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APRIL, 1971, Volume 48, No. 4

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## EDITORIALS

### Career Alternatives Outside the Government

**M**ANY of us in the Foreign Service were jolted by the FSO attrition figures appearing in the articles by Malcolm Churchill in the December 1970 FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and by Samuel Lewis in the February Department of State NEWSLETTER. Voluntary and involuntary FSO departures during the past decade, Department figures show, reached 2348.

Many current developments suggest a growing degree of career mobility in the broader foreign affairs profession. Several Reform Task Force reports discussed the desirability of more in-and-outing in the professional ranks, of more openness in the movement of people as well as ideas. The concept of career thresholds at the FSO-5 and FSO-2 levels, at which some officers would leave the service with honor, also underlines the significance of the availability of career alternatives.

We live in a world of accelerating change and mobility, and the foreign affairs agencies cannot be insulated from this trend. In the case of USIA, for example, the rapidity of technological developments in communications and the fast evolution of media techniques suggests that more in-and-outing is of practical advantage to the Agency and the nation as well as to individual professionals. The massive reorganization of AID, which the President has recommended to Congress, will inevitably create a period of special career flux among AID officers. The unfortunate absence of a real career system for AID professionals over the past 25 years has led to considerable—perhaps excessive—fluidity already.

The Task Force did not spell out recommendations as to what should be done to assist officers in identifying attractive career alternatives outside the government. AFSA is disappointed that the foreign affairs agencies have done only rudimentary work in this field of such great concern to individuals.

AFSA urges the agencies to devote more attention to the subject. Meanwhile, the Association is itself preparing to assist its members with competent professional advice about the availability of career alternatives in the private sector. A major American corporation, a pacesetter in the field, has agreed to assist AFSA in this initiative. We will be making further announcements later in the spring.

The Association hopes to work in close collaboration with the foreign affairs agencies. Clearly, we are not just speaking of assisting officers who are voluntary or involuntary "victims" of attrition. We believe that effective reform will be stimulated if State, AID and USIA feel the breath of keener competition from other prospective employers. The foreign affairs agencies must provide their professionals with the sort of responsibility, authority and career scope which will retain ambitious, goal-oriented men. If career satisfaction is not sufficient, officers will want to move on and AFSA intends to assist them to identify the career alternatives available. ■

### Open Letter to Secretary Macomber from the Chairman of AFSA's Board

As the Department advances further into the implementation stage of reform the AFSA Board believes it is increasingly important that the people affected continue to share in the process of modernization they themselves have set in motion. Advance publication in draft form of contemplated changes in the regulations should become standard practice. The participation of the Foreign Service as a whole in the reform process is the very essence of "Toward a Modern Diplomacy" and "Diplomacy for the 70's."

This is indeed reform from within the system—the demand of the men and women of the Foreign Service that their organization be modernized to help them take charge and carry out their mandate of leadership in American foreign affairs.

The Association, through its committee sessions, its regular conferences with management planners, its red border commentaries, its FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL forum, and its series of open meetings is working to support the widest debate and participation. I know that you agree with this approach; the way the Department has introduced an important and controversial reform measure—the Foreign Affairs Specialist program—has been a good example of it. I must in frankness note that the institution of the centralized personnel system in a manner to emphasize assignments by grade rather than by functional specialty was a quite different example. As you know, AFSA was not consulted in advance and believes that the stress upon horizontal rank rather than vertical cone of specialization is inconsistent with the thrust of personnel reform and with the needs of the '70s.

Various US agencies promulgate planned decisions and regulations in a tentative form to draw the reaction of those who will be affected. The Treasury Department, although perhaps in a different context, frequently gives the public 60 days to review and comment upon proposed tax regulations. Such a process provides opportunity for unanticipated side effects to be identified, for inadvertent oversights to be corrected and, most importantly, for the people affected to know that they have been consulted and have had the chance to state their views and to influence the final form of the decision. The details of how a policy is implemented can determine whether it will be respected.

Let me cite an example. CA-5901 very commendably provided that any recommendation that women or minority group representatives *not* be assigned to particular positions abroad for policy reasons must be submitted to a special review group. At an Open Forum Panel meeting on March 3, the Director of the Department's Office of Equal Employment Opportunity indicated that no decision had been reached as to whether interested employees and groups could consult in advance on the regulations establishing the special review group. AFSA believes that such advance consultation should definitely be provided.

The AFSA Board urges the Department to issue as drafts its Management Reform Bulletins and new regulations, specifically inviting reactions and suggestions from those affected. A period of 30 to 45 days should be provided for comment before decisions are put into final implementing form. In some cases it may not be possible or necessary to follow this procedure. But, assuming limited exceptions, we believe that both the Department and its employees will benefit from such an expression of confidence, cooperation and enlightened self-interest.

In closing I wish to assure you of the continued firm support of the Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Association for reform to improve the competence of the Foreign Service, to reinforce the effective leadership of the Secretary of State and the Department which stands behind him. ■



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## Middle East Perspective

### PARKER T. HART

*Parker T. Hart is a retired Career Minister and now President of the Middle East Institute in Washington, an independent scholarly organization founded 25 years ago. He was director of FSI, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, and Ambassador to Turkey and Kuwait.*

*From an address delivered October 30, 1970 to the American Foreign Service Association.*

**T**HE Middle East Institute is a forum for ideas. We are not, by charter, purveyors of a point of view or a program of action. So what I say is strictly on my own and my motivation is the long-term security interest of the United States.

The first perspective I would mention is that the USSR seems to have learned from us that a mighty navy and air force must be deployed

globally if a world power is to maximize its options and exercise them at critical moments to reduce those of its great adversary. It seems also to have learned that there is no substitute to be found in delegating power to overseas, non-contiguous and especially Arab clients, although its policy is to perpetuate Arab dependence on Soviet weaponry and political support. It learned this lesson when we landed in Lebanon in 1958, in the face of Nasser's attempts to turn Lebanese army guns against our troops and Khrushchev's threats to make molten coffins of the 6th Fleet; when we demanded withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba in 1962 and mobilized to land on the island; and when we sent an air unit to Faisal of Saudi Arabia against a Soviet-supported Nasser in the Red Sea and Yemen in 1963.

Today thoughtful American observers ask: How valid is a Soviet threat in the Middle East as a primary basis for American political involvement? Is the age of American diplomacy backed by muscle on the critical highways of sea power becoming a Soviet age through American default? Is America cutting its military appropriations out of a conviction of a comfortable margin of superiority or for domestic political reasons? Is our fleet becoming obsolete? Can 6th Fleet aircraft carriers live in a Mediterranean shadowed by Soviet surface-to-surface missile craft and submarines and Soviet land-based air power in Egypt? I am concerned that our defense posture in the Mediterranean has become a casualty of drift rather than planning. For years we have disregarded Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) force goals as unrealistic, meaning rather that we had to rationalize the conclusion that it was impolitic to go after the money to meet them at the expense of something else. At the same time we have observed a dramatic build-up of Soviet striking power on NATO's southeast flank.



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The second perspective is that we have now abandoned the last shreds of a fifteen-year policy (1950-1965) that the United States not become a supplier of major weaponry to the immediate antagonists in the Arab-Israeli quarrel, i.e., Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

We cracked that policy in 1962 when we agreed to sell Hawk missiles to Israel after a four-year campaign by Israel's supporters which many of us resisted just because missiles were missiles, as we see today. Then in 1965 when we simultaneously cut off arms to our ally Pakistan and to its adversary India, a neutral, we agreed to sell Skyhawks to Israel, actually delivered after the Six Day War of 1967. Later, in President Johnson's final months in office he decided to sell Phantom F-4's to Israel on credit. At that time all intelligence assessments had been that Israel remained for the medium term far stronger than all her Arab neighbors together. In fact this had been our assessment for many years.

The question is whether we took these and more recent decisions to

supply heavy weapons to Israel because we really believed the power balance was threatened to Israel's disadvantage, because we were intent on showing the USSR and Egypt that we meant business or because for domestic reasons it was politic to accept the Israeli argument? Did we believe Israel's security was synonymous with our own or was a part of it? My concern is that the mix in this cocktail contains a decisive domestic political ingredient, rationalized by some partially valid strategic and tactical arguments, rather than that the strategic and tactical arguments in their full integrity actually prevail. I hope this is not the case, but my experience in the Department obliges me to believe that it is.

Soviet arming of certain eastern Arab states is not new. It is not generally realized that Nasser turned down a US grant arms offer in late 1954 because he would not sign a standard non-political aid agreement. The Soviet Union then made its offer in March 1955 and started its massive armament of Egypt in September 1955. A year

later Israel wiped out most of that equipment (with British and French help) in the surprise strike at the end of October 1956.

The USSR then rebuilt the Egyptian war machine for ten years and saw it smashed again along with Syria's and Jordan's by Israel alone, in 1967. Again the USSR rebuilt Egypt's and Syria's war machines. Recently, it was announced the United States had decided to sell up to two hundred M-60 tanks to Israel and an unspecified number of additional Phantoms. In the press it was explained that the decision was an answer to the Soviet-Egyptian refusal to rectify violations of the cease-fire and remove new SAM-3's from the proscribed Suez Canal area. This was interpreted as our "rectification," opening the way for renewal of talks with Ambassador Jarring. We are now, therefore, the major supplier to Israel of one of the most potent items of conventional strike weaponry in our arsenal. Our answer to surface-to-air missiles is not more surface-to-air missiles for Israel but the means to obliterate them, and a good deal more, within

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Egypt itself. Israel is not an ally, nor Egypt an enemy of the United States, yet we are drawn by this game steadily into a polarization that for over a decade we worked hard to avoid.

The third perspective is that as we make available these powerful weapons to Israel we are letting our military assistance level to Turkey slip far below agreed force goals. The newest plane Turkey has is the F-5, the first squadron having been delivered when I was there between 1965 and 1968. It is an all-purpose aircraft of the kind that suits flexible defensive or ground support requirements but it does not possess the speed and the long-range attack capability of the Phantom. Turkey's Military Assistance Program (MAP) cannot afford the Phantom, yet for deterrent power against the USSR it should have it.

In 1966, Assistant Secretary of Defense, John McNaughton, brought to Turkey a proposal that was virtually take it or leave it. It was a program of MAP levels set by Secretary of Defense McNamara, well below SACEUR force goals for

Turkey which McNamara said could not be met. He offered \$675 million for five years, or \$134 million plus, per year, a big decline from earlier levels.

The Turkish navy and air force were particularly short changed. The Turkish standing army of 400,000 men, with a considerable back-up in mobilizable reserves, is the rock of NATO's southeast wing, the second standing ground force in SACEUR's command. The Turkish air force and navy are small but very efficient and have been warmly friendly to America. McNaughton assured the Turks that these services could remain small, because the United States and NATO could deploy adequate air and naval strength of its own to Turkey's defense on immediate notice. The Turks, who know NATO's resources, disbelieved this and so did some of our chief Air Force officers in Europe. The argument went on for a year over the size of our grant and the distribution proposed between the services.

It was my job to press the McNaughton plan because it was a final Washington position. It was

hard to do with conviction. After a year of persuasion Turkey reluctantly accepted the lowered ceiling with some adjustments in the allocations to its services. Within one year thereafter McNaughton was killed in a plane crash and Congress cut all aid, economic and military, by one-third. Turkey's yearly allocations declined to less than \$100 million total per year.

I really had to earn my pay, when having told Prime Minister Demirel that the McNaughton plan must be accepted, I now had to inform him that with McNaughton's untimely death the plan itself was a casualty. Not only could we not meet it, we could not, in fact, even propose its full restoration to Congress. We would do what we could, but could not equal the McNaughton figure. These were my instructions.

Now anti-Americanism among students and faculty of the universities of Turkey exists and it is bothersome; but what is going to happen to our relations with the Turkish army (the power behind all Ankara governments) and its air force and navy when—as a Turkish friend tells me

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—a further extensive cut has now occurred because of our Cambodian campaign. If we have made hundreds of millions of easy military credit available for Israel, the question has to be put whether we have decided that Israel has a more important role in western defense outside NATO than Turkey has within it. Or was the decision made on grounds of domestic political expediency, on the eve of an election? How can Israel be a replacement for Turkey when its forces have to be committed against Arabs with whom we should have at least tolerable relations if NATO is not to be outflanked?

In the Middle East as a whole the strongest region is the Northern Tier. Greece, Turkey and Iran are not only allied with us but are western oriented. Greece, under a dictatorial anti-communist military government, has antagonized the liberals here and in NATO by police state methods and has a bad name as the result of propaganda by the Greek left.

Under pressure we long suspended military assistance to that country

in a futile attempt to re-democratize it—or, perhaps more accurately, to pacify elements of our Congress. I am glad we have now restored military assistance. Our objections to it were as irrelevant to NATO defense as were our long-standing objections to Franco, with whom we have recently signed a necessary and very expensive base agreement.

Furthermore, while I hold no brief for dictatorships anywhere, I submit that modern Greece has seldom been the model of democracy we expect of it by a misreading of classical history; and had we not had a dictatorship of rather smart military thinkers in November 1967, Greece would not have been able to agree to withdraw forces from Cyprus and thereby prevent a war with Turkey and the destruction of the southeast wing of NATO.

Turkey in its single-minded loyalty to Ataturk has been struggling to "go West" for nearly fifty years and is entering the transition stage to Common Market membership. Without benefit of much oil its growth rate in real terms is 6 to 7 per cent. There is no American or

European substitute for its determined manpower to defend the southeast wing of NATO. Behind the Turkish forces stands a great military tradition.

Prosperous Iran has no such military tradition, but its forces are modernized and its officers have had American advice and training for twenty-five years. All three countries have a history of repeated aggression from the North. All three have a very deep-rooted sense of nationhood and a motivation to retain American support. This was the defense zone which the United States successfully built in the *containment* days of the 1950s and which the USSR has been trying to dissolve ever since. Unable to do so, it leaped over it.


We had also tried for a back-up defense zone, the Arab hinterland to the Northern Tier. For a while we succeeded, but the Arabs have no maturity of nationhood, only a strong feeling of reaction against Western, not Soviet, encroachments. We therefore ran into two contradictions: 1) Arab anti-imperialism directed against western interference;

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
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and 2) resentment over our support for Israel in an Arab land over the bitterest Arab objections. Not only did the Arabs have no history of aggression from Russia but cherished a desire for its active help. This dictated neutralism and an end to bases in North Africa and the Arab East. Helping neutralism was our Tripartite Declaration of 1950 with Britain and France pledging help against aggression and attempting to restrict an arms race in the area of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In both respects it failed, and the USSR broke the control by its 1955 arms agreement with Egypt. Soviet leaders thus began a new relationship with the Arab world and lost no time in initiating efforts to soften up the Northern Tier by offers of bilateral aid to Turkey and Iran.

Today we see a Soviet Union with bases or facilities on, and near, the Suez Canal and at Aden. It is anxious to open the Canal to link up with its new Indian Ocean fleet and it behaves very much as did the United Kingdom of pre-1956 days, watching over a life-line of empire. It has succeeded to a remarkable

degree in polarizing this area of the Arab world against the United States, a trend resisted successfully by Eisenhower and Kennedy but allowed since then to proceed. It has been an irregular polarization, with ups and downs, but a definite one for those of us who lived the history of this region. It is not in our interest to let it proceed.

Now all is not easy for the USSR, despite all its successes. It has no such strength nor political loyalty at its side in the Middle East as we have even today in Turkey, Greece and even Iran. Of these three states there never has been doubt that the true rock is Turkey and that it must be handled with special care, as vital to our strategic interest.

Now for a few thoughts on the Arab-Israeli struggle. Looking at the area with as dispassionate an eye as we can, we could say that if indeed Israel were at peace with its neighbors, its remarkable military machine could be a useful adjunct to NATO. But Israel's strength is not at our disposal. Its quarrel weakens our position and at the same time it draws on our strength to hold on to

additional buffer territories, preparing for some expansion, great or modest, at Arab expense.

No Arab can negotiate a second expansion of Israel and as the Meir Government knows this, thoughtful Israelis are today questioning the validity and sincerity of the Meir Government's path toward peace. No doubt all Israelis want peace, and almost to a man all reject the de-Zionization of Israel and other demands for national hara-kiri by the Palestine Liberation Organization. But increasingly these Israelis see a confusion in national motives as expressed at the top, a confusion based on fear engendered by Israel's small size and the consequences of taking on over one million Palestinian Arabs with a high birth rate. The dilemma is very discomfiting, for the territory looks good but the demographic problem does not. To drive out these Arabs would be to immeasurably damage Israel's image and to antagonize those who, like us, want no further aggravation to a long-standing, festering and expensive refugee problem. Therefore, the

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
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signs point toward a Palestinian state, living at peace beside Israel in Palestine, and toward cultivation of moderate Palestine Arab relationships by an Israel which recognizes it and its rights without giving it the kiss of death.

Because such Israeli views are seldom given much of an airing in our press, and have been downplayed by official Israeli sources but are, I believe, incisive and gaining in strength, I shall quote a few:

"Israel may be able to win and win and go on winning till its last breath, win itself to death, thereby demonstrating the truth of Hegel's aphorism about the 'impotence of victory.' . . .

"The hawks of all kinds throughout the world . . . argue . . . that if we show the enemy that he doesn't have any choice, if we make him face the fact of crushing force, we will bring him to absolute despair and then he will crumble and yield. The trouble is that the hawks forget that the other side is liable to think in the same way, and they also forget the power of despair, of not having anything to lose. We Jews have shown how strong the power of despair could be. . . ."—Professor Jacob L. Talmon.

"A secure border—to the extent that such a thing exists in our world—isn't a 'natural' boundary, like a mountain range or a river; that is an anachronistic conception. Nor is it a border mentioned in signed documents. A border is secure when those living on the other side do not have sufficient motivation to infringe on it. . . . We have to remind ourselves that the roots of security are in the minds of men, since that it where the source of insecurity also lies.

"The term 'secure' borders ceases to be an honest one when you expand settlement up to the new border, so that in order to make the new line 'secure' you need *still another* strip of some tens of kilometers,"—Professor Avigdor Levontin of Hebrew University.

"There is a Palestinian people. There will be no peace until this people reverts to normal conditions, economic and human existence. . . ."


"This is one of the decisive errors committed by our Government. For here lies the key that would have

(Continued on page 58)

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
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"The fate of Germany was thus to be split between East and West, exploited and caressed by each in its own way and denied the right to decide its own fate."

# GERMANY Between EAST and WEST

**W**ITH the end of the Cold War in Europe in sight, the question of the role of Germany has again come to the fore. For the past twenty years this has been, despite the tensions involved, a relatively simple matter. The country was conveniently divided, with each half having become solidly anchored in a respective East and West sphere of influence. Only West Berlin, a leftover from the brief days of four-power harmony, has been the object of occasional crises. Otherwise, each side has learned to live with a situation which was, to be sure, not entirely satisfactory, but nevertheless had generally clear contours.

The new German Ostpolitik has now cast its shadow across this settled pattern of coexistence by confrontation. Without changing the contractual relationships between the parties, a new element has been added, a torrent which is now threatening to overflow the dikes so laboriously erected to keep the river flowing in two separate channels.

The reasons for this development are manifold. They have their roots in the early post-War period when the German policies of both the Soviet and the West were basically empirical in nature, characterized by a groping for the most effective means of utilizing to maximum advantage the millions of Germans each had under its control. Very early in the process, the United States found the right combination. Its solution was so eminently successful that a similar example was called for in the East. In this way, the country came to be permanently

## JAMES A. RAMSEY

*James Ramsey, in the Foreign Service from 1949 to 1964, is now active in the East-West trade picture. He works together with firms interested in development of the Eastern European market. A former member of the Editorial Board, Mr. Ramsey has been a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL. His most recent article was "Report from Vienna."*

divided, and each major Cold War protagonist eventually had reason to be satisfied with the decision to concentrate on developing the material it had at hand.


**I**N time, the United States came to regard the new order of things as an acceptable if not natural state of affairs. It organized its military and political presence in Europe on the assumption that there would be a continuing "Communist menace," that the most one could hope for would be provisional arrangements allowing an uneasy coexistence until the day when the rulers in the East would finally see the light of day and adjust their system to the realities of life.

The trouble with this theory was that the East had a similar one, only in reverse, insisting with Calvinist obduracy on the inevitable perdition of its non-believing Western neighbors. For the Germans the difficulty

has lain in the fact that they became the subject of this experiment in ideological transformation. Their position has been bearable in the sense that each Germany could count on a sympathetic hearing from the senior partner in matters affecting its economic well-being and stability. It has been less bearable in that the senior partner established various rules of conduct and insisted on their observance. The fate of Germany was thus to be split between East and West, exploited and caressed by each in its own way and denied the right to decide its own fate.

**T**HE period at the end of World War II was characterized by a limited Soviet-American collaboration in respect to Germany which had developed out of common wartime interests. Soviet reconstruction needs were so great that it was in their interests to have this collaboration continue, and in some respects it did for a time. However, the aggressive behavior of the Russians and their economic demands, particularly for participation in control of the Ruhr industry and the \$10 billion reparations claim, which would have had to be largely an ultimate American financial responsibility, estranged and alienated the US.

The American decision to reconstitute a German state in the West marked a milestone in the post-War relationship with the Soviet Union. The Russians, who had suffered enormous casualties and had almost forfeited their national existence in four bitter years of war with the



Germans, viewed this development as posing a major threat to their security in the years to come. Their immediate reaction was to search for an opportunity to close the most serious breach in their front against US power in Europe, namely Berlin. They found a pretext for action in the 1948 currency reform which they utilized to attempt a take-over by severing the city's ties to the West.

While the Berlin Blockade was unsuccessful, the policy of self-isolation of Soviet-controlled Europe instituted by Stalin was perfected and continued until his death. In human and political terms it was a nightmare, but economically not unsuccessful since it provided a base for many of the subsequent industrial achievements both in the USSR and Eastern Europe. At the same time, it laid the foundation for structural deficiencies in the economies of these countries, which, as we shall see, were eventually to become of rather crucial importance in an East-West context.

With the passing of Stalin, things began to change. There were first internal developments, including several amnesties and a diminution of police power in the society. These were followed by some accommodating steps in the foreign policy field, chief among them the evacuation of the bases in Finland, the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty, and the 1955 Geneva Heads of State Conference. The US response to these actions was a highly cautious one, i.e. it displayed its willingness to take part in negotiations and come to agreements while at the same time continuing to build its military ring around the USSR and developing sophisticated surveillance systems. By this time both West and East Germany had become full if not equal partners in the respective alliances and shared in the international decision-making process of each side.

In retrospect, it appears that the German question might have reached a de facto settlement on this uneasy basis had it not been for Berlin. The refugee drain through the city was bringing about the economic ruin of a key link in the chain of satellite states the Russians had erected. At first Khrushchev tried to resolve the situation by

offering his free city proposal, and when that failed to gain acceptance, by having the Wall erected. This action led to a major international crisis in which Russians and Americans faced one another with martial intent.

The lesson of the 1961 Berlin crisis would appear to be that both sides learned where the limits of mutual provocation lie. If the German problem could not be settled by negotiations, neither could it be resolved by force. Beyond a tacit recognition of this fact, however, each side has had a divergent concept of what is allowed. The West, being in a basically defensive position, has less opportunity for maneuver than the East which has set itself as a minimal goal the neutralization of West Berlin.

As the Cold War began, the Germans saw many advantages in a partnership with the Americans. Most importantly, they were promised material benefits and a reintegration into at least a part of the world community. Also, from a characteristic misunderstanding of the Russians, they were prone to conclude that the only way they could reunify their country and gain back some lost territory was by amassing enough strength to force the USSR to come to terms.

The reintegration, eventually institutionalized through NATO, the Common Market and other supranational agencies, has worked well from the Western point of view. It has eliminated a dangerous power vacuum in Central Europe while tying Western Germany closely into a community of states with representative forms of government. The one thing that it has not done and never could do was to bring the Soviets to an accommodation. Here the Germans have wasted much valuable time by not realizing that only they themselves could achieve the latter goal.

In the matter of reunification, the long delay in coming to grips with the situation left by Hitler in the East has played into the hands of the Russians. Another German state has in the meantime been fully established on the European scene. This state, like other former parts of the Reich such as Austria and Switzerland, has its own identity and its

own social and political order. Whatever the shortcomings of the German Democratic Republic, the fact remains that it has been raised in less than twenty years time from a Russian reparations zone to one of the ten foremost industrial powers in the world. Aside from the ideological hindrances, reuniting two states as different as West and East Germany would constitute a problem of major dimensions. It has been difficult enough to integrate the economies of countries with similar systems in the Common Market.

While the division of Germany was primarily a Soviet responsibility, it was condoned by the West, including the United States, which in general preferred to leave things the way they were geographically, and, by insisting on such unattainable goals as free elections, actually furthered the split. It is also worthy of note that Adenauer himself was disinclined to see any progress made in the reunification issue. As de Gaulle has noted in his memoirs: "... with this Catholic Rhinelander, head of a traditionally democratic party, I think I perceive an attitude that the present-day Federal Republic could possibly experience a certain discomfort were it to absorb without transition the Prussian, Protestant, and Socialist complex of the severed territories."

Apart from the issue of reunification, post-War West German foreign policy has been burdened with other illusions which have been only slowly expiring. In part they have persisted because of a natural human reluctance to believe that the brutal changes wrought by World War II were permanent. In part also they have continued because others have found it useful for their own purposes to encourage their cultivation. The seeds of this unhealthy bloom were sown in September 1946 in Stuttgart when Secretary of State Byrnes announced in referring to the Yalta Agreement that the extent of the area to be ceded by Germany in the East "must be determined when the final settlement is agreed upon."

Aside from the reality of Russian and Polish possession of these lands, there is really no necessity to have a treaty to end a war which was begun without a declaration. A treaty is basically an instrument of customary international law which major pow-

ers feel themselves free to ignore as the occasion may seem to require. It is true that the other side would in this case like to have one to legalize the situation which has been created, but it is also clear that the Russians and Poles are fully prepared to live without it as they have for the past quarter century.

If reunification and revision of the Eastern borders are dead issues, West Berlin is one that is still very much alive. It is essentially Berlin which both prevents the establishment of a definitive relationship between the two German states and remains a bone of contention between the Russians and the West.

The weakness of West Berlin is that it is a highly dependent organism. Although it has more people and far greater resources than many independent states of the world, it relies for its security on three foreign powers, for its economic viability on heavy subsidization by Bonn, and for its political stability on the forbearance of the rulers in Pankow and Moscow. West Berlin is thus by any objective standards a highly vulnerable creation of post-War European politics. That it has survived at all is due as much to the determination of its citizenry as to the protective support it receives from outside.

The essential question is what the future of this political anomaly is to be within the context of a European detente. The present attitudes of the opposing sides are clear. The East Germans, backed by the Russians, consider Berlin an administrative and territorial structure under temporary foreign control located within the confines of their sovereign jurisdiction. The West Germans consider it a symbol of the unity of Germany and a de facto member state of the Federal Republic. From the point of view of the Western Allies, the city has become largely a prestige question in their continuing confrontation with the Russians.

Each of these viewpoints has something to be said for it. As one of the successor states of the Third Reich, the German Democratic Republic can make a claim to territory which has never been detached from it by treaty. Against this are the social and economic realities which identify West Berlin closely with the Federal Republic. To preserve the

stability of their own position in Germany and Europe, the Americans, British, and French cannot of course permit themselves to be deprived by unilateral action of their rights in the city.

Over the past twenty-five years, Berlin's role has been exaggerated out of its historical importance. In actual fact, it was the capital of a united Germany for only the three-quarters of a century from 1871 to 1945. Nevertheless, during that time it developed into a major cultural and economic centre of the German-speaking part of Europe. It is this role which West Berlin has sought to preserve throughout the post-War period and which provides the key to its future. Its problems cannot be solved by mutual challenges which pit one adversary against another periodically in crisis situations. Nor can a military umbrella held by outsiders permanently guarantee the viability of its economy and society. If West Berlin is to survive, it must discard the lingering malaise of its imperial past and become a meeting ground for East and West, a place where new concepts for intra-European relations can be developed and applied. The city must be taken out of the Cold War context and placed into a new one which will give it Continental significance. Only by becoming a bridge rather than a barrier can Berlin cease being the problem it has represented for so many years.

**T**HE current German-Soviet interest in clearing up the legacy of the past has a strong economic motivation. Parts of the East, especially

Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union are for Western Germany a natural market which is all the more attractive in that it is not subject to the cyclical fluctuations common in the West. The recurrent economic difficulties in the United States, as exemplified by the current recession, represent a potential danger of some magnitude for a country as export-oriented as the Federal Republic.

Throughout almost the entire Khrushchev period the Russians had been trying to interest the United States in an economic collaboration. The official American response was either a negative or disinterested one, although many US firms gradually moved into the market through their presence in Western Europe. The current Soviet leadership continued to manifest a similar interest which culminated in the visit of Henry Ford to Moscow in 1970. The subsequent rebuff of Ford by the Pentagon would appear to mark a turning point in Soviet economic relations with the West. Without exaggerating the parallel with 1939, it can be noted that in both cases there were simultaneous negotiations as well as a compulsion to come to an agreement.

The economy of the Soviet Union has long-term needs requiring urgent attention, largely as a result of its autarchical orientation in the past and the failure to apply sound marketing criteria. The situation has reached the stage where the USSR cannot modernize, adapt, and progress in the absence of greater cross-fertilization with the more advanced countries of the West. The problem is made more acute by the fact that the economies of most of the Eastern European states are in much the same condition, as recent events in Poland have demonstrated. In view of their own needs, the Russians are hardly in a position to give these other states the help they require.

The situation points to extensive business opportunities in the 1970s, which the West Germans, having long been present on the scene have been quick to see. German industrialists are careful to point out that they wish to share these opportunities with their Western partners, especially US industry, a contention which was reiterated by one of the

Federal Republic's leading East-West trade figures, Otto Wolf von Amerongen, in testimony before the Congressional Joint Economic Committee in December 1970. In fact, some projects, such as the Kama truck plant which was the cause of Pentagon displeasure, are of such size and volume that they automatically involve deliveries by a multinational consortium of firms as well as financing by credit institutions of a number of countries.

The significance of the events surrounding the Ford visit and the subsequent German-Soviet agreement lies in the fact that the Common Market and West Germany, as its strongest industrial member, now are in a position to capture the major share of Western trade with the East in the 1970s. American firms will participate meaningfully in this commerce to the extent that they have a presence in the Common Market or in countries which are associated with it.

**D**ESPITE the misgivings expressed in various circles, the new German Ostpolitik is fundamentally sound, both in its concept and execution. It both cleans up the past in a decisive manner and opens perspectives for the development of normal and profitable relations between both halves of Europe in the last third of the century. The United States, as a quasi-European power, should welcome this long overdue German initiative which can benefit all sides if properly carried through.

In the context of inter-state relationships, it is very difficult to achieve concessions where the factual situation has already been decided by history. In the absence of superior power and a willingness to use it, a rectification of an existing and strongly-defended territorial or political arrangement by one side is in fact an impossibility. As in so many human quarrels, the solution lies in creating a different situation of fact, in this case one that will serve as a challenge for economic and political cooperation. It is time to take Germany out of the Cold War atmosphere in which it has lived for the past quarter-century and to place it in a new context where the unique abilities of its people can be of service to both East and West. ■



"... not only flexibility but also perseverance, not only conciliation but also counter-offensives, not only understanding for the opponent's fears, but also understanding of his bad sides."

# On Negotiating with Communist Powers

**T**HE ability of the United States to negotiate with Communist governments is obviously of great importance, even though new agreements are likely to be few and far between. The opportunities for American diplomacy are circumscribed to a large extent by the depth of conflict and the restricted common interest between the United States and the principal Communist powers, as well as by the manner in which Communist governments tend to conduct their diplomacy. Yet, some leeway is left for American diplomacy to manage negotiations more or less skillfully, even though the objectives and tactics of our opponents create enormous difficulties.

The manner in which we negotiate with Communist powers is conditioned by many factors, such as the training and style of American officials, the way in which our government is organized (permitting many agencies to operate like independent fiefs), and the influence of our news media (with their narrow focus on today's events and high tolerance for inaccuracy). None of these internal factors can easily be changed at will, but some improvement might result from a better understanding of how they influence and constrain our conduct of negotiations.

**T**HE resources of the United States Government are limited, in terms of intellectual energy and attention that senior officials can bring

## FRED CHARLES IKLE

*Fred Charles Ikle is known mainly for his contributions to strategies for reducing the risk of war. His work has covered analysis of what war destruction can do to cities, how nuclear war could come by accident and how nations negotiate. He spent 1962 and '63 at the Harvard Center for International Affairs, where he wrote "How Nations Negotiate" (Harper & Row, 1964). Later, he taught policy analysis as Professor of Political Science at MIT. A study he began at MIT led to his book "Every War Must End" (Columbia University Press, 1971). In 1968, he returned to Rand to head the Social Science Department.*

to bear on a subject, in terms of man-hours the bureaucracy can devote to an issue, and of course in terms of budget dollars. Hence, any suggestion that our government should do more of some particular activity ought to be coupled with the realization that another activity will have to be reduced. At least this is true at a time when there are strong pressures to curb the size of the federal budget and the number of government employees. Accordingly, it may be more constructive first to suggest possible savings before recommending new efforts. Savings in this context mean primarily time and energy expended by government officials.

A type of activity that could stand trimming in our conduct of negotiations is the effort devoted to the

interpretation or analysis of the opponent's spoken and written word. As a target of our attention, the opponent's verbal output should be contrasted with underlying forces that motivate his government (as well as the forces that do motivate, or ought to motivate our own government). These more basic forces include the domestic interaction and competition between officials and their agencies, military estimates and calculations that influence top decisionmakers, and economic pressures and incentives. By contrast, the written and spoken word in negotiations with Communist countries consists largely of repetitious rhetoric.

Two factors might explain why the State Department and other agencies bestow so much tender care and scrutiny on all the written and spoken words that Communist countries tend to inject into negotiations. First, there is a widespread notion that Communist governments announce important changes in their negotiating position through subtle modifications in rhetoric or through slight nuances in the wording of their proposals. It is not clear why this notion has gained such currency. A study would show that changes in Soviet negotiating positions, particularly important ones, were announced to us almost always loudly and clearly and usually in quite short statements, while the undulations in wording and daily rhetoric were misleading as often—

or perhaps more often—than serving as harbingers of new Communist positions.

For instance, in the Korean war, when the Communists were ready to begin armistice negotiations, Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik clearly and simply said so in the United Nations, and there were no precursors to his announcement to be discovered between the lines of Soviet or North Korean propaganda statements. Indeed, prior to the Communist proposal for armistice talks, all the rhetoric and verbiage from China and North Korea pointed in the opposite direction: the North Koreans and Chinese kept demanding the total withdrawal of UN forces from all of Korea and the ouster of the South Korean Government. Our officials could learn nothing relevant to the armistice talks by reading Kim Il Sung's demands for "the complete liberation of all territory of our motherland" and the "complete destruction of the American aggressors and the remainder of the Syngman Rhee puppet forces."

Again, after two years of these armistice talks at Panmunjom when the Communist side in the Korean war was finally ready to end the fighting, they said so unmistakably; whereas most of their prior rhetoric added little to our information about the Communist position. Similarly, when the Soviet Government was willing to finalize and sign the Austrian State Treaty, it communicated this change in its position to the Western powers and to the world, swiftly and clearly.

A second reason why such disproportionate attention is being paid to words and rhetoric may be the specialization of the State Department, which tends to emphasize the verbal aspect of foreign relations. It would, of course, be inaccurate to say all that is left for the State Department is the government-to-government traffic in words. The planning of foreign policy is predominantly (though not exclusively) the concern of the State Department. It is a fact, however, that the enormous volume of cables to and from the State Department deals largely with the verbal output of other governments, on-the-record and off-the-record remarks in conferences, and reports on foreign news media. Moreover, a large fraction of inter-

nal State Department memoranda is likewise devoted to the verbal output, particularly in negotiations with Communist countries.

One would like to see the results of a time-study as to how the State Department's staff allocates its working hours. What percentage is focused on words as such? (E.g., on such questions as: Does the recent Soviet proposal show some flexibility? Did the Polish Foreign Minister by saying "cannot" instead of "will not," indicate that our proposal was unacceptable? Is last week's editorial in *PEOPLE'S DAILY* milder in tone?) By contrast, what percentage of working time is devoted to incentives and more basic forces (which may or may not be reflected in these words)? For instance: military pressures (have the troops on the Sino-Soviet border increased?); internal motivations and conflicts within the opponent's bureaucracy (is the Polish Army facing a budget cut and putting pressure on the Foreign Ministry?); and economic incentives (is China stepping up its purchases from Western Europe?).

An important qualification must be added here. The point about exaggerated attention to rhetoric does not apply to negotiations *between* Communist governments nor to discussions *within* Communist governments. For these domains it does pay to look for slight changes in language and to search out the hidden meaning of Aesopian expressions. Furthermore, the fact that paying attention to words shows rapidly diminishing returns does not mean that one can afford entirely to ignore what Soviet or other Communist diplomats have to say.

**R**ELATED to the excessive attention to ephemeral rhetoric is the tendency to get lost in tactical detail. The way in which negotiations with Communist powers are managed within the American Government permits small tactical moves to develop a life of their own. If this drift goes on unchecked, small tactics will displace the very objective of the agreement that is under negotiation. A great many capable officials are then forced—or will force themselves—to labor intensively on these details like pettifogging lawyers.

Several episodes in the test ban



conference illustrate how the concentration on tactical detail can divert the United States Government from the main purpose of negotiations.\*

Paradoxically, despite the fact that the State Department and other government agencies bestow so much care on the vast verbal output of Communist governments, we have been careless in adopting the language of our opponents and *their* definitions of conflict issues in many cases where this was clearly to our disadvantage. Or perhaps this is not so paradoxical. It might be precisely because our officials spend so much time on the opponent's rhetoric that they eventually use his words—first in quotation marks, later without.

Communists have always cultivated the use of slogans, both for domestic purposes and for the purpose of what might be called a "semantic infiltration" of Western countries. That is to say, they try to make us use *their* labels of conflict issues, so that *their* definition of right and wrong will eventually prevail. One of Milovan Djilas' revelations about Stalin illustrates this point. In 1947, when the Soviet Union created the Cominform, Stalin

\*For specific examples, see the full version of this article in the Committee Print, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, Committee on Government Operations, United States Senate, 91st Congress, 1970.

himself thought up the name for its official publication: *For a Lasting Peace—For a People's Democracy*. Stalin's idea was that the Western press would have to repeat this slogan each time it quoted something from this journal. Although Stalin had the right idea, his expectation in this case was disappointed, probably simply because the name was too long.

While our senior officials and our news media did not repeat "For a Lasting Peace—For a People's Democracy" whenever they discussed some Cominform statement, they now frequently use the label "wars of liberation" when referring to internal wars and campaigns of terrorism aimed against non-Communist governments (never for internal wars against Communist governments, mind you!). Since the early 1960s, several Presidents Secretaries of State, and other United States officials have used this expression. To be sure, always within quotation marks, but the news media tend to dispense with that encumbrance. What is remarkable is not this occasional usage, but that nobody seems to ponder about it.

The issue here is not the merits or mistakes of the current American war effort in Vietnam. Except in the eyes of a minute fringe in American society, the reasons against this war are not that the United States is fighting *against liberation*.

Let us look at another and perhaps even more insidious example of "semantic infiltration." Some ten years ago the State Department inexplicably decided to permit the use of the term "Socialist Countries" to refer to the East European countries under the control of Moscow. Gradually, this expression began to filter into government language and the news media. The official and non-official use of this expression has several deleterious effects:

(1) It is insulting to our Socialist friends in Austria, West Germany, England, Sweden, and elsewhere.

(2) It can be exploited by far-rightist opponents of our Socialist friends, to argue that Socialism and Soviet-controlled Communism are all the same, and to undercut efforts, such as by the more libertarian-minded Italian and French

leftists, to rally Socialist forces against neo-Stalinist Communism.

(3) It helps the neo-Stalinists to pretend that their conflict with the United States and other Western countries is all about the choice between Socialism and Capitalism. This makes it harder for libertarian forces in Eastern Europe and within the Soviet Union to work towards a more open and freer political order without giving the appearance of wanting to restore "Capitalism" (by which the young generation in Eastern Europe and Russia usually envisage something out of Charles Dickens).

(4) Worst of all, it seems to sanction the Brezhnev Doctrine, implying that these countries under Moscow's imperial control are all distinguished by the one fact of being Socialist states and that any change in their status could mean only a "return to Capitalism." Where does this leave Yugoslavia, for instance? In the official United States Government vocabulary, is Yugoslavia one of the "Socialist Countries"? Hence, does the United States Government signal to Moscow that it would tolerate a 1968-style invasion by Soviet divisions? Or is Yugoslavia not "Socialist"?

Other forms of "semantic infiltration" could be cited, such as President Eisenhower's unfortunate slip of agreeing with Khrushchev that West Berlin's situation was "abnormal."

Our government, by spending less time pursuing small technicalities and analyzing the flow of words, might be able to devote more energy to the essential aspects of negotiation. On many issues, a strong effort is required to modify the opponent's position so as to reach an acceptable agreement. This must be done not so much through clever tactical tricks, but through a sustained policy of inducements and pressures.

Nearly all agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union were preceded by long negotiations: The Austrian State Treaty was under negotiation for ten years, the nuclear test ban for five to eight years depending on how one counts the beginning, the civil aviation agreement and the consular convention were the subject of intermittent negotiation for ten years, and a simple matter like the hot-line took

more than a year to settle if one counts the time from the first US proposal. (The technical talks implementing the hot-line, once the Soviets had agreed in principle, were smooth and swift.) Similarly, the negotiations with North Korea and Communist China to end the Korean war lasted for nearly two years.

During these protracted periods of bargaining, the positions on both sides changed—in many cases quite substantially. After all, one of the most essential aspects of negotiation is the lack of a firm scale for measuring gains and losses. The dividing line between a gain and a loss is not given by Nature, but is the result of partly explicit and partly intuitive evaluations within government bureaucracies. And these evaluations are themselves influenced by the bargaining process. (Changes of evaluations within a government should not be confused with the granting of a concession, although for the opponent they might have the same effect: If a government grants a concession, it decides to reduce its initial position in order to render it more acceptable to the opponent; but if a government undergoes a reevaluation of alternative outcomes in a negotiation, it changes its views as to what arrangements are good or bad and how the pluses and minuses ought to be weighted in order to draw the balance.)

All too frequently, the positions of Communist powers are viewed as immutable. During the formulation of the United States negotiating position within the State Department and in interagency groups in Washington, it happens often that a possible American proposal or a Western demand is voted down as being "unacceptable" to the Communist side. But by classifying certain proposals as "unacceptable" to the opponent, our negotiators and policy-planners in fact make them so. Since the positions of Communist governments, much as our own, tend to change only gradually under the influence of negotiation, our abstaining from "unacceptable" demands denies us a possibility of modifying a Communist position.

The Austrian State Treaty is a good example. Here, the United States and its Western allies remained clearly committed to a free Austria and kept pressing the Soviet

Union with "unacceptable" proposals. Finally, in 1955 the Russians realized that it would also be to their advantage to end the partition and occupation of Austria. Similarly, a *partial* test ban (i.e., excluding underground tests) seemed unacceptable to the Soviet Government throughout most of the test ban negotiations. Therefore, our negotiators advanced the proposal for a partial ban only from time to time and almost with a feeling of hesitation. But after the Cuban missile crisis, when the inspection arrangements for underground tests still were deadlocked in disagreements, Khrushchev realized that a test ban confined to atmospheric and outer space tests would have advantages from the Soviet viewpoint as well. Thus, one of the principal postwar disarmament agreements was realized on the basis of what part of American officialdom classified as a proposal "unacceptable" to the Soviet Government.

Additional instances can be found of Communist governments changing their position only after prolonged negotiation. Yet, these cases might be more numerous had the US Government pursued some good causes with greater perseverance and conviction. We will never know what agreements could have been obtained had we tried harder. The point here is not that we should brusquely confront the Soviet and other Communist governments with all kinds of far-reaching demands. What is needed is that on essential issues we pursue a sustained policy of inducements and pressures to gradually change their position, even if this seems quite unpromising initially.

Our own evaluations also change under the impact of prolonged negotiation. In many cases, these revisions did not simply lead to Communist gains but actually turned out to be in the American interest, too.

During the prolonged negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty, the United States Government was reluctant to have Austria committed to a permanently neutral status. Yet, today this outcome seems to accord fully with American and NATO interests. Likewise, in the 1950s, the United States Government was initially reluctant to develop cultural exchanges and to let trade with Com-

munist countries expand. Today, most American officials would view non-strategic trade and genuinely bilateral cultural exchanges as being to our advantage. Similarly, limitations on nuclear weapons, such as the test ban and nuclear free zones, became only gradually acceptable within the United States Government. Today, these limitations are largely viewed with favor, or at least not found to be harmful, in the Defense as well as in the State Department.

It is essential, however, to distinguish two types of shifts in our own evaluations. On the one hand, there are those reevaluations where we have come to see an issue in a different light so that we can accommodate some of the Communist demands without impairing our national interests or those of our allies. On the other hand, American (and more generally Western) evaluations can erode in such a way that Communist powers make long-term gains while we delude ourselves that nothing has changed.

Since this distinction is so important, it seems worthwhile to analyze a few cases from hindsight so as to appraise whether they represent a useful reevaluation of US objectives that facilitated agreement with a Communist power, or whether they represent an erosion of our evaluations that concealed a genuine deterioration in our position. The examples of the test ban and the Austrian State Treaty serve to elucidate the former.

In the mid-1950s, senior US officials believed that arms control agreements restricting nuclear weapons, such as the test ban, would reduce the deterrent inherent in American nuclear superiority, perhaps by hobbling the future development of American nuclear weapons technology while permitting the Soviet Union to move ahead, perhaps by leading to political pressures against American nuclear weapons overseas. Today, these fears do not appear to have been well-founded. On the contrary, had Khrushchev's insistence not led to the nuclear test ban, such limitations on nuclear weapons might have become more, rather than less, widespread.

Another reevaluation of a negotiating position occurred within the

United States Government regarding the above-mentioned issue of Austria's neutrality. One has to consider the historical background against which the American position on Austria had to evolve. The early 1950s, we must remember, were under the shadow of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 and the North Korean attack on South Korea in 1950.

Czechoslovakia had never been "signed over" to Soviet control by the Western allies at the end of World War II, neither at Yalta, nor in Churchill's famous-infamous percentage deal, nor at Potsdam. Czechoslovakia, as seen from Washington and London, was meant to remain "neutral" between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, or, as it was put in those days by the Czech president Benes, it was to become a "bridge between East and West." American forces had liberated part of Czechoslovakia from Nazi occupation—much like in Austria—and for two years a parliamentary and relatively independent government ruled in Prague, with the Communists in a minority.

Then on top of the Communist takeover of Czechoslovakia came Korea. Both Soviet and American troops had been withdrawn from Korea, yet the full-scale aggression occurred only one year after the last American forces had left the country. Small wonder, therefore, that American officials were reluctant to deny Austria the possibility of protection through an alliance with the West. Anyone could see that, once the Western forces were withdrawn, Austria would be as encircled by Communist territory as Czechoslovakia was in 1948.

Yet, with the benefit of hindsight it can be said that our acceptance of Austria's neutrality was a risk well worth taking. The critical difference between Czechoslovakia and Austria lies precisely in the manner in which the Western powers permitted their evaluations to shift. In Czechoslovakia, the Western powers tolerated a continuing reduction in their influence during 1946 and 1947 and did nothing to discourage the Soviet Union from preparing a takeover. In Austria, the Western powers insisted from the outset that they wanted to have troops in Vienna as long as the occupation lasted,

and in their diplomacy continually kept the expectation alive that Austria should become fully independent. When this effort was at last crowned with success in 1955, the United States did not write off Austria as Czechoslovakia was written off by the West after American and Soviet forces had liberated that country in 1945.

By contrast, let us consider the transition from colonialism to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Since World War II, the Western colonial powers have divested themselves of their colonies at a rapid pace. In the 1950s and 1960s, this divestiture was often a painful process, with the United States frequently getting caught in the sequel through its alliances, as well as for other reasons. At the same time, the Soviet Union posed as the champion of anti-colonialism with considerable success.

In the 1950s, American policymakers were looking forward to the day when most Western colonies would be independent, expecting that the pressures against the Soviet version of colonialism would then mount, both internally and externally. Ten to fifteen years later, the colonies of Western powers have indeed shrunk to a few remnants; but Soviet colonialism and imperialism, while subject to internal stresses, has escaped sustained external criticism, let alone more serious pressure from without.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia made it clear to most nations, at least temporarily, where the world's last big empire was being ruled from. But very quickly

thereafter, American diplomacy fell back into its defensive stance. Something happened to the evaluation of colonialism and imperialism within the United States Government. The calibration by some of our own officials of past and present trends shifted, so that what our allies relinquished (partly with American prodding) is not being credited to the West, while what the Soviets captured or recaptured by using overwhelming force is being assigned to them as if it was theirs through Natural Right.

Thus, after we encouraged France to give independence to Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and her other African colonies, after we supported the British in granting full independence to their colonies in Africa (some of which became ruled by Marxist governments), and after we did *not* intervene in Libya despite the coup that led to a pro-leftist government we still feel embarrassed that one of our allies, Portugal, is holding on to her African colonies. This is as if the Soviet Union, having permitted Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Rumania, and Bulgaria all to choose their own road to independent forms of Socialism or Capitalism, still felt embarrassed because it continued to exercise control over Outer Mongolia. (For this comparison it is worth recalling that while the Russians expelled Nazi Germany from Poland, Rumania, and parts of Czechoslovakia, the British forces expelled Fascist Italy from Libya which until then had been an Italian colony.)


More specifically, this distortion and false reevaluation of past and

present trends often takes the following form: Some American officials, deeply (and justifiably) concerned about the problems in Vietnam, tend to equate American foreign policy in what they call "our sphere of interest," on the one hand, with Soviet (or Chinese) foreign policy in areas that they allocate to the Soviet (or Chinese) "sphere of interest," on the other. The rules by which these spheres are to be carved up are somewhat unclear: geographic contiguity seems to impress people (nonetheless Iran and Turkey are usually not—or not yet—allocated to the Soviet sphere). All of Indochina is clearly assigned to the North Vietnamese, Chinese, or Soviet sphere of interest, or all three. According to these Americans, it seems most natural, and in some sense "just," that the Soviet Union should help North Vietnam in fighting the American effort to support South Vietnam against North Vietnamese encroachments and attacks. Not because an ally of one-half of a country is always justified in helping his side to take over the other half—for that would mean that the United States would be justified in helping South Vietnam to take over North Vietnam or in helping West Germany in trying to take over East Germany.

Valid reasons against the American effort to support the South Vietnamese government might be that it is so terribly costly to us, destructive and uncertain of success. But for those Americans who want to blur the differences between Soviet and American foreign policy, these weighty reasons are not enough. They argue, we should never have become involved in South Vietnam "because it is not in our sphere of interest." They draw a parallel between Khrushchev's attempt to put missiles into Cuba and the American effort to support South Vietnam, concluding that as Khrushchev was forced to pull his missiles out of "our sphere" so we should pull our forces out of "their sphere." They argue that Latin America is "our part" of the world, exactly in the same way that Eastern Europe is Russia's part of the world or Indochina is the North Vietnamese part of the world.

Given that this view has gained considerable currency in the United

(Continued on page 55)



"It should be the aim of all governments to develop a whole race of such men from whose ranks they may draw their diplomatic agents." M. De Callières

## On the Education of Diplomats—A Commentary

PAUL M. KATTENBURG

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WE can start by observing that attorneys become such upon completing the study of law, doctors the study of medicine, architects architecture and most performing musicians music. This is to name but a few of the professions in which a basis of acquired technical knowledge combines with some necessary degree of innate talent (constituting the "artistry" or "craftsmanship" of the profession) to produce, presumably, professional competence or proficiency. But diplomats do not, as a general rule, prepare in "diplomacy." Like politicians who rarely (but now perhaps less rarely) come to their seats of power without preparation in "political science," diplomats come to their calling from a variety of avenues and without the necessary license that other professions require. Why so? And should it be so?

Much of the reason can probably be found in the traditional and historical development of the diplomatic "art, craft or profession." Princes for good cause traditionally selected brothers, relatives, close friends or associates—in any event men in whom they could repose the utmost of confidence and trust—to represent them to other princes with whom they were either in competition or friendly cooperation. The diplomat in this sense represented the real alter ego or personality extension of the prince, and little did his knowledge or professional competence matter provided he was able faithfully to interpret or represent the prince's state of mind to others in his dealings. It fairly soon became apparent however that the envoy's role was truly a two-fold one: extending the personality of the prince abroad, and conversely conveying back to him the state of mind of his ally, his foe, his present or prospective antagonist or friend.

Hence the role of the diplomat from the era of city-states or tributary empires to that of nations took

shape slowly as being, in essence, that of "representing and conveying," of "interpreting," or in more modern usage, that of "communications." A natural concomitant of this role, as desirable as it was inescapable, became that of seeking areas of common interest and endeavor between the prince and rulers outside the latter's control. These were areas in which the prince's or state's interests could be advanced by means of agreement (through methods of persuasion) rather than means of constraint (through methods of force).

With the development of complex and partly codified relations between sovereigns in the modern period, the character of diplomacy as a professional activity began slowly to take shape. But we might, with some comfort, observe that the serious study of medicine did not by far antedate the 18th century, or that of engineering the 19th. The study of law in any systematic modern sense of the word did not come into existence until after the complexity of codes in the modern period began to make it well-nigh impossible for the dilettante, however imaginative, to practice it by the seat of his pants.

In diplomacy, we may be just a bit later than the rest in joining the trend to professional competence based on grounding of "technical knowledge," to supplement the qualities of artistry or craftsmanship demonstrated over centuries by envoys of the prince. We are, in any event, and if it is of some comfort, in advance of the politicians. Nor are

we surprisingly late when you consider that nowhere more than in the relations of sovereign political units, involving questions (certainly today) of the lives and deaths of perhaps millions, is the need of the envoy's holding the complete confidence of the prince of more supreme importance. It is understandable that rulers would be willing, far earlier, to accede to the regulation and licensing of professions such as architecture and law.

Even today, no diplomatic service in the world that I know of automatically licenses the diplomat to practice on the basis of examination and of knowledge alone. The sovereign or his representatives carefully select the qualified applicants in all instances—not only for their technical knowledge but preeminently for the other qualities required to inspire his confidence.

I SHALL dwell only briefly on those qualities of a temperamental order which I nonetheless believe will remain requirements for the successful practitioner into the indefinite future. Not that their enumeration is well-known or that there is widespread agreement as to what they are. Precisely the opposite is in fact the case; and I am about to make a case for their more rigorous definition and measurement.

It is admittedly difficult, taking the world as a whole as it looks in 1970, to define rather closely, not to speak of seeking to inculcate into the diplomat-in-preparation, those moral and temperamental qualities which the sovereign will require in order to repose trust and confidence in his envoy. They are, generally, speaking, intangible and highly dependent on relationships of a personal and power (therefore political) character. It is nonetheless possible and necessary to make a stab in this direction.

We can perhaps agree that among the principal temperamental quali-

ties sought in diplomats are some of the following. Strength of both character and constitution—it is simply incredible what physical rigors the average diplomat, envoy or sub-envoy, faces: from the hours of his labors to his required intake of culturally-differentiated liquids and solids. Integrity—provided always it is defined in the culturally-conditioned terms of his own sovereign (yes indeed, he must not be beyond the capacity of dissimulating for his country!). Patience and equanimity—the diplomat who “feels” too much or too soon is invariably at a disadvantage over the smiling, unflappable optimist. Alertness—but, “*sur-tout, pas trop de zèle.*” (Some of the most successful American diplomats I could cite have certainly been among the laziest characters I have known.) A predisposition to accept things and the world as they are, and not to believe in the instant or even distant perfectibility of human and social institutions—not to be trapped by culturally-conditioned notions of what is, what is not “evil” or “good”; in other words, an intellectual capacity to think relatively in ethical terms, whatever the personal normative or value-base the envoy carries in his own psyche. Finally, and certainly among the most important, a capacity to “step into the other fellow’s shoes” if not into his brains. And many more.

No real effort has been made to be exhaustive or even very rigorous in adducing this purely illustrative catalogue of some of the required temperamental qualities. In fact, what we may need most of all at this stage is a rather precise catalogue classification and description of such traits. Techniques of measurement could then be developed, using the best we now know of psychology and personality analysis, which could at least help in assessing candidates with a minimal degree of accuracy. Perhaps, as a first step, a study of the “Temperamental Qualities of Diplomats and Techniques for their Measurement” could be commissioned.

Perhaps, by the time such study is concluded, it will have been demonstrated that a Diplomatic Academy—or schools otherwise devoted fully to the study of that profession—are as necessary as, say, schools of architecture or law for the proper se-

lection, as well as the teaching of diplomats. After all, no one enters law school today without high marks on the legal aptitude boards. Most potential diplomats forever remain initially self-selected or picked at random on a largely intuitive basis? (It should be pointed out that the Foreign Service Entrance Examinations, in the American case, the oral portion of which measures temperamental qualities among other attributes, are generally administered after and not before the applicant has completed study of the technical-knowledge base with which he should presumably be equipped, and very often the latter has been acquired rather haphazardly.)

**P**ASSING now to the technical knowledge attributes that should be required of diplomats, let me state at the outset my belief that diplomacy today is a discipline, firmly based on technical knowledge. It happens however that the heart of this discipline does not lie in the knowledge of something called “diplomacy,” which can be transmitted to diplomats-in-preparation in the same way that statutes and codes can be transmitted to law students or design to students of architecture.

But let us remember that lawyers remain “in preparation” for at least some time after they have passed the bar, and that architects require a minimum of three years after graduation before they can be licensed. During these years, lawyers and architects acquire further knowledge, particularly of the integrative elements of their discipline—“on the job” knowledge based on experience. This compares with those in the foreign service today serving a probationary period during which practical experience transforms the disparate components of the knowledge acquired into an integrated whole. It is during the in-service probationary period that diplomats truly absorb through practice the elements of knowledge they have acquired and that they can demonstrate their learning thereof. This is when they begin to relate an acquired body of technical knowledge to the practice of foreign-policy making and to the conduct and implementation of foreign relations. Similarly the beginning attorney,

having absorbed torts and evidence, now begins to demonstrate this learning in interaction with clients, authorities and the courts.

I suggest, therefore, that three levels of learning and instruction are involved in preparation for diplomacy. At the first level, basic elements of knowledge are acquired. This period should normally last two years, spent either in a “diplomacy” major in college or in a specialized academy preparing for diplomacy. The second level, lasting one year, adds elements of greater technical specialization. It should be spent in a program leading to M.A. in Diplomacy, either in graduate school or continuing the academy. (The latter could begin students in the third year of college, leading them through the fifth.) The important thing about the second level, or third year, is that it should be preceded by systematic testing for carefully spelled-out and rigorously defined temperamental qualities. Only if this were passed successfully would the candidate be allowed to proceed.

After he obtained his license, or M.A., he would then be automatically qualified for selection by his sovereign if he desired to engage in public diplomacy; or by the private sector if he desired a career in private transnational activities. The third level of instruction would begin after entry into the career. During this probationary period of probably three years in the case of public diplomacy, the integrative “in-service” elements would be added, partly through practice in diplomatic positions and partly through in-service training.

**R**ETURNING now to the constituent elements of knowledge in diplomacy, what are they at the basic level? First and foremost a thorough, wide and deep grounding in history. Not simply diplomatic history, but history of cultures, civilizations, religions and political systems. Nothing can be more important for the diplomat than to know and be able to interpret what went before; not just in the West but emphatically in other cultures as well. I will not here belabor the point.

Second, economics. Here too, it seems unnecessary to dwell on the obvious necessity for deep and full

understanding of the dismal science in all its recent ramifications of input/output models, systems analysis, cost/benefits measurements and econometrics.

Third, anthropology, combined with as much human geography, basic sociology, and psychology as can be imparted in a two year program (and its previous two-year introduction). A wide and deep knowledge of the spread of human civilization, accompanied by a healthy appreciation of the cultural relativity of norms and mores, morals and behavior.

Fourth, but only last, political science. There is, in political science, much that is highly relevant, some that is highly irrelevant, to the practice of diplomacy. I certainly would not care a great deal, for example, whether my young associate in an embassy knew or did not know Game Theory or the aggregate statistical findings and methods of the Dimension of Nations Project. Nor would I care much if he knew or did not know the highly important findings of quantitative scholars in, say, the area of conflict resolution or the correlation of violence (however defined) with something termed "democratic development" however coded and rated in the matrix.

I would be even less concerned whether or not he was intimately conversant with Kaplan's distinguished work in systems theory or with Rosenau's superb efforts to isolate and study multiple variables in comparative foreign policy formations. It would be preferable, of course, if he knew these things, at least in a general way. But however important these researches are for political science, and for the effort we can encourage of endeavoring to build a more rigorous body of international political theory, they are not fundamental to the intellectual baggage of the diplomat-in-preparation, at least at the basic level.

What is, on the other hand, fundamental to that baggage is his possession of an extraordinarily detailed knowledge, additional to that imparted in the historical dimension, of the philosophical and theoretical thought of seminal thinkers in politics. As well as of thinkers perhaps not regarded so seminal, but whose daily relevance to the themes and trends of human affairs in our age seems to be increasing. Woe to the

young man who knows not anarchist doctrine or history, Leninist theory of Imperialism (or its precursors or follow-on work such as the Theses on Colonialism), or Machiavelli's "The Prince."

If, in addition, he knows behavioral findings, decision-making theory, or political systems in a "political development" context, so much the better. But a diplomat is not and never will be a political scientist. To confuse the two, or endeavor, futilely, to make the one into the other, will only serve to frustrate both. The trained political scientist turned diplomat will be frustrated because of his forlorn expectations as to what his trade really practices. The political scientist will be frustrated because of his failure to have impact quickly on decisions and courses of states which often bear no greater direct relationship to his investigations than those of the geneticist studying cell behavior to the writing of common prescriptions by doctors (yet neither the M.D. nor the geneticist appear to be frustrated by their lack of interrelationship)!

**T**HE technical knowledge fields listed above do not exhaust the necessary intellectual baggage of the diplomat-in-preparation. In his third year (fifth year of college or university) the subject matter taught and learned should come closer to the heart of international relations. In my view, it should include five subjects in which thorough grounding would universally benefit every diplomat and which, in contradistinction to the broad constituent elements of knowledge listed above, form the narrow core of the discipline of diplomacy.

The first of these is study of an area (and of a language proper to that area) carefully selected on the basis of the student's interests, his talents, and the results of his earlier work. (It should be remembered that the testing for temperamental qualities mentioned above would have occurred before this final year of study.)

Second, there should be advanced study of English writing and composition. It is important that the practicing diplomat be able to express himself lucidly and succinctly in all sorts of formats under all types of trying circumstances. (Writing

memoranda of conversations for an official of former Vice President Humphrey's stature and personality while on an eight-day trip to some dozen Asian countries is an experience from which I still have not fully recovered!)

Third, a year's course in diplomacy or in diplomatic practice as revealed primarily through case studies and taught by personnel who have themselves been involved in the process, would seem justified in the final year. This would include elements of the legal, political, psychological and other aspects that go into the making of technique in that subtle "craft" of negotiations. Much of this instruction could, in my view, take the form of games and simulations of the actual diplomatic bargaining process.

For American diplomats, there should be a year's study of American foreign policy divided roughly evenly between "Conduct and Formulation of US Foreign Policy" (many of the current upper-division undergraduate or lower-division graduate courses fit the bill) and a second semester on "Problems of Decision-Making in National Security Policy." Note that emphasis in this second half would center sharply and dynamically on problem situations in both the diplomatic and the security fields, and less statically on the machinery for foreign policy formation which would have been covered in the first half.

Finally, a one-year course in the theory of international relations should be required in this final year (whether or not the student had earlier studied some international politics as part of his basic-level training in political science.) The subject need not be overly stressed or taught to pre-diplomats in depth; once more, we are not concerned with forming political scientists. But the basic elements of international politics could be covered in a first semester, and the fundamental literature of international relations theory (again, stressing seminal thinkers like Wolfers, Aron, Morgenthau) in a second.

The intellectual baggage of diplomats in-preparation is still not complete without the integrative training that would be obtained once admitted to his country's professional

(Continued on page 53)



### The President Decides Exemption

The Federal Labor Relations Council, under date of March 15, informed Deputy Under Secretary William B. Macomber, Jr. that the President had determined that career officers and employees in the Foreign Service of the United States should be excluded from the provisions of Executive Order 11491. This exclusion is contingent on development of a separate program for Foreign Service personnel which is acceptable to the Council. The proposed program should be submitted not later than June 1, 1971.

The AFSA Board will be confer-

ring with the Federal Labor Relations Council on the most appropriate separate program for Foreign Service personnel. This alternative relationship will presumably take the seven-point argument as a basis and point of departure. AFSA will continue to work vigorously on behalf of members' welfare, and the Board intends to build with management a relationship both cooperative and advisory. The Board is pleased by the President's decision, and fully satisfied that given the promise of comparable alternative rights this is the preferable outcome for the Foreign Service.

### Retiree Benefits Win Support

The Department will seek legislation this year for three important retiree benefits according to a letter received by AFSA from Mr. Macomber, the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration. These are (1) extension of "second spouse" provision to the Foreign Service (2) provision at a reasonable cost of a minimum \$2,400 annuity to widows not presently covered, and (3) recomputation of annuities of retirees based on 40 rather than 35 years of service.

A retiree had written to the Department asking its support for these benefits and sent a copy to AFSA. The retiree's letter was forwarded to Mr. Macomber with the Association's strong endorsement and a special request that he give it his personal attention. It is a pleasure to report that Mr. Macomber did so and that the retiree has a detailed reply to his letter.

It is probable that the "second spouse" provision approved for the Civil Service will be extended to the Foreign Service.

However, it will be more difficult to obtain an amendment to P.L. 89-308 which would provide the minimum annuity at a **reasonable cost**


for wives or widows not presently covered by mandatory provisions. Retirees will recall that H.R. 4170 passed the House in 1965 providing the minimum \$2,400 annuity at a cost of only \$300 a year, payable at the rate of \$25 per month, for the period between October 1960 and the date of annuity election. This was amended in the Senate to require a retiree to pay a much larger sum and passed as Public Law 89-308.

It is probable that the Department's efforts to obtain an amendment providing a reasonable payment for an annuity would be enhanced if active and retired members would write to their representatives in Congress supporting the Department's proposed amendment.

The Department is not optimistic about the possibility of 40 year benefits for retirees, even though the proposal would be related to granting credit for 40 years of service to future retirees. Again, it is probable that letters to Congressional representatives would prove helpful.

AFSA will continue its efforts to obtain the benefits present, and future, retirees should have.


### AFSA's New Board Member



AFSA's new member of the Board of Directors, James Donald Wilson, Jr., was an ambassador at the age of 21. Mr. Wilson was selected as Goodwill Community Ambassador to Norway by the Flint Junior Chamber of Commerce, Flint, Michigan, in 1957. He then participated in Operations Crossroads Africa in 1960 and traveled extensively in East Africa "with the objective of gaining a better understanding of Africa and recording my impressions photographically."

Mr. Wilson received his BA and MA from Howard University and studied French for a year at the University of Montpellier. He joined AID as a Junior Officer Trainee in 1965 and had a split tour in Sierra Leone and Congo (K) 1966-68. After taking a year's leave of absence to work for his Ph.D. he returned to AID. He is Desk Officer for Central Africa and responsible for multi-lateral projects in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Chad and Gabon.

Mr. Wilson enjoys chess, swimming, stamp collecting, acting in amateur stage productions and photography. He worked as a free-lance photographer for various university publications during his college years.



The Board of Directors is pleased to announce the appointment of Mr. James K. Palmer as AFSA Executive Director effective March 15. He replaces Ambassador Thomas S. Estes who has moved on after 14 months of outstanding service to the Association.

Mr. Palmer, a bachelor of 36, has a strong administrative background, a knowledge of the problems of professional associations, and experience in Washington. He received a Master's Degree in Business Administration from The George Washington University in 1961. This was followed by Ph.D. and D.B.A. post-graduate studies, during which time he was a faculty member at the University. Prior to his university experience he spent two years as a staff assistant to former Senator William F. Knowland. Following his university teaching, he was Director of Administrative Services for the Navy Federal Credit Union. During 1964-69 he was a Distributor and Manufacturers' Representative for a number of companies specializing in filing systems and data processing accessories. Most recently, Mr. Palmer has been Executive Vice President of the American Association of Industrial Management with headquarters in Philadelphia.

The Board is confident that Jim Palmer will make an important contribution to the Association, and that he will be an efficient, innovative manager of our varied and increasingly complex activities. Members are urged to drop by AFSA headquarters to meet him.

**About Our Cover**

Earl Wilson's work again graces the cover of the *Journal* this month. Mr. Wilson, now on the faculty of the National War College, exhibited his paintings in the Foreign Service Club during the month of January.

**All By-Law Amendments Passed**

The results of the referendum ballot on four proposed amendments to the AFSA By-Laws appear in tabular form below. A two-thirds

majority of the valid votes cast minus abstentions is required for passage.

	Total Valid Votes Cast	Approve	Disapprove	Abstain	Total Minus Abstentions	
Amendment 1	617	524	77	16	601	
Amendment 2	617	531	69	17	600	
Amendment 3	617	519	75	23	594	
	Total Cast	AFSA Board	JFSOC	Disapprove Both	Total Minus Abstain Abstentions	
Amendment 4	617	444	130	40	3	614

The first three amendments, proposed by the Junior Foreign Service Club (JFSC) and supported by the AFSA Board of Directors, received 87 percent or more of the total vote minus abstentions. On the last, contested, amendment the recommendation of the Board of Directors was ratified by 72 percent of those voting and not abstaining, with the JFSOC alternative polling 21 percent and less than 7 percent opposing both alternatives. The text of the amended sections of the By-Laws follows (new additions in bold).

Amendment 1

ARTICLE III

PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

1. To further the interests and well being of the members of the Association and to work closely with the Department of State and other agencies toward the goal of improving the foreign affairs community.

Amendment 2

ARTICLE IV—Section C

MEETINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

6. All regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be open to all members. Accurate minutes of all meetings, including a record of any votes by the Directors, shall be available to members. A summary of such minutes shall be published on a timely basis in the Foreign Service Journal.

Amendment 3

ARTICLE VI

ELECTIONS

5. The Elections Committee shall announce publicly the names of all candidates no later than October 15. The period October 15-November 15 shall be designated the campaign period. The Committee shall organize and publicize at least three meetings at which the candidates can present their positions. The meetings shall be well publicized and held at times and places calculated to ensure the largest possible attendance by the members. In order to

facilitate informed voting, the Elections Committee shall accept and distribute platform statements from candidates to the membership at the beginning of the campaign period. The Association shall bear the attendant cost of reproduction of statements, which shall be of reasonable length, the addressing of envelopes, and postage. To help defray election costs, each candidate shall make a nominal contribution, e.g. \$10.00 to be set by the Elections Committee.

6. The official ballot bearing only the names of all qualified candidates shall be mailed to the Active membership no later than November 15. The Elections Committee shall instruct the Active Members to vote for not more than eleven candidates as Members of the Board of Directors. These eleven names may be voted from among those appearing as individuals or as members of any slate. Slates may be voted as units, in which case each person on the slate will be recorded as having received one vote. Votes may be cast for write-in candidates, provided they fulfill the eligibility requirements on December 31 of the election year. Votes must be received by the Elections Committee no later than December 31 of the election year.

Amendment 4

ARTICLE IV—Section B

POWERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

3. Any 25 active members or any overseas AFSA Chapter may at any time, and by written request, require the Board to discuss in a regular Board meeting an issue they deem important. The Board will report its conclusions to those submitting the request and to the membership at large.

4. It is incumbent upon the Board to seek the advice of the active membership at large as frequently as practicable on major issues before the Association. Therefore, whenever the Board believes an issue to be of sufficient importance—and other considerations of time and subject matter permit—the advice of the active membership shall be sought by written ballot, by communication with Chapter heads or by other expeditious means.

## MEMBERS' INTERESTS

### Overtime Pay Guaranteed

The law and Department of State/AID/USIA regulations have long provided that employees whose basic salary rate is at or below the maximum step of GS-10 may choose to receive overtime pay for authorized overtime work. Implementation of this regulation by various Washington offices and overseas missions has been uneven, with compensatory time off—let alone overtime pay—often not effectively available to employees.

Over the months AFSA representatives have discussed this problem at many levels of the State Department on behalf of our Foreign Service support membership. On February 8 an AFSA Chapter overseas submitted through AFSA a clearly documented case in which overtime pay had been refused in writing to a Foreign Service secretary. As a direct result of this AFSA Chapter initiative, Deputy Under Secretary of State William B. Macomber, Jr. has released a clarification of policy on overtime (CA-890, February 23, 1971), leaving no doubt as to the obligation of all offices and posts to provide employees with an effective choice between compensatory time off and overtime pay. USIA has transmitted a similar message. This is a landmark advance for AFSA and for the Foreign Service.

Long hours of overtime have been traditional in our profession, and the dedication of Foreign Service officers and employees to the nation's international concerns has done great credit to our Service. However, we have developed poor practices. Too much overtime is worked at many posts out of bad habits, or bad management, or misguided ambition. AFSA very much hopes that the new mandatory policy on compensation for overtime will result in better planning and a sharp reduction of unnecessary overtime.

AFSA also believes that it is high time hard-working FSS secretarial and clerical personnel were assured of compensation for their hours of extra duty. The Association has requested its chapters and representatives at overseas posts to cooperate in the implementation of CA-890, and to make sure it is properly carried out. The maximum scheduled rate of pay for GS-10—the cutoff point for overtime pay—is \$14,973. This means that not only support personnel but many junior officers are legally eligible for overtime pay, through the second step of FSO/

FSR/FSIO-5 and the second step of FSSO-3.

### Unused Home Leave

A number of members have asked about accumulated home leave balances which have become so large as to be unlikely of ever being utilized. Questions have been raised as to the possibility of converting unused home leave to lump sum payments or to retirement credit at the end of a career. Legislative authority would have to be obtained to implement any such proposals, of course, and our reading of the situation is that it would be self-defeating to make the attempt.

Congress established home leave originally to "re-Americanize" Foreign Service personnel who serve long periods abroad, and not as a benefit to supplement annual leave. If we ask to convert unused home leave into cash or retirement credit, we might risk reopening the whole concept of home leave. With more and more Foreign Service personnel spending more time on assignments in the United States, the previously established need for special leave for "re-Americanization" might be challenged.

We believe the only way to safeguard home leave is to take it, and not accumulate it. We realize that the system now encourages people to forgo or shorten home leave in order to promote overlaps and avoid vacancies in overseas positions. This should be changed, with good management defined as the ability to program activities with rotating vacancies so as to allow for home leave. AFSA will be presenting proposals to management designed to discourage "requests" to employees to "voluntarily" shorten or forgo home leave.

### Ship Travel by Foreign Flag Vessels

Although management has turned down AFSA's request that employees be permitted to travel by ship at least one way to or from posts of assignment even though the use of foreign flag vessels would be required, there are still some travelers who are managing to go by ship, and foreign ships at that. If you wish to explore the possibility (although for most travelers it would not be feasible), consult CA-3035 of June 2, 1970, which interprets 6 FAM 133 on the use of excess currency for foreign flag ship travel. AFSA believes the restrictions on such travel are much too rigid, and will continue to seek more flexibility. In the

meantime, employees who are interested in ship travel should study the regulations cited above and attempt to use excess currencies whenever they consider themselves eligible.

### "Sesame Street"

Some members have inquired about the possible distribution of "Sesame Street," the successful television educational series for preschool children, to Foreign Service posts. Our initial inquiry indicated that the Department's educational program cannot bear the cost of such a project because educational expenditures are limited by law to first grade and higher. We will explore other possibilities and will report again.

### Naturalized Citizens

Employees and spouses who are naturalized citizens will be happy to note that management has promised AFSA to change the regulations on assignments which have tended to make such persons appear to be second class citizens.

Essentially, the concept that naturalized citizens (employees or spouses) are automatically ineligible to serve in the countries of their former nationalities will be eliminated, especially since it hasn't been enforced in recent years anyway. Management will also make sure that former nationality can in no way be brought to the attention of selection boards. Employees may therefore wish to monitor performance ratings to make sure references to former nationality are not included.

### Complaints

From time to time a member will send in an unsigned complaint about some service, action or advertisement. The Association looks into every one of these, but in the absence of a name, it cannot advise the writer of the results of its investigation.

A recent example: A member sent in an advertisement and complained that an advertised item was not available, and signed "An AFSA Member in Washington, D.C., 7/14/70."

If our member had given his name, he would have had a telephone call within 48 hours advising him that a strike had interrupted production of that item, and that it is now available.

Members are urged to give AFSA their names when they have a suggestion, criticism or complaint, so we can tell them what we did about it.

## Rockefeller Awards

Rockefeller Public Service Awards will be given in five new categories this year. This reflects the feeling of the donor that a new approach to public service should be encouraged.

The awards are for excellent civilian service in the Federal government. Candidates must have worked in government for at least 15 years and be less than 60 years old.

The new fields for the awards are: administration; intergovernmental operations; human resource development and protection; and professional accomplishment and leadership.

Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs administers the awards, considered the most prestigious privately financed honor, on behalf of John D. Rockefeller 3rd.

### Reinhardt Fund

Mrs. Peter Belin has announced the establishment of a fund for the future education of the four children of Ambassador and Mrs. G. Frederick Reinhardt. Ambassador Reinhardt died on February 22 in Zurich. His obituary appears elsewhere in this issue. Contributions to the fund for Frederick, Aurelia, Henry and Catherine Reinhardt will be held in trust by Mrs. Belin. They can be sent to her at 1623 28th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20007.

### A Foreign Service First?

Readers of the March **Playboy** may well have noted the publication of "From Russia, With Limericks," by J. F. O'Connor, page 133, if you still have your copy. Mr. O'Connor writes that these originated on the FS's Eastern European Field Seminar in 1962 and added, "When I was going through my personal papers last year prior to my retirement, I came across copies, turned out some others in the same vein, sent them off to **Playboy** and now here we are. I may well be the first FSO, active or retired, to have had anything published in **Playboy**, which isn't the usual outlet for FS literary activities."

### New Career

Niles Bond, who retired two years ago, is serving as Secretary to the Board of Governors and Assistant Secretary of the Trustees at the Corcoran Gallery of Art. Mr. Bond's long career in the Foreign Service included postings at Habana, Yokohama, Madrid, Berne, Tokyo, Rome, Rio de Janeiro and as consul general at Sao Paulo.

## FOREIGN SERVICE

## Club NEWS

### Evenings at the Club

By popular demand, the Foreign Service Club will be open for two evenings in April and one in May. The success of these evening events will determine future scheduling of similar and perhaps more frequent evening affairs at the Club. Make a note of the dates, Friday, April 23, Thursday, April 29 and Wednesday, May 5.

Drinks will be served in the buffet lounge from 5:30 till closing time, with no reservation required. Dinner will be served at 7:00 on a reservation only basis in the main dining room.

The April 29th dinner will be an Austrian Maifest, with a special menu including Gefullter Pragerschen and Paprikahuhn and a choice selection of Austrian wines. Suitable music will be piped in for the occasion. The Maifest welcomes the coming of spring and with it the first opening of the wines bottled the previous September.

AFSA members can still make reservations for dinner in the evening on other occasions. Dinner must be for 12 or more, but the Club Manager, Duncan Lyon, will make every effort to combine parties to reach this figure.

The Club is, of course, also available for cocktail parties, receptions and meetings on a reserved basis. Just call Mr. Lyon at 338-5730 for information and/or reservations.

Daily lunches served from 12 till 3 are proving popular with AFSA members and their guests. Members wishing to bring guests from the foreign diplomatic corps are invited to reserve in advance and indicate if they would like the flag of the guest's country on the table.

### Foreign Service Club Exhibitors

The Club has been open for exhibits by artists of the foreign service community for a year now. During that time fourteen artists have exhibited.

Foreign Service artists interested in having an exhibit should call AFSA, 338-4045.

### New Club Manager



The manager's accent has changed, from Swiss to British, but the accent at the Foreign Service Club will still be on good food, courteous service and pleasant surroundings.

Duncan Lyon, who came to the Club with the first winds of March, was born in 1944, in Whiston, Lancashire and came to the States in February of last year. He joined ARA just a year ago and worked at the Drake Hotel in Philadelphia.

His plans for the Club—international weeks with menus from different countries, more menu variety in general, extending the facilities to AFSA members in the evening with special functions.

His thoughts about the United States—surprise at the friendliness of the people, a wish for more informative highway signs. He and his wife Janet like Washington and plan to do a lot of sightseeing.

### The Welcome Mat

The Foreign Service Club admits: pantsuits, maxis, minis, midis, peasant dresses, false sideburns, real mustaches, full beards, Van Dykes, saber cuts, turtlenecks, capes, white socks, 2" ties, 4" ties and bow ties. We admit just about everything, as long as it's worn by an AFSA member or his (her) guest.

So come as you are, to the Foreign Service Club.

## AFSA CHAPTER NEWS

The **Kabul Chapter** is firmly launched after five months of operation with over 60 members. There is an effective steering committee chaired by John Patterson. The approach is informal—lunches, discussion groups, afternoon cocktails—built around issues of concern to the Foreign Service in general and AID Foreign Service officers and staff in particular.

The **Bangkok Chapter** remains one of our most active. Its chairman, Jim Wilkinson, holds the all-time Chapter record for the number of individual cases on allowances and other issues referred to the celebrated can-do will-do AFSA Members' Interests Committee team. The Bangkok Chapter, like several others, now uses its own letterhead stationery.

The **Vientiane Chapter** holds the gold star for the 1970 membership drive—Vientiane is an all-AFSA post with sixty (60) new members. Obviously this was a team job, but special congratulations are due Charlie Rushing and Frank Rhinehart for helping us put across the plain truth that AFSA represents and defends the interests of all the Foreign Service of AID, USIA and State, and that for AFSA the "Foreign Service Elite Corps" of the 1970s includes every one of us—FSS, FSIO, FSR, FSO, FSSO (and, before long, FSRU). We are 14,000 strong in this corps, and about half belong to the Association; the more who join AFSA the more AFSA can accomplish for us all.

Send us news of Chapter activities and let AFSA Washington know how it can best serve you.

## Foreign Service People

### Deaths

**Berle.** Adolf August Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs and Ambassador to Brazil from 1938 to 1946, and a consultant to both Presidents Roosevelt and Kennedy on Latin American Affairs, died in New York City on February 17, 1971 at the age of 76. Mr. Berle served a brief tour as an army lieutenant during World War I, and was a member of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace with Ger-

many at Versailles. He resumed the practice of law in the early twenties, and was a member of the faculty of Columbia University Law School for many years. He was a law partner of Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt prior to entering the Roosevelt "Brain Trust" and cabinet, and served on many commissions, and as a lecturer and writer on international affairs, in addition to his legal professional activities.

Mr. Berle leaves his widow, the former Beatrice Bend Bishop, 142 East 19th St., a son, Peter A. A. Berle, of New York; two daughters, Mrs. Clan Crawford of Ann Arbor, Michigan, and Mrs. Dean Myerson of Washington; two sisters and a brother, and ten grandchildren. The family requests that memorial contributions be made to Columbia University School of Law.

**Evans.** Joseph Robert Evans, FSS-ret'd, died February 9, 1971 in California. Mr. Evans entered the Department in 1914 and joined the Foreign Service in 1920. In addition to extensive travel throughout Europe and the Near East in the early '20s as an archives collator, he served in London, Paris, Rome, Bogota, and Bern until his retirement from the last-named post in 1953. At the time of his death he resided with his wife at 1031 Fiske Street, Pacific Palisades, California 90272. A daughter, Mrs. Robert M. Miller (wife of FSO Robert M. Miller) seven grandchildren and four great-grandchildren, also survive him.

**Lewis.** Irving S. Lewis, USIA, died February 14, 1971 at the Washington Hospital Center. He was 51. Mr. Lewis served in the US Army prior to joining USIA in 1950, and was assigned to public and cultural affairs posts in Bolivia, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Uruguay until his recent assignment to Washington. In addition to his wife, Patricia, of 10100 Hereford Place, Silver Spring 20901 and five children, Mr. Lewis leaves his mother, Mrs. Viola Lewis and three brothers.

**Neilson.** N. Paul Neilson, FSIO, Public Affairs Adviser for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, died of a heart attack at his home in Washington on February 19. Mr. Neilson had been a journalist and news commentator prior to joining USIA in 1950. He served in Batavia, Djakarta, Tokyo, Rangoon, Geneva and Saigon until his detail to the Department in 1969. He received the Meritorious Service Award in 1956, and the following year was detailed to the Air War College. Mr. Neilson's

wife, the former Rhoda Arnason, a daughter, Peri Alain, of 5315 MacArthur Boulevard, and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. Jay A. Neilson of Allentown, Pennsylvania, survive. A memorial in Mr. Neilson's name has been established with the American Foreign Service Scholarship Fund. Contributions may be addressed in care of AFSA, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

**Reinhardt.** G. Frederick Reinhardt, Career Ambassador ret'd, died February 22 of a heart attack near his home in Zurich, Switzerland, where he had been Director of Stanford Research Institute since his retirement from the Foreign Service in 1968. Ambassador Reinhardt entered the Foreign Service in 1937, following two years with the International Boundary Commission for the US and Mexico. He served at Vienna, Tallinn and Moscow, followed by war-time posts with the Staff of the US Advisory Council for Italy, the Political Advisor for General Eisenhower's staff, Air Force Headquarters Mediterranean, and with USPolad, SHAEF. He returned to Moscow in December 1945 and went to the NATO Defense College, Paris 1950, and in 1952 became special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Matthew Ridgway in 1952. In 1955 he was named Ambassador to Vietnam, in 1957 Counselor of the Department or State and in 1960 went to Cairo as Ambassador in addition to being named Envoy to the Yemen. From 1961 to 1968 he served as the Ambassador to Italy. Ambassador Reinhardt was a Life Member of AFSA and had been President of the Association from 1959-1960. In addition to his wife, the former Lillian Tootle, he leaves four children, Frederick, Aurelia, Henry and Catherine, all of Zurich, and a brother, Dr. Paul Reinhardt of Palo Alto, California. Mail may be sent to the family at Pelikan-Strasse 37, 8001 Zurich, Switzerland.

**Siscoe.** Frank Gotch Siscoe, FSO-ret'd, died February 14, 1971 at his home in Plainfield, N.J. He was 57. Mr. Siscoe came to the Department in 1947 from the Department of Justice. He held assignments in Prague, Moscow, Rome, Warsaw and Copenhagen, and was detailed to the Imperial Defense College in 1957. He retired from the Department in 1968 and returned to law practice and writing. He is survived by his wife Anne, of 138 E. 7th St., Plainfield, N.J. 07060, and a son John, Palo Alto, California.



## BOARD ACTIONS TAKEN

### DECEMBER 22 AND 29

The Board held informal discussions on Personnel Reform and the Executive Order in the absence of a quorum.

### JANUARY 5, 1971

The Julius C. Holmes Scholarship was established by a motion of the Board.

**E. O. 11491:** Mr. Jerome Ackerman of Covington & Burling, Counsel for the Association, outlined the issues which might arise at the hearing scheduled by the Department of Labor for January 18 to consider the challenge of AFGE as to AFSA's right to intervene in petitions for exclusive recognition filed by AFGE in units of the State Department and AID. He suggested that AFSA establish its right to be heard as representative of a number of personnel in the units where AFGE petitions have been filed, without addressing at this point the question of AFSA's validity as a labor organization under the terms of the Executive Order unless confrontation on the latter question was unavoidable. Mr. Harris will assemble material required to refute allegations that AFSA is not a labor organization, against this contingency.

### JANUARY 12, 1971

The Board accepted a proposal to appoint a Legislative Action Committee to follow legislation pending in Congress affecting the foreign service agencies.

**Reform:** The Department has introduced blue-edged Management Reform Bulletins to report on the implementation of Task Force recommendations. The Association will comment through red-edged AFSA Bulletins on Management Reform.

**Provident Fund:** The AFSA Provident Fund financed by contributions and long-term loans from commissaries and other employee organizations, can lend up to \$100 for sixty days to Foreign Service officers and Staff in emergency situations.

### JANUARY 19, 1971

**Reform:** Officials in O have been invited to participate in an open meeting sponsored by the AFSA Committee on Reform on January 25. Messrs. Bray, Eliot and Harrop met with the Secretary on Thursday, January 14. After expressing their pleasure that the initiative for the Task Force reports had come from the Department, the AFSA representatives told the Secretary of their concern that no clear goals in personnel could be seen. They also discussed the problems raised by the Executive Order, and gave the Secretary a copy of the AFSA position on an alternative arrangement if the Foreign Service is excluded from coverage under the Executive Order.

**AID Reorganization:** Mr. Howard Parsons, Chairman of the AFSA Task Force on AID Reorganization, discussed with the board the Task Force's paper on the Peterson Report. The Board felt that the paper oversimplified basic problems, such as coordination, and the Board requested more specific documentation, current reports from other Task Forces working on the question, and guidance on what AFSA's role should be. Task Force members explained some of their problems in working on AID reorganization; the status of the reforms and of the various Task Forces concerned was confusing, and in a fast-moving situation it was difficult to achieve consensus on important issues. It was decided that Mr. Lyman would outline

the basic issues to be considered and meet with the Task Force; the Task Force would then "sharpen" the issues, make specific recommendations, and return to the Board with them.

### JANUARY 26, 1971

The Board welcomed its new member, Mr. James D. Wilson, of AFR/AID. The Board also reluctantly accepted the resignation of Ambassador Thomas S. Estes as Executive Director of the Association.

**Executive Order:** Two hearings were held on AFGE's challenge of AFSA's right to intervene in petitions for exclusive recognition filed by AFGE in five units of the Department of State and AID. The Hearing Examiner held that the purpose of the hearing was to determine AFSA's status as a labor organization. Counsel for AFSA affirmed AFSA's right to be heard as a labor organization.

**Reform:** The Board discussed devices to make open meetings such as the one held on January 25 to discuss reform implementation more productive.

**AID Reorganization:** AFSA is concerned about the apparent lack of planning in the Department of State to coordinate within the Department and with the new organizational groupings proposed by the Peterson Report. Mr. Kontos is preparing a paper on the subject of the new foreign assistance institutions and their implications for management and personnel reform.

**Club:** The Executive Director reported a net profit of \$1648 from Club operations in December, 1970.

### FEBRUARY 9

**Finances:** On the Executive Director's recommendation, the Board approved a resolution authorizing the Secretary-Treasurer of the Association to obtain a loan from the Riggs National Bank, Washington, D.C. to alleviate a cash shortage problem.

**Openness:** Mr. Heginbotham was authorized by the Board to work with Quest Productions and the Department of State on alternative ownership and rights on a film depicting the experiences of a young Foreign Service officer and the institution within which he works. The film would be produced by Quest Productions, which has offered to try to raise the money for it and still give AFSA an "editorial veto."

**AID Reorganization:** A draft outline of a paper prepared by the AFSA Task Force on AID Reorganization was distributed for study. The Chairman of the Task Force did not agree with the report's recommendations regarding coordination. Mr. Kontos and Mr. Heginbotham have prepared a paper urging effective coordination machinery at the Undersecretary level in the Department, and a meeting was scheduled to discuss this problem with the Undersecretary. An appointment was also scheduled with Mr. Frye of the Office of Management and Budget.

**Grievance Procedures:** Mr. Heginbotham reported that an AFSA member has requested the Association to support his request for a fair hearing on a specific grievance problem under the provisions of 3 FAM 517.1, which he feels have been violated in his case. The Board passed a resolution authorizing the Chairman or his designee to cooperate with Mr. John J. Harter in support of his request for institution of an impartial grievance panel. Mr. Harris was also requested to see what might be done for members with legal problems.

**E.O. 11491:** The Association will request that the White House delay decision on the recommendations made by the Federal Labor Relations Council until the AFSA membership has responded to a referendum on the Executive Order. (Note: referendum ballots must be received by March 31.)

### FEBRUARY 16

**Board Positions:** Mr. F. Allen Harris has been elected Vice Chairman of the Board, and Mr. Erland H. Heginbotham has been elected Secretary-Treasurer.

**Meeting with Mr. Oliver:** A meeting with Mr. Philip M. Oliver, Director of the Job Evaluation and Pay Review Task Force of the Civil Service Commission was held February 11. AFSA representatives at the meeting felt that while there was much common sense in Mr. Oliver's ideas, designed primarily to produce equity in the various Federal personnel systems. Mr. Oliver seemed almost emotionally resistant to the notion that employment in the Foreign Service requires a personnel system different from domestic service.

"Just as perfect security is not possible,  
neither is perfect diplomacy possible."

# Education in Diplomacy

**E**DUICATION for diplomacy is a definite need for an indefinite future. There is a deeply felt and widely expressed need for tomorrow's diplomats to do better than yesterday's and today's. Yet the future which diplomats will face is indefinite, open to unseen challenges and opportunities. The indefiniteness of the future does nothing to diminish the need for education in diplomacy; it does suggest that prescriptions for education focus on the development of knowledge and accomplishments which are most likely to be applicable to situations which are now unknown.

Education for diplomacy is a continuing process and the task of all institutions engaged in the study or practice of international relations. A great deal of learning is required to conduct complex international transactions in a world of diverse cultures, tense nation states, and indefinite futures. The basis for such learning can be imparted in grade schools and colleges; it can be refined and expanded in graduate schools, but it must be built upon and enriched by institutions engaged in the practice of diplomacy. These institutions must mature and focus the learning of their diplomats and alter it to meet and anticipate changing needs and circumstances.

**T**HERE is a question, which deserves the most serious consideration, of whether education for diplomacy is education for a profession. Is there a body of knowledge, of doctrine, of techniques, and of methods of thought which is essential to the effective practice of diplomacy? Is the education of a diplo-

## PETER F. KROGH

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mat different in discrete and defensible ways from the education of other operators? The majority who say no usually cite the successful diplomatic careers of men of diverse educational and professional backgrounds. But it may be that these men precipitated from their varied pasts a common core of qualities and accomplishments which they effectively applied to their missions. There is a need to find out if that is so and to examine leading cases in the conduct of diplomacy for clues to a possible body of knowledge and ability essential to the practice of diplomacy.

**D**IPLOMACY is the advocacy of interests and the process, often highly political, which aims at the elimination, reduction, or postponement of

international conflicts of interests. It involves the protection and promotion of special interests, influencing the decisions of foreign nationals, and reconciling opposing interests through agreement or *modus vivendi*. Diplomacy deals in its essence with the realities of international conflicts of interest and aims at their minimization.

Just as perfect security is not possible, neither is perfect diplomacy possible. The risk of failure is high; successes are almost always hard won. It is essential that both the diplomat and his boss know that batting averages are notably low, home runs infrequent, and sacrifice hits often required. This does not mean that the diplomat should be excused from calculating and controlling the risks of failure; on the contrary, that is one of his foremost responsibilities. It means that the objectives of diplomacy should be cast in terms of "obtaining the best results that can be obtained under the circumstances" rather than in terms of absolutes or of bringing home the coonskins.

The adverse conditions in which diplomacy is normally conducted need to be emphasized and appreciated. Normally they are conditions of great uncertainty, of lack of time, and of incomplete information. The diplomat deals with "events which are not reiterative." Each situation is unique and carries with it unpredictable consequences.

Diplomacy depends for success on the possession of skills which are the surface manifestation of deep accomplishments. Skills normally thought to be illustrative of the diplomatic craft (for example, force

and clarity of verbal and written expression, tact and timing of argumentation and representation, persuasiveness and ability to win confidence) are not really skills but rather the cutting edges of accomplishments acquired through education and cultivated and confirmed through experience. These accomplishments include an ability to discover objective facts and to search for truth, a capacity to identify and delimit issues and to articulate common interests, and qualities of character which inspire confidence and respect. Looked at in this way, diplomacy is neither art nor science but knowledge painstakingly acquired, harnessed to objectives, and applied with great sensitivity to situations. This is why learning to be a diplomat is a "long arduous business, not a gift."

Good diplomacy depends upon several attributes not normally associated with diplomats. One is humility. The diplomat, public or private, must see himself as an instrument of policy whose influence is largely a function of the power of the nation or institution he represents. He must recognize that his leverage derives principally from his status as the representative of something bigger and more impressive than himself and not mistake it for a product of his own ability and character, however remarkable and admirable they may be. Such humility is consistent with a recognition and appreciation that a diplomat through his "personality, character, learning, and gifts" can augment his government's capacity in world affairs.

Another essential quality is creativity—an ability to invent improved policies and new forms and structures of international relations to meet, and even anticipate, emerging problems. The importance of this quality was underlined in 1962 by the Herter Committee which listed "zeal for creative accomplishment" as the prime requisite for foreign affairs personnel. Because diplomacy is becoming increasingly action oriented, the creative mind is needed more than ever. Unfortunately it remains an elusive quality, largely because it has not been traditionally recognized or cultivated as

one of the essential attributes of a good diplomat.

THERE are objectives of instruction in diplomacy which do not change but remain essential because they reflect the irreducible core function of diplomacy as the means by which international conflicts of interest are handled. The so-called new diplomacy does not alter the need for knowledge in fields of study which are at the core of the practice of all international diplomacy. The following are general, enduring requisites:

- Logic and objectivity in thinking, including particularly the ability to identify and delimit issues, to detail alternative courses of action, and to establish and act upon criteria for making choices.
- Clarity and accuracy in speaking and writing.
- Competence in foreign languages and ability to communicate effectively across cultural barriers.
- Awareness of past patterns and events in international relations and the conduct of diplomacy.
- Knowledge of the process of policy making and implementation.
- Ability to project the future consequences of present decisions.
- Understanding of the international system of states and organizations: how it developed; how it functions; the basic factors which affect its functioning, and the way in which the system and the people who serve it behave.

The international system and the basic factors which affect its functioning are dynamic. Over time these factors multiply and change in specific weight. The factors traditionally emphasized have been economic, political, historical and legal; now increasing weight is given to military, scientific, technological, social and cultural factors. Education for diplomacy should acquaint the student with all factors and their interrelationships, while providing a solid grounding in one or two of them.

To these basic objectives of education in diplomacy must be added new objectives which take account of the changing nature of the world in which diplomacy is conducted. Some description of changing conditions, including the emergence of a new

type of diplomat, is needed to put these modern objectives in context.

Those responsible for the conduct of diplomacy are changing in character and number. The official diplomatist is increasingly assuming a minority position in his own profession. Greater numbers of private diplomats are at work.

Official diplomacy, especially official bilateral diplomacy, represents a shrinking piece of the action.

Private diplomats will take up the slack; they will be weaving more of the skein of international activity. As columnist Joseph Kraft wrote, there is now no corner of foreign relations. "not touched annually by American businessmen or tourists or students . . . all American institutions have a deep commitment overseas. The most advanced companies . . . take a growing share of consolidated profits from foreign business . . . most of the country's non-profit organizations have important operations in foreign countries. Cultural exchange is unceasing. Every professional group has connections with opposite numbers around the world. And whether in narcotics or housing or transportation, agencies with purely internal responsibilities are more and more looking to international means of solving internal problems."

The representatives of private interests and public domestic interests make up the proliferating participants in international diplomacy. Their objectives and behavior will greatly influence the nature of future diplomacy.

Education in diplomacy will have to be extended to greater numbers of people preparing for a greater variety of occupations. And this education will have to take into account the changing importance and interrelationship of official and private diplomacy, the involvement of officials formerly exclusively concerned with domestic problems, and the growing circulation of diplomats among public and private international careers.

The growing diversity of participants in diplomacy is but one aspect of the changing facts of international life which need to be considered in describing modern objectives of

instruction in diplomacy. Other salient facts of future international life which will bear heavily on the nature of future diplomacy and education for it, include the following:

—More issues will become international; interests at odds on the world scene will become more numerous, varied, subtle and complex.

—International political and economic relations will be increasingly shaped by the impact of technology; technologies will become more global in their implementation and implications.

—As technology pushes countries into interdependence and domestic problems increasingly transcend national boundaries, there will be a growing need to find solutions based on multinational agreements and undertakings. The “extraordinary galaxy” of international organizations will spin off new institutions. For the near-term, emphasis on regional cooperation will be especially notable.

—Technological advances in, for example, communication, transportation, and computation, will have profound effects on the conduct of diplomacy. Revolutions in communication and transportation will hustle people into contact multiplying the interaction of messages and of emissaries. Advances in information technology will tend to depersonalize diplomacy as cold conclusions are precipitated from the analysis of large quantities of data.

—International trade, business and investments will push rapidly ahead creating new wealth but also new tensions based on economic disparities and conflicts of interest.

—International differences and disputes, based upon color and socio/economic grievance more than upon ideology, will grow more intense and seemingly more intractable.

—With the full reemergence of Japan, Germany, and China as great powers, the multipolarity of power will be a dominant feature of the international landscape requiring reorientation of international political relationships.

To summarize, the world in which future diplomacy will be conducted will be characterized by a proliferation of actors and multipolarity of power, a new complexity of issues

and patterns of negotiation, the implementation of technologies with trans-national implications, an increasing depersonalization of the conduct of diplomacy, and heightened international animosities based more upon race and poverty than on ideology.

**I**N THIS new world, special demands will be placed upon diplomats, both public and private. Preparation for these demands determines specific objectives of instruction in diplomacy which must be added to the general objectives traditionally regarded as essential. Some of these modern objectives are variations or refinements of traditional objectives and involve new emphases rather than wholly new approaches.

**Objective:** Ability to utilize insights of the behavioral sciences.

The diplomat's work is done in contrasting cultures and societies and within the context of international communications. Work in such a setting can be eased by knowledge of behavioral sciences which provide helpful tools of observation and analysis.

In the future, diplomats will be joining more players in an increasingly discordant orchestra. In his cacophonous world, the diplomat will need to place greater reliance on behavioral sciences for insights into the harmonization of conflicting and often irrational voices.

Similarly, faster and more pervasive communications will increase the importance in the conduct of diplomacy of such factors as public opinion, mass attitudes and assumptions, and culturally determined patterns of thought and perception.



Contributions of behavioral science may aid in subjecting these factors to rational analysis and relieve the diplomat of exclusive reliance on intuition.

In order to exert influence, in order to put the other sides in a negotiation a “yesable proposition,” the diplomat must be able to reverse roles and to know how the other sides view the problem and why they view it as they do. He should be able to argue the positions of the other sides and to see his own position as it appears to them. This requires great cognitive sophistication developed through careful study of pertinent behavioral sciences.

It is not suggested that the diplomat become a practicing behavioral scientist. What is suggested is that he be acquainted with, and know how to call upon, findings in social psychology, sociology, and cultural anthropology which help in the analysis and anticipation of the conduct of nations, institutions, and individuals, and which give clues to ways to influence their decisions.

**Objective:** Ability to utilize quantitative methods and models of analysis.

For the future, the diplomat will need tools which enable him to take account of a greater number of variables and which assist him to isolate the main issues and keep his eye on them. These tools must include at least a rudimentary literacy in mathematics and statistics and acquaintance with systems and factor analysis. Possession of knowledge in these subjects can facilitate the assimilation and correlation, and reduction to manageable proportions, of large numbers of factors and variables; it can assist in a “rational arraying” of objectives, alternative courses of action, resources, risks and costs.

The diplomat does not need to know how to build the models, operate the computers and carry out the sophisticated analysis himself; but he must be comfortable with quantitative language and know the likely uses of quantitative methods of analysis.

Because so much of what the diplomat faces is unpredictable, his actions “must inevitably be based, at least partially, on a measure of intuitive resolution of uncertainty.”

Nevertheless, anything which is done through quantitative methods to reinforce the intuitive process by presenting relevant data in a more organized manner should be encouraged. "If the intuitive judgments . . . can be aided by mathematical tools, the new diplomacy may be just that much more able to deal with the complex environment that it faces." (Quotations are from an article by Fisher Howe in *THE ANNALS*, November 1968.)

**Objective:** Ability to use specialists and to get things done.

The education of a diplomat should prepare him to use specialists. The diplomat will have one, at best two, area or functional specialties of his own. For the other specialties that relate to the problems with which he is at grips, the diplomat will need to call on help. To use the available help wisely he must be generally familiar with the spectrum of specialties that could contribute to the solution he seeks; he must see their interrelationships and beware of becoming the slave of any of them. In working with specialists the diplomat's role is primarily one of leader and coordinator. To fulfill this role the diplomat will have to understand the language of many specialists, know what they have to offer, tell them what is needed, and know when the best results are being achieved.

In the future greater emphasis will be placed on the diplomat as expeditor. As Professor Alexander Kiefer has noted, diplomacy increasingly will involve the "development and conduct of cooperative efforts in which mutuality of interest is the key ingredient." More international agreements (for example, those in pollution and population control) will involve the parties in commitments to definite courses of action. The diplomat's thinking will have to be more entrepreneurial, more action oriented than in the past, and he must have the ability to supervise expeditious follow-through on agreements reached. Diplomats who know where the levers of power are, who know how to cut through red tape and get things done, who know how to organize the efforts of others in the fulfillment of commitments, will be at a high premium. In this respect, management abilities will be

more in demand and more essential to successful diplomacy.

**Objective:** Ability to work in international cooperation.

The harmonization of proliferating international interests will require increasing reliance upon the forums and techniques of multilateral settlement. For better or worse, reliance on conference and parliamentary diplomacy will grow and diplomats will have to know where and how to conduct this diplomacy to best effect. They will need to be familiar with existing and emerging multinational organizations, conventions, and procedures. They will have to know about the determinants and patterns of behaviour in multinational situations in order to put forward widely acceptable propositions.

**Objective:** Ability to observe and report accurately.

Technological progress in communications and transportation will reduce the role of the diplomat as independent negotiator and shift the emphasis of his role to one of reporter and adviser to central policy makers. A new premium will be placed on reporting ability, on gathering facts, on skimming vast quantities of information with an eye to the critical determinants of possible agreement, and on relaying a concise, accurate report to home base.

More than ever, education in diplomacy must aim at the cultivation of objectivity and balance so that reporting rests on reality rather than on images and predetermined perceptions. Diplomats more than those in any other profession must see the world as it is and be equipped to tell it like it is.

**Objective:** Awareness of external factors which impinge upon diplomacy.

Diplomats must be made increasingly aware of the galaxy of external factors which bear on the outcome of negotiations. These include public and private opinions and their cultivation and expression in the media; the impact of various official and unofficial channels of influence and activities; and the interaction of groups and interests in one country with those in another.

The diplomat, far from laboring in a vacuum, is frequently caught in

cross currents generated outside his orbit which he needs to be able to counter in order to keep his course.

Especially important is awareness of the interaction and interdependence of domestic and foreign affairs. Recent events in this country have reconfirmed the importance of reckoning with the home front and of taking account of trade-offs between domestic and foreign policies in the conduct of foreign affairs. The diplomat must be aware, and beware, of the domestic pressures which can either undermine or undergird his mission. Knowledge of conditions at home and the way they can impinge on diplomacy will help the diplomat to harness or head off domestic forces. This is not to say that diplomats should shift with the popular tides or that they should be called upon to represent policies to the people; on the contrary, they must demonstrate considerable constancy in their positions and purpose and stand removed from the domestic politics of foreign affairs. They must, however, be sufficiently sensitive to domestic exigencies to avoid being needlessly ambushed by them.

**Objective:** Knowledge of the sources, uses, and limitations of power.

As a consequence of new technologies and multipolarity of power, the bases and applications of power in international relations are shifting at an accelerated rate. In this context it is especially important for the diplomat to know the strategic and diplomatic effects of the new weaponry. He must have a basis in knowledge for advising on the nature and extent of his country's strategic interests and know what strategic posture is best designed to support his diplomatic objectives. Such knowledge must be derived chiefly from experience but a foundation can be laid in the study of power and of security considerations in international relations. This knowledge of power must be paralleled by awareness of, and respect for, national and international constraints upon the use of force.

**Objective:** A blend of idealism and realism.

Objectives of instruction in diplomacy should reflect both world realities and world hopes. Which is to

(Continued on page 52)

The countryside of the Mekong Delta begins at the Saigon city limits. There is no transition. Instead of leading to suburbs, the city streets suddenly give way to the flat rice fields, vegetable gardens, fruit groves, and regularly spaced lines of trees that form the landscape of the delta all the way to the southernmost tip of South Vietnam. The delta represents a marvelous blending of the elements of land and water, and its roads and canals have been well traveled over the years by French and American soldiers pursuing the elusive prize of pacification.

The following story takes place in one of the little hamlets a few miles south of Saigon that are but a short bus ride from the neon lights and skyscrapers of the city and yet are a world apart. Few Western writers ever have a chance to see this other world. No—I should say they see it, but they cannot feel it, become a part of it. Only the villagers themselves can do that, because they live there, and they and their families have seen both the French and the Americans

come and go, duly noting their similarities and differences, seen the bridge across the river put up, washed away, and put up again, seen the countryside remain pretty much what it always was, that is to say, what foreigners would call unpacified.

Pity the poor writer who travels the road or, more likely these days, takes a helicopter to the hamlet. All he sees is the bustle of that day's military operation, the girls in their bright dresses. He is probably not aware that the girls are a recent intrusion on the hamlet's life and profoundly upset its sense of justice; and although he may be told the story of the sharp little clash in the Rung Sat, he certainly ignores the fact that the Rung Sat has served as a haven for bandits of various sorts for centuries. He will view the incident of the five Americans in soot camouflage as heroic, and the villagers will view the same incident as quixotic.

Nguyen Tan Bi is a schoolteacher in the district town of Can Giuoc.

## When the Americans Came

### NGUYEN TAN BI

From "Between Two Fires: The Unheard Voices of Vietnam," edited by Ly Qui Chung. Copyright (C) 1970, Praeger Publishers, Inc. Prefatory note to this chapter by Arthur Dommen. Reprinted by permission.

**T**HE small hamlet of Phu Le suddenly became very lively. Everybody in the hamlet had the feeling that something strange had suddenly happened to their daily life. It was not because a theatrical troupe was passing through this rather gloomy hamlet. It was because of the arrival of the American troops.

Some years ago, in the wake of the revolution of November 1, 1963, (the coup d'état in Saigon overthrowing President Ngo Dinh Diem, officially referred to afterward as a "revolution") American troops had suddenly landed on the coast of Central Vietnam, opening a new phase in the Vietnam war.

At Phu Le hamlet, the inhabitants had learned of their coming only by word of mouth or through the newspapers. They had felt the American presence by watching numerous formations of helicopters flying in a certain direction where a military operation was being conducted. They had seen American planes but never a citizen of the USA.

Each person talked of the Americans according to his own knowledge. In short, everyone was doing what is called "buying a buffalo by photo."

One morning, however, a convoy of large GMC trucks loaded with American soldiers arrived in the village along the road from Tan Qui Dong. On the side of each truck was painted a white star over a line reading "U.S. Army."

The convoy consisted of more than twenty vehicles, not including jeeps. Most of the villagers were curious. They came out of their houses to look at the place where the

vehicles had stopped. They wanted to see what the difference between the Americans and the French was, but to them it was difficult to detect any difference at all.

Like the French expeditionary force, the Americans were both black and white. All of them were tall and big. The convoy stopped before the hamlet school, which was closed for summer vacation. The Americans began carrying supplies and ammunition into the school. Coils of concertina barbed wire were spread around.

The school was transformed into the military camp of an American company. The quiet, dull life of Phu Le suddenly became very lively and exciting.

**I**t could be said that Phu Le was the last portion of land of Nha Be district. It bordered on the Long Phu Tay area of Long An Province. The Doi River was the natural border between Can Giuoc and Nha Be districts, which were linked by the Rach Doi bridge. The end of this bridge on the side of Phu Le was guarded by a regional force platoon and the one on the other side by a whole company. At times the bridge was put under the responsibility of Long An Province, at others under that of Nha Be district. But now it had been put under Can Giuoc district.

The bridge was built long ago, when the French were still here. The soil is alluvial, and since the piers of the bridge had no firm foundation it became weak. No heavy vehicle could cross it. Even worse, many of the floor boards were broken. The public works officials had never thought of repairing it.

The range of military activities of the American company covered also the Long Phu Tay area. So the American captain who commanded the company had new and thick planks of pine wood brought in to board over the bridge, so that jeeps and four-ton trucks could pass. The newly planked bridge brought new life to the Long Phu Tay and Phu Le areas.

Repairing the bridge flooring was a temporary solution. The Americans brought some technicians down to study how to repair the piers of the bridge to make them stronger. They also brought in a lot of bridge-building materials and stored them at the other end of the bridge.

But before the repair work could start, one night, after a heavy downpour, the strong current pulled the bridge down with all its spans. From then on, both sides of the river were separated. However, the Americans seemed determined to rebuild the bridge. Unfortunately, after the Tet offensive, the Americans withdrew from Phu Le and did not return. All the materials that had been intended for the repair work gradually and mysteriously disappeared. Up until now, the public works officials, who seem to have been very busy with important works for the postwar reconstruction, have not had time to think of the present need of the people. So the bridge has never been rebuilt.

**B**EFORE the arrival of the Americans, life here seemed to be suffocating. By nightfall, houses on the edge of the hamlet had already closed their doors. Government soldiers returned to outposts or lay in ambush somewhere. The VC [Vietcong] had managed to sneak into the hamlet at least fifteen times every month. So far, Phu Le and Nguyen Van Chan hamlet of Long Phu Tay had been under the pressure of the VC's Ba Vu sanctuary in the mangrove swamp of the Rung Sat, one kilometer away. The VC came by way of Hiep Phuoc and Long Duc, which they used as footholds for launching subversive activities in the neighboring areas, such as Can Giuoc and Nha Be. Furthermore, they had also taken the direction of Da Phuoc and Bung Xeo to infiltrate into Saigon.

But after the arrival of the Americans, no VC could infiltrate the hamlet. To show that they did not hold the VC in high regard, one evening five Americans with soot smeared over their bodies burst into the Ba Vu sanctuary in an outboard motorboat. Around midnight, the sound of gunfire was heard from the direction of Ba Vu. People also saw flares in the area.

The next morning, an old fisherman brought a wounded American out on his boat. He was the only survivor. An operation was launched immediately. An American unit rushed into the Ba Vu area and found the other Americans dead but, surprisingly, still in their boat with their weapons. On the river bank here and there were bodies of some VC. It was believed that the Communists had been attacked by surprise. Although they succeeded in killing the attackers, they were afraid that more would

come, and so they ran away without bothering to carry off the bodies of their comrades or pick up the Americans' weapons. A black lieutenant said later: "VC number ten."

Nobody knew what he meant. Were the VC cowards or very dangerous?

**T**O know the characteristics of the Vietnamese people, a foreigner should come to the countryside. One of these characteristics is the way the Vietnamese drink their wine. The French drink Martell cognac or champagne, the Americans drink Scotch whisky or bourbon, and the Vietnamese, mostly peasants, have their rice wine.

There are two kinds of rice wine. One kind is distilled by the Binh Tay distillery. This kind is produced and sold legally, but is not good. It is weak, and drinkers have said it can cause headache. The second kind is illegally distilled by the peasants. It is produced with local ferments and locally made facilities. It is very strong and is the favorite of connoisseurs. French and American drinkers have to buy their liquor, while the Vietnamese peasants can produce their own wine. If distilling rice wine were not forbidden by law, the peasants could certainly contribute their part to the restoration of the national economy.

After the Americans' arrival, business became bustling. Merchants bought great quantities of Coca-Cola to sell back to the Americans, who drank Coke in the way the Vietnamese drink water. However, shopkeepers did not neglect to provision their shops with the popular rice wine.

One day a number of black and white Americans came and drank Coke at Mrs. Hai's shop. They were accompanied by a Vietnamese interpreter. At a table opposite them was a Vietnamese in his fifties. He sat with one foot on the rung of the stool and the other on the ground. The man, whom the shopkeeper called Uncle Nam, asked Mrs. Hai for a quarter-liter bottle of rice wine. He also asked her whether she had anything to eat with his wine. Mrs. Hai said she had dried squids. He then ordered one and asked for a dish.

The man did not pay any attention to the Americans and they did not pay any attention to him, either. But when Mrs. Hai brought the squid and a dish to him, the GIs began to stare at him in the way people watch a magician.

The man impassively uncorked the bottle and poured wine into the dish. Then he struck a match and set fire to the dish of wine. The burning wine began to roast the squid. He was as clever as a professional cook. After the roasting was done, the dish of wine continued burning. He blew out the fire and poured the remaining wine back into a glass. Then he began sipping it while chewing shreds of dried squid.

Overcome with amazement, one of the Americans could not help asking the interpreter "What is he drinking? Alcohol?"

The American had seen the white wine burn and believed it was alcohol. He might have been thinking that if the man could drink alcohol he should be an extraordinary drinker. The interpreter might have guessed what the American was thinking, and so he told him "No, it's not alcohol. It's Vietnamese whisky."

"Vietnamese whisky!" the American exclaimed.

"Yes, Vietnamese whisky," the interpreter assured him.

**A** Vietnamese adage says: "Where there is honey, there are flies." Only five days after the Americans arrived, public girls with their multicolor dresses were seen around. These girls had the talent of clinging to the GIs.

When the girls came, people who up to then had been nobodies suddenly turned into heroes by giving them protection. In this small hamlet no one had an adequate knowledge of the law. So the law could be distorted easily. The girls had come to ease the GI's nostalgia for home, but they suddenly turned this small hamlet into a redlight district. How could the village officials ban prostitution? Not only this small hamlet but throughout the war-torn country, where there were Americans, there were prostitutes. These girls, who required no capital to set up their trade, made a lot of money. What did they do with their easy earnings? They gambled. The laws of the land were ignored here.

Many GIs were also attracted to gambling, so certain areas were put "off limits" to them.

It was said that one day, after an operation during which some GIs were killed, the captain commanding the company became angry at the girls for no reason. He ordered his troops to round them all up and take them away by helicopter.

At first, people thought they had taken the girls back to Saigon. But it turned out later that they had carried them to remote hamlets and left them there. Some hamlets were secured, some were unsecured. The girls had to hire the local people to transport them back. Anybody who envied the prostitutes their easy way of making money should have changed his mind. The girls could not bear this dishonor. They cried so piteously that even indifferent people felt sorry for them. After all, they were Vietnamese citizens.

**T**HE Americans were very rich. If someone did not agree with this, it meant that he did not know anything at all about the American expeditionary troops. In their base they had more than enough radios, tape recorders, cameras, record players, cigarettes, tinned foods, and so on. So whenever the troops went out on an operation, some of their belongings were certain to be stolen. The culprits were always the children and reckless gamblers who had lost all their money. One day after many things had been stolen, the Americans lost their heads. They had no hope of catching the thieves red-handed, so they organized a house-to-house search with the help of the local soldiers.

Early that morning, they deployed around the hamlet. All the inhabitants were told to leave their houses and let their houses be searched. The searchers were both Vietnamese and Americans, but the operation confirmed many of the villagers in their belief that foreigners had no respect for their right of privacy.

Some refused to leave their houses, arguing that if they did not remain present during the search they would be

sure to lose their belongings.

One such was the wife of a regional force trooper named Ba. When this happened, Ba was with his unit on the other side of the bridge and did not know about it. Mrs. Ba had a child. This was another reason she refused to leave, shouting at the soldiers, "What are you doing? Why do you want to search the people's houses without allowing the owners to stay inside?"

Meanwhile, the soldiers carried on their search of her house despite her protests. It was not clear what they took from her house, but afterwards she was seen sitting with her infant in her hands, weeping. It seems her case was brought to the attention of the local authorities, but at the time the woman was killed during the Tet offensive some weeks later, it was still unsettled. After that, it was forgotten forever.

**T**HE American company was stationed at Phu Le for nearly two months. During this period it had created turmoil in the small hamlet. Every night the inhabitants heard the same explosions of mortar fire and saw flares brightly lighting up this poor little corner of the sky. From time to time, they saw helicopters landing on the village road to pick up or unload US troops. This had excited the curious children of the hamlet.

Some people had become prosperous from washing clothes for the Americans. In front of their houses they had nailed small signs on which they had written the word "Laundry," which they had learned from the interpreter.

Suddenly one morning, while the disturbance was going on, the people woke up and found to their surprise that the school area was deserted. All the Americans had gone away during the night. The news spread quickly from mouth to mouth.

"The Americans have gone, all gone. . . ."

"Will they come back again?"

After their departure, some people began to worry. They asked the local troops whether the Americans would return, and when the latter answered that they did not know, they began packing their things and leaving the hamlet. They were the people who had done business with the Americans or washed their clothes. They feared that without the Americans around, the Viet Cong would come to the hamlet at night and threaten their lives.

All of a sudden, life at the hamlet returned to its old tempo. Many were content at the sudden departure of the Americans. "It will be better thus," they said. Fathers who had not dared to allow their daughters to go out of their houses felt relieved.

The Americans had arrived suddenly and departed the same way. During their two months' stay, they had provided the hamlet with security. On the other hand, they had upset the whole pattern of life at the hamlet to the point where the villagers despaired of bringing life back to normalcy again. The Americans had handed out Salem and Pall Mall cigarettes to the youngsters and taught them how to smoke. They had given the youngsters a chance to see what debauchery was and some of the children had become thieves.

The Americans had fought in this hamlet a purely military war with weapons and munitions. They had ignored psychological warfare. ■

The verdict—throughout Vietnam, at all levels, the overwhelming majority of FSOs are turning in distinguished performances.

## Inspection and the CORDS Program

JAMES D. PHILLIPS

*Our FSO-4 Inspector entered the Foreign Service in 1961. He has served in Paris, Lubumbashi, Kinshasa and the Department. He claims to have written about his experiences at the insistent urging of friends and colleagues. "Many people," he reports, "at dinner parties, football games and on two occasions during the floorshow at the Cellar Door, have said things to me like, 'Ah, look Dan, I gotta run. Why don't you, ah, you know, write it up for the JOURNAL, or something?'"*

**I**n July 1970 I was detailed, along with another FSO-4, Charlie Higginson, to the Foreign Service Inspection Corps. We were part of a six man team sent to inspect Embassy Saigon and the participation of FSOs in the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) program.

Since my return in mid-September I am often asked how I liked inspecting. I liked it! To paraphrase a recent Simon and Garfunkle song which says "I'd rather be a hammer than a nail," I'd rather inspect than be inspected. I recommend the experience to other FSO-4s, and for that matter, to officers of whatever grade.

The notion that younger officers have a novel contribution to make as inspectors has been around for some time; mainly championed, it must be admitted, by younger officers. However, the Task Forces picked up the idea and included it in their recommendations to Mr. Macomber. The assumption was that younger inspectors could establish rapport with younger officers at posts and give their views more prominence in the inspection report. Also, that an inspector of the same approximate age and grade as those inspected might be better able to advise on career prospects than a senior officer somewhat removed from the most current trends. No one suggested, and to my knowledge no one believes, that senior officers haven't been doing these things more than adequately for some time. Rather, the thought was that middle grade officers might add a new dimension to inspecting.

The Inspection Corps endorsed the idea and Vietnam was chosen

for a test run because of the large number of young officers serving there in the Embassy and in CORDS. Charlie and I had the look of middle-grade officers about us and were forthwith signed on.

**A**n inspection team, we found, has two responsibilities; to inspect the post and to interview and write reports on all Foreign Service personnel stationed in the country. The first job in some respects is easier than the second.

For the post, an inspection is like a visit from your mother-in-law. Once you know she's coming, you just naturally sweep out the basement, try to organize the children and in general pull up your socks. So it is with an Embassy. An inspector should not find the visa files in a mess; the political section's biographic reporting out of date; or the communicators running a numbers game. The real effort occurs largely before the inspectors arrive.

Nonetheless, certain intangibles that can profoundly affect efficient operations are often difficult to perceive, let alone correct if necessary,

by those deeply immersed in day to day activities. From their vantage point, the inspectors can get a more objective impression of personal relations, the flow of information up and down the chain of command, and individual and overall morale. In these areas, I believe, the middle grade inspector has much to contribute. He or she will be positioned better to pick up the unalloyed complaints and concerns of the younger officers and members of the staff.

Insofar as complaints, problems and suggestions from the Mission's "boiler room" stem from real rather than imagined inequities and unproductive procedures, the more emphasis they are given in the course of the inspection, the more likely it is they will be corrected.

The contribution of a middle grade inspector in preparing individual efficiency reports is more difficult to assess. A senior inspector's judgment on an officer's performance is likely to be superior to that of a younger inspector who will have less basis for comparison. Moreover, a senior inspector whose experience over the years with changes in the Department's personnel policies permits him a *plus ça change* . . . attitude, may in fact offer better career guidance than a less seasoned colleague. On the other hand, junior officers probably are more open with "non-establishment" inspectors whose reports therefore may be more comprehensive.

There is no reason why the advantages of both approaches can't be realized through discussion and review of the junior inspector's reports by senior members of the team. We followed this procedure in

Vietnam and I believe it should be followed in all inspections in which middle grade officers take part, given the importance of the inspector's efficiency reports to an officer's career and to the service.

In summary, I believe the experiment was successful and should be continued. A detail to the inspection corps of two months seemed about right to me for these purposes, and, obviously, a large post with numerous younger officers is best suited for inspection by a team such as ours.

My experience leads me to dismiss as groundless the conjecture that top officers at posts and senior inspectors would find it difficult to accept lower ranking colleagues in a sensitive process of criticizing and suggesting improvements, which is the guts of an inspection. Charlie and I were accepted as full inspectors and everyone in Saigon and in the inspection corps offered assistance and encouragement.

ONE of the most interesting parts of the inspection for all of us, I believe, was interviewing the Foreign Service Personnel in CORDS. An inspector visited each of the 60 FSOs and FSSOs in the program at their places of assignment throughout Vietnam. In this way we were exposed in some depth to Foreign Service participation in CORDS and to the program itself.

The CORDS program was established four years ago to coordinate US civilian and military pacification and development efforts in Vietnam. The organization and the program have their roots in the concept that development of viable economic and administrative institutions must go hand in hand with securing the country from terrorist attack, and that the integration of military and civilian command is essential to achieve this goal. CORDS, it should be emphasized, is not a United States effort to pacify and rebuild the country for the Vietnamese or on their behalf. Rather, through CORDS, scarce resources and expertise are provided to bolster and compliment South Vietnam's own security and development efforts. To this end, CORDS officers work with Vietnamese counterparts at the district, provincial, regional, urban and national levels in public safety, refu-

gee resettlement, agricultural development, public administration, education, public works, village self-development, information propaganda, and other fields.

While CORDS is the responsibility of the United States Military Advisory Command, Vietnam (MACV), the deputy for CORDS is a civilian with the rank of Ambassador. This integration of military and civilian personnel is carried down the chain of command so that if a district senior advisor is a civilian, his deputy will be a military officer and vice versa, at every level. (There are four military regions, 44 provinces and some 244 districts in South Vietnam).

Foreign Service officers and staff may serve at any of these levels, including CORDS headquarters just outside of Saigon. When we were there, FSOs occupied the top jobs in two regions and six provinces, but the majority were class seven, six and five officers serving at the district level. While a few FSOs had specialized jobs, for example, agricultural or refugee advisors at the province level, most were general advisors, which means their jobs consisted of working closely with a Vietnamese counterpart, a district chief for example, responsible for the whole range of development and pacification programs.

It is impossible to generalize about how FSOs in CORDS live and work. A junior officer's experience will be quite different from a senior officer's. Conditions vary widely throughout Vietnam; in some places physical security presents no problem, in other places it is of paramount concern. As far as jobs go, each officer must establish his own *modus operandi* with his Vietnamese counterpart and define his priorities accordingly.

THE following account of a day I spent with one young officer in the Mekong Delta, therefore, is not meant to portray an average work day in CORDS or to be representative of all district level jobs. It is, however, representative enough to give the flavor of life and work in Vietnam for a fair number of junior officers in the program. The officer's name and the name of the district are fictitious.

I arrived in Hoi Thung District by helicopter at seven o'clock on a Wednesday morning and was met at the landing pad by Jack Smith, a 26 year old FSO-7 on his first Foreign Service assignment. Smith is District Senior Advisor at Hoi Thung, where he had been for about three months. He is in charge of a four-man American team which consists of himself, an Army lieutenant and two enlisted men. We drove in an aging jeep to District Headquarters, a mile outside a village of some 5,000 people.

District headquarters is a compound dominated by a two-story building with thick, yellowing, concrete walls, built in the 19th Century French provincial/official style. It is the Vietnamese District Chief's office and home and provides space for all the district's administrative offices.

In back of the headquarters building are two long wooden barracks, a small wood and tar paper hut with a corrugated metal roof and a few outbuildings, including a pig sty, several outdoor privies and a jerry-built shower (rain water is ingeniously supplied through perforations in a 50 gallon oil drum mounted on a wooden platform). The compound is enclosed by a crumbling wall, sand bags and barbed wire. Rising out of the rice paddies and surrounded by clusters of peasant huts, it is as one imagines a very primitive, fortified, medieval fiefdom might have looked. Life in the compound, I discovered, may not in reality be very different.

In addition to the District chief, most of the district functionaries and their families live in the compound. In all, some forty adults and children occupy the two barracks, and Smith and company live in the small shack, or, as it is called, team house. An assortment of dogs, chickens, pigs and goats must be counted as part of the official family.

The team house is basically one room divided by a plywood partition into a sleeping area and a kitchen/"parlor" area. Each man has a space about six by six feet square for a bed and footlocker. There is a stove, icebox, dining table, a couch and one easy chair on the kitchen side of the partition. There are no other amenities such as air conditioners, overhead fans, or bathroom

sinks. It is not representational housing!

Smith offered me instant coffee, tinned milk and Spam by way of breakfast, which I ate with the other members of the team. Lunch consisted of essentially the same menu supplemented by a few fresh vegetables. The motor on the team's Boston Whaler was out of commission and no one had been able to go up the canal that week to the provincial capital to replenish supplies. After breakfast, I was introduced to the district chief, an Army major. He gave me a short briefing which Smith translated, relying on the Vietnamese he learned at the training center in Washington where he studied for a year prior to his assignment. He said he came to Vietnam with an FSI-rated 2+, which must be much improved by now, as he uses the language constantly.

Smith, a Vietnamese military officer on the district staff and I then toured the district by jeep. Only the officer carried a gun, and that pro forma, because the district for the most part has been pacified for over a year. There are no large unit United States forces in the district, although there is a US military helicopter center and some logistic personnel at the provincial capital.

Our first stop was a village about fifteen miles from headquarters where a large well had been built with village self-development funds. We looked at the well, which was indeed pumping away, and were given tea by the village chief, an elected civilian. Smith took note of several projects the chief proposed to undertake with self-development funds if more became available from the central government. He promised to discuss them with appropriate district officials. The chief then gave him a run-down on local security and political conditions. (Smith didn't bother to translate, respecting perhaps my keener interest in local customs at that moment finding expression in the activities of a group of very attractive village women washing clothes at the canal bank.)

**W**E proceeded next to call on a prominent Buddhist leader at a temple fifteen miles down the dirt road. En route we stopped at several "people's self-defense posts" to look



over the fortifications and discuss security. These local para-military volunteers confirmed in every case that all was quiet on the military front.

At the temple, we were introduced to a loft where the head bonze has a sort of reception-meditation room and were given more tea. The bonze was interested in Smith's views on the forthcoming senate elections, in which the Buddhists had fielded a slate.

He also suggested that the district chief would be well advised to provide the temple with one of the television sets he had heard the government was placing in rural gathering points, as his temple was a popular meeting place for the outlying villagers. Smith promised to pass on this information to the district chief. (Smith said that one of the more dicey but fascinating aspects of CORDS is acting as liaison between various elements of Vietnamese society and government.)

Back at the team house after lunch, Smith reviewed with his team their activities of the day. He and the lieutenant worked on a report on security in the district which they planned to discuss with the Vietnamese district chief the next day. The report was based on their visits over the past month to each of the villages and hamlets in the district and would be sent to CORDS headquarters in the provincial capital.

The father of a young man who had stepped on a land mine came around to ask Smith's help in getting into the US military hospital in the province capital where his son had been taken for treatment. Smith got the CORDS province senior advisor on the radio and asked him to arrange access to the hospital for the father.

Later that afternoon we visited a school undergoing renovation as part of the joint United States/Government of Vietnam development effort. Construction of a new wing was being delayed because the extension necessitated tearing down an adjacent house. Smith and a Viet-

namese official from the compound negotiated a new site for the house with the peasant owner and the hamlet chief and arranged for the manpower to rebuild it.

When I left Hoi Thung that evening around five o'clock, Smith and his deputy were getting ready to accompany the district chief on an inspection of the military guard posts in the central part of the district.

In spite of the primitive living conditions and separation from his family, Smith's morale was high. Like so many of his colleagues in CORDS, he is in the tradition of the young Americans who went to war thirty years ago, with no love for war or the military, but with the common-sense, energy and "cool" to be highly effective in the jobs they were assigned to do.

Despite many frustrations, our young colleagues in CORDS for the most part feel they are making a useful contribution to the well-being of the Vietnamese people. They are deeply involved in their jobs and derive great satisfaction from the individual "human victories" they achieve, sometimes in a setting devoid of cause for over-all optimism. Not many will re-up for a second CORDS tour, but fewer still will regret their first.

As indicated earlier, Smith's experience is representative only of life at the district level. In province and region headquarters, living conditions are better, in some cases very much better, and the accent in higher ranking jobs is on management rather than operations. In one province we visited, an FSO-3 directs the activities of more than two hundred Americans, including three lieutenant colonels. His job is analogous to an ambassadorship in a medium-sized, very active embassy. (Most province teams are on this scale and fourteen FSOs presently serve as either Province Senior Advisors or Deputy Province Senior Advisors. For them, CORDS is an experience in program management par excellence.)

Throughout Vietnam, at all levels, the overwhelming majority of FSOs are turning in distinguished performances. Their efforts, I believe, will be a source of pride and strength to the service in the years to come. ■

"The horror of that moment," the King went on,  
"I shall never, never forget!"  
"You will, though," the Queen said, "if you don't  
make a memorandum of it."—Lewis Carroll

## On Being Relevant— and Effective

**T**HAT bureau never gets *anything* up on time, and when it does it's terrible!"

"Those bastards upstairs don't know what they want, and *never* give us enough lead time!"

Such diverse attitudes, representing top level and working level views, are the principal daily manifestations of the difficulty in improving working efficiency and making the State Department "relevant for the Diplomacy of the '70s." Broader concerns and narrower preoccupations do interact and affect day-to-day operations in the foreign policy establishment.

Begin with two curious facts: 1) according to the Foreign Service Institute Executive Studies Section, FSOs are quite bright individually, but neophytes organizationally. We write great position papers; unfortunately, we don't work together as well with our fellow men. Our "heroes" are the bright reporters and the penetrating analysts, not those who excel in inducing people to cooperate.

2) Although public administration theory says the State Department works to serve the Secretary and the President, the distinctive views of Seventh Floor principal officers and their staffs about bureau efficiency and paper output

### JOHN D. STEMPEL

*Mr. Stempel served as Staff Assistant to Under Secretary Elliot Richardson for 18 months and helped manage the transition for Under Secretary John N. Irwin II before assuming his present post as Ghana Country Officer. A member of two Macomber Task Forces (Management Evaluation and Training), Mr. Stempel also teaches a course in international politics at George Washington University.*

differ radically from those of any bureau. In short, there is a perception gap which results in a great deal of wasted energy and in confusion which causes delays.

Furthermore, the fault may lie as much with the senior officials and their staffs as it does with the bureaus.

### Structural Problems

One student of bureaucracy has estimated that if each layer of a bureaucracy has to spend only ten per cent of its time on tasks related to the layer just above it (a conserv-

ative estimate), then a seven-layer bureaucracy (such as State's) will spend at best 53 per cent of its working time on tasks relevant to the top echelon.

The Department is no exception to this rough rule of thumb. In fact, conditions may be worse here, since the bureaus, rather than the principals, are the focus for so much activity. If State's role is to coordinate foreign policy, and its principal organs of action are regional bureaus with narrow focus, then we should not be surprised that we're less than 100 per cent effective on problems that cut across bureaus and departments. This weakness in our internal organization is doubtless what led several of the Macomber Task Forces to recommend an expanded and reinforced Planning and Coordinating Staff in one form or another.

When "working" loyalties (as opposed to "ultimate" loyalties) are to Assistant Secretaries rather than to the principals, it is almost inevitable that the working levels will see the Seventh Floor in one of two ways: as interference with their own operation ("we were doing fine until the Secretary got into the act.") or as "heavy artillery" to wheel into place to demolish some other dissenting bureau or depart-

ment. (What? Defense won't agree to another extension? Well, damnit, we'll just have Alex Johnson call Dave Packard—that'll fix that little snot over in Military Sales Records!")

Easing this inevitable circumstance is not simple—bureaucracies have been wrestling with achieving Heavenly Harmony since the Ming Dynasty. All large organizations have these problems. The answer, if there is one, is better understanding by both high and low echelons of each other's differing needs and purposes. This appears to fly in the face of conventional beliefs. The Secretary directs, the bureaus do; (or, ours is not to reason why . . .). Successful managers and effective workers, however, are those who know what the real (as opposed to the formal) requirements of any job are.

No smart country director will order his staff to prepare a country policy paper overnight; no smart desk officer would stall for days before supplying some simple facts in response to a request. Any Assistant Secretary who plans to be out of the building most of the day had darn well better authorize one of his deputies to sign off on routine briefing papers and staff studies or risk his whole bureau coming to a screeching halt—to the accompaniment of private denigrating snorts from the principals (and perhaps occasionally, the Oval Office!). Robert Townsend's "Up the Organization" is a lively, provocative place to start, if you are unfamiliar with executive sense and nonsense.

### Content and Presentation

"Why, these papers treat me as if I were Mortimer Snerd!" This comment, by a former Vice President, underlines the first basic problem: hitting the proper level of generality and usefulness to the person for whom you are writing.

If senior officials have a single complaint, louder than the rest and shared wholeheartedly by their staff men (who take the fanny-chewing when things are not right), it is that memos are much too detailed. The Under Secretary doesn't need to know the entire history of the Zambesi River claim dispute to mention it casually to the Foreign Minister. Deputy Under

Secretary Samuels doesn't have to know the history of the gold standard since 1901 to tell the Ruritanian Ambassador the United States cannot give his country direct budget support (Samuels may have even written a definitive work on the subject in his prior incarnation).

Look again at that memo to the Secretary written yesterday—does it suit *his* (as opposed to *your*) needs? Historical background is fun and sometimes useful, but considering all the unpaid overtime worked around State anyway, it's hardly essential—and worst of all, probably harmful.

On the other hand, country officers have a legitimate complaint when they are asked to produce complex statistical tables or long interpretive pieces on short notice. There may be reasons for the time pressure; many times they are nothing more than the whim of a senior official.

Any officer in a supervisory position does well to allow time for the necessary work and writing, according to the complexity of the task. A simple request for the population growth figure of Rwanda may require minutes to find. An analysis of trade trends between Botswana and South Africa may require a week or so of digging (bearing in mind, of course, that the flow of leader grantees and the demand for other papers has not ceased). Failure to make these kinds of calculations both injures the reputations of those who have erred and results in an inferior product.

A badly-done memo, or one that is needlessly late, does even more pernicious harm: it puts off the principal officer, making him less receptive to work from the same source. A succession of memos that miss the mark—and suddenly X-Bureau, or Y-Department is no longer in the ball game. As one White House staffer, referring to the National Security Council, says, "Anytime State wants to have its say, all you need to do is send over a timely, first-class piece of work, *tuned to the President's needs.*" (italics mine).

A corollary problem here, a much quoted myth, sometimes gets

in the way. Frequently top men themselves say, "The State Department should not make recommendations in terms of domestic politics." Often this is mistakenly taken to mean that the Department should show no political sophistication in planning a given action. Principals delude themselves if they really think this. Most don't—they're only trying to say, "give us the best you can on the merits of the case."

There is no better way to destroy organizational or personal credibility than to recommend something in the foreign policy field which will exacerbate the already gigantic problem of an irate governor without, at a minimum, explaining that a problem exists. Hopefully, those recommending the action will also have thought of a way to neutralize or mitigate the difficulty. Controversies over fishing rights and tariffs are good examples of this type of problem—each affects domestic politicians directly. Others' reactions are simple: If the State Department is so stupid about a sensitive domestic situation, what kind of major catastrophes are being ignored abroad? Perhaps an unfair, but not an unheard of, comment.

Drafting and approving officers also face the "pit and path" problem. How far should a proposal go in outlining rejected options and hidden problems? Should the principal be shown all the pitfalls, or simply be led down the chosen path to a conclusion? Personal styles differ—one individual prefers to see an agreed-on option for his signature; another wants to see several options and make the choice himself.

Providing a thoroughly adequate paper is complicated by disagreements between organizational units. Dozens of studies have complained that State Department papers fuzz over disagreements. This is not unique; it happens in every government department and most large businesses and philanthropic organizations. Most (and all the best) senior officials prefer a paper which highlights gaps in information, ignorance, and uncertainty on the subject. Principals are busy men—the time pressures on them

(Continued on page 57)



### The Army Examined

MILITARY MEN, by Ward Just. Knopf, \$6.95.

THIS book is an up-to-the-minute journalistic (in the better sense of the adjective) study of the men who serve in the United States Army. It is based primarily on well executed interviews with many categories of Army personnel, from sergeants and West Point cadets to senior generals. Despite its flaws, which include an unnecessary use of obscene language, a hasty editing job and a reluctance to give General Westmoreland anything more than token criticism for his uneven performance in Vietnam, the book is to be recommended. The Foreign Service audience can never learn too much about their military contemporaries and their ascending role in the administration of foreign affairs.

Primary emphasis of the book is upon the training, promotion, assignment and development of career officers and their varied reactions to a changing professional environment. The relationship between State and Defense is touched upon lightly. The book is a perceptive analysis of the career, moral and social dilemmas faced by the contemporary professional soldier. The author is sensitive to the aspirations of career military men and is sympathetic to their need to resist alienation from civilian society. The work is the result of several years of close relationship with the Army as a reporter and contains many observations which would also apply to the Foreign Service. I hope that Mr. Just might spend a few years interviewing FSOs and produce a book of comparable perceptivity about that corps.

—JOHN W. STEPHENS

### A War Games Classic

LITTLE WARS by H. G. Wells, with an appendix on Kriegspiel. Macmillan.

CONNOISSEURS of the fatuities of war gaming as practiced in the Department of Defense and in other equally easily bamboozled agencies and departments of state will find this facsimile reproduction of H. G. Wells' classic foundation stone of war games literature an agreeable addition to their libraries. In the nature of things,

the weapons and warriors met with in Wells' treatise are not those to be found in the sophisticated games scenarios of our time. But though these elaborate latter-day productions are doubtless very suitable for the purposes of the artful fellows who make a living out of putting on such shows, it is by no means clear that war gaming practice has been greatly improved since 1913, when Wells wrote this charming and light-hearted treatise of the games men play with lead soldiers and toy cannons. Make a note, then, of "Little Wars" as an ideal graduation gift for War College and Senior Seminar Students. For they are most likely to be in need of such a reminder of the frivolous origins of so much of the military doctrine they have lately been exposed to.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

### The Way of War

THE PENTAGON PROPAGANDA MACHINE, by Senator J. W. Fulbright. Liveright, \$4.95.

THE HAWKS OF WORLD WAR II, by Mark Chadwin. University of North Carolina Press, \$7.95.

IF Senator Fulbright read the book or saw the movie version of Max Shulman's "Rally Round the Flag," did he laugh? Well, that was in the days when the public thought military public relations was a delicious subject for humorous satire.

The laughter is gone and Senator Fulbright comes on now like a latter-day Jonathan Edwards in a new tract exposing the military's "brainwashing" of the American silent majority.

The Senator's revelations of the Army's audacious program to sell the Sentinel ABM program are compelling and disquieting. So are his citations of some of the more egregious military transgressions into the field of political indoctrination. Yet one wonders how far to go along with such comprehensive viewing-with-alarm when we are invited to see something sinister in the Army's Home Town News Center spending half a million dollars a year telling Mom's neighbors that her son is well and the Army is looking out for him.

There is a legitimate perspective to be gained in reading "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine" alongside Mark

Chadwin's account of the campaign conceived and plotted at the Columbia Club in 1940 by a dozen men dedicated to changing America's mind and ultimately to "educating" the American people to the necessity of active participation in the war against Hitler.

Chadwin's book is fascinating for the details it gives of how a relatively small group in 1940 and 1941 coaxed large segments of America from isolationism to interventionism. The book will also help a younger generation to get a new dimension on the deep-seated appeal that preparedness holds for millions of Americans, with or without brainwashing propaganda from the military-industrial complex.

Foreign Service readers will find particular interest in Chadwin's description of the role—among the twelve "conspirators" at the Columbia Club—of a Virginia gentleman and World Council of Churches activist, Francis Pickens Miller. Mr. Miller later became a senior official in CU in the Department of State. It was Mr. Miller who suggested the hawkish title for Chadwin's book.

—D.N.

### Atlanticism

THE ATLANTIC FANTASY: The U.S., NATO, and Europe, by David Calleo. Johns Hopkins Press, \$2.95 in paper.

ACCORDING to Calleo, Atlanticism is a pernicious spell, misconceived and deceptive. Were it not for this fantasy, which Hobbesian bureaucratic djinns in Washington are still energetically sustaining, our European allies might no longer be "huddled together, rusticated in the NATO fortress, while the absent commander has frequent and lingering visits with the enemy."

Whoever those gray eminences in Washington may be, they are said to prefer a US/USSR duopoly, with its promise of condominium, to an autonomous Europe. Not only is our bureaucracy addicted to time-tested political placebos like NATO, Calleo argues, but American financial over-extension and deficits complement the syndrome, as do European timidity and a general American preference for federative polity in international affairs.

Instead Calleo would have our European allies organize their own collective defense. Our fears of a Finlandized Europe, prone before the Soviet colossus, are exaggerated. Calleo enthusiastically catalogues France's attempts to rip away the veil before the grand illusion of Atlanticism.

Whether or not we are as jealously feudal in our attitudes toward NATO Europe as Calleo contends, his book

does represent a provocative attempt to construct *a priori* alternatives to some general lines of policy that the US has steadfastly held to because they have proven empirically right. NATO is in fact moving cautiously in the direction Calleo suggests, as evidenced by the independent action taken by the European caucus last fall to begin sharing more of NATO's financial burden with the US.

Instead of such hesitant first steps, however, Calleo boldly recommends a US military withdrawal and the creation of a European nuclear defense force to supplement the Europeans' already quite impressive conventional capabilities. In the absence of true European federalism, Germany could be associated in Europe's nuclear planning (as it now is in NATO's Nuclear Planning Group) without bearing nuclear arms. Under such circumstances, he continues, the Rapacki Plan for a nuclear-free zone in the two halves of Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia might even become acceptable to the West.

But what would be the consequences for Germany's politics of concurrently sterilizing it of nuclear weapons and Americans? Would it not be effectively neutralized? Calleo does not carry his analysis far enough in this regard.

—THEODORE S. WILKINSON

#### Two on India

SOFT STATE, *A Newspaperman's Chronicle of India*, by Bernard D. Nossiter. Harper & Row, \$5.95.

LAND AND THE CONSTITUTION IN INDIA, by H. C. L. Merrillat. Columbia University Press, \$10.00.

HERE are two books on India as contrasting and divergent as the country itself. Bernard Nossiter, the Washington Post's knowledgeable reporter, sees India as the soft state and his quick, punchy style frames a discouraging conclusion:

"Without a change in values and attitudes, one that insists on the dignity of man and worth in life, it is difficult to see how the soft state will quicken, how social discipline will evolve."

But the well balanced, easily read prose envelopes more than its share of self-serving realities, canards and thumpings of gone goblins. Must we adopt his assumption (why does he?) that in talking to villagers "I think—perhaps naively—I did get through more often than not, that I received more or less accurate answers." Yet without this unconvincing certitude the book could never have been written. Or, concluding in a stage whisper, Nossiter reveals that "I came away from India without an answer to the

question I had set myself. I had not found the key to development." Surprise, surprise! Clearly this book is must reading for any junior high school student who has an interest in India.

Merrillat, on the other hand, has produced a useful, dull work, rewarding to those who can stay awake through its most pedestrian accumulations. The author focuses well and long on the land and the law, which even Judge Bean, in his attempts to steal the Pecos region, would understand. As do the Indians, "Property! At the mention of the word, according to an old Indian saying, even a corpse will sit up on its bier." Merrillat, moreover, tries hard to weave in the setting of his legal analysis, realizing that such a problem is the focus of many forces. But where Nossiter finds the soft state and a depressing conclusion, Merrillat gives us an encouraging picture of a country groping through legal contention and political strife for the balance between individual rights and public needs. It is unfortunate that Nossiter couldn't have written with the more sustained insights of Merrillat or that the latter couldn't have had some of the Nossiter zip in his prose. But then there are critics who wish the Bhagavad Gita had been more carefully edited.

—WILLIAM A. SOMMERS

#### A Superb Comparison

AMERICANS AND CHINESE, by Francis L. K. Hsu. Natural History Press, \$12.50.

THE eminent professor of cultural anthropology, Francis L. K. Hsu, was reared in China but has lived in America some twenty years. In his panoramic *magnum opus*, "Americans and Chinese," he focuses on the lives, views, and activities of common men rather than men of distinction or authority. A central theme is the root causes of numerous, sharp differences between the two peoples.

Chinese and American ways of life, he finds, may be reduced to two sets of contrasts. First, in the American, emphasis is on the individual's predilections—in the Chinese, on the individual's appropriate place and behavior among his fellows. The second basic dichotomy is the prominence of emotions in the American life style as compared with the Chinese tendency to underplay feelings.

These differing fashions of life—the individual-centered American and the situation-centered Chinese—are at the core of the problems which plague each society, such as racial intolerance in America and poverty and bureaucratic oppression in China. This contrast is the key to Hsu's discussion of

the two nations (in terms of art, religion, politics, economics, etc.) and his projections for their future.

In the case of the United States, the influence of individualism is traced in the nature of the US political system, the workings of criminal law, the conduct of foreign policy, and the waging of war; it is found in relations between parents and children, the cult of youth and the fate of age, the concepts of success, and other areas of human interaction. Individualism explains, Hsu avers, why competition permeates American life—the determination not only to keep up with the Joneses but to surpass them.

A deep insecurity haunts Americans—an insecurity that stems from dependence on self, or the nuclear family. This anxiety expresses itself, too, in the world arena, where Americans strive to be first in everything: first in power, first in wealth, first in armaments, and first on the moon.

Is America a mistake? Unique in the American national experience, millions of Americans today are troubled with misgivings about their way of life and its future; much of mankind is anxious with forebodings about US power, and its uses. Hsu sees the core of our problems today as a "crisis of interpersonal relationships due to runaway individualism." He does not see the answer in our exchanging a "materialistic" orientation toward life for a "spiritual" one. It is not a choice between a spiritual or a material emphasis but between "the central importance attached to human relationships in the one, resulting in the mutual dependence of men, and the attempt to escape them in the other." As we must all live with other human beings, we need to relate to each other not in terms of how *useful* one is to the other, but how much *feeling* one has for the other. Loneliness and isolation, mistrust, hatred, violence, and separatism are some bitter fruits of a society held together principally by the usefulness of its members rather than by their feelings for each other. "Therefore, when concerned Americans speak of improving the quality of the life of the individual, they should be thinking of *improving the quality of the interpersonal life for the individual instead.*"

It would be hard in these parlous times to point to a more portentous and ominous, issue for Americans and Chinese than their bad relations with each other. This tragedy reinforces the timely significance of this superb comparative study of two great peoples, a work of magnificent scholarship and an effective contribution to Sino-American understanding.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

## Moving the News

THE INFORMATION MACHINES, *Their Impact on Men and the Media*, by Ben H. Bagdikian. Harper and Row, \$8.95

THE author, Assistant Managing Editor/National Affairs for the Washington Post, has had a long and distinguished journalistic career, including stints on the Providence JOURNAL (as a reporter, foreign and Washington correspondent) and as a contributing editor to the SATURDAY EVENING POST.

This is a thoughtful, detailed, two year study sponsored by the Rand Corporation where Mr. Bagdikian examined the impact of present and future technology on the news. The study included probing examinations of seven newspapers, an equally penetrating inspection of newscasts in a typical American broadcasting market, and gathering the opinions of computer experts, economists and social scientists on the subject.

Mr. Bagdikian is a felicitous writer with an eye for the humorous, such as tracing the history of moving news. He remarked that pigeons "were faster than horses, but they were also more succulent: the eighteenth-century pigeon is more convincing than Marshall McLuhan that the medium can be the message."

—DONALD DRESSEN

## Strawberries vs. Kumquats

THE KUMQUAT STATEMENT; *Anarchy in the Groves of Academe*, by John R. Coyne Jr. Cowles.

AS the title implies, "The Kumquat Statement" is the conservative answer to James Kunen's "The Strawberry Statement." The book deals with campus unrest at Berkeley—kumquat trees grow there. Pointing out the unsavory aspects of contemporary US campus unrest is an easy task—radical students' arrogance, disrespect, violence and slovenliness are no news and legitimate targets. But the author, a staffer on the NATIONAL REVIEW, sets up his straw men and situations and knocks them down.

Politics aside, there are many disturbing aspects about Coyne's book. The left's approval of civil disobedience is somehow made to seem responsible for political assassinations. Why the bloody Tate murders are mentioned at all is a good question. Coyne's anti-intellectual bias is obvious; one wonders why he ever bothered to stay in the distasteful world of academia for his three earned degrees. For a man who hates leftist violence, he shows some similar tendencies of his own—he figuratively (we are to assume) wants to punch

his opponents.

Despite the praise from the respectable William Buckley in the book's introduction, one gets the feeling that Mr. Coyne does his cause a great disservice. The tone of the book is frequently arrogant, petty and carping. The academic world and its professors are heavily discredited with the images of the stupid professor pushing a shopping cart in the "out" door of a supermarket, and the dirty old professor lusting after his mini-skirted students. Yet Coyne himself seems obsessed with the braless leftist women and the fornicating and defecating stray dogs on the campus.

There is also the frequent personal depreciation of the campus protesters. Eldridge Cleaver is described as "an evil man, a rapist and a killer whose mind has managed to project its sickness into society." One dissenter "wanders forward menacingly (with) thighs rubbing together inside too tight pants."

If a fair refutation of "The Strawberry Statement" is to be written, it will have to await something more tasty than a sour kumquat.

—PETER P. CECERE

## A Trip Worth the Effort

SPIRIT OF PLACE, by Laurence Durrell. E. P. Dutton. Illus. by 8 paintings by the author.

LAURENCE DURRELL achieved literary fame in 1958 with the publication of "Justine," the first volume of the Alexandria Quartet. The eminent critic and author Richard Aldington called the early volumes of the Quartet "something pungent and original which will certainly endure."

Other British and Continental reviewers had the highest praise for the Quartet, while in the United States the SATURDAY REVIEW called these novels "one of the major achievements of fiction in our time."

It is noteworthy that the evocative style and careful craftsmanship which were so highly praised in these works are hallmarks of almost all of Durrell's writing. When forced by personal circumstances to produce works of a more popular nature, such as the three humorous books on diplomatic life, "Esprit de Corps," "Stiff Upper Lip," and "Sauve Qui Peut," Durrell has seemed constitutionally incapable of abandoning that splendid quality—a style which successfully evokes the spirit of places and characters.

Nowhere is this more true than in his "travel books," which, as an early admirer, Henry Miller, pointed out, should be called his "residence books," since they are almost invariably based on a long and comfortable stay in the places Durrell has written

about. Thus "Bitter Lemons" is based on a stay of several years, as a private citizen and member of the British information service, on Cyprus. "Prospero's Cell" and "Reflections on a Marine Venus" are the result of prolonged and idyllic living on the Greek islands of Corfu and Rhodes. "The Dark Labyrinth," an early novel, owes its marvelous descriptive passages to Durrell's stay with friends on Crete.

It is no surprise, then, that Durrell agreed to co-operate with an old friend and one of his earliest publishers, Alan G. Thomas, who wanted to collect in one generous volume a selection of letters, essays, poems, and short pieces of fiction with the underlying theme being the importance which Durrell attaches to "the unmistakable signature" of a town, an island, or a country.

The result of Thomas's careful research is not only a windfall to Durrell devotees, but also an excellent introduction for new readers to the work of one of the finest living writers in the English language. The book is "Spirit of Place," a title evidently chosen from the remark by Durrell in a leading essay ("Landscape and Character," p. 156) that "as you get to know Europe slowly, tasting the wines, cheeses and characters of the different countries you begin to realize that the importance of any culture is, after all—the spirit of place."

In this book, Durrell has captured the spirit of such places as Corfu, Greece, Egypt, Rhodes, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Delphi, the Rhone Valley, Avignon, Provence, Grenoble, and Gascony. Going with Durrell is a trip well worth the effort.

—CLINT SMITH

## Another View of Hiroshima

THE PRISONER AND THE BOMB, by Laurens van der Post. Morrow, \$5.00.

IF you were one of 400,000 captives of a fanatical Japanese Field Marshal who planned to massacre all of his charges as soon as his Southeast Asia areas of command were invaded by the Allies, you might not consider totally inhumane the use of the atomic bomb one month before that planned invasion took place. That is the theme of Laurens van der Post's slim volume, "The Prisoner and the Bomb." Having watched his fellow prisoners dying of malnutrition in a land of plenty, while others were casually used for target practice or brutally tortured or beheaded, Colonel van der Post had no reason to doubt the smuggled intelligence of a planned massacre.

Remarkable is the fact that despite this harrowing experience in Java prisons, van der Post can write as sym-

pathetically about the Japanese as he did in his "Portrait of Japan" two years ago. However, van der Post is a remarkable man as well as a beautiful writer. The latter beauty is found even in such a harrowing tale as this one. He will, we hope, eventually bring us his promised "Mountain and the Moon," containing the totality of his long and varied experience with the Japanese.

—AL STOFFEL

### The Ghost of Stalin

AN EMPIRE LOSES HOPE: THE RETURN OF STALIN'S GHOST, by Anatole Shub, Norton, \$10.00.

IN Eastern Europe, as elsewhere, the decade of the sixties witnessed a sharpening of the struggle between change and rigidity, relaxation and control, the individual and the state, and the present with the past. However, the outcome of the struggle appeared more uncertain there than in other parts of our planet where flexibility in organizing and directing societies contrasted with the tight control generally characteristic of Communist-dominated states.

Anatole Shub addresses himself to this struggle in his new book and, although the title would seem to exclude the possibility of development along new lines, describes some of the forces at work which should lead to an amelioration of the more repugnant features of Communist rule. The book, however, tends to underscore the influences frustrating evolution of the Eastern European states into pluralistic societies.

A happy combination of data obtained from both personal observations and experiences and the writings of others, the book is eminently readable and informative. Still it is clearly partisan and pessimistic in its estimate of the chances for change, which Shub frankly acknowledges and which he has previously expressed in other writings.

As could be expected, Shub gives greater attention to the Soviet Union and the more important of the Eastern European states where he lived or travelled as a correspondent or visiting scholar. His efforts to link developments in the Soviet Union with those in Eastern Europe are commendable, particularly his conjectures about the attempts of competing Soviet leaders to use policies and relationships in that area in their struggle with rivals at home.

The book is not without factual errors and questionable contentions. For example, both the "Leningrad case" and the detention and liberation of Professor Barghoorn have been

misdated. The suggestion that the "mediocrity" of the present Soviet leaders was connected in some way with their ability to survive or rise under Stalin is clearly debatable. Khrushchev, for whom Shub appears to have considerable sympathy almost bordering on affection, also survived and progressed in Stalin's lifetime. Shub's partisanship, which tends to reduce his objectivity, is suggested in such practices as when he compares Soviet consumer goods production to a "mouse" and the output of heavy industry to an "elephant." Such analogies might be permitted to poets but hardly to serious observers or commentators.

—VLADIMIR P. PROKOFIEFF

### Germany Under Hitler

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF HITLER'S GERMANY: *Diplomatic Revolution in Europe 1933-36*, by Gerhard L. Weinberg. University of Chicago Press, \$12.75.

IT is rare that the adjective "brilliant" describes a volume in diplomatic history, but the word aptly characterizes Gerhard Weinberg's recently published study of the foreign policy of Hitler's Germany.

Weinberg, who is professor of history at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, combines both long familiarity with the source materials for his study which include captured German foreign office documents, with a keen ability to sort out the important from the trivial. In a remarkable chapter, "The World Through Hitler's Eyes," he discusses the origins of Hitler's ideas on foreign policy. History was a struggle of races, and the Nordic races would defeat the weaker peoples, in particular France, which had harbored Jews and had introduced blacks into Europe (and alarmingly into the Rhineland) from its extensive colonial Empire. The second ingredient of Hitler's foreign policy was Germany's territorial needs, its search for agriculturally usable lands. In the quest for these two goals Hitler used treaties as "temporary instruments to be broken as soon as they were no longer useful in the struggle for space."

The Hitler years were extremely difficult ones for the traditional German diplomatic service and its decline into being little more than a stenographic bureau or pouching service is described by Weinberg with skill. The German Foreign Office faced competition from the foreign policy branch of the National Socialist party, from Goebbels' propagandists and Ribbentrop's opportunists, and from any idea peddler who could bend Hitler's ear. Of the Foreign Minister for

the first five years of Hitler's period, Weinberg writes: "a jovial person, inclined to take his vacations more seriously than his official responsibilities, Neurath was no hindrance to Hitler's ambitions." The former champagne salesman who succeeded him in 1938, Ribbentrop, was described as "capable of great perseverance but little insight. . . His view of diplomacy was as primitive as Hitler's; the suggestion that the way to make Winston Churchill more friendly to Germany was to give him a substantial bribe reflects accurately the approach of both."

A final note: The book is attractively designed, the type face used for chapter headings abstractly suggesting German posters of the 1930s. It is one of a series of books on modern European history of unusual quality published in recent years by the University of Chicago Press.

—FREDERICK QUINN

### An Asian Monarchy

THE POLITICS OF NEPAL: *Persistence and Change in an Asian Monarchy*, by Leo E. Rose and Margaret W. Fisher. Cornell University Press.

FEW countries are more inscrutable to Americans than Nepal, a remote mountain kingdom which has never been colonized by Western powers and is still relatively free of Western influences. This book scrutinizes the inscrutable, and succeeds in illuminating it without making it seem any the less exotic and intriguing. The authors provide a sprightly account not only of Nepal's politics but also of its history, geography, ethnic composition, culture and economy. Their main focus is on the efforts of King Mahendra to transform the society without endangering the monarchy. It is not an entirely happy story for democracy fans, but it is told well in this slender volume.

—EDWARD M. COHEN

### A New Literary and Political Classic

HOPE AGAINST HOPE: A MEMOIR, by Nadezhda Mandelstam, translated from the Russian by Max Hayward, with an introduction by Clarence Brown. Atheneum, \$10.00.

THIS memoir by the widow of a Russian poet who died in a Soviet prison camp in 1938 is a book of quite extraordinary interest. The account it gives of the author's experiences is so rich in insights into the nature of the world around her, and indeed into the nature of humankind generally, that the work will surely win a place both as a classic of memoir literature and as an indispensable document on the

history of the Soviet intelligentsia and of Soviet society over the last half century. Workers in the foreign affairs field, who might suppose that an unorthodox biographic work on the life of a little-known foreign poet could scarcely be of central importance to their own understanding of the politics of the twentieth century, would be much mistaken. For Mme. Mandelstam's book is a profoundly enlightening guide to the understanding of modern bureaucratic society—and so, ultimately, to the understanding of forces at work in our own society.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

### Fishing Reminiscences Around the World

OUT OF THE MAINSTREAM, by Philip Kingsland Crowe. Scribners, \$7.95.

REELING IN, I found that I had caught a handsome little fish about seven inches long. . . . The teeth, razor-sharp and wedge-shaped, closed so hard on the steel hooks that one of them bent and other snapped off." The fish was a small piranha.

Ambassador Crowe's book has many fascinating stories of his fishing

in waters in and off every continent in the world. These stories range from his childhood poaching in a fountain in Gramercy Park (the catch, a large goldfish, he toasted over a candle) to accounts of a 250-pound catfish and of a gigantic perch bigger than a man—with a picture to prove it. In the first part of the book intermixed with these stories are details concerning various fishing clubs, their members and their guides which will interest those who already have some knowledge of these clubs. Often he lists the birds and animals he has seen at the spots where he fished.

Some of the most exciting incidents are about the author's battles with salmon. He loses as many as he wins. Also interesting are the bits of information he gives throughout the book concerning salmon, their life cycle, their habits and their idiosyncrasies. The concluding chapter gives a grim picture of what tomorrow's salmon fishing will be like unless sensible measures are agreed upon by the salmon fishing nations. He points a particularly critical finger at Denmark.

Fishermen, lovers of the out-of-

doors and persons interested in accounts of foreign countries, will read this book with special pleasure. Those who read with delight Ellis Briggs' "Shots Heard Round the World" and Sigurd Olson's "Listening Point" and his other books, will thoroughly enjoy "Out of the Mainstream."

—TYLER THOMPSON

### "Our Revolutionary Age"

THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION by Thomas Molnar. Funk & Wagnalls, \$8.95.

THOMAS MOLNAR discusses a neglected aspect of our revolutionary age—the theory and context of counter-revolution. The book's principal weakness is its almost exclusive focus on the French revolution and its aftermath. The book's strength is the manner in which Molnar places counter-revolutionary thought in its historical context. Particularly sobering for any citizen is his discussion of the problems of political and cultural terror in a counter-revolutionary context. However, his identification of the United States and the Anglo-Saxon political tradition with the counter-revolutionaries in the post-1945 period is really stretching the point.

—JOHN D. STEMPEL

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(Mr. Griffin's father entered on duty with the Department of State when William H. Seward was Secretary of State, in 1866 and served under 23 Secretaries and Secretaries ad interim, during his 55 years.)

Mr. Griffin's son, Bill Griffin, wishes to serve members of the foreign affairs agencies at Chevy Chase Chevrolet, where he is transportation specialist. He can be reached at (301) OL 4-6100 and his address is 7725 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland.

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## EDUCATION IN DIPLOMACY

*continued from page 38*

say that we must educate students for the kind of world they will face while at the same time preparing them to transform the world they face into the kind of place they would like it to be.

**T**HERE is evidence that our problems in world affairs are not only in our diplomats but in ourselves.

There always has been estrangement and misunderstanding between the public and its diplomats. The extent of the estrangement and misunderstanding is accentuated in times of international stress. When the country has its back against the wall—as it now has in a growing number of countries—the public can always blame the diplomat. It is a distressing fact that diplomats are frequently blamed most when they most need support.

Intelligent popular support of international diplomacy is required to achieve an effective international order. Such informed support can

only evolve from greater knowledge of the practice of diplomacy and of the context in which diplomacy is conducted. Responsibility for imparting such knowledge should be assumed by all colleges and universities and developed as an integral component of liberal arts curricula. The objectives of such curricula, which can be variously designed, should be to give the liberal arts students a taste of what the professional diplomat needs to know and do to be effective. Hence, in relation to the professional educational objectives outlined above, the liberal arts student should be required to:

1. Be exposed to cross-cultural experiences or problems;
2. Be familiar with illustrative historical cases in the conduct of diplomacy;
3. Understand the organization of diplomatic policy-making and implementation;
4. Be aware of major determinants of the relations of states and of realistic threats to the peace and opportunities for progress in the world.

**R**EASONABLE men will differ—possibly quite widely—on objectives of instruction in diplomacy. But I venture there is general agreement on the basic qualities of character and intellect which ought to be fostered by education in diplomacy. These would include qualities which motivate and guide a person in the search for objective facts; which open a person's mind to reason and honest argument; which reinforce complete integrity and commitment to principle as the basis for mutual confidence and trust; and which lead to words and actions adapted to the sensibilities of the other side.

Successful diplomacy ultimately depends on qualities of character which can only be taught in the most general way and then chiefly by the personal example of the teacher. If teachers exhibit in their scholarship, teaching, and personal relations qualities of integrity, balanced judgment, high principle, and human warmth, these same qualities will be absorbed by the student of diplomacy and reflected in his work in the world. ■

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## EDUCATION OF DIPLOMATS

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service, to an international organization, or to his firm or institution if in the private sector.

The American Foreign Service today is recruiting entering officers for four "tracks" (referred to in the service as "cones") of professional endeavor: political, economic, consular and administrative. Officers will be expected to follow one of these through most of their careers and previous to selection as senior Foreign Service executives (those not so selected after 15-20 years in the service will remain in their respective professional tracks). Specific training for these tracks will be obtained on recurrent occasions in an officer's career, along with the in-service type briefings he will receive on the style and peculiarities (or "in-house operations") of the American service and along with the on-the-job training.

Entering junior officers in the American service today are already being given simulation and problem-

solving exercises in areas such as political writing and reporting, observation and analysis, biographic collection and reporting, writing of memoranda of conversation, protocol and ceremonial, and on problems, behavior and deportment in the service (including the question of dissent). There is no good reason why such training practices could not also be extended to institutions in the private sector or to international organizations. But the frame of reference for this commentary hardly extends to in-service training in detail.

**I**N sum, then, I am proposing a three-year program of education in Diplomacy, following upon the initial two years of college, interrupted after the second year (or after four years of college) by systematic testing for rigorously defined temperamental qualities. The test failure would receive a simple A.B. in Diplomacy, had this been his major. His failure would not disbar him from seeking employment in the field of international affairs.

But, contrary to the graduate M.A. product of this educational program, it would not automatically qualify him for membership in the pool of professionally-licensed "diplomats-in-preparation" from which the public diplomatic service would predominantly recruit its members—by its own selection methods of course. Such a scheme, in fact, would allow the American Foreign Service if it so wished to drop its written entrance examination entirely and to focus purely on the less tangible traits of "confidence" it would seek to discern during the customary, oral examination it gives applicants. The successful student's M.A. in Diplomacy would be, to all extent and purposes, the union-card needed for entrance into the diplomatic profession. But it would not—and for probably quite sometime still, could not—be the only gateway to selection.

**I**F the proposed course of action, drawn up here in only the roughest and most tentative way, were adopted it is possible that several

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simultaneously worthwhile blows might be struck.

1. We would have recognized the late coming of age of diplomacy as a fully sanctified profession alongside such respectable and properly-licensed careers as law, architecture, medicine and others. Admittedly, there have been great musicians (performers, teachers or composers) who never saw the halls of Juilliard and great military leaders who missed out on Annapolis or West Point.

But think of the very many who did study and graduate in these institutions and of the enviable records they have built. Diplomacy in the age of the pragmatic-bureaucratic state (Kissinger 1969) has become professionalized, systematized and is—in a small way a big business, too big to leave to dilettantes and amateurs. By the same token, it is probably too serious a matter to leave only to diplomats. But then what is proposed here neither diminishes the sovereign's right to accept or reject his envoys nor precludes him from filling key assignments with any person of his choice,

whether trained in diplomacy or not.

2. We would have recognized and accepted the necessary temperamental element of the professional diplomat's baggage. We would have certified it by prestudied classifications of categories and by testing procedures made as scientific as our present knowledge of diplomacy on the one hand, and of psychology and related arts of personality measurement on the other, now permits.

3. We would have identified and hopefully agreed on the basic elements of technical knowledge without which no diplomat today can function, whether under the "new" or the "old" diplomacy, whether as coordinator of executive programs, negotiator of treaties, administrator of embassy residences, consul protecting American interests, bureaucratic infighter in Washington, or ceremonial representative at home or abroad.

4. We would have contributed to making available a corps of generally uniformly-trained personnel who could practice diplomacy for their

sovereign, if selected by him; for international entities and regional organizations if his proclivities and the needs of these institutions combined to bring him there; or for private sector activities of all kinds in the transnational field. In my view, neither the temperamental qualities nor the technical knowledge baggage differ substantially, if at all, in transnational activities from those required for the practice of public diplomacy.

These are not revolutionary or even very novel goals or ideas. They address themselves more to method and salability than to the outright substance of diplomacy: how to put the discipline, if it is in fact one, on the map as a career for professionals rather than for amateurs or dilettantes. There would be no schools of medicine today if most people thought anyone could just get up and practice it. There will be no schools of, or majors in, diplomacy tomorrow unless we put across firmly the notion that a discipline—a body of identified temperamental attributes and knowledge qualifications—exists in this field also. ■

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## NEGOTIATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS

continued from page 25

States, it may be useful to make plain what it would in fact mean if Latin America were in the United States' part of the world in the same way that Eastern Europe is in the Soviet part of the world, and if the outcome of the Cuban missile crisis were applied—with "spheres of interest" reversed—to South Vietnam.

Leonid Brezhnev, in his speech on November 12, 1968, regarding the Soviet role in Czechoslovakia, explained the rules for Soviet foreign policy as follows:

... when the internal and external forces hostile to socialism seek to revert the development of any socialist country toward the restoration of the capitalist order, when a threat to the cause of socialism in that country, a threat to the security of the socialist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a

common problem, concern for all socialist states.

A translation of this official guideline for Soviet foreign policy into what would be a mirror image of the rules for American policy in "our part of the world," reads as follows:

... when the internal and external forces hostile to Capitalism (or parliamentary government) seek to divert the development of any non-Communist country toward the installation of the Communist order, when a threat to the cause of Capitalism (or parliamentary government) in that country, a threat to the security of the non-Communist community as a whole, emerges, this is no longer only a problem of the people of that country but also a common problem, concern for all non-Communist states.

Applied to Cuba, this would mean, not the widely praised outcome of the missile crisis, but the widely attacked Bay of Pigs policy carried

out with a vengeance. And applied to South Vietnam, where "internal and external forces hostile to Capitalism seek to divert the development of a non-Communist country toward the restoration (or in this case, rather, "installation") of the Communist order" this rule would, of course, support American intervention.

A *Pravda* article (September 26, 1968) shortly after the invasion of Czechoslovakia argued:

... the antisocialist forces in Czechoslovakia through their talk about the right of nations to self-determination, in essence were camouflaging the demands for so-called neutrality and for the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic's withdrawal from the socialist community.


Translated into the spheres of interest language and applied to Cuba, this would read:

... the Communist forces in Cuba, through their talk about the right of nations to self-



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determination, in essence were camouflaging the demands for so-called neutrality and for Cuba's withdrawal from the non-Communist community.

The *Pravda* article then explains the correct policy to be taken in this case:

The fraternal Communist parties of the Socialist countries took measures over a long period with the maximum restraint and patience in order to help the Czechoslovak people to suppress the offensive of anti-Socialist forces in Czechoslovakia by a political means. And it was only after they had exhausted all these measures that they began the entry of the armed forces.

Again applied to Cuba, this would mean after the United States had "exhausted all these measures" that it "began the entry of the armed forces."

However, some Americans should be old enough to recall that this was

not the outcome agreed to between Khrushchev and President Kennedy in settling the Cuban missile crisis. On the contrary, President Kennedy, in replying to Khrushchev's famous letter of October 26, 1962, offered "to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba," adding "I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

In the spheres of interests imagery of some American spokesmen, a transposition of the Cuban missile crisis and its settlement onto Vietnam would look as follows: The United States puts nuclear missiles into South Vietnam. An acute crisis ensues between the United States and the Soviet Union and China. The crisis is settled by the American President withdrawing the nuclear missiles from South Vietnam in exchange for which the Soviet Union and China agree "to give assurances against an invasion of South Vietnam," adding the implied promise of curbing their allies from invading South Vietnam by stating that they are "confident that other nations of

Southeast Asia would be prepared to do likewise."

Fudging these fundamental differences will not help international reconciliation in the long run, it will merely reduce the pressures toward greater independence among Communist countries and make Soviet imperialism seem legitimate and accepted. Many American officials ably expound the urgency of discovering and cultivating common interests in negotiations with Communist powers and of healing the fissures of conflict. This is all to the good. Yet, successful long-term bargaining requires not only flexibility but also perseverance, not only conciliation but also counter-offensives, not only understanding for the opponent's fears but also understanding of his bad sides. American negotiators are great conciliators in working with allies (far better than Communist negotiators), but they sometimes lack perseverance in pursuing their cause against a hostile environment. The world is not so kind to us that we are likely to succeed where we lack the will to win. ■

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## RELEVANT—AND EFFECTIVE

continued from page 46

are fantastic—but they all want to know what the heart of the problem is. Papers which obscure or hide the conundrums are recognized as ineffective or useless, frequently provoking anger or quiet contempt. A series of such efforts can crucify the units that produce them. Such bureaucratic self-immolation occurs all too frequently in official Washington.

What is at issue is bureaucratic style—good style is to lay out a problem, frankly discussing uncertainties and decisions. Bad style (bad because it is ineffective and reputation-destroying) is to sweep something under the rug. Bureaucratic tattletales always spoil the masquerade, and principal officials do not generally rise to supervisory positions by being insensitive to incompetence which affects their own performance.

### The Two-Way Street

Statistically, effective country di-

rectorates spend more time checking on their end product and how it was received than ineffective ones. Unfortunately, senior officials often do not generate the feedback that they should to pressure individuals and units to perform satisfactorily. Many lower level officers do not spend enough time getting the high level feel for the problem that they need to have if a paper is to be persuasive.

Developing feedback—reactions to papers, ideas, etc.—is probably the most important single task that all levels in the Department should be undertaking. Many “errors” in drafting could be eliminated. A tendency toward too much detail can frequently be resisted by simply asking a staff assistant how much his principal knows about a subject. Executive Secretariat line officers (S/S-S) often can provide a country desk with constructive criticism of its product. Yet it’s appalling how seldom feedback occurs spontaneously from the top and is sought from below.

Aside from people, information

is State’s most important resource, yet we pay less attention to internal exchanges (feedback) than we should or can.

Before the Department can ease the dislocation represented by the attitudes expressed at the very beginning, principals, their staffs, and working level officers must change two other reactions:

“God, that’s SO bad; I’d like to send it back but they’d just screw it up again.”

“They don’t know what they need up there to handle X! I just hope the Secretary gets his tail shot off tomorrow.”

Natural reactions—perhaps. Emotionally comfortable—maybe. Nevertheless, such feelings and the attendant unwillingness to discuss common problems cut deeply into the efficiency of the Department as an institution. The results of such attitudes contribute greatly to such organizational ineffectiveness as we do have, but worse, help foster myths of incapacity which reduce the Department’s future effectiveness. ■

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opened a chance for a settlement. This is the way that leads to peace. For those who look for a path to the hearts of the Palestinian people, that path runs through the solution of the refugee problem." Sinha Flupan.

The preceding quotes are from "To Make War or Make Peace in the Middle East," selections from an International Symposium, published by NEW OUTLOOK, Tel Aviv, 1969.

In the interest of following developing trends and promoting those which appear constructive, I have been trying to give a wide hearing to such bridge-building Israeli opinion and to encourage its contacts with moderate Arabs whenever I can find them and wherever both feel free to meet. They have been meeting for some time in any case, in Europe and in the United States, but the effort needs a boost.

Meanwhile, among the older moderates what seems needed by Israelis is faith that the other side will settle for co-existence and by Arabs the courage to stand for co-existence against threats of assassination.

How could such a side-by-side co-existence be negotiated, when the Palestine Arab state does not exist?

Perhaps the delegation of King Hussein that negotiates recovery of the West Bank can include West Bank residents and at the same time a West Bank Government can be started. In fact, it should be starting now. Why should West Bank residents accept the all-or-nothing pro-

gram of the Palestine Liberation Organization that promises only warfare with no prospects of success, stretching into an indefinite future? Yet such West Bank residents will need bolstering, for Palestinian extremists will go all out to intimidate them. They must be helped by Arab opinion which must isolate the extremist, because it is to its advantage to do so. I think this is possible.

I believe Palestinian Arab moderates will win the tacit or active help of those Egyptians who want back their Sinai and Suez Canal and not war with Israel for twenty or thirty more years. I believe Nasser at the end was one of these and trust that the attitude carries on. But no Egyptian leader can overlook the need for Palestinian self-determination, for an end to the refugee problem; nor can he overlook Jerusalem or even the Golan Heights.

As for Jordan, it is about half Palestinianized already. I suspect that some day, at a later stage, it will be the major geographical part of a Palestine Arab State stretching from the West Bank and Gaza (with an easement of access across Israel) to Iraq. As for Lebanon, it dearly wants the war to go away. A recent change in Syria, apparently resistant to the abortive Syrian invasion of Jordan and to fedayeen control of Syria's policies, may be a hopeful sign. However, in the light of Syria's chronic instability, we can count no chickens in advance.

One last suggestion: that we bring into the search for peace those Middle Eastern friends of ours who are closest to the problem and who share the cultural heritage of the region, while maintaining disinter-

ested contacts with both sides. I am speaking of Turkey and Iran. Both have shown a sophistication of attitude toward their Arab neighbors which I would not have deemed possible five years ago.

We have spent too much time in Big Four discussions, the four being unable to act without enormous publicity and the aura of pressure which, in these days of a United Nations of 126 states, large powers exert with futility on the small. We live in a period of the tyranny of the weak. Let us de-formalize this machinery and not pretend that we Americans alone can solve this problem or that we are acceptable as mediators. Clearly we have lost our credibility with almost all Arabs and of course the USSR has none whatever with Israel. Let us see if area friends cannot take a quiet, active role in support of Jarring with our full backing.

And that backing, when progress is made, we must be domestically prepared to give. It will involve sacrifices by Israelis as well as by the Arabs. We must regain control of the integrity of our Middle East foreign policy, not leave it to the electioneering of New York, California, Pennsylvania and Illinois. Let us decide to support a Middle East solution based on Arab-Israeli co-existence and reconciliation without annexations and also without terror, blockage of sea traffic or fear of sudden attack. It is a task not beyond the means of wise men and wisdom is no monopoly of Americans, Russians and Western Europeans. The people and governments of the area grope for peace. Let us help them find it, through their own efforts. ■

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## A Doctrine for the Foreign Service

HAVING recently completed a tour of duty in Saigon as the Ambassador's Special Assistant for Press Affairs and as Barry Zorthian's successor in Saigon, it was with more than normal interest that I read his article on a press doctrine for the Foreign Service.

As a career officer who suddenly found himself thrust into the press relations business without any previous experience but who has now run the gauntlet, I wholeheartedly endorse the article to all my colleagues in the Foreign Service for it contains a wealth of wisdom and sound advice. To the management of the Department of State and the Foreign Service, I suggest the article be circulated to all posts and be made required reading for all officers.

Finally, I strongly support Mr. Zorthian's unorthodox suggestion of making greater use of FSOs in press relations work. Two years later with the Saigon experience behind me, I appreciate in a way I never did before the meaning of Barry's words, "the key to public support is effective communication—not communication by specialists . . . but communication by those who formulate and carry out policy."

Barry Zorthian has given us a sound doctrine. Now it's up to the Foreign Service to apply it in a positive and meaningful manner.

GEORGE S. NEWMAN

Bangkok

## And Ten Commandments

HIP, hip, hurray to Barry Zorthian (Feb. '71, FSJ) on his outstanding piece on the need for improved communicators in the Foreign Service.

As one who shares Mr. Zorthian's concern for the sometimes disappointing press relations displayed by our foreign service, I'm hopeful that his Ten Commandments will be widely circulated.

Now let's get on with the job of revamping the USIA.

RON AARON EISENBERG

Washington

## Reducing the Bulge

WHILE everyone is applauding and endorsing the Task Force recommendations, it seems to me one proposal is quietly being shoved under the carpet—20-year retirement prior to age 50.

It is an essential element of the reforms not only for long-term goals, but also for the immediate problem of the "bulge at the top" that the 20-year retirement be instituted as soon as possible. Both the Task Forces and the Department's endorsement, as issued in the December NEWSLETTER, put off to some undetermined date and for reasons ungiven, support for authorizing legislation. The Service is bulging *now* at the top and such legislation is vital for early retirement. Why not push for such legislation *now*? Let us not return to the era of our predecessors when every excuse was found not to seek new legislative authority and additional funds. I know that there is support on the Hill for this piece of legislation, and at least the Foreign Service Association should be aggressive in pushing it, with both the Hill and the Department.

MICHAEL P. E. HOYT  
*Counselor of Embassy*

Bujumbura

## Abolish the Inspectors

MY experience with the Foreign Service Inspection Corps is so disheartening that I have reluctantly concluded that the organization as currently constituted should be abolished. The typical two-man inspection team (usually having one person with a political background and the other with administrative experience) can be faulted on its ability to judge effectively the many specialized functions which our embassies now perform. The inspection system can also be questioned on the grounds of whether even highly competent men can be expected to make valid in-depth judgments about the overall operation of a post and prepare the many individual efficiency reports required in the 4-6 weeks allotted to inspect a medium-size embassy. The above criticisms, while not insignificant, can be remedied within the existing framework. I believe, however, that the present inspection procedure has a basic flaw which makes the whole exercise meaningless at best. Stated briefly, Foreign Service Inspectors are not prepared by-and-large to make really critical judgments about the people who most influence an embassy's effectiveness—the Ambassador and the DCM.

Part of this reluctance is inherent in the nature of the Senior Inspectors. Frequently, these officers are either former chiefs of mission themselves and, therefore, imbued with the old boy ethic; or they are aspirants to ambassadorial or other high positions and perceive that Sam Rayburn's rule—"to get along, go along"—applies to the Foreign Service as well as to the Congress. In addition, Inspection Corps rules seem to preclude any real judgment being passed on the performance of a chief of mission even should the inspectors be inclined to do so. Thus, many inspections become nothing more than whitewashes.

Yet, we all know that the entire tone of an embassy is set by the top two men. The efficiency and effectiveness of the operation are mirror images of the personalities and competence of the leaders. By reviewing the work of individual sections, inspectors can see whether the ambassador and DCMs are doing their jobs, but at present when they find all is not well, they are largely limited to commenting on the symptoms (individual performance of subordinates) rather than the real illness. A badly run administrative section is a *prima facie* indication of a poor DCM, if no action has been taken by the DCM to correct the situation.

In today's large missions, with only a small percentage of State Department personnel in the total US presence, the inspection process should be mainly a management tool—i.e. it should evaluate for Washington how well the entire US effort in a particular country is being implemented. By Presidential directive the ambassador is responsible for this. The inspection, therefore, should concentrate on the responsible person and his principal deputy, and it should look to the whole range of US activities, not just at those in which the State Department is usually involved. The assessment of staff performance should be left to immediate supervisors and Washington end-users.

For the reasons previously cited, it is doubtful that State Department personnel can perform the kind of inspections which would be really useful. Furthermore, the implementation of inspection recommendations concerning over-all US operations within a given country would cut across departmental lines in Washington. I suggest, therefore, that consideration be given to creating an Office of the Inspector of Foreign Operations with an appropriate staff in the White House. Inspectors could be drawn from within and outside government, with a stipulation that an inspector

# The AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE PROTECTIVE ASSOCIATION

Annual Report for the Insurance Year Ended February 28, 1971

## I. Operations

		As of March 1	
		1970	1971
Members carrying Group Life		3052	3017
Group Life in Force (inclusive of Reversionary)		\$73,302,425	\$81,586,525
Enrolled in Foreign Service Benefit Plan		9122	9115
Claims paid during year:			
Group Life,	Number	22	35
	Amount	\$346,000	\$421,625
Family Coverage,	Number	17	12
	Amount	\$34,000	\$26,000
Accidental Death,	Number	1	2
	Amount	\$27,500	\$45,000
Foreign Service Benefit Plan		\$1,771,483	\$1,797,594

## II. New Benefits Added During Year

1. We have increased the Reversionary bonus to a huge 50% for the year March 1, 1971 to February 29, 1972 without any increase in premium. This Reversionary does not apply to AD&D, additional insurance or Family Coverage but for this year the basic \$17,500 policy will pay benefits at \$26,250 and the \$5,000 over 65 coverage at \$7,500 (others in proportion).
2. The Family Coverage for all officers, active or retired, has been increased from \$2,000 to \$3,000 for the spouse and up to \$3,000 for dependent children. Again, without any increase in premium.
3. Provision has been made for the assignment of group life policies under certain specified conditions with the hope that this will assist some members in estate planning.
4. Additional benefits have been added to the Foreign Service Benefit Plan to include coverage for the routine circumcision of newborn children not to exceed \$25 and to extend the period of coverage of dental work necessitated by accidental injury to the jaw or natural sound teeth if the accident occurred while covered by the Plan from six months to one year.

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cannot hold an official position overseas for a specified time (say three years) after he has left the Inspection Corps. The latter proviso would discourage any temptation inspectors might have to torpedo an ambassador in hopes that he would be named to take his place.

The tradition of Foreign Service self-inspection is near-sacred and the above proposal smacks of iconoclasm. It is not. Rather, it is an attempt to suggest ways in which a needed function can be performed, and I urge the AFSA and the Secretary to look in depth at this matter.

TOM SAWYER

### Politi Sci Lives!

**H**URRAH for James Ford Cooper and professional political analysis! It is high time the Foreign Service became acquainted with the revolution that has recently taken place in academic political science. It was a dead discipline twenty years ago, but it is now very much alive and has a great deal to say that the Foreign Service would find useful.

KINGDON W. SWAYNE  
*FSO-Retired and  
Professor of Political  
Science, Bucks County  
Community College*

Newtown, Pa.

### The Iconoclast Writes

**I** KNOW there are some icons so venerable as to be antiquities worth preserving for their own sake, but I for one am increasingly bored by Ambassador Ellis Briggs. If the JOURNAL wishes to have a serious discussion of the reform of the Department of State, let it at least carry on that discussion in the present tense.

CHARLES W. BRAY III  
Washington

### A Testament

**A**s the sun sinks ever lower in the increasingly golden west, for many retired Foreign Service people the realization deepens that "you can't take it with you"—the question of what to do with it grows in urgency. Martin Herz's suggestion that the AFSA should actively seek bequests is an excellent, practical proposal that would surely bring results from a number of Foreign Service people with intimations of mortality.

As alumni representative for some years of my *alma mater*, I've had many discussions with the college president and the director of develop-

ment about the difficulties and techniques of extracting money from alumni and friends of the college. To get a substantial bequest in a will is much easier than to get even a modest contribution from current income.

There are people (dynastically-minded, or whatever) who want their money to go to relatives—*any* relatives, no matter how distant or undeserving. *Au contraire* and rather amusingly, there are people who have a strong desire (conscious or unconscious) that their relatives should not profit from their demise. This stems from the belief that the relatives have failed to show sufficient, or any, affection, solicitude, *et cetera*, for the legator and that they should accordingly, if not be penalized, at least, not be benefited. There are people, too, with a broad, humanitarian viewpoint who, in making their wills, are concerned primarily to promote the causes that have engaged their interest in life.

From these last two classes of legators, the AFSA might expect a good response to requests for legacies. There are many Foreign Service people who, though no longer *en fonction*, are very much concerned for the prestige and advancement of the Service; they would surely be happy to remember the AFSA in their wills.

ROBERT W. RINDEN  
*FSO-Retired*  
Denver

### A Tribute to Ambassador Reinhardt

**I** REALIZE that when an outstanding member of the Foreign Service dies, many of his friends would like to write to the journal to express their

sadness and sense of loss. Frequently they go on the assumption that so many letters will be sent that one more need not be written, and in consequence perhaps what should have been said in testimony to a departed friend goes unspoken. I feel it an obligation of friendship, therefore, to give you these few words of appreciation of Fred Reinhardt.

The careers of Ambassador Reinhardt and my own were fortuitously intertwined over a period of almost a generation. As young officers we went out together at the beginning of World War II, Fred to Tallinn where he studied Russian and I to Helsinki, soon to be bombed by the Russians. Thereafter we were neighbors in a number of posts: Fred was Ambassador in South Vietnam when I occupied the same position in Cambodia; and later when he was Ambassador to Cairo and I in Beirut. I subsequently inspected Fred and his Embassy in Rome.

In all these many years, therefore, I had come to know with ever deepening appreciation and affection Fred Reinhardt as a man and as an outstanding American diplomatist. His deep culture, his natural facility with languages, his unflinching courtesy, and his deftness in diplomacy marked him as one of the outstanding practitioners of our profession.

It would therefore be trite and insufficient to say that I feel a sense of loss. It is more to the point that in the demise of Fred Reinhardt the foreign service—all of it—is bereft of one of its outstanding officers.

ROBERT McCLINTOCK  
Caracas

## Life and Love in the Foreign Service

by S. I. Nadler



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