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AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

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PHOTOGRAPHS AND ILLUSTRATIONS: Cover, letter of credence which presented Chen Ch'iu-Chi to President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908, courtesy PROLOGUE, the journal of the National Archives, winter, 1970.

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EDITORIAL

Toward a United Foreign Service

THE new Board of Directors assumes leadership of the Association at a moment of particular challenge. The resiliency and professional competence of the Foreign Service will be tested more than ever before in 1972. What are some of the major challenges?

This Administration has not relied upon the State Department and the Foreign Service as its pre-eminent foreign policy resource. The Foreign Service must work to reverse this trend, by demonstrating exceptional competence, professionalism and dedication, and by asserting a vocation for leadership in its field of expertise. The Association and the Foreign Service itself cannot alone resolve this complex problem, but they can vastly improve on the present situation through their own efforts.

AID is in a period of flux, reflecting Congressional uncertainties. The Association will take a keen interest in reorganization plans and in developments affecting personnel, both because of our mission to protect the interests of our AID Foreign Service members and because of our concern for sound and effective administration of development assistance.

Foreign Service personnel administration, especially selection out, has been the subject of harsh public criticism. Reform of selection out procedures, to ensure equity and due process, is essential, and AFSA will see that reform takes place. Let us be clear, however, that the concept of selection out was established by the Foreign Service Act to strengthen the Foreign Service. It is in the interest of the Service that selection out, fairly administered, be retained.

The Foreign Service as a whole, in our three agencies, is entering a new stage in which the people of the Service, through a single effective representative, will co-determine the personnel policies which shape their careers and welfare. The historical era of administration by benevolent—and sometimes arbitrary—paternalism is over.

The Association will campaign vigorously for election as exclusive representative of the Foreign Service in State, AID and USIA. The new Board believes that the AFSA membership—and the Service in general—desire a firm spokesman to represent them. The Association will be forthright in asserting the interests and rights of Foreign Service personnel.

At the same time, the Board believes that the Foreign Service will prefer to be represented by its own Association, which will defend the autonomy and integrity of the Foreign Service as an institution.

Under its newly elected leadership, AFSA is determined to be both a crack professional association and a tough representative of Foreign Service employee interests.

AFSA will work for the welfare of its members in USIA, AID and State alike, and for equivalence of privilege for the Foreign Service Staff Corps.

AFSA will stand for full equality for women in the Foreign Service.

AFSA will endeavor to guide the Foreign Service toward professional leadership of the foreign affairs sector of the United States government.

This is an ambitious program. It will require the wholehearted support—and sharing of the workload—by all segments of AFSA membership.

The new Board of Directors presented itself to the membership as the "Participation Slate." Now elected, it seeks the participation of the membership. Particularly, it seeks the participation of those members—usually the more senior—who have complained of excessive "union militancy"; it seeks the participation of those members—usually the more junior—who have complained of insufficient militancy.

We are not and should not be a homogeneous Service. But we do all have broad professional and employee interests in common. And we can realize them only if we unite and pull together as a single Association and a single Foreign Service. ■

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An Embassy To China

ENID S. CANDLIN

Mrs. Candlin is the wife of A. H. Stanton Candlin, a frequent contributor to military publications. She has written two books, a history of Chinese paintings and a volume on Oriental religions and philosophies.

In 1793 Great Britain, then the leading power of the western world, despatched an embassy to China in the hope of negotiating trade and diplomatic agreements, which would place the two countries on a normal footing. China was at that time almost wholly closed to the independent nations of the globe, and her government was only persuaded to receive the mission because it was to arrive in the country on the occasion of the 83rd birthday of Ch'ien Lung, Emperor of the Ch'ing Dynasty, and had as its ostensible motive the presentation of felicitations and gifts to him from George III.

There were then two China's, in point of fact: the people themselves, the overwhelming majority of whom were ethnic Chinese, and the Manchus, the occupying power —a minority but the absolute rulers of the country. All the top-echelon posts were automatically reserved for this Tartar people, who held China under an iron fist, under constant surveillance and severe discipline.

The British Embassy was headed by Lord Macartney, a Viscount, and holding the appointment of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary from the King of Great Britain to the Emperor of China. No more gifted or highly-qualified envoy could have been presented, but, in the event, Ch'ien Lung refused categorically every point the British put forward, and the Mission was a failure.

The English had for a very long time been eager to open up trading and diplomatic relations with China, but, though they were allowed to use the port of Canton to a limited extent, they had not been able to establish any suitable commercial foothold in the country, and had been granted no diplomatic status whatever. Meanwhile in England the population had acquired a taste for tea, and there was a lively market for silk and porcelain. This business brought great profits to any

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merchants bold enough to undertake the hazards of the trade, which was handled through the East India Company. The status of the foreigner in China, however, was both undignified and unhappy, and it was felt by the English that no real progress could be made until an embassy was established in Peking.

The Chinese, as always, saw the situation entirely differently. They knew that the European could not support life without the tea, silk, and rhubarb which he obtained in China, so, for humanitarian reasons, they allowed him to purchase these treasures. They did not want to be contaminated by close contact with the inferior and barbarous peoples who came from across the seas, and of course it would be out of the question to have diplomatic relations with such persons. The position was complicated by the different sorts of Europeans who came to acquire these necessities, and who seemed, in general, hostile to one another. The history of Europe appeared to them to be one long recital of these sub-human groups attacking one another, simply for loot. Of course the Chinese, the people of the Middle Kingdom, heaven-born, could not possibly stoop to unraveling the idiotic quarrels of these peoples, who called themselves Portuguese, Dutch, English, French, and so on, but who were all equally ignorant, uncouth, backward and hideous.

By 1793 the Emperor Ch'ien Lung had been on the Dragon Throne for 57 years, and would continue to reign for another three. It would be unsuitable, unfilial, for him to continue as Emperor for more than 60 years, as that had been the span of his Grandfather's rule (Emperor K'ang Hsi 1662-1723). These two immensely long reigns had together produced an extraordinary aura of continuity and stability—as though Franz Joseph or Queen Victoria had each been followed by a successor matching his achievements. But by the time the western nations were beginning to round the Capes and sail the waters of the whole world, the Chinese Empire was not at all as it seemed. It had become something of a splendid facade.

To all appearances, Ch'ien Lung had been an extremely effective ruler. He had achieved remarkable military successes, maintained the traditional administration of the scholars, and was a patron of the arts. The Empire stretched from the sea well into the Tarim Basin in Central Asia, from Outer Mongolia to Kwangtung on the borders of Annam. Korea, Annam, Burma, Central Asian khanates, as well as Afghanistan, acknowledged Chinese suzerainty over them. The seeds of decay were already at work in this vast structure, but it was not easy for the foreigner to be aware of this. Ch'ien Lung was an oriental potentate—at once kind and cruel, ruthless and highly cultured—a poet, a calligrapher and a connoisseur.

Lord Macartney, an Irish nobleman, had already served his country with marked success at the court of Catherine II, in the West Indies, and in India. Though a man of the 18th century, a contemporary of Clive and Warren Hastings, with small personal fortune, he was known for his perfect integrity, as well as his acumen and forebear-

ance. One of the most distinguished figures of the age, he was of the highest intelligence, amiable, and generous.

The Embassy, consisting of nearly a hundred persons, after many months at sea, finally dropped anchor near Tientsin, in North China. Here the English were welcomed. and assisted to disembark, with all their presents, before starting off, by inland waterways, in a large fleet of junks, which awaited them by Imperial command. The last part of the journey was overland, till at last they reached Peking, then the largest city in the world, with three million inhabitants.

From the capital, the deputation had to proceed further north to Jehol, where the Emperor was staying in the Imperial Park. Lavish provisions were provided for them at every stage and two mandarins, (Chinese gentlemen, not Tartars), called Van-te-gin and Chou-te-gin, were assigned to them as cicerones and companions.

The Embassy was gratified by this attention, but it was disconcerting to find that the red pennants which streamed from the masts of the junks were inscribed in large characters: THE ENGLISH AMBASSADOR BRINGING TRIBUTE TO THE EMPEROR OF CHINA. Lord Macartney notes in his *Journal* that he shut his eyes to this, "endeavouring to put the best face upon everything and to preserve a perfect serenity of countenance upon all occasions." This resolution was to be severely tested as time went on. The people of the embassy were ordinarily referred to as Hung I, or Red Haired Barbarians.

Both the Chinese and the British had been to great pains to have this embassy present a splendid front, but for different reasons. The one did so in order to proclaim the great position of England, the power of the king. Their motives were entirely misinterpreted by the Manchus, who took their pomp as designed to show honor to China, and to the emperor, the greatest person in the world, as everyone knew. They saw the fine trappings of the English as a form of humility and self-abasement, an offering. By meeting the foreigners with so much attention they assumed it was clear that the more evident the outward show of honor, the more obvious the superiority of the Emperor to all petty monarchs. They had no conception whatever of the pride of the British, who were then rising on a mounting wave, a people full of vigor, fearless, bold, romantic, eager. To the Chinese they represented simply a distant commercial kingdom, coming to bow the knee to China.

To bow the knee! Ah! This was the heart of the issue! The Chinese intended it to be very much more; they demanded the kow-tow, the nine prostrations on the ground at the Emperor's feet. The English knew that this was what Peking had in mind, and had from the first made it very clear that they would not comply unless a Chinese or a Tartar of equal rank with Lord Macartney should be commanded to perform the kow-tow, publicly, before a portrait of George III. Lord Macartney was ready to give Ch'ien Lung the same obeisance that he would offer his own monarch: to kneel on one knee, and kiss his hand. To have anyone, particularly

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an evil-smelling barbarian, touch the emperor at all, let alone kiss him, was unthinkable, of course.

Many times, on the journey north, various persons were deputed to reason with Macartney on this issue, to cajole and coax him, to explain, to show displeasure at his obduracy. Van and Chou demonstrated the kow-tow before him, and declared themselves willing to perform it there and then before the King's portrait. They said it would be difficult to do in the English costume, encumbered by tight buckles and knee breeches, but other clothes would be provided. But Macartney was resolute. He felt it absolutely imperative that the Chinese "should distinguish between the homage of tributary princes and an independent sovereign."

A very considerable degree of friendship developed between Lord Macartney and the members of his suite with the two mandarins, which withstood the months of frustration and disappointment lying ahead—so much so that when they finally parted, months later, in Canton, both the Chinese were found to be in tears. The Ambassador felt also a warm-hearted admiration for the ordinary Chinese he observed as they went through the country. This is apparent from an entry he made in his *Journal* soon after they had left their own vessels and started up a canal on the way to Tientsin. The banks of the waterway were lined with men and children, obviously very poor, and working hard. They wore as little as possible (it was summer), and their physique and general appearance so impressed him that: "I could scarce refrain from crying out . . . 'Oh, brave new world/That has such people in it!' "

The *Journal* records the crowds of spectators who everywhere attended their progress, and remarks upon the extraordinary cheerfulness, energy, intelligence and smiling industry of this ill-rewarded people. He thought the behavior of the common people unparalleled in the world. ". . . everything is at the instant command of the State, and . . . even the most laborious tasks are undertaken and executed with a readiness and even a cheerfulness which one would scarcely expect to meet with in so despotic a government."

LORD MACARTNEY was received by Ch'ien Lung, in a silken tent set up in the Imperial Park in Jehol, with kindness and civility. He did only what he had agreed—he bent the knee. He did not know that in the Ch'ing archives it would be recorded that he had, in fact, kow-towed, though awkwardly, due to his being overawed by his surroundings.

The transporting of the presents entailed a great deal of handling, storing, and other details; it was discovered that the officials considered these "tribute," while the British insisted that they were gifts. They consisted of a great variety of things: jeweled watches, a planetarium, orreries, music boxes, mathematical, chemical and electrical instruments, chronometers, carpets and glass, with much else besides. Among the delegation were musicians, a machinist, a painter, military and naval officers, a balloonist with his balloon (which they hoped to send up), and doctors qualified to discuss both scientific and medical

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discoveries. Some of these presents were displayed in a special tent in Jehol. Lord Macartney was afterwards conducted through many splendid halls of the Park, and found, to his dismay, that many of the ornaments he had brought, the watches, orreries and music boxes, were not nearly as fine as those the Chinese (having learned from the Jesuits) now could make themselves. The English were given no opportunity whatsoever to demonstrate, display, or discuss any of the mechanical or scientific equipment they had brought. The balloon was never flown, the well-sprung carriage ignored.

While still at Jehol, the English attended a service in honor of the Emperor's birthday. Ch'ien Lung himself was not present, but the chants, prostrations, the strong "exterior marks of worship and adoration" given him seemed to the Ambassador almost tantamount to deification. Soon after this the Embassy returned to Peking.

At the capital they were housed in a fine palace, which had been built by an official who had made a fortune "squeezing" the British at Canton. Falling into disgrace, his property had been confiscated. The "wits" of Peking found this extremely amusing, Macartney records, but the English did not think it so entertaining. By now they were coming to realize that they were up against forces of unreason and of ignorance of the outer world which they would not be able to penetrate. For some little time they continued to hope that in an atmosphere of goodwill (which should have followed naturally upon their friendly reception), both parties could work out mutually profitable ways of trade. If only they could settle upon some terms, free from crippling taxes, if only the British merchants could live ashore at Canton in a normal way, and a delegation be posted to Peking, a new era of Anglo-Chinese relations could commence. These seemed to the Embassy very reasonable requests.

Yet, no meetings could ever be arranged, nothing was resolved, anything serious which came up in any discussion was evaded. Constantly watched, attended by a polite but totally frustrating officialdom, the English felt themselves to be moving in a sort of spell. Were they, in an oblique way, making due allowance for Eastern ways, in fact making some progress? they asked themselves. No, it was all a delusion, there was no meeting of minds on these issues, no basis upon which they could negotiate. They were finally thwarted on every issue, in the most ceremonious and courteous manner.

Lord Macartney was troubled by gout, and as the cold weather approached he was advised by his hosts that he had much better leave, for the sake of his health. Letters would follow him, they said. He had no alternative but to take their broad hints. On the return journey the Embassy went south by the Grand Canal to the Yangtze, thence overland to Canton, thereby seeing a great deal of the country. On this beautiful expedition they sometimes had some real flashes of insight into the minds of the men who accompanied them, particularly the faithful mandarins Van and Chou. On a

(*Continued on page* 31)

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

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Where do we go from here, so far as our relations with China and Taiwan are concerned?

The US, CHINA and the UN

JONATHAN B. BINGHAM

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THE UNITED STATES is fortunate to have been defeated in its effort to persuade the United Nations to accept a "two Chinas" policy. Defeat opened the way for Peking to enter the UN, a necessity too long delayed, and for the United States and the People's Republic to enter into more or less normal relationships, even though the future of Taiwan remains an unsettled question. An American victory in the New York voting, on the other hand, would have left a festering sore. Peking might well have disinvited President Nixon and returned to a policy of isolationism and diatribe. At the United Nations, dissatisfaction with Peking's continued absence would have steadily mounted, so that ultimately, in one year or two, the Albanian resolution would have prevailed anyway.

The hurt to America's pride was great, but the wound was a clean one and will heal. In time the defeat may be a salutary lesson in the limits of American influence.

While the United States is not hurt by its defeat, the same cannot be said for the United Nations. For the time being at least, the UN is bound to be hurt by the adverse American reaction, not only to the vote, but to the demonstrations of glee which greeted it in the General Assembly, demonstrations that were widely construed to be anti-American. Perhaps it is time that we Americans realized that superpowers are bound to be unpopular, and that small nations are inevitably going to be gleeful when a superpower is discomfited. In the days of the British Empire, the game was called "twisting the lion's tail," and the British had to put up with it. But apparently America has not yet learned that wealth and power—yes, and generosity—do not bring popularity.

The reaction in Congress has been severe. A number of Representatives have introduced resolutions reducing the US share of UN funding to about 6 percent (ratio of US to world population). While these resolutions have scant support in the House Foreign Affairs Committee and will probably die there, the House *has* sustained the recommendation of Otto Passman's Appropriations subcommittee that the US make no contribution in this fiscal year to the UN Development Program on the ground that it has excessive reserves.

In addition, the action by the Congress prohibiting the President from observing the UN sanctions against Rhodesia with respect to chrome (so long as chrome is being purchased from a communist country), a direct violation of our treaty obligations under the Charter, was no doubt in part influenced by the debacle in New York on the China question.

Such events are damaging not only to the UN and its family of agencies, but are also damaging to the US in its relations to the developing countries. A sore loser is never respected. And the African countries in particular—especially those who voted with us on the China question—will never understand why the US with its huge chrome stockpile should join with South Africa in openly defying the UN effort to bring pressure to bear on a racist, white minority govern-

ment.

Unfortunately the trend in the US has been away from internationalism in any case—witness the Congress' refusal to overturn Representative John Rooney's insistence on non-payment of our ILO obligations—but the defeat in New York and its immediate aftermath will only make matters worse.

The anger of Americans in and out of Congress seems to have been focused mainly on the UN as an institution and on the countries of the Third World. As such the anger was misdirected. Obviously the UN Secretariat was not to blame, and such votes as the US did get came mainly from the Third World, especially from Africa and Latin America. The hard fact was that the United States had little support from its NATO allies; on the crucial "important question" vote, only Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg voted with us, four abstained, and the remaining six, including our closest and oldest friends in the world, Canada, France and the United Kingdom, were opposed. On the Albanian Resoluton itself, not a single NATO country voted with us.

The Nixon Administration tried to brush off these defections as being motivated by selfish interests —the fact that countries such as the UK, Canada and France not only recognize Peking but are trying to improve their relations with the People's Republic—but this could not be said of all the NATO group. Nor could it be said of a country such as Ireland, which has an excellent record for disinterested voting on UN questions, motivated primarily by a strong belief in the Organization.

What the American people—and particularly the majority of the Congress—have not yet realized is that the US "two Chinas" approach was a dreadfully weak position, illogical and shot through with inconsistencies. A majority of the UN members not only saw it as such, but concluded—quite correctly, in my opinion—that it was a position adopted by the United States, not on its merits, but for domestic political reasons: the Administration, knowing that the President's announced trip to Peking was unpopular with its conservative supporters, was trying to mitigate the damage by putting up a prodigious battle to keep Taiwan in the UN.

The basic weakness of the US position was that the issue was not really one of expulsion of a member state—as so often reiterated by the United States—but one of credentials: which government had the right to the seat assigned to China at the UN?

The US kept arguing that the 14 million people on Taiwan were entitled to representation, that as their representative the Republic of China should not be expelled. But the Republic of China never accepted that view. Instead, the spokesmen for Chiang Kai-shek continued to insist that they represented all of China. Thus acceptance of the US position meant that there would be two governments in the UN, both claiming to represent the same people.

Such a situation has never been allowed to develop at the UN, and properly so. There have been cases to be sure where states having formed a federation have been allowed to keep their separate memberships. And there is the *sui generis* case of the Ukraine and Byelorussia —the product of a compromise reached by FDR and Stalin. But these are not comparable: in no case have states been seated or allowed to remain which asserted inconsistent and conflicting claims to represent the entire population of a country.

It is true that the Albanian resolution used the word "expel," and the United States pointed to this in support of its argument that a member state was about to be expelled, and that this was a dangerous precedent under the Charter. But the Albanian resolution did not call for the expulsion of a member state, rather of the "representatives of Chiang Kai-shek"—i.e. of a delegation.

Nine or ten years ago, when a "two Chinas" approach was first seriously considered by the US, it might have succeeded. At that time, the US might even have got away with a proposal in the Assembly to offer "admission" to Peking as a new member, leaving for future disposition the question of the Security Council seat. Peking in all likelihood would have stayed out under such circumstances, but at least the US would have been in a less indefensible position. By 1971 it was too late for the "two Chinas" idea.

What then should we have done, once we had accepted the inevitability of Peking's coming in to take the seat of "China?" Did we simply have to let the Albanian resolution, with its offensive language, go through? I do not think so. I believe an alternative resolution along the following lines would have had a reasonable chance of success: (1) Peking's right to occupy the seat of China to be recognized; (2) the status of Taiwan declared to be a question to be settled in the future; (3) pending that settlement, Taiwan to be offered the right of admission as a separate state. (Such a resolution might or might not have included a reference to self-determination for the people of Taiwan as the proper way to settle its status; this would have had the advantage of ringing a bell pleasing to the ears of most UN member states, but it would have had the disadvantage of offending both Peking and Taiwan unnecessarily.)

If such a resolution had been adopted, Chiang Kai-shek would probably not have accepted it and would have left the UN, as his delegation did after the "important question" vote. This would have left Peking free to come in. Peking might not have done so immediately, because of the form of the reso-

lution. But there would have been little sympathy on the part of UN members for Peking's staying out, and after a decent interval of protest the People's Republic would probably have taken its seat. Peking's friends would certainly have urged it to do so, pointing out that, so long as Peking was not in the Seeurity Council to exercise its veto, a Taiwanese Government might decide to aecept the terms of the resolution and apply for and gain admission as a new member state!

But all that is speculation. The faet of the matter is that Peking is now in, Taiwan is out, and President Nixon is in process of trying to mend his fences with the heads of state who were offended by his bombshell announeement of a trip to Peking, before he actually goes there. Where do we go from here, so far as our relations with China and Taiwan are eoneerned?

Theoretieally, the United States could go all-out in its search for good relations with Peking by abandoning its recognition of Taiwan and giving the requisite one year's notice of termination of our Mutual Defense Treaty. But there arc strong reasons against this—notably the faithlessness as a friend and ally it would reveal—and anyway it is simply not in the cards, at least as long as Chiang Kai-shek is around to remind Amerieans of our World War II alliance. Nor is such a total about-face in American policy necessary for the development of inereasingly good relationships with Peking.

In the invitations to our ping-pong players and subsequently to President Nixon, Peking was clearly signalling the end of its long-held hard line that the US had to abandon its "occupation" of Taiwan before there eould be any improvement in Ameriean-Chinese relations.

This does not mean of course that Peking will agree to full diplomatic relations with the United States under the present eireumstances. That is probably years away. But formal diplomatic relations, like formal declarations of war, have beeome non-essential in reeent years. All kinds of friendly eontaets and exchanges are possible without formal diplomatie relations. Consider the case of Algeria, for example: the US maintains a sizable mission in Algiers, trade goes on, a huge Ex-Im Bank loan is under active eonsideration, and relations could be eharaeterized, in the parlance of skiing, as fair to good. The same is true to a lesser degree of Egypt.

Thus I would suppose that President Nixon, without agreeing to any ehange in the status quo so far as Taiwan is concerned, will be able to bring back from Peking agreements for inereased trade, travel and eultural exehanges.

I am all for his visit. I do not hold with those who see a great loss of face in his going "hat in hand" to Peking. For one thing he will not be going "hat in hand," for he will not be asking for anything other than what will be mutually benefieial. For another the wealthiest and most powerful nation on earth does not have to stand on eeremony. A really big person in business or politics or diplomacy, does not have to be afraid to get on the telephone line first.

Moreover, if Nixon's trip destroys much of his (and his predecessors') rationale for our military misadventures in southeast Asia, my reaction is "so much the better." The trip is the more to his credit that he is willing to pay that price.

In the immediate future, I see no change likely in our relations with Taipei. No doubt the majority of the Congress would strenuously resist such a change. But, for the longer run and especially after the Generalissimo has passed from the scene, I would hope the United States would adopt a policy of favoring ultimate self-determination for the Taiwanese. While it seems likely that the 12 million Taiwanese (as opposed to the 2 million Chinese) would choose independence, it does not follow that sueh an independent state would be tied to the US as the Republie of China now is. A natural and far preferable result would be the emergenee of a neutral state, governed by Taiwanese rather than by emigres from mainland China.

In spite of Peking's present rhetoric, there is no reason why sueh an independent and neutral Taiwan should be so unaeeeptable to Peking as to eall for forcible interferenee. In this eonneetion, it is worth noting that the Chinese Communists have not always insisted that Taiwan had to be an integral part of China: in the 1930s Mao Tse-tung told Edgar Snow that, in eontrast to Manehuria whieh had to be regained for China, an independent Formosa could be eontemplated, just as an independent Korea was not unaceeptable (see "Red Star over China," p. 102.)

What of the UN, with Peking in both the Security Council and the General Assembly? Some of the long-time proponents of Peking's entry have predieted that the UN would be strengthened thereby. I must say I am not so optimistic, at least for the short run. While Peking's entry was inevitable and President Nixon's deeision to agree to it was a wise one, the result in the immediate future will probably be more trouble for the UN rather than less. Peking's early speeehes do not signal any readiness to abandon its far-out positions, and these positions may make it more difficult for the Russians to be practical. So far the effect of Peking's presenee on the possibility of the UN playing a useful role in the India-Pakistan dispute, in the Middle East, or in arms limitations and eontrol is hardly a positive one. It will be interesting to see what Peking's actions will be with respect to assessments and contributions to UN programs and to the idea of a career international civil service (an idea never accepted, for their own nationals, by the Russians). One hopeful sign is that Peking finally went along with Kurt Waldheim as Secretary General, after twiee vetoing his eleetion.

Whatever the effeet of Peking's entry, it had to be, and somehow the United Nations will have to find a way to survive. In the long run the world organization is bound to be the stronger for having within its membership the world's most populous nation. And over time for the People's Republic of China the eonstant exposure to the rest of the world at the UN, the need to make aecommodations and compromises, the inevitable efforts to win friendships seem bound to have a softening effeet.

Without China, the United Nations eould never sueeeed in realizing its potential. With China, it just might. ■

One solution to the transfer-of-power problem is for the incumbent leader-with-charisma to choose and anoint his heir.

The Succession to Mao Tse-tung

ROBERT W. RINDEN

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Dr. Rinden will also be recalled as frequent contributor to the JOURNAL *over the years and as the initiator of "Life and Love in the Foreign Service."*

THE death of Stalin was to have momentous effects on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the Chinese People's Republic, Chairman Mao Tse-tung, now in his late seventies and for some years in poor health, may not live the myriad years—"*Mao chu-hsi wan sui*"—his people frequently wish him. In fact, Mao has had intimations of mortality and has talked of them and of the fate of the Chinese Revolution after he is gone. In an interview with Edgar Snow in January 1965 he remarked that:

> He was soon going to see God. According to the laws of dialectics all contradictions must be finally resolved, including the struggle of the individual. (He) was getting ready to see God very soon.

Without seeming to wish Chairman Mao less than "10,000 years," one may speculate on who may succeed him and what policies may follow him when eventually he has mounted the dragon for the long journey to the Western (*sic*) Heaven. Such conjecture, however macabre and shaky on facts, seems rather on the order of contingency planning—given the hopes for increasing and better relations between America and China.

A major problem of charismatic leadership, of which Mao is so outstanding an example, is that of succession—the power vacuum and power struggle that seems usually to ensue upon the Great Man's leaving the stage. During his lifetime, the exalted image of the departed leader has so dwarfed those around him—whatever their abilities and accomplishments—that for any of them to presume himself a qualified successor verges on sacrilege. The greater the glorification of the former chieftain, the more intractable the problem of a credible successor.

As Max Weber has pointed out in his discussion of the "routinization of charismatic authority," one solution to the transfer-of-power problem is for the incumbent leader-with-charisma to choose and anoint his heir. His designation of the crown prince, once it has been formally acknowledged by lesser luminaries (notably those who are actual power-holders and also potential successors), serves to legitimate and assure the ordained succession to power. This method *may* work out all right, yet there remains always the disquieting possibility that allegiance to the departed ruler's wishes may not survive his life and that powerful men with personal ambitions greater than their loyalty to their late commander may not, after all, meekly accept the Chosen Disciple but, on the contrary, may precipitate a disruptive power struggle. Since the purpose of this essay is merely to suggest that there are real uncertainties attendant upon a dictator's choosing his successor and making his decision *stick*, it may suffice to observe that, for example, Lenin, in his famous, and largely-suppressed, death-bed letter warned against Stalin—and yet it was Stalin, who, after a power struggle with Trotsky and other veteran revolutionaries, came to supreme power in the Soviet Union. Moreover, ironically, it was Stalin, who—disregarding Lenin's well-known aversion to glorification of his personality and rejecting the protests of Lenin's widow—inaugurated the apotheosis of Lenin so that he might drape himself in the mantle of Lenin's successor.

In the Chinese People's Republic, Chairman Mao, seemingly apprehensive of a power struggle after his demise, concerned for an orderly succession to his power, and determined that his policies should not end with his life, selected the Defense Minister, Lin Piao, to succeed him and had this personal decision ratified by the Chinese Communist Party at its National Party Congress in April 1969.

Towards reinforcing Lin's position as his heir, Mao sought to bestow upon him some of his own charismatic authority. Lin was ritualistically and invariably described in Chinese official statements and in the Chinese media as Chairman Mao's "close comrade-in-arms," an honorific given to no one else. (Premier Chou En-lai, the third-ranking man in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, is just plain "Comrade Chou En-lai.") Lin was always

at Mao's side on those impressive ceremonial occasions when the Chairman, in majestic silence from the eminence of the Gate of Celestial Peace (*T'ien An Men*), reviews the cheering tens-of-thousands as they march by. At such regal events and at important Party meetings Lin was the speaker-of-the-day, Mao's spokesman and interpreter.

Notwithstanding a variety of measures to heighten Lin's stature, the refractory reality is that charisma is intensely, essentially, personal—scarcely transferable to anyone else. The *role* of a charismatic leader may be transferred but not his charisma. Short, slight, emaciated—frail from years of tuberculosis and weakened by war wounds—Lin is no magnetic personality, no crowd-mover. A main source of the "The Great Teacher's" charismatic authority in a nation that respects the scholar and teacher is his reputation as a great Marxist-Leninist philosopher—a theoretician who has "enriched the treasure-house of Marxism-Leninism"—along with Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. Clearly, Lin Piao does not belong in the pantheon of these Communist immortals, for he has been content to be a soldier and to leave the philosophizing and writing to Mao Tse-tung. Perhaps Lin's major contribution in the field of theory was his world-resounding speech in September 1965, "Long Live People's War." This was little more than a deferential re-hash of Mao's thoughts on "Wars of National Liberation"—and how to win them.

At present, it seems clear that Lin Piao is no longer Mao's successor; he is dead politically, and maybe physically. While the causes of this astounding reversal of his fortunes are obscure—explanations are sensational and contradictory—there appears to be no reasonable possibility of his succeeding Chairman Mao.

Concomitant with Lin's startling disappearance from political and public life since mid-September 1971 have been the increased prominence and activity of Premier Chou En-lai. Chou has an amazing record of political survival. He is one of the very few leaders of the Chinese Communist movement who, from its beginnings until today, has managed to stay in its forefront. Many People's Liberation Army commanders were his political pupils. (Lin Piao was one of his proteges when Chou was head of the political department of the famous Whampoa Military Academy.) His distinguished career as chief political commissar in the Red Army—from its birth in 1927 through 1949—won him the armed forces' respect. In the Party apparatus he has demonstrated remarkable flexibility and eschewed doctrinal rigidity. In 1949 he organized the most extensive governmental machinery in the world; since then he has been its chief administrator. The principal architect of his nation's foreign policy, he has shown impressive diplomatic skill and has acted as spokesman for the emergent nations of Asia and Africa. The more receptive attitude China has shown towards improving relations with the United States—notably, President Nixon's state visit to Peking—and the broadening of China's relations with the rest of the world seem attributable, in large measure, to Chou's major role in the formulation of Chinese foreign policy.

So, for the time and *faute de mieux*, Premier Chou En-lai, his 73 years notwithstanding, may be regarded as the *de facto*, unanointed successor to Chairman Mao. In this connection, one may wonder if Mao would not find it embarrassing to designate another heir-apparent. The spectacular Lin Piao fiasco—with continuing disclosures of his unfitness to carry on the Chairman's revolutionary mission — suggests that Mao's infallibility does not extend to personnel administration. Heightening this suspicion are charges, made both during and after the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, that Liu Shao-ch'i, so long the Party's No. 2 man and Mao's actual successor as Chairman of the Chinese People's Republic, was a revisionist "Chinese Khrushchev"—a swindling, capitalistic-minded, anti-Maoist traitor to the Chinese Revolution. In addition to Mao's less-than-perfect record in choosing his close collaborators there is also the circumstance that a current movement in China lays much stress on Party leadership (i.e., collective leadership) and castigates the theory of "genius." All this would surely militate against the formal laying-on-of-hands in connection with the designation of a crown prince to follow Mao in one-man power.

It seems probable that Mao's revolutionary program will continue under whoever emerges—with, of course, such modifications as the exigencies of the time may require. Chou has been associated with Mao for a long time—since the earliest days of the Chinese Communist movement—and evinces full support of Mao's conception of the Chinese Revolution. Mao would surely see in Chou a successor who would faithfully and effectively carry out his wishes and policies for the nation's future course. Given the effulgence of the Chairman's charismatic authority and blessing, Chou would find great advantage in exploiting to the fullest the fact that he was charged with the continuing realization of Mao's "uninterrupted revolution."

When in March 1925 another "Father of the Chinese Revolution," Dr. Sun Yat-sen, died, General Chiang Kai-shek soon succeeded in representing himself to be the inheritor of Sun's mission—as he still does today on Taiwan, where he often pledges himself and the *Kuomintang* to the ultimate realization of Sun's "Three Principles of the People." Just as Chiang donned Sun's robes and Stalin arrayed himself in Lenin's garments, so it seems predictable that Chou would wrap himself in Mao's mantle.

Quite apart from the manifest advantages for his own position to be derived from stressing that Mao chose him to lead the Chinese masses—both in heading off challenges from other power-seekers and in serving as a rallying-point for the Chinese nation—Chou would find it difficult indeed not to pursue the policies willed him by Chairman Mao. A prime reason for Mao's encouragement of his personality cult—the deification of Mao as "The Great Leader" and "The Great Teacher" and the sanctification of his works as infallible wisdom and eternal guidance—has been to make sure that, once Mao has died, those who come after him will be committed to the continuance of his policies. After so long a conditioning in the unfailing wisdom

(*Continued on page* 42)

The Chinese have faced their population problem, but in various ways, at various times over the years.

CHINA'S Population Problems: Generation to Generation

LEO A. ORLEANS

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A condensed version of Chapter II of "Every Fifth Child: The Population of China" to be published in 1972 in England by Eyre Methuen, Ltd. and in the United States by Stanford University Press.

Levels in Old China: In a society where there are no restrictions on reproduetion, the erude birth rate ean be as high as 50 per 1,000 or even higher. This has not been the easc in China, where traditional customs and social forees tending to limit fertility outweighcd those which eneouraged unlimited families.

In the past, China has been known to worry about underpopulation. Thc vast territories controlled by the early emperors were, for the most part, sparsely populated. Early marriages were eneouraged and the Confucian admonition, "To dic without an offspring is one of the three gravest unfilial aets," was almost universally aeeepted, partieularly sinee a male ehild represented the only available form of old-age insurance. With the extremely high infant and ehild mortality which prevailed during most years, a couplc needed three sons to ensure the survival of one to adulthood.

On the other hand, there were a number of eultural, social and economie factors throughout China's history whieh had the effeet of limiting fertility. Considering China's size and the diversity of her population, not all the factors were applieable aeross the board; but they were widesprcad enough to be signifieant. Among them were diseasc and malnutrition, which may aet to limit fertility; the practiee, by certain segments of the population, of coitus interruptus; female infanticide, thereby redueing the number of women to reach the reproductive ages; the common praetice of breast-feeding babies for as long as one to two years, which deters coneeption; inheritance patterns which limited marriage ehoiccs in order to retain family holdings; shortage of girls due to prostitution, eoneubinage, and the already mentioned female infantieide; soeial approval of eelibacy and disapproval of widows remarrying. Considering these inhibiting faetors, the historieal level of the Chinese birth rate for every 1,000 persons was more likely to be in thc mid-40s rather than the mid-50s.

Of partieular signifieanee was the praetice of infanticide or child neglect—the postnatal mode of birth eontrol. Although practieed to eliminatc defeetive and unhealthy offspring, it was primarily aimed at the female ehild who, as a eonsumer, eould be a serious burden to the poor family, but beeause she would leave home on reaching marriageable age, she would be useless in perpetuating the family line and in the observance of filial piety. The practice of infantieide continued into the 20th century, and as late as 1943 an official publication of the Nationalist Government exhorted its readers to cease this practiec. Sinee fertility depends not simply on the numbers of people but the number of women in the population, the effeet of infanticide on population

growth could be significant.

Chances are that China's birth rate was more or less stable for many centuries with only minor regional variations. In some of the regional surveys birth rates were sampled directly; in other surveys data on age composition were obtained from which approximate birth rates were estimated. Obviously no one knows for sure what the crude birth rate was, but probably most authorities would agree that a rate of 40 to 45 per 1,000 population is a reasonable figure and encompasses most of the suggested estimates.

Whereas the birth rate in China can be considered as high with probably only minor fluctuations over the centuries, the death rate is more difficult to estimate since it tended to fluctuate between high and very high, depending on the extent and intensity of frequent famines, natural disasters, military conflicts, and widespread epidemics of such "filth diseases" as typhus, cholera, plague, typhoid, and dysentery. For the overwhelming majority of the Chinese population, death came without any interference from medical personnel, health facilities, or drugs. Without straying into a dubious evaluation of the efficacy of Chinese medicine, it is fair to say that there were some traditional legitimate doctors who were true scholars and who contributed to the development, propagation, and perpetuation of the art over several thousands of years. They were supplemented by a large number of practitioners of traditional medicine, some of whom undoubtedly had an appreciation of the human anatomy and physiology and were able to assist recovery, but too many of whom were aptly described as an "incongruous, diversified, variable, motley group of physicians, leeches, empirics and impostors."

During the first half of the 20th century many dedicated people worked hard to improve the level of medical care in China. Through the efforts of missionaries and, to some extent, the new government in Nanking, medical schools were built, public health campaigns were initiated, local health departments were established and even the Ministry of Health was finally established in 1928. Hampered by poor transportation and communication, breakdowns in central administration, lack of personnel and funds, the general health of the Chinese masses did not improve.

Since population registers and special surveys are much more likely to omit deaths than births, the collected data must always be adjusted. According to Ta Chen, who conducted an intensive demographic survey of the Kunning Lake Region in Yunnan and supplemented his findings with data from other estimates, the 1934 national death rate in China was 34 per 1,000 and the infant mortality was 275 per 1,000 births. These figures would seem to represent reasonable medians for China, with the death rate dipping into the high 20s during the better years and rising above the birth rate, for a net population deficit during particularly bad years.

As a point of reference, it is suggested that despite the wars, revolutions, and frequent floods and drought, the population of China increased on the average of one-half of one percent per year during the first half of the present century. It should be remembered, however—that because of favorable institutional and economic factors there have been many periods in China's history when her population must have increased at a much more rapid rate to have overcome recurring major disasters.

Fertility: When the Chinese Communists took over the reins of government and set up their new capital in Peking, the size and rate of growth of the country's population was undoubtedly not of vital concern to the new leaders. Furthermore, worry about overpopulation would run contrary to Marxist ideology, which attributed human misery not to excessive population growth but to the maldistribution of income and other supposed defects in the existing social order. The Communist leaders held that the wealth of the country was in the hands of the workers and peasants—and the larger number of hands could only create greater wealth. As late as April 1952, the PEOPLE'S DAILY denounced birth control as "a means of killing off the Chinese people without shedding blood."

The results of the 1953 census were completed in the summer of 1954 and only a couple of months later, in September, the first note of anxiety was expressed by a prominent member of the National People's Congress—Shao Li-tzu. Although his statement was most cautious, he was nevertheless criticized for advocating birth control. In his own defense he insisted that the dissemination of knowledge about contraception had nothing in common with either the old or the new Malthusian theory but was necessary to improve the health of mothers and infants, to advance the education of children, and to allow mothers more time for work and study. By the summer of 1956 it became clear (although never official) that the birth control campaign had authority behind it and that the major responsibility for its implementation was assigned to the Ministry of Public Health. In August of that year, the Ministry issued a directive which stated that "contraception is a democratic right of the people and the government should take every step to guide the masses and to meet their demands for birth control."

The campaign, which reached its peak in the spring of 1957, was carried on with great vigor for a little more than a year. A Birth Control Research Committee was set up to "coordinate experience and research in contraception," numerous educational campaigns were launched by local departments of public health, traveling exhibits were organized, and many hospitals and clinics introduced special facilities to give advice on birth control.

The campaign ebbed, just as it had accelerated, with overlapping articles both favoring and opposing family planning. Gradually the volume of arguments against any population controls overwhelmed the occasional reports of some family planning activities at a given commune or plant. With the initiation of communes and the Great Leap Forward in mid-1958, it became obvious that Communist China had reversed its only recently introduced policy of birth control. A large population was once more regarded as advantageous, and the vicious attacks on Malthusians, "rightists," and "bourgeois economists" again shifted into high gear.

The reasons for the 1958 policy reversal naturally precipitated much

After some initial confusion on the part of the Red Guards as to whether birth control was "revisionist," it was finally resolved to be a Maoist idea.

speculation in the West. Was it really possible that the Chinese themselves believed the proclaimed line that the country was now short of manpower?

What might have happened had the euphoria of the Great Leap persisted is impossible to say. It was predictably of short duration; in 1959 China entered an economic crisis that focused all effort on survival—a dramatic change from the grandiose plans of the year before. For the most part there was silence on the subject of population growth but, as it turned out, the abandonment of the vocal program of family limitation was not a complete reversal—it did not result in a campaign to encourage large families. On the contrary, contraceptives continued to be generally available, although mostly in the cities; birth control clinics continued to function; and although facilities were limited at least in theory, abortion and sterilization for those who requested them.

Beginning in early 1962, as the country was pulling out of the economic morass of the 1959-61 period, the Chinese resumed publication of articles encouraging family limitation to protect the health of the mother and the child. For example, whereas in 1961 the popular monthly, WOMEN OF CHINA, did not carry a single item dealing with any subject related to birth control, in the last eight months of 1962 the same journal published six such articles.

The detrimental effects of early marriage were only a part of the earlier birth control campaign; now disapproval of early marriage ("a poisonous gas given off by the rotting corpse of capitalism") became the primary emphasis of the crusade. By passing the Marriage Law of 1950 the Communists had already raised the minimum age of marriage to eighteen for females and twenty for males, but at that time the rationale for this law was not demographic; rather, it was intended to replace the traditional, early, family-arranged marriage contracts with unions decided upon by the individuals themselves. The new proposals, by different authors, to raise the optimum age for marriage anywhere from five to ten years for both men and women, were designed to limit the size of the family. None of these proposals was legally adopted, but arguments used in the campaign against "the evil wind of early marriage" were most imaginative and made fascinating reading.

As the general economy showed definite signs of recovery in the mid-1960s, the flow of articles on birth control once more slackened and it would have been easy but erroneous to have concluded that optimism had again eradicated all fears of rapid population growth. Although propaganda on birth control and delayed marriage in the mass media essentially disappeared, the push for family planning became much more action-oriented being directed at the professional medical and public health personnel. Articles on the subject in professional journals increased in number, and medical conferences for obstetricians, surgeons, medical administrators, experienced practitioners of traditional Chinese medicine and other medical personnel covered such topics as the effectiveness of the intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD) and improvements in artificial abortion techniques and sterilization methods.

A most important role in the drive to limit Chinese fertility during this period was played by the mobile medical teams, composed of groups of urban medical personnel who were required to spend a certain part of the year attending to the medical needs of the rural population. Among the duties specifically assigned to the teams, which increased to over 1,000 by 1966, was the mission to "publicize the meaning of planned parenthood among the peasants and propagate the knowledge about birth control." To accomplish this task members of the team conducted propaganda meetings, set up exhibitions, showed films, and organized "personal testimony" meetings at which peasant women who were using IUDs or other types of contraceptives described their reactions—favorable, of course.

With the advent of the Cultural Revolution, China discontinued practically all publications and the few that continued were much too pre-occupied with political diatribes even to mention the subject of population. After some initial confusion on the part of the Red Guards as to whether birth control was "revisionist," it was finally resolved to be a Maoist idea and family planning activities initiated in the countryside during the previous years were not disturbed. As a matter of fact, the thousands of additional medical personnel who were permanently moved out of the cities during and after the Cultural Revolution must have augmented the effort in the rural areas. Moreover, as in the case of mobile medical teams, specifically mentioned among the duties of the barefoot doctors—the thousands of peasants who were given a modicum of medical training and sent out among the masses—was the propagation of birth control. This is verified by Edgar Snow who, after his 1970 visit to the Mainland, reported that barefoot doctors are also "bearers of China's effective birth control pills now in widespread use even in rural areas."

Reactions and Results: What effect did all this action and, at times, inaction have on China's birth rate? Trying to convince an overwhelmingly rural, poorly motivated, superstitious population that they should delay marriage and make an effort to limit their number of offspring was not an easy undertaking. The difficulty was accentuated by the already mentioned traditional Chinese attitude in favor of large families. As an outgrowth of Confucian teachings and veneration of ancestors, and because of the very practical need for additional family labor, there existed an overwhelming desire to beget sons. Despite the intensity of the 1956-57 campaign to further birth control, its

impact was minimal and probably well summarized in a letter that appeared in a local newspaper in 1957: "Contraceptive propaganda has not penetrated into the countryside and the use of the various kinds of contraceptive methods is mostly limited to the workers in the government agencies."

In addition to the problems of motivation and education, there were also the physical and economic problems of supplying hundreds of millions of persons in the reproductive ages with the necessary paraphernalia for effective birth control. In February 1958 one newspaper admitted in an editorial that the total supply of contraceptives in China was sufficient to meet the needs of only 2.2 percent of all persons in the reproductive ages.

Thus the fairly extensive efforts to curb Chinese fertility in the 1950s probably had little effect in the rural areas and only marginal success in the cities of China. As a matter of fact it has even been suggested that there was an increase in the birth rate following the Communist takeover. Because parental consent was no longer necessary, because women were assured that they had equal rights and no longer were dependent on either the father or the husband, and because economic security eliminated economic constraints, the marriage rate theoretically could have increased. However, it takes more than the mere proclamation of a new Marriage Law for a Chinese girl to practice this strange, new emancipation. As late as 1970 the Communists felt it necessary to carry a warning in the press: "At present, the class enemies are still making use of the ghost of the doctrines of Confucius and Mencius and lingering pernicious influence of Liu Shao-chi's counterrevolutionary revisionist line [and] engage in the buying-and-selling type of matrimony. . ." It seems doubtful, therefore, that the new freedoms resulted in any immediate increase in marriage and fertility among the Chinese women.

Whereas during the 1950s the birth control campaign achieved only limited results, it seems very probable that during the following ten years—the decade of the '60s—the Chinese managed to start a gradual downward trend in the country's fertility. Considering all the difficulties earlier described, how is it possible to suggest such a change in this short a time period?

The Chinese Communists have always seen the family—the traditional social unit in China, based on the Confucian principles of filial piety and brotherly love—as a major obstacle to the thoroughgoing establishment of communism in China. The efforts to redirect loyalties from family to the leadership in Peking have proceeded primarily on three fronts. First, through the promulgation of the Marriage Law and the "emancipation" of women; second, through the indoctrination and education of children and youth; and third, through the collectivization and subsequent communization of agriculture. Although she may have left her heart at home, the "liberated" housewife became an important unit of labor in the field and factory. Trained from infancy in the sanctity of Mao's thought, children were presumably encouraged to indoctrinate their parents, to inform on them and denounce any deviation from Maoist principles, singing that "Dear are our parents, but dearer still is Chairman Mao." Despite the propaganda and the creation of communes, which were originally intended to replace many of the family functions, the family continues to exist and the changes in the family structure have not been as great as Party leaders desired. Even PEOPLE'S DAILY had to admit reluctantly in 1963 that, "Owing to many historical reasons, the old way of thinking and old habits in marriage and family life are more difficult to eradicate than old customs in any other field." Many of the actions of the Red Guards were directed specifically at traditional filial piety, which implies both love and respect of the child for his parents. The deportation of millions of youth from Chinese cities was certainly not intended to perpetuate familial relationships, but because of the reported opposition to this separation on the part of the affected youth and parents, it may be wrong to assume that this policy resulted in any permanent severance of family bonds. Furthermore, rural families were not affected by this shift.

And yet, in this very changed society, the family changed too. Not so much because several generations no longer live under one roof, under one family head, and not because a male child is no longer considered to be a form of old-age insurance, and not because there is less attachment and love—the family has changed because the social and economic organization of society has changed and with it the thinking of the young people. These conditions now point to the probability of fertility controls and their acceptance.

It is, of course, most important to reach the nation's youth who are potentially the most fertile group. In China, people under 30 constitute approximately two-thirds of the population and, since by the middle and late 1960s they had spent most of their young adulthood under the Communists, they are also the most thoroughly indoctrinated. During those years China made significant strides in providing the vast majority of the youth with at least a primary level education, so that most of the people in the young reproductive ages can no longer be considered illiterate. China is poor but not indigent. Some bad crop years notwithstanding, improved food distribution procedures have, for the most part, resulted in an absence of even regional starvation. The distribution of limited consumer goods has improved. For better or for worse, political indoctrination and mandatory study of the thoughts of Mao have served to avert the intense dejection and desperation so prevalent among many people of underdeveloped countries. The young people of China have been saturated with government policies that denigrate family, cultural traditions, and domesticity, but uphold service and sacrifice for motherland and socialist conformity—conformity so traditional in Chinese society. Because early marriage and numerous children are un-Maoist and reactionary, there now seems to be a stigma attached to having large families. Given the climate of opinion that sees small families as part of a patriotic duty, the youth might well be willing to postpone marriage and to accept

China is one of the few countries in which millions of teen-aged boys and girls can travel, demonstrate and sleep under the same roof without affecting the country's birth rate.

and practice some form of birth control within the marriage relationship.

Relevant here are the activities (or inactivities) of the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution. Despite some speculation to the contrary, China is one of the few countries in which millions of teen-aged boys and girls can travel, demonstrate, and sleep under the same roof without affecting the country's birth rate. In pre-Communist China, premarital sexual intercourse was regarded as extremely reprehensible, and chastity held a high place on the list of womanly virtues. This is one of the traditions of old China accepted and nurtured by the Communists and the "liberation" of Chinese women does not extend to the endorsement of free love. All evidence suggests that China's youth continue to pursue the puritanical sexual mores of the past.

Just in case the drive to sublimate the sex urge needed reinforcement, the media, particularly the publications catering to women and youth, included articles encouraging family planning and the use of contraceptives. The "letter to the editors" format, a particularly popular way of communicating current social attitudes, was frequently used. For example, a published letter from a young wife asked whether it is true that contraception may induce "sexual discord" and is "harmful to bodily health." To this question, which was intended to reflect the concern of many young people in China, the editor responded categorically that one must "refrain from believing in hearsay or offhand assertions." In great detail he then pointed out that contraception "neither affects the love one has for the other nor the normal sexual life of the husband and wife" and that only persons who are "lacking rudimentary knowledge of physiology and personal hygiene" would suggest that the use of contraceptives is unhealthy.

To be effective, this gentle persuasion had to go hand-in-hand with readily available means for family planning, and contraceptives such as condoms, pills, foams, jellies, diaphragms, and especially intrauterine devices were made more readily available throughout the countryside in the 1960s. Perhaps of special significance was the increased use of IUDs which have apparently become progressively more acceptable from the point of view of the woman and of the medical personnel. The IUD may not yet be entirely suitable for advanced Western countries, but because they are inexpensive, because they can be inserted by specially trained personnel with limited medical backgrounds, they are extremely well suited for China.

Oral contraceptives seem to be as ancient as China itself, albeit they are often difficult to distinguish from potions devised to induce abortion. In his volume, "Medical History of Contraception," Norman Hines quotes from the most ancient medical work in the Chinese language, which was written more than 2,500 years before the birth of Christ: "Shui yin tastes bitter, is of cold nature, and contains poison. It is a specific for ulcers, white itching sores on the scalp, will kill parasitical worms in the skin and flesh, cause abortion, and cure fevers. . ." Another ancient prescription is as follows: "Take a square foot or more sheet of paper on which silkworm eggs have been hatched, burn to an ash and pulverize. After childbirth mix this in liquor and take. Those with impoverished blood will not again become pregnant for the rest of their lives." Prescriptions such as these were passed on through the centuries from one practitioner of herb medicine to the next. As recently as 1956, a herbalist who was also Deputy to the National People's Congress, in all seriousness, suggested the following remedy that was quickly picked up by the skeptical world press: "Fresh tadpoles coming out in the spring should be washed clean in cold well water, and swallowed whole three or four days after menstruation. If a woman swallows fourteen live tadpoles on the first day and ten more on the following day, she will not conceive for five years. . ."

Birth control pills, so popular in the West, are a relatively new phenomenon in China. Although Chinese medical journals have reported considerable research in the field of oral contraception, the limited supply and excessive cost hampered mass acceptance and usage of the new drug. More recent visitors to Mainland China, however, have reported seeing prominent displays of oral contraceptive pills which they claim are in abundant supply in China's major cities. Given the necessary priority, China's pharmaceutical industry is certainly now capable of producing these pills in such quantities as to affect China's birth rate. According to Edgar Snow, who made a special effort to look into these questions during his trip to China in 1970, the developments in oral contraception have been dramatic during the past few years: the pills are manufactured in the billions, are distributed free of charge, and are widely accepted by the Chinese women.

Abortion in China has never faced the moral or legal obstacles prevalent in the West. Nevertheless, although the prerequisites imposed by the regime in the 1950s were relatively loose and could be easily met by women anxious to terminate pregnancy, the lack of facilities and trained personnel made discussions relating to abortions for the most part theoretical in nature. Since then, the number of induced abortions has increased significantly. In the mid-1960s numerous articles in medical journals detailed abortion procedures and reported statistical data culled from the experiences of individual doctors or medical institutions. The Chinese are also experimenting with simple methods and producing uncomplicated "gadgets" that can be used by lower medical personnel in performing abortions in the rural areas. There is no way to estimate the incidence of abortion in the country, but, as in Japan, abortion will probably play an important

role in reducing China's birth rate.

Sterilization has never been vigorously promoted by the Chinese Communists. Although it is usually the female who is most anxious to take the necessary measures to limit the family, the vasectomy, or male sterilization, is the easier and cheaper operation. Here, however, the desire to limit the number of births runs head-on into both the universal fear of surgery and the difficulty of convincing the average male, be he Chinese or not, that vasectomy is not castration and that he will not experience any loss of sexuality. Finally, there is also the problem, as in the case of abortion, relating to the shortage of hospital facilities and medical personnel to perform these operations. Despite these obstacles, sterilization has not been ignored. Articles encouraging sterilization and publicizing the cases of individuals who have undergone these operations periodically appear in newspapers and especially in women's magazines. Although the incidence of sterilization has been increasing rapidly, in all probability it is still an insignificant factor in reducing Chinese fertility.

With the above discussion as a backdrop, what then is the current Chinese birth rate? The figures can be little more than informed guesses, but it would seem that the crude birth rate of some 43 per 1,000 total population just prior to 1949 began to decrease slowly midway through the '50s to reach about 38 per 1,000 at the end of the first decade of Communist rule and about 32 per 1,000 at the end of the second.

If the above estimates are anywhere close to being realistic, this drop in the birth rate represents a tremendous achievement for a country that, for all practical purposes, is still underdeveloped. The decrease in the crude birth rate, though likely to continue, will be at a slower rate. The reason for this is a fairly sharp and early decline in Chinese mortality which occurred under the new regime, resulting in an increase in the number of surviving children and, starting with the late 1960s, in considerably larger cohorts of women entering the reproductive ages. Since the birth rate is a gross figure calculated in relation to the country's total population, the increased rate of survival among babies and children would first tend to depress the birth rate (total population growing more rapidly than population in reproductive ages), and as the young people reach reproductive ages (1970s), it would increase the birth rate. In simpler words, although the average number of children per woman may decrease slightly, there will be a larger proportion of these women capable of having children. All in all, China would probably be doing extremely well if she could drop the birth rate to, say, 20-25 per 1,000 by the year 1980.

Mortality: Presumably on the basis of sample reporting areas, as in the case of the birth rate, the Chinese published a death rate in conjunction with the 1953 census activity of 17 per thousand total population—a rate that seems much too low for the conditions that prevailed in China during that time period. To evaluate that figure and to consider the trends in mortality since then, it is necessary briefly to consider Chinese policies and practices in medicine and public health during the past twenty years.

Advances in Public Health: As the reader knows, the Communists inherited serious health problems when they assumed control over the Mainland, but they placed a high priority on the improvement of the country's health conditions. Lacking personnel and facilities for treatment of illnesses, they emphasized preventive medicine and sanitation. Millions of people were vaccinated and mass campaigns were instituted to improve environmental sanitation and to encourage personal hygiene. Millions of people (including children and the aged) were mobilized to participate in the well-publicized campaign to exterminate the four pests—mosquitoes, flies, rats, and sparrows—and, in general, to clean up the cities and the countryside. With these programs, the government did succeed in greatly reducing the occurrence of major infectious and parasitic diseases.

Paralleling improvements in environmental sanitation and personal hygiene were the efforts to increase medical facilities such as clinics, hospitals, and sanatoriums, to accelerate the training of medical personnel, and to recast and enhance their traditionally low image. In pre-Communist China, the great majority of the 20,000 or so doctors practicing Western medicine in the country were trained abroad in Europe, the United States, or Japan. But under the Mao regime, higher education in medicine kept pace with the rapid growth of education in general and despite some fluctuations in enrollment and educational philosophy, particularly during the Great Leap Forward period, it is estimated that by the end of 1966 there were approximately 200,000 persons on the Chinese Mainland with completed higher medical education.

More important, however, in terms of the country's health, was the emphasis the Communists placed on secondary medical education and, below that, on a variety of short-term medical training courses for both full-time and part-time medical and public health workers. Many of the students in these courses were recruited from the countryside, trained in nearby commune medical centers and, upon completion of their training, returned to their native villages. Obviously with their limited training they were unable to perform major surgery, but they could provide adequate medical care for the majority of the population and in this way overcome the problem faced by other developing countries—the difficulty of providing the most basic medical services to their rural population.

During the mid-1960s, in order to disperse medical aid even further to the most remote corners of rural China, Peking first introduced the mobile medical teams which included the better qualified medical personnel to tend the more serious cases during periodic visits to the communes. The second step was to transfer large numbers of doctors and other medical personnel from the cities to the countryside on a more permanent basis. And, finally, they instituted a system of politically pure "barefoot doctors" who were trained to provide first aid, give inoculations, and carry out simple health procedures.

(*Continued on page* 32)



Refuting the Conspiracy

AMERICANS AND CHINESE COMMUNISTS, *1927-1945, by Kenneth E. Shewmaker. Cornell University Press, $10.00.*

PROFESSOR SHEWMAKER of Dartmouth College centers his authoritative study on the expcrienees and writings of Amerieans who came into personal contact with Chinese Communists from 1937 to 1945. He describes and analyzes thcir almost unanimously favorable reactions to thc Communists. After 25 ycars of hostility between America and China it may be hard to imagine that such was thc case—but it was different in the 1937-1945 pcriod. Then, the United Front (*soi-disant*) in China against Japan led Amerieans to think of Chinese, Nationalists or Communists, as allies; moreover, external aggression temporarily kept the two enemy camps from settling the issue on the battlefield. These first American visitors to Red China were not diplomats, most of them were journalists, some were missionaries, businessmen, doctors, educators, and military observers. "Whatever their baekground, they almost invariably returned from Yenan aglow with praisc for China's Communists . . . (and) there is reason to believe that the Chinese Communists were as impressed by Amerieans as Americans were by them."

Why Amerieaan visitors to the Communist area were so taken with the Communists is analyzed in detail. Here, it may suffice to note that the Communists' informality, directness, simplieity, and spontaneity in human rclations appealed to Americans, as did their personal attraetiveness. "Journalists returned from the Border Regions with the eonvietion that they had been among modern mcn in thcir own image." One journalist remembered Mao Tse-tung casually dropping by, with a bag of peanuts, to chat with his guests.

Disillusionment with the *Kuomintang* also worked to the Communists' advantage. That hundreds of thousands of Chincse were living and dying in misery was not what turned Western reporters against the *Kuomintang* regime—after all there was a war on. Rathcr, it was their belief that the Chiang Kai-shek government was cold-hearted or indifferent to the well-being of its eitizens. A Christian missionary who spent his years in China in the Nationalist area felt the *Kuomintang* regarded the peasants "as nothing but an endlessly exploitable souree of money, food, and eonscripts," while Theodore White ealled the *Kuomintang* the "dee-

adent, unprincipled, corrupt governing party."

Many reporters on China later—notably during the shameful era of McCarthyism—became targets of the "Communist conspiracy" thesis. This disinterested, reasoned, documented account and interpretation of why events occurred and why people behaved as they did refutes the "conspiracy" thesis, which even today is still alive and vicious in a few, small, demented circles.

That this is a scholarly book by an eminent authority on China need deter no one from buying it; it is highly readable, absorbingly interesting—with special attraction for those concerned with US-China relations and with reporting on China.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

Fact or Fiction

THE REVENGE OF HEAVEN, *by Ken Ling. Putnam's, $8.95.*

ALTHOUGH this book is clearly not "a sort of Chinese Brothers Karamazov" as the publishers would have us believe, it can be read in several ways.

If one is in a more serious mood —in a mood for reading nonfiction— he can read this as a "first-hand account of life inside China today and of the events surrounding the Cultural Revolution of 1966." After all, the author, Ken Ling (a pseudonym), was there and saw it all personally. He also submitted a 500,000 character (over one million words!) manuscript which, incidentally, he wrote from memory, since he burned his diaries before he decided to swim to freedom. And the manuscript was supplemented by 300 hours of interviewing by Dr. London (Brooklyn College), Director of Research, his wife Miriam and Dr. Ta-ling Lee (Southern Connecticut State College), Research Associates, before the book was "developed." Despite these impressive titles which, incidentally, are not connected with any institution, none of the three is a coauthor, although Mrs. London is responsible for "preparing the English text."

If, however, the reader is in the mood for fiction, he can make the necessary mental adjustment and presto! he has an adventure story in a unique setting. He can then read this chatty, first-person narrative about a young man who became a Red Guard during the Cultural Revolution, how he rose to wield great power at the age of 16, his many travels and his rather fantastic experiences. The many excesses of the Cultural Revolution have become well known, but the individual and mass violence and the swashbuckling activities of our hero would put a Class B Hollywood producer to shame.

Since this reviewer was never a Red Guard and did not live through the Cultural Revolution, he is particularly anxious to be objective in his evaluation of this book. That is why the reader will have to draw his own conclusion as to whether he is reading fact or fiction.

—LEO A. ORLEANS

EMBASSY *from page* 14

famous occasion a caller's pipe went out while his servant was absent. Lord Macartney relit it from a little phosphate bottle which he had in his fob, to the wonderment and delight of the Chinese. Then he was able to tell them of many such things which he had brought, and had hoped to explain. He saw plainly that had his companions had their will, this would most certainly have happened.

THE Emperor's letter read in part:

"If you assert that your reverence for our Celestial dynasty fills you with a desire to acquire our civilization; our ceremonies and code of laws differ so completely from your own that, even if your Envoy were able to acquire the rudiments of our civilization, you could not possibly transplant our manners and customs to your alien soil. . .

"Swaying the wide world, I have but one aim in view, namely to maintain a perfect governance and to fulfill the duties of the State: strange and costly objects do not interest me. . . . As your Ambassador can see for himself we possess all things. I set no value on objects strange and ingenious, and have no use for your country's manufactures. . . . It behooves you, O King, to respect my sentiments and to display even greater devotion and loyalty in future, so that, by perpetual submission to our throne, you may secure peace and prosperity for your country hereafter. . ."

It is still not clear whether this letter was as ingenuous and supremely contemptuous as it appears. Was Ch'ien Lung perhaps aware of the hidden menace these western traders brought with them? The difficulty lay in bridging the gap between the minds of the peoples, and in spite of all our present media of communication the barrier seems almost as insurmountable today as it did in the reign of George III.

THE Emperor's communication was interlarded with unacceptable phrases, for an independent country. Saying that no merchants could either land or come north, and that should they attempt to do so the results would be highly unfortunate, the writ ran, "Tremblingly obey and show no negligence! A special mandate!" These were stock phrases, but singularly inappropriate in the circumstance, had the Court eyes to see. But they had not.

Lord Macartney, on the other hand, his eyes sharpened by the apparent failure of his splendid and hopeful mission, was able to sum up the situation in his *Journal* with great accuracy: "The Empire of China," he wrote, "is an old, crazy, first-rate Man of War, which a fortunate succession of able and vigilant officers have contrived to keep afloat for these hundred and fifty years past, and to overawe their neighbours merely by her bulk and appearance. But whenever an inefficient man happens to have the command on deck, adieu to the discipline and safety of the ship. She may, perhaps, not sink outright; she may drift some time as a wreck, and will then be dashed to pieces on the shore; but she can never be rebuilt on the old bottom." ■

CHINA'S POPULATION PROBLEMS

continued from page 28

Any discussions of medical manpower in China must also include the role of traditional Chinese medicine—an empirical healing art based on thousands of years of practical experience. After an initial tug-of-war between medical and political leaders, the latter predictably won and the Chinese Communists made an all-out effort to give traditional medicine equal status with Western medicine. In Peking's view, traditional medicine had many outstanding advantages. The training of traditional practitioners—"native doctors"—was much quicker and easier since it relied on learning from elders and "practicing while learning." However, to ensure equal status for both Western and Chinese medicine, the regime had not only to build up the validity of herb medicine but at the same time to deprecate modern medical practices. For this purpose, courses in traditional medicine were introduced in all medical schools, physicians practicing Western medicine were required to take special courses in traditional medicine, and both types of doctors found themselves working side by side in hospitals and clinics throughout the country.

Western medical opinion about Chinese traditional medicine differs. Some believe it to be little more than black magic; others feel that the thousands of herbs and drug potions and the healing arts of acupuncture, moxibustion, massage, and breathing therapy have lasted all these years because of their empirical value. Acupuncture, whose practitioners claim that disease can be cured by the insertion of stainless steel needles into specified parts of the body, has been particularly prevalent among the Chinese masses. Chinese press and radio have praised acupuncture and moxibustion—a related practice of burning cones of dried herbs on the needle points—for having cured ailments ranging from stomach trouble to blindness by restoring equilibrium in the human body. By establishing the Academy of Traditional Chinese Medicine in 1955 and by decreeing equal status between Western and traditional medicine a few years later in 1958, the Chinese immediately increased their pool of medical personnel by over 500,000.

Recent Trends: To consider the effects of improved health conditions in China on the country's mortality trends, it is necessary to juxtapose the health facilities and manpower with the political and economic fluctuations that cyclically affect the life (and death) of the Chinese people.

In countries with high death rates the principal causes are infectious and epidemic diseases and extremely high infant and child mortality—causes which readily respond to health measures of the type introduced by the Communists. Probably as early as 1951, China's death rate, which is estimated to have been in the low 30s just prior to the Communist takeover, started its downward trend. It is inconceivable that it would have dropped to anywhere near the 17 per 1,000 report-

ed for 1953, but it did continue to decline during the middle 1950s until the introduction of the Great Leap Forward in 1958 when it may have been as low as 22 per 1,000. The extended working hours, long political indoctrination sessions, and lack of rest and sleep that were so characteristic of the frantic production drive during the Great Leap made millions of workers and peasants more susceptible to sickness and disease.

During the next three years conditions in China deteriorated rapidly. The degree of severity of the lean years following the Great Leap on the life and death of the Chinese people is yet another area of speculation. Although the serious reduction in the production of food crops between 1959 and 1961 and the food shortages that followed are part of the known record, the reports of widespread famine by refugees who entered Hong Kong during these years were probably exaggerated. Nevertheless, the death rate undoubtedly increased resulting in an excess mortality of perhaps five to seven million persons. By 1962 mortality should have resumed its downward trend and by the middle of the decade may have again reached the pre-Great Leap level—estimated at about 22 per 1,000. During the Cultural Revolution the conditions in many parts of China were again unfavorable, but because most of the turmoil and reported increases in the incidence of some diseases were limited to the urban areas, there was probably only a slight pause in the continuing decline in mortality. It is estimated that by 1970 China finally reached the figure of 17 per 1,000, reported seventeen years earlier.

Barring disasters, natural or man-made, China's mortality should continue downward, but very slowly. The decline of mortality in China was achieved primarily through the introduction of environmental sanitaton which tended to decrease vulnerability to death, preventive medicine in the form of inoculations and injections, and a large increase in the number of public health facilities and personnel. A drop in the death rate to levels found in more advanced countries is not likely for some time to come. China will continue to be overwhelmingly rural and the hard work and disabling accidents that occur in traditional agriculture are not conducive to longevity. Although there is increasing use of compost in agriculture, raw manure will still be used extensively. Consequently, elimination of certain diseases (particularly of the digestive tract) is virtually impossible. In the long run, a continuing drop in the level of mortality could only be achieved through an improvement in the quality of medical attention provided to the people—with more emphasis on the curative rather than preventive approach. With the post-Cultural Revolution emphasis on barefoot doctors and traditional Chinese medicine, and with the drastically shortened curriculum for new medical personnel, medical care will continue to be more accessible to all, but its quality is not likely to improve. Furthermore, if Peking decides to change the emphasis back to Western medi-

cine, it will still be decades before well-trained medical people become available in large enough numbers to provide Chinese peasants with up-to-date medical care. It is very possible, however, that this is not a course China will choose in the near future. Peking may very well feel that the country has reached a satisfactory balance, for it is providing quite adequate health care for all the people and, at the same time, is limiting population growth by maintaining what could be considered a reasonable level of mortality.

Natural Increase, Present Size and Prospects: Having pondered the population data reported by the Chinese themselves and having speculated on the trends in China's vital rates, we arrive face to face with the inevitable question: Just what is the population of Communist China? If the Chinese themselves have apparently lost count of their vast population, shouldn't it be sufficient for the rest of us to acknowledge that China has by far the largest population of any country and leave it at that? Perhaps. But our penchant for precision, our fascination with other facets of Chinese economic, social, and political developments, our curiosity and delight in playing academic guessing games, all require something "more scientific"—something that at least suggests authority and authenticity.

To satisfy this need, individuals and institutions in many countries have attempted to estimate China's total population. The approaches range from outright guesses to application of the most sophisticated demographic techniques.

The most authoritative and the most widely used figures are those published by the United States Bureau of the Census (1970 estimate; 826,716,000) and by the United Nations Population Division (1970 estimate: 759,619,000). (Author's estimate for 1970: 753,000,000.) It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union has never published an original estimate of China's population, relying on the all-purpose round figures used by Peking or on Western estimates.

Is it reasonable to expect that given a modicum of stability in China over the next few years, Peking will attempt another national census? At this time it seems to be an unlikely prospect. Because of the complexity and cost of such an effort and because China's national plans and policies are not tied to statistical precision, she will probably continue to make do with her current registration system and whatever approximations Peking's oracles can muster. But even if China were to attempt a more formal count of her population, the published figures would only heighten speculation and controversy. After all, despite adequate funds, the latest computers, experienced staff, and all the other prerequisites for an accurate count, the 1960 census of the United States had an error of more than three percent—increasing to 17 percent among the non-white young males. Given the persistent nature of the handicaps discussed in this chapter, it is difficult to foresee a time when the size of China's population will not be in dispute. ■

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The JOURNAL *welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary.*

Further on Vietnamization

IN his article "Vietnamization of the Foreign Service" appearing in the December issue of the JOURNAL, John Claymore writes of an FSO, whom he does not name, who possesses a file of "documented atrocities" committed in Vietnam. According to Claymore, even though this FSO wrote extensive reports on these incidents, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty. Claymore believes that the FSO should have made his information public and opines that he did not because the publicity might hurt our Vietnam policy, which the FSO supports, or have a negative result on his career prospects.

Concerned that this account might convey a misleading impression of the conduct of one FSO and of Foreign Service attitudes generally, I looked up the file on the matter. I found that the alleged atrocities do *not* involve American troops, as one might infer from reading the article, but Korean forces in Vietnam. The files show that the Department of State took action on the reports it received from various sources regarding these alleged atrocities and that MACV, along with our Embassy in Saigon, sought to get to the bottom of the allegations and to have corrective action taken.

The files also show that the FSO referred to by Mr. Claymore did far more than write reports on incidents that came to his attention in the field. On his return to Washington he took a prominent part in the Department's efforts to follow up on these and similar reports.

I believe that the above facts should be on record in order to rectify the unfair implication that an FSO had stopped short of doing what he knew to be his full duty with respect to atrocity reports out of concern for his career or to protect our Vietnam policy from further criticism.

JOSIAH W. BENNETT
Director
Vietnam Working Group
Washington

The author replies:

Mr. Bennett is correct in his statement that the "documented atrocities" in question were committed by Korean troops *not* American forces. I would be grateful if Mr. Bennett or anyone else in the State Department could explain to me how the identification of the guilty as Koreans makes their war crimes any less heinous or regrettable.

I cannot accept the argument that the Korean soldiers are in Vietnam as troops of one sovereign country (ROK) fighting at the invitation of another sovereign country (RVN) and that the United States therefore can absolve itself of responsibility. The report of the Symington subcommittee, confirmed and embellished by the Pentagon Papers, made clear that the United States Government was paying virtually all the costs of the Korean expeditionary forces and that the Koreans were originally sent to Vietnam only after strong American urging.

The question really is: Should the United States take responsibility for the acts of its own mercenaries?

My answer is yes. Morally, we have no other choice.

Would the State Department answer otherwise?

It was common knowledge among Americans I knew in Vietnam that Korean forces were continually and regularly committing acts that would be defined under the Geneva Convention as war crimes. American reporters also knew this, but to the best of my knowledge, the issue was never dealt with extensively in the American press because of the lack of hard evidence. The Koreans apparently knew better than to commit war crimes when American observers were nearby.

The existence of the file—mentioned in my article and confirmed by Mr. Bennett—underscores the fact that there was official American knowledge of Korean atrocities.

It was my impression—an impression shared by half a dozen former colleagues now in Washington—that the actual, if not official, policy of the American Embassy in Saigon was to play down crimes committed by the Koreans in order not to injure Korean-American relations.

I understand that the American Embassy did make representations to the Koreans about certain of the most blatant atrocities and that reportedly some Korean soldiers were punished. However, the overall American policy seemed to be one of not creating waves in Korean-American relations.

This passive tolerance of Korean war crimes extended to knowledge within the American Embassy of widespread Korean corruption, currency manipulation, and diversion of supplies. Some remedial action was taken in 1969 with the closing of American PXs to the Koreans and the breaking up of a major Korean ring which was selling antibiotics to the Viet Cong.

The Korean troops have become so entrenched in their relatively tranquil coastal enclaves that, according to an authoritative source, they recently refused high level American urging to shift their forces to the much more critical Central Highland and Demilitarized Zone regions.

Finally, I would agree with Mr. Bennett that the FSO who compiled the file on Korean atrocities did everything possible inside the State Department to see that justice was served. His persistence was remarkable within the system.

JOHN D. MARKS (*John Claymore*)

Couples

FROM your November "Letters to the Editor" it appears that Amman is, if not the heart, at least the spleen of Islamic misogyny. Or such Mr. Patrick N. Theros, serving there, seems to reflect in his curious

letter on the pitfalls of reforming the role of women in the Foreign Service.

"Does the wife," growls Mr. Theros concerning simultaneous assignment of Officer couples, "seriously think she can find a meaningful career when jobs will have to be jerry-built for her and/or her husband?" Well, one hears that good marriages must bear all sorts of strain, and equal employment rights may as well be one of them: despite Mr. Theros' nod to John Updike in depicting spouses "locked together like Siamese twins," announced efforts to assign couples together seem to be an acknowledgment of the autonomous professional integrity and ability possible in marriage rather than an excuse for jerry-building.

"How many other employees," cries Mr. Theros in full gallop, "will be displaced to find 'ideal' slots for these prima donnas?" (1) To my knowledge, no one has promised "ideal" assignments—the "alternative" held out to working couples is leave without pay for one of the spouses, hardly a means of displacing other employees; (2) how many "prima donnas" (my, Mr. T., you certainly don't pull your punches!) were forced by the inanity of previous Department policy to give up successful Foreign Service careers in order to marry? and (3) should specters of unknown and unlikely consequences prevent the correction of a known injustice?

Mr. Theros seems to suspect the reform-minded wife of "catering to her own ego" rather than "being a successful complement to her husband with her own dignity intact"—which draws the kind of fine line I'm glad we males don't have to walk. I agree that catering to egos, one's own, one's spouse's, or one's spouse's superior's spouse's, is a shabby principle. But official recognition of independent ability and role is far from catering to egos. It is this recognition, a very pale reflection of domestic attitudes within the United States, which the Foreign Service is just beginning to grant employees and spouses. Mr. Theros' letter suggests that there is still a long way to go before the Service fully represents abroad this aspect of life in the United States.

WILLIAM R. SALISBURY

Abidjan

An Appreciation

THROUGH the JOURNAL, I wish to express my very special appreciation to the 500 members of the Association who supported my candidacy for election to the AFSA Board of Directors.

This support clearly reflects a broad sympathy for the positions I pressed: fundamental personnel reform, statutory guarantee of the right of an aggrieved employee to an independent and impartial hearing, immediate and full application of Executive Order 11636 to the Foreign Service, and vigorous pursuit of improved conditions of work and allowances.

AFSA members should sustain the Board's awareness that these positions find widespread support.

Immediate action by the Board on these issues could strengthen confidence in its role. Among the most urgent actions should be a new resolution affirming active AFSA support for S. 2659, the bill now before the Senate designed to bring a system of justice and due process to the Foreign Service.

It is also to be hoped that the AFSA Legal Committee will be asked to undertake a comprehensive review of AFSA electoral procedures. Approximately half of the relatively few ballots cast reflected opposition to slates. Constitutional reform is obviously indicated.

JOHN J. HARTER

Washington

Yes and/or No

BARBARA GOOD'S comments in the December JOURNAL on a letter concerning field examination for FSSO lateral entry candidates, included: ". . . BEX assured us that FSSOs are now being examined by special BEX traveling panels. . . ." This would indicate that there is now no problem with regard to FSSOs who wish to integrate but may be prevented by assignment abroad.

To set the record straight, I quote from a BEX Operations Memorandum dated December 3: ". . . owing to budgetary problems no firm assurance can be given that examinations will, in fact, be held in your area."

ELLABETH ABERCROMBIE

Abidjan

Dean Acheson's Wit

WE are all very grateful to Mr. Arneson for his superb tribute to Dean Gooderham Acheson—and all the more so for his examples of Achesonian wit.

That Mr. Acheson's undisputed elegance did not deprive him of the human, even the earthy, touch may be seen in his comment to one of his assistants, who—in preparing a draft speech on the imperativeness of NATO, European political and economic integration, *et cetera*—had written: "Man's aspirations can no longer be satisfied within the narrow confines of national boundaries."

"Young man," said Mr. Acheson, "this is a bit over-written; some of man's aspirations can be satisfied within the narrow confines of one small bedroom."

ROBERT W. RINDEN

Berkeley

We Certainly Will

IT was good to see your editorial in the December JOURNAL. There was one thing that struck me, however, with regard to AFSA's support of and concern for AID.

I would guess that Agency employees now make up a fairly sizable portion of AFSA's membership (in Kabul, for instance, there were, as of last July, more members from USAID than from the Embassy and USIS combined). If this is true, it might be well for the JOURNAL to provide more coverage of AID and/or foreign assistance matters than seems to have been the case during the recent past. This would match the Association's heightened concern for AID, membership solicitation of its employees, and growing Agency participation on the AFSA Board and committees. And it would be yet another way to show that with regard to AID, AFSA "really cares."

In any event, at this point in time we could use whatever coverage and publicity we can get.

JOHN A. PATTERSON

Syracuse

The October issue of the JOURNAL *carried a letter on "Students in Embassies" signed by George W. Neumann of Kabul. Through a regrettable error on the part of printer and proofreader, the correct name of Gregory W. Neumann was not used.*

AFSA NEWS

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FEBRUARY, 1972

New AFSA Board Takes Over

AFSA's closely contested 1972 election resulted in members of the Participation Slate winning the right to manage the Association for the next two years.

Heading the new Board is William C. Harrop, State, FSO-2. Vice Chairman is Thomas D. Boyatt, State, FSO-3, with Barbara Good, FSSO-5, as Second Vice Chairman. Other officers are Samuel C. Thornburg, AID, FSR-1, Secretary-Treasurer; and John J. Tuohey, USIA, FSIO-4, Assistant Secretary-Treasurer. Rounding out the Board are Herman J. Cohen, FSO-2, State; Allen (Tex) Harris, FSO-5, State; Linda Lowenstein, FSR-5, AID; James L. Holmes, FSSO-5, State; David W. Loving, FSO-5, State; and William R. Lenderking, FSIO-3, USIA.

The first major item of business for the new Board is to prepare for the election in which the Foreign Service employees in State, AID, and USIA will elect an exclusive organization to represent them in consultations with Agency management on the formulation of personnel policies. At present the Employee-Management Relations Commission is exploring the proceedings to be followed in the election, which will probably be in late spring.

Other pressing issues are co-determination by management and employees of policies affecting the essence of the Foreign Service; advancement of members' interests; development of closer contacts between the Foreign Service and the community at large; and greater participation by all Foreign Service employees in the affairs of AFSA. Special importance within this framework will be the attempt to obtain due process throughout the entire personnel system, equality of status for the staff corps, and a real career system for AID.

In the closely contested election, most voters (58.8%) voted a straight ticket, although there were more split tickets than in 1969. The results of the election perhaps reveal that members did not discern great differences among the slate platforms, but shared a concern for the advancement of the interests of the membership. The AFSA Election Committee will recommend changes in the election system to insure that elections are representative and that resigning Board members are replaced equitably.

The problems to be dealt with in the upcoming months will affect the nature of the Foreign Service and everyone in it for years to come.

With this in mind, increased participation and support of the membership and an influx of new members will be essential to the success of the movement for positive reform to which AFSA is committed.

Awards Nominations Needed

Leap Year Day is the deadline for nominations for the Harriman, Rivkin and Herter Awards for 1972.

Complete information on eligibility for nomination and requirements for submission appeared in the January **AFSA News.**

The Awards are made annually in recognition of extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and creative dissent.

AFSA's Executive Director

Gerald S. Bushnell, AFSA's new Executive Director, enters on duty with the Association after a varied and interesting series of assignments in both government and private industry. Born in Oneonta, New York, he received his B.A. in history at Hartwick College, attended the State University of New York and received his M.S. from Maxwell School, Syracuse University, in Public Administration. Mr. Bushnell served with the New York State Department of Civil Service and the War Production Board before entering the armed forces in 1943. Upon discharge he joined the management staff of OMGUS and then HICOG. He entered on duty with the Foreign Service in 1954, serving in Paris, Karachi and Tehran before assignment as Director of Operations, Planning and Analysis in the Department. From 1968-1971, Mr. Bushnell directed the operations of two Washington subsidiaries of Crowell Collier and Macmillan, Inc. of New York and, just prior to coming to AFSA, served as a temporary member of AID's Office Management Planning.

Foreign Service People

MARRIAGES

Berkely-Magee. Dorothy L. Berkely, State Department Personnel Officer, and Charles M. Magee, USIS Field Program Officer, were married on December 26, in Seoul. Ambassador Philip Habib gave the bride away. AFSA cabled congratulations to the couple on their unique solution to unification of the foreign service.

Rowan-Bohlen. Lorraine Hovey Rowan was married to Charles Eustis Bohlen, Jr., son of Ambassador and Mrs. Charles E. Bohlen, on December 18 in Washington. Mr. and Mrs. Bohlen are residing in New Haven where the bridegroom is attending Yale Law School.

Wheeler-da Rocha Miranda. Laura Claire Wheeler was married to Sidney Rondon da Rocha Miranda in Rio de Janeiro December 27. The bride is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Paul Wheeler of the American Embassy in Rio de Janeiro. Mr. and Mrs. da Rocha Miranda will be residing in East Lansing, Michigan.

BIRTHS

Jacobs. A son, Todd Andrew, was born to FSO and Mrs. Martin Jacobs on December 5 in Pretoria.

DEATHS

Ackerman. Mrs. Louise P. Ackerman, FSS, died December 31 in Panama. At the time of her death, Mrs. Ackerman was assigned to Lima. She is survived by her daughter, Kristie Louise, and two sisters, one of whom is Mrs. George D. Allen, 206 South Avon Drive, Claymont, Delaware 19703.

Cameron. Turner C. Cameron, FSO, died December 24 in Montgomery, Alabama. His Foreign Service career began in 1942 with assignments in Paris, Belgrade, prewar Hanoi, Saigon, and Seoul. He was a deputy director of the Office of Western European Affairs and from 1965-1969 served as director of the Office of South Asian Affairs. Prior to his becoming a diplomat in residence at the University of South Carolina in 1970, Mr. Cameron had been Chargé d'Affaires at the Embassy in Stockholm. He is survived by his wife, Dorothy, 1737 Fairforest Drive, Montgomery, Alabama 36106, his mother, a brother and two sisters. The family requests contributions be made to the American Cancer Society.

Conlon. John S. Conlon, FSSO, died November 16 in Buenos Aires where he was serving as the communications and records officer. After entering the Foreign Service in 1962, Mr. Conlon served in Djakarta, India and Berlin. He leaves his wife, Mary, c/o William Warshauer, 12604 Steeple Chase Way, Potomac, Md. 20854, three children, two sisters and a brother.

Donovan. Andrew Donovan, FSO-ret., residing in County Limerick, Ireland, died October 5. Mr. Donovan joined the Foreign Service in 1930 whereupon he was assigned to Warsaw. He subsequently served in Mexico City, Merida, La Paz, Bogota, Ciudad Trijillo, London, Guatemala, San Jose, San Salvador, and Stockholm. His brother and sister-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. James Donovan, 91 Garden St., Boston 02138, survive.

Drake. Russell P. Drake, former director of the US Operations Mission to Nepal, died December 11 in Silver Spring, Maryland. Mr. Drake began his Foreign Service career in Greece overseeing the repatriation of refugees from the Communist guerrilla war in 1948. From 1956 to 1958, he served on the evaluation staff of the foreign aid program. After his post in Nepal, Mr. Drake retired in 1962. He is survived by his wife, Helen, 424 Windsor St., Silver Spring, Maryland 20910, two daughters, two brothers and seven grandchildren.

Kerchen. Mrs. Mary B. Kerchen, wife of FSR Robert Kerchen, died December 30 in Washington. Mrs. Kerchen was active in civic and social groups where her husband served, including France, Taiwan, Vietnam, Colombia, Togo, Tunisia and Turkey. She is survived by her husband of 1602 Holly Ct., McLean 22101, her mother, a son, three daughters, and a sister.

Parker. Jameson Parker, FSO-ret., director of Gunston Hall, was killed and his wife seriously injured January 7 in Georgetown. Mr. Parker had served as first secretary in Bonn. He had also served as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, a post in which he served a number of times.

Reilly. Mrs. Anne D. Reilly, wife of FSR(AID) Thomas E. Reilly, died October 21 in Bangkok, Thailand where her husband is serving as Assistant General Services Officer. Mrs. Reilly had lived in Bangkok since 1956 when her husband was assigned to the Thailand Mission. Besides her husband, she leaves two sons, a sister and a brother.

Rose. Robert H. Rose, FSS, died December 31 in Falls Church, Virginia. His State Department service included tours in Korea, Vienna, Paris, the Sudan, Liberia and Guatemala. His most recent assignment was as special assistant to the Director of the State Department Office of Munitions Control. He is survived by his wife, Adline, 1032 Poplar Drive, Falls Church, Virginia 22046, three sons, three sisters, and two brothers.

von Hellens. Lawrence W. von Hellens, FSO-ret., died at Helsinki, Finland, on July 4, 1971. Overseas, Mr. von Hellens served in Helsinki, Stockholm, Pretoria, Johannesburg, Belgrade and Ottawa. In the Department, Mr. von Hellens served as Administrative Inspector, Inspection Corps Headquarters, and Organization and Methods Examiner, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. Mr. von Hellens is survived by his wife, Helmi, at Pormestarinrinne 2 B 15, Helsinki, two daughters, a son and a brother.

Board Resolution

On January 24, the Board approved the following resolution:

WHEREAS, Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake has contributed with special generosity to the AFSA Scholarship Fund; it is

THEREFORE resolved that in deep appreciation of his continued generosity, the Board of Directors of the Association hereby establishes a scholarship in perpetuity, to be known as the Timberlake Scholarship.

MEMBERS INTERESTS COMMITTEE

Overseas Allowances Unfrozen

In mid-December, the Federal Pay Board decided that overseas allowances are not subject to controls under the government's wage and price control program that began August 15, 1971. Allowances had been frozen for four months, and the favorable Pay Board decision triggered a worldwide readjustment of cost-of-living and quarters allowances to compensate for the devaluation of the dollar. The August 15 freeze announcement made it necessary to rescind the new education allowance rates for the 1971-72 academic year which had already been published, reflecting widespread increases in tuition. The unfreezing allowed the new rates to go into effect, but prorated only as of mid-December. AFSA has been assured by management, however, that every effort will be made to make the new education allowance rates retroactive to the beginning of the academic year since the Pay Board has decided that allowances are really not wages, and therefore should never have been subjected to the freeze in the first place. We note without comment that State-AID-USIA found it necessary to submit overseas allowances to the scrutiny of the Pay Board, while the Defense Department was courageous enough to decide on its own that allowances were not subject to the freeze.

Supplementary Post Allowance

Thanks to a timely suggestion by the AFSA Chapter in Bangkok, management has agreed to extend eligibility for the Supplementary Post Allowance to employees who spend up to thirty days in temporary quarters at the end of an overseas assignment. Previously, this allowance was limited to the first 90 days of temporary lodging after the initial arrival at a post of assignment. For those who do not know what the SPA is, it is a cost-of-living allowance designed to help alleviate the heavy expense of obtaining restaurant meals while an employee and his family are residing in temporary lodging without cooking facilities. At this time, it is payable only to employees accompanied by at least two dependents. AFSA argued successfully that SPA should be payable whenever an employee and his family are entitled to temporary lodging allowance. Our ultimate objective for SPA is to make it payable to all employees in temporary lodging regardless of their family status.

Mail Order Shopping

Starting this month, we will be providing true-life experiences from time-to-time of AFSA members in dealing with specific mail order houses in shopping for merchandise to be shipped abroad. Three examples follow:

Montgomery Ward: An AFSA member in Kabul reports wonderful treatment from Wards handling a complex Christmas order involving an obsolete catalogue and a number of shipping problems. Wards employees obviously spent a lot of time finding satisfactory answers to the problems posed by the person placing the order, and also took the trouble to write helpful replies to all of the questions asked.

Regent Lapidary of New York: An AFSA member in Latin America ordered jewelry from this company's mail-order catalogue. Upon receipt, he found that the jewelry did not conform to the descriptions in the catalogue. He returned the merchandise and requested a full refund. The company refused to grant a refund, but indicated that it would be willing to exchange the jewelry for other pieces that conformed to the description in the catalogue. The customer insisted on a refund, pointing out that he had to purchase alternate items in order to give his wife a Christmas present. The company refused, pointing out that the catalogue from which the items were ordered did not promise a money-back guarantee.

Sears, Roebuck: A number of AFSA members have written to complain about this company's surcharge of about ten percent on all items ordered through the Department's surface pouch service. Sears has been queried about this extra charge which is not levied for items sent through APO or international freight.

ELECTION COMMITTEE REPORTS

I have the honor to certify the following results of the 1971 election for the AFSA Board of Directors. There were 2456 ballots cast of which 2438 were valid and 18 spoiled. The individual vote totals were as follows:

William C. Harrop	1418
Barbara J. Good	1395
Thomas D. Boyatt	1374
Herman J. Cohen	1367
F. Allen Harris	1309
James L. Holmes Jr.	1245
John J. Tuohey	1239
David W. Loving	1229
Linda Lowenstein	1196
Samuel C. Thornburg	1189
William R. Lenderking	1163
David H. McKillop	1103
Lars H. Hydle	1008
Marie L. Burba	999
Rozanne L. Ridgway	991
Edward L. Peck	959
John K. Ivie	898
Mathew Ward	882
Leonard J. Baldyga	838
James D. Wilson	825
Ann Dotherow	805
Sigmund Cohen	769
John J. Harter	500
Paul A. Toussaint	492
Richard D. Hagan	478

Mr. Harrop, Miss Good, Messrs. Boyatt, Cohen, Harris, Holmes, Tuohey and Loving, Miss Lowenstein and Messrs. Thornburg and Lenderking are, therefore, elected to the new Board of Directors. In ballots cast entirely for one or the other of the two contending slates, the Participation Slate received 871 while the Members Interests Slate received 538.

I have attached a list of individuals who received one write-in vote each. No effort has been made by the Committee to determine if they were, in fact, eligible to be candidates.

Stephen T. Johnson
Chairman, AFSA
Election Committee

A Call for Staff Corps Participation

Recently, we of the Staff Corps Advisory Committee were discussing the unexpected departure of Walker Diamanti from our midst because of his new assignment. Our thoughts seemed to run along the line that we were very sorry to lose him from the committee because of the inspiration and hard work he had contributed, but we hoped that he would be able to help AFSA again in the future. Later on I began to wonder if this thought pattern, the unintended implication of placing AFSA's organizational needs foremost in our considerations, might be indicative of the problems we have faced in trying to get more Staff Corps people involved in the affairs of AFSA.

Walker is a fine example of the point I wish to make. He is fondly remembered by many of us as a faithful friend of the Staff Corps and a feisty advocate of fair and equitable treatment for everyone. The important point is that his first concern has been for the men and women in the Staff Corps, and any needs of the organization came after that. I think the same is true of the members of the Staff Corps Advisory Committee.

Perhaps too many of our Staff Corps colleagues have thought that promotion of AFSA membership was our primary goal. This is not true of either the committee or of the AFSA Board of Directors. We regard AFSA as a tool to be used in achieving our main purpose, that of improving the Foreign Service—all of the Foreign Service. Our committee's role of trying to promote an awareness of Staff Corps problems throughout the Foreign Service and the protection of our rights fits into the overall scheme of the AFSA purpose. Two of the most frequent plaints coming from reluctant Staff Corps people when asked to join AFSA are: "AFSA is only concerned with FSOs," and "What has AFSA done for me or for the Staff Corps?" Let's turn those questions around a bit and hand them back to the asker. "What have you done for yourself lately?" and "Who or what is AFSA?"

Anyone who has tried to fight the system alone can testify to the frustration and ineffectiveness of being a lone voice crying out in the wilderness. If this discourages you, or if you are content with the inequities and conditions that exist in the Staff Corps, then you are presently being adequately rewarded for your apathy. You cannot expect someone else to give you that which you are unwilling to work for yourself.

On the other hand, if you think things could be better in the Foreign Service Staff Corps, if you no longer wish to confine your outbursts of frustration to occasional bull sessions (that may only temporarily relieve the frustrations without correcting the fault), if you are ready to stand up and be counted among those who really care about the Foreign Service Staff Corps and are willing to work hard to make a better service, then join with us and let's work together as a team. AFSA is people, Foreign Service people, banded together in the belief that strength of numbers and a unified front can be more effective in improving the service than a cacophony of lone voices crying out in the dark. That is why you need AFSA, and AFSA needs you. Not just your membership, although that too is important. AFSA needs you, the whole you, to act, to criticize, to suggest, to think, and to work with us. All of us.

Grievance Committee Report

During the month of December your Grievance Committee continued work with AFSA members having grievance problems. There are currently 13 committee members, each offering advice and good offices to at least one individual.

During the past month a member has been advised in cooperation with the AFSA Legal Committee, of the legislative background to specific sections of the Foreign Service Act in order that he could more adequately assess the likelihood of success in overturning a dismissal action. Progress was also made towards rectifying certain improperly prepared efficiency reports and in preparing one case of apparent age-bias for presentation before the Grievance Board.

At the suggestion of the Grievance Committee, AFSA Board Chairman Harrop wrote Peace Corps Director Blatchford to express AFSA's concern that employees involved in the current Peace Corps RIF under the "five year rule" be afforded their full rights under the law and that the action be effected in a fully humane manner.

First Distribution of Funk Fund

The Howard (Hap) V. Funk Memorial Fund, recently established by friends and colleagues of the late FSO, recently had its first distribution to a 15-year-old Kenyan, Joseph Musyoki. The check, presented by Ambassador Robinson McIlvaine, will enable the boy to attent the Limuru Boys Center for one year.

The Boys Center trains young orphans to be farmers or farm managers. The Edelvale Girls Center which teaches orphan girls academic courses and vocational specialties is listed as another recipient.

Those interested in contributing to the Fund may send donations made out to the Funk Memorial Fund to George Lane, c/o AFSA, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037. Mrs. Jill Funk will be advised of contributions in her late husband's memory and contributors will be informed of how the monies are spent.

New Career

Patrick O'Sheel, FSO-retired, has been named Special Assistant to the Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Mr. O'Sheel entered the Foreign Service in 1948, after service in the Marine Corps and working as a writer, editor and foreign correspondent. He served at London, Budapest, Cairo, Pretoria and Kaduna, before his recent retirement.

MAO TSE-TUNG

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of Mao's leadership, the Chinese people could hardly be expected to accept other than modest and gradual changes in policy, over a period of some time. Any abrupt reversal would seem the acme of foolhardiness and stupidity—not within the realm of political reality.

There seems no reason to anticipate that Chou would do other than follow in the Master's footsteps.

There was, of course, the incredible denunciation of "The Great Stalin" by one of his chief adulators and henchmen, Nikita Khrushchev, only three years after the dictator's demise. Is de-Maoization possible in the Chinese People's Republic? Without belaboring a number of basic differences between the Chinese and Russian situations, it may be noted that Mao Tse-tung is both Lenin and Stalin in the Chinese Revolution and that, therefore, to denigrate Mao would be, in effect, to repudiate the revolution which he led to final victory. Such action seems unimaginable. However, in the Soviet Union, the Soviet leaders, in disgracing Stalin, could and did turn to Lenin with even greater homage as the founder and leader of the Soviet revolution and already the object of a major cult of personality. Also, needless to say, the towering prestige that Mao and his teachings have among the Chinese people does much, too, for the Chinese Communist Party and other leaders in China, so that to destroy Mao's charisma and fame would be to diminish greatly their own authority and acceptance in China.

In postulating that for some time after his passing on Mao's vision of the ongoing Chinese Revolution would be honored in both deed and word, it is not assumed that these inherited policies would not be altered to meet changing circumstances. Such modifications would from time to time be necessary; they could readily be legitimized by appropriate citations from Mao's considerable writings, notably his "Selected Works." This would not be any too-demanding, exegetical exercise for in his works may be found many broad, sibylline statements that lend themselves to flexible interpretation. "The Devil can cite Scripture to his purpose," and so, too, could Mao's *epigoni* find sanction in his writings for their actions. Were China's future rulers to apply slavishly his instructions (based considerably on his years in guerrilla warfare) to the ever-changing conditions of a modernizing great nation-state, the consequences could be disastrous.

Whether Mao Tse-tung can control who succeeds him in power and the extent to which his policies and ideology will continue are rich questions for speculation. It does seem likely, however, that a selective use and expedient interpretation of his thoughts and instructions will confer legitimacy on such actions as his successor(s) may find suitable to the demands of future years. It appears probable, too, that he will live on in revered memory among his countrymen, attaining if not "10,000 years," at least "revolutionary immortality." ■

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

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