# FOREIGN SERVICE Journal

JANUARY 1971 • SIXTY CENTS

## THE MILITARY AS A MODERNIZING FORCE

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Peru—Luigi R. Einaudi

Service Academies—Edward Bernard Glick

Executive Branch—Adam Yarmolinsky

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# IN THIS ISSUE

## The Military as a Modernizing Force

In searching for effective ways to achieve economic and social progress, country after country has turned to the military to achieve results. Do military men use their technical training and their organizational skills to cut through the barriers which have thwarted less determined civilian regimes? Or do they take advantage of their new status simply to feather their own nests, dealing more harshly with their critics than did their predecessors? These are the pros and cons of the military as a modernizing force, the theme of this issue.

Charles Koburger, a Coast Guard officer, sets the stage for our discussion with a general look at the subject. He concludes that while military regimes come to power on a platform of mobilization for progress, their authoritarianism and their lack of political skill usually hamper the search for mass support and this brings about a new move for replacement.

The US has consistently asserted civilian control over the military when the issue has been joined, but military influence has become steadily more pervasive. This is the general theme behind the chapter from Adam Yarmolinsky's forthcoming book, "The Military Establishment: Its Impacts on American Society."

Luigi Einaudi of the Rand Corporation writes of the military and the Third World, and has also contributed an article on the Peruvian military. He sees advantages in the military direction of countries which have not been able to organize for progress, but in the specific case of Peru, he believes that the "unmanageability" of the country and the tendency of the military to be obsessed with the eradication of corruption and ineptitude have combined to frustrate attempts to become a truly modern nation.

Africa has experienced many a military coup. The lack of long-established institutions has encouraged societies there to call on any group prepared to "get the country moving"; and the group most often ready has been the military. In excerpts from his chapter in "Soldier and State in Africa" (reviewed elsewhere in this issue) Professor Claude Welch of Northwestern concludes that military regimes in Africa can make but a slight contribution to political development because they are not effective in eliciting wide public support.

Edward Bernard Glick takes a look at the military academies in the US and comes up with the recommendation that we need a single National Defense Academy. People planning to serve in foreign affairs related jobs might also go to such an institutions, which would cause students to think along government lines rather than in more parochial terms.

Andreas Papandreou could probably not be expected to give a completely objective opinion about militarism in Greece. In his brief comment which follows, in answer to the JOURNAL's question, he states his belief that the junta is in power primarily to stay in power

## The JOURNAL'S Question and Papandreou's Reply

*Do you believe that the military services are capable of bringing about economic and social progress in countries where they are in power or exert a major influence?*

THE question is of interest only in the context of the industrially underdeveloped societies. It can be argued with some force that in those societies the military represent the only available technocratic elite. Modern military technology does not stand alone. It is supported by complex organizational structures involved in solving complex problems characterized by sophisticated contemporary centralized planning.

The military combines this technocratic expertise with a commitment to serve the "national interest." With impressive potential political power based on the firepower under its command, it is not surprising that the military often usurps the reins of government.

When it does, the promotion of "modernization" of the industrially underdeveloped society is likely. But the military does so in a warped fashion. First, because it overemphasizes centralized organizational structures and administrative processes; secondly, because the national plan it promulgates is essentially that of a society at war, with all the implications for social and economic growth that this carries with it.

It is especially important to stress that military coups in the Third World are often not intended to serve the interests of the nations or of the peoples in whose name they take place—and this quite apart from the fact that the interpretation given to "national interest" by the military is unavoidably elitist. More often than not the military juntas represent an appendage of either one or the other of the two "international" military machines or pyramids with apex in Washington or Moscow. In such cases, under the guise of a "national revolution," the nation experiencing the coup becomes effectively a satellite of either Washington or Moscow. Actually, such coups or "national revolutions" are nothing more than covert super-power interventions in anticipation of either a true national revolution or of a similar intervention on the part of the other super-power.

In conclusion, then, the modernization brought to the Third World by military juntas is often just an aspect of neo-imperialism. ■

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# EDITORIAL

### Another Step Forward Towards Equal Opportunity

THE policy of equal opportunity in employment without regard to race, color, religion, sex or national origin has been reaffirmed by the three major foreign affairs agencies, and AFSA applauds this action. In going one step further, these agencies are instituting a new procedure which provides for a high level review of any exceptions to the policy of equal opportunity, with the determination to be made by the Secretary of State, the Administrator of AID, or the Director of USIA. Requests for exceptions in overseas assignments must have the concurrence of the chief of mission and will be denied unless the evidence is compelling or the circumstances extraordinary.

This is a fair and just policy and the foreign affairs agencies are to be commended for pushing it forward. In particular, Under Secretary Macomber deserves credit for his efforts to obtain equality of opportunity for everyone in the foreign affairs community.

Gone are the days when a country director could say, "I am unalterably opposed to having a woman officer at that post," and make it stick. Now the decision will go to much higher levels and, we are told, the exceptions to the equal opportunity policy will be rare. The practice of rejecting minorities by stipulating that a person of a given race, color, or religion was not acceptable for a given position had largely died out in the 1960s, and under the new regulations sex, too, will be dropped as the rationale for rejecting personnel, with rare exceptions.

It is hoped that the high level review will consider the qualifications of the competing candidates for the positions where minority and sex candidates are rejected, as well as the exceptions to the equal opportunity policy. If qualifications are not considered by a high level review, the practice of adjusting the requirements of a position to eliminate candidates not wanted because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin may continue, and the new policy may well be circumvented.

The policy of equal opportunity in assignments could be seriously undermined if those who make the decisions on individual cases give it only lip service. Some groups in the foreign affairs community, however, have been outspoken on this issue. The feelings of the people most affected, women and minorities, are strong and we would anticipate vigorous pressure to bring about additional changes in personnel procedures should the new measures prove ineffective in bringing equality of opportunity. ■


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### E.O. 11491—Pros and Cons

WILLIAM BRADFORD's resignation from the AFSA Board may be the first time a Board member has left because of a policy difference. He has introduced needed controversy in a responsible way, and I salute him for it.

Bill opposes the Board's decision to seek exclusive recognition under Executive Order 11941 to represent its active members. I think he is completely wrong, and for those of our colleagues who have not yet signed the AFSA petition for an election to determine whether it will represent the foreign affairs community, I would like to say why.

Bill uses strong language but under the rhetoric, I find the substance weak. He is not talking about a Service that many of us below the seventh floor would recognize. He states, for instance, that ever since joining the Foreign Service he considered himself a supervisor, identified his future with that of the Foreign Service, and therefore finds it "ridiculous and repugnant" to endorse an organization that might place him in opposition to the management of the Foreign Service. Those presidential commission holders who disagree with him, Bill considers "psychotic" and "irrational" because they would oppose "the Executive Branch of which they are an integral part."

No one disputes Bill's right to his own impressions of the Foreign Service, but I wonder how many of us share the experience of having been FSO-8 supervisors, or FSO-6 supervisors or FSO-4 or even FSO-3 and FSO-2 supervisors? For years, and most recently by the Task Forces, the paucity of supervisory positions and the 15-year wait to get at them has been recognized as a serious professional problem. Bill talks about supervisors without telling us how he defines the term. In the same way, he dismisses "opposition to the Executive Branch" for holders of presidential commissions as "particularly irrational." Was President Nixon irrational when he stated in the Executive Order that "effective labor management relations within the Federal Service require a clear statement of the respective rights and obligations of labor organizations and agency management?"

This definition of rights and obligations is a crucial part of any meaningful reform of the administration of the Foreign Service. Only a few months ago a real supervisor introduced the Task Force exercise with the memorable phrase that "administration has not been our bag." How can we make administration our bag if we rule out serious dialogue between the administrators and the rank and file members of the Foreign Service by labeling it irrational opposition?

What bothers me about the case Bill makes are the implications that we are all one happy family of super-

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visors and that there are no problems—at least no problems that cannot be waved away by incanting magic phrases like "presidential commission" and "integral part of the Executive Branch." Bill Bradford is by no means the only senior officer who avoids issues by assuming them to be settled. However, the time has passed when the administration of the Foreign Service could be based on myths, romantic notions and meaningless catch phrases. It is time to sit down and define our professional responsibilities and rights in the way the President has directed us. I think we all agree that this is better done from within by Foreign Service people. Indeed, the Foreign Service may not survive much longer unless it learns to manage itself. Bill recognizes a Foreign Service management; it is curious that he does not see the implication of Foreign Service "labor" and the need for effective dialogue between the two. Being required by the Executive Order to formally call AFSA a "labor organization" may offend some sensibilities but it is a small price to pay for making AFSA an effective professional organization. And the alternatives are dismal indeed.

Bill is concerned with unionization. So am I. But nothing will promote the cause and perhaps the eventual triumph of trade unionism in the Foreign Service more than the this-is-the-best-of-all-possible-worlds approach. The O-area request for exclusion of the Foreign Service from the Executive Order has done more for AFGE's membership drive than anything AFGE has done for itself, and the number of our colleagues who see a trade union as the only alternative to a wishy-washy AFSA is growing.

I am not sure what points Bill was trying to make in his interpretation of the Executive Order, but I leave the rebuttal to the AFSA Board. Let me just say that the Order was intended to cover the entire Federal Service, including the Foreign Service, and that narrow legalistic interpretations almost invariably are completely wrong. Once the Department realizes its administration is more efficiently served when the O-Area is in responsible conversation with a representative professional organization than when it deals with a company union or attempts to play off several employee organizations against each other, the relationship under the Order can be broad and creative indeed.

One further point of AFSA's "trading its influence on most of the important matters" (by seeking exclusive recognition). In the crunch, AFSA has had no influence on matters the O-Area does not agree are important. This is why the Board first requested exclusive recognition in 1969. The crucial point then as today is whether AFSA will have *the right* of consultation and negotiation or whether it will continue to speak only at the sufferance of the O-Area. Unless AFSA can make its members' interests felt in policy formulation, it will continue to lose membership and influence, and eventually AFGE or some other effective organization will replace it. Only exclusive recognition under the order will give AFSA the clout it needs; it has no other realistic alternatives.

Finally, I agree with Bill on the basic point that AFSA members should be consulted on the decision to seek exclusive recognition, but his case for amendment of the by-laws is not clear. Unfortunately, AFSA will not have polling procedures until we vote on the JFSOC-proposed amendment to the by-laws now before the membership. It is good to know Bill will be on JFSOC's side this time. Until then,


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all of us can make our position on exclusive recognition known by signing the AFSA request for an election to determine the exclusive representative for the foreign affairs community.

ROBERT F. PFEIFFER
Washington

I HAVE for some time had subversive (to the AFSA establishment) thoughts similar to those expressed by Mr. Bradford in his letter of resignation from the AFSA Board published in the November JOURNAL. I have endeavored to suppress them on the theory that I didn't know all the details of the "trade union" problem and hence had little basis for arguing with those who were grappling with it. The comments from Mr. Bradford, who is obviously fully informed, are therefore of particular significance to me and I believe they deserve the careful study of all AFSA members from youngest recruit to oldest retiree. I believe that one's position on AFSA recognition under EO 11491 should be based on his opinion of Mr. Bradford's concept of the Foreign Service rather than on what AFGE may or may not succeed in doing.

Leaving aside other questions, the AFSA Board's record on the trade union issue does not inspire one with confidence. The August 1969 AFSA NEWS carried the report of a sub-committee appointed to explore the pros and cons of AFSA seeking some kind of recognition under EO 10988 (predecessor of EO 11491, the Board position on which triggered Mr. Bradford's resignation). The sub-committee recommended that the Association seek "formal" recognition and that this proposal be ratified in vote by a majority of AFSA's members. The ink was hardly dry on this report before the Board, on August 27, applied for "exclusive" recognition in respect of FSOs and "formal" for FSRs and FSSs. This action, inconsistent with the sub-committee's recommendations, was reported to the membership, with no mention of ratification by a membership vote, in a letter of September 22 from the Chairman. The reasons given for this action were the Board's dissatisfaction with its informal relations with management and its concern (unexplained) over "growing tendencies of a labor union to claim that it was speaking for Foreign Service Employees." So far as I know the membership was given no further information on subsequent developments, if any, of this round of the trade union fracas.

Now, a year later, we are the recipients of an alarmist plea from the

(*Continued on page* 50)




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# Five Imitations of the Vietnamese

*by William A. Sommers*

I

In the frail light of rising
against the night's waning,
I discovered a haze in the sky:
obscure, morose,
a changeling,
lost between the end of one
and the beginning of the other.

II

His regalia is plumed in darkness.
He is strong in attack
dispensing shrill echoes in the valley,
then hovers, waiting:
A hawk's eye never sleeps
though hawks do.

My friend from the highland thinks
he is the perfect predator
of the mountain sky.

III

Most are mixtures with soft browns
or blues, even a shade of black
in the tail feathers. Only a few are white.
They talk together in gargles
and walk or fly
with such innocence that even I
love them. Ah for doves,
lovely, kiss-eyed, tremulous,
stupid birds.

IV

John Who is now advisor in Nam Dinh
with many answers and only
a few questions. Be careful, John Who,
this is no testing place for random advice:
your novitiate might kill someone.

(After Tran Te Xuong's *Licentiate Nhu*)

V

The sun makes so white a facade
of the Continental whose
hooped arches introduce travelers
to the wonders of Saigon. And there,
when the rain comes you can drink
and be dry and wonder about
people getting drenched without
ever feeling.

Today, every new state feels the need to build an armed force of its own, usually over-size. This represents a national identity.

# The Military as a Modernizing Force

CHARLES W. KOBURGER, Jr.

*Mr. Koburger, the author of "The New Order of Admiralty," in our August issue, is a research analyst (naval affairs) with the Department of Defense. He has contributed articles to the U.S. Naval Institute* PROCEEDINGS, *the* MILITARY REVIEW, *the* NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW *and the* NAVAL ENGINEERS JOURNAL.

GREECE, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Peru, Syria, Egypt, Libya, the Congo, otherwise as diverse as countries can be, today all share one characteristic: military rule. The list is long. There are still others with the same ruling elite. Why? What is the role of the military in these societies? Is the military really a modernizing force? Is there one common explanation?

The answer to this last key question must be yes, there *is* one common denominator. In each case, the country is under severe political, economic and social stress. Although some of them are more developed than others, none has made the full transition from a traditional society to a modern one. Transition releases many social frustrations without providing one strong positive new affirmation as a steadying force. To this aspect of the problem in many cases must be added the strain of an internal or external, real or imagined, threat to their existence. These manifold stresses are often more than a fragile governmental structure can stand.

But why does this lead to military rule? To find even the beginning of an answer requires a preliminary examination of the potential spectrum of military roles in a transitional society. In the broadest terms, the military here usually carries out four functions: it is an important visible symbol of sovereignty; it helps infuse a feeling of nationhood in divided peoples; it helps maintain internal order; and in some cases it defends the people against external threat. But few of these military forces manage to perform all four.

Only a sovereign power may exercise a legal monopoly of force. Both the dimly remembered traditional societies and the better recalled colonial ones exercised this monopoly through armed forces of their own. Today, every new state feels the need to provide such a visible symbol of its sovereignty, and sooner or later builds an armed force of its own, usually oversized. This represents a national identity. All armed forces perform the symbolic function.

Because of inherent nature, any military organization (even one minimally effective) resembles to some degree a modern organization. It *must* be rationalized, mechanized, secularized. The military image being what it is, even in the most traditional societies, its modernization meets relatively little resistance.

When a state builds an armed force, it draws from a cross section of the usually diverse elements of its society. This is especially true when the force is based on country-wide conscription. It forms a national officer caste, which rapidly adopts a middle class outlook. In recruiting and educating this armed force, it provides a new social mobility for the best of the poor, offering an escape from an otherwise hopeless future. It perforce inculcates the often new idea of loyalty to one nation-state. It teaches one common language. It develops a national military uniform, ritual, and myth, thereby infusing a sense of national identity.

Almost all armed forces foster integration; various forms of modernization are a corollary. The new, conscript learns proper personal hygiene. He learns to wear shoes, to read and write. He learns to handle modern tools and mechanical equipment, a valuable skill he easily takes with him when he leaves the military. The officer gains some mastery of modern technology, he learns something of the techniques of modern management, and he develops some awareness of the necessary rational relation of cause and effect. The psychological impact of training also is important.

Despite many too-often repeated opinions to the contrary, little modernization can be accomplished without law and order. One of the preconditions to any real take-off toward economic maturity is the firm establishment of the centralized state. Both of these are contributions of the military, and result in establishing a climate where progress is at least possible.

Rational social development depends on internal order, often taken for granted. Not all military forces are capable of insuring law and order, once challenged.

"Civic action," the conscious, deliberate attempt of the military to get the various people of the new state to identify with them is a technique of counterinsurgency. It also emphasizes the national modernizing role of the military.

The problem of the external threat—real or imagined—is two-sided. Some developing nations *are* faced with significant external threats to their existence or to their other vital interests. These the military should be expected to counter. In professing to do so, the military helps the state identify a *national* enemy; all can rally to fight against that enemy. (The all too obvious advantages of such a unifying action, however, can result in conjuring up non-existent enemies, thus distracting the people from more necessary constructive efforts.) Few of these armed forces are really ca-

(*Continued on page* 49)

Military dictatorship and perhaps even ultimately stagnation may thus be the price of the selfishness of past Peruvian elites.

# Peruvian Military Relations with the United States

*The armed forces of Peru consist of fiercely independent air, navy and army establishments loosely coordinated by a small joint command (Comando Conjunto). Together, the budgets assigned the three service ministries have accounted for just under 20 percent of central government expenditures over the past decade.*

*Peru's total active military officer corps consists of approximately 5,000 (of which some 3,500 are army) and approximately 50,000 soldiers operating what is in many cases antiquated military equipment of World War II and Korean War vintage, and even then in limited quantities and dubious quality. However, what military materiel Peru does have, it manages efficiently enough to be rated by most military observers at or near the top in Latin America.*

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A NUMBER of commentators including Fidel Castro as well as President Juan Velasco Alvarado, [a General in the Peruvian armed forces] have taken to referring to the political process under way since the military coup which deposed [President] Fernando Belaunde in October of 1968 as a "revolution." Although it is not my intent to analyze its program in this paper, I will briefly discuss some general considerations about the present military government.

There are many ways in which to look at what has happened since October 3, 1968, when the Peruvian military, acting institutionally, that is to say, with the Commanding General of the Joint Command leading the coup but supported ultimately in disciplined hierarchical fashion by the three services, proclaimed the assumption of executive authority in behalf of a Revolutionary Government of the armed forces dedicated to the eradication of an "unjust social and economic order." It is likely that some military leaders, and certainly most civilians, expected matters to evolve along fairly traditional lines. The military government, that is, would hold power, maintain order, bring about some necessary changes, and would then return power to elected civilians after a decent interval.

Once in power, however, even military conservatives have been faced with arguments that what was needed was not a coup, but a revolution. In other words, what Peru needed was basic change, starting with the elimination of the discredited parliamentary system, and continuing with all of the reforms Peru's "sham democracy" had "endlessly discussed, but never implemented." The urgency about the need for striking change also gained acceptance as a means of demonstrating that October 3 had been more than "just a coup." Finally, the difficulty of carrying out even moderate reforms became, given the initial commitment of institutional prestige, a source of pressure to produce significant results.

Although military isolation and secrecy had combined with civilian intellectual suspicions of military motives to divide them, military and civilian progressives actually had a good deal in common. Already, before 1968, military and civilian intellectuals had come together over the petroleum issue, which often seemed to make strange bedfellows, through a newspaper, *El Comercio,* which espoused conservative nationalism, and through two institutions, the National Planning Institute, founded originally by the military junta in 1962, and the Center for Higher Military Studies (CAEM), where civilians had for more than a decade occasionally served as guest lecturers. Catholic-inspired social and political activities formed still another point of contact between military and civilian elites.

With some of the barriers of mutual suspicion lowered, a number of attitudes common to both civilian and military progressives emerged. This process of mutual discovery accelerated in the months following the coup, often with surprising results. Among many Peruvians politically socialized since World War II the American Popular Revolution-

ary Alliance (APRA) seemed just another part of the Peruvian establishment. [APRA, founded in Mexico in 1924 by Victor Raúl de la Torre, is the most famous of Latin American Revolutionary nationalist parties.] Dislike for APRA was no longer proof of conservatism. The search for a progressive nationalist solution to Peru's problem often seemed to be taking place in a political vacuum, occupied verbally by all the major parties, but implemented by none.

As the search developed after the 1968 coup, a startling amount of shared ground appeared between often somewhat disenchanted left-wing civilian intellectuals and professionals and military intellectuals and intelligence specialists. As my phrase suggests, these were and are very diverse groups. Many have been educated in the United States, others in France and are receptive to modern social science, particularly as represented by the economic views of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA). Most are strongly anti-Communist, though there is some confusion over what that means in the 1970s in a country with insignificant Communist groups but a mounting social problem.

The political diversity of persons associated with the regime is most visible among the civilians, many of whom had engaged in prior political activity. Some, like the progressive priests who have helped to obtain public endorsement by Peru's Catholic Church of the government's agrarian reform program, had acted outside of the organized party channels. Other civilians in this relatively small but technically competent group included former Apristas, Christian Democrats, and even a few who had belong to the Social Progressive Party (MSP) before it dissolved after the 1962 elections. Most, however, were political independents whose political philosophies ranged from Marxism to conservative Catholicism, and whose political views were often equally discordant.

Through this diversity, however, important common attitudes unite military and civilian technocrats. One such attitude is *elitism,* or acceptance of revolution from above. The military's views of discipline and paternalism are matched by the intellectual's fear of the masses which will neither vote for him nor support his guerrilla adventures. A second common attitude is *dislike for politics,* hatred for congress and for the traditional political party system. From the military side, there is the dislike for debate, disorganization, and corruption. From the radical intellectual side, the view asserts that politicians are "always selling out" to the Americans and to the upper classes, that they play petty politics instead of making a revolution.

For many military and civilian intellectuals, therefore, there is an element of hatred for the historically dominant Peruvian elites on the grounds that they are anti-national. The social and financial elites tend to be whiter in skin, they tend to have "foreign" attitudes—perhaps to the point of betraying national honor. The often conspiracy-minded nationalists made of a reputedly missing "page eleven" in a proposed settlement of the IPC matter [the seizure of the American-owned International Petroleum Company's oil fields and refinery shortly after the military coup d'etat on October 3, 1968] the basis of the political scandal that undid the Belaunde government.

Nationalists, of course, have no monopoly on conspiracy theories. Ever since it became clear that the Revolutionary Government intended substantial changes, the accusation has been voiced that somehow the military were being "dominated by extremist civilian advisors," presumably Communists intent on moving Peru into the Soviet (or Chinese) orbit, or on emulating Cuba. These accusations reflect the fears and ignorance of their originators rather than any serious analysis of the internal workings of the Peruvian government. The suspicion that somehow all progressive intellectuals are "red" and that if they are they will automatically brainwash the military does more than ignore recent Peruvian history: it also reveals a characteristic Peruvian civilian upper class refusal—often shared by liberal Americans—to believe that the military can ever be expected to do anything competently on their own.

In my view, in any case, the internal political diversity of the Peruvian armed forces as a whole will continue to block dominance by any narrowly partisan political group even if one existed. This military diversity, in fact, may perhaps even prevent the adoption of consistent development policies by the military institutions as such over any extended period of time.

The possibility that the military might adopt some form of "revolutionary" strategy has been fed in recent years by increased military concern over the need for modernization of society as a whole as a prerequisite to military survival as a modern institution. Likewise, the possibility that the military might adopt a strategy with "anti-imperialist" overtones has been fed in recent years by increased military suspicion of United States military and economic policies.

Such language, by its very breadth and vagueness, generates confusion and uncertainty. The military government may, as it did with the nationalization of the IPC petroleum complex at Talara, briefly take

dramatic steps of considerable symbolic significance. This is particularly likely in those instances which are apparently amenable to executive action and the issuance of decrees, like that for agrarian reform. Similar acts may even be called for by radical elements of left and right who see the military as a means of outmaneuvering conservative and liberal democratic political opponents. Policies adopted under such circumstances may thus be the result of the development strategy of a specific political group but they are most decidedly not the strategies of the military as an institution.

Taken as a whole, it is unlikely that the military institutions as such will be able to resolve what they are likely to see as a contradiction between military discipline and the partisan political activity required for the organization of development. Internal political diversity constitutes an automatic internal self-regulating mechanism ensuring the development of internal counterweights to controversial policies that threaten military discipline, unity, and hence institutional survival. This dynamic makes it quite unlikely that the military can be bureaucratically controlled for long by any single partisan clique. Should the military officer corps produce individual leaders with a personal vision of the struggle for development, such men will in practice cease to be military officers, becoming instead what Peru's current leaders denounce almost daily, "politicians," while the military institutions withdraw to a less partisan posture.

This analysis implies that if the military is not the counter-revolutionary tool it is often painted to be, neither can it be regarded as a guarantee of progressive development. The thesis of "military as salvation"—for any partisan group—fails on the fact that the normal internal political diversity of the military is heightened by the assumption of responsible political power and the encounter with complexities of government. This transfer of politics into the military institution itself is often shrouded with secrecy because of the threat of fragmentation and hence of possible danger to the very survival of the military institution itself. The result can be sudden swings and shifts in policy within apparent overall government stability, but repression and ultimate withdrawal from power are possible alternative outcomes of reliance on military power for the resolution of political problems.

Additional sources for skepticism about the military's capacity for sustained revolutionary innovation derive from the nature of Peruvian society rather than from the nature of the military itself. I suspect that revolution from above by the military is likely to fail in Peru for reasons similar to those for the failure of guerrillas to lead revolution from below. One of the most important of these common reasons is the unmanageability of Peru, whether it be measured in social, political or administrative terms. Peru, one third of whose people do not speak Spanish, has nearly twice the population of Cuba spread out over an area more than ten times as large, but with less than one-fifth as many television sets per capita. With neither a charismatic leader nor an overwhelming external enemy against whom to unite, can any Peruvian government hope to find and communicate the emotional cement necessary to hold a revolutionary effort together?

The problem is all the greater if there is uncertainty over the programs required to implement the general principles of change. To maintain momentum while the internal policy debates raged, the military turned immediately after assuming power to their traditional interest in "public morality." Few things are more demoralizing than public displays of habitual ineptitude and corruption. A major public scandal over smuggling implicating some officers as well as highly placed civilian friends of President Belaunde had contributed in the spring of 1968 to the atmosphere that later led to the military intervention. One of the first acts of the new revolutionary government, therefore, was to proclaim the need to eliminate graft and corruption. The moralization campaign which ensued included a series of measures to increase efficiency, including a reform of the basic structure of government, creating three additional ministries.

The attempt to improve public administrative services included the unheard-of introduction of time clocks for all public employees (to be punched by supervisors and employees alike) and the slogan "hora exacta, hora Peruana" to replace the traditional Peruvian habit of tardiness accompanied by the statement that the nobody who was on time was operating on "hora inglesa."

The incoming military ministers made a largely unprecedented (except for some members of the 1962 junta) public accounting of their wealth upon assuming office, and there can be no doubt that the government leadership as a whole has good intentions. Some ministers, in fact, appear to be incorruptible to the point of fanaticism. Harsh and immediate legal proceedings were instituted in the spring of 1969 against those officials of the Ministry of Finance and of the Central Bank, military as well as civilian, who could be charged with corruption or incompetence in the granting of an export license permitting the International Petroleum Company to withdraw funds from Peru.

The government's severity sent a shudder of fear throughout the civilian bureaucracy, and appears also to have frightened many private citizens with the technical competence needed if Peru is to enlist intelligence and knowledge to public service.

Excessive zeal in the eradication of corruption and ineptitude can heighten the deficiencies of public administration. This irony is perhaps most evident in an underdeveloped country with a large marginal population. In such a society, any educated man has means disproportionate to the environment as a whole. A sensitive member of the middle or upper classes from which senior public officials must of necessity be drawn finds it almost impossible to live in Peru without somehow feeling corrupt, if only because he lives well while others subsist in a near-animal state.

To offset the shortages in administrative personnel automatically imposed by the adoption of new government programs such as agrarian reform, the government has attempted to turn to retired officers and to church personnel. Again, a quick consideration of the numbers involved reveals the poverty of

Peru's resources compared to the magnitude of the task. There are fewer than 2500 priests in all of Peru. Even assuming that most clerics are prepared (and free) to cooperate with the authoritarian military in the common cause of development, this is simply not a very large pool from which to draw. Finally, the limits on resources external to the military as a means of expansion of the bureaucracy are underscored by the fact that there are even fewer retired officers still young enough to be useful than priests.

As the time has passed, therefore, increasing numbers of officers have been assigned to the nonmilitary ministries, often occupying senior and even middle-level posts previously occupied by civilians. This proliferation of military officers in what would normally be considered civilian functions can be explained partially as attempts at reform and partially as a method of political control. The presence of many of Peru's best young generals in the ministerial portfolios should also be considered a sign of the depth and likely continuity of military governmental commitment.

The assignment of officers to previously civilian administrative functions may create tensions within the military itself, however. Officers holding administrative posts draw extra basic pay allotments denied those remaining on line duty in the barracks. This irritant may act as a catalyst for morale and other issues contrasting military "politicians" unfavorably with military "professionals."

Of greater immediate concern is the possibility for demoralization of the senior civilian element of the bureaucracy. Many civilian public servants have long practical experience in day-to-day management of affairs in areas only vaguely understood by the military men who now not only block their chances for promotion, but seem, with their insistent demands for revision and change, to imply that previous efforts were incompetent. Bureaucrats know too well the difficulties of innovation.

One of the political functions of the military in Peru has traditionally been to act as a means by which ambitious and talented civilian leaders could take office without having to undertake the messy business of organizing or currying the favor of political parties. As a means of bypassing the party system, which certainly has not always been a paradigm of statesmanship, the military has enabled the nation to draw in more or less "routine" fashion upon the intelligence of some of its more competent civilians.

Whatever the merits of such a pattern (and to one raised in the United States they appear dubious), the current military intervention, with its insistence upon military decisionmaking and military control of key positions, suggests that the Peruvian military, under the leadership of the army, is attempting to erect itself as a super-bureaucracy dominating the state in the search for a modern nation. This attempt to run a government that is military to this degree is without precedent. It is a marked change even with regard to contemporary military regimes in other Latin American countries, as Brazil and Argentina, where civilians have continued to exercise key policymaking functions.

For Peru, the ultimate problem may be that its strength may not lie in its bureaucrats and intellectauls, military or civilian (both of whom are generally looked down upon by social and economic elites), but in the private sector. The tragedy is that this private sector has until now acted in such a private manner as to discredit itself by appearing to deny the national goals to which the military, more than any other group in Peru, is dedicated. Military dictatorship and perhaps even ultimately stagnation may thus be the price of the selfishness of past Peruvian elites. The extent of that price will be determined by the political wisdom and flexibility of the military and their civilian associates as they seek to lead Peru to an improved accommodation with the pressures of modernity.

WHAT role can United States policy play in this process? What role should it play? For the United States, the extent and nature of military participation in the governing of Peru since 1968 complicates the already difficult question of the American role in events on foreign shores.

From an intellectual viewpoint also, the recent history of the Peruvian military should underscore the inadequacies of the often arbitrary and uncertain distinction between "military" and "civilian" governments.

United States military relations with Peru were, with the exception of a naval mission, minimal until the Second World War. War time led to a vigorous US military policy throughout Latin America, seeking the ousting of Italian and German military missions, and, with the collapse of French missions, to their gradual replacement by United States Army and later Air Force missions in an attempt to establish US regional military supremacy.

The doctrine covering the military relation with Latin America, which arose during World War II, were given institutional form in the Inter-American Defense Board, and led to the signing of the 1947 Rio Pact, was that of hemispheric defense. Defense of the hemisphere against external attack, presumably from the Soviet Union and its allies, reached its height after the outbreak of the Korean War with the signing of mutual defense pacts with most Latin American countries. In Peru, this agreement was signed during the (elected by imposition) Presidency of General Manuel A. Odria, who was later decorated by the Eisenhower Administration.

The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of February 22, 1952 between the United States and Peru (3UST2890-2900) committed both Governments to make available to each other:

> "equipment, materials, services, or other military assistance . . . designed to promote the defense of the Western Hemisphere . . . in accordance with defense plans

under which both Governments will participate in missions important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere."

Under the agreement, Peru undertook not to use such assistance for "purposes other than those for which it was furnished" and committed itself to "take all reasonable measures which may be needed to develop its defense capacities."

United States military grant assistance to Peru under this and subsequent agreements has been substantial. Cumulative grant materiel deliveries from FY 1950 to 1965 inclusive were $59.3 million, equivalent to about six percent of Peru's military expenditures. This sum is but one-third that provided to Brazil during the same years, but otherwise Peru is second only to Chile (and comparable to Colombia) in receipt of US grant military assistance in dollar value. Public breakdowns of these deliveries by item rather than by value are not available. All three services have apparently benefited, though it is likely that the navy has had the most success over the years in obtaining desired equipment. Deliveries under hemispheric defense concepts appear to have peaked with support for antisubmarine warfare operations leading in 1959-1960 to loans to Peru of US naval vessels, including a floating dry dock and a destroyer. In the mid-50s, the United States Export-Import Bank had provided credit for the purchase of two submarines. This program, however, did not exclude continuing Peruvian purchases of important equipment, including for example two naval cruisers obtained from Great Britain in 1958. A similar pattern held for the other services.

This development of the military assistance program (MAP) brought about a subtle change in the US military missions to Peru. Previously, US missions, like those of other foreign powers, were contracted on a service-to-service basis. The Peruvian ministries of air, navy or war (army) would separately contract with the appropriate foreign military department, often also at a service level, for individual officers and training services. American military missions had been operating in this fashion in Peru since the naval mission of 1922. By the mid-50s, when a new army mission agreement was signed in 1956, the naval mission agreement dated from 1940, the military aviation mission agreement from 1946. Peru traditionally shared the cost of the missions with the United States, leading Peru to consider the missions as in their service. With the advent of MAP, however, military missions functions and responsibilities were somewhat clouded by their assumption of the duties of supervision of use of American supplied equipment normally performed by military assistance advisory groups (MAAG) in countries where no missions had existed previously.

This political, if not legal, confusion was compounded in the early 1960s by new US regulations designed to ensure effective coordinating of military policy with political and economic considerations. To this end the US missions were to be brought under a single head, who would himself be a member of the US country team under the ambassador. The missions were thus collectively redesignated a "Military Group" although the Peruvians never recognized the Military Group and continued to operate under the terms of the individual mission agreements.

Since 1966, when the Military Group (or three missions, depending on to whom one talked) had 66 members, including 32 officers, 33 enlisted men, and one civilian, the numbers of US military personnel serving in advisory capacity in Peru has steadily declined. In part, this has been due to a general reduction of the US military presence in Latin America. Increasing Peruvian military disappointment at the failure of the US missions, as we shall see presently, to provide access to equipment suitable for external defense functions, or other services desired by the Peruvians, also contributed to the decline. By early 1969, the Military Group was down to a level of 19 officers and 19 enlisted men, as officers whose terms of duty had expired were not replaced. Finally, in May 1969, after US military sales to Peru were halted by application of the Pelly Amendment after Peruvian navy enforcement of 200 mile claims at the expense of US tuna boats, the Peruvian government requested that the US missions be withdrawn by July 1.

The ambiguity of function was underscored when the United States indicated that such a withdrawal, unless Peru accepted a MAAG, would require the termination of all MAP deliveries. Unwilling to lose all contact, the governments compromised on a MAAG attached to the United States Embassy of three officers and four enlisted men supervising delivery of items already in the pipeline.

The reduction of US military advisory activity paralleled in many ways similar reductions in the overall military assistance program. According to information supplied to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the grant military aid program for Peru for FY 1969 contained no materiel grants and a total of $800,000 for training only. Undelivered materiel from prior years plus amounts delivered to Peru after the coup of October 3, 1968 included vehicles ($138,000), maintenance equipment ($40,000), aircraft support equipment ($12,-000), ship support equipment ($13, 000) and other spares and support equipment. Grant assistance was thus down to less than one percent of the Peruvian military budget. The absolute amount is placed in some perspective when compared to the order in March 1970 by the Peruvian Air Force of 16 de Havilland of Canada Buffalo STOL transports for development purposes at a cost of $60 million. In FY 1970, US grant military assistance, *for all of Latin America,* was $21.4 million, down from the FY 1966 peak of $80.7 million.

Behind the changes in both amounts and types of assistance lies a story many of whose details are still unclear, although its lessons may have implications for United States policy that far exceed either Peru or the purely military sphere. Beginning under the Kennedy Administration, after the Soviet Union's discovery of the potential autonomy of the "Third World" from the former colonial powers, and given added immediacy in Latin America by the rise of Cuban-inspired guerrilla activities, the United States adopted a military policy in support of what came to be known as "counterinsurgency and civic action," to



capable of breaking the sound barrier unloaded, but which would have amply replaced the FAP's disintegrating F-80s), the US government procrastinated under Congressional pressure until it was too late to prevent the angry purchase of more expensive and sophisticated French Mirages capable of twice the speed of sound.

After Peru's elected civilian government had made this purchase in 1967, with the unanimous support of Peru's Congress, the United States, which had resumed economic assistance in 1966 after freezing it in 1965 over the ever-present uncertainty over the status of the International Petroleum Company, reduced economic assistance again because of legislation and pressures emanating from Congress. First, Peru's elected civilian government was forced to spend more than it (or its air force) wanted to spend. Then, Peru's elected civilian government was weakened by a fine from the leaders of the Alliance for Progress. Civilian and military leaders were united in baffled resentment at a United States policy which refused to sell them aircraft the US was simultaneously providing to Ethiopia on a grant basis.

provide the security for the Alliance for Progress. This virtual abandonment of the hemispheric defense doctrines in favor of new internal security doctrines was also partially based on the desire to give a new orientation to United States military policies, which had in the late 1950s come under increasing attack from American liberals critical of military dictatorships, particularly those of Generals Fulgencio Batista in Cuba and Marcos Perez Jimenez in Venezuela, but including also that of General Manuel Odria in Peru.

At a programatic level, the doctrinal shift led to US support for mobility, communications, and "nation-building" activities designed to win popular support for the military and thereby deny it to potential insurgents. In Peru, after 1961, the military assistance program helped equip four engineer battalions. AID and Export-Import Bank loan funds were also made available to purchase road-building equipment which the Department of Highways turned over to the military to operate.

The United States switch from hemispheric defense concepts to the newer internal security doctrines was also accompanied by a subtle reversal of the United States' implicit position on military expenditures. Under the mutual defense agreements, countries had accepted the responsibility of maintaining certain units for the common defense. This effectively associated the United States by international agreement with an obligation to maintain certain expenditures. The internal security emphasis now was accompanied by pressure to reduce military expenditures to free additional funds for development purposes. Suddenly liberal US congressmen in particular pictured the Latin American military as engaged in massively unnecessary military expenditures.

This new emphasis unfortunately coincided in Peru (as in most other Latin American countries) with the increasing obsolescence (and hence danger and costliness) of much military materiel obtained after World War II and Korea. So long as the United States considered itself a military ally with an interest in hemispheric defense, there was the possibility it would defray, through assistance programs, some of the expense associated with the increasingly sophisticated equipment the United States and other superpowers were building for their own use (but which tended to be the only equipment available, thereby forcing smaller states to either opt out or to escalate even if merely replacing one aircraft with another). The shift in the Latin American military doctrine of the United States dashed hopes of cushioning the economic and political impact of military "modernization," and seemed even to deny validity to the hemispheric regional or other external defense functions of the Latin American military. Implicitly, "counterinsurgency" doctrine also tended to confirm the military as wardens in their own societies, an aspect of their traditions few officers relished, and which (at least in Peru) they were increasingly coming to question.

Under these circumstances, the changed emphasis seemed to suggest to many (including both military men and anti-American radicals of left and right) that the United States sought to deny the very institutional being of the Latin American military by making of them a special political police. These suspicions were heightened by US delays and later refusals to allow acquisition of "sophisticated" military weapons. When the Peruvian air force sought to purchase Northrup Aviation's F-5 (a relatively cheap jet fighter barely

Before exploring the implications of these views, however, it seems necessary to consider other aspects of US military relations with Peru. The F-5 case suggests that considerations characteristic of general Alliance for Progress policy were applied to arms sales, whether or not this was in the long run interests of the United States. Did the same hold true for US mission and training activity? One of the chief sources of Congressional concern over armaments was the fear that US military policies were contributing to the militarization of Latin America in direct contradiction of the Alliance for Progress.

We have already seen that difficulties of definition, accounting, and secrecy, make it hard to draw an accurate picture of the specific content of the military assistance program, whether in deliveries or training, and even less so in results. A review of the nature and impact of the foreign training of Peruvian military officers, for example, reveals both how little is actually known

about the relevant details and how infinitely complex any assessment of the effects of training must be.

Generally speaking, it is clear that increased professional education, whether within Peru or abroad, has obviously not taken the military out of politics. On the contrary, by promoting self-confidence and international awareness, training may actually increase the military's desire and capacity for political participation. Incomplete quantitative data suggest that the more highly trained officers are, the more likely they are both to attain the top ranks and to participate in politics.

Of the army general officers serving in Peru in the period from 1960 to 1965, some 49 percent had received foreign training of some kind. This training had varied from brief orientation sessions in the Canal Zone to attendance at technical courses of some months' duration in the United States to *étages* of up to two years "on assignment" with a unit in the French army before World War II.

By comparison with previous periods, the 1960s saw the rise to numerical predominance of general officers whose training had taken place in the United States as compared to France. Of those who had studied abroad, often in more than one country, 75 percent had done so in the United States, 30 percent in France and 10 percent in other countries, principally Italy, Britain and Belgium. Although the absolute numbers were larger, on a relative basis, foreign-trained officers were fewer in the 1960-65 period than previously. In 1940, for example, 8 out of Peru's 9 army general officers had received training in France and even in 1950 three-fourths of army general officers had received foreign training compared to but one-half in the 1960s.

Actual numbers for individual students and types of training are difficult to obtain in global terms except from individual installations. The single largest block I know of is made up of 562 Peruvian Air Force (FAP) enlisted specialists (not officers) trained in the 20 years from 1950-1969 in aircraft maintenance and related skills at the Inter-American Air Force Academy at Albrook Air Force Base, Canal Zone. The technical proficiency established as a result of these bilingual courses is a matter of pride to both the FAP and the USAF. It is difficult to assign major political importance to this training effort, however, other than the maintenance of cordial working relations between similar components of Peruvian and American society.

During approximately the same period, from 1947 to 1967, some 324 Peruvian officers, 80 percent of them lieutenants or captains, attended courses at the United States Army School for Latin America at Fort Gulick on the other side of the Isthmus of Panama. Initially, course offerings appear to have been standard World War II type weapons and logistics courses. From the early '60s on they centered increasingly on unconventional warfare operations and communications, subjects which were also taught to some 127 enlisted specialists from Peru in the 1964-67 period. Not until the 1980s will significant numbers of the junior officers taking Canal Zone courses occupy senior command positions in the Peruvian Army. By 1990, however, about one field grade officer in three may have had at least a cadet orientation from the United States.

Seen against the background of substantial and improving Peruvian military educations, the assessment of the impact of this American training would suggest that it is relatively marginal on most matters of day-to-day behavior, and that its effects must be sought at the level of technical skills and general values rather than in support of specific US policies or operations.

If any broad generalizations can be made on the basis of individual conversations, they would include the likelihood that in addition to supplemental competence in the specific (generally technical) subject matter studied, the officers develop more realistic assessments (negative as well as positive) of the United States than if they had never been exposed. Indeed, US training, while often producing admiration for many things American, is more likely to produce critics than supporters of specific US policies toward Latin America.

Such mixed emotions have been more common than not among Peruvian officers since at least the early 1960s. In 1962, when the Peruvian military, acting under the chairman of its joint staff, installed a military junta, the United States refused to recognize the new government and suspended both military and economic assistance. This act shocked many military leaders who believed they had acted out of progressive and nationalist sentiments essentially in harmony with the social and economic reform goals of the Alliance for Progress. In fact, given their own constitutional mandate "to guarantee the fulfillment of the constitution and the laws" (Art. 213, Constitution of 1933) most officers were probably no more ethnocentric in their belief that they acted democratically than were the Americans who criticized them for not living up to the precepts of the United States Constitution.

Peruvian military criticism of the United States tends, nonetheless, to be more realistic on most issues than that of many civilians. Most Peruvian officers know too much through their visits and training to harbor many illusions about the extent of American power. Officers may not, however, be as sophisticated about economic relations with the United States as success in the rather cosmopolitan world of international finance may require. Past US policy reversals under pressure, particularly after the 1962 coup, may have convinced some Peruvian military leaders (possibly erroneously) that the United States will change its policies, and even ignore US legislation, like the Hickenlooper Amendment, if challenged firmly enough.

Relations between the United States and Peru since the 1968 coup can be described as on the whole cool, but with varying degrees of hostility kept generally under control. The recognition of the Soviet Union was a clear demonstration of a desire to assert Peruvian independence of the United States. The expulsion in May 1969 of the United States military missions from Peru was primarily an attempt to retaliate politically for suspension of US military sales under the Pelly Act, but was also a sign of the prior deterioration of military relations between the two countries. This deterioration, it seems clear, was probably more the result of political considerations, (IPC, 200-miles, etc.), than

(*Continued on page* 46)

What role did African armies play in nation-building and state-building before seizure of control became widespread?

# The Roots and Implications of Military Intervention

**CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR.**

*This is excerpted from the chapter of the same title in the book "Soldier and State in Africa," edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr., published by Northwestern University Press, 1970. Reprinted by permission.* *Copyright © 1970 by Northwestern University Press.*

POLITICAL violence is no stranger to Africa. One scholar recently estimated that 300 to 400 acts of political violence occurred in the sub-Saharan region from 1946 to 1964. In few of these, however, were African soldiers the direct initiators. The "man on horseback" familiar to students of Latin American history or the military president common in Middle Eastern history did not play any significant role in African states in the 18 years after World War II. It seemed as though the new countries of post-colonial Africa would escape the dreary round of coup and counter-coup typical of Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Such, at least, was the hope.

Students of African political change almost totally neglected the role of the military until the uprisings noted earlier made the omission distressingly obvious. Writings on African armies were practically nonexistent. The armed forces were not considered to have the potential to become a meaningful independent political force. Major emphasis rested, rather, upon "charismatic leadership," "institutional political transfer," "mass parties," and similar slogans used by political scientists.

Most African states gained independence through constitutional negotiation, through pressure exerted by party leaders against colonial powers relatively willing to withdraw. Self-government did not come through military action. Tropical Africa (leaving aside the territories still under Portuguese control) had no Bolívar, San Martín, or Ho Chi Minh. The so-called "African revolution" thus differed from many other great political changes: hegemony was handed over without large-scale civilian uprisings, campaigns of civil disobedience, or other techniques of political violence, in most cases. Algeria provided the exception, and the tensions born of revolution greatly disrupted post-independence political change.

As a result of the peaceful transfer of power, pressed by nationalist movements, African leaders tended to ascribe extraordinary powers of social, economic, and political transformation to political parties. They were to function as "mobilization systems," recreating African society and its economic underpinnings along new lines. The political kingdom offered the key to further advance, for "all things shall be added to it," according to the slogan popularized by Kwame Nkrumah. In such a setting the military appeared unessential, perhaps irrelevant. However, the failure of political parties to achieve their objectives of change and to maintain widespread popular enthusiasm helped prepare the way for army intervention.

Broadly speaking, African leaders confronted two major post-independence challenges, nation-building and state-building. Nation-building required the inculcation of political loyalties to the system as a whole, transcending the bounds of kinship, language, and locale. "The

African nationalist," Rupert Emerson wrote in 1960, "still has before him almost the entire task of creating the nations in whose name he professes to speak." National unity became the "supreme value and goal." Since political parties had demonstrated their efficacy in the achievement of independence, why not continue to rely upon them in the post-independence reforging of society? The task of state-building involved a distinct series of challenges. Here, emphasis rested upon efficient administration, economic development, further specialization and expansion of the civil service—not upon fealty to the major political leader or mobilization of popular enthusiasm within a political party framework. Nation-building appeared to rest largely upon the political party, state-building upon the bureaucracy.

What role did African armies play in nation-building and state-building before seizure of control became widespread? The answer is simple. They usually remained on the sidelines. African leaders depended upon parties and administrative hierarchies, not upon the relatively small forces inherited from the departed colonial power.

Resentment against colonial rule was thus channeled through political parties, not through military uprisings. Wishful thinking may also have contributed to the lack of attention. No doubt many scholars hoped Africa might avoid, in its political change, the vicious cycle of coup and counter-coup that earlier had rocked Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. What they forgot for the moment was the lesson expressed by Thomas Hobbes: Politics resembles a game of cards; hence, players must agree upon trumps. In politics, if no other card is agreed upon, clubs become trumps. Such was the case in tropical Africa in the mid-1960s.

The military seizures of control that rocked the sub-Saharan area from mid-1965 on cannot be attributed to a single factor. The complexity of events belies simple, unicausal analysis. Many political systems were involved, each with distinct heritages and problems. To assume that "popular discontent" or "economic stagnation" or "neocolonialist interference" brought about the coups d'état does not do justice to the unique combinations of circumstances. Rather than search for a sole cause, we must examine a series of factors, the salience of whose components differs from one African state to another.

Significant factors that helped promote military intervention may be summarized in this form:

1. Declining prestige of the major political party, as exemplified by
   a. increased reliance upon force to achieve compliance,
   b. a stress upon unanimity in the face of centrifugal forces, and
   c. a consequent denial of effective political choice.
2. Schism among prominent politicians, thus weakening the broadly based nationalist movement that had hastened the departure of the former colonial power.
3. Lessened likelihood of external intervention in the event of military uprising.
4. "Contagion" from seizures of control by the military in other African countries.
5. Domestic social antagonisms, most obviously manifested in countries where a minority group exercised control (e.g., the Arabs in Zanzibar, the Watusi in Burundi).
6. Economic malaise, leading, to "austerity" policies most affecting articulate, urbanized sectors of the population (members of labor unions, civil servants).
7. Corruption and inefficiency of government and party officials, a corruption especially noticeable under conditions of economic decline.
8. Heightened awareness within the army of its power to influence or displace political leaders.

Once civilian governments have been ousted, the leaders of military intervention seek to justify their seizure of control. To "prove" that installation of an army regime was necessary is a first order of business. But the newly installed rulers must go a step further, and proclaim their goals for the country. Possibly the most important theme sounded by the military leaders has been "national reconstruction." Though wording varies, the import remains identical: Politicians have failed to resolve the fundamental economic, political, and social problems confronting the state; only a transitional period of military rule can purge the political system of its inadequacies. And, of course, only a period of military rule can restore the professional autonomy of the armed forces.

Rhetoric must not be confused with probability of action, however. The promises of renovation and rebuilding may prove hollow. Can a military-based government cope any more successfully with the difficulties which civilian regimes encountered? Are some of these problems susceptible to solution by means congenial to the governing military junta, in ways that escaped the preceding civilian regime? What are the ways in which a military background might contribute to nation-building and to state-building?

To answer these complex questions, we must examine the process of political change—its directions, its causes, its implications. Using a threefold definition of political development ("purposeful political change in certain directions"), I shall consider how military rule could theoretically contribute to political development, then illustrate how the difficulty of building political legitimacy complicates the tasks of military-based governments.

The constituent elements of political development have been subject to heated debate among scholars. Three major aspects recur in most definitions:

1. An increased centralization of power in the state, coupled with the weakening of traditional sources of authority.
2. The differentiation and specialization of political institutions.
3. Increased popular participation in politics, and greater identification with the political system as a whole.

As organizations, armed forces are characterized by centralization, discipline, hierarchy, communication, and *esprit de corps*. To function effectively, they require a clearly defined chain of command, with

ular structures (institutions) for their accomplishment. Clearly, the armed services epitomize such differentiation of function and specialization of structure.

The high degree of specialization within the armed services contrasts not only with the "fused" traditional social setting, but also with other "modern" groups. Few political parties in Africa, for example, can match the centralization, discipline, hierarchy, *esprit de corps,* and speed of communications manifested by even the smallest professional armies on that continent.

Many commentators on the role of the military in developing countries have focused upon the impact of army training upon both officers and recruits. It stands to reason that extended military service, under certain conditions, will weaken an individual's primary identification with his village, region, and ethnic group.

Author Morris Janowitz speaks of the military offering training for technical and administrative skills, as well as basic literacy and citizenship. Authors Daniel Lerner and Richard D. Robinson note that the Turkish army became "a major agency of social change" precisely because it spread among Turkish rural youth "a new sense of [national] identity—and new skills and concepts as well as new machines." But do these observations apply with equal force to tropical Africa?

To answer this question, we must distinguish between the overall organization of the armed services and the effect upon individuals of experience within them. The armies of tropical Africa are small and relatively simple in organization. Contrasted with the large, complex standing armies of many states of Southeast Asia, Latin America, or the Middle East, the armed forces of sub-Saharan Africa currently exist at a completely different order of magnitude. Taking eastern, western, central, and black-ruled southern Africa together, only two states (Congo-Kinshasa and Ethiopia) had armies larger than 19,000 in 1966—and both countries had received extensive external assistance to build these forces. . . Putting the matter in another way, the ratio of military to civilian population in tropical Africa is about 1 per 1,131—compared to 15 per thousand in the United

adequate communications to ensure that orders are carried out, and with means of disciplinary control. Effective military organization, almost by definition, demands a high degree of centralization.

In organizational terms, thus, the armed forces appear to be a paragon of a "modernized" political system.

Such an appearance is deceiving, however, unless one realizes that centralization is effective only if the right of the central entity to rule is widely accepted. Authority may be defined as the acceptance of certain individuals or offices as possessing a legitimate right to leadership. The exercise of authority presupposes "a community of opinions, values and beliefs, as well as of interests and needs," as author Carl J. Frederich says. Applied to the context of military intervention in politics, the question of authority centers on the act of seizing control: Is this regarded as usurpation, or as a rightful act? In other words, by their ousting of the civilian government, do the armed forces become the legitimate wielders of authority? Can the military develop the "community of opinions, values and beliefs, as well as of interests and needs" that constitutes authority?

For a tentative answer, let us turn briefly to Hobbes's analogy between politics and a game of cards. In both, Hobbes suggested, the participants must agree upon what constitutes legitimate power—what is authority, which cards are trumps. If no card is agreed upon, then clubs—force of arms—become trumps. Where confusion prevails over the source of authority, the possibility of military intervention increases significantly; should intervention occur, the leaders of the coup will attempt to convert their power into authority. Their prospects for success depend upon developing political institutions with a capacity for effective change—a point to which we shall return.

Weakening of traditional sources of authority does not necessarily result from centralization of government functions. To replace traditional, religious, familial, and ethnic political authorities by a single, secular, national political authority obviously requires time, favorable conditions, communications based upon similar values and a growth in mutual confidence. In the absence of favorable conditions, attempts at centralization may touch off major countervailing forces. Tensions may be exacerbated; would-be centralization can bring disintegration.

To put the matter simply, the "modern" organizational characteristics of the armed forces—centralization, discipline, hierarchy, communications, and *esprit de corps*—may readily break down under the stresses of military intervention. Clearest evidence for this collapse comes from what may be deemed "second-stage" coups d'état, in which junior officers turn against those senior officers who previously had seized political control. Three such coups in West Africa manifested the collapse of effective military discipline.

In a traditional setting the many functions carried out within a society may be "fused," in author Fred W. Riggs's phrase. A modern setting, on the other hand, is characterized by differentiation among these functions and the development of partic-

States, 10 for the United Kingdom and the Middle East, and 5 for the Maghreb states. Further, African armed forces consist almost entirely of infantry. The few specialized units (air forces, paratroop units, navies) are highly dependent on foreign military assistance and training, if not on expatriate personnel.

It has frequently been stressed that African states are riven with differences arising from conflicting "primordial sentiments." As the subtitle of a recent book inquired, should Nigeria be considered in terms of tribes, people, or race? The fact is often expressed in the antinomy of "tribalism" and "nationalism"—admittedly inadequate and possibly misleading terms to characterize complex phenomena. More appropriately, one should say that ethnic loyalties for most Africans are not yct fully complemented by identification with the country as a whole: Aizo, Fon, or Bariba rather than Dahomey; Bamileke, Bassa, or Bulu rather than Cameroon. Recognizing the limited extent of "national" loyalties, or, in somewhat different terms, the low level of national political integration, African political leaders have often viewed the state, or a dominant party, as the "architect" of the nation.

Obviously, it would be preposterous to assert that nationalism as a factor underlying political authority in African states cannot be enhanced. The major question, rather, is whether African governments *under military auspices* will have greater likelihood than their civilian predecessors in developing nationalism as a basic support for political authority.

The answer, simply, is No. The copious literature on integration generally argues that nation-building requires extended time and favorable conditions. As a process, nation-building cannot be unduly hurried. Ethnic and cultural divisions appear remarkably durable, be they in Belgium or in Congo-Kinshasa, in the United States or in Nigeria.

Granted that the ethnic divisions of African states impede the growth of political legitimacy based upon nationalism, are there other bases on which military-dominated governments might seck to achieve legitimacy? The jubilation that accompanied the overthrow of Nkrumah and other unpopular politicans would appear to indicate widespread approbation for various coups. Harlley, Kotoka, and their cohorts profited from "popular exhaustion and tacit or active support for the dismantling of sclerosed political institutions," the AFRICAN RESEARCH BULLETIN said. By removing venal and autocratic rulers—whether by incarceration, assassination, or exile—the military rulers emphasized the break with the past. Political parties were banned, on the basis of the corruption and authoritarianism of their previous leaders. One may ask, however, whether this distaste for politicians and support for the military will persist for more than a few months.

No groups of rulers can long base their claims for legitimacy on acrimony and memory of previous injustices. If the new military governors of African countries intend to remain in power for an extended period they must seek to build the capacity of governing institutions, in terms both of legitimate organizational strength and skillful usc of resources. There are three interlocking ways that African military rulers might seek to achieve legitimacy: (1) gain or create social and political basis for support; (2) avoid recourse to excessive use of force; 3) build effectiveness over an extended period.

Given the contemporary characteristics of both African states and their military establishments, none of these means will likely bring about legitimacy.

To rule effectively, having once achieved power, military leaders must develop political organizations of civilian types, or work out viable relations with civilian political groups. There are no other paths toward political development. Military governments will confront the same problems of ethnicity and economic stagnation that confronted civilian governments. The centralized authority and functional specialization of armies may promote intervention, but they do not enhance the possibilities for effective governance based upon legitimate governmental strength. The military rulers of Africa often lack bargaining skills. Their impatience with politicians—their "politics of wanting to be above politics" as author Morris Janowitz says—leads them to distrust the slow, difficult process of coalition-building. Having banned political parties, and likely lacking the abilities to build parties afresh, the African military may well not promote political development. They cannot build legitimate political institutions through the use of force; they cannot transplant their organizational style to the civilian realm; they are not equipped to bring stability, modernization, or political participation; and they lack sufficient flexibility and innovativeness to govern effectively. Indeed, once members of the armed services recognize their inherent limitations in governing, the prospects for a return to civilian rule brighten.

It is notoriously easier for the armed forces to seize control than to give it up. Having taken the reins of power in order to bring certain changes—an end to political meddling in military affairs; a government freed from corruption; an opportunity for wider political choice—the ruling officers may be reluctant to return to the barracks without strong assurance the civilian regime will not revert to its previous ways.

Military withdrawal from political involvement, in simplest terms, comes about in two ways. First, governance leads to division within the armed forces. Torn between a professional ethic that respects civilian supremacy and a desire to protect professional autonomy by forestalling political interference, officers may fall into two camps, those who would carry forth the duties of the armed services by eschewing direct political involvemcnt, and those who would retain military autonomy by precluding significant civilian con-

trol. As this split is resolved, so is the extent of military involvement in politics. When the advocates of withdrawal gain the upper hand, withdrawal may occur. Second, over time, a military-dominated government may so transform itself as to become practically indistinguishable from a civilian regime.

To chronicle the transformation of a military-dominated government into a civilian-controlled government would take us outside Africa. As noted earlier in this chapter, intervention in the political life of African states has occurred relatively recently, for the history of these countries as independent entities covers, in most cases, scarcely a decade. Conscious civilianization, contrasted with voluntary withdrawal, takes place over an extended period of time. Although recent African history offers no instances of this subtle shift to "civilian" control, in which generals become presidents and base their authority upon public support rather than force of arms, the modalities of such a change must be examined.

The starting point for this process is the establishment of close ties between civilians and military leaders following the seizure of control. The extent of civilian participation in a military-dominated government admits of many degrees. The spectrum ranges from complete army control, in which all key governmental posts are occupied by officers, to behind-the-scenes manipulation, in which figurehead politicians carry out their activities under military surveillance. Most African states currently under military control fall near the center of this spectrum. Officers must make alliances with civilians to exercise and maintain control. When an army as minuscule as that of Sierra Leone only (0.06 per cent of the total population) takes power, it can fill only a few top administrative posts with officers, without risking diluting its energies or neglecting army command functions. The ruling junta must exercise its would-be power through civilians, whether civil servants, traditional chiefs, or some other group. Alliances are both natural and necessary.

Civil servants and officers may share an instrumental outlook, a belief that society can be altered by application of certain administrative techniques—a concern, as noted previously, with "state-building." The organizational structure of the civil service accords with the organizational structure of the armed forces: both are bureaucracies. Similarity of outlook thus makes alliance easy. A close working relationship with the civil service has the further advantage, for the officers, of bringing in a relatively uncorrupt group long overshadowed by politicians. Government employees threatened by party machinations have, in many African states, furnished strong support to newly installed military juntas. What more suitable pact than between groups that chafed under the inept control of venal politicians?

At a different level, the ruling officers may ally themselves with traditional chiefs, particularly in local governance. The chiefs represent a mixed blessing, for the support they command in rural areas must be weighed against the antipathy they arouse in some urban areas.

Lacking from this constellation of forces, however, are highly significant social groups, notably trade unionists. As the turbulent history of Dahomey illustrates, such groups must not be disregarded in the civilianization of the regime. Without meaningful participation, they may turn to active opposition. It is simple for officers to seize control, difficult to withdraw.

If they are to go, members of the military must distinguish between the areas of civilian supremacy and professional autonomy. Members of the ruling military junta may divest themselves of their soldierly regalia and demeanor, to become full-fledged civilians.

Probably the closest imitator of Ataturk's actions in tropical Africa now is General Joseph Mobutu. Since seizing control in November, 1965, Mobutu has engaged in a subtle effort to draw the nationalist, Lumumbist mantle to himself. He has announced his intention of leading a "revolutionary" mass political movement. A draft constitution approved in June, 1967, stipulated parliamentary elections in 1968 and a presidential election at the end of 1970. Several observers have pointed out that timing of this election would allow Mobutu to reach the ripe age of 40, the minimum age for the president prescribed by the constitution. Mobutu thus appears to be attempting to make a personal transition from military hero to charismatic president—a tortuous transition that cannot, in and of itself, protect Congo-Kinshasa from dissension within the ranks, popular discontent, and the other difficulties officers face in confronting political responsibilities.

The main obstacle to conscious civilianization—like the major barrier to voluntary withdrawal—lies in tensions and rivalries internal to the armed forces. Coup begets countercoup. The meteoric rise of a lieutenant colonel to unchallenged military and political power does not pass unnoticed. Those who seize control risk arousing jealousies, thereby becoming victims of the whirlwind they unleashed. Legitimacy once broken, cannot readily be restored.

Civilian replacement of military-dominated governments thus depends ultimately upon the attitudes of influential members of the armed services. The military must choose to go, or they must choose to stay, with its attendant risks. They are the ultimate arbiters of the nature and pace of a return to civlian rule.

There are certain advantages political leaders in Africa may use to their benefit in staving off military intervention, even where the scope for such intervention may be very great. First, the current international climate of opinion, of which heads of state in Africa (and, hopefully, their chiefs of staff!) are acutely aware, condemns naked seizures of power and denial of democratic processes.

At this point in time, African armies are proportionately the smallest in the world. The peaceful assumption of independence by African countries, unlike the armed seizure of independence that characterized Latin America, did not enshrine the military as the cornerstone of significant political change. Would-be parallels drawn from Latin America or the Middle East, by omitting the differing circumstances of independence and the international context, are as likely to mislead as to illuminate.

Yet the danger remains that the coup d'état or similar wielding of

(*Continued on page* 48)

Do we really need our military academies?
Or do we just have them because we have them
and because other countries have them?

# Should we Eliminate or Merge our Military Academies?

EDWARD BERNARD GLICK

*Copyright © Edward Bernard Glick, 1971.*
*Dr. Glick is professor of political science at Temple University in Philadelphia, where he specializes in the politics of national defense and Latin American affairs. He has also taught at the University of Florida, City College of New York, Hunter College, School of International Service at American University, George Washington University and as a visiting professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem.*
*Adapted from Prof. Glick's forthcoming book, "Soldiers, Scholars and Society" to be published soon by Goodyear Publishing Company. The research for this article was made possible by a grant from Temple University.*

In a time of rising domestic anti-militarism, there is surprisingly little civilian, and especially college, criticism of America's military academies. Perhaps after using so much energy against ROTC and on-campus military recruiters, professors and students have little left to direct against Annapolis, Colorado Springs, and West Point, where some of our highest uniformed defense officials come from.

There is something even more surprising. When Americans criticize their military academies, the harshest critics are usually military men—many of them academy alumni—and not civilians. For example, in 1968 a Special Subcommittee on Service Academies reported to its parent body, the House Armed Services Committee: "On the basis of this careful review, the subcommittee is pleased to report that in its considered judgment the three service academies are being operated and administered in complete accordance with existing law and are fulfilling, in a satisfactory manner, the mission assigned them by the Congress." The Subcommittee's report of nearly a thousand pages is replete with such reassurances to the testifying military personnel as: "I am not asking these questions in any unfriendly sense whatsoever"; or "Because on this committee are men who have served a long time in the service, who have been dedicated to the best interests of the military, and who have proven themselves time and time again the best friends a man in uniform had"; or

> Now, may I say this, and just in a brief capsule form, that our objective—we are not coming to the Academy, the Naval Academy, as well as the other two sister Academies, with a chip on our shoulder. We are coming in the most cooperative spirit we can muster. We both want to attain the same goal. We want to know exactly what is going on. And as an indication of our attitude there will not be any public hearings during the inquiry of this committee.

By contrast, the military critics of the military academies have been far less generous and solicitous. Well over a century ago, General John A. ("Black Jack") Logan, who was one of the North's few volunteer general officers in the Civil War, had this to say about the United States Military Academy and its products:

> West Point has for years taken possession of the military interests of the Government and has conducted those interests as the sole property of the select circle which by the decrees of West Point has been constituted the only true exponent of the art of war upon the American continent.

The Air Force Academy, the nation's newest one, got one of its biggest blasts from Lieutenant Colonel Charles Konigsburg in a letter he wrote in 1967 to Representative F. Edward Hébert, chairman of the Special Subcommittee on Service Academies. In his letter the colonel charged, among other things:
"First, . . . no young man, however capable and intelligent, can handle the total academy program in the proper manner and spirit. . . .

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AFSA NEWS

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

### AFSA's Chairman Resigns

Charles W. Bray, III, Chairman of the AFSA Board of Directors, announced on December 15 that pressure of work made it necessary for him to step down from his post. William C. Harrop, Vice Chairman, will move up to the chairmanship.

AFSA is now engaged in a host of important activities: our "openness" campaign to build improved communication links among Americans interested in foreign affairs; personnel and management reform; improvement of the working conditions of our membership; resolution of the labor / management question, to name a few. It has become extremely difficult for the Board of Directors to do the job AFSA requires on a moonlighting basis. Charlie Bray took a year of leave without pay in 1968-69 to work at the Association. Bill Harrop will also spend the next year on leave without pay to work full time for AFSA.

Charlie Bray's contributions to the American Foreign Service Association over the past four years cannot be measured in terms of reference available to associations. Under his inspirational leadership, and that of Lannon Walker, AFSA became the motor force behind reform of the State Department. He has led AFSA to play a central, constructive role in the community of national organizations interested in American foreign affairs. He has built AFSA into an effective and vigorous advocate of the welfare and pocketbook interests of its members. Charlie has emphasized that there are no philosophical or policy differences underlying his resignation. The problem is simply time.

The Association is deeply indebted to Charlie Bray. Fortunately, he will continue to be available to assist with AFSA programs and the Board will continue to draw upon his experience and fine judgment.

### The 1971 Harriman, Rivkin and Herter Awards

The Awards Committee of the American Foreign Service Association is happy to announce the 1971 Awards Program. The intent of the program is to give service-wide recognition to individuals displaying courage in all its dimensions, independence of spirit and service dedication — qualities manifested in such abundance by Ambassadors Harriman and Rivkin and Secretary Herter. The awards will be granted in recognition of extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage, and creative dissent.

The Harriman, Rivkin and Herter Awards are open to State, AID, USIA and Peace Corps Foreign Service personnel, FSO, FSIO, FSR, FSSO, whether serving abroad or in the United States—and in the case of the Harriman Award, to Civil Service employees as well. Each award will carry a $1,000 prize.

The Judges Committee of the AFSA will consider nominations for the Harriman and Herter Awards. A separate committee has been established by the William R. Rivkin Fund to consider nominations for the Rivkin Award. The Awards Committee of AFSA will act as the secretariat for the two Committees of Judges.

**Nominations for all three awards may be made by any officer in support of any other officer** in any of the eligible categories. Because of the special nature of these awards, we would like to point out that peers and subordinates of deserving individuals may be in the most favorable position to observe achievements of special merit.

Nominations are solicited for each of the following:

The **W. Averell Harriman Award** (for junior officers—no higher than FSO-6 or equivalent. Civil Service employees are included).

The **William R. Rivkin Award** (for mid-career officers—FSO-5, 0-4, 0-3 or equivalent).

The **Christian A. Herter Award** (for senior officers—FSO/FSR-1 and 2 or equivalent, with the exception of officers now holding appointments as Chiefs of Mission).

#### Submission of Nomination

The Harriman, Rivkin and Herter Awards should not be regarded as super-efficiency reports designed to recognize a conventional performance no matter how outstanding. The three awards are made to identify and reward the special qualities and special achievements noted above.

Two copies of each nomination, unbound on regular size paper, marking each page with the name of the nominee and numbering each page, should be forwarded to:

American Foreign Service Association
Awards Committee
2101 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 02037

in time to be received by February 28, 1971.

The format for nominations is as follows:

PART I: Biographic Data
- NAME
- BIRTHDATE
- GRADE
- AGENCY

PART II: Association with Candidate (Strictly limit to 250 words)

PART III: Justification for Nomination (Strictly limit to 500-750 words) Summary of specific reasons for nomination. The narrative should discuss

a. Qualities of mind and spirit which qualify the nominee for the award.

b. Examples of the candidates' accomplishments, particularly evidence of outstanding initiative, integrity, and intellectual courage.

## SCHOLARSHIP WINNERS

The following are the names of the 1970-71 AFSA Shcolarship recipients, their respective award, and the school they will be attending.

**Kristie Louise Ackerman**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; U. of Santa Clara.

**David Frederick Armstrong**; New York TIMES Foundation; U. of Pennsylvania.

**Clark Richard Barrett**; Maurice L. Stafford Memorial; Virginia Commonwealth U.

**Jeffrey Edward Barth**; American Consulate Women's Group of Munich; Luther College.

**Elsie Louis Beck**; Bruce; US International College.

**Julia Ferne Beck**; Bruce; Wilson College.

**William Walter Bennett, Jr.**; American Wives of Yaounde; Harvard College.

**Anne Elizabeth Berlin**; William Benton Scholarship; Indiana U.

**Robert Matthew Berlin**; William Benton Scholarship; Indiana U.

**Thomas Ernest Booth**; Bruce; Georgetown U.

**Margarita Andrea Brown**; Abe Kramer Memorial; Northwestern U.

**Patricia Elizabeth Bush**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; Sacred Heart College.

**Willard Linwood Chase II**; AAFSW; Harvard.

**Albert Gerald Ciaffone**; AAFSW; Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

**Michael Wayne Conner**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; Wichita State U.

**Joan Ann Cook**; Bruce; Saint Mary's College.

**Catherine Marie Creane**; William Benton; Georgetown U.

**Pamela Jean Eilers**; Charles E. Merrill Merrill Trust; U. of Maryland.

**Barbara Virginia Fossum**; Bruce; Northwestern U.

**Rolando Rene Garces**; James M. E. O'Grady Memorial; U. of Texas.

**Mary Anne Gawf**; Wives of the American Embassy; Chatham College.

**Brian Charles Gendreau**; Oliver B. Harriman; Foreign Service; Northwestern U.

**Gerard Joachim Gendron, Jr.**, AAFSW; Virginia Polytechnic Institution.

**David Hunt Gibbons**; John Gordon Mein Memorial; U. of Southern Cal.

**Gregory Richard Gilchrist**; John Campbell White Memorial; Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

**Stephen Wayne Gilchrist**; J. F. Begg; Virginia Polytechnic Institute.

**Carlos Richard Gonzalez**; Embassy Women's Group, Stockholm; Fullerton Junior College.

**Gregory Joseph Gonzalez**; Embassy Wives in Quito; Fullerton Junior College.

**Paul Raymond Gonzalez**; American Government Ladies of Jidda; U. of Southern Cal.

**Kathleen Patricia Graves**; Charles B. Hosmer Memorial; Barnard College.

**Christy Ann Gronert**; William M. Tait Memorial; Macalester College.

**Sally Jo Gronert**; William M. Awad Memorial; Ripon College.

**John Pierre Hatcher**; Sydney B. Redecker Memorial; No. Carolina State U.

**Marie-Claire Hatcher**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; East Carolina U.

**Harrison Mark Holland**; John Farar Simmons Memorial; Georgetown U.

**Suzanne Elizabeth Holland**; James B. Stewart Memorial; Prescott College.

**Judith Diane Horner**; AAFSW; McPherson College.

**Lynn Marie Ivy**; FS Wives in Iran; U. of Utah.

**Estrellita Jones**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; Smith College.

**Franklin Douglas Jones**; J. Alan Maphis Memorial; U. of Pennsylvania.

**Holly Ann Kannenburg**; AAFSW; Westhampton College (U. of Richmond).

**Daniel Karp**; William Benton; Duke U.

**Eileen Kelly**; Walter S. Robertson Memorial; U. of Cal. at Santa Barbara.

**Kevin Kelly**; Edwin L. Smith Memorial; U. of Cal. at Santa Barbara.

**Rebecca Susan Kelly**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; Bryn Mawr College.

**Thomas Matthew Kelly**; Charles W. Thayer Memorial; Southern Oregon College.

**Francis Patrick La Rocca**; American Women's Club of Berlin; Fordham U.

**Teodor Roger Lopatkiewicz**; Embassy Wives' Club in Mexico City; U. of Virginia.

**Lorene Elizabeth Ludy**; New York TIMES Foundation; Kenyon College.

**James Headley Maish**; Benton Scholarship in honor of James Riddleberger; U. of Arizona.

**Patricia Lynn Malchow**; Arthur B. Emmons Memorial; Pima Community College.

**Kevin Leese Mannix**; AAFSW; U. of Virginia.

**Catherine Denise Marshall**; Bruce; Bryn Mawr College.

**Laure Emily Mattos**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; Brandeis University.

**Lawrence Francis McAuliffe**; American Women's Group of Bonn/Bad Godesburg; Boston College.

**Mary Ellen Miller**; Anne S. Burrows Memorial; Rosary College.

**William Murray Miller**; George Allen Memorial; Xavier University.

**Marcia Diane Milton**; Janet A. Dulles Memorial; U. of Vermont.

**Elizabeth Anne Montavon**; AAFSW; Barat College of the Sacred Heart.

**Peter Nicholas Munsing**; American Women's Group of Bonn/Bad Godesburg; U. of Michigan.

**Robert Bernard Nolan**; John F. Buckle Memorial; Villanova U.

**John Edward Ormasa**; George H. deMange Memorial; Yale U.

**Devon O'Neill Parr**; AAFSW; Michigan State U.

**Eric Clement Patch**; AAFSW; Temple U.

**John Cunningham Patterson**; Harry Raymond Turkel Memorial; Harvard U.

**Paul Manning Price**; AAFSW; U. of No. Carolina.

**Elizabeth Kendall Ranslow**; Douglas W. Coster Memorial; U. of Wisconsin.

**Robin Stephanie Rick**; AAFSW; Reed College.

**Allyn Banks Robertson**; Vietnam Memorial; Women's College—Duke U.

**Charles McKendree Robertson**; American Consulate General Ladies Club of Frankfurt; U. of Tennessee.

**Jose Angel Rodriguez, Jr.**; AAFSW; U. of Florida.

**Andrew Leslie Roman**; New York TIMES Foundation; New College.

**Barbara Ann Rotundo**; AAFSW; U. of Florida.

**Diane Elizabeth Ruyle**; John Foster Dulles Memorial; U. of Washington.

**Judith R. Sillari**; AAFSW; Kirkland College.

**Christopher Towne Smith**; Julius C. Holmes Memorial; College of Marin.

**Whitney Smith**; AAFSW; U. of California at Davis.

**Mary Joann Springer**; AAFSW; U. of So. Carolina.

**Mercedes Suzann Stirling**; Margaret F. Berger Memorial; U. of Arizona.

**Robert Bruce Stirling II**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; U. of Arizona.

**Phillip Jay Stout**; AAFSW; U. of Minnesota.

**Susan Deane Turner**; Charles E. Merrill Trust; Knox College.

**Elizabeth Ann Wagner**; AAFSW; Keystone Jr. College.

**Andrew Blanchard Watson**; given in memory of Thomas E. Tait by an anonymous donor; Columbia U.

**George William Wellde, Jr.**; AAFSW; Randolph-Macon College.

**Daniel Collier Whitaker**; AAFSW; Amherst College.

**Diane Eyre White**; Edward Thompson Wailes Memorial; U. of California at Berkeley.

**Stevan Kelly Wolcott**; AAFSW; Reed College.

### Foreign Service Day, 1970

AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., presided at the luncheon on Foreign Service Day, November 19, 1970, at which Ambassador James C. Dunn was awarded the Foreign Service Cup, and Ambassador William R. Tyler was awarded the Director General's DACOR Cup.

The long day began in the International Conference Area with Registration—and coffee—at 8:30 A.M., as old friends greeted each other. Then Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, Ambassador Riddleberger as Acting President of DACOR, and William C. Harrop, Vice Chairman of the AFSA Board of Directors, acting on behalf of Mr. Eliot, welcomed participants to this year's event.

Mr. Macomber led off with an informal but most informative account of the work of the Task Force, and the general direction of their recommendations. The panel members and participants engaged in a spirited and interesting examination of the subject.

Throughout the day there were panel sessions, led by ranking officers of the Department, on Africa, Inter-American Affairs, the United Nations, East Asia, the Near East, and Europe. In the plenary session, the hard-pressed moderators endeavored to summarize the day's discussions and principle reactions.

At 6:00 P.M., Secretary and Mrs. Rogers were hosts for all participants in the Diplomatic Functions Area. At 8:00 P.M. the hardy ones went to the West Auditorium to hear Assistant Secretary De Palma give the first DACOR lecture of the season. To no one's surprise, he discussed the United Nations!

It was a full but rewarding day. Its success was, in large measure, the result of the tremendous work done by a large number of people in several areas of the Department—including the Office of Public Services, Visual Services, General Services, and the office of the Director General. The staffs of AFSA and DACOR contributed their time and energies in numerous ways to ensure that their members, as well as others, had an enjoyable and instructive day.

### Assignment of Group Life Policies Now Possible

AFSA's Members' Interests Committee noted an item in the **New York Times** regarding assignment of group life insurance, which stated that such insurance can now be transferred to dependents, under an IRS ruling, so that its benefits are not taxed to an estate. This puts group insurance in the same category as the usual life insurance. The transfer can be made only if the policy and the applicable state law permit such assignment, including all rights of changing the beneficiary, surrendering the policy, borrowing against it, pledging it as collateral and assigning the policy.

The Members' Interests Committee asked the American Foreign Service **Protective** Association whether it had developed an assignment procedure. It should be noted that the **Protective** Association is separate from and independent of this Association. AFSPA replied that it had been working on this problem for many years and finally obtained agreement on assignment of its group life insurance effective July 15, 1970.

AFSA is pleased to be able to bring this good news to the attention of its members. Those who are insured with the **Protective** Association and who have not received the Equitable Life Assurance Society's rider to be attached to Group Policy No. 2962 should notify the **Protective** Association, c/o Department of State or Suite 1305, 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Careful reading of the certificate is recommended.

### The World of Foreign Service Art

Our January issue features a new form of cover art for the **Journal**. Janet Sewall, wife of John Kirk Sewall, AID, long a painter and illustrator, is now working in stained glass. For the New Year, Mrs. Sewall and the **Journal** offer you two Chinese gods, the god of good fortune, upper left, and the god who wards off evil, with the hope that the gentleman at the top left will remain in the ascendancy for all of you. Mrs. Sewall has contributed an earlier cover to the **Journal** and her work appears frequently in the **National Geographic**. Her new work is described in a recent issue of **Stained Glass** magazine.

A recent exhibitor at the Foreign Service Club was Helga Weisshappel Foster. Mrs. Foster, wife of Carl D. Foster, VOA, is among the best known painters in Iceland. She has exhibited in Vienna, New York, Washington, Copenhagen, Jutland, Bergen, Helsinki, Lubeck and Berlin. Mrs. Foster will be included in the next edition of the reference work, International Directory of Arts.

In January, the walls of the Foreign Service Club will be decorated with the paintings of Earl J. Wilson. Mr. Wilson's work has appeared on **Journal** covers in black and white and four-color, as well as on inside pages over the years. A career USIA officer, he has served in Shanghai, Manila, Paris, Bangkok, Mexico City, Hong Kong, Madrid and Kuala Lumpur. He is now on the faculty of the National War College. An exhibit of his batiks was shown at the FDIC Building this fall.

*Ambassador William R. Tyler receives the Director's General's DACOR Cup from Ambassador James C. Riddleberger on Foreign Service Day, November 19.*

# INCOME TAX TIPS

### New Legislation

Tax legislation effective January 1, 1970 has expanded tax deductions for out-of-pocket moving expenses resulting from job transfers. Most foreign service employees of State, AID, and USIA who transferred to or from overseas locations, or within the US during 1970 should be able to benefit from these new deductions. A special advantage of moving expense tax deductions is that you can take them even if you normally take the standard deduction in lieu of itemizing. Moving expense deductions are subtracted directly from your gross income and do not preclude taking the standard deduction also.

### What costs are deductible?

Out-of-pocket expenses related to the following costs of moving to a new job location, either on transfer or to take new employment, are deductible.

*Direct costs:* Moving yourself, family, car, household effects and personal belongings to the new location, including meals and lodging in transit.

*Indirect costs:* (added by Tax Reform Act of 1969)

(a) Traveling, meal and lodging expenses for premove round trip house hunting trips to the new location.

(b) Expenses for temporary lodging and meals in the new location for the first 30 days after arrival.

(c) Expenses incident to the sale of a residence or the settlement of a lease at the old job location, or to the purchase of a residence or the acquisition of a lease at the new job location. Examples of deductible expenses in this category are attorney fees, real estate agent commissions, title costs, appraisal fees, escrow fees, loan placement charges, and penalties for terminating a lease prematurely or with insufficient notice. Not deductible are tax, interest or rent payments. "Points" are considered interest. Also prohibited are charges for storage, refitting rugs and draperies, and repairs designed to make a house more salable

### Examples of Deductible Foreign Service Moving Expenses

Virtually all our direct costs of moving, and many indirect costs are paid by the Government in foreign service transfer. But many costs are not paid or reimbursed. The following list of typical examples of deductible moving expenses in foreign service transfers has been cleared by the Internal Revenue Service.

1. *New employees* coming to Washington on first assignment can deduct the first 30 days of temporary lodging, including meals, for the entire family.

2. *Temporary lodging allowances* cover hotel costs for the first 90 days after arrival at each overseas post, but not meals, which are deductible for the first 30 days. (If your family has three or more persons you are eligible for the supplementary Post Allowance while in temporary lodging. Since this allowance is for meals, reduce your initial 30-day meal cost deduction accordingly if you are granted this allowance.)

3. *Household effects* are subject to maximum weight allowances. Excess costs paid out-of-pocket are deductible.

4. *Unreimbursed car shipments* are deductible. If you shipped a foreign car in 1970 (before the ban was lifted) or a second car at your own expense, it's deductible.

5. If you *sold a house* or *terminated a lease* departing Washington for overseas on transfer, the costs are deductible.

6. If you *terminated or acquired leases* arriving at or moving between overseas posts, the costs are deductible.

7. If you were *assigned to a US location* from overseas, and expect to go abroad again at a later date, the Government pays 30 days temporary lodging, but not meals, which are deductible. If you do not expect to go overseas again (for health, pending retirement or other reasons), you can deduct 30 days lodging and meals neither of which are reimbursed by the Government.

8. If you are *stationed in Washington* and are assigned elsewhere in the US for training, POLAD, university, or details to other agencies, or vice versa, you can deduct the cost of roundtrip house hunting visits to the new location, including travel, hotel and meal costs, for the entire family.

9. If you are *transferred back to the US* from abroad, or within the US, you can deduct costs of buying a house or acquiring a new lease.

10. *While in transit* between posts of assignment, deduct out-of-pocket costs for hotels and meals if your *per diem* allowance is insufficient.

### Limitations

1. *Distance:* The move must be a minimum of 50 miles for costs to be deductible.

2. *Dollar maximum:* There is a $2,500 limitation on deductions allowed for indirect costs, including premove house hunting trips, 30 days temporary living expenses, and disposing of and acquiring houses and leases. Within this limitation, expenses for house hunting trips and temporary living expenses may not account for more than $1,000. There is no limitation on deductions for direct costs, including expenses of transporting effects above weight allowances, and hotel and meal expenses while in transit which are not completely covered by per diem payments.

3. *Time:* In order to be eligible for these deductions, you are required to be a full time employee for at least 39 weeks during the 12-month period immediately after your arrival in the new location. If you are planning voluntary retirement or resignation within 39 weeks of arrival at the new location, the moving expense deductions may not be taken. However, if departure in less than 39 weeks is unexpected and/or involuntary (i.e. death, involuntary separation), the deductions are nevertheless allowed.

## Schneider Resigns from Editorial Board

David Schneider has resigned as Chairman of the **Journal** Editorial Board and has been replaced by the Vice Chairman, Archie Bolster. Dave has been with the Board for two years, and during that time has led the Board in devoting a great deal of time to improvement of both the format and the content of the **Journal.** Shortly after he became Chairman, he began the process of a complete reappraisal of the **Journal** by the Editorial Board, and as a result the **Journal** dropped some regular features, simplified and spruced up its graphic presentation, and placed greater emphasis on the professional quality of its articles. The result has been a heavier stream of first class articles submitted for publication, and letters of praise both from Foreign Service readers and the general public. Dave has made a lasting contribution to the efforts of recent years to improve the professional status of the **Journal,** and the Editorial Board joins in expressing its appreciation.

*Mrs. Elbert G. Mathews, President, AAFSW, presents a check for $18, 203.66 to AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., as AFSA's Executive Director, Thomas S. Estes, and Book Fair Chairman, Mrs. Edward E. Masters, look on.*

**AAFSW Book Fair Sets New Record**

This year's big, beautiful and busy Book Fair brought record returns to the AAFSW Scholarship Fund. On December 2, Mrs. Elbert G. Mathews, President, AAFSW, presented a check for $18,203.66, the proceeds of the five-day fair, to Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., President of AFSA.

President Eliot, in a letter to Mrs. Mathews, said, "I know that for every one of you, the satisfaction you have in providing what will probably be nearly half of the scholarships awarded this year, is your reward. But, I wish that there were some way that we could be sure that the entire Foreign Service, whether serving under State, AID or USIA, could know personally of the tremendous amount of work you ladies gave to this project. Certainly, the parents and students who are granted these scholarships have good reason to be especially grateful to you, and all of us should be."

Mrs. Edward E. Masters, chairman of the Book Fair, and her committee expressed gratitude for the help and cooperation of GSA, the Audio-Visual Services Division and the Office of Security, and especially to Fernleigh R. Graninger, Chief, Audio-Visual Services, who designed special book cases for this year's Fair.

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**Marriages**

ABBOTT-ERNSTOF. Sidsel-Anne Abbott, daughter of FSO-retired and Mrs. George M. Abbott, was married on August 12 to Joseph Milton Ernstof, in London.

**Deaths**

CARTER. James R. Carter, USIA-retired, died on March 13 in Fairfax, Virginia. Mr. Carter entered government service with the OWI in 1942 in Lebanon and served with USIA in Lebanon, Turkey, Egypt, Morocco and Washington. He is survived by his wife of 516 Creek Crossing Road, Vienna, Virginia, three daughters and a granddaughter.

JANTZEN. Brian Jantzen, son of FSO and Mrs. Robert Jantzen, died in an automobile accident on November 5, in Canada. He is survived by his parents of the American Embassy, Ottawa, and three brothers.

DONNELLY. Walter J. Donnelly, retired Ambassador, died on November 12, in Bogota. Mr. Donnelly entered on duty with the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce in 1923. He served at Ottawa, Montreal, Bogota, Habana, Rio de Janeiro, Panama, Lima, as Ambassador to Costa Rica, Venezuela and Austria. He resigned from the Foreign Service in 1952. He received the US Government Medal of Freedom and was honored by the governments of Brazil, Venezuela and Colombia. Mr. Donnelly is survived by his wife of 1912 Palmer Avenue, New Orleans, Louisiana, three sons and a daughter.

LAW. Pauline J. Law, FSS-retired, died on November 23, in Washington. Miss Law joined the State Department in 1946 and served in Hamburg, Ankara, Hong Kong, Singapore, Bonn, Vienna and Washington. She retired in 1968. She is survived by her mother, Mrs. Mattie Lawitzke, of Port Hope, Michigan, a brother and two sisters.

MONTGOMERY. Edmund B. Montgomery, FSO-retired, died on November 15, in Santa Barbara. Mr. Montgomery entered the Foreign Service in 1919 as vice consul at Port Limon. He became a Foreign Service officer in 1924 and served at Madras, Habana, San Luis Potosi, Asuncion and Washington. He retired in 1947. He is survived by three step-children, John S. Yates of New York, Reid Yates of Honolulu and Natalie Yates El Skeikh of Alexandria, Egypt, a sister and a brother.

RAVOTTO. Joseph D. Ravotto, USIA-retired, died on November 9, in Geneva. He joined the OWI in 1942 and served at Rome, Paris, Bonn, Mexico City, Tel Aviv, Madrid, and Barcelona with that agency and its successor. He retired in 1969. Mr. Ravotto is survived by his wife of Avenue de Bude 25, Geneva, Switzerland.

ROMAN. Paul Roman, FSO-retired, died on November 25, in Silver Spring. He entered on duty with the Department in 1948 and served at Bratislava, Vienna, Frankfurt and Bangkok before his retirement in 1967. He is survived by his wife of 500 Waterford Road, Silver Spring, Maryland and two sons.

ROSS. Robert Holmes Ross, Jr., son of Jo Anne Dieckman Ross and the late Robert Holmes Ross, died on August 31, in Mexico City. He is survived by his mother of the American Embassy, Mexico, three brothers and a sister. Memorial contributions may be sent to the Leukemia Society of America, Inc., c/o H. Grant Taylor, MD, M. D. Anderson Hospital of the University of Texas, Houston, Texas 77025.

WILLOUGHBY. Amea Willoughby, widow of FSO Woodbury Willoughby, died on November 23, in Washington. Mrs. Willoughby was the author of "I Was on Corregidor," a book about her and her husband's escape from the Japanese during World War II. She is survived by a brother, Andrew Brewin of Ottawa and two sisters, Judith Vivian of Fort Hope, Canada and Rosalind Meridith of London, England.

### Minutes of the Meeting of October 20, 1970

The Chairman welcomed Mr. Thomas M. Tracy to his first meeting as a **member** of the **Board of Directors.** Mr. Tracy has been assigned to work on membership, with emphasis on organization of a permanent network of keymen in Washington and abroad.

### Financial Status

The Executive Director outlined some of the recommendations which will be contained in a detailed memorandum to be circulated to each member of the AFSA Board. It was emphasized that membership is the key to overcoming the present cash deficit in general operating funds. A number of other procedures will be suggested.

A memorandum was distributed, listing **keymen** overseas who have not reported to the Association on the Membership Campaign.

Separate meetings will be set up for keymen in each of the three foreign service agencies in the Washington area. Messrs. Nevitt, Heginbotham, and Lambrakis have scheduled meetings of keymen in USIA, AID, and State respectively. After the preliminary meetings in the agencies an open meeting will be scheduled. Tentative date: November 4.

Mr. Harrop reported that AFSA has been invited by Mr. Macomber for consultation on the program to centralize personnel and to discuss implementation of the **Hall Task Force** recommendations. Messrs. Harrop and Tracy will represent the Association. Other interested members of the Board were invited to attend the meetings.

Mr. Lyman has prepared a paper on the **Peterson Task Force** which will be sent to all members of the Board.

The Chairman announced that Deputy Under Secretary Macomber informed AFSA yesterday that he had written to the Federal Labor Relations Council on behalf of the Secretary, to recommend that **Executive Order 11491** be amended specifically to exclude Foreign Service personnel of all categories in the Department of State, USIA, and AID. Mr. Macomber's letter proposed creating a consultation mechanism whereby organizations including Foreign Service personnel could consult with the management of the three agencies. He also requested that the AFGE petitions for election, already filed with the Labor Department, be held in abeyance.

Mr. Bray replied immediately to Mr. Macomber's announcement by saying that it is unfair to deny personnel in the Foreign Service rights to organize which are granted to Civil Service personnel.

After discussion of the implications of Mr. Macomber's action, a motion was unanimously carried authorizing the Chairman, or members of the Board appointed at his discretion, to inform Mr. Macomber that the Association is unhappy with this action and hopes that in notifying others of it Mr. Macomber will not give the impression that the Association is in agreement with his recommendations. The Chairman was also authorized to advise him of the Board's extreme concern that Foreign Service employees could be left without rights or representation while Civil Service personnel could enjoy the benefits of the Executive Order.

The Junior Foreign Service Officers Club representatives also took strong exception to Mr. Macomber's course of action. Representatives of JFSOC suggested that AFSA/AFGE/JFSOC publicly announce a coalition against the action taken by the "O" area.

The Chairman said that forms of cooperation have been discussed and plans are being made to deal with Mr. Macomber's action, as well as to prepare for any other developments. For example, AFSA's legal counselors, Covington & Burling, are filing petitions to intervene against the AFGE petitions which that organization has filed as a step toward obtaining exclusive recognition in units in State and AID. Mr. Harrop circulated the draft of an insert reporting the Department's action, which will be sent to the membership with the material previously prepared explaining the Executive Order and seeking the support of the membership for the Board's recommendation that AFSA seek exclusive recognition to represent the personnel of the foreign services. The material will be in the mail by this coming weekend.

**Staff Corps Advisory Committee:** The appointment of John K. Ivie to succeed Miss Barbara J. Good as Chairman of the Staff Corps Advisory Committee was unanimously approved. Mr. Ivie is in OM/DIR, Room 905, SA-11 (Extension 23874).

**AFSA Community Action Committee:** Mr. John A. Ulinsky, Jr. will be invited to report to the AFSA Board on the activities of the Community Action Committee of which he is the chairman. His report is tentatively scheduled for Tuesday, November 3.

### Minutes of the Meeting of October 27, 1970

Attention centered on a memorandum, October 22, **"Budget and Cash Flow Situation,"** previously distributed to the Board by the Executive Director. Action was taken on the following recommendations made in the memorandum.

1. A finance committee is to be appointed to monitor implementation of approved recommendations.
   **Action:** Mr. Eliot, President, in cooperation with the Executive Director.

2. The membership recruiting campaign will be intensified, with emphasis on gaining 1000 Staff members and an additional 2000 from AID.
   **Action:** Mr. Tracy

3. (a) Membership in AFSA will include membership in the Foreign Service Club without further payment of dues for Club membership.

   (b) The Executive Director was empowered to negotiate with present management contractors of the Club (Automatic Retailers of America) to modify the contract, eliminating the 5 percent "management fee." The 5 percent gained would be used to employ a part-time supervisor of services and food, but primarily to plan attractions and functions for the Club. In the event the percentage reduction cannot be obtained from ARA, the Executive Director was empowered to explore alternatives.

   (c) Recommendations to handle club transactions on a cash basis are being studied.

4. Book Club and personal purchases will be handled by the AFSA staff until these services can be transferred. The position of Club Discounts Secretary will be abolished. At the present time it is not feasible to abolish the position of Membership Secretary as originally recommended.

5. It was pointed out in the memorandum that the Scholarship Fund should bear its fair share of AFSA's operating cost, as in any normal business operation, but that by resolution of a previous Board payments from the Scholarship Fund to the Association are limited to 10 percent of new contributions. There was discussion of the recommendation to charge a management fee based on a proportionate share of AFSA's operating expenses (mortgage, utilities, taxes, etc.) and the salaries of the Executive Secretary and the Educational Consultant.

6. Secretariat/Journal Staff: Recommendation on these projects were held in abeyance pending dicussions with the Editorial Board.

7. Reduction in costs of **Foreign Service Journal:** Subject to reservations or objections of the Editorial Board, the AFSA Board concurred with recommendations made to dispense with items of marginal benefit and interest. The recommendation was accepted to change By-Laws in order to present membership subscription rate ($5.00) to a more realistic rate of $6.00.

8. Although at the present time the Association cannot afford to staff the room allocated, it was suggested that the Executive Director explore the possibility of maintaining an option to use the room offered by the Department of State to AFSA in the Foreign Service Lounge. The possibility of having direct telephone connections between the Lounge and AFSA neadquarters will also be investigated. Meanwhile, arrangements have been made with AAFSW to display AFSA material and to direct inquries to the AFSA receptionist.

9. Services of our investment counselor have been terminated. The Secretary-Treasurer and the Executive Director in consultation with a member experienced in investments, will deal directly with AFSA's brokers regarding changes in the portfolio. Services of our auditors have also been terminated and a larger firm will be employed.

On behalf of the AFSA Board, the Chairman expressed appreciation to the Executive Director fcr his careful and forthright presentation of the Association's financial position.

The first meeting of the AFSA Task Force on **AID Reorganization** was held on Friday, October 16, at the Foreign Service Club. Mr. Howard Parsons was appointed Chairman of the Task Force and subcommittees were established to study issues of policy, staffing, organization and problems of transition. Sub-committees will report to the Task Force at a meeting to be held on Thursday, October 29, at the Foreign Service Club. Purposes of the Task Force are twofold: (1) to advise the AFSA Board of Directors on substance, structure and personnel in the proposed reorganization of the AID program; and (2) to advise AFSA how to represent members' interests during the reorganization.

Mr. Harrop reported that subsequent to the Board's motion on October 20, representatives of the AFSA presented Mr. Macomber with specific proopsals offsetting Mr. Macomber's recommendations to the Federal Labor Relations Council that foreign service personnel be excluded from **Executive Order 11491.** Mr. Harrop emphasized the importance of establishing institutionalized relationships with management. A conference on the position to be taken has been scheduled for October 28 with representatives of JFSOC, AFGE, and AFSA.

Announcements have been posted of an **Open Meeting** of AFSA in the East Auditorium of the Department of State (Room 2925), November 4, 1970, at 12 noon. The agenda: (a) Executive Order No. 11491; (b) Personnel Reform.

**Minutes of the Meeting cf November 3, 1970**

**COMMITTEES**

1. **Members' Interests Committee:** Responding to AFSA's letters on employee benefits, Mr. Macomber wrote to the Chairman of the Board on October 22, stating: (a) that an increase in overseas transfer allowance is being studied, but action will depend on budget considerations, subject to concurrence of Congress; (b) that recommendations made by the Association concerning first-class air travel and travel by foreign flag ship cannot be approved; (c) that the joint working group proposed by AFSA as a means to implement recommendations in Task Force V does not seem to be the best vehicle for mutual consultation and the he would prefer to continue the exchanges and meetings with the Association which have been useful in the past. In closing, Mr. Macomber invited the Association's recommendations on implementing proposals of Task Force V.

2. **Staff Corps Advisory Committee:** A letter to the Chairman of the Board from Mr. Macomber on October 23, summarized action taken on a number of recommendations in AFSA's letter of August 19 to improve morale and status of Foreign Service Staff Corps employees. The letter stated that response will be made in the near future to recommendations made October 14 by the AFSA Staff Corps Advisory Committee. A report on Mr. Macomber's letter will be carried in the AFSA **News.**

3. **Luncheon Committee:** The Board discussed a memorandum from Andre J. Navez, Chairman of the Luncheon Committee, to Mr. Eliot, November 2, on inviting the President to address the Association in January. It was suggested that a reception might be a better forum than a luncheon for this occasion.

Following Ambassador Parker T. Hart's address on the Middle East at the AFSA luncheon October 30, a reporter representing the **Jewish Telegraph** requested a copy of his speech. Ambassador Hart said he would first want to consult with the Middle East Institute and with the AFSA Board. The AFSA Board decided that they would prefer to have the address carried first in the **Foreign Service Journal** if Ambassador Hart wishes to release the text.

5. **AID-Reorganization:** The AFSA Task Force on AID Reorganization met on Thursday, October 29, at the Foreign Service Club. It is anticipated that by mid-November a draft will be prepared from the reports of the sub-committees.

6. **Openness:** Officers of the Association and members of the AFSA Board will receive copies of the latest draft of a proposal for foundation funding, prepared by Mr. Destler, who will present this subject at next week's Board meeting.

In accordance with the Board's discussion last week, of the management fee to be paid by the **Scholarship Fund** to the Association, the following resolution was passed:

"Be It Resolved:

"That to meet the expenses incurred by AFSA in the management of the scholarship program a proportionate share of AFSA's operation expense (Mortgage, utilities, taxes, etc.) be paid by the Scholarship Fund;

"That an equitable percentage of the Executive Secretary's salary, up to 75%, should be paid by the Scholarship Fund;

"That the salary and costs of the Educational Consultant should be paid by the Scholarship Fund in proportion to the time spent and expenses incurred by him on the scholarship program."

With reference to petitions filed by AFGE for Exclusive Recognition under the **Executive Order** and AFSA's petitions to intervene, the following developments were noted:

1. A letter from Mr. W.J.R. Overath, Regional Administrator, Department of Labor, to Mr. Ackerman of Covington and Burling, denied the request for intervention on technical grounds. Subsequently, required documents were filed and a discussion held with Mr. Dow E. Walker, Area Administrator of the Labor-Management Services Administration. On November 2, a letter was delivered to Mr. Walker referring to the discussion and presenting rebuttal to Mr. Overath's denial of the intervention requests. Copies of this letter, together with items submitted under the rules and regulations implementing the Executive Order were sent to Mr. Alan Strachan, Chief, Welfare and Grievance Staff, AID, and to Mr. Samuel Mitchell, Chief Domestic Career Branch, PER, Department of State.

2. A letter from Mr. Strachan to Mr. Dow Walker was sent under date of October 30, officially lodging objection to the AFGE's petition for exclusive recognition in two units of AID (the Bureau of Africa and the Office of International Training). A copy of the letter was sent to the AFSA for information.

3. In a letter dated November 3, the Area Administrator, Mr. Dow E. Walker, notified State, AID and AFGE that AFSA has intervened in **all** the petitions submitted by AFGE and will be

permitted to participate in the hearings. In other words, AFSA's contention that the "units" proposed by AFGE are "not appropriate" has been sustained and AFSA has been recognized by the Department of Labor as being qualified to intervene in this matter.

4. **Conferences with Mr. Macomber:** In response to the Department's proposal to exclude foreign service employees (including those of AID and USIA) from the Executive Order 1491, four keystone principles were presented by the Board to Mr. Macomber. He was informed that unless these principles which provided rights were granted for Foreign Service personnel equal to those the Civil Service employees would enjoy, since the Order would still apply to them, his proposal would be opposed by AFSA.

After a series of conferences, agreement was reached on three of the four points: (1) the right of consultation; (2) that both labor and professional organizations will have access to agency officials; (3) the right of appeal to the Board of the Foreign Service. However, no progress was made on a provision for written agreements between AFSA and the Department which would establish permanent institutionalized relationship, and assure exclusivity for AFSA to represent the foreign services. Failing to gain this point, the Board concluded there was no alternative except to advise the Department of Labor of AFSA's opposition to the Department's exclusion proposal. Mr. Lambrakis distributed the draft of a statement of principles which will be left with Mr. Macomber this afternoon. It was reported that the Federal Relations Council has requested Mr. Macomber to explain his position on November 10. (Subsequently it was learned that there will be no "hearings" at the November 10 meeting of the Council. The purpose of the meeting is to consider a number of proposals to amend the Executive Order, including that submitted by the Department of State.)

Points to be covered at the open meeting of the Association tomorrow were discussed.

**Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 10.** Mr. I. M. Destler presented his proposal for foundation funding for a four-year program to expand **communication** with groups outside of government through a coalition of U. S. foreign affairs organizations sponsored by AFSA, ISA and other professional organizations. The Board agreed on further discussion on November 17 with recommendations to be made for members of the Steering Committee.

The need for more effective communication with overseas **chapters** was stressed with the recommendation that letters supplementing AFSA News be set out each month.

Mr. Tracy was appointed Chairman of a Reform Implementation Group on the **Task Force Reports.** Mr. Henry Cohen, as Chairman of the Members' Interest Committee, will follow upon the implementation of Task Force V, but the Reform Implementation Group will cover all others. The Chairman will report on this at the November 17 meeting.

Action on **E.O. 11491** was reported as follows: A letter was written by the Chairman of the Board to Robert E. Hampton, Chairman of the Federal Labor Relations Council, urging the Council not to comply with the request to exclude foreign service employees from the provisions of the Order. The Department of State has sent formal replies to the three petitions filed by AFGE, stating that the proposed units are not "appropriate." Open meetings on the Order will be held in USIA on November 19. AFSA has been invited to confer with other professional organizations in the National Federation of Professional Organizations on legislation to be drafted on the status of such organizations under the Executive Order.

Mr. Philip M. Oliver, Director of the **Job Evaluation and Pay Review Task Force** of the CSC, has requested an opportunity to meet with the AFSA Board this month to clarify some of the problems relating to foreign service personnel. Mr. Nevitt will prepare a background paper.

An ad hoc committee of Messrs. Nevitt and Easum will receive nominations for **Secretary-Treasurer** of AFSA to replace William G. Bradford, whose resignation was received with regret.

Howard B. Schaffer, Chairman of the **Awards Committee,** is organizing the 1971 Awards Program.

**Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 17.** A statement of the present financial condition of AFSA was presented and recommendations were approved, including the appointment of a **Finance Committee** to include an experienced retired member, the Secretary-Treasurer and the Executive Director, to keep the Board currently informed on finances.

The Chairman of the Board will make tentative appointments to the Steering Committee on the **"openness" proposal.** The Board accepted the proposed course of action and time table for November and December.

Mr. Tracy, Chairman of the Committee on Reform, has appointed sub-committees to study the recommendations of the **Task Forces** on Foreign Service Staff Corps and FSRU Program; Management and Interagency Relations; Personnel. Problems in these areas should go to these sub-committees to be studied and reported to the Board. The Committee on Reform is responsible for seeing that plans for reform meet the needs of foreign service personnel.

The Board requested complete transcripts of all testimony given before the Federal Labor Relations Council on November 16 on **Executive Order No. 11491.** In addition to AFSA's chairman, those testifying included Mr. Macomber, JFSOC, AFGE's national president and AFGE locals in USIA and State/AID. It was noted that AFGE has filed an Unfair Labor Practice suit against AFSA. Mr. Lambrakis suggested that AFSA build up legal ability for the future by using AFSA's lawyer members as understudies on this problem and others.

The Undersecretary invited members of the Board to meet with him at lunch on November 23 to discuss issues of interest.

**Meeting of the Board of Directors, November 24.** Mr. Destler reported on the first meeting of the **Steering Committee** where several members agreed to write short papers proposing specific activities. If the Board concurs on new proposals for funding sources and contacts, Mr. Bray will travel to New York to discuss and stimulate interest in the proposal.

Mr. Lyman reported that he is drafting a position paper on the **AID reorganization** based on papers submitted by subcommittees.

Mr. Tracy reported on the **Reform Committee on Staff Corps** problems, specifically the proposed Foreign Affairs Specialist category. He will compose a letter based on the Committee's suggestions, which will be sent to the Director General with a copy to Mr. Lionel Mosely (USIA).



*Ambassador James C. Dunn receives the Foreign Service Cup from AFSA President Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., on Foreign Service Day, November 19.*

## MILITARY ACADEMIES

(*Continued from page* 22)

[The] average cadet has an academic schedule and workload in excess of that required at the best colleges. . . . To the academic program, which demands 75-80 percent of the cadet's time and preoccupation, *add* a mandatory military training program, a required athletic program, cadet squadron duties, and other requirements.

"[Second, if,] as most cadets soon come to understand, the object of the 'game' (recognized and described by them as such) is to pursue the image of 'instant academic excellence' in terms of its popular symbols (test scores, grades, extra courses, major programs, scholarships, postgraduate study, academic conference image-building, etc.) and not primarily to acquire substantive understanding of subject matter or to develop attitudes and habits of conscientious dedication to maximum effort in all assigned and related tasks—*then, why not cheat*?

"[Third,] criticism has simply not been tolerated at the Academy, on the faculty. It is equated with 'disloyalty' and 'subversion.' . . . The 'mortal sin' at the Academy, one soon learns, is not in wrongs committed or overlooked: the mortal sin lies in raising questions about the situation, especially in talking outside of the family—as I am doing here.

"[Fourth, one] who has served a tour of duty at the Air Force Academy under the original assumption that he would help to train the future 'creative leadership' of the USAF is led to the following conclusion: that at the AF Academy it has been forgotten that its mission is to produce dedicated and enlightened young officers, not prospective candidates for scholarships and graduate schools or practitioners of academic gamesmanship. We ought surely to do whatever is necessary to enhance the intellectual calibre of our officer corps—in this I yield to no man!—but if it is scholars, etc. we want, let us send these fine young men to the best universities, give them military training during the summers, an active duty commitment afterward, for one-fourth the cost."

And as for the Naval Academy, its most persistent critic, if not its most beloved graduate, is Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, who has often spoken out about academic shortcomings at our civilian colleges as well. Testifying before Congress in 1968, he said: "Naval Academy midshipmen generally lack poise, self-confidence and maturity. They give the appearance of having these qualities, but it is a superficial appearance with little depth." Admiral Rickover's unhappiness goes beyond Annapolis. He once said of *all* the academies:

"No institution can depart too much from the norms of its particular society and function effectively as part of that society. The service academies have set themselves apart from their society. This has resulted in strains, and is one of the chief reasons why officers are not able to identify with the new forces which are exerting influence on the military. The academies should, as soon as possible, stop setting themselves up as a higher ethical society by the use of honor codes, etc. If they continue to do this they will inevitably broaden the gulf between the military and reality. . . . Senior officers at the academies . . . are so anxious to prove their own integrity and their ability to create a perfect society under their auspices that they forget their responsibilities as adults; their responsibilities to do all they can for the youth in their charge, to sacrifice themselves if need be for the youth. Instead, *they impose standards . . . which probably they themselves have never met* and which are not practicable in the services. Such standards are not set up by the colleges from which the Army, Navy, and Air Force draw by far the great majority of their officers, *nor are they used among officers in the services themselves.*" (*Italics supplied*)

If these charges against the military academies are even only partly true, they are serious enough to raise some questions. Do we *really* need our military academies? Or do we just have them because we have them and because other countries have them? Do we keep them at great Federal cost, only because of history, habit, tradition, and the political unthinkability of doing away with them? Or do we keep them because of *proven* military necessity in the light of present-day methods of waging war and peace? Is the United States Marine Corps officer less of a fighting man than his colleagues in the other services because he usually is *not* an academy product, but a graduate of a civilian university and the Corps' Platoon Leaders Course? And if we cannot or should not do away with the academies, should we *merge* them into a single institution, at least at the lower levels of instruction?

Before we can answer any of these questions intelligently and affirmatively, we ought to compare the American practice with that of a foreign democratic country that maintains one of the finest fighting forces in the world and yet does not have a college-level military academy. We ought also to know something about American military academy dropout figures and about officer production and retention figures from these academies. And we ought to compare these figures meaningfully with analogous figures for American officers who are not graduates of West Point, Annapolis, or Colorado Springs.

The foreign democratic country whose experience may have some transfer value for the United States is Israel. She has no military academies on the college level and no ROTC-type program at her civilian universities. This is so because most Israeli men are not permitted to enroll in college before they have completed their three-year tour of obligatory service, which starts at age 18. What the Israelis do have, for a small number of their future career officers in the unified Israel Defense Force, are two *pnimiot tzvaiot* (military boarding schools) at the high school level. One is in the Tel-Aviv area, the other in the Haifa area.

Though they are called in Hebrew *military* boarding schools, they are really military-civilian schools, and this is the important point. Cadets attend classes in the mornings and early afternoons at the famous Herzliah High School in Tel-Aviv and the equally prestigious Reali High School in Haifa. They follow the same regular curriculum and standards as civilian boys and girls at these schools, and they wear civilian garb. Cadets change into uni-



forms and begin the military portion of their studies and training as well as their civilian homework, when they return to the *pnimia* about 2 p.m. After four years at the *pnimia*, for which their parents pay 750 Israeli pounds ($214) yearly, the boys graduate with the rank of corporal and go on to Officers Training School. Leaving the *pnimia* with the lowly rank of corporal tells us something about the Israeli approach to officership and to the intended relationship between officers and men. An Israeli—even a military boarding school graduate — becomes an officer only by climbing the ranks from the bottom to the top. The road is from enlisted man to non-commissioned officer to regular or reserve officer, and for the talented and motivated, the road can be a rapid one.

The whole purpose of not having a military academy as we know it and for making officers first serve in the enlisted or NCO ranks is to maintain and reinforce the "citizen's army" character of the Israel Defense Force.

As for American military officers who come (or do not come) from the military academies, the plain fact is that West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs just do not and cannot produce enough graduates, even if we were all satisfied with their education, promise, and performance. For economic, physical, and political reasons, the three academies are "not easily expanded or contracted to meet emergency expansion needs or to counter the lessened needs," the Department of Defense reported in 1969. In 1968, at the height of our involvement in Vietnam, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara issued a statement to Congress projecting America's defense posture and needs for the fiscal years 1969-1973. Despite our heavy military manpower commitments and losses in Vietnam, McNamara talked about enlarging West Point's and Colorado Springs' enrollment to only 4,400 each, and keeping Annapolis' enrollment at about 4,100.

Moreover, what the military calls "disenrollment" from the three academies is not low. In the classes from 1958 to 1970, the dropout rate for all reasons has ranged from 19.4 to 33.9 percent for the Military Academy, 22.3 to 35.7 percent for the Naval Academy, and 15.4 to 40.2 percent for the Air Force Academy.

"But," some may say, "even if the academies' officer production figures are low, and their dropout rates are high, look at the higher retention rates of academy men after they are commissioned and look at the high percentage of academy graduates in the upper ranks of the services. Doesn't this prove their superior training and devotion?"

Not necessarily. At first glance, academy graduates appear to remain in the services for a much longer period than do other officers. But J. Arthur Heise, in his book "The Brass Factories," argues that this is illusory. He contends that in two of the three services there is little difference in the departure rate of ROTC men who enter the services as *regular*, rather than reserve, officers, and the departure rate of academy graduates, who can only enter with regular commissions. He cites a 1964 study which showed that 23.7 percent of the West Pointers who entered the Army between 1950 and 1960 resigned, compared with 24.5 percent of the ROTC-produced Distinguished Military Graduates (DMGs) who entered the Army with regular commissions during the same period. He says that in the Air Force the departure rate for the first three classes of the Air Force Academy was 27 percent, compared with a 37 percent rate for DMGs from AFROTC. Only in the Navy does the NROTC-trained officer leave at a much higher rate than his Annapolis counterpart. For the Naval Academy classes of 1959-1961, the rate averaged less than 30 percent; for *regular* NROTC men who had finished their obligated service, the departure rate during fiscal years 1959-1961 was 60 percent.

Two points can be made about the argument that the academies prove their usefulness and are worth their cost if only because the vast majority of America's generals and admirals are academy graduates. First, academy graduates dominate the selection boards that choose the people to be promoted to these ranks, just as they favor "wearers of the old school tie" when they choose people for assignments to the prestigious senior service schools. Second, the apparent lack of opportunity non-academy personnel has for advancement to general and flag officer rank may help to account for their lower retention rates. If non-academy officers feel that they have a much lower chance of making general or admiral than their colleagues from the academies, why should they stay?

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Consequences of any attempt to assert a dominant role in development by the military are likely to include a return to quarters.

# The Military and Progress in the Third World

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*Views expressed in this paper are those of the author. They should not be interpreted as reflecting the views of The RAND Corporation or the official opinion or policy of any of its governmental or private research sponsors.*

REPEATED seizures of power by military forces in Latin America, Africa and Asia in recent years have come as something of a shock to those who felt that history evolved smoothly toward "civil rule" away from "military barbarism." The military government in power in Peru since 1968 even seems committed to national development, using authoritarian means to restrain consumption and to impose "law and order" on local radicals and foreign investors alike.

While not new, this reemergence of military rule in Peru and elsewhere raises the more general question: Are the military services in less industrialized countries capable of bringing economic and social progress? Sometimes, of course, they are. But they are also capable of preventing it. The task of the analyst, whether scholar or policymaker, is thus to determine what elements contribute to each outcome. This is not easy, as both revolution and reaction may be present together, along with stagnation and irrelevance.

Military forces may, for example, contribute to social mobility by their social composition and training. But they may simultaneously also support controls over "strategic" resources in ways that divert them from more productive alternative uses. Service chiefs, meanwhile, may be engaged in Byzantine conspiracies of no interest to anyone outside the military. In other situations, precisely the opposite may hold true—on each point—and critical national events may hang on the acts of small unit commanders.

To understand the nature of military participation in government in a given situation, therefore, we must get down to cases. Much United States commentary on the political activity of the military in other countries seems unconsciously to project the values of American-style constitutional democracy.

If military services seem under civilian control, if officers do not participate in "civil" government matters, or if they justify whatever they do with the language of "civic action" and anti-communism, then we are likely to say that the military is contributing to social and economic progress.

On the other hand, suppose military forces exercise direct formal authority over what in American constitutional practice are civilian functions. Add to that their advertising national defense functions or coveting modern military equipment in the absence of what we consider a clear and present danger. Under those circumstances we are likely to consider that military a "reactionary" obstacle to progress.

However sound the values that inspire them, these judgments are often irrelevant to political practice. Throughout the Third World, governments are likely to be the products of delicate civil-military coalitions, regardless of who occupies the presidency or other formal positions of authority.

During periods of social tension, when the coercive basis of the state is particularly evident, the role of the military becomes particularly emotional. If the military obeys the orders of the political elite and maintains order, then it automatically becomes "reactionary." If, on the other hand, the military replaces the political elite in an attempt to alleviate popular pressures, then it is likely to be considered "revolutionary."

Again, however, the complexities of even the simplest social structures and the almost infinite subtleties of political situations render these judgments also rather superficial. The military of most nonindustrial countries, regardless of ideology, operate within constitutional, economic and social contexts which, though they have little enough in common with each other, generally have even less in common with the United States. United States and Western European values are not the most useful guides for disentangling Third World political complexities.

Nor are military expenditures on "sophisticated" modern hardware a reliable indicator of whether the military is assisting or inhibiting progress: Even leaving aside India, Pakistan, and certain countries in Southeast Asia and Middle East, most military forces still have some modern military equipment (though often in token amounts).

Acquisition of modern aircraft (jets and helicopters) or antiaircraft (missiles) weapons may or may not be justified in given instances: In themselves, apart from abnormal quantities, equipment purchases are probably neither avoidable nor a useful criterion of the political nature of the military forces in question. We cannot expect military services to overlook their own needs in the modernization of their countries.

Sometimes a trend appears to overshadow the political diversity

(*Continued on page* 45)

The Defense Department's extensive domestic involvement gives it an advantage apart from the relative strength of constituencies.

# The Military Influence Within the Executive Branch

**ADAM YARMOLINSKY**

*Based on Chapter 3 in the forthcoming book, "The Military Establishment," by Adam Yarmolinsky, a Twentieth Century Fund Study, to be published by Harper & Row in 1971. Copyright 1970 by Adam Yarmolinsky. Reprinted by permission of Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc.*

*Adam Yarmolinsky, born in New York City in 1922, is a graduate of Harvard University and Yale Law School, and has been a professor at Harvard Law School since 1966. He was law clerk to Associate Justice Stanley Reed of the United States Supreme Court, and an associate in prestigious New York and Washington, D. C. law firms. In the 1960s, he was Special Assistant Secretary of Defense and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; in World War II, he served in the USAAF. He received the Distinguished Civilian Public Service Award from the Department of Defense. His literary work includes being public affairs editor for Doubleday & Co., a book, "Recognition of Excellence," editing, special correspondent for the* London Economist, *and articles in periodicals.*

In the oval office of the President of the United States little less than two weeks after his inauguration, President Richard M. Nixon was apologizing for the barrenness of the office; his books and other personal belongings were still in New York. But the office was not devoid of panoply. He pointed to the flags of the four services off to one side of his desk. "They" had sent them over that very day, when they discovered that Lyndon Johnson had removed his service flags. There were no emblems or banners from any other branch or department of government, nothing to represent the Foreign Service or the judicial branch or the Congress—but there were the emblems of the military, richly symbolic of the relationship of the President to the armed services. It is a role all too often forgotten when one mentions the power of the military establishment, for the military is at no time more powerful than the President of the United States—the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces—is prepared to allow it to be.

There have been other societies in which the military establishment played a more influential, if not a completely dominant role, from ancient Sparta to some parts of present-day Latin America. Communist China spends a larger percentage of a much smaller gross national product on its military budget. But the United States and the Soviet Union are the only industrialized societies in which the military establishment is the largest single feature in the economic and political landscape.

It has not always been thus. The growth of military influence within the executive branch has been gradual, advancing in periods of war and military crisis until it came to dominate by its own accumulated mass. Historically the tradition of the American military has been an apolitical one. Early in this country, a professional soldier recalled how the military ". . . lived apart in their tiny secluded garrisons much after the manner of military monks and . . . rarely came into contact with the mass of our citizens."

The military was only indirectly influential in executive decision-making—in matters of defense as well as foreign policy—up to World War I, and even then its influence was largely apolitical.

President Theodore Roosevelt and President William Howard Taft felt free to contact senior officers without bothering their service secretaries, but their communications were scarcely on matters of high policy. A typical letter from Roosevelt to an Army Chief of Staff ran: "Ought we not sometimes to practice our cavalry in charging? If so, would it not be practicable to arrange a row of dummies so that at the culminating moment of the charge the cavalry could actually ride home and hit the dummies? . . . I wish you would see if this dummy idea could not be worked up."

In Woodrow Wilson's time, more memoranda from the service staffs went to the White House as problems of the period—trouble with Japan, civil war in Mexico, and war in Europe—seemed to call more urgently for military commentary than had most issues of the McKinley-Roosevelt-Taft era. But President Wilson resisted recommendations from the General Board and Joint Board when they suggested transferring the fleet to the Pacific during a crisis with Japan. He decided not to do so, and when the Joint Board asked him to reconsider, he replied: "When a policy has been settled by the Administration and when it is communicated to the Joint Board, they have no right to be trying to force a different course." To his Navy Secretary he said, "I wish you would say to them that if this should occur again, there will be no General or Joint Boards. They will be abolished." For a time, Wilson forbade the Joint Board even to meet. And, although he gave great discretion to his

military commanders in World War I, Wilson kept in his own hand all matters which he regarded as political, particularly preparations for peace negotiations.

In 1920 and 1921, the military made further efforts to acquire a voice in policy. Neither President Warren G. Harding nor his Secretary of State, Charles Evans Hughes, paid heed to strong objections from military proposals to the Washington treaty decisions which limited military expansion. Nor did the military regain power in the thirties. In the crisis of 1931 following Japan's seizure of Manchuria. President Herbert Hoover took charge himself. He consulted with the service heads only once, and then not about what he ought to do but merely about what they could do if necessary.

Civilians in the military establishment had access to and influence on the White House, however, during the years just before World War II. Theodore Roosevelt, Taft, Wilson, the Republican Presidents of the 1920s, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, all made use of service secretaries or assistant secretaries in discussions on policy. By and large, these civilians acted as little more than conduits for advice prepared by professional officers. Through much civilian liaison, therefore, the military possessed a continuous—if limited—voice in presidential decision-making despite the lack of overt power.

With the approach of World War II, the relationship between the military and the Executive changed significantly. Successive crises—war between Italy and Ethiopia, Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland, civil war in Spain, and a Japanese drive to conquer China—drew Roosevelt's attention away from domestic affairs. He turned for advice to generals and admirals as well as to diplomats. He decreed that the Chiefs of Staff have direct access to him, without going through the civilian secretaries. During difficult periods after 1940, when he pondered the destroyer deal, Lend-Lease, Atlantic convoys and submarine patrols, aid to Russia, and economic sanctions against Japan, he frequently sought military advice and, after Pearl Harbor, he leaned even more heavily on the military.

Prior to World War II Chiefs of Staff saw Presidents occasionally, but had no higher standing as presidential advisors than senior civil servants in, say, the Interior and Labor departments. Certainly, on foreign policy issues, they did not have status comparable to that of Assistant Secretaries of State or ambassadors. With World War II, their position changed dramatically. In terms of entree to the White House and influence on a broad range of presidential decisions, members of the Joint Chiefs outranked cabinet secretaries. Roosevelt sought advice from the Joint Chiefs on a range of issues that he and his predecessors would have regarded, before 1938, as primarily State Department business. The President gave the Chiefs decisive responsibility, for example, for devising surrender terms and occupation plans, even involving them in arrangements for a postwar United Nations Organization.

Although the military had previously sought a role in policy-making, they showed some reluctance to assume as much responsibility as Roosevelt thrust upon them. The Joint Chiefs and their staff committees dutifully prepared plans dealing with political as well as military contingencies. They attempted to forecast postwar trends and to analyze such subjects as future relations with the Soviet Union. But, by and large, the officers involved did not relish working on intangible problems with little relation to the war in progress. They always took care to write that their judgments reflected a strictly military viewpoint. As far as possible, they tried to shift responsibility to the State Department. After 1945, this reluctance ceased.

Truman, for his part, viewed the military with some mistrust. Roosevelt's first military contacts had been with admirals and social register naval officers whom he had first met as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, but Truman recalled his experience as a National Guard officer in World War I when he ran afoul of Regular Army red tape. Later, as chairman of a Senate committee scrutinizing the military conducts of World War II, Truman saw abundant evidence of the services' expensive inefficiency. He did not instinctively think of the military as a source of wisdom on issues of high national policy.

As in the years immediately after World War I, the professional military after World War II again sought a recognized place in the policy advisory process. This time they succeeded. For, like FDR, Truman found himself facing situations in which he felt need for military counsel; for example, the Soviet Union's failure to evacuate Iranian Azerbaijan and the withdrawal of British support from Turkey and Greece. As he felt compelled to consult the military, he acquired more and more confidence in them. In contrast to wordy, vague, and inconclusive memoranda so often sent from State, papers from the Pentagon on foreign policy issues appeared to him terse, thorough, reliable, and clearly focused on requirements for action. In 1947 Truman agreed that, at least in form, the military establishment should have an institutionalized role in advising him on foreign policy. He sponsored a National Security Act which, in addition to making Air Force a separate service and providing for a Secretary of Defense, set up a statutory National Security Council designed as an inner cabinet to deal with issues of foreign and defense policy—"Mr. Truman's Politburo," as John Fischer called it.

The same act was amended in 1949 to guarantee in law the practice, previously carried on *de facto,* of "legislative insubordination" by the Joint Chiefs. The act provides that "no provision of this Act shall be so construed as to prevent a Secretary of a military department or a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from presenting to the Congress, on his own initiative, after first so informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendations relating to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper."

Nevertheless, President Truman did not revert to Roosevelt's practice of depending on the military as primary policy advisors. After a period of collaboration between the State Department and the Pentagon under George C. Marshall, Truman exhibited some concern about the policy role of the military and encouraged a full-scale review of American commitments and the forces required to sustain them. But with the outbreak of the Korean War, he was obliged to bring military men back into the inner circle of policy-making. General Omar N. Bradley,

as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, began to function much as had Admiral William D. Leahy during World War II, briefing the President almost daily. Truman met occasionally with some or all of the service chiefs to discuss not only military plans and weapons requirements but also such issues as how, by diplomacy, to keep the Chinese out of the war and how to persuade Europeans that the United States government still gave their continent first priority. Even during the hottest phases of the Korean War, however, he never went as far as Franklin Roosevelt in relying on the uniformed military for policy advice. Military professionals functioned as presidential advisors, but for the most part at a secondary level.

Because of his own five-star rank and his personal popularity, President Eisenhower had less need than Truman for clear support from the military. If anything, his military background made him less responsive to the services. He felt qualified to judge as well as to discount advice. Recognizing that political opponents might charge him with allowing the military excessive influence, he took pains to keep his former colleagues at arm's length. He accepted and put into effect early in his administration a task force report which had the apparent effect of giving the civilian Secretary of Defense larger powers. In practice, Eisenhower depended on the Joint Chiefs less than had Truman. During the 1954 crisis over Indochina, for example, he considered ordering air strikes in support of the French even though the service chiefs had advised against such action. In subsequent crises over the Chinese offshore islands, Suez, Hungary, and renewed Soviet threats to Berlin, he showed similar independence. But at the same time, Eisenhower used one military man in the kind of top-level advisory role that Truman had reserved for his civilian secretaries. From 1953 to 1957, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the JCS chairman, occupied a place in Eisenhower's foreign policy councils second only to that of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. His period as chairman and Marshall's as Army Chief of Staff probably mark the two points at which professional military men have had the biggest voice in presidential decisions.

Kennedy assumed the Presidency after having read such books as those of General Matthew Ridgway, "Soldier," and General Maxwell Taylor, "The Uncertain Trumpet," James M. Gavin's "War and Peace in the Space Age," and reports by various analysts charging that the Eisenhower administration had sacrificed to the sacred cow of a balanced budget the military wherewithal for a forceful, flexible, and effective diplomacy. Kennedy intended to give generals and admirals freer access to the oval office. His first dealings with the Chiefs of Staff, however, came with the Bay of Pigs. The next was with Laos. In the first case, the President felt that he had been deceived—the Chiefs had not made plain the probability that the landing would fail unless given overt American military support. On Laos, Kennedy asked the hard questions he had neglected to ask about the Cuban operation. He emerged from both experiences mistrusting not only the judgment of the Chiefs but also their competence.

For self-protection, Kennedy called Maxwell Taylor out of retirement to serve on the White House staff and, in 1962, appointed him chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Even so, he never gave Taylor a status comparable to Radford's under Eisenhower. The President's relations with other professional military men remained at best cool, distant, and wary. For practical purposes, Kennedy received military advice only as it filtered to him through his civilian Secretary of Defense. In his brief thousand days, he never faced a test comparable to Truman's in 1951. He did, however ask the military establishment for help in some close battles on Capitol Hill. He judged it indispensable for Senate ratification of the limited test-ban treaty that the Joint Chiefs certify the treaty as not contrary to American interests; he devoted almost as much effort to negotiations with the Chiefs as to negotiations with Moscow.

During the presidency of his successor, the pattern of caution and wariness was at first preserved. As a longtime member of the Armed Services Committee, Lyndon Johnson brought to the presidency attitudes somewhat similar to Truman's. "The generals," he once said, "know only two words—spend and bomb." On Vietnam and the Dominican Republic, Johnson treated the professional military as agents of doubtful reliability. He decided on a bombing campaign against North Vietnam, and would not let the Chiefs add any bombing targets without his personal approval. During the Dominican occupation, he sent a succession of high-level civilian officials to check on and oversee the operations of the forces landed there. To be sure, Johnson could not be characterized as trustful in his relations with *any* group; still, he showed somewhat greater suspiciousness of the military than most groups.

Nevertheless, in a pattern by now familiar, war forced an alliance between the Executive and the military. As the war in Vietnam wore on and came under more and more criticism at home, Johnson developed a closer relationship with the professional military. By 1968, the



crucial choice before him, one that affected almost all international and domestic problems, was whether to step down or to step up the scale of air operations in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs and the American commander in Vietnam inevitably formed part of the circle from which he sought advice.

Johnson, like Truman at the time of Korea, attempted to counter waning popularity by demonstrating that his policies commanded support from the military establishment. For a time he kept McNamara so much in the foreground that reporters spoke of the war as "McNamara's war." When this tactic failed, the President turned more to the professionals. In the winter of 1967-68 he summoned the field commander, General William C. Westmoreland, to address a joint session of Congress. Johnson emphasized that his own actions accorded with advice from Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs, although there is some reason to suppose that he used the military more as advocates in defense of his position than as counselors on his choice of options.

The Nixon administration appears to be establishing a pattern of civil-military relations which reverses that of the Kennedy and Johnson years. While Secretary McNamara and Clark M. Clifford kept the uniformed military on a comparatively tight rein and permitted civilian Defense staffs to proliferate, Secretary Melvin R. Laird seems to be granting the military more autonomy and reducing the role of civilian staffers. Simultaneously, Henry A. Kissinger's highly structured National Security Council staff, and the new Defense Policy Review Committee suggest that President Richard M. Nixon may be substituting rigorous civilian institutional procedures for the rigorous civilian systems analysis of his predecessors, as his means of assuring civilian control.

As the military establishment has grown, the relative strength of the State Department and the Pentagon has shifted. Defense is now usually dominant. The most obvious and perhaps the most important difference between the Department of Defense and the Department of State is one of size. Expenditure for defense is now running at a rate some twenty times the rate for all other international activities, including foreign aid and the United States Information Agency (if Vietnam expenditures are excluded the ratio might be down to fifteen to one, although a large part of foreign aid expenditures also go to Vietnam). Even in terms of physical plant, the new State Department building in Foggy Bottom does not begin to compete in size with the Pentagon itself, quite apart from the Little Pentagon in the redevelopment area on the Washington side of the Potomac.

The size of the military establishment not only provides economies of scale, but also makes resources available at the top, in manpower, in expertise, and in the variety of services that can make the difference between crisply executed operations and constantly cramped and curtailed operations. It may not be true that overseas commercial telephone conversations between State Department officials and embassies abroad have been cut off in mid-ocean because appropriations were exhausted; but it is true that only the Defense Department (and through it, the White House) has effective immediate voice communications throughout the world. United States ambassadors abroad have to ask for rides in the military attachés' aircraft, and State Department officials at home have to ask for rides in their Pentagon colleagues' official automobiles.

Not only is the Defense Department much bigger, but it is much more pervasive. The State Department has embassies and consulates girdling the globe, and in most of those posts foreign service officers are matched by members of United States military missions.

As of June 30, 1969, there was a total of 8,264 representatives of the Defense Department, compared with only 5,166 representatives of State at these overseas missions. At least one ambassador to a Latin American country asked that the military mission in his country be reduced substantially but his request was never acted on.

The military presence extends also into the heartland of the United States. Where the State Department has established only a few toe- and fingerholds in the local councils on foreign relations in the largest urban centers, military establishments and defense plants mark the length and breadth of the country. Thus the influence of the Defense Department, as measured by its presence and its spending power, is diffused throughout the United States, somewhat unevenly, but very widely; while the much more limited potential influence of the State Department and its ancillary agencies is limited to the nearly voteless District of Columbia and to voteless constituencies overseas.

The Defense Department's extensive domestic involvement gives it an advantage apart from the relative strengths of constituencies—it sensitizes the department to domestic political realities. It is spending taxpayers' dollars. It is drafting the sons of citizens and voters. It is making decisions that affect the economic climate of American communities and the economic welfare of American companies. By contrast, the State Department is generally observing and reporting on a bewildering jumble of activities beyond the reach of the sovereign power of the United States. At least until recently, Defense has had a good deal less difficulty gaining congressional approval for its enormous budget than State has had with its small one. But the Pentagon's budgetary victories were as much a measure of its involvement in domestic politics as the State Department's budgetary defeats are a measure of its estrangement from domestic politics. Pentagon policy-makers are much less likely than State Department planners to ignore the primacy of American domestic politics in making calculations about the political behavior of their own government. It may seem paradoxical yet be a reflection of its strength that by far the stronger of the two departments should be more responsive to domestic political pressures.

The fact that the Defense Department is primarily responsible for the management of its huge resources gives it still another advantage over the State Department. The Secretary of State, under at least three Presidents, has seen it as his primary responsibility to advise the President, rather than to direct the affairs of his department. The under secretaries and the assistant secretaries see their primary role as furnishing policy advice to the Secretary, rather than carrying out the policies he and the President establish. The bureau chiefs, the section chiefs, and the branch chiefs in turn see themselves primarily as policy advisors, looking up toward their superiors rather than down toward the management of

their own departments. Whatever criticisms can be made of Defense management—and current evidence indicates they can be made with considerable effectiveness—it must be recognized that Defense Department officials, military and civilian, regard the management of the defense establishment as their primary and ultimate responsibility. The Department's orientation toward the management of men and machines in turn puts an emphasis on speed and efficiency in Defense operations which State fails to match, even making allowances for the relative strengths in resources available to management. Somehow the responsible officials in Defense have tended in recent years to learn about a new crisis before the State Department officials got the word. The State Department memorandum reaches the White House a day or two after the Defense Department memorandum, and the staff work in the State memorandum is frequently not as crisply or as effectively done. A former White House staff officer noted that when he called for briefing papers on short notice from State for a presidential overseas trip, his first deadline passed without any response. He then turned to the office of International Security Affairs at Defense, which responded with a complete concise, and thoroughly indexed briefing book. State finally crashed through with several cardboard cartons of unsorted cables on the countries listed in the President's itinerary. These are clearly differences that do not go to the merits or to the wisdom of the recommendations emanating from the two departments. They do go to the likelihood that the first recommendations will be acted on and acted on favorably.

One of the consequences of this military-civilian competition in the area of weapons development was first the creation of a (primarily civilian) office of Systems Analysis within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and then the creation of matching capabilities by the Joint Chiefs. Similarly, in the foreign policy area, the office of International Security Affairs developed almost as a miniature State Department, and this development was followed by parallel functions in the Plans and Policy Directorate of the Joint Staff, complete with its own regional desks, like the regional desks in the Secretary's office and the regional bureaus in the Department of State. Here, as elsewhere, imitation proved to be the sincerest form of flattery.



MILITARY considerations and military logic have dominated United States foreign policy in part because the American people, in the period after World War II came to repose special trust in the judgment of professional military men and also because this trust arose out of fear of a cold war antagonist.

That this assertion had some basis in reality is demonstrated, paradoxically, by an episode often cited as proving the vitality of the principle of civilian supremacy—the MacArthur crisis of 1951. Dissenting publicly against rulings by the President, General Douglas MacArthur had called for enlarging the Korean War and backing a Chinese Nationalist campaign against the mainland Communists. After repeated instances of insubordination, Truman relieved the general of his command. There followed an outcry in the press and on Capitol Hill, a hero's welcome for MacArthur in Los Angeles and New York, and a two-month hearing conducted jointly by the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees of the Senate. Since this hearing ended with all members of both committees agreeing that the President had not exceeded his constitutional powers, the result was hailed at the time, and has been hailed since, as a reaffirmation that the elected civilian representative of the people retains ultimate control over policy and strategy.

Yet, if one looks more closely, another conclusion might be drawn. The President's party held majorities in both houses of Congress. Of the twenty-eight Senators on the two committees that conducted the hearings, only eight sided openly with MacArthur on the question of how the war should be fought. One would suppose that an outcome favorable to the President might have been predictable from the beginning. Evidently, however, administration supporters on the two committees felt an intensive investigation was necessary. During the hearings they interrogated fourteen witnesses, including the Secretary of Defense, four members of the JCS, and five additional generals or admirals. The friends of the administration pressed each representative of the military establishment to say that the President had had their advice on the relevant issues of strategy and policy before he overruled a recommendation from MacArthur.

It cannot be proven, of course, that the outcome of the hearings would have been different if this parade of military witnesses had not appeared in support of the President. On the other hand, it is not hard to surmise that the verdict in the two committees, in Congress, and in the country might have been much closer, or indeed have gone against Truman, had Secretary of Defense Marshall, Chairman Bradley, and the other Chiefs sided instead with MacArthur. Of course, it can be said that the issues of 1951 were partly military issues. It can also be argued that Marshall, the Chiefs, and Eisenhower believed they owed loyalty to President Truman, regardless of whether he had accepted their recommendations.

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


## The Military Complex

MILITARISM, USA, *by Col. James A. Donovan USMC (Ret). Scribners, $6.95.*

To most of us, faithful to the concept of civilian authority over the military, "Militarism, USA" will come as a shock. Perhaps it's just that wars are coming closer together, and that we during "peacetime" have felt too compelled to maintain a strong deterrent force to avoid wider conflict, but the result is that the military establishment has been steadily growing in power and influence. It is also growing more inflexible in doctrine. In his chapter on Careerism, for example, author Donovan cites the period of service in the rank of colonel or captain (Navy) as the dangerous years when the pressure to conform with the service's standards in order to be one of the few promoted further can stifle originality and independence of thought. Furthermore, the author gives some glimpses behind the scenes which suggest that the briefings on which senior officers base their decisions are not the objective presentations one would hope for. This is particularly true of the statistical data coming out of Vietnam, which he ruthlessly dissects to show how tenuous the information compiled in papers such as the Bomb Damage Assessment Reports really is.

It is of course the Vietnam war which triggered the critical analysis of which this book is a prime example. Donovan is not really breaking new ground when he concludes that "1) there are limits to the power of the US, and 2) the US is strategically essentially an air/sea power—not a land power." What is particularly noteworthy is that this is a book written by a military officer who takes a good hard look at his colleagues and is alarmed both at the degree of influence which they have and at their preparation for their huge responsibilities.

—A. W. BOLSTER

## The Opposite Ways of History

SOLDIER AND STATE IN AFRICA, *edited by Claude E. Welch, Jr. Northwestern University Press.*

JACQUES MARITAIN, the French philosopher whose views inspired the development of the Christian Democratic movement, maintained that history moves simultaneously in opposite directions. In short, two countervailing forces are to be found in most societies. One is creative, and gives history its dynamic quality. The other is static and, while it too may shape history, this force invariably leads to stagnation.

The American community of scholars is divided in its assessment of the likely contribution of the African military to the development of local societies. There is some acknowledgement that, following the achievement of independence, the first generation of civilian leaders was far from successful in its efforts to create variable governing institutions. However, the forcible removal of these leaders has been treated with considerable reserve. In addition to the frailties of Africa's military "establishments," the limited "competence" and erratic political style of army chieftains are held to diminish prospects for the avoidance of political stagnation.

The contributors to "Soldier and State" are divided in their assessment. But, if the experiences of Algeria, Ghana, Nigeria, and the Congo are an adequate guide, we can assume that a basis for optimism exists. The message of this study is that the military almost certainly will continue to involve itself in the nation-state building process—and could produce results that bring African societies into a state of grace.

—WILLIAM H. LEWIS

## For Congo Hands

THE MERCENARIES, *by Anthony Mockler. Macmillan, $6.95.*

THE book is primarily concerned with the exploits of the motley bands that fought in the Congo under the loose and erratic leadership of Messrs. Denard, Hoare, Peters, Schramme, Mueller and Puren during Katanga's quest for independence. To introduce the reader to the mentality of the white adventurers in the Congo, the author spent the first half of the book racing through six centuries of exploits of various mercenary groups. In the process, Mr. Mockler, a former correspondent for THE GUARDIAN in the Congo, grappled with several attempts to find a definition of the term *mercenary,* but he failed to find anything satisfactory either to himself or the general reader. He admits, however, that he "makes no claims to be definitive and aims rather at entertainment than instruction."

The heart of the book, the chapters on the Congo, is a poorly organized collection of rumors, superficial descriptions of skirmishes, plots and counter-plots. He seemed to find the CIA behind just about every bush and mysterious Frenchmen involved where he could not implicate the CIA. He never quite made up his mind as to the combat effectiveness of the mercenaries and his entire text is filled with inaccuracies, poor editing and undocumented assertions. He also touched upon the limited use of mercenaries in the Yemen in 1963 and Biafra in 1968-69.

At best, the book might be of interest to JOURNAL readers who served in or near the Congo during its secessionist crisis and are interested in picking up a few new rumors. The only real substance in the book is contained in the concluding chapter which examines the prospects for mercenaries in future wars. Mr. Mockler concludes that it is likely that mercenaries would be useful only as technical advisers and instructors who can explain to untutored natives the intricacies of modern weapon technology. It appears unlikely that many countries can afford to recruit outside help in sufficient numbers to be decisive in future engagements; the brains rather than the brawn and daring of a limited number of foreigners remain the only marketable qualities unemployed or underemployed military men will have to offer the highest bidders.

—JOHN W. STEPHENS

## Varieties of Revolution

INSURGENT ERA, *by Richard H. Sanger, Potomac Books, Inc., $7.50.*

POINTING out that political-social insurgencies have been occurring on an average of one a month since World War II, this book, updated from a 1967 version, examines and categorizes their primary characteristics.

The major revolutions examined in this book are categorized as either *societal revolutions* (Russia, China, Egypt, Cuba); *independence rebellions* (Indochina, India); and *Cold War conflicts* (The Congo, The Philippines, Vietnam). These analyses are preceded by an excellently-done chapter entitled "The Life Cycle of a Revolt," in which the successive revolutionary stages culminating in manipulated turmoil in the streets are laid out for the

reader with clarity and succinctness. This chapter usefully sets the stage for the ensuing country case studies.

In general, the author, a retired FSO, has turned out a concise (172 pages-plus a compendium of postwar incidents of political violence), well-researched and well-written study of political, economic and social convulsions which inevitably beset developing countries early on. Parenthetically, its textbook potential is affected by a few minor proofing errors, which presumably will be corrected in subsequent printings.

The author, however, does appear to get somewhat off the track in a brief wind-up discussion of the inevitability of continued political violence in developing countries, and of their implications for the US. The US should not preempt the action, as the author advocates in selective cases, simply to preclude the "Communists" from doing so. Hopefully, the Nixon Doctrine means what it says, the Cambodian example notwithstanding; hopefully, our interests will in fact shape our commitments, rather than the reverse. If US preemption takes place on this basis, in full appreciation of the economic, military, social and political consequences, this may be as it should be and as the author intended. But, if so, he needs to make the point more clearly.

—C. Arnold Freshman

### Israel—Two Conflicting Rights

Jerusalem, Key to Peace, *by Evan M. Wilson, Middle East Institute, $5.95.*
If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem, *by Robert Silverberg, Morrow $12.95.*

Chaim Weizmann once said that the story of Israel's establishment was not the story of right confronting wrong, but of two conflicting rights. It is refreshing indeed to come upon two books, from very different sources, which make room for this dilemma.

Evan Wilson was the US Consul General in Jerusalem during the 1967 war. His book grew out of years of involvement with the Palestine problem. "Jerusalem, Key to Peace" is part travelogue and part history as seen through the eyes of a participant. The moving spirit behind the book is Wilson's captivation with the city and its people. This same fascination is at the heart of the proposal for a Jerusalem settlement which winds up the book.

His account of the history of the Arab-Israeli conflict gives rather more weight to the various international commissions and the UN than I would have done. I am also unable to share the author's hope that a settlement in Jerusalem could precede a general Arab-Israeli settlement. But these are merely illustrations of the truism that no two people see the problem in the same way. Wilson's book will be of interest to both the general and the specialized reader, and includes the texts of important documents on the Middle East in an appendix.

Robert Silverberg is an American Jew who discovered to his surprise on June 5, 1967 that he felt personally involved in the Arab-Israeli war, and set out to probe the reasons for this involvement. "If I Forget Thee, O Jerusalem" is a history of Israel and of American Zionism. The author wrote it with his eyes wide open. The more cynical and unpleasant parts of the story are not glossed over. The story has two villains—the British and the State Department—but no real heroes. The parts on the rise of American Zionism are particularly valuable.

The book is marred by a few errors of fact, most of them not very important for the "big picture." Somewhat more serious—and more surprising—is the author's misrepresentation of Israeli nationalism: he is quite mistaken in viewing the fairly common distaste for customs and personality traits which made up the stereotype of the Diaspora Jew, as a "rejection of Judaism." But these are minor irritations; Silverberg's book is both worthwhile and eminently readable.

—M. Teresita Currie

### The Uneasy Alliance

Soviet Russia and the Middle East, *by Aaron S. Kleinman. The Johns Hopkins Press (Studies in International Affairs), $2.45.*

The dramatic growth of Soviet political and military presence in the Middle East has been the stuff of many a news report over the three years since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Mr. Kleinman has attempted in this short and useful book to put the Soviet role in its proper historical and political perspective, and to trace some of the landmarks along the Soviets' route to their present position. In pointing out that the primary Soviet motive is to gain comparative advantage over its big power adversaries in this geopolitically important area, he properly concludes that the Kremlin policymakers have followed a course determined as much by opportunism as by conscious design. Unfortunately, Mr. Kleinman does not address himself adequately or even directly to the most important of the opportunities offered by the area's instabilities; namely the unresolved Arab-Israeli conflict, which has allowed the Soviets to capitalize on the Arabs' perceived need for a major power supporter. Although there are indeed other local conflicts and tensions which, as Mr. Kleinman points out, would have created instability in the area and probably made major power intervention inevitable in any event, these conflicts would not have given the Soviets the vehicle which the Arab-Israeli struggle has given them. Nonetheless, Mr. Kleinman has analyzed quite acutely the present uneasy alliance between the Arabs and their Soviet benefactors (or is it vice versa?), although I would challenge some of his assumptions on Arab motivations and politics. He concludes with a call for a strengthened US presence: militarily, in cooperation with our Mediterranean allies, and in terms of a more understanding policy toward the Arabs. The first elements are part of our current concerns, but the last is very much a facet of the Arab-Israeli conflict which Mr. Kleinman has attempted to avoid.

—Gordon S. Brown

### The Race in Latin America

The Unrevolutionary Society — *The Power of Latin American Conservatism in a Changing World, by John Mander. Knopf, $6.95.*

There are very few intellectual books written in English about Latin America. There are fewer intellectuals who write books in English about Latin America. John Mander and "The Unrevolutionary Society" do much toward filling that gap. Mander, a contributing editor of Encounter, takes the typical 90-day or 180-day trip around the hemisphere but presents his findings in a most enlightening and untypical manner. Present-day Latin America is seen not through the eyes of the present-day traveler but as an outgrowth of its culture, its colonization, its traditions and its writings. Ideas are presented by Borges, da Cunha, Gallegos, Sarmiento, Fuentes, Neruda and Vargas Llosa much more than they are presented by Mander.

"The Unrevolutionary Society" is not necessarily an easy book to read. It is even a bit heavy at times. This is probably because Mander has filled it with so much. The normal facts and figures are not present, but rather provocative thoughts, ideas, theories and philosophies are employed to bring current political, social and economic situations into perspective. Perhaps a few examples of Mander's statements might best provide a feeling for the kind of thinking that is stimulated by his book. "The United States will be mature when she has learned to guard against the alternating pessimism and optimism that have bedevilled her Latin American

policy in the past." "Chile's exposed position in international trade gives rise to a profound feeling of impotence among her intellectuals. What results is a kind of paranoid nightmare, in which the local Oligarchy, and Army, the CIA, the Pentagon and the World Bank have become fused into a single monster, ever ready to swoop and smother the helpless dreamer." "The blame for the obstacles to reform that are built into Latin American society is imputed—and this is psychologically understandable—to an outside force, the United States of America. Yet this can only compound the feeling of impotence." "Peron was a Nasserist ten years before Nasser." "Americans should at least be aware of this possibility: that if there is a race in Latin America, it may not be a race between Communism and democracy, but between democracy and authoritarian technocracy."

This is not a book of the Left nor of the Right, but rather a thinking man's book on Latin America and should be read by serious students of the area.

—A. IRWIN RUBENSTEIN

### I Spy From Above

UNARMED AND UNAFRAID, *by Glenn B. Infield. Macmillan, $7.95.*

GLENN B. INFIELD, a former USAF Major, has written a history of aerial reconnaissance. The title, "Unarmed and Unafraid," is taken from the motto of US reconnaissance pilots "Alone, Unarmed, and Unafraid." Infield traces the history of aerial reconnaissance all the way back to 1794, when a French balloon was used for observation, through similar activities during the Civil War and into the age of heavier-than-air reconnaissance aircraft in World War I. Most of the book concerns itself with such reconnaissance during World War II and the Korean War. Cold War activities and the Vietnam War are also covered. Unfortunately, security classification did not permit a complete run-down on the ubiquitous spy satellites.

Within the restrictions imposed by national security, the book is reasonably informative and may be of some use to those concerned with the problems of reconnaissance from the sky and space.

—AL STOFFEL

### SALT: The Eastern Perspective

THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: *A Superpower Dilemma, by Roman Kolkowicz and others. Johns Hopkins Press, paper: $2.95.*

THE collaborating authors of this short, pithy volume have done a first-class job sorting out arms control problems as they affect the Soviet Union. Though one (especially one with some special knowledge of SALT) may disagree with occasional specifics, this effort is especially useful for understanding some of the motivations and thinking behind Soviet approaches to SALT.

Although work for the book apparently was finished before the Spring 1970 SALT session in Vienna, nothing that evolved over the summer suggests there has been a shift in attitudes that would change the book's basic conclusion:

"Realistic analysis suggests that even at their most productive point, Soviet-American arms control negotiations will not profoundly alter their adversary relationship, nor will they measurably affect the range of their traditional political interests and objectives. The negotiations would, however, stabilize and formalize Soviet-American relations and thus affirm some new rules of the game for the superpower in the 1970s."

Though the book doesn't spell it out, one of the more suggestive thoughts arising from the analysis is that arms control problems for superpowers have some interesting similarities which transcend the nature of their internal political system.

—JOHN D. STEMPEL

STATUARY RAPE *by Henry J. Paoli*

*"I think I'll send Vice-Consul Ballino to Lower Watta."*

*"The Consul thinks he's sending me to Lower Watta."*

## The Pacific Future

THE EMERGING JAPANESE SUPERSTATE: *Challenge and Response, by Herman Kahn, Prentice-Hall.*

HERMAN KAHN believes that before we reach the year 2000 Japan will have equalled, if not surpassed America and the Soviet Union in terms of GNP, that she will be an economic, technological giant or superstate and that it is likely she will want to become financially and politically powerful in international affairs and will probably endeavor to become a military superpower, possessing at least a defensive nuclear capability. He has written a book to prove his point but is frank to admit he may be wrong and he outlines arguments against his thesis. However, while he admits all these arguments have some substance he believes none of them are sufficiently strong completely to invalidate his case.

John Leonard of the NEW YORK TIMES has called this a "silly book" apparently because Mr. Kahn doesn't speak or read Japanese and cites as his favorite book on the Japanese character "The Chrysanthemum and the Sword" by Ruth Benedict, who also had no knowledge of the Japanese language and had never been to Japan when she wrote her book. Mr. Leonard seems to believe such a person cannot know enough about Japan to justify the extreme views he puts forward. Yet, former Ambassador Reischauer, generally considered to be one of the leading American experts on Japan, and who does have a thorough knowledge of Japanese, has characterized Miss Benedict's book as "a classic on the Japanese personality." Mr. Kahn's book may seem to some a bit silly here and there but it is not as silly as Mr. Leonard's review.

Mr. Kahn makes clear in his Foreword that "the main purpose of this book is to open up discussion rather than settle it." This he certainly accomplishes and anyone who is interested in the future of American-Japanese relations and how they will affect the whole Pacific area in the next two or three decades will find much in this short book to stimulate thought and argument. Mr. Kahn is certainly correct when he points out that despite present indications of wanting to be less dependent upon America and irrespective of choices which the Japanese may make in the next few years on economic, political and defense policies,

> ". . . the future is going to find the United States and Japan with many things to say to each other; they are further going to be closely related in a number of different projects, policies and areas, and they are going to be deeply concerned with each other's intentions and prospects."

The book tells why this is so and contains many suggestions for both American and Japanese leaders which should not lightly be disregarded. Although there will be much disagreement with many of Mr. Kahn's statements, policy makers in both Japan and America can benefit from reading this far from silly book.

—JOHN M. ALLISON

## American Forces in Europe

THE MIGHTY ENDEAVOR, *American Armed Forces in the European Theater in World War II, by Charles B. MacDonald. Oxford University Press, $12.50.*

CHARLES B. MACDONALD, having written wholly or in part, some twelve histories of World War II in Europe is well qualified to do another one. He should also know whether another one is needed.

In "The Mighty Endeavor" he has produced a good readable one-volume history emphasizing the role of American forces in that vast campaign. As befits a Department of the Army historian, his book concentrates on the role of the ground forces. His bibliography and documentation appear to be complete and accurate.

His account of the battle of the Ardennes, described as the greatest single battle ever engaged by American forces, inspires one to read more on that subject, perhaps John Eisenhower's "The Bitter Woods."

—AL STOFFEL

## The Mirage of Revolution

ROADS TO POWER IN LATIN AMERICA, *by Luis Mercier Vega. Praeger, $6.00.*

LUIS MERCIER VEGA has taken an iconoclastic approach to various of the doctrines long applied to revolution and change. His study leaves something to be desired in its organization and presentation of its conclusions, but it is stimulating and offers several helpful leads for those analysing and seeking to indicate the outcome of socio-political change in Latin America. Although Mr. Mercier uses the term Latin America in his title and although he does seek to develop a generalized approach, he recognizes the individuality of the Latin American nations and deals with seven specific countries in terms of his own theories.

Mercier makes a series of interesting observations particularly with regard to change, who brings it about, why and how.

He argues that the European formula of the class struggle, imported into Latin America, has no application. Change and revolution here, he says, are not brought about by the urban workers or the peasants but by the intellectual and middle class leaders eager for power. Their ambitions fit the Iberian Peninsula ideal of the social pyramid and they seek the top so as to control the levers of decision making, not to help the unwashed achieve their rising expectations.

The would-be leaders, the "organizers," bring about change or revolution with the aid of their *clientela*, presently the urban workers and peasants, but in former days made up of the rural workers attached to each *hacienda* or *fazenda*. These lower social orders he describes as the "availables," always hopeful, always used by the organizers who, Mercier feels, turn out to be the only beneficiaries.

Mercier also introduces a novel concept with regard to the familiar classes of society, adding "the state" as a class. The state, he feels, continues to assume new powers because the oligarchy will not assume new responsibilities, or the middle class are unable to fulfill society's new demands or because either class would rather have the state take on new powers than a rival class. The operators of this new "state class" are the technocrats who use their skills and the rubric of revolutionary ideology to build the state power for their own benefit.

Mercier sees social conflicts not as fundamental class struggles but tensions between static and dynamic social structures. He feels the solution lies neither in Marxism nor capitalism but by integrating a community politically, keeping its over-all problems continually in sight. He would appear to favor the Social-Christian concept of seeking to create a great internal mystique oriented towards development and accompanied by "properly conceived" international aid from developed countries. However, Mercier ends on a somewhat despondent note. He feels the political party leaders' efforts are "directed towards the construction of machines with which to seize power, not towards the slow and difficult task of creating associations in the work places and neighborhoods." Furthermore, he feels it would be foolish to believe that the new holders of state power will remain true to the moral principles which originally inspired them and will be unable "to resist the exhilarations of power, the taste for rapid and spectacular public works, and the all too easy confusion between public power and the welfare of the citizens."

—JOHN M. CATES, JR.

### Not Just Gold—Everything

THE CONQUEST OF THE INCAS, *by John Hemming. Harcourt, Brace & Jovanovich, 1970 500 pp. with Notes and Bibliography.*

THE conquest of Peru by one hundred and fifty armorclad Spaniards, led by a 55-year-old illiterate Spanish adventurer named Francisco Pizarro, is one of the most extraordinary dramas of history. Anyone who has traveled by air to Cuzco—or better yet, taken the Central Railroad of Peru to La Oroya and Huancayo—can testify to the indomitable courage and limitless reserves of endurance which must have been present for men and horses to traverse the bleak desert of the coastal plain and scale the towering western wall of the Andes.

Prescott's "The Conquest of Peru," which still remains the classic treatment of the subject, was a work of such transcendent literary merit that it has daunted every newcomer since its publication in 1847. Yet Prescott never visited Peru, confined his researches to the Spanish archives—then the only source available—and ended his story in 1548 with the termination of the bloody internecine struggle between rival Spanish factions. Thus, he did not concern himself with the fate of the Incas and their subjects for the next 250 years of Spanish rule.

Mr. Hemming, a young Canadian historian, has now produced the first comprehensive study of the Inca Empire and its conquest which draws on archaeological findings and documents that have come to light since Prescott. To these new sources he brings an intimate knowledge of the terrain and a crisp and lucid narrative style. The result is an exciting book, replete with new information and insights.

From Prescott one gets the impression that by supernatural feats of prowess, the Spaniards overthrew the Incas almost at a stroke. Hemming shows that the reality was far more complex. The Spaniards hit Peru just after the conclusion of a dynastic civil war. Their success in reaching the heart of the Inca empire and capturing Atahualpa was attributable partly to the smallness of their force—which was regarded as an expedition of gold-hungry marauders, not an invasion—and partly to apathy and disaffection among the defeated elements of the Inca's subjects. Their military exploits against incredible odds were largely the result of cohesion and ruthlessness born of desperation, coupled with the immunity afforded by their armor. It was not until after the murder of Atahualpa that the Incas realized that the Spaniards were not just after gold, but the kingdom that produced it.

Mr. Hemming devotes the rest of his work to the first centuries of Spanish rule, the conflicting policies of the Spanish crown—torn between humanitarian aspirations and greed for gold and the resistance and rebellions of the surviving Inca leaders. The whole book is fascinating and can be unreservedly recommended.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

### Dialogues with the Great

INTERPRETING AMERICAN HISTORY: *Conversations with Historians, by John A. Garraty. Macmillan.*

IMAGINE, after having read the major works on American history, being able to engage some of the best American historians in discussions on their writings, on their views of history, on their fellow historians. Or better, imagine reading a standard work and being able to determine if the author has changed his position since the writing. Few have the opportunity to do this. No one has done it with the care, method and skill of Professor Garraty of Columbia who has collected his discussions in his latest book. He interviews twenty-nine major historians about American history from the founding of the colonies to the present. The reader is treated to well-edited, informal and informative conversations which begin where the books leave off: Commager on nationalism, Morris on constitutional interpretations, Elkins on slavery, Woodward on the Negro, Link on Wilson, Ferrell on foreign policy, etc. Each reconsiders his own writings and comments on the interpretations of others. It constitutes a different and valuable approach in historiography.

Among the most interesting comments are those on the New Left historians, none of whom, unfortunately, were interviewed. It is the book's only flaw that in looking for "the best man in each field," Garraty's criteria needlessly produced a homogeneous "establishment" collection of historians. Twenty interviewers are from the northeastern seaboard, five from the same campus as Garraty. This good book would have benefited from a more varied selection.

Besides this self-imposed limitation, the book accurately reflects a general failing of American historical scholarship, neglect of the colonial period. Until 1945 we had spent more time as colonies than as an independent nation. Yet American historians have lopsidedly written of and studied the second half of our history. Only two historians interviewed in this book have specialized in the colonial period. Garraty probably would have included more, if he could have found them.

—TED MCNAMARA

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

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**MILITARY INFLUENCE** *(Continued from page 38)*

When pressed as to whether he would himself speak out publicly if he believed presidential decisions to be militarily wrong, Bradley replied, "No sir. . . . I have been brought up a little differently." Nevertheless, the conclusion is almost inescapable that Harry Truman had to have demonstrable support from the military establishment. It was a political necessity. It may have been a prerequisite of his survival as President.

In part, hero worship, carrying over from World War II, explained the extraordinary public confidence enjoyed by the military. The popularity that attached after the Revolutionary War and the Civil War to George Washington, Ulysses Grant, and other generals attached after World War II to Marshall, MacArthur, Eisenhower, Bradley, and a few others. In part, the preoccupying issues of the period accounted for public attitudes, for the citizenry would, under the circumstances, have looked to military men for some counsel. Also the unusual position occupied by the military was due to the weakness of the competition. A long-term secular trend had diminished the stature of the clergy; the Depression had shaken people's faith in businessmen, Roosevelt's duel with the "nine old men" and controversies aroused by the Earl Warren court cut into the prestige of the judiciary and by extension, the legal profession. Of national political leaders after FDR, only Eisenhower commanded blind trust among large numbers of citizens. (The Kennedy magic developed largely after his assassination, not before.) And Eisenhower came from the military.

In retrospect, the militarization of American foreign policy appears almost inevitable. The wartime atmosphere soon resumed after World War II. The Soviet Union from 1945 onward seemed to many observers aggressively expansionistic and implacably hostile. Awareness of advances in weaponry and delivery systems made Americans newly apprehensive about their own safety. It is hard to conceive, under the circumstances, how reasonable men in the executive branch could have developed or espoused any policies other than those emphasizing military security, enemy capabilities, and readiness for worst contingencies. In any event, they did not, despite periods of vacillation and sporadic attempts at applying civilian checks and balances.

The large role played by the military establishment in framing and executing foreign policies was merely one by-product of the forces that produced the policies themselves. Civilians like Dean Acheson, Dulles, and Dean Rusk did not speak lines written for them by the Joint Chiefs or by Secretaries of Defense. They spoke their convictions in the language most likely to persuade Congress and the public. They framed their proposals in such a way as to justify open support by military men. It is fair to say that if American foreign policy became partially militarized, the blame should not be laid primarily on the military establishment but on Presidents, civilian policymakers, the Congress, and the American people.

Whether the military is preserving its dominant role under the Nixon administration—at a time of tightening controls and declining military popularity, yet with a continuing and expanding war—remains to be seen. ■

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**MILITARY PROGRESS**
*continued from page 33*

of military forces in the Third World. In a number of countries, observers recently claim to have identified a "new" military asserting leadership in a search for social and economic progress. Military regimes may, in given circumstances and for brief periods, play a progressive role in overall social and economic development.

Particular executive acts may be called for by radical elements of left and right who see the military as a means of out-maneuvering conservative and liberal democratic political opponents. In the near term, such policies, like agrarian reform, may thus correspond to the development objectives of specific political groups. Normally, however, these policies must always be differentiated from the longer-run objectives of the military as an institution.

To determine long term military orientations, we must consider the historic institutional policy precedents that the military forces, as permanently established bureaucracies, may be expected to follow.

My own research on Peru suggests these longer term institutional concerns there have included, since before the 1968 coup: 1) Institutional Autonomy and Survival, 2) Public Order and the Control of Remote Areas, 3) Foreign Policy and Boundary Questions, and, particularly in the last decade, 4) National Development, including under that rubric education, industrialization, control of strategic materials (petroleum, telecommunications), and general national planning and support for central government authority and administration.

The internal political diversity of the armed forces in Peru, as in all moderately developed countries, may prevent the adoption of consistent development policies by the military as such, however. The very bureaucratic complexity of the military acts as an internal self-regulating process inhibiting policies whose effects, directly or indirectly, might threaten to increase internal diversity to the point of endangering the viability of the military institutions themselves. The military profession and institutions must be preserved from excessive political adventurism. No single partisan clique can normally control the military for long, even in the name of progress.

For the military institutions themselves, therefore, the longer run consequences of any attempt to assert a dominant military role in the political search for development are likely to include a return to quarters. The return may come later rather than sooner in some cases, and may be as transient as the attempt to assert the enlarged role. But it is inevitable.

For the country as a whole, the consequences of changes in military participation in government are likely to be determined by the nature of the civil-military coalition in power. It is to the identification of that coalition and its characteristics, rather than to consideration of "military" or "civilian" dominance in themselves, that political-military reporting and analysis should be directed. ■


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## PERUVIAN RELATIONS

*continued from page 16*

a reflection on the technical military record of US advisors.

Relations between US military personnel in the missions and their Peruvian counterparts had historically been cordial, though increasingly distant. Much of the American military personnel's activity was dedicated to the maintenance of complicated records in Lima on military assistance program support. Peruvian officers who valued their American contacts and training in the United States nonetheless pointed out that US military personnel assigned to Peru never exceeded the rank of colonel and had not, to their knowledge, ever included officers who ultimately later attained general officer rank before retiring. Peruvians who attended regular US officer training in the United States knew their best American classmates were not assigned to Latin America.

Professionally, Peruvian military officers often seem to feel a love-hate relationship for the United States. The United States often seems to ignore Peru and its problems, but it is nonetheless the world's leading military power. Peruvian officers, therefore, while often happy to turn toward France, England or Japan for the acquisition of armaments and for certain types of training, nonetheless would like to continue to have access to the United States for equipment and advice when necessary, despite the United States' continuing relegation of Peru to second or third class status militarily.

Under these conditions, US military policies are likely to be marginal except for the rare occasion where they effectively preclude an action beyond appeal. The attempt to prevent Peruvian acquisition of supersonic military aircraft revealed that the US could deny its own suppliers, and perhaps even delay the ultimate acquisition from France. But despite punitive legislation and previously good military relations the US was unable to prevent the purchase in the long run.

Similarly, to argue that an officer has participated in a coup attempt merely because of his US training is as arbitrary as to claim that this training has made him more democratic. Worse, such claims betray an arrogant refusal to take seriously the internal resilience and resourcefulness of Peruvians. When such attitudes become translated into policies, as with the F-5, the result is to provoke unnecessarily the hostility of a critical segment of Peru's political class. The F-5 case did not of itself change the direction of Peruvian government policies. But it went into the equation that did.

Each situation, of course, must be examined on its own merits, for the subleties of politics are such that even a marginal impact may be decisive in a given instance. Our consideration of the place of future military policy in overall United States-Peruvian relations, however, will be significantly aided by the realization that we have as a nation and government frequently lacked the capacity for such subtle analyses in the past. ■


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MILITARY ACADEMIES

*continued from page 32*

If there really isn't a great disparity in retention rates between academy and non-academy officers; if the disparity would be even smaller if the non-academy officers did not feel discriminated against in top promotions; if the cost of an academy education to the Federal Government is so high; if there is no evidence that academy officers perform better than other officers; and if we are truly worried about isolating our professional officer corps from civilian influences—then shouldn't we eliminate the academies altogether?

Perhaps we should, but we won't. For one thing, it seems highly unlikely that we can eliminate the military academies at a time when there is so much pressure from the colleges to eliminate ROTC as well. We can't do away with both of these sources of officer procurement, certainly not simultaneously. For another thing, history, tradition, nostalgia, the armed services, the veterans organizations, the Congress, and the public would probably all combine to defeat any such move.

So if we can't eliminate West Point, Annapolis, and Colorado Springs, should we then merge them into a single National Defense Academy?

There would be a great deal of good, I think, in an institution in which during the first two or three years the students would wear a single uniform—or no uniform—and would take common courses in both military and civilian subjects. There would be advantages to a learning situation that would deemphasize service rivalries and stress the interrelationship of air, sea, and land forces and doctrine, as well as the intimate connection between political and military factors in making and executing the nation's foreign and domestic policies. Perhaps people wanting to enter the State Department's Foreign Service, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development, and the Central Intelligence Agency would also enroll in such a National Defense Academy. Perhaps such an institution would require a five-year program, during the last two years of which the students would opt for or "major in" the Army, Navy, or Air Force and transfer to the present Military Academy, Naval Academy, or Air Force Academy. At the very least, the first three years together might cause the students to think along wide *government* lines rather than along narrow, single *service* lines, as at present. And when some of these students become generals, admirals, and senior diplomats, these same three years of study might enhance that broad outlook that they must have to work well together in the best interests of the nation.

We ought at least to experiment with a National Defense Academy. If it fails, then all that we have lost is some money and time. But if it succeeds, we may gain something much more precious than money and time. We may gain well-educated officers oriented toward the nation and the world rather than to themselves and their services. It is certainly worth a try. ■

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## MILITARY INTERVENTION

*continued from page* 21

force to achieve political ends will increasingly characterize African politics. Coups may be institutionalized as the means for bringing in new personnel—not for changing the basic constraints within which the political systems must operate. In order to stave off discontent within the armed forces, political leaders may turn to the time-honored tactic of expanding budget commitments to obtain ever more and better military equipment. But the relationship is two-sided, and may turn into a form of blackmail against political leaders fearful of dismissal. Increased military spending may be viewed as a form of preventive action by a government.

Let us draw together the threads of the argument. Military intervention has become commonplace in tropical Africa as members of the armed services became more conscious of the power they could wield in overturning what they saw as meddlesome, inefficient, unpopular, and dictatorial political parties and governments. The conception of civilian supremacy has not taken firm root in most African states. As a result, few constraints operate to preclude military intervention.

Contrasted with the relative ease of seizing control are the manifold problems of effective governance. Though military governments may embark upon control with the assurance of widespread popular enthusiasm, little can guarantee the maintenance of this climate of enthusiasm. The moment of rejoicing at the fall of an unpopular civilian regime may quickly give way to resentment against the policies military leaders feel compelled to adopt—just as the moment of rejoicing with the achievement of independence was followed by growing disenchantment with the dominant party. Economic policies may undercut popular support of military governments, particularly through deliberate deflation, unemployment, and cuts in civil service perquisites. Military rule does not automatically stamp out corruption, nor can it eliminate primordial sentiments in the interest of greater national unity. In short, coup leaders face the same difficulties over which their civilian predecessors stumbled—without necessarily benefiting from greater advantages.

The building of political institutions requires time, caution, and exemplary skill. The mass-based party helped arouse political awareness and participation; in the tasks of nation-building, it made a clear contribution. Military governments, owing to their "technocratic" orientation, may make greater contributions to state-building. But both nation-building and state-building are requisite to political development. Effective political institutions cannot be created *de novo* by coups d'état. The political development of African states depends upon the creation of effective, widely supported instruments of government. To this development, military leaders can make only a slight contribution. Such is the sobering lesson this chapter and this book attempt to convey. ■


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## AS A MODERNIZING FORCE

*continued from page 9*

pable of defending against determined opposition.

Armed forces are nonetheless dangerous creations for any newly structured society, or even any old one under the tensions of great and rapid change. In a society where the old order is crumbling and there is yet no strong new order, the political situation is fluid. There are many new needs and few apparent ways to satisfy them. Rarely is there a firmly established central government, a stable electorate or a trained bureaucracy. In such a situation, the military often appears as the only strong, stable organization and the natural repository of the as yet only partly formed national spirit. And they have the guns.

In such a situation the military technocrats are in a difficult position. They feel that they *know* what is right, and they see that it is not being done. They see little social justice and much corruption. They see much bungling. They see no hope of any solution other than intervening directly in the political process, which they know they can do, but that by Western standards they should not do.

It is only in the political arena that values are allocated authoritatively for the whole society. This the military soon come to learn. So eventually they intervene. The military's organizational resources, professional commitments, and their sense of national identity almost guarantees initial success. But ordinarily in the long run they are limited by their natural authoritarianism, lack of political skill, and consequent inability to mobilize or retain mass support. Paralysis again ensues, and the process is repeated.

There are exceptions. A great charismatic military leader, one who can gain and retain the support of the people and who can and will use his political power for national development, tramples limitations. Such a benevolent dictator is best represented by Turkey's Ataturk. Ataturk used the power of this new centralized state to force his people into the twentieth century, to put down dissident minorities, and to drive out external enemies. The military itself spent half of its time as a training school, teaching Turkish to Kurds and modern skills to all. And, having created the infrastructure of a modern centralized state, Ataturk died. His successors were able to begin the practice of modern democracy.

The problems attendant to the military acting as a modernizing force are not uniform throughout the developing world. Yet there is one common denominator: the inability of weak governments to cope with the strains of transition in leading their people into the twentieth century. The strong, rational military—symbol of sovereignty, integrating force, guarantor of internal order and external security—often cannot resist the urge to "clean up the mess" and "throw the rascals out." It occasionally succeeds. Even when it avoids direct political activity, it continues throughout the developing world as probably the largest single modernizing force. ■

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# Letters to the Editor

*continued from page 7*

Board stating its belief that "it is vital that it be authorized to act now" (by only 30% of the membership this time) to apply for exclusive recognition and urging everyone "to lose no time in sending us your authorization." Furthermore, the Board threatens that it may have "to take steps without this authorization or without further consultation. . ." These are strong words to apply to a subject which was sufficiently controversial within the Board itself to inspire the resignation of one of its members. How high-handed can a "representative" Board get?

This appeal is based on a report which, despite considerable detail, leaves this reader, at least, unconvinced. It makes several comments to which Mr. Bradford takes persuasive exception. It also dismisses, on the basis of debatable argument, action similar to that planned by the National Society of Professional Engineers/Professional Engineers in Government—the creation of an entirely separate sister organization of AFSA to seek recognition under the Executive Order. It further makes the important point that a mass organization of civil servants affiliated with the AFL/CIO would hardly be qualified or inclined to represent foreign service interests effectively. But instead of welcoming the Department's answer to this point—a recommendation that EO 11491 be amended to exclude Foreign Service Personnel from coverage—the Board, in an addendum to its plea, gives it only grudging approval contingent on underlined *if*'s, and again urges members to give the asked for authorization.

In this situation members should be particularly grateful to learn from Mr. Bradford that there are two sides to the question. This member, for one, hopes that the Board will follow its communication precept and give the membership a little less father-knows-best and wolf-wolf, and a little more rounded picture. A good start would be a report on the flavor and substance of comments at the Association's general business meeting, about which the AFSA NEWS tells us only that "there was considerable discussion by members."

J. K. PENFIELD—*FSO ret.*
Longbranch, Washington

I believe that the old, gentleman's club, type of management for the Foreign Service is gone beyond retrieval. I believe that, where once a gentleman's agreement was sufficient today's Foreign Service needs a codification of the rights and duties of our terms of employment. Unfortunate as this trend of civilization may be to many of us, it makes it necessary that the right of collective bargaining be "thrust" upon the Foreign Service.

Many positive arguments have been made for the need for collective bargaining. I would cite only the growth of our bureaucracy, with the increasing complexities of our civilization. I see—perhaps too optimistically—the role of a union in tomorrow's world of over-organization as that of an ombudsman—with clout.

On the negative side, the arguments that we are professionals, that we enjoy a special relationship with the White House which would be endangered if we should discuss the terms of our employment with "management," seem to me without merit. I see no incongruity between professionalism and organized representations to management. I refuse to believe that the White House will be deeply concerned with or antagonistic to representations concerning our terms of employment. Further, I would deny that all FSOs are managers (we are 3,000 now, not 300), and even those who "manage" three officers and a secretary cannot believe that they have had any real input into the decisions of "management."

It seems to me that the best interests of all members of the foreign affairs agencies, specifically including most Foreign Service officers, and the longer range interests of the Department, will be served best by a regularization of the relationship between "management" and "labor," and I would hope that continued attachment to a day now past would not blind us to the fact that for purposes of collective bargaining, most of us now belong in the latter category.

THERESA A. HEALY
Washington

P.S.: I would like to add, although it should not be necessary, that a discussion of terms of employment between elected representatives of an employees organization and a small group of administrative specialists in no way does violence to the very solemn obligations of our oath of office.

IN the November and December issues of the JOURNAL, letters from the resigning Secretary-Treasurer of the AFSA Board and several retired gentlemen, use the charge of "trade unionism" to condemn the Board's recommendation to seek "exclusive recognition" under Executive Order 11491. The issue is a deeply felt one for some older officers; it, therefore, requires a serious attempt at reply.

Of course, language presently used in the Order would require AFSA to be formally referred to as a "labor organization" for purposes related to the Order. The language of the Order after all reflects the predominant role played by the trade union movement in defining the position and rights of organizations representing employees of the Federal Government. That language will change as other groups work for revision.

The question posed AFSA members by the Order, however, relates not to labels, but whether the Order's provisions can aid AFSA in shaping the Department of State into a more effective organization and in making the Foreign Service a more satisfying career. Those officers who cannot grapple with this question because of their "abhorrence," "deep personal convictions," "personal repugnances," etc., etc., against calling an organization to which they belong a "labor organization" raise a shibboleth which serves only to cloud serious examination of the Order. Selectively sharing the fruits of domestic trade union efforts is after all not a new phenomenon for those in foreign service. We have adjusted with few perceivable problems to being required to accept salary increases obtained through the efforts of government labor organizations. We do not react in horror and label participants in that practice trade unionists. Why, therefore, can we not determine if Executive Order 11491 has anything to offer the particular needs of those in foreign service without confusing the issues by the use of class slogans (or pretensions)?

Those who have examined the Order with care have concluded that its mechanisms and procedures make good managerial sense for the Department. Three key Macomber Task Forces (I, V, & XIII) dealing with personnel management recommend use of the Order to improve the way in which the Department manages itself and its personnel resources. Similarly, all organized groups in the Department which have studied and taken a position on the Order have recommended its use: JFSOC and the various AFGE Lodges early on; AFSA after long study of the Order.

Strong support in Washington for the AFSA Board's recommendation to seek "exclusive recognition" was clear at the Board's November 4 meeting. Motions passed at the meeting by votes of over 90 percent of the some 500 AFSA members present, requested the Board to cease negotiating any possible alternative to exclusive recognition under the Order and to challenge the attempt to exclude those in foreign service from the Order.

Support for the Order focuses on its provisions formalizing an on-going dialogue between a single organization representing those in foreign service and the administrative apparatus of the Department. The Order's provision for negotiating written agreements on personnel policies, with impasses referred to an impartial outside body for arbitration, would help insure the seriousness of the dialogue. Operationally, this dialogue or feedback mechanism would simply make permanent the ad-hoc effort represented by the Macomber Task Forces studying personnel policy. Functionally, the provisions of the Order would offer AFSA the exceedingly important right to require the "O" Area to bring into the light, discuss, and justify, personnel policies and procedures for implementation.

By seeking to exclude those in foreign service from the provisions of Executive Order 11491, the "O" Area of the Department has indicated its preference for the predictability of an authoritarian organizational structure over the creative dynamism generated by the real participation of those making up the foreign service in its managerial decision-making process. The Macomber Task Forces presented a half-step toward reform; the handling of the Executive Order will make clear the extent of the Department's real commitment to effective management.

The procedures and mechanisms open to AFSA under "exclusive recognition" will be necessary to insure that the recommendations made by the Macomber Task Forces do not die in the bureaucracy—and that senior officers affected by Task Force recommendations are treated humanely. Those in foreign service have often not been so treated in the past. The AFSA Board's efforts to defeat exclusion of the Foreign Service from Executive Order 11491 deserves our support; its collection of the signatures required to seek "exclusive recognition" our active aid.

NORMAN L. ACHILLES
*Chairman,*
*JFSOC's Committee on Executive Order 11491*
Washington

### A Correction

I HAVE the honor to refer to my "New Problems of Social Development," November issue.

Putting to one side our amiable differences about (i) certain terms, (ii) placement of commas and parentheses, and (iii) the use of numbered enumerations, I should very much appreciate your letting JOURNAL readers know that the first sentence of the last paragraph of the first column on page 45 should have read:

> "There has been great shrinkage in the area of 'Inviolable National Privacy' in the past few decades."

COVEY T. OLIVER
Philadelphia

### Time for a Valentine

As one of Alexander J. Davit's "crop" of Junior Officer trainees, I would like to comment on his recent letter to the JOURNAL ("The Return of Ichabod," August, 1970).

Mr. Davit writes that if as Smith Simpson has suggested, Junior Officers were not "leveled with" during the Davit Era at FSI, he would feel that he had "failed miserably." He asked us to be the judges of whether he had.

Mr. Davit did indeed level with us. His candor in recounting his own Foreign Service experiences and in outlining what might lie ahead for us novices was, together with his ability to speak in complete English sentences, one of Mr. Davit's most refreshing characteristics. That, after being leveled with, we didn't immediately resign in panic may be regarded as a further tribute to Mr. Davit's amused and infectious enthusiasm for Foreign Service life.

While I don't intend this letter to be a Valentine to Alex Davit, I do think that the personality of a Course Chairman goes far to determine the usefulness of the Course to new Officers. Mr. Davit is quite right in observing that most incoming officers don't think they need more education. What they think they need, and do in fact need, is experience. First-hand experience can only be got on the job, of course, but second hand—shared—experience is necessary to both reassure and elighten the new officer as to what he should expect over the long run.

A good Basic Officers' Course requires a good Course Chairman. I would think it impossible to devise a literally fool-proof Course. I don't believe that lengthening or deepening the curriculum would necessarily improve matters, and as the holder of a LLM degree in International Law I regard with horror Mr. Simpson's suggested two year course in that subject for Junior Officers.

Mr. Davit possesses both experience and the style required to communicate that experience to others. He ran an excellent Course, the few dull stretches of which occurred when he was out of the room for a minute. Those dull moments were probably the only ones in which we learned nothing.

WILLIAM R. SALISBURY,
*Attorney-Adviser (FSO)*
*Office of the Legal Adviser*
Washington

### The Hatch Act

To the end of encouraging investigation of the interrelationship between restraints on foreign service personnel speaking out on substantive issues and the Hatch Act I refer you to an article published in July, 1970 in BUSINESS LAW.

I happen to agree with the thrust of the article—that the Hatch Act type restrictions are inconsistent with modern constitutional thinking—but appreciate the difficulties in drawing the necessary guidelines that will protect federal employees from political pressures.

By the by I thought John Tuthill's dissent to George Kennan's advice (November 1970) applicable to this topic. An available alternative career will certainly buttress "integrity, personal balance, courage."

PAUL L. GOOD
Albany, Calif.

### One Sure Thing—Taxes

I WOULD like to refer to the item in the October 1970 JOURNAL entitled: State and DC Income Tax Liability—Domicile vs. Residence.

In view of the arbitrary way in which this matter has been handled by the various jurisdictions, I might be interested in joining in a test case in Virginia, presuming this is the wise thing to do. I am making this caveat because some of my friends who merely ignored the "continuing income tax liabilities" found that the problem solved itself in this manner, which would be better than a lost law suit. Of course, they had no property in Virginia. Others were less fortunate.

It seems to me that the Virginia case is the weakest of all. Suppose one is assigned to a job which requires long hours in Rosslyn (the Vietnam Bureau) and one moves to Virginia merely for expediency to avoid the bridge traffic, does not vote in the State, does not buy property with the specific intention of not setting up any permanent residence, advises the local

tax authorities with respect to this "temporary sojourn," etc. It would seem to me that in this case a good argument can be made for non-residence. After all the question of domicile vs residence is largely based on intent. I would not be surprised that if the local tax authorities knew in advance of your intended action, they might well back off from trying to force a clearcut decision in which case they would stand to lose even their hold on all those innocents who are now hooked by what frequently amounts to loose threats.

At any rate, since so many people were drawn into the Vietnam Bureau during the past two years, I think there should be no dearth of interested parties. I would like to thank the association for bringing this matter into the open since the opportunistic and undignified way in which this matter is being handled in practice is rather repulsive.

C. H. ZONDAG

Kabul

### For More Useful Home Leave

MY family and I are just back from home leave and consultations. I have not before served in a post as distant and isolated as this one is, and so we found this home leave particularly useful in giving us an exposure to all that has happened at home over the past two years but about which we had only read.

I think, however, that we might have had a better exposure if we had had the benefit of a seminar such as I understand is available to returning USIA personnel. My PAO colleague tells me that the seminar, which runs for five days, makes available to these persons lectures from a broad spectrum of current American thinking, including spokesmen from elements a good deal left and right of center. I can appreciate why USIA might be ahead of State in this respect but it seems to me that returning FSOs could also well use some of this kind of "instant Americanization."

L. BRUCE LAINGEN

Kabul

EDITOR'S NOTE: *AFSA has contacted training offices in USIA and State and they view this suggestion favorably. We will hope to have a further report in an early issue of AFSA* NEWS.

### Long Term Temporary

TED OLSEN's comments in the June issue on the disappearance of Washington landmarks reminded me of the time I was sent by the USAID to Naousa in the north of the country to look into a manpower problem. Having supplied a loan to build a new textile plant to replace one destroyed by the guerrillas we had an interest in helping the plant get into production. The management complained that because of the lack of adequate housing they were unable to recruit help from the surrounding area. The year must have been 1950 or perhaps 1951.

After reviewing the situation, which was bad, even by Greek standards, I told the owner that the best we could do would be to supply temporary relief such as Quonset huts. Thanking me for the offer to help he was, nevertheless, reluctant to accept it as "in Greece temporary things have a habit of becoming permanent," he said. Amused at his reply I countered by telling him I knew exactly what he meant for on the Mall in Washington, D. C. there was a building called Tempo E which had been there since World War I.

Yesterday, as my bus made its way down Fourth Street, S.W. it passed the Mall just as a bulldozer was scraping the last visible remnants of that architectural eyesore Tempo E into mounds for trucks to cart away to wherever they bury the remains of temporary buildings. I thought to myself how nice it would be to see my Greek friend again. It would give me great satisfaction to inform him that the word "temporary" had real meaning in the United States even if it took over 50 years to prove it.

D. ALAN STRACHAN

Washington

### Reform!

I AM writing a thesis concerning reform in the State Department—the search for organizational effectiveness—from World War II up to the present time. I would appreciate receiving any material that readers might have on this subject.

HARRIS H. BALL

Washington, D. C.

*Editor's Note: The Journal will be pleased to forward material and/or references to Mr. Ball.*

## Life and Love in the Foreign Service

*By S. I. Nadler*

*"Darling, you mustn't torment yourself with ethics, moral considerations, and such things. Look at it this way: you did a Performance Evaluation Report on him, he ended up in the lowest ten per cent, and you're selecting him out."*

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### Voice of Foreign Affairs Community

The Association is the only professional-employee organization—completely independent of the U.S. Government—that articulates the aims of the foreign affairs community. In a vigorous and organized way it acts to achieve those aims on behalf of everyone in that community, regardless of rank, status, category or agency. Thus, U.S. Government action, (laws, policies, rules) that affect AFSA members, immediately engages the Association's talents; it proceeds forcefully.

### Activist in Achieving Important Goals for the Membership

AFSA does more than react. It initiates moves that benefit the membership; in the process, non-members also benefit. But the more members we have, the stronger our voice and the greater the benefits. Thus all personnel should carefully consider the following examples of AFSA initiatives, speculate how much and more could be achieved if all foreign affairs personnel supported AFSA.

- *Ombudsmen.* AFSA recommended that these welfare and grievance officers be appointed in AID, State and USIA. The result: approval. AFSA's Members' Interests Committee collaborates with the Ombudsmen, or works separately, on a wide variety of pocketbook and other issues.
- *Health Insurance.* Premiums for the U.S. Government-American Foreign Service Protective Association health plan were greatly reduced at AFSA's instigation. The saving to an AFSA member who is a participant in that plan is *three to six times his annual AFSA dues.*
- *Travel and Transfer Allowances.* This is another area in which AFSA made the will of its members felt. Travel advances now are paid in full, travel and transfer allowances substantially increased. AFSA has also recommended transfer allowances of up to $800 and has the Department's approval. The necessary legislation and budgetary machinery has been set in motion.
- *Support for Staff Corps.* Staff Corps personnel have the strongest possible backing of AFSA in promoting their interests to the end of retaining the Staff Corps as a powerful and effective arm of the foreign service and to reduce or eliminate inequities between Officer and Staff corps personnel, including overtime, free entry, allowances, quarters, etc. As a result of the Staff Corps Advisory Committee recommendations the next inspector vacancy will be filled by a member of the Staff Corps.

### Champions Proposed Legislation

- *Health Insurance.* AFSA urged that legislation be passed that would increase the Government's share of health plan insurance programs up to 100% instead of the 40% just approved.
- *Overtime.* The Association asks that 10% overtime be paid to employees on standby duty. This would particularly benefit mail, file, security, cryptographic and secretarial personnel. Also, AFSA recommended payment for overtime to all Staff Corps personnel overseas at the FSSO-5 level and below.
- *Retirement for AID Personnel.* The Association holds that AID people should have the same retirement benefits as other members of the foreign affairs community.

### Scholarships and Counseling

More than $73,000 in scholarships went to children of foreign service people last year. AFSA's Scholarship Fund accounted for $63,000 of the total.

Educational counseling continues as an important part of AFSA's service to members: some 300 families a year take advantage of this free service rendered by AFSA through a highly skilled specialist. The unusual needs of handicapped children are covered in this service.

### Provident Fund

This fund is being established with a substantial initial loan from the Bonn/Bad Godesberg American Community Association. Its purpose is to provide immediate financial help to anyone in the foreign affairs community overseas confronted by an emergency that cannot be met by government assistance. Loans have also been received from other posts and the Fund will be operative in the near future.

### Various Insurance Programs

AFSA has arranged with insurance agencies to write short-term automobile insurance for personnel on home leave; before such coverage was virtually unobtainable.

AFSA also has low-rate group insurance programs available only to its members: high limit accidental death and specific loss; long-term income protection; and extra cash hospital-indemnity plan.

The Foreign Service Protective Association provides group life insurance, family coverage and accidental death.

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*This outline of AFSA's activities is designedly brief, but the Association will gladly expand on any point. AFSA welcomes suggestions from members as to what it should be doing in addition to its ongoing programs and proposed courses of action on new issues.*

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