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# FSJ

# FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

MAY 1973: VOLUME 50, NO. 5



COVER: *Watering Place, Rongoan*, by Mary Betts Anderson



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Articles oppeoring in this jaurnol are obstructed and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

Microfilm copies of current os well as of bock issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL ore ovoilable through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

# FSJ EDITORIAL

## In All Fairness

Is there anyone who has not expressed genuine concern for the effects of rampant inflation on both the national economy and individual pocketbooks? Yet most federal employees have received substantial pay increases during the past few years which have largely offset the effects of rising prices.

However, for those employees whose salaries have been frozen at the salary ceiling of $36,000 imposed by Congress, the years of rapidly rising prices have been an unmitigated and increasing hardship.

For example, Foreign Service officers, Information officers and Reserve officers of Class One have been denied every pay increase since July, 1969. Under the latest pay increase, officers of Class Two, step six and above have hit the ceiling and must therefore acquiesce in an actual *decrease* in pay as both prices and salaries of other wage earners have risen regularly. As of January, FSO-1s are receiving $5,173 per year *less* than what they would have been receiving as their fair compensation, and FSO-2s in steps six and seven find themselves shorted by varying smaller amounts. Since July, 1969, after which those at the ceiling received no further pay increases, the pay of most white collar employees has risen about 30 percent.

Unfortunately, remedies for this obvious injustice are not readily at hand. Under existing law, congressmen, Supreme Court Justices and top political appointees can not get another pay raise until 1974 at the earliest. Until these people get a raise, there can be none for career federal workers who are now held at the same ceiling of $36,000. Recommendations for a pay raise must come from the commission on executive, legislative, and judicial salaries which has been requested to submit a report on the matter to the President by June 30, 1973. Any resultant wage increases can not come until March 1974.

The situation discriminates blatantly against those employees whose ability to reach the top echelons of federal service has been "rewarded" with a substantial reduction in real income.

Legislation to lift the current unfair ceiling of $36,000 is obviously called for. Given the current political situation, however, such legislation is not likely to be enacted in the immediate future. Congress *could* enact legislation authorizing employees in the affected grades to receive retirement benefits based on the pay they should be receiving, rather than the pay they actually receive. Of course, they would also contribute to the retirement fund on the basis of the larger amount. Another remedy is to make cost of living increases available to all employees regardless of income.

AFSA strongly supports the proposals to raise the $36,000 ceiling, to base both retirement fund benefits and contributions on what the affected employee should actually be receiving, and to provide cost of living relief to all employees equally. We will communicate these views to Congress and propose legislative remedies to correct this situation.

## Foreign Service Beeswax

In life, art, and the Foreign Service, cross-fertilization —in our case, personal interchange among the Foreign Service agencies—is widely acknowledged to be not only desirable but necessary. Unfortunately, in recent years inter-agency exchange has dwindled to a mere tokenism, and several proposals for correcting the situation have foundered.

Evidence of the decline can be seen in the following figures on State-USIA interchange:

| | 1967 | 1969 | 1971 | 1972 | 1973 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| USIA officers assigned to State | 61 | 47 | 36 | 35 | 29 |
| FSOs assigned to USIA | 28 | 13 | 11 | 13 | 17 |

Figures for AID are not known, but if one discounts the now-defunct CORDS the level of exchange is certainly lower than that between State and USIA. It is also worth noting that most of the USIA officers assigned to State are performing USIA-type work, mostly in CU and public affairs. On the other hand, most of the State officers with USIA hold highly-regarded and often senior posts both in Washington and overseas.

Barriers to exchange in the past have been tight personnel ceilings, the fear that employees who accept positions out of their areas of specialization will become less competitive, and the reluctance of State to allow employees from other agencies to compete for scarce positions at the top.

These barriers are real, but are not insurmountable. There is sufficient first-rate talent in the three agencies to permit a program of genuine exchange which could have a significant impact on the effectiveness with which the United States conducts its foreign affairs. We urge that this be given immediate high-level attention, along the lines of the following resolution recently passed by AFSA's Board of Directors:

> WHEREAS the practice of diplomacy in the 1970s requires officers with the broadest possible range of experience in program direction, public and cultural affairs, and foreign assistance as well as the traditional areas of politics, economics, and negotiation; and
>
> WHEREAS there is widespread agreement that exchanges of talented officers among the three foreign affairs agencies of State, USIA, and AID is beneficial both to the agencies involved and to the officers who acquire added skills and experience; and
>
> WHEREAS the actual number of exchanges among the three agencies has followed a downward trend in recent years;
>
> NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the American Foreign Service Association urges the senior officials of the three foreign affairs agencies to implement a policy of expanded interchange of talented personnel among these agencies, and that the appropriate personnel and policy officials be directed to work out the details of this interchange forthwith.

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# COMMUNICATION RE:

# PRESIDENTS and BUREAUCRATS

I WAS much interested in the editorial in the January 1973 issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL on "Presidents and Bureaucrats." Since I have had some experience with this matter at various levels of the Department, I am tempted to offer a few brief observations which you solicited in your editorial.

Both Presidents and Foreign Service officers should accept with understanding and a reasonable amount of good humor the primary reason why the Department of State is unlikely to be widely acclaimed as a popular institution. The simple fact is that the Department deals with that part of the public business which we ourselves cannot control. Federal, state and local governments and our people themselves can pretty well decide what we do about our domestic affairs. But when we cross our national frontier we find ourselves in a world of some 140 governments, each with its own traditions, political system, problems, urgent needs, hopes, and aspirations. No two governments will look at the globe in quite the same way. No other government simply salutes and obeys when we speak. It is a world of negotiation, compromise, cooperation, occasional confrontation, and on rare occasions violence. A President learns that the State Department must tell him on frequent occasions that he cannot have what he wants because strange foreigners just won't act as he would like them to do. From the point of view of the Oval Room, the Department of State is often the Department of Bad News. A certain amount of frustration and disappointment is inevitable in our foreign relations and these must be balanced by patience, persistence, and a wholesome regard for other and often conflicting points of view.

Further, most foreign policy decisions are about the future—trying to shape the course of events in one direction rather than another. Providence has not given us

"War is a continuation of policy by other means."

—Karl von Clausewitz

"The world has never been in want of theories about how wars may be avoided, and no doubt the human race could do very much better in this respect than it has done."

—Bernard Brodie

the capacity to probe the fog of the future with certainty. It is almost impossible to know everything which one needs to know to make a wholly satisfactory foreign policy decision because of complexity, the rapidly accelerating pace of events, the accidents of personality among all the parties involved, and the fact that certain kinds of critically important information are not knowable. One cannot know what a foreign leader will do before he knows it himself.

In your editorial you spoke about the "loyalty problem" and the "apolitical" aspect of the Foreign Service. I once had a brief visit with the head of the British Civil Service and, in the course of our conversation, I complimented him on the way in which their Civil Service stays away from party politics. He said, "Oh no, you have it wrong. The British Civil Service supports one political party at a time." Our political system is much more complicated than the British system insofar as career service is concerned. Frequently, we have one party in the White House and another party with a majority in Congress. Career officers are expected to be available to committees and subcommittees of the Congress to discuss matters which have a high political content. Orders come from the President, but funds come from the Congress and appointments and promotions depend upon the Senate. Those of us who have tried to insulate career officers from the political turmoil find resistance both in the White House and in the Congress. A President wants and expects support and the political opposition does not always respect the difference between carcer officers and those who are properly politically responsible. Even so, those who rise to the top of the Foreign Service are those who earn respect for their willingness to be candid and forthright rather than those who practice the art of keeping their heads down. Our political system does not permit us to protect our career men from occasional lumps and bruises as well as is done by our British friends but to acknowledge the problem helps to develop a measure of tolerance on all sides.

President Truman was reported to have said to the Department in his day: "I don't want to have foreign policy recommendations from the Department of State based upon domestic political considerations. In the first place, good policy is good politics and I want your views about good policy. Second, you fellows in the Department don't know a damned thing about domestic politics—that's my business." My own view is that a Foreign Service officer below the rank of a Presidential appointee should concern himself with foreign policy considerations but that Presidential appointees must try to see the problem as a whole as the President must look at it—and this must include domestic considerations. Such a rough rule of thumb is undoubtedly oversimplified, but I have not seen a better one thus far.

Ambassador Charles Yost, in his letter published in the March issue, drew a crucial distinction between the role of a Foreign Service officer before a policy decision is made and his duty after one is made. Any Administration suffers if it fails to welcome and stimulate the widest range of discussion in the formation of policy and all

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Administrations have sometimes erred on that point. But it is the President who is elected by the people to determine policy for the Executive branch of the Government. The democratic process fails if the career services, whether in uniforms or civilian clothes, reject or undermine the decision made by the President under the Constitution. If a decision is made which is intolerable to a career officer, his proper course is to resign and oppose it as a private citizen.

Relations between the Department of State and the President can turn on a number of lesser matters. For example, since 1945 the Department has not been able to provide finished drafts for Presidents to use for messages, speeches, toasts and similar purposes. It is incredibly difficult to write for someone else—particularly if he has staff around him who have a built-in resistance to drafts which they consider it their business to furnish. I myself was able to use only a half dozen of more than two hundred toasts prepared for me in a routine fashion for the black books which are put together for the visit of a foreign dignitary. My improvised toasts may not have been as good, but at least they were mine. I once asked the Inspection Corps to keep their eyes and ears open for a highly articulate officer who could assist us in providing better service to the President, but I suspect that this is still unfinished business.

Another example of a very small point. During my tour on the seventh floor, I wrestled pretty hard with two Presidents to ensure that qualified Foreign Service officers were given a full chance at ambassadorial posts. Two outgoing Foreign Service ambassadors made their farewell call on President Kennedy wearing slave bracelets. I heard about that for at least three months. "Know thyself" is pretty good advice, but "Know thy President" is not a bad idea.

Finally, each President will work out the management of his awesome responsibilities in a way which makes him comfortable—and this will vary from President to President. Given the burdens of the office, this tendency can perhaps be understood. It does not strengthen the Department or the Foreign Service to have the gossips of Washington talking about the "morale" of the Department. My early experience in the Department was under Secretary Marshall who said that "An enlisted man is entitled to a morale problem but an officer is not." It never occurred to us to go into his office and cry on his shoulder. The Department is not staffed with cry babies. The Foreign Service is made up of talented, highly intelligent and courageous men and women and gallantry in posts of danger is regularly demonstrated. The fine qualities of the Foreign Service should not be concealed from the public or from Presidents by reports of whining and petulance. I happen to believe that the professional diplomatic service of the United States is the best in the world and that Presidents—each in his own way—come to the same conclusion.

This has been much too long; the subject deserves a book—which I shall not write.

Dean Rusk

## ABOUT THIS ISSUE

REVISIONISM in recent historical writing on the Post-World War II period in American foreign relations is the subject of this issue of the JOURNAL.

"Revisionism" is a difficult word to define. Yet, so many new works on the history of foreign affairs are being written, by so many authors and on so many subjects, and representing such a variety of viewpoints, that they defy easy classification. In one sense, any new generation of historians can be considered revisionist if the writers use new evidence, including state papers and memoirs, not available in an earlier period, and adopt perspectives different from those used by historians of a previous generation. Considered in such a light, the work of such an establishmentarian figure as R. R. Palmer would be clearly revisionist in describing the interrelationship of the American and French revolutions which a generation of previous scholars treated as separate and largely unrelated topics.

"Revisionism," in its most restricted usage, is often applied as an ideological term. Its characteristics are presumed to include a rigidly Marxist perspective, an attempt to blame most international crises of recent history on the United States, and a highly ideological distortion of evidence to fit political ends.

To approach this topic, we have asked three distinguished contemporary historians to present their views on what constitutes revisionism, what some of the relevant authors and issues are for the period under discussion, and how they personally see the problem.

The opening article, an introduction to the question called "Revisionism and the Cold War" and "The Cold War in the Truman Era," is by Lloyd Gardner, Chairman of the History Department at Rutgers University, and author of the recently published "Architects of Illusion, Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-49," a volume which one critic has called "the most important contribution to the continuing debate on the origins of the Cold War."

*Continued on page 37*

# Revisionism— An Overall View



LLOYD C. GARDNER

REVISIONISM is nothing new. It only seems so when it intrudes upon the happy realm of conventional wisdom where objectivity and orthodoxy are still at peace. Reactions to this unwelcome disturbance vary. Some prefer to ignore it, and to go on doing so for just as long as possible. Others attack it vigorously, appropriating the term revisionist as a pejorative epithet to denounce whatever they find disagreeable. Discussion of the origins and nature of the Cold War has proved no exception, and it may be a long time before emotions cool off enough to permit a totally dispassionate evaluation of the evidence.

A revisionist interpretation of Stalin's role in World War II and the early Cold War years has already appeared in the Soviet Union, perhaps the least likely place for the historical process to work its changes. Yet each generation of political leaders sooner or later finds need for a "usable" past, to justify new departures or to reinforce old premises. In 1966 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., said that it was time to blow the whistle on revisionist nonsense before it got out of hand. Exactly one year later, Schlesinger wrote: "revisionism is an essential part of the process by which history, through the posing of new problems and the investigation of new possibilities, enlarges its perspectives and enriches its insights."

Without doubt the Vietnam War had a very great deal to do with the admission of revisionism to polite society. The late Dean Acheson once labeled his principal antagonist on Capitol Hill, Ohio's Robert A. Taft, a "re-examinist." This new species of isolationist, said the then Secretary of State, "was distinctive for pulling up its crops every morning to see what had been planted or from doubt as to whether they should have been." Few could stand up to Acheson's brilliant wit, or get back to the main subject after such a put down. What is most noteworthy today, however, is the variation of this argument which blames Cold War revisionism on the Vietnam "re-examinists."

Vietnam may indeed have been a ghastly mistake, it is now argued—a quagmire we stumbled into along the way—but one should not read back current attitudes and assumptions about the world situation to the struggle with Stalinist totalitarianism and expansionism. It is obvious that the Vietnam War speeded up the historical process, and the writing of Cold War history. But the war in Southeast Asia was not responsible for the appearance or development of historical reinterpretation. It was already there. What the war did was to increase public interest in questions about the American past, not just since the Cold War, but all the way back to the beginning.

Once commonplace remarks took on new meaning for serious writers. When, for example, General Paul D. Harkins remarked upon returning from Vietnam, "I am reminded of our own Revolution," no one got very excited. It was 1964. Nor did anyone think much of his next sentence: "It took eight years to get through our Revolution, and then we ran into some of the toughest guerrillas that we ever want to run into any place—the American Indians." But when David Halberstam quoted Harkins' words in his best selling, "The Best and the Brightest," they had taken on a very different connotation — one profoundly embarrassing to liberals who had defended the war during the Johnson years.

It is wrong, however, to write off Cold War revisionism as an overreaction to Vietnam, an emotional purging of the spirit by men anxious to make amends for their errors. The first serious questioning of American policy by a non-communist writer came from P.M.S. Blackett in "Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy," published in 1948. The most respected American revisionist, Professor William Appleman Williams, published "American-Russian Relations, 1781-1947," at the height of the Korean War in 1952. By the time Vietnam had become a national political issue, an entire library shelf of what would be called revisionist books had been published.

The books which appeared in the '20s and '30s challenging official interpretations of American entrance into World War I, and those which appeared in the '50s raising questions about World War II, focused narrowly on presidential decision-making and supposed high-level conspiracy. These books may actually have retarded serious inquiry into other forces which impelled American foreign policy in those critical periods. Cold War revisionists, on the whole, have avoided this pitfall. This is not to say that they will have the last word. Historians are forever having one last word on a subject, whether it be the nature of French feudalism or the causes of the American Civil War. Anyone who takes the past seriously, however, can no longer avoid confronting Cold War historians who take issue with the accepted versions of the origin and nature of that conflict. Indeed, the time may come when revisionists cease to be revisionists, and become instead the dominant view.

Actually, there were two Truman Doctrine speeches . . .

# THE COLD WAR IN THE TRUMAN ERA

LLOYD C. GARDNER

At Roosevelt's death American policymakers faced an awesome challenge. World War II was not yet over, but it seemed entirely possible that the future peace could be lost in the next few weeks. American postwar planning had begun, informally at least, even before Pearl Harbor. The guiding principle in Washington during those days was a simple determination to avoid Wilson's mistakes at Versailles. Thus while there had been no time to work out the details, the March 1941 Lend-Lease Act was regarded by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and his aides as an opportunity not only to prevent another war debts tangle, but also to set the foundations for a rational postwar economic order.

Then, on August 14, 1941, FDR and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill signed a joint declaration of war aims known as the Atlantic Charter. These promises of national self-determination and equal economic opportunity for all peoples were incorporated into the United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942, and reaffirmed once again by the Big Three as part of the Yalta Protocol concluded on February 11, 1945. With Roosevelt dead, what would happen to the Grand Alliance—and to American war aims?

Ambassador Averell Harriman rushed home from Moscow, so he recounted later, feeling that it was desperately important for him to put his views about Russia's intentions before Roosevelt's successor. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, on the other hand, was about equally concerned that the new President might be goaded into some unwise action *vis-a-vis* the Soviets by Prime Minister Churchill, who could always be counted on to seize any chance to advance the empire's interests at someone's else's expense. It was an uncertain and dangerous time.

Despite Roosevelt's obvious failing health, the possibility of a Truman presidency had never really been considered. Or if it had, the President's close advisers had dismissed the thought out of loyalty—and maybe fear. FDR *had to* represent the United States at the peacetable. None of the key issues for the peace had been decided; only Roosevelt knew the background and relationship of each question. And only he knew how to obtain cooperation from Stalin and Churchill. Without their wartime leader at the helm, American policymakers would become increasingly apprehensive with each passing day that a fatal slippage was taking place, a slippage between Roosevelt's knowledge and Truman's grasp of the world situation, between FDR's immense prestige and HST's command of the tangible levers of American power.

About five o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday, April 12, 1945, Vice President Harry Truman was asked to come to the White House. He did not know why. He imagined that FDR wanted to go over some matters with him before returning to Warm Springs, Georgia, to complete his vacation. Inside the White House, Truman was taken instead to Mrs. Roosevelt's second floor study. "Harry," she said quietly, "the President is dead." When Truman recovered from the shock, he asked, "Is there anything I can do for you?" Eleanor Roosevelt replied, "Is there anything *we* can do for *you*? For you are the one in trouble now."

The next day Truman received his formal introduction to those troubles. The State Department's first report to the President minced no words: "Since the Yalta Conference the Soviet Government has taken a firm and uncompromising position on nearly every question that has arisen in our relations." Of all these questions, said the report, Poland's future was the "most complex and urgent." Ambassador Harriman's recent cables from Moscow had detailed the evidence of growing Russian intransigence throughout Eastern Europe, and informed Washington of the diversion of wartime Lend-Lease supplies to Soviet political purposes in the area: the establishment and support of "friendly regimes." Former German satellites were becoming Russian puppets. Harriman suggested the obvious remedy; the United States must select "one or two cases where their actions are intolerable and make them realize that they cannot continue their present attitude except at great cost to themselves."

Harriman arrived at the oval office of the White House on the morning of April 21 to explain how he thought the Russians could be made to understand just what it would cost to continue their present attitude toward the Yalta agreement on Poland. Somewhat to his surprise, Roosevelt's adviser on Russian affairs found Truman fully informed on the situation and con-

vinced he could get "85 per cent" of the American interpretation. The sticking point was Stalin's determination to retain majority status for his chosen men, the so-called Lublin government. Majority in this instance was not a matter of numbers, said Harriman. The inclusion of "any real democratic leader . . . would serve as a rallying point for 80 or 90 per cent of the Polish people against the Lublin Communists."

The Russians had the impression, continued the Ambassador, that we needed them not only to win the war in the Pacific but to absorb the nation's capitalist surpluses. Marxist ideology had misled them into believing that fear of a postwar depression gave them a powerful hold over American policymakers. When Molotov asked for a $6 billion credit, for example, the Russian Foreign Minister had made a gratuitous, and, Harriman felt, insolent offer to save capitalism from itself by taking surplus goods from the United States. "There were some quarters in Moscow," the Ambassador told Truman, "that believed it was a matter of life and death to American business to increase our exportss to Russia."

When Molotov himself came to the President's office two days later, Truman was ready to lay it on the line. Unless the Soviet government changed its attitude about Poland, he would find it difficult to persuade Congress to act on "economic measures in the foreign field." The best way to disabuse the Russians of any lingering notions about American economic problems, it seemed, was to take the initiative. Truman's other advisers did not all agree that Poland was the best place to test Soviet intentions. Secretary Stimson and General George C. Marshall, for example, thought there was much in the argument that the Yalta accord was ambiguous, and that Stalin was being realistic about Russian security requirements. After all, Poland had provided the Germans with a staging area for two invasions of Russia within 25 years. Admiral William D. Leahy, who had accompanied Roosevelt to Yalta, agreed that the Big Three decision on Poland at that conference was open to more than one interpretation, but felt that a showdown "would have a beneficial effect upon the Soviet outlook." His attitude best typified what was going through the minds of the late President's close advisers. The reorganization of the Polish government was not the central issue nor the deciding factor. What was then? The need to call Stalin to task before he went too far.

Proof came later when Harriman himself accepted less on behalf of the United States than Truman had demanded of Molotov at their first interview. A temporary resolution of the Polish question was achieved in late June, when the Soviet Union agreed to the inclusion of several non-Lublin figures in a reorganized provisional government. In the meantime, however, Harriman had continued to sound the warning about Russian policy in Eastern Europe. Whatever their motives, the Russians were extending their power westward first in one tier of states, then in the next, and so on. Truman sent him to San Francisco to talk with the American delegation at the United Nations conference. "While we cannot go to war with Russia," he said to a surprised meeting of the delegation, "we must do everything we can to maintain our position as strongly as possible in Eastern Europe." Privately, he assured Stimson that a strong policy risked little. "Russia is really afraid of our power or at least respects it," he told the Secretary of War. And though the Soviets might "try to ride roughshod" over their neighbors, Russia "really [is] afraid of us."

Nevertheless, Truman continued his efforts to convince Stalin that Russia's best interests were in Big Three cooperation to establish "democratic" regimes in Eastern Europe. Yet the word itself posed difficulties for both sides. In the first place, with the exception of Czechoslovakia, none of the area's prewar governments fit into any definition of democracy, whatever they called themselves. Second, the retreating Germans had destroyed or removed their satellites' economic foundations, leaving them open to whatever influence got there first, and built new structures. And third, British policy in Greece and Anglo-American policy in Italy seemed clearly designed to exclude communist influence.

As Isaac Deutscher first pointed out in his biography of Stalin so many years ago ("Stalin: A Political Biography," Oxford University Press, 1949), this situation was perfectly acceptable to the Soviet dictator:

> Stalin, "the man without illusions," reckoned with the intervention of each of the Big Three in the domestic affairs of their spheres as with a certainty, intervention that was in part dictated by military necessity and in part exploited military necessity as an excuse.

Deutscher elaborated on this point several times. In 1965 he argued:

> He [Stalin] had committed himself to respect the predominance of the bourgeois order in postwar western Europe and he carried out his obligations. Long before the Truman Doctrine was proclaimed, Stalin had very effectively saved Western Europe for capitalism; he had saved western Europe from communism. ("Myths of the Cold War," in David Horowitz, ed., "Containment and Revolution," Beacon Press, 1967.)

Gabriel Kolko's two massive volumes ("The Politics of War," Random House, 1968; and, with his wife Joyce, "The Limits of Power," Harper & Row, 1972) constitute the most serious effort to provide a detailed documentation for this interpretation of Stalinist foreign policy. But other writers, by no means "revisionist" in outlook, have come to pretty much the same conclusion. A former Special Assistant to Secretary of State Dean Acheson, Professor Marshall D. Shulman, took a second look at Russian foreign policy under Stalin and concluded that it was responsive to outside events, and not the product of revolutionary fervor mixed with the "psychopathology of Soviet Leaders."

> These efforts [to consolidate Russian control as far west as possible] may have acquired a certain legitimacy in Soviet eyes by an assumed political extension of the wartime agreements regarding spheres of military operations. To those in the West who did not share this perception of inevitable conflict or the same

approaeh to a "sphere of interest" disposition of other people, Soviet aetions were baldly expansionist. ("Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised," Harvard University Press, 1963)

Shulman suggests here what would beeome a "realist" interpretation of the origins of the Cold War, the problem of missed signals and mixed pereeptions. To Kolko, however, the very term Cold War is a misnomer which "burdens one's eomprehension of the postwar era with oversimplifieations and evokes the wrong questions." At best, "that unfortunate phrase describes United States-Soviet diplomaey in the narrowest eontext, as if the relationship subsumes most that is critieal in the history of our times."

What was eritieal in the early days of the Cold War was the desire of the United States to reeonstruct a world order compatible, first, with its own expanding politieal and economie interests, and, seeond, with those of world eapitalism. These were not really separate questions, sinee whatever affected one deeply influenced the other. Obviously also, therefore, anything whieh hindered this plan, be it a Soviet sphere of influenee in Eastern Europe, eommunist aetivity in Western Europe, or revolutionary nationalism in the Far East, had to be resisted—or, in Cold War parlance, "eontained." There were, aeeording to this interpretation, no missed signals or mixed perceptions, and eertainly no illusions on the Ameriean side. It was Washington which took the initiative. And the expansion of Ameriean power oeeurred so rapidly, and spread so far, that when events did go awry, it only seemed that the United States was responding to a Russian probe.

Harry Truman's behavior at the Potsdam Conferenee during July and August (the last summit meeting of his presidency) has been made the subject of a special study by Gar Alperovitz ("Atomie Diplomaey: Hiroshima and Potsdam," Simon and Schuster, 1964), who argues that the new President deliberately reversed FDR's policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union, and set out single-mindedly to remove the Russians from Eastern Europe. When economic threats and blandishments failed, he turned to the newest lever available to Ameriean policymakers—the atomic bomb. In faet, contends Alperovitz, the date of the Postdam Conference was set back so as to ensure the bomb would have been tested before the Big Three settled upon an agenda.

"If it explodes," Alperovitz quotes a conversation Truman had with an assoeiate, "as I think it will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys!" There can be little doubt but that the President was, as Stimson confided to his diary, "tremendously pepped up" by the news the Secretary of War brought him on July 16, the seeond day of the conferenee. The bomb test had been suecessful, beyond expectations. Truman then said that "it gave him an entirely new feeling of eonfidenee." It is quite a different thing, however, to say that the President and his advisers had worked out the diplomatie implications of the bomb for Eastern Europe. Or that they would have pursued a different policy had the test been unsuecessful.

Churchill did have a vision at Potsdam. He foresaw that the bomb

would eompletely alter the diplomatie equilibrium, adrift since Germany's defeat. Lord Alanbrooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, noted that the Prime Minister was earried away with this thought. "Now we had a new value which redressed our position (pushing out his chin and scowling); now we eould say, 'If you insist on doing this or that, well . . .' And then where are the Russians!" Truman's behavior was not quite the same. It was more general, and less confined to immediate problems. Since Roosevelt's death he had been looking for "a hammer on those boys" —all of them, the Russians, the British, the French, and the Japanese. What FDR might have aehieved through diplomaey and prestige, Truman eould seeure only by firmly estblishing himself at the head of the Big Threc by some other means.

Margaret Truman has written reeently that the news of the suecessful test had a liberating effeet on her father. "Now, it was obvious that we no longer needed Russia to end the Paeific war. This freed my father to negotiate with far more boldness and bluntness." ("Harry S. Truman," William Morrow & Co., 1973). This may be an answer to Alperovitz, but it opens other questions of an even more fundamental nature.

Truman had come to Potsdam with a series of tests in mind for determining Soviet intentions. One of these he pursued with unusual boldness and bluntness was a proposal for international control and regulation of major European watterways. In his "Memoirs" Truman stated that he offered the proposal as a solution also for the problem of the Turkish straits, the Suez Canal, and the Panama Canal. They should all "be made free waterways for the passage of freight and passengers of all countries." The papers and minutes of the Potsdam Conference reveal no such sweeping proposal by Truman or his advisers. Instead, the American proposal was for the creation of Big Four navigation agencies to oversee traffic on the Danube and Rhine. When Stalin and Foreign Minister Molotov pointed this out, Churchill speeifieally excluded Suez. Molotov then asked, "If it was sueh a good rule why not apply it to the Suez?"

The eonversation had begun with Stalin's demand for the right to fortify the Turkish Straits. But Truman's reaction was unequivoeal:

> The persistent way in which Stalin bloeked one of the war-preventative measures I had proposed showed how his mind worked and what he was after. I had proposed the internationalization of all the principal waterways. Stalin did not want this. What Stalin wanted was control

of the Black Sea Straits and the Danube. The Russians were planning world conquest.

Ever after in his presidency, Truman would come back to Potsdam for confirmation of this view, and the further conclusion that there was no difference between Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia. Perhaps there was one. "It [Russia] is a Frankenstein dictatorship worse than any of the others, Hitler included." Even if one grants Stalin's ambition to control those areas, it is a far leap from that point to the conclusion that the Russians were planning to conquer the world. The German devastation and loss of life was alone enough to cast doubt on Russia's ability to mount a military offensive, especially without continuing American Lend-Lease aid. Only a month before Potsdam, Truman was counting on Russian economic weaknesses to aid him in achieving his diplomatic goals.

Moreover, from a Russian viewpoint (which on this issue stretched back centuries), the American plan amounted to a very unequal bargain, if not outright denial of any sphere of influence. Russia was supposed to turn over the Danube to an international authority and accept an arms-free arrangement for the Turkish Straits, while its two allies did as they pleased elsewhere at Suez and Panama.

Stalin kept control of the Danube, but he never did gain a foothold in the Turkish Straits. At the end of World War II, Russian influence in the Middle East was easily contained. Within two years it was actually receding. Russian efforts to cash in on a wartime promise that Moscow would be "eligible" for a trusteeship over one of Italy's African colonies had been flatly rejected, its demand on Yugoslavia's behalf for the Dodecanese Islands had been voluntarily abandoned, the Red Army had withdrawn from northern Iran after a public debate in the United Nations, and, finally, Russia's post-Potsdam efforts to negotiate a stronger position for itself in the Turkish straits area had been completely thwarted by Anglo-American diplomatic support for Ankara's uncompromising stand.

Only in Greece was there some trouble. Between Potsdam and the Truman Doctrine speech of mid-March 1947, the British had been unable to restore order (at least one to their liking) in Greece. Stalin's willingness and ability to aid the Greek rebels has long been a matter of dispute, with most historians now concluding that his aid was largely in the form of moral support. He could not very well abandon the Greek communists entirely without giving offense to Tito and his allies, who had their own reasons for opposing the Athens regime, or without giving the Yugoslavs free rein throughout the Balkan area.

Washington had available full reports on the corruption and inefficiency of the royalist government, and Administration officials privately acknowledged Greek responsibility for its external difficulties with other Balkan countries. A British withdrawal from the Mediterranean, however, enlarged the issue beyond the confines of Greece itself. The winter of 1946-47 was especially harsh in Europe, exacerbating recovery problems not only in England but in Western Europe as well. Political conditions in France and Italy were discouraging, to say the least, and a leftist victory in Greece under these conditions might trigger a reaction elsewhere: who could say where it would end?

Once the thin line between civil strife and civil war, already breached in Greece, gave way in some other country—anything could happen. And did anyone suppose that Stalin could resist the temptation to add the final push, by whatever means became available? Already some policymakers were saying that Russian delays in settling the German peace treaty issue and related matters were part of such a strategy. Stalin, according to this notion, was perfectly willing to sit back until the political uncertainty and economic chaos created by the division of Germany and Europe forced the West to meet him on his terms.

All these things went through the minds of American policymakers when the British declared their inability to continue financial support for Greece and Turkey in late February. Truman's problem was to convince Congress to give him the money. A preliminary meeting with Congressional leaders in the White House did not go well until Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson took the floor and delivered a sweeping rendition of Russian expansionism befitting the beginning of a crusade. Warned that he must repeat the threat in words like Acheson's, Truman went before Congress on March 12, 1947, to declare that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."

Actually there were two Truman Doctrine speeches. At Baylor University a week earlier, the President delivered a speech on economic foreign policy which went over the world situation and concluded that governments everywhere were being forced to choose between free enterprise and state control. "If this trend is not reversed, the United States will be under pressure, sooner or later, to use these same devices for markets and for raw materials . . . This is precisely what we have been trying to get away from, as rapidly as possible, ever since the war. It is not the American way . . ."

Truman purged the official Doctrine speech of all references to economic interests or strategic requirements in the Middle East in order to sustain the ideological purity of its anti-Communist message, but the historical record abounds with policy statements, both public and private, attesting to American concern about world capitalism. Perhaps these were intended only to sell the Truman Doctrine to the business elite, or to convince a Republican Congress of the Administration's economic orthodoxy. The formula would then seem to be (a) anti-Communism for the masses; (b) good business for skeptics.

The evidence can be read that way. It was Dean Acheson, however, who remarked that the military, political, and economic aspects of a problem could not "be separated in the intellectual equivalent of a cream separator." A recent study by Richard M. Freeland ("The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism," Alfred A. Knopf, 1972), suggests yet another linkage be-

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A long look which leads to a changed estimate on the part of most of the Ike-watchers

# FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

DURING his years in the White House probably no other 20th century President received greater admiration and more vigorous popular support than Dwight D. Eisenhower. Yet, few administrations have been a greater target for the criticism of intellectuals. Almost from his entry into office they found his administration wanting. Summarizing the indictment in domestic affairs, William Shannon assessed the administration in terms of the "great postponement": Eisenhower consolidated the New Deal but failed to define a new consensus. "No national problem, whether it be education, housing, urban revitalization, agriculture, or inflation, will have been advanced importantly toward solution nor its dimensions significantly altered." In foreign policy, the indictment was more severe: Eisenhower squandered American prestige, sacrificed American power, lost ground to the Communists, overextended American commitments, and failed to maintain an adequate military establishment.

The basic problem, according to many critics, was that the administration failed to understand and act upon a firm conception of the national interest: the administration did not understand power and mistakenly relied upon moralism and legalism as the basic standards in formulating foreign policy. Lurking curiously as an occasional strand, albeit a contradictory strand, in this massive indictment was another theme: the administration had also missed opportunities to ease the Cold War.

Many of these critics faulted Eisenhower for his Whig conception of the Presidency, his unwillingness to lead Congress in foreign and domestic policy, his refusal to educate the people from "the illusion of omnipotence," and his reliance upon men of limited or erroneous vision. In this analysis, John Foster Dulles and George Humphrey were usually the major culprits who manipulated a good-natured, trusting, poorly informed President. These views are still part of the orthodoxy. Secretary Humphrey, ever vigilant guardian of the Treasury and leading advocate of fiscal orthodoxy, placed the balanced budget before defense and left the nation unprepared for both a hot war and economic competition. Dulles, a rigid moralist, failed to understand power and relied instead upon legal and religious principles for guidance. According to most critics, he was the architect of foreign policy, blocking negotiations, thwarting Eisenhower's benign impulses, and maintaining inflexibility.

Important parts of this analysis have been challenged from three different revisionist positions during the past twelve years—one radical, another left-liberal, and the third "tactical." The radical analysis, which is usually theoretical and still not very detailed on the Eisenhower years, stresses America's responsibility for the continuing Cold War under Eisenhower. The most prominent practitioners are William Appleman Williams, "The Tragedy of American Diplomacy" (1959, 2nd rev. ed., 1972); Gabriel and Joyce Kolko, "The Limits of Power" (1972) and Gabriel Kolko, "The Roots of American Foreign Policy" (1969); and Harry Magdoff, "The Age of Imperialism" (1969). In each case their volumes focus upon larger spans than the Eisenhower period, stress the basic continuity in postwar foreign policy, and blame the Cold War on the United States. The left-liberal analysis, while generally eschewing or minimizing theory, also stresses American responsibility for the continuing Cold War but usually focuses at greater length upon events. The leading examples are D. F. Fleming, "The Cold War and Its Origins" (1961); and David Horowitz, "The Free World Colossus" (1965), which, despite a spas-

tic overlay of radical theory, ends up very close to Fleming. The radical and left-liberal positions, defined by their differences on imperialism and class or elite domination, share a common perspective: both are sharply critical of American Cold War policy. The third type of revisionism—which I have termed "tactical"—is logically independent of, but compatible with, radical or left-liberal positions. "Tactical" revisionism focuses not on responsibility for the continuing Cold War but on reevaluating and raising the estimates of Eisenhower's tactics and skills as a president and leader. The "founder" of this movement is Murray Kempton, "The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower" (1967), and it includes Garry Wills, "Nixon Agonistes" (1970); Richard Rhodes, "Ike: An Artist in Iron" (1970); Herbert Parmet, "Eisenhower and the American Crusades" (1972); and myself. It is possible to be a "tactical" revisionist and radical (myself), or a left-liberal, or quite orthodox on the Cold War (Parmet). In turn, it is also possible and even likely that most radicals and left-liberals disagree with "tactical" revisionism and share the older view of Eisenhower as weak, even manipulated.

Let us look more closely at the three categories of revisionism, beginning with the radicals. They have concluded that the Eisenhower administration (like Truman's) was not innocent of ideology nor lacking a sense of national interest, but rather had the wrong conception of the national interest. Williams, Kolko, and Magdoff stress the class domination of American foreign policy, view the military as the servants of the dominant capitalist class, and interpret modern American policy as imperialistic. Beyond this consensus there is disagreement on some important issues: whether the capitalist system needs expansion; whether policy-makers are sincerely interested in extending democracy abroad; whether the Open Door policy (equal access to markets and materials) is a tactic for expansion or a part of the ideology.

For Williams, American imperialism springs from an ideology (Weltanschauung): America's freedom and prosperity depend upon both economic expansion and the spread of democracy abroad. The result has been the effort to establish an international liberal capitalist order—a system without colonialism, totalitarianism, revolution, autarchy, or state trading. Policy-makers believed sincerely that American trade and investment would also benefit other peoples directly (as recipients) or indirectly (by expanding world trade). Unlike Magdoff and Kolko, Williams contends that policy-makers did not view American economic expansion as exploitation. Yet, the result of American expansion, according to Williams, has been an "Open Door" empire—what is called informal empire. Williams maintains that "when an advanced industrial nation plays, or tries to play, a controlling or one-sided role in the development of a weaker economy, then the policy of the more industrial country can . . . only be described as imperial."

For Williams, the Open Door policy is not a tactic but an integral part of this ideology. For Magdoff and Kolko, however, who note cartel agreements, subsidies of exports, and other departures from liberal trade, the Open Door is just one tactic for achieving economic expansion—the preeminent purpose of American foreign policy. Unlike Magdoff and Kolko, Williams also implies that the American system does not require economic expansion abroad and that policy-makers have actually operated under a fundamental misconception: that the United States requires a liberal international capitalist order. According to Williams, there has been no *actual* need to block left-wing revolutions or to extend the American system. For Kolko and Magdoff, in contrast, economic expansion is essential to the American system: the rhetoric of spreading democracy is usually a ruse, policy-makers recognize that capitalist expansion (including foreign aid) usually entails exploitation, and destruction or containment of left revolutions and Communism is vital to preserving the American system. The "domino theory" for Kolko and Magdoff, unlike Williams, is often a correct analysis of the threat to American hegemony.

The Magdoff-Kolko formulation does not deal in any significant way with the problem of how the dominant class puts over its conception of foreign policy. The Williams formulation, while not explicitly considering particular cases in the Eisenhower years, does deal with the general problem: the relationship of class interest to the popular acceptance of foreign policy. According to Williams, the ideology of expanding the economy and democracy abroad has been widely shared since the late 19th century. The ideology originated with agrarians, was slowly accepted by industrialists and financiers, and was also endorsed by labor. It became a seldom-challenged consensus. That consensus restricts debates over foreign policy to tactics: how best to expand the American system. In the two decades after Pearl Harbor, according to Williams, the only prominent dissenters from this consensus were some of the so-called isolationists, especially Robert Taft. While sharing anti-Communism, Taft and many of his cohorts challenged fundamental conceptions: the American mission abroad, the need for expanding trade, and the necessity of spreading democracy. As a result, they opposed economic multilateralism and often resisted the programs of foreign economic military aid.

The Williams-Kolko-Magdoff interpretation of class domination and imperialism has been challenged by many non-radicals and some radicals. The most prominent radical dissenter was the late C. Wright Mills, who rejected theories of class dominance, substituted a concept of a power elite, and ignored issues of imperialism. In "The Power Elite" (1956) he contended that postwar American foreign policy was dominated by a coalition of business, the Executive, and the military with the "military in the ascendant." The men in these "command posts" were from different classes, and in the last two cases (military and Executive) membership in the elite depended upon office, not wealth or property. The ascendancy of the military marked the triumph of the "military metaphysic"—the acceptance of the military definition of reality. The result: "crackpot realists," who had "constructed a paranoid reality all their own," managed foreign policy. Eschewing Marxism, Mills also avoided theo-

ries of imperialism and argued that the Cold War was primarily the result of an American arms build-up. It served the interests of the "warlords," the "political directorate," and the "corporate chieftains." The Cold War justified the growth and power of the military. The Cold War also justified expenditures that the economy needed in order to avoid a depression and that the powerful corporations required in order to maintain their prosperity.

Far less theoretical than the studies by Williams, Kolko, Magdoff, or Mills are the "left-liberal" revisionist books by D. F. Fleming and David Horowitz, who relies heavily upon Fleming while leaning toward radicalism. Fleming's sprawling work "The Cold War and Its Origins," whose second volume concentrates largely on the Eisenhower administration, is still the most detailed left-revisionist study of the period. He notes America's postwar counter-revolutionary activities, laments the departure from the Wilsonian tradition of internationalism and the League, ignores Williams's analysis until the end of the book, and then curiously ends by endorsing Williams. Fleming's book is strangely eclectic, even contradictory, for it does not understand Williams's central theme: that the Wilsonian tradition of seeking to establish a liberal capitalist world is the source of the tragedy of American foreign policy.

Horowitz's "The Free World Colossus," which devotes little attention to theory, asserts that America is "counter-revolutionary rather than counter-expansionary and that the rhetoric of opposition to [Communist] aggression was a mere cover for containing internal change." Postwar America was (to use Toynbee's words that Horowitz quotes) the "Leader of a world-wide anti-revolutionary movement in defense of vested interests"—which seems often to mean business for Horowitz. He explains American policy toward Vietnam, Iran, Guatamala, and Cuba in terms of this effort to defend "vested interests." Aside from this radical overlay and the greater emphasis on intervention, the two books are quite similar.

Each blames the early Cold War on the Truman administration, assumes that Roosevelt was following different policies, and has trouble explaining in depth the reasons for the continuing enmity to the Soviet Union under Eisenhower. For Fleming, was it simply an inheritance that Eisenhower could not disavow? Or a method of justifying policies devised for other purposes? Or maybe just self-deception? He never adequately confronts the problem. Nor does Horowitz provide a full answer. He does not tie his notions of a counter-revolutionary policy to Soviet-American relations during the Eisenhower years. There are theories or arguments that might establish the linkage—as Horowitz stressed later in "Empire and Revolution" (1969)—but neither he nor Fleming seemed deeply interested in such basic issues of "why" in the early '60s. Instead, they wanted primarily to establish that American policy toward Russia had been misguided, often provocative, and dangerous. At length, they criticized the Eisenhower administration for maintaining hostility toward Russia and China, for not pursuing negotiations to settle the Cold War, and for resisting Soviet attempts at disarmament and arms control—themes that the radicals also note.

***"The President most superbly equipped for truly consequential decision we may ever have had, a mind neither rash nor hesitant, free of the slightest concern for how things might look."***

In addition to these radical and left-liberal analyses of postwar foreign policy, there has also been a move recently to reassess the tactics and skills of Eisenhower as President. The leader and source of the most enthusiastic judgments is Murray Kempton, a former New Deal-Fair Deal columnist. In the '50s he contributed to the liberal criticism of Eisenhower for his failures. Like many others, Kempton then found Ike weak and spineless, unenlightened and inept: a man of mangled syntax who thought in platitudes and preferred westerns and golf to the exercise of national power. In his recent reassessment, Kempton sharply reverses these judgments. He deems Eisenhower "the President most superbly equipped for truly consequential decision we may ever have had, a mind neither rash nor hesitant, free of the slightest concern for how things might look, indifferent to any sentiment, as calm when he was demonstrating the wisdom of leaving a bad situation alone as when he was moving to meet it on those occasions when he absolutely had to."

What is the basis for this judgment? Undoubtedly the painful Vietnam War, especially when contrasted with Eisenhower's ability to keep America out of war, has contributed to a reassessment of earlier liberal notions about the criteria of a "great" Presidency. Employing some new standards for evaluating Presidents, the reassessment of Eisenhower is also based heavily upon a particular reading of published sources that became available in the past decade—memoirs and appraisals by some members of the administration, notably Sherman Adams, Richard Nixon, and Arthur Larson, and particularly Eisenhower's own two-volume memoirs and his very revealing "At Ease: Stories I Tell My Friends" (1967). These sources, according to Kempton and others, provide the key to understanding Eisenhower: he wore many masks, played many roles, often concealed his purposes and emotions. He was shrewd and clever. Larson, for example, notes that Eisenhower was an able speechwriter and fine editor, and that he purposely sought the simple, colorless prose that filled his addresses. He was aiming to please the common man, not (as with Stevenson) to delight the intellectuals. Even Eisenhower's tangled syntax, Larson contends, was not a fault of mind but a devious stratagem. For example, during one of the Quemoy-Matsu crises, when press secretary James Hagerty warned the President that it might be best to refuse to answer reporter's questions on the subject, Eisenhower replied, "Don't worry, Jim . . . If that question comes up, I'll just confuse them." This technique, Kempton contends, was part of the mask of the man, part of his "protective coloration of being amiable and innocent."

Eisenhower could exploit subordinates, encourage them to stake out advance positions, and then cut himself free with impunity when politics demanded. He was so cunning that few recognized his capacity for ruthlessness. Despite his maneuvers, he maintained his image of the loyal, friendly, uncritical, straight-forward, good-natured man. "He told Nixon and others," Sherman Adams recalls, "that somebody has to do the hard-hitting infighting [read: dirty work] and he had no objections to it as long as no one expected *him* to do it." No innocent, no victim of other men's manipulations, Ike was a shrewd administrator, a man skilled in directing men and organizations while quietly maintaining his dominance and authority. Dulles "knows more about foreign affairs than anyone I know," Eisenhower told Larson, but quickly added, "there's only one man I know who . . . knows more . . .—and that's me." "The mythical Eisenhower, who left decision-making to subordinates, whose mind was 'lazy' and/or not very bright," did not exist, concluded Gordon Gray, who had served both Truman and Eisenhower. He was confident, circumspect, and cautious. He understood the limits of national power and had no need to brandish his abilities or dramatically to exercise his authority—as the liberal conception of the presidency demanded. His guide could have been Robert Frost's words: "The strong are saying nothing until they see."

This is the basic outline of the view of Eisenhower that Kempton, Wills, Parmet (with some ambivalence), and I (with reservations) have advanced. It is theoretically compatible with radical, left-liberal, and non-radical interpretations. Kempton, who seems to be moving near the radical camp, can comfortably share this interpretation with I. F. Stone, the left-liberal journalist, with Wills, who is no radical, and with Parmet and William O'Neill, two liberal historians. It is a view that only a few historians, and a few more journalists, have endorsed so far. The chief danger, some radical and left-liberal critics will undoubtedly note, is that an emphasis on tactics, if not linked to larger questions of purpose and a left framework, may provide some "tactical" revisionists with a self-created mandate to praise and admire skills which advance America's counter-revolutionary policies. The "tactical" approach could lead to celebration, not criticism, to commendation, not comprehension.

Let's look at how members of this "tactical" group interpret some of the key crises in the administration —say, Korea, Indochina, Quemoy-Matsu, Lebanon. Take Korea. A few weeks after the election, Eisenhower went to Korea, concluded that a "frontal attack would present great difficulties," resolved to end the war, and later rejected Dulles's advice to demonstrate "our clear superiority . . . before all Asia . . . by giving the Chinese one hell of a licking." Eisenhower briefly modified the Truman administration's position on forced repatriation of prisoners (which had held up the truce), proposed an exchange of all wounded and ill prisoners, obliquely threatened the Chinese with nuclear war, and even bombed vital North Korean dikes when negotiations seemed to falter. Few would approve the callousness of his tactics in bombing the dikes, but most historians (including radicals and left-liberals) have failed to note or appreciate his shrewdness. He always kept control of the options and never publicly committed his government to any particular tactics. At any time he could back away without any loss of credibility domestically or internationally. The nuclear threat, delivered by Dulles through Nehru, was never public and hence did not commit Eisenhower. (There is strong suggestive evidence that he would not have actually moved to nuclear war—a judgment on which most radicals and left-liberals probably disagree.) In bombing the dikes he escalated the still-limited war and implied that he was prepared to destroy all the dikes and thereby create a famine. By retaining the options and maintaining flexibility, Eisenhower used controlled escalation of actions and warnings (threats) to achieve his ends—precisely the tactics that Kennedy and his advisers claimed to establish and charged the Eisenhower administration with failing to use or understand.

Indochina in 1954 represents another example of Eisenhower's skill It also indicates how the radical and "tactical" analyses can be wedded. Some radicals would contend that America's efforts to keep South Vietnam non-communist was not primarily to secure American access to raw materials or markets in Indochina but to retain them for Japan, which was deemed essential to the international capitalist system. As Eisenhower said in April 1954:

> . . . when you come to the possible sequence of events, the loss of Indochina, of Burma, of Thailand, of the Peninsula, and Indonesia following, now you begin to talk about areas that not only multiply the disadvantages that you would suffer through loss of materials, sources of materials, but you are now talking really about millions and millions and millions of people.
>
> Finally the geographic position achieved thereby does many things. It turns the so-called island defensive chain of Japan, Formosa, of the Philippines and to the southward; it moves in to threaten Australia and New Zealand.
>
> It takes away, in its economic aspects, that region that Japan must have as a trading area or Japan, in turn, will have only one place to go—that is, toward the Communist areas in order to live.
>
> So, the possible consequences of the loss are just incalculable to the free world.

Yet, despite this analysis of falling dominoes, Eisenhower did not intervene with American troops in Indochina. Why not?

Some years ago, in seeking to refute Mills's theory of the power elite, Richard Rovere focused on Indochina, which Mills had cited. Rovere contended that the decision was not made by a power elite: the masses were sovereign. Popular opinion kept the United States out of this war. Rovere's contention is dubious, certainly too simple. Kempton and I, as well as Robert Randle, a nonradical, and Parmet, who relies on Randle's "Geneva, 1954" (1969), conclude, with different emphases, that Eisenhower was reluctant to go to war. (Randle and Parmet contend that Dulles was also reluctant.) Why else did the President not even meet with Con-

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# PROPOSED NEW BYLAWS FOR THE AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION

## PROPOSED BYLAWS

### *ARTICLE I*

*Purposes and Objectives*

In addition to the general purposes and objectives of this Association as set forth in the Constitution, the following are declared to be the primary purposes and objectives of this Association:

1. To further the interests and well being of the Members of the Association and to work closely with the Foreign Affairs Agencies, other interested institutions and individuals to strengthen the ability of the foreign affairs community to contribute to effective foreign policies.

2. To accept and receive gifts, grants, devises, bequests, and funds from such other voluntary associations as may be created by Foreign Service personnel or to accept and receive gifts, grants, devises, bequests, and funds as otherwise donated to this Association by any person or persons, group or groups, and to utilize or dispose of the same for the purposes of this Association, or, as directed by said other associations or said other donors.

3. To publish the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and AFSA NEWS as the official organs of the Association.

4. To maintain and operate a Scholarship Fund or Funds or such other funds as are commensurate with the purposes and objectives of this Association.

5. To carry on such other activities as the Association may deem practicable in order to serve the interests of the Association and its Members.

## PRESENT BYLAWS AND COMMENTS ON CHANGES

### ARTICLE II

CORPORATE SEAL

The corporate seal of this Association shall have inscribed thereon the name of the Association, the year of its creation, and the words "District of Columbia." An impression thereof shall be affixed to these By-Laws.

**ARTICLE deleted, as has been transferred to Certificate of Incorporation.**

### ARTICLE III

PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES

In addition to the general purposes and objectives of this Association as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation the following are declared to be the primary purposes and objectives of this Association:

1. To further the interests and well being of the members of the Association and to work closely with the Department of State and other agencies toward the goal of improving the foreign affairs community.

2. To take over the property, assets, obligations, and contracts of the voluntary unincorporated Association heretofore in existence and known as the AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION, and to continue under the name of the present Association the purposes, objectives, and affairs of that predecessor Association;

3. To acquire real and personal property by purchase or lease, whether in whole or in part, to be used for this Association and its members;

4. To accept and receive gifts, grants, devises, bequests, and funds from such other voluntary associations as may be created by Foreign Service personnel, or to accept and receive gifts, grants, devises, bequests, and funds as otherwise donated to this Association by any person or persons, group or groups, and to utilize or dispose of the same for the purposes of this Association, or, as directed by said other associations or said other donors;

5. To publish the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and AFSA NEWS as the official organ of this Association in order to disseminate information respecting the work of the agencies principally engaged in foreign affairs and Foreign Service among interested persons, including business and professional men and others in the United States and abroad, and persons who may be considering the American Foreign Service as a career; to serve as a medium of exchange for personal and other news and for unofficial information respecting the agencies principally engaged in foreign affairs and the Foreign Service and their personnel; and to keep them in touch with developments which are of interest or concern to them;

6. To create, maintain and operate a Scholarship Fund or Funds or such other funds for such purposes as are commensurate with the purposes and objectives of this Association described in the Certificate of Incorporation or in these By-Laws;

7. To sponsor, through the American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc., a group insurance plan for payment of life, sick, and accident benefits to members of this Association entitled thereto under the Certificate of Incorporation and By-Laws of the said American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc., as are now written or as hereafter may be written;

8. To carry on such other activities as the Association may deem practicable in pursuance of the purposes and objectives set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation of this Association and in these By-Laws, in order to serve the interests of the Association and its members.

**The Purposes and Objectives ARTICLE has been amended to reflect present activities of the Association. Specifically, reference to the American Foreign Service Protective Association and the unincorporated American Foreign Service Association, which are no longer applicable, have been deleted.**

## *ARTICLE II*

### *Membership*

1. Persons eligible for Membership are those American citizens, wherever serving, appointed in or assigned to a Foreign Affairs Agency under authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as Amended; the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as Amended; Public Law 90-494, or successor legislation to these Acts or persons who have retired or been terminated from the Foreign Service.

2. Any person eligible for membership may be so admitted upon application and payment of dues, and shall be permitted to maintain membership so long as he or she remains eligible and maintains current dues payment; only Members shall have voting and other rights regarding the conduct of the affairs of the Association.

3. The Board shall establish terms and conditions for affiliation with the Association, other than membership, for persons not eligible for membership. American citizens closely associated with or interested in the foreign affairs of the United States may become Associates upon the acceptance of their applications by the Board and the payment of dues.

4. The Board may invite to become Honorary Members for specified periods such representative American citizens as they deem proper. Honorary Members shall be exempt from the payments of dues.

5. The rates of dues shall be set by the Governing Board provided that dues shall not be increased, or an assessment levied, except after approval by a majority of those Members voting in a secret ballot referendum.

6. Members may be expelled or otherwise disciplined by the Association for engaging in conduct which discredits or brings into disrepute the Association or the Foreign Service; or taking court or Administrative Agency action against the Association without exhausting internal administrative procedures which the Board shall establish. However, no Member may be disciplined by the Association unless such Member has been served with written specific charges, given a reasonable time to prepare a defense, and afforded a full and fair hearing. The Board shall establish procedures for such disciplinary actions.

## *ARTICLE III*

### *Rights of Members*

Every Member shall have equal rights and privileges within the Association, freedom of speech and assembly, and all other rights guaranteed by law, Executive Order, and regulation.

## ARTICLE VIII

### MEMBERSHIP

1. The Association shall be composed of Active Members, Associate Members, Honorary Members, and Fellows in Diplomacy.

2. Persons eligible for Active Membership are those American citizens serving under the authority of the Foreign Service Act of 1946, as amended, or Public Law 90-494, and any amendments thereto, or who have retired from service under these laws. Those eligible shall be admitted to Active Membership without any formality other than application, acceptance, and the payment of annual dues. Only Active Members shall have voting rights in the conduct of the affairs of the Association. Any Active Member or person eligible for Active Membership shall be admitted to Active Membership for life upon request, acceptance and payment of the prescribed dues.

3. Persons eligible for Associate Membership are those American citizens who are: (a) employees of the Department of State, AID, or USIA who hold officer level positions; (b) employees of other Departments and Agencies of the Government who hold career status and who are serving or have served abroad in connection therewith; (c) in the opinion of the Board of Directors, closely associated with or actively interested in the foreign affairs of the United States. Associate Members shall be admitted to membership without any formality other than application, acceptance, and the payment of annual dues.

4. The Board of Directors may invite to become Honorary Members for specified periods such representative American citizens as they deem proper. Honorary Officers of the Association shall be Honorary Members during the time they hold office. Honorary Members shall be exempt from the payment of dues.

5. The Board of Directors is authorized to elect each year not more than five distinguished American citizens as Fellows in Diplomacy. Those elected should have made outstanding contributions to the field of international relations and at the time of their election should not be officials of the Government of the United States. Fellows in Diplomacy shall be exempt from the payment of dues, and election shall be for life.

6. The Board of Directors may expel a member from the Association for cause after notice to and due hearing of the member concerned.

**The membership provisions have been simplified. The Associate Membership category has been dropped. There are now Members who have voting and other rights, and Associates. Membership is open to anyone who is serving or has served in a Foreign Affairs Agency who has not been separated for cause.**

## ARTICLE IX

### DUES

1. The dues of Members shall be specified by the Board of Directors. The yearly dues include a payment of $5.00 for a subscription to the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and AFSA NEWS.

**The dues provision conforms with Department of Labor standards of conduct.**

**The present expulsion provision is not enforceable due to vagueness. The new provision provides for disciplinary actions other than expulsion, and provides for detailed procedures.**

**A new ARTICLE which incorporates by reference the protections guaranteed to Members due to the Association's status as exclusive employee representative under Executive Order 11636.**

## *ARTICLE IV*

### *The Governing Board of the Association*

1. The property and affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Governing Board composed of officers and Representatives who shall be elected biennially for terms of two years in the manner prescribed in Article IX from among the Association's Members. Each Board Member shall have one vote.

2. Vacancies occurring during the term of the Board shall be filled by the Board by appointment from the Membership, provided that Representatives shall be chosen from the constituency of the vacancy as defined in Article VI(1).

## *ARTICLE V*

### *Officers of the Association and Their Duties*

1. The Association shall have as Officers: a President, a Vice President, a Second Vice President, a Secretary, and a Treasurer.

2. Officers shall be elected by the entire Membership pursuant to Article IX as a slate or as individuals.

3. The President shall function as the Chief Executive Officer of the Association and shall exercise supervision of the affairs of the Association, subject to approval by the Governing Board. The President shall preside at meetings of the Membership and of the Governing Board, shall be the principal Representative of the Association, and shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may delegate.

4. The Vice Presidents, in the order of precedence, shall assist the President in the performance of his or her duties, act as President in his or her temporary absence, and shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may delegate to them.

5. The Secretary shall supervise the Association's and the Board's correspondence, and meet its filing obligations, other than financial, under applicable law or regulations, and shall have such other powers and duties as the Board may delegate.

6. The Treasurer, under the general direction of the Board, shall have charge of the Association's moneys, funds and assets, meet its financial filing obligations under applicable law or regulation, draft a budget for the Board, and render a statement of accounts and balance sheet of the books at each annual meeting of the Association, and at other times when requested by the Board. With the approval of the Board, he or she may make a limited delegation of powers and duties to the Executive Director. All extraordinary expenses and investments shall be made by the Treasurer only upon recommendation to and approval of the Board or by the Membership, if necessary to conform to the Constitution.

## ARTICLE IV

### SECTION A

#### Board of Directors

1. The property and affairs of this Association shall be managed by a Board of Directors of eleven members, who shall be elected every two years in the manner and for the term provided in ARTICLE VI.

2. No person shall be elected as a Director unless such person is an Active Member of this Association and is either on duty in Washington, D. C. or is residing in the metropolitan area of Washington, D. C. The term of duty of each Director shall be two years; however, a Director may be reelected as provided for in ARTICLE VI.

3. If a vacancy should occur in the membership of the Board of Directors, or in the office of President, First Vice President, or Second Vice President, not covered by ARTICLE V, Section B, the Board, in its discretion, may appoint an Active Member to fill such vacancy.

**A major reform. An elected Governing Board replaces the present executive organization of appointed Officers and elected Directors. The new Board is composed of Officers, who are elected at large, and Representatives, who are elected by and from a particular constituency. The constituencies are: State, AID, USIA, and Retired.**

**This change insures representation on the Board from each major membership group in the Association. Each Board Member, whether an Officer or a Representative, has one vote.**

## ARTICLE V

### SECTION A

#### Officers of the Association

1. The Association shall have as Officers a President, a First Vice President and a Second Vice President, who shall be elected as provided for in ARTICLE VI. The Association shall also have as Officers a Chairman of the Board, a Vice Chairman of the Board, a Secretary-Treasurer and an Assistant Secretary-Treasurer, all of whom shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

2. The Association may also have Honorary Officers who shall be appointed by the Board of Directors.

### SECTION B

#### Powers of Officers

1. The President shall preside at all general meetings of the Association. In his absence, the First Vice President, the Second Vice President or the Chairman of the Board of Directors, in that order, shall preside. The President shall be a non-voting member of the Board of Directors. He may call upon the Board of Directors for information and data relating to the affairs of the Association. He shall have such other powers and duties and discretions as may be delegated to him, subject to his acceptance, by the Board of Directors of the Association.

2. The First Vice President shall be vested with all of the powers and shall perform all the duties of the President during the absence of the latter, and in case of a vacancy arising in the office of the President, he shall succeed to that office for the remainder of the President's unexpired term and, in turn, the Second Vice President shall become the First Vice President for the remainder of the First Vice President's unexpired term. The First Vice President and the Second Vice President shall be non-voting members of the Board of Directors.

3. Under the general responsibility of the Board of Directors, the Secretary-Treasurer, or in his absence, the Assistant Secretary-Treasurer or the General Manager shall have charge of all the moneys, funds, and assets of the Association, of the Foreign Service Journal and of the Scholarship and other Funds; shall be responsible for the maintenance of the accounts, collection of dues, receipt of contributions and any other funds which may be due from the members; collect and receive any moneys and other personal property to which the Association may be entitled whether because of gift, grant, bequest or otherwise; make payments out of any moneys and assets in his charge for ordinary operating expenses. All such moneys and funds shall be placed upon deposit in recognized banking institutions or, in the case of surplus funds, invested with the authorization of the Board of Directors as authorized in Article IV,

Section B(2) (f). With the approval of the Board of Directors, he may delegate to the General Manager responsibility for maintaining accounts and payment of ordinary expenses within a monthly total amount as may be fixed by the Board of Directors from time to time. All extraordinary expenses and investments shall be made by the Secretary-Treasurer or his assistant upon recommendation to and approval by the Board of Directors within the limitations of Article IV, Section B(2) (g).

The Secretary-Treasurer, or in his absence the Assistant Secretary-Treasurer, shall render a statement of accounts and a balance sheet of his books at each annual meeting of the Association and at such other times as a statement and balance sheet may be requested in writing by the Chairman of the Board of Directors.

**The duties of Officers parallel those in the old Bylaws.**

## *ARTICLE VI*

### *Representatives of the Association and Their Duties*

1. Representatives shall be elected as a slate or as individuals by and from the Membership employed in each of the Foreign Affairs Agencies (State Department, USIA and AID or successor Agencies), and from the retired Members as groups. One Representative shall be elected by each of the above groups for each 1,000 Members or fraction thereof.

2. In addition to their duties on the Board, Representatives shall have special responsibility for the interests of the Members from whom they were elected with respect to any matters which affect only that particular group.

**Representatives are elected from and by the Association Members employed in State, USIA, AID, and from the Retired Members as a group. On the basis of current membership, the number of Representatives would be: State-4, USIA-1, AID-1, Retired-2. AID needs only 30 more Members to qualify for another Representative. USIA needs 300.**

## *ARTICLE VII*

### *Powers and Duties of the Governing Board*

1. The powers of the Board shall be those vested in the Board by the Constitution, by these Bylaws, by powers given them pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia, and by the general powers normally vested in a Board by virtue of their office.

2. The Board, in general, shall have the power to perform or authorize the performance of whatever is necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Association and to respond to the views of the Membership.

3. The Board shall determine the Association's policy in all matters affecting the interests of its Members.

4. In addition, the following specific powers are hereby expressly conferred upon the Board:

a. To establish policies and programs to achieve the purposes of the Association;

b. To create and abolish Committees of the Association; to appoint the Chairmen and Committee Members of such; to direct the work of all Committees; and otherwise organize the internal structure of the Association;

c. To ensure the observance of the standards of conduct required of the Association by law and regulation;

d. To manage the assets and investments of the Association; to approve an annual financial plan; to authorize the disbursement of funds; provided, however, that no disbursement exceeding one-third of the Association's general funds shall be made for a specific purpose unless authorized by a majority present at a meeting held in accordance with Article XI of these Bylaws; to provide for an annual independent audit of the Association accounts; and to report annually to the Membership on the financial position of the Association.

e. To authorize and approve the employment, compensation, conditions of employment, and duties of an Executive Director and such other salaried employees of the Association, the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, and the Foreign Serv-

## SECTION B

### POWERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

1. The powers of the Board of Directors shall be those vested in the Board by the Certificate of Incorporation, by these By-Laws, by powers given them pursuant to the laws of the District of Columbia, and, by the general powers normally vested in the Board of Directors by virtue of their office.

2. In addition, the following specific powers are hereby expressly conferred upon the Board of Directors:

a. To appoint a Chairman and a Vice Chairman from among the members of the Board of Directors;

b. To appoint a Secretary-Treasurer and an Assistant Secretary-Treasurer of the Association;

c. To appoint members of the JOURNAL Editorial Board, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Board of Directors, and who, under the general direction of the Board of Directors, shall be specifically responsible for the publication of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL;

d. To appoint, upon the recommendation of the Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc., and subject to the By-Laws of said Association, the Directors of that Association who shall serve until replaced in accordance with the provisions of the By-Laws of the American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc.;

e. To authorize and approve the employment, compensation, conditions of employment and the duties of the General Manager and other salaried employees of the Association, as may, in the consideration of the Board of Directors, be necessary;

f. To invest any surplus funds of this Association in recognized banking institutions, securities, real property, building and loan associations, and in the State Department Federal Credit Union;

g. To authorize disbursements of Association funds to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Association as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation and these By-Laws; provided, however, that no disbursement exceeding one-third of the Association's general funds shall be made for a specific purpose unless authorized by a majority present at a general business meeting held in accordance with the provisions of ARTICLE X of these By-Laws;

h. To select such person or persons, firm or firms as desired from without the membership of this Association to audit and examine the accounts of this Association annually, or more often if deemed necessary by the Board of Directors, and to authorize the payment of fees and expenses in connection therewith;

ice Club, as may in the consideration of the Board of Directors be necessary;

f. To keep the Membership currently informed of important matters affecting the interests of the Membership and the Association, including developments in foreign affairs which are of concern to them as professionals. The Board shall also facilitate communications to the Membership from Members or a group of Members, on matters of Association business; provided, that the costs are borne by those initiating the communication.

g. The Board shall seek the advice of the Membership whenever practicable before adopting policies which will have major impact on the Membership of the Association.

h. To make regulations implementing the Constitution and these Bylaws; and to interpret the Constitution, the Bylaws; and any regulations issued. Except as otherwise provided in Article IX, the interpretations of the Constitution, these Bylaws and the regulations of the Association made by the Board shall be determinative;

i. To appoint the Chairman and members of the JOURNAL Editorial Board, who shall serve at the pleasure of the Board, and who, under the general direction of the Board, shall be specifically responsible for the publication of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL. The yearly dues shall include a payment of at least $5.00 for a subscription to the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL.

## *ARTICLE VIII*

### *Meetings of the Board*

1. The Board shall meet at least once each month at a time and place determined by the President, and at such other times and places as the President shall determine. The Board shall meet to consider a particular subject at the written request, submitted at least five working days prior to the proposed date of the meeting to the President, of one-third of the Members of the Board, 25 Members, or one overseas Chapter.

2. A meeting shall be held only with a quorum present. A quorum shall consist of more than one-half of the Members of the Board. Decisions taken at meetings of the Board shall be by a majority of the quorum present at the meeting.

3. Regular meetings shall be announced and shall be open to Members. The Board shall maintain minutes of all meetings, including a record of any votes, which shall be available to Members and Associates. The Board shall publish in a timely manner all important decisions.

4. Executive Sessions of the Board in addition to regular meetings may be held upon the call of the President.

i. To perform, or authorize the performance of, whatever is necessary to carry out the purposes and objectives of this Association as set forth in the Certificate of Incorporation and in these By-Laws

3. Any 25 active members or any overseas AFSA Chapter may at any time, and by written request, require the Board to discuss in a regular Board meeting an issue they deem important. The Board will report its conclusions to those submitting the request and to the membership at large.

4. It is incumbent upon the Board to seek the advice of the active membership at large as frequently as practicable on major issues before the Association. Therefore, whenever the Board believes an issue to be of sufficient importance—and other considerations of time and subject matter permit—the advice of the active membership shall be sought by written ballot, by communication with Chapter heads or by other expeditious means.

**This ARTICLE has been updated.**

## ARTICLE VII

### COMMITTEES

The Board of Directors may create such Committees as it deems necessary. The chairmen and members of Committees shall be appointed by the Board of Directors. The number on each Committee shall be within the discretion of the Board of Directors.

### SECTION C

#### MEETINGS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS

1. The Board of Directors shall meet at least once each month on a date determined by the Chairman, and at such other times as the Chairman may determine.

2. The Board also shall meet at the written request of five Directors made to the Chairman of the Board at least five days prior to the date of the meeting, or by notice in writing mailed by the Chairman of the Board or by the President of the Association to each member of the Board at least 5 days before the date on which the meeting is to be held.

3. A meeting of the Board of Directors shall be held only with a quorum present. Six members of the Board of Directors shall constitute a quorum.

4. Decisions taken at meetings of the Board of Directors shall be by a majority of the quorum present at the meeting.

5. The President, and the Vice Presidents are privileged to attend all meetings of the Board. The Chairman of the Board at his discretion may invite others to attend meetings of the Board of Directors.

6. All regular meetings of the Board of Directors shall be open to all members. Accurate minutes of all meetings, including a record of any votes by the Directors, shall be available to members. A summary of such minutes shall be published on a timely basis in the Foreign Service Journal.

**This ARTICLE makes Board consideration of a proposal submitted by either one-third of the Board, 25 Members, or one overseas Chapter, mandatory. This ensures consideration of any matter of concern to a minority of the Board or the Membership.**

## *ARTICLE IX*

### *Elections*

1. The Board shall appoint an Elections Committee on or about February 15 of each odd-numbered year consisting of not less than five Members, including at least one Member from each Foreign Affairs Agency and one retired Member. The Elections Committee will administer the elections, interpret those sections of the Bylaws relating to elections and resolve election issues and disputes. Elections Committee Members may not be candidates, nor may they be members of the Board, nor may they accept appointment to the Board or a Committee Chairmanship in the Association during the year in which the election is held.

2. The Elections Committee shall issue an election call to all Members in the March FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and/or AFSA NEWS, prescribing the terms and conditions of the election and soliciting candidates.

3. Candidates must make known their candidacies not later than 25 days following the date of the election call for Officer or Representative positions. Candidates may file individually or in slates. Candidacies must be accompanied by evidence of eligibility as of June 30 of the year of the elections, a statement that the candidate will be in the Washington area during the term of office, and a small filing fee, to be determined by the Elections Committee, to help defray election costs.

4. The Elections Committee shall verify the eligibility of candidates for each position, and announce publicly the names of the candidates on or about April 1.

5. Candidates may submit campaign statements according to regulations to be established by the Elections Committee. The Elections Committee shall have published in the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, and/or AFSA NEWS, and/or elsewhere at Association expense, the platform statements of the candidates and/or slates during the beginning of a campaign period of not less than 30 days. The Elections Committee during this period shall organize and publicize campaign meetings. Should candidates wish to mail supplementary statements to the membership, the Association will make available to them on request the membership mailing list or address labels. In such cases candidates will reimburse the Association for all related expenses.

6. The official ballot bearing only the names of all qualified candidates, slate identifications when applicable, and voting instructions shall be mailed to each Member on or about May 15.

7. Each Member may cast one vote for each Officer position and, in addition, may cast a number of votes not exceeding the number of Representative positions available in the Members's constituency. Members may vote for candidates as individuals or as a slate, or may write in the name(s) of any Member(s) who fulfills the eligibility requirements as of June 30 of the election year.

8. The secrecy of each Member's vote shall be guaranteed.

9. The Elections Committee shall count on or about July 10 all ballots received at the Association as of the close of business the last working day of June. Candidates or their representatives may be present at the counting and challenge the validity of any vote or the eligibility of any voter.

10. The Elections Committee shall decide all questions of eligibility and declare elected the candidates receiving the greatest number of votes for each position.

11. The new Officers and Representatives shall take office on July 15.

## ARTICLE VI

### ELECTIONS

1. On or before August 1 of each election year, i.e., every even-numbered fiscal year (July 1-June 30), the Board of Directors of the Association shall appoint an Elections Committee of at least five individuals from among Active Members of the Association residing in the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. Members of the Board of Directors or Officers of the Association shall not be members of the Elections Committee.

2. On or before September 1 of the election year, the Elections Committee shall issue an election call by general mailing to all Active Members. The election call shall solicit candidates for election to the eleven positions constituting the Board of Directors of the Association. Nominations must be received by the Elections Committee on or before October 15 of each election year. Candidates may be presented either individually or as members of slates.

3. The Elections Committee shall ascertain whether each candidate on October 15 fulfills eligibility requirements, i.e., current residence in the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., Active Membership, current in dues payment. Members of the Elections Committee shall not themselves be eligible as candidates nor may they accept appointment as Officers of the Association or Members of the Board of Directors at any time during the election year. Incumbent Officers of the Association or Members of the Board of Directors, if otherwise qualified, may be candidates.

4. After eligibility of all candidates has been determined, the Elections Committee shall ascertain whether there are at least 22 candidates. If fewer than 22 candidates have qualified, the Elections Committee shall select qualified candidates, with their consent, in sufficient number to assure at least 22 candidates. In selecting such additional candidates, the Elections Committee should bear in mind the desirability of reflecting the structure of the Active Membership of the Association.

5. The Elections Committee shall announce publicly the names of all candidates no later than October 15. The period October 15-November 15 shall be designated the campaign period. The Committee shall organize and publicize at least three meetings at which the candidates can present their positions. The meetings shall be well publicized and held at times and places calculated to ensure the largest possible attendance by the members. In order to facilitate informed voting, the Elections Committee shall accept and distribute platform statements from candidates to the membership at the beginning of the campaign period. The Association shall bear the attendant cost of reproduction of statements, which shall be of reasonable length, the addressing of envelopes, and postage. To help defray election costs, each candidate shall make a nominal contribution, e.g. $10.00 to be set by the Elections Committee.

6. The official ballot bearing only the names of all qualified candidates shall be mailed to the Active membership no later than November 15. The Elections Committee shall instruct the Active Members to vote for not more than eleven candidates as Members of the Board of Directors. These eleven names may be voted from among those appearing as individuals or as members of any slate. Slates may be voted as units, in which case each person on the slate will be recorded as having received one vote. Votes may be cast for write-in candidates, provided they fulfill the eligibility requirements on December 31 of the election year. Votes must be received by the Elections Committee no later than December 31 of the election year.

7. Within five working days from January 1 in the election year, the Elections Committee shall tally the election results. The eleven candidates receiving the greatest number of votes shall be declared as elected to the Board of Directors; the Elections Committee, by majority vote, shall decide ties.

8. The new Board of Directors shall take office on January 15 and shall itself elect the President, the First Vice President, and the Second Vice President of the Association. The Board of Directors shall elect from its number a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, a Secretary-Treasurer, and an Assistant Secretary-Treasurer.

**This Article provides that elections will be held in the spring, instead of the fall. The Board will take office in July instead of January. The change is made to minimize the number of vacancies on the Board which must be filled by appointment. The Board's term will conform to the normal Foreign Service transfer cycle.**

## ARTICLE X

### Recall

1. Fifty members, or a two-thirds majority of the Board, may recommend the recall of a Board Member for behavior in contravention of the Association's Constitution or Bylaws; committing fraud, embezzlement, or malfeasance in the management of Association funds or other such serious misconduct.

2. A Special Meeting of the Membership shall consider the proposal and may reject it, take other action short of recall, or endorse the recommendation. If endorsed, the Board shall appoint a Committee to organize a recall election under the applicable election provisions of Article IX. A majority of the Members casting valid votes in such election may recall a Board Member.

**A new ARTICLE providing recall provisions for serious misconduct of a Board Member.**

## ARTICLE XI

### Meetings of the Association

1. The Board shall call an Annual Business Meeting in metropolitan Washington, where the Association's principal office is located, on or about March 1 each year, at which it shall give an account of its management of the Association's affairs, and present its proposed financial program for the succeeding fiscal year.

2. The Board may also call Special Meetings in Washington at its own initiative for any specific purpose, and must call such a meeting at the written initiative of one-third of the Board or of 50 Members.

3. At least 10 days prior to the Annual Business Meeting or a Special Meeting, the Secretary shall mail to each Member in the metropolitan Washington area a notice of the Meeting, including the time, place, agenda, proposals to be considered, and other relevant material, or shall have the same published in the Foreign Service Journal or Afsa News.

4. A majority of Members present and voting at a meeting may, after a vote by count of hands, recommend a decision or course of action to the Board provided that the item in question appeared on the agenda of the meeting and is within the authority of the Board.

5. Procedure in Association meetings shall be in accordance with *Robert's Rules of Order* except for quorum requirements; provided, that the Constitution or Bylaws shall take precedence over *Robert's Rules of Order* in the event of conflict.

## ARTICLE XII

### Referendum

1. One-third of the Board or 100 Members by written request may propose a referendum on any matter within the Board's authority, which shall be promptly circulated to the Membership.

2. A Special Meeting of the Association shall be called within 60 days to consider such referendum proposal, and may reject, amend, and/or approve it. If approved at the Special Meeting, the Board may elect either to implement the proposal or to organize a ballot of the membership on the proposal. A majority of Members casting valid ballots shall determine the Association's final position on the proposal.

## ARTICLE I

### Office and Place of Business

The principal office and place of business of this Association shall be in the City of Washington, District of Columbia.

## ARTICLE X

### Meetings of the Association

1. A general business meeting of the Active Members of the Association shall be held in Washington, D.C., in the spring of each fiscal year and shall also be held whenever requested by 50 or more of the Active Members of the Association who are within the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C. General business meetings also may be held at the request of the President or the Chairman of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall have a notice of the hour and place of any general business meeting sent to each Active Member who is within the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C.

2. A majority of Active Members present and voting is required for the transaction of business at a general business meeting, except in the case of amendments of the Certificate of Incorporation or of these BY-Laws, where ARTICLE XI applies. Procedure in meetings shall be in accordance with *Robert's Rules of Order,* except for quorum requirements, and provided also that these By-Laws shall take precedence over *Robert's Rules of Order* in the event of conflict.

**This ARTICLE provides for initiatives to be instituted by one-third of the Board or 50 Members. Provision is made for recommendatory action to be taken at these Special Meetings.**

**A major innovation. Permits one-third of the Board, or 100 Members, to initiate a referendum on any matter within the Board's authority.**

## ARTICLE XIII

### Amendments

1. The Board or 50 Members may propose in writing an Amendment(s) to these Bylaws. The Board will promptly circulate the proposed Amendment(s) to the Membership.

2. A Special Meeting shall be called within 60 days of the filing of the Amendment(s) with the Secretary to consider the proposed Amendment(s), and may, by a majority of Members present and voting, reject, amend, and/or approve it.

3. If the Meeting approves the proposed or amended Amendment(s), the Board shall appoint an Amendments Committee which shall, within 45 days, submit a ballot on the Amendment(s), with short statements by its proponents and opponents, to the entire Membership. Should members wish to distribute, at their own expense, supplementary statements regarding proposed amendments, the Association will make available to them on request the membership mailing list or address labels. In such cases candidates will reimburse the Association for all related expenses.

4. The adoption of the proposed Amendment(s) shall require the affirmative votes of not less than two-thirds of all valid votes received.

## ARTICLE XIV

### Chapter Organization

Members at overseas posts are encouraged to organize Chapters to carry out the purposes of the Association. Chapters shall adopt Bylaws, subject to the approval of the Board. The Board shall delegate such authority to such Chapters as it deems necessary.

## ARTICLE XV

### Transition

1. These Bylaws become effective after they have been acted upon favorably, as provided in Article XI of the Bylaws being superceded.

2. When these Bylaws come into effect, the Bylaws being superceded are automatically repealed; provided, the activities specifically authorized and actually being conducted under such Bylaws shall not thereby lose their validity as Association activities.

3. The Directors and Officers who took office for two-year terms on January 16, 1972, may serve out their terms.

4. New Officers and Representatives to take office on January 15, 1974, shall be elected as provided in Article IX for a term to expire on July 15, 1975, except that the following substitutions shall be made in Article IX: "January" for "July"; "December" for "June"; "November" for "May"; "October" for "April"; "September" for "March" and "February" for "August."

5. This Article shall be automatically repealed on July 16, 1975, unless these Bylaws fail to be acted upon favorably in whole or in part by the Membership, in which event the present Bylaws will continue in effect.

## ARTICLE XI

### Amendments

1. Ten or more Active Members may submit a proposal to amend the Certificate of Incorporation or these By-Laws. A proposed amendment shall be reviewed by the next general business meeting, provided it is submitted to the Board of Directors at least 20 days before the next general business meeting. The Board shall send the text of each proposed amendment to each Active Member of the Association in the metropolitan area of Washington, D.C., at least ten days prior to the general business meeting.

2. The general business meeting may by majority vote modify the proposal, but only to clarify it, or to compromise between the existing document and the proposal, and, if the proposal is voted, may bring other portions of the existing document into conformity with the proposal. A proposed amendment shall be referred to the entire Active Membership for ratification if it is approved by majority vote at a business meeting. However, if a proposed amendment was submitted by 100 Active Members, the proposal without modification shall be referred to the entire Active Membership for ratification regardless of the result of the business meeting's vote, which shall only be advisory.

3. An Amendments Committee, appointed by the Board of Directors, shall submit any amendment qualifying for referral pursuant to paragraph 2 to the entire Active Membership for ratification by mail between 30 and 45 days after it was voted on by the business meeting. In order to facilitate informed voting by the Membership, the Amendments Committee shall encourage and accept a brief statement by proponents of an amendment and a statement of approximately equal length by its opponents, and shall include a copy of each such statement with each ballot. The Association shall also address envelopes provided by proponents or opponents who wish to send additional statements to the Active Membership at their own expense. Forty-five days after submitting an amendment to the membership for ratification, the Amendments Committee shall tally the votes. If two-thirds of the members voting approve a proposed amendment, it shall take effect.

**Proposals to amend the Bylaws under this ARTICLE require 50 instead of the present 10 signatures.**

**Short statements in support of and in opposition to proposed Amendments will be sent at the Association's expense along with the Amendments ballot. However, any additional material sent to the Membership shall be completely at the sender's expense.**

**New ARTICLE. AFSA Chapters shall be delegated authority to effectively represent Foreign Service members on issues of local concern.**

**FOREIGN POLICY** from page 20

gressional leaders on the matter and instead let Dulles, who clearly had less prestige, meet with leaders? Why did Eisenhower stipulate conditions which he already had good reason to believe the British and French would not accept? For example, he wanted the French to continue the war, to continue losing soldiers, but also to promise to end colonialism in Indochina—precisely what the French were fighing to preserve. While Eisenhower refused to commit American troops to save Indochina, he was not pacific or passive. He sought to "save" Vietnam by other means: by installing a puppet government, providing massive economic and military aid, and helping to block elections that probably would have unified the divided nation under Ho Chi Minh.

In the case of the administration's intervention in Lebanon in 1958, also, Kempton, Walter LaFeber, generally lumped with Williams, and a few others have stressed Eisenhower's cautious tactics. Intervening only after an assessment that the Soviets would protest and acquiesce (which proved correct), the President carefully restricted the role of the American marines, who easily outnumbered the Lebanese troops. As Eisenhower explained in his memoirs:

> The basic mission of United States forces in Lebanon was not primarily to fight. Every effort was made to have our landing be as much of a garrison move as possible. In my address I had been careful to use the term 'stationed in' Lebanon . . . If it had been prudent, I would have preferred that the first battalion ashore disembark at a dock rather than across the beaches. However,the attitude of the Lebanese army was at that moment unknown, and it was obviously wise to disembark in deployed formation ready for any emergency.

He went on to append a revealing note of explanation:

> The decision to occupy only the airfield and capital was a political one which I adhered to over the recommendations of some of the military. If the Lebanese army were unable to subdue the rebels when we had secured the capital and protected their government, I felt, we were backing up a government with so little popular support that we probably should not be there.

Do other interventions support the "tactical" reassessment? Most analysts—revisionists or not—would acknowledge that the Eisenhower administration acted skillfully to overthrow Mossadegh in Iran in 1953 and Arbenz in Guatemala in 1954. But questions of purpose and strategy linger. What is one to make of the administration's statements that Iran was a communist government and that Guatemala represented a "threat" to this hemisphere? The Iranian government was not communist. The administration distorted the situation in Guatemala and exaggerated the importance of the communists. And the Lebanese rebels were not communist-inspired, despite Eisenhower's claims. Was Eisenhower simply misinformed in these cases? Or did he use the bugaboo of communism to justify policies conceived for other purposes?

In Guatemala, the government had nationalized property and received support from the communists. The overthrow eliminated an unpalatable situation and offered a pointed warning: the United States would not tolerate nationalization of property owned by its citizens nor the existence of governments in Latin America that depended upon communists. (Horowitz suggests that Dulles's stockholdings in United Fruit, whose properties were seized, adds a personal economic motive.) The other interventions can be similarly interpreted. Mossadegh's nationalization of oil, if not punished, might have encouraged others to try that strategy to move toward a social revolution. Perhaps, as Barnet has suggested, the overthrow of Mossadegh and intervention in Lebanon were intended as warnings to others in the Middle East and elsewhere. In Iran, the results also yielded an added bonus: a large share for American oil firms in the new consortium established after Mossadegh's removal. Once again, the themes of "tactical" revisionism can be integrated with left analyses.

The Eisenhower administration's response to Castro has been a favorite subject for the left. A number of radicals and left-liberals, most notably Horowitz, Williams ("The United States, Cuba, and Castro" [1962].), and Robert Scheer and Maurice Zeitlin ("Cuba: Tragedy in our Hemisphere" [1963]), have sharply criticized the administration's treatment of Castro and conclude that American enmity pushed him into the Soviet camp. Despite differences in detail, they maintain that the administration opposed Castro even before he came to power, tried to forestall him by making a deal with Batista on his successor, sought to use economic power to block social reform, and vigorously resisted nationalization and social revolution. They contend that Castro was initially hostile to the Communists and that the party had opposed him, and they imply that the dynamics of the revolution would not have pushed him to Communism if there had not been American hostility. They disagree on precisely why the United States was counter-revolutionary. The pressure of particular American interests? Or maintaining conditions for American hegemony? To stress America's counter-revolutionary commitment, they also focus on the invasion at the Bay of Pigs. The invasion dramatizes the left-liberal and radical analysis. But the failure of the invasion poses a troubling problem for most of the "tactical" revisionists who have so far avoided confronting the speculative, but useful, question: Would it have been a failure under Eisenhower? Clearly the intelligence briefings (Cuba would rebel against Castro) were wrong and the military planning was faulty. Would Eisenhower have discovered the errors? Or would he have committed enough American resources (including troops) to have made the Bay of Pigs a success? (Curiously, perhaps, Williams concludes that Eisenhower would not

have authorized the invasion for he had a "deep disinclination to involve the United States in acts that violated what he considered to be America's moral integrity.")

A less troubling area for the new "tactical" revisionism is Eisenhower's military policy and strategy—though most disregarded the subject. Since Dulles's declaration in January 1954 of "massive retaliation," most critics have judged the Eisenhower administration's strategic posture and policy as unduly dangerous. Some deemed the cutback in conventional forces as foolish, and in the late '50s they also regretted that the administration was unwilling to develop a capability for counterinsurgency. If faced with aggression in other parts of the world, the administration, according to its critics, was limited to only two choices: acquiescence or holocaust. That criticism was unfair, for the administration's strategy was in fact more subtle and complex. It had a concept of limited war, including limited nuclear war, but also sought to avoid involvement in the large-scale limited war that Korea represented. Eisenhower was going to avoid Truman's error. Another Korean-style venture, Eisenhower understood, could drain America's resources, injure her international prestige, split the NATO alliance, and impair his own popularity at home. Given the administration's cutback of conventional forces, another Korea was tactically unlikely, if not impossible. Belligerent rhetoric was often employed as a substitute for military capability. The administration's lack of preparedness for such wars constituted an important added restraint on the Eisenhower government—a theme overlooked until recently by most radicals and left-liberals. America, put simply, was militarily unprepared under Eisenhower to fight in Vietnam. Kennedy changed that.

Most radicals and left-liberals condemned Eisenhower for maintaining the arms race. Eisenhower, "tactical" revisionists might note, actually sought to slow the arms race. Acting partly for economic reasons, and because of his fear of the "garrison state," he initially cut back Truman's arms budget. Under minor pressure in his first term to expand the military, he continued vigorously to resist the advocates of great military expenditures even when charges of bomber gaps and missile gaps cost him some popularity in the late '50s. Wisely he avoided escalating the arms race by revealing publicly what Soviet leaders already knew: American U-2 flights over the Soviet Union disclosed that there was no gap. To justify his own caution, he offered (but never adequately explained) a relatively new theory of nuclear strategy: limited deterrence. The United States, according to this theory, did not need nuclear superiority or even parity, but only enough weapons to be able to withstand a Soviet first strike and still retain a second-strike capability. That potential capability, not superiority, would be a sufficient deterrent. Again, it was Kennedy, not Eisenhower, who escalated the arms race, greatly expanded production of missiles and aimed for great nuclear superiority.

While Eisenhower rebuffed the efforts of (primarily) Democrats to increase greatly spending for armaments, he was also unwilling to accept Soviet proposals for disarmament or arms control. When in 1955 the Soviets accepted the long-standing American plan for nuclear disarmament and large-scale troop reductions (with inspections, the administration abruptly rejected its own plan and managed successfully to seize a propaganda victory with the "Open Skies" plan. It was insincere. As Eisenhower later admitted, he and his advisers knew the Soviets would reject it.

These issues of military strategy and policy, and of arms control and disarmament, are central to the larger issue of the President's handling of Soviet-American affairs and related to questions about the Dulles-Eisenhower partnership. For most historians, including most radical and left-liberal revisionists, Secretary Dulles, not Eisenhower, was the architect of foreign relations. According to this view, the Secretary undermined Eisenhower's occasional initiatives for a rapprochement with the Soviets. The newer view of Eisenhower as a skilled tactician and master of his administration obviously runs contrary to orthodox analyses as well as the Kolko-Fleming-Horowitz interpretation on these subjects. Unfortunately, aside from Parmet's book, the newer view is still a sketch or outline and does not usually draw direct issue with older interpretations by examining some of the same cases: say, Eisenhower's April 16, 1953 speech (in which he called for sincere "deeds" by the Soviets), the Geneva conference, and disarmament and arms control. Yet, on the basis of my own work and Parmet's, it is possible to indicate how the "tactical" revisionists could analyze these problems and the larger issues of the Cold War and the policies of Dulles and Eisenhower.

Eisenhower sought to ease the Cold War, to relax tensions, but not to reach any significant settlement. Dulles, while more skeptical of the Soviets and given publicly to extreme rhetoric, was not the dominant force. In some measure he was used by the President to stake out more extreme positions, to issue warnings, and to court the right-wing with bellicose rhetoric—not action. Eisenhower, while wishing to avoid a more costly arms race, did not believe that a formal Soviet-American detente was possible. In early 1955, he was even dubious about holding the Geneva conference. Throughout his years in the White House he knew that he would not offer the terms required for a settlement. In Europe, for example, he would not countenance disengagement. Nor would he officially back away from the promise of an ultimately unified Germany. But he did not expect a resolution of the German problem. As a guiding principle of his foreign policy, he wanted to avoid direct Soviet American confrontations that might leave the Great Powers a choice only of (humiliating) retreat or holocaust.

Better than many of his critics in the '50s, he understood the limits of presidential and national power. He sought to conserve both — as a man with conservative inclinations would. But like most Americans in the '50s, he had neither the desire nor the flexibility to break free of the premises of the Cold War. Like most, he was willing to use deceit as a stratagem in the Cold War—even

*Continued on page* 38

An evaluation and reevaluation of recent history by radical and not-so-radical writers

# KENNEDY, JOHNSON AND THE REVISIONISTS

WALTER LAFEBER

THE 1960s began with the Kennedy Inaugural and, on a less exalted level, Daniel Bell's proclamation of an "End of Ideology." (That the first flatly contradicted the second would unfortunately not be noted until too late.) The President's statement asked commitment to a 15-year-old cold war, and Bell's writing assured Washington that the commitment could rest on a national consensus dedicated to an improving New Deal at home and fighting Communism abroad. As late as the mid-1960s these supposed virtues were starkly reaffirmed in Lyndon Johnson's 1964 election triumph and in the widely-read biographies of Kennedy written by Arthur Schlesinger Jr., and Theodore Sorensen, two former Kennedy aides.

Sorensen's eulogy appeared in 1965, at the same time that President Johnson committed ground combat troups to Vietnam while the transparent skin of consensus was being punctured by campus rioters, teach-ins and civil rights demonstrators. Revisionists who had deeply questioned the thrust of American policy during the '40s and '50s suddenly became more popular with students and publishers. William Appleman Williams, Lloyd Gardner, David Horowitz, Richard J. Barnet, Gar Alperovitz and Robert Freeman Smith (all of whom published important work between 1960 and 1966) had been among the first to question American reliance upon economic pressure, military intervention and unresponsible presidential power in extending the American overseas empire.

In 1966 an unlikely revisionism emerged from the diplomatic correspondent of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Philip Geyelin, who published "Lyndon B. Johnson and the World." Geyelin's traditional liberalism, gentleness and easy style did not hide a searching analysis leading to the conclusion that because "Vietnam was becoming less and less susceptible to cure by consensus," Johnson and his countrymen were swamping themselves in a conflict that could destroy any possibility of building a Great Society at home. For the remainder of his term the President was fair game to critics of less consistency and understanding than Geyelin. Foremost was the old Kennedy entourage, including Schlesinger, Sorensen, Richard Goodwin and Kenneth O'Donnell, who blasted Johnson by comparing him with the supposedly more astute and certainly, when measured by the standards of Palm Beach, more sophisticated John Kennedy. When the Kennedy barrage lifted, however, the only apparent differences between the two sides seemed to be those of style and the unprovable (and improbable) notion that Kennedy's sense of balance would not have led him as far into the Vietnam morass.

Then in 1969 came Garry Wills's "Nixon Agonistes," a historically-rooted, scathingly-written analysis of American liberalism since Woodrow Wilson. Kennedy appeared as only another link in a now invalid liberalism that was premised on beliefs, such as marketplace competition, which were no longer true and which indeed could lead only to continual national disasters. Kennedy's personal style and academic apologists, Wills argued, had temporarily hidden liberalism's bankruptcy, but behind the charisma had been "the liberal hot-cold warrior, Catholic secularist, McCarthyite civil-libertarian, who changed flags often and deftly." Preaching the cold war as a crusade, "Kennedy, with his call for escape from the Eisenhower narcolepsy, had to reduce everything to a contest with Khrushchev." American liberalism could no longer offer anything more substantial. Wills's account undermined the Kennedy myth, and the publication of "The Pentagon Papers" in 1971 demolished it for all who cared enough to read the evidence.

The most notable product of the reaction was British journalist Henry Fairlie's best-selling "The Kennedy Promise; The Politics of Expectation" (1972). The subtitle was the theme, for Fairlie argued that such politics led "to the politics of confrontation" abroad and at home by promising more than could be delivered. Based on an "elite consensus" only, not mass support, Kennedy tried to mobilize a pluralistic society with a mere call-to-action and not through political insight or programs; his politics were simply not equal to his ambition. The results included unneeded crises in Berlin and Cuba; the weakening of the State Department bureaucra-

cy, whose caution was not welcomed on the vigorous New Frontier; and, worst of all to Fairlie, a quest for utopia which when it inevitably hit dead-ends resulted not in a scaling down of the search but in a rebellion against American political institutions. In Fairlie's hands, the Kennedy years emerged as an aberration in the otherwise hopeful development of restrained cold war foreign policies.

This is revisionism, but quite different from the Kolko-Williams-Gardner analyses of policy in the '40s and '50s. The differences can be indicated by noting that in 1965 Fairlie wrote an article in the NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE of July 11, 1965 entitled "A Cheer for American Imperialism," an understated title given the essay's contents; and by further recording that in February 1973 President Nixon enthusiastically recommended Fairlie's book to Ronald Reagan. There has been no news that the President ever recommended the work of William Appleman Williams or Garry Wills to anyone.

The most important and systematic of the moderate revisionists is Richard J. Barnet, whose "Roots of War" (1972) argues that war-making under Kennedy and Johnson must be analyzed multi-dimensionally through the National Security Managers' bureaucracy, the political economy of expansionism, and the failures of the electoral process to control foreign policy. Barnet's argument is more complex and convincing than his work of 1968, "Intervention and Revolution," although he continues to place great emphasis on the bureaucracy's role. He believes both Kennedy and Johnson were overly influenced by the "deliberate inflation and distortion of issues in the advocacy process" of the bureaucracy. Barnet plants his account well historically, demonstrating how Franklin D. Roosevelt's manipulation of the political economy and presidential power were vital precedents for the '60s.

This use of history is essential for any important revisionist work, and it similarly informs Ronald Steel's "Pax Americana" and his essays in "Imperialists and Other Heroes" (1971). Steel views the tragedies of the '60s as evolving out of the ideology established by Henry Luce's American Century utopia of 1941 and the United States military structure which survived, then expanded, after 1945. Steel is nevertheless eclectic, for he likes Kennedy's toughness on Berlin and during the Cuban missile crisis, but condemns Vietnam policies since they resulted "from a euphoria of power generated in part by our success in the Cuban missile crisis. . . . The liberals wanted to prove that guerrilla wars were not the wave of the future." Steel provides less a fundamental analysis than apparent approval of policies that worked and disapproval of those that did not. Nor does he, while condemning the liberal ideology, explain the political economy out of which the ideology emerged. Steel and Barnet nevertheless raise crucial questions about that ideology and its shaping of policy-makers.

A variant of the Barnet-Steel approach, and an argument that has gained wide attention in academic and governmental strategy sessions, has emerged from a group of analysts at Harvard's Center for International Affairs and more recently the Kennedy Institute of Politics at Harvard. Organized and led by Richard Neustadt and Graham Allison, this group argues that such decisions as the Skybolt affair of 1962 (which Neustadt studied), and the Cuban missile crisis (analyzed by Allison), must be viewed in the context of organization theory rather than ideology. Allison, for example, rejects the "rational actor model" (that is, that governments act in a unified manner resembling a rational individual), and opts for the view that decisions emanate from divided bureaucracies which bargain "along regularized circuits among players positioned hierarchically within the government." Decisions are made, in other words, by struggles between various bureaucrats rather than by personal ideology. Allison's account has been blistered by Stephen D. Krasner's "Are Bureaucracies Important? (Or Allison Wonderland)" in FOREIGN POLICY, Summer, 1972. Krasner demonstrates some historical errors in Allison's account and then argues that the bureaucratic emphasis "obscures the power of the President," "undermines the assumptions of democratic politics by relieving high officials of responsibility," and concludes that "for both the missile crisis and Vietnam, it was the 'baggage' of culture and values, not bureaucratic position, which determined the aims of high officials."

Allison's account of the missile crisis is hardly revisionist, yet his model of bureaucratic decision-making can be, for when applied to policy failures it can carry the Barnet-Steel thesis of misguided liberal National Security Managers to a more complex level. Abraham F. Lowenthal's "The Dominican Intervention" (1972), for example, destroys the government's explanation for landing the troops in 1965, analyzes the decision-making process, and concludes that the policy emerged from "the natural consequences of the attitudes and assumptions with which American officials generally had approached the Dominican Republic for some time." The most radical revisionist would not change that epitaph, but he or she would go considerably farther than Lowenthal in delineating the political economy and corporate structure which shaped these decisions. The Allison model could be of value to revisionists studying the '60s when used with moderation and an understanding that outside the walls of Foggy Bottom and the Ivy League exists the more important world of, for example, expanding multinationals.

Indeed many radical revisionists condemn the Kennedy-Johnson years by presenting a mirror-image of Kennedy's consensus society. Their criticism harkens back to C. Wright Mills's Power Elite concept, and softens, if not neglects, the pluralisms of both the society and the decision-makers. Daniel Horowitz's "Imperialism and Revolution" (1969) is valuable in that it restores an international context which many of the above-mentioned revisionists overlook; in Horowitz's hands this context is constructed through a radical class analysis. He believes that American policy must be carried out within "the class framework of international politics the reality of imperialist expansion and revolutionary resistance, the polarization of world social forces over the control of production and natural resources and the distribu-

tion of material wealth." That kind of world gives the American elite little maneuvering room except for arguments over which kind of military force will be used in response.

Other radical revisionists differ from Fairlie and Halberstam in emphasizing that the fault lies less in the Eastern Establishment than in the corporate political economy and its larger elite class which has developed a historical rationale for its own existence. In "Some Presidents, from Wilson to Nixon" (1972), William Appleman Williams deals harshly with Kennedy but explains Johnson's failures with such phrases as "He is a child of his age" and "he was . . . miseducated with masterful efficiency by the white northern elite that had dominated the conduct of foreign affairs since 1865." Williams, however, also differs from Barnet, Allison, Lowenthal and Steel in stressing that the Bay of Pigs, the Skybolt fiasco, Vietnam and Santo Domingo resulted not from bureaucratic infighting or the misuse of power, but from an American system which required an open, global marketplace even if bayonets had to be used to keep it open. But he would also differ from Horowitz in believing that American society is sufficiently pluralistic to change its foreign policies peacefully by restoring "the integrity of our own [voting] franchise." A similar radical revisionist critique is Robert Freeman Smith's writing on the Alliance for Progress. That approach failed, Smith argues, not because of improper execution or the Latin American response, but because it contained a contradiction: "The vocabulary was that of social revolution, but the concepts were a mixture of US-oriented capitalism and New Deal economics." Smith does not stress a class-determined warfare, however, and he consequently is much closer to Williams than to Horowitz.

A fourth radical revisionist might be Frances Fitzgerald, whose "Fire in the Lake" (1972) is the best explanation available for the central tragedy of the '60s. She is brilliant in comparing the American and Vietnamese worlds, but when analyzing specific policy motivations she only records that Kennedy and Johnson shared the American "national myth" of belief in historical progress and the power of American technology. This is not enough, and unfortunately there is not a chapter in the book on the dynamics in American society comparable to the several on the Vietnamese.

That Vietnam ranks with the Civil War as the greatest tragedy in American history is a judgment not limited, of course, to revisionists, but noted even in the orthodox writings of Schlesinger and Sorensen, although they tend to start the story in 1964 rather than 1961. The Cuban missile crisis, however, presents a contrast. Not only do the orthodox argue with revisionists over this affair, but revisionists differ among themselves as to its causes and meaning. The arguments have wide-ranging significance, for not only did the crisis itself bring the world to the edge of annihilation, but most historians do agree that Kennedy's supposed success encouraged both him and Johnson to think they could similarly face down the insurgents in that "raggedy-ass country," as Johnson termed it, of Vietnam.

Fairlie is scathing: ". . . the conduct of John Kennedy [in the missile crisis] was an irresponsible exercise of great power, from the consequences of which he was saved only by what Dean Acheson called 'plain dumb luck.'" In order to deliver on the overblown promises of 1960-1961, Fairlie believes, Kennedy had to use "crises as an instrument of policy" since he was politically incapable of devising other means. Richard Walton's account similarly focuses on the Kennedy world-view, but does so more systematically. Better than anyone else, he raises the possible role which the upcoming congressional elections might have played in Kennedy's brinksmanship. But taken even on the President's own terms, Walton argues, the missile crisis was avoidable, for in the end Kennedy had to give in to a demand from Russia and Cuba that they had issued before the crisis: the United States was to promise not to try to invade Cuba again. Walton demonstrates that contrary to the orthodox accounts, the nuclear test ban which supposedly issued from the detente following the missile crisis was badly misleading: "the treaty caused an increase in testing, not the decrease that . . . Kennedy led [the world] to expect." And the President, in succumbing to military pressures, was largely responsible.

Unlike Fairlie and Walton, moderate revisionists such as Barnet and Steel are not as concerned with the unfulfilled "Kennedy Promise." Steel even praises the missile crisis for helping to "bring an end to an adventurous phase in Russian foreign policy." What it did to corrupt American policy is not as clear, although he does note the link between the crisis and the deepening Vietnam involvement. Barnet is more critical, but his emphasis is upon the 1963 detente resulting from the crisis. Unlike Walton, he praises the detente, asserting that it was made possible in part because Kennedy overrode the Crisis Managers in the bureaucracy who had vested interests in maintaining the cold war.

Among the radical revisionists, Horowitz believes the missile crisis to be less interesting than the larger problem of why detente failed and the Cold War accelerated. His answer is his thesis: American policy was aimed not simply at stopping the expansion of other nation-states; hence Soviet expansion could be halted, but the internal upheavals in Cuba and Vietnam churned on, prompting continual American intervention. Williams similarly gives short attention to the crisis itself, viewing it as the result of more than a half-century of American open-door imperialism which failed to come to terms with radical movements in Mexico, Rusia, China or Cuba. Unlike Horowitz, Williams hopes for a less-than-apocalyptic remedy, and so he can conclude that the crisis "may have been the most important, if limited, learning experience" for Kennedy. But, Williams adds, if in the American University speech of 1963 the President "publicly unzipped the Truman Doctrine as it affected direct confrontations between nuclear powers, he had not learned the other lesson from Cuba: a social movement can unzip a nuclear empire."

The ideological distance from Fairlie to Horowitz and Williams is great, but they are united by more than a determination to revise or-

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# FSJ BOOKSHELF

## The Negotiations of Princes

HENRY KISSINGER's indebtedness to the foreign policy principles of Metternich is so well-known that we are fortunate in having a new biography —the first in English in 35 years— to provide us with an insight into their mysteries ("Metternich," *by Alan Palmer. Harper & Row, $12.50*). The more recent appearance of a brilliantly written life of Talleyrand—one of the best biographies in a decade—will enable the reader of both to judge the careers of each statesman against the backdrop of the other's life ("Talleyrand," *by J. F. Bernard. Putnam, $12.95*).

Clemens Wenzel Lothar, Prince Metternich, has until recently received a uniformly bad press from historians. As the architect of a European system unabashedly dedicated to anti-liberalism and resistance to change he has usually been presented as the veritable apostle of reaction, an image to be expected in an era that exalted nationalism and self-determination for linguistic minorities.

Tall, handsome, rich and elegant, Metternich was the pampered scion of a wealthy Rhineland family which before the incursions of the French Revolution owned 75 square miles of farms and vineyards around Coblentz. At the age of 21 his doting parents secured him an appointment in the Austrian diplomatic service and while still in his 20s he became Minister respectively to the courts of Saxony and Prussia. In 1806 Metternich made a brilliant entry onto a larger stage when he was appointed Austrian ambassador to the court of Napoleon. There he impressed the Emperor by self-assurance, and dazzled Paris with his lavish hospitality, only to suffer the inconvenience of expulsion under escort when in 1808 Napoleon broke with the Habsburgs and embarked on the campaign that was to culminate in the victory of Wagram. Back in Vienna in the victor's train, Metternich swiftly reestablished himself at the center of events by helping to arrange the marriage between Napoleon and Marie-Luise, the daughter of the Austrian Emperor. Soon thereafter he was appointed foreign minister and later Chancellor, in which posts he was to exercise a dominant role in European politics for the next 40 years.

Metternich handled the final alliance against Napoleon, and the in-

eredibly complex peace negotiations that followed, with considerable skill. His object was to keep the Czar committed to the alliance against Napoleon without letting the Russians too deep into Europe—to restore the pre-revolutionary system of sovereign monarchies, and at the same time to build a structure of transnational cooperation that would throttle revolutionary nationalism. To achieve these purposes, Metternich made pursuit of the balance of power and submergence of dynastic ambitions in the interests of Europe his guiding principles.

After the exile of Napoleon, Metternich created the Holy Alliance and henceforth devoted himself to the preservation of "public order" at home and abroad. He became an incessant traveler to conferences in other capitals—the coachman of Europe, as he called himself. "I came to Frankfurt like a Messiah saving sinners. The Diet took on a new appearance as soon as I began to busy myself with its affairs."

His personal fastidiousness and distaste for coercion did not prevent him from relying on a vast network of spies and police agents to report on subversive activities; he was also a firm believer in censorship ("Today the greatest evil . . . is the press."). So great was Metternich's influence from the Congress of Vienna until his resignation and exile in the revolution of 1848 that he gave his name to an era and made it synonymous with reaction.

***The French people are civilized, but their sovereign is not. The sovereign of Russia is civilized but his people are not.***

***Marriage is such a beautiful institution that one should spend one's whole life contemplating it.***

Metternich was widely criticized in his younger years for his indolence and frivolity—he thought nothing of holding up important business to make arrangements for parties and balls—but became increasingly diligent and distressingly pompous as he grew older. His voluminous correspondence gives us an idea both of his haughty conservatism and insufferable complacency. "At this decisive moment," he wrote of events of 1813, "I saw myself as the representative of the whole society of Europe. Shall I say it? Napoleon seemed small to me." And on intellectuals: "I wish for the good of humanity there could be learning but no learned men."

In contrast to the smooth path trod by this lofty grandee, the career of the far more talented Talleyrand was checkered with so many vicissitudes and near-disasters converted into triumphs that it reads like an adventure novel—but one that defies all standards of plausibility.

The eldest son of one of the great families of France, Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Perigord was deliberately raised in impoverished and lonely isolation, and then disinherited from the succession, because of a foot deformity. He was forced into the Church at an early age and soon became a bishop—one of the least celibate in history—but with the onset of the French Revolution became one of the leaders of the moderate wing and drafted the decrees that nationalized the Church. How-

ever, as the Terror approached, Talleyrand became increasingly disaffected and finally exiled himself under official auspices to England and America, where for two years he lived in straitened circumstances.

With the fall of Robespierre, Talleyrand arranged for his own recall and installation as Foreign Minister by the Directory—which he soon abandoned to hitch his career to the star of Bonaparte. Once again Foreign Minister, Talleyrand remained in office through the Consulate and Empire until he broke with Napoleon over the Spanish adventure. Convinced that Napoleon would never abandon his reckless career of military conquest until he had ruined France, the apostate ex-bishop and former revolutionary now worked behind the scenes for a Bourbon restoration and re-emerged as the Foreign Minister of Louis XVIII after Napoleon's exile to Elba.

The period of 1814-15, when France was defeated and occupied by the coalition of great powers, was the climax of Talleyrand's career. Virtually singlehanded he negotiated a peace settlement that restored France's natural frontiers, ended foreign military occupation, and left the country with a trivial indemnity. At the Congress of Vienna he capped this feat by raising France from the status of a vanquished aggressor to a guarantor of the European order. All this after French armies had been devastating the territories of Europe for twenty years.

***"These cynical practitioners of old-fashioned diplomacy built an order that lasted for a hundred years."***

Talleyrand fell out with Louis XVIII and spent years in retirement without, however, losing his hand for intrigue. Convinced that the Bourbons were too reactionary to unify France and avert another revolutionary bloodbath, he connived at the succession of Louis Philippe and ended his career, when almost eighty, as French Ambassador in London.

Like Metternich, Talleyrand was an aristocrat who lived on a lavish scale. The source of his income, however, was tainted with corruption of such magnitude that historians estimate that in the course of his career he received the equivalent of $30 million in bribes. What he gave in return is not clear, for there is not the slightest evidence that Talleyrand ever sacrificed one iota of France's interests in the process of enriching himself. Indeed, his reputation for probity in the business of diplomacy won him the accolade of that paragon of rectitude, the Duke of Wellington. Talleyrand was a man of transcendent charm and his wit and wisdom became proverbial:

"The French people are civilized, but their sovereign is not. The sovereign of Russia (i.e., Czar Alexander I) is civilized, but his people are not". . . . "The Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees are acquisitions of France, the rest are acquisitions of the Emperor. France has no wish to keep them. . . ."

On the appointment of an incompetent successor: "What a perfect

choice. He knows the Crimea better than any man in France." And on marriage: "Marriage is such a beautiful institution that one should spend one's whole life contemplating it."

It is hopeless to translate the personalities of Metternich and Talleyrand into modern terms. Both seem to have spent as much time in boudoirs—not their wives', needless to say—as in their offices. Metternich intermingled statecraft and love affairs to the point where it was difficult to say where one left off and the other began, while Talleyrand was surrounded with titled ladies all his life. Both were lazy to the point of laxity in the conduct of routine business; it was their fixed and ineluctable maxim never to lift a finger in any task capable of being executed by others. But perhaps the chief difference between them and their modern equivalents was their independence of judgment, disdain of popular opinion, and refusal to be imprisoned by precedents or instructions.

The most attractive feature of the statecraft of these two giants was its civilized tone. Both men detested extremes. Their policies were based on a principle of moderation that assumed a commonality of interest on the part of friend and foe alike in the preservation of the European system. The reason they broke with Napoleon and treated him as an outlaw was not that he occasionally made war, but that he was so violent and uncontrollable that there was no dealing with him on a civilized basis. These cynical practitioners of old-fashioned diplomacy built an order that lasted for a hundred years.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

## ABOUT THIS ISSUE

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Barton J. Bernstein, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University, discusses historical writing on the Eisenhower years. Bernstein, who edited a widely-used anthology, "Towards a New Past" has written extensively on the period and is at work on a book on the atom bomb and diplomacy. His approach to historical literature on the 1950s is to sub-divide it into radical, new left, and "tactical" revisionist schools, whose perspectives range from America-as-the-bastion-of-imperialism to interpretations of the "shrewd old Ike knew what he was doing" variety.

Our third essay, "Kennedy, Johnson, and the Revisionists" is by Walter LaFeber, Professor of History at Cornell University. In it LaFeber, whose published works include "America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1966," lists some of the main works of revisionist literature of recent years and their arguments.

Taken together, the pieces represent a survey of revisionist historiography for the post-1945 period and a presentation of some of the main revisionist positions. A few readers may be exasperated that old truths and truisms are irreverently challenged; others may welcome the opportunity to consider the work of an entire new generation of scholars that has come to dominate the writing and teaching of modern diplomatic history.

FREDERICK QUINN

**FOREIGN POLICY IN THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION**

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if it involved deceiving the American people for "their own good." Like many, he was also willing to champion shibboleths—for example, "liberation"—that promised the impossible but maintained useful support for the administration within the nation. He subscribed to the outlines of the Truman-Acheson framework of containment, used more belligerent rhetoric, but usually followed more cautious strategies. Even the extension of anti-Communist alliances throughout much of the world led not to war or armed confrontation but to peace and the conservative use of American resources. It is a measure of his political skill that his administration could ease the tensions of the Cold War and yet maintain the allegiance of many potential (right-wing) critics while undercutting their policies.

Most of the revisionism—radical, left-liberal, and "tactical"—of the Eisenhower administration is quite recent and often still fragmentary. Usually it is tucked away in essays or in parts of books devoted to larger stretches of history. Partly for these reasons, it has provoked neither the interest nor the passion unleased by the revisionism on the origins of the Cold War or on Truman's ability as a Chief Executive. There are also other reasons: one set for the radical and left-liberal and another for the "tactical." Because the Eisenhower administration was sharply criticized by liberals and (most liberal) historians in the '50s, the radical and left-liberal analyses are less troubling than those of the early Cold War—policies that liberal citizens endorsed. Many historians, mostly pro-New Deal-Fair Deal in orientation and commitment, are unwilling to countenance left analyses of Roosevelt or Truman but consider left analyses less threatening when applied to Eisenhower. He never had their support or affection and many were repelled by the strident moralism and fierce anti-communism of Eisenhower's administration. The newer "tactical" revisionism, I suspect, is less known. While probably treated as a curiosity, this revisionism does not directly threaten deeply held ideological positions. It only challenges older views (a familiar process in historical dialogue) and contributes to a reappraisal of what Vietnam has already compelled: a reassessment of liberal standards for a "great" presidency. The "tactical" view also has a subtle advantage: it does not seem negative but positive; it does not tear down the American past or Eisenhower, but seems to contribute to a greater appreciation of each. To many scholars, who have recently felt embattled in their universities and in their profession, the "tactical" revisionism seems quite moderate, certainly not unpleasant: it appears calm, generous, friendly, even non-ideological. For these reasons the new assessments and analyses of the Eisenhower administration are likely to be greeted with more open curiosity and receptiveness, and less ire, than those of the Roosevelt, Truman, or Kennedy administrations. ■

## KENNEDY, JOHNSON AND THE REVISIONISTS

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thodox views of the '60s. All of these revisionists agree on one central proposition: American liberalism, as it developed from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson through the '50s, was not only tried and found wanting in the '60s, but failed so ignominiously that the Kennedy-Johnson years must mark the end of a long era. Fairlie believes that liberalism's promises became ultimately corrupted because the Kennedyites asserted "the capacity of American positivism to fulfill the prophecy of American puritanism: that the city of man can be built in the image of the City of God on this earth." On a more secular level, Williams has provided the best historical analysis of how the "roots" and "contours" of the American liberal tradition shaped the bitter fruits of the '60s. Condemnation of liberalism might be expected from conservatives and radicals, but it is as harshly treated by the moderate revisionists. Steel condemns Vietnam as not a general's war, a bureaucraey's war, or even as Kennedy's or Johnson's war, but as "a liberal's war," for it was "the liberal formula—an all-powerful central bureaucracy, an unhindered President, military interventionism—[that] have been tricd and found wanting."

The '60s began with an apparent consensus and now another quite different consensus is forming among scholars of various ideological persuasions about the meaning of that decade. But irony does not end there. It could be that the contradietions within the Kennedy-Johnson liberalism became dramatically apparent between 1956 and 1959 when the Suez crisis, the Common Market, Castro, and the race of African colonies towards nationhood transformed a bipolar world into a pluralistic community. Americans had two alternatives: adjust to the diverse nationalisms, or continue to view the world as divided simply between Communists and the "free," using military means to maintain the division as neatly as possible. Amerieaan liberals' political theory from Andrew Jackson through Reinhold Niebuhr supposedly rested on a belief in the value of competing pluralistie units, but they discarded the theory, or what remained of it, and seized the first alternative. The best analysis of this post-1956 process is not revisionist, but from Walt Whitman Rostow, particularly his "The Diffusion of Power, 1957-1972" (1972). His command of this period is as yet unmatched, and his work deserves close study despite his inability to see that out of his analysis emerged an alternative to the policies of the '60s.

The work of Rostow and the revisionists will be developed so that we can learn, hopefully, from the nightmare decade. That the revisionists who wrote between 1960 and 1966 on the New Deal, Truman and Eisenhower years were correct in the warnings about American diplomacy is now of little comfort, even to the revisionists. Hopefully their more fundamental work on Kennedy and Johnson will be more closely studied, less easily dismissed, and consequently become a history now that will teach. ■

**REVISIONISM AND THE COLD WAR**

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tween foreign and domestic issues. Faced with a hostile Congress after the mid-term elections of 1946, and the need to initiate a bold new foreign policy with global implications, Truman combined his anti-Communisms, foreign and domestic, to outflank the Republicans and conservative "isolationists" of both parties:

> The pairing of major anti-communist initiatives in the foreign and domestic fields could be particularly helpful in winning support for Cold War foreign policy in the broad areas of the Midwest, where the fear of domestic communism tended to be combined with resistance to an aggressive international policy. The Administration seemed to recognize this consideration, for it was Attorney General Clark and not a representative of the foreign policy bureaucracy who was sent into the Midwest to speak in support of aid to Greece and Turkey. At the same time, of course, the dramatic and unexpected declaration of a drive against communists at home, shortly after the Truman Doctrine speech, heightened the sense of crisis in which the matter of Greco-Turkish aid was debated by bringing the communist danger directly and immediately to the American doorstep. In sum, the Administration seemed to have decided that if it could not avoid the internal security issue, it might as well make the most of it.

Freeland's book poses several questions, not all of which he is able to resolve inside its pages. Nevertheless, it seems clear that he has demonstrated the connections and consequences of the international anti-communist crusade for domestic politics, and proved that they were never separate issues. Once set loose, there was no way to control these powerful forces even when they threatened to destroy the Truman Administration in the days of Joseph McCarthy.

Ironically, the most thoughtful critiques of the Administration's plan to aid Greece and Turkey *did* come from conservatives on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Georgia's Walter F. George and Alexander Wiley from Wisconsin. George's comments after hearing Acheson explain the Administration's reasons for ignoring the United Nations in executive session evoke an eerie sense of biblical prophecy in post-Vietnam America:

> I do not know that we will have to go anywhere else in this world, and I do not say that at the moment. I do not see how we are going to escape going into Manchuria, North China, and Korea and doing things in that area of the world. But at the same time that is another question, and we have got the right to exercise common-sense. But I know that when we make a policy of this kind we are irrevocably committing ourselves to a course of action, and there is no way to get out of it next week or next year. You go down to the end of the road. (*Hearings Held in Execu-*

*tive Session Before the Committee on Foreign Relations: Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine*, made public on January 12, 1973.)

Tom Connally of Texas was worried about the implications of the Truman Doctrine, too, but concluded, "I do not see how we can do anything else except to go along [with the President] or to forget the whole business, and that would put us in a ridiculous attitude before the world. We would then be regarded as having been bluffed out of it by Russia, and we had better never have started." Time and again in the Cold War, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Congress in general would find itself confronted by presidential actions and statements which it could not effectively challenge without repudiating the premises of the Cold War.

It began with the Truman Doctrine, continued through the Korean War and the Eisenhower years, and reached a climax in the '60s with the Cuban missile crisis and the war in Vietnam. "Change has come not from wisdom but from disaster," writes Senator J. William Fulbright. "It cannot be said that the assumptions underlying the Truman Doctrine were wholly false, especially for their time and place, but there is a powerful, presumptive case against their subsequent universal application: the case deriving from the disaster of our policy in Asia." ("The Crippled Giant: American Foreign Policy and Its Domestic Consequences," Vintage Books, 1972.)

Yet Fulbright himself recognizes elsewhere in his narrative that the Truman Doctrine could not work in its "time and place" without a powerful statement of its "universal application." The same is true of George F. Kennan's recent explanation of the way in which his famous "X" article, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" was distorted into the Containment Doctrine. He was, he asserts in his "Memoirs," speaking of a political threat, to be contained by political means—and only at certain key strategic points. In practice, there proved to be no way to limit Containment. The Truman Doctrine was containment, so was the Marshall Plan. So was Korea. And so was Vietnam.

President Harry S. Truman is not the villain of the Cold War. Neither were American policy makers simply responding to an aggressive Russian foreign policy, which sought to extend communist power into every "nook and cranny available to it in the basin of world power." The President's advisers encouraged him to take the initiative after Roosevelt's death, not to tell the Russians to "go to hell," but for far more serious reasons. The United States picked up Britain's lapsed responsibilities in the Middle East, not to satisfy an abstract urge to power, but to secure the flanks of European capitalism. The post-World War II era came to an end in the '60s. Cold War premises were no longer sufficient to sustain American foreign policy in the new era, so they were abandoned. It now seems they are not sufficient to sustain a historical interpretation of the Cold War either. ■

# LETTERS TO FSJ

### Discrimination

■ In connection with the Association's efforts to stamp out discrimination and to air grievances, I should like to focus on an area of discrimination in the Foreign Service which, to my mind, has not been sufficiently publicized and discussed: the discrimination against the FSIO vis-a-vis the FSO when it comes to ambassadorial and DCM appointments.

It seems that by definition, by training, and by experience the FSIO is as qualified as the FSO to be a chief or deputy chief of mission. While the FSO may have a political, an economic, an administrative or a consular specialty, the FSIO usually has an informational or cultural specialty (or—a combination of the two—a PAO specialty). What is more, the PAO (as well as the IO and the CAO) often has had to demonstrate—even at a comparatively early stage of his career—expertise as an executive by virtue of the fact that he has had to run operations of an informational and cultural nature involving large staffs, facilities, equipment and budgets.

Nowadays the Chief of Mission is primarily an executive running a complex foreign affairs establishment. Obviously he should be knowledgeable of political, economic, administrative, consular, cultural and information work and have the ability to conduct the special aspects of his responsibilities, be they representation, negotiation or reporting. It would of course be advantageous to every career Chief of Mission to have had personal experience in as many of these functional areas as possible. This is, however, a matter of relativity, depending upon the previous assignments and preferences of each candidate for the highest office in the career Foreign Service.

My point is that, first, I believe FSIOs are equally qualified to be considered for this office; and second, FSIOs are being discriminated against in consideration for this office.

There are approximately 50 FSIO-1s and Career Ministers (Information). During the last seven years, only three FSIOs (or their prior equivalents) have, to my knowledge, been appointed Chiefs of Mission: one in Khartoum (since retired), one in Tegucigalpa and one in Lagos. I know of only two DCM assignments. This, I believe, is ample proof that FSIOs are not getting equal consideration with FSOs for ambassadorial or DCM appointments.

Since the AFSA is supposed to represent both FSOs and FSIOs equally—without discrimination to either—I would like the organization to take a more active interest than it has heretofore in overcoming this obvious example of discrimination against one "minority" in the Foreign Service.

HANS N. TUCH

Brasilia

### Dollar Devaluation

■ Enclosed is a clipping from the Department of State NEWSLETTER for March concerning the effect of the dollar devaluation on Foreign Service allowances. In the last paragraph, the statement is made that "Local employees are not affected by the devaluation because they are paid in local currencies." As far as it goes, this is correct. However, I would like to draw the Department's attention—and AFSA's—to the fact that *retired* local employees receive their retirement pay in fixed dollar amounts; and the dollar has depreciated between 15 and 30% in the past two years. The Department seems unaware of the problem. AFSA does not represent local employees. Surely there must be someone in the Department able to come up with some redress for these retired local employees.

Here is an example of the kind of problems that a bureaucracy tends to ignore and that a union can throw on the table—but who is there to represent the locals?

THERESA A. HEALY

USEC, Brussels

### Terrorism

■ On March 2 and March 6 President Nixon, in the wake of the tragedy at Khartoum, reiterated our Government's policy of not giving in to terrorist blackmail or extortion. The President's words have a special relevance to members of this Mission in view of our own prolonged confrontation with the very fundamental problems posed by terrorist tactics. We recognize there may well be a further cost in human anguish to be paid in adhering to this policy. Nonetheless, we strongly believe that the position set forth by the President is the only acceptable one our Government can follow if we are ever to overcome this sinister impediment to the peaceful diplomatic process.

FRANK V. ORTIZ

Montevideo

### Is Anyone Listening?

■ For those who may wish to pursue further afield our history of policy makers who "do not listen," a phenomenon so eloquently related by Barbara Tuchman and John Service at the AFSA luncheon for "Old China Hands," Volume V of the recently published 1947 Foreign Relations provides chilling testimony on the Middle East.

This area, too, had its experts and specialists in Loy Henderson, George Wadsworth, Ray Hare and others in less senior positions at the time who, with perception and courage, tried valiantly to bring some sense into White House handling of the Palestine issue.

If anyone is inclined to wonder what has happened to the US position in the Middle East since World War II, as most recently exemplified by the Khartoum tragedy, and why, a reading of Henderson's Top Secret Memorandum of September 22 and November 24, 1947, will give the answer.

DAVID G. NES

Owings Mills, Md.

### Plea for Arabists

■ Would you open the pages of the JOURNAL to some special pleading on behalf of Arabic language and area training?

This is a type of career specialization which offers uncommon attractions and opportunities for all officers, not excepting those of junior and middle grades. Recently, however, in correspondence with Personnel over a new Political Chief for Jidda, I became aware of an imbalance in our "mix" of Arabists today: the Foreign Service has on its rolls quite a number of Arabists now too senior for Jidda's position, and since 1967 younger officers have

not been volunteering for Arabic training in numbers sufficient to deal with our present needs.

The causes of such a problem I believe are three: first, the 1967 war caused many of our embassies in the area to close, and made an Arab specialty appear to some officers unwise and untimely; second, our deepening involvement in Vietnam diverted growing numbers of FSOs to that country after a year's area and hard language training. (These officers were often just the type of activists and problem-seekers who in previous years had been drawn to the Arab world because of the stimulation that it offered.) Finally, the young FSO, with his FSO-5 threshold before him, may fear a loss of career acceleration if he chooses prolonged language study while his classmates are already at work in one of the traditional Service disciplines.

Vietnam is ending, however, new posts are being established in the Middle East, and old ones are being reopened. The threshold is still with us, but there are many good reasons why ambitious younger officers—who may have given a passing thought to Arabic—should now consider this possibility at greater length.

The majority of my colleagues who are Arabists did not choose this specialty out of any early or unwavering attraction to the area. What attracted us was rather the prospects this specialty offered for challenging and interesting work in a part of the world where major issues of strategy, energy and politics would be at stake. In addition, we noted that the posts were small enough so that a younger, or middle-level FSO—by virtue of his language skills and area expertise—could demand and receive a satisfying share of the action. Arabists were aware that no other hard language could promote its graduates to the head of the line for scores of jobs at all levels in approximately 30 posts and 20 countries. The traditions, politics and geography of these countries, moreover, are sufficiently varied to provide constant change and stimulus within the Arabist's specialty. No assignment, of course, is like its predecessor; I feel it may be easier nevertheless for an Arabist to retain a sense of freshness and novelty about each new posting than for practitioners of some other hard languages.

In a personal sense, I feel my Arabist colleagues have also found the satisfactions of their specialty to have grown over the years. Those with ten to fifteen years' experience in the field and on Washington desks foresee a time when—in their mid-40s or early 50s—they will be as in command of a discipline as are other professional men such as doctors, lawyers and engineers.

Among my colleagues I perceive that this sense of achievement—a feeling that one is approaching a substantive mastery of a field—could be a valuable complement to the satisfactions that the Arab specialist, like the generalist, can derive from a steady increase in his diplomatic expertise.

There are further satisfactions that Arabic offers, and which it shares with other hard language specialties as well: that of working over the years at a common task with officers whom one comes to know well, to like and to respect; that of the literary and cultural perspectives afforded by a deepening study of a non-Western civilization; this last satisfaction, in fact, can sometimes become the basis for a scholarly and rewarding career upon retirement from the Foreign Service.

This should be to look well beyond the horizons of most younger officers; but I hope—for other reasons mentioned—that many of them will choose the Middle East and find in it as much satisfaction as a quarter of my own A-100 class did.

HUME A. HORAN

Jidda

### A Caveat for Consular Appointees

■ Charles Kennedy in his "Open Letter to Consular Appointees" (February) failed to warn the new ranks of consular officers that should they want to, or have to get out of the Foreign Service after five, seven and one half, or fifteen years, they may find themselves singularly unqualified for any other type of civilian or Government work. Economic, Commercial, Administrative, and Information Officers all have civilian counterpart jobs which they can fall back on. Even Political Officers have some qualifications for teaching. But a Consular Officer may find that even if he had an M.A. degree in economics, history, or business administration when he came in, his credentials are nearly worthless after a few years of consular "experience." So, if Mr. Kennedy's letter succeeded in scaring off any new consular fledglings, (which I realize was not his intention), then let them get out now while their qualifications are still marketable.

JAMES W. CARTER

Rangoon

### The Last Shall Be First

■ I have been reading with much interest the many articles on the upgrading program for the Staff Corps —mainly secretaries. The programs for secretaries such as the Secretary of the Year Award, language training, area training, staff officer rank, the "Bill of Rights" are all steps in the right direction.

I would like to point out, however, that there are a few other Staff Corps members who are not secretaries, mainly communicators, technicians and couriers. It is hoped that this group has not been overlooked in the upgrading program. All too often we are the first to be called to perform our duties but the last to be recognized.

We are a small group but don't get us lost in the shuffle. We are a pretty dedicated bunch—even if we are a bit surly at times.

EDWARD T. NOSKO
*C&R Officer*

Kampala

### Clarifying "Table B"

■ In regard to "Communication re: The Cone System" in the April FSJ, some readers may be confused as to the meaning of Table B on page 30. The omitted description reads: "The 'pinch' in the political cone, then, is not one generated by discriminatory treatment. Rather, it is a function of: 1) the substantially reduced rate of overall promotion (see Table B); 2) the assumption that the basis of promotion should be the inherent theoretical requirement of a vacancy at a higher grade."

STEPHEN HAYDEN

Washington

# AFSA NEWS

published by the
AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE ASSOCIATION
2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037

## MEMBERS' INTERESTS

### $ $ $

### Devaluation And Allowances

As this issue of the **Journal** was going to press, previous optimism regarding the hoped-for retroactive readjustment of overseas allowances to reflect the dollar devaluation of February 14 was turning to gloom.

An information blackout has been clamped on while the mandarins in the Office of Management and Budget debate our standard of living. From what we can piece together, the new cost of living indexes resulting from the dollar devaluation of February 14 would cost the Defense Department several hundred million dollars in new and increased overseas allowances if implemented in accordance with present criteria. In order to avoid this tremendous new budgetary burden, the OMB is examining the basis for calculating the "Post Allowance" (cost-of-living) in an effort to pare down this allowance. One possibility is to change the percentage of salary calculated as "spendable income," which is another way of saying the amount of money actually spent on the local economy as opposed to purchases in dollars in the US, in third countries, or dollar outlets like PX's and commissaries. If the "spendable income" base can be lowered, then the allowance goes down even if the cost-of-living goes up at your post compared to the cost-of-living in Washington.

One way of reducing the "spendable income" base under consideration is to subtract the amount of money an employee would normally spend on rent if stationed in the United States. Since a housing allowance is provided abroad, the employee is therefore considered able to bank that amount in dollars in the US. If the employee actually spends that extra money on the local economy, that's his tough luck. The fact that employees have unusual expenses overseas such as kindergarten, overseas travel for children in college, unreimbursed representation outlays, out-of-pocket rental costs, key money, deductibles for emergency visitation, and many others, is probably also tough luck.

We hope our worst fears, admittedly based on our not having all the facts due to the information blackout, turn out to be unfounded. If there is substance to these rumors, AFSA will fight hard through management and Congress to forestall an injustice.

**SPECIAL ANNOUNCEMENT**

**AFSA's annual General Business Meeting will be held Thursday, May 17, 1973 at noon in the East Auditorium, Department of State.**

**The agenda:**

1. **Chairman's Report — William C. Harrop**
2. **Treasurer's Report—David W. Loving**
3. **Consideration and vote upon proposed amendments to the By-Laws as published in this, the May issue of the "Foreign Service Journal."**
4. **Other business**

## USIA NEWS

### Quartile Rankings

The Association is very pleased that USIA has accepted a recommendation made by both AFSA and the 1973 Selection Boards not to automatically inform each officer ranked in the 4th quartile. AFSA called USIA management's attention to the frailties of this practice last year in one particular case in which a shocked officer received notification that he was ranked in the 4th quartile the very same week that his superior recommended that the employee receive a merit step increase!

### Victory—At Last

**AFSA was certified as the exclusive representative for Foreign Service employees in USIA on April 18. The certification came after 77 previously challenged ballots were opened. AFSA received a sufficient number of these votes to reach the required majority. AFSA has now won certification as exclusive representative in State, AID and USIA and is negotiating with the managements of these agencies on a broad range of Foreign Service concerns.**

INDEX

# FOREIGN SERVICE NEWS

AFSA Chairman of the Board Bill Harrop testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early April on the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1973 (S. 1248).

After remarking on the tragic events of Khartoum and the need for increased security for Foreign Service personnel, AFSA proposed legislation to compensate the families of Foreign Service victims. Such draft legislation was submitted with the statement.

AFSA reaffirmed its stand on including AID Foreign Service personnel under the Foreign Service annuity system and offered a proposed amendment to the Foreign Service Act of 1946 to effect this.

An additional amendment to the Act was proposed to remove any possible ambiguities from the wording providing for the Foreign Service merit promotion system, and to authorize promotions as a result of grievance and discrimination board recommendations.

AFSA also proposed that voluntary retirement after 20 years of service be provided for regardless of age. To reduce overcrowding in the senior classes of the FSO Corps, the Association urged that the Act be amended to provide for the mandatory retirement of Career Ministers at age 60. This would not, of course abridge the President's right to appoint Career Ministers to Chief of Mission positions beyond that age.

The statement continued with a report on the status of grievance procedures for the Foreign Service, now a subject of negotiation between the Association and the Department of State.

In conclusion the statement drew attention to the unusual financial problems of Foreign Service families, citing several examples and proposing legislative remedies. On the devaluation problem, it was proposed that an additional item be added to the Authorization Act calling for an economic adjustments allowance. The Committee was urged to provide for education allowances for kindergarten aged children of Foreign Service families stationed abroad, to bring the foreign affairs agencies in line with the practice of the Department of Defense. The final item dealt with the cost of transfers between assignments within the US and to and from overseas posts, to bring the Foreign Service practice in line with the Civil Service.

### Annuity Loophole

AFSA's Members' Interests Committee is investigating the development of an insurance program to insure Foreign Service personnel in the event that both the Foreign Service employee and his spouse die simultaneously or before their children have finished their education. A major defect exists in the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System, in that when **both** the employee and spouse die, the yearly annuity which will be paid to any surviving child will be $1,400, with a maximum of $4,100 to the family!

For example, if a Foreign Service employee dies in a plane accident leaving a wife and four children, his family will receive an annuity depending on his salary and the number of years of his service plus an allowance for the children. This provides a minimum income for the family. However, if the employee and the employee's spouse are killed in the same accident or a few years apart, the four children would receive a total of $4,100 each year, or just over $1,000 per child.

The Department is preparing an amendment to the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability Program to remedy this serious loophole.

# AFSA ACTIVITIES

### CHAPTER NEWS

AFSA London has recently completed its annual election of its Board of Directors and the Board in turn has elected its officers for 1973. They are: Bill Mills, chairman; Dirk Gleysteen, vice chairman; Bill Edgar, secretary; Alan Gise, Judith Jamison, Arthur Crowfoot and Paul Sadler, members. The Board subsequently elected George Lambrakis as member at large.

AFSA members in Karachi met in February and voted formally to establish an AFSA Chapter. Edward Bryant was elected Acting Chairman of the Chapter, pending adoption of Chapter Bylaws and a formal election of a full slate of officers.

AFSA/Bangkok recently reorganized its Chapter's Board of Directors to replace Jim Krause, Mary Jane Timmons, Jackie Cahill, Bill Weinhold, and Hal Colebaugh. The new Board is: Dave Krecke, Chairman; Dwight Cramer, Vice Chairman; Herb Roberts, Vice Chairman; Harlan Lee, Treasurer; Lee Caughill, Secretary; Tom Ward, Membership; Jules Bacha, Staff Corps Interests; Lee Bigelow, Newsletter; B. Ellen Matthews; Mike Brown; Bob Sellers; Ed Corr.

AFSA/Bangkok held meetings on employee-management relations under the Executive Order with a member of the Inspector General's Office, and on labor relations in the Israeli Foreign Service.

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A recent survey of the Chiefs of Mission during 6 of the last 12 years reveals the following statistics:

| | 1961 | 1964 | 1965 | 1969 | 1972 | Jan. 1973 | April |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Non Career | 20 | 38 | 30 | 45 | 31 | 29 | 32 |
| CA | 3 | 5 | 5 | 3 | | 1 | 1 |
| CM | 40 | 35 | 38 | 31 | 30 | 29 | 23 |
| FSO-1 | 20 | 24 | 31 | 34 | 46 | 46 | 43 |
| FSO-2 | | 3 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 4 | 4 |
| FSR-1 | | | | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| FSIO-CM | | | | | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| FSIO-1 | | | | | 2 | 2 | 1 |
| Total | 83 | 105 | 106 | 115 | 115 | 113 | 107 |
| Percentage of Career Officers | 76% | 64% | 72% | 61% | 73% | 74% | 70% |

## ROSTER OF AFSA COMMITTEE CHAIRMEN

**AID Advisory,** Edwin L. Martin, AFR/DS, Rm. 4746, NS, x29872

**Amendments,** Michael R. Gannett, INR/RSG, 8733, 20236

**Awards,** Howard B. Schaffer, CA/FS/NEA, 2908, 22121

**Club,** Samuel R. President, CU/EX/BM, 4807, 23149

**DACOR,** (2), Wm. O. Boswell, 5712 Warwick Place, Chevy Chase, Md. zip 20015, tel. 654-7385; Robt. Cleveland, 2911 Garfield, NW, 20008, 332-1217

**Education,** Mrs. Sam. Thornburg, 7510 Milway Lane, Alexandria, Virginia 22306, tel. 768-3877

**E.O. Election,** Thomas D. Boyatt, NEA/CYP, 5248, 20279

**Executive Order,** Richard H. Melton, ARA/IG, 6909, 22399

**Finance,** David W. Loving, EUR/WE, 5230, 23063

**Grievance,** Alan Hardy, AF/E, 5238, 20857

**Journal Board,** Teresita C. Schaffer, E/IFD/ODF, 2833, 20686

**Keyman Coordinator,** Robert H. Pelletreau, AF/N, 4511, 21194

**Legal,** Marian L. Nash, L, 6422, 22628

**Members' Interests,** Herman J. Cohen, AF/C, 4238, 22080

**Memorial Plaque,** Harrison Symmes, S/IG, 7806, 28842

**Openness,** David E. Biltchik, Carnegie Endowment, 1717 Mass. Ave., Suite 503, D.C. 20036, tel. 332-6929

**Policy Process,** Wm. C. Harrop, S/PC, 7312, 28986.

**Staff Corps Adv.,** (2), Barbara J. Good, IO/UCS, Rm. 500, SA-2, 22780; James L. Holmes, OC/EX, 2130, 21584

**State Negotiations,** Thomas D. Boyatt, NEA/CYP, 5248, 20279

**USIA Advisory,** (2), John J. Tuohey,

USIA, IEE, 804, 1750 Pa. Ave., 25133; Wm. R. Lenderking, USIA, IOP/P, 507, 1750 Pa. Ave., 25209

**Committee Coordinator**—Helen Vogel, AFSA, 29672

*Dr. John A. Hannah, AID Administrator, Tom Boyatt, Vice Chairman, AFSA, "Whit" Whitten and Linda Lowenstein, AFSA Board members, and Edwin L. Martin, chairman of the AID Advisory Committee, on the occasion of AFSA's certification as exclusive representative for AID's foreign service personnel.*

# STATE DEPARTMENT NEWS

### Dispute on Selection Out Review Board

Negotiations between AFSA and the administrative management of the Department of State on Precepts for the 1973 Special Review Panel on selection out having bogged down, AFSA filed the first Appeal to the Board of the Foreign Service.

There are three issues:

1. a. Should officers being considered for selection out be permitted to appear personally before the Special Review Panel to speak to their record; and
   b. If so, should they be permitted to be accompanied by a person of their choosing, if the Special Review Panel so decides.
2. Should AFSA, as exclusive employee representative, be notified of the final determination by the Secretary, or his designee, as to whether an officer is or is not to be selected out.
3. Should administrative management alone decide who is to serve on the 1973 Special Review Panel; or should administrative management prepare candidates who would then be jointly agreed on by administrative management and AFSA.

The Association, of course, is arguing the affirmative in questions 1 and 3, and for mutual agreement with respect to appointments to the Special Review Panel on issue 3.

# AAFSW NEWS

The May activities of the AAFSW include a visit for members to the Chinese Art Collection of Senator and Mrs. Hugh Scott on Wednesday May 16, at 10:30, and a final meeting on May 22, at which Ambassador William Porter will address the membership. This meeting will also feature the election of officers.

Summaries of the panel on the

changing role of the Foreign Service wife are still available by sending a stamped, self-addressed envelope to Mrs. R. B. Finn, AAFSW, P. O. Box 4931, D.C. 20008.

### Book Fair

The AAFSW requests assistance for the annual Book Fair. Proceeds are used to support the Scholarship/Education Fund.

Early donations of the following items would be particularly appreciated, in order to facilitate mounting and framing:

engravings and old prints
art calendars and catalogues
needlework and embroidery.

Please call Leila Wilson, 333-5805, or Carol Sutherland, 530-8821. For donations of books and stamps, please call the coordinator at 942-2960, or 362-3895, District, 893-7175, Virginia, 493-9192, Maryland.

## MEMBERS' INTERESTS

**Overseas Leave Balances:** Foreign Service employees serving overseas for all agencies are reminded that they can accumulate up to a maximum of 360 hours of annual leave while in overseas locations. Personnel serving in the United States can accumulate only a maximum of 240 hours. If you are contemplating a transfer from overseas to a US location and have a leave balance between 240 and 360 hours, that amount becomes your leave ceiling for the time you are serving in the US. If you wish to maintain a leave balance of 360 hours during your assignment to the US, you must make sure that you depart from your overseas location with that many hours accumulated. You cannot go below 360 hours, return to the US, and accumulate up to 360 hours again while serving in the US. People we know have been unaware of this situation and have returned to Washington for eventual retirement or separation only to discover they had permanently lost up to 120 hours for which they might have received lump sum payments.

### Insurance Claims

An AFSA member took out insurance on his stored household effects with one of the Washington area companies that had his belongings in storage under a USG contract. He discovered some ambiguity in the language of the insurance policy which indicated that loss or damage must be reported to the company within 90 days of the occurrence. He inquired and was informed "the 90 day rule begins at the time the certificate holder becomes aware of any loss or damage, and this normally occurs when the household effects are taken out of storage. The twelve-month limitation for filing suit begins on the date of discovery of loss or damage."

## JOURNAL NEWS

Eric Griffel, the **Journal's** newest Board member, was born in Krakow on July 15, 1930. His family moved to England, anticipating WWII in 1938, and he lived in England and went to school there through high school.

After emigrating to the US in 1946, first to New York and then Los Angeles, Eric attended UCLA, 1948-1951 and again 1953-57, where he majored in Political Science. He served in the US Army in France, 1951-53 as a French translator at the exalted rank of PFC and became a US citizen in 1953.

He worked in the City Manager's Office of Los Angeles, then joined AID under one of its previous names in 1957, and served in Washington and Afghanistan, then as Assistant Program Officer to Rabat and as Program Officer to Guinea. Eric also opened and closed AID's office in Elisabethville in 1963 and has since served in Nepal, Washington, and Dacca as Deputy Provincial Director and Director, during the time of the Civil War, now Asia Coordinator in AID's Bureau for Program and Policy Coordinator.

### Volunteers Wanted

The City Hall Complaint Center created, managed and staffed by volunteers is located in the District Building. The Center has entered its fifth year of operation and continues to do everything it can for citizens of the District of Columbia who call 393-3333 between the hours of 10 A.M. and 2 P.M. five days a week. It is serving as ombudsman in the very real sense of the word.

The job entails a once-a-week commitment to the city year 'round when possible. It is a marvelous way to learn first-hand what problems concern and frustrate city dwellers. The hours are 9:30 to 2:30 and more hours can be given in various ways as the volunteer becomes familiar with the city and its many problems. Please write to Mrs. Malan S. Strong, care of City Hall Complaint Center, District Building Room 7, Washington, D.C. 20004 or contact the office at 347-6017 for further information. Previous Foreign Service wives have proved to be excellent volunteers. The need is NOW.

### Scholarships

Miss Hall's School: An anonymous donor has made available four scholarships each year, the value of each being 25 percent of tuition charged, to daughters of FSOs. The school enrolls approximately 160 students in grades 9-12. Address inquiries to: The Headmaster, Miss Hall's School, Pittsfield, Mass. 01201.

### Moore Memorial

A recent report from Ross N. Berkes, Director, School of International Relations at the University of Southern California, states that the scholarship fund established in memory of George Curtis Moore is growing rapidly. More funds are needed and contributions can be sent to Dr. Berkes at USC, Los Angeles, California 90007. Checks should be made out to the University of Southern California and marked "Moore Memorial Scholarship."

### Noel Memorial Fund

The administrator of the fund in memory of Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr. at Moberly Junior College, informed us just before the deadline for this issue that several thousand dollars have been received for the fund, mostly from childhood friends of Ambassador Noel. Taking into account funds promised but not yet received it is believed that the fund can be used to provide scholarships from its annual proceeds. A committee representing the college, the city of Moberly and the family will select recipients. Contributions to the Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., Memorial Fund may be sent to Mr. Will Ben Sims, Moberly City Bank & Trust Company, Moberly, Missouri 65270.

## Foreign Service People

### MARRIAGES

**Schnoor-Myles.** Margaret Schnoor was married to FSO Stanley T. Myles on March 3 in Curacao.

**Timberlake-Lillis.** Frances Timberlake, daughter of Ambassador and Mrs. Clare H. Timberlake, was married to J. Patrick Lillis on March 5, at the Dahlgren Chapel, Georgetown University.

### BIRTHS

**Dean.** A son, Clayton McCoy, born to FSO and Mrs. James Clayton Dean on February 26 in Washington.

### DEATHS

**Anderson.** Erthel H. Anderson, AID-retired, died on February 17 in Dallas, Texas. Mr. Anderson entered on duty with AID in 1958 and served in Afghanistan, Yemen and the Sudan before his retirement in 1968. He is survived by his wife, Frances, 616 W. Colorado Blvd., Dallas, Tex., a brother and two sisters.

**Benton.** William B. Benton died on March 18 in New York. Senator Benton's life spanned careers in advertising, education, politics, publishing and public service. He established his own advertising agency, Benton and Bowles with Chester Bowles in 1929, served as vice president of the University of Chicago from 1937 to 1945 during which time he bought the Encyclopaedia Britannica, arranging for the profits to go to the University. Senator Benton served as Assistant Secretary of State for public affairs from 1945 to 1949 and as Senator from Connecticut from 1949 to 1952. He is survived by his wife, Helen, of Southport, Connecticut, four children and eight grandchildren. Senator Benton had been an honorary member of AFSA since 1948—an appreciation of his interest in and concern for the foreign affairs community. A scholarship has been established in his memory in perpetuity.

**Beach.** Arthur E. Beach, FSO-retired, died on February 2. Mr. Beach entered the State Department in 1927 and joined the Foreign Service in 1954. He served at Khartoum and Johannesburg before his retirement in 1960. He is survived by two daughters, Mrs. Harry A. Breher, 4908 Kingston Dr., Annandale, Va. and Barbara J. Beach, 2400 S. Glebe Rd., Arlington, Va.

**Fuller.** George Gregg Fuller, FSO-retired, died on March 12 in Washington. Mr. Fuller entered the Foreigh Service in 1920 and served at Christiania, Trondhjem, Malmo, Reval, Jerusalem, Bushire, Teheran, Berlin, Niagara Falls, Kingston, Winnipeg, St. John, Antwerp, and as Consul General at Tunis before his retirement in 1949. He served on the founding committee of DACOR and as its first managing director. Mr. Fuller also taught at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University and was on the staff of American University. He is survived by two sons, the Rev. George Tucket Havemeyer Fuller, Edmonton, Alb., and Gregory Alson Williams Fuller, Gaithersburg, and a daughter, Therese Lamb, 11028 Waycroft Way, Rockville, Md., a sister and seven grandchildren.

**Hartman.** Wayman C. "Tony" Hartman, AID-retired, died on February 4 in Columbia, Mo. Mr. Hartman joined AID in 1965 and served in Laos until 1972. He received two Meritorious Honor Awards from the agency. Mr. Hartman is survived by his wife, Galena, of P. O. Box 102, Pilot Grove, Mo. and four daughters. Contributions in his memory may be made to the American Cancer Society.

**Longyear.** Robert Dudley Longyear, FSO-retired, died on August 2, 1972 at his home in Suffolk, England. He entered the Foreign Service in 1921 and served at Port-au-Prince, Geneva, Lucerne, Munich, Marseilles, and Malaga before his retirement. He is survived by his wife, 8 Rue de L'Hotel de Ville, Geneva, Switzerland.

**McKee.** Ruth E. McKee, FSO-retired, died on December 20. Mrs. McKee entered on duty with the Department of State in 1950 and joined the Foreign Service in 1955. She served at Tokyo before her retirement in 1963. She is survived by a sister, Margery McKee, 733 North Wilton Pl., Los Angeles, Calif.

**Meloy.** Francis E. Meloy, retired government employee, died on February 23 in Santo Domingo, where his son Francis E. Meloy, Jr., has been the Ambassador since 1969. Mr. Meloy worked for the War Department and the Department of Agriculture for 44 years before his retirement in 1942. He is survived by another son, Daniel, of New York City.

**Stearns.** Byron O. Stearns, AID-retired, died on August 18. He is survived by his wife of 6582 Weyanoke Court, Alexandria, Va.

**Stotts.** Maida F. Stotts, FSO-retired, died on January 9 in California. Miss Stotts entered the Foreign Service in 1945 and served at Chungking, Shanghai, Naples, Kobe and Toronto before her retirement in 1967. She is survived by her sister, Mrs. Earl R. Weston, 816 Walnut Ave., Long Beach, Calif.

**Urist.** Harold E. Urist, FSR-retired, died on February 22 in Bonita, California. Mr. Urist joined USIA in 1950 and served at Guatemala City, Montevideo and Mexico City before his retirement in 1970. He also directed the Communications-USA Exhibit in Moscow in 1964. He is survived by his wife, Margaret, 4095 Bonita Rd., Bonita, Calif. a son and a daughter.


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