FOREIGN SERVICE Journal

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

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

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FOREIGN SERVICE Journal

JULY, 1971, Volume 48, No. 7

DEPARTMENTS

PHOTOGRAPHS AND ILLUSTRATIONS: "Window on Rossokovskoye Street," by Robert Sivard (courtesy Midtown Gallerics, from the collection of Mrs. J. K. Costigan), cover; Naval Photographic Center, photograph, page 18; Princeton University Press, portrait, page 22; Richard H. Sanger, photographs, pages 28, 29, 30; Helen Semler, illustrations, pages 34, 35, 36, 41; Henry J. Paoli, "Statuary Rape," page 38; S. I. Nadler, "Life and Love in the Foreign Service," page 48.

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EDITORIAL

Support S. 2023

On June 8, 1971, Senators Birch Bayh, John Sherman Cooper, Hubert Humphrey, and Hugh Scott co-sponsored S. 2023, a bill to provide grievance and appeal procedures for Foreign Service personnel. This bill closely parallels, and draws heavily upon, the draft grievance and appeals procedures proposed by the AFSA Board to the Secretary of State on March 31, and to the Director of USIA on April 29. The bill would add a new section on grievance and appeal procedures to the Foreign Service Act of 1946 without otherwise changing the Act.

It is a good bill, directly in line with what the Association has endeavored to obtain for its members. It is time that the foreign service men and women of State, USIA and AID had the right to an open hearing before an impartial body if they felt wronged by personnel decisions. Other government employees, including those in the armed forces, have had such rights of due process for years.

The Senate bill, like AFSA's proposals, does not question the traditional Foreign Service concepts of promotion and selection out by review board evaluation. It does assure that individuals will have the right to a hearing if they believe they have been unfairly treated under the system.

On June 15, 1971, the AFSA Board unanimously passed the following resolution:

Resolution Adopted at Meeting of the Board of Directors, June 15, 1971

WHEREAS, the American Foreign Service Association has as one of its principal purposes the promotion of the welfare of members of the Foreign Service of the United States; and,

WHEREAS, the absence of due process for Foreign Service employees to obtain protection from injustice, unfair treatment, career damage, reprisals, or arbitrary administrative actions must be rectified; and,

WHEREAS, S. 2023 embodies the basic principles the Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Association believes necessary for a fair and impartial system of grievances and appeals;

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the American Foreign Service Association Board of Directors, on behalf of the more than six thousand actively employed members of this Association, expresses its deep appreciation to Senators Bayh, Humphrey, Cooper and Scott for sponsoring S. 2023, and pledges its firm support for its enactment at the earliest possible date.

Members of the Foreign Service are urged to express their appreciation and support to Senators Bayh, Cooper, Scott, and Humphrey, and to write their own Congressmen and Senators in support of this proposed legislation.

Communication from the AFSA Board

June 9, 1971

Honorable John H. Burns
Director General of the Foreign Service
Department of State

Dear Ambassador Burns:

The Department has asked the Association for our views and comments on the draft proposal for changes in the FSO promotion, selection-out and performance evaluation systems.

Because of the importance and scope of these proposals, the Board of Directors has consulted extensively with the Association's membership both in the Department and overseas. We have received comments from some 55 posts abroad and many officers in Washington. The AFSA Committee on Reform, in addition to discussing the proposals with a large number of officers, sponsored an open meeting in May which was attended by over 600 persons.

The Board has found a large measure of support for the basic aims and principles set forth in the proposals. Except as indicated in the body of this letter, the Board believes the Department's proposals to be sound and well conceived, particularly as they relate to improved job security in the middle grades. We do not know, however, how the Department plans to implement these proposals with respect to officers already on board. For example, will all current FSO-8, 7 and 6 officers be subject to the "threshold examination?" Will those FSSOs who have been examined for integration as FSO 8, 7 and 6 be subject to a subsequent threshold examination? Will the proposal to provide "assured tenure" in Classes 5, 4 and 3 be applied to officers in those grades currently facing selection-out? We ask the Department to clarify these points.

Turning to the individual proposals in order of their presentation, we have the following specific comments:

1. *A junior officer review period.* The Board was impressed by the strong support from the Association's members for the "threshold examination" concept. We endorse this proposal. Our only reservation concerns the 7½ year maximum; six years seem ample even for officers entering at the FSO-8 level.
2. *Assured tenure of 20 years for those in Grades 5, 4 and 3.* The Board found overwhelming agreement that this proposal constituted a great improvement in the existing personnel system. The AFSA Board requested its Chapters specifically to include their AID and USIA colleagues in their review of these proposals, since the concepts might ultimately apply to them also. AFSA members overseas, USIA as well as State/AID officers, appear to support the middle-grade assured tenure concept almost unanimously. We strongly concur.
3. *Accelerated promotion for the top five percent of Class 5, automatic promotion for all others in Class 5 strictly according to seniority in Class and according to vacancies within functional cones.* We agree in principle, but support an alternate means. For the next few years of transition at least, we believe that 80 percent of promotions should be based upon functional cones, and the remaining 20 per-

cent on the basis of cross-conal ranking.

4. *Full competition for promotions from Class 4 to 3.* We agree, except that (as in item 3) we believe 80 percent of the officers should be promoted by functional cone and 20 percent by cross-conal ranking.
5. *Promotions from Class 3 to 2 and Class 2 to 1 made under a system similar to that now in use.* We agree. However, we strongly oppose the suggestion that senior level promotion lists should be prepared alphabetically for submission to the "O" Area. This would appear to undermine the principle of promotion according to merit. We support the preparation of promotion lists by rank order.
6. *Selection-out for low ranking to operate only at Classes 2 and 1.* We agree, including reducing time-in-class at the FSO-1 level from 12 years to 10 years. Selection-out for low ranking has historically proved difficult in Classes 2 and 1 and must be supplemented by time-in-class. We believe it is essential to provide regular openings for a flow of younger officers into our more senior ranks, and we feel the Service should accept the cost of losing a small number of still highly productive officers who are not in Presidentially appointed positions after 10 years in Class 1.
7. *Officers will be eligible for promotion only after 2 years in Classes 5 and 4, 3 years in Classes 3 and 2, and 5 years in Class 1.* We agree with the principle but not with the specific minimum time-in-class requirements proposed. We found, as did the Department, that a very considerable number of officers wish to retain a competitive system which is balanced to some extent by improved job security. Therefore, we believe that the minimum time-in-grade requirements should be one year at Classes 5 and 4, two years at Classes 3 and 2, and three years at Class 1.

The Board of Directors understands the importance of consultation between the promotion boards and PER in order to determine a realistic appraisal of vacancies and needs for particular specializations. We do not agree, however, that promotion board chairmen should be appointed from PER. Reports from our members and overseas chapters indicate widespread concern and suspicion about this proposal, and even a mention of "sinister motives." We would have no objection to PER officers advising and consulting with the promotion boards.

We do not object in principle to the "truth teller" device, which would require rating officers to state how many officers of a Class they have rated in the past five years, and where individually rated officers would rank among them. There will be great variations among raters —and among raters' recollections—and in the numbers and quality of officers they have rated in the past five years. These variations, we believe, will limit the utility of this device.

The Association has recognized, at least since 1968 and the publication of "Toward a Modern Diplomacy," that we live in an increasingly specialized world. The Foreign Service obviously cannot remain isolated from these trends in our society. The Board of Directors has supported and continues to support the cone concept of increased specialization, although we doubt that the four traditional cones will adequately meet the needs of the future. We recognize that the inevitable emphasis upon functional specialization is causing some transitional difficulties and hardships, particularly in the political cone. These problems were not caused by the officers who will have to bear some of the consequences of poor planning, recruitment, and management by the Department during the most of the 1960s. As the country officers mention in their letter of today's date to Mr. Macomber, the area and language specialists of the political cone provide an absolutely crucial substantive expertise to the Department.

We feel the Department has a deep obligation, particularly to officers in the political cone, to make the transition period of the next two or three years as equitable and fair as possible. This program will have to include substantial training opportunities, flexible personnel management of the cone system, and realistic career counseling policies. This ought to be self-evident, but it has not been so in the past.

While we support the cone concept as a means of rationally dealing with a more specialized world, we would add a word of caution. If the cones become too restrictive and their management too bureaucratic, they will not last long. We need specialized expertise within a flexible Foreign Service, not several different foreign services.

The proposals include some reduction of position levels, although we are not sure of the extent and we understand that the Department is studying a number of options. We accept some reduction as being in the longer-term interest of the Foreign Service and the efficient conduct of the Department's foreign affairs responsibilities. However, we reserve our position until we know the details and rationale of the Department's reduction proposals, and the data on which they are based. The Association wants the Department to know we intend in the future to do everything we can to insure that the Department vigorously seeks an honest comparability with the Civil Services at Classes 8, 7, 6 and 5. The Association believes our more junior officers should be given increased responsibility—we also insist they should be compensated fairly for their work.

The Association has often urged the Department to make a systematic study of its personnel requirements according to grade level, specialization, and the impact of different personnel systems (such as FSO, FAS, FSR, FSSO and GS) on positions and people. The Department is now making such a survey, but it will take many more months to complete. We can only point out that if this study were complete now, both the Department and its employees would be much more confident of the endurance and fairness of these proposals.

AFSA members have expressed a profound weariness with the repeated changes over the past 10 years in the ground rules affecting promotion and selection-out. Our members were nearly unanimous in feeling we should adhere for an adequate trial period to whatever changes are now agreed upon. It is possible that data developed in the positions and requirements survey now under way will suggest different solutions, but the need for further changes will have to be clearly and systematically demonstrated.

The Board also found most members of the Association attach considerable importance to the greater open-

(*Continued on page* 52)



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

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The master of gamesmanship, one-upmanship and lifemanship explains the fine art of

Buckmastership

C. NORTHCOTE PARKINSON

THE desk of a recent President of the United States was said to be adorned by a framed notice saying "THE BUCK STOPS HERE." This assumption of responsibility was, no doubt, generally admired but the origin of the expression is not generally known. According to the "Concise Oxford Dictionary," a buck is an article placed as a reminder before a player whose turn it is to deal at Poker. But what was the object used for this purpose? "The Random House Dictionary" would have it that a buckhorn knife was most commonly used. Shifted privily, it would thus transfer the responsibility to someone else, the process being called "Passing the Buck." The phrase, if not the idea, had its origin in the United States but has since become current in Britain and the Commonwealth. It means, let us agree, that the buck-passer shifts the responsibility to another person, together with all the possible blame for having given the wrong answer. This is, of course, a common practice in the over-organized world of today.

In any large organization, business as well as public, the buck can be passed in three directions: (1) downwards, (2) sideways, and (3) upwards. The buck-passing executive accompanies his action by a telephone call, his words chosen, respectively, as follows:

(1) "That you, Underleigh? Buckmaster here. I am sending you back the file on the Perilous Project as put forward by Morgan Merlin. I feel that this should be dealt with by you. I do not say that you were wrong to send it forward in the first place but I do know that the Chief likes to see signs of initiative at every level. So make your own decision and let me know afterwards what you have done. I have every confidence in your judgment."

(2) "That you, Longstop? Brian Buckmaster here. I am sending you the file on the Morgan Merlin affair, which has come to my office in error. You will realize when you glance at it that we in this Department are not in any way involved. The questions which arise are technical and legal but not administrative. We are always most careful not to trespass on your territory and this is certainly best left to the experts. It is good to have a man of your knowledge and experience—I shouldn't, myself, know the first thing about it. Over to you and the best of luck."

(3) "That you, Miss Cushion? Assistant Under Secretary here. I am sending Sir Arthur the file on the Merlin Project. He will realize, when he sees my minute, that the decision is one I cannot make myself. The political and financial implications are a bit beyond me and I hardly

think my filing cabinet should contain a document with so high a security classification. I know that Sir Arthur will know how to deal with it."

Nearly every file that comes to Buckmaster is thus neatly passed to someone else, being always too important (or else too trivial) for him. When the file has been rejected by every other department and when his own chief has told him to deal with it personally, he finally writes a minute on these lines:

"This crucial matter would seem to admit of two possible solutions, A and B. In favour of A there are the following cogent arguments:

i) . . . *ii*) . . . *iii*) . . . and *iv*) . . . *As against that*, there are the following reasons for preferring B

i) . . . *ii*) . . . *iii*) . . . and *iv*) . . .

I suggest that the Minister should decide"

Faced with such a minute one politician wrote "I agree" in the margin, subsequently explaining that he concurred in the view that the two alternatives were indeed those that had been defined.

Buckmastership is not, let us emphasize, confined to the Civil Service, being endemic to every large organization. It is more particularly characteristic, however, of the pyramid-type structure in which the incoming problem is first considered at the lowest level. There is in that hierarchy a further tendency to ratify a low-level decision by a high-ranking signature. This process begins with Bottomley, to whom the matter is first referred. However inexperienced and junior, he perceives that the answer to the application must be either "Yes" or "No." Fearing that "Yes" may involve him in a lot of extra work, he suggests the answer "No." He does this lightheartedly because the final decision must be taken, as he knows, on a higher level. The chances are that Underleigh will reverse his recommendation on principle, merely to keep him in his place, and that he in turn will be over-ruled by someone else. All Bottomley has done (he supposes) is to waft the thing on its way. But Underleigh is distracted that day, as it happens, by something else and fails to form an opinion of any sort. He absently signifies rejection and passes the file on to Middlebloke, knowing of course that the final decision will not be his. Middlebloke, with other things on his mind, absent-mindedly confirms the "No" before passing the file to Upperman. But Upperman has come to rely upon Middlebloke, whose ability has been tested over the years. He submits a formally negative reply to Topdog for signature. It is one of the weaknesses, however, of the pyramid process that nearly everything converges on Topdog's desk. He can do no more than glance at the papers he has to sign, relying on Upperman to see that each decision is the right one. Out goes the reply and the answer is "No." The fact that the answer has taken six weeks to produce might convince a naive applicant that the proposal has been the subject of grave deliberation in solemn conclave. It is the sad fact, on the contrary, that it has never been discussed at all.

What is wrong with the paper-passing process is that

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everyone relies upon everyone else. The man at the bottom assumes that the men at the top know best. Frantically busy, the men at the top assume that the whole subject has been thoroughly investigated by the men at the bottom, who alone have time to work on it. In the imaginary case described, one man would have done better by himself than the five did between them, as he would at least have known that the decision was to be his. As things were, each executive assumed that the work would be done or had been done on another level, whereas no work had been done by anyone. And this, believe it or not, is an accurate picture of what can actually happen, especially when the final answer is negative. A positive decision is less easily reached because the question may then arise of what further action should be taken by whom, "Yes" being seldom enough in itself.

It would be wrong, of course, to assume that no bucks are passed in the home and among the family. The day may begin with mother asking father to switch on the electric fire and may end with father asking mother whether she has put the cat out. In the meantime little Bobby has persuaded his older sister, Margaret, to do his homework for him, while Margaret has cajoled Jeremy into pumping up her rear bicycle tire. We all agree, therefore, that responsibility should be thus decentralized and so made to devolve upon someone else. There is a contrast, however, with public life in that laziness in the home can never be hidden. Where someone fails to do his share it is immediately obvious and becomes a subject for comment. Nor is the smaller organization very different from the family, its officials being too few to be faceless. As we pass, however, to larger administrative units we find that the scope for paper-passing and decision-dodging becomes progressively larger; which is one reason, among others, why the smaller organization is often the more efficient.

A Court appointment still in existence is the Mastership of the Queen's Buckhounds. Whether the Master was ever responsible for training the Civil Service is a matter of doubt among historians. That this post is now a sinecure is manifest, for our public officials seem to require no instruction in the buck-passing art. If we accept the fiction, however, that the Mastership is still a key post in our administration, we have the chance to accord it some recognition. Whenever the Whitehall Buck has been passed with particular dexterity the Leader of the Opposition might move that the salary attached in the Buckhound Mastership should be increased by (say) five shillings a year. Let it still be our boast that we give credit where credit is due.

And for the future? A time may come when an effective decentralization—with provincial Parliaments established in such cites as Edinburgh, Cardiff, Winchester and York—will have so revolutionized our administration that the old customs of Whitehall will be forgotten. Then that old Inn sign "THE PASSING BUCK" will be a mystery, perhaps, to young people who have never heard the expression in common use. ■

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In the morning, Berliners awoke to find their city divided—with both incongruous and tragic results.

The Berlin WALL

JOHN AUSLAND

John Ausland has been an occasional contributor to the JOURNAL *over the past 20 years, articles stretching from communism to how to buy a movie camera. He wrote the book-length manuscript from which this article is taken while assigned to the Pentagon. He tells us he is still hoping to find a publisher. When last heard from, Mr. Ausland was serving as Deputy Chief of Mission in Oslo.*

On August 13, ten years ago, the world awoke to find Berlin divided. As the days passed, barbed wire, stone, and mortar became what is now known as "the Wall." While this event was both preceded and followed by a number of crisis points in the long (1958-64) Berlin crisis, it was certainly the most dramatic and best-remembered. It is for this reason that the JOURNAL *has selected this chapter from John Ausland's unpublished manuscript on the Berlin crisis for publication just before the tenth anniversary of "the Wall." Mr. Ausland was a member and later Deputy Director of the Berlin Task Force from 1961 to 1946.*

WHILE Berlin was in the center of the stage as 1961 entered its second half, other events were waiting to make their entrance. On August 1, Congress passed a joint resolution, authorizing Kennedy to call 250 thousand reserves to the colors. Five days later, a Soviet rocket hurled Cosmonaut Titov into space for 17 orbits. Elated, Khrushchev welcomed the space traveler to Moscow and—lest anyone fail to get the point—announced that Soviet scientists were capable of developing a 100 megaton super bomb. In view of the worsening atmosphere, Kennedy decided to give up temporarily his efforts to improve relations with Khrushchev, and on August 21 the United States terminated its civil aviation negotiations with the Soviet Union. On the last day of the month, Khrushchev announced that he would resume nuclear testing in the atmosphere.

This thunderclap resounded in Belgrade, where 25 neutralist leaders—including Nehru, Tito, Sukarno, and Nasser—gathered on the first day of September. Four days later, Kennedy announced the resumption of underground testing. The neutralist leaders called on the Sovict Union and America to "suspend their war preparations . . . and take steps toward negotiations . . ." Khrushchev declined to stop testing. Kennedy refused to hold any morc conferences with Khrushchev "until they could serve a useful purpose." In the middle of the month, two West German planes accidentally strayed over East Germany. They landed in West Berlin with Soviet fighters desperately trying to locate and destroy them. This commentary on Soviet air defenses reverberated all the way back to Moscow. The Soviet leaders, chagrined, refused to believe that it was not a deliberate provocation.

Early in October, Kennedy urged Americans to build fall-out shelters in their homes. Newspapers reminded their readers that thc Berlin crisis was not the only product of Vienna (the Kennedy-Khrushchev June 3-4 meeting in Vienna, at which the two leaders had a confrontation over Berlin). The neutralist leader Souvanna Phouma became Premier of Laos, an important step toward the fulfillment of Kennedy and Khrushchev's agreement to neutralize that sleepy kingdom. While conditions in Laos seemed promising, those in South Vietnam were causing deepening concern. In mid-October, Kennedy despatched his Special Military Adviser, General Maxwell Taylor, to Saigon. His mission was to determine the best way to help the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem deal with the growing insurgency of the Viet Cong. Ten days of rioting began in the Dominican Republic on October 16. A few days later, Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric spoke to the Business Council in Hot Springs, Virginia. When he had finished, the myth of the "'missile gap" had been publicly destroyed. Khrushchev replied at the end of October, by exploding a 50 megaton bomb.

This was the arena in which the second act of Kennedy and Khrushchev's struggle over Berlin was played out.

1. *Voting with Their Feet*

The repercussions of Vienna were felt in a deeply personal way in East Germany. Always restless under the Soviet yoke, Ulbricht's wards became even more desperate. People began to talk again in undertones about rebellion. By early July, even the regime organ NEW GERMANY was reflecting tiny rays of unrest. Rolf Weike, Party First Secretary in Karl Marx Province, accused "leading comrades" in his area of interfering with supplies to consumers. Herman Matern, a member of the Politburo—taking account of the

discontent—called for "open discussions among party members and with the people."

Observing these and other portents, the American Ambassador in Bonn, Walter Dowling, asked Washington in early July what it proposed to do if there were an uprising. After struggling with this question for several weeks, officials in the State Department decided that such an important decision could not be taken in advance. Besides, they assumed that the lessons of the 1953 and Hungarian uprisings had not been lost on the East Germans.

Washington was, at this time, becoming increasingly concerned about the growing flood of refugees into West Berlin. After Vienna, many East Germans again were gripped by the fear that the door was about to be closed. Many who had hesitated to abandon their homes and loved ones before now decided that they had better make their escape while they could. Although the border with West Germany was sealed, they could travel by train or bus to East Berlin. From there, they easily skipped into West Berlin on foot, by streetcar, or subway, for the controls at the sector boundary were perfunctory.

Many friends, relatives, and neighbors had preceded them since World War II— an estimated 3½ to 4 million. This was over a fifth of the East German population, including some of its most skilled workers, managers, and intellectuals, as well as many young people. The stream reached flood tide in 1953, the year of the East German uprising, when 350,000 left. Another peak was reached in 1956, in the wake of the Hungarian uprising, when East Germans again feared the door would be closed. The flow gradually diminished until 1960, when it began to increase again.

After Vienna, the East Germans panicked. During July, there were over 30,000—the greatest number since 1953. During the first part of August, the refugee officials in West Berlin were at their wits' end. Although extra camps were opened, all reception centers were filled to capacity. These centers processed the refugees as quickly as possible and sent to West Germany those wishing to go, which was most of them. Since the East Germans controlled travel by Germans on road and rail, the refugees went by air. All flights of the regular civil airlines—Pan Am, BEA, and Air France—left Berlin packed. Allied officials speculated on whether a military airlift would be necessary, but additional civil aircraft were thrown into the breach. This drama became front page material, as the world watched a regime bleeding to death.

By mid-July, Washington was asking itself what action Ulbricht might take to stop this hemorrhage. The State Department cautioned the American Embassy in Bonn and Mission in Berlin that, if the refugee flood continued, Ulbricht might take drastic steps to control it. State suggested that Ulbricht could try to control movement from East Germany to East Berlin or he could severely restrict travel from East to West Berlin.

This specter caused great concern. Many American officials looked on East Germany as a gigantic pressure cooker. West Berlin was the safety valve. If it were sealed, they feared there would be an explosion.

If this worried Washington, just imagine Ulbricht's anxiety! He was sitting right on top of the pressure cooker. He moved, therefore, with great circumspection. While Ulbricht made it clear that the "demilitarized free city" of West Berlin would be an island in a red sea, Khrushchev's scenario provided for this to come after a peace treaty. On June 15, a correspondent of the Frankfurter Rundschau asked Ulbricht, "Mr. Chairman, does the setting up of a free city in your view imply that the state frontier will be at the Brandenburg Gate, and are you determined to treat it consistently as such with all its consequences?" Ulbricht replied, "Nobody intends to put up a wall."

By early July, Ubricht had decided to begin moving. On July 6, he opened a campaign against East Berliners—an estimated 60,000—working in West Berlin. Most of them commuted because they had the best of both worlds, good jobs and a free market in West Berlin and low rent and other subsidies in East Berlin. During July, Ulbricht gradually tightened the screws, making it less and less advantageous. On July 23, the New York TIMES reported that rumors were circulating in East Germany that the escape hatch was about to close. Three days later, Ulbricht demanded that "all means" be taken to halt the refugee exodus. On August 3, after conferring with Mayor Willy Brandt, the Allied Commandants protested the restrictions on East Berliners working in West Berlin. By that time, however, Khrushchev and Ulbricht were conferring in Moscow, plotting their next—and boldest—stroke.

2.*The Division of Berlin*

The victorious Allied powers in World War II clearly intended Berlin to be dealt with as a whole. This is evident in the wartime agreements on Germany and Berlin. The war was no sooner over, however, than the arrangements began to fall apart. Berlin was divided politically in 1947, when the Soviets established a separate regime in the eastern half of the city. When the Soviets later established the German Democratic Republic, Ulbricht made East Berlin the capital. He maintained, however, the legal fiction that East Berlin was separate, by applying legislation there separately. The Soviets also maintained a Commandant in East Berlin, with whom the Allied Commandants dealt. Nevertheless, by 1961 East Berlin was a completely different world from West Berlin.

Ulbricht began controlling movement between East and West Berlin in 1951. Over the years, the number of crossing points were progressively reduced. While these still permitted a great deal of movement back and forth—an estimated half million a day—he had established the principle that he controlled the number of crossing points. During 1960 Ulbricht introduced new controls regarding travel by west Germans and West Berliners to East Berlin but eased off when Adenauer threatened to suspend interzonal trade. The issue subsided until after the Vienna conference.

Washington knew that something was afoot when Ulbricht flew off to Moscow in early August 1961. The Warsaw Pact met from August 3-5, at about the same time as the western allies were meeting in Paris. Those officials who had time to speculate assumed that Khrushchev

was laying plans for his long-heralded peace conference. He had given the Allies until the end of the year to decide, but with the pace of events no one took that at face value. The issuance of a noncommittal communique at the end of the Moscow meeting was ominous.

During the week of August 6, the war clouds accumulated rapidly. The NATO Foreign Ministers concluded their meeting in Paris and reaffirmed their determination to maintain the freedom of west Berlin. On Wednesday, August 9, Khrushchev boasted of his superbomb. He added that the Soviet Union did not want war but if there were one "all Germany will be reduced to dust." British Foreign Secretary Home warned the British people of a possible war over Berlin. He explained that the word "negotiation" was not a magic formula, which would make dangers go away. On Thursday, August 10, Kennedy admitted the seriousness of the situation and expressed the hope that the Berlin question could be settled with negotiations. Khrushchev called Marshal Ivan S. Konev out of retirement to command the Soviet forces in East Germany. On Friday, August 11, after a trip around the United States Washington Post correspondent Chalmers Roberts reported that the American people were in an ugly mood. The same day, Ulbricht stressed the need for border defenses against western militarists. His People's Chamber instructed the Council of Ministers to take all necessary measures on the basis of the decisions of the Warsaw Pact.

On Saturday, August 12, Khrushchev and Ulbricht drew two more cards. The East German Council of Ministers adopted a decree making the line through Berlin a state boundary. East Germans and East Berliners could cross only with special permission. West Berliners could visit East Berlin only on West Berlin identity cards, that is, not on West German passports. The Minister of the Interior, Karl Maron, issued a decree, which designated 13 crossing points. The decree concluded by saying, euphemistically, "Citizens of the German Democratic Republic who do not work in Berlin are asked to refrain from traveling to Berlin until further notice." These two decrees were, however, not published that day.

Meanwhile, Marshall Konev had flung an armed ring around Berlin. Soviet and East German forces were placed on alert.

Shortly after midnight, on Sunday, August 13, the subways stopped at the sector boundary. Police told the passengers to get off. They could not cross the line. Police also halted all vehicles and streetcars. Soon people on foot or on bicycles were caught in the net. Guards began stringing barbed wire. Others placed obstacles in the roads. Gradually, movement across the boundary ground to a halt.

In the morning, Berliners awoke to find their city divided—with both incongruous and tragic results. A man who had gone to East Berlin for a party and stayed the night found himself trapped. Another, who had gone to East Berlin to visit his mother, was separated from his wife and children. Men and women who had worked in the other half of the city were suddenly unemployed. Moreover, thousands of East Germans who had waited one day too long were trapped in Ulbricht's concentration camp.

On Sunday, August 13—after the city had been divided—Ulbricht showed his hand, by publishing the decrees adopted the previous day as well as the Declaration adopted by the Warsaw Pact at its meeting in Moscow earlier in the month. The Declaration complained that the Federal Republic had induced "certain unstable elements in the GDR (German Democratic Republic) to leave for West Germany." It also observed that "subversive activities directed from West Berlin have greatly increased of late . . ." Therefore, "The Governments of the Warsaw Pact member states [call on the GDR] to establish . . . effective control . . . around the whole territory of West Berlin . . ." In order to reassure the Allies, the declaration added "that these measures must not affect existing provisions for traffic and control on communication routes between West Berlin and West Germany." In order to make it clear that they were not completely without feeling, the authors added, "The governments of the Warsaw Pact member states understand, of course, that [these measures] somewhat inconvenience the population."

Thus, on August 13, Ulbricht reduced the number of crossing points between East and West Berlin to 13, and soon closed the one at the Brandenburg gate. With rare exceptions, he forbade East Berliners and East Germans to travel to West Berlin. West Berliners and West Germans were, however, still allowed to visit East Berlin, as could Allied civilian and military personnel and other foreigners. For six days, Ulbricht watched the reactions and strengthened his fence. He began construction of the wall on August 19. Four days later, he reduced the number of crossing points from 12 to seven. Allied personnel and other foreigners were limited to the crossing point at Friedrichstrasse, which later became known as Checkpoint Charlie. West Germans could use two crossing points and West Berliners four.

Ulbricht threw in a hooker for West Berliners. They would have to apply for permits at one of two branches of an official travel bureau Ulbricht proposed to establish in West Berlin. Mayor Willy Brandt—understandably suspicious of Ulbricht's motives—decided he could not allow the East German regime to establish a presence in West Berlin. He requested the Allied Commandants for assistance. On August 25 they issued a decree banning the establishment in West Berlin "of offices purporting to issue permits for entry into the Soviet Sector of Berlin . . . " With this decree, movement by West Berliners—but not West Germans—into East Berlin stopped. (It only began again at Christmas time in 1964, when Brandt worked out an arrangement for the East Germans to issue passes in West Berlin.)

Berlin was divided. By and large, only Soviet and Allied personnel were able to move about the city. And their turn was soon to come.

3. *The Allied Response*

Khrushchev and Ulbricht achieved complete tactical surprise. August 13 found Berlin Mayor Willy Brandt in West Germany electioneering. Kennedy was spending the weekend at Hyannis Port. Macmillan was in Scotland, and Foreign Secretary Home was off shooting grouse. De Gaulle was on vacation, and French officialdom—



as any August—was sleeping in the sun. Khrushchev himself was on holiday on the Black Sea. The only two leaders at their posts were Adenauer —and Ulbricht.

In retrospect, it may seem somewhat difficult to understand why the west was taken by surprise. Certainly everyone knew about the refugees. Many observers had speculated on what Ulbricht would do to stanch the flow. The State Department had advised the Embassy in Bonn and the Mission in Berlin in mid-July that Ulbricht might take drastic steps. Even before that, Ulbricht had spoken in a press conference of a "wall"—although denying that he intended to build one. Why, then, the surprise?

After Khrushchev's ultimatum in 1958, the Allies constructed a paper model of the Berlin problem. Its foundation was that the Soviets would launch the crisis by signing a peace treaty. The East Germans would then attempt to replace the Soviets at the autobahn and rail checkpoints and in the Berlin Air Safety Center. If the Allies resisted, the crisis would intensify. If the Allies accepted the East Germans, they would only have postponed the evil day until the East Germans tried to apply unacceptable procedures.

This propensity was reinforced by other factors. During early August, Secretary Rusk and a number of officials concerned with Berlin were in Paris planning against the peace treaty scenario. President Kennedy and other senior officials in Washington were preoccupied with the possibility of an East German uprising. As for the failure to notice Ulbricht's reference to a "wall," this is easily explained. Officials were drowned at the time by words. Ulbricht's statement was lost in the background noise.

This recreation of the atmosphere in August helps to explain the reaction. When word was received from Berlin that the city had been divided, there was little inclination to take any precipitate action. After conferring with his staff and with Kennedy by telephone, Secretary Rusk issued a statement at about noon which said, "Available information indicates that measures taken thus far are aimed at residents of East Berlin and East Germany and not at the Allied position in West Berlin or access thereto." "These violations of existing agreements will be the subject of vigorous protest through appropriate channels." There was no reference to any possible US or Allied action.

From that point, the situation went steadily downhill. After struggling with their capitals for two days, the Allied Commandants in Berlin sent a letter of protest to the Soviet Commandant in East Berlin. When Brandt referred to this gesture the next day in a talk to a crowd gathered in front of the City Hall, it jeered. Berlin morale was not helped any by Adenauer's receiving that same day the Soviet Ambassador Smirnov, who bore a reassuring message from Khrushchev. Adenauer also cautioned the East Germans "not to do anything that could only worsen the situation. . . ." Four days after August 13, the Allied governments protested in Moscow. Given the problems of intergovernmental coordination, this was a backbreaking performance — but it was still too slow. The Berliners also soon noted that US soldiers, under orders from higher headquarters, were not patrolling the sector border.

As the week wore on, it became increasingly evident that August 13 had been traumatic for the Berliners. Early in the week, one senior official in Washington remarked, "I certainly hope this does not get in the way of our planning for the crisis." By mid-week, he saw that something had to be done. But what? The official position before August 13 was that the Allies would counter the division of the city with restrictions on travel by East Germans to NATO countries. Consideration would also be given to restrictions on trade. While the Allies agreed on the travel restrictions, it took time to work out the details. Restrictions on trade would have been just as painful for the Allies as the East Germans and were never agreed to.

In mid-week Edward R. Murrow, Director of the US Information Agency, cabled from Berlin that morale was going to pot. On Thursday, August 17, Kennedy called a meeting at the White House to consider a letter from Mayor Brandt. After a lengthy and heated discussion, he decided to approve Brandt's request to send a high-level official to Berlin. Kennedy selected Vice President Johnson. In response to Brandt's request to name General Lucius Clay—hero of the Berlin airlift—Commandant, Kennedy asked Clay to accompany Johnson.

On Friday, August 18, Kennedy met with Johnson and Clay. On Clay's urging, Kennedy directed Defense Secretary McNamara to reinforce the Berlin garrison. As a result, the First Battle Group of the Eighteenth Infantry Regiment (about 1,500 men) found itself the following day racing toward Helmstedt, at the western end of the

Autobahn.

Johnson and Clay departed for Germany Friday night and arrived in Bonn Saturday morning. After assuaging Adenauer's feelings—he had been told he could not accompany Johnson—they pushed on to Berlin. In his speeches, Johnson pulled out all the stops. Drawing on the Declaration of Independence, he pledged American "lives, fortunes, and sacred honor." The Berliners went wild with enthusiasm. Their beleaguered city had not been forgotten.

On Saturday, August 19—with Johnson in Germany and the battle group on its way to Helmstedt—the Berlin Task Force addressed the question of the Soviet reaction. Although the Director, Foy Kohler, and Ambassador-at-Large Bohlen had calculated that the Soviets would not hinder the convoy, this could not be counted on. The Joint Chiefs prepared and the President approved, therefore, contingency instructions.

After a race across Germany, the convoy arrived at the Soviet checkpoint shortly after dawn on Sunday. A Soviet officer had some difficulty counting the soldiers in their trucks. Since the men were tired and his orders were to get to Berlin, Colonel Glover Johns ordered them to dismount to be counted. While this was contrary to Allied practice, it did expedite the processing. Soon the convoy was on its way across East Germany and arrived in Berlin in the early afternoon—where it was met by Johnson, Brandt, and Clay.

Once again, the Berliners were overjoyed. There were scenes reminiscent of the liberation of Paris. In Washington—where the White House was in direct contact with the convoy—there was a great sigh of relief. The Soviets had not tried to stop the battle group, and Col. Johns had not had to execute his contingency orders.

Practically no one noticed that the convoy had dismounted to be counted—a precedent which led to a serious confrontation on the autobahn two years later.

4. *Doing Business on the Potomac*

By the time of the Johnson visit to Berlin, the organization which was to manage the Berlin crisis had begun to take shape. Following Vienna, Washington was both preparing for a crisis and getting itself organized at the same time. Kennedy took personal charge, immersing himself in even the finest details, for he was determined not to have another Bay of Pigs. Although Dean Acheson played an important role in the initial phase of the crisis, he gradually faded from the scene. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara took a direct interest from the outset, but were by no means able to devote full time. After a diffused scrimmage within State, European Assistant Secretary Foy Kohler emerged as quarterback. McNamara asked Paul Nitze to represent him on military questions. The Joint Chiefs named Major General David Gray as their representative.

During June and July, Kohler and Nitze and their subordinates operated under a loose arrangement known as the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Germany and Berlin. The two studies requested by Kennedy were issued under the auspices of this committee. Nevertheless, it met very infrequently, and coordination took place under the aegis of the German desk in State, which was headed by Martin Hillenbrand, with members of the staff assigned responsibility for liaison with the various agencies.

Kennedy was by no means satisfied with this arrangement and kept urging that a task force be formed. There was also pressure from the Pentagon for more formalized arrangements—which really meant regular meetings. Within State, there were divided councils. Officers in the newly established Political-Military Office under Deputy Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson favored a task force. Some officers on the German desk were unenthusiastic, fearing that they would "lose control of the problem" particularly to the Pentagon. Actually, it was questionable at that point whether anyone was fully in control.

Under Kennedy's prodding, Rusk and McNamara agreed in late July to establish a task force. Kohler and Nitze, on the eve of their departure for Paris, agreed to establish a staff nucleus, consisting of officers from State, Nitze's office, and the Joint Staff. This group moved into the State Operations' Center, where they were ensconced in early August. Immediately after August 13, the Coordinating Committee evolved into the Berlin Task Force and started holding daily meetings. These gatherings provided a forum for keeping all concerned informed and an opportunity for the more strong-minded individuals to blow off steam. Much of the work was done in smaller working groups. Unless it was particularly sensitive, however, any paper or instruction was reviewed in plenary meetings. Since feelings often ran so high that you could have cut the tension with a knife, only as strong a person as Foy Kohler could have held these meetings together.

As time passed and people got better acquainted, the process gradually smoothed out, and the task force did a great deal of valuable work together. Kohler and Nitze also worked very closely with Rusk and McNamara. Whenever key decisions were needed, they all went over to the White House for meetings with Kennedy. These meetings were also attended by McGeorge Bundy, General Maxwell Taylor, and Martin Hillenbrand.

This only represents one dimension of the effort—coordination of the White House, Foggy Bottom, and the Pentagon. Another dimension was represented by the Ambassadorial Group, which was also chaired by Foy Kohler and included the British, French, and German Ambassadors. During this period, these men met almost every afternoon. As questions became more detailed than they were able to deal with, they set up sub-groups—ultimately six in all. Kennedy and Adenauer (and probably de Gaulle and Macmillan) were never very happy about the work of the Ambassadorial Group. They may have forgotten, however, that these Ambassadors were not free agents but worked on the basis of instructions. Their job was to reconcile often widely divergent points of view. What is remarkable is not that they accomplished less than their impatient bosses wanted but that they were able to do as much as they did. Even if they had been archangels, there were limits as to how far they could go in reconciling irreconcilable positions. This was nowhere better demonstrated than in their efforts to reach agreement on negotiations. ■

An "insider's" view of some aspects of the Cuban missile crisis is related in these three personal anecdotes.

The Cuban Missile Crisis

Robert A. Hurwitch

Mr. Hurwitch entered the Foreign Service in 1950 and has served principally in Latin America. During the 1960-63 period he dealt primarily with Cuban affairs in the Department. Subsequently, he served as DCM in La Paz, Bolivia and Vientiane, Laos. He is currently assigned as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.

OCTOBER 15th had been an all too rare day at home with my family. I'd had little respite from the constant bureaucratic grind, weekends included. My family had become accustomed to my brief and irregular appearances for an occasional meal, some sleep, and seemingly incessant telephone calls. The grueling pace had slackened enough lately, however, for me to declare the day a holiday, for Monday, October 15th, 1962 was my birthday. My wife, Lee, had borne the burden of my hectic life uncomplainingly; but a full day together would certainly help us both. Our three school-age daughters readily agreed to force themselves to skip school for the day. Our three-year-old girl rounded out the family and over a leisurely brunch we all hastened to get reacquainted.

I caught up on women's club activities and the latest goings-on at school. The morning passed quickly and we moved outdoors to enjoy the beauty of the autumn foliage. The crisp fall afternoon and sun-warmed blue skies filled us all with a sense of well-being. Lee and I sipped our martinis while I poked lazily at the steaks sizzling on the barbecue. The girls were chattering away as they tossed a ball to one another. We let the time pass unhurriedly as dusk turned to evening and we moved indoors, content and at peace.

At nine, as we sat around the living room re-living the day and planning just such another the telephone rang. Roger Hilsman, the Director of Intelligence and Research, was calling and, in guarded double-talk, said that the analysis of high altitude photos taken the day before over Cuba showed unmistakably that offensive missiles were being rapidly installed on the island. Stunned, I returned the telephone to its cradle slowly, and knew that next Sunday, if it came at all, would not be that day's copy.

I called Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Edward Martin, and learned that he had already received Roger's disheartening news. He asked me to meet him outside Under Secretary George Ball's office at 8:30 the next morning. Feigning fatigue, I bade my family goodnight to retire to the bedroom to ponder what action we should take. The children responded absently to my goodnight kiss; for they, too, had been transported to another world—that provided by their favorite television show.

When I met Ed Martin the next morning, Alex Johnson and several other senior Department officials had already gathered outside George Ball's office. I told Ed that during the night I had thought of a plan to take out the missiles while minimizing the risks of nuclear warfare. Ed replied that he, too, had a plan, and took from his pocket his 3″ × 5″ pad, only the first page of which was filled with writing. Ed is about the most laconic man I know—forthright and decisive—he never wastes words and consequently gets a tremendous amount done. His plan was typically concise and its essence spelled *quarantine*, the course eventually adopted by President Kennedy so successfully. I thought of the file drawers in my office full of lengthy contingency plans. I thought of the seemingly endless committee meetings, the wrangling and compromises they represented; and here in small handwriting on one side of a three by five-inch sheet of paper were the essentials of a plan to meet a most critical situation—one for which we had not planned previously. I described my plan briefly to Ed: Cuban exile pilots would carry out their long-standing project of destroying Cuba's oil refineries (essential to Castro's planned economy) with the missile sites as new targets. By such actions on the part of the Cuban exiles (who were at that time engaging in considerable harassment of Cuba anyway), open confrontation between the two great powers might be avoided—and yet both the Cubans and Soviets would get our message that we knew the missiles were there and would not tolerate them. I observed that it was an unorthodox plan and that perhaps I'd been spending too much time lately across the river with the planners of clandestine operations. Ed just listened.

Just as we were to go in to meet

Soviet ship Anosoy *departed Cuba November 6, 1962 with missile transporters and canvas-covered missiles.*

with George Ball, the telephone rang in his outer office. Roger Hilsman answered and in response to a question, listed seven of our names, replied "yes, sir" a couple of times and hung up. He explained that McGeorge Bundy at the behest of the President wanted to know who in State had been informed of the crisis and after listening to the names, said that no one else was to be told without prior White House approval. And so, for the next few days, only a handful of men knew and faced the grave situation that threatened to destroy our nation.

George Ball is a comfortable man to be with. He listened carefully to Ed Martin and the several others who spoke. Ed also briefly outlined my plan. Everyone sounded dispassionate. George thought that we would probably have to do something along the lines of Ed's plan and from that moment on was an eloquent advocate of *quarantine*. It was 9 a.m., time to meet with Secretary Rusk.

As we trooped into his office, the Secretary came briskly from behind his desk to join us around a small table. He listened impassively while the same speakers as before presented their views. Once again, Ed Martin described both his plan and mine. The Secretary nodded and said that although there was yet much to be sorted out, he was confident that whatever the course finally adopted, it would be essential that the American people be told in advance of the peril they faced. As he hurried off to meet with President Kennedy, the Secretary made it clear that as far as he was concerned, there would be no covert bombing missions over Cuba.

I reflected for some time that morning upon the Secretary's decision, which had seemed so right as soon as he expressed it. In devising my plan, I had focused so intently upon the importance of eliminating the missiles while avoiding direct confrontation with a nuclear power that I had overlooked one of the essential underpinnings of our society which Secretary Rusk's observation had highlighted: in our system of government the American people, in their consent to be governed, entrusted their government with wide latitude of action and decision; by the same token, they also trusted their government to consult with them—directly and/or through their elected representatives—when national or international matters arose that vitally affected their welfare. Without such mutual trust, our system would not work.

The issue, then, was to be met squarely—and the American people and their leaders tested, in the open rather than in secret.

SATURDAY, the 20th, was the day of decision. For days since that first early Tuesday morning meeting with Secretary Rusk, the debate over the wisest course of action had been moving inexorably to a final decision—for *inaction* as a solution was never seriously proposed. As the differing viewpoints were being propounded and weighed, intelligence reports and photos gave progressively dramatic evidence of the feverish activity in Cuba to complete the missile installations. Before missiles pointing toward New York, Chicago and San Francisco were armed, a decision had to be reached, the Soviets confronted, and sufficient time had to remain for political negotiation with them. The schedule was tight, the danger great; and the decision could not be hasty.

During those days each of the two main positions—quarantine or air attack, either possibly followed by eventual invasion—reached high points of tentative acceptance among several key Presidential advisors. They were to ebb from final approval as the advocates of the other position summoned new arguments to bolster their recommendations. For the first several days at informal meetings the proponents of differing views discussed the advantages and disadvantages of the various possibilities. The informality of the meetings encouraged a thorough and candid exchange of views, but did not guarantee a systematic cataloguing of the many arguments. This was corrected after the third day when the two main positions were

reduced to writing, with the merits as well as the weaknesses of each position delineated.

Assistant Secretary Ed Martin asked me to join the group that was to formulate the paper favoring the air-strike thesis. Knowing that I had abandoned my covert air-strike proposal and that I opposed the overt air-strike thesis as one leading to greater rather than less likelihood of irreversible confrontation between the two nuclear powers, Ed wanted to make certain that the final product met the President's desire for a balanced view. Despite the cogent reasons adduced in favor of United States Air Force air-strikes to take out the missile sites, none could overcome a vital weakness in the argument: that as a result of the bombing, Soviet personnel manning the missile sites would probably be killed by United States-piloted bombers and therefore the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics would very likely become inextricably bound to the foolhardy course it had embarked upon.

What the Soviet Union would or would not do in response to our several proposals for action was inevitably uppermost in everyone's mind. How could we maintain the security of our nation and our national dignity without triggering the holocaust of World War III? All of us, no matter the degree of responsibility, lived intensely with this question. Despite the remarkable security discipline and absence of press leaks, no one could underestimate the Soviet intelligence apparatus. How much did it already know of our plans? Had it already designed counter-measures? And the Soviet policy makers? Were they indeed bent upon forcing us to live continuously under the threat of missiles in Cuba, no matter how moderate and measured our response? For the man in the Kremlin was all this only an initial step in an unblinking campaign to dominate us—no matter the cost? Awareness of the consequences, whether confessed or buried, surely influenced all of us, and no one could be certain of what they might be.

It was in this atmosphere of uncertainty and foreboding that Ed Martin, just back from a White House meeting, told me that a sufficiently strong consensus had been achieved at the meeting to enable us to alert our Ambassadors in Latin America. He asked me to take a final look at the telegram we had prepared a day or so before. In it we informed our Ambassadors of the nature of the crisis and instructed them, upon receipt of the word "go," to seek immediately an appointment with their respective Chiefs of State in order to convey to him the gravity of the situation and to seek his support through his Ambassador to the Organization of American States for the course of action we had determined: quarantine, with the threat of escalation if the work in Cuba to complete the missile sites was not halted immediately and the missiles withdrawn forthwith. Doubt over what the decision should be then gave way to anxiety over what the nature of the Soviet response might be.

I scrutinized the telegram that we had prepared for the contingency that the decision would favor quarantine. The text of the message was clear and concise. The codeword that had been devised to signify the Cuban missile crisis was properly included. I told Ed that we were ready to go and he said, "Send it." I glanced at my watch. Ten minutes to three, now Sunday morning.

As I walked down the deserted, echoing corridors from our temporary offices on the seventh floor to the Communications Center, the importance of what I was about to do loomed large in my mind. Once the message was sent, there was little likelihood of turning back. The telegram had taken on an intrinsic meaning of its own for me and I became fixed by the significance of the very act of turning it in to be sent.

I pressed the buzzer of the well-secured code room and waited until the top half-door opened. When it did, a sleepy code clerk listlessly held out her hand for the message—a routine she knew well, to her utter boredom. She started to walk away, half reading the message when her eyes caught the special code word. She stopped and returned to the door, now fully awake, reading the message slowly and carefully to make certain that she had no questions as to its transmission. She sensed its significance and knew the importance of its expeditious and sensitive handling. Satisfied, she closed the half-door and the spring-lock snapped shut. The message was on its way.

I made my way once again through the ghostly corridors back to my office, picked up my coat and headed for the elevators. Anticipation of the nature of Soviet reaction weighed heavily upon me. Just as I reached to push "down," alarm bells suddenly reverberated harshly throughout the corridor. The clangor echoed and re-echoed as I stood transfixed, my finger glued to the button. The entire building seemed to cringe from the deafening noise. "The missiles are on the way!" was my first reaction; irrational as it later obviously was, I "knew" that the Russians had somehow discovered our decision and had decided to pre-empt us.

The arrival of the elevator resolved my doubts as to which exit to seek. As I started down, never had the dignified pace of the State Department's elevators seemed so anachronistic. The alarm clanging greeted each door opening at every floor. At last, on the main floor, the din subsided. I placed a tone of nonchalance into my voice and inquired of the guard to whom I'd shown my identification card what all the alarms had been about. He shrugged. "Fire drill, I guess," was his uninterested reply. I couldn't explain about the telegram I'd just sent; I couldn't explain about how the bells ringing right at the time I was worrying about the Soviet reaction for a moment had turned me cold. I couldn't explain for security reasons—and I probably could not have made him understand, anyway. It was something I could not share. Frustrated but relieved, I went out to my car for the drive home to McLean, Virginia.

It was now the small hours of a clear, quiet October morning—a time of stillness that inclined one to drive slowly and savor the surroundings. As I passed through the peaceful Virginia countryside, most of the homes were dark, broken only by an occasional night light. Asleep and innocent, the people did not yet know of the grave danger that faced them and our nation. Their President and his writers were working hard on a speech that he

would give the next day on a nationwide broadcast telling the people candidly of the grim situation and the action he contemplated. In the meantime, the secret must be kept. As I neared home, I was engulfed by the sense of loneliness and isolation that those in high office live with constantly; sharing it with them, if only momentarily, gave me an unforgettable insight into the burdens they continuously carry.

THE National Military Command Center in the heart of the Pentagon is a remarkable instrument of government. Equipped with the most modern and intricate communications gear, this eerie, large room with its lighted panels blinking on and off and computers whirring, could easily have been drawn from one of the more imaginative James Bond films. From the Center, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are able to control and reach instantly all of our military commands throughout the world. By scanning the different colored lights, they know at all times the state of readiness of each of these commands.

During the missile crisis, in response to the decision to confront the USSR, lights changed progressively as each of the theater commanders reported that he had brought his combat elements up from their normal peace-time state to "full alert." Our entombed rockets throughout the country were unshrouded. Our warships moved openly from the West Coast through the Panama Canal, where Soviet intelligence could see them and be convinced that we were not bluffing. The awesome armed force of the United States was being prepared to defend the nation against all eventualities. In the National Military Command Center, as orders were given and data received, one could sense just what this power implied.

In measured terms, the President had already made the American people aware of the crisis.

The massive, round-the-clock, Soviet-Cuban effort to ready the missile sites for firing was nearing success.

The test of wills was underway.

By this time, our Naval vessels had achieved their assigned positions on the line of quarantine



around Cuba. Each held steadily to its waters with our aircraft overhead, waiting for the Soviet ships that were strung out across the Caribbean, Atlantic, Mediterranean and Black Sea. As they approached, and the distance narrowed between our forces and their merchantmen, the tension rose in the Command Center.

In one glass-enclosed corner of the Center, several grim-faced officers were receiving continuous radio reports from the ships on the quarantine line and from the aircraft that flew forward to hover over the Soviet freighters. All the freighters were steaming ahead, seemingly unaware of the drama in which they were players and of the danger that awaited them. Either the USSR was unable to control these vessels or was intent upon pursuing its reckless, headstrong course. The moderate response of quarantine did not appear to be adequate or effective.

If the quarantine failed, we would eventually have to take the more drastic, and more dangerous, step of invasion to ensure that the missiles could not fire upon us and to maintain the credibility of our warning to the Soviets that the perils would escalate were they to be misled by our moderation. Our regular troops and some of our reserves were beginning to pour into Florida. Amphibious vehicles and landing craft were gathering at assembly points in the southern regions of the state. Huge cargo planes carrying tons of supplies roared incessantly over Miami and other cities in the south. Fighter jets were moving into position. There could be no mistaking our resolve.

As I sat in the Command Center silently watching the large wall map where models representing Soviet ships were being moved closer to Cuba by men who were receiving the reports from our air-borne observers, I began to despair. The days of debate, the nights made sleepless by anxiety, had they been wasted? Had we miscalculated the Soviet disposition to respond reasonably to a measure that had been carefully designed solely to protect us from a Soviet-inspired threat; that had purposely avoided giving Castro ground to claim that our actions threatened the survival of Cuba; that had been especially tailored to minimize the risk of harming Soviet personnel; that in short had been fashioned for self-defense only, while at the same time providing the Kremlin with the clear option to extricate itself?

As I brooded, unwilling to look at the wall map any longer, I noticed some stirring among the men in the glass-enclosed corner. The grim set to their faces was giving way to hesitant smiles as they pressed their earphones closer to hear every word. Slow smiles changed to relieved, broad grins as the voices of our pilots came crackling in: "The forward ships have stopped. Several of the others nearby are turning back, leaving a wide, white, curved streak awash of their sterns." With these words, gloom turned to relief and then glee. Pent-up emotions were released as we enthusiastically slapped one another on the back.

The National Military Command Center had undoubtedly witnessed many instances of danger and tension before. I doubt that any could have matched in drama those suspense-packed moments of the crisis over missiles in Cuba. I hope that circumstances never require a repetition of them. ■

About the book that made its author a name
to be remembered for well over a hundred years

The Marquis de Custine and his Russia in 1839

GEORGE F. KENNAN

The author ranks as one of the most distinguished specialists in foreign affairs: former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Yugoslavia, in addition to numerous important posts abroad and in the Department of State as a careeer foreign service officer. His expertise in Russian affairs is unsurpassed. Mr. Kennan retired from the Foreign Service in 1953. A professorship at the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton has been one of his main pursuits since then, accompanied by numerous writings, including two Pulitzer prize winning books: "Russia Leaves the War" and "Memoirs, 1925-1950."

THE book took the form of 31 long letters to an anonymous French friend, written ostensibly during and just after the journey of the summer of 1839. The device was not wholly artificial. Custine did apparently contrive to write and smuggle out one or more letters during the period of his stay in Russia. These he presumably recovered and drew upon in the writing of the book. But by far the greater part of the material was evidently composed for the first time in 1841-42; and in general the casting of this material in the form of letters from various points visited during his journey was an artificiality (not uncommon in the literature of the day) which cannot have been intended to deceive anyone.

The first three of the letters had very little to do with Russia and could, for the most part, just as well have been omitted from the account. Another letter, in the body of the work, was devoted to the highly-embroidered and romanticized recounting of a tale from Russian peasant life which someone had told him. For the rest, however, the letters purported to give the impressions of the journey.

Many of these impressions were aesthetic: long descriptions of landscape and architecture in the romantic style of the period. There are also numerous anecdotes and legends, almost exclusively second-hand, which Custine saw fit to include. For all of these he has been severely, and often justly, taken to task by his many critics. It is not on these passages, however, that the enduring value of the book has rested. It is rather the many political reactions, often expressed in biting aphorisms and witticisms appealing to some readers, infuriating to others, but always striking and provocative, that have given to the work its extraordinary longevity of relevance. These reactions constitute, in their entirety, one view of the Russian government and society of that day. It is a view not easy for any outsider to recapitulate, because so much of its color lay in the language in which it was stated. The following observations and citations, however, may give some idea of its salient features—particularly those that have attracted the attention of the readers of our own time.

It will be easier to understand Custine's reactions if one has in mind the views on political institutions with which he entered upon his journey. They were, by his own account, not dissimilar to those with which Tocqueville had embarked on the journey to America. Custine, like Tocqueville, was preoccupied with the decline in the influence of the French aristocracy which had set in with the Revolution and had continued even after the Restoration. He viewed with fear and distrust the egalitarian tendencies that seemed to be pervading and overwhelming French society in the age of Louis Philippe. He was of course on principle a monarchist, because it was impossible for him to conceive of an aristocracy without a monarchy. But he was by no means a protagonist of personal absolutism. "Being an aristocrat by character as well as conviction," he wrote,

> I consider that only an aristocracy can resist the seductions as well as the abuses of absolute power. Without an aristocracy there would be nothing but tyranny in monarchies as well as in democracies. The spectacle of despotism revolts me in spite of myself and violates all the ideas of liberty that flow from my intimate feelings and my political beliefs. Despotism can be born of unlimited egalitarianism just as well as it can be born of autocracy. The

power of a single man and the power of all men together conduce to the same end. . . .

Holding these views, Custine was of course suspicious of the power of elcctoral majorities. To place nations at the mercy of such majorities was to subject them, he said, to mediocrity. Democratic government was the government of words, not acts. The statesmanship of the multitude was always "timid, avaricious, and mean." And all this being so, he had no kindly feelings, in principle, towards the concept of a constitutional monarcy. He even claimed, in the *avant-propos* to the second authorized edition of his work, that he went to Russia "to seek arguments against representative government."

On the other hand, he recognized that such views were now under heavy challenge and attack in Western Europe; and one suspects that he had himself been somewhat shaken in his attachment to them, probably by the reading of Tocqueville's first volume of *De la Démocratie en Amérique*—shaken not in the sense that he had been weaned away from them or convinced of this opposite, but rather in the sense that he found himself devoid of arguments with which to refute the conclusions Tocqueville had drawn from his American journey. Custine's conviction of the essentiality of aristocracy, as an institution, and his abhorrence of egalitarianism, remained firm, throughout. But on the question whether the institution of monarchy should or should not be accompanied by anything in the nature of a parliamentary body, and whether such an arrangement should have its foundation in constitutional provisions limiting the power of the throne: on these questions his feelings, on available evidence, were muddled and uncertain at the time when he entered upon his journey.

This ambivalence was well-reflected in the account he gives of a talk he had with the Emperor, Nicholas I, soon after arrival in Russia. As to the literal accuracy of this account, one must reserve judgment. The claim on the part of historical personages to recall at a later date the exact words used by themselves and other parties in long conversations is bound to inspire a certain uneasiness in the historian. But the passage, whether litcrally accurate or not, may safely be taken as reflecting some of Custine's own hesitations on the subject in question.

The Emperor, according to this account, expressed to Custine his strong aversion to the concept of a constitutional monarchy. He did not deny that his own government was a personal despotism. Despotism, he said, was the very essence of his government. But, he said, it was a form of government that accorded with the temper of the nation. "I can conceive," he went on,

> of a republic. It is a proper and sincere form of government—or at least it can be. I can also conceive of an absolute monarchy since I am, after all, at the head of such an arrangement. What I cannot conceive of is a constitutional monarchy. It is a government of the lie, of fraud, of corruption; and I would rather retreat as far as China, if necd be, than ever adopt it.

To this, Custine quotes himself as replying (somcwhat grandiloquently):

> Sire, I have always regarded representative government as a compromise inevitable in certain societies and at certain times; but like all compromises, it solves no problem—it only postpones the difficulty. . . . It is a truce of sorts, concluded between democracy and monarchy under the auspices of two very mcan tyrants: fear and self-interest; and it is sustained and prolonged by the pride of spirit that satisfies itself with loquaciousness, and by the popular vanity that accepts its rewards in words.

The Emperor responded to this pronouncement, the account continues, by warmly shaking Custine's hand and saying: "Monsieur, you speak the truth"; after which he went on to refer (obviously, with the recent Polish uprising of 1830-31 in mind) to the difficulties he himself had experienced in his effort to fill the role of a constitutional monarch in Poland.

How much of what Custine quotes himself as saying on this occasion was sincere, and how much was the product of a natural anxiety to be tactful and courteous in the discussion of this delicate subject with an absolute monarch, is not easy to determine; but his description of representative government as a "compromise inevitable in certain societies and at certain times"—a view which we may take as almost certainly influenced by Tocqueville—is clearly indicative of the torn and contradictory feelings with which, during the period in question, he reflected on the proper role of popular representation in the pattern of modern government.

This is perhaps a good point at which to note that Custine's attitude towards the person of the Emperor was also one of the most painful, almost tortured ambivalence. Few critics have failed to spot as one of the great weaknesses of this book the contradictory and, in its totality, unconvincing manner in which Custine dealt with the Imperial person. There are evidences on the one hand, of a desire to please and flatter the Emperor, and

to commiscrate with him on the difficulty of the task of ruling so great an cmpirc with so unhappy a past. (In a letter to Madame Récamier, commenting on the more favorable view of Russia entertained by the French ambassador in Petersburg, M. de Barante, Custine wrote: "After all, if one were to pass one's life together with the imperial family, one *would* love Russia: it represents without question all of the best that there is in this country.")

On the other hand, as Custine's indictment of the Russian political system gathered power throughout the book, and as the examples mounted of the unlimited personal power of the supreme sovereign, it became impossible to maintain the pose of absolving the Tsar of all blame for existing conditions. Custine finally faced up to this situation, towards the end of his account, with characteristic pithiness and incisiveness. "If the Emperor," he wrote, "has no more of mercy in his heart than he reveals in his policies, then I pity Russia; if, on the other hand, his true sentiments are really superior to his acts, then I pity the Emperor."

That Custine was utterly fascinated by the Emperor—that he studied him with intense, almost passionate interest, that the person of the Emperor meant more to him than that of any other individual he encountered in Russia—is clear. In part this lay, no doubt, with the great fascination normally exerted over others by men who wield great power. . . . But beyond this, one senscs that Custine had, initially, a certain hope that he could ingratiate himself even beyond the normal possibilities of a foreign visitor and that he could win from the Emperor a form of personal interest and friendship that would give him real intimacy and influence at court. Had this hope been gratified, which it was not, his book would probably never have been written; for the hope was obliged to do battle in his mind, over the entire course of his journey, with the growing horror of his impressions of Russian conditions and the mounting impossibility of evading or concealing the fact of the Emperor's primary responsibility for them. Custine was confronted in the end with a choice: either to describe conditions and experiences that constituted, inescapably, an implicit reproach to the Emperor, or not to write any book at all. It is to the resulting conflict in his feelings that there must be attributed those contradictions and *non sequiturs* in the treatment of the Emperor to which so many foreign critics have drawn attention.

Quite aside from the person of the Emperor, Custine was not long in reacting negatively to the absolutism of the imperial position, as a political instituion. He should not, perhaps, have been quite so unprepared for this. His companion on the ship, Prince Kozlovski, had warned him of it. "*Chez nous,*" the prince had said, "despotism is stronger than nature: the Emperor is not only the representative of God—he is the embodiment of the creative power itself." Neverthcless, Custine was taken aback by what he encountered on arrival. He had not pictured it quite this way. "There does not exist today on the face of the earth," he was moved to exclaim, soon after his arrival, "a single other man who enjoys such power and uses it—not in Turkey, not even in China." And what appalled him was not so much the absolute personal power over the *actions* of men: it was rather the power over their thoughts and words—in effect over their souls. He had the initial impression that evcrything he heard in Petersburg was only the reflection of some sort of party line, so to speak, put forward from above. "Among this people deprived of leisure and of will," he reflect, "one sees only bodies without souls, and one shudders upon reflecting that for so great a multitude of arms and legs therc is only one head." This led him to the realization that something more important than just political rights in the legal sense had been sacrificed to the Emperor's personal power: namely, individual dignity and independence of character. It was not that these things were wholly non-existent, not that no one enjoyed them or gave at least the appearance of enjoying them; it was rather that no one could depend upon them: thcy could not be taken for granted. "In Russia," he wrote, with an air of surprise and discovery, "tolerance has no guarantee, either in public opinion or in the constitution of the State; like cverything else, it is a species of grace imposed by one man; and that one man can withdraw tomorrow what he has extended today."

It was, however, as we have seen, not the institution of monarchy but rather that of aristocracy to which Custine looked to provide the keystone of any sound political structure; and it was here, accordingly, that he experienced his greatest disillusionment. Although himself an aristocrat, as he himself put it, "by character as well as conviction," and a firm supporter of the monarchical principle, Custine appears to have had a real distaste for court life and a certain contempt for the courtier, aristocratic or otherwise. His concept of aristocracy was that of the independent *grand seigneur* of aristocratic lineage who had the dignity not only of his rank but also of his country estates or his fortune and whose status was in no way dependent on the royal or imperial favor. Possibly his distaste for the courtier was the product of his own unhappy experience when attached, in his youth, to the suite of Louis XVIII (then "Monsieur"). However this may be, he was particularly revolted by the atmosphere of the Russian court and the character of the nobility who composed it. He recognized this as being primarily only another mirror-image of the Emperor's absolute authority. Under the shadow of that authority all other distinctions of rank and caste seemed to lose meaning. Elsewhere the superior distinction of birth was an independent possession, of which no nobleman could normally be deprived. Here, in Russia, it had no independent value. Like everything else, it was a product of the Emperor's favor. He could extend it; he could withdraw it. All these pompous courtiers, Custine suddenly realized, were no more than slaves themselves. They could be made or

You are a slave, like them: and I, your god, soar equally above both your heads.

broken in a day. And the effect was to depress all of society beyond the imperial person itself into a virtual egalitarianism as sweeping and as odious in Custine's eyes as that which he understood to exist in the American democracy described by Tocqueville. When he attended the Peterhof fête, marked as it was by the theory that the Emperor and Empress were receiving at a single social occasion guests from all ranks of Russian society from top to bottom, it occurred to him that what was implicit in this imperial gesture of hospitality was not that the Emperor was saying to the laborer or to the merchant: "You are a man like myself," but rather that he was saying to the *grand seigneur*: "You are a slave, like them: and I, your god, soar equally above both your heads."

But beyond this ignominy of position vis-à-vis the Emperor, there was much in the personal behavior of these Russian aristocrats and courtiers for which Custine could find only contempt. True, his observations were drawn largely from the people he saw at court, during the first days of his visit to the Russian capital. For reasons already noted, the doors of the more independent and distinguished noble houses in Petersburg were evidently closed to him—a circumstance that no doubt added to his bitterness. When he came away from the capital and traveled in other parts of the country, people were more hospitable, and he met some in whom he recognized a higher quality. But by and large, the opinion he formed of his own counterparts among the Russian nobility was unflattering in the extreme. He found them false, insincere, without independence of character or taste. He was constantly made aware of the savage intensity of their competition for the imperial favor. He observed in their behavior cruelty and officiousness towards underlings combined with the most extravagant obsequiousness towards people higher in position than themselves—a servility, as he described it, "gratuitous and involuntary, which does not exclude arrogance"—a servility borne by people who were themselves only *"une espèce d'esclaves supérieurs."* The actions of these people purported to be their own, but they were really those of an external will, and the pretense was too obvious to be accepted. They reminded him, he said, of "puppets whose strings were too thick."

Even more odious, to Custine's taste, were the efforts of upper-class Russians to imitate the West. He could not endure the caricature of himself that seemed to him to emerge from their aping of Parisian customs and manners. It was all too obvious, too pathetic. The veneer of European civilization was too thin to be credible. The outlines of Asia shone through at every point. These Russian courtiers had taken on, he said, just enough of the gloss of European civilization to be "spoiled as savages," but not enough to become cultivated men. They were like (and I use his words) "trained bears who made you long for the wild ones."

Custine gradually became aware that this intolerable gap between outer pretense and inner reality was only a single reflection of something broader and more serious still—something that came to constitute, one feels, the true focal point of his indictment of the regime of Nicholas I. This was the terrible, cynical, demeaning contempt for the truth that seemed to pervade Russian government and society. The behavior of the entire governing establishment appeared to be based on the cultivation of a series of massive fictions—fictions not just subconsciously and innocently appropriated into the minds of the bearers but deliberately conceived, perpetrated, and enforced. He found himself confronted at every turn with two images of Russian reality: the image of Russia as it really was, and the image of Russia as the authorities—and not, unfortunately, the authorities alone wished it to appear. And he could never accustom himself to, or forgive, the cynicism with which everyone, from the Emperor on down, played at this game of make-believe and attempted to enthrone the false, artificial image at the expense of the real one.

Under the impact of this cultivated untruthfulness the whole facade of Russian social and official life began to appear to him as contrived, artificial, unreal. "I came here to see a country," he wrote,

> What I find is a theatre. . . . The names are the same as everywhere else. . . . In appearances everything happens as it does everywhere else. There is no difference except in the very foundation of things.

He tended to attribute this passion for pretense to a consuming inferiority complex vis-à-vis the West, to an insatiable desire on the part of the Russians to appear to be what they were in reality incapable of being. And he had no sympathy or patience for these impulses. They disgusted him. "I don't reproach the Russians," he wrote,

> for being what they are; what I blame them for is their desire to appear to be what we are. . . . They are much less interested in being civilized than in making us believe them so. . . . They would be quite content to be in effect more awful and barbaric than they actually are, if only others could thereby be made to believe them better and more civilized. . . .

In preference to this, he observed, even "a tyranny avowed would be a form of progress."

Here again, he had been forewarned by Kozlovski. "Our government," the prince had said to him,

> lives by the lie, for the truth frightens the tyrant no less than the slaves. . . . The people, and even the grandees, resigned spectators of this war against the truth, endure uncomplainingly the scandal of it, because the lie of the despot . . . will always be the flattery of the slave. . . .
>
> Russian despotism not only counts ideas and sentiments as nothing, but it remakes the facts, it struggles against the evident, and it triumphs in the cause."

And now Custine, making his own observations, could only echo these views. "One must confess it," he wrote, "Russians of all classes conspire with a marvellous harmony of effort to bring about the triumph of duplicity in their country." They had "a dexterity in the use of the lie, a natural facility for falseness" which, he said,

"revolted his sincerity." And it seemed to him that his was, in his own words, "the most enormous of faults." Why? Because "in renouncing the truth," he explained, "the spirit abdicates, and by a strange reversal of things it is then the master who humiliates himself before the slave; for the man who deceives is beneath the man who is deceived."

In one respect, however, Custine came to modify this view before his journey was ended. He had spoken, in the passage just cited, of the "man who is deceived." But he was eventually obliged to ask himself the question: was anyone really deceived? Precisely because everthing was hidden, he noted, everything was also guessed: "I look in vain for the dupes of these puerile falsehoods, and I cry out to myself like Basil: Who is deceived, here? *Tout le monde est dans le secret.*"

However, if everyone was in on the secret, everyone was taking jolly good care, Custinc also noted, not to show that he was; and the resulting atmosphere of total discretion—the quiet cautiousness, the wary guardedness of speech, the unwillingness to call things by their right names—was another aspect of Russian life that made the deepest sort of impression upon him. He referred to it as "the silence," and he conceived of it as a pervasive and sinister condition of Russian society. He found it symbolized by the strange, almost eerie stillness that prevailed on the Petersburg streets and public places. "In Russia," he observed, "only the horses have permission to make a noise."

Here, once again, his shipboard companion had not failed to tell him what was in store for him. "However little one speaks in Russia," Prince Kozlovski had said, "one always speaks too much, because in this country every discussion is the expression of a religious or politicial hypocrisy." And now, once again, Custine had occasion to make his own observations. In Russia, he concluded,

> secrecy presides over everything: administrative secrecy, political, social secrecy; discretion useful and discretion useless. A silence that is superfluous assures the silence that is necessary. Here, discretion is the order of the day, just as imprudence is in Paris. Every traveler is in himself an indiscretion. . .

And it dawned on him then that this silence, too, was part of the Russian inferiority complex with relation to the world outside. It was a weapon of foreign policy—a defensive weapon, a very effcctive one. "If it is true," he wrote,

> that better diplomats are to be found among the Russians than among the most advanced peoples, the reason is that our press informs the Russians about every plan that is proposed and every event that occurs among us. Instead of prudently concealing our weaknesses we reveal them every morning with passion, while the Byzantine policy of the Russians, at work in the shadows, is careful to hide what they are thinking and doing and fearing. We go forward in the light of day; they advance under cover. We are blinded by the ignorance in which they leave us; they are enlightened by our candor. We are weakened by rumor; they are strengthened by secrecy. And there you have the secret of their cleverness.

And yet it occurred to Custine that all these tendencies—the disrespect for the truth, the deliberate mystification, the studied silence—while representing weapons in the hands of the regimc, were also the reflections of a great underlying weakness—a weakness precisely in relation to the West. They reflected, as Custine saw it, an awareness of backwardness, a distrust of one's own people, a shame for the tyranny one dared not live without—qualities that made Russians quail at the thought of any free and true comparison with western conditions. It was this that lay at the bottom of the obsessive fear of foreign observation that seemed to him to permeate Russian officialdom.

The absurd extremism of this fear astonished Custine as it has, I think, many westerners in other ages. The Russians, Custine wrote, "are Chinese disguised; they do not like to avow their aversion to foreign observation, but if they dared to brave the reproach of barbarism, as the true Chinese do, the access to Pctersburg would be as difficult for us as is the access to Pekin." And he went on to identify, with pungency and brevity, the basic reason for this state of affairs. "The more I see of Russia." he wrote, "the more I approve the conduct of the Emperor in forbidding his subjects to travel, and in rendering access to his own country difficult to foreigners. The political system of Russia could not stand twenty years' free communication with the West of Europe."

And why was this? Custine arrived at his own explanation. It was not that the system had no achievements to its credit. It was that its achievements, such as they were, had been purchased at too heavy a price. The system was too costly and inefficient. He saw Russia, in fact, as a country where the most grandiose efforts produced the tiniest results. And given the nature of the system, it could not, he thought, bc otherwise. Despotism was, after all, composed of

> a mixture of impatience and laziness. With just a bit more patience on the part of ruling power and a bit more activity on the part of the people the same result could be obtained at a much lower cost. But what would then become of the tyranny? One would have to recognize at once that it was useless. Tyranny is the imaginary illness of the peoples [*la maladie imaginaire des peuples*]. The tyrant, disguised as a doctor, persuades them that health is not the natural state of civilized man, and the greater the danger, thc more violent, of course, must be the cure. In this way, the tyrant feeds and prolongs the ailment under the pretext of curing it.

And this, Custine went on to explain, was one of the reasons—perhaps the greatest reason—why one could not accept the Russian system as a model for anyone else. "Things that I admire elsewhere," he wrote.

> I hate here. . . . I find them too dearly paid for; order, patience, calmness, elegance, respectfulness, the natural and moral relations that ought to exist between those who think and those who do, in short all that gives worth and charm to well-organised societies, all that gives meaning and purpose to political institutions, is lost and confounded here in one single sentiment—that of fear.

Russia, accordingly, had little or no value as a example for other countries. To the extent that Custine's journey had been inspired by a desire to find the model of a

well-ordered society that could be invoked and held up as an alternative to the wretched philistinism and egalitarianism of the regime of Louis Philippe in France, this idea had now to be abandoned. "The society of the Russians, such as they have arranged it," he concluded with a tinge of sadness, "can serve only their own uses; *il faut être Russe pour vivre en Russie.*"

All these were reflections induced in Custine by the obviously intense reluctance of Russian officialdom to permit the true image of Russian reality to become known to foreigners and to constitute a basis for comparison between Russia and the West. But there was, he recognized, also something even deeper and more subjective in the distaste for the truth, the preference for the façade, the insistence on the discreet silence, to which this officialdom was addicted. There was an unwillingness to admit, even before one's own people, the full ugliness of Russian despotism. Dissimulation on so vast a scale as Custine observed it in Russia could serve, he concluded, "only to mask a profound inhumanity; it is not the good that one takes such care to conceal." And again: "A regime whose own violence is such that it be supported only by such means can only be a profoundly vicious regime."

In entertaining these gloomy thoughts on the nature of Russian despotism, Custine did not fail to take account of those qualities in the Russian peasant masses—the brutalization, the sly obstinacy, the latent anarchic trends—which called for methods of rule different from those that would have been effective in other countries. Like many another western visitor to Russia, beginning in the sixteenth century with one of the first permanent western diplomatic envoys there, Herberstein, he could not avoid asking himself to what extent the rigors of the regime constituted an unavoidable response to the nature of the people, and he was perfectly willing to recognize the psychology of the Russian masses as an extenuating circumstance. "Clemency," he observed toward the end of his journey,

> represents weakness in the approach to a people hardened by terror; nothing disarms such a people but fear; implacable severity forces it to its knees; mercy, on the contrary, causes it to raise its head; one would not know how to convince it; one can do no other than to subdue it; incapable of pride, it is not incapable of audacity; it revolts against mildness, but gives obedience to ferocity, which it mistakes for true power.

But even in these bitter reflections, he could find no fully adequate justification for the behavior of the regime. If this vicious circle of brutality and counter-brutality, this "struggle of deception, of prejudices, and of inhumanity between people and sovereign," as he termed it, was ever to be overcome, someone had to take the initiative, to set the example, and this could only be the government. "It is not to say," he explained, "that one could and should govern the Russians in this day and age as one governs other European countries; I would simply like to submit that one could avoid a number of the evils if only the example of a certain softening of the customs and manners [*l'exemple de l'adoucissement des moeurs*] were to be given from above." Did not, after all, the barbarity of the serf "accuse," as he put it, the corruption of the master?

Custine had no illusions that the leaders of the regime would concede this *adoucissement des moeurs.* Their prestige was too intimately engaged in the old policies. To modify these policies now would be to admit past error. "They fear," he wrote, "the evil effects of a tardy justice, and they aggravate the evil precisely in order not to be forced to justify [past] excesses."

Like many other visitors to Russia, Custine was struck by the monumentality, the preposterous scale, the vastness and enormity, of all that the government created. What, he asked himself, could all this be designed to symbolize, to commemorate? Scarcely Russia's past: this was too shallow, too unhappy. Also not the present: this was too unimpressive and depressing. Only the future remained. Undertakings so vast in sale could be justified only by service to some grandiose design—to some far-flung ambition, embracing more than past and present, and more than just Russia alone.

And what could this be? There was only one conceivable answer: world conquest—conquest in the name of ideological proselytism—conquest as a concealment and expiation of internal failure. This, he concluded, was the "*arrière-pensée*" behind all Russian policy. It was an *arrière-pensée* to which men deferred without even being aware that they were doing so. But the recognition of it seemed to him essential to any understanding of Russia. Without it, he wrote, "the history of Russia would appear to me an inexplicable enigma." What, after all, was "Saint Petersburg in its magnificence and immensity" if not "*un trophée élevé par les Russes à leur puissance à venir?*"

There was of course nothing new, even in Custine's day, about the idea of world conquest as the innermost impulse of Russian policy. For 350 years western travelers in Russia had been arriving at similar thoughts and suspicions. Of this, too, the Russian prince had spoken, on board the ship; and he had offered his explanation. There had been a time, he had said, when Russia had herself stood, as a Christian nation, between the Mongol hordes and the civilization of Europe. But things had now changed. Russia had herself become a semi-Asiatic country. And having been for centuries oppressed and humiliated by the Tatar hordes, Russian rulers were now inspired by a subconscious desire to compensate for these humiliations by inflicting them on others—at home and abroad. Suffering, after all, did not make people humane. It was a habit of princes and of people to take their revenge upon the innocent. They fancied themselves strong when they created victims. Thus the Russians had now come to occupy with relation to Europe the place the Mongols had once occupied with relation to Russia. The role of buffer between Europe and Asia, once filled by Russia herself, had come now to be assumed by the Poles.

This point made a profound impression on Custine when he first heard it from Kozlovski's lips. And now people in Russia confirmed it. "Europe," he quotes some of them as saying to him in Petersburg, "is following the road that Poland took: she is enervating herself in a vain liberalism, whilst we continue powerful precisely because we are not free; let us be patient under the yoke; others will some day pay for our shame."

The logic of this thesis, and his inability to find a better explanation for many of the phenomena with which he

Russia was a menace to itself . . . by virtue of the fact that it had no past to believe in.

was faced, filled Custine with a dread sense of the menace that Russia must someday constitute for Western Europe—for a Western Europe, in particular, that seemed to be losing its faith in its own ideals and traditions. And it was to this thought that he addressed what seem to me to be some of the most eloquent and significant passages of his entire work. "An ambition inordinate and immense," he wrote,

> one of those ambitions which could only possibly spring in the bosoms of the oppressed, and could find nourishment only in the miseries of an entire nation, ferments in the heart of the Russian people. That nation, essentially aggressive, greedy under the influence of privation, expiates beforehand, by a debasing submission, the design of exercising a tyranny over other nations: the glory, the riches, which are the objects of its hopes, console it for the disgrace to which it submits. To purify himself from the foul and impious sacrifice of all public and personal liberty, the slave, sunk to his knees, dreams of world domination.

Did one, Custine then asked himself, have to take these dreams seriously? What was this thought of conquest, which he now saw and described as "the secret life of Russia?" "Is it merely a lure," he asked himself, "designed to seduce primitive populations over one period of time or another, or must it some day be realised?" He confessed himself obsessed with this question. "Ever since I came to Russia," he wrote,

> I have taken a dark view of the future of Europe. This opinion is challenged, to be sure, by some very wise and experienced men. They maintain that I exaggerate Russian power. Every society, they say, suffers its reverses, and the destiny of this one is to expand to the East and then to become itself divided. . . . (The contemporary reader will not fail to note the relevance of this passage to the Chinese-Soviet conflict.)
>
> [But] I see the Colossus from close at hand and I find it difficult to persuade myself that the only object of this creation of Providence is to diminish the barbarism of Asia. It appears to me that it is chiefly destined to chastise the corrupt civilization of Europe, by the agency of a new invasion. The eternal tyranny of the East menaces us incessantly; and we shall have to bow before it, if our extravagances and iniquities render us worthy of the punishment.

To Custine, the danger of Russia's strength was always, first and foremost, a function of Europe's own weakness. "It is not for nothing," he wrote,

> that Providence is piling up these enormous inactive forces in the East of Europe. Some day this sleeping giant will rouse himself, and then force will put an end to our wordy liberal confusion [literally, to "rule by the word"]. . . .
>
> When our cosmopolitan democracy, bearing its final fruit, has made out of war something odious to entire populations, when those nations that are supposed to be the most civilised ones on earth have finally enervated themselves in their political debauchery and have fallen progressively into internal somnolence and the world's contempt, when, swooning in their egotism, they have lost all attraction for other as allies, then the floodgates of the North (The term "North" was often used, at the time, to refer in a general way to Russia, as the term "East" might be today.) will be opened once more in our faces, and we shall be subjected to a final invasion, no longer by ignorant barbarians but by sophisticated, enlightened masters, masters more enlightened than ourselves, for they will have learned from our excesses how we could and should be ruled.

But would this then, Custine asked himself, as many people were to ask themselves at a later period in history, would this be so terrible? Would it be the end? Would a Russian domination be really intolerable? Would it not have its uses? He did not think so. He explained, in words that recall much of the contemporary discussion of Soviet policy in Czechoslovakia, why he rejected this suggestion:

> A Russian domination, even if it should limit itself to diplomatic demands, without proceeding to actual conquest, would seem to me to be the deadliest possible thing for the world. One is deceiving one's self about the role that country would play in Europe. By its own constitutional principles, Russia appears to represent order; but by the character of its people it would propagate tyranny under the pretext of putting an end to anarchy.

This, then, was Custine's view of the significance of Russia for the future of Europe. A threat? Yes. Unavoidably so, because Russia's backwardness, the uneven rhythm of her own development, and her inability to come to terms with herself forbade it to be otherwise. A nation that was not at peace with itself could not be at peace with its neighbors. But the menace Russia presented was something that could be measured only in terms of Europe's own weakness.

Russia was aggressive—yes—out of a desire to be something it was not. Europe, however, was threatened primarily by its failure to be all that it really was.

Russia was aggressive—yes—for lack of quality it recognized and envied in others but did not itself possess. Europe was threatened primarily by its failure to respect and to preserve a quality that was already its own.

Russia was a menace to itself and to others—yes—by virtue of the fact that it had no past to believe in. Europe was threatened primarily by its failure to respect the past that it had.

There were noted, at the beginning of this chapter, the views on political institutions with which Custine entered upon his journey to Russia. It remains to note the ones with which he returned, for they were different in emphasis even though they may not have been, as he himself claimed, greatly different in kind.

The reader will recall Custine's statement that he went to Russia "to seek arguments against representative government." Actually, this was only a part of the sentence. It is now necessary to take cognizance of the remainder of it, which read: "but I return the partisan of constitu-

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PART TWO:

Life as a Russian Worker

R. H. SANGER

This continues the story of the Sangers' life in Russia in the early 1930s.
The photo above shows Stalin with leaders of Russia at the time of this visit.
Photographs by the author.

Life as a Factory Worker

After six months in a Moscow office and nearly four months on various farms we felt the time had come for factory jobs outside of Moscow. So we got work in an electrolytic zinc plant in Ordzhonikidze, a little city at the north end of the Georgian Military Highway in the Caucasus. Two days on a crowded train took us to this zinc center; it required four days to find a place to stay. Then an apprentice at the factory (who worked part-time in the hotel) said his family would rent space in their flat. To get into the room we had to pass through the bedroom where the mother and two grown-up daughters lived. The father slept on the dining room table and the son on a row of dining room chairs, the grandmother occupied the kitchen, and the grandfather the bathroom. There was no electricity and not too much heat. But the place was clean, had running water and the family were good examples of Russian workers.

The family wanted 100 Russian rubles a month for our space, and we compromised on two US dollars which, being hard currency, enabled the family to buy meat and other imported items at the Torgsin store where only hard currencies and articles of intrinsic value were accepted. The flat had that unforgettable Russian smell of cornmeal frying in sunflower seed oil, black bread, cheap tobacco, and unwashed bodies, all sealed in for the winter with strips of paper and putty around the windows.

We found the family delightful. The father had worked in the zinc plant for 26 years before its modernization and had poisoning, acquired, so he said, because in those days the plant was privately owned. His ageless wife talked constantly about the difficulties of life. The older daughter, aged 18, a student at a Farm Technicum, spent most of her leisure time primping before a cracked mirror. The younger girl, studying to be a doctor's assistant, was an ardent Communist. The main relaxation of the apprentice son was playing the tuba.

For the next three months I rose in the pitch darkness at 5:30 a.m., ate a hurried breakfast of cereal, tea, and black bread, and joined a column of silent figures moving to the gate of the zinc plant, urged forward by repeated blasts of the factory whistle which boomed through the fog like the voice of a hungry animal waiting to be fed. Once inside the walled compound I made my way to my bench in the machine shop where, under the guidance of a brigade foreman, I worked on all sorts of odd jobs ranging from filing down a pair of zinc bookends to repairing hammers and wrenches.

Lunch was at 11:00, eaten in one of the four "graded" dining rooms and usually consisted of soup, meatballs, potatoes, macaroni, and a sweet white cake plus lots of black bread. This was a heavy industry, semi-military plant so the meals were far better than anything I had on the farm or for that matter on the Moscow Daily News.

About once a week we had folk dancing in the machine shop—very lively since all Caucasians are born dancers. At first I thought it was put on for my special benefit, but I learned that the dancing was rotated from shop to shop each day. After lunch at the factory we were often called to the "Red Corner," the propaganda center, by a good looking Red Army man who told of the dangers of sudden attack by the Capitalist powers. Most of the audience seemed bored.

The pace of work in the afternoons was slower and men on nearby benches would ask me about conditions in America. Their ideas of the United States—derived from local Communist papers—were that half the workers were unemployed and all of them were lucky to get horsemeat. At the end of the first week I was promoted to threading three inch bolts and on the day I exceeded my quota of four bolts an hour I was taken by the leader of our brigade to the dining room for

"Udarniks" or shock workers, where we had soup and four pieces of real meat.

Fridays were pay days, and on getting our money we were urged to buy tickets in the State Lottery. I never heard of anyone winning, but not to have taken a ticket would have been a sign of bad attitude. In spite of "voluntary projects" we got occasional days off, usually spent sleeping, shopping and playing chess at the workers club. A particularly jolly weekend was at the plant's rest home, marked by native dances, charades, an amateur hour where everyone had to perform, and setting up exercises in the snow.

After a month in the machine shop I was moved to a repair brigade in the roasting department. If anything broke we were rushed in to fix it which we did by cannibalization and occasionally theft from other sections of the plant. Our efforts were often slowed by power shortages or lack of needed parts. But when we did get things running again there would be cheers and cries of "Socialism wins again."

At first Marion was assigned the job of running one of the heavy, manually operated overhead cranes that moved the bars of finished zinc. But the physical work involved was too much for her, so she sadly accepted a job in the day nursery looking after the children of the women workers in the plant.

There all play was politically directed. Even four year olds were taught to line up wooden tanks in defense against invasions by capitalist countries, or to hurry little wooden trucks to overfill production quotas on state farms. Because they were free from looking after their children, the women did all sorts of heavy jobs in the plant. In fact there was a "volunteer" shock brigade of women which was used to unload railway cars or shovel concentrate into the roaster when the conveyor feeders broke down. They were proud of being called "the little locomotives."

We did most of our shopping in the central farmer's bazaar, a combination country fair, junkyard, and flea market where the peasants offered everything they thought might be sold. This ran from vegetables, chickens, and homemade breads to kindling wood, threadbare padded coats, worn boots and old brass kerosene stoves. The day in town was a big event for the farmers and they brought their families with them, often coming twenty miles in two wheeled carts drawn by thin horses or donkeys.

After another four weeks I got a ten per cent raise and took home 120 rubles a month working in the leaching department. Here there was no dancing at lunchtime but lectures on how to avoid being burned by the sulphuric acid from the cumbersome hoses which we hauled around corners and tied down with muddy ropes. The foreman of our shift was a stocky young woman who was on duty for 24 hours and then had four days off.

By now I realized that the new section of the zinc plant, which had been in operation for less than a year, was running at about 15 per cent of its capacity. It employed some 300 office workers and 1,600 production workers to turn out an average of eight tons of zinc a day. In contrast to this, a plant in East St. Louis had 16 office workers, 170 production workers, and regularly made 50 tons of high quality zinc a day. I asked the American engineer who had designed both plants and who gave me the above figures for an explanation.

"The trouble goes back to a meeting of the directors of the Zinc Trust in Moscow when a 60 ton a day plant was proposed. I insisted there was not enough electric power, sulphuric acid, trained labor, or zinc ore in the North Caucasus to warrant a plant bigger than 20 tons a day at the most. At this the Political Commissar who was presiding pointed to a picture of Lenin over which

Children in a nursery like the one where Mrs. Sanger taught.

Mikhail Borodin addressing a meeting of editors and workers

was written 'There is no fortress which Socialism cannot storm.' Then the Commissar said, 'There is a plant in America making 50 tons of electrolytic zinc a day. Does anyone wish to go on record voting for a smaller plant than that of the capitalists?' No one did. Thus the larger plant became an unchangeable part of the second Five Year Plan, even though everyone present knew that it would be years before it produced to capacity. Given such political domination of the Russian economy, the inflexible planning system and the vagaries of the Russian mind, this is how factories are built in the USSR today."

PART IV

Socialist Vacations

On leaving Moscow and Ordzhonikidze we sold our surplus clothes, medical supplies, and such extras as razor blades and toothpaste, for over 5,000 rubles. In a country where the average worker made 100 rubles a month, this was a small fortune and we decided to spend it on travel and rest. So we took a trip along the Volga and then spent a month by the Black Sea. Much of it was at a workers' rest home near the beach at the resort of Sochi, a stretch of blue water, pebbly beaches, pointed cedars, and brilliant tropical plants, sheltered by wooded mountains.

There we saw the proletariat elite at play: upper level Party officials, brigade leaders, and shock workers. The first surprise came when we put on bathing suits and headed for one of the beaches below the hotel. To our embarrassment we were the only people in sight wearing suits. It is interesting how fast one can get used to swimming and sunbathing without clothes. Furthermore we found there were other nearby beaches for those who preferred to wear something, which at that time usually consisted of black underwear since the state was "wasting" little effort on making bathing suits.

Chess and checkers room of the Rest House on the Black Sea

Almost every day we joined in a "Socialist Excursion," taking overcrowded and rickety buses to see such sights as the Botanical Park, the Museum of the Revolution, or to the Hydrogen Sulphide Spring in the sunlit valley of Matsesta, much patronized by crippled coal-miners and peasants with arthritis. The Russians said the waters must be beneficial because they were so evil-smelling. On these trips we often passed, but never talked about, the large villa reserved for the use of Stalin, his sons, daughter Svetlana, and an inner circle of party bosses and drinking companions.

Our most interesting hours were spent with the group at our table in the dining room, or on the bedroom balconies, where almost every evening over a bowl of fresh fruit, Caucasian sweets, and a bottle of local wine we talked far into the night. The word had spread that we were American Communists and after a few drinks people in these groups talked freely.

The women complained about the high cost of food, the difficulties of life with children in overcrowded apartments, and the poor quality and scarcity of clothing. The men spoke of low pay, the shortages of power and raw materials and the need for more consumer goods. They agreed there had been a food shortage, but insisted it was due to the obstinancy of land-hungry kulaks and the evil deeds of counter-revolutionaries.

A frequent member of our group was a lieutenant from the nearby rest home of the Red Army. He probably was sent to check on us but his love of vodka outran his discretion. One night he told about having been assigned to the party which took former Prime Minister Herriot of France around the Ukraine. The visitor insisted there was a famine and the Russians were told to "unconvince him." To do this they promised to take him to village "A." Next they chose village "B" and moved out its sick and hungry inhabitants, replacing them with healthy families from the Red

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Communist leaders are turning not to Marx and Lenin . . . but to the Harvard Business School

EASTERN EUROPE: The Unstable Element in the Soviet Empire

ROBERT F. BYRNES

Robert F. Byrnes, Distinguished Professor of History at Indiana University, adapted this article from a study he made for the Senate Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations in September 1970. Dr. Byrnes has been chairman of the Conference on Slavic and East European Affairs, director of the International Affairs Center, director of the Indiana University's Russian and East European Institute and head of its history department. He is the author of several historical works.

EASTERN EUROPE remains a part of Europe and therefore the very heart of the struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. The thesis of Walter Lippmann in 1947 is still valid: the main problem is "whether, when, and under what conditions the Red Army can be prevailed upon to evacuate Europe," because the balance of power and peace can be achieved only with withdrawal.

Soviet control of most of Eastern Europe has given it forward military bases and possession of the traditional invasion routes into Europe. The Soviet position constitutes a kind of pistol at the head of the West. The peoples and resources of the area increase Soviet economic and military power.

At the same time, the Soviet position gives it a veto over the unification of Germany and over the unification or reconstruction of Europe. It maintains the fear of another Russian-German alliance and therefore provides opportunities for Soviet diplomacy. It also enables the Soviet Union to restrict the role European states can play in world politics.

The Surface View of Soviet Authority

Soviet control over Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland appears tighter and firmer than ever before, and the relative independence of Romania is severely hedged by its geographical position. The force and skill with which Soviet-led ground forces crushed Czechoslovakia in August 1968 demonstrated that the Soviet Union is powerful and resolute and that it would not tolerate significant modification of the Communist monopoly.

Moreover, Czechoslovak socialist humanism was crushed at remarkably low cost, and the post-invasion diplomatic skill was exceptional. The cause of Czechoslovakia disappeared far more quickly from the international scene than did Hungary's in 1956. Even the losses within the international Communist movement were restricted. Moreover, the Soviets have demonstrated impressive political skill in changing the Czechoslovak political system since August 1968.

At the same time, the United States concentrates its diplomatic energies upon finding honorable and quick endings to crises caused in part by Soviet aggressive actions, the war in Southeast Asia and the conflict in the Middle East, and on reaching an agreement in the SALT talks. Moreover, the United States is swept by disillusion, weariness, a revival of isolationism, another wave of hedonism, and a one-sided intellectual disarmament which clearly reduce our influence in world politics and must affect the Soviet view of Soviet prospects. In fact, we often resemble Great Britain or France in the 1930s. In addition, most Americans, for understandable reasons, are increasingly preoccupied with domestic social problems, at the same time that many of our intellectuals and opinion makers concentrate upon debunking American policy since the end of World War II.

Our allies in Europe after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia also resumed their relationships with the Soviet Union and its East European allies. In fact, the West German government, with the full understanding and support of its allies, on August 12, 1970 signed a nonaggression agreement in Moscow which recognizes the inviolability of the present boundaries of Europe. This means apparent acceptance of the Soviet position in that critical area and may lead to some kind of status or recognition for East Germany.

Western acceptance of Soviet hegemony and even perhaps of the German Democratic Republic helps explain the Soviet drive for a détente. The Soviets must also seek to soften and divide the West; to take advantage of the current American disarray and irresolution to ease the United States out of Europe; to destroy NATO; to paralyze West European efforts toward some kind of unity; to obtain trade and credits for itself and for the equally stagnant economies of Eastern Europe; and to attain some kind of security on their Western borders at a time of prolonged tension with Communist China.

However, the policy of détente also raises problems and challenges. Indeed, I believe that it represents a great gamble and exposes Soviet Western borderlands to uncontrollable developments. Basically, West

German acceptance of the present boundaries of Eastern Europe represents no real change: no Western states hoped or intended to change those boundaries, and no treaty can guarantee their permanence. Moreover, this agreement and other West German treaties with the several states under Soviet hegemony will reduce Czech and Polish fear of West Germany and help create a climate of trust and peaceful rivalry.

Soviet controls lose their justification and some of their potency when fear is reduced, while those elements of our strength become ever more effective as peaceful relations are more widely accepted. In short, moving the competition into fields where our weapons are most effective will enable the Western states to use their economic, intellectual, and diplomatic tools with the different countries in such a way as to undermine the Soviet position.

The Basic Instability of Communist Eastern Europe

Eastern Europe is a seriously unstable area. It constitutes the Achilles heel of an overextended empire, an area which has already given Soviet leaders several serious cases of indigestion. The Soviet Union will not be able to absorb its peoples as easily as Russia did those of Central Asia just 100 years ago. Moreover, Eastern Europe is subject to the same economic, social, and intellectual forces that are causing rapid change everywhere in the world.

The basic problem for the Soviet Union is simple: its military and political rule is threatened by powerful economic, social, and intellectual forces not susceptible to the controls that have proved effective in the Soviet Union (and which will remain effective there).

First of all, nationalism is a rising phenomenon throughout Eastern Europe, as Yugoslav, Albanian, and Romanian relations with the Soviet Union all demonstrate. The peasants kept it alive during the dreadful years under Stalin and his puppets. Now, the affection for the national history and culture, and for the national interest, has been adopted by the workers, the middle class, the students, and the intelligentsia as well.

The economic problems that the rulers and their Soviet overlords face

make Eastern Europe especially vulnerable to Western strengths. East Europeans, at enormous effort, including the sacrifice of most civil liberties, have modernized their economies quite significantly, and substantially progressed in industrial production. However, they find that the command economy methods have "taken them as far as they can go," and that the West Europeans in the same two decades have moved into a new economic era, which leaves East Europeans even further behind than before. This discovery and the clear slowing down of the Czechoslovak economy in the mid-1960s were at the root of the Czechoslovak problem.

Moreover, the economic and social problems of Czechoslovakia are even more challenging than they were before the invasion. The Soviet Union does not have the materials or the understanding to provide assistance; indeed, it is hampered by the same scientific and technical lag. At the same time, it has prevented the Czechoslovaks from obtaining economic and intellectual sustenance abroad. Consequently, the stagnant Czechoslovak economy will stagger on, with a working class ever less disposed to obey the commands of its rulers and with an industrial base ever less competent, at a time when a new wave of industrial advance is sweeping the West.

On the other hand, if necessary changes from abroad are introduced, they will inevitably reverberate throughout the economy and into intellectual and political life. The Russians in turning to the West for technological and scientific aid for the flagging economies of Czechoslovakia or Poland are thus courting serious dangers. In contemporary terms, the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe is a closed system facing a modernization crisis of especial severity because it is compounded by imperial problems. In an old Russian phrase, they seek a fire which will not burn.

Moreover, this new fire may not succeed in warming up the stagnant economies of these countries, but may only stimulate appetites and intensify problems. From 60 to 75 per cent of their foreign trade is committed to the Soviet Union by long-term agreements, so they have little freedom of action. Generally, the East European states are obliged to ship their finest industrial products to Moscow, receiving in return raw materials, such as oil, gas, and iron ore. In addition, the quality of their goods generally falls far below the level sought by Western consumers, and East Europeans lack marketing skills. In short, prospects for greatly increased trade between Eastern and Western Europe are dim.

An intellectual and philosophical vacuum also creates a dangerously unstable system in Eastern Europe. Briefly, Marxism-Leninism is considered less and less relevant even by Communist leaders, due to the changes in doctrine introduced since 1956; the visible breakup of the solidarity of the international Communist movement and the development of various forms of Communism; the rapid changes within these societies; the revived interest in traditional beliefs, including religion; and the irrelevance of Marxism-Leninism to help resolve the problems these states now face. Communist leaders are turning not to Marx and Lenin to resolve their economic problems, but to the Harvard Business School and to Western technology.

Above all, Eastern Europe is unstable because of the remarkable recovery and the growing vitality of Western Europe, the ideas and ideals and cultural influences of which are overwhelming Eastern Europe and having a significant impact in the Soviet Union as well. Movies, music, fashions, novels, economic theory, social relations between generations, and all of the qualitative achievements of Western science and technology are thoroughly known, respected, and envied throughout Eastern Europe. In fact,

Western Europe is a magnet for the East, as it was before the First World War, and the sunflower turns to the West now rather than to Moscow. Indeed, Moscow must on occasion see Eastern Europe as a carrier of Western infections, rather than a barrier or "cordon Stalinaire."

Unfortunately, from the Soviet point of view, Eastern Europe cannot be isolated from Western Europe and the rest of the world as it was during Stalin's time, and the prospects for increased external influence grow. In fact, Soviet efforts for a détente will certainly increase Western influence throughout Eastern Europe. The impact of this flood is already obvious among those whom the Communist regimes have most favored, the workers, the students, and the intellectuals, who brought about the revolts in 1953 and 1956 and the move for "socialism with a human face" in Czechoslovakia.

The question is, therefore: Can Soviet military and police power control these economic, social, and intellectual forces, or will these forces produce changes like those that undid the work of the Congress of Vienna 150 years ago? Will these forces lead to situations such as 1956 and 1968, but next time in several countries simultaneously and with more skilled leadership and even greater popular support? Will the intellectual and economic and social pressures produce a general softening, withering away, or nibbling at the power of those supported by the Soviet Union, a development causing a slow and gradual erosion of will like that which has afflicted other societies at other times? What will be the impact of such developments within the Soviet Union?

Our Strengths and Our Diplomacy

Our economic and military strength is so vast that we do not understand its significance, while our power when added to that of our allies almost staggers the imagination, However, our greatest strength is almost invisible, because it is the social vitality, the effervescent intellectual vigor, and the freedom and openness in which we live and face our serious problems.

Western Europe, most of which is allied with the United States and with which we share values, has the same kinds of resources. Its economic, political, and spiritual recovery proves that its brief period of decline is over and that it will soon assume a central role again in world affairs. The progress its states have made since 1950 towards some form of federal or other union has been remarkable. Moreover, the existence of several possibilities for union and the open-endedness of the various plans both constitute advantages in the 1970s, when some or all of the states of Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union, may become associated.

Another strength of the United States and its European allies is their leading role in introducing revolutionary scientific, technical, philosophical, and social concepts into political and international life. The Western states are equipped for change, lead in it, respect it, assume it. They help to create a series of revolutionary changes as significant as those of the Renaissance and Reformation. But these are condensed into a shorter period of time, produce more elemental transformations within every society they touch, and are universal in their scope. The West is riding, if not driving, a complex of revolutionary changes which recognize no frontiers. We therefore possess a tremendous advantage over the Soviet Union, a most conservative society bothered by heresies that it cannot master and fearful of change throughout its empire.

Finally, in the competition which lies ahead, economic, social, and political forces, which are among our greatest strengths, will play an increasingly important role in world politics in a situation in which those who work best in times of peace can act most effectively.

All of our strengths can be used effectively only if we have confidence in ourselves and in the peoples of Eastern Europe, of whom we tend to know little and whom we often disparage. We must, first of all, maintain and increase when necessary our economic and military power. We should maintain our alliances, particularly NATO. We must continue to demonstrate resolution and perseverance in our relations with the Soviet Union, and we should under no circumstances allow anyone to doubt our strength, resolution, and credibility.

The central position in our foreign policy should remain the peaceful reconstruction of Europe. This should be accomplished without alarming the Soviet Union but providing the states and peoples of Eastern Europe with the independence and right to self-determination which they deserve and seek. In the immediate future, the principal goal for the United States and its allies should be ensuring the safety and security of West Berlin as an integral part of West Germany, which should have unhindered access. Our diplomacy should also continue to concentrate upon obtaining agreement on a monitored withdrawal of Russian and American troops from Europe.

I know of no dramatic step that we can take toward our long-term goals. In fact, we should seek to avoid dramatic steps or crises, which would increase the instability of Eastern Europe and alarm the Soviet peoples and their leaders, both sensitive to their hard-won position on their Western borders. We should press for reconciliation and promote the new forces bringing change. We should also reiterate our continuing national interest in the application of self-determination to Eastern Europe and in the reconstruction of a peaceful Europe, accomplished with the support of the Soviet Union, which would benefit from the end of an unstable and dangerous situation.

We should also seek to increase the quality of the American diplomats engaged in Russian and East European affairs. The United States stumbled and fumbled in Eastern Europe before the two world wars, in part because we usually assigned our most skilled diplomats to other areas. But we have also benefited from the remarkably high quality of our representation from the Department of State and USIA in these areas since World War II. However, the brilliant generation that set these standards is now moving off the scene, and we need to pay increased efforts to appointing first-rate men and women to these posts and strengthening the quality of those responsible in Washington.

We ought to make intensive and skilled use of our economic strength and our cultural vitality. We should

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Outside the little oasis of the diplomatic colony there stretched still, fascinating and inviting, the great land and life of Russia . . .
—MEMOIRS 1925-1950, George F. Kennan

To Moscow— With Nostalgia

PETER SEMLER

The author, Peter Semler, has served in the South Pacific, the Soviet Union, France and Germany. He graduated from Yale in 1953 and joined the Foreign Service in 1956. He is now in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs.

Mr. Semler claims that his wife, the illustrator of his article, had something to do with interesting him in Russia. Mrs. Semler, who was born in Yugoslavia of White Russian parents, is a graduate of Georgetown University.

THE Foreign Service has a number of unstated conventions. One of these is the reticence with which Foreign Service officers speak of their past posts. All of us, I am convinced, accumulate over the years a collection of movable feasts along with some less digestible experiences. Inwardly we compare our good posts much as old Paris hands roam the world, the comparative merits of Paris bistros programed forever into their minds. A voice within us vibrates when we hear, at a remote distance, of a remarkable accomplishment of our former country of assignment, or when a face, a tune, or a picture brings to life again the experiences which made the old post a part of ourselves.

Yet, we seem to think that this mental baggage is too frail to stand exposure. To hear Foreign Service officers exchange small talk over sherry at an AFSA luncheon is to be in a world where housing, amenities, and the idiosyncracies of Ambassadors are the only things that matter.

Moscow exemplifies this convention. A good word is seldom heard about it. Our diplomats and journalists have produced over the years a sizable body of literature that usually reads like an article in FOREIGN AFFAIRS to which a touch of the Post Report has been added.

To be sure, Charles Thayer added humor to the record. Lyric passages are buried in George Kennan's "Memoirs" that throw more light on his relationship with Russia than his essays on Soviet foreign policy. But most of the literature unfortunately oscillates between the humdrum happenings in a small Western community sometimes overcome with its own importance and the often none too original views of the writer about United States-Soviet relations.

For all of the poor-mouthing about life in Moscow, the number of recidivists there now, and the larger throng waiting its turn elsewhere, must compare with the waiting lists for Paris and London. It is true that our very own version of the scissors' crisis adds to the attraction of Moscow: at the same time as one's propensity to consume dips sharply after the initial visit to GUM, the grateful Government picks up a larger than normal share of our expenses. The result is often the temporary severance of links with the Credit Union which in turn gives rise to momentary euphoria..

Nevertheless, most of my friends in the years 1962-1964 liked Moscow not just for financial reasons. Working for an Ambassador who, with his wife, did his level best to run a happy Embassy helped. So, too, did the presence of Embassy officers and staff with more than the usual zest for the silly and the bizarre. We always had the makings of a lively evening among ourselves and with our friends from other Embassies. Perhaps the rule really is that the less auspicious the circumstances, the sharper the sense of humor of Foreign Service types.

For me, as for my friends I suspect, the real problem was to leave the Embassy behind. With all its services (only Bonn can match Embassy Moscow in my experience, and even Bonn did not have its very own dentist's chair) the Embassy

was a welcome haven for the traveler coming home. It lost its charm quickly enough when we were forced to spend a few days without leaving it. The real compensation for a tour in Moscow lay beyond its confines.

Beyond was a large city with as many monstrous specimens of 20th-century bureaucratic architecture as any place in the world, with its share of diesel fumes and coal dust, with crowds as given to elbowing as those on the subway at home. But Moscow, like any truly great city, still combines the scent of ten centuries of history with the pulse of our times. Just enough remained of the solid stone two-story bourgeois homes of the 19th century, or the ornately carved and wainscoted log houses of an earlier time, of churches and palaces of all periods for the Sunday stroller to drink in the past, to conjure up the age of troikas and musketeers, of Andrei Rublev and Lev Tolstoy, of Peter and Rasputin, in that half-daydream induced by the weakening of the sense of time.

Beyond were splendid views of a river making a Seine-like pattern through the city, with its embankments and bridges, and with an occasional broad sweep of the hills behind. In Red Square, the crenelated walls of the Kremlin provided a bas relief for the rhythms of the cupolas of St. Basil's and for the turrets of the two structural monuments to Europe's Golden Age standing guard at the entrance to the Square. Like all such architectural achievements, Red Square changes with the seasons. In the heat of a summer evening, the *kvass* wagons standing by at the curbs, the Square exudes comfort and good feeling. How different it is after a snowfall has left patches of white on the gold cupolas of the Kremlin churches above. Then it appears majestic. To find Red Square at its most ominous, one need only wait for a snowy evening toward dusk when the combined victims of its history seem ready to reenter the Square, ghostlike, to join the huddled and bundled passers-by.

It was always harder to penetrate the Moscow of the living than old Moscow. In this great city of sprawling apartment complexes, the entries remained mysterious to us foreigners as if the city consisted of Orchard Street or the Rue St. Denis,

whetting one's curiosity but lined with intriguing buildings which one did not enter without a purpose.

All the more rewarding, then, were those evenings when we could be with the Muscovites at their most relaxed—when they were neither travelers, nor guests, nor out on the town but at home. One does not forget arriving for the first time at a Russian home on a bitter November evening, nostrils signalling their frozen state, to be greeted by a roaring fireplace and generous "riumkis" of medicinal vodka, drunk at such moments without the usual hors d'oeuvres. How the fire, the internal anti-freeze and a good meal led inevitably to a conversation which just as inevitably became more metaphysical as the night wore on.

No matter the occupations of our hosts at such times: sooner or later, the conversation must turn to the meaning of life just as a similar evening in Paris requires discussion of the arts. Nietzsche would have felt at home among these people able to treat the most profound subjects without that "*teutscher* Ernst" which bothered him so much.

Beyond was the incomparable Moscow region with a whole world to be discovered within the forty-kilometer limitation placed on foreigners. The exhilaration of a sunny day when one's cross country skis develop their own momentum, permitting their rider to glide along effortlessly amidst the shafts of sun making their way through the birch branches. Or arriving at the edge of a glade with a sweep ahead of sev-

eral miles of rolling snow-covered fields coming to an end at the pickets of a small village, its single cupola standing out amid the wooden houses. Stopping at an *izba* or log hut with multi-colored wainscoting and receiving the hot tea generously offered by one of those indestructible women on whom Russia still depends. Leaving behind the jammed Sunday "electric" with its crowds of excursionists to cut across miles of pasture and blue-green forest, every inch covered with snow, to arrive at the next spoke of the railroad net converging on Moscow. Or doing the same on foot in the spring, hiking through fenceless country laced with brooks and birch forest.

Further beyond was Russia itself, sufficient for me at least to dull any incipient taste for the exotic regions of Central Asia or Siberia. Any direction from Moscow took one to places seemingly untouched by five hard decades. Any Russian knows how much the town of Masensk suffered during the war. Yet, the foreigner coming down the hill through the Turgeniev territory around Orel who sees the forty cupolas ahead docs not know this.

The monastery town of Zagorsk, best approached by train, still greets its visitors with a profusion of domes and towers. In the Ukraine, distant trains thread their way through lush green countryside for the visitor standing at the Monument to Peter at Poltava. There are Kremlins to be seen at Vladimir, at Rostov Velikiy, at Yaroslav'l. All this without mentioning the trump cards of Russian tourism: the sweep of the Neva at Leningrad, the ur-Byzantine magic of St. Sophia's Cathedral at Kiev, the monastery town of Suzdal.

Above all, the people were beyond. We often wondered how they could remain the way they did, crowded into communal apartments (a situation which may at long last be improving), and spending much of their free time obtaining the necessities of life. They often seemed protected by an armor of humor, born of adversity, of endurance, and a refusal to be ground down by circumstances.

In asking ourselves how the Russians kept their spirit intact after so much hardship, we were of course giving way to our own Western ethnocentricity, wanting to judge Russians by the standards of West Europe. In "Notes from the Underground," Dostoievsky may have revealed the key when he observed that Russians are never really romantics whatever they may say

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Three on the State of the Nation

COMES THE REVOLUTION, *by Edward W. Lewis. Arbor House, $6.50.*
THE SECOND YEAR OF THE NIXON WATCH, *by John Osborne. Liveright, $5.95.*
AMERICA THE DUTIFUL, *by Philip W. Quigg. Simon and Schuster, $6.95.*

WORKING journalists Osborne and Lewis of THE NEW REPUBLIC and the New York DAILY NEWS, respectively, agree that the performance of the Nixon administration is getting worse with each passing day. The primary deficiencies are the President's inability to grasp the magnitude of the problems he faces and to apply the resources of his administration to domestic and international programs that have any promise. Having Spiro Agnew as a Vice President does not help.

Osborne's book is a collection of 39 unrevised weekly columns about the events and nonevents in the Nixon Administration's second year in office. All were previously published in THE NEW REPUBLIC; some have notes added which update items reported earlier. Written in highly readable prose, the book suffers in structure because of the space limitations imposed on weekly columnists, a minor fault. Osborne views Nixon as a man with some good intentions but who is now hopelessly lost in his battles to improve his personal image and make the bureaucracy respond to his will. One must note a strong parallel in the decline in effectiveness of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon as national leaders. Perhaps the office has become impossible and we are resigned to one-term occupants of the White House.

Lewis argues that the currents of discontent in America are building to proportions that can only be described as revolutionary. He considers revolution inevitable; only the form, timing and duration of the revolution remain in doubt. He finds our nation in a period of serious economic and social upheaval comparable to the declining days of the Hoover Administration and does not see an FDR on the horizon to lead us out of the morass. He certainly does not mince words when he states ". . . Nixon, like Hoover, lacks the knowledge of humanity that brings respect and understanding for people bewildered, distressed and demoralized, suspicious of those in authority and fearful of a future unless the system is changed." The author advocates some major surgery in our constitutional Federalism, including reorganizing Congress to make it more responsive to the electorate, merging some of the smaller states into regional systems of administration and reorganizing the two major political parties to reflect a truer liberal-conservative ideological split rather than the current system of loose ideological and regional units which come together only at election time to run on platforms of "lowest common denominator" campaign promises. Lewis has a punchy, highly readable style with a strong touch of H. L. Mencken's iconoclasm. His ideas are worth pondering and include a great amount of common sense. He can be faulted only in terms of organizing his recommendations more effectively.

If the reader is left stunned by the severity of the condemnation of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell apparatus and the condition of America in general and needs some reassurance, he can turn to "America the Dutiful." The author, a former Managing Editor of FOREIGN AFFAIRS and a superbly informed and experienced observer of international affairs, has constructed a book which, by careful planning, leads the reader through America's modern diplomacy. It will reassure him that most of the actions taken in recent years were not as stupid, venal and inconsistent as the more severe critics have claimed. Toward the close of the book, however, he gradually departs from the mood of self-congratulatory confidence and starts questioning our position in world affairs more sharply. Our Vietnam posture, in particular, receives some strong criticism. I certainly recommend Quigg's book to JOURNAL readers who want to learn well reasoned arguments that can be useful when responding to critics of most of our actions in the foreign affairs field over the past 25 years. The author points out the logic which existed at the time for our policies in the Congo, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic and Cyprus, among other fast-breaking crises. He avoids giving credit or blame to any of the Secretaries of State or President involved. This stylistic approach was intended to avoid offending the sensibilities of the strong critics of Rusk, Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower and Dulles, to name a few of the principals involved. It is successful in this regard, but it creates an illusion that all our international policies were the result of a well-understood national consensus, a significant defect in an otherwise worthwhile analysis.

—JOHN W. STEPHENS

A Sea Change

THE EUROPEAN DISCOVERY OF AMERICA—THE NORTHERN VOYAGES, *by Samuel Eliot Morison. Oxford University Press, $15.00.*

THE old master has done it again. One would think that with a dozen successful books, two Pulitzer prizes, the Presidential Medal of Freedom, and countless other honors to his credit, Samuel Eliot Morison might be content, at the age of 83, to rest on his laurels. However, he has now embarked on a history of the early voyages to the New World, of which the first volume, "The European Discovery of America—The Northern Voyages," 679 pp. with photographs, illustrations and maps) shows no diminution in scope or intellectual vigor—if anything, the reverse.

This comprehensive account of all the known voyages across the North Atlantic to the New World before 1600—and some spurious and imaginary ones as well—covers the explorations of Leif Ericson, the Cabots, Verrazzano, Raleigh, Frobisher, Cartier and many lesser known adventurers. It also contains a wealth of new material. An experienced sailor himself, Admiral Morison has gone over in person most

of the coastal regions touched by the early explorers. Flying at low altitudes from Maine to Labrador in a small plane, his aerial observations of the North Carolina coast enabled him, among other things to establish sites described by Verrazzano which have hitherto escaped identification. His feel for the vagaries of the sea and weather, and his encyclopedic knowledge of early navigational methods, have also given him a unique capacity to reconstruct the circumstances of many early landfalls, often from the most cryptic of log notations.

The same gift for meticulous reconstruction makes the author's sardonic exposé of such marvels as the legendary discoveries of St. Brandon and the Welsh Prince Madoc, and the fabulous kingdoms of Norumbega and Hy-Brasil, the Isle of the Blest, equally fascinating. Yale University's Vinland Map, which caused a sensation several years ago, is given a devastating deflation in authenticity, while the Kensington (Minn.) rune stone gets even shorter shrift. Much of this material is set forth in the form of expanded footnotes which are as tart and vivid as the text.

There are innumerable other attractions. The coverage of Cartier and the remarkable French exploratory effort is exceptionally comprehensive for an Anglo-American historical text. Sailing, navigational and shipbuilding techniques are lucidly explained. And the maps are outstanding, some of them drafted from new data and others reproduced for the first time from foreign archives. An enriching work and one to keep.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

Intellectual Overkill

SUPERMAN AND COMMON MEN: *Freedom, Anarchy and the Revolution, by Benjamin R. Barber. Praeger, $5.*

IN these political essays, the author lambastes some prominent targets and poses alternatives to American political thinking. He holds that anarchism leads to dead ends, that proper coercion can result in liberation, that even some tolerance is out, and that the real American revolution will spring from the determination of the common man.

The chapter on anarchism takes on the far-out left. Mr. Barber wastes his ammunition, however, if only because he credits a movement that *appears* anarchistic yet is hardly made up of theoretical anarchists. Jerry Rubin's freakin' fag revolution analyzed via political philosophy smacks of intellectual overkill. The essay on the limits of tolerance is familiar, Mr. Barber sneaking up to but not quite endorsing a Marcusean view. More useful is his discussion of the private nature of tolerance in classical liberal theory as against the urgency of the public interest.

Mr. Barber's slim volume centers on a chapter based on Rousseau's phrase, "Forced to be Free," the target this time being the liberal mechanistic model of freedom and coercion. The author rightly moves beyond this to freedom in a psychological context that considers intention, the question of when men act as much as how. Man becomes free when he is aware; coercion restricts deliberation. From there, Mr. Barber describes a contemporary world where our awareness is altered by propaganda, advertising, modes of persuasion—even education.

Mr. Barber's concluding look at contemporary America is the conventional crisis vision: the demise of pluralism, corporate centralism, racial frustration, flagrant ethnicity, commercialized politics. The book hustles to its end, trotting out the familiar anarchist/fascist predictions for the United States. Even with his pessimism, Mr. Barber envisions a re-creation of democracy out of what seems little more than hard work and exhortation.

A provocative center and a weak finish, but still a good book to argue with.

—MICHAEL P. CANNING

STATUARY RAPE *by Henry J. Paoli*

"Get the hell off the grass!"

A Standard on the Soviets

SOVIET POWER AND EUROPE: *1945-1970, by Thomas W. Wolfe. The Johns Hopkins Press, $3.95.*

DIPLOMATS and scholars interested in Soviet affairs know what they may expect from a book by Thomas Wolfe, because they know his RAND studies and other writings: meticulous research, a reasoned unpolemical view, and a thorough examination of every facet of the problem.

They will not be disappointed in this extremely solid work, which amounts very nearly to a full-scale history of Soviet policy since 1945.

Although Dr. Wolfe concentrates upon Europe, he mentions world areas as they become relevant to his story; and since the principal East-West and US-USSR coming-together was in Europe, a history of Soviet policy there is in effect a history of most of Soviet policy outside her borders. He gives a quarter of the book to the post-war Stalin era, a quarter to the Khrushchev period, and half the book to the five years since Khrushchev fell. A careful reader of the 500-plus pages will come away with a panoramic view of the power that lay behind Soviet policy and the policy that was fashioned to use the power. He will get no theories or tendentious theses from Dr. Wolfe, but a dispassionate, massively documented recounting of the main strands in Soviet policy since the war.

The book will be one of the standards on Soviet foreign policy, and is well recommended.

—Jack Perry

A Czechoslovak Communist Explains 1968

A Year is Eight Months: Czechoslovakia *1968, by Journalist M with introduction by Tad Szulc. Doubleday, $5.95.*

This unique book evaluates the reasons for Czechoslovakia 1968, that is eight months of that tremendous year. The author, Journalist M, according to Tad Szulc's chilling introduction, probably is still living in Czechoslovakia. Until the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia he was a prominent communist who was a highly active and an influential member of Prague's press corps. Journalist M, as late as February 1969 when he completed his book, was dedicated to the cause of socialism.

The outstanding thing about this account is that one can get the essence of the events from the beginning of the Czechoslovak state in 1918 until January 1969. It highlights the Dubcek era but also puts it perspectively into the history of the Czech and Slovak people.

Journalist M's explanation of the political motivation behind the dismissal of Novotny and the reforms of 1968 is that liberal-minded Czechoslovak communists wanted to remold communism so it would better fit the needs and desires of the Czechoslovak people. For them, communism had lost momentum and meaning. It needed to be revamped. It could no longer be a static ideology. Socialism with a human face was the answer. As Journalist M ends his book in February 1969, after the invasion and occupation but before the fall of Dubcek and the advent of the "realists" now under extreme pressure from the ultra conservatives, he was optimistic that socialism with a human face could continue to develop in Czechosolvakia. A hope he must have by now given up.

Aside from the excellence with which Czechoslovak developments, desires and aims are developed, this book is an extraordinary portrayal of how a communist thinks, justifies and evaluates his world.

—Helene Batjer

The Year That Was

Eyes on the World, *by Walter Cronkite. Cowles, $8.95.*

If you're getting a bit hazy about the way it was 'way back in 1970, this is the book for you: the highlights of the year in text and picture, as reported by CBS staffers and commentators, and placed in context and perspective by the admirable Cronkite. Quite a year, too —Kent State, Fem. Lib., the environment, Angela Davis, the Black Panthers, and a good deal more.

—T. O.

WITH NOSTALGIA

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about themselves. Perhaps it is this lack of illusion which allows Russians to survive where others could not.

Most distinct in my memory are not the friends we made in Moscow but the chance encounters on trips around the country. Our first trip took us to Vladimir, only days after arriving in Moscow. Armed with a new Polaroid, my wife prepared to snap the Vladimir Cathedral from a vantage point in the town below, still consisting of the log house construction of old Russia.

A militiaman came by and said we should not photograph such a poor section of town which would be rebuilt any day. My wife replied that she was photographing the cathedral and the policeman had only to wait a few minutes to see that this was so. He waited and my wife sheepishly showed him a fine picture of the old town with nary an outline of the Cathedral in it.

The militiaman snorted and left. Whereupon an older man approached us with the usual question: "You are foreigners, aren't you?" We said yes, and he invited us into one of the nearby houses. There he gave us tea in a small and dark living room abutting onto a minuscule kitchen. He remarked that of course people live better in America than in the Soviet Union. But he was not complaining. After all he had survived (and here he recounted a typically Soviet life history including war service and a period of near famine) and one son of his had gone to the University. His house wasn't much and the "ends of the month" were difficult on his pension of fifty rubles a month. We thought life had treated him roughly. Evidently, he did not.

In the university town of K., we spent a day with a professor who had returned to Russia from years in the emigration. Erect, silver-haired, over sixty, he showed us the sights, chatting all the while in a nostalgic vein about Paris and Shanghai and bemoaning the problems he had in satisfying his remaining vices: cigarettes made of light tobacco and indiscriminate reading. Neither Western books nor real cigarettes had been available in K. for some time: only the long-filtered Papyrosi had been on sale for months on end, and as for literature, it was hard to come by.

Was he discontented? It did not seem so. Much of his spare time, it appeared, was spent in conversation with the university students for whom he provided the information not found in their curriculae. What about life in the West and China? What are the main currents of 20th century thought besides Marxism? How do different economic systems work in practice? How many persons like him must there be in Soviet towns filling in the voids in Soviet textbooks?

At Penza, I ran into a couple in their early thirties who traveled about the Soviet Union in the tradition of the 19th century "Peredvizhniki" or wanderers. Of course, they were employed, for the pack on back, outstretched palm method of getting to know one's country is

called parasitism in the USSR and is prohibited.

Quite deliberately, the man and his wife had acquired occupations in great demand. His specialty as an assembly line trouble shooter was needed by plant managers and he was able to write ahead to a factory in his branch of industry to get a job. The job offer usually came with that supreme necessity, an apartment to go with it. In this way, he and his wife had already lived in the Crimea, in Leningrad and in Siberia, and they proposed to make their way to a Central Asian Republic after sampling the Central Volga region. I imagine they are today adding to the hundreds of friendships and experiences they had already accumulated when I met them.

These people were perhaps not typical of all Russians any more than the sturdier types of any nation outnumber the more pedestrian majority. They were more typical than the mystics and poets we chanced upon, surviving without too great difficulty in the Soviet system and again maintaining an old Russian

tradition. Somehow, Russians have not been deadened by Soviet "reality"—that amalgam of over-inflated bureaucracy, endless lines, rude salespeople, and crowded flats that depress today's visitor to the Soviet Union who bothers to look around.

One wonders why the Soviet Government insists so strongly on keeping the visitor away from Russian life to allow him to return home having seen some sights but with his only real experience being his wrangles with the Intourist agency. Or why Soviet youth, with all it has to offer, is kept from joining that West European summer playground where students from all Western nations, and some non-Western countries too, get to know each along the hitch-hiking, youth hostel and beach circuit.

We were admitted all too rarely into the Russian world. When we were, it was more often than not into those limited circles of Muscovites who are allowed access to the West and to foreigners. Only occasionally were we granted a glimpse into the life of a people, cut off more than most from the outside world. Yet, these contacts were enough to make Moscow a fine post. "Little things attach us to life," Montaigne said, and little things add up to a Russian feast to be enjoyed wherever Russian is spoken and Russia comes alive. ■

RUSSIAN WORKER

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Army, out of uniform of course, and with lots of food. Then the party set out one morning in an open Intourist Lincoln. Unfortunately the bridge to village "A" was down.

"Just what I thought," Herriot said. "You don't let people into villages these days. Why can't we go over there?" he continucd, pointing to the onion shaped domes of the church in well-stocked village "B." After several fictitious phone calls, the party was granted permission to visit village "B" where everyone was healthy and every kitchen full of food. This modern variation of the trick that Princc Potcmkin worked on Catherine the Great was so successful that Herriot went back to France and reported there could be no famine in the Ukraine since it was just accident that they had stumbled on village "B." Herriot's report was a factor in France's recognition of the USSR and the lieutenant was very proud of his ability as a guide.

From Sochi we continued by ship along the Black Sea stopping off at formerly aristocratic Yalta to see the vineyards and Livadya, the last Czar's winter palace; thence on to Odessa with its busy harbor and crowded bathing beaches. On one of these we ran into newly appointed United States Ambassador William Bullitt, who asked us to havc dinner with him.

This turned out to be particularly fortunate when, a month later, we tried to get exit permits to leave the USSR and were given a complete run-around. After fruitless days of waiting in dingy offices to see officials who were always out or busy, I finally put in a person-to-person telephone call from Kiev to Bullitt at the American Embassy in Moscow. An hour later we were told that the Ambassador was out. But after lunch that day word came that the visa office would be open all afternoon "due to the rush of unexpected business." That night with exit permits in hand and our American passports properly stamped, we boarded the night train for the West. We will never forget the feeling of a weight being lifted when we finally crossed the border into what was then free Poland.

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tions."

In other passages of the book, Custine explained in greater detail what he meant by this statement:

> In France, I had imagined myself in accord with these rigorous disciplinarians; but since I have lived under a despotism which imposes military rule upon the population of an entire empire, I confess that I have learnt to prefer a little of the disorder which announces vigour to the perfect order which destroys life.
>
> I left France scared by the abuses of a false liberty; I return to my country persuaded that if, logically speaking, the representative system is not the most moral form of government, it is, practically, the most wise and moderate; preserving the people on the one side from democratic licence, and on the other, from the most glaring abuses of despotism; I therefore ask myself if we ought not to impose a silence upon our antipathies, and submit without murmur to a necessary policy, and one which, after all, brings to nations prepared for it, more good than evil.

It is difficult to know what value to assign to these statements. Their similarity to the conclusions arrived at only shortly before by Tocqueville on the basis of his journey to the United States is so great that one suspects Custine, as he wrote these passages, to have been strongly under Tocqueville's influence, and perhaps unconsciously anxious to gain for himself a bit of the acclaim Tocqueville had won with his book. Be that as it may, there is no doubt that these words reflected truly the feelings with which Custine completed his Russian journey. And they will stand, in any case, as classical statements of the effect which travel and residence in Russia has had on countless western visitors, in reconciling them to the imperfections of the political systems of their own native countries. For this, they need only be supplemented by the well-known sentences with which Custine ended his entire book.

> To have a feeling for the liberty enjoyed in the other European countries one must have sojourned in that solitude without repose, in that prison without leisure, that is called Russia.
>
> If ever your sons should be discontented with France, try my recipe: tell them to go to Russia. It is a journey useful to every foreigner; whoever has well examined that country will be content to live anywhere else.

So much for Custine's reactions to Russia. It is these, outstandingly, for which the book is known. But the impression given of Custine's qualities of insight and judgment would not be complete if no mention were made of certain of his judgments on broader problems of international life. The passages in which these judgments are embodied are ones which, to my knowledge, have not received attention in any of the published works concerning Custine; but they deserve notice because they too appear, like so many of the judgments concerning Russia, to leap across the intervening decades and to have an actuality in the mid-twentieth century far greater than any they could have had at the time.

In these passages, Custine entered the lists against the concepts of romantic nationalism that were becoming standard features of personality for at least three generations of coming statesmen and thinkers, not only in France but throughout the western world. Departing from a series of insights which only the bitter experience of two world wars and the spectre of the atom have been able to bring to others, he challenged the validity of the concept of national glory (to which even Tocqueville was attached); he rejected the uses of any attempt to spread power or ideology by proselytizing among other peoples; he praised the model of the small state, concentrating on the internal improvement of its own society, over that of the great state, bent on the expansion of its power; he rejected materialism, imperialism, and war, in all their forms. How it was possible for a man to arrive at ideas so wholly contrary to the entire developing atmosphere of his own century and culture remains one of the mysteries with which Custine's person and cast of mind seem always to have been surrounded. With these introductory observations, the passages in question may be permitted to speak for themselves:

> However much our religious propaganda may appear to me sublime, to that extent I find odious every sort of politieal proselytism—the spirit, that is of conquest or, more precisely still, the spirit of rapine justified by an over-clever sophistry that goes by the name of glory. Far from uniting the human species, this narrow ambition only divides it.
>
> I observe, among the most civilized of the world's countries, certain states which have power only over their own subjects, who are themselves small in number. These states have no weight at all in world politics. It is not by the pride of conquest nor by the exercise of a tyrannical power over foreigners that their governments have won the right to a universal recognition; it is by their good example, by their wise laws, by an enlightened and beneficent administration. With such advantages a small people can become not the conqueror of the world, but rather its torch-bearer, which is a hundred times preferable. . . . In our country the fascination with war and conquest continues to endure, despite the lessons of the god of heaven, and despite—also—those of the god of the earth, which is self-interest. . . .
>
> I hope to live long enough to see the shattering of this bloody idol of war and brute force. One's power and one's territory are always sufficient to one's purpose if one has the courage to live and die for the truth, if one pursues error to the bitter end, if one sheds one's blood for the destruction of falsehood and injustice.
>
> It is not by looking covetously to the outside that people establish their right to universal recognition, it is by directing their energy upon themselves and becoming what they can become under the double influence of spiritual and material civilization. This species of merit is as superior to the propaganda of the sword as virtue is preferable to glory.
>
> That super-annuated expression: "a power of the first order" as it is applied to national policy, will be for a long time to come the source of the unhappiness of the world.

EASTERN EUROPE: Unstable Element
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seek to increase trade, although it can never become large. We ought to encourage "triangle trade." We should provide most-favored nation treatment to those countries which are working towards increased freedom, and we ought to assist East European states to enter GATT and other international associations, such as the aid consortia of the World Bank. We ought, of course, to continue to encourage increased trade between Eastern and Western Europe.

We should also promote cultural exchange, widening access to information and increasing intellectual contacts in every conceivable way. Government and private institutions together should concentrate upon increasing opportunities for American and East European scholars, artists, musicians, and students to participate in international conferences and to continue their study abroad. We should exercise our ingenuity and imagination to expand the flow of books, journals, newspapers, music, movies, and exhibits.

We should also help the East Europeans learn more about our society. American study programs and the exchange of teachers of language, literature, history, and the sciences can all aid, as can summer seminars and university centers abroad.

All would benefit if permanent bridges with permanent bases in several countries were established through joint or international research projects engaging scholars and institutions from several countries for several years on problems of common concern. These would include cancer, crop yields, urbanization, air pollution, business management, public administration, and educational experiments. A federal coordinating system could be provided by the government, universities, private foundations, and organizations such as the National Academy of Sciences.

Moreover, we should prepare plans for crises, such as those in 1956, which found us unprepared. For example, we should press for the creation of a United Nations peacekeeping force which might be put to use if such a situation should arise again. We should also expand our relationships with Communist China, if only to harry or worry the Soviet leaders into a more relaxed position in Eastern Europe.

In the nineteenth century, the Eastern question constituted a critical diplomatic issue. The situation of the states of Eastern Europe today in many ways resembles that of the Balkan peoples under Ottoman rule. The Greeks, the Serbs, the Bulgars, and the other Balkan peoples obtained their independence after long and hard struggles, in which outside assistance played an important role.

We should view the situation in Eastern Europe as a similarly long, tortuous, and involved struggle, one in which resolution, determination, and imagination are likely to prove as important as military power. These qualities have always been decisive. No one apprcciates this more than the East Europeans. We should also. ■

A Record of Selfless Devotion

HARRY A. HAVENS who died last month at the age of 85 was one of that fast disappearing group whose loyal and devoted service to the Department and the Foreign Service spanned the years from pre-World War I to post-Wriston. He came to Washington from his native Whitehall, New York, to accept a Civil Service appointment as stenographer in the old Consular Bureau. Forty odd years later he retired as Assistant Chief of its successor, the Division of Foreign Service Administration—two departmental units whose names are scarcely remembered today.

A lifetime in the same departmental sub-division culminating as its Assistant Chief may not seem a brilliant career to officers accustomed to today's short assignments and expectation of rapid advancement or early selection out. Perhaps it was not "brilliant," but Harry Havens' long record of selfless devotion to the public service won for him the respect, affection, and confidence of his associates and superiors. He took seriously Grover Cleveland's dictum that public office is a public trust, not a job about which one negotiates with "management" over "grievances."

I write this tribute from the heart. Harry was my lifelong friend and my right arm during the hectic four years when I was Chief of FA.

NATHANIEL P. DAVIS
Glens Falls, N.Y.

Qs and As

IN reading the editorial which appeared on page 2 of the Foreign Service JOURNAL for May 1971 my attention was caught by the following sentence:

"Yet in these times of accelerated change, the nation needs its finest *young* officers in positions of responsibility."

It seems to me that this raises a number of questions which could be usefully addressed by the JOURNAL for the benefit of its readers. Some of those which occur to me are:

1. What does the phrase "*young* officers" mean? (I assume there is an age bracket definition and that the phrase does not refer to physical fitness, youthful outlook or other youthful qualities which older officers also might conceivably possess.)
2. What is to become of the finest *older* officers? (Presumably they should at least all be moved out of "positions of responsibility.")
3. May we assume that the need for "the finest *young* officers in positions of responsibility" extends also to Departments and Agencies other than State? To the Legislative and Judicial Branches? To Business and to Industry?
4. Who wrote the editorial in reference and what is his age?

DONALD S. HARRIS
(Age 49)
Berlin

In response to your letter of May 26, addressed to the Editor of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, I am replying herewith to your questions in the order asked:

1. As the editorial stated, the average age of Ambassadors appointed from the career service is 54.3, and AFSA believes this average should be several years younger, say about 49.
2. The finest older officers will, we hope, stay on. Unfortunately, some older senior officers who might perhaps yield their places to younger men are very reluctant to retire.
3. Yes. In a period of accelerating change when it is difficult even for younger men to adjust to the rate of movement, young officers are needed generally in positions of responsibility. This has been recognized in many Departments and Agencies of the Federal Government (certainly on the White House staff), and this relatively advanced average age of legislative and judicial leaders has become an important domestic political issue. In private industry the importance of placing competent *young* men in positions of responsibility has long been recognized.
4. William C. Harrop, age 42.

A Tribute and an Elegy

ON Easter Monday, in the full loveliness of a Washington spring, Charles Thomas shot himself.

He was 48 at the time, and left a wife and two children. He was selected out of the Foreign Service two years ago as part of a reduction-in-force, an FSO-4 with no retirement prospects despite nearly 20 years of creditable service.

He did the best he could in those subsequent years, passed the D.C. Bar exam (he had been to law school), pounded the pavements in several cities looking for work as a lawyer, banker, or economist, something that would use his experience in languages, international organizations, or economics. He found nothing, except occasional employment as a public defender in narcotics or burglary cases where he did very well, but which paid little money.

It is not easy to speculate on the reasons for Charles's death. It was, above all, a personal choice and act, but he was part of the Foreign Service as well, and subject to the bitter caprice that sometimes marks its personnel practices. Sudden or unexpected selection out, the "one bad efficiency report," the log jam of more talented officers than jobs in the upper ranks, could all be contributing factors; if they were absent, or their impact reduced, he might still be with us, doing good work.

Shelley's funeral elegy seems strangely appropriate:

He is not dead, he doth not sleep—
He hath awakened from the dream of life—
'Tis we, who, lost in stormy visions, keep
with phantoms an unprofitable strife.

Name withheld by request

New York Not Representative

LET'S assume Alexander Campbell is right about New York in his article "As New York Goes" in the May JOURNAL. New York probably is overcrowded, polluted, crime ridden, near bankrupt and mostly ungovernable.

He is incorrect, however, in his statement that "New York is a test case for American cities." New York is *not* representative of the United States as a whole. What it is, is a conglomeration of all the worst things that are happening to big cities all over the world. But too much of the United States lies West of the Hudson River to accept Mr. Campbell's gloomy forecast.

Many critics of the US and some people who live in New York and Washington have managed to convince themselves that those cities are somehow particularly representative of life and thought in modern America. Fortunately, as always, the folks out in the boondocks reject such nonsense.

If you thought Mr. Campbell's article was alarming (or funny), just wait until you read the remainder of his forthcoming book, "The Trouble With Americans." It should be a big seller in Fun City.

GUY W. FARMER

Mexico City

Think Tank Vacancy

READERS of "The Rolling Think Tank" by James H. Webb in the June issue of the JOURNAL may be interested to learn that THE carpool from West Falls Church will indeed have a vacancy in August when Charles Gage transfers to Bonn.

Applicants may call the undersigned on extension 21310.

ROBERT L. HUBBELL

Falls Church

Lost Potsherds

ABOUT eighteen months ago a large package addressed to me (then in the Department of State) containing some pieces of ancient pottery was lost. I am told it was sent by sea pouch, but it has never been located by the Department's mail room.

If any one knows the whereabouts of this package, I would appreciate being informed.

ROBERT S. FOLSOM

Port-au-Prince

AFSA into the 18th Century

ALL that good work done by AFSA —"Toward a *Modern* Diplomacy" and that new reformist image stuff—undone by a travel agency! It's that posh tour labeled "Journey into the 18th Century" featuring cocktail parties at the American Embassies in London and Vienna.

I would cite the name of the firm and the world-famous men's magazine in which the ad appeared, but since the travel agency missed the opportunity to buy space in the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, I surely won't help them get any *free* publicity.

Don't despair: there's still a way for AFSA to get some profit out of our embassies' participation in the 18th century sound-and-light spectaculars. How about charging the travel agencies a sort of cabaret tax for use of our embassies, the money of course going into the AFSA provident fund? Let the embassy wives sew authentic replicas of 18th century diplomatic costumes—lace jabots, gaiters, the whole bit. Their husbands could perform at guild rates for the affluent tourists and AFSA collect actors' agency fees.

Don't delay! If AFSA doesn't act fast, Congressman Rooney will put our representation accounts on a self-sustaining basis now that embassy cocktail parties have been taken over by the tourist-industrial complex.

VOUCHER VARLET

McFall Manuscripts to be Published

THREE years ago the McFall manuscript contest was announced in your magazine. Ninety-five entries in the contest were received, of which 17 were awarded prizes totalling $4,000. Additionally, $500 was disbursed by the undersigned sponsor of the contest in purchasing the right of ownership to 20 non-prize-winning entries and expenses of some $300 were incurred in furtherance of the project.

The announced purpose of the contest was hopefully to induce a publisher to incorporate in a book, "Tales of the Foreign Service," the prize-winning manuscripts, as well as such numbers of the 20 non-prize-winning entries purchased by the sponsor as might be considered desirable by such a publisher.

Unhappily, after one year of consistent effort on the part of the undersigned to interest a publisher to take on the task of publishing such a book, the project has proved unavailing. The almost universal response was "most interesting—but it won't sell." If such judgment is valid, then, of course, neither the primary purpose of educating the public nor the secondary design of making a gift of all profits from the enterprise to the educational projects of AFSA and DACOR in equal portions would be possible of realization.

In order, then, that at least some portion of the financial outlay for the contest may be recaptured, an agreement has been worked out with the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL whereby all of the 37 manuscripts owned by the undersigned will be made available to the JOURNAL Editorial Board for the purpose of selection by the Board of such number of the 37 entries as it considers desirable for publication in the JOURNAL. I have informed the Board that it will be my intention to give in equal portions to the Educational Fund of AFSA and to the Educational and Welfare Fund of DACOR, all income realized by me as payment from the JOURNAL for each of the entries so published.

JACK K. MCFALL

Milford Sound, N.Z.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

by S. I. Nadler

"Everything is all right! My investigators have just submitted their report: he's a genuine FSIO, not just an FSO."

AFSA NEWS

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Herter, Rivkin, Harriman Awards Presented

Secretary of State William P. Rogers spoke at an awards ceremony honoring distinguished officers serving in the foreign affairs field. This was the fourth annual such presentation made by AFSA to a senior, mid-career, and junior officer in commendation of their outstanding service as measured by intellectual courage, creativity, and personal integrity, and, strange as it may seem, disciplined dissent vis-a-vis United States foreign affairs management.

Each award included a $1000 check. More than 200 guests attended, including the donors of the awards (or their relatives).

The Christian A. Herter award went to Archer K. Blood, 48, an FSO-1 and recently Consul General in Dacca, East Pakistan. The nomination stressed Mr. Blood's reporting which not only involved "sensitive understanding of forces at work in East Pakistan, but demanded . . . great discretion . . ." Mr. Blood was also commended for his direction of relief in East Pakistan following the tragic cyclone that killed an estimated 300,000 people.

The William R. Rivkin award memorializing the late Ambassador to Luxembourg, Senegal, and Gambia went to Samuel Friedlander Hart, an FSO-3 assigned to AID. This award is for officers in mid-career. Mr. Hart, now assigned to Santiago, was Chief of the Joint Economic Office and embassy economic officer in Costa Rica. His nomination included these comments:

"Mr. Hart has consistently placed his sense of justice and principle above the temptation of following the path of least resistance, a fault too often found in the Foreign Service. In terms of professional acumen, Mr. Hart is exceptional. His grasp of Costa Rican economic conditions and his quick identification of real issues are noteworthy. But far more important in the broad context of professionalism is Mr. Hart's commitment to change, change both in the style and creative role of U.S. Missions overseas.

"Mr. Hart is, at this mission, the principal FSO advocating embassy management and policy reform in the spirit of the recent Task Force recommendation and 'Diplomacy for the 70's.' He is vitally concerned with the need for updated practices and more efficient use of Mission personnel talents in the decision-making process.

"Mr. Hart has displayed what I considered to be extraordinary courage and adherence to personal convictions in the face of significant pressures on him to accept what he sees as an unreasonable and faulty U.S. strategy paper."

The W. Averell Harriman Award is for junior officers and is made possible by Governor Harriman's generosity. The winner this year is Robert Maxim, FSO-6, recently named consul in Oran after an assignment in the Department of State. The Special Assistant to the Director General of the Foreign Service said about Mr. Maxim:

"I have had an opportunity to observe at first hand this year his leadership of the Junior Foreign Service Officer Club in connection with an issue on which we often differed sharply. I have nothing but the highest respect for the way in which he has handled a sensitive role, for his uncompromising commitment to the best interests of the Foreign Service, and the eloquence and courage with which he has addressed both high officials of this Department and his sometimes unruly colleagues."

Another comment came from Mr. Maxim's colleagues, who said:

"We believe that Bob Maxim merits the Harriman Award because of his independent and untiring work to bring younger officers more fully into the mainstream of the Foreign Service. His efforts as President of JFSOC have been directed at making the Department more aware and hopefully more responsive to the new approaches and fresh ideas many junior officers can bring to the Service.

"Top-level managers, including Deputy Under Secretary Macomber, have recognized the legitimacy of these concerns, as is witnessed in Mr. Macomber's comments concerning the end of paternalism in the Foreign Service and his emphasis on providing more challenging jobs for younger officers. Bob Maxim has been by far the most prominent spokesman for expressing junior officer opinion on these matters.

"During the past year, there have been some differences of opinion between JFSOC on one hand and AFSA and the Department on the other. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, no one has ever questioned Bob Maxim's commitment to the Foreign Service or his deep desire to accomplish responsible reforms to make it a more open and more challenging career for officers of all levels.

Foreign Affairs Specialist Meeting

In an AFSA Open Meeting on April 12, Deputy Director for Personnel, Donald B. McCue, urged FSS employees to weigh all the variables before making a decision to convert to FAS or FSO. "This is a very personal choice," Mr. McCue said "and you have to think of yourself and whether or not it benefits you. Consider how long you have been in grade, when your next in-step is due, your susceptibility to selection-out, your chance for promotion this year and how this might affect conversion. Also obtain the best possible authoritative advice from your own personnel people."

The Staff Corps Advisory Committee considered the most salient points in the meeting as follows.

Mr. McCue said there were drawbacks to remaining in the FSSO Corps because over a long period of time promotions will dry up due to contraction. Even if you promote the same percentage the base narrows and promotional opportunities will decrease over the years.

He remarked that designating positions FSO or FAS does not imply a nice orderly assignment process. For the time being people will be moved back and forth with some FSSO and FAS in FSO jobs and some FAS in FSS jobs. This changeover of personnel systems will require great flexibility for quite a few years to come.

The question of competition with FSOs was discussed. Mr. McCue said that if FSSOs thought they could 'hack it' in the FSO Corps, they should go into it. Competition would be based on performance . . . It was up to management to see that the rules are fair.

He said that there was less risk in converting to FSRU than to FSO. A person converting to FSO is only given 2 years in which he can not be selected out on the basis of performance, whereas the person converting to FAS is given 10 years or the time-in-class of the grade level of appointment, whichever is less.

He said that selection boards do look at age and grade. The 40-year-old FSO-6 may well lose the edge in competition with a 25-year-old FSO-6 but his time in the service with good reports should offset the difference in age of the inexperienced junior FSO.

Mr. McCue quashed the rumor that knowledge of a foreign language would be a requirement. He said candidates would be tested in language aptitude as a tool for future assignment. It would not be an attempt to keep those without language aptitude from getting into the FSO Corps.

FSSOs converting to FSO-6 would not lose their full weight allowance and regulation changes are under way to allow for continuation of the previous allowances for those individuals affected, he said.

One staff officer asked: "Doesn't the Department worry about having too many chiefs and not enough indians to issue non-immigrant visas year in and year out, fix the plumbing in the Ambassador's residence and do all the other jobs that FSOs don't want to be bothered with?" Mr. McCue said it was a question of doing the job and that he did not see the indian vs. chief relationship at all. He would expect junior FSOs to punch NIV's along with the rest. The staff officer added: "With the abolition of the Staff Corps you are losing a whole group of people who are satisfied doing their jobs, who came up from secretarial and communications and were happy to move up the ladder to FSSO-1 (FSO-3). How many of the lawyers you are bringing in to consular work, or the business administration graduates to do the plumbing are really going to be happy?" Mr. McCue replied: "We cannot afford to get rid of the level of people we have in the Staff Corps. We will certainly need them as long as we have the service, and we are giving a great deal of thought to this question. We may lose the very backbone of our administrative and consular cones. It may well be

Ivie on Board of Directors

John K. Ivie, newest member of AFSA's Board of Directors, is the second Staff Corps representative—the other is Barbara Good. The new member is chairman of AFSA's Staff Corps Advisory Committee. Mr. Ivie feels that two important problems confront the Staff Corps during this era of reform in the Foreign Service. First, is protection and awareness of Staff Corps rights. Second, the need to instill a feeling of concern in Staff Corps employees.

Changes for the Staff Corps must come, but will be realized only with hard work and unity from within the Staff Corps, he says. "If I can help awaken this slumbering giant that comprises almost half of the Foreign Service," Mr. Ivie says, "I will have done a great deal for the Staff Corps and for the Foreign Service."

A native of Albuquerque, New Mexico, Mr. Ivie joined the service in 1963 following four years in the Marine Corps which included 2½ years in New Delhi as a Marine Security Guard. His assignments have included Ponta Delgada as administrative assistant; Nagoya as administrative and consular officer and Fort Lamy as GSO and administrative officer.

He is presently serving in the Directives Staff of the office of Organization and Management. Mr. Ivie has been active in several AFSA programs during the past year.

"It has been frustrating trying to get more people to take an interest in the affairs of the Staff Corps," he says, "and what progress we have made has not been easy."

that we will have to redesignate some of these jobs FAS."

Another problem facing Staff Officers moving over to FSO was the fact that they convert two grades lower than FSOs with the same years of experience. One Consular Officer remarked that she has been doing the same job as a FSO in Consular work for four years and she wonders why she has to come in at the junior officer level. She said she never felt any discrimination until they said she would be an FSO-7. Mr. McCue answered: "I know exactly how you feel. I think we have to consider our FSS Corps. They have been loyal, and have worked hard. Many of them hold key positions. I can think of certain places where the whole embassy would collapse if the FSSs walked off the job. We have to take care of them."

A former secretary presently serving as a personnel technician asked how management planned to take care of the group that has been reconed from personnel positions back to secretarial jobs. Mr. McCue agreed that the Department has a serious problem in asking people to step back from progress. "One alternative we are working on is the Executive Secretary program to allow secretaries to move up the career ladder. Do we give them some sort of diplomatic title? One possibility is to eliminate the FSO staff aide and this would give greater opportunity to the secretary. This is only one answer but not the answer." Someone added: "These girls do the work of the personnel officer at certain overseas posts but because BALPA and OPRED eliminated their positions they don't get the credit. They are really in a bind." Mr McCue responded: "This is a result of our decision to designate all personnel positions above a certain level FSO—to allow the junior FSO to begin as a personnel officer and then move up to Administrative and Executive Officer. It may well be that we will have to designate some of the lower level positions FAS so that we do not filter off our personnel people in other directions. I think we all recognize that FSO-3 is the top level in the personnel field. We are going to try and take care of everyone as best we can until we get our system straight. Perhaps the girl who has moved into administration after many years of secretarial experience could be considered for FAS on an individual basis."

Someone remarked that her counselor said that General Schedule people needed perquisites to encourage them to move over to the FAS system, but none were offered FSS people because they were already under that systm. She wondered: "What's in it for the Staff Corps to offset the jeopardy of time-in-class and selection out the FAS and FSO personnel systems promise?" Mr. McCue replied: "Very little is offered the FSSO with the exception of psychic income—how strongly you feel about becoming an FSO."

A voice in the back of the room ventured that Mr. Macomber had done a lot for minorities and women. Maybe it was now time for him to do something for thhe Staff Corps. Mr. McCue replied that his point was well taken and that he would bring it to Mr. Macomber's attention in a meeting that afternoon.

Staff Corps Board Representative, Barbara Good, thanked Mr. McCue for his participation and concluded the meeting by saying: "If you want your voice heard by management, join us on the AFSA Staff Corps Advisory Committee and speak up for your rights."

Foreign Service People

BIRTHS

Hughes. A daughter, Alice Theresa Dawson, born April 16, in Capetown to FSO and Mrs. Paul R. Hughes.

Morehouse. Twin sons, Jason Parker, and David Kenyon, were born April 16 in Seattle, to Mr. and Mrs. Richard Morehouse. Mrs. Morehouse is the daughter of FSO and Mrs. Stephen Winship.

Savage. A daughter, Jessica Katrin, was born May 24, in Addis Ababa, to FSO and Mrs. John R. Savage.

DEATHS

Boehm. Patricia Ann Boehm, wife of FSO Richard W. Boehm, Public Affairs Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, died on May 12 in Washington. In addition to her husband, she leaves a son, Stephen, and a daughter, Karen. Friends in the Department have made generous contributions to the AFSA scholarship fund in her memory.

McKesson. Erna McKesson, wife of Ambassador John A. McKesson, III, died on May 20 in Paris. Her husband and a son, John A., IV, of the American Embassy, Libreville, survive. The McKessons served at Reykjavik, Berlin, Paris, Saigon and Dakar.

Reese. James S. Reese, FSR, of the AID mission to Senegal, died in Dakar on April 29. Mr. Reese had served since 1958 as a food and agriculture expert in Salvador, Brazil, Port-au-Prince, Tananarive, Rabat and Dakar. His widow, Ann, and three children may be reached care of Mrs. Ferguson, 4402 Vandalia Street, Dallas, Texas 75219. Mr. Reese's parents also survive.

Leap. Melvin L. Leap, former State Department employee, died May 29 in Arlington. He had been an associate member of the Foreign Service Association for over 20 years. Mr. Leap joined the State Department in 1931, and at one time served as Executive Secretary to the Interdepartmental Commission on Cooperation with the American Republics. In 1947 he became Chief, Clerical and Miscellaneous Employment, Division of Foreign Service Personnel.

Westley. Ann Westley, widow of FSS-retd. Roy O. Westley, died in Phoenix, Arizona, in late May.

MARRIAGES

Hope-Nye. Jean Barker Hope, daughter of FSO-retd. and Mrs. Ashley Guy Hope, was married to Robert Nason Nye on May 29 in North Carolina.

Tiger-Bick. Rebecca Janet Tiger, daughter of FSO and Mrs. M. Gordon Tiger, was married to Donald A. Bick on June 6 in Alexandria, Virginia.

McCormack-Myers. Elizabeth F. McCormack was married on April 16 to Christopher J. Myers in Maryland. Mrs. Meyers is Chief of the Foreign Service Lounge.

MEMBERS' INTERESTS

Temporary Lodging Flexibility

AFSA members returning to an assignment in the US on transfer from abroad should note that the regulations governing the 30-day temporary lodging allowance are now much more flexible. Thanks to a bureaucratic pincers movement by Ombudsman Robert Gordon and AFSA, temporary lodging expenses in connection with arrival in the US from abroad may now be incurred within a four-month timeframe, beginning 60 days prior to and terminating 60 days subsequent to entrance on duty. This means you can take part of your 30 days at your new location to look for quarters, depart for home leave, and return to the new location in time to complete your 30 days of temporary lodging at government expense.

For the many returnees who must spend more than 30 days in temporary quarters before settling into permanent housing, we remind you that 30 days of temporary lodging expenses are deductible on your Federal income tax as a moving expense (even if you do not itemize deductions). This deduction applies to the first month after entrance on duty. So if you require 60 days of hotel living, for example, save the 30 days immediately after entrance on duty for a tax deduction, and claim the other 30 days on your temporary lodging voucher.

Artificial Exchange Rates

One enterprising AFSA member claimed as a federal income tax deduction the difference between the artificial legal rate of exchange at his post, and the open market rate which was much higher and which he was forbidden to use by USG regulation. He claimed it as a business loss, and now reports that he was successful. We know the IRS audited his return because it was disputed on another item. This return was also filed shortly after a business firm won a court case on a similar claim. While we cannot promise that it will work for everyone, AFSA members stationed at posts with adverse exchange rate differentials between the Embassy cashier's legal rate and the open market rate may wish to claim business losses on their returns.

Telephone Credit Cards

The C&P Telephone Company of the Washington area has indicated it will look kindly upon credit card applications from AFSA members despite the fact they may be without a permanent address beyond the Foreign Service Lounge. Normally in such situations, a $100 deposit is required. But your AFSA membership card, and the absence of your name on credit deadbeat lists, will suffice for a free telephone credit card. These can come in handy if you do not have all those coins necessary to call Miami from a phone booth in O'Hare Airport.

BOARD ACTION TAKEN

April 6

In the absence of a quorum, no formal meeting was held. The following announcements and reports were made.

Openness. The chairman of the committee, Charles Thomas, and Messrs. Destler and Heginbotham reported on discussions of the openness program with academic centers in the Boston area. They had good discussions at Harvard, MIT and the Harvard Business School with Robert Bowie, George Lodge, Don Price, and others. The first luncheon seminar under the openness program was held on April 5 at the Foreign Service Club with Professor Harry Levinson speaking.

Employee Management Relations. Messrs. Harrop, Harris and Wilson met with W. Vernon Gill, Executive Director of the FLRC, with regard to the preparation of the alternative program requested by the President.

April 20

Reform. An outline of draft proposals for changes recommended by the Task Forces was given to AFSA, AFGE and JFSOC by the office of the Director General with the request that written reports be sent to Samuel Lewis. Field chapters will be consulted, and an open meeting scheduled before AFSA's comments.

Grievance and Appeals Committee. The Committee has met several times recently and is preparing a new draft of recommendations.

Membership and Dues. The Membership Drive Committee has been appointed and material will be mailed to chapter heads and keymen. Proposed changes in dues were discussed.

Finance. Four sub-committees and an Action Committee on finance were established with progress reports requested every two weeks.

(*Continued from page* 3)

ness and advanced consultation undertaken by the Department in the development of these changes in the personnel system. The Department's willingness to seek the views of Foreign Service personnel constitutes a sharp improvement in employee-management relations. Our experience with getting information to the field and receiving the returns indicates that a minimum of six weeks is needed to consult adequately with the membership of the Association on matters involving complex and important issues. We feel that the time was well spent and in the interests of both the Department and its employees.

The Board of Directors reluctantly realizes from its own soundings on the Hill that there is little chance of early favorable Congressional action on 20-year retirement. Nevertheless, we believe the Department should study the benefits and potential effects of such legislation, work with interested employee organizations toward the development of specific proposals, and be prepared to present them forcefully to Congress when the prospects are more favorable. The Association pledges its full support to this task.

The AFSA Board reserves the right to make additional comments when the Department has revised its proposals. The Association requests an advance copy of the Department's final proposals, so that it may make such comments as it feels would be appropriate to the Board of the Foreign Service.

In sum, with the several exceptions noted above, the American Foreign Service Association supports the Department's proposals. We believe the proposals are imaginative and comprehensive. They represent a constructive effort at reform, and should help us meet the challenges of the 1970s.

Sincerely yours,
WILLIAM C. HARROP
Chairman, Board of Directors

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