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Journal



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From Ted Olson



Washington Letter

As we have remarked before, writing a letter that won't reach the addressee for a month or six weeks involves problems. They are problems that didn't plague our ancestors; never having enjoyed the convenience of overnight or near-instant communication, or even conceived of the possibility, they got along quite nicely without it. Diplomats had more elbow-room; their elbows were not being joggled by a daily avalanche of NIACTs and EYES ONLYs. Wasn't it our Minister to Spain who once received a letter from the Secretary of State noting that they hadn't heard from him for a couple of years; how were things going down there?

As we sit down to write this in mid-May—earlier than usual, because we are coping out for a couple of months—the events of the last few weeks dominate headlines, commentary and conversation so completely that it's difficult to believe that by the Fourth of July they may have faded into the background, to be replaced by other events still unpredictable. Wherever you are you've heard and read about them, and probably been instructed to report local reaction, soonest.

If those incoming evaluations have matched the press reports, they must be pretty grim. Not all so devastating, we hope as Arnold Toynbee's characteristically magisterial verdict in response to a query from the *New York Times*: "To most Europeans, I guess, America now looks like the most dangerous country in the world."

Back here, too, the reaction has been profound, a mixture of dismay, disbelief, indignation and, for some, despair. Pundits write soberly of "the worst crisis since the Civil War." That seems a little extreme when one looks back over 100 years of history, some of it fairly recent: the Haymarket riots, the May Day massacre, the near-collapse of the economic system in the quadrennium 1929-33, the months immediately after Pearl Harbor, the McCarthy terror of the early '50s. But beyond question the country has been deeply shaken—by the slaughter of a dozen young people, for no adequate reason, so far as anyone has yet demonstrated; by the disruption of higher education at hundreds

of colleges and universities; by concern over our suddenly widened involvement in Southeast Asia, after the soothing assurances that withdrawal was proceeding according to plan. All these, plus the failure of the economy to respond to the regimen and medication now in use, have given many persons a queasy feeling that somehow things are falling apart.

Washington and its satellite areas have—as of this writing—happily escaped any tragic confrontations. Nobody has been shot. No buildings have been burned down. Property damage has not been heavy. The demonstration on the Ellipse, where 75,000 to 100,000 protestants congregated on May 9, had a picnic quality, except for a serious shortage of victuals and potables. The only violence was rhetorical. The only arrests were for indecent exposure; it was a very hot day, and the fountains and the Reflecting Pool were too tempting to resist.

Trouble broke out afterward, and continued sporadically for more than a week, particularly at American University, where students blocking rush-hour traffic at Ward Circle serimmaged with police, and at Maryland U., where sitdowns on Route 1 brought out the militia. A good many homebound commuters got their first whiff of tear gas. The press consensus is that the D.C. police for the most part behaved well, showing remarkable patience, forbearance and good humor. Chicago and other cities might well ask Chief Jerry Wilson for lessons.

In this dark and frightening time one can nevertheless find glimmers of encouragement. The extent and intensity of the protest seems to have astonished those at whom it was directed. Disaffection, they discovered, was not limited to spoiled juveniles and eraekpot intellectuals. It had spread to all ages and classes; it had even penetrated the governmental establishment. The shock of this discovery was salutary. There has been an attempt to reopen channels of communication, a disposition to listen and try to understand.

Encouraging also is the apparent disposition of a significant number of the young dissenters to move from the streets to Congressional ante-rooms and the doorsteps of voters. There

will be thousands of young people cross-examining candidates and ringing doorbells this summer. They've already set up shop in Washington, with computers and everything. The Washington demonstrations showed what they can do when they put mind and muscle into a cause. It was an impressive job of improvisation. In a week or less the ad hoc leadership set up an organization for managing the crowds and controlling potential trouble-makers that was almost as efficient, if not as tidily "structured," as that put together over a much longer period for the November 15 "Mobe."

Our society should be able to use people like that. It's heartening that so many of them have determined now to work within the society, trying to improve it, instead of repudiating it and trying to tear it down.

Postscript, in a Lighter Vein

In one flurry at American University, we see by the papers, "rocks and marshmallows were thrown." Marshmallows, yet! Raw or toasted? Anyway, there's an idea: missiles that express displeasure but inflict little damage. Edible too, if deftly fielded.

We were reminded of a foreign capital in which we were once stationed, where, we learned, there were two varieties of oranges—eating and throwing. When a demonstration was expected the police turned out before dawn and picked all the little hard oranges along the expected line of march so that they wouldn't be available for window-smashing.

No Summer Symphony Season

For a spell it looked as if our National Symphony might be going under. Now it seems to have scraped together enough money and pledges to ensure the 1970-71 season, with Antal Dorati as the new conductor. But the summer schedule had to be seratehed. The Fiesta in air-conditioned Constitution Hall inaugurated last year is not to be repeated, and unless there's a desperate eleventh-hour salvage operation, the customary programs at Columbia's Merriweather Post Pavilion are cancelled out too.

The musicians are bitter, and no wonder. They've written Senator Tydings, chairman of the Senate District Committee, complaining that the cancellation constitutes not only a breach of the contract that ended the strike last fall—it provided for 46 weeks of paid employment—but "a violation of public trust and a sheer disregard of civic responsibility." They estimate it will cost each member a loss of \$2,200 or more in salary.



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Meanwhile, the Post's Paul Hume writes, some may have to cke out a livelihood delivering milk or mending cars.

Most symphony orchestras in America suffer chronically from financial trouble. This year it's worse, because of the financial pinch everywhere. The plight of ours is particularly grave. It's sad, just when in one more year it is to have a proper auditorium to play in for the first time in its history.

Summer entertainment in the capital area will be mostly lighter stuff. Here's a partial schedule:

Ford's Theatre: Through Labor Day—"The Fantasticks," returning "by popular demand" to keep the historic playhouse open through the summer, perhaps for the first time since 1865.

Arena: Through July 5—The Pulitzer Prize play, "No Place to be Somebody," by Charles Gordon.

Carter Barron Amphitheatre: through July 5—Jerry Butler and the Edwin Hawkins Singers; July 6-12—Brook Benton, "Cannonball" Ad-derly, King Curtis & the Kingpins, the O'Jays; July 13-19—The Diana Ross Show; July 20-26—B. B. King, The Ides of March, 5 Stairsteps, Chairmen of the Board; July 27-Aug. 2—

Smokey Robinson and the Miracles; Aug. 3-9—Ray Charles and the Supremes; Aug. 10-16—The Temptations; Aug. 10-16—Judy Collins and Arlo Guthrie. [Your hopelessly square correspondent hopes that he copied those names correctly, and that they will mean something to some of you. He never heard of most of them before.]

Olney Theatre: Through July 12—"Madigan's Lock," by Hugh Leonard; July 14-Aug. 2—"Little Murders," by Jules Feiffer; Aug. 4-23—"Enter a Free Man," by Tom Stoppard (he wrote "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Are Dead;") Aug. 23-Sept. 13—"The Price," by Arthur Miller.

Shady Grove Music Fair: Through July 5—"The Sound of Music," with Barbara Eden; July 6-11—Engelbert Humperdinck; July 24-26—"Cabaret," with Leslie Uggams; July 28-Aug. 9—"George M!" with Mickey Rooney; Aug. 11-16—The Debbie Reynolds Show; Aug. 18-23—"I Do! I Do!" with Carol Lawrence and Robert Goulet; Aug. 25-Sept. 13—"Man of La Mancha," with Howard Keel; Sept. 15-20—"Irma la Douce," with Elke Sommer; Sept. 22-27—"This Is Burlesque," with Ann Corio (who else?)

Further cultural note: After a year

as acting director of the Corcoran, the innovative Walter Hopps has the job and the title for keeps.

What's Happening to Our Nats?

We can only hope that by the time you read this our Senators will have hit their stride, if they have one. Through most of May it was hard to decide which part of the morning paper was more depressing, the sports pages or the financial section; the Nats were sliding downhill as fast as the Dow-Jones averages. Nine straight lickings, the worst streak since 1963, when, you may recall, they finished tenth. One comfort: with the league split into two divisions they can't do worse than sixth.

A couple of months ago we wrote that the trouble was poor pitching. It's still shaky, but what's worse is the dismal spectacle of our mightiest hitters stepping to the plate in the ninth inning, with the potential tying and winning runs on base, and either grounding into a double play or whiffing out.

Ted Williams swears he's not discouraged, so we'll try not to be.

We must report also that the Caps didn't retain the basketball title they won a year ago when they were the Oakland Oaks. And next season we

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
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may not have a basketball team. If the two leagues merge, as is now contemplated, the Caps will probably be moved somewhere else and rechristened.

Property Levy Down, Income Tax Up

To an economic illiterate, it was a bit confusing at first. One day Montgomery County announced: Goody, goody! Money's coming in faster than we figured, so we're going to cut your property tax. Next day: Sorry, but we'll have to raise the income tax. It goes up from 45 per cent to 50 per cent of the state levy, which is the maximum permitted by law. The idea is to shift the burden from property to income, which is generally regarded as more equitable.

Simultaneously, though there was no causal relationship, PEPCO was authorized to raise its rates by 13 per cent. And newspaper subscriptions went up again.

"Sorry About That" Department

It's getting embarrassing, the frequency with which we have to apologize. We write a baseball piece, boasting about that wonderful Senator infield, and Ted Williams lets us down by trading off Ken McMullen. We report dutifully that the Young Left still has a Washington outlet, and next thing we know the QUICKSILVER TIMES is no more—blown apart by internal stresses, like Apollo XIII. And by the time we get that in type, one of the warring factions has the paper going

again, though for how long we wouldn't predict.

On the latter subject, we've been wondering why publications that are hawked openly in the streets, have listed phone numbers and maintain a nation-wide press service, call themselves "underground" papers. We tend to feel that term belongs by some sort of moral copyright to the anti-Nazi resistance forces with whom it originated. They actually did operate underground, in cellars and mountain hideouts; they distributed their mimeographed sheets by stealth, knowing that detection meant torture and possibly death. And they didn't feel it necessary to use obscenities. What could you call your enemy that would be more insulting than Nazi?

Oddments

- More on the Age of Nostalgia: There's a new bimonthly magazine called THE ROARING TWENTIES. Two James Branch Cabell novels (remember him?) have turned up on the paperback bookracks—"Figures of Earth" and "The High Place." On the other hand, the TV columns report that Lawrence Welk is getting ready to retire.

- The Post says Washington may be the only city in the world with more telephones than people. May be, you notice. AT&T lists 859,326 telephones, and the last Census Bureau estimate—before the decennial count was completed—was that the District had 798,000 residents.



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
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
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Dozing at the day's end and
Rome and my children
Rome and my tedium of scribbling in dry embassies
Rome left behind me,
I dreamed of Verdun in June
That sunny day we walked to the farm below the hill
My wife pregnant and we in young powers
Watching the geese and ducks,
How we dreamed of a pastoral life in Lorraine
Living by soft poplars and the grass above old bones
All the years we should live as beauty bloomed back
Like the girl out of prison, laughing in the park.

And instead we went dutifully to cities,
Duly to sere streets and smog
Embassy to embassy, tightness to tightness
Spilling our life among the commissaries:
From Moscow to Paris—France again, green again—
En route to Bangui. And we drove to Verdun
Through wind-whipped vineyards
Into our lovely Meuseland.
Arrived there, something dim stirred my mind,
We watched the quiet barges.

But my wife went to the beauty-shop
So I bought the children ice cream
And on to Africa.

Now in Tuscany, too late
As we scream through the night
I think of the goose farm
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
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COMMUNICATION



RE:

Mr. Alsop's FSO

GLEN H. FISHER

In early October, Stewart Alsop, writing in *NEWSWEEK* (Oct. 6), discussed the sometimes less than prominent role played by the Foreign Service officer in foreign affairs decision making. He suggested that one of the lessons to be learned through US experience in the '60s is that the professional FSO's favorite phrase "have you considered all the possible consequences, sir?" often has considerable merit. He noted that in critical decision making, such caution might be more the path of wisdom than the more confident "can do, sir" of the military. Alsop's commentary did not—in one page—completely exonerate the FSO from overcaution or lack of imagination; he even said that many FSOs are pretty stodgy. But at least he drew public attention to one of the core aspects of professionalism in the Foreign Service, that is, the FSO's habit, as a matter of professional practice based on hard experience, of evaluating policy alternatives in the perspective of a real world where a complex of both obvious and less obvious factors impinge on the outcome of a given policy, and his habit of seeking out the unanticipated consequences of any projected action.

Mr. Alsop's commentary poses still another occasion for us to consider the nature of our professionalism, if indeed the occasion is not already sufficiently prompted by the current reduction in force across various agencies in our official overseas community, and by the continuing deliberations of the American Foreign Service Association regarding the kind of Foreign Service we need for modern diplomacy. Actually, Alsop's frame of reference may serve as a healthy reminder that AFSA's discussion may lose relevance if it is directed too much toward the bureaucratic problems of that larger collectivity of people who in one way or another earns its living by dealing with foreign affairs activities rather than focus on the objective of Foreign Service—i.e. bringing a competent Foreign Service professionalism to bear on the policy problems of our Government.

In advancing the concept of a "united foreign service," there may be a real danger that such definition of our FSO professionalism as remains may become even less distinct, especially given the play of semantics to which it has been subjected in the course of many debates and introspections. As it is now, the question remains insistent for the FSO and for some of his nearer relatives engaged in the substance of foreign affairs: is there a special professional status in our diplomatic establishment, or is the FSO just another subdivision in the "unified foreign service?"


The answer to this question is important to the FSO who is concerned with his self image and career expectations. It is even more important to the US public and its Government. In today's increasingly complex, specialized, and often compartmentalized international relations activities, we have tended more and more to depend on the specialized technician to attend to the many separate components of our foreign affairs, and less, perhaps, on the professionals in diplomacy whose competence and experience encompasses the broader field and the more far reaching implications and

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consequences of our actions. We need to press the question: Is foreign policy serious enough, complicated enough, with ramifications far enough removed from the common experience or even the specialized technical experience, that we need professional help from the professionals in diplomacy? If so, what constitutes "professional help?" How do we develop it?

Perhaps our difficulty in arriving at a concept of professionalism in the FSO ranks which would compare with professionalism in law, medicine, etc., starts with our uncertainty in determining just when in the career the "professionalism" begins. In law, one passes the bar examination, is licensed and begins to "practice." In medicine, one is trained to technical standards, tutored in the norms of medical practice, is tested and licensed, and then launched to preside over people's physiology. Ministers are "ordained." But somehow the rites of passage in which a new FSO attends his swearing-in ceremony seem less convincing. There has been no common pattern of training. No single set of professional standards seems to exist. The specific duties to which FSOs are assigned seem too varied to pretend to call for a single brand of professional competence. What is worse, many real professionals in diplomacy are practicing very successfully without a license, and often positions which call for the level of professional diplomacy to which Alsop refers are filled by appointments which ignore both the license and the aura of professional experience.

Back to Mr. Alsop's "foreign policy professionals." Within the Foreign Service Corps, perhaps the key to understanding this professionalism is to see it as a professional-level competence which is the *product of the career experience* as well as a function of the qualifications demanded by the entrance examination and the promotion process. Then FSO professional status—for those who make it at all—comes in the middle or upper grades of a profession-oriented continuum of experience. However, there is no reason to deny professional competence just because it is a bit hard to determine when professional status begins, and because the status comes more by an apprentice-to-craftsman route than by a specialized training and licensing route. Nor, in the heat of a policy decision, should one overlook the fact that the professional's participation is needed. This concept of professionalism seems to be the rationale for creating an FSO Corps in the first place. And a bigger and more technically-specialized foreign affairs bureaucracy is not a substitute for the professionalism which the career Foreign Service, and Mr. Alsop, visualizes.

What, then, are the basic requirements for FSO professionalism besides some experience? There seem to be at least three main elements.

1. However acquired, there is a broad body of pertinent knowledge which bears on the foreign policy process and which, if not unique in detail, is specialized in its total pattern. For example, the professional in foreign affairs knows his government's foreign policy apparatus, and also that of a number of other foreign countries. He knows how these work formally, and how they actually work in practice. He knows international organizations, diplomatic custom and usage, and the mechanisms of diplomatic communication. That is, he knows the tools of the trade and how to use them. He knows the context from which foreign policy objectives evolve, which means he knows a lot of US history, economics, politics, public attitudes, etc. He also must know this for the foreign area or areas with which he is concerned. He knows one or more foreign areas in depth, and perhaps just as important, when he approaches a new area including the new and developing nations, he knows what he needs to learn. Closer to the daily job, he knows both Embassy and Department of State bureaucracies, and how to get things done through them. So we could add to

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the catalogue, particularly when one recognizes specialization in diplomatic functions. The point is that this is a combination package of indispensable knowledge relating to the substance of foreign affairs which goes far beyond that gained in the course of a good general education, or simply by working in the foreign affairs bureaucracy.

2. Secondly, there is that necessary quality of lost innocence which, as in other fields, establishes the "old pro." In foreign affairs professionalism there is no substitute for the varied experience of the FSO, through the course of which he has seen policy in action—sometimes at painfully close range—and he has seen that which has worked, and that which has not. Most to the point, he has had to live with the consequences of policy decisions at many levels. Repeatedly he has seen the unanticipated element determine the outcome, and with experience, the number of unanticipated elements become fewer in his perception of policy problems. He has observed the policy initiatives of other countries, has tried to analyze them, and predict them. Because his mental computer is thus programed with the memory of that which has not worked before as well as that which has, and also with the many less obvious factors which come into play in determining the outcome of a policy initiative, the professional may appear negative when faced with the fresh new idea. Also suggested that this has annoyed some Presidents. And it may give the image of lack of imagination. But one of the virtues of a professional in any field, and for which he is paid, is that his is the counsel which helps avoid repetition of past errors, and anticipates the negative as well as the positive consequences of proposed courses of action.

3. Finally, the professional-level FSO is the one government servant whose mission in life it is to carry out the United States Government's business, and execute its policy, in a foreign environment. He is the one whose skill allows for the real differences in cultural background and national experience, for contrasting public institutions and the way they operate, for the variations in logic and the assumptions and perceptions which go with them. His language ability is not only his means of verbal communication, it is also his entrée into the thought processes of those with whom he must deal, or the foreign publics whose attitudes impinge on their policy makers. His accumulation of experience in everyday living and working in the institutions of foreign societies give that extra dimension from which the relevance of our actions and policies can be judged and interpreted for the benefit of the US officials and the public back home who lack this dimension. In short, foreign affairs professionalism involves not only the policy formation process, but the special competence in crossing the bridge to carry it out in a foreign situation.

Mr. Alsop speaks of FSOs as being "in theory professionals in the conduct of America's foreign policy . . ." If the theory is to be more than just that, it would seem incumbent on the FSO Corps to attend to its professionalism, to cultivate it, and to defend itself from dilution by assuming too many functions which do not represent the substance of foreign affairs, from usurpation of its functions by an expanding overseas foreign affairs bureaucracy, or from accepting a too modest status within a unified foreign service. ■

The great exponent of perseverance, William the Silent, Prince of Orange, never wavered in the face of every hardship and disaster from striving for the unity and independence of the Netherlands. The immortal sentence in which he epitomized his life cannot be repeated too often: "It is not necessary to hope in order to act, or to succeed in order to persevere."

—Dean Acheson in "Present at the Creation"

Britain's Diplomats

THE Duncan Committee has advised the Government that the British Foreign Service is bigger than it needs to be mainly because it is performing (efficiently) many tasks which no longer need to be performed. This is good advice and the Government should take it. The Committee argues that the chief aims of British foreign policy now are to improve the balance of payments through trade and to consolidate Britain's position in Europe and as a member of NATO. Britain's decision to withdraw from Singapore has rendered out-of-date the assumption that remote foreign Governments will respond to British diplomatic pressure because of British military power. So the sort of Embassy that goes with the assumption is out-of-date as well.

The Committee recommends, in effect, that the Foreign Service should be made less pretentious in countries where pretentiousness would be vain in any case, and that the chief effort everywhere should concentrate on trade. This would mean a reduction in the size of the service itself, in the numbers of attachés of various sorts, and in the British Information Service. The Committee finds that the BIS is generally less effective as a disseminator of information about Britain than the BBC and the British Council because the BIS is a British Government agency and is therefore suspect.

These proposals seem reasonable in view of some of the remarkable facts the Committee discovered. The BIS employs 117 people in New Delhi and 36 in Calcutta to attempt "the insurmountable task" of projecting the idea of Britain to the Indians. New Delhi is well endowed with attachés also. On the military side there is one Major-General, one Captain RN, one Group Captain, one Lieutenant Colonel, and one Squadron Leader. There are also two Ministers, four Counsellors, 13 First Secretaries, 14 Second Secretaries, one Third Secretary, one Passport Officer, one architect, and a doctor to look after all the others.

In its own brisk way the Duncan Committee has followed the Fulton Committee's advice to "look at the job first." Having done this with much diligence and in a very short time, the Committee concluded that outside the areas and countries with which Britain must now be mainly concerned—Europe, North America, China, and Japan—many of the jobs did not need to be done at all. The Committee questioned the usefulness of "political reporting" to which diplomats give much skilled time. The Committee's conclusion, very delicately put, was that although political reports to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office might contain much useful information, the people in Whitehall who read them did not seem to take them seriously enough to act on them. "A substantial number of the reports are not readily identifiable as contributing directly to action and decision-making in London."


If the Government accepts the Duncan Committee's Report it must also accept that Britain now has too many diplomats and that although they nearly all work hard and efficiently, much of the work they do is a fairly expensive waste of time. This will come as a shock to diplomats and they ought, as the Committee says, to be generously treated if they have to retire early. (The treatment of locally-recruited staff should be particularly generous.) But money would be saved in the end and the service would be more efficient. Another conclusion which follows from the Committee's report (but which the Committee itself has not drawn) is that if less money ought to be spent on the official British Information Service then more should be spent on the British Council and on the BBC external service. If, as the Committee says, these two non-Government organisations are doing a good job, more money would enable them to do a better one.—from *Manchester Guardian Weekly*, July 24, 1969

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—Edna St. Vincent Millay

An American Foreign Policy Imperative—

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AN era is at an end.

For more than two decades, the essence and the heart of our behavior as a nation has been an activist foreign policy. It is through our assertion of world leadership that we have expressed our national purpose and identity. We have judged our national leaders primarily against the standard of their performance in the international arena. Our sense of well-being and accomplishment has been, to a great extent, a measure of the apparent success or failure of our international role. Our government's best minds, and the better part of our governmental energies, have gone into creating, protecting, and applying American influence to the course of world affairs.

Our international role has dominated the intellectual climate of American life to such an extent that for several decades, the first criterion of an intelligent, responsible, and informed American citizen has been his ready acceptance of the necessity for our active assertion of world leadership. He who challenged or resisted the activist thrust of American foreign policy was—by definition—either unwise, irresponsible, or uninformed.

It is no mystery how international affairs achieved this overweening role in our national life. At the beginning of the era, our society came to believe several propositions which, in retrospect, made such dominance almost inevitable:

- The era began with a world conflagration which was seen as the more or less direct result of the

MARSHALL WRIGHT

FSO-2 Marshall Wright authored "An American Foreign Policy Imperative: Responsible Restraint" during the year he just completed as the first State Department Senior Fellow at the National War College. As we go to press Mr. Wright is beginning his second assignment on the staff of the National Security Council where he had served previously in 1967-68. During his career, which Mr. Wright describes as "at best, checkered," he has served abroad in Canada, Burma and Thailand, and Thailand, and in the Department in a variety of slots.

failure of the United States after World War I to shoulder its international responsibilities. Americans generally accepted the proposition that when the United States turned its back on the League of Nations—on collective security—on an active role in world affairs—we condemned the world and ourselves to the tragedy of World War II.

- We came out of World War II with a virtual monopoly of the kind of national strength which could be used effectively to influence the nature of the world in which we live. No one else could even attempt the task of creating a world order conducive to peace and prosperity. We, alone, possessed the potential for benevolent leadership. Not to use our potential was tantamount to saying that the course of world events did not matter, that it could safely be left to blind fate. That proposition obviously was untenable in the aftermath of World War II with its 30 to 40 million dead and its introduction

of the atomic bomb.

- Most important of all, we became convinced that there existed an intense and urgent threat to our national well-being. A united world communist movement was working with profound determination and frightening skill to take advantage of the general instability that followed World War II. Our strength and our influence stood as the only effective barrier to the broad extension of communist power. A prime communist goal, therefore, was the destruction of our strength and influence. Simple survival demanded that we defend ourselves by contesting with the communists for the future of the world.

These three propositions, I believe, constituted the philosophical foundation for the American assertion of world leadership after World War II. They were the reasons why the United States Government decided upon, and the American people assented to, this departure from the traditional American resistance to overseas involvements.

Americans are, however, a pragmatic people. Our original commitment to an activist world policy was a matter of cool calculation. Our subsequent enthusiasm, and the resulting dominance of world affairs in our national life came later. It evolved out of our actual experience with an activist role abroad. For it worked. To our delight, our pride, and our intense sense of accomplishment, it worked.

As the United States began to assert its leadership in world affairs, we experienced one glitter-

ing success after another. The Russian assault on Iranian independence vanished in the face of American firmness. The communist attempt to take Greece foundered on the rock of the Truman Doctrine. The Marshall Plan was a brilliant success in restoring the economic viability and the political stability of Western Europe. The airlift kept Free Berlin alive. Our occupation policies toward Germany and Japan succeeded beyond all precedent and all expectation. The nations of the world demonstrated an almost eager acceptance of American leadership. The United Nations was generally responsive to American initiatives. Under our benevolent gaze, colonial empires were liquidated, and sixty-three new countries came into being.

But, at the same time, the Russian development of a nuclear arsenal created a sense of deep threat. It underlined the need for an overwhelmingly strong military force and an active world policy to circumscribe the growing communist strength. The initial Russian lead in space was seen as a setback, requiring a massive United States Government catch-up effort and a thorough overhaul of our educational and scientific/technological performance.

Our successes, then, encouraged us to do more—and our setbacks forced us to.

Moreover, the cost of our activist policy came to appear to be tolerable, if not surprisingly light. Although we initially shouldered the costs of an activist national security policy with a sense of picking up a necessary burden, we soon came to feel that the "sacrifice" had no real bite. The American economy prospered and continued to prosper as never before in our history.

Thus grew a unique phenomenon in the history of world affairs. The United States came to define its proper international role almost solely in terms of what was desirable. We could do—and should do—whatever seemed advisable. There was no need to cut our policy to fit a pattern of available resources. There was no need to distinguish sharply between the essential and the merely desirable.

This attitude became an unspoken but fundamental part of the

American approach to world affairs. (It was identified and elegantly named "the illusion of American omnipotence" by the British scholar, Denis Brogan.)

Let the reader, in these days of our disenchantment, question whether our commitment to world leadership was ever so all encompassing and enthusiastic as I have described it, let me offer a piece of evidence. Go back and read John F. Kennedy's Inaugural Address. You will search in vain for one word addressed to domestic affairs. Indeed, a mention of domestic affairs would have been out of place, for President Kennedy quite explicitly addressed himself throughout the speech to a world constituency, rather than a domestic one.

Let the word go forth, from this time and place, to friend and foe alike, that the torch has passed to a new generation of Americans . . . unwilling to witness or permit the slow undoing of those human rights to which . . . we are committed today, at home and around the world.

Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, support any friend and oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty. . . .

To those old allies whose cultural and spiritual values we share, we pledge the loyalty of faithful friends. . . . To those new states whom we welcome to the ranks of the free, we pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny . . . To those peoples in the huts and villages of half the globe . . . we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required. . . . To our sister republics south of the border we offer a special pledge . . . to assist . . . in casting off the chains of poverty. Let all our neighbors know that we shall join with them to oppose aggression or subversion anywhere in the Americas. And let every other power know that this Hemisphere in-

tends to remain the master of its own house. . . . Finally, to those nations who would make themselves our adversary . . . Let both sides unite to heed in all corners of the earth the command of Isaiah—"to undo the heavy burdens . . . and let the oppressed go free." . . . asking His help and His blessing, but knowing that here on earth God's work must truly be our own.

It is hard to imagine any more sweeping declaration that the business of America is world leadership. And it is worth remembering that this declaration, made by a President just elected by the narrowest of margins, was generally hailed as a brilliant and inspirational expression of the national mood. I, at least, cannot remember any criticism that it was too concerned with international matters, or staked out for the United States too grandiose an international role. It is instructive of the change that ten years has brought in our national attitudes to contemplate the reception which would be given today to such a declaration of American purpose.

With the passage of time, then, we came to see an activist world policy as a moral and practical necessity, sanctified by success, and essentially unlimited by any particular level of available resources. On this national consensus rested several decades of hyperactive American assertion of world leadership. It led to alliances with 43 countries. It led to the creation in foreign lands of 143 American military bases. It led to the consistent allocation of at least 40 percent of our federal budget to national security purposes. It led to the application of American military force in Korea, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Laos, and Vietnam. It led to our sending economic assistance to 111 countries, and military assistance to at least 79.

It is now clear that time has overtaken this consensus. Time—and changes both in the domestic and the international scene—has eroded the philosophical foundation on which our national security policies have rested since the Second World War.

The implications for American

foreign policy are profound—and must be recognized squarely. Those who manage our national affairs must either find a new basis for a continuation of our policy—or cut the policy to fit the foundation that now exists in current American attitudes.

At the simplest level of complexity, this is true because we are a society with effective representative institutions. It is *not* true that no American foreign policy can be long pursued without the support of the American public. In many instances, indifference serves quite as well as active support. For non-controversial policies requiring no great expenditure of resources, the executive branch need not be much concerned with what public opinion is, or more precisely, what it would be if it existed. The ultimate control of American public opinion on government policy is dependent upon two factors. First, the issue must be a matter of public controversy. Otherwise, public opinion, if it exists at all, is dormant and ineffective. Second, the policy must be one which requires for its successful implementation the expenditure of large resources. Otherwise, the ultimate sanction of public opinion, the Congress, is not fully effective.

The rule, then, goes something like this: no American foreign policy can long be effectively pursued without public support *if* the policy is a matter of public controversy, and *if* its implementation requires the expenditure of significant resources.

And this is precisely the crux of the present crisis facing America's national security policy. It is the activist nature and the high cost of our world policy which is now a matter of public controversy.

The critics no longer accept for foreign policy the dominant role in our national life. They assert, instead, the higher priority of domestic affairs. They no longer agree that the cost of our national security policy is tolerable. To the contrary, they consider it excessive. They no longer accept the communist threat as so urgent and imminent as to require an all-out national effort to create and maintain a world order conducive to our own

well-being. Instead, they assert that there is no longer a united world communist movement, and they question, in any event, whether it is still implacably and effectively dedicated to the destruction of American well-being.

The truth of these assertions is not, of course, demonstrable. Alone, they would probably not be sufficient to force a redirection of American policy. But the criticisms do not fall into a vacuum. They fall on a fertile soil of domestic opinion. For hand-in-hand with the growth of a minority severely critical of the assumptions underlying our activist policy, has come a great change in the psychological attitude of the American people toward the nation's role of world leader.

A large part of our people no longer respond to the vocabulary of our foreign policy. The zest is gone. The exciting and youthful sense of purposeful leadership in decisive events has been replaced with a middle aged skepticism born of experience and weariness. We are no longer sure that the events are decisive, and we are no longer so confi-

dent that our leadership is purposeful. Would it not have been better, in retrospect, if we had never gotten into Vietnam at all? What will be the end result of all our effort there? Why with our mighty and costly defense establishment, can we not bring to a successful conclusion a conflict with a weak and small enemy whose force has never exceeded 300,000? Is the end result of our investment in national security a situation in which a minor power can with impunity seize one of our naval vessels and imprison its crew? Is the end result of the Alliance for Progress a situation in which Governor Rockefeller cannot visit South America without becoming a focal point for widespread riots? Is the end result of the Marshall Plan and NATO a situation in which we are booted out of France and in which our oldest ally, until recently, seemed determined to undermine the dollar? Why must the United States maintain a military force of 350,000 men in Europe, while not a single NATO ally meets its military commitments to the strength of NATO? Does foreign economic as-



sistance do any good, and if so, why does the gap between the have and the have-not countries continue to widen?

It does no good to dismiss the questions as unfair. As President Kennedy observed, life is unfair. These are questions which American citizens ask themselves. They find no truly satisfactory answers. And the result has been a fundamental change in their attitude toward the American role in world affairs. Somehow, we seem now to be the victim of distasteful events, rather than the purposeful leader of decisive ones. There is no longer much emotional satisfaction to be gained from our international activity—and there used to be much.

Similarly, it is pointless to dismiss the criticism of our policy as unworthy of serious consideration. That kind of Olympian rejection is merely an outmoded manifestation of the intellectual sanctity which our activist foreign policies enjoyed for several decades—but enjoy no more.

There is, in fact, considerable merit in most of the propositions of the critics of current American policy. It is true that the world communist movement is no longer united. It is true that the threat posed to the United States by communism no longer appears as urgent and heavy as it did twenty years ago. It is true that the balance of payments problem, the human and material costs of the Vietnam war, and our domestic inflation, have destroyed the once proud American assumption that world leadership could be asserted without significant sacrifice to our domestic well-being. And it is certainly true that within the past few years we have become conscious as a nation of grievous and frightening weaknesses in our domestic life which demand not only our resources, but our concentration.

In any event, for purposes of this analysis, it does not matter so much whether the criticism of American policy is right, as that it is widespread. What is true is in a sense less important than what the collective American mind thinks is true. And in the collective American mind, there is no longer a shared set of beliefs, a common philosophical foundation, to support so ac-

tivist a world policy as the United States has followed in recent decades.

That policy was possible only because of a shared concept of reality—a view of what was true about the world in which we live and what was necessary for our well-being in that world. That view of reality has changed. Our policies, perforce, will change with it.

I submit that there is now in our national psyche a set of general convictions that make a de-emphasis of our international role as much a certainty in the decade ahead as was its expansion in the aftermath of World War II. Those convictions are:

- At home, we face an urgent and imminent threat to our national well-being. Our domestic crisis probably transcends in seriousness and is in any event more immediate in its impact than the dangers which face us in the international arena. The first order of American business is to come to grips with our domestic problems.

- The operations of the United States Government in the field of national security have got somewhat out-of-hand. Our expenditures for the defense establishment, our maintenance of military forces abroad, our commitments to the defense of other countries, all seem out of proportion either to the need for or the benefits which accrue from such operations.

- Our impact on world affairs is no longer as effective and as decisive as it once was. In many instances, our operations abroad seem to exacerbate rather than mitigate problems. Our ability to control events abroad is, somehow, diminished, and our general assertion of world leadership often involves us in problems not susceptible to satisfactory resolution by our efforts.

It is a mistake to consider these attitudes as the result of the Vietnam war. For that implies that the attitudes are transitory, and will change once the Vietnam trauma is behind us. Such a reversion is highly unlikely. Indeed, without some unifying event of transcendent importance, such a reversion is inconceivable.

To be sure, the Vietnam war has

contributed mightily to the transformation in national attitudes. It precipitated, it accelerated, and it greatly intensified the reconsideration of America's activist world role. It gave to what otherwise might have been a reasonably cool and detached assessment of national priorities, a white-hot emotional flavor and—on both sides—more than a touch of crusading zeal. But the seeds of reassessment were already present and visibly sprouting in such phenomena as the Congressional and public skepticism toward foreign aid, the growing expressions



of concern with the "military-industrial complex," the easy public acceptance of strictures regarding the American role as "world policeman," and, most of all, the rising tide of high concern with our domestic racial and urban problems.

Nor is it reasonable to believe that the current American role can be long maintained by a supreme effort of "public education," and a dogged determination by our national leaders to hold the line. Such an effort, however noble in its motivation, would be wrong-headed and futile.

The nature of international life is such that the undiminished assertion of American world leadership is—simply—impossible. It would require for its success an assured continuity which it does not now possess—and cannot now be given.

For the first requirement of the successful application of American world leadership is the willingness of foreign governments to accept that leadership. And no foreign government can commit its well-being to dependence upon the United States unless it can have confidence in the continuity and the

reliability of our commitments.

In the present state of American public opinion, we are clearly in for a protracted and highly publicized struggle over the nature of our international role. Each of our biennial elections is taking on the character of a national plebiscite on our foreign policy, and an increasing number of Congressional roll-calls are billed as attempts to change the course of American policy.

Under these circumstances, few things could be a greater disservice to an effective American foreign policy than for our national leaders to hold to the fiction that all is as it has been, and that current US foreign policy continues to be a rock upon which our foreign friends can build with total confidence.

Our foreign friends know better. They are acutely aware of our domestic disarray, and of the heated debate over national priorities. They follow, and they absorb the implications of the widespread charges that we are "over-committed." They will not—for they cannot—continue to shape their national policies around the assumption that American policy is a constant and dependable factor. To assure them that they "can count upon us," is to ask them to respect King Canute's judgment regarding tidal movements.

Foreign governments already know full well that changes are in store for America's international role. They already know that the Executive Branch of the United States Government is beleaguered by a rising Congressional and public demand for a cut-back in America's international operations and commitments. What they need now to know is how the Executive Branch will come to terms with this sentiment, and what the shape of American policy will be after the terms have been struck.

A renewed sense of confidence in us and our commitments is dependent upon the emergence of a restructured policy which demonstrably has continuity. That continuity can only come from a broad consensus of American public support. Until the United States has created such a policy, both our friends and our enemies will be uncertain as to our future role.

In such an atmosphere of uncertainty, no American policy can be

truly effective. In such an atmosphere, it approaches the fatuous to insist upon an undiminished assertion of broad American world leadership.

I should, at this point, make it clear that I do not seriously contemplate the possibility that the United States is headed for a return to isolationism of the pre-World War II variety. There is, so far as I can see, no significant American sentiment calling for a crude withdrawal from the world. Outside the farther reaches of the New Left, there are none who suggest dismantling our military establishment, least of all our strategic nuclear deterrent. Few, indeed, would suggest that we scrap the concept of collective security, terminate all our alliances, and tell the rest of the world to work out their future with the Soviet Union and Communist China.

There is no support among the American people for such a policy. They are not foolish enough to permit such a policy to be foisted off upon them. But neither are they foolish enough to believe that the only alternative to the policies of the past two decades is a feckless and improvident retreat to isolationism.

Instead, it seems to me, the American mood calls for a policy of deliberate but responsible restraint in national security matters. It calls on those charged with our security to exercise this restraint without the sacrifice of fundamental national interests.

Put another way, it seems to me that the message which should be heard by our diplomatic and military professionals is something along these lines: "You have had a good long run at asserting world leadership in a very active way. We have given unstintingly of the resources you have said were necessary. Now we'd like to be able to concentrate on some problems here at home. Moreover, we think maybe we've reached the point of diminishing returns on some of this world leadership business. We know we still have to do our part, and we're willing to do it. But we want you to manage things so that our part doesn't take up so much of our attention and resources. Even God rested on the seventh day.

Give us a little repose."

It seems clear that our national political leaders have absorbed this public attitude. Perhaps they share it. If not, they appear nonetheless to have accepted it as an imperative in their conduct of our affairs. That is what the Guam Doctrine means. That is what Secretary of State Rogers means by a "more modest" American approach to international problems.

It can be argued that those charged with the management of our national security should be greatly stimulated by such a challenge. It takes one level of professional competence to identify what things are desirable to do in terms of national security. It takes another—and altogether more demanding level of competence—to decide which of these desirable things can be left undone without running unacceptable risks. From the professional point of view, the whole process of fitting our national security policies to a pattern of reduced resources and restrained activity will be a matter of risks assumed. Applying restraint in our national security policy means, precisely, deciding what we can afford not to do.

We are, in all probability, in for a sustained period in which fewer resources will be provided to meet our foreign policy and national security needs. Hard, and perhaps agonizing, decisions will have to be made as to how those resources can best be used. In making those decisions, the nation will need the fullest participation of those who understand best and care most about America's international role.

They must not disqualify themselves from serious participation by adhering to views which are fast becoming irrelevant. Those who continue to insist that we should do all that we have done, can contribute little to deciding what not to do. Those who deny the necessity for making painful decisions as to our priority interests, cannot influence the decisions as to what those priority interests are. And it is those decisions that will determine the future shape of American policy.

It therefore seems to me that the first order of business for international relations is
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And with Caesar to take in his hand the army,
the empire and Cleopatra, and say, "All these
will I relinquish if you will show me the fountains of the Nile."

—New England Reformers, Ralph Waldo Emerson

Return to EGYPT

DAVID G. NES

David G. Nes, FSO from 1946-68, has served in Glasgow, Paris, and London, and as a Deputy Chief of Mission in Tripoli, Rabat, Saigon, and Cairo. A graduate of Harvard's School of International Law, Ambassador Nes was awarded the Department's Superior Honor Award in 1967. He revisited the Mid East earlier this year at which time he gathered material for this article.

DURING the early morning hours of June 10, 1967, as American Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo, I closed the doors of our Embassy for the last time, and was driven through a tight blackout to the railway station to lead the last remaining group of Americans out of Egypt. A few hours earlier, President Nasser had gone on the radio to admit his country's devastating military defeat and to resign. The streets were soon filled with chanting masses calling on him to remain their leader, a plea which the National Assembly soon confirmed. Anti-Western, particularly anti-American feeling was intense and our security was questionable. In this atmosphere the Spanish Ambassador, Angel Sagaz, who was representing US interests in the UAR, with great courage drove himself to the station to say farewell.

Early this year in a United Arab Airlines Russian-built IL 18, I flew in from Tripoli, over the Western Desert, flaps down above the three great pyramids of Giza, across the Nile and its islands of Zamalek and Roda, purple in the setting sun, a wide sweep over the sand dunes along the road to Ismailia and on into Cairo airport to be met by old friends.

Driven in through new Nasr City with its modern government offices and row on row of apartments, Heliopolis, a middle class suburb of villas and parks, and into a city celebrating its first thousand years of history, I could not but feel joy at a return under these new and yet untried circumstances.

First impressions are often distortions of reality, but when one knows a city and a people well, you can at least observe changes. There were many fewer international aircraft parked at Cairo Airport but most major lines still maintain schedules including TWA. The streets and traffic seemed somewhat less hectic and more subdued and many areas of street lighting were out, but on the whole, life seemed to be going on as I remembered it three years before. After that first night with friends at the Estoril restaurant, where you can still enjoy excellent European cuisine, and a dinner with wine for less than \$3.00, I walked back across the A'Tahrir Square to the Nile now under a full moon. Cairo seemed a most beautiful city and far from the Palestine War.

To complete impressions, considerable new modern construction is proceeding, particularly in the Heliopolis area where a new sports center, large park with gardens in full flower and an outdoor res-

taurant, the Merryland, provide Cairo's growing middle class the outdoor amenities of a Paris or London. Lunching there alone on a Friday, I was possibly the only foreigner and, certainly, the only American to mingle with thousands of families on their weekly holiday. In downtown Cairo, two additional large luxury hotels are nearing completion, the Sheraton in Giza and the Fontana with a sweeping view of the Nile from Roda Island. In walking miles through most



Damaged Suez canal area

areas of downtown Cairo, I found the shops stocked pretty much as I had remembered them, except for the bookstalls where New York, London and Paris daily newspapers, magazines and books in English are largely unobtainable—a combination of foreign exchange shortage and censorship.

While to the casual observer there are thus few evidences of war to substantiate the daily military communiqués which largely fill the Cairo radio news programs, foreigners are severely restricted in movement out of Cairo—the “agricultural” road to Alexandria and the routes to Ismailia, Suez, Fayume Oasis and up river to Assiut being closed to them. During my week’s stay, there were two observable Israeli air attacks. On a drive between the site of the ancient capital of Memphis and the “step pyramid” of Saqara, I heard and observed two Israeli Mystères streak low on the other side of the Nile on their bomb run, unloading in the Helwan steel complex vicinity and then with after-burners roaring, lift straight up out of sight. The second attack involving four aircraft, came several days later just as I was being greeted by Foreign Minister Riad in his downtown office. One of his aides, with typical Egyptian sense of humor, quipped, “Well, you see, Mr. Nes, your friends are giving you a military salute.” At this point the anti-aircraft fire was heavy and you could see the bursts from the Ministry windows. There was, however, no slackening in the pace of the traffic or pedestrians below. Few even looked up, so used have they become to Israeli air activity overhead. As recent history has shown, during World War II and in North Vietnam, bombing from the air only increases a peoples’ resolve and fortitude.

The non-official American presence in Cairo is still considerable. On the official level, we are still represented by Spanish Ambassador Sagaz who maintains a section in his Embassy of some twenty American Foreign Service personnel. The largest American presence stems from the operations of two oil companies, AMOCO-UAR, a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Indiana, and Phillips. The

American University of Cairo is thriving with the largest budget, \$3.3 million, American faculty members—30, and students—74, in its history. Its incredibly young and energetic President, Dr. Christopher Thorn, told me there are now 1700 undergraduate students of all nationalities, 450 graduate, and an evening adult education program of some 2700. In Maadi, a suburb used by many of the American oil company families, the American College, a Preparatory High School, enjoys a new modern physical plant and the largest student body in its history. The American Missionary School in Alexandria has also profited by the presence of American oil company families in that city. The American Research Center, which supports archeological efforts, and the Ford Foundation, which is involved in Nile river irrigation and hydroelectric planning, are also back in full operation.

Of somewhat questionable advantage to the remaining American cultural position are the films being currently shown and attracting large crowds—“The Young, the Evil and the Savage,” “Life, Love and Death,” “Rosemary’s Baby,” and “The Strange Affair.” How long Egypt’s cultural orientation and preference will remain Western under the pressures generated by the Palestine War is problematical.

On the political scene, it is always essential to remember that Egypt enjoys a high degree of built-in stability in its history, the character of its people and the nature of the regime. How many Chiefs of State in today’s world have survived sixteen years of varying social, economic and military setbacks including two military disasters and yet emerged with greater popularity than in 1954? Unquestionably President Nasser enjoys the full support of his people and there is little articulate opposition. Since June 1967, several key personalities within the Revolutionary Command leadership have disappeared, Marshal Amer by suicide, Ali Sabri, head of the Arab Socialist Union, into a less politically advantageous position and Zahria Muhiedin, Vice-President in June 1967 into obscurity. Anwar Sadat, close confidant since pre-revolution



Downed Israeli aircraft

days, has emerged on top in the number two position and enjoys the full trust and confidence of President Nasser. He takes over during the President’s frequent trips abroad and seems well-versed in current military operations, describing for me his analysis of Israel’s recent escalation of the conflict. Comparing Israeli air strikes with the United States-North Vietnam bombing strategy, he jokingly said “They are so similar as to have been devised in the Pentagon.”

There are still between three and six million Copts (Early Christians) in Egypt, many still holding top positions in business and the government bureaucracy, and a small Jewish community of some 2000. There has never been social discrimination against the Jews in Cairo and, somewhat surprisingly, I found a Jewish golfing partner still playing at the Gezira Club. Incidentally, golf there is still very popular with a large number of Egyptian low-handicap players. Starting times are required on Fridays and Sundays. Tennis is, likewise, a major sport with Egypt’s number one player, of some international standing, receiving the Sportsman’s Award of the Year.

The economic-financial situation, surprisingly enough, seems somewhat improved from three years ago. This phenomenon is due to three developments. First, the joint Kuwait-Saudi Arabia-Libyan annual contribution of \$260 million designed to cover the consequences of the June 1967 hostilities, loss of the Suez Canal tolls, oil production from the Sinai and tourism. Second, and of greater future potential, is the ever-increasing production of oil. Production from AMO-

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AFSA's Annual Awards Ceremony

Deputy Under Secretary William B. Macomber presented \$1,000 awards to three outstanding officers of the foreign affairs community at a special luncheon ceremony on the 8th floor of the Department of State on July 1. The awards are made annually by AFSA to one senior, one mid-career and one junior officer in recognition of their intellectual courage, creativity and personal integrity, including disciplined dissent in the conduct of United States foreign affairs.

The winner of the Christian A. Herter award, established in honor of the late Secretary, was Leslie Albion Squires of USIA. Mr. Squires was nominated on the basis of his work in Dacca, East Pakistan where he served as Consul General. The nomination was made because of his foresight and performance before and during the violent political upheaval in East Pakistan in late 1968 and early 1969. The nomination read in part: "Squires's first main accomplishment in Dacca was his success in overcoming the anti-American suspicions and resentments of many East Pakistanis . . . by dealing with them so straightforwardly and tactfully that they came to realize he was a man who could be trusted . . . [his] reports were so well buttressed with solid facts and keen analyses that he overcame the skepticism in the Department and Embassy and brought them to focus on East Pakistan as a potential crisis area. It is primarily to his credit that the US Government was not caught off guard when the crisis finally did erupt. . . . In reviewing [his] performance during those turbulent months, it is difficult to find any instance when his decisions and actions were less than the best possible under the circumstances; and it is easy to find instances when he accomplished more than seemed possible at the time. His performance was all the more remarkable in view of the fact that throughout it he was suffering from a painful and possibly serious physical ailment which compelled him to be hospitalized."

The William R. Rivkin Award, given in memory of the Ambassador to Luxembourg, and later to Senegal and The Gambia, went to Thomas D. Boyatt, FSO-4, Chief of the Political Section in Nicosia. Mr. Boyatt's nomination was based in part upon his experience as reported in his article in the December, 1969 *FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL*, "The Hijacking of TWA Flight 840." In addition he was cited for the drafting of a long-range approach to peace in connection with Cyprus, Greece and Turkey which eventually became the Country Policy Statement formally approved in Washington. A previous article of Mr. Boyatt's in the *JOURNAL* was also mentioned to show him as a "loyal iconoclast," see "The Case for Traditional Diplomacy," December, 1967.

The W. Averell Harriman Award for junior officers, now funded by Governor Harriman through 1988, was given to Warren Bruce Kinsey, FSO-6, nominated on the basis of his performance while serving with *CORDS* in Long An Province, Vietnam. Mr. Kinsey received two nominations for the Award. The nominations read in part: "The nominated officer is a student of Vietnamese culture and speaks the language fluently. . . . He made judicious use of US

funds and commodities to assure their proper use and to maximize results. With his counsel the province achieved its highest level of pacification . . . He often stayed overnight in remote villages and hamlets and showed a disregard for his personal safety and comfort . . . Not only did he excel under emergency conditions, but he also excelled at resolving the myriad day-to-day problems which he dispatched with imagination and speed . . . Mr. Kinsey proved particularly skillful in his role as advisor to the technical service chiefs and other province officials. He was able to give program and planning advice to officials, but leave them with a sense of pride in their own accomplishment when this advice paid off. Consequently his accomplishments were of a long term nature as these officials gained in self confidence, ability and initiative. One particular success was the establishment of a training program for village and hamlet officials which greatly improved local administration throughout the province."

Honor guests invited to the luncheon were former Under Secretary of State Elliot L. Richardson, Dr. John A. Hannah, Administrator, Agency for International Development, Frank J. Shakespeare, Director, United States Information Agency, and the donors of the Awards.

At the AFSA luncheon on May 27, Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson greets Senator Charles McC. Mathias and AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.



Births

WOOD. A daughter, Felicity, born to FSO and Mrs. Chalmers B. Wood, on May 16, in Washington. Mr. Wood is awaiting assignment to an overseas post in July.

Deaths

CHRISTOPHERSON. Carl E. Christopherson, FSO-retired, died on May 3 in Winchester, New Hampshire. Mr. Christopherson entered the Department of Commerce in 1928, serving in Sydney, Calcutta, Shanghai, and Manila; later he served as a Foreign Service officer at Frankfort am Main. Mr. Christopherson is survived by his wife, Louise Christopherson, of RFD 3, Winchester, N.H., and by two brothers and two sisters.

GREENE. Winthrop S. Greene, FSO-retired, died on May 13 in Vienna, Austria. Mr. Greene entered the Foreign Service in 1924 and served in Ireland, Chile, Switzerland, Colombia, Sweden, and England before he was consul general in Lagos, Bratislava, and Vienna. He is survived by a daughter, Mrs. Frances Preston of Crymnych, Pembrokeshire, England, and a granddaughter.

LOVEGROVE. William A. Lovegrove, USIA-retired, died on April 25, in Lausanne, Switzerland. A well-known sculptor, Mr. Lovegrove joined the Agency in 1949, and served in Stuttgart, Dusseldorf, Cairo, Athens, and Vienna. He is survived by his wife, Isolde Lovegrove, and a niece, Mrs. George W. Lipp, both of Bay Shore, Long Island. A scholarship in memory of Mr. Lovegrove, Executive Secretary of the European Council of International Schools, has been established by the American College of Paris.

REDECKER. Sydney B. Redecker, FSO-retired, died on May 20, in Greenwich, Connecticut. Former US consul to Germany, Mr. Redecker also served in Warsaw, Rotterdam, Naples, and Johannesburg. He is survived by his wife, Maxine Redecker, 111 Park Ave., Greenwich, Connecticut; a son, John B. Redecker of Washington; and three grandchildren.

SAWYER. John B. Sawyer, FSO-retired, died on April 25, in Modesto, California. A federal government employee for 41 years, Mr. Sawyer served at various posts abroad including Hong Kong and Shanghai. He is survived by his wife, Vera Cass Sawyer of 517 Lottie Avenue, Modesto,

California, a daughter, and two grandchildren.

SEARLES. Charles D. Searles, USIS died on May 24, in Eldoret, Kenya. Mr. Searles joined the State Department in 1950, transferring in 1956 to USIS. He served in Austria, Laos, Madagascar, Togo, and most recently as USIS head in Uganda. He is survived by his wife, Nancy Searles, 8 Brattle Road, Syracuse, New York, and two sons.

TAIT. William M. Tait, AID-FSR-retired, died recently in Deerfield Beach, Florida. He is survived by his wife, of 1597 S.E. 4th Court, Deerfield Beach, Florida, and two children. Contributions to the AFSA Scholarship Fund in memory of Mr. Tait are welcomed.

TURKEL. Harry R. Turkel, former Ambassador to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council of the OAS, died on June 15 at Masada, Israel. Ambassador Turkel joined the Department of State in 1929 and served at London, Havana, Mexico City, Paris and Ottawa before going on duty with the US Army in 1942. He served as a lieutenant colonel in military intelligence overseas, receiving the Legion of Merit and the Croix de Guerre with gold star. He returned to the Department in 1945 and entered the Foreign Service in 1947, serving at Mexico City, Lima, Athens, Bonn and the Department. He retired in 1961 and served as Research Associate, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, Johns Hopkins University. He co-authored "Peace Observation: A History and Forecast," published by Johns Hopkins University Press in 1966. Ambassador Turkel is survived by his wife Margaret S., of 3046 P Street, N.W., a daughter, Mrs. Michael Tippett, Sydney, Australia, a son, William C., with National City Bank, Athens, a brother, Dr. Henry W., of San Francisco and five grandchildren. Interment was in Jerusalem on June 18. Contributions in memory of Ambassador Turkel may be made to the American Foreign Service Association Scholarship Fund, 2101 E Street, N.W.

WARNER. Carlos J. Warner, FSO-retired, died on May 15 in Norwalk, Connecticut. Mr. Warner joined the State Department and served at Buenos Aires, Bogotá, Havana, London, Berlin, Rome, and Zurich, where he was consul general. He is survived by a brother, E. Allen Warner, and a sister, Mrs. J. Ronald Wyllie, both of Wilton, Connecticut.

AFSA Has A New Overseas Chapter in France

A new overseas Chapter of the American Foreign Service Association was formed at the American Embassy in Paris, France. Its membership includes Foreign Service personnel assigned to the Embassy and constituent Consulates, USIS, the United States Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the United States Delegation to UNESCO in Paris.

Quoting from the Charter of AFSA/Paris, the new organization has among its objectives the identification of "... issues unique to the assignment in France of AFSA members and of members of the Foreign Service in general..." and "... questions relating to the professional aspects of a Foreign Service career, whether Officer, Staff Officer or Staff..." The President of AFSA/Paris is Larry Raicht (State), the Vice President is Milton Iossi (USIS), the Secretary Treasurer is Clifford Brody (State) and the Recording Secretary is David Jones (State).

Prompted by Secretary Macomber's speech on January 14 and the subsequent creation of the Task Forces, AFSA/Paris compiled its "Task Force Report," a fifteen-page summary of suggestions in response to the stated goals of the individual Task Force groups. Broad in scope, the Task Force Report included among its suggestions proposals covering language training, career management, promotions, Staff personnel assignments, home leave, buy-American policies, the Task Forces themselves, and the Peterson Report. Secretary Macomber, in acknowledging receipt of this unusual document, stated his own satisfaction that the many AFSA/Paris members had contributed to the report and that the proposals were succinct and very well-stated.

Other overseas Chapters should feel free to write directly to AFSA/Paris about its programs. As one of its current projects, the Chapter is searching for organized and effective means to provide comments on questions of interest of the Association. At the same time, it seeks to work together with other Chapters to develop both practical local programs and effective lines of communication with the Department through AFSA headquarters, despite the obvious handicap of not being in Washington "where the action is." The Association, in turn, welcomes this new voice from the field and is providing AFSA/Paris support it needs to follow through on its objectives.

AFSA Co-Sponsors Conference on Research in Foreign Affairs

A Conference on Research in Foreign Affairs—jointly sponsored by the Department of State, the International Studies Association (ISA), and AFSA—will be held this fall to focus on questions concerning the utilization of foreign affairs research in the formulation of foreign policy. The conference is planned at Airlie House in Warrenton, Virginia on October 16-18. Participating in the conference will be a selected group of 40 men and women—evenly divided between government officials and academic and other social scientists interested in foreign policy formulation.

The proposal to hold this conference was originally made in a letter to Secretary Rogers from the Presidents of AFSA and ISA in May 1969. The letter discussed the emergence of "foreign affairs professionals" in many areas of American life and encouraged the Department of State to take the lead in broadening the "dialogue between Government and citizen." More specifically, the two associations urged the Department to sponsor a small working conference with the objective of tapping new sources of knowledge, acquiring new techniques, and—perhaps—directing foreign affairs research into areas that are of value to the Department, as well as to the researcher.

In response to this letter, the Department has agreed to join AFSA and ISA in co-sponsoring such a conference, which will examine the forms and sources of available research that are relevant to foreign affairs, evaluate the utilization of research in the policy making process, and develop recommendations thereon. Among the topics to be considered will be: 1) the State Department's experience in the sponsorship and use of social research in the policy making process; 2) recent developments in the social sciences of possible interest to foreign policy makers; 3) problems of utilizing research in the policy making process, including the improvement of communications between the policy and research communities; and 4) possible options open to the Department of State in effectively utilizing available research capabilities—both internal and external.

Formally commissioned papers focusing on these topics will be discussed at the conference. In addition to the commissioned papers, personnel in State and associated agencies are invited to submit their ideas and suggestions relating to the conference topics. Comments and thoughts of particular

AFSA Asks Benefits for Injury or Death by Hostile Action

AFSA sent a letter to Deputy Under Secretary Macomber on May 21 urging the Department to try to improve the benefits payable to employees and their dependents in the case of physical injury or loss of life by hostile action. The letter read in part:

We are concerned to note . . . that, with the exception of the one-year free sick-leave allowance, an employee victimized by hostile action abroad is treated for benefit purposes exactly as any US Government employee who may be injured or killed in a job-related accident. Thus, an employee who might be killed or injured by kidnapers or political terrorists would receive the same benefits for himself and his dependents as, for example, a building-maintenance employee killed or injured through the collapse of scaffolding or in a boilerroom accident.

We urge the Department to take a close look at what might be done to improve the benefits for victims of hostile actions and their survivors. Among the possibilities to be studied, we suggest:

1) revision of the government-wide life insurance program to include a special indemnity over and above other payments for loss of life due to hostile action abroad to any US Government employee assigned overseas on a regular tour of duty or on temporary duty, regardless of the agency or branch of government;

2) emendation of the employees compensation schedule (5USC 8107) to provide extra benefits for complete disability caused by hostile action over and above disability from other causes;

3) emendation of the employees compensation schedule to provide survivors with a lump-sum payment equal to one year's salary of the employee, in addition to the appropriate choice of annuity under the Employees Compensation Act or the Foreign Service Act.

Deputy Under Secretary Macomber replied that his office was looking into the Board's recommendations and would be in touch after an opportunity to study them. He expressed appreciation for AFSA's interest.

interest will be circulated, with attribution, to participants in advance of the conference. Ideas should be submitted in informal letters, by August 15, to the conference planning chairman—Dr. Burton Sapin, Dean of the School of Public and International Affairs, George Washington University, 2110 G St. N.W., Washington D.C. 20006. Inquiries regarding conference topics, or the conference itself, may be addressed to the following State Department and AFSA representatives on the planning committee: Grant Hilliker, INR/XR, Pio Uliassi, INR/XR, and Edith Bruce, AFSA representative from E/IS. Other members of the planning committee are Professor Richard C. Snyder, Director of the Mershon Center of Ohio State University; Professor Kenneth Waltz of Brandeis University; William Bader of the Ford Foundation; and Mansfield I. Smith, Director of the Council on Leaders and Specialists of The Experiment in International Living.

As a co-sponsor of the Conference on Research in Foreign Affairs, AFSA supports its aims as a means of promoting greater professionalism in the Foreign Service. AFSA also views the conference as another step toward establishing closer, and more productive, collaboration between foreign service officers and members of the academic community. Although the

conference itself will be limited to 40 participants, AFSA—in conjunction with ISA and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research—is planning to sponsor some pre- and post-conference meetings open to all interested persons. The pre-conference meetings will provide an opportunity to discuss and evaluate the commissioned papers and informal letters before they are presented at the conference. Post-conference sessions will be used to analyze the results of the meeting and to develop possible recommendations for future action. Anyone interested in participating in these activities is invited to call Edith Bruce on Ext. 20760.

Bangkok Chapter Active

The Bangkok Chapter carried out a very interesting survey of the membership there. Maybe none of the information will surprise you, but it certainly is helpful to the Board in trying fairly to represent the opinions of the membership. We have sent copies of the questionnaire and Bangkok's tabulation of the results to every Chapter Head and Keyman in posts around the world. We would like to see the survey repeated elsewhere. When we get a significant sample, we will publish the results in the JOURNAL.

July Cover Artist

Marie Skora, wife of FSO-retired George W. Skora, studied under Frederick O'Hara, the internationally known print-maker, and Elmer Schooley, head of the art department, New Mexico Highlands University. She also studied etching in Venezuela and portraiture in Mexico. Mrs. Skora has had eight one-man exhibitions in this country and overseas and has exhibited her work in many national and international graphic shows, receiving a number of awards.

During her two years in Caracas, Mrs. Skora worked in the art therapy room of the orthopedic hospital there and she has been a volunteer worker at Children's Hospital for the past two years in the same field.

The block print for the cover was designed for the Independence Day program of the North American Association of Venezuela.

1970-71 Awards for Student Excellence

Twenty-two graduating high school seniors have been named by the Committee on Education of AFSA as recipients of the Awards for Student Excellence. All of those whose names follow are children of members or of deceased former members of AFSA, and will receive a certificate from the Association honoring their achievement.

Recipients of AFSA Scholarships will be listed in a forthcoming issue of the JOURNAL.

Thomas William Ainsworth, (Thomas W. Ainsworth); **Margaret Marie Amateis**, (Roland P. Amateis); **Jeffrey Myron Baskin**, (Myron A. Baskin); **Peter Brescia**, (Peter F. Brescia); **Catherine Winifred Brown**, (Emerson M. Brown); **Margaret Rice Cheney**, (Edward R. Cheney); **Marc Jacob Cohen**, (Louis A. Cohen); **Janet Anne Colm**, (Peter W. Colm); **Juliette Simpkins Kendrick**, (Joseph T. Kendrick); **Lawrence Koegel**, (Lawrence Koegel); **Marsha Marie Koone**, (Carl D. Koone); **Robert Walter Landau**, (George W. Landau); **Francis Patrick LaRocca**, (Francis P. LaRocca); **Mildred Adela Mays**, (R. Lynn Mays); **David W. Moskowitz**, (Saul Moskowitz); **John E. Ormasa**, (Anthony J. Ormasa); **Roderick Allen Price**, (Russell A. Price); **Thomas Yarbrough Recknagel**, (Thomas M. Recknagel); **Maurry Ira Schlossman**, (Alvin Schlossman); **Lawrence Christopher Stedman**, (William P. Stedman); **Edith Buchanan Terry**, (Charles W. Terry); **Hugh McPherson Wolff**, (Hugh Wolff).



Another Happy Hour

The American Foreign Service Association and the Department of State-USIA Recreation Association are pleased to report that the first joint Happy Hour at the Foreign Service Club was so successful that a second session has been scheduled.

The Foreign Service Club will welcome members of both Associations to a Happy Hour from 5:30 to 7:30 on July 30. There'll be potables, munchables, music and conviviality, all for low, low anti-inflation prices,

ranging downward from 75¢ for a cocktail.

Come, bring a friend, meet a friend.

Memberships

Club memberships will be automatically renewed after July 1 and dues will be billed at the annual rate—*unless* a member previously advises the Club Secretary that a monthly billing is desired. Sorry we can't offer a choice in the billing—the computer isn't up to it!

Foggy Bottom International

Seeking a change from the foreign affairs that they customarily engage in, representatives of 30 nations met last May 2nd at the Foreign Service Club. It was an international "singles-only" dance-cocktail party, held by a new group of Washington's international circuit, "Foggy Bottom International." Bringing together Embassies, the Department of State, students, businessmen and others interested in international relations, the group attracted nearly 200 Washingtonians and foreigners who felt very much at home in an atmosphere where several different languages were spoken and where informality was the "theme."

Guida A. Evans, with the State Department Visa Office, the president of the club, was enthusiastic at the turn-

out which proved her conviction of a need for this type of gathering in the Washington area. Mrs. Evans commented that the tremendous response indicated a great desire especially by foreign diplomats for the get-togethers, where they can forget politics and simply enjoy themselves. A popular break in the cocktail party was a dance exhibit by Vic Daumit, Director of the Daumit Dance Studio who demonstrated several new "mod" dances.


Foggy Bottom International plans many more such cocktail parties at the Foreign Service Club, as well as boat rides, movies and other activities for single members of the International set.

Foggy Bottom International party in full swing at the Foreign Service Club. President Guida A. Evans in center foreground.



EGYPT

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High dam

CO's "Morgan" field in the Gulf of Suez, has now reached 300,000 BPD, while Phillips is lifting 40,000 BPD in the Western Desert. Both companies are hopeful that continuing and intensive exploration, particularly in the Western Desert, will eventually result in another Libyan miracle. Since Egypt's internal petroleum requirements are only 120,000 BPD, she has become an exporter and in 1970, should receive revenues of some \$100 million. Thirdly, Egypt has been blessed with two extraordinarily good crop years in cotton, rice and grain—the first two being exported to the amount of \$40 million last year.

Internally, a growth rate of 6½ percent during the first Five Year Plan has slowed to 4½ percent, but it is hoped it will rise again as petroleum exports increase and the power and irrigation potential of the Aswan High Dam bears fruit. Interest on an external debt burden of some \$2 billion is heavy. Repayment of debts, however, has been successfully rescheduled with

every creditor except the United States. The current adverse balance in foreign accounts is running about \$230 million this year. Much of this is attributable to food import requirements of 2½ million tons in grain a year. All in all, the picture is not bad, given Egypt's past financial history and the current "war of attrition" with Israel.

As for the war itself, the Suez Canal divides the UAR and Israeli ground forces along a front of 90 miles. Artillery and rocket cross-fire continues daily, as do small cross canal raids by both sides. The cities of Port Said, Ismailia and Suez have been virtually destroyed, leaving another 500,000 refugees of the Palestine War to be settled elsewhere. In the air the Israelis, with apparently an impenetrable defense and a large offensive superiority, began in December heavy bombing of the Suez Canal area. More recently, this has been extended to the West Bank of the Red Sea, including the temporary air and naval occupation of the island of Shadwan, and is now penetrating to

the vicinity of Cairo. During my week's stay, there were the two attacks already described in the Helwan area, the first on Dahshur, the second on El Maadi. The Israelis are said to be willing to take higher losses than heretofore in the expectation of increasing deliveries on new American planes. The purpose of the Israeli air offensive seems largely psychological, to force the UAR to sue for peace on its terms.

In sum, I found Cairo as a city little changed since June 1967. The UAR is politically stable, and its internal economy and external balance of payments have somewhat improved despite the continuing hostilities. From a military standpoint, Israel has little to fear in the foreseeable future from Egyptian offensive capabilities, but itself does not have the depth of power required to knock Egypt out or force her to relinquish her claim of sovereignty over the areas occupied during the 1967 hostilities. Egypt wants peace in Palestine as much, or more, than we want peace in Vietnam, and has agreed to a settlement based on the UN Resolution of November 22, 1967, arrived at through the Jarring Mission or another third party mediation. She cannot agree to direct negotiations with Israel while under attack nor can she agree to a cease fire while a large part of her territory is occupied. Hence the conflict could continue for a very long time in ever-increasing intensity.

Meanwhile, the United States cannot expect a resumption of diplomatic relations with the UAR, but will probably continue to enjoy there, for a time at least, an unofficial presence in mutually advantageous financial and cultural endeavors such as the petroleum industry, American University of Cairo, Ford Foundation, tourism, etc. Personal relationships between Americans and Egyptians can be excellent as demonstrated by my own easy access to the Vice-President, Cabinet Members, Mohammed Heikal and other key officials. Whether Nasser could weather a settlement which disregarded rapidly coalescing Palestine nationalism is another question and all indications are that he is unwilling to take this risk. ■

"There is no place for majority rule in foreign policy. If a foreign policy decision has nothing more going for it than sheer numbers, that's not enough."

Exorcising the Hobgoblin of Conformity:

The Question of Foreign Service Resignations

THERE is always the question what a career official should do when his government adopts a policy which he believes is a tragic mistake, a policy which he cannot in good conscience support," Ambassador Robert Murphy said in his autobiography, "Diplomat Among Warriors."

Murphy was referring to the events leading to the Berlin Blockade in 1948. He felt that the United States government, then sole possessor of the atomic bomb, should take a strong military stand against the Russians who were significantly nibbling away at Allied access rights to Berlin. He and General Lucius D. Clay, then military governor in Berlin, recommended military action to President Truman. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, opposed military action because they felt that the rapid United States demobilization after World War II had left the military unprepared to win a land war against the Russians. President Truman followed the Joint Chiefs' recommendations and no direct military action ensued. Instead, the Berlin Air Lift was instituted, which succeeded in supplying the beleaguered city with the necessities of life; the Russians eventually capitulated and lifted the blockade.

"But the Berlin blockade is the one occasion in my long career where I feel I should have resigned in public protest against Washington's policy," Murphy wrote. "My resignation almost certainly would not have affected events, but if I had resigned I would feel better

DINO J. CATERINI

A 38-year-old native of Cleveland, Mr. Caterini received a B.A. in Political Science from Miami University (Ohio). He then received his LL.B. from New York University School of Law and studied Comparative Law at the University of Padua on a Fulbright Scholarship. Mr. Caterini practiced law in New York before joining USIA in 1960. He has served in Berlin, Mogadiscio, Asmara and Vietnam, and received the Superior Service Award and the Meritorious Service Award. Mr. Caterini is presently assigned to Rangoon.

today about my own part in that episode. I suffered anguish over this decision of our government not to challenge the Russians when they blockaded Berlin, and I still deeply regret that I was associated with an action which caused Soviet leaders to downgrade United States determination and capability, and led, I believe, to the subsequent Communist provocation in Korea."

Murphy is one of the few career diplomats to write the unwriteable, even to approach the question of protest resignations from the career foreign service. In the Berlin incident, of course, Murphy was referring to the heady atmosphere where high-level policy is created, to those exalted corridors of power where earth-shattering historical decisions are made—and unmade. Most Foreign Service officers are not involved with that level of decision, but the central question posed—whether to resign or not when one disagrees with basic policy—is still as real on the lower levels as the higher ones.

The Vietnam war has caused more soul-searching on the part of career Foreign Service officers—and especially the younger ones—than any comparable international event in the history of American diplomacy. There have been a number of little discussed and unpublicized resignations from the foreign service because of our policy in Vietnam.

In a relevant passage from his book Murphy tells about a conversation on the subject of resignations he later had with the late Henry Luce, chief executive of Time Inc. Luce "told me with some asperity," Murphy writes, "that one of the defects of public service in the United States is that very few officials resign from their jobs as a matter of principle. In the early days of the Republic, he said, there were many resignations on issues, and that is a healthy situation."

From the standpoint of a career service, Murphy takes issue with Henry Luce. "There is much truth in Luce's view," Murphy writes, "but there is inconsistency in modern American practice because of the career principle, and ordinarily I have little sympathy with a Foreign Service officer who resigns because he disagrees with policy."

On this point, I disagree with Murphy. Unlike Murphy, I have a great deal of sympathy for anyone who resigns in protest. But he explains, "a professional diplomat understands when he accepts government service that he is obedient to official policy, no matter how repugnant a particular line may be to

him personally. It is the function of a career diplomat to carry out his government's policy, a function which critics often do not understand."

I agree with Murphy's own personal decision not to resign for in the Berlin incident, I believe, Murphy would have done both himself and his country a disservice in resigning. I base my belief on what I think is a little understood cause of dissatisfaction in the foreign service—a cause which is often present in most resignations from the foreign service but which was not present in Murphy's case: the inability to have one's views aired—heard—listened to.

In Murphy's case, he had direct access to the ear of the President and to the other high-ranking policy makers in the Truman administration. He had presented his views and he had lost.

The ability to be heard is crucial in discussing the question of foreign service resignations, as this writer believes—in the final analysis—that this is the gut reason for most "protest" resignation from the service. This is tied in with the entire question of conformity within the service.

When a career Foreign Service officer enters the service, he knows that he must obey official policy. But a few clear-cut distinctions must be made; they have seldom been clearly articulated. A distinction must be made between conformity in policy *implementation* and conformity in policy *formulation*. Most officers are perfectly willing to conform as to policy implementation provided they have first had some means of participating in the policy formulation half of the exercise—as Murphy had in the Berlin affair. However, policy often comes down to the implementing of a fiat proclaimed from on high.

I would expand upon the implementation/formulation dichotomy as it impinges upon the question of conformity. It is necessary that Foreign Service officers speak with one official voice when speaking with foreign governments, officials and public. This is the *implementation* aspect of conformity and most officers do not challenge it. When Foreign Service officers and their critics condemn the service for

"conformity," they are talking about conformity in policy formulation.

This is the second half of the conformity dichotomy, what one might call the foreign/domestic split. In talking abroad—to foreigners—conformity is a necessity; in talking domestically—to ourselves—conformity is inexcusable—and does both the foreign service and our country a disservice.

And yet it is this feeling that one cannot talk freely, cannot say his piece—that often leads to frustration, dissatisfaction and eventually to resignations. Most FSOs can probably name a couple of extremely competent officers who began their careers as fellow junior officers but who later resigned, even though loving the basic life, because they felt confined, bound, restricted, limited and unable to give full vent to their creative impulses.

During fiscal year 1968, 266 officers resigned; 80 per cent of them were younger officers. Many officers will merely turn up their noses at these resignations and say "good riddance, they didn't fit in anyway." But it might behoove the foreign service to do some real soul-searching as to why they didn't fit in. It just might be that the foreign service itself has to do some changing so as to accommodate creative talent, so that it fits in with the aspirations of a growing body of younger talented officers rather than the other way around. There will always be *misfits* in the foreign service—those who thought they would like the life and later discover that they don't. When they resign, it is better for themselves and the service. But resignations because of frustration represent a loss of talent to the service and a black mark on the life style of the foreign service.

The foreign service cannot afford to lose even one officer under such circumstances because of what it says about the atmosphere in which officers work—because of the implication that an officer resigned because he did not "conform" to the unwritten rules of the game. A career officer should not have to resign in order to state his views.

When an officer resigns because he feels creatively frustrated, because he feels defeated by the un-

stated but clearly understood laws of the system, the foreign service, and by extension America, is the loser. Although the foreign service may be able to absorb any number of individual resignations, it cannot ignore the implications such resignations suggest about the environment its officers work in—the implication that the foreign service "way of life" embodies a blind adherence to conformity where thoughtful internal criticism is rewarded only by social ostracism and career isolation.

The foreign service has to encourage criticism from within. It will certainly get it from outside if it doesn't. No channel should be closed to the career officer; every channel should be actively encouraged. So long as we are talking to ourselves—to the domestic side of the foreign/domestic dichotomy—no holds should be barred—and there should be no pressure to conform—no rigid obedience to official policy.

We must get rid of the notion that foreign policy wisdom resides only in the Secretary of State—or the Foreign Policy Board—or any other chosen group whose specific task it is to create policy. We should encourage officers at all levels to *think*, to create.

There is no need to make officers work within the structure of a stylized and bureaucratic reporting format. Clearances in draft and signatures of agreement have no place in this type of reporting.

The individual should commit himself to his ideas and he should be encouraged to write in good plain reasoned but gut-felt English. There is no place for majority rule in foreign policy. If a foreign policy decision has nothing more going for it than sheer numbers, that's not enough. We should be seeking some underlying principles and truths, a foreign policy that understands our national interest and seeks to foster it.

In speaking to ourselves—in referring to the domestic half of the career officer's audience—I am alluding not only to communications with the headquarters offices—State Department, USIA, AID, but to communications with the American people as well. There is no need to require conformity when

talking to the American people. On the contrary, officers should be encouraged to write thought-provoking articles, books and monographs on foreign policy *whether the writings conform to official policy or not.*

In this connection, some thought should be given to eliminating the internal censorship which now exists in the foreign service. Now, all writings must be approved for publication. Americans pride themselves on freedom of thought and freedom of expression and there is no reason why a career Foreign Service officer should have fewer rights than a private citizen.

The elimination of internal censorship—along with the encouragement of complete freedom of expression—would help solve two of the negative factors that plague the foreign service. One is the adverse opinion held by the American general public of the foreign service as an effete, conservative, bland and unimaginative elite corps of well-mannered but unproductive pencil pushers. A second is the negative impact of a working atmosphere in which a great many officers, rightly or wrongly, feel that complete freedom of expression not only goes unrewarded but is somehow actively discouraged.

We must reconstitute the atmosphere in which we work. Some will argue that such freedom will erode the discipline so essential to the smooth working of the service. But this is not so because only self discipline is meaningful. This may result in opinions that do not follow the latest line. But the place to thrash out ideas is in the open forum.

I have doubts about any government, organization or group that consistently speaks monolithically with one voice. Anyone who has ever dealt with a Communist country knows that many opinions in a society clash despite the attempts of the regime to create the appearance of speaking with one voice. Also anyone who has ever served in a totalitarian or near-totalitarian country knows the deadening impact of the pressure to conform. President Lyndon Johnson tried to create the illusion of an administration behind his policy from top to bottom. One could argue plausibly that had President Johnson encour-

aged dissent from *within* the administration and the bureaucracy,—had he created an open administration, he might have diffused his opposition from *without* by dispersing it *within*, thereby preventing the creation of a situation in which views became polarized either for or against him. In politics, as well as public administration, it is always dangerous to create a situation which can be summed up by the words. "If you're not for me, you're against me."

If the foreign service continues to demand obedience to policy when the foreign service is talking to itself as well as when it is talking to foreigners, the problem of "mini-protest resignations" (i.e., unpublicized low-level resignations as opposed to publicized high level ones) will remain and possibly increase. These resignations will not necessarily be over precise policy differences but will probably reflect a dissatisfaction with the pressure to conform and the unwillingness of the foreign service to reward creative and daring thought. In the early days of the Republic, there were many resignations on issues, a healthy situation. But I think some fundamental differences between the days of the Founding Fathers and today's world should be pointed out.

In the early days of the Republic, public service was not a career service. Most public servants were gentlemen farmers or independently wealthy businessmen for whom public service was a sometime thing. It is doubtful, under such circumstances, whether acts of resignations represented real acts of courage. It is actually quite easy to resign in protest when one has something else to go back to—the old plantation or the family bank. It takes a genuine act of courage, however, to resign in protest when one has devoted a good part of his life to a career in public service and has no alternative profession to fall back on. This represents a truly profound and genuine moral anguish—the type of tragic situation from which great literature springs—and which was seldom present among public servants in the early days of the Republic.

The fact that the average career

officer is tied to his career is perhaps the biggest factor which the pressure to conform has going for it. This problem transcends the foreign service and touches all aspects of modern society. America today is less free-wheeling and more inhibited—less open and more confined—less likely to create the wide-open, foot-loose and fancy-free character of the Frontier. The Frontier spirit could produce the type of rugged American who could threaten to resign at the drop of a hat—and who could easily afford to do it.

The contemporary American is a different animal from the frontier American, however, because necessity has made him so. This is true of the present-day American in the Foreign Service—in the Civil Service, in the giant corporations, and in all society. Having no frontier to escape to, it is harder to be independent. Without viable independence, it becomes harder to resign in protest, and the older one becomes, the harder it becomes. If the frontier were the dominant feature which shaped the early American character, then it is the quest for security which has most shaped the modern one. I think that if the entire question of security were not involved there would be more resignations from the Foreign Service, from the Civil Service, and from the giant corporations—and from all institutions to which people feel bound. The problem transcends the Foreign Service but becomes more poignant in relation to it because of the immense importance of the issues involved, because the Foreign Service in the field of foreign policy is daily dealing with issues of profound importance to the future of America.

But has the quest for security made cowards of us all? Have we really sacrificed our basic beliefs on the altar of security—careers—retirement?

Perhaps only each individual can answer that question after searching the deepest caverns of his innermost soul. But it does seem to me that everyone has to believe in something deeply enough to risk losing all in a crunch. This is what the Founding Fathers did when, in signing the Declaration of Inde-

pendence, they mutually pledged to each other "our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor." Like the Founding Fathers, most Americans do believe in certain basic fundamental principles—more so than they are often aware. Freedom of religion, freedom of expression, freedom of thought, freedom of the press—these represent basic ideals to which almost every American is committed.

One can justifiably ask the question, however, whether what was healthy for the Republic in its early growing days is equally healthy for the country today, or more specifically, whether it is healthy for the career foreign service? Although protest resignations are to be applauded at times it is doubtful whether they always represent acts of courage. It all depends on how one looks at the situation. For example, to those who believe that reforms in the foreign service are deeply needed, it may be more courageous *not to resign* and to try to work for needed reforms from within. Under such circumstances, one could argue that, in resigning,

one is merely running away from the problem and that the act of resignation is one of cowardice not courage. I think this is basically true so long as there is a meaningful machinery for reform from within.

But there has to be a certain point beyond which a Foreign Service officer should resign in protest. So it is proper to ask the ultimate question: when then should a career officer resign in protest?

To me, the answer seems to be: only when the system within becomes so oppressive and so unable to change that to fight it from outside represents the only viable alternative. To anyone genuinely interested in the future of the foreign service, no other answer makes sense because if everyone with the courage to resign did so it would leave the foreign service in the hands of the very people the disenchanted are purportedly out to fight—the bland, the conformist, the unimaginative and the indifferent. The very person brave enough to resign because he is dissatisfied with the system is the one the foreign service most needs and can least afford to lose. It would be unwise on our part, however, to deny that many such persons have been lost in the past. The resignation of good men is a problem and the foreign service must face up to it. The resignation of even one good man is one too many. This brain drain represents a loss of talent which the foreign service can tolerate only at the risk of reducing itself to a bland, homogeneous and

uncreative bureaucracy ignored by the very presidents it was created to serve.


We should ask ourselves just what President John F. Kennedy meant when he once asked Charles Bohlen, "What's wrong with that goddamned Department of yours, Chip?" In desperation, President Kennedy ended up creating a special foreign affairs coterie in the White House because he had become suspicious of "those guys" in the foreign service.

In my opinion, when President Kennedy asked Bohlen "what's wrong?" he was really asking, "Why don't you guys in the Foreign Service ever come up with some new and imaginative ideas? Why don't you fight for what you believe in? Why don't you show a little more creativity—zest—life—spunk?" In other words, President Kennedy carried around in his head the image of the foreign service as an effete bunch of unimaginative conformists more interested in a safe and secure career than in daring, courageous and innovative thought and action.

It doesn't matter whether the image President Kennedy had of the foreign service is wrong but so long as the negative image exists, it makes sense for us to ask ourselves why.

It seems to me that the basic reason lies in the pressure to conform. If consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, then conformity is even doubly so. It is a psychological fact of life that one can never force truly creative thinkers to conform. When forced to, they resist—or move on. President Kennedy—and other presidents as well—have implied somehow that the foreign service has no backbone. It just might be that the reason the foreign service is so is because those with backbone leave because of the pressure to conform. Without the courage to encourage dissent from within, we face extinction. If Presidents continue to lose confidence in the foreign service as their major advisory arm in foreign affairs, the real power will switch to those special groups in the White House or within other specialized agencies unconnected with the career foreign service in whom the president has

(Continued on page 48)



"If we are to guide the forces of change rather than be mastered by them, we must be wise and far-sighted in our national and international policies."

"The Crisis Of Development"

These are the proposals and conclusions of a Commission on International Development of the Council on Foreign Relations, and reprinted from "The Crisis of Development" by Lester B. Pearson, through the courtesy of Praeger Publishers.

THERE are sixty-eight formal recommendations and several less formal suggestions in the Report. Their general objective is to support and strengthen cooperation for development and to give a clearer purpose and greater coherence to "aid" strategy. To this end there are recommendations to increase the quantity of "aid" and improve its quality and its utilization, to emphasize the fundamental importance of the concept of partnership in the total aid relationship, to increase the export trade of developing countries and promote sound foreign investment, to make aid organization and administration more effective and strengthen its multilateral element, to increase the value of technical assistance and last—but very far from least—to deal with the population explosion.

In the first chapter of its Report, the Commission summarizes its general conclusions and I do not think I can do better here than to summarize that summary.

The record of economic growth in developing countries over the last two decades is a good one and should be a source of confidence, rather than discouragement, for the future.

This record shows that where there has been a resolute national purpose and a sincere effort on the part of developing countries, economic growth has resulted, and external aid has helped to sustain and accelerate that growth.

When failures have occurred, these have been largely due to political weakness, or instability, in developing countries, when governments have subordinated the known and necessary needs of long-term development for more immediate and selfish political goals, or when "aid" commitments have been inadequate or not carried out. Reversals in other sectors of development, such as trade, have also contributed to failures.

While "aid" has been of great importance, the problem of development, in all its aspects, can be solved only by

LESTER B. PEARSON

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each country itself. Nothing of lasting significance can be achieved without national drive, national sacrifice, and national leadership.

The technical means are now available—if the political will is strong enough—to create a world of expanding opportunity for all, without today's abject poverty and the debilitating disparities in economic and social standards that now exist between nations.

This, however, will not be achieved without active and constructive international cooperation for world development, based on a partnership which should be insulated, as much as possible, from international politics.

Economic growth must be balanced against social goals, something that can be done only by the developing countries. When it is not done, economic growth will be nullified by social weakness and division.

There can be no single strategy of development, but there must be agreement on basic principles; and programs should be welded into a coherent and coordinated system.

Much has been learned about the problems of cooperation for development. What is necessary now is to apply what has been learned with a clearer sense of purpose, more accurate assessment of needs, and a closer relationship between aid-commitments and aid-performance on both the donor and receiver sides.

The proportion of aid through multilateral channels should be increased, and the international agencies used for this purpose must provide leadership and efficient administration.

The total volume of aid should be increased to one per cent of the gross national product of the wealthy countries, a goal to be met by 1975. In view of the special need for, and declining flow of, official assistance and concessional finance, particular importance is attached to a separate target for official development transfers of 0.70 per cent of gross national product, also to be reached by 1975.

Donors and recipients should join in an effort to rationalize and simplify existing cumbersome procedures. There should be a combined attack on the practice of tying aid to purchases in donor countries, which now reduces the value of aid and distorts the channels of world trade. Greater attention should be paid to the need for program, as opposed to project, aid.

Technical assistance should be more adequately integrated with capital assistance, and be made more relevant to local conditions, especially in the fields of education, research and development.

Mutually beneficial private capital flows should be increased, but this must be done in such a way as to recognize the legitimate interest of developing countries in maintaining their economic independence.

In view of the problem of mounting debts, some repayment schedules will have to be rearranged in order to restore the framework for orderly and dynamic development. Debt relief has an important part to play in aid strategy. Official development loans should be provided at rates of interest no higher than two per cent, with grace periods of seven to ten years, and maturities of twenty-five to forty years.

The development of poorer countries requires a continued expansion of world trade in which the developing countries should have a larger share. This requires that the trade policies of developed countries should be modified in favor of imports from the less developed ones. Trade between the developing countries themselves, both on a global and a regional basis, should be encouraged.

Population growth must be controlled so that it does not thwart social and economic progress.

I would like to make here a somewhat more than capsule reference to proposals in our Report dealing with organization and administration of aid programs—something that I have mentioned only incidentally in these lectures, though it is of obvious importance.

The strategy of aid must be related to the total concept of development, and not separately to its various parts. This is particularly necessary in the organization and administration of aid, which is becoming more complex, both nationally and internationally. It should be simplified. I know how difficult this will be, and I know that it would be folly to expect total efficiency in something so complicated and which touches on so many aspects of government and of intergovernmental relations. But improvement should be possible. Indeed, it has already taken place in recent years, though much remains to be done.

Multilateral agencies should be strengthened. Existing procedures, including national procedures, are too cumbersome, too slow-moving, and there is too much overlapping. There should be a closer coordination of aid activities between governments and international agen-



cies. This is even more important in the field than at headquarters, though the profusion of agencies often lacks direction and coherence at the top.

All the components of aid, bilateral and multilateral, should be brought into a closer relationship with each other through a new international framework designed for this purpose. The Commission has, therefore, proposed, and I consider the proposal to be most important, that the President of the World Bank should invite to a conference, to be held in 1970, the heads of appropriate organs of the United Nations, heads of multilateral agencies, regional development banks and UN coordinating bodies, as well as representatives of donor and recipient governments. The conference would discuss the creation of improved coordinating machinery through a council on the highest level, which would be capable of relating aid and development policies to other relevant areas of foreign economic policy, and of making standardized assessments of development performance, as well as clear, regular and authoritative estimates of aid requirements. Such a council would also be able to provide balanced and impartial reviews both of the aid policies and programs of donor governments and of the aid and development performance of recipients. It should bring about a more constructive and acceptable dialogue, which should lead to a closer and better relationship between the transfer of aid resources and their utilization—something which I have stressed so often as especially important. This monitoring of performance, for that is what it would be, would be done by an international body which must reflect in its representation and operation both sides of the aid relationship.

There would be new machinery, then, at the top decision-making level to cover the whole development front. On the agency and operational level, there are already consortia and consultative groups of donors and recipients, which have worked well. They should be strengthened and new ones, where required, should be set up which will also reflect this principle of dual representation, responsibility and operation.

The World Bank, or some other appropriate existing agency, should provide the necessary technical reporting services for such reviewing agencies. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund should also adopt procedures in countries where both operate for prepar-

ing unified country assessments and giving expert and policy advice.

The International Development Association, the "soft loan window" of the World Bank, should play an increasingly important role in the whole development system. To this end, it should be given greater financial resources—and for a longer period than one year. Among other things, it could formulate broad criteria to govern the allocation of concessional financing for development in order to offset some of the more glaring inequities which now exist in aid distribution.

A key agency in the development process is the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), under the tireless, experienced and devoted leadership of Paul Hoffman. It is the specific purpose of the UNDP, in Mr. Hoffman's words, "to help convert the latent potential [of developing countries] into fuller productivity, particularly by pre-investment surveys and technical assistance." That this potential exists is indicated by the estimate that, at present, not more than 20 per cent of the natural resources and 10 per cent of the human productive capabilities of the developing countries are being fully utilized.

The UNDP is now the largest source of pre-investment assistance. Current commitments for pre-investment and technical assistance amount to \$129 million. By 1968, over \$2 billion in follow-up investment had been stimulated by pre-investment activities, supported by the UNDP.

If multilateral aid is increased, as recommended by our Commission, the work and responsibilities of the UNDP would be expanded. In consequence, its organization and administration and its relations with other agencies should be so ordered as to enable it to take on these new and enlarged activities with maximum effectiveness.

I have attempted to indicate briefly the views and proposals of the Commission on International Development. I am very conscious of the fact, however, that, even if governments considered these proposals wise and implemented them, and if, as a result, there were a new and better aid relationship with a wise and well-administered strategy for total development, there would still be difficulties and problems. This is inevitable in the effort to build a healthy and desirable aid relationship based on partnership between materially rich and poor nations in an increasingly interdependent, swiftly changing world—a relationship which touches at so many points on complex and sensitive political and economic matters within and between nations.

I can only repeat that such an international effort cannot succeed unless there are tolerance, sympathy and understanding on each side. These, I realize, are not qualities that can be taken for granted in relations between states, even in normal circumstances—far from it. They will certainly not exist in an aid relationship unless there is a very clear appreciation by the developing countries, which shows itself in policy and action, of what is required from them for self-sustaining growth as the foundation for self-reliant and total national development.

The list of such requirements is long. I do not

apologize for mentioning again some of its main components at the end of these lectures. There must be

- Political stability, without which there can be no steady and orderly development
- Social progress based on social justice and human rights
- Integrity and efficiency in government
- Financial and economic policies which do not sacrifice long-range national objectives to immediate political pressures or ambitions
- The efficient allocation of domestic resources for development, with rates of savings and investment that are as high as possible

These are only some of the requirements for the kind of development policy which warrants and should secure cooperation and assistance from outside.

Even when these requirements are accepted in principle, their implementation will often be frustrated by

- Insurmountable social and cultural obstacles to the necessary reforms
- Failure to save and invest sufficiently for growth, because people are so poor that everything goes to mere survival
- The lack of political will, of the resolution to make the effort and the sacrifices necessary for success (Failure here is often due to the feeling that the problems to be faced seem so intractable as to defy solution; so why bother?)
- An acute shortage of technical skill and know-how
- Too high a rate of population increase
- Modernization of agriculture, without sufficient regard to local conditions
- Industrialization artificially or uneconomically forced
- An educational system not directed to local needs and possibilities, including the development at home of technology, science and know-how
- Trade and fiscal policies which do not provide for a sound and steady increase in exports

These, then, are some of the requirements that must be met, some of the obstacles that must be overcome by the developing countries if cooperation for world development is to succeed. Any country that is trying to meet and overcome them has, I repeat, the right to expect and receive the material help and the understanding cooperation of those who are economically more advanced and richer in material things. Its right is our obligation. It is as important to us as it is to it that this obligation should be discharged. Indeed, the "aid" is as mutual as the obligation is general, and the results, for better or for worse, will be universal.

We have now finished a decade which began with the all but total liquidation of the old imperialism and ended with man on the moon. It was a time of troubles and problems but also of great technical achievement—some of it bearing hope for the future, some menacing. The next decade may be an even more difficult period of tension and crisis. Things are still changing and with ever more bewildering speed, and change normally means disruption. If we are to guide the forces of change rather than be mastered by them, we must be wise and far-sighted in our national and international policies. One test of that wisdom and far-sightedness will be what we do about international cooperation to

(Continued on page 47)

An examination of the system complete with suggestions for the improvement from the literature and from the experience of big business.

Performance Appraisal And Promotions in the Foreign Service

DONALD P. WARWICK

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By the standards of private and even progressive public organizations the system of performance appraisals and promotions in the Foreign Service is antiquated, cumbersome, ineffective, and wasteful of human potential. The malaise currently seen in the officer corps, especially among its most talented members, stems from many factors. Not the least of them is the feeling of insufficient responsibility, excessively slow advancement, poor prospects for the future because of the "age lump" in the upper grades, and poor treatment compared with their counterparts in other professions. The squeeze on promotions, the dilution of responsibility, and the incredible hierarchical layering of the State Department have already driven many young officers to more tempting pastures, and the trend is likely to be accentuated in the future. Unless the Foreign Service personnel system is drastically changed, the chances are good that within ten to fifteen years mediocrity will be the dominant note in the Service.

The problem of performance appraisals, competition, and promotion cannot be discussed apart from broader questions about the Foreign Service and the State Department. One issue that cuts across almost every aspect of the personnel system is a pervasive ambiguity about goals in the Foreign Service in general, and in the operating units of the State Department (with the exception of more production-oriented activities such as issuing visas and passports).

Some of this ambiguity is inescapable, deriving from the inherent unpredictability of events in the international community. Here I refer, however, to the apparent reluctance of managers in all segments of the State Department to define the specific objectives of their units, and to use these objectives in appraising the performance of their subordinates.

The resulting vagueness means that Foreign Service, as well as Civil Service, personnel must be evaluated on the basis of subjective, ill-defined, and often vacuous personality traits such as "integrity." Another problem *not* peculiar to the State Department and Foreign Service concerns the implicit (and sometimes explicit) managerial philosophy incorporated in organizational manuals and gradually in the minds of managers themselves. It is based upon the military chain of command concept. As long as this philosophy is allowed to dominate the system, meaningful change in personnel practices will be severely

constrained.

Performance appraisal systems in any organization aim at serving three purposes: (1) letting the employee know where he stands so that he will be encouraged to improve his performance; (2) providing the organization with information on how well its human resources are being used to meet its goals; and (3) to provide an inventory of executive, managerial, and other potential available for future needs. From all indications the appraisal system in the Foreign Service does poorly on all three counts, especially when compared with systems in other organizations. The reasons for this failure are these:

1. *Evaluation and promotion are not related specifically to organizational goals.* On the officer evaluation report (Form JF-41) the candidate's performance is evaluated abstractly rather than by the concrete objectives of the unit to which he is assigned. The rater is asked to evaluate knowledge of work, productivity, ability to plan work, judgment and dependability. But nowhere is he requested to appraise the officer's contribution to the attainment of the unit. Moreover, some of the specific criteria suggested in the instructions for use of Form JF-41 implicitly attribute an absolute value to certain qualities that should be judged in relationship to the goals of a unit and the nature of its work. One such trait is "Amount of Supervision Required." The assumption here, apparently, is "the less supervision the better." In many situations this as-

sumption may be wrong, or the entire dimension irrelevant for an adequate evaluation of effective performance.

2. *The rating dimensions are too general to be useful, and may result in serious omissions of information.* The rating forms reflect the misguided belief that all officers can be rated and compared on the same criteria, irrespective of the specific tasks to which they are assigned. Thus, every candidate, whether he is a political, economic, or administrative officer, working in Washington or Kathmandu, is rated on his written and oral expression, relations with Americans, relations with foreigners (whether or not he ever sees any), and executive ability. The implicit model, of course, is that of the political officer, while the notion of permanent functional specialization is foreign to the instructions for Form JF-41. More serious than the abstractness and at times irrelevance of the dimensions appearing on this form are those that are missing. Either specific forms should be developed for the various functional cones, or subdivisions should be added to reflect the nature of an officer's work. It might also be noted that some of the dimensions suggested in "Precepts for the 1968 Selection Boards . . ." (FAMC-512) are odd, e.g.:

Positive recognition should be given to those officers who . . . have exercised selectivity, either as drafting or as supervisory officers, leading to a reduction of the work load and/or personnel and hence to a reduction of the need for increasing overseas staff. (p. 2)

However laudable and urgent the reduction of overseas personnel may be, it is remarkable that this criterion should be given great prominence in itself, with no consideration of the relationship between staff cuts and the effectiveness of the mission in question. This statement and the entire circular illustrates the sense of ambiguity and drift alluded to earlier.

3. *The ratings overemphasize personal characteristics considered apart from performance.* Many experts on performance appraisal agree that the personality of the employee should be played down in performance ratings.

The employee's personal qualities are relevant to the organization *qua* organization only to the extent that they affect his ability to meet the organization's goals. Defenders of results-oriented appraisal systems will argue that if you are interested in performance, focus on performance rather than personal traits *assumed* to be related to performance. R. R. Blake, in an article called Re-examination of Performance Appraisal, in *ADVANCED MANAGEMENT*, July, 1958, wrote:

"It is better to be concrete and to evaluate specific work situations when the job required more than Joe gave it and try to find out what blocked him, and finally to place plans in action which will prevent that kind of situation happening again. When you do that you are acting like a manager of *men*, you don't use terms like initiative, character, or adaptability because their abstractions are too difficult for even the best of us to understand. You may find yourself using terms like material cost control, job safety, care of equipment, planning and scheduling, amount of re-do work, or sales results, if they are relevant, because they point to concrete, specific aspects of work."

As suggested in the above quotation, personality characteristics are difficult to define, and nearly impossible to apply on any objective basis. They are a convenient opening to subjectivism, the kind that can be particularly dangerous in an organization with loosely defined goals. If a superior dislikes a subordinate but cannot fault him on performance, perhaps because it would require too much explanation, he can easily shift his ire to personal qualities such as integrity and courage, versatility, adaptability, motivation, and tact. It is obviously rather damning to have questions raised about one's integrity, and a low rating, offered with little explanation, may be picked up by the promotion panels as a justification for holding the officer back.

Evaluation of personal qualities places the superior in the role of a judge and personality analyst, and asks him to carry out a task for which he may have little competence. Felix M. Lopez writes: "It is alleged that most supervisors have little or no competence in the field of personality appraisal, and even if they were able to identify person-

ality weaknesses, they could not do anything about such weaknesses. The charge is made that those who use the person-oriented approach are, in a sense, rendering judgments about a fellow human being in which their own values, attitudes, and background are so inextricably interwoven in the final product that it is difficult to separate the two."

This general problem is complicated by the extreme vagueness in the qualities suggested for consideration in the Instructions for Form JF-41, the officer evaluation report. Psychological research suggests that six raters who knew an officer equally well would probably come out with different assessments on such broad qualities as intellectual caliber (potential or as shown in the man's work?), range of interests, goals, ambition, commitment to the interests of the Service (can anyone define these?), objectivity, discretion, and creativity. I suspect that in many cases the average inter-rater agreement would be no more than 30 per cent—a rather flimsy basis on which to decide a man's future.

Personality-oriented evaluations are much more threatening to the individual, and, when negative, are likely to lead to a reduction in performance rather than an improvement. Most employees are open to suggestions about improving their work, but few are willing to take criticisms of *themselves* in an objective, rational manner.

Appraisals emphasizing personal characteristics are less constructive than those geared to changes in performance and results. When the superior and subordinate agree on performance objectives at the beginning of the rating period and then discuss progress at the end, improvement is likely to follow in the next period if the "coaching" is handled properly. By contrast, when an officer is told that he lacks courage, is deficient on intellectual caliber, was not thorough, lacks patience, is not properly motivated, and shows insufficient discretion, he will usually be highly resentful and confused about what to do, and may respond by withdrawing into the safety of bureaucratic ritualism.

4. *The system of appraisals and promotions discourages initiative*

and risk-taking. One of the cardinal weaknesses of the personnel system in the Foreign Service is that the punishment for failures resulting from personal initiative is much greater than the rewards for success. Elementary psychological theory suggests that in this situation the officer will be behaving rationally when he avoids initiative and plays it safe. This tendency was noted in rather extreme form in the widely criticized and universally read "Argyris Report" (named for C. Argyris and published in 1967).

"We have a powerful circular loop, a process within the foreign service culture that tends to reinforce the participants to minimize risk-taking, being open and forthright, as well as minimizing their feelings of responsibility and their willingness to confront conflict openly. This, in turn, tends to reinforce those who have decided to withdraw, play it safe, not make waves, and to do so both in their behavior and their writing. Under these conditions people soon learn the survival quotient of 'checking with everyone', of developing policies that upset no one, of establishing policies in such a way that the superior takes responsibility for them."

One need not look to such a mysterious-sounding term as "culture" to explain these tendencies. The entire tone of the rating forms and especially the "Precepts for the 1968 Selection Boards" indicates that the eyes of the Department are much more sensitive to past failures than to successes. Consider the following instruction from the "Precepts":

"Single unfavorable episodes from the past should be appraised as to lasting importance, and failings which have been overcome should be discounted. To give undue weight to past reports of defects which have already been corrected would be patently unfair to the officer concerned."

Despite this pious disavowal at the end, the message to the raters is clear: watch out for the troublemaker, and keep an eye open for past problems that may recur. Moreover, this emphasis upon past difficulties may indirectly create an unfortunate solution to the problem of rank-ordering facing the panels. When performance criteria are vague—as they certainly are in the Service—and when discussions of

personal qualities are bland and undiscriminating, as they are reported to be in a majority of cases, the members of the promotion panels may well be tempted to use past "burrs" in the man's record as a means of shelving candidates. Given the large number of folders and the many other demands on their time, this is an all-too-human response, but it also means that past "episodes" assume much greater importance than the instructions suggest. On this score, it is worth noting that the "Precepts" contain no comparable instruction concerning past successes and examples of outstanding performance that might bode well for the future.

Along the same lines, the "Precepts" and the instructions to the rating officers place relatively little emphasis on originality, initiative, and "results," and relatively great emphasis on "good judgment," "service discipline," and "discretion." The following cautious note struck in the "Precepts" captures the tone of this document: "Initiative should be judged not only on results but also on demonstrated soundness of reasoning and judgment (p. 2)." Again the message is clear: if you want to innovate you must be willing to accept two kinds of risk: (1) the risk of poor results following upon your experiment, which will most certainly be used against you; and (2) the risk of being accused of poor judgment even if the results of your experiment are seemingly successful. On the other side, nowhere do the "Precepts" or the rating forms raise questions such as the following: "Have there been any instances when the officer should have taken action but did not because of an excessive cautiousness or because of a misconceived definition of good judgment?" One need look no further than the performance appraisal reports to discover the most powerful reasons for caution in the Foreign Service, though, as Argyris suggests, these are undoubtedly reinforced by group norms in the culture of the system.

5. *The psychology of management underlying the appraisal and feedback system is inadequate to the needs of the Foreign Service.* The forms and instructions suggest the following as the prevailing

model of management:

- Performance standards are determined unilaterally by the supervisor.

- The subordinate is then told what he is expected to do; the superior's statements then serve as his effective operating goals.

- Performance evaluation consists of determining how well the subordinate did what he was told or expected to do, and pointing out any gaps to the subordinate. The instructions for the rating form state: "State the frequency and content of discussions you have had with the officer during the rating period in which you explained what you expected from him, in general and specific terms, and reviewed his performance pointing out, in particular, areas where improvement was needed or possible. Describe the specific steps you have taken to help him improve his performance."

- The most effective way of helping an employee to improve is to point out his personal and performance shortcomings and tell him what he ought to be doing.

Most superiors in the State Department, of course, do not follow this model in practice, but it remains as the implicit ideal norm in the system.

There is no space here for a full or even casual review of the merits of different organizational philosophies, particularly the rational-machine model vs. the participative-human relations approach.

It may be useful to summarize the results of a study of performance appraisal systems carried out at the General Electric Company. The results challenge all of the assumptions of the model laid out above.

The purpose of the GE study was to find out what goes on during an appraisal interview, and how this interview affects performance. The Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, "Performance Appraisals: Effects on Employees and their Performance," Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963, p. 41, summarized the findings:

1. "The appraisees find the appraisal a threat to self-esteem; this at least seems to be a reasonable guess. He goes into the discussion with a favorable conception of his own per-



formance and discovers that the manager does not evaluate his contribution as favorably as he thinks he should have.

2. "The appraiser is frustrated. He gives more praise than criticism; yet the subordinate does not respond positively either immediately or later to that praise. When the manager, furthermore, tries to provide advice on aspects of performance in need of improvement, he gets a defensive reaction at least half of the time. The more such advice he offers, the more defensive the subordinate becomes.

3. "Defensiveness in the reactions of employees, inspired by frequent criticisms, appears to interfere with setting of our own goals and with achievement of goals set by himself and the boss.

4. "*Criticisms were effective stimulators of improvement only where they were followed by carefully stated goals for improvement of criticized performance.* (Emphasis added)

5. "Managers who provided an opportunity for participation by employees in daily decisions obtained more improvement in performance than those who provided little opportunity for participation in decision-making.

6. "Men whose supervisors provided them with criticisms of them were particularly sensitive to any incongruity between the behavior of the boss in the appraisal discussion and his daily style of supervision. This incongruity, for men who were threatened by the supervisor, reduced their motivation and their improvement of performance."

Two specific weaknesses of the managerial system in the State De-

partment should be singled out for attention because of their pervasive negative influence on the morale and performance of the Foreign Service. The first is the tendency to exalt the role of superior and to separate him psychologically from the rest of his unit. The Department follows the classic principle that the boss "has" the authority, and should use it unilaterally to get things done. In theory goal-setting is seen as his responsibility, and obedience the major responsibility of the subordinate. Second, and related to this, discussions of leadership and executive ability operate on highly individualistic, "great man" assumptions that have been shown to be erroneous in empirical studies. At a time when social psychologists are inclined to define leadership more in terms of a man's ability to move a group toward its goals than in terms of abstract personality characteristics, the Department still relies on the latter in its rating instructions. The net result of these two tendencies is a kind of modified "personality cult" centering about the superior (especially the Ambassador!), and a parallel reduction in the influence of the subordinate officers. The appraisal system builds in no incentives to encourage the superior to develop the capacities of those in his unit. As a knowledgeable officer has remarked, the present culture of the Service is one in which "senior officers tend to view themselves as

virtuosi without responsibility for the performance of the orchestra as a whole."

In general, I share the feeling of the Foreign Service Association that basic reforms should be brought about in the personnel system of the Foreign Service, and that these should *not* be brought about in a piecemeal, "tinkering" fashion. In the case of the performance appraisal and promotion system it is important that reforms take account of the peculiar nature of the Foreign Service and the State Department, and that programs and policies not be transferred unquestioningly from private or other public organizations. At the same time, it is clear that the experience of corporations such as the General Electric company are highly relevant to the needs of the Foreign Service and may offer a useful point of departure. The State Department has a sad history of drawing up reforms or reorganization plans and then simply "springing" them on those affected, thereby generating anxiety, insecurity, and resentment. This was unfortunately true of some of the otherwise admirable reforms introduced by Deputy Undersecretary Crockett in 1965 and 1966.

The previous discussion of problems points up a number of possible changes that might be considered by a task force. To sharpen the issues I will state them as recommendations, though in fact I mean them to be only tentative suggestions for further study.

1. *Foreign Service officers should be permitted greater opportunities for professional specialization.* The reasons for this policy have been well-stated in recent publications of the Foreign Service Association. Here I will consider only the implications of this policy for performance evaluation.

2. *Performance ratings should be much more closely tied to the officer's professional or functional specialization.* This policy would alleviate several of the problems noted earlier, including the ambiguity of goals, the dependence on personal qualities, and the general vagueness of present rating dimensions. Several specific possibilities are open on this front. First, special forms could be devised for each

functional "cone" so that the dimensions of performance are related to the overall goals of that cone. This would assume, of course, that each cone could, in fact, clarify its goals, and this may be an impossible expectation at present. Second, the present panel system could be changed so that each "cone" would be assigned a permanent promotion panel consisting of insiders and outsiders whose task it would be to carry out a *rating* of each man in the cone (i.e., each officer). This policy would decrease the dependence of the officer on his immediate supervisor, while still allowing the supervisor's intimate knowledge of his performance to enter into the rating.

3. *Performance appraisal should be more closely tied to the goals of the unit to which the officer is assigned.* The tendency to speak in vague abstractions or to submit unanchored assessments of performance can be reduced by having the rating officer state specifically what was expected of the man and how well he did it, with concrete examples when possible.

4. *The goals on which performance rating is based should be jointly set by the officer and his superior, and should be reviewed frequently.* The General Electric study suggests that performance appraisals are most effective under the following conditions:

- When the subordinate knows what is expected of him from the beginning of the rating period onward, rather than at the end.

- When the performance goals are mutually agreeable to the superior and the employee, rather than dictated by the former;

- When the *results* of the employee's work are evaluated in frequent review sessions whose major focus is on improving performance rather than personality.

- When work planning leads to specific, measurable goals, when the knowledge of results is immediate and relevant, and especially when the knowledge of how well he is doing comes from the employee's own observations rather than the comments of someone else.

- When the employee can ask for assistance without feeling that this is an admission of weakness, and when the manager can offer

assistance without creating a defensive reaction in the employee. "To establish this climate, the manager must act as a helper rather than as a judge. In work planning and review sessions, the emphasis shifts from the judging implicit in appraisals to a concentration on accomplishing mutually acceptable goals. The emphasis is shifted from the weaknesses of the man to a job-centered approach. The climate is established for the employee to receive assistance when and as needed, as the Foundation for Research on Human Behavior, said.

- When the emphasis is upon improving *future* performance rather than rectifying past mistakes "Instead of stressing past mistakes use the review sessions as opportunities to learn how to improve work performance. Instead of dealing in subjective opinions, praise, or criticism, they mutually search for mutually acceptable goals. The manager becomes a helper, rather than a judge. The subordinate becomes a partner, rather than a defendant."

5. *Superiors should themselves be rated on the extent to which they develop the potential of their subordinates.* Here two practical steps might be taken to reduce the present separation and exalted status of some superiors: (1) the rating forms might include questions on what the goals of his unit are, how well he was able to mobilize his subordinates (and himself) to attain these goals, and what *specifically* he did during the rating period to develop the potential of those assigned to his unit; and (2) all ratings completed by the superior become part of his permanent file as well as those of the officer rated. At present these ratings can be used if there is any question about the man's fairness. With appropriate changes in the rating forms, however, it would be advisable to use these in judging the performance of the superior, on the grounds that leadership is an interactive process—one cannot lead or be an executive in the abstract. The best operational test of a man's executive ability is the extent to which he was able to mobilize those under him to attain the goals of his unit, and this is likely to be reflected in his ratings of others.

6. *The present emphasis on personal qualities should be reduced or eliminated.* Only two questions should be of concern in the ratings: (1) how well has the man done; and (2) what is his potential for the future. Personality traits should enter into this equation only when it can be demonstrated that they affect one or the other.

7. *The appraisal system in general and the rating forms in particular should give explicit attention to the officer's capacity for innovation and initiative.* Rather than rate the man on a vague dimension such as initiative, the rating officer should be asked specifically to cite *behavior or examples* showing the innovative capacity of the individual in question. The presence of such a question on the rating form might encourage superiors to permit more initiative on the part of those under them, without jeopardizing such requirements as security and predictability.

8. *The system of promotions should be keyed to the positions likely to be available to avoid the present "age lump" at the top.* More specifically, promotions should be made on a "cone basis," with explicit consideration of the number of positions corresponding to the ranks in question. At present there seems to be some tendency to promote first and look for positions later.

9. *The Department and Foreign Service should experiment with new options for increasing job incentives for promising younger officers.* Many believe that promotion of the talented is too slow, and that once promoted their responsibilities are too diluted because of the overcrowding in the upper reaches. To break this deadlock the following steps might be tried or at least considered:

- Institution of the possibility of promotion of more than one grade at a time for extremely promising young officers. While this would have to be used on a rare basis, its presence would serve as a psychological incentive;

- Occasional promotion of talented men to positions rated above their rank, on the ground that they may be willing to live with the lower rank provided that their level

(Continued on page 45)



Sukarno's Success

THE RULER'S IMPERATIVE: *Strategies for Political Survival in Asia and Africa*, by W. Howard Wriggins. Columbia, \$10.00.

NTH reaching the final chapter of this book, I had planned to caption the review "Machiavelli Updated," for I was at first struck by the completely detached and seemingly amoral tone of the analysis of how the leader of the developing country can best aggregate and maintain power. But in the final chapter, in which he demonstrates how successful short-run strategies may prejudice longer term objectives, the author appears, while still avoiding moral preachments or traditional cold war verbiage, to reveal a preference for democracy, for gradualist approaches to economic development, and the avoidance of foreign policy adventurism. One learns to appreciate how Sukarno managed to last so long without being induced to admire his methods, which planted the seeds of his eventual downfall.

The author, a Columbia professor and former member of the Department's Policy Planning Council, starts with a general description of the problems and goals of underdeveloped countries and then proceeds to examine the various strategies available to the political leader: the projection of the leader's personality, the building of an organization (ethnic parties, "patron" parties, and mass parties, either authoritarian or democratic). In addition, the leader may find it helpful to promote an ideology, to reward the faithful or intimidate the opponent or wavering ally, to develop the economy, to expand (or alternatively to contract) the degree of popular participation in politics, and to use foreign policy to forward his domestic objectives of consolidating internal power. In discussing each of these strategies, which he disaggregates for purposes of analysis, Professor Wriggins considers the advantages and disadvantages. Thus, while it may be politically profitable for the time being to raise the cry against real or imagined external threats, it may divert resources from development and frighten away needed foreign assistance.

At the end of the study, the author stresses that these strategies are not distinct and mutually exclusive alter-

natives but capable of some degree of substitution and combination. The successful leader is the one who perceives the most appropriate mix for his country and the best compromise between short term exigencies and longer term goals.

The author illustrates each strategy with examples, drawn chiefly from South Asia but including Middle Eastern and African political leaders. The Foreign Service reader will immediately think of other examples, from his own experience, which illustrate the various categories.

Although the author's expression is neither esoteric nor obscure, it is compressed, and the book is not easy reading. But for the reader who seeks to improve his understanding of the seeming irrationality of governments struggling with diverse followers and centrifugal forces, the effort is well worthwhile.

—ARMISTEAD LEE

Mission Impossible: Informing the People on National Security

CONFIRM OR DENY: *Informing the People on National Security*, by Phil G. Goulding. Harper & Row, \$7.95.

HAVING wrestled for the last four years with the task of trying to keep the press and public informed on foreign policy developments, I found Phil Goulding's "Confirm or Deny" of compelling interest. Those less directly involved in the public affairs problems our government faces in dealing with crises will find this book no less relevant.

Portions of "Confirm or Deny" may be so unsettling to some that they may wish to label the reading of it hazardous to one's health. For the author does not disguise the fact that decisions made in a crisis atmosphere are, and by their nature have to be, based upon information that is sometimes inaccurate, frequently misleading, and always incomplete. Those whose job it is to deal with the press are hampered by these same difficulties.

Under heavy pressure from the press, the Congress, and the public, the official spokesman all too often finds himself faced with the choice of deferring comment until all the facts are known, or of running the risk of

inadvertently misleading the public. The only thing he can be certain of in such a situation is that either choice can be disastrous.

An admitted poacher who turned gamekeeper, Goulding covered the Pentagon for the CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER before becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in 1965 and Assistant Secretary two years later. His book is a lively, straightforward account of some of the major crises of policy and action in which he was involved in the eventful four final years of the Johnson Administration.

The book deals with seven incidents, or "misadventures in national security," beginning with the flight of a US reconnaissance aircraft over a French nuclear installation in July 1965, and ending with North Korea's capture of the USS *Pueblo* in January 1968. Other chapters are devoted to Robert McNamara's campaign for a "thin" ABM system and his efforts to de-escalate the war in Viet-Nam, and Clark Clifford's determination to begin United States disengagement from that war.

The last chapter, which offers a frank and engaging insight into the author's personal feelings at the time Secretary McNamara was replaced by "Mr. Smooth," is the most entertaining and controversial part of the book. Goulding fully supports Townsend Hoopes's contention that it was Clifford who persuaded President Johnson to reverse his Vietnam policy. This is, of course, in direct conflict with the former President's own recollections, as confided to Walter Cronkite and several million TV viewers, that it was his Secretary of State who played the decisive role in the decision to end the bombing. Since Dean Rusk's personal sense of loyalty prevented him from revealing even to his closest associates the substance of his recommendations to the President he served so faithfully, the truth of the matter may remain obscure for some time to come.

One of the most appealing qualities of "Confirm or Deny," and rare in books of this kind, is the author's disarming candor. He readily accepts responsibility for errors that he might well have sought to share with others; and he does not try to justify his mistakes. But the reader should not draw unwarranted conclusions from Goulding's confessions of error. He learned from his mistakes and developed considerable skill in performing a task which TIME once termed "Mission Impossible."

Goulding had significant influence on Defense policies, and he exerted

that influence in the right direction. He had the foresight to bring into Defense as his deputy the able and knowledgeable Dan Henkin, also a former newsmen, who became Assistant Secretary when Goulding finally left the Pentagon, "physically and mentally exhausted," with the change of administrations in January 1969.

—CARL BARTCH

A bas the Altar of Technology

ARMS BEYOND DOUBT: *The Tyranny of Weapons Technology*, by Ralph E. Lapp. Cowles Book Company Inc., \$5.95.

NOT 20 pages into his book, Ralph Lapp states his position clearly and forthrightly with respect to the military-industrial complex of which retiring President Eisenhower spoke on the eve of his departure from the White House. There can be no doubt where Lapp stands: "... the United States needs to make the most searching examination of its national security in the light of the new technologies of our time. I maintain that we have overreached ourselves in our quest for security and that by so doing we have led to an escalation of the arms race. We have worshiped too long at the altar of our high technology."

With this introduction, the reader is under no illusion where he is going. Lapp has not made a historical, or even an overwhelmingly persuasive scientific case for or against the antiballistic missile system, by whatever name. He does start from a reasonably understandable discussion of the pros and cons of one kind of anti-system over another, but more important, he goes on from there. What he is getting at is not ABM per se, or nuclear warfare per se, but something far more significant in political terms.

Taking the Eisenhower text, Lapp maintains that the ABM debate, with all its ramifications, has confronted American society with a political military-industrial complex. What started out as a shadow of connivance between the Defense Department weaponry advocates and the manufacturers thereof has taken on, in Lapp's view, Congressional overtones. His most obvious examples, of course, are Rivers and Russell, both of whom play significant roles in Pentagon planning from a budgetary point of view, and both of whom have major economic political stakes in defense contract awards to their respective states. The Californians in Congress are not far behind.

Lapp's plea is for less worship at his "high altar" of technology, and more light on the significance of various Pentagon proposals ordinarily foisted

on an unsuspecting public in terms of "national security," and couched in such obtuse scientific terms as to be all but incomprehensible to the voting layman. Press coverage of the Pentagon also comes in for a measure of Lapp's ire; he considers the quality of Defense Department coverage, now that Hanson Baldwin has gone from the TIMES, as inadequate to the complexity of the problems with which the public really should be wrestling. Now that Drew Middleton appears to have inherited the Baldwin mantle, at least, perhaps matters will improve in that one journal, if no others.

This is a readable book, because its author does not involve either himself or his audience in all the complexities, either scientific or historical, of the development of missile weaponry and its effect on Pentagon planning and on the American society. Lapp has looked at this immense problem of mass-retaliation tactics with the insights of the scientist he is and the experience of the Government official he was. If he is not the best writer in this field, and this is not after all his trade, much less his intent, he makes his points and for this reviewer this is good enough.

—JOHN M. ANSPACHER

The Gordian Knot Described

VINH LONG, by Harvey Meyerson. Houghton Mifflin, \$5.95.

FEW books on Vietnam have described the present conflict—its concepts, programs and frustrations—as well as Harvey Meyerson in his first-

hand case study, "Vinh Long." Tracing the kaleidoscope of events in the pacification efforts of a Mekong Delta province from summer 1967 through 1968, Mr. Meyerson is strongly critical of the assumptions and expectations of the American civilian-military advisory team. He dissects very accurately the difficulties involved in trying to measure "progress" and he has something cogent to say about all of the elements of the rural development program, ranging from the quality of the new life in the New Life Hamlets to RD cadre teams and military operations.

While many of this book's conclusions are not above debate, all of its points on the problems and Gordian knot-like complexities of the United States advisory effort in Vietnam are worthy of special attention and serious discussion.

—JOHN W. ZEROLIS

An Unofficial Russian View of the Future

WILL THE SOVIET UNION SURVIVE UNTIL 1984? by Andrei Amalrik. Harper & Row, \$4.95.

IT is commonly supposed by many who should know better that communist propaganda, while not particularly effective in converting outsiders to communism, has at any rate succeeded in persuading Russians that the Soviet system is all that it claims to be. This view has been held with particular tenacity by some of our own political propagandists, perhaps because it reinforced their contention that ever larger sums of money should



"Fireworks"

by Marie Skora

The Crisis of Development

LESTER B. PEARSON

In this timely follow-up to the report *Partners in Development*, prepared under his chairmanship by the Commission on International Development, Lester Pearson discusses the meaning of international development, its historical context, the current economic-aid situation, and prospects for the future. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations. \$4.95

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be made available for counter-propaganda. "Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?", an unauthorized essay in futurology by a young Russian intellectual now living in Moscow, suggests that political propaganda has by no means been as successful as Soviet propagandists have pretended or our propagandists have feared.

The author's perceptive observations on present Soviet reality and on the possible future evolution of Soviet society deserve a wide audience. It is perhaps unlikely that events will turn out quite as described, for human efforts at foreseeing the future are notoriously fallible. It is doubtful, for example, that a future Russo-Chinese war would turn out as near a draw as the author predicts. Soviet overkill capacity is probably too great to make that a possibility. On the other hand, it is surely true, as the author indicates, that the stagnating bureaucratic regime now in power in Moscow is incapable of the regenerative effort required if the country's problems are to be overcome.

A thoughtful commentary on the author's apocalyptic vision of the end of the Soviet regime, written by Professor Sidney Monas of the University of Texas, adds to the interest of this fascinating work.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

Can ESP Be Bugged?

PSYCHIC DISCOVERIES BEHIND THE IRON CURTAIN, by Sheila Ostrander and Lynn Schroeder. Prentice-Hall, \$8.95.

THERE can be no doubt about it. This book brings a new dimension to East-West relations. For too long we have focused on the convergence theory, on the strategic arms race, on MIRV and ABM. The authoresses, who spent the summer of 1968 in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe delving into the occult and unexplained phenomena from ESP to UFOs, put things in a different frame of reference. They assure us, for example, that "there are organized witch covens in Russia which are in world-wide underground communication with witches in the West." How do they know? Why, because they talked to a Russian witch (who appropriately enough opens the conversation with the casual observation, "I am a witch"). Anyway, speaking as one who believes so fearfully in hobgoblins as to be reduced to hideous gibberish if caught out-of-doors after nightfall, the reviewer will take their word for it.

Miles. Ostrander and Schroeder are concerned also that we may be entering an ESP race with the Soviet Union—concerned because "ESP can be a weapon of war." If so, we're in



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for trouble. The Soviets clearly have the edge. Not only are they experimenting with ESP, but, being Soviets, they are already trying to bug ESP! By the time imperialist spies have the capability to transmit telepathically their ill-gotten secrets from Moscow to home bases in Washington, London or Bonn, the KGB will be ready for them! A psychic "interceptor" (stationed no doubt in a special room in Lubyanka) will tune in on their "messages." (Chort! The bad guys win again.)

While to categorize this as a "must" book would be to say too much, one can safely declare that all Sovietologists will learn something from it. For example, who among Kremlin watchers can claim to have heard of Wolf Messing? Yes, that's right, Wolf Messing! But it's not what you think. Messing is not a substitute for entrails in the hands of the oracle. No indeed. He is a psychic *extraordinaire* whose powers were once tested by Stalin. And who among us has read a bio on Nelya Mikhailova, a PK medium who can move objects around a room as if she were a—well, a PK medium? These are but a few of the characters who people the pages of "Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain." If one is jaded by books assessing the

chances of a full nuclear exchange, this will represent a welcome change of pace.

—WAYNE S. SMITH

A Feeling for Latin America

POLITICAL POWER IN LATIN AMERICA. *Seven Confrontations*, edited by Richard R. Fagen and Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr. Prentice-Hall, Inc.

IN their introduction to this volume the authors refer to the well known frustrations of professors and students in trying to convey and capture the feeling of Latin America in a few short months. "Political Power in Latin America" is an ingenious and readable effort to meet the problem. The power "confrontations" it presents are the Chilean presidential election of 1964, the Venezuelan presidential election of 1963, the Argentine election and coup of 1962, the Brazilian coup of 1964, the Dominican revolution of 1965, the Mexican University strike of 1966, and two challenges to the leadership of Fidel Castro. The presentation, in each case, is made through writings of academic commentators, both American and Latin American, statements of Latin American political leaders, press reports and editorials, and other similar material.

The confrontations presented are important in themselves. They also are

capable of conveying a considerable feeling for Latin America, for the variety the countries exhibit as well as for the qualities they possess in common. The contextual material, which is limited in volume, provides desirable background, economic, social, and political, for understanding and interpreting the confrontations. The volume's conclusions not only unify the text but are so perceptive and illuminating as to merit independent reading.

—WILLARD L. BEAULAC

A New Frontier

SIBERIA THE NEW FRONTIER, by George St. George. McKay, \$7.95.

SIBERIA is a huge, both beautiful and ugly land inhabited by some of the tougher people on earth. Here is a glamorous description of it by a Russian-born American who seems to have been given extraordinary assistance in gathering material by the Soviet Novosti press agency. The book is of such a nature that Mr. St. George is quite right to say in conclusion that "The reader might feel that the author is partial to the Soviet system."

—PETER BRIDGES

PERFORMANCE

from page 41

of responsibility is high enough. This would create role conflicts when the lower-grade officer was above a man ranking higher, but these difficulties may not be insuperable. In any event it may be psychologically beneficial to play down the importance of rank *per se* and play up the importance of a man's job assignment, quite apart from his rank. Similar problems occur in the academic community, and the strains involved often prove to be tolerable (as when assistant professors head committees including full professors from the same Department. The test is whether the younger man is capable, in which case the rank strains become less important.)

• Setting up an *executive cone*, as suggested by the AFSA, but one which would have two components: (1) officers actually working as executives, either as a regular "cone" specialization or on leave from their regular specialization; and (2) younger officers singled out by

a special panel as "potential executives" to be groomed for future work in this area. These would normally be officers working in one of the specialized cones, but who would also be told that because of their over all promise they will also be considered for special executive training programs. Such assignments or decisions would have to be reviewed periodically, with some names added and others removed from the lists depending on their progress. Selection for the executive cone would seem to be a powerful incentive to stay in the service for a younger officer, even if his actual assignment may be less than ideal.

10. *The present selection out provisions should be converted from a relative to an absolute basis.* There is something terribly punitive and threatening about the present provisions, a tone that seems inconsistent with the goal of building morale in a career service. The use of percentile ratings is analogous to the use of the distribution curve in classroom grading—those affected feel that "some of us

are going to fail no matter how well we do." These ratings also convey a false sense of mathematical precision about a process that is very delicate and fallible, and in certain cases may bind the hands of the Service when perhaps more than the usual number should be involuntarily retired. It would be much better from a psychological and even practical viewpoint to follow these procedures for selection-out: (1) institute a probation period of from three to five years at the end of which each officer would be reviewed on an absolute basis to determine whether he should be retained; here no fixed quotas would be used; and (2) once a man has passed the probationary period the assumption should be that he will continue and be promoted in the service unless his performance is consistently poor and is not corrected. The promotion panels could still be instructed to look for weak cases each year, but these should be evaluated again on a case-by-case basis rather than by the norms of a numerical quota. ■

RESPONSIBLE RESTRAINT

from page 22

tionally-minded Americans, and above all for our military and diplomatic professionals, is to recognize and accept the inevitability of constraint in American foreign and national security policies. We need to get on with the task of restructuring our international and defense postures to something that the American people will support and the rest of the world will believe in.

As one who has spent his entire mature life in the field of foreign affairs (and profoundly believes in the general wisdom of the policies we have followed since World War II), I do not come lightheartedly to the conclusions set forth in this paper. But neither can I bring myself to view these developments as unrelieved tragedy.

It is not, after all, a bad thing for the American Government to reflect the sense of priorities of the American people. It is, after all, a truism that leadership in world affairs can only come from the vitality and strength of domestic life.

There is, perhaps, great wisdom in the instinct of the American people that the time has come for the United States to behave with more circumspection and modesty abroad, and to concentrate, for the time being, more of our attention and our resources upon the mote in our own eye. There is, both at home and abroad, a considerable resistance to and resentment of what is seen as an excessive assertion of American leadership in the world. It is in the oldest American tradition that we recognize and respect that sentiment.

It is not immoral to be more chaste with our favor. It is neither selfish nor irresponsible to believe that the greatest gift that the United States can make to the world is to keep our own society healthy and our own institutions strong. And, there is much truth in Montaigne's observation that "a man doth oftentimes doff his doublet only to jump shorter than he did in his cape."

It is hardly likely that a more selective and discriminating Ameri-

can approach to international obligations and operations will result in a general collapse of the international system. It is possible that it might even lead to a strengthening of that system.

In any event, we have come to a point where it is inevitable that we shall have a change of emphasis in our national policy. For good or ill, the United States is in for a period of restraint in international affairs, and of concentration upon our domestic problems.

It is incumbent upon the internationalists among us to accept and preside over this process with the courage which Hemingway defined as grace under pressure. For it is essential to our national security and well-being that the process of restructuring our international role be performed with a delicate instrument and with a wise discrimination between the necessary and the merely desirable. Surgery is inevitable—and surely it is better that it be performed by professionals with a scalpel rather than by amateurs with a hatchet. ■

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CRISIS OF DEVELOPMENT

from page 36

bring about more even growth and development over the whole world. We would be foolish, and worse, if we now defaulted on this novel and noble adventure in cooperation, which could have such far-reaching implications for the future. There is no cause, yet, to conclude that we will do so, to cry doom and show gloom. The "crisis of development" is a very real one, but it can be overcome. It is not timidity or despair, but sensible realism, which insists we look risks and dangers in the face.

The 1970s may bring crises, but they also offer vast opportunities for positive and creative action in the international development field. We have the means, if we have the will, to act. The opportunities before us should make us bold, not beaten, for our capacity to exploit them is almost limitless. If the technological skill which took man into outer space can be linked with moral awareness and recognition of the urgent and practical need for international cooperation, we can bring a better life to all mankind.

This is the light.

The dark comes from our fears and our hates, our wrong priorities and our rooted prejudices, the destructive use to which we put so much of our technology, the poisoning and polluting of our environment, weariness and a declining public commitment to new international responsibilities.

With will and work, the light can overcome the dark. An important move to this end, and one which would be a test of our resolve, would be to strengthen international cooperation for development, to work toward a goal where world welfare is as normal as world conflict, and world responsibility as world discord.

We are at a moment in human destiny when new opportunities and new hopes can be held out to the submerged and impoverished billions. The gates of the future are not closed. They are ajar; they will respond to a determined push. But we cannot push if we lack the will, for we have the strength, materially, in abundance. Two hundred years of technological and capital growth have placed at the disposal of the richer countries unprecedented resources, which grow, on the average, by four or five per cent a year. We know so much more now about the problems of world development than before, and knowledge is a first stage essential to doing something about them. Compared with the innocence with which the development process was approached only two decades ago, sophistication and understanding are now the order of the day. A more careful study of facts and needs has taken the place of earlier overoptimism based on illusions and ignorance. We have made great steps forward in understanding what is actually happening. We have also made great steps forward in understanding what now has to be done. These are important gains that have occurred in the last two decades, for, as I have just said, more knowledge and greater understanding are the foundation for better work and greater progress.

What a tragedy it would be if we slackened, faltered and gave up at this time because only the will is lacking!

What a triumph, if the seriousness of the challenge were met by the greatness of the response! ■

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HOBGLOBLIN

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confidence. If that happens, the career foreign service might still continue to exist—but in name only. It will have been stripped of all meaningful power and will continue to live only because the modern state has not yet learned how to deal with atrophied bureaucracies whose useful days are over.

No one denies that it is the function of a career diplomat to carry out his government's policy and that here conformity is essential. Many compare the foreign service with the military in this connection.

But I believe there is a great deal of difference between the demands of the foreign service as a career and those of the military. I even think it is dangerous to relate the two. In the military, absolute obedience is essential to the functions the military are empowered to perform; in the career foreign service—an atmosphere of obedience, absolute or otherwise, can be catastrophic because it represents the antithesis of what is necessary if

policy formulation is to be creative rather than ossified.

Under no circumstances should the foreign service become the civilian mirror image of the uniformed military. Discipline of the military variety should be unthinkable in the foreign service. There is a place in American society for both the military and the foreign service: both are necessary in their chosen spheres. But if the foreign service is to differentiate itself from the military and offer truly sound and imaginative foreign policy alternatives to the president, then the foreign service must differentiate itself from the military by stressing obedience less and creativity more.

In "Diplomat Among Warriors," Robert Murphy discusses his own decision whether to resign over the Berlin blockade. He says: "Under the American system, officers and officials are free to make their opinions known to their superiors—up to the point where policy is definitely decided. After that everybody is expected to support policy to the best of his ability."

I agree with Murphy on this point, except that I would add a proviso. I would say, "After that everybody is expected to support policy to the best of his ability, *provided* that the atmosphere in which he works is conducive to the free flow of creative ideas, to the constant questioning of policies once agreed upon, and to the rewarding of creative dissent through the encouragement of contrary views." To create any other type of working atmosphere will mean the death of the foreign service.

I am optimistic about the future, and I look forward to reading sometime in the years ahead that the newly-elected President of the United States, in a cabinet meeting, turned to his recently-appointed Secretary of State and said, "What's wrong with that god-damned Department of yours, Chip? Can't you control your people up there? They're saying some far out things." Then he'll smile and add, "Which is exactly what I want. You're the only Department that ever says anything new." ■

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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

Who Abdicated?

MR. MACOMBER tells us that the State Department lost control of foreign policy because we did not participate in the development of the new instrumentalities of foreign policy following World War II. This happened because "we were not organized to do so managerially and we did not have the specialists required." The thesis that better organization, better mechanisms for leading the foreign affairs community, and the early development of potential managers will "return the action" to the Department of State apparently has some appeal to the editors of the leading journal of the military-industrial complex, *GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE*, which writes approvingly of this bold program of reform in its May issue. (To those who are unfamiliar with this publication I might point out that its lead editorial chastises A. Ernest Fitzgerald and Senator William Proxmire for attempting to educate American businessmen about the waste in the defense budget. This is "simplistic illogic," "dumb business," a "bonehead argument," according to *GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE*.)

By way of contrast, a retired Air Force Colonel, writing in *THE WASHINGTON MONTHLY*, May 1970 ("The Secret Team and the Games They Play," by L. Fletcher Prouty) suggests another theory as to why the Department of State has had relatively little to do with major foreign policy activities in recent years. Mr. Prouty writes that, "the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret . . ."

To my mind these two articles point up a fundamental difference in the perception of the role of this country's foreign affairs. Proper management, comprehensive programing, cost-effectiveness, country analysis strate-

gy, etc. seem to me to lend themselves to production efficiencies and ready quantification; success or failure has become a matter of toting up projects accomplished: dictators deposed (or restored) rebellions quelled, aid delivered, insurgencies countered, and the like. The other more traditional view of foreign relations conjures up visions of a rather undirected foreign ministry and a number of missions around the world staffed by persons of average intelligence who happen to be skilled, by reason of education, experience and, hopefully, even motivation, in the business of disposing of problems with other countries according to generally known policy direction.

The end product in either of these two systems may be good, bad or indifferent. Style, Mr. Kennan tells us, is important in foreign affairs and I know which style I prefer. The important distinction, however, comes in accountability and there our democratic safety valves have failed us. A little secrecy in diplomacy is not a bad thing, but where billions of dollars, thousands of lives, and respect of sovereignty are concerned, we had better be sure that the people are informed and able through their representatives to judge policy and to adjust it if necessary.

I have no argument with the proposition that our management and information systems could stand improvement and modernization. But, I am extremely sceptical of our ability to recapture the "action" by means of internal reform. If American foreign relations are to be reformed, the job of restating fundamental policy and reforming the relevant institutions will have to be done by Congress which abdicated responsibility and lost effective control of the action two decades ago.

HARRISON B. SHERWOOD
Reston, Virginia

Letter to the Twin Citian Magazine

Having been born under the sign of Pisces (February 19 to March 20) I was much interested in your March issue on astrology. There you stated that, "for Pisces there always is a 'harmony of the spheres'. Pisces normally needs a calm environment, often a secluded one, for happiness—but Pisces is also very much aware of the needs of others and cares about them. That is why he is THE natural diplomat. . ."

The question immediately occurred to me as to whether or not our State Department has made a special effort to recruit people born under the sign of Pisces. Certainly one would suspect that any foreign ministry hoping

to conduct a wise diplomacy would seek out the best diplomats possible. I therefore immediately embarked upon a research project to test the wisdom of our government.

I have a copy of the Biographic Register of the Department of State which gives birth dates and other biographical information about the members of the Department. We made a random sample of 110 names from the Register and to our amusement, discovered that only four of our diplomats are Pisces. One would anticipate that according to the law of probability, there would be closer to a dozen! It would appear that the State Department has only a third of what would be a natural distribution of people born during the Pisces period. Certainly this fact explains the failures in American foreign policy in recent years. What is *not* explained, however, is how it *would* be possible to recruit so few Pisces without trying.

Can it be that there is some gigantic conspiracy at the highest level of our government to keep Pisces out of the State Department in order to maintain a low level of diplomatic success and therefore assure the supremacy of the Military-Industrial Complex?

WILLIAM C. ROGERS
(Born March 12)

We Did It

WELL, you did it, without the letter I've been meaning to write for ages; i.e., in the Bookshelf section! It has annoyed me monthly to find the name of the reviewed book at the end of the article. The format in the May issue is so much better; the headings are excellent and all pertinent material where it should be. I wish I had been the one to suggest this since, as I say, it's been on my list of "things to do" for a long time.

FLORENCE F. W. COEY
Coral Gables, Fla.

Where Are The Problems?

MOST ideas currently being discussed for the reform of the Foreign Service seem to me to be designed to correct failings and/or solve problems relating to the foreign policy decision-making process in Washington. Ideas and proposals drawn up on this basis—and then applied indiscriminately to the entire Foreign Service across the world—impose American "public administration" solutions upon situations which, in fact, are not American. The implementation of foreign policy takes place, primarily, in association with non-Americans and outside the United States. (In fact, it mainly takes place

among peoples who share little of our cultural heritage.)

This being the case, one should evaluate proposals to reform the Foreign Service by starting from the premise that the proposed reforms should, first and foremost, seek to correct failings and/or to solve problems abroad (among foreigners). Proposed reforms of the Service should probably be rejected if they are designed primarily to solve Washington problems. Unhappily, most of the reform proposals offered nowadays are of this type (for example, the pending Macomber proposals). Those of us who are interested in having the best Foreign Service in the world should remain alert to the danger that fundamental "reforms," designed to help the Department of State win bureaucratic struggles in Washington, may be inappropriately imposed on our operations overseas.

JOHN P. HEIMANN

Washington

The Brains of Foreign Policy

I share Francis Cunningham's unease over the current emphasis on specialization in the Foreign Service. To his reasons all excellent, I would add the thought that specialization, unless carefully controlled, brings narrowness. And narrowness can bring isolation from reality. Can a functional or geographic specialist be expected to grasp the significance of developments in this increasingly interdependent world? If he cannot, how can he think meaningfully and constructively about foreign policy?

A specialist can easily degenerate into a technician, one who is asked only how to do something, not whether it should be done or what other course would be better to follow. Our Vietnam involvement shows that, even more than officers with area, linguistic, management, and other skills, we need officers qualified and ready to speak out on foreign policy issues which transcend national and functional boundaries. The Foreign Service should be the nation's foreign policy brain, not just its spinal cord.

I am not arguing for a return to the "generalist" concept. I do not believe in a professional foreign policy elite set above foreign policy's grubby details. Obviously, some degree of specialization is needed in as large and complex an organization as today's Foreign Service. I am merely asking for moderation. A Foreign Service officer must not be a specialist only. He must have a variety of experience and training; he must be made to see the link between our needs at home and our programs abroad. In short,

his specialization should be the foreign policy of the United States.

JOSIAH W. BENNETT

Manhattan, Kansas

A Diplomatic Apollo Failure

THE savior of the Apollo 13 Mission was repeatedly stated during the recent space crisis to be the engineering concept of "redundancy," i.e., built-in duplication of systems. I doubt that there is anyone connected with the US space program that would care to challenge the wisdom of this concept today.

The United States Foreign Service, when I joined in 1952, was built upon an unstated concept of "redundancy," i.e., that of reliance upon the "generalist." We began to give it up under the "wristonization" program, and apparently have determined now that the concept of an officers corps of men and women of wide breadth of experience and knowledge is unsuited to the present technical age. At least the Macomber proposals appear so directed with their emphasis on fitting each officer into his ordained "cone."

There is no question but that the Foreign Service requires the knowledge and abilities of specialists, but this does not, it seems to me, mean that it should be made up of such. They are needed to advise in their areas of specialized knowledge those who have garnered the broader outlook through education and experience, particularly the latter.

The Foreign Service is the instru-

ment through which the official relationships of the United States are conducted with a large variety of foreign governments composed of different peoples in pursuit of varying, and often conflicting, interests. Concentration upon specialized views of our relationships will not provide the overall understanding of the diverse motivations and pressures operating upon these governments that the United States Government needs in order to effectively pursue its own goals.

Is it too late for a second thought, or do we need a diplomatic Apollo failure to prove the value of redundancy and the generalist?

BYRON E. BYRON

Ankara

Submission and Irony

THE tone of moral uplift in Crag Eisendrath's article in the April issue of the FSJ is not reassuring to at least some of us troubled by the essential barrenness of our work as junior FSOs. History is replete with examples of established institutions advising their impatient and eager young: "They also serve who only stand and wait"—and equally replete with the young seeing through this sham. And isn't it somewhat ironic for Eisendrath to counsel humble submission to the system when he himself resigned from the Foreign Service after presumably waiting in vain for that "good" job?

ANDREW D. SENS

Bordeaux

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

By S. I. Nadler



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