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## FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

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94105 (415) 392-7144  
JOSHUA B. POWERS, LTD., 5 Winsley Street, London W.1 01-  
580 6594/8. International Representatives.

©American Foreign Service Association, 1973. The Foreign Service Journal is published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20037. Telephone (202) 338-4045

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D. C.



The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

Membership in the American Foreign Service Association is open to the professionals in foreign affairs overseas or in Washington, as well as to persons having an active interest in, or close association with, foreign affairs.

Membership dues are: Active Members—Dues range from \$13 to \$52 annually depending upon income. Retired Active Members—Dues are \$30 annually for members with incomes over \$15,000; \$15 annually for less than \$15,000. Associate Members—Dues are \$20 annually.

For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); \$6.00; two years, \$10.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add \$1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in Historical Abstracts and/or America: History and Life.

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

## Mandate for What?

ONE striking result in the two Foreign Service representation elections held to date is the small percentage of votes for "no representative." The men and women in State and USIA want a voice through their exclusive representative in making the decisions which affect the Foreign Service. Nine out of ten of those voting opted for an exclusive representative. This mandate appears to us to contain three basic elements.

The first element is for the employee's viewpoint to be cranked into each and every decision that affects the Foreign Service. Our primary concern is to adopt policies which enable the Foreign Service to fulfill its mission of effectively serving the interests of the United States. However, too often in the past, policies have been adopted with secondary regard for the interests of employees. Administrative concerns came first, employees second. We all recognize the real constraints on all decisions. But it is imperative that the effect of a decision on the people in the Service be weighed along with the effect of a decision on the administration of the Service.

The second element of the mandate appears to be a call for consistency in the application of personnel policies. The single most voiced complaint about personnel policies relates not to the substance of the policies but to the fact that they are in continual flux. It appears that our only fixed policy is to change the system every other year. The elected employee representative has a mandate to insist on a continuity of *sound* policies.

Finally, there is agreement in the Foreign Service that we must have fair procedures and guarantees of due process in the decisions that affect our careers. This mandate includes a comprehensive grievance system and such basics as access to files, review of efficiency reports prior to submission, open information regarding assignments, and fair procedures regarding security matters.

Our most difficult job in the Foreign Affairs Agencies as exclusive representative is to develop a consensus on the personnel system which will most effectively meet the needs of the Service and fulfill our expectations. AFSA represents all segments of the Service and must formulate personnel policies which will treat fairly all the groups competing for recognition in each of the Foreign Affairs Agencies. If, and it is a big if, we can develop a consensus in each of the Agencies, we can have a decided impact on shaping the personnel system. Conversely, if we cannot develop a consensus, then we will in the long run abdicate personnel policy formulation to management.

Developing a consensus is a political process—one which an *open* AFSA is better able to perform than the managements of the Foreign Affairs Agencies. There is one large catch. The people affected must participate in the process. If we can achieve participation from all sectors of the Foreign Service, we are confident we can come up with responsible positions which reflect a true consensus.

THE Board of Directors of the Association took special pleasure in arranging our luncheon on January 30 to honor the China hands of the 1940s.

It was high time that the Foreign Service and the country paid homage to this generation of FSOs who were so ungratefully castigated because the facts they reported were not welcome.

The 300 places at the lunch were reserved within a week, and the Association contracted for closed circuit television to enable a spillover crowd of about 500 in the State Department Auditorium to hear Barbara Tuchman and John Service speak. (Their remarks are reprinted in this issue and the Board commends them to you.)

The event was broadcast nationally, and was filmed by the major television networks. Press coverage was extensive. There have been editorials in, among other papers, the New York TIMES, the Baltimore SUN, the Minneapolis TRIBUNE, the Philadelphia INQUIRER, the Fort Worth STAR TELEGRAM, the Boston GLOBE, the Miami HERALD, the Chicago NEWS and the Louisville COURIER JOURNAL.

But the purpose of our luncheon went beyond the extension of long overdue recognition to colleagues. We wanted to discuss and reflect upon integrity in diplomatic reporting. We wanted to underscore the importance of maintaining the highest standards of professionalism in the Foreign Service. We wanted to underline our belief that in the nation's interest her policy makers must weigh *all* the facts.

It is the duty of the Foreign Service to provide the facts as we see them to the President, and we shall continue to do so.

## About This Issue

ON January 30, AFSA held a historic luncheon honoring the old China Hands of the Foreign Service. Barbara Tuchman and John Stewart Service spoke before a packed house, including an overflow audience which practically filled the Department's largest auditorium, on the theme of Foreign Service reporting.

AFSA was proud to have been able to make this event possible, and the JOURNAL is likewise proud to present as its star attraction in this issue the speeches given by Mrs. Tuchman and Mr. Service on that occasion, along with excerpts from AFSA Board Chairman William C. Harrop's introductory remarks. Ross Terrill's article on how Chinese foreign policy is made is a fitting reminder of the historic importance of the events which John Service so courageously reported on from Chungking.

Some readers may find Lacy Wright's portrait of John Paul Vann, "warts and all" an ironic companion piece to this discussion on China. Here, too, however, we have an example of courageous individualism, this time in an AFSA member who was honored during his lifetime with the Herter Award.



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# COMMUNICATION RE: THE QUIET CRISIS

PROFESSOR MASON'S "Quiet Crisis" neatly described the conflict between the typical foreign service personality and the growing bureaucracy. His solution is that the foreign service agencies should start recruiting a different type of person and train that person to adapt to the inevitable bureaucracy.

To political, economic, and consular officers who naturally are not current with trends in administration the future may look black indeed. It is true that the administration apparatus will grow and that the average program officer will find himself becoming more involved with administrative procedures. But I should point out it is *not* inevitable that the administrative machinery will become more authoritarian. FSI, at least, includes a preponderance of "democratic" material in its teachings on management. The budget course I took five years ago included Dr. William Van Dersal as a lecturer and Douglas McGregor's "The Human Side of Enterprise" was on the reading list. The syllabus for the course ended last June included their books plus others by Frederick Herzberg and Chris Argyris. The overall philosophy is self-actualization and a tenet clearly stated

is that the administrative staff sections exist to serve the substantive elements, not to control them.

As with so much else in life, however, eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. Program personnel should keep abreast of trends in administration or else they will find themselves enslaved by the staff sections whether or not the staff sections really want it or really try very hard for this position. But again there is nothing inevitable in this process. The great danger exists if Program Officers sniff with disdain at the trivial machinations of the admin types.

It is just as dangerous for the admin types in their ignorance of political operations to think that political personnel are engaged solely in insignificant protocolary intricacies. Protocol properly used is not an end in itself but a means toward the goal of establishing clear lines of communications for negotiations. These negotiations protect national interests or advance them as well as can be done and often our negotiations achieve something more valuable—the advancement of mutual interests.

I feel that in the long run the program types have more

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to fear from admin than the other way around.

Mechanization for example. It can be great or it can be a monster. It depends upon how well the people who design and control the machines apply two principles: (1) Machines should work—people should think; (2) Machines exist to serve people and not vice versa. Machine systems are successful when the designers ask the substantive personnel what they want from the machine. As a corollary Washington should ask the posts what the post wants. (There was such a questionnaire about 18 months ago but I don't know what resulted from it.)

Mechanization of payroll and disbursing for me on balance has been good. Although communication between producer (Wash.) and user (individual at post) has become difficult simply because "you're there and I'm here," the development for me as post budget and fiscal type has enable me to devote more time to budget and less to fiscal (accounting, payroll, and disbursing). This is good and some of us budget and fiscal types may yet develop into budget-management officers as some of our job titles read.

Mechanization brings centralization to mind. Is centralization good? It depends. I regard the ideal as one of centralizing work and decentralizing decision-making. As an example, both common sense and neoclassical marginal productivity economic theory agree that in areas where labor is plentiful but machinery scarce it is wise to use relatively large inputs of labor. Washington may and should dictate certain goals which a post must accomplish but allow the post which knows its local conditions to select its own methods. The CASP is probably a healthy development in this area in that it is a clear and systematic statement of general goals that ARA wants posts to accomplish and asks the posts to state its methods. Once Washington starts giving unsolicited advice or orders to a post concerning methods, the CASP will degenerate but so far I do not believe that this has been the trend.

Unfortunately, the Department seldom asks posts for comments on proposed administrative changes. That should be done much more often. (An encouraging sign—CA/PER some months ago surveyed fiscal personnel about a new system of long-range assignment.)

Another improvement would be the requirement that all officers in State Department Washington at junior management levels and up be encouraged during their careers to spend at least two two-year tours overseas at small posts—class 3 and 4. This proposal neither emasculates the GS corps nor is it vindictive. It simply states that a man in Washington cannot appreciate conditions at overseas posts unless he has spent some time there *responsible for a job at that post* and not simply as a Washington visitor. GS people working for the Foreign Service agencies should be sent overseas occasionally with a guarantee of a return to a comparable Washington job. This is nothing new—DOD for years now has been sending civilians overseas on this basis, and USAIDs are staffed with many a PASA person.

So, Professor Mason, the emphasis should not only be on training people to adapt to the organization: there is still room for good people working well together to get the organization to adapt to people.

Santo Domingo

JIM YOUNG

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*The international scene was witness once before, in the 19th century setting of Europe, to a concert of powers.*

# THE NIXON FOREIGN POLICY: Toward a New Concert of Powers

DR. CURTIN WINSOR, JR.

**T**HE past year was an election year distinguished not by charismatic personalities but rather by the divergence of views of the candidates. Now that the record and presumably the views of President Nixon have been affirmed by the American people, it seems in order that we should examine some considerations of what they may bring us in the future.

During the past four years, the Nixon policies went far in clearing away the debris which has littered the international landscape since the final days of World War II. Policies and styles have been adopted which have averted crisis and the need for crisis diplomacy. The sterility of the nuclear arms race has been demon-

strated, though the importance of nuclear capability and the maintenance of a nuclear stand-off between the United States and the USSR continue to be a matter of policy as well as of fact. We have seen a determination evinced by the Nixon Administration to achieve step-by-step nuclear disarmament through the maintenance of strategic equality—a course of safety and thoroughness rather than dramatic breakthroughs. Even the Vietnam War, which historians may call America's test of national maturity, seems to be fitfully subsiding. From where I sit, there is a sense of happening—of passage—a transition from one era to another.

The first term of the Nixon Presidency has thus set the stage by clearing away the Cold War and the tenacious confusions which arose during and after World War II.

Now, as we look forward to four more years of the Nixon policies, we may expect to see the gradual construction of a new international system. By way of analogy, one might say that the first term cleared the land and laid the foundations upon which a new international structure can arise.

The work of the first term is by no means completed. But the momentum of these achievements is cumulative, and it seems probable the second stage will arise even as the first continues. A basic theme of this process will be a shift of priority in the conduct of foreign policy from the realm of political-military affairs to that of political-economic affairs. Military considerations will by no means be removed or static. But the consent of the two principal possessors of military might to rest at strategic equality will set the stage for a truly multi-lateral world system—a concert of powers.

This emerging international system will operate at two levels, a level of world interests and a level of regional interests. At the level of world interests, we have the "world powers," which may include several nations of Western Europe, Japan, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. These nations are so designated because they have present or foreseeable interests throughout the globe. Their interests are, to varying degrees, interlinked. These "linkages" have already come to be, more or less, mutually understood and respected, a process which has led to an era of crisis-prevention at the "world" level.

This emerging concert of powers is not limited to direct relations among the "world" powers. It manifests itself also in several regions of strategic importance to these powers, where key regional powers play important roles and have the ability to affect notably the interests of the world powers as well as the stability of the given region. This is the case of Israel in the Middle East, India in South Asia, and a number of countries in the vast Pacific area. These areas and, to a much lesser extent, Africa and Latin America, have heretofore been focal points of rival great-power interests which in turn have greatly exacerbated regional instabilities. There has thus been a kind

*The author, a former FSO, is Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Republican National Committee for International Relations and National Security Affairs.*

of self-fueling mechanism for both regional and global mischief. (Recent cases in point being the Indo-Pak War of 1971 and, in a far more complex manner, the Indochinese wars.)

While it is too soon to declare that the post World War II era is altogether gone and forgotten, it does appear that as the concert of powers emerges and military issues diminish, world diplomacy is turning increasingly to matters of an economic character. Trade has increased, new international economic patterns are taking shape, new interests are being forged. New problems also are arising, of course. The sheer growth of modern technologies has created pressures unknown in previous eras. (It is interesting to note that ninety-five (95) percent of all scientists ever born are still alive today.) And yet, the commonality of these problems works, at least in some ways, toward the creation of a new international system.

Uncontrolled expenditure of the earth's resources is a matter of international concern as we become increasingly aware of our planet's finite character. The growing menace of world-wide pollution of the air, waters and lands is rapidly becoming a matter of diplomatic urgency. The dramatic problems of the planet's wild-life are a matter of grave concern. There is the plight of its ocean mammals, for example, and the problem of fishing industries which can drive whole species, once dependent upon reproduction in vast numbers, to extinction in several generations. (*Vide* the Atlantic herring, the yellow-tail flounder, and the Atlantic salmon.) But new technologies have opened up areas for positive cooperation as well as need for controls. The exploration of outer space and underspace have opened new doors in this respect, as has the field of medical research. All of these diverse considerations and imperatives are contributing pressures toward the emergence of the new concert of powers.

As the bi-polarity of the post-World War II environment becomes history and gives way to diverse interests in an essentially economic world system, we can also foresee a better environment for the nations south of the Equator. Continents

***"Today's diplomacy spans continents and is no longer the province of Europeans, though Europe continues to be a factor at the world-peace level. This diplomacy encompasses the cultures of East and West. It spans ideologies and it spans races."***

which were once the semi-exclusive preserve of a single world power or even a few are opening up to more multi-lateral trade. By way of example, Latin America, once largely an economic province of the United States, now enjoys increased interest from Europe and Japan. Africa, once the province of France and Britain, is now becoming increasingly of interest to the United States.

The international scene was witness once before, in the 19th-century setting of Europe, to a concert of powers, which grew out of the turmoil of the Napoleonic wars. The kings and princes of that era sorted out their personal aims and managed to harmonize them—largely under the genial guidance of Prince Metternich—for a century; and the system perished only with the onset of the First World War. But theirs was a system of men and human interests and understandings that was limited to the dimension of a single continent, and set in an era of individualistic diplomacy. In that era, Prince Metternich sustained a semblance of balance by dint of his personality and the commonality of such problems as the industrial revolution and the emergence of bourgeois interests.

In today's world, President Nixon has sought to clear away the obfuscations of the Cold War era and to coalesce the institutional interests of today's world-power governments, in much the same way as Britain's policies and Metternich's skills achieved a concert in the 19th Century. But there is a great difference in the two worlds. Today's international relations are conducted by more broadly-based bureaucracies—even when there is a strong element of personal leadership at the top—and these in turn reflect vast coalitions

of interests which include multinational corporations and some transnational interests. But national interests remain the predominant factors in today's diplomacy, and these are still defined by national bureaucracies and their constituent interest groups.

Today's diplomacy spans continents and is no longer the province of Europeans, though Europe continues to be a factor at the world-power level. This diplomacy encompasses the cultures of East and West. It spans ideologies, and it spans races. All of these factors were non-existent in the era of Prince Metternich.

In the four years which are yet to come, the Nixon foreign policy may emerge as both architect and prospective tenant in this evolving concert of powers. We have witnessed the Nixon diplomacy which prevents crisis and de-emphasizes military considerations in favor of economic ones. Perhaps we will also witness the end of the bi-polar political-military era that followed World War II. We will see it give way to the multi-lateralism which is emerging from an era of increased and broadened world trade. This tendency will be further encouraged by the need to protect the planet's environment and to join in scientific endeavors for the betterment of the species. And from these considerations perhaps even the flow of ideas may grow along with trade and scientific cooperation. The evolving world order will be a less personal one than Metternich's. It will represent broad and impersonal coalitions of interests. But, for this very reason, it may endure to give our children and their children the basis for generations of peace. ■

# the REAL ills of the Foreign Service



*"... if you take any hallucinogen  
or any mood changing drug and give it on a  
regular basis to a young individual  
this is going to have some effect on the  
maturing process."*

*Following a term of office which was marked by greatly expanded medical coverage and service for the Foreign Service and the Department, Dr. George I. Mishtowt recently retired as Director of the Office of Medical Services.*

*He was interviewed by a member of the JOURNAL board, Ralph Stuart Smith.*

**Smith:** The Foreign Service has been called a "hazardous profession." Would you put it in a class with sword-swallowing or high-wire work?

**Mishtowt:** I wouldn't say it's particularly hazardous, but it does have some built-in problems. . . .

**Smith:** What have been the major causes of long-term hospitalization?

**Mishtowt:** In the late '50s and early '60s it was chronic infectious hepatitis. Since we started the gamma globulin program, that has almost disappeared. In the middle and late '60s, it was car accidents—the same thing as in the United States, but

compounded by unfamiliarity with driving conditions in other countries. That seems to have tapered off. More recently, it has been drugs and psychiatric problems—not employees but dependents. . . . But long-term hospitalization, of course, is not necessarily an index of the most common problems.

**Smith:** Right. In any case I think the popular image I referred to relates more to psychological factors: broken homes, alcohol, and things generally coming apart. . . .

**Mishtowt:** In a way it's strange: American society is so mobile . . . and yet, breaking roots here and moving abroad is often traumatic. For some people, frequent moves thereafter are even more so—especially when there is prolonged separation from children because of education. There are some families that just don't stand up under this, and so the husband finds himself under heavy pressure to leave the

Foreign Service.

**Smith:** You mean, the wives . . .

**Mishtowt:** I don't mean to put all the blame on the wives, by any means. A number of officers simply don't find job-satisfaction; and others have told me that they too were concerned with the frequent moves, especially where education problems were involved. You see the role that children play in this. There is also the "re-entry phenomenon." Many American Foreign Service children evolve fantasies about their own country—so that when they finally return home they may have serious problems of re-entry into American society and the American school system.

**Smith:** Getting back to the parents, what about alcohol?

**Mishtowt:** The Foreign Service has no monopoly on alcoholism, of course. But with all the obligatory receptions and what-not, alcohol is obviously a "way of life" in the diplomatic community. And with scotch at \$1.50 a bottle, exposure to alcohol is not exactly a rare phenomenon. I think "exposure" is the key word. We began to try a frank and direct approach to this problem some ten years ago; but people, including the United States Government, just weren't ready for it. There were no formal programs for this kind of approach in the federal service. The Civil Service Commission had not come out with any programs or policies on alcoholism. So we kept our program pretty much *sub rosa* for a while. But now of course this is all changed. There is the Alcohol Rehabilitation Act, which enjoins all government agencies to address this problem aggressively. Since July 1 of 1972, in fact, we have had a section of our office devoted to this, and we hope we will be able to provide much more help in the field than we were able to heretofore. In this connection, we are trying to encourage use of the AA — and interestingly enough, there are AA chapters in almost every major city in the World. We're trying to coordinate activities with the AA in this regard. We're also trying to impress on supervisors abroad that when an employee has this problem they should address it directly and not just sweep it under the rug or recommend that

the employee be transferred to Washington or another post. The supervisor has a responsibility for talking to the employee and referring him to the appropriate facilities—medical, AA, or otherwise—for help.

**Smith:** Realistically speaking, do you think an employee would go to his counselor or minister for help? Wouldn't he be afraid of a stigma on this record?

**Mishtowt:** It's certainly true that over the years individuals have not approached their superiors in embassies for help; nor, in many cases, have they approached us for help, because they were afraid this would hurt their careers. But more recently we have had many more people come to us. I could specifically name—but of course will not—individuals who have been "reformed alcoholics" for a number of years and have been holding down important and senior positions overseas with no difficulty.

**Smith:** What about hard drugs among Foreign Service children?

**Mishtowt:** As I mentioned, psychiatric illness is now the major cause of long-term hospitalization. Ten years ago it was virtually unknown for us to have a dependent adolescent in a mental hospital for any period of time; and now it's not unusual for us to have five to ten—though by no means all drug-related—at any given time, many of them hospitalized for six months to two years. I'm sure that these problems we meet are a direct extension of what is happening in our society in the United States. But there are certain differences, and these relate to the ease of obtaining drugs overseas, and their cheapness. There are many countries where there are virtually no controls over barbiturates or opiates . . . One can go into the drug store and ask for anything on the shelf, and it will be dispensed without a prescription. Of course, it's also true that the THC—or tetrahydrocannabinol—content of pot and hash varies enormously from one place to another. In India, for example, it is ultra-high compared to the United States, where the material has been cut so many times to make a profit for the middleman.

**Smith:** Do you think that young Americans are somehow more sus-

ceptible, a more ready prey, than other young people?

**Mishtowt:** On the contrary, I'm afraid it is just a matter of time before some of the others "catch up." It depends on the region, of course. Up to now we have had little or no problem with American adolescents in Central or Latin America, and I believe this is simply a reflection of local conditions; but I don't know how long it will stay that way.

**Smith:** You have spoken about drugs and FS children. How about the parents?

**Mishtowt:** I don't know of any Foreign Service employee who has been involved in the use of heroin. We have had rare cases of employees who have self-medicated themselves with amphetamines or barbiturates, and we have had to evacuate them and help them. But the problem is essentially with the young people. This is an area in which we are working very actively. We have a full-time psychiatrist who is working with the dependents' school system, with the President's Special Action Group, with the Department of Defense and their programs, and he is trying to start programs of preventive education in our schools overseas.

**Smith:** Would you say that the use of hard drugs among FS children is on the rise or leveling off?

**Mishtowt:** We are seeing more cases now, but I think this is at least partly due to the fact that word has gotten around that we are trying to help families with this problem, that we are able to provide some assistance. So there are more families coming forward now. In spite of this, I think that the actual inci-

dence of the problem probably has leveled off.

**Smith:** I think that young people would draw a very sharp distinction between marijuana and hard drugs. Would you agree with this?

**Mishtowt:** I would agree that marijuana should not be in the same class with the hard drugs. A lot has to be learned about marijuana; but the amount of active ingredient in it, as generally available in the US, is such that there is very little physiological or psychological effect from it. On the other hand, when you get potent pot or hash, with significant concentrations of THC, it is an hallucinogen. So when young people say that pot doesn't hurt, I will agree because most of the pot that is available has so little THC in it that there's very little in the way of real psychological or physiological effects.

**Smith:** If marijuana were legalized, wouldn't it be possible to control the strength of it?

**Mishtowt:** You have to remember that the plant, in the US, is practically ubiquitous, and therefore almost impossible to control . . .

**Smith:** But if the sale of marijuana were legalized, would you not have the advantage that standard brands would come onto the market, so that the buyer would know, just from looking at the package, that the dosage wasn't excessive?

**Mishtowt:** Yes, definitely, there would be that advantage; but the question remains as to who is going to use it. I'm oversimplifying the problem a bit, but . . . if you take any hallucinogen, or any mood-changing drug, and give it on a reg-

*Continued on page 33*

For some time the American community in Bangkok has suffered from a serious situation which involves the rather widespread use of heroin by American adolescents, US Government personnel and others.

MED, in cooperation with Defense and the Special Action Office for Drug Abuse Prevention (SAODAP) in the Executive Office of the President, has now set up a treatment and rehabilitation facility in Bangkok. On Jan. 15, 1973 a team of four drug treatment and training specialists, consultants to SAODAP, landed at Bangkok and started treating patients and recruiting local paraprofessional personnel.

The first 12 months of operation will be completely funded by SAODAP, after which the facility will probably be operated as a shared administrative support arrangement under the auspices of an employees association.

This is a community problem and the community agreed in several meetings in early November to support wholeheartedly this type of program, under the control of the Ambassador. It will be the first type of facility of this kind ever established overseas.

AFSA welcomes the Department's response to this problem and lends its full support to MED'S efforts in this field.

In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance.—U.S. Foreign Policy, by Walter Lippmann

# HOW CHINA MAKES ITS FOREIGN POLICY

ROSS TERRILL

LIGHTS burn late in the new cream-brick block which houses China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After the Cultural Revolution, the number of personnel at the Ministry was slashed by almost one-half. Those who remain must work fantastic hours to cope with a swelling volume of business. Some work who are too tired and ill to work, like Vice Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua this past summer. Some who speak a Western tongue fluently must punctuate policy work with translating tasks. "Peking wives"—it occurred to me—must have even more to put up with than "Washington wives." (I say "wife," but in fact the Chinese no longer use the established word for wife, *'ai-t'ai*"; they use *"ai-jen,"* "lover," for spouse or amorous friend alike.)

Yet morale is high. Officials are naturally encouraged that their Ministry has become as much a focus of attention as any foreign ministry in the world. The more so because it firmly relegates to an unlamented past the period of 1966-1967 when

the Chinese foreign policy establishment was very nearly derailed by a hot avalanche of ultraleftism. Ch'en Yi, the Foreign Minister at that time, was harassed and "supervised" so unrelentingly by Red Guards that Mao eventually declared: "How can Ch'en be struck down? He has been with us forty years and has so many achievements. He has lost twenty-seven pounds in weight. I cannot show him to foreign guests in this condition."

Ch'en Yi no longer works on foreign policy, but it does not seem that he has been purged. A senior Chinese military man, when it was remarked to him by a European ambassador that Ch'en's going was a "loss," replied with a broad smile: "Your loss is our gain." One of China's true military experts, Ch'en Yi, though seriously ill, has probably been working on high military matters. He resurfaced last summer as a vice chairman of the top Military Affairs Committee.\* Of other high officials in the Ministry, it is remarkable how few were blown away by the storms of the Cultural Revolution. In 1967, the two Vice Ministers most assailed by the zealots were Chi P'eng-fei and Ch'iao Kuan-

hua. Yet how little the huffing and puffing availed. Today, Chi is Acting Foreign Minister, and Ch'iao is the Vice Minister in charge of Western affairs and top man at the UN for the 1971 session.

At one point in the struggle of the Cultural Revolution, 91 senior men in the Ministry put up a manifesto backing Ch'en Yi against those who reviled him as "poison" and classified him as "bourgeois." Almost every responsible man one meets in the Ministry today is one of the 91, as are most of the ambassadors who have been flying out to occupy new posts and dust down old ones. I often talked with one official, of middle age, as much a scholar as a diplomat. Like his wife, he is a graduate of Yen-ching University. His home is as well furnished with books as his mind is with ideas. I asked if the zealots (in conversation they were always called *"chi-tso-fen-tzu,"* "ultraleftists") had tried to get at his books. For there was a bit of "book burning" in 1967. Self-appointed maestros passed the wand of ideology over certain works, and pronounced even gold to be dress. "No," he answered with an expression that gave nothing away. And if they had come? "If they had quoted Chairman Mao to me, I would have quoted other parts of Chairman

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\* Ch'en Yi died of cancer in early January, 1972.

Mao to them—and I would have won.” (Remarkable was the diplomat’s belief in the power of persuasion, in the importance of the correct Word. But you find it everywhere in China. The Chinese apparently have not, like many in the West, from the greatest philosophers to the hippie at the corner, lost confidence that reason and conduct are related.)

We find continuities in the history of new China’s foreign policy community that rival Andrei Gromyko and J. Edgar Hoover. There have been only two regular Foreign Ministers in the regime’s 22 years. Most of China’s senior diplomats come from a small circle of negotiators and propagandists who cut their teeth on four diplomatic operations prior to Liberation. First, a liaison group headed by Chou En-lai at the Nationalist capital of Hankow (and after Hankow fell to the Japanese, at Chungking); second, a branch outfit at Kweilin which put out a news service. A third knot worked out of Hong Kong; Ch’iao Kuan-hua distinguished himself there. Fourth, the Chinese Communist party was represented on the “truce teams” which the Marshall Mission operated in North China and Manchuria. Huang Hua, the present ambassador to the UN, was an active part of the Marshall Mission machinery. He ran the information work at the Mission’s Executive Headquarters in Peking. Many of China’s senior diplomats are Averell Harrimans of the East, their resilient careers interlaced with decades of their country’s (or Party’s) foreign policy.

What does the Chinese foreign policy machine consist of? It is small by US standards—the Foreign Ministry has no more than a thousand people—but not simple. Chou En-lai as Premier heads the State Council. It is a kind of cabinet at the pinnacle of the state administration. Its well-staffed corridors include a Staff Office for Foreign Affairs. The Foreign Minister feeds to this office—for the benefit of Chou and his staff—papers from his Ministry. Into the Staff Office also goes material from the “international liaison” section of the Party Secretariat of the Chinese Communist party. This section may well be extremely important, especially for re-

lations with Communist countries, but the visitor learns nothing about it.

The Ministry itself seems in some ways a very conventional place. You cannot altogether wonder that the zealots of 1966-1967 considered it a “bourgeois” island cut adrift from the seething Maoist mainland. Diplomatic procedures are much as in a European foreign ministry. There are ambassadors, and there are third secretaries; commercial counselors and military attachés. Very few become ambassadors who have not been career diplomats for many years. Secret files exist. Zealots briefly challenged this practice in 1967, one crying out as he rifled the files on May 13, “What’s so terrific about secrets? To hell with them.” Yet the attempt in the middle of the Cultural Revolution to transform the style of Chinese foreign policy in the end went little further than frills

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like what clothes to wear and how many courses to serve at diplomatic dinners.

One important change in organization did occur (beyond the cutting down in size). A Revolutionary Committee now runs the Ministry, and several sources style it a quite effective example of this new kind of organ. It is chaired by Chi P’eng-fei, top man among the Vice Ministers, and Acting Foreign Minister. But the second and third figures in the Revolutionary Committee are not Vice Ministers. They are People’s Liberation Army men (Li Yao-wen, Ma Wen-po). At a banquet given late in June by the diplomatic corps, to thank the Ministry for the recent diplomatic tour of various provinces, it was made clear in the ways the Chinese make these things clear that Mr. Li and Mr. Ma ranked above Ch’iao Kuan-hua and other Vice Ministers. So the Army

has found its way to the highest levels of the Foreign Ministry. What looks like genuine collective leadership has been set up in the Revolutionary Committee. It is quite different from the days when Ch’en Yi ran the Ministry with brusque authority. PLA men and Vice Ministers work things out together. The amiable and somewhat reticent Chi is no strong man. Having set this new pattern and found it good, China may not appoint a really strong successor to Ch’en Yi for some time.

Geographic groupings within the Ministry have altered interestingly over the years. The original tendency in 1949 to divide the world into “socialist countries” and “the rest” has totally gone. In those days one Vice Minister, Wang Chia-hsiang, looked after the Communist bloc and another, Chang Han-fu, spanned everything else. Gone, too, is the inclusion of the Asian Communist states in the same department as the European Communist states. Later they formed a separate and important department of their own. Preferring to salute the future rather than reflect the present, Peking included the affairs of Laos and Cambodia with “Asian Communist states.”

Since the Cultural Revolution brought a severe pruning of the Ministry, there is now a single department for “Asia,” Communist and non-Communist states together. The other geographic departments are West Asia and Africa (this starts west of Afghanistan); East Europe (including the USSR); the West. This last department takes in not only the United States, but West Europe and Australia and New Zealand. But it has a quite powerful Deputy Director heading an America-Australasia subdepartment Mr. Mr. Ling Ching) and another (Mr. T’ang Hai-kuang) heading a West Europe subdepartment. In addition to these geographic departments, the Foreign Ministry contains five functional departments: Information, Protocol, Personnel, Treaty and Legal, and General Affairs.

Outside Peking are officials who work in the “foreign affairs section” of each province’s Revolutionary Committee. These people, twenty or thirty strong in the provinces I visited, deferred on all nonlocal points

to the Foreign Ministry people who traveled with me from Peking. They have no policy role, and concentrate on receiving foreign visitors with charm and informed conversation. One in Canton had dug up a fact about Australia that few Australians know. "Oh, you are from Melbourne," he remarked the morning he met me at the Canton train station. "It is, of course, the former capital, in the days before Canberra was built." There is little point in talking about foreign affairs to most of these provincial foreign affairs officials. They seem to specialize in what might be called the "kangaroo" or "fauna and flora" aspects of foreign lands. ("China has never had a Prime Minister drown in the sea, as your Prime Minister did in 1967.") But they can give the visitor data about their province.

Officially separate from the Foreign Ministry are a number of "people's organizations" essential to the conduct of Chinese foreign policy. Their personnel circulate like satellites in the outer orbit of the Ministry. One of these bodies is the People's Institute for Foreign Affairs. It was for years a mysterious body until it surfaced last summer. It receives ex-statesmen, such as Clement Attlee in 1954 or the ex-President of Mexico some years later, and it receives people "who are not governmental but too distinguished to come to China in an ordinary way." Its former research function has in recent years been "neglected." Only a dozen people work full time at its offices now. Its directors are mostly former ambassadors or distinguished professors, many of them extremely able, most of them fairly old.

The Chairman of the Institute, Chang Hsi-jo, is a former Minister of Education and one of China's most prominent non-Party intellectuals. Chatting with him at banquets and receptions, I found myself in yesterday's spacious, languid world. The patrician head of well-groomed white hair, the silk clothes, the polished walking stick which he wields with authority, suggest an Oriental aristocrat from the pages of Somerset Maugham. Here is a man who participated in the 1911 revolution and went soon after to study in London, yet who is part of Mao's foreign policy establishment in the

post-Red Guard era. The elegance and cultivation are matched by a certain strength reserved for occasions of need. During the Hundred Flowers period in the spring of 1957, Professor Chang assailed the Chinese Communist party for having "contempt for the past" and a "blind belief in the future." He is still capable of caustic comment on bureaucrats, and gentle irony about ideologists who talk as if they had history's agenda tucked in an inside pocket.

We discussed political science, which he studied at Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and taught for many years at Tsinghua and other leading Chinese universities. This meant neither the Thought of Mao nor computerized social science. In the warm Peking afternoon, banners of Mao's quotations above us, we talked about the ideas of Harold Laski, Graham Wallas, and A. L. Lowell! Required by the occasion one evening to allude to Australia, Professor Chang managed to recall two famous Australian tennis players he had once watched play in New York. It was "people's diplomacy" of a casual and catholic kind. You could mistake Chang for a retired professor presiding over a lawn tennis association, rather than a retired professor presiding over Chinese Communist semiofficial diplomacy.

Another finger on the hand of Chinese diplomacy is the Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries. It deals with notable foreigners who seem well-disposed toward China. I never found out where its offices are. Its leaders are like a heavenly host making appearances but having no known abode. You can sometimes get from them illuminating, informal explanations of Peking's foreign policy line. Edgar Snow had given me a letter of introduction to an Association figure. One morning I got into a taxi at the Hsin Ch'iao Hotel to deliver it. The driver said he did not know where the offices of this body were. He went into the staff booth to inquire. Sitting in the taxi, I watched a series of consultations in the staff booth. Twenty minutes later a Luxingshe aide came out of the hotel and said I was wanted on the phone. It was the Foreign Ministry. Could I

come immediately? Postponing the delivery of the letter, I drove instead to the Ministry. We had a "business meeting" about my program, none of it of an immediate character. Eventually the subject of Snow's letter of introduction to a leader of the Association was broached. Just what was this letter? I explained its harmless nature. "We will deliver it for you." So I handed it over. Three days later when the Association figure gave a lunch for me at the Peking Hotel, a Foreign Ministry official was present throughout our four hours of conversation. Liaison between the Ministry and the Association is clearly close. Maybe the Ministry would like it to be even closer.

These semiofficial agencies of the Chinese foreign policy establishment—others include the Overseas Chinese Commission, the Friendship Associations between China and various nations, the Council for the Promotion of International Trade—are led by a fascinating array of able and experienced diplomats. You find they are finely tuned to the Foreign Ministry. Yet they have a flexibility which makes them better gatherers of information on the world, and better defenders of the Chinese position, than many diplomats in the formal structure of the Ministry.

Wang Kuo-chuan, ambassador to Poland in the mid-1960s, now does important work on Japan questions from a base in the China-Japan Friendship Association. Li Shu-teh, an economist on the Council for the Promotion of International Trade, played a key role in talks with Mr. Whitlam about trade between China and Australia. When the Trade Minister had a session with Whitlam, he was accompanied by a deputy director of his ministry, and by Mr. Li. Similarly, in the session with the Foreign Minister there was present one senior Ministry aide and also one aide from the world of semiofficial diplomacy: Ling Ching, head of American-Australian affairs in the Ministry, together with Chou Chiu-yeh, a former ambassador now prominent in the People's Institute of Foreign Affairs.

In short, the Chinese foreign policy machine is like an orchestra of diverse instruments. Now a drum is

*Continued on page 28*

**J**OHAN PAUL VANN was rarely spoken of except in superlatives. He was described at one time or another as the brightest, the brashest, the most knowledgeable, the hardest-working, the bravest, the most abrasive American in Vietnam. He was certainly the most tenacious: by the end he had spent some eleven years in Indochina. Through it all his was the analysis of the war that was most right most times. He lived long enough to hear himself called a near-legend, and he seemed unable to forget what kind of performance that led people to expect from him. Once at a party in Can Tho I heard him shout into the bridgework of two Washington visitors that he fully expected to die in bed. He was killed, instead, this past June 9th, in a fiery helicopter crash, at night, flying from his headquarters in Pleiku to Kontum, then under siege. His 48th birthday was less than a month away.

The characteristics that carried John Vann from a poor Virginia boyhood to a position of high influence in the longest war our country ever fought are not hard to catalogue. Nervous, skeptical intelligence. Incessant self-discipline. A willingness to take large—although well-calibrated—bureaucratic risks. Almost superhuman staying power. (He normally slept four hours a night, but often settled for three in times of crisis.) All this at the service of an ambition whose horizons were being constantly expanded.

Perhaps the most telling indication of the intensity of Vann's drive is the contrast between him and the others who helped fashion our policies in Vietnam. Many of them were brilliant, well-connected men, American aristocrats: McGeorge and William Bundy, Ellsworth Bunker, Henry Cabot Lodge, Maxwell Taylor. Others, like Robert McNamara, Robert Komer, Henry Kissinger, and Creighton Abrams, boasted impressive careers. John Vann, on the other hand, was by birth a redneck, by training a flyer and guerrilla war expert, and by instinct and breeding a military man. Yet by 1968 Dr. Henry Kissinger was reading Vann's

*From a speech given December 5, 1972, by Lucy Wright at the Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia.*

*"For close to ten years in Vietnam, Vann displayed an unyielding moral toughness and integrity as well as physical bravery of the first order." Foreign Service JOURNAL, August, 1972*

# JOHN PAUL VANN

PORTRAIT  
OF AN  
ACTIVIST

LACY WRIGHT

ideas on US withdrawal from Vietnam and the phased turnover of the war to the South Vietnamese, and later Kissinger gave Vann credit for being the primary architect of Vietnamization. Vann was accepted by men like Kissinger and McNamara and Komer because he was as good

as they were at the techniques—like statistical analysis—that they prized. And he knew Vietnam as did no other American.

Vann first went to Vietnam in 1960 as an Army Lieutenant Colonel, and his career there rather neatly divides itself into four parts. The first of these—and Vann's Army days—lasted until 1963. During this period he was advisor to the Vietnamese Army's 7th Division, based at My Tho in the Delta. These were the beginnings of our involvement, the days of President Diem, General Harkins, the Strategic Hamlet Program, and official American optimism. Vann was one of several dissenting voices: he charged that the Vietnamese were not fighting but evading, that reports were being falsified, and that our side—far from winning the war—was losing it, and at a rapid pace. Vann soon found that the American command in Saigon was not interested in what he and his fellow dissenters (Colonel Wilbur Wilson was one, Colonel Fred Ladd another) had to say. People like David Halberstam of the New York TIMES, however, were interested, and much of the information for Halberstam's Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "Making of a Quagmire," came directly from Vann. When Vann's tour came to an end in 1963, both the American and Vietnamese leadership in Saigon considered him an upstart and a troublemaker; and when he arrived back in Washington, the responsible men in the Pentagon did not ask for his views. Some of his Army friends succeeded in getting him scheduled to brief the Joint Chiefs, but this was squelched at the last moment by Maxwell Taylor (according to the account of Halberstam and others). So John Vann, who loved the Army and would always remain a military man above all, resigned his commission and went to work—at a much higher salary—for the Martin-Marietta Corporation in Denver, Colorado.

By early 1965, however, Vann was back in Vietnam as a civilian working for AID, beginning the second part of his involvement there. He was assigned the number two American job in Hau Nghia province in III Corps. Hau Nghia was not only a dangerous place—which Vann no doubt welcomed—but an

obscure one—which, I suspect, he did not. Again, he was critical of the way things were being done, complaining, for example, of the indiscriminating tactics being used by the newly-introduced American combat units, such as free fire zones. At the same time, substantial and visible progress was beginning to be seen in Hau Nghia. His superiors were begrudgingly impressed.

It was in III Corps that Vann met Daniel Ellsberg, when the latter was working for Secretary McNamara. One chapter of Ellsberg's "Papers on the War" recounts a trip around Hau Nghia with Vann and describes his massively detailed knowledge of the province. Ellsberg was impressed with Vann's ideas on how the war should be fought, and urged McNamara and others to pay more attention to him. Gradually, Vann's viewpoint was gaining acceptance.

In late 1967, however, Vann was in trouble again. His continuously pessimistic reports from the field contradicted the news of progress being disseminated from our Embassy and top military commanders. He told me later that it was suggested to him then that perhaps he ought to resign. His superiors wanted a team player, not a prima donna who kept telling them they were wrong.

Then came Tet '68. It was a turning point for Vann. There were no more suggestions that he resign (he had, after all, tried to tell them it was coming), and, more significantly, his conviction that time (and everything else) was on the side of the communists was completely reversed. He felt the other side had risked all and lost: they had sacrificed irreplaceable numbers of their best field commanders; they had alienated the South Vietnamese population by causing widespread suffering, at the holiest time of the Vietnamese year; and, most important of all, their attack had jarred the South Vietnamese into taking some of the measures—like mobilization—that they should have adopted long before. (In later years Vann rarely let a visitor escape without giving him the surprising information that it was not until 1968—three years after we had started sending combat draftees to Vietnam—that the Vietnamese began draft-

ing their own 18-year olds.) So Vann's whole outlook changed after Tet, not because he decided he had been wrong before, but because he believed the other side had blundered so badly that now the Saigon government stood a chance of winning.

During his time in III Corps Vann continued to add to his already large personal reputation. The Tet attacks afforded him a number of chances to play the role he liked best—that of a hero. (Not content, by the way, with courting danger in the line of duty, he flirted with it in his off hours as well: in the middle of every night of the Tet fighting, he once told me, he drove alone from Bien Hoa to Saigon to see his girl friend.) He continued, too, to inform the press (or shoot off his mouth to reporters, depending on your point of view) about the way the war was going.

One such interview—with Peter Arnett of AP—cost him, he said, the top American job in the Delta, that of Corps Senior Advisor, which he said had finally been promised him. He gave Arnett a long discourse on how well pacification was proceeding in III Corps (where he was by now the Senior Advisor's Deputy for CORDS), but tacked on to it his views on how mistakenly the United States Army was fighting the war and how much wiser it would be to start turning it over to the Vietnamese themselves. Arnett ignored the good news and printed the complaint, even though Vann had told him it was off the record. According to Robert Komer, who spoke of the incident recently, General Abrams was furious. Komer, who imitated Abrams' loud, high-pitched whine, quoted him as saying: "I don't mind that he criticized me. Everybody criticizes the Commander. What gets me is that he did it in quotes!"

So when John Vann went to the Delta in early 1969, to begin the third phase of his Vietnam career, he was not Corps Senior Advisor but, again, DepCORDS. It was in the Delta that I served as Vann's Polad. I remember meeting him for the first time at the airport in Can Tho, a surprisingly short, thin-haired, red-faced man with a raspy voice and eyes that perpetually squinted in the sun. His relationship

with my predecessor there had been distant, and my boss at the Embassy in Saigon was not sure that Vann wanted to continue the practice of having as his Polad a provincial reporter from the Embassy political section. Vann had said he wanted a Polad who worked only for *him*, and it was thought he might simply choose his own, and have nothing to do with the Embassy's man. But he had apparently reconsidered, because he shook my hand and welcomed me to IV Corps. For the first six months or so, however, he had little to do with me. It was not until I had gained some experience that I started to get to know him.

During the two years Vann spent in the Delta, the business of the day was pacification. CORDS, set up by Robert Komer in 1967 and now headed by William Colby, was at the height of its activity. American advisors were trying to show their Vietnamese counterparts how to defend hamlets, build bridges, grow better strains of rice, construct compost plants, and a good many other things. More basically—and with more difficulty—they were trying to convince the Vietnamese that they had an interest in helping government programs succeed. The CORDS advisors encountered graft, nepotism, tacit arrangements with the enemy, and a general reluctance on the part of all but a few to take the war any more seriously than was absolutely necessary at the moment. Yet progress was being made, more quickly than many had thought possible. Villages long sealed off to the government were re-entered, roads long considered unsafe were again heavily traveled. Orchestrating it all—supervising the 2000-odd CORDS Delta employees, swooping down with uncomfortable regularity on the 16 American province teams and 70-some district teams, sleeping two or three times a week at lonely outposts, haranguing famous and not-so-famous visitors as their chopper flitted low across the rice paddies and up the canals, belching statistics and exuding optimism—was John Vann. He was not Senior Advisor, but he was making do.

Vann was not an ideologue: he was not likely to be found lingering over coffee discussing Marxist-Leninist subtleties. I heard him say once

*Continued on page 30*

# CHINA and the FOREIGN SERVICE 1952

JANUARY

THE conclusion of the Loyalty Review Board that "there is a reasonable doubt" as to the loyalty of John S. Service is cause for grave disquiet among all members of the Foreign Service. The JOURNAL is thankful, therefore, that the full text of the latest official papers in the case have been made public. The Department's announcement of the findings of its own Loyalty Security Board and the findings of the Review Board have accordingly been mailed in advance to each JOURNAL subscriber. It behooves each of us to try to determine what, in fact, is rotten, since the charge of "rotten apple in the barrel" has already been raised on the hustings and will undoubtedly become louder.

The case turns on a freely admitted indiscretion nearly seven years ago in the transmittal of information of a non-public character to the editor of an American magazine, a journalist whose *bona fides* were inadequately examined. Nothing covert, no perjury by Mr. Service, no affiliation with any organization now suspect is involved. The information transmitted did not affect the national security but was of a "background" nature which, by direction of superiors, Mr. Service had provided to journalists in China to explain the political situation in which the United States was trying to bring all factions to contribute to the assault against Japan. The Review Board specifically asserts it does *not* find Service guilty of disloyalty. It merely concludes that "to say that his course of conduct does not raise a reasonable doubt as to Service's own loyalty would, we are forced to think, stretch the mantle of charity much too far." We note the phrase "forced to think."

The JOURNAL recognizes that forced thinking may be induced by events which are extraneous to the case, including 100,000 casualties in Korea and admittedly partisan pressures inherent in our Far East policy and related events. But we plead for objectivity. We respectfully suggest that the Review Board's present ruling was rendered in the light of conditions in 1951 rather than of 1944, the date of the indiscretion. We believe that judgment should be reached in consideration of American policy in that earlier time when we were allied with the Soviet Union and our military and diplomatic missions in China were under instructions to seek unification of Nationalist and Communist forces. We think, also, that Mr. Service's motives have withstood exhaustive scrutiny and are revealed as those of a loyal, devoted and effective government official who was guilty only of indiscre-

tion. Finally, we believe that the Review Board's judgment of what is punishment and what is charity fails to take into account the indelibility of a stain of doubtful loyalty in the case of an employee of the Foreign Service.

Article I of the Constitution states "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." While it may be that for the Foreign Service the Bill of Rights is partially suspended, the JOURNAL believes it wrong for actions to be taken within the Executive Branch contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and which would be precluded if taken by the Legislative Branch. We think the Review Board's attitude can be justified only by the precision of hindsight and is, in effect, an *ex post facto* ruling. The stigma of questionable loyalty when applied to an official dealing with foreign governments, one of which he impliedly favors over his native land, is a cause for ostracism and other disabilities so serious that the penalty becomes akin to attainder and hence unduly cruel and unjustified.

We hope the Review Board will give favorable consideration to Mr. Service's formal appeal for a reversal or reconsideration; if not, that prompt reference to the President will be possible; and that if all recourse to Administrative action should prove unavailing, the matter can be considered by the courts. For it is not only Jack Service and the Foreign Service that are victims in this matter. To the Department, the reversal implies that its Loyalty Security Board, despite carefully selected members and diligence in the examinations which preceded its decisions, is either inept or biased or both.

If the present decision in the Service case is permitted to stand without reference to the courts, one of two general conclusions—both damaging to the conduct of our foreign relations—can be expected to crystallize. One will be "Maybe McCarthy was right after all." For the more discerning it will be "It seems that the good, along with the bad, must be sacrificed to the clamor for blood."

The JOURNAL believes that there is a great deal at stake here for Service, the individual; for the Foreign Service as a group of dedicated government employees; for the Department in its heavy responsibilities of diplomacy; and for the American people and their heritage of justice. Every effort must be made in our collective self-defense to utilize all available means, including the courts, to make certain that justice prevails in the case of the loyalty of John S. Service to the United States.—  
*Foreign Service Journal, January, 1952*

# CHINA and the FOREIGN SERVICE 1973

JANUARY

*I believe that over the years the Foreign Service has consistently demonstrated that greatest loyalty a political leader can demand from a career service: complete and honest professionalism.*

*One of the best examples of this kind of loyalty was the performance of so many Foreign Service officers in China during World War II, and of others concerned with Chinese matters back in Washington.*

*I believe we have much to learn from the example of these men and from the history of their era. I am delighted to see a number of them in this room—Edmund Clubb, Robert Barnett, Fulton Freeman, John Service, Arthur Ringwalt, Walton Butterworth, and others. I am especially pleased that Mrs. John Carter Vincent could be with us. I wish others such as John Paton Davies, Edward Rice,*

*Raymond Ludden, John Melby, James Penfield, and Philip Sprouse could have joined us also.*

*President Nixon has opened a new and hopeful phase in the relations between the United States and China. This is a fitting moment to honor a generation of Foreign Service officers whose dedication and professional honesty was ill-paid by many of their countrymen.*

*To help us learn from the lessons of history, we are greatly honored to hear today from Barbara Tuchman and John Service. Mrs. Tuchman, as you all know, has twice won the Pulitzer Prize for her brilliant books, "The Guns of August" and "Stilwell and The American Experience in China, (1911-45)." She will introduce Mr. Service.—from the opening remarks of William C. Harrop, Chairman, Board of Directors, AFSA*



*Congressman James W. Symington greets John S. Service as Ambassador W. Averell Harriman looks on, at the AFSA luncheon for the "old China hands" on January 30 at the Department of State. As the Boston GLOBE wrote, "22 years later, the foreign policy establishment tacitly acknowledged its silence as a grave injustice and error, and paid belated homage to the man and some of his colleagues."*

## Why Policy Makers Do Not Listen

BARBARA TUCHMAN

**W**E have gathered to honor a group of Foreign Service officers—represented in the person of Jack Service—whom history has recognized as having been right; and not only history, but even, by act if not by acknowledgment, the present Administration. Can there be anyone among that group who reported from China during World War II who, watching an American president journey in person to Communist China in 1971, was not conscious of an irony so acute as to make him shiver? Could anyone, remembering past attitudes, look at that picture of President Nixon and Chairman Mao in twin armchairs, with slightly queasy smiles bravely worn to conceal their mutual discomfort, and not feel a stunned

sense that truth is indeed weirder than fiction? When I was young, the magazine VANITY FAIR used to publish a series called "Impossible Interviews" by the artist-cartoonist Covarubbias in which he confronted Calvin Coolidge with Greta Garbo and John D. Rockefeller Sr. with Stalin, but last year's meeting in Peking outdid Covarubbias.

Yet it could have happened 25 years earlier, sparing us and Asia immeasurable, and to some degree irreparable, harm, if American policy had been guided by the information and recommendations of the staff of the Chungking Embassy, then acknowledged to be the best informed service group in China. It included the Ambassador, Clarence Gauss, the Counselor, George

Atcheson, both deceased, and among the secretaries and consuls stationed all over China, besides Mr. Service, such men as John Paton Davies, Edward Rice, Arthur Ringwalt, Philip Sprouse, and alternately in the field and on the China Desk, Edmund Clubb and the late Carter Vincent. Several had been born in China, many were Chinese-speaking, and some are happily here with us today.

For having been right many of them were persecuted, dismissed, or slowed or blocked in their careers, with whatever damage done to them personally outweighed by damage done to the Foreign Service of the United States. No spectacle, Macaulay said, was so ridiculous as the British public in one of its periodic



*John Service at the podium as the guests rise in a standing ovation. Marshall Green, Mrs. Service and William C. Harrop, center front. From the Detroit News, "John Stewart Service has lived to see the day he thought he'd never see. . . . And it would be difficult to say who was more pleased—Service or the Foreign Service officials who dared put on the affair."*

*Historian Barbara Tuchman surrounded by some of the capacity crowd at the luncheon, of which an editorial in the Minneapolis TRIBUNE remarked, "History has recorded what happened to the official bearers of bad news from China. The purge that reached its sorry zenith in the McCarthy era shattered careers and deprived the US of some of its best government talent on China."*

fits of morality—and none, one might add, so mean as the American public in one of its periodic witch-hunts. Your colleagues and predecessors were hounded because able and honest performance of their profession collided with the hysterics of the cold war manipulated by a man so absolutely without principles as to be abnormal, like the man without a shadow. I shall not pursue that story now, however important it is to you and to every citizen, because what I want to get at is a problem perhaps more abiding, and that is, why these men were not listened to even before they were persecuted.

The burden of their reports taken as a whole was that Chiang Kai-shek was on the way out and the Com-



munists on the way in and that American policy, rather than cling in paralyzed attachment to the former, might be well advised to take this trend into account. This was implicit in reports from officers who had no contact with the Communists but were united in describing the deterioration of the Kuomintang. It was made explicit by those who saw the Communists at first hand, like Service in his remarkable reports from Yen-an, and Ludden who journeyed into the interior to observe the functioning of Communist rule, and Davies whose ear was everywhere. They were unequivocal in judging the Communists to be the dynamic party in the country; in Davies' words in 1944, "China's destiny was not Chiang's but theirs."

This was not subversion as our Red-hunters were to claim, but merely observation.

Any government that does not want to walk open-eyed into a quagmire, leading its country with it, would presumably re-examine its choices at such a point. That after all, is what we employ Foreign Service officers *for*: to advise policy-makers of actual conditions on which to base a realistic program. The agonizing question is, why are their reports ignored, why is there a persistent gap between observers in the field and policy-makers in the capital? While I cannot speak from experience, I would like to try to offer some answers as an outside assessor.

In the first place, policy is formed by preconceptions, by long-implanted biases. When information is relayed to policy-makers they respond in terms of what is already inside their heads and consequently make policy less to fit the facts than to fit the notions and intentions formed out of the mental baggage that has accumulated in their minds since childhood. When President McKinley had to decide whether to annex the Philippines in 1898, he went down on his knees at midnight, according to his own account, and "prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance." He was accordingly guided to conclude "that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the very best we could by them, as our fellowmen for whom Christ died."

Actually the main impulse at work was the pressure of the "manifest destiny" school for a stepping stone across the Pacific, but the mental baggage of a President in the 1890s required him to act in terms of Almighty God and the White Man's Burden just as the mental fix of his successors in our time has required them to react in terms of anti-communism. Closer observers than Almighty God could have informed McKinley that the Filipinos had no strong desire to be Christianized or civilized or exchange Span-

ish rule for American, but rather to gain their independence. This being overlooked, we soon found ourselves engaged not in civilizing but in a cruel and bloody war of repression, much to our embarrassment. Failure to take into account the nature of the other party often has an awkward result.

The same failure afflicted President Wilson who had a mental fix opposite from McKinley's, in favor of progressivism, reform and the New Freedom. So fixed was his mind that when the reactionary General Huerta carried out a coup in Mexico in 1913, Wilson became obsessed by the idea that it devolved upon him to tear the usurper off the backs of the Mexican people so that Mexico might be ruled by the consent of the governed. "My passion is for the submerged 85 percent who are struggling to be free" he said, but the reality was the submerged 85 percent were cowering in their huts unable to distinguish a difference between Huerta and his rival Carranza. Wilson however sent in the Marines to seize Vera Cruz, an intervention that not only appalled him by costing American lives, but succeeded only in deepening the turmoil in Mexico and drawing the United States into further intervention two years later against that man of the people, Pancho Villa. Political passion is a good thing but even better if it is an *informed* passion.

Roosevelt's bias too was in favor of the progressive. George Kennan has told how, when the Embassy staff in Moscow began reporting the facts of the Stalinist purges of the 1930s, revealing a tyranny as terrible as the Czars', the President discounted the reports as the product of what he considered typical State Department striped-pants mentality. It was not only inconvenient but disturbing to be in receipt of reports that would have required a change of attitude toward the Soviet Union (foreign policy obeys Newton's law of inertia: it keeps on doing what it is doing unless acted on by an irresistible force). Rather than be discomfited by these disclosures, which Roosevelt's own bias caused him to believe were biased, the Russian Division was closed down, its library scattered and its chief re-assigned.

This desire not to listen to unhappy truths—"Don't confuse me with facts"—is only human and widely shared by chiefs of state. Was not the bearer of bad news often killed by ancient kings? Chiang Kai-shek's vindictive reaction to unpleasant news was such that his ministers gradually ceased to bring him any with the result that he lived in a fantasy.

Your reports must also pass through a screen of psychological factors at the receiving end: temperament, or private ambitions, or the fear of not appearing masterful, or a ruler's inner sense that his manhood is at stake. (This is a male problem that, fortunately does not trouble women—which might be one advantage of having a woman in high office. Whatever inner inadequacy may gnaw at a woman's vitals, it does not compel her to compensate by showing how tough she is. You might cite Golda Meir in objection, but one gets the impression that her toughness is natural rather than neurotic, besides required by the circumstances.)

Proving his manhood was, I imagine, a factor pushing President Nasser of Egypt into provoking war with Israel in 1967 so that he could not be accused of weakness or appear less militant than the Syrians. One senses it as a factor in the personalities of Johnson and Nixon in regard to withdrawing from Vietnam; there was that horrid doubt, "Shall I look soft?" It was clearly present in Kennedy too; on the other hand it does not seem to have bothered Eisenhower, Truman or FDR.

A classic case of man's temperament obscuring the evidence is brought out by John Davies in his recent book, "Dragon by the Tail." Stalin's greatest error, he points out, was to underestimate Chinese Communism. "He was deceived by his own cynicism. He did not think Mao could make it because, astonishingly enough, of his own too little faith in the power of a people's war."

Of all the barriers that reports from the field must beat against, the most impenetrable is the disbelief of policy-makers in what they do not want to believe. All the evidence of a German right-wing thrust obtained by the French Gen-

eral Staff in the years immediately preceding 1914, including authentic documents sold to them by a German officer, could not divert them from their own fatal plan of attack through the center or persuade them to prepare a defense on their left. In 1941 when the double agent Richard Sorge in Tokyo reported to Moscow the exact dates of the coming German invasion, his warning was ignored because the Russians' very fear of this event caused them not to believe it. The same principle dominated Washington's reception of the reports from China in the 1940s. No matter how much evidence was reported indicating that the collapse of the Kuomintang was only a matter of time, nothing could induce Washington to loosen the silver cord tying us to Chiang Kai-shek nor rouse the policymakers from what John Service then called an "indolent short-term expediency."

National myths are another obstacle in the way of realism. The American instinct of activism, the "can do" myth, has lately led us into evil that was not necessary and has blotted the American record beyond the power of time to whiten. Stewart Alsop made the interesting point Sunday [January 28] in the *NEW YORK TIMES BOOK REVIEW* that American Presidents since Roosevelt have disliked the State Department and leaned heavily on the military because the military tend to be brisk, can-do problem-solvers while senior Foreign Service officers tend to be "skeptical examiners of the difficulties"; and worried uncertain presidents will prefer positive to negative advice. You will notice that this reliance on military advice coincides with the era of air power and has much to do, I think, with the enormous attraction of the easy solution—the idea that a horrid problem can be solved by fiat from the air, without contact, without getting mixed up in a long dirty business on the ground. The influence of air power on foreign policy would make an interesting study.

Activism in the past, the impulse to improve a bad situation, to seek a better land, to move on to a new frontier, has been a great force, *the* great force in our history, with positive results when it operates in a sphere we can control. In Asia

that is not the case, and the result has been disaster. Disregarding local realities, and depth of motivation, disregarding such a lesson as Dien Bien Phu, we feel impelled to take action rather than stay out of trouble. It would help if we could learn occasionally to let things seek an indigenous solution.

The costliest myth of our time has been the myth of the Communist monolith. We now discover happily if belatedly that the supposed Sino-Soviet unity is in fact a bitter antagonism of two rivals wrapped in hate, fear, and mutual suspicion. Our original judgment never had much to do with facts but was rather a reflection of fears and prejudices. Knee-jerk reactions of this kind are not the best guide to a useful foreign policy, which I would define as the conduct of relations and exercise of influence so as best to serve an enlightened self-interest.

The question remains, what can be done to narrow the gap between information from the field and policy-making at home. First, it remains essential to maintain the integrity of Foreign Service reporting, not only for the sake of what may get through, but to provide the basis for a change of policy when the demand becomes imperative. Second, some means must be found to require that preconceived notions and emotional fixations be periodically tested against the evidence. Perhaps legislation could be enacted to enforce a regular pause for rethinking, for questioning the wisdom of an accepted course of action, for cutting one's losses if necessary.

Failing that, I pass to a final suggestion which is not proposed as a joke: it is to abolish the presidency, because it seems to me that too much power and therefore too much risk is now subject to the idiosyncrasies of a single individual at the top whoever he may be. I would substitute a committee of five to be elected as a slate put forward by each party, and to have a single five-year term with a rotating chairman, each to serve for one year. The idea needs a little working out which I leave for the moment to anyone here who may want to consider it.

By a circuitous route I come to Jack Service, the focus of this

*It was a poignant occasion when several hundred officers of the United States Foreign Service gave a luncheon at the State Department last week in honor of a small band of their former colleagues who had been persecuted for being right. Here, in effect, was the last step in the vindication of the "old China hands," whose careers had been ruined or tarnished because they correctly predicted the victory of the Chinese Communists over the ineffective Kuomintang Government of Chiang Kai-shek.—Editorial, New York Times, February 4.*

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meeting.

Mr. Service was born in China in the Province of Szechuan, the son of missionary parents serving with the YMCA. His youth was spent in China until he returned to the United States to attend Oberlin College from which he graduated in 1932. He also acquired a classmate as wife and anyone who knows Caroline Service will recognize this as an early example of Jack's good judgment. After passing the Foreign Service exams, he returned to China because no openings were available during the Depression, and entered the profession by way of a clerk's job in Kunming. Commissioned as a Foreign Service officer in 1935, he served in Peking and Shanghai, and joined the Embassy in Chungking in 1941. During the war years he served half his time in the field, seeing realities outside the miasma of the capital. This opportunity culminated when after being attached to Stilwell's staff, he served as political officer with the American Military Observers Mission to Yen-an, the first official American contact with the Communists. His series of conversations with Mao, Chou En Lai, Chu Teh, Lin Piao, and other leaders, embodied in vivid almost verbatim reports with perceptive comments, are a historical source of prime and unique importance. Equally impressive are the examples that show Service passionately trying to persuade and convince the policy makers, as in the brief prepared for Vice President Wallace in June 1944 and the famous group telegram to the Department, largely drafted by Service—a desperate effort by the Embassy staff to halt the Hurley drift down the rapids with Chiang Kai-shek. If there was passion in this it was at least informed passion.

Following arrest in the Amerasia affair in 1945, Service was exonerated and cleared, and promoted in 1948 to Class 2 officer—only to be plunged back under all the old charges in 1949 when the Communist victory in China set off our national hysteria, and put Senator McCarthy, in strange alliance with the China Lobby, in charge of the American soul. If Chiang Kai-shek were to keep American support it was imperative that the "loss" of China so-called, should be seen as no failure from inside but work of some outside subversive conspiracy. That spectre exactly fitted certain native American needs. Along with others, Service suffered the consequences. Despite a series of acquittals, he was pinned with a doubt of loyalty and dismissed from the Foreign Service by Secretary Dean Acheson in 1951, as Davies and Vincent were subsequently dismissed by Secretary Dulles. Six years of pursuing redress through the courts finally brought a unanimous verdict in his favor by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1957. He rejoined the Foreign Service but was kept out of any assignment that would use his knowledge and experience of China. When it was clear that the Kennedy Administration would offer no better, Service resigned in 1962 and has since served with the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California in Berkeley.

Fortunately for the record and the reputation of the Foreign Service, the reports of Service and his colleagues from China in the 1940s are now where anyone can consult them—in the published volumes of "U. S. Foreign Relations, China Series." Under the inflexible verdict of history, they stand up.

I am honored to present to you Mr. John Service.

# Foreign Service Reporting

JOHN SERVICE

LET ME, first of all, say simply that my family and I appreciate your invitation to be here, and that is probably the understatement of the year.

There have been some very kind remarks about us "old China hands." I particularly appreciate the mention of John Carter Vincent. We all knew him as a staunch friend, and as a capable, courageous and loyal chief.

The group of officers you are remembering today have some things in common—beyond shared experiences in China and in post-China. One of these is that in China we were primarily political reporting officers. But another is that we are all strong-minded individuals. To pretend to speak for this group would be foolhardy—and presumptuous. I speak for myself alone.

If, by some miracle, the clock could be turned back and I had my life to relive, I would still wish to be a Foreign Service officer. But if denied that choice, my second wish would be a career as a foreign correspondent. The link, of course, is the absorbing quest to observe, understand, and report in depth what is really happening in a foreign society: to get beneath the superficial, pick up the important, underlying trends—and from that basis to try to look into the future.

Classified policy matters aside, this common reporting goal often makes natural allies of FSOs and press abroad. Many of the best brains I've picked have been those of newspapermen: American, Chinese, and foreign. A junior officer, nebulously assigned to the American Army in Chungking, would be told to "get lost" if he sought interviews with august figures such as T. V. Soong or Generalissimo Chiang. The same questions might just as well—or even better—be put by a representative of the world press, who *could* get a private interview. It was my good fortune that we had a remarkably able group of correspondents in Chungking during the war.

Obviously, reporting is not merely a glamorous, exciting pastime. It is utterly basic to the intelligent formulation of a realistic foreign policy. And to keeping it up-to-date. Without facts, and an understanding of those facts (which may often be tenuous and largely intangible because they involve people and attitudes rather than quantifiable items in the national balance sheet), our policy makers are flying blind. And even being hard-nosed in a condition of blindness is not to be recommended.

Of course, the Foreign Service officer has many functions other than political reporting: you can name them as well as I. I submit, though, that none is more vital to the country, or more rewarding to the individual, than reporting. It was the best, most satisfying part of my own career. But, again, I was fortunate in having unusual opportunities.

Twenty-three hundred years ago, a Chinese scholar of strategy said: "Know your enemy, know yourself; a hundred battles without danger." Much of our policy toward China and Vietnam since World War II has been a negative example of Sun Tzu's wisdom. Of course, the other side has had problems knowing us.

But the value of reporting is far broader than "knowing the enemy." We must also know and understand the problems and attitudes of friends, and neutrals.

Reporting obviously varies. From some countries (such as the developed, free press countries of Western Europe), the flow of information is so great that Foreign Service reporting may play a relatively unimportant role. Elsewhere, reporting may have to be done from a distance, or under severe limitations. Kremlinology, refugee interviews, the piecing together of rumors try to fill the gap.

Foreign Service reporting becomes vital as we move toward countries that may be small, less developed, non-white, or with cultures and institutions drastically different

from our own.

I have yet to learn of a computerized prediction that Mao's people-based forces would defeat the vastly larger, better-equipped, American-trained armies of Chiang Kai-shek; or that Mao would turn against his party and carry the country with him in the astonishing Cultural Revolution. There is a limit but also much truth in Mao's idea that man and his spirit are more important than machines.

I recently heard a talk by a man who has spent many years, up to the present, as a China-watcher in Hong Kong. His gist was that all the recent American visitors to China since ping-pong diplomacy and the President's visit had learned little that was not already known to his craft in Hong Kong. When the chance came for questions, I had two: Had he applied for a visa to China? And, if granted, would he go? The answer to both was an unqualified affirmative.

Confucius seems *not* to have said: "One picture is worth a thousand words." But perhaps one can coin another phrase: One close look is worth a thousand distant guesses. There is no real substitute for being on the ground. The briefings and lectures I listened to during my recent trip to China meant less than being able freely to walk city streets and country paths and to travel some 6500 miles.

Political reporting, if worthy of the name, is nonpolitical. My two chiefs, Ambassador Gauss and General Stilwell, both anathema to the China Lobby, were both—so far as I know—staunch, life-long Republicans. But their views and reports of the facts in China were inseparable from those of their subordinates whose inclination might be Democratic or plain liberal.

We who served in China during the 1940s have awaited—for what has seemed an excessively long time—the publication of the annual China volumes in the fat, red-bound series, "Foreign Relations of the

United States." They have just reached 1947. The product has been worth a wait. These are an admirable, objective, and complete presentation of the historical record. There has been no attempt, so far as I can see, to doctor that record, to make it look better than it actually was. Everything is there: including reports and views that pointed in directions other than the policy finally adopted. Perhaps I may be bold here with a collective "old China hands" word of appreciation for the uncompromising honesty and high professional quality of these works of the Historical Office. Personally, I shall also look forward with anticipation—hopefully before 1990—to reading what Foreign Service officers on the ground in Vietnam were actually reporting in 1963, 1964, and 1965.

One notable thing about the record shown in the "Foreign Relations" volumes is the broad unanimity in the Foreign Service political reporting from China. A few of us (like John Davies, Ray Ludden, and myself) may have been more ready to propose policy conclusions and recommendations. But in substance, our reports, though they received publicity, and unmerited notoriety, were not different from those of the many other Foreign Service officers reporting from the Embassy and all over the country. I say this, of course, not to spread the onus; but to suggest that any credit for being "right" must be widely shared.

Successive volumes extend the picture. When the "first generation" of reporters became unacceptable to the fixed ideas of Ambassador Hurlley, new men were brought in: men with "fresh minds"—supposedly without "bias" or "preconceptions." To meet these standards, it was obviously necessary to assign men who had not been recently in China. Many were assigned without any previous experience in the country. But very soon the reports of all these men came to sound very much like those of the men they had replaced. The "truth" of China did not change.

There's more to reporting, of course, than merely being on the ground. In October 1964 I arrived in Wellington, New Zealand, as Deputy Chief of Mission. It was just before a national election. Ambas-

sador Avra Warren, an old professional, had assigned a young, new-minted third secretary the task of making an analysis and electoral prediction. Pouch day was upon us—our last chance to get a prediction to Washington. The Ambassador thought the third secretary a capable young man—"likely to do well in the Service"—but had grave reservations about his prognosis. The third secretary conceded that the election would be close, but firmly concluded that Labour (the incumbents) would win by certainly three, and probably four seats. "Hell," said the Ambassador, "almost all the press supports the Tories; everyone I know outside the government is going to vote Tory; and everyone tells me the Tories are

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*. . . much more remains to be done. For example, rather than downgrading the State Department and its "bureaucrats," we should strengthen it, insulate it as far as possible from domestic political crosscurrents and encourage its experts to join in public debate on the major issues. — Editorial, Garden City Newsday, February 4.*

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going to win." Furthermore, the Ambassador had a theory (call it history or political science) that democracies change parties after a long war.

My immediate task was to read the report and advise whether it should go forward. I knew nothing about New Zealand politics. Having transferred direct from Tokyo, there had not even been the chance for a briefing by the country desk. So I talked to the understandably uptight third secretary about his sources, and how he had gone about collecting the information for what appeared to be a superbly documented, realistic analysis. On this basis, I told the Ambassador that I thought we should send it. In contrast to one other Ambassador I have known, he took my advice.

The wait seemed long but election day finally came. Labour did win by four seats, but one seat was so close that for a while it seemed that the margin might be only three.

A few comments. Most important, the report was right—right on the button. That's what the game is all about. But more. The officer had

a talent for developing contacts among the right people—though in this case the right people were clearly to the left of the Ambassador's circle. Furthermore, those contacts led to the development of useful information; we've all seen high-powered social types who "know everybody" but somehow lack a nose for news. And finally, he knew what to do with the information. Some officers accumulate a terrific amount of data in their heads or personal files; but it doesn't mean a thing in the Department if they can't organize it to produce a cogent, timely report.

Also the reporting officer had done his work so well that he had the courage of his conclusions—despite the intimidating effect (even if not intended) of the Ambassador's doubts. The Ambassador deserves credit, too, for a broad concept of reporting, and for willingness to trust the judgment of the officer.

Incidentally, the young third secretary was Marshall Green. The Ambassador's early judgment, that he was a man of promise, was indeed correct.

We have been looking at reporting from the American angle. Perhaps a New Zealand echo of this story may not be irrelevant. In 1948, as some of us will recall, everyone (and I mean everyone) was sure that Truman was going to lose. In a conversation with an officer from New Zealand External Affairs a few weeks before the election, I was surprised to have him say: "What are you chaps so excited about? Our Embassy in Washington tells us that Truman is going to win."

Obviously, to be most effective, the reporting officer needs some freedoms. If his reporting is to get beyond clipping newspapers and collecting published statistics, he should not be overly tied to a desk. If he is going to be able to travel about the countryside and succeed in getting close to people, he may need time, encouragement, and facilities for intensive country specialization and language training—and some assurance that the time committed to gaining such in-depth specialization will not penalize him in the competitive rat-race for promotion. Finally, he needs freedom in his contacts in order to get beyond the local elites and the particular party that, for the time being, may be

holding (or monopolizing) power.

My assignment at the Embassy in Chungking and later for two years with the Army gave me these freedoms in what—for the Foreign Service—was perhaps an almost unprecedented degree. Without those freedoms, my reporting would have been much more limited—and you probably would not have invited me here today.

It is interesting, though, to recall that when I first suggested in January 1943 that the Kuomintang-Communist struggle for power was going to engulf all policy considerations in China, and that the only adequate way to inform ourselves on the attitudes and strength of the Communists was to send Foreign Service reporting officers to Yanan, my proposal was met in the top echelons of FE with much tongue-clucking and grave head-shaking—in a negative direction. I and others did, of course, eventually get to Yanan. But only because there was a change of guard in FE (with men recently in touch with the actual situation in China—such as John Carter Vincent—taking over). And also because, while State approved and desired our going there, it could be done under the convenient guise of our working for the Army.

There are still countries—in Latin America, Africa, and parts of Asia—where the situation is not unlike that in China during the 1940s. If we keep ourselves in ignorance and out of touch with new popular movements and potentially revolutionary situations, we may find ourselves again missing the boat. The proper measure of such reporting should not be popular sentiment in the United States as reflected in some segments of the press, or by some Congressional committees not charged with foreign relations.

Sometimes, of course, the reporting is in vain. It may, for various reasons be ignored—or, in effect, rejected—by the President and policy-makers in Washington. This has been well discussed by Barbara Tuchman. But, from the viewpoint of the Department, this should not reduce the value of reporting.

There are many countries, as I have noted, where—despite the information explosion of modern news media and academic research—the Foreign Service reporter is still in a

position to be the best, most current, and only steadily available source of reliable information. For State to reduce its flow of sound, reliable reporting from the field is, I suggest, a sure method of slow suicide.

Where does the reporting officer stand in all this? First of all, he has his responsibility to State and the American government. That responsibility is to report the facts conscientiously as he finds them. If the government dislikes or ignores his reports, that does not relieve him from his responsibility as a reporting officer. When Ambassador Hurley resigned in 1945 with strong charges against the reporting of some of us in China, Secretary of State Byrnes replied:

I should be profoundly unhappy to learn that an officer of the Department of State, with-in or without the Foreign Service, might feel bound to refrain from submitting through proper channels an honest report or recommendation for fear of offending me or anyone else in the Department. If that day should arrive, I will have lost the very essence of the assistance and guidance I require for the successful discharge of the heavy responsibilities of my office.

But the reporter is also in a sense, writing for himself—for his own conception of what good reporting should be, and for his own integrity. Most definitions of good reporting would suggest that it involves more than a mere recital of facts: it also means an ability and willingness to draw conclusions from those facts.

The reporter owes something, too, to history. He watches history being made, wherever he is. It may be a relatively quiet backwater. Or he may be very close to momentous events—as I was to the world-changing revolution of a half billion people—that make insignificant his role as an individual. But whatever the magnitude of the events he observes, or his distance from their vortex, the reports he writes today will be part of the history of tomorrow. And if he writes them when he is young enough, he may see that tomorrow.

I wish I could say, after all this, that the Foreign Service itself has always supported the value of reporting and area expertise. I imag-

ine we can all think of negative examples: they have not been few. Let me take an example.

When the Sino-Japanese War commenced and the Japanese occupied Shantung in 1937 and 1938, our consul in Tsingtao was Samuel Sokobin. He was a capable, conscientious officer—a China specialist of long experience. As is often the case, he had come to have a genuine liking and respect for the Chinese. Eventually, Chinese guerrillas began to be active in Shantung. Soon the Chinese press was carrying dramatic accounts of heroic exploits in crippling the Japanese-held railways and denying the Japanese the important agricultural and mineral resources of the province. In his post at the main port, and making intelligent use of excellent contacts in shipping and business circles, Sokobin came to realize the gross exaggeration in these claims. The Japanese were maintaining and increasing the flow of these strategic materials to Japan.

Sokobin did not consider that a responsible officer needed to be told when (or what) to report. He commenced a series of reports thoroughly documenting the success of the Japanese in countering the guerrillas and in exploiting the resources of their occupied territory. He should, of course, have been commended; but the reaction his reports received was very different. He was upsetting the picture, then the accepted line, of a Chinese resistance not only brave but also effective. Sokobin's reports were harshly depreciated. He was cruelly and ridiculously accused of being "pro-Japanese." And, with a perverted idea of justice, his transfer was arranged to Kobe, Japan. He was never returned to service in China.

Sokobin's career might never have reached the heights—one can never know. But in 1947 he finished 33½ years of loyal service as Class 3 and consul in Birmingham.

This was long before McCarthy had become a senator. The United States was neutral in the Sino-Japanese War, and there was no outside high level pressure. It was entirely an internal State Department affair: in fact, it was done by the China branch to one of their own. Perhaps, in valuing the integrity and honesty of field reporting, few of us are beyond reproach. ■

## Modesty and Clarity

THE CONDUCT AND MISCONDUCT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, by Charles W. Yost. Random House, \$7.95.

CHARLES W. YOST having left the employ of the United States Government in 1971 under less than auspicious circumstances after having served it honorably and effectively for almost 40 years, the first thing to note is that his latest book is not one of the "kiss and tell" variety. It is a sober, intelligent, fairly dispassionate analysis of the factors that go into the making of a sound (or unsound) diplomacy.

That it is an unspectacular book will not surprise those who have known Ambassador Yost, whose style has always been a combination of calm, clarity, courage, and great modesty. That there is occasional opposition partisanship on topical issues is perhaps understandable, the author being a Democrat who was writing in an election year. That the book goes over the same ground as so many factors on the same subject that have appeared in recent years is inevitable. What is noteworthy is that it ends on an entirely different note.

The author gives highly personal appraisals of the Presidents and Secretaries of State under whom he has served; he surveys the apparatus of the State Department and the other mechanisms and power factors in the foreign policy equation; and he does this well—but in some cases less readably than, for instance "The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory" by John Franklin Campbell.

Where Campbell advocated a cut of 50 percent of the State Department's personnel, Yost would prescribe a cut of only 30 percent. One is tempted to ask, as one was tempted to ask George Kennan in similar circumstances, why he didn't recommend such cuts in his own Mission when he had an opportunity to do so. The answer is simple—the cuts always seem more clearly possible in someone else's domain. (Kennan, incidentally, had the good grace to admit as much when he was Ambassador to Yugoslavia where he expressed surprise

that the requirements placed on his Mission were so large—which did not prevent him from reverting to his advocacy of massive cuts when he had again left the Service.)

The Yost book ends with a plea for greater support of the United Nations as a mechanism that should be given a chance to make the adjustments between the great powers, and indeed between all countries, that will be necessary to avoid world catastrophe. The author argues persuasively that the eventual transformation of the UN into something like a world government is necessary. One is less persuaded that it will be possible. Indeed, his argument is essentially that it *must* be possible because it is necessary.

Acceptance of this thesis requires an act of faith. One is reminded of Blaise Pascal who argued that if the chance of eternal life through faith in God were only one in a million, he would be a fool not to make a bet even against such odds, since the alternative is nothingness.

—M. F. H.

## Hungarian Foreign Policy

HUNGARY AND THE SUPERPOWERS: *The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik*, by János Radványi. Hoover Institution Press, \$5.95.

THIS study, concerned with the consequences of the Hungarian revolution in regard to Hungary's international relations, is of singular value for students of Eastern European affairs and Foreign Service officers specializing in the area. It joins to scholarly analysis of the subject the knowledge derived from the author's previous experience in the diplomatic service of the Hungarian government. For those of us in the Department of State who dealt with János Radványi as chief of the Hungarian diplomatic mission here (1962-67) the appearance of the book has been awaited with keen interest.

The work throws considerable light on the machinery and methods of reaching decisions in Hungarian foreign policy; on the moderating influence of Kadar on Hungary's for-

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eign relations; and on the manner of reporting by Hungarian representatives abroad.

In treating the interaction between China and Eastern Europe, Radványi gives attention to the impact of the Hungarian revolution on the Mao Tse-tung regime. Of special interest is the revelation that Mao Tse-tung, urged by the Chinese ambassador at Budapest, pressed Khrushchev to take military action against the revolutionary government of Imre Nagy.

The author records how the Eastern European and Soviet representatives at Washington reacted to the Cuban missile crisis. This illuminating chapter documents Mikoyan's statement to a meeting of the Communist chiefs of mission that a Soviet aim in the missile deployment in Cuba had been to alter the power relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

In 1962 American diplomacy vis-à-vis Hungary was engaged in a three-fold effort: to help erase the repressive consequences of the 1956 events, to settle the long standing Hungarian question in the United Nations, and to improve United States-Hungarian relations. This story of success is told here from the standpoint of Hungary and the personal participation of its chief diplomatic representative to the United States at the time.

—HAROLD C. VEDELER

### A Happy Union

A STUDY OF HISTORY, *The First Abridged Illustrated One-Volume Edition*, by Arnold Toynbee. Oxford University Press, \$35.00.

PROFESSOR TOYBEE'S "A Study of History" has come in for considerable criticism from professional historians since the first volume of what eventually became a 12-volume set appeared in 1934. But such disagreements are an inevitable consequence of the differing approaches which different writers with differing backgrounds and outlooks will necessarily have to historical reality. They may sometimes help speed into oblivion works which deserve to be forgotten, but they cannot cause lasting damage to a work such as Toynbee's "A Study of History," which is so clearly the product of a mind of great quality, of vigorous

curiosity, and of unflagging energy.

The issuance of a magnificent new one-volume edition of this encyclopedic survey of ancient and modern civilizations by the Oxford University Press, and its distribution in the United States by the American Heritage Press, is therefore a welcome event. It will make available to a new generation of readers a work that deserves a place on the shelves of everyone with an interest in or a concern for the ups and downs of past and present-day civilizations. Its splendid illustrations, a great many in color, are a particularly valuable feature of what is in effect a largely new reworking of its fascinating subject matter.

In its happy union of text and illustrative material, the book perhaps owes something to the example of the fine books on art and civilization by Andre Malraux. In format, the work compares favorably with the attractive English-language editions of the Larousse "Encyclopedia of Ancient and Medieval History" and "Encyclopedia of Modern History" (now being remaindered at a bargain \$10.00 each on Washington bookstore sale shelves). Book buyers who fear that their weight allowances will not permit of the addition of such large books as these to their already overstrained shipping allowances should put aside their doubts and buy them and this latest and best product of Professor Toynbee's anyway. They can always make room for them by taking the long overdue step of turning in to the AAFSW book sale their sets of Will Durant's "The Story of Civilization."

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

### Nordic Political Science

SCANDINAVIAN POLITICAL STUDIES—(Volume 7/1972), edited by Erik Rasmussen. Columbia University Press, \$10.00.

CUMULATIVE multiple correlation coefficients? Structural collective variables?

If the Far North suggests to you only free love, fiords, or Bergman films, "Scandinavian Political Studies" may prove as disconcerting as your first sauna. If, on the other hand, you really like "typologizing your subapproaches," this 1972

Yearbook is for you!

It is the seventh in a series published annually by the Political Science Associations in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Its roster of writers reads like a who's who of Nordic political scientists who can and do give their US brethren a run for their *krona*. Thirteen, 20-page essays range from analysis of labor radicalism in Norway (the most radical in all Scandinavia) to potential racism in Denmark (and we Americans thought we had that to ourselves!). Five brief "reviews" probe recent election returns in all four countries and such pending questions as economic stabilization and affiliation with the European Community. The text concludes with a comprehensive bibliography of Scandinavian political science for 1971. The book is for the specialist not easily deterred by quantification and behavioralese. That caveat aside, no serious student of the northern flank should miss this impressive reference collection. —SANDY VOGELGESANG

#### A Look to the Future

THE FUTURE EXECUTIVE, by Harlan Cleveland. Harper & Row, \$5.95.

THE name of the game for Harlan Cleveland's future executive will be complexity and constant change.

Effective organizations, those that make things happen (hopefully the desired things) will consist of systems, not hierarchical pyramids, and that means a blurring of the traditional lines of authority and responsibility. Tension, loose control at the top, plural centers of decision will characterize these organizations. In other words, they will be more horizontal, more consultative. And the line between public and private executives will grow more indistinct. Their feet will be kept to the fire by making sure their decisions will be publicly known.

To staff these systems the author sees more women in the saddle, as well as representatives of other minority groups, such as the Black Panthers. John Gardner's "gifted generalist" will be in great demand. These people will need a lot of physical energy, enthusiasm, humility (James Huff, June issue, "The Foreign Service Illusion," take heart!), a relaxed approach to di-

rection. They will "steer" rather than "drive." Theirs is the tough task of making cooperation really work—by getting people to *put the skunk on the table* and face the real issues (Chris Argyris, take heart!).

Cleveland analyzes many of the gut issues which continue to hamper State's effectiveness.

It's worth six bucks for those interested in what may happen to people in future organizations and for Cleveland's accounts of crisis management in State.

—HARRIS H. BALL

#### A Personal History

CHINA PAST AND PRESENT, by Pearl S. Buck. The John Day Company, \$3.95.

CONSIDERING the role Pearl Buck has played in introducing China to many millions of people around the world, it is difficult not to feel a little sad about this latest book. Behind the weighty title is a picture book and some one hundred pages of text in which Miss Buck presents her very personal autobiography, a very personal history of China and some very personal interpretations of China today.

The whole book seems to be an overreaction to an unfortunate experience: in response to her recent application for a visa to visit the People's Republic, she received an insulting note of rejection from Peking stating that "... you have in your works taken an attitude of distortion, smear and vilification toward the people of new China." Understandably upset, Miss Buck uses this book to remind us of her parents' sacrifices for China, of how she is more Chinese than American, of how much she loves the Chinese people, and of how she knows China better than almost anyone else. No one can deny that Miss Buck knows China. Unfortunately, however, the "feel" that she has for the country goes back to the years of "The Good Earth," while in her apparent belief that China is China is China, she is sorely lacking the "feel" (which she says is so important) for the China of today.

The pictures of Henri Cartier-Bresson, Rene Burri, Hiroshi Hamaya, Marc Riboud and Helen Snow are beautiful and discerning, but the book makes one sorry for Miss Buck—a very uncomfortable feeling. —LEO A. ORLEANS

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## HOW CHINA MAKES ITS FOREIGN POLICY

from page 14

used; now a violin for a mellow effect; now a flute to achieve a delicate and modest melody line; now a trumpet such as Radio Peking to sound the major theme in unmistakable fashion. The musicians are highly professional even when they are packaged as amateurs, and most of them have been at the job, with a change of instruments, for many years.

Of the training of new diplomats the visitor discovers little except that it is done not by a single method but by many. A few have a background in the Institute of International Relations of the Academy of Sciences. But this has been suspended since the Cultural Revolution. Its members have gone off to communes to exchange the care of nations for the care of pigs. The Foreign Language Institutes are an important source. They began the path back to regular work late in 1971 (with even more emphasis than before on Western tongues). There

used to be an Institute of International Relations in Peking, which taught at the graduate-student level. But some of its former students (who include foreigners) told me that it no longer functions.

In the next few years, diplomats with an Army training will emerge in China's embassies. Just how they are being trained is not known, but two interesting points surround the Army's role in the foreign policy corps. One is that a number of able men were sent into the Army, some at Chou En-lai's own instigation, to "hide" from the furies of the Cultural Revolution which might otherwise have cut them down. This is one more case of the Premier running the Cultural Revolution with his left hand while limiting its destructiveness with his right. It is also one more case of the Army extending its role beyond military tasks. The result is that there are many diplomats (and other professionals) in the Army who are not ordinary Army men, but whose career patterns are now bound up with the Army.

The second point can be put simply. Watch out for the Navy and the Air Force. After Lin Piao took over Defense from the less "Maoist" P'eng Teh-huai, the Army swelled up with prestige as a "model" and a "school" for the whole nation. A little resentment stirs in the other two services. They feel that the colossal stress upon politics has left the more professional and more technical aspects of military work enfeebled. The Navy and the Air Force are the natural repositories of these neglected aspects. In recent months there has been pressure to give more prominence than Lin Piao's policies did to air and naval work and weapons. This may well affect defense and foreign policy by the end of 1972. Already in the fall of 1971, it became one of several issues surrounding the eclipse of Lin Piao, and accompanying changes in the relation of the Army to politics.

In the leading universities, teaching of international relations resumed in the fall of 1970. One place I glimpsed it was Peking University. The seven subjects taught in



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the Department of International Politics are not designed to tease an idle imagination: Philosophy of Marxism; History of the CCP; History of the International Communist Movement (starting with the First International); Anti-Imperialism (starting in 1945); Anti-Revisionism (from the Third International or "Comintern"); National Liberation; Foreign Languages. Yet into these austere categories some teachers manage to fit interesting material.

Liu Shao-ch'i seems more famous since his fall than before it. Three of the courses (Anti-Imperialism and National Liberation as well as Anti-Revisionism) make him a prime target. The slogan for him is *san-ho i-shao* ("three reconciliations, one reduction"). He was, it is now said, on good terms with three enemies: reactionaries, revisionists, imperialists. He reduced support for glorious national liberation struggles. Some of the students from this department were doing their practical work on map-making at a Peking publishing house. Oth-

ers were laboring on the construction of a new harbor near Tientsin.

I will not soon forget the teaching of the Korean War in Chinese schools. Few events are better known to Chinese students of society than this one. There is a double stress (beyond the themes of patriotism and Chinese-Korean solidarity). It was one episode in the long story of the United States trying to "get at" China. Three paths to China's heartland, it is said, were mapped out by Washington: via Taiwan, Korea, and Vietnam. And over twenty-three years the US has trodden each path. The second stress is upon Russian selfishness. It is not asserted, though it is hinted, that Moscow cooked the whole adventure up. At any rate, China had to bear the burden. Every gun and bullet China got from Russia she paid for at "the highest prices."

It is odd to hear the Korean War taught this way. You have heard American students taught that Russia and China, composing a "monolithic Communist conspiracy," together hatched the whole thing. You

have been told that the United States could never have wished to "get at" China. Actually, the version I heard in Chinese schools is nearer the truth than that taught in the United States. China did *not* push North Korea into war. General MacArthur *did* get at China—by the time Peking entered the war, he had bombed bridges touching Chinese territory.

But beyond the soundness of what was being taught, the seriousness of the tone in these classes on Korea was haunting. In Western classes, students take up this political topic or that, but how few topics really grip them. Fewer still if we think only of international politics. But these Chinese students talked about the Korean War with a clear and immediate sense of its connection to their own lives. A threat to China stirred in them deep personal feelings. If some will tomorrow be diplomats, the Chinese Foreign Ministry—whatever it may lack in experience of the world—will not lack conviction and purpose. ■

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## ACTIVIST

from page 16

that our justification for keeping the North from taking over the South Vietnamese was to inhibit China, during her belligerent phase, from liberties she might otherwise be impelled to take with the nations around her. He asserted that China would be bound, eventually, to exert her influence over the Indochinese states, but that she needed to be restrained until she was ready to do it peaceably. Although that explanation is probably as good as there is to be had on the subject, it was not a theme Vann returned to often. He was, in reality, congenitally on the side of the underdog: he said many times that, had he been a young Vietnamese when Diem was president, he would have joined the VC. He had always thought that the war during that period was primarily a civil war, aided to be sure by the North, and he stood in sympathy with the grievances that fueled it and in admiration of the men who fought it. The profounder significance of Tet for

him was, I think, that it created a new underdog: troops from the North, different from and disliked by the average southerner, had openly invaded the South and caused terrible damage. This was the level of injustice that moved Vann.

If Vann was not an ideologue, he was unmistakably a leader. He had acquired, first of all, the underpinnings: he knew about organizations and was an expert statistician; he never made the mistake of relying on only one source for news of a situation, nor did he expect to get the truth about a project from the man he had assigned to do it; he managed to get to know most of his subordinates in the field personally and remember their names; he sensed when the real chain of command differed from the formal one. He was, in short, a formidable bureaucrat.

But he was more. The Washington Post spoke after his death of the press conferences he held each Wednesday night in Pleiku while he was directing the defense of Kon-tum: "It is said that at the first of

these sessions the assembled reporters arose when Vann strode in. It is plausible, and it is safe to say, there was no other man in Vietnam who could command such a reaction." For my part, I remember Vann as a speaker at the monthly "Hail and Farewell" parties in Can Tho to welcome new members to CORDS and say goodbye to departing ones. Stiff, hatchet-voiced, the precise arrangement of polysyllables that would have been easy work for Ellsworth Bunker or William Colby seeming always just beyond his reach, he commanded absolute silence. And among his subordinates only the handful of those who had known him longest, like Wilbur Wilson or Colonel Carl Bernard, called him by his first name. To everyone else, whether speaking to him or about him, it was "Mr. Vann."


Vann's magnetism, it seems to me, lay in his powerful ability to convince people he was right. As though his very presence in a top position in Vietnam were not living proof of the accuracy of his predictions, Vann bombarded any inter-



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locutor—reporter, senator, or general—with statistics, history, vignettes, prognoses, analyses. He typically took visitors on his daily rounds, dropping down here and there, generally displaying he knew more about a subordinate's area than the man himself did. Vann rarely let up on a captive listener: on a long ride, or late into the night at his office, Vann could talk virtually non-stop for two, three, five hours. In III Corps he had once taken Teddy Kennedy for an all night drive through the countryside (which he was, of course, strictly forbidden to do), and he later concluded that Kennedy's views were pretty sensible when you got him away from his chief aide. It is closer to the truth, I suspect, that Kennedy, subjected to the full Vann treatment, hardly got a word in.

In the spring of 1971, Vann was finally elevated to the job he had long wanted. He was sent up to be the Senior American Advisor in Military Region II. He was the first and only civilian to be given command of a military region, and, in-

deed, he was the only civilian capable of handling it. (Vann liked to boast that he had more official combat time in than anyone in the US Army, and that he was adding to his combat experience every day.) His year in MR II was to see what was probably the last great communist offensive of the war. And it was to end, as we know, in his death.

I know only bits and pieces of what happened to Vann in the weeks before his helicopter crashed. I have spoken with two friends who were reporters at some of Vann's last press conferences; I talked with Robert Komer, who visited Vann in Pleiku before the offensive started; and I read the papers. The image of Vann that emerges is almost that of a man possessed. He took over the direction of the war completely. He had already relegated Corps Commander Major General Ngo Dzu to the status of a corporal, according to Komer. Now he began personally planning air strikes, personally rescuing trapped American advisors, personally flying into Kontum at night while it was under siege. His

press conferences were almost the sole source of news about the offensive, and the reporters said Vann was more cocksure and aggressive than they had ever seen him. He was said to have exhausted the pity he used to feel for the enemy. He made the defense of Kontum his personal crusade: while others predicted the North Vietnamese would walk over it, Vann insisted it could and should be held. The last Sunday of Vann's life his helicopter took ten rounds going into Kontum. The next day, the height of the fighting, his was the only helicopter to go in. It was on the Friday that he perished.

Vann had always drawn criticism for doing too much, for taking unnecessary risks. He rode his motorcycle alone through the Delta. He drove his car through the deserted countryside at night. If there was fighting, he went to it himself, day after day if need be. He had survived countless battles and at least several ambushes. A friend estimates he was shot down by hostile fire at least 25 times during the past ten

Before...



After...



I was the strong silent type at cocktail parties until I started reading the JOURNAL. I'm still silent but I can no longer tear the phone book in half.

## FOREIGN POLICY

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years.

If some of Vann's daredevilry was grandstanding, most of it was due to his conviction that, if you want to know what things are like, you have to go there yourself. He didn't pronounce a road secure until he himself had ridden on it, and he didn't assess the worth of an outpost until he himself had spent the night there. Once he and I flew to Ben Tre to have lunch with a judge whom Americans in the province were calling a VC sympathizer because he was freeing suspects scarfed up by the Phoenix program. I did the interpreting, and Vann was at his diplomatic best, soft-spoken, sympathetic but insistent. We discussed case after case, and found that most of the suspects were poor people being used by local officials as fodder to fill quotas, against whom there was no real evidence. On another occasion, when Ambassador Bunker's office challenged Vann's contention that 10 to 15 per cent of the South Vietnamese armed forces were ghost soldiers (that is, merely names on a list), Vann fired

back reports of visits to units in the field whose personnel he had asked to have shown to him so he could see for himself how many were there as opposed to how many there were supposed to be. It was in the course of initiatives like these, carried out day by day over years and years and often carefully put down in writing, that Vann learned about Vietnam. There was no way to do this consistently without exposing himself to danger.

What, now that it is all over, were his accomplishments? How should we remember him? Well, he got to the truth more often than others, and he reported it fearlessly. He argued early on that we were killing indiscriminately and that it was losing the war for us and that the Vietnamese would never fight as long as we did it for them, and eventually many of his ideas were adopted. He was an inspiring and tireless leader in the field.

But I think we should remember him above all as his own man. The crowd at his burial in Arlington National Cemetery should be testimony

enough to that. Spiro Agnew and Melvin Laird were there, and so were Teddy Kennedy and Daniel Ellsberg, along with others of every different persuasion, the prominent and the unknown. Robert Komer spoke, I think, for all of them when he called Vann "the best we had."

Before I close, I feel I should remind you of all the things about John Vann I've had to leave out. I haven't told you about his battles with Ambassador Bunker, about his dislike for the CIA, about his womanizing, about how he got along with the Vietnamese, about his weakness for giving jobs to old friends or about the Tran Ngoc Chau affair.

I haven't even told you he had a sense of humor. David Halberstam's latest book tells of a briefing Vann gave to Walt Rostow in 1967, which was somewhat pessimistic. Rostow, slightly shaken, said, "But you do admit that it'll all be over in six months."

"Oh," said Vann, "I think we can hold out longer than that." ■

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## FOREIGN SERVICE ILLS

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ular basis to a young individual who is emotionally maturing, this is going to have some effect on the maturing process. In this respect I think you have to look at it in the same way as at alcohol: it's obviously no good for an adolescent to drink every day. You understand, I'm not trying to equate alcohol with marijuana, because there's no question that physiologically marijuana is many, many times as safe as alcohol, and there's no evidence that marijuana is addicting as such or that it will cause some of the long-term degenerative brain or liver changes that alcohol will cause.

**Smith:** On balance, then, in the United States, do you think the problem would be more manageable if marijuana were legalized?

**Mishtowt:** Probably, and yes, I think it should be legalized, and I think it is just a question of time before it will be. But you understand that that still will not solve the problem I mentioned, which exists with any hallucinogen . . .

**Smith:** Another subject: What about "war casualties"—from Vietnam, I mean?

**Mishtowt:** People don't always talk about these things. I know that, psychologically speaking, there have been "casualties" . . . on both sides of the question. There were some who believed fervently in the policies that the United States Government adopted, and were disillusioned that they weren't able to carry them through. There were also individuals who violently disagreed with these policies from the beginning . . .

**Smith:** And clinically?

**Mishtowt:** We have had an unusual number of heart attacks in Vietnam—primarily among AID people. Of course this relates to the work-load that's placed on the heart in hot, humid climates . . .

**Smith:** Might it be that the AID people also have to travel around the country quite a lot and are subject to a corresponding number of physical dangers?

**Mishtowt:** This is part of it; the long hours of work probably are part of

it; I'm sure that some of this is also related to frustrations over trying to get a job done under those circumstances . . .

**Smith:** During the time you have been in the Foreign Service there have been great improvements in medical benefits—and I know you are not unconnected with this. How would you summarize the changes that have taken place?

**Mishtowt:** There's no question that the coverage now is much, much better than it used to be. First of all, dependents are now covered—this was an amendment to the Foreign Service Act in 1958, with appropriations being made available in 1959. There is no question that we have been much more liberal in interpretation of the regulations and what we can do. Under Mr. Macomber's "Diplomacy for the '70s" we have changed the regulations to extend benefits beyond the 120-day limitation that applies to dependents if the condition has clearly been caused or aggravated by being abroad. There are government-wide insurance policies now, paid for by

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both the government and the employee, which were not available when I joined the Foreign Service. Also, there is the expansion in the number of Foreign Service doctors and nurses manning dispensaries in our embassies abroad.

**Smith:** How would you compare the system of benefits to that which is available to the military?

**Mishtowt:** They're less; there's no question that they're less. But the military have had, historically, a different type of benefits. They have had total, comprehensive medical care . . . The Foreign Service has had the use of appropriated medical funds primarily for serious illnesses and injuries incurred abroad. It has been primarily an "overseas benefit," if you will, rather than a "benefit while you were in service," which is of course quite different from what the military have. And of course the regular military have benefits after retirement, whereas the Foreign Service Act specifically states that our benefits are for the employee; and once one becomes an annuitant, one is no longer an em-

ployee . . .

**Smith:** Altogether it's quite apparent that the Foreign Service has meant a lot more to you than just the sum of its patients. How did you get interested in it in the first place?

**Mishtowt:** I had originally hoped to go to the Georgetown Foreign Service school. But that was in the depression years. I received a science scholarship at Georgetown, and in order to go to college at all that was the route I had to take. I went into science courses and became interested in medicine. But I never lost my interest in the Foreign Service. Also, my wife's father was in the Dutch Embassy here; and my own parents were in the Russian Embassy in Washington, before the Revolution. After getting my medical degree in '42 I went into the Army, then to the Lahey Clinic in Boston, then into private practice; but when I was asked to join the Foreign Service medical program, in '55, it seemed like a rather natural thing to do.

**Smith:** In terms of the immediate future, what do you think should

be done in FS medicine that isn't being done?

**Mishtowt:** One area which particularly concerns me is the need for a dental program. We have too many documented cases of individuals who were unable to receive adequate dental care at posts, and who, in order to correct the dental problems that arose, have had to pay as much as several thousand dollars . . . I know several families that have bills between \$3000 and \$5000 because of lack of dental care where they were stationed. I have proposed that we have a series of roving dental teams in certain areas, and that these teams would provide, if you will, prophylactic or "routine maintenance" care . . . Unfortunately, I'm told that we need an amendment to the Foreign Service Act to implement this, and that is now dormant . . .

**Smith:** All the same, Foreign Service medicine seems to be one of those rare things which are getting better . . .

**Mishtowt:** There always have to be exceptions. ■

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
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### Presidents and Bureaucrats

■ I have read with interest the editorial "Presidents and Bureaucrats" in your January issue and, as an FSO who was an editor of the JOURNAL in the 1930s and has served under seven Presidents and 15 Secretaries of State, I should like to make the following brief comments.

No doubt you are correct that suspicion and mistrust has often existed between the President and the State Department. President Roosevelt was inclined to consider its personnel hopelessly reactionary, out of sympathy with his New Deal reforms and with his liberal attitude toward foreign affairs. Fifteen years later the pendulum had swung to the other extreme and the Department was believed, in some executive and legislative circles, to be populated with Reds and subversives.

Both stereotypes were wide of the mark. Views of most career personnel had changed during this interval only in the same direction and to a similar degree as American opinion generally. The difference was in the way it was perceived from outside, by Presidents, Senators and citizens. This misunderstanding may be inevitable in the case of the particular bureaucracy which deals with kinds of problems—foreign affairs—which are arcane and mysterious to most citizens, even to many Senators and some Presidents. The fault is not primarily in the bureaucracy.

Your editorial states: "From any President's viewpoint, the prime quality to be sought in an advisor is personal loyalty." This remark provokes me to make two observations.

First, in my 35 years in the Service I never encountered a case of disloyalty to an incumbent President. The tradition and training of FSOs is to present their views, as candidly and vigorously as the current climate and their position in the hierarchy permits, before a policy decision is made, but to carry out that decision scrupulously and loyally once it is made. They have sometimes tended, in my opinion, to be

even overzealous in this respect.

This leads to my second observation which is that, if the *prime* quality a President seeks in an advisor is personal loyalty, he is mistaken and doing himself a disservice. If that were his primary criterion, he would surround himself with a group of "true believers" or of docile yes-men who would merely confirm his prejudices and encourage his mistakes.

Of course a President cannot tolerate public servants who are undercutting him behind his back. He must be expected to introduce into the higher echelons of the bureaucracy some people of his own party and persuasion, hopefully enjoying other qualifications as well. However, the essential service which career public servants with long and wide experience can render a President is to "tell it like it is," to inform him without fear or favor, for example, what the real situation is in a particular part of the world, what are the US capabilities and the limits on US capabilities in respect to it.

If a President interprets such objective advice as "disloyalty," or mistakes prudence for timidity, he will be cutting himself off from the main benefits a highly trained bureaucracy can bring to him. In his own broadest interests he should facilitate their input into policymaking and encourage in-house diversity of opinion and dissent. The failure of many Presidents adequately to recognize and use the knowledgeable people available to them has often gotten them and the country into serious trouble.

In summary, I should venture the view that the problem is not primarily one of "loyalty" down the line but of sufficient broadmindedness and sophistication at the top to use profitably precious assets built up in the public service over many years.

CHARLES W. YOST

New York

### A Fundamental Issue

■ The editorial in the January, 1973 issue of the JOURNAL, "Presidents and Bureaucrats" raises a fundamental issue—the Service's relationship with the White House—and I congratulate the Editorial Board

for devoting space to it rather than the normal combination of electioneering and bread-and-butterism which generally dominates this periodical of ours. Unfortunately, this venture into professionalism was not sustained in the accompanying analysis except in the most cursory way.

As we seem to live in an illiberal time when people must establish their credentials if they wish their viewpoints considered on the basis of merit, let me unequivocally state that I yield to no one in my belief that the Service needs a just and sensible grievance system and that the management of the Service is not perfect. Nevertheless, I also believe that the alarms and excursions of the past few years over this issue may well have dulled the professional perceptivity of both the Service and its managers. It may well be true that our energies have been sapped to such a degree by what must appear from the White House as a dispute that is given *undue* weight and attention vis-à-vis the national interest. The question may well be—why should the President—any President—take us seriously. The burden of proof is on us to demonstrate that we have something to offer—skill, vigor, perceptivity, and non-partisan loyalty (perhaps this is better than apolitical) to the Constitutional order. We must demonstrate that we are forceful advocates of thoughtful policies and also vigorous executors of Presidential instructions. . . .

Times are difficult for the Service—and unfair things have happened to some of us—and may continue to do so in the future. There is no question but that we should work to change things for the better—but surely this can be done without damaging further our credibility or reducing the quality of our labor to the mediocre or time-serving. President Kennedy told us that life is unfair—and he surely cannot be accused of complacency. The improvement of our relationship with the Presidency will not be a gift from "senior appointees . . . who are sufficiently politicized to be sensitive to the needs of the White House. . . ." (Are FSOs really that politically backward that they cannot see the political realities in the United States? For shame!) Nor will it come as a benedi-

son from the President. It will come when we persuade the White House that we are professionally competent, non-partisan, emotionally mature, and willing and able to carry out the incumbent's policies.

VICTOR WOLF, JR.

Copenhagen

### Tribute to an Adversary

■ What manner of crepitations emanate from Hanover? Is it Ambassador Briggs asserting the Foreign Service is not rpt not an adversary of the Department? Who can forget that Ellis Briggs was the staunchest adversary the Department ever had? Who can forget how the cables burned round the globe with immortal mixed metaphors in response to the more insane edicts out of Washington? And in those dark days of the early '50s, wasn't it Ellis Briggs, one of but three cries in the wilderness, who dared to challenge the famous bookburning mandate in excoriating Briggesonese? The only prose burned under his command were such sort of deplets.

I am too far removed from the present day realities of the Foreign Service to take a position on the merits, but I deem it likely that the Ambassador may well recognize that any relationship in which two beings, human or organizational, are legally bound, ineluctably attains an adversary character at times. But little wonder Ambassador Briggs fails to sympathize with the majority of FSOs who feel they must organize to effectively carry on the good fight, which he waged so ardently, so well and for so long . . . all alone. . . .

IRYNE CODON BLACK

Newport Beach, Calif.

### Assez C'est Assez

■ Now that the shame of it all no longer leaves me *atterré* I rise to proffer regrets and apologies (neither *trop* deep) to Edward K. Dey (*ancien élève, l'Université McGrew, Paris*) for the distress and shock he suffered on, unexpectedly, finding twice (*twice, mind you*) in the September JOURNAL this statement of Tallyrand's classic advice to diplomatists: "*Et surtout, pas trop de zèle.*" He declares that, according to "the foremost authority," the *trop* in this quotation is "apocryphal."

Before accepting his presumed correction, may I ask him to inform

JOURNAL readers the identity of "the foremost authority" on this quotation and also to disclose who conferred on him the accolade of "the foremost authority."

While respectfully awaiting Dey's reply in the JOURNAL to these questions, may I cite my foremost authority in this matter: "MacMillan's Book of Proverbs, Maxims and Famous Phrases" (New York: Macmillan; 1948), in which on page 2666 will be found the following entry, quoted *verbatim* and *in toto*:

7. Not too much zeal (*pas trop de zèle*) Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand (c. 1792), *See Sainte-Beuve, Critiques et Portraits*, iii, 324. Sometimes quoted, "*Sûrtout pas de zèle*" (Above all, no zeal). A reflection of the French proverb, "*Trop de zèle gâte tout.*" (Too much zeal spoils everything).

*Evidemment*, Dey simply cannot bear *trop de zèle, id est, excessiveness*. Yet, not content to use JOURNAL columns to "correct" me and my alleged accomplice-in-misquotation (who, lucky him or her, is spared by anonymity the public obloquy which I must bear alone), Dey must also cast personal aspersions on us, for he deduces that as we are "mis-quoters," we must suffer from "an excess of some quality or other." To condemn not only the "sin" but the "sinners" does seem excessive, even "*trop de zèle.*"

When, *un beau jour*, you, dear Editor, decide that *la préciosité* of our indulgence in *ces grandes préoccupations* is excessive ("This correspondence must cease"), my French instructor and I can continue our duel in the cornfields of Iowa—with cornstalks as weapons.

ROBERT W. RINDEN

*Ancien élève, Oskaloosa H.S.*

### German First Secretaries

■ Dennis Kux and Michael Boerner's article on the German Foreign Service in the January issue of the FSJ contained one possible misunderstanding. They said that "The Germans promote their younger officers much faster than we; an officer can expect to reach First Secretary level in about four or five years after entering the Service." While the Germans may actually promote their younger officers faster than we do, the quick elevation to First Secretary is not proof of such

practice. Most Foreign Services move their diplomatic staff quickly to First Secretary, but this does not necessarily reflect promotion *within* their personnel structures to a pay and position grade equivalent to FSO-3 within ours: (0-3 being the normal grade for First Secretary). The distinction is between diplomatic title (largely for external purposes) and pay grade/rank.

EDWARD MARKS

Brussels

### Use of the Flag

■ I was very intrigued by the James May article on the perfect diplomat in the January issue of the JOURNAL. The closing line is interesting for the words ". . . and the national flag over his coffin when he dies."

After first posing the question as to whether an American diplomat, either current or retired, has the right to have the American flag displayed on his coffin when he dies, I would ask why not? and if so, under what conditions?

JOAN E. CORBETT

Washington

EDITOR'S NOTE: The answer to the first question is yes, according to the provisions of 2 FAM 154.3, which provides in part that the flag may also be used to cover the casket of a deceased American Foreign Service employee pending completion of transportation arrangements or up to the time of burial is burial takes place at his post.

### Representation Variants

■ Bravo for Irwin Rubenstein's letter (November 1972) on representation! I, too, have assumed the Congress to be reasonable until proved otherwise. (If a sensible proposal is made and still ignorantly refused, that, of course, proves otherwise.)

Someone has to testify that there are variants of what is now called "representation." If you hold a seminar lasting all day, refreshments and/or lunch are merely a civilized thing to do and should be considered a part of the program costs. Events of this sort do differ materially from the at-home cocktail.

But we should try sensible proposals for *necessary* representation. Al Capp has come a long way from thinking Congressmen are Neanderthals. Maybe we should too.

FRANK LATTANZ

Ibadan



## AFSA ACTIVITIES

### Nominations Needed

It is again time for nominations for AFSA's three awards honoring Foreign Service people who tell it like it is and who have the courage and integrity to question the system's conventional wisdom. This is one of the Association's most important professional activities and it is placed in high relief by the Association's recent honoring of Jack Service and the "old China hands" for their contributions a generation ago.

The three awards are the Herter Award for senior officers (FSO 1 and 2 and equivalents), the Rivkin Award for middle-grade officers (FSO 3-5 and equivalents), and the Harriman Award for junior officers (FSO 6-8 and equivalents). They are given, **not** for all-around good performance or super-efficiency reports—this is the Department's area—but for outstanding intellectual originality, courage, forthrightness, and "constructive dissent." Although past recipients have often been chosen on the basis of their contributions to the Department's debate on general foreign policy issues, this is not the only field in which these characteristics can be displayed. One of last year's winners, for example, was singled out for her work on women's rights. The awards themselves are \$1000 each.

Two copies of each nomination, unbound on regular size paper, marking each page with the name of the nominee and numbering each page, should be sent to: American Foreign Service Association

Awards Committee  
2101 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037

in time to be received by April 15, 1973.

The format for nominations is as follows:

#### PART 1:

Biographic Data  
NAME  
BIRTH DATE  
GRADE  
AGENCY

#### PART 2:

Association with Candidate  
(Strictly limit to 250 words).

#### PART 3:

Justification for Nomination  
(Strictly limit to 500-750 words).  
Summary of specific reasons for nomination. The narrative should discuss:

- a. Qualities of mind and spirit which qualify the Nominee for the award;
- b. Examples of the Candidate's accomplishments, particularly evidence of outstanding initiative, integrity, and intellectual courage.

Anyone with knowledge of a Foreign Service colleague's accomplishments can nominate for these awards—in fact, the idea is to emphasize peer nominations rather than nominations by superiors. This is where you come in: the more nominations AFSA receives, the more certain we can be of having sought out and found the most deserving candidates. We hope that some person at each post meets the specifications for one of these awards, that you AFSA representatives will pass the word to others at the post, and that each chapter will send in at least one nomination as soon as possible. Because the middle-grade group is far larger than the other two, we would appreciate your giving special scru-

tiny to junior and senior officers with the right qualities.

### AFSA Honors John Service and China Hands

A distinguished audience of nearly 300 scholars, journalists, government leaders and Foreign Service officers gathered in the eighth floor ballroom of the Department on January 30 to honor John Service and his "China hand" colleagues for their contributions to the quality and integrity of political reporting.

Highlights of the moving tribute to Mr. Service were an introduction by historian Barbara Tuchman, in which she discussed the reasons why candid political reports are often ignored by decision makers, and Mr. Service's own remarks, in which he stressed the need for acute observation, honesty, and the courage to draw conclusions. Mr. Service twice received standing ovations from the gathering, which prompted Washington *Post* reporter Marilyn Berger to observe that "the Foreign Service officers seemed in some respects applauding themselves at a time when their own utility has been brought into question by a White House that runs its own foreign policy." The *Post* story described the lunch-

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eon, which was organized by AFSA, as an occasion regarded by Foreign Service officers "as vindicating the role of the Foreign Service itself. Some even said they came to assuage their own guilt."

In introducing the program, AFSA Board Chairman William C. Harrop said that the most fitting reaction to the affair came from one of the Department's "old China hands," invited back by AFSA. "I never thought I'd live to see it," he said.

#### **New Luncheon Series**

Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush and Under Secretaries William Casey, William Porter and Curtis Tarr have agreed to join AFSA members in a series of get-acquainted luncheons this spring.

The schedule for the four luncheons to be held in the Benjamin Franklin Room on the Eighth Floor of the Department is:

Wednesday, March 21—Deputy Secretary Kenneth Rush

Thursday, April 5—Under Secretary William Porter

Tuesday, April 24—Under Secretary Curtis Tarr

Monday, May 14—Under Secretary William Casey

Notices and reservation forms are in the mail to AFSA members on the luncheon list. If you will be in the area at the time of any of these luncheons and would like to attend, please see the receptionist at AFSA headquarters.

## **AID NEWS**

### **Review Proposed of Study Group Recommendations**

In a letter to Assistant Administrator Campbell, AFSA has commended the diligent efforts of the Foreign Service Performance Evaluation System Study Group. However, AFSA has pointed out that it would be inappropriate for the Agency to implement any recommendations emanating from the Group prior to the certification in the very near future of an exclusive employee representative. Performance evaluation and promotion are two extremely important subjects for AID employees and for their exclusive representative; they are directly within the latter's sphere of concern and responsi-

bility. AFSA believes it would be most unfortunate if action were taken to revise the Agency's performance evaluation and promotion system at the very time an employee representative is being elected. Under the Executive Order, no system can be devised or revised solely by management.

In light of these circumstances, AFSA requested that any recommendations submitted by the Study Group be held in abeyance pending certification. At that time, the exclusive representative will most certainly enter into consultation with AID regarding any revision of the Agency's performance evaluation and promotion system.

## **USIA NEWS**

### **Retirement Board Precepts**

AFSA has commented on the proposed Precepts for the 1973 USIA Retirement Board. After noting that the Association has serious reservations regarding basic USIA selection out procedures, AFSA made the following recommendations in a letter from Board members Jack Tuohy and Bill Lenderking:

- That the Retirement Board be required to develop standards of performance for each class in accordance with the Foreign Service Act;
- That the Retirement Board apply these standards and make final determinations on selection out, instead of the determinations being made by the Deputy Director;
- That the Retirement Board be drawn from all classes of the Agency, not just senior officers.

## **STATE DEPT. NEWS**

### **Negotiations Begin**

The AFSA State Negotiating Committee, under the direction of Tom Boyatt, has initiated discussions with representatives of the Department's management on a wide variety of subjects. In order to come to grips as quickly as possible with the large backlog of matters of interest to AFSA members and to take advantage of the more liberal granting of official

time for negotiations during the first ninety days following the certification of an exclusive employee representative, AFSA has proposed, and the Department has accepted, simultaneous discussions on matters of mutual interest. To this end, the Negotiating Committee has been divided into four subcommittees: Framework (Rick Melton); Grievances (Tex Harris); Members' Interests (Hank Cohen); and Personnel (Jack Miklos). AFSA representatives are currently meeting with their management counterparts each afternoon on a Monday through Thursday schedule.

Discussions have been frank and businesslike. In the framework area, AFSA has already proposed agreements relating to dues allocation; AFSA access to new employees; access to agency communications facilities; the organization of overseas chapters; and the provision of other agency services and facilities, including office space within the Department. These agreements are essentially facilitating arrangements which are designed to enable AFSA to meet its responsibilities to represent all Foreign Service employees of the Department of State.

On Members' Interests subjects, AFSA has introduced detailed proposals with respect to adjusting allowances for the recent devaluation, eliminating deductibles on R & R and emergency visitation travel, dropping mandatory attendance at US Government-sponsored schools, equalizing shipping allowances for single employees and married couples without children, providing special assistance to families with handicapped children, and restoring ship travel. Other proposals are in preparation.

AFSA has put forward the Bayh-Cooper Bill as the basis for a permanent grievance system.

On personnel subjects, AFSA has requested formal consultation on the structure, precepts and membership of all selection boards. AFSA has asked for an explanation of the Department's policy on Section 519 of the Foreign Service Act. AFSA has requested management to review the criteria and definitions used

for the classification of Foreign Service positions, and to discuss establishing midcareer multifunctional positions. AFSA has also asked for access to data on non-career appointments and on the lateral appointment process.

### Career Tenure

Excerpts of letter from AFSA Chairman Bill Harrop to the Director General:

As you know, the Association is determined to maintain and strengthen the career Foreign Service officer system established by the Foreign Service Act. I know you fully share this position. We have applauded the Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps proposed by the Task Forces, with the clear understanding that the FAS Corps would be composed of true specialists whose expertise was needed by the Government, was not available elsewhere in the career Service, and was of a character requiring a higher degree of specialization and continuity than was appropriate to FSOs.

It is our understanding that Foreign Service Reserve officers who are not profound specialists, and who are in fact qualified for and engaged in the traditional administrative, economic, consular and political functions of the FSO Corps, are **not** eligible for conversion to career FAS status. To utilize the FAS program to grant permanent career status to such officers would in our view be a distortion of the Foreign Service Act and an abuse of the career principle.

At a time when our Service is shrinking under stern budgetary pressure, the permanent retention of such FSR officers, who were appointed for a limited period only as authorized by the Foreign Service Act, could make it virtually impossible for us to increase the recruitment of new junior FSOs, an increase which must begin very soon if we are to retain our career system. The implications for the assignment and promotion of career FSOs, and for their exposure to time-in-grade retirement are evident and highly deleterious.

The Department Notice of January 24 could be interpreted as an

invitation to all FSRs—even those not falling in the highly specialized categories described by the quotation from MRB No. 8—to apply for conversion.

I would very much appreciate your confirmation that the Association's understanding of the FAS program is correct and that officers in specialties which are standard to and available in the career service will not be eligible.

As exclusive representative of the Foreign Service in the Department of State, the Association wishes formally to request that its representatives participate on the panels or boards which will evaluate the eligibility and qualifications of limited appointment officers being considered for tenured FAS status.

## Foreign Service People

### MARRIAGES

**Morrison-Cadeaux.** Margaret Elizabeth Morrison was married to FSO Ralph H. Cadeaux, on February 10, in London. Mr. Cadeaux is being reassigned to FSI as Coordinator for the Consular Course.

### BIRTHS

**Stempel.** A daughter, Jill, born to FSO and Mrs. John D. Stempel, on January 23, in Lusaka.

### DEATHS

**Ballantine.** Joseph W. Ballantine, FSO-retired, died on January 29, in Fairfield, Connecticut. Mr. Ballantine entered the Foreign Service as a student interpreter in Japan in 1909 and served at Kobe, Yokohama, Tansui, Kolohama, Tokyo, Dairen, Canton and Mukden. He also served as consul general in Ottawa and then as director of the Far Eastern office and special assistant to the Secretary of State before his retirement in 1947. He authored two books and many magazine articles. Mr. Ballantine is survived by his wife, Lesley, 129 East 10th Street, New York 10003, three daughters and 7 grandchildren.

**Cleveland.** Cybele Sieta Marianne Evalee Cleveland, 9-year-old daughter of FSO and Mrs. Stanley Cleveland, died of leukemia on January 30 in Boston. She is sur-

vived by her parents of the American Embassy, Brasilia. The family asks that contributions in her name be addressed to the Treasurer's Office, Children's Hospital Medical Center, Boston, Mass. for the Charlotte B. Ward Fund.

**Davis.** Robert C. Davis, FSO-retired, died on December 22, in Boston. Mr. Davis joined the Department in 1946 and later served in the Foreign Service. He was assigned to London, Brussels, Moscow and Ottawa before his retirement in 1972. He is survived by his wife, Shirley Chapman Davis, Olde County Road, Frankestown, N.H., a son, a daughter and four grandchildren.

**Dempsey.** James M. "Jack" Dempsey, AID-retired, died on December 24, in Gainesville, Florida. Mr. Dempsey joined the foreign assistance program in 1957 under the ICA and served in Vietnam, Iran and the Dominican Republic, retiring in 1969. He was the author of several authoritative books and papers on vegetable fiber development. Mr. Dempsey is survived by his wife, Kay, of 275 Carib Dr., Merritt Island, Fla. and two sons from a previous marriage.

**Frazier.** Alfred D. Frazier, retired courier, died on January 28 in Paris. Mr. Frazier retired in 1953 at the age of 70.

**Hamilton.** Robert C. Hamilton, AID, died on December 23, in Washington. Mr. Hamilton joined AID in 1966 and served in Vietnam until 1969, when he transferred to Washington. He is survived by his wife, Mary, Apt. 516, 4545 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington and four children from a previous marriage.

**Louchheim.** Walter C. Louchheim, investment counselor, civic leader and patron of the arts, died on January 31, in Washington. Mr. Louchheim helped to organize and became a member of the staff of the SEC and served as one of the planners and an adviser to the U.S. delegation at the Bretton Woods Conference and the inaugural meeting of the IMF and World Bank. He is survived by his wife, Kathleen (Katie), a former deputy assistant secretary of State, of 2824 O Street, N.W., two daughters and three grandchildren. The

family suggests contributions in his memory to the Katie and Walter Louchheim Fund of the Library of Congress.

**Wilson.** Wilbur Wilson, Associate Director of CORDS Region IV, died on December 19, in Washington. Mr. Wilson joined AID in 1967 and served in Vietnam, in Bien Hoa and Can Tho Provinces. He is survived by his sister, Mrs. Howard J. Evans, 271 White Oak Dr., New Kensington, Pa., a niece and a nephew.

### Weintal Bequest

The will of Edward "Teddy" Weintal, former Polish diplomat, veteran **Newsweek** diplomatic correspondent and special assistant to the Director of USIA, established an annual prize or prizes for the best news, magazine or electronic reporting on foreign policy and/or diplomatic affairs. The awards will total at least \$5,000.

In addition, the income from the other half of the residuary estate will maintain one or more scholarships bearing Mr. Weintal's name at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.

Awarding of the prizes and scholarships will be by a three-member panel consisting of Charles Bartlett, Chicago **Sun-Times**, Marvin Kalb, CBS News, and Hugh Sidey of **Time-Life**, with the President of Georgetown College or his designee serving as ex-officio member and administrator.

Mr. Weintal was killed January 24, 1973 in a horseback riding accident in Rock Creek Park.

### Becker Awarded Honorary Life Membership

Edmund F. Becker, FSO-retired, has been awarded Lifetime Honorary Membership in the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany, the Chamber announced recently. Mr. Becker served with the State Department in Germany for over 11 years, as Commercial Attache at the Embassy in Bonn, as the first Director of the Trade Center in Frankfurt, and as Commercial Counselor at the Embassy in Bonn. The award, which was in recognition for "long years of outstanding and dedicated service . . . rendered in promoting inter-

national trade," is the third to an American diplomatic officer, other recipients being Ambassador Conant and Ambassador Krekeler. Mr. Becker was also the recipient of the Chamber's "Certificate of Merit" at the time of his retirement in 1969. He is the Washington representative of the American Chamber of Commerce in Germany and of the Munich Fair Authority.

## AAFSW NEWS

AAFSW members have been invited to The White House for tea on March 13 at 3:00 P.M. And on March 15, members and their guests will be welcome at the National War College luncheon arranged by Mrs. William Leonhart. Luncheon is at 12:00 and Liz Carpenter will be the featured speaker.

Members who enjoyed the morning of Americana and old movies at the National Archives on February 13 may be interested to know they can get information about other Archives activities as well as about joining the Archives' new Associates Program by calling Mrs. Barbara McDonald at 963-5456 or writing her at National Archives, Washington, D. C. 20408.

A summary of the AAFSW's January panel on the changing role of the Foreign Service wife may be secured by sending a self-addressed stamped envelope to Mrs. Richard B. Finn, Program Chairman, 7007 MacArthur Blvd., Washington, D. C.

Potential members are reminded they are welcome at all meetings of the AAFSW. While it is possible to join at each meeting, the best way to join and be assured of receiving the AAFSW Newsletter is to call or write Membership Chairman Mrs. Robert S. Steven, 657-9714, c/o AAFSW, P. O. Box 4931, Washington, D. C. 20008.

## MEMBERS INTERESTS

### Income Tax Litigation

The National Association of IRS Employees has filed an interesting suit against the USG. They

ask the courts to decide that the seven percent of salary withheld for the civil service retirement fund not be counted as part of gross income for federal tax purposes. If the Association wins the case, the implications for all employees in and out of government would be far reaching. The Government will certainly fight hard on this one all the way to the highest judicial levels. The IRS Employees Association, however, is advising its members to file amended returns for 1969 requesting refunds on the contributions to the retirement fund. Amended returns for 1969 cannot be legally filed later than April 15, 1973 because of the statute of limitations. By filing for 1969 now, a taxpayer keeps his 1969 case open until the court case is settled.

### Sales Taxes on Pouch Room Packages

Thanks to an alert AFSA member in New Delhi, AFSA requested Sears Roebuck to stop collecting sales taxes on merchandise being shipped overseas via the State Department mailroom. AFSA explained that zip code 20521 exists exclusively for mail destined to addresses outside the United States, and is therefore in the same category as APO and FPO mail. Sears executive suite agreed to stop collecting the sales taxes immediately, and sent appropriate instructions to the Philadelphia offices. Sears also asked that any failure to implement the new instructions be reported to Mr. Clawson, Dept. 568-E, Sears, 4640 Roosevelt Blvd., Philadelphia, Pa. 19132. AFSA suggests that complaints be made (with copy to AFSA) only on merchandise shipped from Philadelphia after February 15, 1973. Information about other mail order houses which collect sales taxes on merchandise sent through the State Department mail room should be forwarded to the Members Interests Committee as soon as possible. Now if only Sears will drop its special surcharge on pouch room mail, we will all be happy.

AFSA and Sears request that orders going to Sears with 20521 as the return address be clearly labeled "not subject to sales tax."

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