



# FOREIGN SERVICE Journal

NOVEMBER 1970 • SIXTY CENTS

# REASONS YOU SHOULD JOIN AFSA

## Voice of Foreign Affairs Community

The Association is the only professional-employee organization—completely independent of the U.S. Government—that articulates the aims of the foreign affairs community. In a vigorous and organized way it acts to achieve those aims on behalf of everyone in that community, regardless of rank, status, category or agency. Thus, U.S. Government action, (laws, policies, rules) that affect AFSA members, immediately engages the Association's talents; it proceeds forcefully.

## Activist in Achieving Important Goals for the Membership

AFSA does more than react. It initiates moves that benefit the membership; in the process, non-members also benefit. But the more members we have, the stronger our voice and the greater the benefits. Thus all personnel should carefully consider the following examples of AFSA initiatives, speculate how much and more could be achieved if all foreign affairs personnel supported AFSA.

- **Ombudsmen.** AFSA recommended that these welfare and grievance officers be appointed in AID, State and USIA. The result: approval. AFSA's Members' Interests Committee collaborates with the Ombudsmen, or works separately, on a wide variety of pocketbook and other issues.
- **Health Insurance.** Premiums for the U.S. Government-American Foreign Service Protective Association health plan were greatly reduced at AFSA's instigation. The saving to an AFSA member who is a participant in that plan is *three to six times his annual AFSA dues.*
- **Travel and Transfer Allowances.** This is another area in which AFSA made the will of its members felt. Travel advances now are paid in full, travel and transfer allowances substantially increased. AFSA has also recommended transfer allowances of up to \$800 and has the Department's approval. The necessary legislation and budgetary machinery has been set in motion.
- **Support for Staff Corps.** Staff Corps personnel have the strongest possible backing of AFSA in promoting their interests to the end of retaining the Staff Corps as a powerful and effective arm of the foreign service and to reduce or eliminate inequities between Officer and Staff corps personnel, including overtime, free entry, allowances, quarters, etc. As a result of the Staff Corps Advisory Committee recommendations the next inspector vacancy will be filled by a member of the Staff Corps.

## Champions Proposed Legislation

- **Health Insurance.** AFSA urged that legislation be passed that would increase the Government's share of health plan insurance programs up to 100% instead of the 40% just approved.
- **Overtime.** The Association asks that 10% overtime be paid to employees on standby duty. This would particularly benefit mail, file, security, cryptographic and secretarial personnel. Also, AFSA recommended payment for overtime to all Staff Corps personnel overseas at the FSSO-5 level and below.
- **Retirement for AID Personnel.** The Association holds that AID people should have the same retirement benefits as other members of the foreign affairs community.

## Scholarships and Counseling

More than \$73,000 in scholarships went to children of foreign service people last year. AFSA's Scholarship Fund accounted for \$63,000 of the total.

Educational counseling continues as an important part of AFSA's service to members: some 300 families a year take advantage of this free service rendered by AFSA through a highly skilled specialist. The unusual needs of handicapped children are covered in this service.

## Provident Fund

This fund is being established with a substantial initial loan from the Bonn/Bad Godesberg American Community Association. Its purpose is to provide immediate financial help to anyone in the foreign affairs community overseas confronted by an emergency that cannot be met by government assistance. Loans have also been received from other posts and the Fund will be operative in the near future.

## Various Insurance Programs

AFSA has arranged with insurance agencies to write short-term automobile insurance for personnel on home leave; before such coverage was virtually unobtainable.

AFSA also has low-rate group insurance programs available only to its members: high limit accidental death and specific loss; long-term income protection; and extra cash hospital-indemnity plan.

The Foreign Service Protective Association provides group life insurance, family coverage and accidental death.

*This outline of AFSA's activities is designedly brief, but the Association will gladly expand on any point. AFSA welcomes suggestions from members as to what it should be doing in addition to its ongoing programs and proposed courses of action on new issues.*

# FOREIGN SERVICE Journal



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THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

Membership in the AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION is open to the professionals in foreign affairs serving overseas or in Washington, as well as to persons having an active interest in, or close association with, foreign affairs.

Dues are \$30 annually for members earning over \$15,000; for those earning less, dues are \$15.00.

For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); \$6.00; two years, \$10.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add \$1.00 annually for overseas postage.

**N**o theme has been so pervasive in discussion of American foreign policy in the last several years as the emergence of a new, lower posture. The press, the academic community and many within the government have stressed this trend—especially since the President's Guam press conference and the publication of his foreign policy report in February of this year. Indeed, the "Nixon Doctrine" has become a sort of shorthand designation of the new "low posture" policy although, of course, the two are not identical but only overlap.

Too often, however, the phrases "Nixon Doctrine" and "low posture policy" have been little more than ritual incantations that absolve the speaker from finding out what they really mean, much less doing anything to implement them. We were therefore pleased when Thomas Thornton, a member of the Department's Planning and Coordination Staff, proposed that this special issue of the *JOURNAL* be devoted to an exploration of the problems and opportunities posed by these new and still largely undefined concepts. The contributors to this issue offer a wide range of experience within the Department and in the academic community (several have substantial reputations in both) and their experiences result in approaches that differ markedly.

It is interesting but not surprising, for instance, that Ambassador Neumann and ex-Ambassador Oliver take a cautious view of multilateral economic assistance and Professor Wilcox—a battle-scarred veteran of Columbia University—is acutely sensitive to the domestic restraints on our policy. Jerome Holloway, a scarcely less scarred veteran of service in the East Asia Bureau during the Cambodian crisis, raises substantial questions concerning the relationship of overall policy and the exigencies of crisis situations, and Senator Mathias reflects many of the concerns about the substance and guidance of American policy that have troubled him and his colleagues in recent months. Mr. Thornton is concerned about the need within the foreign affairs community for a comprehensive approach to the problems facing the country in the 1970s.

Since we hardly expected to find a single "blueprint" for US policy in a changing environment, we welcome this diversity of approach and analysis. Complicated issues such as the ones raised here must first be approached cautiously—like the proverbial German cat circling the hot porridge—before they can be attacked directly. Also, of course, these are issues about which honest men can reasonably differ. We offer this issue, then, as a contribution to a debate—one in which our readers will have to be active participants. ■

### A Professional Association


**E**XECUTIVE ORDER 11491 on Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Government presents an extraordinary challenge to the Foreign Service and the American Foreign Service Association.

The Board of Directors has sent to all members the results of our thorough study of the issues raised by this executive order and by the current drive of an AFL-CIO affiliate to obtain exclusive recognition rights for Foreign Service personnel. The Board has concluded that we have no real choice: AFSA must itself seek exclusive recognition as a "labor organization" for all Foreign Service personnel.

This decision was reached after consultations with high officials of State, AID, and USIA; with the AFL-CIO affiliate; with the Department of Labor, the Civil Service Commission, the Federal Labor Relations Council, the National Federation of Professional Organizations, with scores of our members in Washington, with DACOR members, with our legal advisers, Covington and Burling. We urge members to read carefully the explanatory material they have received. The explanation is longer than we would have liked, but the problem is intricate and cannot be glossed over.

We believe our members will reach the same conclusion as the Board, and we urge that you sign the required form and return it without delay. We rely upon members to seek the signatures of Foreign Service colleagues, whether AFSA members or not. The Association legally must have the signed forms of 30 per cent of total personnel in Foreign Service (FSO, FSSO, FSS, FSIO, FSR, FSRU) before it can move ahead. Our competitor—the AFL-CIO affiliate—has already requested elections in five offices of State and AID which include Foreign Service personnel. The AFL-CIO may prove to be the appropriate representative of Civil Service personnel; the Association should speak for the Foreign Service.

*The Board of Directors proposes no compromise of AFSA's traditional mission as a professional association.* The Board pledges jealously to protect AFSA's professional character and goals. The Board is persuaded that AFSA's future as a professional association in fact depends upon its future as an effective spokesman for the economic and personnel interests of its members. ■



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
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## COMMUNICATION

RE:

## George Kennan's Advice

JOHN W. TUTHILL

I would like to take issue with one part of George Kennan's interview as published in the August number.

In answer to the question as to his advice to a "promising student" interested in the Foreign Service, Kennan states "if he was very ambitious and competitive as well as being bright, I would not suggest that he enter the Foreign Service at the bottom and make it a career. The realistic advice . . . is to tell him to become a successful lawyer or businessman and plan later to enter diplomacy at the top."

This is not the advice I give nor can I believe that Kennan is as cynical about the Foreign Service and the role of its members as his response would seem to imply. Actually my advice to "promising students" is consistent with Kennan's up to a point. I strongly advocate that all Foreign Service officers learn a trade and work at it *before* entering the Service. The basis for my recommendation however is quite different from Kennan's.

The United States government needs a Foreign Service that is composed of independent individuals. I seek the independence which comes from the knowledge and assurance that the officer is capable of supporting himself and his family with dignity and satisfaction in some other trade. I'm not choosy about the "trade." It can be law, business, teaching, journalism, banking or truck driving, but it should be a trade that the officer has worked at *before* entering the Foreign Service.

There is a related justification. I must admit a horror of young men and women entering the Foreign Service direct from university work. While I realize that the universities of today are hardly "cloistered" from the events of our time, nevertheless I think that officers should know more of their country than they are likely to learn from an adult life limited to the Foreign Service and the universities.

The basic reason, however, is that I want officers who are fiercely independent in their judgments and who are quite prepared to leave the Service for another trade if their independent views lead to career difficulties. It is an enormously dangerous world in which we live and there should be no doubt about the integrity, personal balance, courage and, of course, judgment of those reporting events back to the United States Government and making policy recommendations in connection therewith.

There is another, and related, point of difference with Kennan. In response to a question regarding reform of the Foreign Service, Kennan states "I know that the State Department has to be larger today than when I first entered Government service in 1925, because among other things we have relations with so many more countries now." I would place much more emphasis upon the "other things" than upon the enlarged number of embassies that we have abroad.

The fact is that, during the past 25 to 30 years, there has been a veritable avalanche of problems in the field of foreign affairs and an enlargement of the share of US responsibility for such problems. We have, of course, had the horrors of

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Subject: An invitation to join the Union.

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Many of us in the Union are also proud to be members of the professional society, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA). We strongly urge all eligible members of AFSA to join the Union. There is much we can do together. The Union can serve State-AID-USIA personnel in securing their individual rights—in *representing* employees when there is a difference between the individual and Department or Agency management about those rights. As a member of the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE), you will have the backing of 325,000 other people in government who are also members of AFGE. Equally important, you will have the services of a full-time national staff of 265, including 10 full-time attorneys. These people will represent you most effectively in Congress, the White House, the Civil Service Commission, the courts, and in our own agencies.

When our country's interests are at stake we all want truly *experienced* diplomats to negotiate on our behalf. Diplomacy is no place for amateurs. Similarly, when our job interests are at stake, we want to be represented by experienced negotiators.

With your help, we will soon qualify (under Executive Order 11491) for exclusive representation of employees of State-AID-USIA. Join us now.

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World War II and the post-war confrontation of the super powers. In addition, while we have talked a good deal about technological developments which have shrunk the world, we have not, in my view, more than begun to understand the policy implications of these well-known developments. While Soviet-US relations are of paramount importance, new problems or new aspects of old problems have arisen probably faster than during any other period in world affairs. The need for an effective peacetime alliance and related economic, financial and trade collaboration; decolonialization and the—as yet unaccomplished—necessity for the democratic, affluent, northern world to find a viable relationship with the troubled “third world”; the changing of conditions of alliances almost as soon as they have been created; the speed of transportation and communication and the prospect of further quantum jumps as the satellites and international TV come into play—these and similar developments are the main reasons why the State Department and US missions abroad have grown.

I don't think that I am likely to be charged with advocacy of excessive personnel at home or abroad. Clearly while our needs and responsibilities have grown our operations abroad have spread excessively to the point that many of our operations abroad do a positive disservice in terms of US interests. However, the Service and its job has become immensely more complicated. There is now a need for young men and women with a variety of talents and qualifications undreamed of 30 years ago. And with these expanded requirements, there is a greater rather than a lesser need for an effective Foreign Service.

If the above is correct, it follows that the role of the future Foreign Service officer, while perhaps less glamorous than his predecessors, is likely to be more complicated and equally exacting. If a young man or woman entering the Service will think of the needs of his government and the

possibilities of making a constructive contribution towards dealing sensibly with the issues which confront us, then I think the Service will be more, rather than less, attractive. It depends to a large extent on whether the new officers will think not of their careers, but of the possibilities for making real contributions.

Kennan presumably was thinking largely in terms of decision making on high policy issues. I agree that, given a democratic form of government, in which there is a constitutional division of responsibilities between the Executive and the legislature, the President will always choose a Secretary of State having in mind his influence with the Congress. But is this surprising and, as Churchill pointed out—given the alternatives in terms of types of government—bad?

So, I assume that the President will decide basic foreign policy issues, while keeping a vigilant eye on Congressional and public opinion and that, while his Secretary of State and the Department behind him can be expected to contribute recommendations and background before these decisions are taken, they will also be charged with carrying them out.

This does not leave a modest role for the Department of State or its Foreign Service. The United States remains the main, but not sole, nation of the democratic independent world. As such it has a tremendous responsibility, not only for the final issues of war or peace, but also for the thousands of actions that require policy decisions by the United States Government. All of these can never be referred to the President through the Secretary of State. Responsibilities have to be delegated if chaos is to be avoided. This means, in practice, that many Foreign Service officers in many parts of the world will henceforth be reporting, making recommendations or taking specific actions which ultimately will have a profound effect upon the position of the United States and the background against

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which the President must take his responsibility for the final policy decisions.

I think that constitutes enough of a challenge for a promising student—unless of course his ambition leads him to seek to become President or Secretary of State. The Foreign Service is a poor bet as a road to either of those jobs. There is, however, a perfectly respectable route open to him—politics. It would be just as well if the Foreign Service avoided looking disparagingly upon this route.

So—while agreeing with much of what Kennan advocates—I shall continue to advise the bright, independent student that there exist perhaps even more challenges, more need for imagination and courage in the Foreign Service today than ever before. I would advocate that he, or she, forget about career prospects, career management, rates of promotion, and instead try to be ready for the problems and issues and to accept the great satisfaction that comes with the acceptance of that responsibility. Also, I would recommend another "trade," because the Foreign Service officers who are needed are those who are prepared to quit if the Service in practice fails to offer that it potentially can. I might add that in my own more than a quarter of a century in the Service that time never came.

## Three Poems

by Philip C. Narten

Echoes can assert validity,  
shouting back a challenge flung to rocks.  
Or they can dissemble,  
rumbling the thunderclap's boast  
between valley and cloudbank  
until the issue is muffled and confused.  
Or they can mislead,  
if the instigating tumult is itself unheard  
and conjecture steals the seat of sense.  
Such are the echoes of immortality.

The image of the mood escapes;  
bat-flight in the warm twilight—  
past grope or net  
or hurried stone of stimulus.  
Hold a shard of it in your hand  
(these fragments seldom of a size  
to show the potsherd former shape)  
and it will crumble into ancient dust;  
nor will tears cement it.

Follow the night into the farthest shadows.  
There no firelight will disturb the even black  
where memory can forget itself. Gratefully,  
recessed panics will speed to their escape;  
and in all the jammed alcoves, nooks, crannies,  
niches, crevices, and corners of your mind,  
you will find only a blissful dead hollowness.  
No echo, clattering or muffled, will rebound  
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## Ambassador Grew Writes

To Frank B. Kellogg, November 29, 1926

In accordance with your instructions, I respectfully lay before you the following considerations regarding the situation concerning our Chiefs of diplomatic missions abroad.

There is another important element to be considered. During the last thirty years efforts have been made by successive administrations to develop an efficient Foreign Service in order to carry out effectively the increasing demands of American business and of our steadily increasing interests abroad. . . . In the Rogers Act of 1924 the importance of promoting efficient Foreign Service officers to the position of Chief of Mission was definitely recognized and a moral obligation was placed upon the Administration to consider the names of efficient Foreign Service officers for such promotions. . . .

The situation in the Service today is as follows: Every year a considerable class of young men is taken into the Service. This year there were twenty. Class I of the Service is filled with twenty-three men who have had from fifteen to forty years experience in the Service. A large proportion of these officers are fully equipped, competent and fitted in every way to represent the United States as Minister or Ambassador. If experience continues to show that only an infinitesimal proportion of these officers can ever hope to become Chiefs of Mission, and that very few of even that small number can ever hope to be sent to desirable posts where their wives can live in healthful and cultural surroundings and where their children can obtain their normal education, the incentive to the best young men of the country to adopt the Foreign Service as a career and the morale of the Service through all its ranks are bound to suffer. That feeling is very marked in the Service today and has come to me from many sources. . . .


I am not sure that the President appreciates this situation nor am I sure that he has ever been given a clear comprehension of what we are trying to accomplish with the Foreign Service and what it is going to mean to the country in future and what it means today. If the morale and therefore the effectiveness of the Foreign Service are to be sacrificed to temporary political expediency, I do not think that we can look to the future with equanimity. The American people are essentially practical and businesslike. They demand the most efficient service that the Government can render and they cannot fail to approve and support the application to our Foreign Service of the principles which make successful business houses, namely, the practical recognition of ability. No business house is going to succeed if the majority of its vice presidents are appointed for political considerations rather than for ability, experience and familiarity with the work. The large business organizations and chambers of commerce of the country solidly supported the Rogers Act and are solidly behind us in what we are trying to accomplish.

It therefore seems to all of us that the time has come to put the matter up squarely to the President. I believe that the resignations of several of the Chiefs of Mission, political appointees, who have served more than their traditional terms without rendering the highest type of service can with all propriety be requested, and I think that to the vacancies thus created a considerable number of efficient, able and deserving Foreign Service officers of Class I with long experience should be promoted. Such a step would encourage all the ranks of the Service, would give an added incentive to the best young men in the country to come forward for the Service, would meet with high approval from the public, business organizations and chambers of commerce throughout the country and would at the same time be serving the best interests of the Government. . . .  
—from "Turbulent Era" by Joseph C. Grew.

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# EUGENE

MOLLY STEPHENS

*Miss Stephens is a native of Michigan but a transplanted resident of Northern California. She entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and has served at Libreville, Rome and Vientiane. She is now secretary to Ambassador William H. Sullivan in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*

**T**HE American Embassy in Libreville has better facilities now, but in 1962, during my tour of duty in Gabon, the Embassy was housed in a crowded, makeshift structure in which the electricity and plumbing were incredibly moody. There were so few rooms that my boss and I shared a common office. Somehow the Deputy Chief of Mission survived my clattering typewriter with his sense of humor intact. As for me, sharing an office with the DCM in the land of the equatorial rain forest was an astonishing introduction to modern

diplomacy.

One afternoon I was busily typing when I heard the door behind me open quietly. The office was instantly filled with the rich, ripe fragrance of a long-unwashed body. I turned to greet the visitor, and found myself facing . . . Eugène.

He was a very small, very thin Gabonaise. His ancient clothes looked as if they had grown to his wiry little body—due, I suspect, to a long association unbroken by needless removal for laundering. He was wearing a stubble of beard, and a couple of lonely teeth were scattered here and there behind a diffident smile. He was just a little drunk, probably to give himself the courage to come in the first place.

Lying helplessly imprisoned under his arm, with its head hanging dolefully down, was a skinny, undersized, half-wild African chicken, clucking softly to itself.

To my amazement, my boss knew Eugène very well. He shook hands with the shy, ugly little man, greeting him with a warm "*Bonjour, Eugène, comment allez-vous? Que puis-je faire pour vous*

*aujourd'hui?*"

Eugène shifted his bare feet self-consciously, then sat primly on the edge of the proffered chair, all the while keeping a firm grip on the hapless fowl tucked under his arm.

What the DCM "could do for him today" turned out to be quite a bit indeed. In his African-French pidgin he explained.

Eugène, it seemed, had brought the DCM a present—the stringy little chicken—in return for which he wished a very big favor. He wanted 40,000 francs (around \$75) with which to buy another wife. He had sent his picture (or somebody's picture) to his prospective mother-in-law back in a jungle village somewhere and, apparently on the strength of the picture, the matriarch had approved the match.

"Forty thousand francs seems like a very high bride-price, Eugène," my boss said thoughtfully, "especially for a second wife. Surely you didn't pay that much for your first wife." (Plural marriage is advantageous in Gabon. Since women do all the heavy work, the more wives a man has the better off he is economically—except that

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
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good wives tend to be rather expensive.)

Eugène reassured the DCM of the soundness of the investment. The bride was very strong. And not too old, either—thirteen. She would be able to work very hard.

"She sounds like a very good wife," my boss agreed, "but it will take you many years to pay me back forty thousand francs, even if she is very strong and can work hard."

"But," the little man said earnestly, "If I pay bride price, government baby bonus come to me. I give it to you. If I take wife but cannot pay bride price, baby bonus go to wife's father."

This was perfectly true. Without the bride-price, he could not marry his prospective wife and therefore all his children were the legal property of his wife's father—and the government baby bonus, an important incentive in this underpopulated little land, would also go to the bride's father.

"What if you don't have any babies, Eugène."

The diffident smile returned, but with a shade more confidence this time.

"Oui, there will be babies," he said assuredly. "Girl already have one baby in village."

And that was the real reason his thirteen-year-old fiancée was so expensive, when an average girl fetched a price of about \$40. In a land where a high percentage of the women are sterile, his strong young bride was not.

The DCM had to explain to Eugène, gently and tactfully, that he was unable to give him 40,000 francs for his second wife.

Eugène took the news like a man. He was deeply disappointed. The DCM had already done him one small favor and the little Gabonese had counted heavily on a donation from the "rich American"—yet he rose at the end of the interview (teetering just a little) with the shy smile intact on his seamed, unshaven face.

And then he did a very generous thing. Although he rarely had enough money to buy meat, and in spite of my boss's refusal to help him, Eugène, with a magnanimous gesture, offered the DCM the chicken anyway.

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In which the author points out some of the opportunities and problems inherent in going about the business of foreign policy

## The Nixon Doctrine and Beyond

**T**HE question of implementing a low posture policy is one of relinquishing power. The United States has never looked at its position as an imperial one, but to a great extent the nation did fulfill the imperial role of maintaining security and minimum order on a world-wide basis. How can we divest ourselves of part of this role without seeming to incur a defeat in the traditional concepts of international politics? How can we get down from the tiger?

At the same time, we are faced with the difficult problem of making clear implicitly, if not explicitly, just how much of our role we are prepared to relinquish. The residual position of the United States, even were a low posture position to be ruthlessly implemented, will still be of vast proportions. If the credibility of this continuing commitment is called into doubt, the risks could be enormous—much as happened in Korea in 1950.

Substantial dangers of misapplication by us and misinterpretation by others will be a constant part of the policy environment. Indeed, a low posture policy does not mean a policy of low risk. By relinquishing control of events to others, we will lose some of our ability to alter the outcome of developing situations. Although this should be offset by a smaller US stake in the outcome, our nerves are likely to undergo quite a bit of strain as we allow the interplay of countervailing international forces to replace our unilateral role.

The move toward a low posture in US policy has been generally accepted by our fellow actors on the

### THOMAS P. THORNTON

*Mr. Thornton has been a member of the Planning and Coordination Staff since 1969; for five years prior to that he was chief of the South Asia Division in INR and in the mid-1950s served with USIA in India. In addition to his work in the Department, he teaches political science at American University and is the author or editor of a number of books and articles on political and linguistic subjects. (He will not admit to having published previously in the JOURNAL.)*

international stage, but their acceptance has resulted in no small part from the lack of specifics in the Nixon Doctrine. A little wishful thinking can go a long way in estimating the impact that a change in US policy will have. We must expect that our allies will seek to avoid doing many of the jobs that must ultimately fall to them. Few will willingly take over costly and unpleasant duties that we have performed previously, and we shall sometimes have to play the role of a drill sergeant in calling for "volunteers." Having gotten our volunteers, however, it will be hard to restrain ourselves when our allies do not do their job the way we would do it and may even seem to be failing. The temptation to retrieve deteriorating situations—to intervene "just a little bit" to save a country from its own shortcomings—will be great. But we must, as a senior administration official recently said, get over the idea that the security and development of other countries are more important to us than to the countries themselves.

Further, we must accept the fact that when others take over responsibilities from us, they will also expect to take over such benefits as we may have derived. This is particularly likely to happen as the Europeans move out into the Mediterranean region and the Japanese into Southeast Asia. When we turn over much of our security role in these areas (and the question is only when, not whether), we must expect Europe and Japan to reap the commercial benefits. European community members, for instance, will hardly pay much attention to our protests over their preferential trade agreements with Tunisia, Greece or Israel, if we are simultaneously pressing them to assume our security role in the Mediterranean.

All aspects of our foreign policy will have to be reviewed in the light of our low posture policy. This was done of course in the President's foreign policy report to Congress, but the treatment there was necessarily very generalized. We have only begun the necessary study for a general application of the policy and our coverage has been very uneven in terms of the various areas of the world.

The Nixon Doctrine was originally enunciated for Southeast Asia and has received its principal elaboration there. But even the Vietnamization program—the first fruit of the Doctrine—has not met its critical test. The program has proceeded thus far under the wing of a large American military presence. The critical point, both for the program and for our steadfastness, will come when Saigon



must rely predominantly on its own resources. Whether we have yet to meet the test in Cambodia or have already failed it depends on whether the May incursion turns out to have been a spill-over of the Vietnamization program or a coup to relieve the pressure on Lon Nol.

While in Southeast Asia the outlines of some basic questions are emerging, only the barest beginning has been made in Europe with Congressional pressure for troop reductions, proposals for Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, support of the Brandt initiatives toward Eastern Europe and other still more modest steps. It is in Europe, however, that the low posture policy will meet its severest test: no individual part of that policy will be more difficult and beset by doubt than withdrawal of all but a symbolic United States military presence in Europe. This may (and should) be still a good way off, but Europe in some form or other will ultimately have to move to a real third force role from the "second-and-a-half"

position it now holds. In terms of international stability it may be better that an intermediate force emerge to separate the United States and the Soviet Union, rather than perpetuate a dangerous bi-polar confrontation in Central Europe. It will be hard and occasionally nerve-racking, however, to observe the end of the "American hour" in European history and of the hopes for an Atlantic Community that slipped from our grasp in the 1950s. A carefully managed low-posture policy will be necessary to ensure that the decline in our political and security function is not paralleled by declines in our economic and cultural roles. Our relationships with Europe in the last decades of this century will be much different from those we anticipated a decade or so ago, but they could be equally fruitful if we manage them realistically.

Looking further, the outlines are still hazier. Our low posture policy in Africa is part heritage from previous years and part accident. It may or may not be adequate for today, but

we need to re-examine it closely to ensure that it fits into our changing world-wide role. Relative inactivity is not the only or necessarily the best manifestation of a low posture. In Latin America, because of our proximity and long history of involvement, a sensible low posture will likely be something quite different from what we will be doing in Africa or even Asia. Latin America will probably not emerge as a third or fourth force; its future will remain closely interlocked with ours. The exuberance of the early years of the *Alianza* will certainly not provide a model for the future, however—even less so the paternalistic approach of previous days. Our ability to devise a posture low enough to be acceptable in a climate of rising nationalism, but strong enough to guard our interests and promote progress throughout the Hemisphere may be the most challenging task for our policy in the next years.

Dealing with the Soviet Union poses a different kind of problem. The "negotiation rather than confrontation" aspect of the Nixon Doctrine can be associated with the low posture policy (and to some extent springs from the same sources); but a "low posture" vis-à-vis Moscow in the sense that we have been using the term is not immediately a feasible option. In our bi-lateral relationships, a low posture policy is only possible to the extent that the Soviets reciprocate (SALT, Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction), and this can only be the result of hard negotiation backed by adequate military strength.

To the extent that Moscow is either actually or potentially an element in nearly all of our foreign policy, however, a general low posture policy will be indirectly relevant to our relationship with the Soviet Union. Our ability to lower our posture in the Middle East, for example, is restricted by the danger that the USSR might move in to fill the ensuing vacuum to our detriment. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, we probably have greater freedom to reduce our presence in the expectation that the Soviet Union will assume a larger part of the burden of offsetting Chinese influence. (This has already happened in Pakistan.) Indeed, in pursuit of a low posture policy in Southeast Asia, we may

want to urge such countries as Thailand and Cambodia to strengthen their ties with Moscow.

Also, Europe's resumption of its traditional role as defender of the Eastern marches against Russian expansion will perhaps permit us to lower the temperature of our relationship with Moscow. As we have noted above, this is certainly many years off; it is, however, a goal worth working towards and the moves that we make in pursuit of it should in themselves be useful in rationalizing our policy towards both the USSR and Europe.

The generalizations in which these problems have been posed indicate the long way still ahead of this country in bringing its policies into accord with realities. And the list could be extended considerably. (What, for instance, about China?) The Nixon Doctrine is, of course, only a year old and major policy shifts in a responsible, democratic country take time. Even so, we of the foreign policy community have been unduly slow in coming to terms with the Nixon Doctrine and must make up for lost time.

In setting about our task we have to avoid two extremes: ignoring or paying only lip service to the fact of change at home and abroad on the comfortable assumption that this, too, will pass away; and an exaggerated response that seizes on the new policy departures as yet another fad to be pursued with unthinking exuberance.

Thus far, at least, the first of these has been more characteristic of the community's response. But this is not really a choice open to us. The Nixon Doctrine is not just another brave new slogan of the type that American politicians feel they must offer. The facts of life give the United States only the choice of adapting our foreign policy constructively on our own terms, or accommodating ourselves to conditions imposed on us—at best by the force of circumstances and at worst by our rivals.

The immediate task is an organized and sober rethinking of where we have gone too far, where others can and should do more, and how we can employ our resources in a more cost-effective manner—in sum, the reappraisal of our interests, capabilities and commitments that

President Nixon has called for. Beyond that lie the thorny problems of providing guidance to our military and economic assistance and information programs, determining levels of reporting and of personnel, and working out the many detailed positions needed to shift a course of policy.

These are not just routine mechanical chores. Despite its virtues, the Nixon Doctrine does not provide immediately useful guidance for most of the questions that we will face. It is not a blueprint (not even a "broad-brush blueprint" as one Department officer recently described it with intriguing imagery). This may be disappointing to those who want a plan that tells where each nut and bolt must be placed and relieves the craftsman of responsibility for any broader concept. But blueprints in foreign policy are not really very useful. They are too rigid to be adapted to changing situations (e.g. the downfall of the containment theory in its extreme form) and their publication makes life too easy for opponents who are building a counterstrategy. Since a low posture foreign policy is difficult to implement and the Nixon Doctrine points only in a general direction, the scope for ambiguity and misunderstanding—but also for creative application—is very great.

We said that there was no real question whether or not a low posture policy would be applied—just concerning the terms on which it would be imposed. In a narrower sense, this means that the choice is whether leadership in elaborating an effective new policy will repose in the Foreign and Departmental service, or drift still further adown Pennsylvania Avenue. We need only look around to see that the mechanics of the foreign policy business are changing markedly. The BALPA and OPRED programs have reversed the trend of growth in the foreign policy establishment; only a trickle of recruits is entering the FSO ranks while FSR and GS appointments have virtually stopped; the flood of reporting airgrams has ebbed. AID appropriations have shrunk drastically and there is every sign at present writing that there will simply be no Foreign Military Sales appropriation this year. We do appear to be entering

an era of "foreign policy without tools."

Much of the decline in the Department's influence since World War II has been ascribed to the fact that we were not a resource-dispensing agency. Country teams and Interdepartmental Groups notwithstanding, the Department has been reduced to the role of one voice among many, often having less faith in its own product—diplomacy in the broadest sense—than in the resources of AID and Defense as the substance of international relations.

What we have lost in the past years will certainly not be handed back to us on a pewter (hardly silver!) platter. The ultimate control of foreign policy will and probably must remain within the National Security Council framework. Our colleagues in DOD will continue to play a strong role as will the successors to AID. Private business will continue to be the most significant element of the American presence in most parts of the world. The opportunity that we have is to provide the political rationale and guidance for this reduced but continuing effort—to reassert the primacy that should accrue to the diplomatic establishment at a time when diplomacy is again becoming the coin of the realm in our international relations.

The reader will probably come away with the impression that the author has strong feelings about the direction of United States foreign policy. He has and he realizes that they are controversial. I am therefore indebted to the Editorial Board of the JOURNAL for opening their pages to this discussion, and to the contributors whom I have asked to examine the topic from their varying points of view. It has been our joint objective to point out some of the opportunities and problems inherent in the Nixon Doctrine (and there are plenty of both) and to articulate some of the problems that all of us face in going about the business of foreign policy. We, too, have not sought to provide a blueprint. We hope, however, to have raised some of the right questions and stimulated a useful response from our readers who, by and large, will be charged with the task of bringing to life the most important and compelling foreign policy ideas that has come along in some two decades. ■

What are the implications and what will be the impact of a low posture foreign policy for the United States?

## A Perspective from Asia

**T**HE exact nature of the term "low posture" defies definition. Although its nature may become quite clear when applied to a particular place and time, it is quite difficult to generalize with any precision. It involves both substance and style. It implies real power without desire to dominate and hence the careful marshaling and application of limited resources. Together with the Nixon Doctrine, enunciated in a background news conference by the President on Guam, July 25, 1969, it marks a significant stage in the evolution of our foreign policy which has passed from observer status in world affairs to world policeman, and now seeks a less ambitious but still very significant role.

There is no doubt that our nation is passing through a period of self-doubt and finds it difficult to stay a steady course in foreign affairs against the heavy winds of criticism and self-criticism. But our people frequently overlook the fact that a policy may be right even though it runs into difficulty and crisis. It may be proof that the policy is very much right indeed and that therefore its opponents find it necessary to make a greater effort to defeat it. The widespread idea that a good and correct policy will automatically find the agreement and applause of all men is based on the charming illusion that all men and governments are basically reasonable (i.e., following our pattern of reasoning) and rational-

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istic. These and similar illusions belong in the realm of political science fiction and ought to have no place in the appraisal of diplomatic moves. Nevertheless, they persist in popular folklore.

This is not the first time in our history that men frequently of eminently good will have succumbed to the illusion that all other men are similarly well intentioned and that if only government and especially the State Department would get out of the way, all would be well. Alas, there is no evidence to support this dream. This is still a highly unsafe world and such events as Czechoslovakia should give some pause to those who believe in the early triumph of good will. Nor is there any assurance or likelihood even that men and nations will find it easy to agree as to what does constitute fair and reasonable conduct. This is well illustrated by the explosive Middle Eastern dispute in which a life-long Zionist leader, Dr. Nahum Goldmann, in a recent article, quoted Israel's founder and



first president, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, to the effect that the conflict between Israelis and Arabs was not a conflict between right and wrong but between right and right.

Our national self-doubt and national breast-beating are further increased by the onslaught of revisionist historians, many of whom find nothing but the basest and most contemptible of motives in some of the brightest pages of our recent diplomatic history, and by the simplistic views of some of the more articulate and militant young generation who demand instant utopia and find little room for diplomacy in their beautiful dreams of all-embracing peace and love through direct people-to-people communication. Others, normally possessed of more balanced views and wiser judgment, have perhaps only recently discovered the depth of our racial problems, the difficulties of our cities, and the dangers in the decline of our environment. Some of them would like to turn inwards, feeling that we cannot car-

ry so great a foreign burden when our own country demands so much of our resources and our attention.

The wise and amazingly farseeing men who created the American Constitutional system had no illusions about the baser aspects of human nature, the predatory instincts residing in men and the divergencies of views existing within society. They therefore created the admirable system of "checks and balances" so that no power could go too far and so that "power could check power." That principle of "checks and balances" applied to the international system spells "balance of power," the presence and the use of power to check other powers which might go too far.

It follows that, even though we are no longer in the age of Kennedy's brilliant inaugural rhetoric, we are far more aware of our own limitations. We are well beyond what Charles Burton Marshall has called the "illusions of American omnipotence"—that the American presence and power are still essential in order that "power may balance power," all the more so as few countries are capable of exercising such a role. I take it as axiomatically proven that the ad hoc agglomeration of powers arising occasionally under the aegis of "collective security," under the United Nations or other comparable arrangements, is able to function only under the rarest circumstances and never when the big powers are arraigned on opposite sides of a conflict.

It should be underscored, however, that "power to balance power" in the international arena does not necessarily have to be predominant power especially where the situation is more than bipolar. It is in the skillful use of significant but not predominant power that there lies one of the most important arguments for a "low posture." It is, of course, particularly applicable where the countries concerned are determined to help themselves and desire our presence.

How does US low posture in Asia look from the aspect of future relations between the USA and the Soviet Union? The USSR has come a long way since the time after World War I when, regarded as a pariah, it joined another pariah,

Germany, to astonish the world with the Treaty of Rapallo. Yet it was only after World War II that the Soviet Union moved to the front ranks of power. Now both on strategic but even more on doctrinal grounds, the USA is to the Soviet leadership the rival incarnate, hated and admired at the same time. To the Soviet leaders and thinkers, the United States represents the most advanced form of the capitalistic system. Therefore it is "logical" to them, that is, dialectically irrefutable, that the USA must seek the overthrow of the "socialist camp" and evidence to the contrary is dismissed as propaganda and smokescreen. Much Soviet thinking can be summarized in the formula "what must be, is."

The theory of the "two camps" being inevitably hostile still remains basic Soviet dogma. There is no room in this concept for such things as good will or generosity except on a *quid pro quo* basis in the form of temporary technical adjustments. Yet while the USA appears as the principal enemy in doctrine, it also constitutes a country whose achievements are most to be emulated. "To catch up with and surpass the USA" has been the clarion call of the Soviet leadership from Stalin to Khrushchcv to Brezhnev and Kosygin.

The destruction of the principal capitalistic enemy by frontal assault, or at any rate outright confrontation, has been made highly risky by nuclear weapons and the USA's consistent superiority therein. However, Communist doctrine still requires pressure on all fronts and the seeking out and winning of secondary targets and objectives through "wars of liberation" and the exploitation of targets of opportunities such as are present in the Middle East. Thus the essence of the classical Soviet strategy is based on the assumption of a bipolar world with a straight-line conflict between the two poles, the "capitalist" and the "socialist," whose result must be that any gain of Soviet power would lead to a diminution of the USA and that any weakening of American power would inevitably result in the enhancement of Soviet influence.

For a while, events seemed to justify the Communist theory. After

Moscow had been stopped in Europe by the Marshall Plan and NATO, it made inroads elsewhere while events in Europe weakened NATO. The Russians were able to exploit their target of opportunity that the Western, and especially the American, vacuum created in the Middle East, while American power became heavily engaged and seemingly bogged down in Vietnam.

Nonetheless the Russians do not seem to feel confident that things are simply going swimmingly for them. The reason might be that the Soviet leadership is beginning to realize that this is no longer a bipolar world. China's direct challenge to the Soviet Union is here to stay especially now that China has developed nuclear weapons. Further, both Peking's doctrinal challenge to Moscow and its vast territorial claims constitute objectively (a favorite Marxist expression) a far greater menace to the USSR than America's now well-contained power in Asia. To this comes also the discovery that the radicalized youth of the world is quite capable of running quickly through the official revolutionary doctrine of Moscow to arrive at Chairman Mao's "Little Red Book." And it is also obvious now that the youthful revolutionary militants direct their ire as much against the Soviet Union and the Communist party's entrenched bureaucracies as against America.

The Soviet Union is now among the "beati possidentes," a well-established major power, unwilling to give up any of its positions and, despite its claim to being "the homeland of the revolution" it is now in danger of losing out as a result of revolution and instability in the world. The logic of the present and foreseeable power relationships in Asia (outside the Middle East) should therefore drive the Soviet leaders to this conclusion: while a predominant role of the United States in Asia can certainly not be in the Soviet interest, the disappearance of the American presence or even its very material reduction is likely to favor China rather than Russia and hence would weaken the Soviet position in the area of its greatest challenge.

Of course, this is not the whole story. Soviet policy follows the twin

goals not only of increasing or at least maintaining its power positions in the world, but also of holding its leadership in the "socialist camp" and winning support among the "revolutionary movements" around the world. From the latter point of view, any appearance of Soviet-American collaboration or any suggestion that the Soviet leaders are lacking in fervor for the "anti-imperialist struggle" would obviously be awkward.

Nevertheless, the history of Soviet foreign relations, especially in the last two decades or so, has clearly indicated that whenever the Soviet leaders are forced into a choice between their security interests and their political-ideological positions, they are likely to opt for the former. This is, of course, an evolutionary process and not always clear cut. As long as the United States forces are heavily engaged in Vietnam, it will be quite difficult for the USSR to execute a visible policy shift. Nor would it be much easier for the USSR to make such changes, even after an American withdrawal, as long as Vietnam appears as nothing more than an outpost of American foreign policy, a "satellite" as the Russians would understand it.

But suppose Vietnamization were to become sufficiently successful, not only to prevent a takeover by Hanoi, but also to give Vietnam an appreciable measure of independence even from the United States. Then it is conceivable that Moscow might cautiously reexamine its future relations with Saigon, just as it has already given some highly cautious and tentative indications of some interest in contacts with Taiwan.

The indication grows that most Asian countries are quite well aware of the importance of a continued but low posture American presence. The Foreign Minister of Singapore, who is not particularly pro-American, stated this quite clearly in a recent, much-noticed statement. Many Asian observers are concluding that a triangular big power situation in Asia, USA-USSR-China, presents greater safety features for their continued independence than a bipolar situation, USSR-China, in which the Russians are not even likely to remain pre-

dominant over the long run. This is likely to remain correct as long as other nations are unwilling or unable to play this kind of a role.

Japan is only very slowly and cautiously moving toward a role of political importance in Asia, although increasingly able to do so, being handicapped by the memories of a not-so-distant past and by considerable internal opposition. India, the only other Asian country of appropriate potential, has too many internal problems to envisage, in the near future, a role of strong leadership in international affairs. Certainly since the disappearance of the charismatic personality of Nehru, India's foreign policy has not been marked by strong initiatives. Thus, the argument remains for a strong, though not dominant—in other words low postured—American presence in Asia.

How does this situation look from the aspect of future relations between the USA and Mainland China? Obviously, the Chinese leaders cannot be expected to welcome an American presence, whatever its posture. But the low posture might at least make some contribution toward convincing the Chinese that the American presence does not constitute an active challenge to China's security. Still, it is liable to impede China's expansion and therefore the strengthening of its position in a future contest with the Soviet Union. This is somewhat troublesome because it is not in our interests to increase the seemingly implacable hostility which the Chinese leaders profess towards America. Nor should we contribute to the already sufficiently well-developed xenophobic tendencies of China by trying to keep that colossus isolated from the rest of the world. Moreover, if we were to give strong support to the Soviet side in the Sino-Soviet dispute, it might even encourage dangerous Soviet adventurism.

But, on the other hand, prospects for a significant improvement of Sino-American relations appear, at best, quite long range, as Communist China remains firmly in Maoist hands. It shows little interest in recognition by the United States or in being seated in the United Nations, and is therefore unlikely to

change its conduct to bring either one about. Hence our China options are exceedingly limited.

There is still an argument in favor of preparing for the possibility of some distant improvement of relations, perhaps in the economic and cultural fields. And there is, of course, every argument in favor of maintaining such fragile contacts as do exist, especially the Warsaw Talks, and enlarging them to the extent that the Chinese are willing to do so. Over time, who knows, the Chinese may discover that the Russians are not the only ones who might on occasion play "the American card" or hint at the existence of such a card. But to do so the Chinese would have to accept the fact that Asia is not soon going to fall into their hands, and to admit that they would have to modify some of their arrogance and superiority complexes which are a great deal older in China than the Communist regime. Still, a carefully apportioned and reasonably low posture in our Asian presence ought to prevent unnecessary and dangerous hysteria on the part of Mainland China and should not contribute to the already well-developed "siege psychology" of Peking.

From the foregoing, I would conclude that a significant low-postured American presence in Asia is essential for the preservation of peace, for the defense of the independence, especially of smaller countries, and in the long run, is in the interest of Soviet-American relations as well. It is doubtful that a significant American presence in Asia will enhance Sino-American relations in the short run, but neither I believe would anything else, including our withdrawal.

In the long run, the future leaders of Mainland China hopefully would accept the fact of America's presence to consider it in their interests to establish gradually some more pervasive relations. To the extent that anything could contribute to such an evolution, a "low posture" should.

It is important to underscore that a policy of "low posture" does not mean self-effacement or withdrawal. It means a carefully balanced and harmonized combination of real presence and exceedingly careful and skillful style. It also

means that we should manage our limited resources in such a way as to give us maximum control and flexibility. Strict policy control in their application should be maintained. From this I come to the following operational conclusions:

● It would seem highly desirable that the United States retain a high degree of operational control over its economic aid and technical assistance programs in order to use them to maximum advantage. I am therefore constrained to say that I question seriously the apparent enthusiasm for the headlong rush into multilateralism found in the Peterson Report. Undoubtedly, a case can be made for our stronger participation in the program of international and multilateral organizations, but in Asia, at any rate, I see much room for retaining strong bilateral programs. By the same logic I would hope for greater policy control of aid programs both in the field and in Washington, which also raises some questions about the organizational proposals of the Peterson Report. Although I am making this proposal primarily in view to strengthen American policy, it is also my view that this constitutes sound management as well. It is significant that the Jackson Report criticizes UN development programs precisely for the lack of field control and coordination.

● The political implications and objectives of our assistance programs should be clarified. There is considerable confusion on this score even in certain branches of the US Government, where "political" is often interpreted as a form of "pay off" or an attempt at "buying friends." It is nothing of the kind. It does mean greater selectivity of projects and areas of aid impact and that the furtherance of political objectives, well beyond Title IX of the Foreign Assistance Act, should be recognized as an important objective. It is, of course, quite true that economic and technical assistance does not in itself give a great deal of political leverage.

The often heard truculent position of some of our fellow citizens that we should "tell this or that government to do such and such or withdraw aid" is totally ineffectual and every practitioner of the art

knows the miserable results of such heavy handed pressure. But we still have some influence which, with skill and patience, can be usefully employed. Of course, we will have more leverage with our programs if we administer them with both a wise and a firm hand.

It would be useful if certain recipient countries were brought to accept the fact that our assistance under certain circumstances, might be stopped. An excessively permissive attitude in the face of disparagement and hostility by the host government can be counterproductive. However the rationale of drastic action on our part must be examined in each case, and there certainly are circumstances under which a great deal of patience and forbearance is justified.

But this is not always necessarily so. It is, of course, true that our overall aim in giving economic aid is to support the long-range stability, self-reliance and self-confidence of developing countries and such aims could be undermined by overemphasis on short-range political goals. A wise mix of both factors would therefore be necessary, but to that end firm policy control should lie primarily with the Ambassador in the field and with the Assistant Secretary of State for the geographical area in the Department of State, subject to review by higher levels.

● Our determination to withdraw militarily from Vietnam notwithstanding, the continued strength of our military position in Asia must be an important consideration. Even though we are planning to reduce our military presence elsewhere, too rapid dismantling of our military strength has rarely served either our national purposes or peace. A low posture is nevertheless posture, not non-posture.

● Combat troops and eventually other military forces must be withdrawn from Vietnam without undue humiliation. If we believe that our interest is to play a significant role in Asia, we cannot expect to do so even with the lowest of postures and the greatest of skill if we simply cut and run. I have attempted to show above that a significant American presence in Asia is a necessity for the preserva-

tion of peace and the protection of the independence especially of less powerful Asian countries. Any significant diminution of our prestige and the reliance which may be placed on our ability and will to carry out obligations, would be counterproductive. It is important to underline that this consideration does not merely apply to Southeast Asia, the area in Vietnam affected by events in Vietnam, but throughout many vaster regions of non-Communist Asia.

● A low posture and low visibility means that great attention should be paid to the number of visible Americans in Asia. This has obvious implications not only regarding our military deployment but also with regard to the type and nature of both our AID and Peace Corps programs.

The application of the fairly subtle "Nixon Doctrine" and its tactical corollary, the "low posture" make it especially important that their implications are better understood by the American public. It should be the task of men of knowledge and judgment in the field of international relations, whether in or out of government, to explain patiently and persistently certain truths about foreign affairs. One of these is that in a disparate, unevenly developed world of many political systems, the likelihood is highly remote that diplomacy will be replaced by some sort of people-to-people type of inter-personal relationship. Another is that in this unsafe world the road to greater peace can be achieved only through diplomacy and that diplomacy is not an exercise in rhetoric or the sudden flashes of debating skill. It is the careful, judicious and responsible use of power and influence for positive aims, or in the succinct words ascribed to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, "the aim of diplomacy is not to win arguments but to win objectives." Further, because the adjustment of differences is difficult and slow even within one political entity, it is bound to be even more so when the task is one of adjusting differences between so many different diverse and divergent entities. Therefore, the quest for instant solutions, so audible in the quasi-revolutionary rhetoric of our day, is a great illusion. ■

The world is puzzling about America; is it really on the brink of civil war, or is it a noisy boisterous continent well into the "technetronic age?"

## Implications of a Foreign Policy of Restraint

**I**N the twenty years following World War II, Americans witnessed a revolutionary discontinuity in their historic foreign policy tradition of restraint and isolation. Conceived in the notion that only Washington could support a tenuous world order threatened by militant Communism, and dedicated to the proposition that American national power should be built and committed to a stable world of independent nations, the "new foreign policy" was dramatically interventionist and active.

That a nearly two hundred year old democratic government of checks and balances, evolved in continental insularity, could have been transformed to sustain the "new Rome" in the course of less than one generation was remarkable. Equally surprising was the doctrinal ingenuity of a government fancied to be naive in world politics. From Marshall Plan and Truman Doctrine to Massive Retaliation, Counter-Insurgency and Flexible Response, successive American governments mobilized national resources for the tasks of containment, deterrence and world development.

At the heart of American power was the rapid development of a new set of global governmental instruments—the world's most formidable military force, world-wide propaganda and intelligence operations, peacetime alliance systems and far-flung economic undertakings. To generate these instruments, the American domestic society had to be changed, both in the physical sense—the military-industrial complex, anti-Communist pub-

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lic opinion, higher rates of government taxation and spending—but also in the organization of power in the foreign policy decision-making process.

Congressmen might deplore the secrecy attached to operations of the CIA and condemn its operations in retrospect, but the new American global posture required such operations. Similarly, diplomats continue to deplore the fact of the State Department's weak voice in the shouting matches of the foreign policy process. But they must admit that the large number of new elements in American foreign policy imply a larger number of bureaucratic managers. In a government in which checks and balances apply within the executive as well as between the branches of government, coordination in foreign policy is possible only from 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The new diplomacy brought into being, therefore, a new Washington.

With bipartisan Congressional support and public acquiescence, the new Washington foreign policy managers were successful as they undertook to restore the European nation-state model of international relations that had been shattered by the inter-war and World War II developments. Containment and deterrence worked against a USSR

preoccupied with reconstruction and a China rent by revolution. Massive aid, along with creative monetary and trade policy, helped set Third World governments on the path to non-communist evolution. While the design of this American strategy was conservationist and the conditions for its success relatively favorable, it must nonetheless be judged a creative and wholly underrecognized achievement.

*A World Restored, and then? . . .*

The twenty year American restoration of the world system is over. Deterrence was effective because America was a militarily hegemonous, status quo, power; containment succeeded because the USSR had neither the appeal nor the capacity to seize opportunities that the United States pre-empted. In 1970, however, US-USSR strategic relationships are those of near parity and the Soviet Union is now a global actor in world politics.

The international economy has boomed beyond the capacity of any nation or group of nations to patronize it, with the dollar and the pound under pressure from vigorous continental and Japanese currencies. Reduced economic assistance, tied to high cost donor-country supply restrictions, and under domestic criticism, has been subject to the relentless counter-attack of population growth in the developing countries. The risks and costs of active interventionism have increased appreciably.

The national security bureaucracy of Washington, however, has not

*(Continued on page 37)*



## GENERAL BUSINESS MEETING

### Exclusive Recognition—E.O. 11491

AFSA's Board of Directors has recommended that it seek exclusive recognition under Executive Order 11491 on Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service to represent all employees covered by the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, and by PL 90-494 that established the Foreign Service Information Officer category.

The recommendation was made at the General Business Meeting of the Board, attended by Washington AFSA members, on September 23. The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club took a similar and strong stand in a paper distributed at the meeting.

The Board's recommendation will soon be put to a vote by AFSA members. A circular will explain the rationale for the Board's analysis of the order.

### Amendments to By-laws

At the meeting, JFSOC also proposed four amendments to AFSA's By-Laws. One deals with the purposes and objectives of the association. Another centers on open meetings of the Board, and a third concerns the election of the Board. The Board supports these three proposed amendments. The fourth, affecting the powers of the Board, is supported in spirit by the Board, which offered an alternative. Following a lively and detailed discussion of these proposed amendments it was voted that they would be submitted to the entire membership for its vote.

### President's Remarks

AFSA President Theodore Eliot opened the meeting by pointing out progress made in the past ten months for the membership, especially in benefits and allowances. He said that the Board would hold regular open meetings of the Washington membership. Mr. Eliot also pointed out that communication with overseas membership is being bolstered

and a program to gain support for AFSA and the foreign services with logical constituencies in the country is under way.

Although expressing some reservation about the Association's seeking exclusive recognition, Mr. Eliot said that "I would rather be represented by AFSA, an organization with proven concern for those in foreign affairs, than by the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE)."

### Report of the Secretary-Treasurer

William G. Bradford, Secretary-Treasurer, gave a brief report of the Association's finances. He stated that while we were solvent we were not by any means wealthy. He pointed out that the membership drive was falling short of our goal and unless it picked up this month it would be necessary to reduce expenses to the level of our current rather than estimated income.

(The audited financial report for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1970 is summarized elsewhere in the AFSA News.)

### Summary Analysis of E.O. 11491

Board Member Donald Easum presented the Board's analysis and recommendations concerning E.O. 11491. These are the highlights.

Unionization of federal employees has jumped from 19,000 in 1962 to 1.4 million today. This is more than half of the federal work force subject to the new order. Exclusive recognition now covers a fourth to a third of all salaried employees. The implications for the foreign services of State, AID and USIA are obvious.

"Exclusive recognition" means that an organization so recognized under the E.O. becomes the exclusive representative before management on behalf of all employees in the unit.

Already the AFGE, an AFL-CIO affiliate, is vigorously seeking to become the exclusive bargaining agent for civil and foreign service employ-

ees of State, AID and USIA. If successful, this would mean that the foreign affairs community (some 15,000 people) would be only another constituent, so to speak, of the 350,000 member AFGE.

Three feasible courses of action the Board faced were:

1) Rely on the hope that as a professional association AFSA might still have some access to management even if management accords exclusive recognition to someone else;

2) Accept the consultative role provided by the Order for so-called associations of supervisors; or

3) Seek exclusive recognition under the Executive Order.

These are the benefits AFSA could anticipate if it obtains exclusive recognition:

—Establish AFSA as the exclusive representative before management of all employees in the unit;

—Entitle AFSA to act for all such employees and to negotiate for agreements with management covering these employees;

—Management would be obliged to invite and accept AFSA representation at formal discussions on personnel matters and general working conditions. AFSA's access to management is at present excellent. It has not always been so, however. Exclusive Recognition would assure not only that the door to management would always be open in the future, but that management would be obliged to consult and negotiate with AFSA on AFSA recommendations and proposals. AFSA's role as an agent of constructive change in the Foreign Service would be immeasurably strengthened.

Mr. Easum said that in seeking exclusive recognition under the Executive Order, AFSA is not changing its character or its purposes. Neither is it shifting its emphasis from professional to strictly employee relations objectives.

Following Mr. Easum's presentation there was considerable discussion by members.

## Open Letter to Foreign Service Staff Corps Colleagues

More Action by AFSA

In Charlie Bray's letter to Mr. Macomber on Staff Corps morale which appeared in the **AFSA News**, he mentioned the formation of a study group to consider matters of interest to the Staff Corps. This group is the Staff Corps Advisory Committee and is composed of experienced Foreign Service Staff Corps members representing State, AID, and USIA. Under the chairmanship of Barbara Good, the Staff Corps representative on AFSA's Board of Directors, the Advisory Committee informs the Board of Staff Corps problems and recommends solutions to these problems.

The Committee's major concern at the present time is to determine how implementation of the Task Force recommendations will affect the future of the Staff Corps. Since Task Force reports did not focus on the specific problems of the Staff Corps, there is much uncertainty and apprehension as to the future of the Staff Corps.

The Committee is presently seeking answers to some of the questions raised by the Task Force reports. For example: Who will remain staff? Who will be asked to convert to FSO and FSRU? How will conversion be accomplished? Will conversion be voluntary or mandatory? What are the advantages and disadvantages of conversion? How broad will the FSRU category be? How will the Mustang program actually be administered? And who will be eligible? The Committee is compiling the list of questions for presentation to the Administration.

The Staff Corps will be informed of the Committee's activities through the new column in **AFSA News** in the **Foreign Service Journal**.

Before the Committee can make concrete suggestions on career related problems facing the Staff Corps, it must know what the administration's plans are for the Staff Corps of the Seventies.

The Committee has drafted a report which deals with some of the long standing problems familiar to the Staff Corps such as overtime payment, duty-free entry, training, etc. (See **AFSA News** coverage of Charlie Bray's letter to Mr. Macomber for full details).

If AFSA is to be really effective, two things are required from the Staff Corps at large: First, your membership and support are needed. This point has been made repeatedly in both the **Journal** and in Barbara Good's Open Letter. Representing the Staff Corps is not an

easy task. It requires time to canvass the membership and with AFSA's limited budget, research and study have been accomplished by volunteers in their spare time. Once a respectable membership is achieved the resultant dues will enable AFSA to engage additional help to work on Staff Corps problems. Secondly, your constructive advice is needed. Everyone in the Staff Corps has pet grievances—some are just plain gripes. But what about the problems that are soluble? Admittedly, in the past there wasn't much opportunity to be heard officially, but now AFSA wants to provide the necessary communications channel. Through membership in AFSA you can express yourself and know that your questions and recommendations are not falling on deaf ears. What is bugging you? The more constructive criticisms and suggestions received, the stronger AFSA's position will be, but documentation is needed now.

The Department and Foreign Service are undergoing a period of reform. The Task Forces recommendations have been made, but other sources are also being given consideration. AFSA initiated this reform and now you have a chance to participate.

Now is the time to join AFSA (or renew your membership if you are already one of the **only 800 Staff Corps members**) and communicate your ideas to Washington. If you do not, you will have no reason to complain if the transformation turns you into a statistic.

**SO OFF YOUR APATHY! JOIN UP  
—SPEAK UP!**

### Our Cover

Our November cover is a scene from Thatta, Pakistan, painted by Ruth Boynton, wife of Dr. Willard Boynton, Deputy Director of the Office of Population, Technical Resources, AID. Mrs. Boynton graduated from the Massachusetts College of Art in Boston and worked as a commercial artist for a time. On moving to Maine she became a member of the Maine water color society and exhibited there and elsewhere in New England and New York. She has taught art in Maine, Saigon, Karachi and Lahore, in addition to participating in one-man and group exhibitions there. She also illustrated a children's book, "Than Hoa of Vietnam," written by Leone Neal Osborne. The Boyntons have five children.

AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot wrote at length to Chiefs of Mission and Principal officers on October 12, urging that steps be taken "to improve the conditions under which our Staff Corps colleagues work and live." He pointed out that AFSA had brought the problem to the attention of Deputy Under Secretary William Macomber. These are the highlights of Mr. Eliot's memorandum.

AFSA's Staff Corps Advisory Committee is recommending action by State, AID, and USIA. Posts can take steps to ease the situation and bolster morale.

The "second-class citizen" complaint is nearly universal among Staff Support personnel. The Staff Corps employee too often receives only minimal courtesies and assistance upon arrival at a post. Staff Corps employees seldom overlap with predecessors, and frequently it is difficult to grant them the administrative leave or the help they need to locate housing and get settled. Government housing is often considered inadequate. Staff Corps employees are often prohibited from importing their automobiles or effects, or in some cases only the Staff Corps employees of one agency are prohibited while this privilege is freely granted to their counterparts in other agency offices.

Lack of consideration and common courtesy from supervisors is a common complaint of the Staff Corps. Junior officers come under special fire for insensitivity and poor supervisory talent that leads to the resignation of some of the best Staff Corps people. There is widespread feeling that Staff Corps employees are treated like automatons, required to work long hours or tiring schedules; that overtime is frequently required but not always necessary, and too frequently uncompensated.

Mr. Eliot asked: "Are your supervisors following a 'golden rule' approach to relations with their subordinates, and are work schedules and classes designed to give adequate opportunity for Staff Corps employees to study the local language?"

Joint discussion with Staff Corps employees at posts might well uncover other problems, and AFSA urged CMs and POs to chair such sessions.

The Tripoli chapter of AFSA has made the reduction of Staff Corps inequities its major objective, and has the full support of the Ambassador.

## TRIPOLI FORMS CHAPTER

Goal is Staff Corps Improvements

Embassy Tripoli has formed an AFSA chapter and has also decided to "concentrate its efforts toward the problems and goals of the Staff Corps," James L. Holmes, president of the new chapter, says.

Ambassador Palmer in his congratulatory letter to Mr. Holmes, said: "I am equally pleased at the decision of the Chapter to concentrate initially on the problems of the Staff Corps, while supporting at the same time the other objectives of AFSA."

Staff Corps complaints that the new chapter will consider and suggest to AFSA ways and means for rectification are:

- Privileges: Payment of customs duties by some FSS, while other FSS and FSOs are exempted. Problem ranges from "irritant" to "major financial hardship."

- Promotions: Lack of consistency in method, juggling of regulations, seemingly arbitrary reductions for budgetary reasons.

- Allowances: Do not cover needs of many posts, discrimination against single persons, based on "grade" rather than "need."

- Efficiency Reports: Entire system a "mess," supervisors lack training in writing efficiency reports.

- Summary: Complaints, uncorrected, produce low morale, low quality and quantity of work, loss of trained personnel. Combined with "real or imagined personal and social slights" contribute to "officer/enlisted" mentality and feeling of second-class citizenship.

### What's the Future of the Staff Corps?

Since the problems of the future of the Staff Corps were assumed, rather than analyzed, by the Task Forces, the Association's Staff Corps Advisory Committee under the chairmanship of Barbara J. Good has been busy studying the Task Force reports and recommendations in order to come up with a list of questions it would like answered by the Administration.

In an earlier Open Letter to the Staff Corps, the goals and problem areas the Committee planned to study were mentioned. Now the big question is: "What is the future of the Staff Corps?" A list of questions has been drawn up for presentation to the Administration by the AFSA Board. These questions must be answered and understood before the committee can make concrete suggestions on career related problems facing the Staff Corps.

AFSA has pledged that it will work with all its strength to solve Staff Corps problems. Its effective, dynamic Staff Corps Committee—composed of experienced Staff Corps personnel representing all agencies—is attacking these problems one by one. And it is getting results. The committee welcomes interest and support from the field such as Tripoli's.

AFSA urges other Chapters to take up this serious problem and submit the views of members and non-members, Staff Corps or other category. FSOs should be taking the lead in submitting recommendations for solutions.

Without the Staff Corps our foreign service programs could not operate. The time for correction is long past due—it is here now.

If a post has no chapter, perhaps Staff Corps and other personnel will organize a meeting to discuss this and other problems that AFSA headquarters should know about and have suggestions for solutions.

Above all, FSS can support a local movement, the Staff Corps Advisory Committee and AFSA by their membership. AFSA will be heard only to the degree that it speaks for the largest number and all categories of people in the foreign affairs community.

The Tripoli Chapter and its goals prove again that AFSA is no longer just "FSO-oriented; it is equally FSS, FSIO, FSR-oriented.

The Committee has prepared a report which focuses on the recurring problems of the Staff Corps such as payment for overtime, duty-free entry, training, the supervisor-subordinate relationship, etc. and Charlie Bray's letter to Mr. Macomber on this subject was published in **AFSA News** for October.

The Committee plans to inform the Staff Corps of its activities through a regular column in future issues of **AFSA News** and to be truly effective and representative, it needs to hear from you its "constituency," the Staff Corps members of AFSA. The Committee looks forward to receiving your constructive criticism and suggestions or recommendations.

Now is the time to unite and speak up through your Committee. If there is no AFSA Chapter at your post why not start one today?

## On the Board of Directors



Thomas M. Tracy was recently elected to the Board of Directors of AFSA. Born in Massachusetts in 1936, Mr. Tracy graduated with a B.A. in political science from Colgate University in 1958. He received his M.A. in history from Stanford University in 1959. A year later he joined the Department and was assigned as a consular officer to Ciudad Juarez. Since then Mr. Tracy has served as cultural exchange officer in New York, consular officer in Birmingham, England, administrative officer in London, desk officer for Ireland, and administrative officer in the Bureau of European Affairs. Now a special assistant in the Executive Secretariat, he also served on the Career Principles Committee of AFSA. Mr. Tracy is married and has a son.

### New Career

After a long career in Government, in which he served as special assistant to Justice Jackson at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials, and, more recently, for many years as senior economic advisor to AID missions in Asia and South America, Dr. Otto H. Korican has taken on the post of Managing Director of the newly established Foreign Service Audio Center. The Center has been organized for the benefit of Hi-Fi enthusiasts in the Foreign Service, to obtain for Foreign Service personnel the best Hi-Fi equipment at substantial discounts from stateside prices, and to act as Information and Consultation Center on all Hi-Fi matters of special interest to officers serving in overseas posts.

### Another 100% AFSA POST

The Consulate General at Nassau joins Embassy Niamey as a 100% AFSA membership post.

The Consul General, Turner B. Shelton, has just been nominated to be Ambassador to Nicaragua.

AFSA MEANS ACTION!!

**JFSOC Corresponds with Director-General Re 0-6 Time in Class**

JFSOC is continuing its dialogue with the Director-General on the problem of time in grade for class 6 officers. In response to our initial letter, the DG referred to statistics indicating that the figures for selection-out of Class 6 officers and for officers in danger of selection out for time in grade this year were lower than those we had cited. We have now replied to this letter, expressing our appreciation for his willingness to discuss this issue with us. We explained the basis for our figures and asked that a special review be undertaken of the class 6 officers presently in their final year in grade to ensure that no officers are lost due to unusual and unfair circumstances. Ideally, we would like to see the time in grade at Class 6 extended to five years. We have also urged that all statistics regarding the personnel system be regularly published in order to alleviate the distrust which inevitably stems from lack of knowledge about the functioning of "the system."

**Births**

GROVE. A son, Mark, born to FSO and Mrs. Brandon Grove, Jr., on September 15, in Washington, D. C.

**Deaths**

EVANS. Allan Evans, former Deputy Director for Research in INR, died August 22 in Palo Alto, California. Dr. Evans, who received his Ph.D.

in History from Harvard, served as chief of OSS research in London during WWII. He joined the Department in 1946, serving as director of the Office of Intelligence Research and, from 1961 to 1969, as Deputy Director for Research in INR. He was awarded the War Department's Medal of Freedom, and in 1958 was named the Department's Civil Servant of the Year. In 1964, he was awarded a Distinguished Honor Award by the Department. Dr. Evans is survived by his wife, Marjorie, of 1481 Pitman Avenue, Palo Alto, California.

BALTHASER. Dorothy Balthaser, wife of Robert M. Balthaser, FSO-retired, died on October 11, in Washington. She is survived by her husband of 3412 Glean eagles Drive, Silver Spring, two daughters, two sisters and two brothers.

BOUCHAL. John L. Bouchal, FSO-retired, died on August 1 in Wilber, Nebraska. Mr. Bouchal entered the Foreign Service in 1912, served at Prague, Port Said, Helsingfors and as consul at Montreal before his retirement in 1935.

DREW. Gerald A. Drew, Ambassador-retired, died on September 27 in Lewes, Delaware. Ambassador Drew entered the Foreign Service in 1927 and served at Para, Port-au-Prince, San Jose, Guatemala, Tegucigalpa, San Salvador, Quito, Paris and Budapest. He was appointed Ambassador to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, then to Bolivia and to Haiti.

In 1960 he was named inspector general of the Foreign Service. He retired in 1962. He is survived by his wife of 70 Henlopen Avenue, Rehoboth Beach, Delaware, and three daughters, Mrs. Robert DuBose and Mrs. Drew Wilkinson of Washington, and Mrs. Norman Sweet of Saigon.

KING. Frank Lamar King, former news editor and program coordinator for VOA's Africa division, died on October 6, in Washington. During his 28 years in government service Mr. King worked for the Department of State, ECA and USIA. He retired this year. He is survived by his wife of 609 Ambassador Lane, Holmes Beach, Florida, and four daughters.

REED. George L. Reed, FSR-retired, died August 11 in Kensington, Md. After 10 years with the US Public Housing Authority, Mr. Reed joined the Foreign Service as housing attache in London. He next served in Greece where he was decorated by King Paul for his service to Greek refugees. Mr. Reed also served in Puerto Rico, the Dominican Republic, and was a housing consultant to the World Bank, the UN, and AID. Mr. Reed is survived by his wife, Mrs. Reese Reed of 9804 Kensington Parkway, Kensington, Md., and by two children and five grandchildren.

SPIKER. Clarence J. Spiker, FSO-retired, died on September 25 in Warsaw, Virginia. Mr. Spiker entered the Foreign Service as a student interpreter in China in 1914. He served at Shanghai, Peking, Chungking, Swatow, Nanking and Peiping before his retirement in 1948. He is survived by a brother, Carlisle T. Spiker, Sr., Route 1, Warsaw, Virginia and a sister, Mrs. R. W. Woodward of West Hartford, Conn.

THORESEN. Mrs. Musedorah W. Thoresen, FSO-retired, died on October 1 in a fire at her home in Washington. Mrs. Thoresen joined the Department of State in 1937 and served in Hamburg, Manila and New Delhi. She is survived by a daughter, Mrs. Anthony D. Schlesinger, 54 Garden Place, Brooklyn Heights, New York and a sister, Mrs. Reynolds N. Kirby-Smith, Cocoa, Florida.

WARLOW. Josephine Painter Warlow, wife of Ernest J. Warlow, director, FBO, Department of State, died on September 22 in Washington. She is survived by her husband, 2219 California Street, N.W., Washington, her father, two sisters and a brother.

**American Foreign Service Association**

Combined Balance Sheet (Audited)  
as of June 30, 1970

**Assets**

Current Assets (Cash, Acct. Rec., Etc.).....	\$123,438.88	
Investments.....	507,407.14	
Fixed Assets-Net (Bldg., Equip., Furn.).....	536,291.45	
<b>TOTAL ASSETS.....</b>		<b>\$1,167,137.47</b>

**Liabilities**

Current Liabilities (Acct. Pay, Taxes, Etc.).....	\$113,802.83	
Longterm Liabilities (Bldg. Mtg.).....	384,399.33	
Escrow Accounts (Dues Paid in Advance).....	142,898.99	
<b>TOTAL LIABILITIES.....</b>		<b>\$ 641,101.15</b>
<b>NET WORTH 6-30-70.....</b>		<b>\$ 526,036.32</b>
<b>TOTAL LIABILITIES &amp; NET WORTH.....</b>		<b>\$1,167,137.47</b>

**Combined Expense & Revenue Summary (Audited)**

Total Revenues for 1969-70.....	\$369,574.73
Total Expenses for 1969-70.....	401,152.89
<b>NET LOSS for 1969-70.....</b>	<b>\$ 31,578.16*</b>

\* Includes loss on sales of securities and first year operation of the Club.

## AFSA BOARD MINUTES

Minutes of the August 25 Meeting.

### Announcements

**Annual Meeting:** The annual general business meeting of the Association will be held on September 23. Notice of meeting and the interim report of AFSA's activities will be sent to the members in an AFSA News Bulletin which is now being printed and should be in the mail late this week.

**Proposed Amendments:** Discussion of proposed amendments to the AFSA By-laws, on the agenda for today's meeting, was postponed until September 1.

**Communications:** Copies of Summary Report of the AFSA Advisory Group to Improve Communications with the Membership were distributed by Mr. Lambrakis. Discussion of the report was postponed until September 1.

**Meeting with Mr. Macomber:** Copies of letters presented to Mr. Macomber on August 19 according to the projected agenda reported in Minutes of the Board meeting of August 18, will be sent to officers of the Association and members of the Board and to JFSOC.

**Kidnaping:** A letter from the Chairman of the AFSA Board to Mr. Macomber, August 19, recommended that the Department of State initiate consultations with other governments to obtain an international agreement refusing payment of ransom in cases of kidnaping. Copies of this letter will be sent to officials of the Department of State and other agencies with a covering letter to be drafted by Mr. Davies.

### Executive Order No. 11491

Mr. Davies, Messrs. Easum and Lyman and the Executive Director met with Mr. James R. Keene, personnel officer in AID, to discuss implications of the Executive Order. Mr. Alan Strachan, the officer assigned from AID to study the Executive Order, participated in the discussion.

### Women's Committee

Under the Office of Equal Employment a committee is being organized of women in the Department of State who represent different personnel categories. Miss Good has been a member of the **Ad Hoc** Committee to improve the Status of Women in Foreign Affairs Agencies and will represent the Staff Corps and the AFSA on the official committee, a chairman for which will be announced shortly. Members of the **ad hoc** committee will meet with Mr. Macomber on August 26 to discuss with him areas they consider were not covered in the Task Force Reports. Members of the AFSA Board suggested other subjects which might be of interest to the Women's Committee.

### Vice Chairman and Board Replacement

Mr. Nevitt will poll members of the Board and officers of the Association for nominations of individuals to succeed Mr. Richard Davies as Board Member and Vice Chairman. These will be considered at the Board Meeting on September 1.

### Minutes of the September 1 Meeting

Minutes of the Board meeting August 25 were approved as written. Mr. Maxim requested that the minutes of the meeting of August 18 be corrected to read as follows: (page 2—Executive Order No. 11491—Sentence 3)

"It will be made clear that AFSA must have a legal and permanent right to consult and negotiate with State, AID, and USIA on personnel matters affecting members of the Foreign Affairs community."

Addition of the words "and negotiate" was approved.

### Communication

Mr. Lambrakis, Chairman of the **ad hoc** committee presented the report of the Advisory group appointed to recommend measures to improve communication with the membership. A more detailed summary of findings is stated in Mr. Lambrakis's memorandum of August 25 to members of the Board. Measures suggested to facilitate fuller communication with AFSA members were:

1. Open meetings regularly scheduled. Regular Board meetings to be "open."
2. Use of Chapter heads and Keymen at overseas posts and in the Washington area to inform the membership, call special meetings and report on consensus, "feedback" and complaints.
3. Expanded use of pouch and "interested party" telegrams via the Department of State to improve contacts with the posts.
4. To poll the membership on major issues.
5. Bulletin Boards in appropriate locations on which copies of correspondence, special notices, and minutes of AFSA Board meetings would be posted.

The Chairman expressed appreciation of members of the Board for the useful ideas developed by the Committee and requested that Mr. Lambrakis convey the Board's thanks to the members of **ad hoc** committee.

The importance of the domestic network of keymen in communication with membership was discussed.

#### Action:

1. The Executive Director to investigate costs and requirements for installation of bulletin boards in strategic areas: Foreign Service Lounge, Foreign Service Institute, USIA, AID, etc.
2. Messrs. Nevitt, Lyman and Lambrakis are to consult on improvement of the network of domestic keymen.

### Proposed Amendments to the AFSA By-laws

Messrs. Maxim and Mulloy discussed the four amendments to the By-laws proposed by JFSOC. The Board suggested some technical (non-substantive) changes be made which Mr. Maxim agreed to try to arrange.

### Minutes of the September 8 Meeting

### Executive Order No. 11491 (Labor-Management Relations)

Mr. Bray said he had received a request from the Federal Labor Relations Council to make our views known at their meeting on October 7, 8, 9. The Executive Director will contact NFPO and consult with them on the Executive Order.

Mr. Bray said he had been thinking over the situation with regard to the Executive Order on Labor-Management Relations over the weekend, and he is convinced that if AFSA is challenged by a bid for exclusive recognition by a union, we are prepared to go to the mat. Nevertheless, we should now stand back and look at the benefits and the costs so the membership can have all the facts. He asked the Board members for their views on what AFSA might gain from exclusive recognition.

Mr. Nevitt noted that the Executive Order was not written with our needs in mind and said that benefits that might accrue from exclusive recognition might not be what AFSA wanted them to be. AFSA wants the right to go in and make a case.

Mr. Bray suggested that AFSA might not enjoy the same open door policy as it does now if it does obtain exclusive recognition, and noted that under the terms of the Executive Order this would mean negotiations would have to take place after office hours.

Mr. Harrop expressed concern that an "exclusive" gained by some other organization would foreclose AFSA's ability to act; he hoped AFSA could be both a labor and a professional organization.

Mr. Bray then read aloud Section 11 and 12 of the Executive Order and advised other Board members to re-read the Executive Order in its entirety and to study sections 11 and 12 in particular.

One agency, Mr. Bray reported, had categorically stated there would be no mixing of Foreign Service and Civil Service in a "unit" under the Executive Order. The acceptable size of a unit was also discussed. It was remarked that a community of interest would be difficult within the Foreign Service especially between the categories of FSO, Junior FSO, FSRU, and FSS.

Mr. Bray questioned the role of AFSA if exclusive recognition meant wearing only one mantle and that turned out to be the union mantle. Mr. Easum said that the key to what AFSA does still depends on the definition of supervisor.

Miss Good said that she felt that the Staff Corps would have no objection to AFSA's role if it achieved exclusive recognition since most staff employees have long felt the need for a union-type organization to fight for its

rights. She said the AFSA should play this role since most Foreign Service personnel have no affinity with the AFL/CIO.

#### Openness

Mr. Heginbotham said that he has discussed with Mr. Mark Destler the possibility of AFSA's employing him for six months to work on the development of proposals to increase openness, to raise funds for special projects, and further relationships with such organizations as the World Affairs Council, etc. His annual salary would come from the Donner Fund and would be in the range of \$11,200—\$12,000. It was stated that the Donner Fund balance is under \$11,400.

#### AFSA Luncheon Chairman

Mr. Lambrakis said that André Navez in CMA has agreed to be Chairman of the Luncheon Committee. The Board approved this nomination.

#### Proposed Change of Day and Time for Board Meetings

Mr. Easum said that the weekly Board meeting on Tuesday conflicts with official meetings he must attend on this day. The Executive Director was asked to arrange for a telephone poll of the officers and members of the Board to determine a more suitable day for Board meetings. Following the close of the meeting, at 1:30 p.m. Mr. Lambrakis and Mr. Easum discussed with Miss Good the specific problems of the staff corps as they pertain to training.

#### AFSA ESTABLISHES TASK FORCE ON AID REORGANIZATION

AFSA has established a Task Force to advise the AFSA Board on issues, and actions to be taken by AFSA, in connection with the forthcoming reorganization of the AID program. Howard Parsons, former USAID Director in Taiwan, Iran, and Thailand and presently with the Board of Examiners of the State Department, will chair the Task Force. Tentatively, sub-committees have been established on (a) policy issues, under John Ulinski, O/PR; (b) organization and staffing, under Robert Gordon, AA/UN; (c) coordination of aid and foreign policy, under Gordon Tiger, NEA; and (d) problems of transition with special attention to personnel rights, under Ernest Preeg, S/PC.

AFSA Chapters overseas are urged to discuss the reorganization and forward views and suggestions to Howard Parsons or directly to sub-committee chairmen. Special effort should be made to increase AID personnel involvement, and membership, through these discussions. All individual members in Washington and overseas are invited to contribute views on this matter. AFSA sees this as a matter of critical concern for the entire foreign affairs community, and of direct personal concern to many of our members.

#### More New Careers

What happens to diplomats when they decide to go on to other things? AFSA News has been keeping track of the current positions of many former diplomats and has uncovered a wealth of information. This "Where Are They Now?" column will be published from time to time as space permits, and will keep our readers up to date on the activities of former FSOs.

#### John M. Steeves

Former Director General of the Foreign Service John M. Steeves has been serving as Executive Director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University since April, 1970. Ambassador Steeves was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs from 1959-62 and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from 1962-66.

#### William H. Weathersby

William H. Weathersby, until recently Deputy Director for Policy and Planning for USIA, has been named to the newly created post of Vice President for Public Affairs at Princeton University. Ambassador Weathersby, who accepted this post in May, will be responsible for "planning, coordinating and implementing effective efforts to present the objectives and activities of the University accurately to all of its various publics."

#### John N. Plakias

Retired from the Foreign Service in 1962, Mr. Plakias has been employed by RCA since that year. In 1964 he was assigned to Washington and last year was named Director of International Relations, Washington.

#### NOTICE!

This is the last issue that will be sent to AFSA members who have not renewed.

Fill out and mail renewal notice in the front of the **Journal** to keep your **Journal** coming.

#### ERRATUM

The hippo which decorated one of the pages of the October **Journal** was erroneously credited to Marie Skora. It is the work of Mary Betts Anderson.

#### Income Tax: Loss by Exchange

AFSA has been informed that an FSO stationed in Vietnam has claimed his loss by exchange as a deduction from Federal income tax. Statistics and administrative rulings were submitted to support the claim, which is based in part on the reportedly successful claim for adjustment under similar circumstances by a private company.

The Internal Revenue Service has not yet made a decision in this case.

## AFSA's Secretary-Treasurer Resigns

Dear Charlie:

As you know, I have deep personal objections to anything resembling a labor organization for the Foreign Service, and I feel compelled to oppose the Board's recommendation that AFSA seek exclusive recognition under Executive Order 11941. For me to voice such opposition in public while still a member of the Board would be improper. Therefore, I am submitting herewith my resignation from the Board effective immediately.

Since joining the Foreign Service I have considered myself a professional and a supervisor and have identified my own future with that of the Foreign Service. For me to endorse and join an organization now, which by definition excludes professionals and supervisors and which might place me in opposition to the management of the Foreign Service, would be both ridiculous and repugnant.

I have no quarrel with the logic of JFSOC's Argument that "to fight a big organization you need a big organization." However, I disagree with the premise that there is a need for AFSA or any other group of Foreign Service employees to fight their own organization. To arm ourselves against ourselves is psychotic, and it is particularly irrational for the holders of Presidential Commissions to place themselves in opposition to the Executive Branch of which they are an integral part.

The Board's draft recommendation that AFSA seek exclusive recognition contains no reference to what might be good for the Foreign Service, while there are frequent references to what might be good for AFSA. I do not share this attitude on the importance of AFSA as an independent entity. I am frankly not worried about AFSA or its future; I am concerned over the Foreign Service and its future, and I believe any steps toward unionization will do great damage to its already battered career system.

Even if I were to accept the argument that what is good for AFSA is good for the Foreign Service, I question the real gains that would accrue by receiving exclusive recognition. The Executive Order is clear: "the obligation to meet and confer does not include matters with respect to the mission of an agency, its budget, its organization, the number of employees and the numbers, types and grades of positions or members assigned to an organizational unit,

work project, or tour of duty, the technology of performing its work or its internal security practices." In short AFSA would be trading its influence on most of the important matters, which have been its goals, for the "right" to negotiate on wages, hours, and conditions of labor. The assumption that management would ignore this provision of the Executive Order if AFSA were a labor union, but would strictly enforce every provision of the Executive Order if AFSA were not a labor union is insupportable.

AFSA's recommendation to seek exclusive recognition is completely negative in character and a fearful reaction to an imagined threat. There is no case made in favor of unionization except stopping AFGE. Under present conditions, this is like the Orioles quaking at the thought of a series against the Senators. I cannot believe that an organization of 7,000 can be afraid of a competing organization of 600. Even if AFGE should become a threat in the future, there are many options open to AFSA short of becoming a labor union itself. These include, but are not limited to, outright exemption of all Foreign Service personnel from the terms of the Executive Order, definition of units or supervisors in such a way that Foreign Service personnel is ruled out, or formation of a professional organization. None of these would satisfy the more militant faction of JFSOC which threatens to bolt AFSA unless this organization does its bidding. However, I am convinced the views of this small group have already been given undue weight.

In addition to the foregoing, I am disturbed by the tactics proposed by the Board. Namely, that if an informal membership canvass results in a "sufficient affirmative endorsement" the Board would then start seeking exclusive recognition. Such a course of action would be a high-handed evasion of AFSA's by-laws. Despite any sophistry to the contrary, converting AFSA into a labor organization is clearly a far-reaching step involving the very nature of the Association. For years AFSA has solicited the generous support of its retired personnel, now with no more than a casual tip of the hat it plans to transform itself into a new organization which will preclude the active participation of these members. Similarly, without yet knowing who is a "supervisor" and who is not, it proposes to exclude this category of

members from active participation. To legally carry out such a major change it is clear that a formal amendment of the by-laws is needed, not an informal canvass, and that the proposed amendment would need endorsement by  $\frac{2}{3}$  of the voting membership, not by a vague "sufficient" number.

I would appreciate your publishing this letter in the **Foreign Service Journal**, with any comments or rebuttals the Board may care to make. In closing, let me wish you and the other members of the Board the best of luck in all your endeavors, except that of seeking exclusive recognition.

Sincerely,  
WILLIAM G. BRADFORD

### Health Benefits

(The following is an excerpt from the Oct. 1, 1970 column, *The Federal Diary*, by Mike Causey in the *Washington Post*.)

The government has confirmed the likelihood of a big jump next year in health benefits premiums. The carriers of the multimillion dollar program are asking for January increases as high as 20 per cent in some plans and operations.

Civil Service Commission negotiators have been trying to dissuade the carriers from a major price increase. But CSC is warning that "the upward trend in premium costs is expected to continue with many plans needing substantial increase for 1971." The "normal" rise is about 12 per cent.

That means that the higher government premium payment that begins in January will be all but wiped out for employees enrolled in plans that jump in cost.


The federal program is one of the world's biggest insurance operations, and certainly is the largest civilian staff health care plan in the world. It covers more than 8.2 million people, most of the 2.8 million federal employees, almost a million retirees and the rest dependents.

At the moment, the government or agency share of the biweekly premium is down to about 23 per cent for the popular high-option, family coverage plan. The recent law signed by the President will increase that share to an average of 40 per cent in January.

But the higher rates that will go into effect the first of the year—none have yet been announced—will cut into the higher contribution. So the relatively minor take-home pay jump employees had banked on for 1971 just won't happen for most workers.

# AQUIA

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STAFFORD, VIRGINIA



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STATE \_\_\_\_\_

ZIP \_\_\_\_\_

## IMPLICATIONS

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radically transformed itself to respond to the new world because the costs of strategic "sufficiency," and the burdens of management of an increasingly tenuous military presence in the world have increased. Similarly the large national intelligence community requires an ever larger budget to exploit technology and monitor developments important to American strategic interests. Information and propaganda programs must re-tool for more sophisticated audiences and more intense counter-American efforts by global rivals. AID witnesses great economic opportunities for a Third World development revolution but the scale of required resource transfers remains far beyond our ability to contribute. Less control, power and influence, therefore, comes at a higher and higher cost.

Within the executive branch, the changing scale of America's role in the world breeds new conflicts and higher levels of inter-agency rivalry, especially under conditions in which the domestic supports for the new foreign policy are disintegrating. Broad bipartisan support for an aggressive foreign policy is dead in the Senate and only half alive in the House. The military-industrial complex is under unprecedented attack from shareholders on account of its poor profitability and from the left/peace fronts because of its claim on national resources. John Kennedy buried the Red Menace in the rhetoric of detente, and more and more Americans are challenging the philosophical axioms of the now "old" new diplomacy. As a result, budgets come hard, and priorities have to be publicly debated.

### ... the Nixon Doctrine

President Nixon, in many ways the product and symbol of the new diplomacy of the 1950s, was elected to his office when almost every condition of that strategy had changed. He endorsed the goals of the new diplomacy while changing its means to those of restraint, conciliation and parsimony.

Thus: SALT talks with the USSR; rapid but quiet moves to normalize relations with China; the

return of Okinawa to Japan; a reduction in scale of the Vietnamese War; a patient continence in increasing Israeli-Arab capabilities for war; continued support, in a more quiet voice, for NPT; encouragement for alliance burden-sharing; multilateral aid efforts in the Third World; and some brave new words about possible trade concessions for less developed countries in the American market. Europe and Asia were both counseled to exploit their new strengths to lessen the burden on what would become a reduced American global presence.

Were it not for the partisan criticism that Mr. Nixon has always attracted, and setting aside the special irritations of the Vietnamese-Cambodian affair, these policies should have met a changing American public opinion on foreign affairs. If successful, they should also reduce the costs and risks of American diplomacy in the 1970s. But these "steps back, steps down" in a global posture brought the President into conflict with his national security bureaucracies, his inherited clients in the world and those elements of American public opinion and interest that remained ideologically wedded to the *weltanschauung* of the 1950s.

The SALT talks have been acceptable to some members of the foreign policy community only because their chances of success have been advertised as low and their actual outcomes thus far have been very closely held. Should a draft treaty emerge, it might be impossible to mobilize the trust and support necessary to win its passage against foes within the executive branch as well as in Congress and the society at large. Restraint, if it is to come, will have to be disguised as superiority by the governments of both the US and USSR. The pattern for this stratagem was set in the changes in China policy, in which the old policy of *confrontation* was not publicly abandoned even though the statements on the Sino-Soviet border clashes and the new trade and travel policies, accompanied by more intimate talks, constituted its dismantling.

The perils of proclaiming constancy and practising change may be seen clearly in the Vietnamiza-

tion of the Indochinese war. The decision to speed US troop withdrawals was read as precipitous and ill-advised by at least some important officials at MACV, JCS and the attentive public who read the fortunes of war as ebbing for the North Vietnamese, and who failed to understand how a President who had sworn himself to "peace with honor" could undertake such policies.

The decision to prolong American involvement after his peaceful utterances in the campaign denied Mr. Nixon the support of the communities interested in termination of the war. The Cambodian action intensified this conflict, leaving both sides more dissatisfied than before, and encouraging a rebellious Senate to attempt to curtail presidential power in foreign affairs in the Cooper-Church amendment.

The increasing division within the executive branch and in the public is not only faithfully reflected in the Congress, but it is exploited there as well. As long as the President's writ was unchallenged in foreign affairs management, executive branch bureaucratic politics dominated the decision-making process. The re-entry of the Congress, at the expense of a weakened presidency, restores at least some of the conditions of the pre-war American diplomacy, and the recent protectionist trade policies that have emerged from the House Ways and Means Committee may be only a beginning. The Nixon Doctrine, if it is to direct American energies in the world, will have to win new support in the executive branches and in the public arena before the Congressional siege will abate. It is nearly impossible to exaggerate the importance of the Vietnamese war in this process.

### The Bureaucrats of Restraint

A bureaucrat, the old saw goes, is a man with an infinite capacity to make ends of his means. People called to the public service have seen their work as critically important, and have breathed into *their* segment of the new diplomacy that level of commitment. As long as the budget expanded, more functions could be undertaken, a larger staff recruited to do the job more professionally, the uncertainties of

the policy environment increasingly reduced and opportunities for meaningful work thereby increased. The diplomacy of restraint and the economics of austerity threaten the entire bureaucratic ethos.

Administrators will have to do less professional work because their instruments, budgets and staffs will be reduced. Soldiers will have to expose themselves to higher levels of risk because they will lack the numbers and superiority necessary to foreclose it. AID officials will lack high performance statistics with which to buttress their requests for resources because fewer resources will have been invested in their client states. America will have to tolerate a worse world press because USIA was not budgeted for the proper level of news management abroad. The world may even be full of surprises as the intelligence communities have fewer sources of news.

The State Department, with a self-image of management rather than operations, stands to lose less than "program" agencies. FSOs have few vested interests in particular programs, just in control over them. In the past, the "embassy core" was rivaled by military assistance, intelligence, commercial, agricultural, informational and economic assistance staffs because of their clout with client government ministries, Congressional committee chairmen, "production" minded auditors and impatient Presidents. The diplomacy of restraint promises smaller operations and, therefore, relatively more important foreign service roles in the process. Of course, there will be fewer FSOs, a diminishing importance of American representation abroad and perhaps greater congressional influence in the course of diplomacy.

Nor will the winding down of the national security community structure be a bloodless cost-benefit affair. If the absolute scale of the effort is to be reduced, most agencies in the process will attempt to ensure that their *relative* position remains intact. A smaller version of present management arrangements would hardly be conducive to new foreign policy initiatives for the precise reason that bureaucratic ends tend to be the product of

bureaucratic means. A small military assistance program, for example, may or may not be an essential component of the American foreign policy of 1975, but a small military assistance program is a sure result of bureaucratic politics in which the only control on program is the level of the budget.

President Nixon's re-establishment of a strong National Security Council, portrayed by some casual observers as a replay of his Eisenhower internship, is more properly understood as a device to gain bureaucratic control so that budget cuts will follow program rather than agency priorities. Needless to say, the future of that enterprise is uncertain.

### *The Politics of Restraint*

Paul Hammond once wrote of the "burden of foreign affairs" for the presidency. The constitution and custom focuses authority in the White House. Also the extension of American power has become global. But more particularly because American power to produce desired effects in the world is uncertain, the President always finds his mandate, his responsibilities, and his performance out of balance. His public support is often the first casualty of the mismatch.

Presidents Truman and Eisenhower shared in the advantages of public support for an active diplomacy, although the Korean War brought down the Democrats in 1952 as surely as the Vietnamese War brought down Lyndon Johnson in 1968. John Kennedy undertook to bury the anti-Communist mainstay of public support for intervention in the rhetoric of détente with the USSR, and with a sophisticated new doctrine of flexible response to ambiguous challenges, whether of revolutionary insurgency or Third Area provocation by China or the USSR. Eisenhower and Kennedy had the luck of peace in their administrations, Truman and Johnson the bad luck of costly wars too limited to command the crusading zeal of a "democratic peoples war," but too large to handle without conscription, taxation and inflation.

President Nixon took office in a posture like Dwight Eisenhower's but without the public and political

support for an active diplomacy as well as an end to war. He is faced with a "dismantled" structure of public support for costly foreign intervention. Mr. Nixon also lacks the support of the hawks, the liberals, the young and America's traditional allies abroad. There is no ideology except isolationism and a narrow patriotism to support a diplomacy of restraint, but it tends to strengthen the hands of those whose policy predilections are antithetical to the president's "residual" commitments. Inefficient producers that seek protection from foreign trade, unilateral disarmers who would scrap General Purpose Forces and leave continental defense to the vagaries of spasm war triggered by vulnerable "defensive" ICBMs, anti-economic assistance groups that would deny the world needed resources in favor of domestic consumption are interests that threaten wider reductions in presidential capacities in foreign policy.

The "old" ideology of Red baiting could probably be reactivated, at the cost of support from the western European states and the domestic liberals, by a "foreign policy Agnew" but it would decrease the flexibility of foreign policy toward China, the USSR and Eastern Europe, imply very great risks, and trigger a new and expensive wave of rearmament.

On the other side of the spectrum the costs are equally impressive, an alienated and bitter right, fed by the confusions of domestic change as well as world disorder and the collapse of what remains of the western alliance in a period when the Soviet Union is expanding its international role. Moreover, the President must steer between these extremes while in a position of being a minority party leader, out-voted in the Congress and narrowly supported by the general electorate.

### *On Representing the New America Abroad*

The world has had a difficult time understanding the post World War II, well-meant imperialism of the United States. Imperialism it was, in the sense that power lay at its core and dominated the dynamics of its extension; well-meaning it

was in that narrow self-interest was less dominant than a concern for strategic stability and a sort of congenial world pluralism. The loose fit between intent and operation, between authoritative explanations of goals and between private and public sectors in overseas operations made misunderstandings easier. Two blurred images of America resulted; one was the "benign elephant," interested in a stable, peaceful jungle, but on occasion given to careless romps; the other image was of a determined, anti-Communist elite pursuing a global plan aimed at strengthening capitalism, establishing Pax Americana, and managing the allocation of world resources from New York and Washington.

For twenty years, the world puzzled over which image was the more accurate. The Marshall Plan, Truman Doctrine, AID and military assistance plans, seemed to confirm the former. The spread of the multi-national corporation and of American management and marketing power in the world, however, testified that the "Old Yankee" spirit was not dead or disinterested.

By 1960, most intelligent observers had probably concluded that America was the agent of a conservative political vision and the carrier of a revolutionary economic-technological system. But precisely in 1960, the internal order and external policies of the United States began to change unpredictably as those two attributes collided. Leaving aside the deserved romance of the New Frontier and the enormous appeal of the Kennedy leadership style, the foreign and security policies of the United States in the thousand days were erratic. The legacy of a missile gap led to an unnecessary surge in strategic weapons emplacement, steps acknowledged in Robert McNamara's San Francisco speech in September 1967 as being the primary stimulant in the strategic arms race that became apparent with ABM and SS-9 systems in the USSR.

Then the active interventionism of American foreign policy, but hardly its constancy, was demonstrated by the Bay of Pigs debacle, the severely stressing Cuban missile

crisis choices, the Skybolt crisis with the UK, the Laotian agreement of 1961 and the concomitant despatch of advisors to Vietnam, the build-up of conventional counter-insurgency forces and finally, the assassination of Diem in the Americanization of the Vietnamese War.

John Kennedy's assassination was not the beginning, but rather a confirmation to much of the world that the American system was unstable and incoherent, its government preaching détente and rattling missiles, calling for peace and committing the Green Berets. As a result of the Kennedy years, the world was only too ready to believe that Lyndon Johnson was a "true," parochial American representing an unpredictable people. The demands of the Vietnamese war, and the President's reluctance to finance it directly with the consequent "inflation as a substitute for civil war" process was accompanied by a brittleness of policy support as the Left denied him support because of the "right" war, and the Right because of his "left" domestic programs. The abdication speech appropriately confirmed President Johnson's lack of power.

The Kennedy-Johnson era witnessed the emergence of newly powerful political forces in the United States. Some were the product of deliberate policy. Others were the inherent result of demographic and social change and some of them the wholly unanticipated consequence of political and technological processes. Blacks, the young, the poor, the South and the cities, all systematically disenfranchised in the national status-power-wealth rankings, came roaring into Washington demanding as fundamental a recasting of the constitutional order as General Marshall's Plan for America had nearly two decades before.

While the public coffers were not exactly empty—before the maw in Southeast Asia consumed all of the Keynesian fruit, the public budget was relatively fat—no system responds to new demands instantly. Moreover, the new factors in American politics came together when the President was being trapped and destroyed by the burdens of foreign affairs.

The State of the Union Address for 1966 is one of the most impressive in recent history, but it will be forgotten because its vision and proposals were not backed by the power to move the American Republic. Those who represented the country abroad had the difficult task of pointing to declarations and intentions, while somehow explaining why, in the face of the obvious, the US political system was so sluggish, so confused, so violent.

President Nixon inherited the disorder, and the weakened presidency. The national elite was bitterly divided, a division exaggerated by their young in the nation's better universities. The economy was in real trouble, and social tensions were higher than at any time since the Depression years. Domestic and foreign violence dominated the news. Rising crime rates and the deplorable poverty and malnutrition indicators tended to confirm that America was a society in which the social cement—a decent regard for others—was crumbling.

The jibe that Washington had become a hardship post, marked by a decline in law and order, runaway inflation and poor schools, and that FSOs might count on a differential as against placid Dacca, orderly Rome or sophisticated Bissau, was not very funny in 1970.

The world is back to puzzling about America; is it really on the brink of civil war and civic disintegration, or is it a noisy, boisterous continent well into the "technetronic age" as a pathfinder? The returns, as usual, are not all in. In either case, the consequences over the mid-term future will be a weakened presidency, a worsening relative position of American power in the world and grave adjustment problems within the country. An official diplomacy of restraint seems the inevitable outcome. Technetronic America, however, marches on the world with even more vigor than the legions of John Foster Dulles. Its new forms of expression and communication, management and production, consumption and imagination are now firmly a part of global development. The true tasks of a diplomacy of restraint is to capture *this* America, and turn it to public rather than private global purpose. ■

Can the foreign affairs community recognize the primacy of domestic problems and so carry out a foreign policy which will be truly "a shield for the Republic?"

## East Asia and the Guam Doctrine

**O**UT of President Nixon's talk with newspapermen at Guam July 25, 1969, came a doctrine whose essence was codified in the President's February 18, 1970, foreign policy report to the Congress:

The United States will keep all its treaty commitments.

We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us, or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security and the security of the region as a whole.

In cases involving other types of aggression we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for its defense.

There have been suggestions that this doctrine is now to be applied on a world-wide basis, and indeed the President's statement on Latin American policy of October 31, 1969, seemed to confirm this intention.

But it was to East Asia that he pointed his Guam remarks. And, it was in his Asian trip after Guam that the President underlined and expanded what he had said, while his advisers on that trip were clarifying his background for newsmen at each Asian stop, often in terms rather revealing for what was to come in the next year.

And it was in East Asia that the doctrine has been now seen to falter. Finally, it is in East Asia that

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both the essential and, perhaps more importantly, the detailed Nixon Doctrine must become the rule if the American people are to have a sane conspectus of East Asia and their role in it.

On the surface the causes impelling a changed stance in East Asia in 1969 were obvious to a new Republican administration. Richard Nixon was President of the United States largely because the Democratic party's Vietnam policy had been found a failure by the American people—bloody, costly, and unending. But factors argued for change which would go beyond trying to wind down the Vietnam war and to avoid future Vietnams.

The pre-eminence and lonely opposition the United States had filled in Asia since 1945 was no longer supportable at home. Nor was this position really any longer necessary. Since the Sino-Soviet quarrel had destroyed that Communist monolith we had heard so much about after October 1949, Communist China no

longer looked the wave of the future; Asians had paid close attention to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, the fatuousness of the Mao cult and the implications for them of a doctrine of wars of national liberation. By 1969 it had become apparent that it would be difficult to regard Japan in the decade of the '70s as no more than a brighter-than-average ward; it had to be a partner. In the rest of non-Communist Asia a new nationalism was abroad. This nationalism relied no longer on charismatic leaders and it did not feed on the tensions and crises of strident anti-colonialism as in the immediate post-independence years. Rather, Asian nationalism was becoming more broadly based and increasingly pragmatic. Little imagination was needed to see that the period of American tutelage in Asia was drawing to a close.

There were other forces in Asia, tentative and still growing, but, even with all their weaknesses, hopeful. Australia and New Zealand, who used to think of themselves as islands somewhere in the English Channel, had become honorary non-whites, ready to try to take up some of the slack to be left in defense of Malaysia and Singapore when the United Kingdom completed its military withdrawal then planned for the end of 1971. Indonesia, a dormant giant, had come out of the miasma of the Sukarno years. Even Taiwan and South Korea were disproving predictions that they would be permanent charity cases for succeeding US aid agencies. There were movements toward regionalism, infinitely

more difficult to motivate than in Europe because of cultural, historic and economic diversities in Asia little known and little appreciated in American public opinion. Standing alone, none of these or other changes—the Sino-Soviet split excepted—could have led anyone to predict a new era; in the aggregate, though, these changes were impressive.

In the summer of 1969, these developments seemed to Richard Nixon to be less important in his foreign policy than the basic problem his administration faced: how to manage an era of negotiation, not confrontation, with the Soviet Union. The era of clear American strategic superiority over the USSR was ending; the new word was "sufficiency," never defined, yet clearly not meaning "superiority." Costs for newer weapons were supportable only in a siege economy on either side. Soviet projections of conventional power into the Mediterranean, Middle East and Indian Ocean were being accepted reluctantly by many in the United States, but still accepted. And the role of the USSR in Southeast Asia was obviously going to expand. Shibboleths of 1952 and 1956 no longer applied. The USSR had to be dealt with as an equal. If this required reduction of the American role in Asia, so be it.

To a Republican president this choice could not have come easily. The party was traditionally bearish on Europe, bullish on Asia. Whether a Republican harked back to the ebullience of Senator Beveridge and the expansionism of T.R. (who saw the dangers of our exposed position in the Philippines less than a decade after we had annexed them) or to Hay's Open Door (which he lived to regret) and Taft's China consortium policy for American investors, a long line of Republican activist policies had made up the history of our Asian policy.

Democrats had gone along, of course, but the three wars which we had fought in Asia in Richard Nixon's lifetime under Democratic presidents had not been wars of purely Asian involvement. The Japanese war had been part of the larger war against Hitler; even before Pearl Harbor a Europe-first strategy had been chosen consciously. The Korean invasion was handled as a hold-

ing action; Europe was more in President Truman's and General Bradley's minds than Korea in 1950—"the wrong war, in the wrong place with the wrong enemy." And, in Vietnam, perhaps nothing so gave away the basic force of the two previous Administrations' thinking than the constant references to Munich and appeasement.

Party aside, Mr. Nixon had a personal stake in an Asia-first policy. His opponents could quote back to him many lines advocating such a policy, including the famous not-so-off-the-record address to the American Society of Newspaper Editors in April 1954 when he had called for the immediate introduction of American troops into Indo-China to help relieve the French at Dien Bien Phu. Nor, as a politician would he have been likely to forget that he owed his own elections as congressman, vice-president and president in part to weariness with wars begun during Democratic administrations. There would seem many political opportunities in an Asia-first policy, particularly if it could be contrasted after a Vietnam wind-down to the Democratic record of 1964-1969.

There are those who argue that the President made no such clear choice. Some would have it that his Guam backgrounder on July 25, 1969 was merely a statement of "No more Vietnams." Others say that it was really only a rambling off-the-cuff prelude to his Asian stops. Neither of these explanations seems in harmony with what we have learned of Mr. Nixon since he became President or of what we have seen to be his style. But even if there were substance to these two explanations, the intellectual choice outlined here can certainly be seen in the subsequent broad actions of the Administration, just as some of the difficulties that the Doctrine has met in subsequent actions can now be seen to have been present in its genesis.

The backgrounder was handled rather curiously. Although the *NEW YORK TIMES* printed a purported text in full on July 26, the day after it was given, no copy reached the State Department or the Foreign Service until August 11; no substantive guidance was pouched until September 2; and newspapermen traveling with the President had not

failed to note that backgrounders with White House officials after each stop of the President's Asian journey seemed to emphasize the "nuclear shield" aspect and the ambiguity of the threat of invoking this shield if "a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security" is threatened. The concepts of a reduced American presence or a "lowered profile" in Asia were passed over quietly by these spokesmen, who did repeat, however that the United States wanted no new commitments.

Senator Mansfield early on saw this anomalous handling of the Guam backgrounder. During a trip to Southeast Asia between August 13 and August 27, the Senator reported:

1. There is also some uncertainty as to what the new doctrine will mean in specific terms.

2. The concepts, practices, and programs by which US missions in Asia have operated for many years remain the same.

3. Notwithstanding the President's recent visit and Presidential statements to the contrary, some US missions still expect this Nation to continue as a major military factor in Southeast Asia after the conclusion of the war in Vietnam. Developments within Southeast Asian countries are still referred to as "vital" to this Nation's interests, "vital" implying more of a commitment than can be derived from a reasonable reading of the President's new approach. Ironically, in some US embassies an inconsistency is not seen between budgetary requests for greatly increased US bilateral assistance and, hence, greater US participation in the indigenous situation, on the one hand, and the administration's new doctrine on the other.

4. It would appear, therefore, that the first order of business under the new doctrine is to see to it that the President's new concepts are reiterated and thoroughly explained throughout the US departments and agencies concerned and that they are disseminated among all US officials in

Southeast Asia.

The Senator's confidential report has never been made public but he did say that he had made therein other recommendations "in order to contract and adjust American activities in Southeast Asia to bring them in line with his Guam Declaration."

But contracting and adjusting American activities in Southeast Asia was to prove not easy. The first reaction of US officials in the area was one of incredulity; "I was physically shocked when I learned what the Guam Doctrine meant," said one political officer at a Southeast Asian Embassy. One of the most senior officers of the Department cautioned against reading into the background anything but a re-statement of the President's hawkish side. An ambassador refused to read a telegram setting forth some examples of what a lower profile might be. And, when it came to specific implementation, these types of reaction were translated into the most stubborn and skillful bureaucratic delay.

In a new policy situation it is not the dramatic events but relatively small day-to-day decisions that are often the unseen jewel on which a huge door is hinged. Or, as Lao Tse said, "Govern as you would fry a small fish." Examples might be personnel changes, reorientation of military exercises, changes in trade and passport regulations, changes in AID procedures, military force posture of small units, changes in information policies, etc. Thus, the dramatic change may be missing but the persistent pursuit of a new approach really entails a succession of mundane decisions which cumulatively will make a new approach clear but which when standing by themselves look picayune. However, foreign governments are sensitive to these things. Thus, when a Foreign Minister's sleeve is plucked, when last year he would have had his arm wrenched out of its socket, he understands. It was in these small matters that resistance to change suggested from Washington was most fierce.

No one would suggest that these reactions should be looked upon as sabotage. They were the normal reactions of a generation of FSOs, USIA and CIA officers and, above all, military officers who had been taught since 1945 that passivity was not the way to advancement either

of career or of national interests or who had been thoroughly inducted into what J. K. Galbraith has called the "cult of the cold warrior."

Those who entered the Foreign Service in the immediate post-war years can recall with amusement and, now, perhaps with some sense of guilt the way we looked upon the pre-1939 FSO. He had been raised in an entirely different world. Where he had reflected and possibly reported, we were going to act and we were going to report. As a new FSO in 1947, I remember well the reasons that were detailed as to why the State Department could not administer the Marshall Plan; it was just not an activist organization.

The Cold War aspect came with the Berlin blockade, the Communist triumph in the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War. Henceforth, to activism was added crusading zeal. To paraphrase President Nixon's description, in his foreign policy speech, of what the Nixon Doctrine is not: "America could and would conceive all the plans, design all the programs and undertake all the defense of the free nations of the world." It led to what one officer described as "not-a-sparrow-shall-fall" reporting. To men with twenty-five years of such conditioning a double interpretation of the Guam Doctrine seemed heresy.

Nevertheless, as months went by after the Guam background, progress was being made in reaching a reduced presence and a lower profile. Often, this progress came about more as a result of budgetary limitations than from conscious attempts to enforce a new policy concept. The investigations of the Symington subcommittee on bases and commitments brought both United States and Asian officials around to some cut-backs. In other cases, Vietnam, in particular, the reduced role was related directly to domestic pressure. And in one outstanding case, Okinawa's reversion, to enlightened statesmanship and skillful diplomacy.

And then came Cambodia.

This article cannot hope to be authoritative on the Cambodian operation. Nor, can it swell the spate of inside-dope and pop-psychoanalytic articles that have covered the Cambodian decision.

The elements to support the Cam-

bodian decision were present in many of the reactions to the Doctrine found in the Department and in the Pentagon. This was most assuredly true at our military and diplomatic missions in East Asia. In those cults of activism and the Cold War, which had resisted embracing any substantial portion of the Doctrine, Cambodia was welcomed by votaries as a return to an older and more comfortable faith.

But if one looks beyond Cambodia and, if that is yet possible, beyond Vietnam, it is not hard to predict the persistence of the Guam Doctrine under its new name of the Nixon Doctrine. As an exercise in policy and diplomacy, it faltered in Cambodia; as an exercise in bureaucracy it was no great success. Yet, it has the wary support of Asian leaders, it has the support of significant parts of the foreign policy establishment in this country, and, most importantly, it can be made to reflect the budgetary and political realities of the United States in the 1970s without needlessly exposing ourselves or our friends in East Asia to danger.

To reflect these realities it is going to be necessary for the foreign affairs official to see the organic link between our foreign and domestic policies. Sixteen years ago this winter Talcott Parsons in discussing "McCarthyism and American Social Tensions" in the *YALE REVIEW* wrote:

"... the strains of the international situation have impinged on a society undergoing important internal changes which have themselves been sources of strain, with the effect of superimposing one kind of strain or another.

"It is a generalization well established in social science that neither individuals or societies can undergo major structural changes without the likelihood of producing a considerable element of 'irrational' behavior."

The question is obvious: Can the foreign affairs community as now staffed and structured recognize the primacy of domestic problems and so carry out a foreign policy which will be truly "a shield for the Republic?" In East Asia the Nixon Doctrine could be that shield. ■

"Population control is still left to that portion of the political spectrum which in the game of nations might be called 'Inviolable National Privacy' "

# New Problems of Social Development

**T**HE older problems of social development I came to know all too well while I was involved in inter-American affairs in the 1960s. They include:

- Confusion about the meaning of social development.
- Lack of usable doctrine contrasted to economic development.
- Rejection of modernity by vested interest groups in developing countries including cultural and educational vested interests.
- The Marshall Plan's dead hand on US development operations (it was exclusively economic).
- The unfortunate legacy of Bretton Woods as to national backstopping of international development activities by non-development institutions such as finance ministries.
- The reluctance of foreign offices in developed and developing countries to accept development as a new type of international relationship.

These problems, all of which have links to the two new problems of social development that I shall attempt to analyze have so far always forced the center of gravity of external assistance toward the purely economic: infrastructure, productivity, import substitution, export intensification, foreign exchange policy and national accounts management. This is particularly noticeable in the Alliance for Progress. Social and civic development objectives are set out in the Charter of Punta del Este, but in Alianza assistance practice, institutional development related to the above economic goals is about as far as social development ever got. And even this degree of institutional development gets only secondary

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treatment in the Scarcity-Priorities Game that foreign assistance so far has had to be.

What is social development? I use the term not necessarily the same as institutional development (a fairly neutral term—even a fascist or mercantilistic institution can be developed). And it is not exactly that rhetorical favorite, especially of some of the military, "nation building." Social development refers to modernization of the norms and processes for sharing benefits and burdens in societies. It is fairer sharing, especially on the benefits side: education, health, job opportunities (including job training), tax equity, effective administration (including honesty in government). Think of total development as light coming through a prism. Social development is a discernible area in the whole spectrum of development, and there are shadings from the equally discernible purely economic end all the way to the purely political end.

Some new lines of activity are still to be classified. Just recently we have all become conscious of ecological problems, and I think these challenges in developing countries should be included within social development.

Population control is harder to classify. It certainly is not yet purely economic; operationally it is still left to that portion of the political spectrum which in the game of nations as I know it might be called "Inviolable National Privacy."

Economic development, of course has social effects; and some of these, undoubtedly, have been seen by ultra-nationalists and vested interests groups as impinging on "Inviolable National Privacy." To a considerable degree, the chant of "Trade, Not Aid" is the ploy of traditional export oligarchs who find the so-called "foreign conditioning" of external assistance a threat to their internal advantages. Traditionalists, everywhere I suppose, incline to the "trickle-down" theory of human betterment. But the traditional export oligarchs that I have in mind are not even much for "trickle down," as may be seen by their strong and usually effective objections to greater taxation of them for the common good. Some exporters of traditional commodities are, of course, not oligarchs but little people. Export oligarchies vary as to countries and commodities. Sugar, for example, is hardly ever a mass man export interest.

On the whole, economic development practices and doctrines no longer fall within the taboo of "Inviolable National Privacy." One reason for this is the spread of economic



development theories through graduate education of developing country nationals in developed country universities. Also, the feed-in of professional development economists into all development agencies, has given the world a remarkably wide consensus of professionalism as to those items that above I listed as purely economic. How often is the cry of interventionism raised as to issues of monetary economics today? Not often, even as against the International Monetary Fund.

Purely political development is hardly ever attempted through foreign assistance, since political considerations are excluded by the articles of the multinational development institutions. Moreover, since much of economic development is no longer controversial, it seems largely in the field of social development that resistance to change occurs. That it occurs results in part from the fact that the doctrines and the men needed for social development are themselves far below the present stage of growth of economic development technology. Further, some social development schemes tend to be vague and half-baked. Too often they reflect the drives and pressures of faddists and of well-intentioned determinists in the developed world.

Also, there are some fundamental doctrinal disputes, such as the very important one of whether developed-country concepts of basic education are relevant to the needs of the poor countries as to the conditioning of their peoples for as happy and effective lives as reasonable projections of national and regional improvement show may be possible. Nonetheless, there is a solid core of social development doctrine and experience available. Basically, the expectations in the field of social development draw upon, not the national idiosyncracies of a single developed country, but upon the modern—if always challenged—way of life generally common in the free, Western, developed world.

Does this concept present problems? Of an ideological nature in terms of 18th and 19th century notions, from the Physiocrats through Marx, yes. In terms of the actual administration of modern societies, hardly. Thus it seems to me a mistake to give great weight to oligarchistically-sourced yells of "gringo intrusion" when what the shouters are really attacking under nationalistic cover is something that is not gringo but modern social practice, whether in the German Federal Republic, Sweden, Idaho, or Australia.

We USA-Americans are remark-

ably masochistic, and too often we swallow the bait I call "Inviolable National Privacy" when it should be left dangling.

On the other hand, there are areas where the United States' way of doing things socially is not the way that all developed countries do them. In such areas, whether the United States is using its leverage through bilateral or multilateral assistance, it should "knowledgeably eschew ethnocentric predilection." I know of no better examples of our failure to do so than in the administration of criminal justice. While I was Ambassador to Colombia, every time an American was held in detentive custody pending investigation by the examining magistrate, I got the same type of "make protest" instruction from Washington: demand arraignment, bail, and so on. Had no one in the Department ever heard of the continental penal law system, without grand juries, bail bondsmen and the Mallory Rule? I often wondered, as I would again repeat my little essay on very simple comparative law, assuring the Department that we were receiving all the cooperation possible from the Colombians, within the maximum that their system would tolerate without discrediting it.

Another instance in the same area: Why did AID persist in sending non-Spanish speaking, common law lawyers to Latin America to advise on the modernization of the criminal process? Why not some aid-financed Swiss, Italian, German, or French, experts, considering that, on the whole Latin America deals with criminal charges in ways still essentially Napoleonic?

Social development, bedeviled as it long has been in the various ways sketched previously, must now contend with new difficulties. These new problems are very serious: First, attitudes underlying them tend to put social development beyond the sphere of external assistance, thus throwing such development as remains back to an exclusively economic base and leaving the listed problems of social development free of operating pressures that they be solved. Second, as the Installation Address on August 7 of the new President of Columbia suggests, the regressive austerity of economic development on the very poor mas-

ses must be leavened with "people programs."

Although I have attempted without much result to get analytical appraisal as to whether the recent "near thing" in Colombia might have a causal relation to imbalance between economic and social development, the words of President Misael Pastrana Borrero tend to suggest there was one. In any event, economic development with only incidental social betterment components is no more than "trickle down," a philosophy of peaceful revolution that has never worked anywhere in the developed world. All the more reason why it should not be expected to work in the far weaker distributive structures of the developing countries.

The Low Profile Doctrine is neither objectionable nor new insofar as United States development concepts are concerned. Implications to the contrary are offensively unfair to Kennedy-Johnson diplomacy. True, there has always been considerable insensitivity in the execution of various aspects of foreign assistance; and it is only for understanding that I note the corrosive effects of similar insensitivities in the actual operation of internal anti-poverty programs. The cure for insensitivity and ineptness in either case is better training or better people, not in prejudicing or ending the effort. The development-related aspect of the Low Profile Doctrine that concerns me here is whether social development may drop out of operations, leading to the counter-productive disequilibrium that the recent Colombian election case possibly may present. The "drop out" dangers that I see as potential, but avoidable, are lack of development-related dialogue on social development issues and enlargement of the taboo area.

No dialogue might result if the United States responds only to developing country initiatives that do not contain significant social development elements. Every experienced assistance man knows how difficult it is to get specific development initiatives from the government of a developing country.

Enlargement of the taboo area has resulted in a great shrinkage in the area of "Inviolable National Privacy" in the past few decades.

Most would agree that this has been good. Nonetheless, it is possible that unless encouraged otherwise, United States spokesmen vis-à-vis developing countries today may take the Low Profile Doctrine as a broad hint to widen the taboo area. This is a danger, not only in bilateral diplomacy, but in multipartite-universal and multipartite-regional diplomacy. The area of development most vulnerable to widening of the taboo area is social development, considering that most political development is already within it. On a small planet, ever more widely divided between our very rich and our very poor, the nation state already stands all too frequently as a barrier between the grossly deprived within its territory and the possibilities of betterment that, not one developed country, but all planetary civilization could provide.

The real problem is, what do we have, what can we reasonably expect, as to international development institutions and how can they do the things that cannot be done bilaterally as well as some would like? Thus we have the setting for the second of the new problems, "bankability" and social development.

With the exception of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and a small Organization of American States development fund, the existing multilateral development assistance institutions are banks. These banks have soft loan appendages, such as the World Bank's International Development Association, or they administer funds earmarked for varying degrees of concessionality in lending. There is not, so far, a worldwide or regional *full range* development *agency* with an array of authorizations in the development field comparable to that of the United States Agency for International Development. It is most important, it seems to me, that the present lack of multilateral institutions to do the whole job of development assistance ought to be kept seriously and constantly in mind as the merits of shifting emphasis from bilateral to multilateral assistance are appraised.

There is nothing wrong with the multilateral approach to develop-

ment assistance except that the existing, well-financed (UNDP is not) multilateral institutions are not structured to go much beyond development lending plus some free technical assistance (almost always loan related) paid for out of the international institution's earnings and profits. The development loan approach to development assistance, even in the economic assistance field, has been found to be inadequate without large grant assistance for both capital transfer and technical assistance. The existing relationship of loans to grants in the totals of assistance supplied to developing countries has already created a serious repayment problem, as the Pearson Report shows. But here I wish to stress that social development—the absolutely essential structural and distributive modernizations that will make the trauma of development tolerable to present generations—is particularly vulnerable should foreign assistance become mainly multilateral, without there being changes in the international development institutions. Why?

One reason is that the development banks cannot use their capital raised by public financing in ways that would undermine the financial soundness of the bank's bonds. This means that every "hard" development loan proposal must, in a convincing and credible way, be quantifiable and, as so quantified, meet cost-benefit and related tests of bankability. President McNamara deserves great credit for taking managerial initiatives in the World Bank toward enlarging the scope of lending from the Bank's traditional field of essential national physical infrastructure into virtually the whole array of development needs, including education and population. Nonetheless, a loan is a loan is a loan, and in the social development field the big basic limitations are those related to "credible quantification"—credible, that is, to the more traditional executive directors and to the world's "money community."

The Inter-American Development Bank is farther along with "social lending" than is the World Bank for the poor nations of the world, and at its soft window it has been

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"Otherwise the Nixon doctrine, like the SEATO treaty before it, will join the pavement of good intentions on which American troops march into the hell of mainland combat"

## America and Asia

To a disturbing degree, our political discourse today revolves around an irrelevancy. The debate revolves rapidly because emotions are high; but traction is low, so we don't seem to be getting anywhere.

The issue that so confounds us is the future of Vietnam after the departure of American troops. I believe our troops must withdraw and so, obviously, does nearly everyone else, with only the question of how still unsettled. But the ultimate consequences are politically irrelevant because, despite our deep concern, events in Vietnam will be far beyond our power to control. The issue that should concern us, meanwhile, is the impact of our Asian policy on the great powers of the region: Japan and China. Yet this question is inadequately considered by the public—and the political arena—though the Nixon Administration has broached interesting and commendable policies.

Such distortion of perspective is characteristic of nations stumbling from a war.

More than a century ago, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote; "the most important time in the life of a country is the coming out of a war." The history of this century gives haunting resonance to his words as the United States prepares its departure from Vietnam without wide public discussion of future policy.

The aftermath of World War I plunged the United States government into a struggle between the executive and legislature that ended with rejection of the League of Nations by the Senate. The terminal phase of World War II is now wide-

### SENATOR CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR.

*Senator Mathias served his state (Maryland) as assistant attorney general, city attorney of Frederick and as a member of the Maryland House of Delegates before being elected to Congress in 1960.*



ly regarded as a prelude to the Cold War. And the last stages of the Korean conflict were fraught with the bitter controversies associated with the name of Senator Joseph McCarthy. In ending the previous wars of this century, we have invariably failed to establish the conditions for a lasting peace—and new tensions abroad have reverberated at home.

It appears that "the coming out of war" poses special difficulties for a democracy like the United States. The emotions of war hang on—and hang over—into the post war period. National mobilization creates distortions in our economy and in our political institutions that further encumber the work of the peacemakers. The post-war challenge to American leadership is not simply to determine and prosecute the right

foreign policies; equally important is the adaption of our domestic institutions and the education of public opinion. This process transcends the office of the President and embraces all branches of government—indeed all realms of the society.

This Administration has shown a deep awareness of the international problems of ending the Vietnam conflict. It has developed a policy of transition—usually designated the Nixon doctrine—by which we hope to avoid further instability and war in the region. This approach is designed gradually to shift the burdens of regional defense to indigenous organizations of collective security. Under the doctrine, the United States will adopt a low military profile in the region. Future ground engagements of American troops will be scrupulously avoided, while

major aggression is deterred through our strategic striking power.

The success of this approach will depend not only on its application in Asia but also on its promulgation in the United States. On the one hand, Congress and the public must understand and support the intricate combination of trade, aid and diplomatic policies that the doctrine entails. On the other, the Executive must offer cogent and consistent leadership in putting the doctrine into effect. We should define clearly the real American interest in Asia and discard the nebulous formulations that led to our current predicament.

The roots of our interventionist stance lie in the "coming out" of World War II. In 1943, as the tides of war shifted in favor of the Allies, Walter Lippmann wrote a book, "U.S. War Aims," which dealt with the impending problems of a post war settlement. The destruction of Japanese military power, he wrote, would create a post-war vacuum in Asia which the United States could fill only at the risk of a protracted commitment of ground forces on the Asian mainland. Lippmann felt that the United States was unsuited for such an Asian role. He urged instead that the United States accept an ultimate Chinese sphere of influence in Southeast Asia. The only country where a real danger of conflict would arise, Lippmann predicted, was Korea, because of its proximity to China, the Soviet Union and Japan.

Lippmann's advice was not taken and his prediction came true. The destruction of Japanese military power in Asia did create a vacuum. The United States did encounter excruciating political and military difficulties when we attempted to replace Japan in the Asian balance of power. The confounding futilities of nation building in Vietnam and coalition management in the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) suggest a fundamental weakness in the American approach to the region.

Lippmann's proposals, of course, became problematical after Communist victory in the Chinese Civil War and the emergence of an apparently monolithic Communist bloc. But it is difficult today, nearly three decades later, to deny his analysis of the fundamental power relationships and

American limitations in changing them.

In fact, his proposition that the United States cannot effectively maintain an extended presence on the Asian mainland has become conventional wisdom, accepted by every American President. Yet the vacuum created by the eclipse of Japan has exerted so strong a magnetism on the military hardware of the United States that we have found ourselves violating our better judgment and intervening on that distant and inhospitable continent.

Now President Nixon has indicated that the United States will try at last to reverse this tragic pattern, try to escape the magnetic Asian vacuum by filling it—perhaps with American military hardware but in the future kept in the hands of Asians. One must hope the effort will succeed, that the United States can at long last elude the thrall of conditions created decades ago.

There are serious problems, however. For the new approach is being tested first in Vietnam, surely the Asian battleground least suited to its success. Vietnam is the one country in the world where a national Communist party led an authentic war of national liberation against a Western colonial power. Although the defeat of France in 1954 seemed to create a new Asian vacuum in Indochina, in fact, it established a strong indigenous force to fill it: the Communists led by Ho Chi Minh.

The decision to support an anti-Communist regime in South Vietnam appeared to be analogous to the relatively successful effort in South Korea. But in fact there was little correlation between the authentic Korean nationalist regime of Syngman Rhee and the externally originated government of Ngo Dinh Diem. As President Eisenhower's memoirs report, perhaps 80 per cent of the South Vietnamese supported Ho Chi Minh in the mid-1950s. Thus the special conditions of Vietnamese history reinforce the natural liabilities of the United States on the Asian mainland and make Vietnam an unfortunate test for the Nixon doctrine.

Nonetheless, we are beginning our general policy of Asianization with an effort at Vietnamization. The Administration asserts, moreover, that the success of the Nixon doctrine

elsewhere depends on its success in the war zone. This contention has disturbing overtones of assertions over the past decade that defeat of the Communists in Vietnam was indispensable to their containment throughout Asia. The domino symbolism is still employed. American policy seems to be based on the assumption that successful Vietnamization will lead to the development of other indigenous Asian forces capable of filling the power vacuum in the region. But, this assumption conveniently overlooks the existence of a government in Hanoi. Unless we are prepared to reverse signals at suicidal risks, adopt the LeMay formula for victory and treat Hanoi like World War II Japan, imposing unconditional surrender and a new regime, our goal of an anti-Chinese coalition of Southeast Asians may well be frustrated. North Vietnam, apparently the strongest nation on the southeastern border of China, will present an effective collective security arrangement. As long as Southeast Asia is divided, the Chinese will find invitations to intervene. If United States ground forces are not introduced, the side supported by Peking may be expected to triumph.

The best way to contain China is to leave Southeast Asia and thus create the conditions under which a new arrangement must endure. The states of the region must be constrained to devise their own collective security ties, responding to the real power conditions in the region. When these countries do adjust, the political situation may well be more favorable to our interests after we leave than it is now while we try to manipulate events. For if the natural geopolitics of the region are allowed to prevail, any vacuum in Indochina is likely to be filled by powers inhospitable to Chinese hegemony. If, however, we continue to foster civil wars in the region, the emergence of a regional counterbalance to China will be delayed and China will be granted more opportunities to interfere. Secretary Rogers has pointed out that our intervention in Cambodia enhanced Chinese influence in the region.

A more promising application of the Nixon doctrine would dictate early adoption of a much lower military profile in Southeast Asia. As we

withdraw our troops from Vietnam, we should withdraw our minds from that harrowing experience, ultimately irrelevant to our real interests in Asia. As difficult as it is for us to accept, the gravest remaining danger of the war in Vietnam is the possibility that the United States will overreact to a setback there—either by retreating to a Fortress America or by flailing out with new escalation of the conflict. Continued presence in Indochina cannot contribute to the achievement of the chief goals of the Nixon doctrine: new indigenous collective security arrangements designed to maintain peace and contain China.

The key tests of the Nixon doctrine will come in Japan and Thailand. In both countries a major problem will be breaking the psychological dependence on a heavy American military presence.

In Thailand, our role is complicated by SEATO treaty revisions and reinterpretations. The SEATO treaty as ratified 16 years ago by the United States Senate was a collective defense arrangement that committed the United States to consultation with the signatories for the development of a cooperative response in case of Communist aggression in the region. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles repeatedly assured the Senate that the treaty did not affect the Constitutional provisions for Congressional participation in any decision to go to war; and he insisted that under no circumstances was ground action contemplated. A major ground commitment, he said in words that echoed Lippmann's, "would involve an injudicious over-extension of our military power. . . . I believe that if there should be open armed attack . . . the most effective step would be to strike at the source of aggression rather than to try to rush American manpower into the area to try to fight a ground war."

Yet the SEATO treaty as widely understood today bears little relationship to the document ratified by the Senate. Before assuming his current responsibilities, Henry Kissinger discussed one aspect of the problem in his contribution to the Brookings Institution study "Agenda for a Nation." Kissinger wrote: "Because the United States has often seemed more eager to engage in the defense of SEATO and CENTO allies than

they themselves . . . SEATO and CENTO have become in effect unilateral American guarantees." SEATO in particular has been transformed from an organization of collective defense to a vehicle for unilateral American intervention.

This transformation occurred without the slightest participation of the Senate, though constitutionally it shares treaty power with the President. The key instrument of the change was a joint communiqué signed in 1962 by Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman, with an additional interpretive statement by Thanat. This agreement states that in the event of aggression against Thailand, "the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the treaty," and adds that this obligation "is individual as well as collective." In case there might be any misunderstanding, Thanat released a separate statement accurately describing the significance of the communiqué: "According to the present charter," he pointed out, "all decisions must be taken by unanimity. The joint communiqué says that . . . any individual country or countries may agree to take action even though there is no consensus . . . within SEATO." The statement further contended that "the understanding between the US and Thailand" also applies to "revolutionary wars" or "wars of national liberation."

This communiqué has been reinforced by events. The unilateral United States intervention in Vietnam, the substantial deployment of US military personnel in Thailand, the withdrawal of France from SEATO, and the diminished participation of Pakistan and Great Britain, all contribute to the conversion of SEATO into a bilateral treaty between the US and Thailand—all tend to commit us to unilateral ground combat if Thailand is attacked. Yet the Senate, despite its clear constitutional assignment relating to treaties, was not so much as informed by the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations which worked the changes.

As a key step of cooperation with the President in carrying out the Nixon doctrine, Senatorial leaders should consult with the Administration on actions to reduce the unilateral American military engage-

ment in Thailand to dimensions appropriate under the original treaty. American troops must ultimately be removed and American bases ceded to Thailand. Bangkok should not be encouraged to adopt belligerent postures toward its neighbors on the assumption that its coverage under SEATO requires no collective approval. In particular, Thailand should not be forced into too close associations with the present military regime in South Vietnam. The development of indigenous collective security arrangements will be extremely difficult for Southeast Asian countries that apparently serve as agents of the United States.

This United States disengagement in Thailand must begin soon. It can proceed quietly and gradually; but it must be clear and irreversible. Otherwise the Nixon doctrine, like the SEATO treaty before it, will join the pavement of good intentions on which American troops march into the hell of mainland combat.

The development of new collective security arrangements in Southeast Asia would contribute to a peaceful and productive Asia within which Chinese influence will not directly endanger any vital US interest. The fate of Japan, however, is a paramount concern, both as the mainstay of capitalism in Asia and as a potential long term counterbalance to the influence of Communist China.

It is a commentary on current American priorities that while neglecting crucial Japanese interests, we have spent some \$150 billion on our marginal concern in Vietnam. This imperial sum gurgles down the drains and swamps of the Mekong delta, without significant Congressional opposition and almost no negative votes year after year. But when, by contrast, a relatively small trade deficit originates in the same part of the world there is a wounded cry, and a demand for relief without examination of the total problem or of alternative means of assisting domestic industries without sacrificing essential national interests. Both objectives can be achieved at costs which would be bargain-counter terms on any military price-list.

In dealing with Japan on trade Americans should recognize the huge disparity in bargaining power.

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## THREE POEMS

by P.B.

### I. TO TANAQUIL, ON A MOUNTAIN BIRTHDAY

*When princes turn to Welsh then well may I  
Find fit Etruscan names to call you by  
As you meet another year at Larciunei  
Keeping the cruel utilities-men at bay,  
O lovely mother fearless on the mountains  
And loving figure gliding on the ice  
With all those kids. Nor have the fine Rome fountains  
Ever seen a lady quite so nice.*

*And us half through: half through this brief, strange life  
That sweeps too quickly by and leaves us where?  
Great grandsons may recall this man and wife  
Him staid but her still vibrant in the air  
Of all that counts: the rinks, the climb, the race  
Smiles of encouragement always on her face.*

### II. OUT OF VAL GARDENA

*Earth fading, beauty overwhelmed my mind.  
I strolled at Chiusa station, leave all gone  
Thinking of blinding ridges two miles high  
As Tyrol valley green turned black and blind  
And suddenly the train's great sliding brawn  
Was on me. But I dodged him, loath to die  
And boarded for a long night trip to Rome  
Nor dreamed of climbing. In the Val Kedul  
The chamois watched the moon upon the scree  
And little cliff-owls crooned the small stars home  
Until dawn came and in the Tuscan cool  
I got coffee at Cortona. Now sweating me  
In August Rome might wonder if thought lied  
Except for a mountain's scar upon my side.*

### III. INDO-EUROPEANS

*Lonely to see Ulysses, Nausicaa  
Is borne along by the blond tourists  
Till she comes at midnight in Piazza Navona  
Under the streetlights, cobblestones covered with fairies  
The fair moonlight a mystery in the smog.  
O darling Nausicaa so far from home  
How can you tolerate these times,  
Death in the subways and lettuce in plastic  
A hundred million painted mouths  
Double that in cringing men  
And all the grand green beech trees  
Withering in Beckett's dreams*

*Lo comes some sailor coasting along but  
Who can he be? Pretend the Pelasgian  
Who lands in a cove by gentle deer  
Strikes inland by oaks and pure springs in pastures,  
Rome just two huts and Syracuse a village,  
Until on a mountain the people call Vel  
He does all the honors in blood, on the flowers  
Ignorant of Camus, a sinner to Paul VI:  
Shall we blush at this erection?*

*Your street is one too trampled and re-paved  
And you are sick of love  
But set me as a spear upon politics  
I will cripple those corporate men  
Paving their way through the tall dry plains  
Usurped from the deer and fatal dead primitives  
The plains of too-brief history  
Of too many churches and wild cherries soured:  
I and the Xhosa, we ran along the tow-path  
And watched the water leaking out  
In the old days, as a boy.*

*If you think of Massawa it's not so bad a place  
Or of Danang. And at Sverdlovsk  
Though our province program's not begun  
And at Urumchi  
O mountains of the tigers  
Mountains of my love  
Our life is brief, to stand upon a palace  
Listening to the night drums and strings  
You and I and moon upon the snow  
High above Tocharia.*



### The Reform that Failed

PROGRAMMING SYSTEMS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS LEADERSHIP, by *Frederick Mosher and John Harr*. Oxford University Press, \$2.95 (paper).

ONE learns from failure as well as from success. The failure in this case was the abortive attempt by a group of dedicated, often zealous Foreign Service officers to install a country-based programing system (CCPS) in the Department of State and its missions abroad. One of the lessons to be drawn from this failure is that efforts to change organizations are easily frustrated by a hostile environment.

The reformers, William Crockett and the group around Richard Barrett in the Department's Office of Management Planning, saw country programing as a tool for rationalizing and integrating the diverse activities of the foreign affairs agencies and as an instrument for reclaiming for the Department its role as chief arbiter and director of American foreign policy. The adoption of new systems techniques, they argued, was necessary to bring the management of the Department into the twentieth century and to provide the Secretary of State with managerial power equal to his responsibilities.

Their efforts came to naught primarily because CCPS challenged the existing processes, power structure and norms of the foreign affairs community. The new system, many feared, sought to replace a political and diplomatic orientation in the conduct of foreign policy with one that was administrative and managerial. It was at loggerheads with the programing system (PPBS) favored by the Bureau of the Budget. It proposed an individual country rather than an individual agency as the basic focus for the framing of program and policy decisions and thus threatened to intensify agency in-fighting both in Washington and in the field. Most importantly, CCPS met with firm (though often passive) resistance from many who question the relevance of a quantified, rational, and "systematic" approach to foreign affairs and received little or no support from the top echelon of the Department or from the FSO corps as a whole.

Presented as a case study, this is an engrossing and compact little book whose pages are full of insights into the personalities of its principal actors as well as behind-the-scene glimpses of the processes of organization change. Those to whom CCPS, EROP, FAPS and PPBS were fighting words will enjoy reliving the fight.

—RICHARD L. SCHOTT

### Air Force Planning

THE AIR FORCE PLANS FOR PEACE, 1943-1945, by *Perry McCoy Smith*. The Johns Hopkins Press, \$5.95.

MAJOR PERRY SMITH is not going to be very popular in some places in the Pentagon for having written his book on "The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945." He shows that the planners appointed by the Air Force were of limited competence and that their primary objective was to justify a large independent Air Force in the postwar period. They were not particularly concerned with an accurate evaluation of world events and possible enemies. Service rivalries also played a decisive role in the planning process. However, given their objective, their planning was successful. They did provide adequate justification for a seventy-group Air Force on an equal footing with the Army and the Navy.

He points out that the planners could not be accused of making the common mistake of planning to fight the next war with weapons and techniques that had been effective in the last war. They were, in fact, planning to conduct the next war using weapons and techniques that had been largely ineffective in World War II. Actually, they were not really planning to fight any war but simply planning to set up a force that would justify a large autonomous Air Force. Even their choice of air bases around the world was made to justify a large postwar Air Force to occupy and serve those bases. One of their fears was that a small regular Air Force in combination with commercial airlift was unlikely to require sufficient airplanes to insure a large aircraft industry which in turn could produce combat aircraft in quantity in time of national emergency. Smith points out that this is a rather different view of

the much maligned military-industrial complex because, instead of industry insisting on a large Air Force, the Air Force planners were insisting on a large aircraft industry so as to insure adequate potential for mobilization and development of military aviation.

—ALBERT W. STOFFEL

### The Perfectability of Man

HOUSE DIVIDED—*Poverty, Race, Religion and the Family of Man*, by *Thomas and Margaret Melady*. Sheed & Ward, \$5.50.

AMBASSADOR and Mrs. Melady have written a book which proceeds from a deeply felt Christian commitment to an analysis of the problems of poverty, race and religion as the primary factors in the gap between the rich northern developed countries and the poorer developing countries of the southern hemisphere. The economic sections are short and generally discursive and clearly less critical to the authors' argument than the chapters on race and religion.

In their desire to find a general pattern into which world tensions fit, the Meladys' have adopted generalizations which do not in fact apply throughout the developing world. They are at their surest in dealing with Africa, which they know well, less perceptive in their writing on Asia and misleading in their analysis of Latin America where the implications of race and religion as divisive factors are very different from the other areas of the Afro-Asian world.

The book, which takes its inspiration from recent papal encyclicals, is infused with a strongly irenic approach to world problems. There is a generosity in the Melady's vision of the future, which they believe must be based on a passion for self-development among the peoples of the world, founded in a Christian commonwealth under papal leadership, and leavened by a racial tolerance through contact and knowledge. Throughout their analysis runs a faith in the perfectability of man. Unfortunately many readers living in this war-ravaged world, where man's Hobbesian propensities are evident, may find it difficult to accept the Meladys' belief in human progress.

—ANTHONY C. E. QUAINTON

### China in the Community of Nations

THE RISE OF MODERN CHINA, by *Immanuel C. Y. Hsu*. Oxford University Press, \$14.50.

IN his monumental work, Professor Hsu presents primarily a Chinese view of the evolution of modern China, his interpretation being enriched by Western and Japanese scholarship in

recent decades. In these turbulent centuries of Chinese history, foreign and domestic forces interacted to transform the Confucian universal empire into a modern nation-state. Hsu's account of this labored, painful metamorphosis is of great value in understanding the contemporary behavior of China.

Seeing modern China's history as her active response to the West's aggressive challenge, he shows how a series of clashes between the two civilizations resulted in a century of humiliation for China and led to China's struggle for survival in the harsh new world thrust upon her. Chinese efforts at adjustment—the self-strengthening movement, political reform efforts and the 1911 revolution—are lucidly described. After the early 1920s, the main force of Chinese development is found in the ideological struggle between the Nationalists and the Communists (complicated by the Japanese invasion), which ended in the triumph of Mao Tse-tung. Finally, Hsu traces the course of Communist China's evolution from 1949 to 1970, including a perceptive analysis of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution. Highly readable and thoroughly documented, this political history of modern China is a stirring, reliable account of the Chinese people's search for freedom from foreign domination and a rightful place in the family of nations.

JOURNAL readers may find Hsu's comments on US-China policy of special interest. Regarding the much-debated "loss of China," he holds that the United States cannot be held responsible for this:

Chinese Communism had been an internal development spanning thirty years of history and no foreign intervention could have altered its course. Active American armed intervention before the spring of 1948 might have delayed the Communist advance but probably could not have stopped it for good.

In the light of the Korean and Vietnamese experiences, Hsu estimates that such a military venture would have required one million American soldiers.

While not absolving the United States from all responsibility for the Nationalists' rout, he finds that:

... the single most important cause for the downfall of the Nationalists was the eight-year Japanese war, which completely exhausted the government militarily, financially, and spiritually. Had there been no Japanese war, the situation in China would have been very different.

Among other causes of the Nationalist defeat, he lists: (1) deceptive

military strength (war-weariness of the Nationalist forces and the miscalculations of Chiang's military strategy); (2) inflation and economic collapse; (3) loss of public confidence and respect ("... the obnoxious conduct of Nationalist officials who returned to the Japanese-occupied areas after the war did permanent damage to the government prestige."); (4) failure of American mediation and aid; and (5) retardation of social and economic reforms ("They failed to see the revolutionary potential of the peasant masses and consequently never attempted to organize it. It was precisely in this area of neglect that the talent of Mao found its highest and most successful expression.").

As for China's future, Hsu believes that, as the Chinese are "basically a peace-loving, hard-working people of notable intelligence and common sense," ... "once China's sense of injury at the hands of foreign powers is mollified by the achievement of big-power status, industrialization, and nuclear power, a more responsible and realistic appraisal of her position vis-à-vis the rest of the world will be in order. Hopefully, pragmatism and common sense will return to guide the country into a rightful position in the community of nations."

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

### Vintage Lippmann,

#### Taste Treat For The Gourmet

EARLY WRITINGS. WALTER LIPPMANN, *introductions and annotations by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. Liverwright Pub. Corp., \$7.50.*

JAMES RESTON states that Editor-in-Chief Gilbert Harrison of the NEW REPUBLIC has done us all a favor by rescuing vintage Lippmann pieces from the files. He is so right.

These "Early Writings of Walter Lippmann" cover the period 1914-1920 when young Walter, three years out of Harvard, co-founded the NEW REPUBLIC. The grace, wit, passion, humanitarianism and depth and breadth of view that characterize the later Mr. Lippmann are all present to an astonishing degree in the youthful Mr. Lippmann. Many of the pieces are timeless.

At the outbreak of World War I we find the youthful Lippmann arguing with a passion against America's involvement in the global conflict:

We alone cannot undertake to police the world. (Nov 21, 1914)  
All are not spineless who think that the honor of a democracy is not that of a Spanish grandee. (Jan 22, 1916)

... they (the American people) do not want to be told that war is

a gymnasium of the virtues; they know it to be the stinking thing it is (Ibid.)

We have not been able to find a foreign policy which meets the facts of the world and squares with the historic prejudices of our isolation. (June 3, 1916)

By 1917 he had swung around to the inevitability of American entry on the side of the Allies:

... we must fight Germany not to destroy her but to force her and lure her back to the civilization in which she belongs. (Feb 17, 1917)

The early Lippmann like the later Lippmann had little use for intellectual or literary snobbery:

That is what kills political writing, this absurd pretence that you are delivering a great utterance. You never do. You are just a puzzled man making notes about what you think. You are not building the Pantheon, then why act like a graven image? You are drawing sketches in the sand which the sea will wash away. What more is your book but your infinitesimal scratching, and who the devil are you to be grandiloquent and impersonal. . . ? (Aug 17, 1915)

The candidacy of Warren Gamaliel Harding for the US Presidency in 1920 drew another Lippmann response which deserves inclusion in the US Archives:

If an optimist is a man who makes lemonade out of all the lemons that are handed to him, then Senator Harding is the greatest of all optimists. He has been told by his friends and his critics that he is colorless and without sap, commonplace and dull, weak and servile. Right you are, says the Senator. You have described exactly the kind of man this country needs. It has tried Roosevelt and Wilson, and look. It can't stand the gaff. I am nothing that they were. I am no superman like Roosevelt and no super-thinker like Wilson. Therefore, I am just the man you are looking for. How do I know that? I am distinguished by the fact that nothing distinguishes me. I am marked for leadership because I have no marks upon me. I am just the man because no one can think of a single reason why I am the man. If any one happens to think of a reason then I shall cease to be that normal man which these abnormal times demand.

(July 29, 1920)

In his half century plus on the

American scene Mr. Lippmann's analyses and predictions have been neither prejudice-free nor infallible. Still, a reading of his "Early Writings" demonstrate his candidacy for the title "America's political prophet."

—JAMES D. McHALE

### Law 'n' Order

JUSTICE: *The Crisis of Law, Order and Freedom in America*, by Richard Harris Dutton, \$6.95.

THIS is the book version of three long articles published in the *NEW YORKER* in 1969 about the Department of Justice under Attorneys General Ramsey Clark and John P. Mitchell. Its theme is decline and fall—from the humane and "concerned" administration of Clark, through a tortuous and painful transition, to the cold, insensitive and reactionary regime of Mitchell.

As a factual description of the Department of Justice under the last two administrations the book appears comprehensive and well-documented. The author is particularly effective in describing the operations and working atmosphere of the nation's chief law enforcement agency. The administrative side of law enforcement—detection, record-keeping, prison administration, training, assistance to local officials—is also well-covered. (Justice is one of the smaller departments of government with a total staff of 35,000, of which 2000 are practicing lawyers; they have a pending case load of 60,000 cases, many of extraordinary complexity.) The emphasis, however, is on the contrast between the policies and approaches of the Clark team and the Mitchell team in the three key areas of civil rights, anti-trust, and law enforcement. Here the author's sympathies are entirely with Ramsey Clark—and apparently so are those of the Department's professional staff which is the author's primary source of information. Clark is portrayed as a splendid public official and a warm, humane person to boot.

Despite these virtues, it is distressing to report that the book is disfigured by a partisanship and bias so blatant as in places to be almost grotesque. There is hardly one unsavory aspect of American domestic politics from campaign oratory to post-election appointments for the party faithful which is not ascribed to the Republicans alone. The Republican campaign of 1952 is stigmatised as the most mendacious in American history and Republican officials are uniformly portrayed either as narrow-minded Babbitts or (in the case of Secretaries Charles E. Wilson and George

Humphrey) as "arrogant misfits." Even the most commonplace phenomena, such as perfectly normal and modest professions of unfamiliarity with Departmental functions on the part of a new Deputy Attorney General from outside life, are treated with sneering condescension. Needless to say, no reference is made to the corruption and fifth-rate legal appointments of the Truman Administration; to the egregious distortions of constitutional and treaty law by ex-Attorney General Katzenbach; and to the fragrant aroma of nepotism in the last two Democratic Administrations, e.g., Robert Kennedy, Fred M. Vinson, Jr. and Clark himself.

Perhaps the most useful contribution the book can make is to illustrate how deeply the divisions in contemporary American life now permeate such areas as law enforcement, which used to command some degree of social unanimity. The degree to which even our most cherished assumptions today are open to question cannot be ignored by anyone with responsibilities for the making of foreign policy.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

### A Noble in the Badlands

THE MARQUIS DE MORES, *Emperor of the Badlands*, by Donald Dresden. University of Oklahoma Press, \$6.95.

IN the Spring of 1883, a young French nobleman, Antoine Amedee-Marie-Vincent Manca de Vallombrosa, Marquis de Mores et de Montemaggiore, boarded a Northern Pacific train in Chicago. Destination: *Les mauvaises terres*, the Badlands of the Dakotas. Educated at French military schools and a crack marksman, the young Marquis de Mores was to call on all his skill and courage to accomplish his mission, which was to establish a series of enterprises in the Badlands—ranches, pens, slaughterhouses, and packinghouses—to supply meat to the East.

Many other adventurers were attracted to the Badlands in those days. They ranged from common criminals and hired killers, who were in the majority, to such well-known and well-respected figures as Theodore Roosevelt, who owned a large spread near Medora, the town that de Mores built. Rustling and bushwhacking were rampant, and de Mores quickly became embroiled in a shootout which was to set the pace for much of the action to come.

After things became more peaceful, de Mores's beautiful young wife, née Medora von Hoffman, daughter of a wealthy German-American banker in New York, came to Medora, and was chatelaine at a beautiful home the

Marquis had built overlooking the town.

The story of the rise and fall of the Marquis in the Dakotas (he was eventually beaten not by local gangs but by the Beef Trust), and his subsequent adventures in Indo-China and in the Sahara, where he met a tragic death at assassins' hands in 1896, has been told in a fascinating new book by Donald Dresden, "The Marquis de Mores: Emperor of the Badlands." Dresden, who is on the professional staff of the *JOURNAL*, has done a prodigious amount of research on the book, including conversations with the Marquis's family, especially Mme. Athenais de Vallombrosa de Graffenreid, his daughter.

The result is a fact-filled but highly readable book which is enthusiastically recommended not only to those having a special interest in the subject or the times, but to the general reader as well.

—C. E. SMITH

### Canada's Tribulations

A NATION DIVIDED: *Canada and the Coming of Pierre Trudeau*, by Peter C. Newman. Knopf, \$7.95.

PUBLISHED originally in Canada as "The Distemper of Our Times," this is a lively chronicle of the tribulations of the Government of former Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson. Favoring an anecdotal, behind-the-scenes approach, Canadian journalist Peter Newman laments the political infighting that gripped Pearson's Government, sapping its energies for more fundamental problems. The author's basic point, oft-repeated, is that Pearson's celebrated talents as diplomat failed him when it came to governing the country.

Dwelling at length on political scandal and party strife, however, the author tends to slight the serious social analysis suggested by the title, at least in his American edition. Discussion of the broad confrontation between Quebec and Ottawa, for example, focuses generally on personalities and politics. A happy exception, though, is Newman's engrossing account of the intense, symbolic "great flag debate" that produced Canada's now familiar maple leaf standard. Perhaps Pearson's crowning political achievement, this new ensign represents one success in what became Pearson's effort, conscious or otherwise, to conciliate Quebec sufficiently to gain time for his successors to try to resolve the vital question of that province's future place in Canada.

Readers familiar with the men and events of the Pearson-Diefenbaker era will enjoy Newman's accounts, even if they find little new insight into the

deeper issues of the period. Trudeau fans, however, are certain to be disappointed, for, despite its American title, only the final chapter really addresses the emergence of Canada's new leader.

—JACK M. SEYMOUR, JR.

### "Main Street" in Our Town

THE AVENUE OF THE PRESIDENTS, by Mary Cable. Houghton Mifflin Company, \$10.

IF this attractive book was not on your list for Christmas 1969, keep it in mind for 1970. For Washingtonians, either permanent or periodic, this would make an ideal present. It is, in brief, the story of Pennsylvania Avenue from the White House to the Capitol—from L'Enfant's plan to Lyndon Johnson's Commission, from mud-track to boulevard. Mrs. Cable has not confined herself narrowly to the Avenue; she has included a great deal on the development of the Capitol and the White House, the Washington Monument and the Mall, and the City Canal that is now Constitution Avenue. All of this is told on heavy-glaze paper with a profusion of handsome sketches, drawings, and photographs to illustrate every decade and almost every structure along the Avenue since the days when high tides with storms left Potomac catfish in the puddles where the Avenue crossed Tiber Creek on a log bridge.

There is lots of good history in Mrs. Cable's little study, and it is pleasantly sweetened with anecdotes all the way. The name of Tiber Creek, for instance, came from the quaintly classic conceit of the original owner who rejoiced in the patronymic of "Pope" and so named his farm "Rome" and the creek "Tiber." It was Mr. Jefferson who insisted that the new avenue should be lined with four rows of Lombardy poplars—an avant-garde Continental touch but poor horticulture. And inhabitants of the Department of State may take some comfort in the knowledge that their insight is in no way impaired by their location in an area once known to be "froggy" but never called "froggy" by those who knew it best in the old days.

—WILLIAM M. FRANKLIN

### Population Planning

BORN TO STARVE, by Joseph D. Tydings. Morrow, \$6.00.

SENATOR TYDINGS has joined the ranks of public figures urging the adoption of population policies at home and abroad. His arguments and proposals in the global field do not differ significantly from much of the

neo-Malthusian writings already on the market. However, his approach with respect to the United States—initially based upon a proposed family planning center in HEW and a requirement for the Secretary of HEW to submit a five year plan to Congress has more originality. This approach he would justify both in terms of concern for the quality of life and the interest of the United States in setting an example for the rest of the world. Those who are already enthusiasts of population limitation will find "Born to Starve" a comforting book; others may not find it convincing. Perhaps its greatest defect—at least with respect to the United States (where self-sustaining economic growth is normal)—is that it does not face up to the question of the dependence of our economic growth (the basis of our quality of life) upon continued population expansion at least at a historical rate to assure the basic incentive for investment.

—EDWARD R. O'CONNOR

### The Green Revolution

SEEDS OF CHANGE, by Lester R. Brown. Praeger, \$6.95.

"... must reading for all those who believe, as I do, that our participation in world development must continue and must become the distinguished feature of our efforts to help keep the peace."

So states Eugene Black, Chairman of the Overseas Development Council, in the foreword to Lester Brown's dramatic story of how hybrids, water and fertilizer offer new hope of feeding the people in developing nations.

New seeds have permitted once food-hungry nations to multiply their production in wheat and rice. These

prolific seeds, combined with round the calendar farming, irrigation and fertilizer, now accord the plow a 50-50 chance of catching up with the stork in many lands where widespread famine once existed.

"The agricultural breakthrough has not been achieved in all poor countries, and it is so far confined to cereals, principally wheat and rice. But it has already arrested the deteriorating food situation in some of the most populous countries of Asia—India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Turkey, and the Philippines," says the author.

After detailing the techniques that were employed to bring about the renewed hope of a food-population balance, Brown concludes with an "agenda for the 1970s." In it, he does not hesitate to touch upon sensitive areas of United States foreign policy, as for example:


"Our foreign policy, our relations with the world of today, must recognize that the future threat to peace and stability is increasingly Poverty, not Communism." —JAMES O. MAYS

### The Production of an Albatross

THE HIDDEN CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS by Samuel Lubell. Norton, \$5.95.

SWEEPING change smites America. Its irascible citizens grow weary of each other after a frenetic decade that has offered no time to adjust to events. In "The Hidden Crisis in American Politics," Samuel Lubell sees a nation caught in conflicts and tentatively hopes for the spark of a new unity.

Lubell, journalist and public-opinion analyst, structures his book around our recent principal "crises": racial antagonism, crime-laden and



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befouled cities, the university as bat-  
tleground, a move towards post-  
Vietnam neo-isolationism, and the  
struggle over the allocation of the  
country's resources. Our inability to  
reconcile these conflicts is seen as the  
"hidden crisis" in American politics.  
Each crisis receives extended treat-  
ment, and Mr. Lubell makes several  
cogent points. The draft is interpreted  
as the underpinning for student dissent  
after 1965, the year the nation saw a  
quantum leap in the number of col-  
lege-age youth. He views the Vietnam  
war as producing, not hawks and doves,  
but an albatross, an ornithological  
burden most Americans wanted to  
cast off in different ways. America  
becomes the "claimant society" with  
more competing groups demanding  
what our economy and government  
cannot deliver. Lubell observes the  
breakup of a "national coalition" into  
fragmented groups hypersensitive  
about their own identity and how it  
conflicts with that of others.

Lubell's method begins with a care-  
ful analysis of past voting returns,  
often at the precinct level. Once de-  
cided on an issue to investigate, he  
conducts extensive personal interviews  
within key electoral segments. His  
book is full of interview clips, one-  
liners that sum up political currents.  
His prose is straightforward and un-  
adorned and, unfortunately, repetitious,  
principally because the crises he de-  
scribes in discrete chapters overlap to  
form one grand crisis, seen from dif-  
ferent angles but in similar language.

Samuel Lubell sees hope for our  
democracy, however battered, in the  
exercise of self-restraint, a humane  
recognition of what the state can  
effect and what our political appetites  
can demand. May he be right.

—MICHAEL P. CANNING

### The Land is Ours!

THE PERSIAN LAND REFORM, 1962-1966,  
by Ann K. S. Lambton. Clarendon Press,  
Oxford.

LAND REFORM is a major social and  
political step forward in any country  
where traditional agriculture has been  
the rule. Iran's land reform has prob-  
ably been the most successful of all.  
Ann Lambton has already established  
herself as the authority on agriculture  
in Iran, and her latest book proves her  
mastery of the subject. All aspects of  
the program are explained in impres-  
sive detail, and the author treats all  
the players in this drama with great  
fairness, too.

Dr. Lambton gives credit to swift  
implementation as a major factor in  
the success of land reform in Iran,

and she rightfully praises the dedica-  
tion of land reform officials. How-  
ever, she fails to cite the importance  
of effective coordination with other  
governmental authorities, particularly  
at the beginning. Only days after the  
first land reform official left to im-  
plement the program in Maragheh, he  
faced a group of landowners to ex-  
plain the program, flanked by the  
Chief of Police, the local Gard-  
merie Commander, and the ranking  
Imperial Iranian Army officer in the  
area. To people accustomed to hear-  
ing grandiose plans announced by  
the government without any follow-  
through, the quiet determination of  
these officials was so convincing that  
there was never any serious challenge  
to the program in the pilot project  
area.

It is a pity that this epic tale is not  
told with the liveliness and enthusiasm  
that it deserves. After all, few themes  
are more captivating than release from  
serfdom! Scholars will find much to  
work with, and the book will still  
appear to "old Iran hands," but why  
can't scholarship be lively?

—A. M. BOLSTER

### Our "Game of Conflict" with Nasser

THE GAME OF NATIONS, by Miles Cope-  
land. Simon & Schuster, \$6.95.

PUBLISHED in London last year,  
Miles Copeland's anecdotal reminis-  
cences of his behind-the-scenes involv-  
ment in United States-Middle Eastern  
affairs, "The Game of Nations," is  
now available in an updated and re-  
vised edition to American readers  
through Simon and Schuster.

Controversial in concept, irritating  
perhaps to some, this is nevertheless a  
very readable book and will doubtless  
have a large audience in those Wash-  
ington agencies struggling with the  
ever-present complexities and inconsis-  
tencies in our conduct of relations  
with the Arab world.

Since my own diplomatic experi-  
ences did not embrace the 1949 Syri-  
an coup, the 1958 Lebanese crisis, nor  
our relations directly with Egypt  
immediately prior to and during the  
decade following the 1952 "revolu-  
tion," it is difficult to comment on  
Copeland's narration of the roles  
played in these events by our diplo-  
mats and CIA people on the scene and  
Washington emissaries. His in-depth  
coverage of Kermit Roosevelt's vari-  
ous missions to Cairo in search of a  
constructive US-Nasser relationship  
and of the events leading up to our  
denial of arms assistance, makes in-  
triguing reading—particularly for

those American diplomats who had the misfortune to follow this "wave of the future cra."

Copeland's long and apparently close personal association with Nasser and other key UAR personages, has produced an insight into Egyptian motivations and frustrations which goes far to explain why Cairo's words and actions are not as illogical and unpredictable as we often view them. As Copeland recognizes, the Nasser "revolution" has faced a growing gap between objectives and their satisfaction, a gap which Nasser for fifteen years filled with nationalistic pride, a rejection of Western values and views, and the manipulation of a policy of "neutrality" to achieve a position of leverage on the world's stage—"a factor to be contended with."

While one cannot quarrel with Copeland's analyses of the background of the June 1967 hostilities, he has not attempted to deal with the aftermath, the fact that the Palestine problem is no longer in the ice box, but very much on Nasser's front burner, the enlargement of the Soviet position in Egypt to exceed in influence that of any "foreign power" in its history, and finally petroleum discoveries which could make Egypt a viable concern. To place these recent developments

on the "game board" at this time, would seem a fascinating and useful exercise. Perhaps Copeland can add a chapter in the next edition.

—DAVID G. NES

### Truman Revisited

POLITICS AND POLICIES OF THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, edited by Barton J. Bernstein. Chicago, Quadrangle Books, \$10.00 (paperback \$2.95).

THIS is a volume of analytical essays sharply critical of the foreign and domestic policies of the Truman era. They are by younger historians influenced by William Appleman Williams, a scholar who has deeply and seriously questioned the simplistic view of Soviet malevolence as the cause of the Cold War.

According to the editor in his lead essay, "American leaders sought to reshape much of the world according to American needs and standards, and thereby contributed significantly to the origins of the Cold War."

Mr. Bernstein writes in his introduction that the essays are based on archival sources unavailable to earlier scholars.

Behind the book's dull title is material of absorbing interest, casting a cold but dispassionate look at the

familiar guidelines by which a generation has come to judge Truman and his policies. It will not please some, but it carries the conviction of good research and reasonable conclusions. The questions it raises are our concern today.

—LEWIS C. MATTISON

### Warfare

WARFARE, by Robert Leckie, Harper and Row, \$5.95.

THE dust jacket promises a concise history of warfare with "as much meaning in one paragraph as most authors manage in a page." It doesn't quite come out that way. There is a steady flow of historical references and some helpful tracing of the development of weapons and tactics, but the account is not sufficiently analytical to justify its advance billing. Of course it's a tough job to write a survey of warfare in less than 200 pages, even for a military expert. Mr. Leckie is a sportswriter and an ex-Marine. He has authored a series of books on the American way of war, many of them for "younger readers," and I suspect he has over-reached himself in writing a history of all warfare.

—A.M.B.

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## SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

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more relaxed about pay out analyses. Nonetheless, even as to it, there are outer limits, not the least of which is the tendency of Congress to wish to ensure North American-type substantive audit oversight of lending operations.

Another reason changes are essential in international development institutions is that many social development projects are still highly controversial as to whether they are credibly quantifiable. It is not likely, for example, that national health, primary education, secondary education (other than vocational), and population limitation will in the near future be so measured.

As this is being written, the United States is putting into operation a new institution specifically directed toward social development in the Western Hemisphere. This institution, resulting from the laudable initiative in the House Foreign Affairs Committee will attempt to insulate social development support

from the United States Government, as well as to raise funds from various non-governmental and multi-governmental sources. Its future is still before it.

One established, truly international and universal, sub-institution that could become the world's full-range development agency is the International Development Association (IDA), usually thought of as the "soft lending" window of the World Bank. Inasmuch as IDA does not float bonds for its resources but depends upon periodic contributions from member governments, there is no reason why IDA has to function like a bank. But in practice an IDA loan has been analyzed exactly as a "hard" loan from World Bank bonded capital, except for the hard currency repayment capacity of the assisted country.

Originally, before serious limitations were imposed on IDA during its gestation, it was to be a grant, not a loan, agency. However, as finally constituted, IDA was authorized to give interest-free "credits." Is there a real expectation, deep down in the

Jungian subconsciousnesses of the countries that have funded IDA that IDA "credits" are really payable like World Bank loans? Or, was the shift from grants to loans as IDA evolved a generally accepted sugar-coating of national reluctance to give to the poor countries as the United States had given to the developed but war-damaged Marshall Plan countries? Was the marked shift toward loans in bilateral assistance a similar benign avoidance? My inclination is that the IDA credit could and should be changed to a clear grant basis. But that aside, what is essential is that IDA assistance, even if still called "credits," be freed of the rigors of "bankability" as described above. Only then will we have a multipartite development agency that will have capabilities throughout the social portion of the assistance spectrum.

This shift will require wisdom over the whole spectrum and great objectivity about the institutions of development, whether bilateral or multilateral. Where should this leadership be lodged within the United

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States Government? It would be extremely difficult to answer this question in terms of what I recall from experience in service about the varying senses of mission of the various Executive Branch substitutions that have "interests" in the matter. Suppose USAID is "balkanized" as proposed by the Presidential message version of the Peterson Report and coordination of the "split-up" is transferred to the Executive Office of the President. If this happens, the direction of United States positions in all multinational assistance institutions ought to be there, provided a genuine, driving sense of mission about the validity, urgency, and national interest significance of development assistance exists there. Otherwise, I should be content to see leadership lodged with whatever participating agency gives promise of the most drive. Congressional committee interests must be honored in allocations of authority in the Executive Branch. In the Senate, all foreign assistance is pretty much a Foreign Relations Committee matter, while in the House, the Commit-

tee on Banking and Currency has a leadership role so far as multinational banks are concerned.


In this appraisal of what we might call the "institutional development needs of international development institutions," little has been said about the development funds of the United Nations and the OAS. Both have considerable potential for social development, especially in the grant-funded, technical assistance field.

Unfortunately for the UNDP, the widening chasm between the few rich and the many poor nations, each with eventual recourse to "one country, one vote," seems to have damaged seriously the prospects for significant capital transfers related to development in general through the United Nations. The noticeable lowering of Latin-American "drive" toward getting development assistance makes the outlook for expansion of the OAS fund poor.

The biggest danger to social development is that the new problems when added to its unsolved ones will submerge it in favor of strict-

ly economic development "trickle down" and all that. The "trickle down" problem even exists in the field of social development in a rather insidious form. North Americans, especially well-intentioned lawyers, tend to assume that problems are automatically solved by improving institutions, norms and modalities. Social development inputs could easily take the form of tinkering exclusively with an array of institutions in developing countries, from university administration to stock breeders' associations, without coming to grips with the basic and urgent social justice problems that I believe lie at the heart of social development.

In taking this position I do not contest the overwhelming need for more adequate funding of economic development. No "numbers game" should be played with total amounts if foreign assistance goes mainly multilateral. All I seek to do here is to call attention to the most neglected part of an area of too much overall neglect, benign or otherwise. ■



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Rowena F. Ward, Mgr.—Gladys L. Warner, Asst. Mgr.

## AMERICA AND ASIA

*continued from page 42*

While US trade with Japan is a relatively minor part of the United States economy, Japan is dependent on trade with the United States for its economic livelihood. When one considers the political pressures generated in the United States by increasing imports—which benefit the US economy as a whole—one can understand the violent Japanese reactions to US protectionism which would ravage large sectors of the Japanese economy.

The consequences to the United States—apart from higher prices for textile consumers—may be repudiation of the Japanese-American Security Treaty and disillusionment with capitalism in many Asian underdeveloped countries. Textile manufactures are the major industrial product in which the poorer countries sometimes enjoy a comparative advantage in American markets. The irony of American policy becomes even more acute when one realizes that these textile factories were often constructed with the help of US for-

eign aid. Although not often seen in these terms, I believe that the ultimate success of the Nixon doctrine will hinge as much on our trade policies as on our military commitments. The recognition of this fact is implicit in President Nixon's outstanding basic statement on trade.

As we attempt to Vietnamize the war it will be equally important for us to end the Vietnamization of our Asian policy and vision. It will become clear that the focus of our concerns has been perversely narrow. To develop broader perspectives and more germane policies, we will have to involve every part of the government and society. The changes will be too great and far reaching to be achieved by the President alone.

After two decades of strident misunderstandings—after a decade of harrowing military sacrifice—the President cannot alone bear the political burdens of difficult new choices, cannot alone face full responsibility for preparing the public as we move out of Vietnam and open our eyes to a new world. This

Administration has made prudent and appropriate overtures toward China, and valuable retrenchments in Vietnam. But on the long course ahead, it will need help from all of us.

Therefore I think the lower military profile in Asia envisaged under the Nixon doctrine is unlikely to produce a lower profile in Congress on foreign and military affairs—even though that too may be an unpublicized goal of the President's policy. Continued Congressional debate—even if it sometimes embarrasses our foreign service in the field—is indispensable for the process of public and Congressional education, for which, I predict, the President and the State Department will be the ultimate beneficiaries. If this educational process succeeds, moreover, it will be a triumph for the democratic ideal. We will be able to make this most important time in the life of our country an exciting period of institutional vindication as we "come out" of this war on top of our real national problems. ■



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LETTERS  
TO THE  
EDITOR

### No Guinea Pigs

THE editorial on kidnapping in the June number argues that if prospective kidnapers were encouraged to believe that nations would not ransom their diplomatic personnel, the kidnapers would be discouraged from their grotesque seizures.

My trouble with this point of view is that it seems to be rather unimaginative as to the ingenuity, perversity and cold-bloodedness of the people in the kidnapping business. How fanatics will respond in various situations is, of course, speculative. But the record raises doubts as to the likelihood that such a course of action will dissuade dedicated, well-organized terrorists. It is just as likely that they would have no qualms about seeing if we really meant business, and then eliminating the victim if there were no pay-off.

Moreover, if the rules of what is now a reasonably understood game are changed on our side, I would be confident that the kidnapers club would explore ways of altering the game to suit their purposes. Male diplomats do not exhaust the list of possible targets. Rule changing of this sort by our side might only succeed in escalating the business, in involving others who, until now, have gone unscathed. There are all sorts of other dirty possibilities which the line taken by the editorial either assumes will not be undertaken by kidnapers or is willing to risk whatever reactions would be induced by the recommended international and US stance.

I think it is neither wise nor fitting for any nation to use its overseas representatives as guinea pigs in a guessing game with fanatics.

Name withheld by request

### The Hobgoblin Revisited

I enjoyed and welcome Mr. Caterini's article in the July issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL on "Exercising the Hobgoblin of Conformity." I fully agree that in speaking to ourselves—especially including communications with the American people—we need

to do away with practices which even subtly if not intentionally promote conformity and inhibit expression of views which do not necessarily conform to official policy.

I would question further however Mr. Caterini's automatic acceptance of conformity for Foreign Service officers when speaking with foreign governments, officials, and public. Obviously in implementing policy in negotiations or official statements or public addresses having probable official connotations, US representatives must speak with one voice—and conform to agreed policy. But there is a tendency to carry that over to requiring (again often subtly) an FSO's automatic and complete defense of all US policies everywhere when speaking to any foreigner, even privately. First of all, such conformity as this has a debilitating effect on the officer—you simply cannot be monolithically in favor of every US official position 8 to 12 hours a day in working capacity, and then be open, innovative and energetic when speaking or writing in-house or back to America. (Indeed you lose all the stimulation of mind and spirit that comes out of real discussion with others.) Second, most officers overseas don't defend US policy that way or do it convincingly and we ought to recognize the fact, helping expand the propriety of more honest representation. Third, such uncritical defense of all US policies immediately turns people off. I was with some students in Korea, in an informal home setting, when one asked about some inconsistencies in US policy on Korean reunification. Like a machine with a button pressed, the Political Officer next to me suddenly began reciting the official (twelve year old) line on reunification, obviously from careful memory. When I looked, somewhat embarrassed, at the students I saw them with their eyes cast down, not listening. They had heard that 10,246 times and had wanted a more human, analytical discussion.

What are the appropriate guidelines? It seems to me that it is, as stated earlier, incumbent upon any officer to conform to official policy in any negotiating capacity or any representation, speech, etc. that can be construed as having official relationship to such policy or as being an official statement of US policy. As an individual engaging in numerous every-day informal discussions with people in foreign countries, the officer should be required only (1) to be able to explain the reasons for US policy, and (2) to put those reasons forth in the most cogent and meaningful fashion.

Beyond that the officer should not have to pretend that he personally agrees with the policies if he does not, and he should be able to discuss all arguments on both sides in an open and honest intellectual framework. US policy and representation abroad will not be damaged; indeed it will be made more accepted and believable. We will also be giving witness abroad in practice to our belief in freedom of personal conscience in the United States. That in itself will be impressive.

Adding this to Mr. Caterini's excellent prescriptions will help give us a vital Foreign Service.

PRINCETON LYMAN

Washington

### Conflict Orientation in Media

I want to congratulate you for the excellent discussion you arranged and published in your September issue ("Department Meets The Press"). For someone who has spent quite a bit of time working on both sides of the street I find the discussion more informative and more to the point than any other I have seen since this issue became hot following several of Vice President Agnew's speeches last year.

My own feeling is that it is not so much a matter of good news or bad news. Peter Grose put his finger on one of the key issues when he noted that controversy is interesting. I would use a stronger word and say that conflict is interesting. Having spent more than four years dealing with the press on the hot issue of Vietnam, I found that the biggest problem was posed by the conflict orientation of the news media. I don't blame them for this. I merely take note of it. As a matter of fact I find that in reading newspapers and news magazines and in watching TV I myself am always intrigued and interested in a good fight. At the same time as a government official interested in seeing a full story told I recognize that this conflict orientation often completely skews a report. This problem is all the more serious with TV because editors are looking for reports that have visual impact.

Last fall when some Americans who opposed United States Government policy in Vietnam attempted to demonstrate in the courtyard of the Embassy in Paris, a TV correspondent told me quite frankly that if some blood was spilled or somebody was dragged away by the police kicking and screaming he would have a story. I said to him yes, and that is all that the editors would put on the air. But even if there were one such incident (there wasn't that day) taken by itself

it would not have been a fair picture of what happened in front of the Embassy that day in Paris. He agreed.

ROBERT DON LEVINE

Paris

### Very Large, Russia

CHARLES KOBURGER's article on the development of Soviet naval power was interesting and informative but in the end left me thoroughly confused. I do not know whether to regard the Soviet Navy as a nine-foot midget or a three-foot giant. The flaw in Mr. Koburger's article lies in his technique of analyzing Soviet naval intentions and capabilities by comparing them with US naval doctrine, built around the aircraft carrier. He seems to be arguing that since the Soviets have not added carriers to their long-distance fleets, they do not pose a serious threat to US units such as the Sixth Fleet.

Unhappily for Mr. Koburger, technology has provided the world with more efficient and less expensive ways of neutralizing a carrier-based navy, than building a rival carrier-based navy, and it would have made for a much clearer picture of Soviet naval capabilities and intentions if he had discussed this problem. Instead he is forced to quote rather questionable statistics in support of his argument: "90 percent of the air support provided in the brush fire wars and chronic hostilities of recent years has been carrier-based." Surely Mr. Koburger does not mean that 90 percent of all the sorties flown in Indochina, Korea, Malaya, the Congo, etc. were launched from carriers! I am sure he has some basis for this statement, and it would have been helpful if he had included it.

Mr. Koburger's analysis of the political role of the Soviet long-distance fleets was more perceptive, but I should think that the question of whether the eastern Mediterranean and North Africa are effectively "theirs" is still open to debate.

DENNIS W. KEOGH

Los Angeles

### Loyalty—A Two-Way Street

I am at a loss to understand why the JOURNAL, normally sensitive to such matters, has refrained from any commentary about the case of Mr. Arthur J. Olsen.

Most Foreign Service officers, especially those stationed at home, have read the extensive press coverage reporting the Department's reversing its decision to appoint Mr. Olsen as Director of the Office of Press Relations after he had been offered the position.

This appointment, which does not require advice and consent of the Senate, was apparently cancelled because of pressure brought by a single Senator, for personal reasons. Further it seems that the Senator's objections were based on events which occurred even before Mr. Olsen was in government service.

That such a misfortune could befall a qualified and competent officer is, I feel, a demeaning experience for Foreign Service personnel and can only be a source of discouragement. Not so many years ago Foreign Service morale was weakened when the system refused to protect loyal and responsible officers against a vindictive purge. Loyalty both ways—up and down—should be taken for granted as essential to creating the *esprit* we would like the Service to have.

AMBLER H. MOSS, JR.

Washington

### The Importance of Staffing

THE points made in the article, "The Importance of Attitudes," by Mr. Smith Simpson, in the May 1970 issue of the JOURNAL are very well taken.

With regard to the compartmentalization of consular officers, I should like to add a point or two of my own. The tight staffing pattern referred to by Mr. Simpson does not only make it practically impossible for an adequate training program at FSI to have sufficient inputs of officers at all appropriate points in their careers. It also effectively insulates consular officers from developing political,

economic, or commercial skills or participating in these functions as an adjunct to their consular assignments. In posts where I have served, I have noted that the sheer pressure of work on individual consular officers (brought about in large part by inadequate staffing) leaves them in such a state of physical and mental weariness at the end of each working day that they simply have no energy left to expend on social contacts or other activities ordinarily thought to be part of the sphere of endeavor of the Foreign Service officer abroad. Nor can consular officers, as a practical matter, devote any of the working day to anything other than purely consular activities; workload, pure and simple, effectively keeps each consular officer completely occupied, and without any opportunity to make "trespasses" within the preserves of political or economic officers.

I therefore register a plea for a reasonable extra number of "officer bodies," both to provide for Mr. Simpson's objective of better, more comprehensive in-service training at FSI, and to provide as well for a staffing pattern which would permit consular officers in consular assignments to learn and perform in the "political, informational, cultural, economic and commercial" aspects of the work of the Foreign Service which, as Mr. Simpson put it, have been "from time immemorial" part of consular work.

OLIN S. WHITTEMORE

London

### Life and Love in the Foreign Service

By S. I. Nadler



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