


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On the Control of Hawks

■ I trust you won't think me unduly sensitive if I comment briefly on Mr. Charles Maechling, Jr.'s review of Neville Maxwell's "India's China War" in the June 1972 issue of the Foreign Service JOURNAL. Mr. Maechling speaks delicately but disparagingly of "the professor of economics then serving as United States Ambassador to India" who was uninformed on the intricate background of negotiations between the British and the Chinese over the remote frontier areas between Tibet and India before World War I. And he attributes similar professorial innocence to my academic colleagues in the White House. I do not contest his charge. I would only express doubt as to whether there was anyone then in the employ of the United States Government who was really informed on these remote and esoteric negotiations. Certainly there was no one in the Embassy in New Delhi, excellent though this staff was, who was in command of the history. When the trouble developed, I think we all sought to inform ourselves. That we functioned with an imperfect background, is, nonetheless, hardly surprising.

As to the problem itself, we certainly reacted to what seemed to be a Chinese military threat. And this involved military aid—not much, but less than I proposed. To have decided not to help, especially after the Indian defeat, would have been a remarkable exercise in indifference. Mr. Maechling overlooks the less obvious part of the story told by Maxwell, and at considerably greater length in my own "Ambassador's Journal." This involved firm adherence to the assumption that this was a border dispute—an assumption which, had it been wrong, I would still be explaining. And it involved keeping both our own and the Indian hawks under control. Numerous suggestions were made at that time, both by our people and the Indians, for a new military alliance against the Chinese. The resistance of the mission to this involvement was firm and unflinching. Mr. Maxwell tells of our efforts to keep the situa-

tion cool; Mr. Maechling, in his review, uses Mr. Maxwell's book to convey an impression of a quite different sort.

Might I add a personal note. I first read Mr. Maxwell's book in manuscript form and found it (as Mr. Maechling would have suspected) almost embarrassingly informative. He was having difficulty finding an American publisher. I helped him to this end. I like to think that I encourage illumination even when it is adverse to myself. But I doubt that I would have been all that generous had the book reflected Mr. Maechling's view of our efforts.

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
Cambridge

Bandwagons and Kicks

■ I have noticed lately that our efforts to make the State Department "business conscious" are taking on "bandwagon" aspects. While Secretary of State Rogers has repeatedly said that commercial interests are one of the more important areas of our foreign relations responsibilities, he has never said to my knowledge that it is *the most* important area of our interest.

Isolated, but frequent, instances of growing concern by State personnel with respect to attitudes of others in the Department or overseas, suggest to me that we should be wary of overdoing a good thing. What I am saying is that it is becoming "good form" to suspect one's neighbor of being "soft" on pushing commercial interests of the United States, hence give him a good kick to get him moving.

In an institution noted for its "cool," it hardly becomes us to panic in the wake of the Magnuson bill or other threats to a way of life to which we wish to become accustomed. I would suggest therefore that those of us who wish to take up the banner of business, especially newcomers, do so in a straightforward manner and not by questioning automatically and without grounds whether others of us have been doing our jobs.

We should also keep in mind that what is good for business is not necessarily good for the United States, or that what is good for one business whose business practices

are questionable can seriously injure US commercial interests as a whole. Let us exercise a little caution and examine what we are doing, instead of the more tempting exercise of running around in circles in all directions.

RICHARD F. KING

Falls Church

NOTE from the AFSA Board: AFSA does indeed prescribe a good kick to get all of us moving more briskly to push the commercial interests of the United States (see AFSA Reform Bulletin No. 16). AFSA believes the way of life we had better become accustomed to is the way which most effectively advances the primary overseas objectives of the United States. Unless business with our help earns more foreign exchange, we will certainly see accelerated trimming of foreign affairs programs (e.g., AID) and ever more limited foreign policy options.

Bibliography Coming

■ Ka and I expect to have our "Bibliography of American Foreign Service Authors, beginning with Benjamin Franklin and including Wives" in the hands of the publishers this summer.

As new authors and old ones are turning up every month we want to include every one that qualifies.

At last count we had 700 authors. There must be more.

It would be helpful to us if you would include another notice in the JOURNAL asking authors who have not been in touch with us or who have just published a new book to send the following details: title, where published, year of publication, name of publisher, and number of pages.

As stated before, we do not include books of less than 50 pages, unless poetry. We do not include magazine articles, essays, speeches, letters and similar material unless collected and published in book form. We do include plays and operas and symphonies which have been publicly performed. In which case we require the title, where performed (name of theater, opera house or concert hall and name of producer), year first performed, number of acts, number of pages in script. Please include the names of any awards received.

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Feminism in Foggy Bottom:

Man's World, Woman's Place?



SANDY VOGELGESANG

NOT another story on Women's Lib! you groan. And no wonder, if you are a typical member of the Government's foreign affairs com-

Sandy Vogelgesang is an FSIO-5 on detail to State to cover Scandinavia for INR/RES. She says, "I interrupted my one and only Foreign Service assignment (Youth Officer in Finland, 1967-69) to complete my doctorate at Fletcher in 1971. Working with and writing about political activists in and around Harvard Square (my thesis dealt with the radical intellectuals' reaction to the Vietnam War) resensitized me to the 'movement' for equal rights for all Americans."

munity. Read: mid-career male. You have heard more than you ever wanted to know about the distaff sex and her quest for identity. Until now, yours has been the tidy realm of gentlemen's agreements. You are a rare man indeed if you have even noticed how few women enter your conference rooms, except to take notes or serve coffee.


Bad news! A "movement" is invading the *sanctum sanctorum*. One speaker at a recent Foreign Service

gathering warned that the message of women's rights represents more of a threat to the traditional State Department than does Henry Kissinger. Women of the Foreign Service—whether secretaries, staff personnel, or officers—are making it clear that they will not let what one FSO calls "the last bastion of male elitism" stand unchallenged. The newest and fastest-growing organization in State-USIA-AID is the Women's Action Organization (WAO). More than 800 dues-paying members (ten per cent male) have signed up since its founding in late 1970. Official circulars on "equal opportunity for women" suddenly abound, stateside and in the field. In Bob Dylan's words, "the times, they are a-changin'..."

But—and here's the rub with "the girls"—not enough and not fast enough. For all the well-meant rhetoric and undeniable progress, the role of women in the Foreign Service remains minimal. A case in point: in this ballyhooed era of "Women's Lib," the percentage of female FSOs has actually *decreased*. In 1957, women constituted 8.9 per cent of the FSO corps. By 1972, there were only 152 women among 3086 men. Less than five per cent! Virginia Slims notwithstanding, who has "come a long way, Baby?"

Dreary Status Report

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
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tell many tales. Even so, it is hard to fault the reality projected by the following representative data:

- The 85 female FSIOs at the United States Information Agency represent only 9.3 per cent of the total 912 officers. That's not bad compared to USIA's sister agencies, but not stellar for an organization specializing in areas traditionally open to women. Those few women officers cluster at the low and mid-career levels, while men outnumber them 34 to 0 at FSIO-1, 130 to 2 at FSIO-2, and 276 to 14 at FSIO-3.

- Ditto for FSR and FSS personnel at the Information Agency. Only 59 of the 493 FSRs at USIA are women, with *none* promoted to FSR 1 or 2. Thanks to secretaries, women account for 209 of the 474 FSS slots but they fade out zero women to 37 men and eight women to 95 men at the uppermost FSS 1 and 2 levels, respectively.

- At AID, men account for 100 per cent of the highest-ranking FSS-1s, whereas women form 80 per cent of the lowest FSS-10s. Men

constitute 97 per cent of the FSR 1-3s, 92 per cent of the GS 15-18s, and 98 per cent of the AD 15-18s.

- Though women (mostly secretaries) compose 46.7 per cent of the FSS corps at State, they register only 7.7 per cent of the FSS-1s and 14 per cent of the FSS-2s. They are tired of being used as executive officers, but paid as secretaries.

In short, to quote from an AID status report (Spring, 1972) which could speak for the entire foreign affairs establishment: "Women are woefully under-represented in most of the organizational units, especially at professional levels." Even where opportunities to redress the imbalance have presented themselves, little has happened. Response to President Nixon's directive of April, 1971, calling for more women at senior and mid-career echelons, has been disappointing. Little wonder, some cynics suggest, since the President himself has hardly set a noble model. For example, he has appointed *no* non-career woman ambassador. No

woman has emerged as an area director in the recent reorganization of USIA. Not one woman serves on AID's advisory committees for child care or nutrition—presumably fields in which women might offer special expertise.

With this bleak situation, one might wonder why the women of the foreign affairs agencies have not taken a collective leap into the Potomac. The answer lies apparently in those few but significant changes that have occurred and which are just beginning to make an impact.

Progress to Date

What one WAO activist calls the "spontaneous accretion" of the women's movement in the early 1970s forced the State Department to hold its first open meeting ever on the rights of female employees in the Foreign Service. That session almost two years ago, together with a follow-up meeting on marriage and a diplomatic career, led to revision of the mid-Victorian veto responsible for many female resigna-



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
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




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
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


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tions from the Service. A woman who was once forced to leave the Foreign Service because of marriage can reenter now. Over 55 "working couples" are now on the Foreign Service payroll. The Board of Examiners (BEX) cannot ask a woman candidate whether she isn't really plotting marriage after a short fling abroad at Uncle Sam's expense. Largely because of the well-publicized Alison Palmer case, the *machismo* factor cannot bar women from assignment to any post—at least if it can be proved as such. Mrs. Gladys Rogers (head of the Office of Women's Affairs), together with Mary Olmsted (Deputy Director for Personnel Management and Services), provide official channels for women's views within the State Department. Each agency can claim at least a few high-ranking women and the lists are growing.

Promising as such advances are, Foreign Service women are not ready to rest on their laurels. Behind the banter over "sexist" language in staff meetings lurks the knowledge that women are far from equality of professional opportunity. "What makes me so mad," asserted one young FSO, "is that I don't expect to see it in my lifetime."

Microcosm of America

And she's probably right. Just as the Foreign Service has responded to more general shifts among the American people—trends that have made the Equal Rights Amendment a legislative reality after fifty years in the Congressional hopper—so does the "Fudge Factory" reflect the attitudes of US society. With the three international affairs agencies but a microcosm of a larger phenomenon, how can one blame the Foreign Service *per se*? Indeed; the initial surprise or anger some feel about the lowly status of women in the Service quickly becomes a far deeper sense of frustration. Most of the problem lies elsewhere with its roots resistant to change.

How, for example, can one brand BEX recruiters "male chauvinists?" These dedicated men and women are trying to find new officers, primarily for commercial and administrative positions (given the current glut of political officers). The hunt focuses logically on schools of business administration. To no one's

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surprise, women, unconditioned by American society to become corporate magnates, hardly abound at the Wharton School. Women account for only about 25 per cent of those taking (and passing) the Foreign Service written test. Most men who take the oral exam are over 27 and boast impressive graduate or professional experience. Most female applicants at that stage are under 23 and fresh out of a liberal arts school.

Probing USIA and AID employment statistics reveals the same dilemma. The bulge of men in the higher reaches of the Information Agency's FSR ranks reflects the preponderance of highly skilled technicians there. It is no wonder that Agency recruiters just don't find many female radio engineers or relay station operators. The same predicament affects AID's public health programs. Their doctors are generally men and their nurses, women, because that is how the medical pie is sliced throughout the United States. Until there is an end to what some call the "sexist" upbringing of American children—or the kind of social conditioning which suggests that Susie goes to college to marry a prospective FSO and not to become one—the sex ratio in the Foreign Service can't change much.

Stereotypic Sexism

For the same reason, those stereotypes which color language in State, USIA, or AID—as elsewhere—will not disappear soon. When a senior official requests "a good man" for a post, he means just that. His word-choice betrays—probably unconsciously—the sentiment of the chap in a *NEW YORKER* cartoon who snorted: "When I speak of mankind, one thing I *don't* mean is womankind." The implicit, if unintentional, bias of male hegemony recurs as well in that vital document, the annual efficiency report. What finer tribute can the reporting officer pay the female employee than that "she thinks like a man?" Conversely, write that Joe Smith "thinks like a woman" and you seal his selection out.

Double standards flourish unnoticed or unchallenged. Let a male FSO play the sexual field abroad and he's considered the dashing Don

Juan of the Corps Diplomatique. Let a female officer or secretary do the same and she's a security risk and disgrace to the National Image! Women all too often hear references to their dress or shape rather than the caliber of their work. What man would or should stand for having his policy position ignored while colleagues focus on his suit cut?

Voluntary Rape

The fact that women accept such stereotypes and double standards suggests what may be the main obstacle to sexual equality in the Foreign Service—women themselves. As one FSIO observed, "They conspire in their own rape." All of the women interviewed in the three agencies stressed this phenomenon—and admitted to some complicity themselves. Just as many housewives shun the women's movement, so do women in the Foreign Service. Many don't want to be liberated. Some want their "sisters" to suffer the same rites of passage, arguing, "After all, if I came up the hard way, why shouldn't the next girl?" Others bemoan the paucity of high-ranking women but admit that they wouldn't want to work for one.

Men on Defensive

If some women reject the cause of equal opportunity, it is no wonder that many men do. Like those orthodox rabbis who protest the proposed Equal Rights Amendment as a threat to their tradition, Foreign Service males resist feminist inroads into their bailiwick—and quite naturally so. Their sensitivity is all the more acute now with dwindling employment. Good intentions run amuck on rumors of "reduction in force." The parallels between the public's reaction to minority problems and the Foreign Service's response to women's rights are striking. The old line—it's fine to have open housing for blacks, but not next door—becomes—it's okay for women to have equal access to jobs, but not mine.

Generational differences among men on this question are exaggerated. As one young woman noted, "The hassle isn't just with the Old Boy Club." The JFSOC man gets just as defensive as his elder counterpart when his status is at stake.

Hence, the rumblings of resentment, in part, against promotion for women aggrieved by sexual discrimination who displace men on the lists or against working couples who allegedly monopolize the "good posts."

Solutions—Radical and Reformist

Clearly with such specific grievances and general biases permeating the Service psyche, Heaven won't and can't help the working girl. If not, what's to be done? The options vary in the fight for equal rights for foreign affairs women, with tactical polarization reflecting the wider tug of war between liberals and radicals throughout the United States.

On the one hand, a few women in the Foreign Service believe that no significant change can come from present approaches. This group feels that only top-level directives which require "affirmative action" will budge the apathetic or recalcitrant. Only such action, they point out, is breaking the comparable log-jam of sex discrimination on US campuses. The more radical camp of female activists proposes employment quotas to right past and present wrongs and work stoppages to underscore the need for "Change—Now!"

On the other hand, most Foreign Service women seek to raise consciousness, not barricades. That, for example, is the preference of the Women's Action Organization. Its philosophy is eternal vigilance as the price of progress. Its officers stand alert to make management more responsive to women's plight pointing out inequities or chances to fill an important opening with a *qualified* woman. To that end, they praise Deputy Under Secretary William Macomber, Jr., for his help.

Reformist women look to the young to challenge the role expectations which have so far skewed thinking inside and outside the foreign affairs community. Those with the gift of optimism over the long-run recall that suffragette Susan B. Anthony's dying words were: "Failure is impossible." Whether Gloria Steinem, in fact, expresses an old idea whose time has come remains an open question. The United States is still the land where, according to television commercials, woman's ul-

timate satisfaction comes from hearing her husband croon, "My wife, I think I'll keep her."

Feminism in Foggy Bottom? The point is *not* that one group should gain at the expense of another, that a woman promoted means a man demoted. The burning issue is *not* whether women are called "Ms." That fight has more symbolic than actual importance for women who, like men, want to be known as individuals and not objects on or off the marriage market. Instead, the goal is a Foreign Service that reflects the belief that every American, regardless of sex, has the same chance to enter and rise in that profession. The "movement" is for human rights, not just women's rights—if only because it is not clear that men benefit physically or otherwise from the present situation.

The implications are infinite. For one, women must accept equality of responsibility along with their new opportunity. Just as women will be eligible for the draft if the proposed Equal Rights Amendment is ratified, so must Foreign Service women take dangerous or distasteful assignments. The expedience of the fragile female has been exploited too long by both men and women for their respective ends.

Pursuit of equal employment rights may require that the foreign affairs agencies, acting alone or together with the rest of the US Government, set an example for the rest of American society. Indeed, as one FSO put it, the more basic question at hand is whether the Foreign Service wants to be a static or changing organization (obviously a point relevant across the board in today's troubled Service). The Government has already moved ahead of much of private industry and the academic world in the area of women's rights—but only marginally. There is still much to be done. How better to "tell America's story abroad"—in a way that reflects credit on the integrity of purpose set forth in the Constitution or this year's electioneering—than by showing that women can speak for America, too? Ms. Secretary of State?! Official and popular detractors notwithstanding, why not? We could and have done worse. ■

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AMERICA AND ASIA: THE IMPACT OF NIXON'S

MORTON H. HALPERIN

THE spectacular and unexpected trip by the President of the United States to the People's Republic of China quite naturally has raised questions in American and Asian minds about US motives for the move, its impact on Asian politics, and its significance for the future of Sino-American relations and US relations with other Asian nations. This essay considers each of these questions in turn.

WHY THE NIXON TRIP?

To understand why the United States did not seek to establish relations with Peking at an earlier date and why President Nixon was able to move with relative freedom at home at the time he did, one must look largely to American domestic politics. To understand why the President decided to seek improvement in Sino-American relations, one must look largely to his conception of US national security interests and his view of how the world must look both to American domestic politics and to the President's style.

No foreign policy issue has been more entangled in domestic politics than American relations with China in the postwar period. Prior to the establishment of the People's Republic in 1949, President Harry S. Truman and his Secretary of State,

Dean Acheson, were under intensive pressure from the right wing of the Republican Party and from conservative Democrats to provide further military and economic aid to the Chiang Kai-shek regime. Truman, recognizing that such aid would be ineffective and run the risk of gradually drawing the United States into military involvement in the conflict, refused to accept this advice since he was determined that under no circumstances would American forces be used in China. He paid the price of increasing Republican dissatisfaction, which ultimately ran the risk of threatening bipartisan support for the Marshall Plan and Truman's overall European policy.

As the Nationalists fled from the mainland, Truman was faced with growing pressures, both from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and from the Republican Party, to intervene to defend Taiwan. These pressures, too, Truman resisted. He and his Secretary of State carefully explained that Taiwan had been returned to China, and hence American involvement in the defense of Taiwan would be involvement in the Chinese civil war. When war broke out in Korea, Truman, needing bipartisan support for his East Asian policy as well as the acquiescence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the American military intervention in Korea, felt it necessary to send the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait. It was this action, taken in the opening days of the Korean War, that is likely to have the most

lasting effect on the evolution of Sino-American relations.

Any doubts in the United States about the sending of the Seventh Fleet into the Taiwan Strait were removed with the Chinese intervention in the Korean War. From that time forward, all Americans viewed China with a sense of betrayal. Americans felt a special responsibility for China; Americans had wooed China and supported it but had seen it reject these overtures and send Chinese soldiers to kill American boys on the Korean peninsula.

Thus, from 1950 onward, there was widespread domestic support for the effort to isolate and contain Peking and ultimately to see the regime overthrown and replaced by an anti-Communist government. During the period of McCarthyism that followed, there was a search for the "traitors in the State Department" who had permitted China to "fall" to Communism.

The issue was clearly too hot to touch politically during the 1950s, even had Eisenhower or his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, had any desire to do so. In fact, both had strong personal feelings of animosity toward Communist China and eagerly reinforced the policy of containment and isolation.

President John F. Kennedy and most of his principal foreign policy advisors did not share these views about Peking. They recognized that the People's Republic of China was here to stay and that the United States should move toward some sort of diplomatic contact with the

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CHINA POLICY

Peking regime and stop seeking its isolation from the international community. However, Kennedy quickly recognized the strong domestic pressures against any such move. The China Lobby had maintained its popularity, and Kennedy felt vulnerable to right-wing pressures. These concerns were brought home forcefully during his conversations in the transition period with the outgoing President and Vice President. Both Eisenhower and Richard Nixon informed Kennedy that they would generally support him on foreign policy matters but would be obliged to speak out and attack him, should he make any move toward diplomatic relations or UN membership for Peking. Indeed, reporting this episode in his book, "Six Crises," Nixon takes pride in his success in preventing Kennedy's left-wing advisers from moving him toward contact with the People's Republic:

I then brought up the issue which I told him I had particular strong views—the recognition of Red China and its admission to the UN. . .

In expressing my strong opposition to this policy, I pointed out that . . . what was really at stake was that admitting Red China to the United Nations would be a mockery of the provision of the Charter which limits its membership to "peace-loving" nations and what was disturbing was that it would give respectability to the Communist regime which would immensely increase its power and

prestige in Asia, and probably irreparably weaken the non-Communist governments in that area.

In the Johnson administration, these domestic political concerns were reinforced both by bureaucratic pressures and by the war in Vietnam. The Administration was painting the struggle in Indochina as necessary for the containment of China, and it was difficult to move toward accommodation with Peking. Only if China could be shown to be an expansionist and aggressor nation could the war in Indochina be justified to the American people. Moreover, Johnson tended to defer to Dean Rusk on most foreign policy matters. Rusk, a veteran of the India-Burma theater in World War II and a target for critics of the Korean War during his tenure as Assistant Secretary of State, was unwilling to recommend to Johnson any change in China policy.

Thus, the 1960s came to a close with the United States continuing to maintain its quite extraordinary policy of attempting totally to isolate China and prevent any contact between the two countries. It is true that most travel restrictions had been lifted, but this was largely at the insistence of the Supreme Court, which gradually ruled unconstitutional many United States Government restrictions on the travel rights of American citizens. Trade remained prohibited until the end of the decade. Moreover, the United States was committed to efforts to prevent Peking's entry into the

United Nations or its establishment of diplomatic relations with other nations.

At the same time, fundamental changes were under way in the general public attitude in the United States toward the People's Republic. As a result of the Sino-Soviet split, the disillusionment in the United States with the Vietnam war, and the acceptance of the analysis of China being done by American China specialists, the American people were ready for a new China policy. By the time President Nixon came into office, most Americans were prepared to accept the permanence of the People's Republic as an independent nationalist regime which was not a puppet of the Soviet Union and was indeed hostile to Russian influence. China was viewed not as an aggressive expansionist power but rather as a defensive and weak nation that aspired to be treated as a major world power. The memories of the Korean War had faded in the United States by 1969, and most Americans were prepared to accept the argument that the United States needed to find some way to help bring China into the world community.

Thus, President Nixon came into office at a time when change in American China policy was long overdue and when the domestic political situation made it particularly easy for him to act. There has been some adverse reaction from the right wing of the Republican Party to what he has done, but because it is difficult for anyone to charge that President Nixon is soft on Communism, he was much freer to act than a Democratic President would have been, even in the current changed political climate. Domestic politics, then, provided the setting in which the President could move on China policy if he wanted to do so.

The explanation for his decision to modify US policy toward China, however, lies in his conception of America's role in the world and the nature of diplomacy in the 1970s. Both President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, believe that future peace and stability depend primarily on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. These are the only two

countries with substantial nuclear capabilities and with conventional military power that can be projected throughout the world. They are also the only two countries with the military and economic resources to sustain large-scale conflicts that could threaten world peace. Thus, from the early stages of the administration, the focus has been on a strategy that came to be known as "linkage," namely an effort to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a broad range of international issues—from the Middle East to strategic arms limitation negotiations to Indochina to the security of Central Europe. It is this process of negotiation with the Soviet Union that is to yield the generation of peace that Mr. Nixon has promised the American people and the era of world stability about which Kissinger has written so much. Thus, relations with other nations are to be seen largely as they affect the overall relationship with the Soviet Union and contribute to world stability.

It is in this context of Soviet-American relations that the decision to move toward establishing contact with Peking must be seen. The President seems to feel that agreements with the Soviet Union will be more likely if the Russians fear the consequences of the absence of such agreements. In this connection, while American relations with Peking are not, as the President said, specifically directed at any other nation, they are nevertheless seen by the administration as useful in prodding the Soviet Union into agreements on a broad range of questions. Moreover, only if the United States is prepared to have contact with all the major powers of the world can it be in a position to deal with the Soviet Union across the board and to establish procedures seen as consistent with the American interests and world stability.

Thus, the President's China policy is rooted in his concept of global diplomacy rather than in the so-called Nixon Doctrine. If the trip to China was aimed primarily at the Soviet Union, the Nixon Doctrine was aimed primarily at the American people. The Nixon Doctrine was designed, on the one hand, to convince the American people that the US role in the world would be reduced and, on the other,

to encourage American allies—particularly in East Asia—to take greater responsibility for their own security. While seeking to convince Americans that the US role in the world should be reduced, the Nixon Doctrine also aimed at justifying continued American involvement. Thus, the Doctrine asserts that the United States will continue to meet all of its commitments and to help countries resist Communist aggression. The effort seeks to convince the American public that while the American role is diminishing the United States still needs to maintain a substantial military capability and to concern itself with events in East Asia because of the threat from China and Soviet Union. America's allies, it is hoped, will be persuaded that the United States is more likely to remain involved if they make a greater contribution to their own security. From the perspective of these latter two objectives, President Nixon's trip to Peking and the changed policy toward China are not at all helpful. As will be discussed below, and as must have been clear to the President and his advisors, the dramatic change in China policy serves to disquiet America's allies and to add to the concerns stemming from the Nixon Doctrine. The President's trip makes it harder to sustain domestic support for the degree of involvement in Asia that the President apparently wants to have.

If we now ask why the new policy toward China has unfolded as it has, we need to look toward the President's style in relation to bureaucracy as well as to American domestic politics. Both Nixon and Kissinger have a great distrust of entrenched governmental bureaucracies, particularly the State Department. They believe that career bureaucrats have a limited vision and that they cannot be relied upon faithfully to execute the policies laid out by the President. Moreover, they have learned that bureaucracies tend to leak information to the press. Individuals who are opposed to a policy initiative under consideration are likely to inform the press about it before it has reached the official declaration stage, in the hope that publicity will modify or block the proposal.

In order to avoid these dangers,

when the President is fully committed on an issue, he and Kissinger will work alone to devise a strategy, drawing for expertise and staff work on a few members of Kissinger's entourage. Kissinger will then seek to execute it without informing the State Department. This was the pattern followed when the Soviet Union showed signs of seeking to establish a base in Cuba that could be used to refuel Soviet nuclear submarines. While the rest of the American Government tended to view this move with relative equanimity, Kissinger and the President decided that it was a serious threat to American security. Kissinger was dispatched to talk with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, then visiting the United States, and negotiated an arrangement under which the American Government claims that the Russians agreed not to establish such a submarine base. The pattern reappeared in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). When the talks appeared to be bogged down, Kissinger apparently carried out private negotiations and the result was the President's dramatic announcement on television that an agreement had been reached with the top Soviet leaders that both governments would concentrate on negotiating an ABM limitation while at the same time limiting certain strategic offensive forces.

It is not surprising that, in the delicate negotiations for the Presidential trip to Peking, Nixon and Kissinger moved with their usual secrecy and without consultation with the bureaucracy. They must have feared that a leak to the American Press might have led to a denunciation by right-wing groups before the Administration was ready to announce its dramatic move. They also must have been concerned that the State Department would insist upon consultation with American allies, thereby delaying and perhaps forcing the cancellation of the proposed trip. Until it was certain that the President's trip could be arranged, there must have seemed little purpose in risking adverse publicity, particularly given the President's disdain for the advice and effectiveness of his foreign policy advisors in the bureaucracy.

Moreover, secrecy allowed the

President to make another of what is now becoming a tradition of surprise Presidential television announcements. In domestic political terms, the process is very effective. The mystery surrounding the announcement of his appearance increases public interest, and the President has a large and curious audience. The statement that he was going to China and that Henry Kissinger had just returned was an event of major domestic political importance, and the trip may have valuable political benefits unless it becomes clear that it has failed to produce long-run benefits. If domestic politics and the President's style provide an explanation for the secret manner in which the arrangements for the trip were made, it is nevertheless true that they added to the cost of the proposed move in terms of America's relations with its Asian allies.

EFFECT ON ASIAN POLITICS

The immediate effects of the announcement of the President's trip to Peking cannot be divorced from the fact that it occurred without prior consultation. Since the President was not prepared to tell his own Vice President or Secretary of Defense what he planned to do, he could not very well consult with leaders of foreign governments. This secrecy was bought at a high price.

The greatest problems created by the President's trip were in Japan. In order to understand the problem, it is necessary to consider briefly the state of American-Japanese relations and the role of the China issue in Japanese domestic politics.

Relations with China had been a critical aspect of US relations with Japan since the early 1950s when Secretary of State Dulles told Prime Minister Yoshido that the United States Senate would not ratify the treaty ending the American Occupation of Japan unless the Japanese Government agreed in advance that Japan would deal with Nationalist China rather than with Communist China. Yielding to this pressure, Yoshido sent a letter to Dulles indicating that if the Senate ratified the treaty, Japan would open negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek leading toward a peace treaty. The Japanese kept their word and signed a treaty of peace with the Nationalists

rather than with the Peking government. Thus forced to bind themselves to the Nationalists, the Japanese feared that they would wake up one morning to find that the United States had changed its policy toward Peking, leaving the Japanese out on a limb.

The concern of successive Japanese governments about this issue was compounded by the fact that China has been and remains an important issue in Japanese domestic politics. All the opposition political parties and major newspapers, as well as important elements within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, have been pressing for some time for a normalization of relations with Peking. They have charged that the Japanese Government has not moved on this question out of undue deference to the United States. In fact, the Sato government's reluctance to establish formal diplomatic relations with the People's Republic is based as much on Japan's relations with Taiwan as on an unwillingness to break ranks with the United States. Nevertheless, the Japanese have always recognized that they would have to move if the United States did and they have always desired to move first.

Recognizing the importance of the China issue to the Sato government, the United States had begun consultations with Japan on the specific issue of the China seat in the United Nations. These negotiations had been going on for some time when the Kissinger trip and the planned Presidential visit to the Chinese mainland were suddenly announced. The negotiations involved what had been described in the Japanese press as "intimate and frank" discussions. Japanese leaders were confident that they knew the precise thinking of the Nixon administration on China and that the two governments were determined to work out a common policy. This sense of cooperation is the key to Prime Minister Sato's consternation upon learning only minutes before the President's announcement that, unknown to him and the American officials with whom the Japanese Government was consulting, the United States had been working out plans for Henry Kissinger to go to China and to arrange for a Pres-

idential visit. The "frank" consultations Sato thought he was having with the United States were exposed as a sham.

Beyond this, however, many Japanese feel that the President's move confirmed their worst nightmare—that of an accommodation between Washington and Peking at the expense of Tokyo. Although it is unlikely that any such deal would be made, the concern persists.

Concern in Tokyo was reinforced a month later when the United States administered what became known as the "second shock," namely the unilateral American decision to impose a 10 per cent excise tax on imports and to suspend trading in gold. This step was soon followed by a US ultimatum on the question of an import quota on Japanese textiles by the American insistence that Japan cosponsor the important question resolution designed to preserve Taiwan's seat in the UN General Assembly.

Although the Japanese Government has accommodated itself, to these American initiatives, they have raised doubts in Japan as to whether the United States is in fact prepared to treat Japan as a major ally and a full partner in East Asia.

In other countries as well, the impact of the announcement of the Nixon trip, followed by American economic moves, has increased concern about the future of American policy. In Australia, concerns were highlighted by the fact that China had become a domestic political issue. The opposition parties had been pressing the Australian Government to move toward recognition of Peking and seized upon the American move as evidence that the United States was moving in that direction and leaving Australia behind.

In countries such as Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand, the way the visit to Peking was handled underscored the fears of leaders who had been concerned about the meaning of the Nixon Doctrine. Particularly because they were not informed in advance nor told afterward what had been discussed between Kissinger and Chinese Premier Chou En-lai, leaders of these governments could not but fear that some secret understanding had been reached with China at their expense

or would be reached during the President's visit. In Thailand and Korea, the concern was particularly great. The Thai, who had been reassessing their policy because of the Nixon Doctrine and the American disengagement from Indochina, became increasingly worried that the United States might be preparing for a total withdrawal from the Asian mainland. The Koreans feared that Sino-American negotiations would focus on the Korean problem as one concrete issue that had traditionally involved the two powers and that they might feel was ripe for settlement.

THE FUTURE OF ASIAN POLITICS

It is easier to specify what the reopening of American contact with Peking cannot do and the dangers it holds for Asian politics than it is to specify the likely benefits.

Despite some wishful thinking in the United States, the President's trip to Peking is unlikely to have any appreciable effect on the Indochina war. Peking is very unlikely to be willing to persuade Hanoi to compromise on its terms for a settlement. Chinese public statements have made it clear that they will not put pressure on Hanoi, and Chinese leaders have almost certainly told American officials the same thing in private. Even if the Chinese were tempted to bring pressure on the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the risks in such a move are considerable. It is one thing for the Chinese to be seen dealing with American imperialists and quite another for them to compromise their ideological position by seeming to throw away the interests of a key ally. Abandoning Hanoi would be tantamount to handing over Communist leadership in Southeast Asia to the Soviet Union. This Peking is not likely to be prepared to do. Moreover, even if the Chinese were to reduce or cut off aid to Hanoi in an effort to force it into a political settlement, the Soviet Union would be likely to fill the breach and enable Hanoi to carry on.

The publicity attending the President's trip has reduced some of the domestic pressure in the United States for a total American withdrawal from Vietnam. However, if it becomes clear that the President's trip has not advanced an Indochina

settlement, this pressure will again increase.

The renewed contacts between Washington and Peking are no more likely to bring a settlement in Korea than in Indochina. Despite the concern of Seoul (and one may suppose Pyongyang) about these contacts, neither Peking nor Washington has the leverage on its ally to bring about a settlement between the two Koreas. Moscow remains the principal supplier of the North Korean regime. Moreover, it is unlikely that either Pyongyang or Seoul can be coerced into accepting the 38th parallel as a permanent political boundary and renouncing the use of force against its rival. A settlement of the Korean problem will have to await changes in Korean politics, whereby each government gradually accepts the other's legitimacy. Until that occurs, no deal by the superpowers can have an appreciable effect on the Korean situation.

Despite the hopes of the administration, the move toward China is not likely to have any major impact on Soviet-American relations. As the Russians have shown in dealing with the Indo-Pakistani war, they will continue to pursue what they view as their own interests in various parts of the world, even if this raises doubts in Washington about whether or not the Soviet Union is genuinely interested in a big power détente. The two superpowers reached an agreement on Berlin in 1971 because both had a sufficient stake in reducing tensions there and not because the Soviet Union was concerned about the American *rapprochement* with China or because it wished to demonstrate its interests in peaceful relations with the United States. Agreement on SALT or in the Middle East will likewise be determined by the specific issues and pressures involved and not by Soviet fear of a Sino-American *rapprochement*.

When the President announced that Henry Kissinger had been to Peking and that he would follow, many observers assumed that some understanding on the Taiwan question must have been reached. In particular they assumed that Kissinger and the Chinese leaders had reached an understanding about Chinese admission to the United

Nations. It soon became apparent that this was not the case when the United States went down to defeat in its efforts to maintain a seat for Taiwan in the General Assembly. There appears to be no more truth in the supposition that some understanding had been reached on the issue of Taiwan. American officials have made it clear that the United States intends to maintain its treaty commitments to the defense of Taiwan, and China has stated unequivocally that the issue is an internal affair of the Chinese people. It is doubtful that Peking and Washington will reach any agreement on this issue in the near future. Unless they do so, it will not be possible for them to establish formal diplomatic relations, although some lesser form of regular diplomatic contact is likely, including possibly a permanent American diplomatic presence of some kind in Peking.

Despite the seeming rigidity of both sides on the question of Taiwan, it appears that a solution might be reached if the United States took a more flexible position on the issue along the lines laid out in a recent book by Richard Moorsteen and Morton Abramowitz, "Remaking China Policy: US-China Relations and Governmental Decision-Making." They propose that the United States adopt a "one China but not now" policy, "under which the United States would declare that, in its view, Taiwan is a part of China and should come under the control of the mainland. The United States would assert, however, that such a change in the *de facto* status of Taiwan should not occur by force but rather should be negotiated peacefully by the officials on Taiwan and the Chinese Government. The United States would continue to maintain its treaty commitment to Taiwan until this settlement came about but would not attempt to interfere with Peking's efforts to regain control by peaceful means."

In order to reach an understanding with Peking along these lines, the United States would almost certainly have to agree to withdraw all of its military units from Taiwan. This the United States should be prepared to do. Until the Vietnam war intensified, the United States maintained only a very small mili-

(Continued on page 29)

RANK INJUSTICE

IN 1970 the Department of State established 13 task forces to examine the organization and operations of the Department and the Foreign Service. The reports of the task forces were made public in the Department's publication "Diplomacy for the 70's," released in December 1970. The opening summary portion of that monumental work noted that

Although only one of the 13 task forces had specific responsibility for examining Foreign Service promotion policies, five task forces recommended adopting a semiautomatic promotion system in the middle grades. . .

This remarkable convergence of informed opinion on the topic indicates that the case for semiautomatic promotion of middle-grade officers is a compelling one indeed. But the case has not proved compelling to the Department officials responsible for implementing the recommendations. They evidently have not even felt compelled to explain their unwillingness or inability to institute a semiautomatic promotion system; in all the reams of "Management Reform Bulletins" reporting on the implementation of the task forces' recommendations, not one word has been said to date on this topic.

To my knowledge the Department's only public statement bearing upon this key recommendation of the task forces is to be found in a release by the Director General of the Foreign Service dated April 1971, in which he noted some of the

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The case for semiautomatic promotion of middle grade officers

E. M. COHEN

dissatisfactions with the traditional promotion system but reported that

While these views are widely held, there is also, however, broad resistance to any proposal which would eliminate competition for promotion opportunities on the scale proposed by Task Force II.

What Task Force II had proposed was this:

From the FSO-6 to the FSO-3 level, we strongly favor a system of phased or "semiautomatic" promotions. In other words, from the FSO-6 level officers would move up by seniority as vacancies occur for officers in a particular cone at the next higher rank. Officers who are particularly outstanding would be eligible for faster promotion than the rest of the class, while those who are weak would be considered for possible delay in promotion or selection out.

A proposed mechanism for operating such a system, with safeguards for the rated officers and the rating officers, was presented in the report of this Task Force's Working Group on Promotion Policies. Space limitations preclude republication of that report here, but the interested reader can find the full text on pages 80-84 of "Diplomacy for the 70's." Also to be found in that report is a very brief and unfortunately superficial statement of a few of the reasons for the recommendation. I believe that the case for semiautomatic promotion of middle-grade officers deserves a fuller exposition, which I will undertake in the remainder of this article. I also believe that it deserves a better fate

than to be swept under the rug on the seventh floor. If there is a case against a semiautomatic promotion system, I hope this article will elicit it, so that all junior and mid-career officers would be reassured that the traditional promotion system as it now operates is the best possible.

The Unrankable Rank-and-File

I begin with the observation that each of the middle grades of Foreign Service officers at any given time consists of: (1) a handful of "hot-shots" whose performance clearly puts them heads-and-shoulders above the others in that grade; (2) a handful or two of "dead-beats" whose performance leaves much to be desired; and (3) the other officers, comprising perhaps 90 percent or more of the total number in that grade—let us call these others the "Main Group." The case for semiautomatic promotions is based on the contention that within each middle grade there is no significant difference between the "best" and the "worst" officers in the Main Group in their respective degree of *meritoriousness for promotion*.

This is not to say that all these officers have the same degree of skills or desirable personal characteristics. Even within a particular cone there may of course be considerable differences as regards these attributes. In the 0-4 economic cone, for example, one officer may be superb in analyzing complex statistical data but undistinguished in drafting reports and weak in supervising his underlings (if any), while another may be weaker in his analytical powers but more proficient in drafting and supervising, and oth-

ers may have completely different mixes of strengths and weaknesses in these and other requisite attributes. The point I stress is that when each of these officers' respective strengths and weaknesses are weighed up—by any reasonable procedure for quantifying these unquantifiable attributes—there is invariably a very even balance between any two officers in the Main Group of any middle grade in any cone. (I happen to believe that the cone system itself is highly iniquitous; but the case against the cone system is quite independent of the case for a semiautomatic promotion system, and I therefore am expounding only the latter in this article.)

It is not surprising that FSOs within each such group are so closely comparable in what might be termed their net worth to the Service. Most officers will have gone through an intensive written and oral examination procedure for entry into the Foreign Service, and then through an on-the-job probationary period lasting several years, and then through a selective "threshold" scrutinization, before being permitted to enter into the middle grades. Or they will have gone through a lateral entry process designed to assure that they meet the high criteria for their compeers. By the time they have come through either fine-screening process they constitute—let us dispense with obfuscatory modesty—an elite. Some may be more elite than others, but not in all respects, and rarely to any appreciable extent.

If this is so, then our traditional system of evaluating mid-career officers for promotion is fundamentally inappropriate.

The system works reasonably well in spotting the "hot-shots" (those gifted few who are indeed appreciably more elite in some key respects than their compeers) and the "dead-beats" (those who have run out of steam or have proved themselves incapable of taking on higher-level responsibilities) — but then, almost any kind of system involving so much time, effort and expense would accomplish those relatively easy tasks. The system works much less well in determining which particular officers among the remaining 90 percent or more in a particular grade (the Main Group) within a particular cone should be

promoted in a particular year. It works less well in this important respect for the simple reason that it obliges the promotion panels to base their recommendations on something that does not exist—namely, on *significant* differences between the officers in the Main Group with regard to their meritoriousness for promotion.

Having identified and rank-ordered the hot-shots and the dead-beats, the panels must also rank-order the vast, qualitatively homogeneous Main Group. It is like trying to concoct a *pousse-café* with liqueurs of approximately equal specific gravity. This ranking of the unrankable rank-and-file invariably leads to rank injustices. The panelists, in their quest to find significant differences between those officers, often attach significance to factors that do not warrant significance—or even to factors that they have been instructed by the precepts to ignore.

Moreover, the panelists must base their rankings not so much on the differences between the *officers* as on the differences between the *evaluation reports* which the respective supervisors have written about the officers. *Ceteris paribus*, the officer lucky enough to have a supervisor who is proficient in the art of efficiency-reportsmanship inevitably is ranked higher than the officer whose supervisor reports the truth straightforwardly. Almost as lucky as the former is the officer whose supervisor lacks the courage or diligence to "tell it like it is" about him, and so depicts the officer as the Messiah when in fact the officer is just another angel. (Even Messiahs have been finding it tough to get promoted in recent years, however; most of the recent promotees have been depicted as God.) At the other frequent extreme, unlucky indeed is the officer who is depicted as a devil merely because of a personality clash with his supervisor.

In short, the traditional system seeks to rank unrankable officers by relying on unreliable reports to quantify unquantifiable attributes. Its results, seemingly based on rational criteria, are actually highly arbitrary. It is patently preposterous to assert that *this* officer in the Main Group ranks 11th, for example, while *that* one ranks 12th and *that* one 21st, and so on. The ranking is

laden with, to use statisticians' jargon, "spurious accuracy." The differences between the rankings have no real meaning—except insofar as they make or break the ranked officers.

New Conditions are Intensifying the Old Iniquities

The rank injustices of this system were somewhat tolerable in those years long past when the number of FSOs was steadily increasing and the number of officers promoted each year was relatively large. The upward flow through the middle ranks was relatively rapid, and an officer who undeservedly was snagged along the way could reasonably expect that he would soon be able to swim or drift back into the upsurging mainstream, and perhaps even catch up with his compeers who, by chance or by navigational skills, had eluded the snags.

In recent years, however, as the officer corps has been diminished or become stationary in size, and the number of annual promotions has been severely reduced and divided into narrow channels ("cones"), the upward flow has become a trickle; an officer who undeservedly becomes snagged along the way finds it exceedingly difficult to get back in the swim, because the trickle provides no propelling force and the narrow channels are clogged with the bodies of all the others who have been snagged. The iniquities in the traditional promotion system no longer tend to wash out as years go by; they tend rather to wash up their victims.

The grievance procedures which are currently being developed cannot rectify the grievances that arise from the inherent general defect of the traditional promotion system, i.e., from the system's inherently arbitrary ranking of unrankable officers. The most widespread and demoralizing grievance in the Foreign Service today is the grievance of those middle-grade officers who have worked as hard and as well as any of their compeers in the Main Group, and whose personnel files are filled with glowing evaluation reports from their supervisors and inspectors, but who nevertheless have not been promoted after a longer-than-average stay in grade.

Ironically, precisely because we now have improved grievance

procedures, it has become advantageous for such an officer to receive a blatantly unfair evaluation report from his supervisor. In that event the officer can file a grievance claim and perhaps be compensated for it by a promotion. But if instead he receives from his supervisor just another superlative evaluation report, his chances for promotion are much slimmer.

Ironically, too, the newly liberalized provisions for selection-out on account of time-in-grade tend to work against the victims of the system's rank injustices. Formerly, an officer who was nearing the end of the time-in-grade limit tended to receive special attention from the promotion panels, which frequently (and contrary to the precepts) granted "tombstone" promotions in such cases. Now, such an officer in the middle grades would have to stay in grade for nigh on to 15 years, or stay within the three middle grades almost 20 years, to get this lunatic fringe benefit.

The Better Way

A semiautomatic promotion system for middle-grade officers offers a way out of these rank injustices and cruel ironies. Like the traditional system, it would permit hot-shots to move ahead as rapidly as their performances warrant. It also would continue to hold back or get rid of dead-beats. But it would rank the remaining officers in each cone on the basis of the only meaningful (and, fortunately, quantifiable) difference between them—the difference in their length of service in grade.

Curiously, the traditional system virtually ignores that difference. The precepts for the 1971 Mid-Career FSO Selection Boards stated: "Time-in-class should be considered a relatively unimportant factor." Thus, under the traditional system an officer who has been in grade 1½ years and has received during that period two *extremely* impressive evaluation reports is ranked higher than an officer who has been in grade more than six years and has received seven *very* impressive evaluation reports. But do two "extremelys" really outweigh seven "verys?" Does experience really not count? Should an officer who has shown great promise during his initial years in grade real-

ly be boosted over an officer who has already proved himself to be a dependable high-level performer year after year *after year after year after year after year*?

A semiautomatic promotion system would buttress, rather than contravene, the principle of promotion by merit. If the entry-probation-threshold screening process is working at all, then it is working to produce a class of 0-5 officers who are very closely comparable in their individual sum totals of meritoriousness. Within the Main Group of each cone in grade 5 the most meritorious officers are those whose merits have been seasoned the longest. This is true not only because a good officer tends, like a good wine, to improve with age (provided that neither is kept bottled up for too long!); it is true also because, to coin a phrase, there is no substitute for experience.

Indeed, logic and ethics both dictate that time-in-grade must be considered the primary important factor in any system of promotion by merit; because the only practical and fair procedure for determining which officers are the most meritorious is to (a) begin with the working hypothesis that those who have had the most experience, i.e., the most time-in-grade, are the most meritorious, and then (b) in reviewing the record of each officer, search for evidence that he deserves a higher or lower ranking than the ranking indicated solely by his time-in-grade—and rank him higher or lower only if the actual evidence clearly and reliably warrants such a departure from the working hypothesis. I am contending in this article that the evidence never can be so clear and so reliable as to warrant such departures in the rankings of officers in the Main Groups. But even were that contention incorrect, the procedure outlined in (a) and (b) above is logically and ethically unassailable; accordingly, even under the traditional promotion system, the factor of time-in-grade must at the very least be given some considerable weight, and must not be deemed by the precepts to the promotion panels as "relatively unimportant."

It might be thought that a semiautomatic promotion system would semiautomatically lessen the incentives for officers to strive to

perform well. I believe that the built-in safeguards against such a tendency would be more than adequate: The entry-probation-threshold process already is such as to allow only highly-motivated officers to come into the middle grades. The force that impels them to work hard and well is not external to themselves—is not a "carrot" dangled before them or a "stick" prodding them from behind—but rather is an internal drive. Their motivation to work well and to impress their colleagues would not be lessened by the knowledge that they will be promoted in due course. On the contrary, their motivation will be lessened only if they come to believe that no matter how hard and how well they perform they may not be promoted in due course—and *that* is what many officers *are* coming to believe under the *traditional* promotion system.

Under a semiautomatic promotion system, even more than under the traditional system, the prospect of being designated a "hot-shot" would by itself provide ample incentive for officers to strive to do their best in carrying out their duties. Under the traditional system, an officer who moves exceptionally rapidly up the ladder is often viewed—and perhaps with justification—not as being exceptionally competent but rather as being exceptionally lucky; his rapid advancement may signify nothing more than that he had an excellent assignment in an important post or office, that he was in the right place at the right time, or that he had a supervisor or two who really knew how to work an evaluation report. Under a semiautomatic promotion system, the procedure for designating an officer as a "hot-shot" would be beefed up (see the proposed mechanism in the above-cited report of Task Force II's Working Group), so that only those officers who have clearly evinced extraordinary competence would be promoted relatively rapidly. As it would become more of a bona fide honor to be promoted rapidly, officers would not strive less intensively to be designated as hot-shots.

In short, I see no justification for the view that middle-grade officers would lapse into lassitude under a semiautomatic promotion system.

(Continued on page 27)

DO CONSULATES HAVE A FUTURE?

JAMES N. CORTADA

WHEN I retired from the Foreign Service at the end of 1970 after serving three and a half years as Consul General at Barcelona, my third consular assignment over a 28 year period, I felt strongly inclined to write an article raising questions about the future, if any, of consulates and consular specialization. By coincidence my first consular assignment had been in Barcelona from June 1949 to December 1951. I was thus in a position to contrast the functioning of that post during two different periods. I had also served as Consul in Basra, Iraq, from 1953 to 1955 and had a clear concept of the operation of a small

Jim Cortada who retired from the Foreign Service about 18 months ago is now a practicing journalist with a foreign affairs column published thrice weekly in a central Virginia newspaper and others associated with it. Throughout a long and fruitful Foreign Service career he served in the Caribbean, Middle East and Spain, including three Embassy and three Consular posts. He is also connected since retirement with numerous civic organizations as a director or officer.

post in an area off the beaten track. But I was reluctant to attempt the writing task so soon after my departure from the Service for fear that unnecessary minutiae might overwhelm the product. However, after 18 very active months of deep involvement in local political and civic organization affairs coupled with research in connection with the preparation of a book concerned with a historical topic, I feel sufficiently removed from the Foreign Service scene to try my hand in reflecting a few thoughts on the subject. Despite laudable efforts by the Department in recent years to strengthen the consular career track, consular officers and consulates still have a long way to go both in career and functional terms.

Questions related to the selection, training and assignment of consular officers at the various levels and to the role of consulates relative to Embassies and the Department have long been vexing ones, difficult of resolution and rooted in the consequences of the Rogers Act of

May 24, 1924. As will be recalled the Act provided for the amalgamation of the diplomatic and consular services into a single career Foreign Service. Supporters of the Act hoped that a strong corps of professional foreign affairs specialists would emerge, exempt from the vicissitudes of political payoffs. In the latter respect Consul and Consul General assignments had particularly been the prey of political opportunism and one objective of the Act was to correct this practice. Furthermore, historical records show a certain amount of jealousy on the part of consular officers with respect to their colleagues in the diplomatic branch. Questions of diplomatic immunity, import duty exemptions and status were frequently at the root of friction but there was rarely any misunderstanding with regard to consular career administration, such as it was, the functioning and purposes of consulates and the relationship of consular establishments to Legations and Embassies.

Until close to the outbreak of World War II, practically all career officers were initially assigned either to a consular post or the consular section of a diplomatic mission. Thus, all officers of that period acquired a basic understanding of, and respect for, consular responsibilities. Not all of these officers liked the work but they were aware of its importance and knew what was required of consular specialists. In the immediate post World War II years the practice continued to be followed for a brief period but was gradually abandoned. Expanded Embassies and increased demands for officers in other specializations, coupled with a reduction in the number of consular establishments, have resulted over the years in a professional foreign affairs cadre which has had very limited experience with consular affairs, and which, with few exceptions in my judgment, does not know the complexities of consular work and more importantly also does not know nor care about the role of consulates.

A casualty of the Rogers Act quite logically was the position of Director of the Consular Service whose responsibilities were absorbed by various units in the newly created Foreign Service structure of 1924. Despite the fact that there has always been an Office or Bureau in the Department charged with consular responsibilities in the strict sense of the term, it has neither been able nor willing to match the influence of the political and administrative divisions of the Department in matters pertaining to senior consular assignments and the full gamut of consular post operations. Consequently, since the elimination of the Director's position the consular personnel aspect and the functional phase in its traditional interpretation have lacked a high level "friend" at court to look after these interests.

Before going to Barcelona I was Dean of the School of Professional Studies in the Foreign Service Institute and from time to time would discuss with junior and mid-career officers their views on how they felt about a career in consular work. Some of their observations can be summarized as follows:

sections of medium to large embassies tend to be of the same rank. The chief of the consular section is usually lower ranking.

- The heads of the three sections mentioned above are generally close to the Ambassador in the development of important Embassy foreign policy positions. The chief of the consular section may learn about these at a general staff meeting or, if the matter is on the sensitive side, not at all.
- Ambassadors tend to take a special interest in the officers supervising the political, economic and administrative sections at efficiency report time but the head of the consular section appears invariably to be at the mercy of the Deputy Chief of Mission.
- Even though the chief consular officer frequently is fluent in the language of the country and because of his or her job has relatively massive contacts with nationals of the host country, thus acquiring insights of an important anthropological nature, he or she is rarely consulted regarding the Embassy's public relations activities.
- Top Consul General assignments rarely seem to go to officers with solid consular backgrounds. The plums appear to be given to officers with political, economic or administrative specializations and no consular experience.
- Few Ambassadorships are bestowed on Consuls General.
- Consulates General such as those at Rotterdam, Barcelona, Guadalajara which appear to offer as much challenge for their principal officers as do some thirty or forty "mini" embassies around the globe do not appear to be qualifying posts with respect to career minister promotion.
- Within the geographic bureaus only the country directors and departmental administrative officers take an interest in consular post matters. Assistant Secretaries and their Deputy Assistant Secretaries have not the slightest interest in their

affairs *per se*. Only if some special problems arise will they become aware of the existence of consulates.

The above are merely the more important observations which I recollect. Whether they are true or not I wager that the officers who held these views in 1966 and 1967 when I looked into the matter still believe them. I would not be surprised if the junior and mid-career officers of today held the same beliefs. In any event I suggest that the situations mentioned and the extent of current attitudes warrant analysis. From my recent experience in Barcelona I would say that most of the observations are valid and from conversations with other officers assigned to Europe while I was in Spain, the patterns would appear to hold. I do not know what the circumstances in other parts of the world are like with regard to our missions and consulates, but I suspect that with the exception of special purpose posts they may not be too different from the one prevailing in Europe.

A myth widely believed throughout the Foreign Service by officers of all classes who have not served in consulates in recent years is that the larger establishments perform functions normally ascribed to Embassies (political, economic, information, et cetera) in addition to the traditional consular work. In Barcelona, a post as important as any I can think of in Europe as far as consulates are concerned (United States naval visits in the district alone totalled about 90 in 1970), the position of political officer was abolished on the Embassy's recommendation! Furthermore, the post was instructed by the Embassy to stay out of economic analysis and add only a paragraph or two to the Embassy's periodic economic assessments. Since the number of American businessmen calling at the Consulate General was quite limited, I, therefore, had doubts about our justifications for an economic officer position even though he also took care of commercial matters. At both the Embassy's and Department's direction our main concerns were American tourists and their problems, a function which could very well be dealt with in part by the efficient and numerous travel agencies in

- The heads of the political, economic and administrative

Barcelona and by the Embassy in Madrid with respect to instances of imprisonment. Our other important work was related to public relations and in this respect we worked closely with the United States Information Service unit in the Embassy. I understand from other colleagues that their experiences with regard to our Embassies in other countries were not too different from mine in terms of reduced consulate responsibility.

In looking back over the years I spent in Barcelona I realize that our difficulty in persuading the Embassy to cut us in with regard to its really interesting business stemmed partly from the Embassy's senior officers' inability to figure out how to do so. Instinctively most of the Embassy's officers considered the Consulate General in Barcelona as an extension of its consular section and we were treated accordingly insofar as political and economic activities were concerned. At least that is how matters seemed to me. In fact on one occasion a mid-career officer in Madrid while on weekend duty called me at my residence in connection with a minor matter involving protection. Although this officer had never been in Barcelona and to my knowledge had never served as a consular officer, he proceeded to instruct me on how to resolve the case which had local characteristics. When I explained that we had to deal with the matter in a certain fashion in view of the circumstances, the officer abruptly stated that the Consulate General was really part of the Embassy's consular establishment and we should take his orders. He was very much taken aback when I explained that as Consul General I was subject only to the Ambassador's orders and by his specific instruction to the Deputy Chief of Mission. Interestingly, I found that Ambassador Hill, although a political appointee, and the administrative officers had a much clearer concept of the possible role of the Consulate General than most of the other Embassy officers with the further exceptions of the Naval Attaché and the United States Information Service officers. As far as the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs and his Deputies were concerned, their only interest in the Consulate General was that

we make every conceivable effort to make certain that no American traveler complained to a Congressman about a real or imagined negligence by the Consulate. As a result of this extreme worry at the top levels of the European Bureau the Embassy's instructions to us with regard to some protection cases verged on the absurd.

During my assignment to Barcelona the Department embarked on a fairly drastic reduction-in-force program. Before the pressure was off we were about 25 per cent below the total personnel complement authorized at the time of my arrival. Oddly enough we totalled the same number of American and local employees as we had on December 31, 1951! In 1951 there were only a handful of Americans in the district,

"Little is to be gained by prolonged stay in the classroom before exposure to consular realities in the field."

few tourists, one United States naval visit and very few American commercial enterprises. But our political and economic sections functioned very much as they did in an Embassy in those days long gone by and our overall activities were well coordinated with those of the Embassy. A result of the personnel reduction was to heighten the need of achieving a clear understanding with the Embassy and the Department regarding our post's priorities. This objective was eventually met through an exchange of correspondence. Other consulates in Europe solved the problem in a less formal manner but still at the expense of traditional functions.

Unquestionably, the advance in communications technology, massive tourist travel, the tremendous development abroad of American controlled or directed enterprises, the fact of nuclear weapons and the fast changing relationships between nations have altered the very essence of traditional diplomatic practice. Consular life as part of diplomacy has naturally been affected. A Consulate General in Europe in 1972 cannot be expected to function

as it did in 1949. In the United States some thirty to forty governmental agencies, without counting the National Security Council assistants, participate in an ever increasingly complex policy process. Under these circumstances no President or Congress is going to grant the Department of State a monopoly over the management of our foreign affairs, assuming they ever could be managed, a most doubtful assumption. The position of the Secretary of State in this jungle of policy participants will nevertheless remain as that of first among peers by virtue of the seniority of the Secretary among the cabinet officers. But while the Department will always have to share the policy making function, implementation responsibility will in the main reside in the Department and the overseas missions because of the professional competence of the Foreign Service. I suggest that Consulates are as essential as Embassies in this implementation role.

Departmental and Embassy officers over the years have frequently expressed the view that practically all governments have become so centralized that the vital business of diplomacy can be dispatched only in the capitals. Consular staffs are regarded as being stationed in posts outside the main stream of policy-making and therefore their function in this regard is to report from time to time some interesting tidbits of political or economic developments, assist modestly in informational and cultural affairs and on the whole stick to traditional consular work. Without setting up a strawman I would argue that this description is inadequate. Embassy officers by virtue of their specialized functions deal mainly with like specialists in government, other Embassies and to a limited extent business management. Consular officers function in a precisely opposite fashion. They come into contact with a broad gamut of the area in which they live, come closer to the grassroots of the host country and reflect therefore a feeling for developments in a manner difficult, if not impossible, for their Embassy colleagues. Likewise, officers in the consular section of a medium or large Embassy come across segments of population not

easily accessible to other Embassy officers.

The formula must be found through which Embassies and Consulates can function effectively in a carefully meshed fashion appropriately supported by the Department. In this process care should be taken to make consular careers attractive and promising as one route to the top. If a solution cannot be found then perhaps Consulates as posts should go the way of the dinosaur and leave to today's highly effective travel agencies the task of looking after travelers' mundane wants. With the prize of an important consul generalship thus becoming impossible as a goal, consideration might be given to blending the administrative and consular functions in Embassies into one and eliminating consular work as a specialization. But I would maintain that it would be a colossal mistake to follow this route. It would not be in the interest of the nation to do so, as it is not in its interest to continue to deal with Consulates and the consular specialization in the present fashion.

As one now on the outside looking in, it is difficult to propose in the necessary detail a plan attempting to solve the weaknesses I have mentioned. However, there are several suggestions which I can make. Some of these relate to the matter of career prospects and others to the problem of Embassy-Consulate relationships.

Taking into account the views of some junior and mid-career officers expressed or described earlier in this paper, I propose the following:

- (1) The chief consular officer in an Embassy should be of the same rank as the other heads of section.
- (2) Consuls in charge of their sections in an Embassy should participate fully in all Embassy political and economic policy discussions and planning.
- (3) Any post designated as a Consulate General should automatically qualify the incumbent Consul General as eligible for promotion to career minister rank.
- (4) No officer should be assigned as a Consul General unless he or she has served

in at least two consular assignments.

- (5) Efficiency reports of Consuls General should be prepared by the Chief of Mission.

The lacuna left through the elimination in 1924 of the position of the Director General of the Consular Service should be remedied by the creation of a second Deputy Director General of the Foreign Service whose tasks would be supervision of consular assignments, and the development of rational relationships between Embassies and Consulates and the latter with the Department. Without protection at this level it is practically hopeless to talk seriously about consular specialization as a career track equal to the other principal Foreign Service fields. The incumbent of the new position would have to examine carefully with each Bureau the functioning of each Consulate relative to the supervisory Embassy and the Department. In this respect he would work closely with the Foreign Service Inspectors.

With regard to training programs for consular specialization, emphasis at the beginning should be related to on-the-job training. Little is to be gained by prolonged stay in the classroom before exposure to consular realities in the field. However, at mid-career level several weeks of study in depth of consular case studies combined with some training in public psychology (since consular activities are highly service oriented) and management seminars would probably be very helpful. Otherwise over a normal career span consular assignments should be interrupted at least every six or eight years with a tour of duty in non-consular work. A senior consular officer who becomes a Consul General or Ambassador should have a solid consular background and ample experience in other facets of Foreign Service responsibilities.

According to Professor Graham H. Stuart in his classic book on "American Diplomatic and Consular Practice," M. Talleyrand is reported to have once stated "the functions of a consul were infinitely varied and that even though one might have been a clever public minister one had to know a great deal more to be a good consul." ■



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Maoist Pilgrim's Progress

THE LONG MARCH, by Dick Wilson. Viking Press.

ON October 16, 1934, about 100,000 Chinese Communist men and women suddenly abandoned their beleaguered position in Southern Kiangsi and retreated from the relentless encirclement of Nationalist forces. Heading west and then north, into wild lands little known even to the Chinese, they disappeared from sight.

In fact, the Communists were only taking the long way round. When, almost exactly a year and 6,000 circuitous miles later, only about 5,000 ragged survivors of the original group reached the caves of Yen-an near the Great Wall in the north, their luck had begun to change. Not only had these Communist forces been able to withstand the repeated attacks of Nationalist armies, provincial bandits and warlords, hostile tribesmen, and implacable natural disasters, but Mao

Tse-tung had emerged as the most powerful leader of a Party that had been sorely tested and had survived. Most importantly, the Japanese attacks in 1937 gave the Communists a respite from the Nationalists.

In Mainland China today, *Chang Cheng* or the 25,000 li march is part of the belief system of modern Chinese Communism, the Maoist version of our "Pilgrims Progress." The "Long March Cadres" of the Party have the greatest prestige among the "old cadres," and occupy the highest Party and government posts. The recounting of the Long March is de rigueur in schools everywhere. To some extent the power struggle which broke out in Peking at the time of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966-69 represented a conflict over the continuing relevance of the Long March experience in governing the China of the 1960s and 1970s.

Wilson deals smoothly and competently with the political story of the Long March, showing how it has helped to mold China's own style of communism. He does not lose track

in his account of the human side of the Long March, the solid serpentine of human beings, stretching 50 miles in column, covering each day an average of 27 miles, attacked by bombers by day, marching with reed torches by night. Spiced with generous (perhaps overly generous) quotations from some of the survivors' accounts, Wilson conveys the drama and excitement of this extraordinary trek. At the same time, he maintains a healthy scepticism at what he acknowledges is often patently contrived political propaganda. "The Long March itself," Wilson writes, "is—an amalgam of true heroism and false political reconstruction."

Maps, detailed itineraries, brief biographies, some excellent pictures and a useful appendix of command line-up all add to the value of this excellent book.

—EUGENE K. LAWSON

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acclaimed memoir of his 12 years near the center of American power is an engrossing book, written by a warm, humane, literate man. It is a vivid—and sometimes painful—catalogue of the good liberal concerns of the 1960s.

McPherson offers interesting sketches of several national figures, but they rarely take on the dimensions of real human beings, remaining in shadowy outline, like one-dimensional figures in an allegory. It is also disappointing that McPherson has so little illumination to supply about the extraordinary and complex man he worked for as Senate and White House aide for almost 12 years, Lyndon Johnson.

McPherson may well have been too modest about the momentous progress that was made in the domestic social sphere during the period, but his treatment of foreign affairs is sufficient to give pause to anyone who is concerned about how the United States handles its relations with other countries. Although he sagely chides the conventional wisdom of the day, his descriptions are laced with unconscious con-

descension, remnants of cold war cliches, and the bland assumptions popular with Washington phrasemakers but which often lack meaning if examined closely. The suspicion grows throughout the book that here is another American politician imprisoned by his own rhetoric. In one classic passage, he is totally oblivious to the unintentional irony of his airy dismissal of Senator Fulbright's statement that America had become "arrogant" by relating his recollection of "an American major . . . wondering how to get his Vietnamese advisee to do something intelligent for a change."

Despite McPherson's decency and wit, this is a disappointing book. Yet it is useful—and shocking—to realize how little one who by all accounts was one of the very best of us really understood about some of the great events in which he played an important part.

—WILLIAM LENDERKING

Cloak and Dagger Thrills

THE GENERAL WAS A SPY, by Heinz Höhne and Herman Zolling. Coward McCann, \$10. GEHLEN: *Spy of the*

Century, by E. H. Cookridge. Random House, \$10; THE SERVICE: *The Memoirs of General Reinhard Gehlen*, translated by David Irving. World, \$10.

IN 1945, Major General Reinhard Gehlen, chief of the Eastern section of German military intelligence, surrendered to the Allies with 50 steel boxes of espionage dossiers on the Soviet Union. After a short stint in de-nazification purgatory, Gehlen, together with his documents and a few key assistants, was snapped up by American military intelligence.

Built up to formidable proportions by the CIA, the Gehlen intelligence and counter-espionage organization for two decades played an indispensable part in the sterile post-war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, popularly known as the Cold War. In 1956 West Germany created its own intelligence agency, the BND, out of the Gehlen organization, which Gehlen headed until his dismissal, under a cloud of scandal, in 1968. These three books tell the story of the Gehlen organization and its accomplishments.

As a historical account of one

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esoteric aspect of the Cold War—which, despite scandalous expenditures of effort and money scarcely affected the evolution of East-West relations in the slightest—these three volumes are useful period pieces. Gehlen himself emerges from these books as a morose pedant notable chiefly for his plodding industry and an obsessive hatred for the Soviet Union, to whose KGB counterparts he nevertheless bears an uncanny resemblance.

A dreary story, despite a few cloak-and-dagger thrills and some interesting observations on Soviet strategy. The Höhne book is the least unreadable of the three.

—CHARLES MAECHLING

Four Errors of Diplomacy

INTERVENTION AND NEGOTIATION: *The U.S. and the Dominican Republic*, by Jerome Slater. Harper & Row.

THE 1965/66 United States imbroglio in the Dominican Republic is still rather fresh for historical scrutiny. Mr. Slater's dispassionate treatment and assessment of US pre-intervention, intervention, and nego-

tiation substantially contrast with other academic writers and provide needed correction to an analysis of the events.

He cites four errors of US diplomacy: failure to exert constructive and liberal influence in the pre-intervention phase, April 24-28; premature decision to intervene since the risk of a communist takeover was slim; failure to restore ex-President Bosch to power; and failure to opt for sweeping military reforms.

The author notes the widespread tendency, particularly among government officials, to consider the Dominican outcome a success in averting a communist takeover, avoiding a bloody civil war, restoring order, holding honest elections, withdrawing our troops, and promoting socioeconomic reforms.

Mr. Slater believes the US enjoyed some luck in solving the Dominican problem. He could have added that the skillful, prestigious negotiator, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and his Organization of the American States colleagues, were

prudent, liberal and human in their actions.

—PETER SARROS

FSJ COMPETITION

The August competition states that many historical events have been inadequately reported. Readers are invited to fill noted historical gaps by submitting memoranda of conversation for a historical meeting at which they might have wished to be present, for example: Henry IV's meeting with Pope Gregory at Cannossa; Dr. Kissinger's greeting to Chou en Lai at the Peking airport, etc. Entries should be no more than 100 words in length.

A prize of \$10.00 to the reader who submits the most original and humorous response. The winning entry and those of two runners-up will be published in subsequent issues. Entries by October 15, please, to: Foreign Service JOURNAL, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

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RANK INJUSTICE

from page 19

But just in case any of them do goof off, for any reason, they could as readily as under the traditional system be held back from promotion or selected out—for cause.

I also see no grounds for believing that the phased promotion of officers after the 0-6 grade might elevate a larger number of them into the successively higher middle grades than there are positions available there. As Task Force II stipulated, semiautomatic promotions would always be subject to the availability of positions and of funds. According to "Management Reform Bulletin No. 27," issued in July 1971, it is projected that in 1976 there will be 813 positions at the 0-5 level, 829 at 0-4, and 804 at 0-3. Semiautomatic promotions would simply put officers into these positions as openings develop—not force an increase in the number of positions. Nor would semiautomatic promotions worsen the "crunch" between class 3 and class 2 (the above-cited Bulletin envisages that in

1976 there will be only 368 positions in class 2 as compared with the 804 in class 3); semiautomatic promotions would apply only up into the 0-3 grade, after which, the task forces proposed, the traditional system would apply. The point, again, is that semiautomatic promotions would be a procedure for filling vacant positions, not for expanding the number of positions.

Ideally, of course, under a semiautomatic system there should be a fixed schedule for promotions, specifying the number of years an officer would normally stay in each of the middle grades. In practice, because of uncertainties about the availability of positions or funds, it may not prove feasible to devise or to implement such a schedule. For example, it may become the stated policy or the actual practice of the Department to promote 0-5 officers after they have been in grade, say, five years, but in some given year there might be only enough prospective 0-4 vacancies available in the cone to permit promotion of just a few of the 0-5 officers who are

equally eligible for promotion on the basis of their five years in grade. In that case the problem could be resolved in at least two different ways: only the most senior of the identical-time-in-grade officers could be promoted (i.e., the most senior in terms of total years in governmental service or, if still finer criteria are necessary beyond that, total years of life); or promotions of the identical-time-in-grade officers could be deferred until there are vacancies above for all of them, provided that the deferral is not likely to last longer than some months.

The essential point in this regard is not that there will be a slow-down in promotions—there would be as much of a slow-down under the traditional system, given these circumstances—but rather that under the semiautomatic system the slow-down would be effected in a manner that is equitable to the affected officers and justifiable to all reasonable persons. The lack of promotion under these circumstances would then not reflect adversely on the



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affected officers, as it tends to do under the traditional system. In contrast with the humiliating and debilitating impact of a missed promotion under the traditional system, an officer who is denied a semiautomatic promotion despite years of satisfactory service would still be able to hold his head high before his colleagues, friends and family.

Summing Up: Improved Morale and Efficiency—at Lower Cost

In summary, a semiautomatic promotion system would prevent the rank injustices which have become increasingly manifest under the traditional system.

It would immensely improve the morale of middle-grade officers. It would put an end to their annual ordeal, the unnecessarily cruel months-long period of awaiting publication of the promotion list. (It would incidentally improve their efficiency during those long months.)

They would be assured that their labors would be rewarded in due course.

They would be assured that their

classmates who are promoted more rapidly are making it because of demonstrably outstanding performance.

They would be assured that they will not be held back from promotion merely because of the fickle finger of fate; or a posting to an inconsequential place from where the gleam of a sterling performance could not be seen in Washington; or an assignment to training or to an inappropriate job; or high-level hanky-panky with the promotion list; or an unfortunately ambiguous phrase in a supervisor's evaluation report; or a personality clash with a supervisor; or any of a host of other possible unfair factors.

The administrative costs of the promotion process would be substantially reduced, because there would be little if any need for promotion panels for the middle grades. There would thus also be an appreciable lessening of the subjective element in the promotion process.

The subjective element would be further greatly reduced because su-

pervisors' evaluation reports would no longer be the end-all and be-all for determining promotions. The reports would instead be utilized primarily for determining onward assignments—a purpose to which they are far better suited, because what they are evaluating, after all, is not the officers' relative degrees of meritoriousness for promotion but rather their individual strengths and weaknesses in specific skills and personal characteristics. The semiautomatic promotion system would thus not ignore these relative strengths and weaknesses, as is sometimes charged. Rather, it would attach the greatest importance to them in the assignment process, not in the promotion process—because, to underscore again the essential argument of the case for semiautomatic promotion of middle-grade officers, there invariably is no significant degree of difference between the officers in the Main Group in each middle grade of each cone as regards the sum total of each one's strengths and weaknesses. ■

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AMERICA AND ASIA: THE IMPACT OF NIXON'S CHINA POLICY

from page 16

tary presence on Taiwan. As that war winds down, the United States should be able to remove the forces that were introduced on the island to support Indochina operations. The remaining units, which are largely concerned with the supply and training of Taiwanese forces, could also be removed without any serious detrimental effects on Taiwan's military capability. In fact, the Nationalist forces are now strong enough to defend Taiwan against a Chinese Communist attack. Peking has made no effort to develop the amphibious and airborne capability it would need to invade a heavily defended island 90 miles off its coast. Politically, it seems unlikely that the Chinese would risk launching a military attack on Taiwan that might cause the Americans to intervene, no matter what American declaratory policy was. The American military capa-

bility to intervene in Taiwan would also not be affected by a US military withdrawal. The American power that would be used in defending Taiwan would come from the Seventh Fleet, which is not based in Taiwanese ports, and from airbases in Japan and Okinawa.

If the United States were prepared, as it should be, to assert unequivocally that Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China and to remove all of its military forces from Taiwan, the way might be open for a settlement of this issue. Such steps would not substantially increase the probability of a Chinese Communist military attack against Taiwan but would probably speed the day when a government on Taiwan would come to terms with the mainland government.

Beyond these more immediate questions, a dialogue between Washington and Peking is long overdue on more fundamental questions affecting the security and well-being of the peoples of China, the United States, and, indeed, of the

rest of the world.

One set of issues concerns problems raised by the fact that both China and the United States are nuclear powers. The United States should begin to talk to Peking about reducing the risk of nuclear war and the effects of testing nuclear warheads. It is likely that, for a considerable period, Peking will not be seriously interested in these negotiations and rather will seek to develop nuclear parity with the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the process of mutual education should not wait until treaties on fundamental arms control questions can be negotiated. In the shorter run, it may be possible to interest the Chinese in such measures as the treaty banning biological weapons.

The United States should also give serious consideration to the Chinese proposal to ban the first use of nuclear weapons. China is now the only nuclear power that has proclaimed unilaterally that it would never be the first to use nuclear

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weapons. In the case of Europe, the United States has been reluctant to issue a no-first-use declaration because of the German fear that Soviet conventional power can be deterred only by the NATO threat of the first use of nuclear weapons. In Asia, there is no such fear. There is no place along China's borders where China has an overwhelming preponderance of conventional military power. Moreover, it is unlikely that any Asian nation expects the United States to use nuclear weapons in its defense, and this question has not been an issue in US bilateral relations with any of its Asian allies. Thus, the United States should give serious consideration to the exchange of no-first-use declarations with China, even if it is not prepared to negotiate a world-wide no-first-use agreement.

The entry of China into the United Nations should also make it easier to bring Peking into negotiations on a whole range of non-political matters involving space, weather, control of the sea beds,


disease control, and matters of international pollution. Multinational agreements in these areas would mean very little without the participation of the government of one quarter of the world's population, and the United States should, in its bilateral dealings with Peking, seek to interest it in joining the efforts that are under way in the United Nations and other forums.

The fascination Americans have always had with China, and the concern caused by the Chinese development of nuclear weapons run the risk of creating a situation in which the United States appears to give priority to relations with Peking over relations with other Asian powers and in particular with Japan. In fact, in moving toward Peking, the United States appears to have lost track of the fact that relations with Japan will be much more important to American security and indeed to the security of East Asia as a whole than the bilateral relations between China and the United States. A militarized Japan would

create far greater problems for Asia than China is likely to do in the next few decades. Economically, Japan can make a much more significant contribution to the development of East Asia than China possibly can. Japan is now the United States' largest overseas trading partner, and this trade will, for the indefinite future, be infinitely more important to the United States than any possible trade with the Chinese mainland. Thus, in seeking to improve relations with Peking, the United States should, more than it has in the recent past, weigh the consequences for relations with Japan. This does not mean that the United States cannot seek to improve relations with China; only that it must do so after the closest consultations with Tokyo and bearing in mind the much greater importance of relations with Japan.

For example, before moving toward the "one China but not now" policy advocated above, the United States should discuss the matter in detail with Tokyo. Fortu-

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nately, Japanese political leaders seem to be moving in the same direction. Japan has assured Peking in recent months that it accepts that Taiwan is a part of China, and the Japanese will probably be willing to go along with a "one China but not now" policy.

In dealing with other countries in East Asia, the United States should be sensitive to their concern that it is prepared to sell out their interests in an effort to come to an understanding with Peking. This problem will be particularly acute in relations with Korea. Korean leaders understandably fear that the United States may reach some understanding with Peking at their expense. In particular, the Chinese have been pressing for some time for a complete American military withdrawal from Korea. The United States has already withdrawn more than 20,000 men from Korea and is reported to be planning a total withdrawal over the next several years after the Korean military forces are built up. The arguments for such a with-

drawal may be questioned on their own terms. A total American military withdrawal from Korea would increase the risk that either the South or the North would be tempted to launch military action. Moreover, such a withdrawal would raise the gravest questions in Tokyo as to whether or not the United States was reneging on a commitment to a country whose security is important to the defense of Japan. The American move toward China reinforces all of these concerns. It would thus make sense for the United States to postpone any plans for a total withdrawal from Korea and in fact to commit itself to maintaining American forces on the Korea peninsula until there is a fundamental change in the Korean political situation. At the same time, the United States should press the South Korean Government to move ahead with efforts to begin a political dialogue with North Korea.

In assessing the future, it is all too easy to assume that Asian politics will largely be determined by

the political relations between the superpowers. In fact, as in the past 25 years, Asian politics is likely to be shaped largely by internal developments in the countries of the area. Superpower relations can lead to wars causing great destruction, or they can contribute to an environment that reduces the likelihood of interstate warfare and increases the prospects for economic and political development. Since the superpowers do not have any incompatible vital interests in Asia, it is to be hoped that the new Sino-American contacts will reduce tension in East Asia and provide a climate in which other nations can concentrate on economic and social development. But that will occur only if there is not an American withdrawal that ruptures American-Japanese relations and increases the sense of insecurity of small Asian nations. And it will occur only if the United States comes increasingly to view China as China sees itself, namely as a weak, poor, and developing nation. ■

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I was the strong silent type at cocktail parties until I started reading the **JOURNAL**. I'm still silent but I can no longer tear the phone book in half.

What Is Selection Out?

WHAT do we mean by selection out? Under Section 633 of the Foreign Service Act the Secretary prescribes regulations concerning the maximum period of time-in-class and standards of performance to be maintained in the Service. However, there are two views in the Foreign Service as to what selection out means. For those who are familiar with the intention of the drafters of the Foreign Service Act, selection out means competition.

For many others, selection out means a method of RIFing FSOs. As stated last year by Under Secretary Macomber in a letter to Senator Cooper: "While it is true that this [selection out] authority was used sparingly during the postwar years when we had an expanding Service, it has been used to a greater extent since 1961 when it was decided to start reducing the size of the Service. A procedural change was made in 1967 to place greater emphasis on maximum time-in-class, rather than in low selection board rankings, as the primary vehicle of *forced attrition*."

It is clear that management has been "fine tuning" the size of the FSO corps by adjusting selection out. The 15/20 year tenure provision for the middle FSO ranks was advertised as a way to "encourage creativity." But when management adopted the proposal it knew very well that, given the dramatic slowdown in the promotion rate, if the middle grade time-in-class was not extended, large numbers of FSOs would be *TICed* in mid-stride. Junior officers at the "threshold" today face the same problem. Only management is waiting to see how many will be "lost" before deciding on whether and how to rescue them.

Certainly one's opinion on the merits of selection out depends on whether it is a system to maintain a competitive officer corps or to achieve reductions in force, or both. We must have an answer to the future use of selection out before we decide how it should be changed, if at all. Should management alone provide this answer or should we both? ■

AFGE's Strategy—Delay

AT the first meeting of employee organizations with the Employee Management Relations Commission early this year, AFGE's Executive Vice President offered to bet AFSA's representatives \$5.00, not that AFGE would win the elections, but that *no* elections would be held in the Foreign Affairs Agencies in 1972. It looks as if he would have won his bet.

AFGE, which has been waiting until the very last day

to meet all the deadlines imposed in the election process, has now raised the FAS conversion issue in the pre-election conferences in such a way as to necessitate hearings by the EMRC. AFGE claims that all FSSOs and FSRs who have not and do not intend to serve abroad are *wrongfully employed* and should not be entitled to vote in a Foreign Service election. What it means, is that AFGE has found a way to postpone the elections several months in the vain hope that they will be able to increase their support in the Foreign Affairs Agencies in the upcoming elections.

Meanwhile, AFGE is putting out increasing quantities of slickly worded propaganda. However, their only achievement to date has been to block the conversion of the Staff Corps to FSRU status and now to delay the elections. AFSA's motto in the upcoming election should be "VOTE AFSA—DEEDS NOT WORDS." AFGE's motto should be the reciprocal. ■

A Tribute To John Paul Vann

JOHN PAUL VANN was akin not only to American military heroes of the past but to the great dissenters of American history. He understood Henry David Thoreau and Thomas Paine. And he knew and understood Daniel Ellsberg when Ellsberg believed in the war and later when he didn't.

In a sense, his beliefs and the beliefs of those who were non-believers in US policy in Vietnam were not far apart. He was the first and one of the very few Americans to resign his Presidential military commission and voice public dissent over US policy in Vietnam.

Vann was called back to Washington in 1969 and, in the Diplomatic Reception Rooms of the Department of State, received an unusual award for courage. The American Foreign Service Association presented to him the Christian A. Herter Award "for extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and creative dissent."

That award, we feel, was particularly satisfying to Vann. He was a professional soldier and veteran of three wars, and medals for physical courage were not new to him. His bravery and heroism had been recognized repeatedly. But John Vann knew that moral and intellectual courage was a much rarer commodity and much more rarely recognized. For close to ten years in Vietnam, Vann displayed an unyielding moral toughness and integrity as well as physical bravery of the first order. He died with one medal to show for his intellectual courage and a chestful for physical courage. In Vietnam it was the former quality of Vann's that was most valuable to America. ■



"Face-to-Face" Holds Conference on Transnational Relations and United States Foreign Policy

The conventional view of world politics is that it consists of interactions among states. Foreign policy, therefore, involves dealing with other governments. A more recent interpretation asserts that transnational relations—activities not controlled by central foreign policy organs of governments—are also extremely important for world politics.

To examine the implications of transnational relations for American foreign policy, **Face-to-Face**, the new joint venture of the American Foreign Service Association and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace sponsored a weekend conference in May at Belmont, Maryland. Participants included various government officials, including foreign service officers, and several contributors to "Transnational Relations and World Politics." The conference was led by Professors Robert O. Keohane of Swarthmore College and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. of Harvard University.

According to Nye and Keohane, the implications of transnational relations are that they change the nature of the world with which American policymakers must cope. New issue-areas, such as monetary policy, oceans and space policy, trade policy, and environmental policy, become salient partly through the activities of such transnational actors as international bankers, oil companies, multinational corporations, or transnational groups of scientists. Thus the rise of new actors in world politics and the increasingly complex patterns

of transnational communication broaden the agenda of foreign policy. The characteristic reaction of governments is to increase in size and to become more highly specialized, which tends to diffuse governmental responsibility. It also causes more subunits of governments to interact, and lines of control from the top of the bureaucratic pyramid become weakened. In this process of actual interdependence combined with networks of influence, the conception of "national interest" becomes even more difficult to apply to specific cases. A problem that this process poses for democratic societies is that loss of control by central policymakers further weakens democratic, or popular, control over foreign policy.

Interdependence is a key concept in the discussion of how transnational relations affect American foreign policy. Participants stressed that interdependence should not be defined too narrowly, for instance, in terms of strategic interdependence or trade. In these areas, although the United States is relatively independent compared with other major Western states, this ignores dependence on particular resources from abroad, the effects of international social trends on American society, and ultimately American dependence on the maintenance of the global ecosystem itself. Governments can react to such aspects of interdependence but they do not create them.

Regarding the development of

transnational relations, some participants argued that the United States exchanged economic assistance for security resources and vice-versa with Germany and Japan after World War II, while others maintained that trade-offs were limited by the fact that separate bureaucracies handled economic and security issues. No participant denied the possibility of such trade-offs, and if transnational relations continue to increase in importance, we can expect redoubled, if only partially successful, governmental attempts to manipulate these relations for their own purposes—for instance, by using direct foreign investments as tools of influence (either as penetrators of another society or as hostages), by infiltrating transnational labor movements, or by attempting to control transnational communications networks.

Discussing multinational business enterprises, Louis Wells of the Harvard Business School emphasized that increasing innovation in Europe and the formation of European-based multinational enterprises were likely to lead to increased European investment in the United States. Such a development will likely create new conflicts of interest—for instance, between foreign and American workers.

Will the diffusion that results from transnational relations make the State Department obsolete? The general consensus was that it will not, but the job of coordinating foreign policy becomes much more difficult when foreign policy is effectively being made in most cabinet departments and a variety of other agencies, on is-

sues that are not only transnational but cut across governmental jurisdictions. The example of US-Canadian relations was emphasized: 9000 different visits are made annually by United States officials to Canada, with somewhat more made in the opposite direction. In the private sector, 36 million visits take place each year. Wells pointed out that transnational issues cause greater loss of control from the top than do more contained issues. The response of multinational firms to this has been an attempt to inculcate loyalty to the organization in its members (one might say, the functional equivalent of nationalism), but also to abolish entirely, in many cases, the international division of the enterprise, with each division having an international sub-division. Following this analogy, the State Department would be abolished, and its functions parceled out to the other agencies. Participants doubted that this would happen, not only because of organizational inertia but because transnational relations have certainly not become supreme, even though they have become increasingly important.

Nye and Keohane asserted that erosion of democratic control as a result of transnational relations posed a serious problem. Some government participants held that international cooperation could proceed much more effectively without interference from nationalistically oriented groups or Congressmen; and that the important issue was not the procedural one of responsibility but the substantive question of how to achieve the right balance of values. To some participants, the conception of "democratic control" seemed to connote restriction of individual freedom or of mutually beneficial transnational activity, with regulatory organizations becoming immune from public scrutiny and control.

The conference concluded with discussion of the implications of transnational activity for the distribution of resources in the world, and the extent to which governments should intervene in transnational networks, even extending within other societies, to

foster social justice and welfare. Some favored an active approach to ensure that benefits of transnational activity reached below the elite level, and others, regarding this activism as a form of imperialism, preferred a less interventionist stance.

Many participants found the conference intellectually stimulating, although ideas were often tentative and no simple solutions were discovered. Continuing exchanges among the participants are planned. A future meeting may focus on a specific aspect of transnational relations as it affects American foreign policy.

Foreign Service participants included David Biltchik, Robert Dickerman, William M. Johnson, Ernest Preeg, Richard Roth, James Sutterlin, and Robert Hormats of the NSC.

STAFF CORPS NEWS

Unpaid Overtime— The Staff Corps' Burden

Recently AFSA has received letters in response to its request for a status report on post compliance with State CA-890 of February 23, 1971, regarding the administration of overtime. Some secretaries report they are grateful to AFSA for its role in convincing the Department to enforce payment of overtime. Many report that it is only paid to the Embassy Duty Secretary while others state that they are able to receive cash for any compensatory time which they are unable to use within the 16 week time limitation.

However, we think management can do better in seeing to it that the Staff Corps is rewarded for all the free labor it contributes. The regulations are quite clear: employees who perform regularly scheduled overtime must receive monetary compensation for such overtime work and may not be granted compensatory time in lieu of overtime pay. Employees who are ordered to work irregular or occasional overtime may receive either overtime pay or compensatory time for such overtime work, however, an employee whose basic salary rate is at or below the maximum scheduled rate of GS-10 has a legal right to choose to receive overtime pay for irregular or oc-

casional overtime work (3 FAM 232.3-2, 3-3). One of the ways to overcome the problem of "no funds" at post would be to make the payment of overtime a line item in State's appropriations budget. If bankruptcy is a legitimate gripe on the part of management, it seems the least that could be done until adequate appropriations are received, would be to expand the 16-week period allowed for using compensatory time. As it now stands, more enlightened posts have to resort to fudging on the regulations to achieve this end. Why not legitimize such practices?

AFSA is still concerned about the secretary who must pinch-hit in the Ambassador's office on a regular basis in addition to her own regular 8-hour a day job and is forced to accept compensatory time. The high grade Ambassador's secretary can rearrange her schedule so as not to exceed the 40-hour week, but the junior level secretary who could certainly use the cash is forced to make the sacrifice.

Dedication to duty is great and most staff personnel are willing to "donate" extra hours to Uncle Sam, but let's not encourage martyrs or a welfare system that only benefits management at the expense of the lowest paid salaried worker.

AFSA is not impressed by the cavalier attitude of Admin officers who have stated that even if they did have the money the last possible use it would be put to would be in the payment of overtime.

Another shocking example of "using" the employee has occurred during Presidential visits. One secretary reported that she was only paid for half of the 40 hours she worked during these visits. Her intangible compensation came in the form of high commendation in her efficiency report. Maybe it's time to ask some of our traveling Congressmen and Senators to contribute their \$50.00 a day "spending money" to pay for the secretarial services the State Department seems unable to afford.

AFSA will approach management once more for relief in this improved but not perfect situation.

E. O. ELECTIONS

AFSA continues its efforts for early elections to select an exclusive employee representative in each of the three foreign affairs agencies. At this stage, the only bar to elections is AFGE's delaying tactics. As reported in the July *Journal* AFSA's successful election petition was challenged by AFGE on several grounds. AFGE's strategy of stalling by means of legalistic roadblocks received a severe jolt on June 20.

AFGE Challenges Thrown Out. AFGE's claims that AFSA's election petition in State was invalid because of "coercive practices," because of Bill Harrop's alleged management official status, and because Tom Boyatt and Hank Cohen were members of the 1971 Selection Boards were all submitted to the Employee-Management Relations Commission (EMRC). Concerning the charges of "coercive practices," the Commission concluded "that there is not sufficient evidence to cast doubt upon the validity of the authorization cards. . . ." As to the charges regarding Messrs. Harrop, Boyatt and Cohen, upon investigation the Commission concluded "that the evidence does not support your (AFGE) contention that any of the individuals named is a management official or a confidential employee, as defined in E.O. 11636, nor that the administrative responsibilities of these individuals are related to personnel policies in such a manner as would make it inappropriate for them to participate in activities protected by E.O. 11636." Accordingly, the Commission affirmed AFSA's election petition in State. Subsequently, on July 7, the Commission also ruled in AFSA's favor and against similar charges by AFGE in connection with AFSA's election petition in USIA. What it boils down to is that AFGE's hopes to put the election off have been dashed.

State Electoral Conference. With elections on the way the Commission ordered pre-electoral meetings during the second and third weeks in June to reach agreement among the parties—AFSA, AFGE, and State management—

regarding the procedures to govern the State Department representation election. During the conferences, the parties were able to reach substantial agreement on procedural aspects of the election. The only significant area of disagreement among the parties related to the question of the eligibility of employees to vote in the election. AFSA seeks to expand the list of eligible voters, consistent with the eligibility criteria specified by the Executive Order 11636, so as to enable the largest possible number of employees to participate in the election. AFGE, by contrast, seeks to reduce the number of eligible employees by putting forward an interpretation of the Order even more narrow than that advanced by management. These results were reported to the Commission on June 26.

Although the report of the results of the State Department Electoral Conference was forwarded to the Commission on June 26, AFGE in a further stalling effort now maintains that the Conference has not yet been concluded since all issues were not resolved. The regulations of the Commission, however, are clear on this point. If the Electoral Conference fails to produce agreement, the results are to be reported to the Commission which will decide the matters at issue. It is now up to the Commission either to direct that an election be held or to order hearings to consider the areas of disagreement among the parties. Since the Electoral Conference resulted in no basic disagreement over procedures and the Commission's "Procedural Guide for the Conduct of Elections" establishes that in the event the parties are unable to agree on the question of employee eligibility, all employees believed to be eligible by any of the parties are to receive ballots; AFSA believes that the Commission should direct that an election be held without further delay.

USIA Electoral Conference. Pre-electoral meetings in USIA began on June 28, with representatives of AFSA, AFGE, and agency management present. Discussions are proceeding smoothly aided by the

agreement on procedural questions reached earlier during the State Department meetings. The parties are now in the process of preparing their positions on employee eligibility which, as in the State Department Conference, is likely to produce wide areas of disagreement with AFSA seeking to broaden participation and AFGE seeking to narrow it.

AID Election Petition. The required showing of interest for an election petition in AID was tabled on June 30. AID management was "unable" to post our petition until July 5. AFGE has until July 20 to "intervene" to get on the ballot. As of July 17 they have not done so.

Fellowships at the Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations offers about a dozen fellowships annually to Americans between the ages of 27 and 35 from the academic, government, business and professional communities. The fellowships are designed to encourage better utilization of reflective or scholarly wisdom in the making of decisions in international problems.

Each fellow is enabled to undertake an examination of an important problem in international affairs and to explore the implications of that problem for the interests and policies of the United States, foreign states, or international organizations. There is keen competition for these fellowships, which finance up to a year of research either at the Council in New York or elsewhere by arrangement. Project proposals are considered by an Advisory Selection Committee. A book, article or report will normally be written by the fellow.

AFSA urges officers to profit from this opportunity for creative work. The fellowship also provides an excellent opportunity to make valuable lasting contacts in the academic and professional world of foreign affairs.

Interested officers should write Mr. John T. Swing, Associate Executive Director, Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., 58 East 68th Street, New York, New York 10021.

BOARD ACTIONS TAKEN

By-Laws Revision. The AFSA By-Laws Committee, headed by Lars Hydle, submitted to the AFSA Board of Directors a complete revision of the AFSA By-laws and Certificate of Incorporation. Unfortunately, several of the proposals contained in the proposed By-laws did not comply with the technical rules of the Labor Department. Consequently, the proposed By-laws must be reworked to ensure their conformity with the government-wide standards for employee organizations. This work is under way within the Board and it is hoped that in the Fall a proposed set of By-laws to further open up AFSA will be circulated to AFSA members for comment.

LEGISLATIVE REPORT

AFSA Chairman Bill Harrop testified before the Hays Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Operations on grievance legislation on July 18 and will appear again on July 25th. He was accompanied by Board member Tex Harris and Legal Committee member William Salisbury. The bill in question, S 3722, was passed by the Senate on June 22 by a vote of 56 to 27 and is based on legislation AFSA prepared in early 1971.

In his testimony, Bill Harrop stated that the Foreign Affairs Agencies and AFSA were in agreement on eight elements essential to grievance procedures. However, nine elements considered basic by the Association are opposed by management. These elements are: 1) an independent grievance board, not composed of employees of the foreign affairs agencies; 2) a broad enough definition of grievance to allow review of all areas affecting the employee's professional career; 3) a right to an open hearing; 4) access by the grievance board to any document or information considered by the board to be relevant; 5) that the decision of the grievance panel be final and binding, except when the Secretary of State rejects a decision as adversely affecting the foreign policy interests or national security of the US; 6) that pow-

er to recommend appropriate disciplinary action be vested in the Board; 7) a one-year statute of limitations on the filing of grievances and a limited period of retroactive application; 8) the employee's right to choose between the agency's grievance procedure or some other available remedy; 9) provision for judicial review under the Administrative Procedures Act.

Bill Harrop closed by saying, "Foreign Service employees and agency management are united in the belief that grievance legislation is necessary. We differ from management in seeking legislation which is complete and meaningful rather than a ratification of paternalism. We urge your favorable consideration of S. 3722."

Copies of the complete testimony are available from AFSA on request.

AFSA members are urged to write Chairman Wayne L. Hays in support of S. 3722, sending copies of their letters to the Association.

AID NEWS

AID Retirement

Things are still on the tracks regarding AID's entry into the Foreign Service retirement system. Indications are that the House Foreign Affairs Committee will include the retirement provisions in the Security Assistance Act which is currently being marked up. Please write your congressman requesting his or her support, with copies to AFSA.

E. O. ELECTIONS

AFSA Platform. The AFSA Election Steering Committee has circulated to Participation Committees in Washington in all three agencies and to Chapters and Keymen overseas, a draft AFSA platform for the upcoming election. The AFSA Board hopes that many members will participate in the drafting of the AFSA platform for the upcoming election. If you have not seen a copy of the platform please check with your Participation Committee Chairman or post Keyman or AFSA headquarters.

Kissinger Defines F.S. Role

Dr. Henry Kissinger defined a full and evolving role for the Foreign Service in informal remarks at the annual awards ceremony of the American Foreign Service Association on June 29.

He was introduced by AFSA's chairman in these words:

"The Association invited Dr. Kissinger to be our speaker on this particularly Foreign Service occasion in order to make two points. First, that the unified Foreign Service of the United States exists to serve the President and all of his Government. We reject out of hand those media campaigns which endeavor to create division between the Department of State and the White House. Our professional experience in foreign affairs and our full loyalty belong to the President of the United States. Second, in inviting Dr. Kissinger to be with us today the Association wishes to express our respect and admiration for his as a professional in our line of work. Dr. Kissinger, welcome to the Foreign Service."

The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs emphasized that the whole-hearted participation of the Foreign Service was necessary in order for the new diplomacy to work. He defined the central problem as creating an international system in which the United States protects its friends but also deals constructively with its adversaries. Such a system, which is only in its initial stages, is quite different from the 19th century balance of power arrangement, and attempts to institutionalize self-restraint on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States. In the emerging configuration, the United States would play a more delicate role, engaging in dialogue with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and lessening areas of overcommitment without undermining basic partnerships with our allies.

Dr. Kissinger added that diplomats today must pay more attention to over-all objectives and strategy; it was his impression that since World War II the Foreign Service had come to concentrate upon negotiation and tactics.

MEMBERS INTERESTS

COMMITTEE

Temporary Lodging Upon Return to USA

Are you transferring back to the US for a tour of duty between overseas assignments? If you are, do not forget the temporary lodging allowance (home service transfer). Here are a few tips for taking maximum advantage of this allowance:

1. Remember the ground rules. The allowance is payable for 30 calendar days at any time during the period beginning 60 days prior to, and ending 60 days after, the date you start your new job or training assignment. Daily rates are calculated at a maximum of \$12 for the first adult occupant over 11 years, \$9 for the next adult, and \$6 for each person thereafter regardless of age. A family of two adults and two children is therefore eligible for \$33 per day. Reimbursement is made for actual lodging expenses with the maximum daily amount vouchered against receipts.
2. Within the 120-day period of eligibility, the 30 calendar days of temporary lodging need not be taken consecutively. It is possible, therefore, to use up one or two weeks of the allowance at the new location while you look for permanent housing, and then use up the remainder at a later date while waiting for the new housing to become available. The 30 days can be broken by home or annual leave.
3. The employee need not be present for the family to enjoy the allowance. This is especially important for employees who remain at the overseas post longer than expected, and who send their families on ahead to settle into permanent housing. The family can utilize this allowance during the 120-day eligibility period even if the breadwinner is not one of the occupants of the temporary quarters.
4. In arranging your documentation for preparation of your claim voucher, make sure that the owner

of your temporary housing provides a paper showing the true daily rate actually paid for the quarters. This is especially important for employees who occupy temporary quarters under a 30-day lease and then, for some reason, remain for a period of less than 30 days. If you take a month's lease at \$600, for example, your daily rate is \$20, and you will be reimbursed at that rate. If you stay for only 20 days, however, and present the lease as your documentation, you will still be reimbursed only \$20 per day for the 20 days even though your true daily rate was \$30 as a result of the shortened stay. This results in a \$200 loss. It would be wise in cases of this type to obtain a paper from the landlord certifying that you occupied the quarters for 20 days and paid either the total sum of \$600 for that period, or a daily rate of \$30, preferably the latter.

5. Most returning employees are unable to locate and occupy permanent quarters within the 30-day time frame envisaged by the allowance. Consequently, they have to pay for varying amounts of temporary lodging out of their own pocket. Employees in this category should remember they are entitled to a federal income tax deduction covering 30 days of temporary lodging connected to a job transfer. If you have 60 days of temporary lodging, for example, claim 30 days under the allowance and 30 days as a moving expense tax deduction. Moving expense deductions can be claimed even if you do not itemize.

Per Diem Payments During FSI Assignments

Per diem payments to employees taking training at FSI between overseas assignments are woefully inadequate. Not only are families not covered, but the per diem paid to the employees for themselves is reduced after 21 days from \$25 to \$12.50. AFSA is working with management on the reform of this system which effectively forces the employee to pay for his or her own training if he is on TDY status. In the interim, employees caught up in an FSI training as-

signment with inadequate per diem should take advantage of the provisions of 6 FAM 154.3c to seek upward adjustments of their per diem stipends. If you can show in graphic terms that what FSI is providing in per diem is causing a hardship for yourself and family, appeal for relief under the regulation cited. AFSA knows of cases in which per diem has been increased as a result. The regulation gives management the right to adjust the per diem where individual cases so warrant.

Task Force Recommendation

AFSA Members' Interests Committee Chairman, Hank Cohen, wrote Director General Hall to express AFSA's concern at the apparent lack of progress in implementing the Task Force V recommendation that the Foreign Service be included in the Soldier and Sailor's Relief Act of 1940, as amended. AFSA pointed out that the problem of legal domicile and state tax liability would be clarified by inclusion of the Foreign Service in the Soldiers' and Sailors' Relief Act. The Director General's office replied that they were too busy at the present time to undertake a study of implementing this Task Force recommendation but would do so in the near future. We will be following up.

AFSA ACTIVITIES

AFSA's annual general business meeting was held on June 28, in the West Auditorium of the Department of State. Dr. Horace G. Dawson, Vice President, presided.

After a report from Chairman William C. Harrop summarizing the year's activities, which have been previously reported in **AFSA News**, Treasurer David W. Loving presented a financial report (copies available from AFSA).

The next order of business was the amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation. Due to the importance of these amendments and the requirement of a vote by the active membership, this material appears on page 39 and a ballot for the vote is bound in after page 40.

BIRTHS

Simpson. A son, Mark Howard, was born to FSO and Mrs. Dan Simpson May 30 in Cape Town.

DEATHS

Carson. Irene R. Carson, wife of FSO-ret. Frederick R. Carson, died on July 4 in Alexandria, Virginia. Mrs. Carson accompanied her husband on assignments in Athens, the Philippines, Rabat and Geneva. In addition to her husband, 1130 Cameron Road, Alexandria, 22308, she is survived by a daughter, Mrs. Patricia Lou McPeak, a son, John F., a sister and a brother.

Cochran. William P. Cochran, Jr., FSO-ret., died on June 26 in Asheville, N.C. He is survived by his wife, Margery, of 32 Forest Road, Biltmore Forest, Asheville, 28803, a daughter, Mrs. Margaret Cochran Spear of Altadena, Calif., a sister, Mrs. G. G. Woofford and three grandchildren.

Dawson. Ambassador William Dawson died July 3 at his home in Blue Hill, Maine. Ambassador Dawson had served as chief of mission in Panama and Uruguay and later as US Representative to the OAS. He served in consular posts in Barcelona, Frankfurt Rosario, Montevideo, Danzig, Munich and Mexico City. Ambassador Dawson is survived by his wife, Agnes, Blue Hill, Maine 04614, a son, Edward of Philomont, Va., three grandchildren and five great-grandchildren.

Fuller. Therese A. W. Fuller, wife of FSO-ret. George Gregg Fuller, died June 24 in Washington, D.C. Besides her husband of 3816 Huntington St., N.W. 20015, Mrs. Fuller leaves two sons, the Rev. George Fuller of Mt. Vernon, N.Y., Gregory Fuller of Rockville, a daughter, Mrs. Gordon Lamb of Rockville, a brother Clarence T. Williams and seven grandchildren.

Milliken. Sidney Milliken, a former employee of the Embassy in Santiago, died in January of this year in Chile. There are no immediate survivors.

Offie. Carmel Offie, FSO-ret., died June 18 in London. Mr. Offie had served in Honduras and most of

the major capitals of Europe during his 17 years in the Foreign Service. Mr. Offie is survived by two sisters, Teresa Offie of 1517 30th St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007, Mrs. Joseph Marosy of Markham, Va., four brothers, Anthony, James, Samuel, and Joseph, and several nieces and nephews.

Patchen. Mr. and Mrs. Bruce Patchen died in late May in Connecticut. At the time of his death, Mr. Patchen was a program analyst with the African Bureau of AID. He had previously served in Quito, Buenos Aires and Saigon. Mr. and Mrs. Patchen leave their daughter, Laura, 7504 Lynn Drive, Chevy Chase, Md. 20015 and a son, David who have requested contributions to be made in their parents' memory to the AFSA Scholarship Fund. Mrs. Patchen's mother, Mrs. Mae Rode, lives in New York City.

Wheeler. Richard Smith Wheeler, FSO-ret., died at his home in Arlington, Va. on June 20. Mr. Wheeler spent 18 years in the Department of State arranging conferences in many parts of the world. He is survived by his wife, Dora, 5614 N. 33rd St., Arlington, Va. 22207, and three sons, Douglas of Arlington, Dr. Richard M. of Lafayette, Ind., and Capt. David L. of Kearney, Nebraska.

Correction—Mrs. Lincoln MacVéagh's address is Avenida Biarritz 12, 1 Direito, Estoril, Portugal. The May issue carried an incorrect address.

LATE NEWS FLASH

The General Accounting Office has decided in response to AFSA's petition that increases in overseas allowances were illegally frozen by management during last year's wage price freeze. Such increases must now be paid retroactively. A major achievement for AFSA's Members Interests Committee for you. Details next issue.

Notes: The Washington *Star* recently noted that the Pentagon now has more three star and four star generals and admirals to command a force of 2.7 million men than it had to command 12 million soldiers during World War II. It's good to know that we are not the only agency with a surplus of senior officers.

STAFF CORPS NEWS

Staff Corps Inspectors: The AFSA SCAC request that staff corps members serve on inspection teams has met with partial success. Although a full time inspector from the staff corps has not been assigned to the Inspector General's Staff a few TDY consular officers, former staff officers, have been used to supplement inspection teams with good results. The Director General's office is considering assigning this summer the first staff corps officer to the Inspection Corps for the inspection of a major European post. Progress is slow.

STATE NEWS

FAS Lawsuit. The District of Columbia Circuit Court on June 22 modified the lower Federal Court's injunction which has prevented all conversions to FSRU status and sent the FAS lawsuit back to the lower court for a trial on the merits. Inasmuch as the circuit court only addressed the status of the Foreign Service Reserve Corps' conversion to the FSRU program, AFSA immediately petitioned Under Secretary Macomber to have the Justice Department file with the Court of Appeals a motion to clarify its decision regarding the Staff Corps. After discussions with the Department of Justice, a motion for clarification was filed, as of July 18 no decision regarding whether Staff Officers can convert to FSRU status has been issued.

CLUB NEWS

Foreign Service Artist

The paintings exhibited in the Club this month, and the one on the cover of the *Journal*, are those of Nance Hall Asher, wife of FSO John Asher. Most of the paintings on display were shown at a USIA-sponsored exhibit in Lagos in 1966. Mr. and Mrs. Asher were stationed in Nigeria for five years before they were evacuated when civil war broke out. Mrs. Asher's paintings in this exhibit reflect "Iboland" in good times as well as bad.

Proposed Amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation of the American Foreign Service Association

To : Active AFSA Members
FROM : Board of Directors, William C. Harrop, Chairman
SUBJECT : Proposed Amendments to AFSA's Certificate of Incorporation

The proposed amendments to AFSA's Certificate of Incorporation which were published in the June JOURNAL were considered at our general business meeting on June 28, 1972, in accordance with Article XI of the By-Laws.

The proposed amendments to the Preamble and to Articles IV(d), V, VI, and VIII of the Certificate of Incorporation were approved at the general business meeting as proposed by the Board of Directors. The proposed amendments to Articles IV(a) and VII were also approved, as amended at that meeting. The two changes made at the meeting were, respectively, the substitution of the word "Government" for "President" in Article IV(a) and of the word "five" for "ten" in Article VII.

In accordance with the By-Laws, the Board of Directors has appointed an Amendments Committee chaired by Mr. Michael R. Gannett, to submit the proposed amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation, as amended and approved at the general business meeting, to the active membership for ratification.

Submission by the Amendments Committee to the Active Membership* of AFSA for ratification of amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation, as proposed on May 22, 1972, and approved with amendments by the general business meeting on June 28, 1972.

The following eight amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation are presented to the Active Membership of the American Foreign Service Association for ratification. A ballot is included in this issue of the JOURNAL. To be valid a completed ballot must be signed by an Active Member and received by the Amendments Committee no later than October 10, 1972. The Post Office Box to which ballots are to be returned is maintained by the Riggs Bank which will hold all returned ballots until counted by the Amendments Committee.

In accordance with the By-Laws, by letters dated July 13, 1972, the Amendments Committee directly notified the proponents, and the only announced opponent, of the opportunity to provide statements on the proposed amendments for submission to the Active Membership together with the ballots. The Committee's communications further notified the proponents and the opponent of its deadline of July 21 for the submission of such statements, which it specified were not to exceed 600 words. Notice of this opportunity to submit statements was also posted publicly. The deadline was subsequently extended to July 25, and further extended to July 26. The statements received are printed in full below, following the proposed amendments.

PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION**

Present wording of Preamble:

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that we do hereby associate ourselves to establish a corporation, not organized for profit and in which no capital stock is required or is to be issued, under and by virtue of Chapter 6 of Title 29 of the Code of Laws for the District of Colum-

bia, and Acts amendatory thereof, for the purposes and under the corporate name hereinafter mentioned; and to that end we do by this, our Certificate, set forth as follows:

Proposed amendment No. 1:

Delete after "under and by virtue of" and substitute the following: **the provisions of Chapter 10 ("The District of Columbia Non-Profit Corporation Act," Act of August 6, 1962, Title 29, District of Columbia Code (1967), for the purposes and under the corporate name hereinafter mentioned; and to that end we do by this, our Certificate, set forth as follows:**

Present wording of Article IV(a):

IV

The objectives and purposes for which the Association is organized as a corporation are, as follows:

(a) *To promote in all lawful, legitimate and appropriate ways the advancement of the welfare of the members of the Foreign Service of the United States Government, or as otherwise designated, in the American Foreign Service who shall become members of this Association including the welfare of their dependents or their designated beneficiaries; to foster among them an esprit de corps; to advance in every possible way the intelligent, efficient and skillful discharge of the duties of their occupation; to advance and safeguard their economic interests; and generally to encourage and promote better and more satisfactory employment conditions for them;*

Proposed amendment No. 2:

Delete and substitute the following in sub-paragraph (a) on objectives and purposes:

(a) **To promote the intelligent, efficient and skillful discharge of the professional duties of the Foreign Service and of the missions of the Foreign Affairs Agencies in the service of the Government of the United States; to advance and safeguard the careers, economic interests, conditions of employment, and welfare of the members of the Foreign Service, including the welfare of their dependents or designated beneficiaries to foster among them an esprit de corps; to enhance understanding and rapport between the Foreign Service and the American foreign affairs community;**

Present wording of Article IV(d):

(d) To do all and everything necessary, suitable, convenient, usual or proper for the accomplishment of the purposes herein expressed or incidental thereto and, generally, to exercise and enjoy all rights, powers and privileges now or hereafter granted by Chapter 6 of Title 29 of the Code of Laws for the District of Columbia, and Acts amendatory thereof, and any other rights, powers, and privileges now or hereafter granted by law; provided, however, that no part of the net earnings or of the principal or assets of this Association shall inure to the individual benefit of any donor, grantor, or testator, or his or her heirs, representatives, or assigns, or of any member of the Association or of any private shareholder or individual other than through payments of life, sick, accident, or other benefit which may be provided for the members of the Association *and no part of the net earnings or of the principal or assets of this Association shall be diverted to carrying on propaganda or in otherwise attempting to influence legislation.*

Proposed amendment No. 3:

Line four delete the words "Chapter 6" and substitute "**Chapter 10.**"

*Persons eligible for Active Membership are US citizen Foreign Service employees of State, USIA and AID, and persons retired from such employment, as specified in the By-Laws.

**All changes and new material herein appear in bold face type, italic type indicates a deletion in the wording of the original article.

Proposed amendment No. 4:

Delete everything after "Association," in the fourth from the last line, and substitute the following:

; except that the Association may pay compensation, including the employer's share toward any social security or pension scheme, to any Member, Associate, or Director in a reasonable amount for services rendered; and provided, further, that no substantial part of the net earnings or of the principal or assets of the Association shall be diverted to carrying on propaganda or otherwise attempting to influence legislation.

Present wording of Article V:

V

The management and administration of the affairs of the Association for the first year of its existence shall be by a Board of Directors of five persons. For the next ensuing years of its existence, the management and administration of the affairs of the association shall be in a Board of Directors of not less than five and no more than eleven members, as the By-Laws of the Association from time to time prescribe.

Proposed amendment No. 5:

Fifth line: delete remainder of paragraph after "Directors" and substitute the following:

as prescribed by the By-Laws of the Association.

Proposed amendment No. 6 to add a new article:

VI

This Certificate of Incorporation shall constitute the Constitution of the American Foreign Service Association.

Proposed amendment No. 7 to add a new article incorporating in amended form in the Certificate a provision in the By-Laws:

VII

Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed by the Board of Directors or by a petition signed by five percent of the Members as of the date submitted. The Board of Directors will thereupon submit the proposal to all Members for ratification by ballot. If approved within 60 days by a two-thirds majority of the Members voting, the amendment will become effective.

Note: The relevant provision of the By-Laws reads:

ARTICLE XI
AMENDMENTS

1. Ten or more Active Members may submit a proposal to amend the Certificate of Incorporation or these By-Laws. A proposed amendment shall be reviewed by the next general business meeting, provided it is submitted to the Board of Directors at least 20 days before the next general business meeting. The Board shall send the text of each proposed amendment to each Active Member of the Association in

STATEMENT BY BOARD OF DIRECTORS
AS PROPONENTS

The Board of Directors and Officers of AFSA unanimously recommend the adoption of these amendments to our Certificate of Incorporation. Our Certificate was promulgated in November 1951 and has never been changed. Amendments are needed now to bring the Certificate up-to-date with changes in the D.C. Code, with the terms of Executive Order 11636, and our current programs. These amendments were overwhelmingly supported at our Annual Business Meeting on June 28.

Proposed Amendments No. 1 and No. 3:

In 1962 the District of Columbia adopted the modern "Nonprofit Corporation Act." These amendments incorporate the Association under the provisions of this statute, Chapter 10, instead of Chapter 6, which relates to charitable

the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., at least ten days prior to the general business meeting.

2. The general business meeting may by minority vote modify the proposal, but only to clarify it, or to compromise between the existing document and the proposal, and, if the proposal is voted, may bring other portions of the existing document into conformity with the proposal. A proposed amendment shall be referred to the entire Active Membership for ratification if it is approved by majority vote at a business meeting. However, if a proposed amendment was submitted by 100 Active Members, the proposal without modification shall be referred to the entire Active Membership for ratification regardless of the result of the business meeting's vote, which shall only be advisory.

3. An Amendments Committee, appointed by the Board of Directors, shall submit any amendment qualifying for referral pursuant to paragraph 2 to the entire Active Membership for ratification by mail between 30 and 45 days after it was voted on by the business meeting. In order to facilitate informed voting by the Membership, the Amendments Committee shall encourage and accept a brief statement by proponents of an amendment and a statement of approximately equal length by its opponents, and shall include a copy of each such statement with each ballot. The Association shall also address envelopes provided by proponents or opponents who wish to send additional statements to the Active Membership at their own expense. Forty-five days after submitting an amendment to the membership for ratification, the Amendments Committee shall tally the votes. If two-thirds of the members voting approve a proposed amendment, it shall take effect.

Proposed amendment No. 8 to add a new article incorporating in the Certificate a provision in the By-Laws, amended *mutatis mutandis*:

VIII

The Corporate seal of this Association shall have inscribed thereon the name of the Association, the year of its creation, and the words "District of Columbia." An impression thereof shall be affixed to this Certificate of Incorporation.

Note: The relevant provision of the By-Laws reads:

ARTICLE II
CORPORATE SEAL

The Corporate seal of this Association shall have inscribed thereon the name of the Association, the year of its creation, and the words "District of Columbia." An impression thereof shall be affixed to these By-Laws.

By: Amendments Committee
Michael R. Gannett, Chairman
John A. Armitage
Terry L. Leitzell
Edwin L. Martin
Murrow B. Morris
Edith Russo
Walter N. Walmsley

STATEMENT BY JOHN D. HEMENWAY
IN OPPOSITION

Informed AFSA Members Will Vote "No" to All Amendments

Approval by the membership of these amendments will greatly strengthen the power of the Board to act arbitrarily without keeping the membership informed.

This statement is submitted for inclusion in the August Foreign Service Journal under protest at the unfair manner in which the Board of Directors and the Amendments Committee have tried to restrict, curtail and censor my comments opposing the proposed amendments to the Certificate of Incorporation and to the By-Laws of the Association.

It is written in this form on three (3) hours notice. If the amendments are accepted, in the future the membership will not even have this much discussion of the issues in the JOURNAL. At 12:00 on July 26, I was informed by Mr.

PROPOSERS STATEMENT (continued)

and educational corporations. This should have been done years ago.

Proposed Amendment No. 2:

The new language omits the reference to Foreign Service personnel "who shall become members of this Association," which is too restrictive in view of AFSA's representation of the entire Foreign Service, members or not. A clause relating to our new Openness program designed to establish a continuing dialogue between the Service and those in academic, business and Congressional circles is added.

Proposed Amendment No. 4:

This amendment would regularize the long-standing practice of compensating AFSA members who serve on the permanent staff as Executive Director or in other positions. It also makes clear AFSA's authority to compensate AFSA members on LWOP working full time at the Association, which will be an essential element in meeting AFSA's augmented responsibilities as exclusive representative of the men and women of the Foreign Service. This amendment would also drop the lobbying prohibition, which is no longer required by the IRS to maintain our tax-exempt scholarship and openness/reform programs.

Proposed Amendment No. 5:

This proposal leaves to the By-Laws (which can be amended more easily than this Certificate of Incorporation) the number of Directors the membership may wish to prescribe. This allows more flexibility.

Proposed Amendment No. 6:

There is a legal requirement that employee organizations

(continued on reverse)

OPPOSERS STATEMENT (continued)

Michael R. Gannett, Chairman of the Amendments Committee that the Committee-set deadline for opposition statements had passed—yesterday, July 25. He said a letter had been hand-carried to my home on July 24 setting forth this requirement. Evidently the AFSA Board will claim—on such a basis—that I was notified in timely fashion by written correspondence of these decisions taken to deny me equal and free access to the membership. After my conversation with Mr. Gannett, I telephoned my home where my wife found an undated letter in an unopened envelope bearing no indication of how, or when, or to whom it had been delivered or of the importance of its contents. No attempt was made by Mr. Gannett or anyone else to ascertain that I had received the letter until Mr. Gannett's call two days after the alleged delivery date to inform me that the deadline was one day past. All this happened in 48 hours! Is this fair play?

My files are all at home and this is written on my lunch hour. Under these conditions I have no option but to restrict this comment to a few remarks made below and to inform the members through this Foreign Service JOURNAL announcement that I shall be sending to each of you in a separate envelope my substantive comments on the specific reasons why you should reject these proposed amendments. Even the right to circularize the membership will be curtailed by these amendments.

If this does not provide sufficient reason to reject the amendments out of hand, let me provide some other examples of restrictions designed to limit the membership's knowledge of what the AFSA Board is up to in Washington: 1. The report of AFSA Board Chairman William Harrop at the annual public meeting of June 28, at which I opposed these amendments in extensive commentary, suppresses and thereby misrepresents positions which opponents

(continued on reverse)

(Cut off along this line)

Ballot for ratification of amendments proposed on May 22, 1972, to the Certificate of Incorporation of The American Foreign Service Association, as amended and approved by the General Business Meeting held on June 28, 1972.

Please sign, print your name, and date this ballot in places indicated.

NOTE: To be valid this ballot must be signed, and received by the Amendments Committee no later than October 10, 1972.

ONLY ACTIVE MEMBERS OF AFSA ARE ELIGIBLE TO VOTE.

After completing ballot fold on dotted line and seal gummed edge.

I, an Active Member of AFSA, vote as follows on the proposed amendments, as set forth in the August 1972 issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, to the Certificate of Incorporation:

- Proposed Amendment No. 1 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 2 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 3 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 4 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 5 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 6 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 7 FOR AGAINST
- Proposed Amendment No. 8 FOR AGAINST

Date: _____

PROPOSERS STATEMENT (continued)

"shall adopt a Constitution and By-Laws." AFSA's Certificate, with the addition of this Article, will serve a dual purpose.

Proposed Amendment No. 7:

The entire amendment procedure for the Certificate of Incorporation is presently contained in the By-Laws for a very good reason—these procedures have been amended numerous times in the history of the Association. The Nonprofit Corporation Act requires that changes in the Certificate of Incorporation be adopted by a two-thirds majority. This should be set out in the Certificate itself.

This proposal states the basic elements of the amendments procedure—how amendments may be proposed (by the Board or 5% of members), how balloting shall be conducted (by written ballot), the time limit for balloting (60 days), and, most importantly, the percentage needed to adopt (two-thirds of those voting). Other more detailed provisions regarding the amendments are needed, but they have been and will be subject to more frequent change and, should therefore be left in the By-Laws. The provisions in the present By-Laws regarding establishing an Amendments Committee, statements by opponents, etc., which are not superseded by this proposed amendment, still will be in effect.

In short, this proposal puts the basics of the amendments procedure for the Certificate of Incorporation in the Certificate—where they belong, and leaves the more detailed and likely-to-be-changed provisions regarding amending the Certificate in the By-Laws. This makes sense.

Proposed Amendment No. 8:

This simply transfers an Article from our By-Laws to a more appropriate place in our new Constitution.

OPPOSERS STATEMENT (continued)

have addressed to the AFSA Board on the amendments and other issues.

2. The amendments committee has restricted me to 600 words comment on very complicated matters.

3. The amendments committee has reserved the right to change my final statement or edit it, i.e., "censor" it.

4. The amendments committee refused to allow me to read the final statement of the AFSA Board published in this issue. The AFSA Board appointed the amendments committee, refused to permit me to participate on it—even as an observer—and, of course, is the real proponent of the amendments which enhances their unchecked control and wheeling and dealing with "management" at the Department for personal gain at the expense of the AFSA membership and the standards of our profession.

Our Association is facing a very severe test as to whether the much-proclaimed "openness" will be honored by its own Board of Directors in dealing with the AFSA membership. At the sparsely attended June 28 annual meeting, AFSA Board members and officials outnumbered the members and Mr. Harrop evaded responding appropriately to several financial questions, including apparently unauthorized AFSA payments to current AFSA Board members now to be "regularized" by these Constitutional amendments. Before voting for the amendments, ask yourself the question, "Why is the Board in such a desperate hurry to push the amendments through?"

Remember—if you accept all of these amendments, the Board will never again be required to keep the general membership informed. This is a grab for permanent power within AFSA. Unless prevented by the AFSA Board you will receive full particulars by mail; your interests will best be served by retaining this last constitutional guarantee of integrity within our professional organization—which I was proud to join in 1955.

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


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