. His posts were in Paraguay, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Colombia. He is survived by a son, Robert D., Jr., 695 Timuquana Dr., Merritt Island, Fla., and two brothers.

GILCHRIST. Wayne R. Gilchrist, FSO-retired, died on March 9 in Washington. Mr. Gilchrist joined the State Department in 1946 and served at Havana, Mexico City and Seville before retiring in 1969. He is survived by his wife of 10214 Stratford Ave., Fairfax City, two sons, his father and three sisters.

HORNBECK. Vivienne B. Hornbeck, widow of Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck, former ambassador to the Netherlands, died on May 8 in Washington.

MANCHESKI. Alexander C. Mancheski, FSS, died on March 15 in New York. Mr. Mancheski joined the State Department in 1948 and served at Praha, Brussels, Karachi, Dacca, Athens, Vientiane, Rio de Janeiro and Kingston. He is survived by a sister, Mrs. Minnie M. Washkovick, East Washington St., Wisconsin Rapids, Wisc.

WAGNER. Joseph J. Wagner, FSO-retired, died on April 22 in Washington. Mr. Wagner entered the Foreign Service in 1940 and served at Habana, Bombay, Lisbon, Tehran, Nicosia, Athens, Addis Ababa and London before his retirement. He is survived by his wife of 3214 Woodley Road, N.W. and two children. Contributions to the Heart Association in memory of Mr. Wagner are welcomed.

WEINER. Jacob Weiner, father of FSO Herbert E. Weiner, died on March 28 in Washington. Mr. Weiner accompanied his son to various posts including Lisbon and Ottawa.

More New Careers

What happens to diplomats when they decide to go on to different things? Breathes there an FSO who hasn't daydreamed about such a possibility? AFSA NEWS has followed through on some former diplomats, and has come upon a wealth of material, which will be published from time to time as space permits. Where are they now?

Howard R. Cottam. After six years as Ambassador to Kuwait, Dr. Cottam accepted an appointment as Director of the Food and Agriculture Organization's Liaison Office for North America in Washington, D.C. He took up his duties there early in August 1969.

Arthur L. Richards. On his retirement from the Foreign Service, Hon. Arthur L. Richards took on the job of Executive Director of the Washington International Center of the Meridian House Foundation in Washington. The Center provides an orientation program each year for some six thousand government-sponsored leaders, specialists, students, teachers and military leaders from abroad. Assisting Ambassador Richards in this unique program are a professional staff of 20 and more than 200 volunteers. Anyone interested in serving as a volunteer should communicate directly with Ambassador Richards.

Phillips Talbot. Serving as President of The Asia Society is Hon. Phillips Talbot, former Ambassador to Greece and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Ambassador Talbot was named to this organization, with headquarters in New York, effective January 1, 1970.

Randolph A. Kidder. Former Foreign Service officer Randolph A. Kidder has been serving since June 1969 as Director of the Institute of International Education's European office, with headquarters in Paris. He is concerned with liaison with European education ministries and universities involved with educational exchange and university reform, and working with Fulbright Commissions in European countries.

Parker T. Hart. After a thirty-year career in the Foreign Service, Ambassador Parker T. Hart is now serving as President of the Middle East Institute, replacing retired Career Ambassador Raymond A. Hare, who became National Chairman of the Board of Governors. Ambassador Hart's last assignment was as Director of the Foreign Service Institute. He had served previously as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, as Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Turkey, and as Minister to Yemen.

Thomas A. Linthicum. Retired FSO Thomas A. Linthicum is serving as Personnel Officer for the City of Escondido, California, a city of 36,000 whose population has doubled within the last decade. Escondido is in Southern California, located some 30 miles north of San Diego. Mr. Linthicum is personnel officer for a City staff of some 215 employees.

George C. McGhee. Hon. George C. McGhee has resumed the active direction of his own business interests and has gone on several corporate boards—Mobil Oil Corporation, Procter and Gamble, and American Security and Trust, among others. He has assumed the Chairmanship of the Business Council for International Understanding, which operates on a broad front in assuring cooperation between business and government both at home and abroad. His interests in Washington include work with the Urban Coalition (headed by Hon. John Gardner, former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare). This work, which he describes as most interesting, takes him to many parts of the United States working on problems of the inner cities and ghettoes.

Harlan Cleveland. In September 1969, Hon. Harlan Cleveland, former Ambassador to NATO, became President of the University of Hawaii, which has an enrollment of more than 35,000 students. Ambassador Cleveland, a former Rhodes Scholar, reports that he is delighted with his new academic appointment.

The *Journal's* Batik Cover

Our cover artist this month is Adrienne Huey, wife of FSO George O. Huey. The Hueys were stationed in India, where Mrs. Huey studied batik with Devayani Krishna, one of India's foremost batik artists. In India, Mrs. Huey conducted a batik studio in her home, teaching the art to members of the foreign community in New Delhi, and to young Indian girls preparing for marriage.

To make a batik painting, the design is first sketched on drawing paper. When the final design is reached, it is then drawn on a large piece of paper the exact size of the finished batik. This is then transferred to the white cotton cloth on which the batik will be painted.

The original of the cover was donated to the Foreign Service Club by Mrs. Huey and now hangs in the Buffet Lounge.

The Hueys are leaving in July for assignment to Panama.

Erratum

A typographical error in the April JOURNAL resulted in the crediting of the "Communication re: The Art of Communicating" to James D. Phillips. Mr. Phillips will be remembered as the author of the "Communication re: Ambassador Galbraith's Speech" in the February issue.

John R. Lepperd is the author of "The Art of Communicating" and the yearly index will be corrected to show this. The JOURNAL staff regrets the error.

Richard M. Helms, Director of Central Intelligence, speaks to the members of the American Foreign Service Association at the luncheon on March 26. Mr. Helms' speech was completely off the record.

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JFSOC NEWS: Election Results and New Policy

The new officers of the Junior Foreign Service Officers Club are Bob Maxim, president; John Curry, vice president; Pat Mulloy, treasurer; David Loving, coordinator of committees; and Norm Achilles, business secretary.

The new officers issued the following policy statement: "Few dispute the need for change in the Foreign Service nor Mr. Macomber's view that reform is better done from within than by outsiders. We believe that those who will inherit the Foreign Service in the next decade must make their voices heard effectively in shaping the Service of the future.

"We feel JFSOC should be the forum in which junior officers can identify professional problems, come to a consensus and act together to implement their ideas. We do not believe in presenting the personal views of JFSOC leadership as the views of JFSOC members. The first of what we hope will be a continuing series of polls has already gone out to our members. In this way there will be no doubt as to the extent of members' support for views expressed by JFSOC's officers. JFSOC should be the vehicle for continuing reassessment of our profession by junior officers; it must also be a pressure group prodding AFSA as well as the 0 area. This will require considerable time and effort, which we feel junior officers can and should provide.

"We also intend that JFSOC not only see its suggestions realized but that it monitor their implementation, so that reform cannot be thwarted by the bureaucratic momentum of ideas that have outlived their time. We look for more than the temporary flurry of reform activity of Mr. Macomber's present task forces. We want a continuing conversation between policy makers and the rank and file of the Foreign Service. There has been much talk in recent years about the need for managerial skill. One reason why management has not been 'our bag' in the past, is that policy makers have failed to recognize the vital need for a formal institutional mechanism to insure continuing dialogue between all ranks of the Foreign Service officer corps and the administrative hierarchy of the Department. We have in mind consultative mechanisms similar to those already functioning in the British and Canadian diplomatic services.

"We see the major issues for junior officers as the need for better pay, more rational promotion policy, more responsible jobs (particularly in the wake of BALPA and OPRED), and for selection-out provisions designed to encourage and not demoralize the career service. In a broader context, we are concerned with whether 'the system' works to encourage its members to be creative, productive and to find satisfaction in their work, or whether it serves as a self-perpetuating bureaucracy. We need a personnel system that has the support and good faith of those affected by it. We see neither efficiency nor hope for junior officers in a system that periodically revises career prospects and the composition of the Service through 'time-in-grade selection out.' We need a grievance system that must be listened to and that will make openness possible. We need a promotion and assignment process that will assure assignments on grounds of merit and encourage real openness by protecting the individual from punitive efficiency reports or assignments. The Department and the AFSA board will be made aware that salaries for junior officers in Washington do not permit more than mere subsistence. These salaries are neither commensurate with those of Civil Service colleagues in positions of equivalent responsibility in the Department or in other agencies, nor consistent with the high standards by which junior officers are judged.

"We hope you will join us in our endeavor to provide leadership for JFSOC that is responsive to its members."

Recent JFSOC activities with regard to CORDS assignments, the Macomber Task Forces, and an initial poll of the membership are discussed below. Plans for future activity include study of Executive Order 11491 on labor-management relations in the Federal Government and its implications for the Foreign Service.

Junior officers (FSO-5 and below) who wish to participate in these or other JFSOC activities may contact David Loving in EUR/EX, room 5424, extension 20456.

JFSOC Action

In letters to the thirteen Task Force Chairmen, JFSOC called for formation of an organization to represent all officer levels of the Service with the Department's Administration under Presidential Executive Order 11491. Citing managerial effectiveness JFSOC emphasized the need for an organization to provide continued dialogue with the administration. It underlined the necessity of insuring the implementation of Task Force recommendations and providing officers the sense of full participation in the service. The officers of JFSOC asked that the Task Forces' final report recommend the formation of such a group.

Commerce Evaluation Reports

Committed to the principle of openness, JFSOC's recent letter to the Director General requested that Department of Commerce evaluation reports for State's E/C officers be made available to the rated officer as are regular foreign service reports. Initial reaction has been favorable.

Junior Officer Opinion

The first of a planned series of JFSOC polls of junior officer opinion was enclosed with the recent announcement of election of a new leadership slate and its platform. A tabulation of initial returns shows that 86 per cent feel the Department can undertake effective in-house reform, and about an even split exists between those who believe the FSO corps can play a prime role in reform and those who are skeptical. The vast majority of those answering supported the JFSOC technique of keeping in touch with junior officer opinion through polls such as this one.

A surprising 87 percent believed that the Department does not adequately inform employees of the ways in which personnel policies are formulated. Eighty-five percent feel that meaningful career planning does not exist in the Foreign Service, and 80 percent believe contacts and luck are the primary determining factors in assignments.

In reply to a question of which issue required the most urgent JFSOC action, by far the largest number responded that job responsibility was the biggest concern followed closely by promotion policy and assignment procedures.

JFSOC and the Task Forces

Thirty junior officers attended a JFSOC-sponsored caucus of junior officer members of the thirteen Macomber Task Forces on March 19.

Participants in the meeting identified two key points in the Task Force scheme which need special attention:

—the manner in which the proposals emerging from the various overlapping Task Forces can be brought together into a coordinated and effective call for reform; and

—assuring that action is taken to implement the proposals. It was agreed that JFSOC could play an important role in making certain that imaginative points of view were seriously considered and in lobbying for follow-up action where necessary.

Further meetings of the caucus of junior officer Task Force members will be held later.

FOREIGN SERVICE Club NEWS

Tips on Gratuities

The Board of Directors has approved the recommendations made by the Club Manager that in lieu of cash tips a 15 per cent gratuity be added automatically to all luncheon checks, as has been the practice for group affairs.

The purpose is to attract and keep the kind of waitresses or waiters the Club requires to serve members in the way they have a right to expect. Salaries are extremely low in the restaurant business, and trained personnel respond best to offers of a known level of gratuities, good hours and pleasant working conditions. The Club can now offer all three.

Naturally, nothing will prevent a member from adding a cash tip as a special mark of appreciation for extra service requested or given.

The manager, Mr. Brandli, would appreciate receiving written comments from members on the service they receive, compliments as well as constructive criticism.

Happy Hour

In what we hope was only the first of many mutually cooperative activities for the benefit of the members of the respective organizations, the Department of State and USIA Recreation Association (DSRA) and the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) arranged a Happy Hour at the Club. It was held on Thursday, May 21, 5:30 to 7:30—and beverages were reduced in price for this "first." All AFSA members were invited, regardless of whether they are also Club members.

This occasion gave members of each organization a chance to meet in a congenial atmosphere and get to know one another. AFSA hopes that DSRA members will find the Club facilities attractive enough, and its services sufficiently flexible, to offer a solution to some of the problems encountered by DSRA in finding suitable places for various functions.

We urge AFSA (and RA) members to turn out in force for these get-togethers.

Dr. John A. Hannah, Administrator, AID, joins Maurice Williams, Assistant Administrator for NESA, and Mrs. Frances Gulick, USAID/India, during AID's Spring Review of Population Programs at the Foreign Service Club on May 11.

Club Membership

Responses from the circular sent to current as well as prospective Club members have been slow.

Members who joined in April or May 1969 are reminded they received a bonus in the form of additional months of membership through June; prospective members also received a bonus period up to July 1 if they indicated their desire to join prior to that date. All were given the opportunity to choose the monthly plan for their dues payment.

Avoid the last minute rush—send in your completed circular soon to keep the computer happy!

Club Wins Interior Award

The Foreign Service Club received an award for superlative achievement in interior design in Institutions International Awards Program 1970 on May 24.

The entry was displayed in the booth at the International Amphitheatre in Chicago through the National Restaurant Show and an announcement of the winners appears in the June issue of INSTITUTIONS magazine.

First Art Exhibit

The first exhibitor to take advantage of the offer of space in the Foreign Service Club is Richard F. Wolford, AID. Mr. Wolford spent six years in Lagos and sixteen of his paintings were exhibited in the Club during the month of May. His paintings reflect his interest in the religion, art and mythology, as well as the scenery, of Nigeria. One of his paintings, now in the collection of Dr. William Saltonstall, was reproduced on the cover of the January, 1966 JOURNAL.

All four Wolfords, Richard, wife Jean, daughters Mimi and Betsy, are artists and have collected African art during tours in Addis Ababa and Lagos.

The next exhibitor at the Club will be R. Gordon Arneson, whose painting of a 16th century Norwegian farmhouse appeared on the May cover.

Identifications Needed

Richard F. Boyce, who is preparing the bibliography of F.S. authors reported on earlier, needs help in identifying the following: Mrs. V. Roxor Short (1906) "Caravan Cookery," Mildred Dunn (1967) "Ambassador Life," Joan Gillespie (1960) "Algeria: Rebellion and Revolution," Alice Rogers Hager (1949) "Washington: City of Destiny." An additional list will follow next month. Anyone with information about F.S. connections of these authors may communicate with Mr. Boyce through the JOURNAL.

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"The will for peace on the part of peace-loving nations must express itself to the end that nations that may be tempted to violate their agreements and the rights of others will desist from such a course."—Franklin D. Roosevelt

The Superpowers and Peaceful Coexistence

THOMAS C. CALHOUN

An FSIO, Mr. Calhoun received his B.A. from Duke in 1959 and his M.A. from Stanford in 1964. He joined USIA in 1964 and has served in Canberra, Bangkok, Nakhon Phanom and Washington. Mr. Calhoun is enrolled in Greek language training at FSI.

EVEN a cursory examination of the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union since World War II makes one realize that we are lucky to be alive. Yet, for the past fourteen years or so, the name given by the Russians to this seemingly perilous state of affairs has been "peaceful coexistence." Since this time span encompasses serious crises in many parts of the world, numerous threats, mobilizations and provocations, it is well to ask what the words mean.

It is clear that peaceful coexistence has not meant an eschewing of competition or conflict. What it *has* meant, when it has been observed, is a set of ground rules, mainly tacit in nature, governing relations with the United States and its Allies: there still will be competition, but this competition should halt short of war. The term is sanctified in Soviet usage by having been used by Lenin himself, but the way in which it has been applied since about 1955 has forced the Russians to expand and modify Lenin's definition to justify its more recent practice. Thus, Lenin saw peaceful coexistence as a tactic, useful merely to postpone the inevitable conflict between socialism and capitalism. It could be used in periods of communist weakness to give the forces of socialism breathing space to build up their strength for the preordained battle, but it was never more than an expedient; certainly not a permanent feature of ideology. More recent Soviet leaders, particularly Khrushchev, gave peaceful coexistence a permanent place in Soviet policy and produced suitable ideological modifications to Leninism to give it proper sanction. But why did the Soviet Union feel compelled to enunciate this doctrine, and what were the practical and ideological manifestations of this policy? The proper order for a reply, I believe, is first to examine the circumstances which I think led to the adoption of peaceful coexistence, and then discuss the way it has been practiced and the modifications of Soviet doctrine required to sanction it. This order, in my estimation, corresponds to the way in which this policy (and almost any other) was adopted: a response made to a situation, followed later by the justification.

Peaceful coexistence came about partly because more hostile Soviet policies had been failures and partly because the Kremlin leadership (or a majority of it, at least) saw positive benefits accruing to the Soviet state by virtue of a less belligerent posture. Consider the first decade after World War II: whereas in 1945 the Russian Army faced a prostrate Europe, in 1955 the western nations had rebuilt their economies to a remarkable degree. The Americans had not left the continent two years after V-E Day, as Roosevelt had predicted they would, but were there in strength ten years later, leading an alliance of anticommunist nations. From the ruins of Hitler's Germany had come the Federal Republic, economically vigorous and rearming. Political and economic cooperation was on the increase among these states. The communist parties in the west had failed to take control. Many of the so-called Bloc nations were restive, and Yugoslavia had been lost.

In addition to NATO, other anti-communist alliances

had been formed throughout the world, and American forces were poised in bases around the periphery of the communist world. A Soviet proxy, North Korea, had failed to unify the Korean peninsula by force. Finally, even though the Russians had succeeded in developing nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, they had come to realize their destructiveness. Activities undertaken by the Russians to improve their security by "rationalizing" the western boundary of Soviet power (e.g., the Berlin blockade; the Czech coup of 1948) had served only to increase western hostility and spur western military cooperation.

Soviet planners also saw positive factors contributing to the decision for peaceful coexistence: Russian nuclear weaponry made the USSR too strong for the capitalist powers to cow. With this mutual deterrent enforcing an armed truce between the two giants, the Russians could engage the capitalists in an economic and political competition which would obviously end in victory for socialism. As developed, the policy affirmed that the true value of socialism as the best path to development would be self-evident. Especially would this be true if the arms race could be slowed, because arms production placed an uneconomic burden on the Soviet Union, and produced nothing lasting.

Another positive factor contributing to the decision to push peaceful coexistence was the belief that by espousing peace and displaying the virtues of the socialist system the Russians would gain positions of leadership in the "Third World." The Russians would become peace-loving pedagogues to the less fortunate of the world's peoples. The genesis of Soviet interest in competition with the United States for influence in the lesser developed parts of the world was probably more a reaction to American efforts in foreign aid than anything else, but it dovetailed nicely with the supreme confidence shown by Khrushchev and other Russian leaders in the ability of the Russian system to sell itself on its own merits as the model for developing nations. This positive assumption picked up momentum with Soviet advances in technology, particularly after the Sputnik shock of 1957. In general, then, what the Soviet Union sought from the policy of peaceful coexistence was not just an end to the corrosive action-reaction syndrome vis-a-vis the West, but also an increase in that elusive commodity known as influence.

A knowledge of the background to the adoption of the policy of peaceful coexistence makes the main elements of its practice understandable. Nevertheless, it must be understood that the practice of this policy was never uniform, but was characterized by fits and starts; dovish cooing punctuated by the rattling of rockets. In part, the periodic bellicosity was due to conservative ascendancy in Kremlin decision making; in part, it was a reaction to events. For example, the hard line followed by Russia in the period 1960-62, featuring a Berlin crisis and the chilling Cuban Missile Crisis, could be explained in part as a reaction to specific events (the downing of the U-2) or situations (larger US defense outlays; the Soviet ICBM inadequacy which led them to try to put "legs" on their IRBMs by installing them ninety miles off our shores). But particularly after the Cuban crisis the atmosphere of detente with the United States generally has prevailed despite Vietnam, Czechoslovakia, a more confident Russian military posture, and the conservative turn in the Kremlin hierarchy.

The ideological underpinnings of peaceful coexistence were new interpretations of vintage Lenin or new doctrine non-contradictory to Lenin but responsive to modern circumstance. Thus, war is no longer inevitable with the capitalist powers, as Lenin had said it was, because nuclear weapons have made all-out war unthinkable, or at least unwinnable. Similarly, capitalist encirclement of the USSR is not possible because the Soviet Union is too strong to permit it, while it had been weak in Lenin's day. Finally, the new policy even denied the inevitability of violent revolution as prerequisite to communist rule. On the contrary, said Khrushchev, nations can come to communism peacefully, even through parliamentary means. In this he was evidencing the buoyant optimism of the late '50s, when, as I have said, Russian confidence in the "salability" of their system was high.

The practice of peaceful coexistence has contained a number of elements. First, it has been typified by a number of Soviet proposals on disarmament, primarily viewed as bilateral agreements with the United States. Many of the early Soviet proposals, particularly the ones demanding immediate and total disarmament, seem to have been made strictly for purposes of propaganda and were treated by the West as such. Even the more limited proposals, such as for an atom-free Europe, were turned down because the result would have favored the power with the largest conventional forces in the area; i.e., the Soviet Union. But, as the big power detente developed, agreements were reached on the perimeter of the nuclear weapons question; i.e., banning the use of such weapons in Antarctica and in outer space, no atmospheric testing, and, most importantly (from a strategic point of view), banning the dissemination of nuclear material and weapons technology. In concluding these agreements, Krushchev (who was in power during the signing of the first three) had to make a significant modification in Leninist theory. At the time of the Test Ban Treaty he claimed that there were distinctions to be made among the leaders of the "imperialist powers," and agreements advantageous to the Soviet Union could be reached with the less reactionary among them. It was also "proof" of a premise of détente which said that moderate Soviet policies would bring out moderation in western leaders, while the Stalinist hard line had only engendered reaction.

Allied with Soviet disarmament proposals has been a penchant for calling conferences on such subjects as European security, neutralizing the Mediterranean, dismantling foreign bases, and so on. Once again, much of this has seemed to be mere public relations work establishing Russia's bona fides as the champion of peace, for they were offering little *quid* for our *quo*. For example, the call for a European Security Conference was probably designed to maneuver the West into recognizing East Germany as a sovereign state, a significant gain for the USSR, without giving up anything in return.

Also, there was much talk and occasional action on cutbacks of conventional forces. When the cuts actually

occurred they were serving a dual purpose: giving tangible evidence of a desire for détente and reducing the "uneconomic" arms burden on the Soviet economy to enable socialism better to show its productivity.

The competition with the capitalist world was to continue in the economic and political spheres, and the era of "peaceful coexistence" has been marked by a great deal of activity in those areas. The Russians took the world as a battleground, and Soviet officials began cropping up in most unlikely places. With the Soviet Union forswearing conspiratorial politics abroad for more open relations with leftist parties and national rulers, there were few places in the world off limits to Russian officials. The Soviet penchant for pushing too hard too soon got them into trouble here and there (e.g., Guinea and the Congo), but by and large the Soviets were successful in winning for themselves a new respectability in the somewhat new role of conventional diplomacy. A large aid program, geared to the visible and the spectacular, assisted in establishing the desired image of Russia as a modern state willing to help others along the path to modernization. One reason for their degree of success, however, was not particularly flattering to the Russians: many saw them as not so far ahead of the lesser developed nations that they could not be caught, or at least approached, but the Americans were assumed to be totally out of reach.

Hand in hand with the peripatetic diplomats and officials went cosmonauts, exhibits, and trade fairs, all designed to show off socialism's accomplishments. Reams of statistics poured out of Moscow showing the strides that were being made in overtaking America's lead in this product or that.

Front groups were created or existing groups manipulated to give worldwide voice to certain tenets of Soviet foreign policy. In this area the Vietnam war was a godsend. for anti-American groups sprang up like mushrooms everywhere and were joined piously by the communists.

Also at this time Moscow began to tolerate more diversity among the satellites and among non-ruling communist parties. The new interpretation of Leninism that said there could be differing roads to socialism put ideological clothing on a policy born out of necessity. The communist parties of the west in the 1940s had said they would welcome the Red Army as liberators and had lost grievously as a result. Khrushchev allowed them to express a degree of national feeling, and their strength was renewed. The ruling parties in the satellites had shown great restiveness from 1953 onward, and Khrushchev had been wise enough to loosen the reins a bit. After his reconciliation with Tito and his subsequent denunciation of Stalin, the movement for change in the satellites became irresistible. Some, like the Hungarians, moved too far and were crushed, but it is significant that Kadar had soon adopted most of the rebels' reforms. This toleration of a degree of diversity among the satellite nations was not part of the policy of peaceful coexistence, because peaceful coexistence was a relationship reserved to capitalist powers, which are hostile to socialism. Nevertheless, the "liberal" approach to the satellites effectively complemented the "peaceful coexistence" line, for it reflected reasonableness and tolerance on the part of the Soviet Union.



Here we must examine the Brezhnev Doctrine—Does it spell the end of détente? Does it spell the end of peaceful evolution within the satellites? Or is it merely an adjunct to peaceful coexistence; a modifying doctrine that limits the permissible goals of détente without supplanting it?

First, while the doctrine certainly counds ominous and clearly limits sovereignty granted to the satellites under other agreements (e.g., the Warsaw Pact), it is not nearly so significant as the action which spawned it. The action in Czechoslovakia choked off what the Russians thought to be an alarming trend in a country vitally important to their security; the justification is merely verbiage after the fact, designed to compel other satellites of similar inclination to think twice before allowing such a situation to develop. The brutal intervention spoke more eloquently than the lame doctrine which followed. The intervention was seen by the Russians to be a security matter, an internal security matter, as it were, and that was that. It has not meant the end of détente by any means. In fact the Soviets were displaying eagerness to meet with the United States to discuss nuclear questions while the tanks were rolling, and just last year Foreign Minister Gromyko made one of the most conciliatory speeches of the decade—calling for talks on almost all of the major issues dividing east and west. Currently, with Soviet troops still in Prague, we are talking to the Russians about the Mideast and about Berlin, and about arms limitation.

The Brezhnev Doctrine and the invasion that spawned it also did not put a halt to evolutionary forces within the satellite countries, although I am sure it caused East European leaders to set prudent limits to evolution. For example, the Hungarians claim that they have achieved or gone beyond the reforms of Dubcek's Czechoslovakia by being prudent and by maneuvering reform measures through the usual communist party channels, thus allaying suspicions of working through "counterrevolutionary elements." Moreover, they have not allowed a reformist frenzy to develop, which would surely bring in the world press corps and probably set the stage for another Soviet intervention. Where liberal

internal evolution has ceased it has often been due to strictly internal reasons, as in Poland. Thus, while it seems to be true that the Soviet Union is on a conservative tack for the moment, it has not frozen development in the satellites.

Therefore, I conclude that the events in Czechoslovakia and the Brezhnev Doctrine have served to define the permissible limits to détente, without closing off those avenues of cooperation which the Russians are most eager to explore. It was a warning to the satellites, to be sure, but it was also a warning to the United States to adopt a more modest estimate of the anticipated fruits of détente. Just as Russian commitment to détente ebbed and flowed from about 1955 to the present, so has our national mood vis-a-vis the Soviet Union rocketed between delight and despair. I believe we tended towards over-optimism in the glow of the post-Cuba phase of détente, and therefore greeted the Dubcek reforms as a precursor of a general throwing off of communist shackles. It looked as if things would go all our way—the satellites would loosen their ties to Russia, but we would make no concessions in our zone of influence. Détente to us seemed to mean victory, or eventual victory. The Russian response in August, 1968, brought back a degree of realism. It showed our policymakers that Russia would not allow winners and losers in the game of détente, especially when it stood to be the loser, and the Kremlin leaders felt strongly enough about this to accept the opprobrium they must have known would be forthcoming. At worst, the intervention and the doctrine have plunged us into an overpessimistic view of our relations with the USSR; at best, it has brought a welcome measure of realism, caution, and prudence to our policymakers.

What has détente meant for the United States, and what are the implications for the future? First, the limited relaxation of tensions permitted by the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence has reduced our once total hostility to a more selective confrontation on grounds that seem to be desirable to both sides. It has helped us to see that we have some common desires as well as some possibly irreconcilable differences. For example, we mutually desire not to have a nuclear accident, hence the "hot line." We mutually desire not to get dragged into a war by proxies, hence our joint, as well as four power, talks on the Mideast situation. We mutually desire not to allow non-nuclear powers to acquire the technology necessary to build nuclear weapons, hence the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. Thus have we achieved what some have called "limited adversaryism."

While this limited détente has permitted us to reach tension-reducing agreement with the USSR, it has also spurred the European nations to practice more self-reliance within the respective defense pacts. While the United States and the Soviet Union are essentially stalemated militarily, the "unthinkability" of war has had an erosive effect on western unity. France has opted out of NATO, Canada has cut its forces severely, and other members have never achieved the desired force levels. And, true to human nature, the more we try to tighten the screws the more reluctant or indifferent our Allies become, and we are in the embarrassing position of appearing to be more interested in the defense of our Allies than they are themselves. Thus we face a dilemma—détente holds both promise and danger; promise in that there seems to be reason to believe that a genuine reduction of tensions can be achieved, primarily through agreements of the two great powers; and danger, in that the very stability we seek and the way we seek it (essentially over the heads of the Europeans) might bring about a weak, rather frivolous Europe which would invite instability.

What, then, do we want détente to do for us, and how much can we realistically expect? Détente should mean a chance to begin eliminating instability or potential instability, particularly where it counts the most—in Europe. But what about the *status quo*? We have lived with it so long that it seems stable enough. But much of that stability, it seems to me, is "unnatural," depending as it does on such devices as a divided nation and large foreign military contingents. This is stability of a sort, but stability achieved at a very high economic, political, social and psychic cost. It is stability purchased at a high level of risk and anxiety. Nevertheless, attempts to change the *status quo* might breed more instability than we live with today. Still, I think it would be desirable to seek a more rational Europe which would draw its stability from a more natural system of national relationships, rather than from bipolar military stalemate.

If the *status quo* must be changed in order to bring about a more natural and lasting stability, how can it be changed without increasing the fears and anxieties of the principals? Clearly, whatever changes come about must be gradual and nonthreatening on balance to either side. The changes that can possibly be made will be limited in scope by a number of considerations which must be kept in mind at all times by American and West European policymakers. First, Soviet security needs, or felt needs, cannot be ignored in any cross-European proposals. Czechoslovakia has taught us that the Russian threshold of perceived injury is low, so erring on the side of caution would be wise. Second, the fear of a rearmed Germany loose on the continent and unrestrained by supranational accord is still very much alive in Europe, east and west alike. A Germany with control over nuclear weapons would be an even more alarming apparition to many Europeans. Third, the complete withdrawal of the United States from European security arrangements would give Europe two unattractive choices: build a deterrent force of proper size and weaponry, or put complete trust in the American nuclear umbrella three thousand miles away and rely on the restraint of Russia and her allies. Europe does not want and probably cannot afford the former, and if it did attempt to build such a force there would have to be a German nuclear component, which would be seriously provocative and destabilizing. If it chose the latter course what stability there might be would be at the sufferance of the Soviets, and this would be a situation no European chancery would be happy with.

Having set out all the caveats, I do not mean to imply that no movement is possible, but only that drastic solutions suggesting victory for one side and defeat for the other are just not in the cards. What, then, is possible, and what should we do?

First, we should continue to seek agreement with the Russians in those areas of the world where we have

mutual interest in settlements, e.g., the Middle East Also, we should encourage the Russians to conduct constructive, tension-reducing diplomacy in those areas where our influence or our room to maneuver is limited, e.g., the Kashmir dispute. Finally, we should continue to seek meaningful ways to limit the amount and destructiveness of the weaponry we have amassed in the course of our long confrontation.

When our discussions with the Soviets concern Europe, we must make sure that we calm any European fears that we are negotiating their fate without bothering to consult them. But the most important thing we must do is decide once and for all just what kind of Europe we want. We seem to be of two minds on this question. Our military strength, as reflected in NATO, makes us more than equal partners within the alliance. We dominate the alliance; we control the nuclear option. Talk of an all-European defense force has died down. It gestated for years but could not be delivered. Such grotesque ideas as the Multilateral Nuclear Force were floated as a sort of halfway house; more a sop to West European sensitivities and pride than an increase in military strength. But, at the same time we perpetuated an unequal defense arrangement in the "Atlantic" approach, we also seemed to be encouraging greater West European unity. At times we have seemed to envision three great blocs: The United States, Europe and the USSR. But this Europe would have to have a credible defense, more than merely the French and British national nuclear forces, hence it might tend to become something to which the Soviet Union would be sure to react violently: a sort of super-Germany; a German dominated, nuclear-armed, anti-communist, highly organized Western Europe.

One reason for the strength of the supranational western Europe idea, besides the anticipated economic benefits it would bring to its members, is the idea, seductive to some western statesmen, that such a united Europe would act as a giant magnet, drawing the east European satellite countries out of the Soviet orbit and into a pan-European arrangement which would permit them to replace communist one party rule with more "natural" multiparty liberal coalitions. That the Soviet Union is aware of this sentiment is attested to by a recent article in the Soviet magazine, New Times, which calls this a plot to replace socialist governments on Russia's borders with governments giving only the appearance of socialism. Clearly, a drive for such a powerful, unified Europe would provoke a response from Moscow, especially if the communist buffer states of Russia's western "glacis" were openly courted. But there is another reason for opposing an overt effort towards this supranational western Europe with its supposedly irresistible appeal to the remainder of Europe: it is not needed. What the reformers in communist Europe are seeking is the institution of such concepts as for example, self-determination (to a degree), free (or freer) enterprise, and freedom from arbitrary arrest. These are ideas that flourish in the nation states of the West; they are just as visible and alluring in a fragmented Europe as they would be in a more highly organized Europe—and less provocative to the Soviets.

But if a strong, highly unified Europe is potentially destructive of east-west détente, or at least of bipolar détente, what of the reverse; a loosely organized western Europe, free to be as individualistic as circumstances permit? Certainly the trend seems to be that way—NATO seems to be slowly disintegrating; its critics asserting that it is anachronistic for a number of reasons that have to do with politics as well as strategy. Even the US commitment, at least in numbers, reportedly is under examination. The Common Market has found cooperation harder to come by in recent years, and it has proved to be vulnerable to conflicting national policies. This seems to be the evolutionary trend—is it not for the best?

My answer would be a qualified "no." A loosely organized western Europe, particularly one with a very much less active American partner, would be an inherently unstable Europe. Even the east European states, I believe, would be reluctant to see such a situation develop, because it would leave a strong Soviet Union essentially unchallenged on the continent. The key danger here would be *ambiguity*; a confusion and a fuzziness as to what responses would be forthcoming in the event of Soviet or Soviet-sponsored initiatives along the East-West border. It was, in part, this kind of ambiguity that led North Korea to attack South Korea in 1950. Here, then, is the value of NATO. However debilitated and anachronistic it might seem, it represents an unambiguous statement of intent. It is stabilizing in the sense that it gives communist policymakers a rather clear idea of the probable western reaction to provocative communist moves. Fortunately, NATO seems to be riddled with spies, who serve the useful purpose of revealing to the USSR the fact that NATO does indeed have firm contingency plans. Thus NATO permits a rather loose Western European political structure to exist without destabilizing weakness.

NATO, run by professional military men unified by a common purpose, is the most highly unified of all west European and Atlantic institutions. And that is as it should be, because it is more natural. That is, it is natural for NATO to express a unity of purpose, but it is difficult for me to conceive of a supranational western Europe which could enunciate sufficient unity of purpose in the political, economic or social spheres to long endure. The nation states have enough grave problems that seem to approach insolubility at the national level to make me doubt the ability of a supranational authority to deal effectively with them. Perhaps I am being unduly pessimistic, but the thought of a European government attempting to deal with disparate groups of Flemings, Walloons, Bretons, Bavarians, Irish Catholics, Irish Protestants, Italian trade unionists and German bankers taxes my imagination.

Another reason for valuing NATO is, oddly enough, the fact that its creation spawned a counterpart, the Warsaw Pact. These two entities are valuable in a time of détente because their strength and their deployment can be the subject of east-west talks, and any change in their strength or disposition would be tangible evidence of détente. Mutual military reductions, whether between the US and the USSR or between NATO and the Warsaw Pact are, in my estimation, easier to accomplish than, say, mutual political concessions because the end results are more clear. One wing of tactical aircraft

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

"Millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney (1797)

Citizen Logan and the War

K. C. TESSENDORF

Mr. Tessendorf is a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL. *His most recent article was "Pardon My Conquest" in the November issue. Mr. Tessendorf served as a diplomatic courier from 1952 to 1954 and is now a free-lance writer.*

THE negotiations at Paris had gone badly; had failed in penetrating even preliminary courtesies. Two of the discomfited American envoys were returning to America bearing lurid tales of bribery and perfidy in protocol. Hundreds of Americans continued to languish in foreign jails, and the armed intransigence of the adversary increased.

Before the crisis ended, the President would cry out in exasperation: "This damned army will be the ruin of this country!" Now, however, anticipation of full-scale war absorbed the energies of Congress and the nation, and buoyed by the feverish tide he told a wildly acclaiming crowd: "The finger of destiny writes on the wall the word: War!" Yet there was great division, a polarization of opinion in the land. Students at the College of William and Mary burned the President in effigy.

Oh yes—perhaps clarification is in order: The year was 1798, John Adams was president, the adversary France, the incendiary incident the X Y Z affair.

Franco-American relations, once so cozy and cordial, had soured when the United States signed Jay's Treaty with England, with its preferential trade clauses. The new American ambassador was refused at Paris, and the French corsairs began preying on American shipping assigned to Britain or her overseas possessions.

Such was the major foreign problem facing the new president in 1797. Adams, gingerly stepping into the shoes of the Father of Our Country with only a three vote margin over Jefferson in the Electoral College, felt constrained to retain Washington's Cabinet intact. This was a miscalculation, for several of the Cabinet owed total allegiance to Alexander Hamilton, Adams's great rival within the Federalist party.

Thus Hamilton in effect operated the levers of power from his law office in New York—by mail-order. Adams would ask Cabinet advice, and Hamilton's minions would write to him in New York. He would then pontificate by return mail—with Adams usually following Cabinet advice. This was markedly so in the instance of Secretary of State Pickering: "I wish you were in a situation not only 'to see all the cards' but to play them. With all my soul I would give you *my* hand" is blushingly typical of his correspondence with Hamilton at this time.

Since Hamilton favored peace at this point, in due time Adams announced a plenipotentiary trio would go over to treat with the French. Arriving in Paris in the autumn of 1797, the Americans encountered M. Talleyrand, now handling foreign relations for the Directory. A man of parts certainly, Talleyrand was superbly amoral in the practice of statecraft; further, he was anxious to restore his fortune lost in the revolution.

"First and foremost, you must be rich," he said, vowing that he would not have later "to ask alms from the Republic." The Austrians, the Germans, the Portuguese paid—it is said he amassed 30 million francs while in office. Naturally, he expected the Americans to pay too.

He met with the envoys informally, but delayed from month to month an official audience. Meanwhile he repeatedly dispatched emissaries (later delicately designed by Adams as X, Y, and Z) to ask and press a bribe of $250,000, plus a "loan" to the Directory of 12 million dollars.

"It is no, no—not a six-pence!" declared Envoy Pinckney when badgered by Talleyrand's henchman; but it was less from moral outrage than from the fact the Americans had neither the money nor the authority. After consultation they intimated a deal might be made, but diplomatic settlement would have to be made in advance of payment.

But Talleyrand had no interest in a settlement. French spoliation of American commerce was profitable, and as long as the status quo continued—without outright war—the Minister was content to dally with the envoys. He expected that Jefferson and his pro-French party would soon be preponderant—he believed many politically active Americans owed more allegiance to France than to the Federalist Administration.

After five months of diplomatic shadow-boxing Pinckney and John Marshall returned home. Talleyrand interceded in persuading the third, Gerry, to stay on, for he believed the Americans would not declare war as long as "negotiation" continued. Gerry, who was not a fire-breathing Federalist, patriotically believed his continued presence prevented needless war. He was probably right.

The XYZ affair was presented to the nation in its most garish, insulting context; for Adams succeeded in mouse-trapping the Jeffersonians into demanding publication of full details. A great flush of war fever afforded unaccustomed popularity to President Adams, who responded as charismatically as he could. From New

York however, Hamilton decreed through the Cabinet that instead of war, the issue should be turned as a club against the francophile Jeffersonian Republicans.

The Federalist press thundered: "The man who does not warmly reprobate the conduct of the French must have a soul black enough to be fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils." Here is Noah Webster on the party of Jefferson: "I believe such a pack of scoundrels as our opposition and their creatures was never before collected into one country—indeed they are the refuse, the sweepings of the most depraved part of mankind."

Never before had so much libel, slander, innuendo, been collected in this country. Even the normally apolitical sex became involved: "I remember well the time when party spirit in this country ran so high that even ladies wore different cockades as badges of party attachment, and to have seen them meet at the church door and violently pluck the badges from one another's bosoms."

Between issuing warlike broadsides, the Adams Administration settled down to preparing the repressive Alien and Sedition Acts, to building a Navy to combat the French corsairs, and to increase vastly the Army complement. As the latter proceeded, Hamilton's sentiments became very hawkish; for he dreamed of conquering the Western Hemisphere as its commandant. In the summer of 1798 Adams vacillated between outright war, and measured defensive retaliation. He was jealous of Hamilton's martial ploy, and he wondered if Gerry was accomplishing anything in Paris.

At this point a footnote in the history of the time surfaced. He was Dr. George Logan, a Quaker gentleman farmer of rural Philadelphia. When we scan his portrait by Stuart, we see the smoothly confident profile of an 18th Century patrician, whose refined features could have been those of an early American president. However, the talents of George Logan ran heavily toward rural economics; especially as a virtuoso of improved fertilizers.

He lived in that entrancing era when a man of position was well acquainted with all the giants that stud our history books—Washington, Franklin, Madison, Monroe, John Adams; he seems to have been a confidant of Jefferson. It was great fun to host a political salon; to dabble at amateur statecraft.

As a pastoral conservative he abhorred the rise of cities, industry, and the vulgar money-getting of the Federalist merchants. His political thinking seems fuzzy, since though an aristocrat he embraced the French Revolution at its bloodiest, when the notorious Citizen Genet attempted to revolutionize the United States on the French model. His Quaker sensibilities appear unaffected at this dinner of Genet's:

> The head of a pig was severed from its body; and being recognized as an emblem of the murdered King of France, was carried round to the guests, each one placing the cap of liberty upon his head, pronounced the word "Tyrant!" and proceeded to mangle with his knife the head of the luckless creature doomed to be served for so unworthy a company.

In the summer of 1798 Dr. Logan was among those informally under surveillance by an incipient Federalist Inquisition. Logan knew that the extreme Federalists craved France to take the initiative in declaring war, so that they could openly smash the "traitorous" opposition. Giving thought to this, Dr. Logan decided he would journey to warn the Directory, and thus stave off a war certain to be disastrous to free domestic politics. He procured from Vice-President Jefferson a testimonial certificate (a kind of early passport), and slipped out of the country. When discovered, this occasioned a new crescendo from the Federalist press:

> "For can any sensible man hesitate to suspect that his infernal design can be anything less, than the introduction of a French Army, to teach us the genuine value of true and essential liberty by re-organizing our government, through the brutal operation of the bayonet and guillotine. . . Their demagogue is gone to the Directory for purposes destructive of your lives, property, liberty, and holy religion."

The Alien and Sedition Acts lay in the balance in the Congress at the time. Logan's secretive maneuver can only have inflamed the xenophobic "Jacobin Phrenzy" of the period.

In Paris Talleyrand became increasingly alarmed at the course of events in America, as he divined them from the reports of official French representatives in the New World. Also, the new American Navy was sweeping the Caribbean of French corsairs and commerce alike. The last thing he desired was an effective wartime alliance between the United States and Britain. So the perceptive statesman altered course and tacked strongly for peace. He buttered up the willing Gerry, provided him with apologies and protestations of correct future conduct, and sent him off to Adams. Through an intermediary he adroitly curried favor with the nearest legitimate American ambassador, William Vans Murray, in the Netherlands. Murray began writing letters positing his belief that Talleyrand was genuinely conciliatory.

Events had thus been set in a newly pacific course by the time Dr. Logan arrived at Paris (Murray tried to have him arrested in the Netherlands). The practical Talleyrand was of no mind to waste time with non-designate Logan; he was affable and offered to introduce him to the French agriculture man—so that they could talk about fertilizers. However Logan persevered in getting an audience with Merlin of the Directory, through contacts afforded by the American expatriate colony in Paris. Merlin too was affable, and eventually Talleyrand decided to further sweeten American relations by releasing American vessels sequestered in French ports, and liberating some of the imprisoned sailors.

Logan arrived back in Philadelphia bursting with these portentous good tidings. Secretary of State Pickering brusquely told him he had already learned of these developments, and showed him to the door, his voice trembling with barely repressed wrath: "Sir, it is my duty to inform you that the government does not thank you for what you have done." It was the same

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
THE VISITOR
Welcome to Halcyonia!
How was your trip?

The local people
are not wholly
receptive to Western
culture


Do you know how
to sex chickens?


We also grow our own fresh vegetables


It's a good thing
my wife was born on a farm!


Our main problem
water. We save
every drop.

The cook is the mainstay of the household. If he doesn't get along with the other servants, you are lost.


Things will get better when the World Bank improves the roads.

My wife is taking an art course
I keep my marbles by playing golf

The caddies whittle their own clubs, and play two below par.

Fore!

The Club is the center of social life in Halcyona


But he couldn't have caught it here!

It was grand having you.
Come back again soon!

Chicken feed and a personal interest in problems build a bridge between peoples

The Importance of the "Unimportant" Issues in Image Building

JOHN R. BARROW

The author is serving as the State Department representative to the Armed Forces Staff College. He wrote this article as an accompaniment to a unit of instruction entitled "Psychological Aspects of National Strategy" which is part of the curriculum. Mr. Barrow writes, "My previous job, and the one on which this article is based, was Consul General in Aleppo where my staff and I achieved a small measure of notoriety by sliding down a rope from an upper story to escape a rampaging mob during the Arab-Israel War of 1967."

IT IS a widely held belief, which most of us who have lived in underdeveloped areas accept as fact, that generally speaking the Communist countries have done a more effective job than has the United States in creating a favorable image among peoples of the underdeveloped areas. They have succeeded in doing this despite the fact that the peoples concerned are for the most part highly nationalistic and deeply religious and hence opposed to Communism as a doctrine. By way of contrast, the God-fearing, liberty-loving Americans have acquired the reputation of being fat, overfed cats concerned only with becoming richer and more powerful while other peoples become poorer and weaker.

The Communists' success as propagandists does not stem from superior ideology, which, as indicated, is often rejected by the peoples concerned. It stems rather from a superior ability to exploit local aspirations to their own advantage. If a school building needs repair, the Communists are agitating for it. If a peasant farmer is confused about how to submit an application to the government, Communist lawyers will help him. If the local governor is a tyrant, the Communists will try to have him removed.

The cells of the Communist Party, organized either overtly or covertly in nearly every locale, have an enormous advantage in observing local problems and relating to them in an effective way. By contrast, there is no "American Party" operating overseas. It would have been alien to our beliefs to have created one in the first place and would now, in any case, be too late since most underdeveloped peoples have already been conditioned by anti-American propaganda.

Our Embassies overseas and our United States Information Services have striven energetically to overcome the Communist advantage. However, limitations of resources and an inclination to get bogged down in paper work have caused our efforts to be centered mainly in the national political capitals and a few of the principal cities while meager attention has been paid to the small towns and the countryside.

Also, in the beginning, our psychological approach was wrong. The main thrust of our activity was to prove that the United States was the greatest country in the world. This needs no proof since even the most ignorant peasant already knows this and to some extent resents the power and affluence we have achieved.

In more recent times, we have improved by tailoring our activities to take into account local attitudes, but even so they remain directed mainly at problems as defined in the national capital or main political centers, problems of high politics which are of concern to high officials but not necessarily the *major* concern of the common man. I am not saying that programs developed at the national level and directed toward national problems

are not important, but I am saying that even under the best of circumstances they are not enough to combat, at the provincial and rural level, the virulent Communist activity which, while not totally ignoring international problems, is directed toward much more circumscribed local situations.

If this is the case, how can we do better? Perhaps I can best illustrate by examples in my own personal experience as Consul General in Aleppo, Syria prior to the 1967 Arab-Israel War. Part of my Consular district was the town of Hama a little less than midway between Aleppo and Damascus. The people of Hama have a long-standing reputation, antedating the "cold war," for being among the most fanatically anti-foreign of any in the Middle East. For a foreigner to develop friendships in the town was considered a virtual impossibility. Indeed, my initial activities in the town were confined to a stiff and formal courtesy call on the governor.

However, one day as I was driving through Hama, I noticed a government-operated poultry station, and thinking I might be able to buy some chickens, I stopped in and introduced myself to the manager. Now it must be remembered that at that time, as now, the Syrian Government was strongly anti-American and this man was an employee of that government. But in negotiating the purchase of the chickens, I discovered he had a problem. It seems that contrary to the advice of his superiors in the Syrian Ministry of Agriculture, he had decided to purchase some poultry feed from an American company. He did this, he told me, not because he was pro-American but simply in the belief that the American feed was superior in quality to anything produced locally. He had "gone out on a limb" by paying a far higher price than was normal.

Unfortunately, the feed had arrived partially water-damaged in shipment and he took me to the warehouse to show me the damage. He said he would like to communicate with the American company, but he feared to do so through the Ministry of Agriculture which might well take the occasion to discipline him or even to remove him from his job. On the other hand, he did not speak or write English and was at a loss as to how to communicate with the American company. In considering his predicament, I asked him if he had a typewriter and when he told me he did, I went to his office and personally typed out a letter for his signature describing the situation to the American company. The whole operation took about twenty minutes of my time and none of the United States Government's money.

Some weeks later, I visited Hama again and stopped at the poultry station and was greeted effusively by a smiling poultry station manager. It appears that the American company, being a reputable one, had replaced the damaged shipment and my friend—and he was now truly my friend—was off the hook with his government. From then on, the town of Hama was entirely open to me, for the poultry station manager was a man of some local repute and had many friends in the town to whom he introduced me as his good American friend. Consequently, the prestige of Americans as helpful fellows rose considerably — in a town hitherto closed to us. My good fortune in Hama was directly attributable to the fact that I had met a man with a problem that fortunately I was able to do something constructive about.

Not all problems are so easily tractable; in fact, not many are. But the fact that a local problem cannot be solved is not necessarily a barrier to making some mileage out of it in terms of image-building. On another occasion, I visited a farmer in Idlib, a small agricultural center southwest of Aleppo. The access road to the farms in his neighborhood was in horrendous condition and about the only thing the farmer would talk about was the poor state of the road and the failure of the government to do anything about it. In terms of being able to solve the problem of the road, there was nothing I could do for I had no funds for this purpose, there was no AID mission in Syria or any other United States facility that could be tapped. However, I said to the farmer that as I was meeting the Governor of Idlib that day, I would mention the poor state of the road to the Governor in hopes of engendering some Syrian Government initiative to fix the road. I subsequently made good on my word in my talk with the Governor.

As far as I know, the road has still not been fixed. When I mentioned it to the Governor, he acknowledged the sad state of its condition and said that he had been trying to get funds to fix it, but had gotten no favorable response from his superiors in Damascus. Thus, this was a problem that I could not solve. Nevertheless, whenever I returned to Idlib to visit my farmer friend I received a warm and friendly reception, for he knew that I had taken an interest and had tried to be of help and even though I failed he was grateful. The Communists work by agitation, which is not possible for us, but we *can* display interest and sympathy and sometimes sympathy is enough.

These are but two of many examples of local problems encountered by me and my staff, in all of which we tried to be of as much help as possible. Unimportant, perhaps in the large order of things, but extremely important to the in-



dividuals concerned. Fortunately, our office was not overburdened with paper work so that we could do a good deal of traveling and engage in more "good-will" activities than might normally be the case.

There is another point to be made here. In the national capital at Damascus, the focus of attention was the Arab-Israel question. Thus, it had always been assumed that the principal thrust of our information program must be to explain United States policy on the Arab-Israel question and on related questions of high Near Eastern politics. However, since US policy on most of these questions was anathema to the Syrian-Arab people, information activities directed to this end were bankrupt from the start. But in the provinces, whenever I was able to set aside the Arab-Israel problem and focus instead on *local* problems and issues (as I invariably tried to do), the strain and tension almost immediately evaporated and the Syrians perked up their ears with interest. The poultry farm manager had a peripheral interest in the Arab-Israel question, but he had a *major* interest in the operations of the poultry farm. The Idlib farmer felt a vicarious relationship to the Arab cause but he had a *direct* relationship in the success of his Idlib farm. In both cases I was successful because I could relate to the major interest while setting aside the secondary interest.

I do not claim that what I have said above is particularly novel. Any FSO who is worth his salt tries to engender goodwill wherever he goes. The military have done much of this in their civic action programs. AID could point to many instances of the goodwill engendered by their personnel, as could the Peace Corps whose principal business is to be helpful at the local level. However, neither the military services nor the Peace Corps can be operative everywhere, whereas Embassy and AID officers are frequently too preoccupied with their activities at the national level—the "milk run to the Foreign Office" as we used to call it—to devote much of their attention to provincial and rural problems. Nor, as has been said, do we have an "American Party" established at local levels to be alert to opportunities to exploit local problems to our advantage.

The important thing is the discovery of what the primary interests of the local people are. One cannot know this *a priori.* One may make assumptions about some of the things that might be of interest to the local people but one can only find out what actually is of major interest by circulating among them and finding out directly. Once the primary interests have been discovered, more than half of the battle has been won, for it usually takes just a little imagination to find ways to relate to the problem in some constructive way. Moreover, as I have said above, sometimes mere sympathy is enough.

I have often wished that in our overseas Embassies there could be one or two officers of outstanding personality and resourcefulness who would have no substantial desk responsibilities whatever, but who could merely "float" about in the countryside talking to people, discerning problems and endeavoring to portray a helpful American attitude toward them. I am not talking here about large doses of United States Government aid; I am talking about adequate doses of US interest and sympathy. With due regard to the demands of high politics, we should not overlook the importance of the seemingly minor local problems as a means of "getting through" effectively to the people.

I also feel that we do far too little to exploit our tremendous cultural leverage overseas. Even though the Syrian Government was thoroughly hostile to us, I always had students hanging on my coattails trying to find out how they could get an American education or at least an American-type education. Moreover, the faculty of the Aleppo University were prepared even to defy the anti-American policy of their own government, in order to establish closer rapport with American educational institutions and facilities. The programs of the Aleppo University in both engineering and agriculture were American-oriented. There was not a single Soviet Bloc instructor at the University, despite the pro-Soviet policy of the government. Unfortunately, the cultural program was often the easiest target for Congressional cuts in appropriations and we were thus severely limited in what we could do. But it should be stressed that the limitations came from the US side; not from the Syrian side.

It would appear self-evident, especially in this day and age when universities all over the world are looming large on the political horizon, that we ought to have a first-rate cultural program, strongly led and adequately financed. There are rich dividends in doing this, both short-term and long-term. Short-term, in that promoting cultural and educational exchange creates a network of American-oriented officials with whom we can communicate effectively. This is not to say that these officials are going to be "patsies" for the United States. Often the contrary is the case. However, they do, for the most part, understand us and the possibility of relationships going astray through misconception and misunderstanding are thereby significantly reduced.

In the long term, the cultural exchange program is effective for the contribution it can make to the modernization process in the underdeveloped countries concerned, a process which we have come to understand as essential to the maintenance of stability and independence.

It may be argued by some that promoting inter-personal relationships on the level I have described is fine, but what about its impact on national policies? In fact, despite years of hard work on the part of the staff in Syria, we could not prevent the severance of official relations during the Arab-Israeli War, nor has it been possible to restore relations since the war.

The answer is that despite the rupture we still retain a large measure of friendship and good-will among the people we were able to know, and this is directly due to assiduous interpersonal activity. To the extent these personal relations exist, the more quickly could we expect to rebound from the 1967 disaster. In any case, in a hostile political atmosphere, interpersonal and cultural activities may be the only acceptable means of maintaining any relationship at all and thus should be developed to the fullest. ■

From diplomacy to teaching college students is a long step in a long career but Ambassador Beaulac enjoyed taking it

Diplomat in Residence

I HAVE completed one of the most interesting three year periods of my life. For a person who spent 40 years in the Foreign Service before retiring in 1962 that is quite a statement! Nevertheless it is true.

I came to Southern Illinois University in January, 1967, for a six months tour as Diplomat-in-Residence and Visiting Professor in the Department of Government. As six months grew to three years the fascination of the job also grew, and it seemed to me that quite logically my usefulness to SIU grew as well.

My invitation from SIU came out of the blue. Webster Ballance, a retired Foreign Service officer, was already employed at the University as an administrator. One day, almost casually, he wrote a memorandum suggesting that SIU engage the services of a diplomat-in-residence. His memorandum was circulated to the various university departments. Dr. Orville Alexander, Chairman of the Department of Government, told me later that when he read it his first thought was, "Why didn't I think of that myself?" He recommended that SIU engage its first diplomat-in-residence.

Universities give importance to publication, and of course publication makes people known. I had published two books, both of which were known to SIU faculty members in Government and History, and I was therefore a logical person for them to think of. The thought was soon translated into action and I became SIU's first diplomat-in-residence.

What does a diplomat-in-residence do? It was suggested at first that I should have no fixed

WILLARD L. BEAULAC

Ambassador Beaulac is a retired Foreign Service officer who has served as Ambassador to Paraguay, Colombia, Cuba, Chile and Argentina. He is the author of "Career Ambassador" and "Career Diplomat." Southern Illinois University Press published his book, "A Diplomat Looks at Aid to Latin America" this spring. Ambassador Beaulac is now serving as Visiting Professor at Ball State University.

duties but should be left free to give public lectures and to consult with professors and students concerning international relations and the Foreign Service. However it was finally decided that since I was to receive the salary of a full professor, administrators and trustees would feel better about the experiment if I should also teach a course. That was a happy decision from my viewpoint because I have derived greatest satisfaction from teaching and, I believe, made my greatest contribution as a teacher.

I was given a wide choice of courses at both the undergraduate and graduate level. Some persons thought I should offer "Problems of American Foreign Policy" and I should be left free to select the problem or problems I would concentrate on. Instead, with the Chairman's hearty approval, I chose "Introduction to American Foreign Policy," a General Studies course for undergraduates. The course offered several advantages. Classes were large. Therefore the course was capable of arousing a continuing interest in international relations on the part of a correspondingly large number of students. Also it gave students a more sophisticated background for understanding and forming judgments in foreign policy matters. Those were important objectives not only of educators but also of the Department of State which requires a certain level of interest and understanding by citizens if it is to operate effectively. The course offered the added advantage that it compelled me to do a good deal of studying in order to broaden my own background which has been principally in Latin American and Spanish affairs.

I have taught "Introduction to American Foreign Policy" to some seven hundred students. Only a handful have flunked. A majority have shown moderate to considerable interest in the subject. A few, fifteen per cent perhaps, have been enthusiastic and even brilliant students.

In addition to "Introduction to American Foreign Policy" I have given, at various times, "Organization and Administration of American Foreign Policy" and "Introduction to Latin American Government and Politics." I have guest-lectured in other courses in Government and in History and Journalism. I also have given some ten or twelve public lectures on a variety of subjects as well as a series of five public lectures on aid to Latin America which I have since converted into a book. SIU Press published it this spring.

I had been on the lecture circuit for three years before coming to SIU and I was therefore quite accustomed to lecturing. Nevertheless I approached university teaching with some trepidation. My lectures had been based solidly on my own experience. But university professors are concerned with "the literature" of international relations, and

there was a great amount of literature that I was not familiar with. A person who, during most of his life, has spent ten to twelve hours a day in the conduct of international relations has not had much time to read what people have been writing on the subject. Not as much as he would like at least.

This relative unfamiliarity with "the literature" turned out not to be a major impediment however. With much more time for reading than I had ever had before I found that I could overcome it, at least in part. I found also that students were much more interested in what I had done and observed than in what I had read and that recounting and interpreting one authentic experience might convey more to them than a dozen pages of text could.

Students never ceased to be fascinated with the discovery that persons whom they had read about with only moderate interest—remote figures in history to them—were real flesh and blood people, with their own human characteristics, their own idiosyncracies, many of them friends of mine. Charles Evans Hughes and Cordell Hull became more than names to them, as did such recent figures as Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, and John Foster Dulles.

A diplomat-in-residence could make people come alive. I had dined with Kosygin, lunched with Willy Brandt. I knew Franco, had talked to Indonesia's Sukarno and Korea's General Park. I had been host to President Eisenhower and Vice President Nixon. I was intimate with presidents in Latin America because I had literally grown up with some of them. I had known democratically elected presidents who became dictators and dictators who were democratically minded. I could communicate the flavor of living abroad and conducting our nation's business abroad. Any Foreign Service officer with long experience can do that. It helps to convert what can be a dry subject into something living, relevant, and familiar.

I quickly got used to students and felt a bond of common interest with them. With faculty members, particularly in Government, it took a little longer. With them I was conscious that I knew relatively little of "the literature" or of the "jargon" of political science. I probably was a little fearful of revealing a degree of ignorance concerning a subject I was teaching.

There was a corresponding timidity on the part of some faculty members toward me. Those who had been out in the world a good deal, who had served our government in Washington or abroad, or who had taught abroad, were outgoing and immediately friendly. They were as easy to know and be with as Foreign Service officers were. Others were not so outgoing. I suspect that some had the same feeling of inadequacy concerning the real international world that I had concerning "the literature," a natural fear of saying things that might sound naive to a person who had inhabited that world and worked in it as I had.

Acquaintance soon dissipated those hesitancies however. I discovered that "the literature" of international relations was so vast and was growing so rapidly that none of my colleagues could keep up with it. They, in turn, discovered that while my experience was direct and in some respects impressive it also was limited and that they knew many things about international relations that I had never had time or opportunity to learn. When we had all reached that point we had no trouble communicating with each other and helping each other. We no longer had any fear of revealing inadequacies that all of us knew we possessed.

After I left SIU at the end of the summer quarter I was followed by another Foreign Service officer who was in the process of retiring. I helped select him. His background of experience is different from mine. It has been principally in Germany and Eastern Europe. When he has been here a few years SIU plans to engage another retired Forign Service officer with still a different background. In this manner students and faculty, over a period of time, will have opportunities to capitalize on the experience of Foreign Service officers in various parts of the world and in various substantive fields—the political and economic fields, for example, intelligence, disarmament, and multilateral diplomacy.

The idea of using the experience and talents of retired Foreign Service officers at universities has caught on rapidly. The reaction of many university administrators and department heads has been, as it was at SIU, "Why didn't I think of that myself?" or "Why didn't I think of that earlier?" The State Department's External Placement Division has a list of some eighty retired officers it has helped to place in universities. But many officers who have gone out to universities are not on the list. Such names as Kennan and Kohler are not there, nor are the names of scores of others who have made arrangements with universities independently of the State Department.

Not all Foreign Service officers who have gone into academic life (or in some cases returned to it) have become diplomats-in-residence. Indeed the largest group have gone out as professors or visiting professors. And, as in my case, some diplomats-in-residence have served also as visiting professors. Some Foreign Service officers have gone into research. Some have become deans, heads of departments, and directors of area institutes.

So far as I can ascertain universities that have had experience with all these persons are uniformly pleased with the results. I believe we can look forward to the day, not far distant, when universities will be asking for more experienced Foreign Service officers than the State Department will be able to supply.

The number of persons involved in the best of circumstances will not be large, of course. Even if all Foreign Service officers went out to universities following retirement they would constitute only a tiny percentage of persons teaching in the international relations field. In practice only a limited number will decide to enter teaching. However the factor, experience, which they will be able to contribute will help measurably to improve the quality of teaching. And since teaching, like diplomacy, is essentially communication, it will provide a remarkably familiar as well as a satisfying second career for those officers who may decide to take it up. ■



The Meaning of Poverty

LIVING POOR, *A Peace Corps Chronicle, by Moritz Thomsen. University of Washington Press, $6.95.*

LIVING POOR is the story of a Peace Corps Volunteer's failures, but as a compelling portrait of poverty it is a great success. Moritz Thomsen spent three years in Rio Verde, Ecuador, and he takes you right there with him. You feel personally involved as he tries to convince villagers to make investments in proper coops and feed for the chickens he brings to the village, knowing that the money involved constitutes most of their savings. You suffer with him as the garden plots he planted are washed out by floods, and the corn crop, planted in jungle land laboriously cleared by the village cooperative he helped establish, is eaten by worms despite copious doses of insecticide.

Author Thomsen writes in a straightforward, even humble style. He turns his analytical eye on himself and the Peace Corps almost as often as he does on the villagers. He does not preach, and he brings you gradually into the local scene before he starts making any judgments about their ways. I think the best passage in the entire book is this wondrously perceptive and sympathetic description of the poverty:

> Living poor is like being sentenced to exist in a stormy sea in a battered canoe, requiring all your strength to keep afloat; there is never any question of reaching a destination. True poverty is a state of perpetual crisis, and one wave just a little bigger or coming from an unexpected direction can and usually does wreck things. Some benevolent ignorance denies a poor man the ability to see the squalid sequence of his life, except very rarely; he views it rather as a disconnected string of unfortunate sadnesses. Never having paddled in a calm sea, he is unable to imagine one.

In this kind of life one can understand the desperate need to celebrate something once in a while, even though one is too poor to spend much. At first Thomsen is disgusted by the drinking bouts on Saturday night, and finds it hard to enter into the spirit of the occasional fiesta which frequently ends up in drunken brawls pitting friend against friend. But he soon understands the villagers' urge to gain some occasional respite from grinding poverty. In one episode the spirit of exhilaration aroused by the match of La Cooperativa Futbol de Rio Verde with a rival team is painted in gay colors by the author, only to be tinged with ironic despair as the soccer match disintegrates into a free-for-all, but what a glorious memory for the villagers! And that is what counted.

The author clearly questions the worth of "success" to those few people who prosper by following him in his projects. The three people to whom the book is dedicated have clearly raised themselves above their fellows by the time the author leaves, but at a cost of broken friendships, general alienation, and personal rivalries so strong that the village cooperative has been torn apart until only these three members remain. They must have asked themselves if it was worth the effort. One wonders what has happened to them since.

In this struggle to make a living the subsistence economy is a far harsher tyrant than any government official could ever be. Author Thomsen details his struggles to keep on working in the jungle clearing project, such as how much work he can do on the fuel value of three or four bananas. And he explains that his diet was far richer than those of the men working with him. Is it any wonder that farmers in subsistence economies are frequently seen chatting and resting?

Since most of the world does live in poverty, it seems ironic that we need a book to tell us what it is like to live that way, but surely we do. This book should be read by everyone who plans to work in an underdeveloped country, because it puts across with startling clarity the human side of poverty economics.

At the end of the book the reader wonders whether Rio Verde felt any lasting benefit from the stay of PCV Thomsen. Perhaps Rio Verde is best left alone unless it can be caught up in a comprehensive and well-financed development program which can register permanent gains. But would a remote village ever merit such attention from planners? Perhaps it is still better to light three small candles than to curse the darkness.

—A. M. BOLSTER

A Slice of History

THE GREAT WEAPONS HERESY, *by Thomas W. Wilson, Jr. Houghton Mifflin, $5.95.*

FOR those who have followed, even since his death, the J. Robert Oppenheimer story, this is presumably required reading. Whether one agrees or disagrees with the security-risk findings against this outstanding American intellectual, here is how, and to a large extent, why, it happened. FSO Wilson has put together principally from records and transcripts, an account of the event of the late '30s and on into the '50s which brought the United States to the scientific-military posture it now "enjoys," if that's the word. Through it all plods the inexorable figure of J. Robert Oppenheimer, in all his charisma, suffering the psychic shock, as Wilson has it, of his transformation from theoretician to "manager," at the Manhattan Project. Oppenheimer's imaginative grasp of the powers which move the universe, and of how they could, if they should, be harnessed to man's will, qualifies his mind as one of America's most outstanding, in his own field as well as in others. But it appears also from Wilson's story that Oppy's was a mind vulnerable to being victimized by the forces of the society in which it flourished. This is not a unique experience; only the very purest of the pure scientists, who have rejected any opportunity even to serve their country in a political/management atmosphere, have avoided such schizophrenia.

"Heresy" will spellbind only the most avid analysts of the great debate between science and society . . . the body politic. Wilson has written a one-slice-of-history book with a point in Oppenheimer's favor, but he has sacrificed style to his argument and in the pedantic process of tracing a beginning, a middle, and an end of the story, he has raised questions which a more complete, many-faceted history of the science-society debate, including the Oppenheimer case, would doubtless have answered. There is, for instance, frequent reference to the Haakon Chevalier critique of Oppenheimer's attitudes and activities, without explanation, on the assumption that Wilson's readers have kept up with all the documentation available and all the books extruded therefrom. It's hard to imagine who might be so involved, at this late date, as to want to add to his collection this and other books in the same vein which even today continue to roll from the publishers' presses.

—JOHN M. ANSPACHER

The Spirit of Geneva

GENEVA 1954. *The Settlement of the Indochinese War, by Robert F. Randle. Princeton University Press, $17.50.*

A DECADE of bitter conflict in Vietnam together with new trials and threats of disaster in Cambodia and Laos produce an oft-heard and plaintive cry from harrassed western diplomats for "a return to the spirit of Geneva." The phrase instantly conjures up soothing visions of weary, patient diplomats, from East and West, working together in a spirit of compromise, to end the nightmare of violence and discord that has become the normal state of existence on the Southeast Asian peninsula. What *was* the true "spirit of Geneva"? How much "accord" *was* there in the Accords?

Columbia University's Professor Robert F. Randle has, in his own words, "tried to tell as complete a story of the Geneva Conference of 1954 as available documents permit." Nine delegations representing South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, France, the United States, Mainland China, the USSR and Great Britain met in Geneva in April 1954. The USSR and Britain acted as cochairmen. Three months of intense negotiations and hard bargaining by the conferees produced six unilateral declarations, three cease-fire agreements and a final declaration. It is these documents plus the minutes of the last plenary session which are commonly referred to as "the Geneva Accords."

Professor Randle has divided his study into three sections. The focus in Part I is on the jockeying for position by the Powers before the Conference began. In every respect the implications of Geneva were global. Part II is a study of the hard, day-by-day bargaining at the Conference while Part III is a detailed, legal analysis of the defects of the Agreements and the difficulties facing their implementation.

Professor Randle leads the reader to an inescapable conclusion. In the strictly legal sense there *were* no Accords. Only in the cease-fire agreements and the technical arrangements for military withdrawal was there agreement or consensus among the nine parties. The author presents his legal brief:

- The final declaration was unsigned. Can an unsigned treaty create obligations among the states who negotiated that treaty?
- The final declaration was an expression of pious attitudes and not hard obligations.
- The delegates from the United States and South Vietnam did not "associate" their governments with the terms of the final declaration.
- Only four of the nine powers gave their unreserved assent to the terms of the final declaration.
- The necessity for new accords in Laos in '62 together with the resumption of "the Second War in Vietnam" in the '60s were the inevitable consequences of imprecise and inadequate Accords in '54.

Professor Randle's work represents a significant contribution to our understanding of one of the major international agreements of recent times. While the style is dull, pedagogic and monotonously repetitive it is also a well-documented and justifiable critique of the shortcomings of the Accords.

—JAMES D. MCHALE

More Sources On Soviet Conduct

AN INTRODUCTION TO SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY, *by Richard F. Rosser. Prentice-Hall, Inc.*

SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1956-67, *by William Zimmerman. Princeton University Press, $9.50.*

PROFESSOR ZIMMERMAN and Colonel Rosser have each attempted to add their individual contribution to the growing literature on Soviet foreign policy. Both, however, have distinctively different audiences in mind and they have accordingly adopted rather different approaches to their common subject. Colonel Rosser, who is also a Professor and head of the Political Service Department at the Air Force Academy, is probably the more successful of the two. He has evidently striven to produce a basic text book for use in college courses on Soviet foreign policy and, as his title suggests, does not pretend to bring overly sophisticated concepts to bear in his analysis. His book is, however, objective, dispassionate and well informed so that it does the job Colonel Rosser sets for himself with admirable dispatch. He explains the varying interpretations which have been offered to account for Soviet external political activities and, while clearly indicating his own preferences, does not fail to give competing interpretations their due.

Professor Zimmerman's objective is at the same time more limited and more ambitious. He is concerned primarily with Soviet perspectives on international relations rather than the full range of Soviet political behavior abroad and he is thus enabled to probe more deeply into the questions of perception and cognition than Colonel Rosser's generalized study can hope to do. Although the Zimmerman volume is not labeled as such, it has many of the earmarks of the Ph.D. dissertation, and presumably is the lineal descendent of such an effort. The work abounds with footnotes and the author's intention seems to be self-consciously directed at reassuring his examiners that he has read all of the available literature on the subject rather than communicating any conclusions he may have arrived at as a result of perusing his very impressive list of American and Soviet sources. There is also a studied effort to perform a kind of cross-cultural synthesis between the academic fields of international relations theory and Soviet foreign policy. Professor Zimmerman's book does, however, draw some persuasive conclusions about the changing role of ideology in the formulation of Soviet foreign policy as well as about the limited convergence of views which has been taking place between the academic communities in the US and the USSR on the nature of international politics.

—EDWARD L. KILLHAM

The New Radicalism

THE LIMITS OF PROTEST, *by Peter Buckman. Bobbs-Merrill, $5.95.*

A young English critic looks at youthful protest in the West and finds it wanting, mired in vacuous rhetoric and the politics of gesture. Yet Peter Buckman seconds the aims of that protest, agrees with its targets and hopes for its success. To engender that success, he counsels a new hard-headedness to radicals, a recognition of the limits of protest.

Buckman's critique of Western society is bedrock New Left. He sketches a vision of the "system" comprised of centrist politics and corporate centralism, C. Wright Mills' "power elite" linked to William G. Domhoff's American ruling class. A sympathetic overview of recent protest is offered, particularly the anti-nuclear and civil rights campaigns. Buckman traces protest from a vague and vicarious stage attempting suasion to an increased precision on issues in appeals to direct action.

Wishing the Movement well, Buckman sees it too often going astray. The new radicalism leaves the majority to its preoccupations and provides no pointers to a viable future. He scores the incantation of "the people" without their involvement. Black militants are chastised for being too rigid towards the white allies they need.

Mass identification with issues becomes less likely as extreme radical positions turn off more of the mass.

Buckman has hopes: campus radical bases attracting the disgruntled teeny-bopper, political awareness arising among ghetto citizens, communes lasting. The author's real hopes lie with self-supporting bases, "liberated areas" offering alternatives to the present society. The Movement needs success in American terms. Without it, it is seen as degenerating into that one thing that contemporary society cannot abide—a bore.

One unfortunate aspect of this kind of book is that it tries to pin down the Now Generation. Already beyond the ken of "The Limits of Protest" are the anarchist acts of the radical fringe, the continued fragmenting of the New Left, the wider schisms between black and white radicals—none of this suggesting the directions Mr. Buckman would like to see. A revolution by increments would appear to be upon hard times.

—MICHAEL CANNING

Philosopher in the State Department

HIGH ON FOGGY BOTTOM, *by Charles Frankel. Harper & Row, $6.95.*

PROFESSOR FRANKEL's memoir of his two and a half years as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs is as difficult to characterize in a few paragraphs as those of other short-termers in the diplomatic establishment. It is a book of considerable penetration but also of slap-dash generalization, and thus a book of truth and half-truth, of saber-like thrusts at the heart of some of our problems and random lopping off of conveniently exposed limbs. Like Professor Galbraith's "Ambassador's Journal," it is a strange mixture and, like it too, extraordinarily lean of suggestions as to how we get from here (where they claim we are) to there (where they think we should be).

Such memoirs therefore strike this reviewer as period pieces, belonging to the 1950s rather than to the 1960s, to the world of Stanton Griffis ("Lying in State"), James S. Childer ("The Nation on the Flying Trapeze"), Earl E. T. Smith ("The Fourth Floor") and "The Ugly American" rather than to our present world. We are now in a period of reform and have been since 1963 when William J. Crockett became Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, to be followed by the Young Turks, Elliot Richardson and William B. Macomber. Since 1963 it is the rare critique which can hope to make sense if the critic is not very well informed indeed of the diplomatic establishment.

In addition, some chapters have a patronizing tone, as though Professor Frankel regarded his bureau as a kind of classroom of undergraduates who, for all their experience, had failed to scale his own Socratic heights. His points in these chapters, it seems to me, could have been made without this irritating quality. Many of us in the diplomatic establishment do indeed lack vision. We do indeed tend to operate on pedestrian rather than Socratic levels but the time for beratement seems to me past and the time for analysis of why and constructive suggestions very much with us. We are engaged in a serious effort to redeem ourselves and we need not so much flailings to get on with the redemptive process as suggestions of what it should produce, how to get it vigorously going and how to make it self-renewing.

This being said, I must add that Chapter 3 ("Plans and Prejudices") is well worth reading. From it comes a major and valid point—that we of the diplomatic establishment are conducting foreign affairs *alongside* what Voltaire called an intellectual or cultural "republic" as well as *within* a civilization "whose intellectual and educational leaders, on both sides of most political boundaries, have come to look upon such boundaries as increasingly artificial and inconvenient." A government in a free society which ignores or underrates these two facts will "alienate its intellectual and educational leaders" and set back "the gradual evolution of an international political community." Amen to that. So where do we go from there? How do we bring about such a vision in the minds of our diplomatic officers? And politically appointed policy makers?

One final point should be made in appraising this memoir and the views which it expresses. Considerable autonomy has been granted the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from its beginning. Keeping political considerations to a minimum in this area has been a good thing. One gathers Dr. Frankel approves of it. But autonomy, as everything, carries a price, and this he seems to overlook. If the general policy makers in the Department and White House leave the Bureau largely to its own devices, it must expect hard going when it wants to enlist their interest in new educational and cultural policies which depart from tradition so greatly as to require their approval. "Indifference" to such efforts may be symptomatic not only of a lack of vision but of the Bureau's autonomy. To combine autonomy with the dynamics of foreign policy and diplomacy will take some doing. It demands a lot of experience in the business and one can be fairly certain it will not be done by short-termers. This is why the initial and continuing education of career officers is so important.

—SMITH SIMPSON

Russophobia

RUSSIA: HOPES AND FEARS, *by Alexander Werth. Simon and Schuster, $6.95.*

FOR someone in the Soviet field, a book like this is very scary. It is scary to see someone who knows Russia so well (the author, who died while the book was being printed, was born in Russia in 1901, left for England in 1922, spent the war years in the USSR and was close friends with some of the best-known Soviet intellectuals) make his judgments not on any facts but on his feelings about the country. In this respect he is part of the grand old tradition of Russophilia (Sir Bernard Pares is the best-known example) which let love of the Russian people form understanding of the Soviet regime. Alas, the parallel grand old tradition, of Russophobia, or Sovietophobia, or anti-Communism in its classic form, also bases itself on an attitude rather than on realistic judgment. I used to think the press should be excused any tendency to whitewash aspects of Soviet reality because there was a higher duty to educate American opinion away from unrealistic Sovietophobia. Increasingly, though, I feel that the press has a duty——just as does the diplomatic and scholastic establishment—to face the complexities of Soviet reality and condemn any judgment-making (or policy-making) on the basis of intuitive attitude. It is scary to me, then, that a book like this can still—in 1969—judge Stalin's labor camp system as if the truth were to be found in one's feelings about socialism. Or that the author can write on page 255 that aside from literature, "Everything else seems to be going marvelously well." I had thought that apologetics of this kind had been outgrown by now. Still, there are some excellent conversations recorded in the book, including one with Ehrenburg, shortly before his death, in which Ehrenburg speculated on the possibility of eventual independence for his native Ukraine. I cannot recommend the book except for these conversational passages, and for the startling bit of information (footnote page 149) that Kirov's murder, which was used to justify the death of multitudes—was the deed of a jealous husband.

—JACK PERRY

Sino-American Relations

Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition, *by Ishwer C. Ojha. Beacon Press, $5.95.*

Recent US initiatives towards an improvement in relations with Communist China add timely interest to this concise study of "Chinese Foreign Policy in an Age of Transition" by a Boston University professor of government.

In discussing Sino-American misperceptions, he notes that most analysts of relations between the two countries see Taiwan as the chief obstacle to *rapprochement*. Taiwan is not primarily a territorial problem but a political, symbolic one. It signifies to Peking's leaders the survival of a rival government and a challenge to the legitimacy of their rule of mainland China. "The only solution, therefore, is either to return Taiwan to China, which would be impossible under the present balance of world power, or slowly to strip Taiwan of its status as an alternative symbol of legitimacy."

Our involvement in Vietnam has profoundly influenced our relations with China and Chinese perceptions of America's role in Asia. Soviet commentators have accused Peking of bellicosity in words but passivity in deeds—a charge privately echoed by Communist parties in other lands. "For China to respond to American overtures while the Vietnam War continues to rage would only corroborate this charge."

Because of China's drive to gain world status commensurate with her current and potential power, the formidable American presence in Asia and the American bases on China's periphery tend to induce in her rulers a mood of claustrophobic anxiety. Yet, despite more than 400 "serious warnings" to the United States and two decades of perfervid anti-Americanism, the leadership of the Maoist regime has been cautious to avoid direct Sino-American hostilities. Its prudence may be attributed largely to its appraisal of American military capabilities and to its fear of US readiness—with slight pretext—to destroy Chinese nuclear installations.

In the past two decades vehement anti-American attacks have served to maintain internal unity and patriotic fervor in mainland China. Between its many ideological campaigns, the Maoists have found anti-Americanism convenient "filler." A certain degree of tension in Sino-American relations seems useful to Peking.

In addition to his analysis of Sino-American relations, the author considers China's policies vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the Third World, as well as putting China's foreign policy into historical perspective. His views are lucidly, cogently expressed and backed with scholarly citations. Students of Communist China will find his interpretations stimulating and reasoned; the casual but informed reader on things Chinese will enjoy his highly readable, thoughtful account of Communist Chinese attitudes and policies.

—Robert W. Rinden

Libya in the Modern World

Libya, *by John Wright. Praeger, $7.50.*

In view of the rapidly growing importance of contemporary Libya as a burgeoning oil exporter and an actor in the arena of Arab politics, the timely publication of this book is a welcome addition to the Praeger "Nations of the Modern World Series." John Wright, a British journalist and civil servant, has skillfully woven a highly readable descriptive-historical account of Libya which effectively fills a void in the literature on North Africa. Until it is complemented by more serious scholarship, this book is therefore likely to serve as a basic reference. In the short space of 280 pages the author covers the full span of Libyan history from pre-historic times to early 1969.

The reader interested in Libyan history from a purely Libyan perspective, however, will find the book less than satisfying. Fully one quarter of the text is devoted, for example, to the motives and dynamics of Italian colonization. In this respect Wright's book might be compared to Robert L. Hess's "Italian Colonialism in Somalia." The reader is offered a vivid description of the personalities and proclivities of figures such as Balbo, Graziani, Volpi and other Italians, while the Libyan protagonists remain less clearly delineated. No reference is made to Arabic sources such as the works of Ali Mustafa Misurati, a contemporary Libyan writer and historian who has published more than 30 volumes relating to Libyan history based on his research in Libyan archives and the first hand accounts of Libyan nationalists. Similarly no reference is made to Tahir Zawi's *Jihad al-Abtal fii Tarablus al-Gharb*, which describes the Tripolitanian resistance to Italian occupation. These and other Libyan sources should be assessed if a more accurate and complete picture of the historic evolution of contemporary Libya is to be reflected.

While this imbalance does not detract from the basic accuracy of Wright's narrative, it does on occasion lead to somewhat misleading conclusions. He states, for example, that nationalism "was little understood in Libya in 1943" and that it was "transplanted from Egypt, Syria and Lebanon." Such statements do injustice to the effect of Omar Mukhtar and other Libyans on the evolution of both Libyan and Arab nationalism. It is equally misleading to suggest that "for most of their history Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan had been ruled separately." Wright to the contrary, these three territories were ruled in common for four centuries prior to Libyan independence with the brief exception of the period 1943 to 1951.

—Frank Ralph Golino



Youth on the Rampage

The Student Revolution: *A Global Confrontation, by Joseph A. Califano, Jr. Norton.*

Joseph A. Califano's essay length book is the result of a 1969 Ford Foundation grant, under which he traveled to several countries in Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Asia to study the issue of student/youth unrest. The book purports to be a summary of the situation in the several countries visited, a comparison of similar threads found there, and his views on the significance these have for the United States.

Since the literature on the subject of youth activism is large and growing, presumably the purpose of Mr. Califano's grant was to contribute something new to the field. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Most recent writings in the student/youth field cover certain countries or areas; rarely of late has the specific theme of cross regional comparison been undertaken. It is precisely here that Mr. Califano could have made his contribution. Perhaps the limits of time and funds excuse the small sampling of countries visited, but certainly the

extensive reading and study he claims to have undertaken in the United States after his return should have resulted in something more profound and less duplicative of that already in print.

The impression one gets in that the trip was all too "impressionistic"—and that Mr. Califano observed little and talked and studied even less. Perhaps the terms of the Ford grant required him to turn in a written report. The range and importance of his experience forces one to conclude that he is capable of far better work than shown in "The Student Revolution." The book seems to be the equivalent of a mediocre semester paper handed in by a bright graduate student to get his courtesy passing mark from an understanding but disappointed professor. The meaningful task of comparison still remains to be done.

—PETER P. CECERE

No Potted Palms

RUFFLES AND FLOURISHES, *by Liz Carpenter. Doubleday, $6.95.*

LIZ CARPENTER is described on the dust jacket of her new book, "Ruffles and Flourishes," as a simple girl who found adventure in the White House. If Liz arrived in Washington simple, she learned fast. By the time she was appointed by her good friend Ladybird Johnson to be press secretary and head of her staff, she was a sophisticated Washington journalist who was rated by her colleagues, including the males, as one of the brightest political wits in the nation's capital. So this biography of her Washington days, and particularly those she served in the White House, is more than a Cinderella story. It is a lively, humorous account of what it's like to run a press office for the nation's First Family, which could, and did, include planning the press coverage of two super weddings as well as the usual gamut of political tours, speaking engagements and state dinners.

Through it all Liz handled the Washington press corps as only a professional newswoman with long experience in Washington could. Under her regime newswomen didn't hide behind the potted palms. They donned evening gowns and mingled with the guests, and the result was often news worthy of the front page.

Liz, who was already familiar with the way LBJ worked because she had served him as an Executive Assistant when he was Vice President, describes Lyndon Johnson as "The Long Arm," due to his frequent reaching out when he saw her to do tasks beyond the call of duty as press secretary. Like the time he decided there were not enough women serving in high government positions and told her to corral Esther Peterson at the Department of Labor and appear with her at a Cabinet meeting the next morning with facts and figures to prove there were many women able to handle high executive positions.

For all those wanting a fill-in on the Johnson years at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, "Ruffles and Flourishes" makes good reading.

—ALVADEE ADAMS

Intelligence in Israel

THE SILENT WARRIORS, *by Joshua Tadmor, ed. and trans. by Raphael Rothstein. Macmillan, $5.95.*

THIS monograph on selected aspects of Israeli espionage since World War II is primarily valuable as a contribution to the non-fiction literature on the role and significance of national clandestine intelligence. It also provides some specialized insights into the history of the virulent Arab-Jewish nationalistic conflict in the Middle East during the same period. A former Haganah intelligence officer, the author uses the "case method" of organization to describe Israeli successes in clandestine operations and counterespionage. By far the outstanding example is the chapter on Eli Cohen (alias Kamal Amin Tabas), the Israeli operative in Damascus in the early 1960s whose exploits won for him the status of national martyr-hero. Regrettably, the story of Adolf Eichmann's capture in Argentina is omitted, probably for security reasons. The American academicians and journalists who take a doctrinaire, jaundiced view of American national intelligence as the "invisible government" or all powerful monster threatening American freedoms might benefit from the final chapter. It deals briefly with Israel's national intelligence system and the close security surrounding its directors and operations.

The author's nationalistic bias is present of course yet admirably restrained. The style is lucid and the brief background paragraphs on the political situation are helpful; but the general result is somewhat lackluster considering the inherently exciting materials. Obviously writing under restrictions, Tadmor should not be criticized for not exposing any new "methodology" or techniques in espionage and counterespionage. However, the very survival of Israel against tremendous odds is proof in part that its intelligence system is highly proficient in implementing the time-honored techniques. Excepting the one chapter mentioned above, the vital details of this proficiency are not effectively portrayed in this book.

—FRANK A. KNAPP, JR.

THE NUCLEAR YEARS
The Arms Race and Arms Control, 1945–70
Chalmers M. Roberts

The diplomatic reporter for *The Washington Post,* who has covered most of the events and negotiations of the nuclear quarter-century, has written a lively account of the development of the arms race and efforts to control it. Mr. Roberts traces American and Soviet activities in the nuclear arena from 1945, when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, to the preliminary Moscow-Washington SALT talks last fall. Five trenchant cartoons by Herblock illustrate the text. $6.95

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DIPLOMATS *from page* 14

try, Trade & Commerce.

As a union, the diplomats' group faces many frustrations.

For one thing, the public reaction tended to be jocular.

"I'll tell you this," Sharpe says with feeling, "if I read one more story about the striped pants union, I'm going to be sick."

Perhaps, above all, there was the frustration of the government's own attitude.

"Before collective bargaining," Marshall explains, "the government took a paternalistic attitude towards its employees—at least in fits and starts. Now they say we don't need to worry about you, you are on your own. They forced us into the adversary system.

"We feel we are professionals, but, when we got down to negotiating, the Treasury Board treated us just like the postal workers. They were afraid to set any precedents that might be used by other groups. It made life very difficult."

Union and management skirmished over compatibility allowances (the money paid to equalize the cost of living, moving, changing schools etc. compared to those faced by a home-based civil servant) and over incentive payments (to compensate for the nomadic life).

In the end, the union refused Treasury's proposals for changes and settled for the old allowances. But they will be high on this year's list for stiff bargaining when the diplomats want improvement.

The union failed completely to get entertainment and representational allowances included in the package, the government insisting that this remains a management prerogative.

They also got an agreement on working hours—a 37½ hour week—and overtime that looks great on paper.

How long can men such as Marshall, Sharpe and Copithorne go on talking like that without beginning, even subconsciously, to come to be thought of as troublemakers by their seniors? In theory, of course, they are doing exactly what Parliament ordered them to do, but, in reality it can be a problem.

"We worry about this," Sharpe admits. "Can our relations with our seniors withstand the constant buffeting of this adversary arrangement? We represent the interests of our membership and we have to keep at it. There are questions of promotion policy, redundancies that really upset some of our members. We cannot fail to keep pressing."

If they get a full-time director, this would ease some of the burden, he would be able to be the man to keep annoying the top brass.

But he may find he has to do more than that.

"Our new recruits are a very different breed," Marshall says. "They don't think the way we do, they come from the activist atmosphere of today's universities where they are used to burning down the dean's door when they don't get what they want.

"As they take over, this could become a very much more militant association."

In fact, the foreign service looks like never being the same again.

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SUPERPOWERS *from page 44*

disbanded by each side is just that and no more, but altered political arrangements are open-ended and the ultimate results are more elusive.

Looking to the future, then, I see hope for gradual relaxations of tensions as long as western statesman retain a calm, serene frame of mind, shun "statesmanship" by public pronouncement, and refrain from looking at détente as a zero-sum game and a cheap way of winning at the expense of the other side. Barring unforeseen circumstances, I foresee the two superpowers reaching agreement on a number of issues peripheral to the European political situation, such as the settlement of non-European crises, and on such things as cultural and technological exchanges. Also, it is quite possible that arms limitation talks will be successful in certain areas. These will be important, but they do not necessarily presage a general political rapprochement. I do think that certain stabilizing arrangements might be possible in central Europe, both two sided (US and USSR) and four sided (US-NATO and USSR-Warsaw Pact). However, in order to bring these arrangements about I think the US will have to refrain from prodding the west Europeans into greater unity than they desire, so as to avoid triggering that well known Russian paranoia. Moreover, I think we should indicate to the West Germans that something less than complete reunification with East Germany would be a more desirable goal. Fortunately, the current FRG government seems to be more favorably inclined toward some sort of association, as distinct from complete integration, than any preceding German government. At the same time, we should continue to support NATO for the reasons I enumerated above, realizing that some kind of associative arrangement between the Germanies might provide opportunities for expanding the settlement by mutually agreed upon force reductions or redeployments in the two opposing military alliances.

I expect to see a continued emphasis on "bridgebuilding," but, hopefully, low-keyed and *sotto voce*. After Czechoslovakia, it might be well for the United States to be the reacting power rather than the initiating power in this area. I think there will continue to be interest in bilateral industrial, technical and cultural arrangements, such as those between Russia and Italy on the production of automobiles and motion pictures. Here again, post-Czechoslovakia, I would expect the satellites to exercise caution and follow the Soviet lead.

The pace will be slow, perhaps glacial. It is possible that the pace could be accelerated by a number of factors: one might be a Russian decision to make settlements in the west that would permit it to concentrate more strength and energy on the Chinese problem. Another might be a swing away from the current conservative ascendancy in the Kremlin and a decision to concentrate on Russia's internal economic and social problems, which might lead it to adopt a more permissive attitude in its relations with its satellites and with the West. While our planners should be ready for such contingencies, they should realize that peaceful coexistence as practiced by the Soviet Union demands from us alertness, nerve, aplomb, serenity, and, above all, truly Oriental patience. ■

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MOVING TO THE TABLE
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at Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, and the other at Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota. The President indicated at his press conference that the first phase was to be enlarged and completed, and the second phase was to be initiated, but he did not disclose any details.

On February 24, Laird announced thc new program. He called for congressional authorization of an additional Safeguard site at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri and of advance preparation work on five more sites, but without a commitment for deployment. The five new sites were to be located in the northeast, the northwest, the Washington, D.C. area, the Michigan-Ohio area, and at Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Laird called this "modified phase II" Safeguard program a minimum effort and added that he believed it to be the only viable course, "given President Nixon's determination to postpone additional actions on US offensive systems this year in order to advance prospects for success at SALT."

Nixon, in January, repeated the two major reasons he had given the previous March for fashioning the Safeguard system: protection of the American ICBM force from Soviet attack and defense of the general population against the possibility of a Chinese attack a decade hence. In speaking of China, Nixon said that within ten years, "It will be very important for the United States to have some kind of dcfense so that nuclear blackmail could not be used against the United States" (or its Pacific allies). He appeared to be thinking of the effect his Guam doctrine—the pulling back of conventional American military powcr—would have on the balanee of power in Asia. Thus he argued that the Safeguard system would give the United States "a credible foreign policy in the Pacific it otherwise would not have."

The Nixon decision, with the second round of the SALT talks impending, set off a new round of eongessional and public debate on the Safeguard system, the MIRV program, and their relationship to a possible strategic arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union.

The problems ahead in arms control were highlighted on February 18 in the President's report to Congress on United States foreign policy for the 1970s. He informed the Congress and the nation, "We are now entering an era in which the sophistication and destructiveness of weapons present more formidable and complex issues affecting our strategic posture." He found a serious threat to the retaliatory capability of the United States in the growing forces of Soviet missiles, land- and sea-based, with greater accuracy and with multiple warheads. He suggested three categories of proposals for the SALT talks that would enable the United States to respond to a broad range of Soviet proposals, a limitation on the numbers of missiles, limitations on the capabilities of missiles, and a reduction in offensive forces. ■

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
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ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
from page 27

ice Association are interested in opening up the Service by making greater use of lateral entry. This would have a number of advantages, particularly if it could be coupled with short terms of service. At present the Foreign Service does not have enough technical specialists. Given the Service's predisposition toward the "generalist," such specialists are not likely to be developed within the Foreign Service and must therefore be recruited from outside. Many of the specialist candidates for appointment might not be interested in giving up their professional careers in order to spend a large part of their lives abroad but might be interested in entering the Service for four or five years. The adoption of a different philosophy with regard to lateral entry would make it easier for the Service to draw on the vast reservoir of trained men in the middle years of their lives. More important, these men might be a valuable leaven in the Foreign Service since they would be likely to have perspectives varying from those normally found in the Service.

Some FSOs have misgivings about the extension of lateral entry on the ground that it will tend to undermine the concept of a career service. Their instincts are probably right. The guild-like characteristics of the Service would be strained by extensive use of lateral entry. If a choice must be made between a closed Service, on the one hand, and an open, adaptable Service on the other, however, there can be no doubt where the long-term interests of the nation and of the Department of State lie.

One of the features of the Young Turk rebellion that makes it encouraging is that it has received the backing of the Secretary of State and of Under Secretary Elliot Richardson. The Under Secretary has endorsed a number of ideas of the American Foreign Service Association, has instituted some changes and is considering others. If a working alliance can be achieved between top appointive officials in the Department and the dissident elements in the Foreign Service, the entire situation in the Department could become malleable. Together they might be able to do that which neither could do alone.

The external environment in which the Department of State must operate is going to become more rather than less demanding with the passage of time. The Department is charged with conducting the foreign policy of one of the world's most powerful nations and the insulation and lack of effectiveness that were irritating but tolerable in the era before World War II are too costly and dangerous to be tolerated any longer. The costs associated with non-adaptation, errors made, imagination not exercised, problems not understood, and opportunities overlooked are not borne by the Department alone but by many people, in the United States and elsewhere, whose destinies will be shaped to some extent by the successes and failures of the Department. ■

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CITIZEN LOGAN *from page 46*

over at General Washington's: "(He) had the unpardonable effrontery to wait upon General Washington. Upon his introduction he offered his polluted hand to the General, who declined returning his fraternal salutation." He told Logan the Directory should "expect a worm treaded upon to turn at last." Logan persisted that the Directory wanted only peace and normal relations.

President Adams heard him out impassively, but unforgivingly. "Is this constitutional," he wrote Pickering, "for a party of opposition to send embassies to foreign nations to obtain their interference in elections?" Adams thought not, and prepared legislation appropriate to the irritation.

Meanwhile the extent of Cabinet duplicity had been revealed to him in the course of Hamilton's successful struggle to lead the new Army. He sifted the pacific overtures received through Gerry, Murray, his sons in Europe, and Logan. He moved courageously for peace by deciding to send yet another diplomat to France; incidentally stymieing thereby Hamilton's bloated dreams of conquest. The decision cost him re-election, and was eventually fatal to the Federalist party. War was averted through a fortunate confluence of Talleyrand's dispassionate manipulations; Hamilton's ambitions; and Adams's jealousies and statesmanship.

Congress in 1799 approved the "Logan" Act, still in force—its essential provision:

> "Any citizen of the United States, wherever he may be, who, without authority of the United States, directly or indirectly commences or carries on any correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government or any officer or agent thereof, with intent to influence the measures or conduct of any foreign officer or agent thereof, in relation to any disputes or controversies with the United States, or to defeat the measures of the United States, shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both."

The Act has not been enforced; Logan himself made a similar trip to London circa 1812. The language is vague; intent is difficult to prove; violation of the First Amendment is conjectured. But the principal reason the Act has been shunted into an enforcement limbo twixt State and Justice is that private diplomacy is ineffectual. In the many incidences (just read your daily newspaper!) where the Act might be relevant, none historically seem to have visibly deflected the course of foreign relations from predestined channels. Diplomacy implies power of office. Earnest, or narcissistic do-it-yourselfers only draw attention from the media, and exacerbate the professionals. The breed flourishes in circumstances of diplomatic vacuum, amid supposed information and communications gaps. The course of true diplomacy never runs more smoothly than when we have "Our Man"—a credentialed professional — on the scene. ■

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Where We Go From Here

HAVING served in Vietnam from 1963-65, I read with interest Barry Zorthian's article "Where Do We Go From Here?" in the February issue of the JOURNAL. Of the four major points raised, the onc concerning itself with communication merits attention. That "the failure to communicate effectively can leave an information vacuum which will inevitably lead to an erosion of support" has been proven by hard field experience and has the support in principle of most eminent academicians concerned with communications and national development.

Mr. Zorthian's call for a strategy, however, should not be limited to counterinsurgent doctrine as such nor set apart in a new organization for use in time of need as the panic button is pushed when an allied strategic nation wakes up to face a full-fledged insurgency. The establishment of effective communications approaches at this point is a bit tardy and is, as Mr. Zorthian points out, harder to establish and less effective as the struggle continues. And, speaking in the context of communications, he cites Vietnam as a case where "the effort of the United States Government fell short of the needs."

Be that as it may, his central question is one of the most important to be asked as new overseas communications approaches and policies are shaped, particularly for the less advanced societies. For it is in these countries that are found most readily the ingredients upon which insurgencies feed.

Insurgencies do not happen overnight. Organization for the Vietnam insurgency first began during World War II. The trenches of organized dissent ran silently and dug deep into the wellstreams of the population for almost two decades. Perhaps we were not fully conscious of the original sore, the spreading infection, or in possession of the know-how to come to grips with it. The consequent cost to the United States in men and materials and national prestige has been astronomical. Indicative of the dimensions of the problem, the liberal Polish author Leopold Tyrmand, who came to the United States to settle in 1966, scores two points in connection with revolution. Writing in the NEW YORK TIMES, he states, "In our time, revolution is quite impossible in: a genuinely democratic country where a majority does not want revolution; a totalitarian state equipped with all the modern devices of control and suppression." How many nation-states in the world today can be so described?

Few will disagree with President Nixon's assessment in March of last year that "as far as commitments are concerned, the United States has a full plate." Until such time as the United States decides to drop the plate, the burden of sharing the responsibilities accruing from world leadership remains.

Two points are at issue. The first arises from our own evolvement as a nation born of revolution only two hundred years ago. How do we present ourselves as a nation and people to the progressive elements in many of the developing, emerging nations in the world today?

Secondly, counterinsurgency as a national strategy is at best defensive and negative by nature, if not paradoxical. What strategy is being developed (or can be developed for that matter) which is offensive and positive in nature, one that is designed to put the opposition on the defensive and place it in the position of having to counter the inroads of modernization and national development?

Is this where we should be going to from here?

GEORGE P. HAVENS

Washington

Survival in the Service

THE current plethora of studies has inspired me to make one on a subject about which I have occasionally been curious; namely, the rate of personnel attrition (to coin a phrase) among Foreign Service officers. From my study, I have discovered that it is 47 per cent over a ten year period, assuming, of course, the correctness of my methodology and the validity of the various factors I fed into it.

Some of your readers may be curious to know how I uncovered this hitherto unknown figure of 47 per cent. My method was simplicity itself. As tools I used "The Biographic Register for 1959" and "The Biographic Register for 1969 (July)." During a few pleasant hours of browsing over the Easter weekend, I made a random selection of the names of 100 FSOs appearing in the 1959 Register and then checked the 1969 Register to see if they were still listed. I found 47 names were no longer listed.

There were enough by-products of my simple study to write a doctoral dissertation. For example, consider that of the 53 officers who survived the 10 years, 2 had become AEPs; 8 FSO-1s, and 14 each FSO-2s, 3s, and 4s, while one poor fellow had only reached FSO-5.

One could also hypothesize about promotion rates from my study. Of the 53 survivors, 22 had been promoted only once in the 10 year period, 16 had been promoted twice, 11 had been promoted three times, and four fast rising stars had been promoted four times.

I can not forbear to mention one other conclusion of my study. This is that for survival in the Service it is best that one's family name begin with E, H or J. However, this conclusion needs further study inasmuch as my random selections carried me only through the letter J.

I do not pretend to infallibility of my methodology or conclusions and would welcome any good-natured or ill-humored controversy they may arouse.

DONALD S. HARRIS

Berlin

Title IX the Key

CONGRATULATIONS for your Title IX presentation in the March 1970 issue. The several articles by scholars and practitioners on non-economic aspects of development provide a unique source of expert analysis on a subject of special interest to the foreign affairs specialist. I hope that you will experiment furthcr with this format in considering equally pertinent topics.

The articles caused me to reflect on my own experiences as an aid administrator and stimulated me to spell out why I have come to believe that, for both conceptual and operational reasons, Title IX may be the key to successful development programing and implementation.

The development effort cannot be an inanimate economic or engineering exercise which is planned in ivory-towered isolation. Since development must be sustained, usually over decades if it is to transform the life style and institutions of a nation which is seeking change, a development plan must be made realistic and imperative to the people. They must be helped to understand that development is no short-term miracle or wonder drug and that their work, sweat and tears spent in the effort will be rewarded. Hence, the structuring of incentives must be responsive to people's needs and wants.

Title IX reminds us that this process cannot be ignored or shied away from. It reminds us that the structuring of incentives for private action and individual response is as much a part of development plans as infrastructure and capital investment schedules. It reminds us that grass-roots institutions to mobilize the energies of the people and to extend incentives to them are as critical as upgrading the public administration. And, it reminds that the dialogue and inter-action between government and people is as important as that between government and foreign adviser.

What I believe we can do under Title IX is first to learn to understand the political dynamics and sociology of each developing country—each is different from its neighbor, and each is in constant change. Hence, Congressman Fraser's emphasis on research into and knowledge of the political and social realities should be a critical element of each external assistance program. All too often, I have found myself talking and advising when I should have been listening and receiving advice. The need to communicate with, not talk at, those being advised is an imperative imposed by Title IX. To learn and to understand the political process at work and the nature of the challenges to it are indispensable for an effective assistance program. And, the acquiring of this knowledge is not susceptible to the neat time-phased programing documentation of most donor organizations, and formulae which try to fit Title IX into project form and allocate funds for such projects do not comply with its spirit or meet its goals.

To introduce these Title IX considerations into the conceptual and operational system of foreign assistance, let me suggest the need for:

(1) special knowledge of each recipient country's sociological, political and motivational norms;

(2) imagination in finding new approaches to and mixes of aid activities;

(3) patience while change evolves; and

(4) capacity to innovate and to awaken the will to innovate in national co-workers.

Successful application of Title IX approaches will require full credit to and for the host country operators and anonymity for the foreign aid agents. Indeed, it will require even greater capacity to listen to, understand and communicate with the host country at executive, bureaucratic, business, farmer, labor and grass-roots levels.

Again my thanks for a most interesting issue which stimulated this reflection and reaction.

IRVING G. TRAGEN

Washington

Verbal Imagination

MY many years in the UK entitle me to refute the hoary old canard that the British have no sense of humor. A recent NEW STATESMAN "Weekend Competition" set in answer to a wish for astronauts with "a bit of verbal imagination" elicited this entry from Martin Fagg:

> May I primarily place on record how profoundly obligated I am to you, Mr. President, for temporarily manumitting me from the onerous discharge of my ambassadorial prerogatives in London—the seat of that very gracious and lovely person, Her Britannic Majesty, the Queen—so that I may accompany, in person, the Apollo Moon Project. I hope to achieve some due measure of reciprocity by the elevated propriety of the sentiments I enunciate. This whole experience has had a transcendently prayerful effect on us all—I have observed how, during the three days of our encapsulated spatial pilgrimage, while I have been addressing them, my fellow astronauts have withdrawn into a state of bemused and, I sincerely trust, reverent taciturnity. . . . As for the moon itself, on whose exterior epidermal surface I am promenading at this present time—I tell you, Dick, as a piece of real estate, I wouldn't give you a dime for the whole goddam joint—that is, I mean to say, Mr. President, that it appears currently insusceptible of being advantaged by the inauguration of those manifold cultural and economic blessings inherent in the American way of life. In fact, looking at its potential domicile-wise, it implies possibilities of discomfiture attendant upon the obvious necessitation for some due elements of refurbishing. . . .

FSO-retired

La Mesa, California

For Creativity

IN responding to the JOURNAL's invitation to comment on the issues raised by Deputy Under Secretary Macomber in his important January 14 speech, I would like to draw attention to the point he made about "creativity."

Mr. Macomber is, I think, quite right in his judgment of the Foreign Service's poor record in innovative thinking in recent years. The problem of finding, fostering, and furthering new ideas in foreign policy *is* a serious one. If the nation cannot look to its foreign policy brain, the Foreign Service, for new foreign policy ideas, where can it look?

It seems to me that we should seek remedies in three areas: (1) greater receptivity at all command levels of the Service, (2) better opportunities for thinking and writing, and (3) improved channels of communication with outside fountains of thought—academic and other.

Receptivity to innovation at each command level is a *sine qua non.* Mr. Macomber suggests that older officers may be encumbered in their thinking because they "know too many reasons why too many things won't work." Maybe. But may not this seeming intellectual ossification be as much the result of past discouragement from past supervisors? For creativity to flourish, each new proposal from the ranks of the Service should be acknowledged and discussed with its author. Meritorious proposals should be rewarded by being given a place in the foreign policy corpus of the nation. No other encouragement will be needed.

With regard to the second area, Mr. Macomber has pointed the way to the solution in the current drive to reduce the quantity of reporting. The over-burdened action officer will welcome the time this allows to put together his ideas; and he will use it if he has confidence that his effort will be hospitably received.

In my view, the third area is the most important and presents most difficulties. Creative thinking does not arise spontaneously. It comes as sparks struck off from contacts with other probing minds. The Foreign Service community is too restricted, too ingrown, and too narrowly specialized to find within its own ranks the kind of stimuli it needs for radically new thinking. We must therefore find ways to widen and deepen channels of communication between the Foreign Service and private groups interested in foreign affairs. The scholar-diplomat seminars should be an excellent device for this purpose; they are, however, still too brief in duration to have full effect. The proposed State Department Fellows Program should prove even more effective; and I hope it can soon be realized. The Department's Diplomat in Residence Program, now six years old, has been particularly beneficial because of the opportunities it has provided for deep and continuing contacts in vital academic centers throughout the country. It should be enlarged and a particular effort should be made to extend it to mid-career as well as senior officers.

When we speak of creativity in foreign policy thinking, I am sure we do not have in mind tired old proposals for abrupt changes of direction which neglect practical considerations and can lead nowhere. New policy does not come from overlooking facts. Nor, I think, does it come from a simple reshuffling of known facts.

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		1968	1969	1970
Members carrying Group Life		3120	3089	3052
Group Life in Force (exclusive of Reversionary)		$60,213,600	$59,578,300	$58,387,250
Enrolled in Foreign Service Benefit Plan		9600	9273	9122
Claims paid during year:				
Group Life,	Number	24	25	22
	Amount	$371,240	$294,000	$346,000
Family Coverage,	Number	10	11	17
	Amount	$10,000	$16,000	$34,000
Accidental Death,	Number	2	4	1
	Amount	$35,000	$43,750	$27,500
Foreign Service Benefit Plan		$1,307,026.91	$1,516,052.49	$1,771,483.33

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We must look to other sources for inspiration, and I suggest that there are two: (1) modern techniques of analysis (in political science, economics, psychology, etc.) which will yield new data suggesting new policy directions and (2) experimentation with different sets of values which would enable us to look at the world from fresh angles and liberate us from frozen modes of thought.

This latter is most important. There are many exceedingly well informed Americans whose outlook on foreign affairs is not ours; their conclusions on vital matters often are very different from ours. Perhaps they are not wholly right; but are they wholly wrong? They often reach their differing conclusions by using new and unconventional starting points of thought.

I agree heartily with Mr. Macomber's setting it up as an important aim to stimulate creative policy thinking. Success will lead not only to better foreign policy formulation, but to a revivified Foreign Service which will better serve—and represent—the American people.

JOSIAH W. BENNETT
Diplomat in Residence

Manhattan, Kansas

For Cross-Specialization

THE comments on Deputy Under Secretary William B. Macomber's speech of January 14, 1970 in the March issue of the JOURNAL struck me as reasonable qualifications on the plan for a more structured framework for the Foreign Service. My own experience leads me to support strongly two of Peter F. Krogh's points—"that the Department has been relatively oblivious to education" and "that great care will have to be taken to promote inter-functional or cross-specialization contact."

If, as Russell O. Prickett suggests, there are too many of us at work on foreign affairs operations, perhaps the Congress could be convinced to allow a larger number of us than at present to go to universities and engage in other educational projects which would better prepare the Foreign Service to provide the country with ideas and leadership in foreign affairs management. The fact that in recent years both Republican and Democratic administrations have turned to universities for foreign affairs ideas, approaches, general expertise and even diplomats suggests that either the Foreign Service has not had a sufficiently broad conception of its role or, and probably nearer the truth, it has not been provided the funds to support such a conception. Foreign Service depth of knowledge and experience needs to include, as Mr. Macomber made clear, modern methods of management, but it also needs to include a great deal more.

On the matter of the functional specialization career system, I think the Foreign Service might find the experience of universities over the last twenty years with their traditional system of dividing knowledge into disciplines with corresponding departments relevant. Increasingly many universities have found that their professors and students do better working within inter-disciplinary programs such as American studies. Inter-disciplinary programs seem particularly appropriate for the continuing education of Foreign Service officers because foreign affairs are essentially inter-disciplinary. I don't know whether "inter-functional contact" can be made a structural element of a new Foreign Service, but if the education of Foreign Service officers inclined them to operate that way, it would come down to the same thing.

H. CLAY BLACK

Minneapolis

On Title IX Issue

DEVOTING the March, 1970, issue of the JOURNAL to Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act was an excellent idea even though the articles were heavily slanted in the direction of political pseudo-science, and dedicated to the proposition that language which non-"scientists" have some difficulty understanding must conceal thought that is bright and helpful.

Happily Daniel S. Lev contributed reality to the discussion. Why do we leave him in Berkeley? There would seem to be a real need for him in the State Department.

WILLARD L. BEAULAC
Visiting Professor of Political Science

Muncie, Ind.

A Question of Taste

IT seems to me that Charles Maechling's review of Henry Brandon's Anatomy of Error" (JOURNAL, March 1970) raises at least a question of editorial taste. The slurs and invective that mark Mr. Maechling's treatment of President Johnson and his principal foreign-policy colleagues are common enough coin in the wrangling over Vietnam. But I wonder if "the journal of professionals in foreign affairs" is an appropriate forum for this kind of personalized and denigratory argumentation. There may well be a considerable range of discussion about Vietnam to which your magazine can usefully lend its columns. This professional, however, would hope that such aspects as insider views on the character and competence of the honorable men who bore the heaviest responsibilities in the last administration could be left to other publications.

HARRY W. SHLAUDEMAN

Santiago

Life and Love in the Foreign Service *By S. I. Nadler*

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