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
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EDITORIAL

T Authorization Hearings

THIS year, for the first time, the Department and USIA have been required to defend their programs in authorization hearings. A dialogue each year between Congress and the foreign affairs agencies should increase mutual understanding on policy as well as operational questions.

The Authorization Hearings will also provide AFSA an opportunity to report annually to the Congress on matters of professional and employee concern. AFSA testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is printed elsewhere in this issue. The Senate Committee has responded affirmatively to three AFSA requests. It has reported out amendments to the Foreign Service Act 1) establishing a grievance procedure for the Foreign Service to assure due process, 2) providing that Foreign Service promotions shall be based on the rank order findings of objective selection boards, and 3) lowering the retirement age for career ministers to 60. ■

Magnuson Bill

THE Magnuson Bill (S. 2754), the "Export Expansion Act of 1971," is now being considered by the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism. The bill reflects the profound concern of legislators at our deteriorating balance of trade. It also reflects the dissatisfaction of many American businessmen with the quality of commercial services available in overseas missions and with the degree of priority the Foreign Service allots to its trade promotion responsibilities.

One of the nine varied measures opposed in the bill would transfer responsibility for overseas economic and commercial representation away from the State Department to a new International Commerce Service reporting directly to the Secretary of Commerce.

AFSA testified forcefully against this proposal before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Association has established a new professional committee chaired by Herman Barger to review Foreign Service operations in the commercial and economic fields and to recommend improvements in our performance. Copies of AFSA's testimony and of AFSA *Bulletin on Management Reform* Number 14, on the Magnuson Bill, are available at the Association or from AFSA keymen abroad.

The Senate Subcommittee has received a distorted image of the services and support now provided to American business by our embassies and consulates, and we are working with Senators and staff members to correct this distortion. The Service can take pride in the work it has already done and is doing to promote American commercial interests.

International economic issues, including export promotion, have increased sharply in their importance to the United States relative to our international political and security considerations.

Foreign Service priorities and attitudes have been shifting to reflect this change. In the New Foreign Service we are recruiting more business school graduates and economists; we have strengthened our economic/commercial training programs; the economic/commercial cone of the FSO Corps has received a high share of promotions; the Secretary of State has made clear the importance he personally attaches to this function. But the process must be accelerated if the Foreign Service is to prove its qualifications to conduct the country's international affairs in the 1970s—and if it is to retain its responsibility for these affairs. ■



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They Landed to Lower the Flag

In these days of Young Turks and the Department's official encouragement of at least verbal manifestations of dissension, I think our readers might be regaled by this account of a fight between the US Marines and the American Consul, and of the insubordination of the Consul vis-a-vis his Minister.

It also may be instructive to reflect on the fact that, although both the Consul and the Naval Commander were equally fatuous, they both were later promoted by their respective departments.

—ROBERT MCCLINTOCK

**BERNARD C. NALTY and
TRUMAN R. STROBRIDGE**

ANY resistance will be met by force," snapped the Marine lieutenant. While two civilians glared angrily, a sergeant and two privates strode to the flagpole and began lowering the colors. The flag was the Stars and Stripes, the Marines were Americans, and the two civil-



Commander William T. Truxtun

ians were members of the United States diplomatic service. The Marines had landed on foreign soil not to restore order or to protect American lives, but to lower the flag of the United States.

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then-independent kingdom of Hawaii on 21 September 1870. At the time, Hawaii was in the midst of its transition from way station for merchant ships to tropical garden spot. The landing of armed men was no novelty, for, in a rowdier era, the Hawaiian Islands had served as a haven for Pacific whaling ships and their rugged crews. . .

The lawless years had passed, however, long before the summer of 1870, when Commander William T. Truxtun guided the USS *Jamestown* to her berth at Honolulu. American merchants and missionaries had done their best to convert the islands into a miniature New England and make Honolulu resemble a suburb of Boston. . .

In spite of this, all was not placid at Honolulu, though the trouble, actually a clash of personalities, was confined to the city's American colony. The resident American Minister was Henry A. Pierce, well-bred and a credit to the diplomatic corps, but thought by some to be too dignified. The American Consul,




The United States Sloop of War Jamestown

Thomas J. Adamson, Jr., for instance, felt that Pierce was more dignified than efficient. Soon the inhabitants of Honolulu's American community, like those of any small New England town, were pricking up their ears to catch Adamson's latest outburst against his superior. . .

By the autumn of 1870, little

more than a year after his appointment as consul, Adamson was on the way out. As he waited for the axe to fall, the impetuous consul longed for an opportunity to puncture his rival's poise. The death of Queen Kalama gave him his chance.

Kalama, Dowager Queen of Hawaii, fell ill, lingered for a few



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weeks, and then on 20 September died. Her timing, for Adamson's purposes, could not have been better, for Pierce was out of town. By 8 o'clock the following morning, all but one of the foreign consulates had lowered their flags to half-mast out of respect for the dead queen. The single exception was the American Consulate where Old Glory flew from the top of the staff. Such an act of arrogance, Adamson gloated, was sure to shake the minister's famed dignity.

Among those who noticed the consul's breach of etiquette was Commander Truxtun of the *Jamestown*. Truxtun, one of the absent minister's most devoted admirers, already had ordered the *Jamestown's* colors lowered to half-mast. He confidently expected the consul to follow his example, but nothing of the sort happened. When it became obvious that the American flag was going to stay just where it was, Truxtun ordered Ensign Andrew Dunlap to go ashore and remind Adamson of the niceties of international courtesy.

Ensign Dunlap walked into Adamson's office, politely asked that the flag be lowered to half-mast, then waited for the diplomat to comply. Adamson's answer stunned the young officer, who had been schooled in the idea of prompt and unquestioning obedience. "I consider this," growled the consul, "a piece of impertinence on the part of your commanding officer." The diplomat was not responsible to a naval officer, and if Truxtun had any suggestions to make, he should make them to Pierce who would then pass the recommendations on to Adamson. In other words, as long as Pierce was out of town, the flag would remain at the top of the staff.

Upon Dunlap's return to the *Jamestown*, Truxtun listened impatiently as he blurted out the story of his defeat ashore. Then the naval commander made a decision that would result in the Honolulu newspaper beginning its front page with: "On Wednesday the habitués of Queen Street were witnesses to a most remarkable scene. . . ." Turning to his executive officer, Truxtun ordered him to "land the landing force"—words that usually bring to mind the picture of thousands of Marines swarming across a fire-

swept beach.

In this case, the landing force totaled only six Leathernecks—First Lieutenant Henry Clay Cochrane, a sergeant, and four privates. Nor was the ship-to-shore movement much of a problem. The Marines simply piled into a boat manned by bluejackets and were rowed to the dock. . . . Once ashore, Lieutenant Cochrane's Marines fell snappily into formation and marched on the "enemy"—in this case Adamson and his thoroughly confused assistant, Jonathan S. Christie.

Lieutenant Cochrane had been ordered to "keep the consular colors at half-mast from 8 a.m. to sunset," and this he intended to do. The consul had different ideas, however. "I do not recognize Commander Truxtun as my superior officer," he declaimed. "I look to Mr. Pierce as my official superior, and I decline to half-mast the flag until I receive notice from him." Then Adamson delivered his final blow: "I outrank Commander Truxtun, and he has nothing to do with me at all."

Thomas J. Adamson, Jr., could not have made a more unfortunate remark. As the Marine officer of the *Jamestown*, Lieutenant Cochrane had the job of enforcing Commander Truxtun's wishes. As far as he was concerned, the skipper of a man-of-war was the supreme lawgiver—with the possible exception of the Commandant of the Marine Corps. No one was going to disobey Commander Truxtun if Henry Clay Cochrane could help it. . . .

When both Adamson and Christie "went to the door to prevent the ingress of the Marines" and refused to budge, Cochrane ordered his men to throw them out the door; then he reconsidered and thoughtfully added, "as gently as possible." The pair of diplomats, "after a smart scuffle," according to the next issue of the Honolulu paper, "yielded to superior force." They were carefully deposited outside the consulate, where they sat watching as the American flag was lowered to half-mast.

Doubtless the newspaper writer enjoyed describing how "a file of Marines . . . charged upon the US Consulate and carried it by force, after a short but gallant resistance on the part of the Consul" and his

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vice consul; however, his article ended with a conclusion that probably summed up the opinion of the American residents of Honolulu:

The quarrel as it stands between the several US officials is none of ours: but we may be allowed to protest at the course taken by the Commander of the Jamestown, in landing a force upon our shores, as an insult to this government. American interests here cannot be benefited or promoted by such outrageous proceedings.

Fortunately, the American Minister returned to Honolulu in time for the burial of Queen Kalama. To atone for the flag incident, Minister Pierce and Commander Truxtun arranged for a 50-man detachment of sailors and Marines to march in the funeral procession. This gesture of respect ended the affair as far as the participants were concerned, but the Secretary of the Navy was yet to be heard from.

Conscientious officer that he was, Commander Truxtun had penned his version of the incident. He or-

dered Cochrane and Dunlap to describe their actions, and mailed all three letters to the Honorable George M. Robeson, Secretary of the Navy. A quick glance at the reports sent Robeson scurrying to the State Department where, to his horror, he learned that Truxtun, by landing six armed men on neutral soil, had shattered one of the principles of international law. From Washington, D.C., a letter sped to Truxtun, a document in which Secretary Robeson termed the landing "a subject of profound astonishment." As far as the Secretary of the Navy was concerned, the incident proved Commander Truxtun's "unfitness for responsible command."

Although Truxtun had managed to settle the quarrel between diplomats on the spot—in a day and age when a lack of rapid communications prevented any consultation with higher headquarters—and had, in addition, soothed the injured feelings of the Hawaiians, he now found himself in disgrace. Ordered home immediately, he was subse-

quently assigned to a position ashore as an ordnance specialist at the Boston Navy Yard.

Once the Hawaiian "war" had been forgotten, however, Truxtun later won promotions to captain and finally to commodore. Nor was the career of Lieutenant Cochrane impaired, for he completed 40 years of service in the Marine Corps and retired as a brigadier general.

The State Department, as was customary in those days, treated its representatives in a most diplomatic manner. Since Adamson was already scheduled for transfer, he was appointed the American Consul at Melbourne, Australia, a post which paid \$4,000 per year—a splendid salary in those days. Pierce remained at Honolulu. With half the Pacific Ocean between them, the two men worked peacefully and efficiently. Thus, the Hawaiian incident of 1870 resulted in no casualties to either side. ■

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DAVID D. NEWSOM



IN the field, Foreign Service officers receive tantalizing hints of the complexity of foreign policy making. They deal with members of the country team representing other agencies. They witness the sometimes tortured replies which come back to requests to the Department. In the field, diplomats have been protected by the fact that the Department had the ultimate responsibility. They make recommendations; they could indulge in advocacy, but in most cases theirs is not the final word. In the Department there is no recourse. How can FSOs best contribute to that leadership in foreign affairs for which we in the Department are responsible?

First, it is essential to understand the environment. Don't rail against the complexity. It is there. Learn its demands and requirements.

The President of the United States needs answers in times of crises. He needs recommendations for longer-range problems. He needs them quickly, concisely, and

accurately. He needs them within a broad framework of his own policies and politics. Furthermore, the field of foreign policy—while of great importance to him—is only one of several critical areas in which he must make decisions involving domestic policies, other international obligations, public mood and public opinion, the Congress, the personalities around him, his own broad objectives. He and the men around him have no time for patience, for prolonged arguments or for costly mistakes.

The Secretary of State and the Department beneath him must

provide prompt, intelligent and effective responses in the field of foreign affairs that will mean success both internationally and domestically or the President will look elsewhere. That is what contemporary controversy about State is all about.

This broader view seems to come hard to an FSO. They resent those looking over their shoulders whom they classify as outsiders or "politicals." FSOs forget that, even though professionals, they are part of a system based essentially and happily on a democratic political process. They are not truly sensitive to the fact "the outsider" may have corresponding doubts about the professional. The career man is not associated with an administration, has not faced the battering of a political campaign, and does not depend upon the political success of an administration for his future.

In Washington, therefore, Foreign Service officers have no special status. They are, in fact, members of a group which traditionally in the White House and by the political level of the Department is often regarded with suspicion and doubt. To be effective in Washington, they must prove their understanding of this other side. FSOs need not be a part of it, but must recognize it and work with it. The Foreign Service is accepted and succeeds only to the

Mr. Newsom has been Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs since July 1969. An FSO since 1947, Mr. Newsom is a member of the Board of the Foreign Service and President of the American Foreign Service Protective

Association. He has served at Karachi, Oslo, Baghdad and as Ambassador to Libya. He received the National Civil Service League Career service award in 1971.

degree that it performs its professional role effectively in an essentially political atmosphere. In politics the question of personal loyalty is immensely important. It is a difficult task to establish our professional competence to present things honestly as we see them without in any way suggesting or risking doubts about our basic loyalty to an administration.

The Foreign Service officer coming into a responsible position in Washington must first therefore recognize what he is. This is admittedly a difficult and perhaps controversial subject which the Foreign Service has faced at the cliché level far too long.

There are various approaches. There is the advocate who feels deeply and sometimes emotionally about a given foreign policy course in the area in which he is working. The advocate can sometimes bring to his work a moral element. He tends to be intolerant of those who do not fully accept his view. Advocacy is a luxury which can be enjoyed in the field, and even then exacts its price. In Washington, except in limited doses, it can be both ineffective and disastrous.

There is the academic Foreign Service officer who feels that his task is to study a problem in great depth and to make certain that each level and each counterpart has a full understanding of all the intricacies of the problem. This, too, is a luxury that can be enjoyed in the field. In Washington there is seldom time for it.

A third approach is the policymaker. This is the officer who at an early point in his career feels disappointed if he is not called upon to decide the larger issues. Time may ultimately demonstrate to him that he may not have had, at that point, all the bases for his decision, but that does not help at the beginning.

It is important for the officer coming to Washington to know what he is. He is only occasionally an advocate, only in limited doses the academic; on rare and stimulating occasions a policymaker, but he is none of these basically. Basically, to be successful, to be effective, and to give to the Secretary of State the kind of support he needs, the Foreign Service officer must be essen-

tially a professional expert capable of analyzing a situation in an area, functional or geographic, and distilling the essence of problems and the alternatives which face us for the consideration of the higher levels of the Department and of the United States Government.

In this definition of the professional there is wide scope for initiative, freedom of expression, and the courageous pursuit of that which an officer believes to be right. Such a role is distinguished, however, by an intelligent recognition of the total environment, including the political environment, in which policy must be made and carried out; by recognition of the pressures upon the higher echelons of the government; and by recognition that at some point the debate must stop and decisions must be made.

It is understandable and common for officers coming into the Department to protest against the competition within the government and the complexity of policy-making. This is unfortunate. Little can be done about either the competition or the complexity. Rather than protest against it, it is far better to understand it, to master it, and to use it for the pursuit of leadership in the foreign affairs process. Ironically, the more one uses it, the less stultifying it becomes.

To do this requires an understanding of the particular nature of each of the agencies with which State works. Each has a different legislative mandate, a different budget. The man sitting across the table from an FSO in an interdepartmental meeting works for somebody else who rates his performance on a different, perhaps opposite, set of objectives than the FSO's boss. The FSO's job is to convince or to reconcile these opposing viewpoints in order to present to the ultimate decision-makers the most effective recommendations on dealing with an issue.

Before an FSO becomes too upset at the brash, demanding, challenging tone which sometimes emanates from the White House staff, consider its position. Many were part of the President's campaign staff. They were bruised in the political fight. They are there to ensure the continued political suc-

cess of the President. They draw that humbling distinction which one encounters in Washington between the man who has been out on the front lines of American politics and the civil servant or bureaucrat who has not. Even the professionals who work in the White House absorb this high pressure, demanding atmosphere. It should be respected as a part of the American political process. It should be responded to succinctly and professionally with appropriate attention to the role of the Secretary of State and the Department. An informal relationship with the National Security Council staff can be extremely useful and should be encouraged—not avoided.

The Department of Defense also has its own set of pressures and circumstances. The civilians in the Department of Defense are in their own right professionals, but they will be interpreting issues from a different point of view. It is neither fair nor judicious to seek to denigrate or castigate some of the points of view which may be found in the Pentagon. A professional presentation of the foreign policy considerations as State sees them can frequently correct what may seem an oversimplified view of circumstances and at a minimum elevate policy controversy to a higher plane.

In dealings with the Agency for International Development, a large dose of sympathy is essential. This is a beleaguered agency. Its personnel have endured uncertainty and the calamities of a doubting and demanding Congress. If they seem meticulous re standards which they lay down for economic projects, this is frequently based on some past experience. There is, unfortunately, a considerable list of projects which State has pressed on AID for political reasons and which have not been successful. They have the ultimate responsibility and get the blame. One does not need to accept the caution, but one must understand why it is there.

The Central Intelligence Agency need not be looked upon as an unnecessary and sinister competitor. Each President has valued the particular intelligent expertise which CIA brings to the higher Council. It

(Continued on page 27)

This is excerpted from Chapter 3 of "Power and Policy: America's Role in World Affairs" by Senator Claiborne Pell.

Member of a distinguished family of American diplomats and statesmen, Senator Pell is the only member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to have begun his career in government as a member of the Foreign Service.

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the Challenges

by SENATOR CLAIBORNE PELL



THE question most basic to international survival in the twentieth century, in my opinion, is the need for a continuously realistic appraisal of the changing currents of political intentions, ideology, patterns, and loyalties in our modern world. Are we up to date in our view of the world and its challenges? And are our policies in step with the times and the demands of these changing challenges? If we do not ask these questions and give them reasonable answers, we will fail in the world arena no matter what else we undertake, or how righteous our cause.

To put the matter in perspective, let us think back to the polarity of the world in, let us say, 1939. Who were our friends and who were our enemies? Germany under Hitler, Italy under Mussolini, Japan under Tojo, and Russia under Stalin were our enemies. Within two years there was a shift, and the Soviet Union, under heavy Nazi attacks, became our ally and friend. Then, within a

scant decade, the tides changed, and we were in the icy grasp of an ideological Cold War that pitted us against the Soviet Union and all her Communist allies. The Western World was split in two by barriers of cement and steel, in the process throwing the United States into close and cordial alliance with the three nations—Germany, Japan, and Italy—which had been her strongest adversaries in World War II.

The winds of change continue to blow, and today most of us are aware that the Communist world is no longer the monolithic block of ideologic solidarity which seemed to face us a decade ago. China and the Soviet Union are at serious odds, and almost overnight we have become committed to a national policy of diversity in our treatment of the Communist world. We perceive not only that there are significant differences in ideology and practice among the Communist nations, but also that there has been a subtle yet

marked mutation in the nature of the Communist system as it has been subjected to the erosion of time, the test of practicality, and the necessity of trying to provide efficient government.

We are reminded again that there are few things more transient in world history than the mutuality of national interests; and conversely, that there is nothing quite so imperishable as the self-interest of individual states. Even the most totalitarian of governments must provide for at least the minimum needs of its people and if ancient prejudices and dogmas make this impossible, then those prejudices and dogmas will be ignored in practice—no matter how long they may linger on in political rhetoric.

In this connection, it is critically important that we pay less attention to what people say they are doing and more to what they do in actuality. There is growing understanding that many of Nikita Khrushchev's most bellicose public utterances

were made for the purpose of defending his flanks against his own hawks in the Kremlin and in Peking. He was, in effect, trying to strengthen his position for making accommodations with the west. By taking literally rhetoric meant for home consumption, western statesmen did much to contribute to his ultimate downfall—and so an opportunity was lost.

It is an accepted principle of psychology that a person's deeds, observed over a period of time, are a more reliable guide to what that person really wants in the world than any purely verbal declarations about his ambitions. This is also a sound principle in dealing with nations.

Our most important problem in the world arena is the redefining of our own national interests in terms of the realities, and not the myths, of what will soon be the last quarter of the twentieth century. The success with which we meet this problem depends in large measure, I believe, on the accuracy with which we perceive and understand the world around us, particularly that part of the world which we still may be inclined to think of as hostile.

THERE is, perhaps, no better showcase of the shifting nature of the Communist world today than the handful of nations comprising Eastern Europe. Here, on a broad band of territory stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, bordered on the West by Germany and on the East by Russia, live 100 million people who for a quarter-century have been the forced partners of the Soviet Union in a historic experiment in radical socialism, imposed upon them by the brute force of World War II and its disruptive aftermath. The people of Eastern Europe, occupying as they do the buffer zone between East and West, are by nature culturally independent and by heritage fiercely nationalistic. It is only to be expected, therefore, that the veneer of communism should wear thin first in this historically volatile area.

I have had a good many years of personal association with this part of the world. In the years before World War II, while still a college student, I traveled through Poland,

Slovakia, and Hungary, and, in fact, was at one point arrested briefly by the Nazi Gestapo in Danzig. Shortly before the war my father became American minister to Hungary, where he later was interned for a short period after delivering declarations of war on behalf of the various British Commonwealth nations and after the rupturing of our relations there. After the War, I returned to Eastern Europe myself as a Foreign Service officer and established the American Consulate General at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia. While I was there, the Communists came to power in a putsch, and I had the very useful and disagreeable experience of dealing on a day-to-day basis with the new Communist government. It was during these years, too, that my younger son was born in Vienna. Later, after leaving the Foreign Service, I returned to Eastern Europe again as vice president of the International Rescue Committee to assist refugees in Austria at the time of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In the years since, I have returned to Eastern Europe many times to observe the changes that are taking place.

What we see in Eastern Europe, I believe, is the whole evolutionary spectrum of communism—from its unhappy origins, through its development as an ascendant system of radical social organization and control, and now to its decline as an ideology which can only survive by adopting many of the attributes of capitalism. The Russians themselves acknowledged this when they resorted, in Czechoslovakia, to the use of brute force to stifle the evolutionary forces that were swiftly moving there.

The fascinating fact here is that, while in 1948 no actual Russian soldiers were needed in Czechoslovakia to impose communism, it took more than a half a million Russian and Warsaw Pact soldiers to reimpose it in 1968 after Czechoslovakia had had twenty years of Communist rule.

We must recognize that for Eastern Europe—as indeed for most of the world—the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels have virtually no relevance to today's world. They are as out of date as Ptolemy's charts would be for an

astronaut. The history of Eastern Europe is a case study of the fact that social revolution in the industrial age just does not happen according to the tidy but violent Hegelian prophecies of nineteenth century theorists.

To be sure, there was what appeared to be a classic Hegelian-Marxist clash at the outset, and it came to some parts of Eastern Europe sooner than others. I personally remember in Poland the spectacle of peasants in the fields dropping to their knees to kiss the hands of strolling aristocrats and their guests in the late 1930s. I can remember staying at a house where the butler was in the hospital as the result of being kicked downstairs by his employer following a household dispute. It became clear to me then that the pendulum of social justice some day was going to swing sharply to the left in Eastern Europe, although I had no idea how far to the left. But what happened after the initial swing was not according to the script of Marx and Engels—or even of Lenin and Stalin.

The plain historic fact is that Marxism was conceived almost exclusively as a negative ideology, designed as an Hegelian antithesis of nineteenth century capitalism. It had no real or rational internal theory of economics, other than the abolition of the concept of property as we know it and the notion that the means of production should be communally or publicly owned. But as an economic theory, it was sadly lacking in detail as to how such a communally owned society would operate, and, most important, what forces and motivations would keep it running.

Thus, in Eastern Europe as well as in the Soviet Union itself, the motivation was supplied and imposed artificially through the political system, during the era which we are coming to recognize as the second or Stalinist phase of communism. This era lasted nearly three decades in the Soviet Union and one decade in Eastern Europe—drawing to a close, more or less, about 1957, following the Hungarian, Polish, and East German uprisings.

There is no doubt that the Stalinist period yielded great results, at enormous human cost and only af-

ter painful fits and starts and many miscalculations. But the undeniable proof is there to see: the Soviet Union and its satellite states did become, to varying degrees, modern industrial nations, with independent capacities for meeting at least the primary requirements of a specialized modern economy. Whether similar results might have been achieved without the messianic and sadly maniacal onslaught of communism is one of those historical "if's" to which there can never be a true answer.

In any event, there were very definite basic reforms which emerged like the phoenix out of the second stage of communism. We must understand these advances if we are to understand the larger question of the future course of communism as an ideology and evaluate our response to that changing course.

I have said that communism is based on an archaic and negative doctrine and that for this reason it lacks any coherent internal dynamic for perpetuating itself. It began, in its first stage, on the Hegelian theory that the future can be projected as a reaction to the past or the present, and progressed to a second stage of reform and progress imposed by political regimentation, there being no system of internal economic forces to assure achievement of its goals. Granting the evidence of Communist achievement during the second stage in Eastern Europe, we must then consider the apparent evolution of a third stage of communism, which I believe is already upon us in the satellite nations of Eastern Europe and will soon confront the Communist parties of Asia.

If we were to label this third stage, I suppose it might be meaningful and accurate to call it the converging stage in the evolution of communism. For, basically, what is happening is that the Communist nations, lacking their own internal motivating forces, are drifting further and further away from radical economics and back toward the center of the political spectrum in their quest for guiding principles which will make their societies work.

The reasons for this drift to convergence are interesting. Basically, they result from the fact that com-



munist has always had within itself the seeds of its own destruction. Having achieved the reforms which fill basic human needs for housing, food, and health, it finds that, with its people better educated and with their basic needs satisfied, it is confronted with increasing demands for human comfort and fulfillment—for freedom to worship and talk, to travel, to work where and as one chooses, to practice one's faith, and to accumulate a little property to leave for one's children—all desires which conflict directly with the political manipulation required to keep the Communist system going. Having created the educated citizenry it needed to survive in a scientific era, communism finds itself increasingly at odds with a populace which is less and less tolerant of regimentation as a way of life and the ideological strait jackets which attempt to hold them back from grasping the world as it is. Increasingly, the Communist regimes are finding themselves at odds with the young and the enlightened.

Three years ago, the New York TIMES quoted a rather poignant statement by a university professor in Warsaw, himself obviously the product of another generation, who was surveying modern Polish youth with wonder and some misgiving: "They laugh at us and what we created for them," he said. "They know only the advantages and forget what we suffered to create them. Without us they would never have seen the university. We have opened for everybody what only the rich had before. They accept it, but

they don't know what it cost us."

There was no better proof and confirmation of this alienation of the young than the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, an event which I had occasion to view at rather close quarters, actually being at the Bridge at Andau. For in that case it was the students and workers—the traditional allies of earlier Communist uprisings—who in this case fought a Communist regime almost to a standstill. And, interestingly enough, it was the shopkeepers and former middle classes—the traditional enemies of communism—who on that occasion sat on their hands.

Thus we see that there are many internal forces at work today in the third stage of Communist development for which Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels made no provision: alienation, impatience, economic and spiritual discontent, and, simply, the natural desires and aspirations of man.

The Communist regimes learned in the '50s, through the hard lessons of Poznan, Warsaw, and Budapest, that these internal pressures cannot simply be met by continued or increased political regimentation. And so they have, slowly and gradually, begun, in effect, to rebuild the Communist world to take account of human nature.

Slowly, and inexorably, the Communist states are being forced to move away from the artificial controls of political regimentation and substitute the normal interplay of human instincts and desires as the most sure criteria for public policy. In the basic area of economics,

where these changes in viewpoint manifest themselves earliest, this means that there is to an increasing degree substitution of market demands and consumer choices for production quotas, of interest payments as an incentive to investment, and of merit pay and bonuses to reward talent and initiative.

We might think, at first glance, that the result would be something that looks like a capitalistic society. This, of course, is not the case, but it is clear that the evolving system is a substantial mutation of the original Marxist economy. One very apt label being applied to it is the term "Market Socialism." I have noted with interest that economists from both sides of the Iron Curtain have met to discuss the theory of convergence of the two basic economic systems: the Western market economy and the Eastern centrally planned economy. It is this concept which inspires my own label of converging for the third stage of Communist evolution.

I WANT to emphasize I am not suggesting that the point of convergence is now at hand, or that the Communist states have been totally reformed. In many respects, in fact, the rigid authoritarian political system remains as strong as ever, as the people of Prague have more than once been reminded. But I am speaking here in terms of long-range trends and evolutionary processes. In that context there are some very interesting signs indeed of movement, from revolution to devolution to a form of evolution.

Consider, for example, the question of consumer credit, which has only recently made its appearance as a part of the supply and demand system in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This is a very significant development, for it opens to the average citizen the possibility of purchasing goods he previously could not have dreamed of owning, and this in turn commits the State economy to producing more and more of the sort of consumer goods he wants to buy.

Installment buying was first introduced in the Soviet Union in 1959 and has spread since into all of Eastern Europe. Under the Soviet system, the buyer is generally re-

quired to limit himself to credit equaling not more than four months average wages. The payments are collected directly from his employer who acts as the guarantor of the debt. The down payment must cover not less than 25 percent of the total price and service charges are quite low, not exceeding 2 percent for a debt extending over twelve months.

In Rumania, which from a domestic viewpoint is perhaps the least liberal of the satellites, down payments range up to 40 percent and repayment is required in six months. In Poland, where even automobiles can be purchased on credit, the terms are more liberal and average consumer debts are extended nineteen months.

One notable result of these policies has been stimulation of the manufacture of consumer goods in each of the satellite nations. Television sets, refrigerators, washing machines, and radios are being produced in increasing volume with East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland leading in volume of production.

Tourism, with or without credit, is another big factor in both the economic and ideologic reorientation of the Eastern European states. The contacts made and information exchanged and new interests aroused by such travel will contribute immensely, I believe, to the gradual erosion of barriers between East and West.

On the heels of tourism comes trade, and there is much evidence that the countries of Eastern Europe want to increase their trade with the West. One symbol of American commercial penetration to date which particularly struck me on a recent visit was the availability of Coca-Cola in Bulgaria. However, Coca-Cola is really only a symbol of what might be, because our trade with the satellite nations is lamentably low. A major impediment in each case is the absence of non-discriminatory or so-called most-favored nation tariff or trading treatment, by which we would assure each of the Communist and satellite nations that it could trade with us on the same terms we extend to the rest of the world.

An interesting case in point is

that of Rumania which, more than any other satellite nation, is displaying an independent foreign policy which borders almost on open defiance of the Soviet Union. Her trade with the Soviet Union has steadily decreased, and she seeks new trading partners in the West; already 30 percent of her trade is with Western Europe. But Rumania's trade with the United States is infinitesimal. As in the other satellite countries, the lack of most-favored nation privileges is a serious—if not fatal—barrier. There are other special problems in the case of Rumania, for Rumanian officials consider that they burned their fingers badly in their negotiations with the Firestone Company several years ago for the construction of two synthetic rubber plants. Firestone later withdrew from the negotiations because of pressure from a competitor, pressure which was exerted through a campaign in the United States which appealed to emotional anticommunism. As a result, Rumania will be chary of such negotiations in the future.

TURNING away from the field of economics, I should like to add to this survey of the new era in the evolution of communism by taking note of certain other changes in orientation which strike me as particularly significant.


One general observation is that political oppression has significantly declined. Even in Hungary, where the abortive revolt of 1956 and Russian repression is still a very real memory, the reign of terror is over. The police no longer knock on the door at midnight to arrest and torture citizens who run afoul of the regime. And political opponents no longer fear execution. Repression is still a fact of life, but it is less obvious, less direct, and less brutal. As communism in Eastern Europe mellows and enters the era of convergence, the most obvious techniques of regimentation are falling into disuse.

Another very significant fact, I believe, is that the Catholic Church is retaining its strength in Eastern Europe and in some cases even improving its position.

(Continued on page 29)

WORLD WITHOUT ANCHOR

RICHARD LOWENTHAL



DURING the second half of 1971, the long and slow process of the dissolution of the post-war bipolar world order has made a sudden "leap forward." Since the announcement of President Nixon's forthcoming visit to Peking in mid-July and the break-up in mid-August of the international monetary system created at Bretton Woods after World War II, almost anything has come to seem possible in world

affairs, and nothing may be taken for granted any longer. Since then, the United Nations' heavy vote on seating China and expelling Taiwan, and the American Senate's snap decision of late October endangering a world-wide network of foreign aid policies in a fit of absent-mindedness (and owing to the absence of a great many bodies) has come to confirm that impression and to deepen the sense of universal flux—as well as, on the Western side at least, of undirected drift.

Before attempting any analysis, it may be worthwhile simply to enumerate the major events. Washington and Peking have proclaimed their readiness to enter into serious negotiations, thus making the potential triangular constellation in Great Power diplomacy actual for the first time. Moscow has reacted by bitterly denouncing the intentions of China, but speeding up its negotiations with the United States both on Berlin and on the limitation of strategic

armaments, and by accepting an American presidential visit in its turn; and it has intensified its separate but coordinated efforts to improve relations with both West Germany and France. It has also made notable progress towards aligning some of the traditionally non-aligned powers—after Egypt, now India—even made inroads on the non-alignment of Yugoslavia by obtaining her signed support for "socialist internationalism." The American decision to end the convertibility of the dollar, combined with severe measures of commercial discrimination and a refusal to negotiate on them for an unspecified time, has put the economic relations between the advanced non-Communist countries into disarray with risks of world-wide recession, has weakened their economic influence in the Third World and has served notice on the USA's major allies that they may suddenly find themselves on their own in looking

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after their vital interests—a notice extended to all its client states by the Senate vote on the aid program. In Japan, this economic shock has combined with the political shock of the form and content of the arrangement with Peking to weaken decisively the group within the ruling party that was most firmly committed to pro-American policies. In Western Europe, it may have helped to swell the majority for British entry into the Common Market, but is likely to strengthen neutralist undercurrents as well. Since then, the loss of cohesion within the non-Communist world has been demonstrated by the procedural and substantial defeat of the United States on the China issue in the United Nations Assembly, the tendency toward neutrality on the part of smaller pro-Western States of Asia, and the lack of an American consensus on the need to restore that cohesion has been shown up by the Senate vote in all its nakedness.

To sum up, what began as a belated consummation of the breakup of the Russo-Chinese alliance by the inauguration of truly triangular diplomacy to the advantage of international flexibility and to the potential disadvantage of Russia has led not only to considerable Russian gains in some former non-aligned countries but to the release of strong disintegrative tendencies throughout the "Western" network of alliances, emanating from the American center.

IN trying to understand the change, one should start by looking back at the time when the triangular constellation first seemed to emerge: the summer of 1963. Then, with the failure of the last formal party talks between the Soviet and Chinese Communist leaderships and the subsequent spate of diplomatic disclosures by both sides, their alliance had clearly broken up; and the simultaneous test ban agreement between Britain, Russia and the United States appeared as one of the first fruits of the new situation. Now that Russia and China had finally ceased to form part of a single ideological block and Peking had become a fully independent factor in world affairs, the road to less ideological power politics

seemed open everywhere: along with a detente between the US and the Soviets as then envisaged by President Kennedy, a parallel opening of diplomatic channels from the US to China was clearly to be expected in due course, while the decline in Communist pressure would eventually promote a growing independence of both Japan and an increasingly integrated Western Europe from American leadership. Yet those developments were delayed for eight years—by an odd detour of history.

The primary cause of this detour was the fateful increase in the American involvement in Vietnam, due to the acute risk of a collapse of the South Vietnamese government in 1964 and to the Johnson administration's misperception of the Vietnamese war as the beginning of a major Chinese effort at southward expansion by armed revolution. From 1964 to 1968, American policy-makers not only persuaded themselves that China had started the war and controlled its course on the Communist side, but that Peking's commitment to revolutionary "wars of liberation" made China the main enemy in a world that was otherwise on the verge of stabilization, since Russia had supposedly turned into a "satisfied power." Accordingly, the Johnson administration was committed to "fighting China" in Vietnam, while hoping for Soviet influence there to help end the war. There was no room for triangular diplomacy in that rigid and one-sided concept.

As the scale of American intervention in Vietnam mounted, increasing Chinese self-isolation came to respond to American rigidity. In 1965, some of the Chinese military and political leaders, feeling threatened by the growing American presence to the South, seem to have pleaded for the partial reconciliation offered by Khrushchev's successors as a means of reinsurance against the supposed threat: Mao's decision to eliminate at all cost such "conciliatory" tendencies was at least one of the precipitating factors of the "Cultural Revolution" of 1966-68. The turmoil into which it threw China preserved her from any temptation to intervene directly in Vietnam, but at the price of a turning inward of all energies which made


Peking virtually disappear from the diplomatic stage for several years. The third corner of the triangle thus came to be hidden behind dense clouds of ideological dust, which only began to settle with the ninth congress of the Chinese Communist Party in the spring of 1969.

It was, then, the continuing domestic momentum of out-dated ideological concepts that delayed the full impact of the new triangular constellation on the foreign policies of the powers. In the United States, the administration had become strangely dependent on a residual form of crusading anti-Communism, now concentrated on China and increasingly irrelevant to America's real interests, for maintaining the dynamism of American policy at home and abroad. In China Mao had become even more dependent on his commitment to "permanent revolution" to justify both his root and branch rejection of the Soviet road of development and his own position, as a leader above all institutional control. In the Soviet Union, it was the fear of "ideological subversion" that during the same period moved Khrushchev's conservative successors to take military action against the Czechoslovak reformers rather than risk the spread of their dangerous innovations in Eastern Europe and in Russia itself, and thus limited their scope for diplomatic flexibility as well. And even the European champion of non-ideological power politics, General de Gaulle, was fatally hampered in his drive for the realistic objective of a more independent role for Western Europe by his commitment to an irrelevant nationalist ideology, which caused him to isolate his country and foil the progress of European unification by sterile attacks on the United States and by his veto against British entry into the Community.

Only as each of the powers in turn began to feel the cost of the pursuit of illusory concepts were the roads gradually opened for a more flexible, "pragmatic" diplomacy. The American leaders were forced to perceive how their overengagement in Southeast Asia paralyzed their capacity for action in more vital regions, while the horror and futility of the war in Vietnam damaged their influence abroad and po-

larized opinion at home, giving rise to a passionate anti-militarist and anti-imperialist protest movement among their own young generation and that of their allies. Hence a returning sense of reality led, by 1968, to President Johnson's decision to renounce another candidacy, and later to the efforts of his Republican successor to disentangle the country from a disastrous adventure. Meanwhile, in China, the restoration of order by the forceful intervention of the army—the only national institution whose command structure had remained intact—indicated that the ideological paroxysm of the Cultural Revolution had burned itself out after doing much damage to the country's economic development and to the administration and international influence of the regime, and that Mao had become convinced that even the consolidation of his own position now required a period of stability. Thus the turn to the rebuilding of institutions was followed by the country's speedy and effective return to the international scene. About the same time, the Kremlin leaders became aware that, while their occupation of Czechoslovakia had consolidated their control of their East European power sphere it had deprived their campaign for the dissolution of the Atlantic alliance, launched in 1966 in the name of the need to overcome the partition of Europe between opposing military blocs, of any shred of credibility. At the Budapest conference of the Warsaw Pact in March, 1969, they thus turned to seeking a consolidation of the status quo on the basis of the existing alliances. Finally, the events of May 1968 had shattered the Gaullist delusions of grandeur, while Soviet action in Czechoslovakia had destroyed any hope of a French, or even West-European, mediating role between USA and USSR. The fall of de Gaulle in the following year only helped to accelerate a turn towards better relations with the United States and towards the admission of Britain into the Community.

From about the beginning of 1969, then, the delayed effects of the triangular constellation began to gather speed. Yet the events of the intervening detour had drastically changed the relation of forces be-



tween the principal actors. If the growth of Chinese power had not been altogether stopped by the internal convulsions—at least not in the field of arms technology—it had certainly been delayed. For Western Europe, too, the period of stagnation in its institutional development has meant a grievous loss of time in adjusting to its role in the new constellation.

In the United States, the massive expenditure for the Vietnamese war had long restricted the allocation of resources for general arms development as well as for domestic purposes and had still become a prime cause of inflation. Its scaling down now became a cause of growing unemployment, while public reaction to the whole searing experience and to the administration's loss of credibility resulted in growing pressure to reduce arms expenditure, military commitment and foreign aid across the board. The United States thus emerged from the detour with grave damage to its economic health, its social cohesion, its relative military strength and its capacity for diplomatic action, in short to all the components of its international influence—a damage unlikely to be quickly and fully repaired even with the best conceivable leadership.

By contrast, the Soviet Union, had been able to use the interval for a major increase in its absolute and relative military strength, both in strategic nuclear weapons and in conventional, above all naval, mobility, and was for the first time approaching all-round military parity with the US. It had powerfully entrenched itself in its new sphere of influence in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; and if it, too, had clearly overextended its resources in the process, by 1969 the effects were only beginning to make themselves felt. The power that had been most immediately weakened and endangered by the original rise of the triangular constellation thus turned out to have gained most from the detour.

THE limits of Soviet gains became visible, and the costs of Soviet over-extension noticeable, as the United States and China began to liberate themselves from their ideological preoccupations. Under Nixon and Kissinger, Washington not only started the painful process of disengagement from the Southeast Asian jungle, but soon showed a new sense of priorities. Efforts were made to recover the diplomatic initiative in the Middle East and to use the

opportunities offered by the demise of Gaullism for improving relations with Western Europe. The negotiating position for SALT was underpinned by production of the new MIRV-missiles, and the first cautious signals went out to China. Meanwhile Peking manifested its return to the international scene by the first Ussuri incident of March 1969 on one side and by moves to resume active diplomatic relations in various directions on the other.

To the increased pressure on both fronts, Moscow reacted mainly with an increased interest in serious negotiation on the basis of the status quo. For all its continuing efforts in the missile race, and all the immense complexity of any attempt to limit it by agreement, the Russian negotiators at SALT seemed genuinely concerned to find a solution that would enshrine their achievement of "parity" while putting a ceiling on its cost. The Budapest reformulation of Soviet aims in Europe, by giving clear priority to consolidation of the status quo over any hopes of disrupting NATO, amounted to an encouragement of those forces in Western Germany who were prepared to accept the former but not to sacrifice the latter; so did the Soviet agreement to the opening of Four-Power-Talks on Berlin. On the Chinese frontier, the Soviets had reacted to the first serious incident by massive counter-attacks, by substantial reinforcements of their troops and even by planting rumours that they were considering preventive nuclear war; but after this preparation, they opened negotiations with Peking, offering minor frontier adjustments in return for overall stabilization. Nevertheless the economic difficulties of the winter of 1969-70, leading to the repeated postponement of decisions on the new Five-Year-Plan and therefore of the party congress, showed that all these negotiating moves had failed to relieve substantially the pressure on Soviet resources arising, in the new international constellation, from the preceding period of expansion.

In fact, despite the partial progress towards normalization achieved during 1970 by the signing of the Moscow Treaty with the Federal Republic and by the exchange of ambassadors between Moscow and

Peking, a number of events converged further to increase the pressure on the Soviets since the winter of 1970-71. The December revolt of the Polish workers who succeeded in shaking the regime without any intellectual leaders showed all the more convincingly the political risks implied in a prolonged disappointment of consumer expectations. The removal of a number of strongly Soviet-oriented Egyptian leaders from key positions by Anwar-es-Sadat, and the ruthless suppression of a pro-Communist coup in the Sudan with his support served as a reminder that Soviet control of the "progressive" Arab states was as yet far from secure. Finally, the open exchange of friendly signals between Washington and Peking during the "Ping-Pong phase" indicated the need for a substantial Soviet rapprochement with one side to avoid the risk of being caught in the middle; and this need for an unmistakable option became urgent after the announcement of Nixon's forthcoming visit to the no longer forbidden city.

But the worst, from the Soviet point of view, was that the option was predetermined: there was no real choice. During the years of the detour, the Americans had been at a disadvantage because they voluntarily refused to talk seriously to the Chinese. Now, the Russians were at a disadvantage because despite the formal dragging on of the frontier talks, the Chinese refused to talk seriously to them. Besides embarking on a new effort to improve the lot of the Soviet consumer, and besides mending their fences in Egypt by a mixture of pressure and promises resulting in a long-term treaty, they could basically only turn to the side that was seeking, and offering, stability on the basis of the status quo: the bourgeois West.

Thus about the time of the Soviet party congress in March-April, the Berlin Four-Power-Talks, on which not only Bonn's ratification of the Moscow and Warsaw treaties but the European Security Conference desired by Russia had been made dependent, began to deal with the substantive problems. By May, Brezhnev's Tiflis speech accepting the principle of a negotiated troop reduction by both sides in Europe offered relief to an American Pres-

ident hard pressed by his Senate to make unilateral withdrawals. By June, another speech, this time in Moscow, offered negotiations on a reduction of forward naval forces, and the East Germans were given hints of impending Soviet concessions on Berlin. Finally, following the Nixon announcement, the Soviet press was after a short interval instructed to put the chief blame on the Chinese traitors; a conference of East European party leaders without the Rumanians was called to the Crimea, informed of the opinion and alerted to the need to exclude Chinese influence from the Balkans; and the four-power negotiations on Berlin were brought to a speedy conclusion by an open display of urgency hardly paralleled in the annals of Soviet diplomacy.

Yet if the Nixon-Kissinger administration's return to reality, supplemented in Europe both by the new Eastward realism of the West German government under Willy Brandt and by the opening of the West European community to Britain under de Gaulle's successor, soon bore remarkable fruits in a beginning recovery of the world position of the West, its American protagonists did not hide the fact that these fruits were bought at the price of putting narrower limits on their solidarity with their allies and friends and making more substantial claims on them in return. There was indeed no other way of overcoming the external and internal consequences of prolonged "ideological" overengagement, nor of adjusting the system of alliances in a realistic spirit to the increased economic power and political independence of Western Europe and Japan in particular.

The "Nixon doctrine" spelt out the new principle of limited solidarity as well as the justified demand for a fairer sharing of the common burden in so many words, and its consequences did not remain confined to Southeast Asia. In the Middle East, for instance, the effort to regain influence in Egypt promptly translated itself into growing pressure on Israel. But the immediate effects became far more serious when the new link with Peking was suddenly announced without advance consultation with the principal Asian ally of the United States,

and without apparent forethought of the impact on Asia's leading non-aligned power: a weakening of Japanese-American ties was made inevitable, India was driven to seek protection in a treaty with the Soviets (to the grave reduction of American influence on the course of the crisis in the sub-continent), and the signal was given for a general abandonment of Taiwan and a hurried turn to neutrality by the minor pro-Western states of Asia that badly weakened Washington's position vis-a-vis its new bargaining partner.

If the lack of diplomatic preparation for the Washington-Peking "coup" of July 15 might still have appeared as due to an isolated error of judgment within a generally sound policy, such an interpretation was no longer possible after the President's economic thunderbolt of one month later. Here, the *manner* of the surprise announcement, decided without even consulting the Foreign Policy Adviser and the Secretary of State, had clearly been deliberately chosen both for domestic effect and with intent to shock the allies and friends of the United States. It was meant to underline the message of its content—that the Nixon administration regarded the cooperation of its major allies in matters of trade policy as well as their contributions to the costs of joint defense as grossly insufficient, and would henceforth be guided by American interests in the immediate and narrow meaning of the term, without sentimental scruples about the supposed common interests of the West. As the shock waves spread, it came to be realized that the decisions had been motivated both by the increasing seriousness of America's economic difficulties and by accumulated resentment about many equally unilateral, if less important economic measures by which her European and Japanese allies were felt to have aggravated her problems: indeed, it could be plausibly argued that *their* solidarity had been deficient first where the common interest required material sacrifices from each according to his ability, and that the response to gentler forms of American prodding had often been poor. But the fact remained that the government of the West's leading power was seeking a solution of its

economic problems not by pressing for immediate negotiation about the terms of a return to concerted policies but by first attempting a wholesale transfer of the burden of recession to its friends and partners in a spirit of confrontation, while leaving the date and terms for negotiation uncertain pending a test of relative endurance. If the purpose of those shock tactics was to bring about a tangibly more cooperative European and Japanese attitude by a blatantly less cooperative American one, the results clearly corresponded less and less to expectations as time passed. Hence after more than three months, a combination of economic second thoughts with belated consideration of alliance interests forced a revision of exaggerated demands and a turn to negotiation on reasonable terms. Yet even if the monetary crisis and the related issues of trade discrimination are eventually settled successfully, some of the damage caused to the Western economies and much of the harm inflicted on interallied confidence by Mr. Connally's Guns of August are likely to remain.

At first, of course, the short-term domestic advantages of this "New Economic Policy" seemed as obvious as the long-term, and in part even short-term, international dangers; yet it would be superficial to speak simply of an American decision to give priority to domestic over international considerations, and to attribute it purely to the electoral preoccupations of the President. For the upsurge of economic nationalism to which Mr. Nixon is playing up is itself but one facet of the neo-isolationist groundswell by which American opinion has responded to years of international overengagement in general and to the Vietnamese nightmare in particular. The administration has fought hard against a number of the more direct manifestations of that groundswell in the fields of foreign and military policy, in particular against the demand for unilateral troop withdrawals from Europe, or indeed for immediate and unconditional total withdrawal from Vietnam. But it has clearly felt compelled to appease the spirit of national egotism by a "nationalist" economic policy—compelled because it was unable to

oppose a convincing alternative to that spirit.

For the grim truth is that in the course of the years the Vietnam war has eaten, the consciousness of the common interests of the Western democracies has been widely eroded along with the ideology of crusading anti-communism; and while that erosion has by no means been confined to the United States, that is the country where it has been deepest and had the most far-reaching consequences. The past decade has seen a profound change in both the composition and the outlook of the American intellectual and political elite, connected both with a regional shift away from the East Coast and a generation change away from the people who led the original support for the Marshall Plan and the Atlantic alliance, and affecting the conservative as well as the liberal end of the political spectrum. If the westward shift began by producing illusions about a quasi-imperial American role in Asia, failure has turned it into a force for rejecting all international commitments. If the generation change began by promoting a new dedication to the solution of pressing domestic racial and social problems, the daunting size of those problems seems now to contribute to a reaction in the direction of crude material egotism. Finally, with the waning of the stratum of concerned citizens in the churches and the universities, in the trade unions and in business, that once formed the backbone of internationalist policies, the responsible leadership in both parties that used to formulate and put through those policies has all but disappeared: its effective absence is probably the decisive aspect of the recent Congressional chaos over foreign aid.

To the leaders of an administration that would like to maintain and reshape the American world role in a spirit of realism, that mood of the nation appears as an unwelcome, but effective limit on their freedom of action—a handicap they have to take into account. Yet to the outsider, it appears that their own type of realism has not only been shaped by that mood, but contributed to it. On the most subtle and self-conscious level, that type is represented by Henry Kissinger's admiration for the

realistic power politics of some of the great European statesmen of the nineteenth century—of a Tallyrand or a Bismarck, who strove for the security and greatness of their countries with both a ruthless disregard for ideologies and a sober sense of the possible. But while that kind of Realpolitik has obvious advantages over any “ideological” foreign policy inspired by either pacifist idealism or crusading militarism, it is tied to the conditions of its origin in the “classical” diplomacy of absolute monarchies, and cannot effectively be transplanted to a modern mass democracy. For a democracy cannot play a powerful role in the world unless the necessary efforts and sacrifices are freely consented to by its people—and in the second half of the twentieth century no free nation will grant that consent for the purpose of national power alone, without the inspiring force of a less parochial idea. This is why the “realpolitik” of General de Gaulle was proved hollow by the events of May 1968, even before the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia refuted its underlying international assumptions. And that, too, is why the realistic diplomacy of Kissinger was hurt to the very core by the more narrowly “realistic,” just for that reason popular, New Economic Policy of August 15, 1971.

Our analysis seems to have turned full circle. We began by describing the high price paid by the Great Powers’ neglect of the sober pursuit of their interests under the influence of ideological fanaticism, and the advantages reaped by them from a return to realism. We have now come to the conclusion that effective power politics for our time cannot be pursued by a democracy without credible commitment to a wider idea. Is it really possible, we shall be asked, to make a meaningful distinction between inspiring ideas and misleading ideologies in foreign policy, except by the standard of one’s personal ideological preference, or by the ex post criterion of success? Is not the true lesson of the end of the bipolar constellation that the conflict between two types of political and social systems—between Western democracy and Communist dictatorship, as we see it, or between Western Capitalism and Eastern

“Socialism,” as the Communists see it, has ceased to be a major factor in determining the alignment of the powers? And is not the growth of the forces of disintegration within the Western system of alliances, following the great schism among the Communist powers, only the natural fruit of this belated “End of Ideologies,” or at least of the relevance of ideologies, in world affairs?

In trying to answer these obvious objections, I should like to make three points. The first is that the difference of political systems is still of vital importance not only for the individual citizens on either side, but for the future of a large number of countries. True, the Soviet Union is no longer a revolutionary power seeking to dominate the world and transform it in its own image—it has long accepted the necessity of prolonged coexistence with states governed by a different system. But it still insists on strict conformity with its own system as far as its own power sphere extends; it still regards conflict between the two types of systems, even if in carefully limited and controlled forms, as inevitable. It still feels compelled by its rivalry with the other superpower to use opportunities for expanding its sphere of influence wherever that is possible without serious risk, and to make expansion of its *type* of control follow the expansion of its *area* in due course. It follows that at the very least the citizens of the advanced democracies, who in their overwhelming majority prefer their own system of government to the Communist alternative, have a vital interest in remaining free to develop their own institutions rather than being absorbed into the Soviet sphere of influence, and that this fact constitutes the basis of a common security interest of their states experienced for instance, in the North Atlantic Pact and in the American alliances with Japan. That interest can be formulated in terms of the common ideas underlying the Western type of system. It is not, for that reason, unrealistic or “ideological” nor is it diminished by the growing independence of Japan and Western Europe.

My second point concerns that old but cynical distinction between accepting an idea as binding on your own foreign policy and a desir-

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
able rule for others, and assuming that it is in fact binding on all or seeking to force it upon them. To accept and promote, e.g., international conventions against aggression or intervention by one state in another's affairs is a policy of peace commendable on both moral and realistic grounds. To base one's diplomacy and defense policy on the assumption that all other states will accept such conventions and abide by them, without a painstaking study of their actual behavior, is an ideological attitude liable to lead to loss of security and appeasement of aggressors, hence both unrealistic and immoral. Again, to try and "make the world safe for democracy," or to make the liberation of other countries from their—capitalist or Communist, democratic or dictatorial—system a general objective of foreign policy, is an ideological concept bound both to endanger international peace and to involve any country committed to it in obligations surpassing its resources and in incalculable risks. To recognize the

common interest of existing democracies in their individual and collective safety, and to act accordingly, is plain realistic common sense.

But if these distinctions are valid, it follows that there is no contradiction between the need to base the foreign policies of the democracies on faith in their common fundamental ideas and on a realistic analysis of their respective interests and relative strength in a changing international constellation. It is only the loss of a realistic sense of the possible that leads governments into self-destroying ideological adventures, and produces on the rebound a distrust of all general ideas and a self-isolating confusion between realism and shortsighted national egotism. So far from being the proper remedy for the former ideological excesses, such narrowing of the outlook is merely the natural, but equally dangerous swing of the pendulum to the opposite extreme. Yet if such a reaction is natural—particularly at a time when no acute common danger appears to threaten

the democracies—it is by no means inevitable that it will run its full disruptive course.

The tendency toward the general adoption of beggar-my-neighbor policies in the economic field, and to the consequent political and military disintegration of the Western alliance, can be stopped. The gains of the new realism can be preserved and saved from the consequences of the decline of solidarity. But the chance of stopping the first and saving the other depends on responsible leadership that combines a realistic appraisal of the new world situation with a firm sense of the abiding common interests—in all the advanced democracies, and above all in the United States. Only such leadership can ensure their successful individual and common adjustment to a world no longer governed by warring ideologies and rigid blocs, but still divided both by the rivalry of superpowers and by the continuing conflict between different forms of government and ways of life. ■



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ENVIRONMENT

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should be respected and understood. It can be very useful.

In dealing with other agencies there are certain fundamental requirements. Even though the making of foreign policy and interdepartmental relations are frequently abrasive processes, it is essential to gain the confidence of those with whom one deals in other agencies.

The speed and the effectiveness with which decisions can be made, particularly in time of crisis, is very directly affected by the degree to which others will have confidence in an FSO and in his recognition of their problems. Quick clearances of outgoing messages, for example, which may seem a mundane thing, can be possible if the man in Defense trusts his State counterpart and understands that State knows his problems. He must know his FSO counterpart is not going to embarrass him by something put into an outgoing message which bears his clearance.

In dealing with other agencies, as

in dealing with the Congress and the public, another essential for the FSO is the ability to explain a problem. One of the worst approaches to relations with others is to suggest that the problem is of such a complexity that only an FSO can understand it. FSOs too often talk in terms which the person directly dealing with a problem may understand but others may not. They also at times tend to talk more about the foreign interests which were involved than about the American interests. To the people in the US Government seeking answers, the elaborate or condescending response is not appreciated or effective. Explain issues in terms of their interests, but do not try to run their show.

In interdepartmental dealings, there is always profit in making as great an effort as possible to resolve issues at the country officer or at the country director level. The breadth of issues and considerations which exist at the Assistant Secretary, and even more at the Secretary/Under Secretary level, do not permit a

constant battle on the part of the Assistant Secretary or Under Secretary on behalf of unresolved problems at lower levels. Choose only the most critical ones to fight up the line. When an FSO does raise an issue, he should be sure as much of it has been resolved at his own level as is possible.

FSOs will also have their relationships within the Department. There will be seeming overlaps with other Bureaus—particularly in the functional field. There will be inevitable conflicts of interests between geographic bureaus. Members of the seemingly amorphous staff on the Seventh Floor will be looking over your shoulder in the name of the Secretary and the Under Secretary.

The same rule applies. Understand their task; their problems. Remember, also, that the Department is not organized for the convenience of the Foreign Service; it is organized to meet the requirements as they are seen from the Seventh Floor. Things can appear quite differently from that perspective.

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being aggressive, of taking initiative. Rewards in the Service do not go only to those who follow the dictates of their superiors and take no initiative. Quite the contrary is true. Keep in mind that the man at the top is looking for ideas; his own success depends on them.

Few in the Service, perhaps, are by nature or by experience capable of the kind of brash aggressiveness sometimes associated with initiative. Such aggressiveness is hardly the most effective. State's success depends on its ability to present and project problems and answers and to win the day by its understanding of the total environment and its demonstrated professional competence. State will not win all the battles, but it will establish its credentials.

To summarize:

First understand the political environment, but don't try to be political—be professional.

Second, clearly understand the objectives of the United States and its political leadership. Learn what is required. Be professional but

avoid parochialism, and, above all, avoid emotional involvement. Too many experts have weakened their case by appearing to the political level to be too committed.

Third, in explaining a problem the FSO should put himself in the position of his superior or the other agency. Make what is said meaningful and understandable to him.

Fourth, refine the problem to the maximum at the lowest possible level. Make recommendations, but make them within the totality of the problem.

Fifth, know the problems and mandates of others. Explore other positions carefully and with understanding. Build up confidence, which is a major key to effective work within the United States Government.

Sixth, know one's own maximum mandate. How far to go without reference? Take the maximum of initiative, minimize reference to higher-ups, but don't err on the side of avoiding advice.

Seventh, keep the initiative. There are various techniques for

doing so. Anticipate problems. Call superiors and others before being called. Don't have meetings unless what is to come out of it is known. Don't have meetings unless there's a draft on the table. Keep everyone informed in a crisis situation.

Eighth, follow-up. Don't let things slip away thinking that others are going to pick up the pieces.

Ninth, it is getting the job done, not the credit that counts. Don't be afraid to give others credit where due.

Finally, in the midst of the doubts and concerns about the Foreign Service and its future, in the midst of the frequently reiterated statement that initiative and courage are not appreciated, keep in mind that the person at the top is looking for people with the answers. He is looking for the man who will take the initiative, who will demonstrate the imagination, will understand the total environment and will give to the man at the top the kind of imaginative support that he wants. Such men rise, and strengthen their organizations as they go. ■



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THE CHALLENGES

From page 19

It is an interesting and frequently overlooked fact that in many of the Communist countries of Eastern Europe, the churches and the clergy are directly supported and subsidized by the state. This results from the fact that the Communist regimes first of all deprived the churches of the lands and properties which for so long had been their source of support and financial independence. Subsequently, the Communist governments in several instances launched on a clear policy of caesaropapism, which simply means using the church for the purposes of the state. The process has also been described as a kind of one-sided separation of church and state, in which the churches have no right to interfere with the political life of the country, but there is no prohibition against government intervention in the affairs of the church.

My impression is that this process has been carried to greater ex-

tremes, as we might expect, in those countries which historically had a greater commitment to national Orthodox churches than to Roman Catholicism with its allegiance to the Pope. In the Socialist Republic of Rumania, for example, the salaries and subsidies paid by the government may be suspended if there is evidence of "undemocratic attitudes" on the part of the clergy. Also, the government may simply annul the appointment of clergymen and teachers at religious institutions "in the interest of public order or state security." It is worth noting, too, that the salaries paid the clergy in Rumania are noncompetitive, with salaries for parish clergy reported in the range of twenty-eight dollars a month, which is less than the pay of a construction worker. A bishop might make as much as seventy dollars a month.

In Bulgaria, the national Orthodox church received government subsidy until the early 1950s, when the payments were suspended and the government apparently launched on a course designed to virtually

eliminate the practice of religion. The Holy Synod of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church subsequently reported that its support was based almost wholly on the sale of candles. In 1963 the government added an administrative blow by decreeing that Sunday was to be a regular workday and that different days of the week were to be designated as days of rest in the different administrative districts of the country. Bulgaria is thus the extreme example of state domination of religious activity in Eastern Europe. But the church is still there—a prime example of Marxist-Leninist dogma yielding to pragmatic realities.

In the Roman Catholic countries of Eastern Europe, the evidence seems to be that the practice of state subsidy has been resorted to as a necessity because the church fulfilled such an important role, but that the imposition of caesaropapism has been much less complete and much less effective. In Poland, for example, the clergy receive stipends paid from the income obtained from confiscated church

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property. They also are paid fees for the performance of religious services in state facilities, such as hospitals, prisons, and sanatoriums. But when the state attempts to collect its tribute in return, in the form of bureaucratic interference in the training of the clergy, it encounters continuing firm and outspoken opposition.

In Czechoslovakia, the state has succeeded to a greater extent than in most other countries. It has made the church depend almost wholly on the government for economic support and in return the state controls the number of persons permitted to study for the priesthood and exercises veto power over clerical appointments. But there has been a relaxation of state regimentation in recent years to the extent that some of the Czech bishops were permitted to attend the Vatican Council. A Czechoslovakian Cardinal, Dr. Josef Beran, and several other bishops and clergymen have been freed from long political imprisonment, and the government has concluded

a protocol with the Vatican in which it formally acknowledges the role of the church.

In Hungary, which is the most eastern country in Europe with a Catholic majority, the church suffered renewed oppression following the abortive revolution of 1956, in which the clergy were accused of playing an important role. Now, however, the position of the church has improved since the signing of a protocol with the Vatican in 1964. There is no overt oppression although there is no question but the church still must be responsive to state control. But, on balance, it seems to me the church has not lost any ground and in some cases it has clearly gained.

These then are the high points of Eastern Europe today: a Communist satellite zone in a condition of flux and change, as it enters a distinctly new phase of ideological evolution. Old techniques of repression have had to be abandoned, new recognition has been given to normal human aspirations and desires,

new opportunities for trade and tourism present themselves, and an older generation of doctrinaire Communists is yielding to a new wave of youth and experimentation.

How should we in the West react to these changes and what are their implications for the long-range evolution of East-West relations? It seems plain to me that we have a great opportunity and that if we conduct ourselves with wisdom, imagination, and restraint—and avoid the ideological rigidities of the 1950s and '60s—we can go a long way toward resolving the great ideological cold war of the twentieth century.

We have heard of the revolution of rising expectations in the developing countries of the world. The Communist countries of Eastern Europe are caught, it seems to me, in a counterrevolution of rising expectations.

All men have certain natural drives which, as we have seen in the political and economic spheres, in-

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clude the desire for freedom, for human contact, and for property. As standards of living improve in Eastern Europe, as adequate housing, health care, and education become generally available, as communication and direct exposure to Western societies increase through tourists who visit from the West, these drives will become stronger. They will force Communist governments to change to adjust to these drives. The first demand may be freedom to choose one's work. The inevitable result will be freedom to choose how to dispose of the gains of work—more choice, in other words, in what to buy and where to travel. And eventually, although this end is certainly not yet in sight, there will undoubtedly be a demand for freedom of choice in politics.

I am convinced, therefore, that time is on our side in Eastern Europe. The trend there is toward freedom—and not away from it. Communism is changing to accommodate this trend, changing more slowly in some countries—more

rapidly in others. It seems obvious to me that we can best hasten this erosion within the Communist world by increasing contact at every level, and in every sphere of activity, between the countries of the West and those of Eastern Europe. We have an opportunity to avoid the mistakes of the postwar era to which I have already referred—and once more pursue our true national interests.

There are some definite political steps which we should be prepared to take in response to the situation. We should, for example, enact legislation to promote East-West trade, granting to the nations of Eastern Europe the equal or nondiscriminatory ("most-favored nation") tariff treatment they so much desire. What this will mean in actual trade possibilities until the United States has solved its basic balance of payments problem is problematical. But at least we can demonstrate that whatever the restrictive trade policies in which we engage, the motives are purely economic and not

political or ideological.

There will be other clear opportunities for political and diplomatic action on our part as time goes on, particularly if we are fortunate enough to be able to take steps in such areas as arms control. But the essential, continuing challenge is a philosophical one and it is one we will have learned to anticipate and respond to effectively if we fully appreciate what is now transpiring in Eastern Europe—and perhaps Asia. Basically, it is a challenge to be sensitive and responsive to change and evolution, and to free ourselves of stereotyped misconceptions and out-of-date notions. We must learn to contemplate the realities, rather than the mythologies, of world affairs in this last portion of the twentieth century.

We must all learn this lesson—Americans, Russians, Chinese, and every other great power—if only because that is the only way to assure that there will be a twenty-first century. ■

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


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The Kyrulian ambassador's wife ignored me until I started reading the JOURNAL. She still ignores me but I have memorized Dave Newsom's rules for bureaucratic survival.



The JOURNAL welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary.

Status of FAS

ONE of our greatest problems is responding to overseas applicants for the Foreign Affairs Specialist program who have written to individual members of the Ad Hoc Committee. These letters request information about the status of the AFGE-originated temporary injunction against State and USIA. They ask where it stands, what is happening, and when they can expect their applications to be processed. Apparently, because of the injunction, employees are writing to us instead of to the Department and the Agency.

The latest information available as of this writing is that on April 21, 1972 at 10 AM a hearing will be held in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Justice Department, representing State and USIA, will argue that the temporary injunction obtained by the AFGE in the District Court be vacated. AFGE, represented by its attorneys, will oppose.

No one knows how the appellate court is going to decide—their deliberations may take anywhere from a week to six months. The Ad Hoc Committee has succeeded through its attorneys in being admitted to the hearing as a "Friend of the Court," which seems to suggest that the court shares the committee's concerns as to the reasons the AFGE Local sought the injunction in the first place.

Naturally, the decision will be an important one vitally affecting the right of choice of many hundreds of Civil Service and Foreign Service employees. As soon as we have

more information, we will attempt to spread the word as best as we can. We have already undertaken two massive mailings to employees both overseas and in the United States—all at considerable expense to the Ad Hoc Committee and on our own time. Funds supplied by some 200 employees are held in escrow by our attorneys, Baker and McKenzie, but so far our expenses exceed income by several thousand dollars. The Committee, a totally-independent-of-management group whose participation in the case has in fact been opposed by the Department of Justice, will continue to support the interests of all FAS applicants as long as it possibly can.

JOHN R. WHEELER, JR., *Chairman
The Ad Hoc Committee in
Support of the Foreign Affairs
Specialist Program*
Washington

Questions for Debate

ISSUES addressed by the JOURNAL in its April editorial will be debated in and out of the Foreign Service for months to come.

Unfortunately, the editorial and two recent AFSA open meetings misrepresented and distorted those issues.

Questions of intense and legitimate concern to the Foreign Service include the following—

What is "merit?"

How is "merit" best identified, measured, and ranked?

Do Foreign Service personnel policies reward courage, imagination, integrity, and compassion?

Do they discourage sycophancy, indecision, and ruthlessness?

Do the Selection Boards operate as they should?

Are the instruments and processes which govern Foreign Service personnel operations adequate? Are efforts being made to improve them?

Can a valid merit system exist in the absence of an effective appeals system?

If past "error" in personnel practice has seriously injured a career, what can be done to rehabilitate the career?

The Board of Directors would merit the support of the AFSA membership if it encouraged considera-

tion of these questions.

Meanwhile, it should drop its effort to amend the Foreign Service Act in a manner likely to open the door to serious abuse of the Foreign Service career system. The Secretary has ample statutory authority to recommend promotions.

Only a small percentage of the AFSA membership would support an expansion of the existing authority, or even comprehend the peculiar concept of "compensatory" promotions favored in the April editorial.

CONCERNED

Washington

Education for E.O. 11636

BEFORE we grow numb from fanfares for the "new era" of the new Executive Order governing labor-management relations, perhaps we ought to have a look at the issues the order poses for AFSA. From Paris, which in recent years has been one of the most active overseas chapters, this is the way these issues look. . .

If AFSA is to survive as a viable organization, it must win the forthcoming election or come so close as to be a hush-in next time. If AFGE becomes the exclusive representative, AFSA is finished because very few people will pay dues to two organizations when only one will be able to represent them. . .

But even if AFSA wins and becomes the exclusive agent, it will not necessarily gain members because the new Executive Order does not include a closed shop. Present AFSA members will compare carefully the pluses and minuses of dues paying. . .

Is AFSA ready to hire two or three full time professionals to handle recruiting, organization and grievances? Is AFSA willing to take legal action when "in-houses procedures" bring no relief for its members? Is AFSA willing to lobby in earnest on the Hill? Is AFSA willing to utilize the press to make management more responsive? Is the Board going to poll the membership and will it keep them informed so that polling can be meaningful? These questions imply whether the Board will reorder its priorities so that its first loyalty is to its new constituency. . .

The new Executive Order is obvi-

ously not a final document. Consultation on new policies is not negotiation of outstanding issues, and in-house systems in our country have been neither popular nor successful. If one recalls that not too long ago management sought a complete exclusion from the labor-management relationship and that it instituted a grievance system only under the threat of the Bayh Bill, management's position on the new order falls into perspective and so does the need for AFSA's adversary role. How much progress we make from management's monopoly of personnel policy toward the free market equilibrium of responsible collective bargaining depends on if and how well AFSA orients itself to the role of being a tough and dedicated adversary of management. Both sides face a long education in the value of collective bargaining. If management prefers talk, study and cosmetic systems, it is the duty of an employee organization to recognize the ploys and hold management responsible by whatever legal means are appropriate.

For AFSA the first test will come in the unit election. Hopefully, the Board will be able to show us that win or lose it can be a good representative and a tough adversary.

ROBERT F. PFEIFFER

Paris

Eminence Grise?

It took a Middle West Congressman in the early part of this century to propose abolition of our diplomatic service as not really needed and, in a curious reversion to the practice of antiquity, to suggest resort to diplomatic representatives only when the need of specific negotiations arose. It now takes a Far West President and a modern-day Riche-lieu to do indirectly what Champ Clark proposed 60 years ago. If there is one way subtly to undermine and eventually render ineffective a diplomatic establishment, it is to frustrate it by bypassing it, refusing it vital information and by conducting discussions and negotiations in the White House of which it is kept in ignorance, thereby signaling every embassy in Washington and every government around the world that the way to proceed with us on

important matters is not through the career diplomats but somehow, by whatever devious means, to gain access to the throne. For a President and an adviser who claim to be up to date, this is a curious reversion to the centuries prior to the 19th when nothing of importance was decided except in the palace. Perhaps the State Department and Foreign Service are beginning to feel what the Congress feels—that there has set in an exceedingly dangerous trend to the centralization of our foreign affairs in one man and his immediate retinue. Louis XIII had his Cardinal Riche-lieu. Have we Richard I and a Cardinal Kissinger?

FSO-RETIRED

Compensatory Promotions

THE attached letter has been delivered to Senator Fulbright and other members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and more recently to all members of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, including Chairman Wayne L. Hays, with signatures of 60 members of the Foreign Service. I hope you will be able to publish it in the forthcoming JOURNAL to permit the earliest possible solicitation of views from other AFSA members.

We, the undersigned members of the United States Foreign Service, wish to express our disagreement with part of a recommendation made to you by the Board of the American Foreign Service Association, concerning "compensatory promotions." We refer to the proposed amendment to the Foreign Service Act . . . to permit promotions [to correct grievances]:

We agree that it is proper to establish a procedure for the examination of grievances protested by Foreign Service employees regarding their efficiency ratings. We agree that such a procedure should provide for a variety of corrective actions, including removal of unjust, inaccurate, or prejudiced information from a file, retention in service of an employee facing involuntary separation, and recommendations for promotion on an exceptional basis. However, except through a comparative examination of the records of all employees in competition with each other for promotion we see no way to effect "compensatory

promotions" without risking comparable injustice to the colleagues of employees so compensated. Such injustice would clearly result, for example, in the case of the substantial number of employees each year who are recommended for promotion by the Boards but for budgetary or other reasons are not promoted.

In addition to considerations of justice to the individual employee, moreover, we believe it is important not to lose sight of the original purpose for which the Foreign Service personnel system was established, i.e., to provide the Service with the best qualified people available to perform the work required. This goal will not be met if employees are promoted on any basis other than that of ability, be it through favoritism on one hand or in compensation for past wrongs on the other. . . . With these considerations in mind, we have tried to develop an approach that will permit correction of injustice in such a way as to maintain the professional standards which are essential to the welfare of the Foreign Service and to the effective performance of its tasks. . . . [Gist of the proposal, summarized here for the sake of brevity is as follows:

We concur in the proposal that adherence to selection board rankings be made mandatory.

We propose that a duly constituted Grievance Panel or EEO hearing examiner be empowered to remove inaccurate or prejudiced statements from a file, to add notations to a file including recommendations for promotion, and in exceptional circumstances to order the retention in service or re-examination of the file, *in comparison with the records of all other employees in the same category who were recommended for promotion by the previous selection board*, either by a reconvened regular board or by a special board established for the purpose.]

Following are the signers from whom we were able, by press time, to obtain permission to publish their names: Robert T. Willner, Sean M. Holly, G. Norman Anderson, Richard Bogosian, Donald W. Born, William Paul Clappin, Stephen P. Dawkins, William L. Dyess, David C. Halsted, Robert Hayashida, John P. Heilmann, H. Kenneth Hill, Harold E. Horan, John Krizay, Doyle V. Martin, Stephanie Mayfield, Ralph Meima, James C. Nelson, William Newlin, Sol Polansky, Robert L. Pugh, G. Edward Reynolds, David Schiele, Peter G. Smith, Robert W. Smith, Linwood R. Starbird, Ross P. Titus, William N. Turpin, Charles H. Twining, Thelma E. Vettel, Herbert Wilgis.



AFSA's CHAIRMAN TESTIFIES

*Excerpts from the Statement of William C. Harrop at the
State Department/USIA Authorization Hearings,
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 23, 1972*

I. The Foreign Service Merit Promotion System

The intent of the Congress under the Foreign Service Act of 1946 (Sec. 621) seems clearly to have been that relative merit should be established by objective selection boards insulated from domestic political considerations and from personal value judgments. Through subsequent legislation the same provisions were applied to Foreign Service Information Officers of USIA.

The Director of USIA, Mr. Frank Shakespeare, has this year made a personal selection of officers to be promoted from Class FSIO-2 to FSIO-1 without regard to the rank order in which the Selection Board had evaluated officers qualified for promotion. We believe this action, which is not perhaps in itself too serious, establishes a dangerous precedent and exposes the Foreign Service promotion system to political abuse. It also changes the relationships between the Director and the career officers who report to and advise him. The Association requests the Committee to amend the Foreign Service Act so as to leave no possible ambiguity about the nature of the non-political merit system. We would suggest language along the lines of the following draft:

Sec. 623 (a). The Secretary **shall** establish, with the advice of the Board of the Foreign Service, selection boards to evaluate the performance of Foreign Service officers; and upon the basis of their findings, **which shall be submitted**

in rank order by class or in rank order by specialization within a class, to the Secretary, the Secretary shall make recommendations in accordance with the findings to the President for the promotion of Foreign Service officers. No person assigned to serve on any such board shall serve in such capacity for any two consecutive years.

(b). In special circumstances, which shall be set forth by regulations, the Secretary may recommend to the President the promotion of a Foreign Service officer who has received a recommendation for a promotion by a grievance panel, or by an Examiner or Board under the Federal Equal Opportunity provisions.

Paragraph (b) is designed to authorize promotions as a result of grievance and discrimination board recommendations. Such authority does not now exist in our judgment. The Association believes that this authority for compensatory promotions is required for a satisfactory grievance system. We also believe very strict standards must be established to limit the utilization of such a special promotion authority and to prevent its abuse.

II. Retirement Age of Career Ministers

The Foreign Service Act provides for mandatory retirement of FSOs at age 60, while FSO-Career Ministers extend to age 65. The Association believes it is inappropriate for career ministers who are not serving in chief of mission or equivalent high positions to

stay on after age 60 and thus prevent the advance of their younger colleagues. The Department of State is in agreement with this position and has already submitted a request to Congress. The Association would strongly urge that the authorizing legislation you are now considering amend sections 631 and 632 of the Foreign Service Act to reduce the mandatory retirement age of career ministers from 65 to 60. This proposed action would not, of course, abridge the President's right to appoint career ministers to chief of mission positions beyond the mandatory retirement age.

III. The Bayh Bill

Since the Bayh Bill was introduced, Foreign Service personnel have obtained the right to elect an exclusive representative to consult and negotiate on their behalf with the management of the foreign affairs agencies. Under these changed circumstances, the Board of Directors of the Association is prepared to support somewhat less detailed legislation, as long as it would establish complete and clear principles of due process, and leave some of the specific procedures and regulations for codetermination by management and the exclusive representative under Executive Order 11636. The Association has been discussing language with Senate staff members who prepared such a draft. We continue firmly to oppose a delay in legislative action pending the election of an exclusive representative.

IV. A Transfer Allowance for the Foreign Service

At present, Foreign Service personnel receive a maximum pay-

ment of \$175 to cover extraordinary expenses for clothing and only when they transfer from one climatic zone to another. Employees of other agencies, by contrast, can claim up to \$950 per transfer for miscellaneous expenses plus the costs of selling or buying a home, or obtaining or breaking a lease for rented quarters. Since the number of non foreign affairs agency employees serving abroad is several times greater than the number of career Foreign Service personnel, and since the former are receiving the allowances authorized by the 1967 legislation, the Association believes the time is overdue for Foreign Service personnel to receive equitable treatment. The Congress can accomplish this simply by eliminating section 5724 (g) of Title V, U.S. Code. This section prohibits the extension of the benefits of section 5724 and 5724/a to employees of the foreign affairs agencies (State, AID and USIA), who in fact have more frequent and more costly transfers than do those who now receive compensation for out of pocket costs.

V. The Magnuson Bill and the Professional Role of the Foreign Service

Title I of S.2754, the Magnuson Bill, would transfer responsibility for economic and commercial representation overseas from the Department of State to the Department of Commerce. It would create a new "International Commerce Service" reporting directly to the Secretary of Commerce. This bill is now before the Committee on Commerce.

In testimony February 18 before the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism, the American Foreign Service Association argued strongly against this further fragmentation of overseas responsibility. We pointed out that:

a) Commercial and economic work are a central part of the responsibilities of our missions; Ambassadors and political officers play a key role in supporting American exporters and investors; it is not advisable to attempt to define trade promotion and other economic work as somehow sepa-

rate and distinct from other mission programs;

b) Our Ambassadors already must manage missions staffed by State Department personnel on the average by only 16%; still another major agency presence (Commerce) with parallel communications lines back to Washington, and another diminution of State Department and Foreign Service responsibility is a questionable proposition at best;

c) While the Foreign Service has in the past given inadequate priority to trade promotion, a major change in attitude is well under way; as export expansion has become more important to the country, this function is receiving sharply increased attention in the Foreign Service;

d) Improvements in domestic backstopping are more acutely needed than improvements in overseas economic and commercial activities; the budgetary expense of creating a new bureaucracy in the Commerce Department would be considerable, as would the administrative problems of recruiting competent personnel and training them in foreign languages and cultures;

e) It is inaccurate to blame the Foreign Service trade promotion effort for our balance of trade problem; governmental trade promotion can at best have only a marginal impact as compared to currency exchange rates, productivity, availability of export financing, foreign demand, competition, and the desire of American business to export; there is no "organizational" solution.

The Association urges the Foreign Relations Committee to review most carefully the implications and effects of this legislative proposal and to make its position known to the Senate at large.

The Foreign Service of the United States was established to conduct the overseas business of the nation, and to represent abroad the concerns not only of the State Department but of all federal agencies. The establishment of rival overseas services for other agencies tends to dissipate and confuse our presence abroad and our effectiveness internationally.

We are a Service of experienced professionals in foreign affairs, thoroughly loyal to our President and prepared to serve and advise him in whatever fashion he finds most supportive to his conduct of our foreign policy. We ask only to serve.

At the conclusion of AFSA's statement, Chairman Fulbright indicated that the Bayh Bill was under active consideration by the Committee and was expected to be introduced as an amendment to the State Department authorization bill. The Chairman expressed his personal opposition to any further division of foreign policy responsibility and suggested establishing a Hoover-type commission to review the entire United States foreign policy making operation.

OPENNESS

At the 13th Annual Convention of the International Studies Association in Dallas, March 14-18, AFSA members Arthur A. Hartman and P. Viron Vaky participated in a panel discussion on how non-US diplomats view the US foreign policy process. The panel discussion was preceded by a paper on decision-making by Professor Theodore Coulombis of American University. The moderator was Professor Abdul Said of AU and the panel was organized as a joint effort between the Washington Chapter of ISA and Face-to-Face, the new joint venture of AFSA and the Carnegie Endowment.

NOTES

- Work on a priority basis (which AFSA has long urged) is under way on the Interactive Personnel Model. The Model, a computer program, will list the Department's employees by skills on one side and "the needs of Service" on the other and see how they fit. It is a welcome step toward modern management . . .

- The carpenters and electronic industry are at work turning S/S into a modern, more efficient (albeit slightly strangelovian) operation. It will soon rival the Diplomatic Reception Areas as a tourist attraction . . .

HELP

Exclusive Representation Election

Last December, President Nixon issued **Executive Order 11636**, which makes **collective bargaining** on personnel and bread and butter issues **mandatory** in the foreign affairs agencies. The next step is an **election** by Foreign Service employees to choose their **exclusive representative** in each of the three agencies involved—State, AID and USIA.

AFSA is ready for the elections. We have filed an application to get on the ballot by submitting the signature cards signed last year by 2,500 employees indicating they want AFSA to represent them. This is known as a **showing of interest** which is required before the balloting can begin.

Unfortunately, the Employee-Management Relations Commission, which is empowered to implement EO 11636, has rejected these signature cards as being too old, and as having been solicited when a previous executive order was in effect. If the Commission had not rendered a negative decision, then **AFGE**, our only potential rival among employee organizations, would certainly have entered a formal objection. With their minimal membership among Foreign Service personnel, **AFGE** would rather wait and delay. We are anticipating stalling tactics from AFGE as we go deeper into elections process.

In view of recent developments, we now have to **solicit a new set of signature cards** to generate a new showing of interest. We would appreciate your signing and returning to AFSA headquarters the showing of interest card below. We need your help now.

RECENT AFSA ACTIVITIES

Leave Legislation

The House Subcommittee on Employee Benefits approved a bill which would allow crediting of leave in excess of the present maximums if leave was lost unavoidably through administrative error, exigencies of public business, or sickness.

The legislation provides leave lost through administrative error would be retroactive to June 30, 1960 for both current and former employees.

It allows most employees to take leave during the first 90 days of employment, and allows an employee to receive lump sum payment for leave earned above the current maximum limits during the year of his separation.

AFSA testified in favor of the legislation in February.

Election Report

AFSA's Participation Committees in the State Department collected over 1,000 "showing of interest" cards in Washington during a 10-day period ending April 14. We have surpassed our goal for Washington collection and cards are still coming in!

AFSA's overseas chapters have all received showing of interest cards and explanatory material. As the **Journal** goes to press we are just beginning to hear from the posts. **Santo Domingo**: 51 cards of 60 eligibles. **Santiago**: 42

cards of 52 eligibles. Congratulations to both chapters! We hope to obtain an overwhelming showing of interest before May so we can trigger an election and begin the new employee-management relations system as soon as possible. Please give us your help in this effort. Exclusive representation by AFSA in State, AID and USIA is crucial especially in this seminal period.

Retroactive Allowance Increases

As indicated in February **AFSA News**, AFSA feels strongly that overseas allowances should never have been subjected to the Phase One wage freeze covering the period August 15-November 14, 1971. We have exchanged correspondence with the GAO on this subject, and have pressed management to argue in favor of retroactive increases in allowances that should have gone up during the Phase One freeze because of dollar devaluation or other reasons. The initial reactions from the GAO are hopeful. The fact that within-grade salary increases due to take effect during the Phase One freeze have been paid retroactively gives cause for further hope. We want AFSA members to know that the issue is definitely still open, and that we are working hard to achieve justice for Foreign Service employees who effectively took pay cuts during the pay freeze.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION AUTHORIZATION FOR REPRESENTATION 		Permanent Agency:	
		Office/Post:	
I, the undersigned employee, wish to be represented for the purpose of exclusive recognition under Executive Order 11636 by the American Foreign Service Association. I understand this does not obligate me to join, or pay any fees or membership dues to any employee organization.		Location:	
		Phone:	
		Name: _____ (Print) (Last, First, Middle)	
		Address: _____	
		Social Security Number: _____	
Signature: _____		Date: _____	
		Grade (e.g. FS10-5): _____	



Merit and Compensatory Promotions

The AFSA Board advised the Board of the Foreign Service and the Secretary of State that it found no legal authority for the Board of the Foreign Service, the Director General or the Secretary of State to recommend Foreign Service officers for compensatory promotions under existing legislation. AFSA pointed out that the Foreign Service Act was carefully drafted to establish a career promotion system based exclusively on merit as determined by objective selection boards. The Act states that the President has the exclusive power to promote Foreign Service officers. However, to insulate Foreign Service promotions from possible abuse, the Congress carefully circumscribed the methods by which recommendations for promotion could be transmitted to the President for action. AFSA urged the Board and the Secretary to immediately seek an amendment to the Foreign Service Act authorizing compensatory promotions. The Secretary and the Board of the Foreign Service rejected AFSA's viewpoint and added two names to the just released promotion list for compensatory reasons.

Women's Rights Amendment Supported

The AFSA Board endorsed the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution. The Amendment which received Senate approval states that "Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the U.S. or by any State on account of sex."

Personnel Policy Changes

AFSA has informed agency management in each of the foreign af-

fairs agencies that major changes in personnel policies should be made only after due consultation with the exclusive representative of the employees after representation election. Until an exclusive representative is elected and the employee consultation process initiated, AFSA believes that management must refrain from making major changes in personnel policies and practices.

Precept Opposed

AFSA urged State Department management to delete a section of the Staff Corps precepts which states that the selection boards should ignore any mention of an employee's activities in or on behalf of an employee organization. The AFSA Board believes that the precepts should be absolutely neutral as regards employee activities in employee organizations.

Magnuson Bill

The Magnuson bill is still in the Senate Sub-Committee on Foreign Commerce. It has not as yet been separated into several bills to ease handling in the full committee and on the Senate floor.

Senator Inouye, a co-sponsor of the legislation, recently wrote AFSA Chairman Bill Harrop indicating that he would give the memorandum concerning the plan for a Technical Services Office his close study and attention; that he was keeping an open mind about Title I and would welcome any evidence of State's interest in upgrading the commercial function and officer to a point commensurate with present realities. The Senator pointed out that "the burden of proof rests with the Department to show more than merely a recognition of the problem of ineffective commercial representation and with the trade figures now available it will be very difficult to delay action on legislation to improve our export performance."

Action Committee Established

AFSA has established an Action Committee to recommend improvements in the commercial and economic performance of the State Department and the Foreign

Service. Thirty-four AFSA members have volunteered to serve on this important ad hoc committee. The Committee is preparing action recommendations to improve economic and commercial work both overseas and in the United States. The Committee will also make suggestions to promote attitudinal change and improve personnel policies. Recommendations from AFSA overseas chapters and members are needed.

Thornburg Resigns

The AFSA Board accepted with deep regret the resignation of Sam Thornburg. Mr. Thornburg was selected to head the new AID Office of Management Services, a management official position. He has done an outstanding job on the AFSA Board and will be greatly missed.

NOTES

- Board of the Foreign Service member Assistant Secretary Hillenbrand has been nominated by President Nixon as Ambassador to West Germany. . .

- The Administration is pushing hard for enactment of the Federal Executive Service legislation. If the FES passes it may make high level Foreign Service appointments more attractive to career civil servants as they would avoid the FES contract time limitation. . .

- Senators Fulbright and Aiken have moved to create a new Hoover-type Commission to study the functions of the federal agencies in the making of foreign policy. The proposal springs from the Senator's concern over the proliferation of US civilian personnel overseas in foreign policy roles. . .

- The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved a measure to require a 10% cutback in US personnel overseas, except for regular State Department, armed forces, and Peace Corps volunteers. The proposed cutback would hit mainly USIA and AID.

Are you seeing AFSA's red borders? If not, please contact your Keyman or Chapter Head. We have put out 23 AFSA News letters and 14 Reform Bulletins in the last year.

MEMBERS' INTERESTS COMMITTEE

Home Leave Deductions

AFSA is very disappointed with the Department's March **Newsletter** article headlined "Home Leave Expenses Are Not Deductible." While this article was coming out, AFSA was receiving communications from members who had claimed deductions for home leave outside the Ninth Circuit area (western states) and have already received their refund checks. This group includes people filing amended returns for earlier years.

The net effect of Assistant Secretary Donelan's letter to the IRS requesting guidance on this subject, of course, is to generate a universal negative attitude toward home leave expense deductions in all IRS districts beyond the western states. AFSA had hoped that this might not happen, and that the various IRS districts could decide for themselves whether or not to follow the Ninth Circuit Court decision in *Stratton vs IRS*. This would allow a large number of AFSA members to claim and receive deductions for home leave expenses this year. In cases where such claims were disallowed, we would then have appropriate documentation for another court test in another circuit.

Since all AFSA members on active duty in the Foreign Service stand to benefit by the ruling of the Ninth Circuit Court, AFSA must do everything possible to keep the momentum of the *Stratton* case in high gear. That means everyone who has a claim should file and report the result, favorable or unfavorable, to AFSA. When the results are in, AFSA will then determine how to proceed further. The **Newsletter** article appears to be designed to inhibit foreign service personnel from claiming home leave deductions, which is just the opposite of good judgment on this issue.

All AFSA members who have filed for home leave income tax deductions, please write to the Members' Interests Committee, c/o AFSA, advising whether their home leave deductions were al-

lowed. By working together, we hope we can establish the deductibility of home leave expenses.

More On Mail Orders

Sears special service charge for pouch orders continues to generate comment. From Geneva: "Fail to understand what service this special charge covers. If Sears merchandise wasn't so good, we'd have broken relations long ago." From Madras: "Sears may provide special packing for sea pouch parcels, but we did not see any evidence of it. On the contrary, our most recent shipment was completely demolished. The packing was obviously not made to withstand transport by sea pouch. We would be willing to pay the extra charge for extra quality packing."

Some AFSA members are having problems with computerized mail orders. From Abidjan: After mailing an order to J. C. Penney (Atlanta, Georgia), the member was deluged with refunds, adjusted shipping charge notices, re-invoiced shipping charges, and finally the package with half the order unfilled. No effort was made to find substitutes despite a request from the customer. From Stockholm: An order to Sears was marked for urgent air parcel post delivery. Instead of sending urgently, Sears delayed to request additional postage even though the customer had a charge account. When the additional postage was sent, Sears delayed another two weeks before sending the order which arrived too late for the scheduled winter vacation.

USIA Corner Cutting on Language Training: A USIA employee is being assigned to language training at FSI between two overseas posts. Because the agency is unable to place the employee in an ongoing overseas assignment prior to the beginning of language training, and since the employee might have to spend a short period in the agency awaiting the assignment after the training is completed, the employee is being transferred to Washington rather

than assigned on a TDY basis. This will result in a substantial financial loss to the employee which will not be compensated for by the availability of household effects and car shipments for a period of less than 12 months. The employee is shocked by this treatment and so is AFSA. A protest has been lodged, with the request that the employee be given a choice between per diem or the shipment of effects and car with no per diem beyond the home service transfer allowance.

STAFF CORPS TESTIMONY

Referring to Chairman Fulbright's query on morale in the Foreign Service, Board Member Barbara Good responded in part: "I want to mention the fact that I represent the Staff Corps—the secretaries, communicators and the people who do a great deal of work. Having served overseas 14 years as a Secretary and Communicator, I know that we do not always get a fair shake. We have been second class citizens for a long time. And, especially as a woman I know that the Foreign Service has not been fair to us. We have organized and we have changed some regulations but it is going to be up to us to see that people are educated to follow through on these changes. We still have a long way to go, and I wouldn't want to mislead you into thinking that everybody is happy overseas.

"A lot of us work very hard and we don't have equitable pay or allowances and some of us are treated very shabbily. I think that it would be quite wrong to give you the impression that everyone is terribly happy. The Staff Corps is not necessarily all that happy. . . .

"Our promotions and salaries are simply not equitable. We are working on some of the solutions and we hope to convince management to change things and make it better for us. But, for a long time many of us have not received equitable treatment or adequate promotions or salary raises, and it is high time something was done about it."

AFSA Finances

The Board regrets that there has been a delay in providing financial information to the membership. We have had an unusual personnel turnover during the past year, losing two executive directors, two accountants and a bookkeeper.

However, with the help of our auditors (Leopold and Linowes) and much hard work, Executive Director Gerry Bushnell has reduced the inevitable backlog in the Association's financial records.

The pie charts below show revenue and expenditures during the first six months of the current fiscal year for the General Fund (which comprises Association operations other than the separate Scholarship Fund and AFSA Fund). Other financial notes follow.

AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

July 1, 1971 to December 31, 1971

GENERAL FUND

Revenue

Membership Dues	\$ 85,788
Journal Adv. Sales & Subscriptions	46,088
Club Sales	40,142
Miscellaneous	
Journal income	4,389
	<u>\$176,407</u>

Expenditures

Payroll	\$ 69,453
Operating Costs of Journal	36,419
Operating Costs of Club	28,886
Operating Costs, Association	
Building	6,401
Office	8,066
Professional Services	1,791
Payment on Mortgage	3,818
Balance being used to offset previous deficits	21,573
	<u>\$176,407</u>

—The dues schedule adopted in May of 1971 is producing, on a fiscal year basis, sufficient revenue to meet all current operating costs and to slowly retire past indebtedness.

—The anticipated ten per cent loss of membership following the May '71 increase of dues did

not materialize. In February, 1972, membership was 7,287 compared with strength figures for like dates in 1970 and 1971 of 7,394 and 7,469. We hope to go well over 8,000 members following our annual membership drive in the spring. **Journal** subscriptions from libraries and other nonmembers have continued to increase.

—Contributions to the Scholarship Fund and AFSA Fund programs continue at the levels of prior years. (Additional contributions to finance AFSA Fund activities would be helpful now and will be necessary in the future).

—Capital appreciation of the Association's Scholarship Fund investment portfolio during the period of 7/22/71 to 1/31/72 was six times that of the Dow Jones—30 Industrials for the same period.

—The Scholarship Fund and AFSA Fund programs are treated as separate entities restricted for use of specific programs. The programs financed by the two funds carry their respective shares of the cost for the administrative services provided by the Association. The cost sharing system used is similar to that employed by U.S. agencies using centralized services overseas.

—The interest-bearing loan of \$25,000 from the Scholarship Fund to the General Fund has been curtailed by \$5,000. The balance of \$20,000 will be repaid this summer. The loan is handled in the same manner as a commercial bank loan.




—The **Journal's** advertising income has improved and its publication costs have been reduced, thanks to a fine effort by the Editorial Board and Editor Shirley Newhall.

—The Club, while growing in popularity and meeting all direct cost of food, beverage, salary, supply, and so forth, is not yet able to carry its full share of the administrative overhead and building charges. A more active evening business appears to be the best answer to this problem, and we are experimenting with ways to develop it.

—The Club dues credit liquidation is now over 50% complete.

The target date for disposing of all outstanding cases is July 1.

—The spring months are the most difficult for the Association budget. Membership renewals and new memberships each year are low during April and May, while cash demands remain high. Fortunately our bank credit is excellent. We hope that this will be the last spring season when we have to resort to short term credit. This has been an unavoidable necessity for the Association for many years.



Foreign Service People

MARRIAGES

Parrish-Kemper. Patricia M. Parrish was married to Jay C. Kemper December 29 in London. Mrs. Kemper is assigned to the Consulate General in Asmara, Ethiopia and Mr. Kemper is Civilian Personnel Officer for the Air Force.

Shearwood-Boyatt. Maxine Lorraine Shearwood was married to FSO Thomas D. Boyatt on December 30, 1971, in Cincinnati, Ohio. Mr. and Mrs. Boyatt are residing in Washington.

BIRTH

Ledogar. A son, Charles Hubert, was born to FSO and Mrs. Stephen J. Ledogar on March 4 in Paris.

DEATHS

Barghahn. Joseph Barghahn, FSR-ret., a lecturer on economics at the Foreign Service Institute, died March 23 in Florida. Mr. Barghahn had served with the State Department since 1948 as an economist in posts in Japan, the Philippines, Israel, Iran, Uruguay and Liberia. He leaves his wife, Mildred, of 19100 Roman Way, Gaithersburg, Md. 20760, and a daughter, Barbara.

Davis. Richard H. Davis, career minister and Ambassador to Romania, died suddenly March 25 in San Juan while on an inspection tour of posts in the Caribbean. Mr. Davis joined the Department in 1938 serving in Hamburg, Tsingtao, Chungking, Moscow and Vienna. He had also been deputy commandant for foreign affairs at the Naval War College until his present duty as a senior inspector for the Foreign Service. He is survived by his wife Harriet and a daughter Cynthia both of 3410 Q St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007, and a stepdaughter, Anne Svensk of Boston. The family requests contributions be made to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

Engle. Ruth B. Engle, wife of Paul H. Engle, M.D., FSR-ret., died January 16 in Michigan. Mrs. Engle had lived in Karachi, Baghdad

and Manila while Dr. Engle served as an Embassy medical officer. She leaves her husband, of Olivet, Michigan 49076, four daughters, a brother, two sisters, and seven grandchildren.

Deak. Dr. Francis Deak, FSO-ret., died January 21 in New York. Dr. Deak had served in Washington as well as Paris and Rome. He had also been UN Adviser in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs. Dr. Deak is survived by his wife, Agnes, of The Toledo, #47, Towers of Windsor Park, Cherry Hill, N.J. 08034.

Flake. Valerie Flake, wife of Wilton C. Flake, the first US ambassador to Ghana, died March 14 in Rockville, Md. Mrs. Flake is survived by her husband of 4717 Jamestown Rd., Westmoreland Hills, Washington, D.C. 20016, a son, and four grandchildren also of Washington.

MacVeagh. Lincoln MacVeagh, former publisher and ambassador to six countries during World War II, died January 15. His wife may be reached at Casa Das Laranjeiras, 68 Rua Alonso, Enriques Estoril, Portugal.

Neal. Ernest Neal, FSR(AID), died January 14 in Washington. Mr. Neal had previously been serving as a population officer in Africa. His other assignments included India, the Philippines, Liberia and Sierra Leone. In December, Mr. Neal received the AID Superior Service Medal. He is survived by his wife, Judith and daughter Amy of 1464 Roundleaf Ct., Reston, Va. 22070, his parents, and a brother.

Tewell. Harold S. Tewell, FSO-ret., died April 2 in Dallas. Mr. Tewell entered the Foreign Service in 1920 and was assigned to Vancouver, Havana, Rio de Janeiro before retirement in 1950. Mr. Tewell is survived by three daughters, Mrs. Harvey Wellman of Bethesda, Mrs. William Aickin of Seattle, and Mrs. James Gee of Dallas, and a son, Richard of Atlanta.

Wagner. On March 27, Camille Stokes Wagner, wife of FSO-ret. Joseph J. Wagner, died in Washington, D.C. Mrs. Wagner is survived by her husband, a daughter, Karen, and a son, Mark, of 3214

Woodley Road, NW. Washington, D.C. 20008.

HAPPENINGS AT THE WIVES' SEMINAR IN MAY AND JUNE FOR THOSE GOING ABROAD OR RETURNING TO WASHINGTON, D.C.*

May 8-19—Wives' Seminar

Two weeks of lectures, films and round table discussions.

May 23-24—Youth Activism and the New Left

Two-day seminar on impact of the youth rebellion and analysis of current youth concerns.

June 5-16—Wives' Seminar—as above.

June 19-23—Volunteer English Teaching

One-week seminar introducing materials and techniques for teaching English as a foreign language.

*any adult dependent of a federal employee in the foreign affairs area is eligible, i.e. son or daughter 18 years old or over, mother, father, wife.

WIVES' SEMINAR, FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, D.C.
557-5525

CLUB NEWS

Cindy O'Brien, the Foreign Service Club's able and innovative manager, has announced that the Club will have a series of truly international luncheon menus this spring. Suggestions and recipes are welcome. Already slated for the platter are such items as Chicken Biriani, Mongolian Beef, Swiss Schublig, Fiambre Surtido and Barros Luco. Suitable wines, available by the glass, will also be listed.

The Foreign Service Club welcomes AFSA members and their guests for private dinner parties, cocktail parties and receptions. Reservations and information telephone 338-5730.

Dinners for 25-140 guests include appetizer, entree, salad, dessert and coffee or tea. Prices range from \$4.25 to \$6.95. The complete list is available on request from the Club or from AFSA's receptionist.

The Club also offers a wide range of plans for cocktail parties and receptions and will be glad to supply details or tailor a party to specifications.

Wherever your passport and overseas assignment take you, TRAVEL-PAK will follow . . . to insure your personal and household effects and to provide personal liability insurance as well.

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- Earthquake • Typhoon • Pilferage
- Lightning • Explosion • Vandalism
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Package Tours Program 1972

DOMESTIC

April 28-30	Eastern Shore	\$ 59.50
May 25-29	Historic Boston	115.00
May 26-29	Disney World	HOTEL PRICE 67.00*
June 17	Pennsylvania Dutch Country	16.50
June 23-25	Atlantic City	54.50
June 30-July 4	Niagara Falls	115.00
July 12-16	Canada—N.Y.	128.50
July 28-Aug. 5	Nova Scotia	275.00
Aug. 18-24	Nova Scotia	275.00
Sept. 8-10	Atlantic City	58.50
Sept. 15-18	Disney World	HOTEL PRICE 67.00*
Sept. 22-25	Disney World	HOTEL PRICE 67.00*



*Plus transportation: AIR—\$199.00, Bus—\$136.90, Amtrak—\$122.45

EUROPE

May 11-18	Spain Torremolinos	\$279.00
Sept. 16-30	Viennese and Swiss Extravaganza	581.90
Sept. 16-Oct. 6	Highlights of Europe	636.90
Sept. 23-30	Three Capitals	421.20
Sept. 30-Oct. 14	Viennese and Swiss Extravaganza	581.90
Sept. 30-Oct. 14	Eastern and Western Europe	587.40



CARIBBEAN¹

May 26-June 1	St. Thomas	\$277.50
June 16-23	Puerto Rico	267.75
Aug. 18-24	Puerto Rico	267.75
Sept. 15-21	Puerto Rico	287.00
Oct. 20-23	Puerto Rico	232.00
July 21-25	Puerto Rico	266.29



¹Prices subject to change by the CAB.

Overseas transportation via Jet Airliner
Inland transportation via Deluxe Motor Coach

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