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

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FIFTIETH ANNIVERSARY YEAR

DEPARTMENTS

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by Francine Faulhaber

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FSJ EDITORIAL

The AID RIF

On October 18, 1974, AID Administrator Parker at a special meeting of AID/Washington personnel announced a substantial reduction-in-force which he said he expected could range between 300 and 400 American personnel. In his remarks, Mr. Parker stated that he was ". . . determined to ameliorate the trauma of those who will be departing by not only ensuring full compliance with regulatory requirements, but also by utilizing every management right available to me to protect and further your individual rights." This is a laudable statement of intent.

Unfortunately, the Agency's past actions give us literally no confidence that the upcoming RIF will be carried out in a fashion which is either humane or in the best interests of the Agency. On the contrary, AID's abysmal performance in carrying out the Public Safety RIF indicates that the Administrator's noble sentiments are likely to be translated into a bungling, mechanistic and inhuman self-evisceration of AID.

The Association can little quarrel with the desire of the Agency to rationalize its operations, minimize the costs to the taxpayer, and deal with an apparent overgrading of the rank structure. Indeed, measures to cope with these problems are long overdue. Unfortunately it is the employees currently working for the Agency who will reap the bitter harvest of the Agency's serious mismanagement in years past.

Since this situation is the fault of the Agency, but the personal hardships will fall solely on the employees, a special obligation devolves upon the Agency to minimize the need for a RIF, to limit its scope to the maximum extent possible, and to ameliorate the impact on employees. The Administrator indicated a number of steps he intends to take to that end. While these are a useful beginning, they do not go anywhere near far enough. The Association believes the Agency should take the following immediate steps, in addition to those already announced:

1) The Agency's current RIF rules as they apply in the Foreign Service are the height of idiocy. They apply the logic of a rank-in-person system to the Foreign Service but without providing Civil Service protection.

Worst of all, the way the Agency conducted its last RIF allows unlimited scope for serious abuse, since the Agency can assign anyone in the Foreign Service to any position, change any position description, assign any AOSC (job categorization code) to any position description and then RIF any AOSC. The capacity for the Agency to seek out individuals it wishes to get rid of for whatever reasons (political leanings, willingness to dissent, personality conflicts with supervisors) remains totally unconstrained.

The Association doubts that a RIF is necessary at this time. But if a RIF is required, the Agency should seek from the Congress on a priority basis legislation which assures that the best people are retained and that all employees are treated fairly and equitably. Such legislation should require that employees be considered in broad occupational groups and rank-ordered by impartial panels convened for the purpose. Any other means of RIFing Foreign Service employees undermines seriously the merit concept.

2) Before deciding that a RIF was necessary, the Agency should have first sought special legislation to provide incentives for employees to retire, thus assuring greater fairness both to those who wish to retire and to those who wish to remain. Now that the Agency has decided for better or for worse to conduct a RIF, it still should seek one-time legislation to provide retirement incentives.

3) We firmly believe that those employees who are RIF'd should receive retirement benefits at least as substantial as they would have received if they had been selected out which is not now the case. The Agency should seek immediate legislation to provide all Foreign Service personnel, R-3 and above, who may be RIF'd with an immediate annuity, irrespective of age. Furthermore, the Agency should immediately adopt a hardship clause which would allow those who are within two years of retirement the opportunity to remain with the Agency until they qualify for an immediate annuity.

4) In carrying out this RIF, the Agency should give careful consideration to the kind of staffing it really needs to carry out its mission. The present situation under which 60 percent of the Agency's employees are in Washington should probably be reversed. AID's bloated Civil Service bureaucracy is the most obvious place to make major cuts. Given the notorious inadequacies of AID's Washington-based administrative structure, one possibility the Agency might consider would be to turn over a substantial portion of AID's strictly administrative functions in Washington to the Department of State to eliminate the senseless duplication.

5) Before the Agency RIFs anyone, it should put an immediate halt to the wasteful rehire of consultants and the scandalous misuse of contract employees who have the advantage for the Agency of not appearing on the Agency's roles, but who actually cost the taxpayer far more than would direct hire personnel.

There is no way to make a good thing out of a RIF, but if the Agency would take these steps in its own interest, in the public interest, and in the interests of its employees, it might at least make credible the pledges which Administrator Parker has made. ■

The Diplomats Protest

The tradition of American professional diplomats is to accept without public complaint the appointment of non-career ambassadors—and to make the best of it. Many a foreign service officer has worked overtime to make up for the incompetence of an ambassador who had obtained his job by cash contributions or service to his political party.

Now, with refreshing boldness, the American Foreign Service Association has challenged President Ford's nomination of Peter M. Flanigan as Ambassador to Spain and has condemned the "sale, rental or auction of ambassadorships." The diplomats ask the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for "the most careful scrutiny" of Mr. Flanigan, recalling that he was linked in Watergate testimony to the appointment of Dr. Ruth Farkas as Ambassador to Luxembourg, allegedly in return for a large contribution to President Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign.

The association might well object to Mr. Flanigan on the additional ground that, with Spain already entering the inevitably difficult post-Franco era—even though the aging generalissimo is still nominally in charge—the Madrid post is not one for on-the-job training. A skilled professional is called for at a time when Spain faces painful adjustment and probable upheaval. The President would be well-advised to take the Foreign Service's rare intervention to heart and withdraw the nomination of Mr. Flanigan.

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COMMUNICATION
re:

Identity Lost, Identity Regained

"Partir, c'est mourir un peu."

Freely translated, this means: to retire from the Foreign Service is to lose your identity.

Being a Foreign Service officer is not just a livelihood, it's a way of life. It's an identity. It's a demanding and fulfilling role, the greatest role and supreme dignity that most Foreign Service officers will know in this life. So, when you retire from the Foreign Service, you will have to find a new role, a new identity—or you will become a non-person.

If you choose to live in the United States in the "golden years" of your retirement, you will be confronted much too often with the invariable, inescapable query: "What do you do?" You are asked, in effect: "Who are you?", for in America who you are is largely determined by what you do. "I am a retired Foreign Service officer" will not do. You must *do* something.

So, to replace your lost identity with a new self you must do things. You must get involved. It's not so much what you do, in terms of status and remuneration, as that it provides you with interests, activities, friends.

Some few retired Foreign Service officers are fortunate in being able to turn to prestigious, well-paid, full-time positions, but most retired Foreign Service officers may find new interests and new activities something of a problem. There is no point in this essay to my rehashing the many suggestions put forth in manuals to happy retirement, "How To Be Happy Though Retired," and the like. I would, however, like to suggest that, unless you feel your interests and talents can find realization only in megalopolis, in some cosmopolitan world capital, you

Dr. Rinden, after 26 years as an FSO, retired and entered the Ph.D. program in political science (Northeast Asia area specialization) at University of California, Berkeley. In early 1972, he left the UC Center for Chinese Studies (where he was a Research Fellow) to return to his alma mater, *Wm. Penn College, where he is Professor-in-Residence. He is active in Democratic politics, Kiwanis Club, United Nations Association, People-to-People Program,* inter alia.

consider the small town in the United States as a place for your retirement—as perhaps the best, the easiest place to establish your new identity in a range of new pursuits.

A formidable, inherent obstacle to establishing your identity in a metropolitan area is the impersonality of life there. James Baldwin wrote "Nobody Knows My Name," and that's the way it is in The Big City. Moreover, nobody cares; you are an anonymity lost in a faceless, indifferent crowd.

In a small town, you live in a radically different situation.

By "small town," I don't mean a hamlet or crossroads of a few hundred souls, but rather a small city with a population of 10,000, more or less. Here, people will know and care that you exist; they will actively seek to involve you in their various concerns. You will be invited, even urged, to join them in civic, educational, religious, political, sports and social organizations. They all want more members and especially those with some leisure time and a bit of extra money to contribute. Your Foreign Service background will be a distinct asset in a small town. You will stand out as one who has traveled to faraway places, who has dwelt in distant lands, and who (let us hope) speaks foreign languages fluently. All of this will give you recognition, status, and even a measure of glamour. Program chairpersons of varied groups will beseech you to provide their program by giving a talk on the Foreign Service or countries in which you have served. In fact, you may find it prudent to be somewhat selective in acceding to requests to join up and take part. But don't be too chary and you'll soon be amazed to find how many rewarding things you have to occupy you and how wide your circle of friends has expanded.

"Very small potatoes," some of you may say, after the dignities and responsibilities of the Foreign Service. While admitting that none of this is very Big Deal, may I point out that retirement from the Foreign Service necessarily entails a considerable, sad-making loss of status and privilege. "No momma, no poppa, no whiskey-soda, no flight pay, *and* no diplomatic list." You will simply have to learn to adjust to this form of cultural shock.

But you don't have to become a wan spectator on the purlieus of the passing scene. Nor do you have glumly to kill time by recalling the departed glories you once knew. Politely but firmly decline to join the *danse macabre* that some retired Foreign Service officers hold in phantom courts. Live today, such as it is. If the activities adumbrated seem hardly worthy of you, be comforted by Parkinson's and Rinden's Laws. The former holds that work expands to fill up the time available for it; the latter holds that the things you do will expand in importance and interest as you become ever more involved.

And so, dear friends and *chers collègues* of yesteryear, when you think ahead about what will come to you as it must to all Foreign Service officers, retirement, why not consider a small town in God's Country? If any of you should choose to retire to Oskaloosa, Iowa, "Twelve Thousand Friendly People," county-seat of Mahaska County, and site of William Penn College, please let me know. As a returned native, as well as an Old China Hand, I'll polish the wine cups, warm the wine, and stand at the main gate, respectfully awaiting your arrival.

I'll also introduce you around and get you involved. ■

LETTERS TO FSJ

Political Cowardice-Public Virtue

■ The personnel theory governing the American practice of diplomacy holds that our overseas representation requires a professional cadre of the highest competence and experience. This is so except at the very top, where the position of Ambassador can be filled by any subliterate amateur who wishes to escape the tedium of corporate retirement or the social pressures of Cedar Rapids and who is fiscally unbuttoned at election time. All that is required is six days of respectful briefing, some part of which is devoted to elementary geography. In office, even his professional subordinates are expected to say, when asked, that he is "very popular." A thought-provoking doctrine. The professional foreign service officer who reacts is, presumably, thought a party at interest. So, my disability as a onetime political ambassador notwithstanding, let me do so.

The only hope for change in the present system lies with those professionally responsible. This requires prompt, stern, articulate and professionally confident protest of all such appointments. No one should be deterred for a moment by the suggestion that such protest implies lack of respect for the President or his advisers. Only as it is forthcoming will the political leadership be circumspect about such appointments. Presidents will not wish to dispatch a man who has been labeled unqualified. Perhaps some candidates who yearn for title and unnatural respect will think twice if these involve risking a well-reasoned statement saying, in more elegant words, that the aspirant is a dope. Political courage is, no doubt, a great force for good in our Republic. Political cowardice is, on occasion, an even greater force for public virtue. The labeling of the unqualified has not only these deterrent effects; it may also, on occasion, cause the Senate to reject purely political pay-offs.

For the foregoing reasons I strongly applaud the initiative of the Foreign Service Association protesting egregiously unqualified appointments. This action should, however, be broadened to include fair-minded scrutiny of all political appointments. If some solid qualification exists, the man should, of course, be marked "qualified." If he has no visible qualifications he should be plainly and vigorously so described. Criticism of such action should be expected from political sycophants within the Foreign Service and the considerable number for whom stuffed-shirtedness seems still to be a problem. And rebuke is inevitable from those outside who wish no interference with present political games and rewards. I truly hope that no one will be deterred by such objection or complaint; that, indeed, it will be taken as a sign that the effort to end the doctrine that diplomacy is the natural reward for unqualified amateurs is having effect.

A final word. Implicit for the reform just mentioned is the maintenance of the most scrupulous standards for the career service. It must support, and indeed insure, the exclusion from top positions of the kind of *cliché* diplomat, clothes horse, cold war ideologue, social

lush and general purpose cluck who, on occasion as all know, has made it to ambassador in the past. If such, by being members of the Club succeed, the case against the spavined corporation executive and the glandered politician is badly weakened.

JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH
Cambridge

A Kick for the Coffers

■ I wish to submit a modest prooposal which will I believe increase the number of career Foreign Service personnel serving as Ambassador. The plan is simple:

1. Raise AFSA dues to $500.00 or $1,000.00 per year.
2. Put all the surplus income in a special fund and use it to buy as many ambassadorships as possible from the political party in power.
3. Give every AFSA member a number and hold a lottery in order to distribute the ambassadorships.

This proposal has numerous merits. It would solve AFSA's financial difficulties, while strengthening the career service, and it would serve to lessen the discrimination against women, minority groups, and non-State Department Foreign Service officers in the selection of Ambassadors.

JAMES C. DEAN
Tel Aviv

"There Are No Islands Any More"

■ I do not know what could be more properly the concern of AFSA than the qualifications of political nominees for ambassadorships. After all, it is the AFSA membership who will have to serve these individuals if they are confirmed. So I think that the view expressed by an AFSA member in a letter appearing in the September JOURNAL to the effect that such concerns and their expression are not the business of AFSA is erroneous.

This new AFSA practice of speaking-out against the confirmation of insufficiently qualified nominees is somewhat analogous to the American Bar Association's expression of its views on appointments to the judiciary. The evaluations of the professional association of this country's diplomats on potential ambassadors has worth in a way similar to that of the ABA's on prospective Justices of the Supreme Court.

In making known its objection to particular ambassadorial nominees, AFSA serves the Congress, which must decide to grant or deny the office, and the US citizenry, in whose interest it is to have the best possible diplomatic representation.

I applaud the current AFSA Board for starting to speak out on nominees, a practice it did not come to without provocation. The last administration put forward several clearly outrageous ambassadorial nominations, including —according to testimony—some that actually had been sold and one that had been partially post-paid. And there was the instance of a would-be ambassador who, with the proper training, might have made an acceptable nominee for a vice-consulship.

I suppose I should add that I am not asserting that only career officers of the Foreign Service ought to be ambassadors or even that the percentage of non-career ambassadors is necessarily too high. The country has been well served diplomatically by—to give some examples from the last ten years—the likes of Adlai Stevenson, Reischauer and Moynihan (a nominee of the last administration, to give it its due).

Finally, a word on Costa Rica, since it seems to have figured in two recent nominations. Costa Rica, it appears, has come to be looked upon as a sort of Latin American Luxembourg—a pleasant, unimportant place in which the opportunities for ambassadorial malfeasance are practically nonexistent. This is a dangerously wrong view. Costa Rica is influential among the countries of the hemisphere, and US relations with the hemisphere are certainly important. At the moment, for instance, Costa Rica and two South American countries are leading the hemisphere toward a long-overdue reconciliation with Cuba. So let the word go out: COSTA RICA IS IMPORTANT.

WILLIAM S. DIEDRICH
Washington

The Memory Is Bright

■ This issue of the Foreign Service JOURNAL will carry to many of his friends the sad news that Frank Wile finally lost a long, moving and

Continued on page 27

"An international misunderstanding that once might only have ruffled a few feathers in government circles may throw tens of millions into paroxysms of passion today."—Foreword, "Assignment: Tokyo"

DETENTE WITH MAINLAND CHINA: THE VIEW FROM JAPAN

ARMIN H. MEYER

FOR THE AMERICAN ambassador in Japan, no commodity was in shorter supply than time. Thus, when early in the morning of July 16, 1971, news bulletins were proclaiming that President Nixon would be making a major foreign policy pronouncement just before noon Japan time (evening of July 15 in the United States), I arranged for a long overdue haircut during which to listen. The President's remarks were to be broadcast by our armed forces radio station, known locally as the Far East Network (FEN).

When the President began by stating that he had sent Dr. Henry Kissinger to Peking, my instant reaction was that it was a slip of the tongue, that he had meant to say Vietnam (which had figured so prominently in Dr. Kissinger's most recent journey). The illusion vanished quickly, however, as the President of the United States disclosed his acceptance of an invitation to visit the People's Republic of China. In a brief three and a half minutes, it became clear that one of the most astonishing diplomatic developments in a generation was being announced. It was also immediately clear that a seismic impact could be expected in Japan.

Quickly dispensing with the barber, I directed urgent telephone calls to Washington. One top State Department official was at San Clemente. A second, upon hearing the President's announcement, had rushed to the residence of the Undersecretary of State, where I could ask them both whether any country had been given advance notification, stressing that if Japan had not we were in for real difficulty. By way of explaining the move to our Japanese friends, I suggested we say that it was consistent with public statements which had been made by the President and the Secretary of State, and consistent also with the tenor of our close bilateral consultations which had envisaged the development of improved relations with Peking for both Japan and the United States. We should also stress the President's pledge that his bold diplomatic breakthrough "would not be at the expense of old friends."

My Washington colleagues cited firm instructions from San Clemente, which at that moment were being telegraphed to all our diplomatic posts abroad, that no

---

Ambassador Meyer entered the Foreign Service in 1946 after service in academe and in journalism. He served at Beirut, Kabul and in the Department before his ambassadorial appointments to Lebanon, Iran and Japan.

United States Government official should comment in any way on the President's announcement. They agreed, however, that my proposed rationale to the Japanese would be appropriate. Just before we concluded our conversation, my colleagues on the other end of the line received word that Secretary Rogers had in fact informed Japanese Ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba by telephone in advance of the announcement. Due to difficulties in locating the Ambassador, who was out to dinner, the notification was less than the three hours in advance which had been intended. The information reached Sato only a few minutes before the President's announcement.

No nation has for so long been of more profound interest to Japan than China. Since World War II, policy toward China had been among the most important items on the United States-Japan diplomatic agenda. It was understandable, therefore, that the President's surprise announcement produced what the Japanese described as a "shokku." The problem was not so much the substance of the President's endeavors, for Japan, too, favored the deisolation of mainland China. Prime Minister Sato, during a private conversation with General Motors Board Chairman James Roche, heartily endorsed the President's move, and a public statement of approbation was issued by the Japanese government. For their part, the opposition political parties and the press were pleased, for they had long been hammering at Sato and his predecessors to normalize relations with China.

If the Richter ratings in Japan were higher than anywhere else, it was, as we pointed out in our telegrams from Tokyo, because the tremors from the tactical aspects of the President's action were bound to have dramatic impact both on the domestic political scene in Japan and on the critical ingredient of trust in the relationship between Japan and the United States.

Ambassador Koichiro Asakai, who served in Washington from 1957 to 1963, had become famous in Japan for telling of a "nightmare" he once had that he would wake up one morning and read in the Washington Post that the United States had recognized Peking and was negotiating diplomatic relations. Now, all Tokyo was saying that "Asakai's nightmare" had in effect come true. In reporting this, we noted that even before the President's announcement the "China mood" had become a fever in Japan, that Sato had already suffered dissension within his own party on China policy which affected his control of the Diet, and that the erosion of Sato's premiership might well be hastened. What concerned us most of all was the chorus of outcries, in the press and in official circles, that the United States had "jumped over Japan's head." Such accusations could call into question the special relationship between Japan and the United States which Prime Minister Sato and his predecessors had made the hallmark of Japan's postwar policy.

To repair the damage which was likely to occur, the Embassy urged, as we had on numerous occasions prior to July 15, that steps be taken to shore up the feeling of mutual trust, particularly through high-level consultations of as intimate a nature as circumstances would permit. Opportunities in the future would include the joint cabinet sessions in Washington in September, and, of greater urgency, the coordination of our positions on the question of Chinese representation at the United Nations. Ever since the preceding General Assembly, the Japanese authorities had urged the development of a new common position and, in recent weeks, they had become understandably impatient, arguing that virtually every day that was lost was costing the vote of a friendly nation at the United Nations. (Washington's unresponsiveness was no doubt related to the imminence of the July 15 announcement.)

Washington was not unmindful of our problems in Tokyo. Some hours after his announcement, the President himself sent a personal message to Prime Minister Sato. Secretary Rogers provided further explanations to Japanese Ambassador Ushiba. Aside from the Embassy's assessments, Washington could not ignore American public criticism to the effect that our most important East Asian ally had not been properly consulted. With characteristic serenity, Prime Minister Sato replied to the President's message without rancor, pledging cooperation in the fashioning of peace in Asia, and expressing his eagerness for furtherance of and close consultation in the development of policies with respect to China.

To understand why the President's announcement caused consternation in Japan, one had to appreciate the depth of the Japanese psychological complex with respect to China. Japan's relationship with its other massive neighbor, the Soviet Union, was rather cold and matter-of-fact. But with regard to China, emotions were involved. It was a love-hate syndrome, with a number of contributing factors:

a. **Cultural Mother.** Ever since the sixth century, and undoubtedly before, Japan was indebted to mainland China for most of its cultural heritage. Its language, its religion, its ruling concepts were greatly influenced by the Tang and subsequent Chinese dynasties. Its history in many ways was parallel, if not interlocked, with that of China. In Japanese culture, no force was more compulsive than one called "on," which is a deep sense of obligation to those who have been benefactors.

b. **Propinquity.** With territory many times larger than that of the Japanese islands, and with a population at least seven times that of Japan, the neighboring Chinese mainland perforce commanded deference. Japan's dynamic society had no cause to feel inferior, but subconsciously it was difficult to disregard living next door to the legendary Chinese dragon. Propinquity was inevitably a strong force.

c. **Atonement.** When they were overrunning China in the 1930s it was possible for the Japanese, consistent with their hierarchical philosophy, to rationalize the action to themselves as a virtuous endeavor. It may not have been an American Point Four program, but, in many Japanese eyes at that time, it was at least as honorable as Western imperialism's shouldering the so-called "white man's burden." When the "Co-Prosperity Sphere" ended in disaster, apology and redress were as natural for the hierarchically-disciplined Japanese as were the sacrifices made two centuries earlier by the legendary 47 "ronin"

who committed harakiri as atonement for having taken lives to redeem their master's honor. Some 10,000,000 Chinese perished during the fourteen years when Japanese authority held sway over China, and the Japanese of 1971 retained a deeply felt sense of guilt. Certainly, the guilt was not expiated by the 1952 peace treaty with Chiang Kai-shek's government.

d. **Economic Opportunity.** Economically, the Japanese believed that three quarters of a billion Chinese could provide an enormous market for Japanese transistors, automobiles, and other manufactured products. During the 1930s, China trade accounted for about one third of Japan's total external trade, but this was largely due to a distortion of natural economic patterns brought about by Japan's empire building in Manchuria and North China. In many ways, the nations were complementary, China with raw materials, Japan with industry. However, China was short of foreign exchange, and there were few indications that she would be any more willing than Japan to import competitive products or to purchase abroad any more than would be minimally necessary. In 1971, trade between the two countries was nearing the $1 billion level and there were prospects for expansion, but it was likely to be more gradual than many Japanese hoped.

e. **Demonstration of Independence.** The common assumption in Japan was that Japan's postwar China policy had been heavily influenced by Washington. It was an assumption not without validity. John Foster Dulles had warned Prime Minister Yoshida that the Japanese Peace Treaty (and with it the termination of American occupation) would not be approved by the United States Senate unless Japan would conclude a separate peace treaty with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's government at Taipei. That such influence on Japan's China policy still existed in 1971 was a myth. For a variety of reasons, including a level of trade exceeding that with mainland China, Japan's leadership saw wisdom in maintaining its ties with Taiwan, even while courting favor with Peking. Foreign Ministry officials, however, complained of "grappling with the ghost of Dulles," and even Foreign Minister Aichi was heard to say that in China policy, Japan tended to play "second fiddle" to the United States. If in light of the resurgence of strong nationalistic sentiment Japan should wish to demonstrate its independence, nothing would be more dramatic than Japanese initiatives in China policy. Conversely, following in America's wake would tend to confirm that Japan was still not unshackled.

f. **Bridge-Building Aspirations.** Not only did most Japanese wish to build Japan's own road to Peking, but there were many, including government leaders, past and present, who envisioned Tokyo playing the key role in bringing Washington and Peking together. They based this ambition on Japan's "unique position"—history, proximity, and superior comprehension—in dealing with the Chinese. They considered the Taiwan issue an insurmountable roadblock for the Americans but were confident that they could find a way around it for the United States as well as for themselves. If the bridge could be built, it would emancipate Japan from the dread of becoming embroiled in any hostilities that could develop between its valued ally and its massive neighbor. Among those who were pressing for Japan to play the role of mediator was Dietman Tokuma Utsonomiya, who helped organize a conclave of American and Japanese parliamentarians at Santa Barbara in January 1969 and who strove vigorously to follow it up with a conference expanded to include Peking representatives. His efforts were overtaken by the President's breakthrough signaling that the good offices of Japan were unneeded.

g. **Anxieties about Sino-American Affinity.** While welcoming Sino-American rapprochement, the Japanese would, of course, not wish it to be at Japan's expense. Traditionally, Americans had had warm affection for the Chinese people, and, according to *Asahi*, the Pacific War was in essence a "clash of China policies." Such considerations caused some Japanese anxiety that a Washington-Peking reconciliation might result in a shift in American-Asian policy away from the postwar emphasis on partnership with Japan in order to focus on China. To allay Japanese uneasiness, repeated assurances were given, both publicly and privately, that no American relationship was more important than that with Japan. Nonetheless, the Japanese could be expected to be continually on guard to assure that in any Sino-American settlement, or in any deliberations regarding the future shape of political relations in Asia, Japan's legitimate interests would be taken into account. This underscored the importance of close consultations, specifically with regard to China policy.

h. **Asia for the Asians.** The special United States-Japan postwar relationship notwithstanding, Japan was also tugged by regional imperatives. A common bond among the nations of the Orient was their past resistance to Western domination. That Asian hands should shape Asia's destiny was, therefore, a call with undeniable appeal. It was being clarioned frequently by Philippine Foreign Minister Carlos Romulo. The concept, as President Nixon himself emphasized, was fully compatible with the Nixon Doctrine. But its full potential as a cohesive force in drawing China and Japan closer together had not yet been tested.

THE PRESIDENT'S July 15 broadcast was brief: Dr. Kissinger had held talks in Peking: knowing of the President's "expressed desire" to visit the People's Republic, Premier Chou En-lai had extended an invitation which the President had accepted; the purpose of the Peking meeting would be to "seek the normalization of relations between the two countries" and "to exchange views on questions of concern to the two sides."

Neither Japanese nor Americans could but marvel at this diplomatic triumph, but it hit Tokyo with typhonic force, and from Americans at the vortex, the immediate reactions were almost as bitter as those of most Japanese. It seemed incredible that on a matter of such critical consequence to our most important ally in Asia, we appeared to be dealing behind the back. We were honeying up to our adversaries and neglecting our friends. Insensitive to the destructive potential of the China fever in Japan, we were undermining those

We were honeying up to our adversaries and neglecting our friends. Insensitive to the destructive potential of the China fever in Japan, we were undermining those who for a generation had hinged Japanese policy on a deep and abiding trust in the United States.

who for a generation had hinged Japanese policy on a deep and abiding trust in the United States. We had reneged on our repeated pledges to engage in intimate consultation and coordinated action. "Asakai's nightmare" had come true, if not literally at least psychologically. Outcries that America had "jumped over Japan's head" were difficult to refute. It seemed in effect like a diplomatic Pearl Harbor. (One of our European diplomatic colleagues told the Japanese they had no right to complain, for they had taught the Americans this tactic in 1941!)

Given the emotions of the hour, all these reactions were normal. In varying degrees, they would continue to be held by many observers. But after days and weeks of reflection, my own conclusion was that this historic action was so delicate and so precarious that the President and his Assistant for National Security Affairs could not have handled it in an intrinsically different manner if its accomplishment was to be assured. This conclusion was prompted by the following considerations:

a. **Basic Accord.** The July 15 announcement was fully in accord with the desire of both Japan and the United States for improved relations with Peking. It was a technical application of mutually agreed policy. The Japanese were far ahead of us in their economic intercourse with Communist China, which was also a tactical application of policy; they should understand the value to our common interest of our capitalizing on Peking's responsiveness to make progress in the political field.

b. **Tip-Off.** That the United States was not insensitive to the fact that the Presidential announcement would have a major impact on Japan was demonstrated by Secretary Rogers's advising Ambassador Ushiba in advance. Admittedly, it was short notice and could not forestall the shock, but it was clear indication that Washington appreciated Japan's problems.

c. **Probability of Leakage.** Premature disclosure of the American diplomatic breakthrough to China would undoubtedly have wrecked the aircraft before it got off the ground. So important was this factor that, according to Dr. Kissinger, the only officials besides himself in the United States government who had been fully aware of the project were the President, Secretary Rogers, and a few communications technicians. With respect to the Japanese government, there had in the immediately preceding months been unfortunate leakages of highly secret information pertaining to Japanese-American affairs. In mid-June in Paris, Secretary Rogers, consistent with an appeal made to me two weeks earlier by Prime Minister Sato, confided our views concerning the Chinese representation question to Foreign Minister Aichi. Two days later, this information, which had been shared with no other non-American, appeared on the front page of Tokyo's *Asahi Shimbun*. Remedial action for such chronic leakages was discussed during the last week in June with Foreign Minister Aichi, his senior assistants, and even Prime Minister Sato. Too many eyes were seeing highly sensitive papers. (A Deputy Vice Foreign Minister a short time later was forced to resign because his secretary was leaking documents to a news reporter.) On this score, American skirts were far from clean. Day after day, columnist Jack Anderson was publishing excerpts from classified American government communications. Thus, had the President sent any messages for us to convey in Tokyo, there would have been an additional risk of leakage.

d. **Why Not Others?** If the United States had undertaken to confer with Japan in advance of the July 15 announcement, the question would have arisen as to what other countries must be consulted. Certainly, the Republic of China, which was more directly affected, would have a justifiable claim. So would Korea. Then what about our Australian and New Zealand allies, the Philippines, Thailand, and our NATO partners? It would have been exceedingly difficult to draw the line, and with each additional consultation the probability of leakage would mount.

e. **Pressures and Inflated Expectations.** As the President pointed out in his 1972 foreign policy report, risking advance public disclosure might have risked disillusionment by inflated expectations. At the same time, pressures would have been created on both the Chinese and American sides, forcing both to take public positions which could only have frozen discussions before they began.

f. **Shock No Matter How Handled.** Whatever method might have been conceived for disclosing the Nixon-Kissinger breakthrough, the hard fact was that the change in the United States-Chinese relationship after 20 years of animosity could not but produce major repercussions, particularly in Japan. It was in this context that Prime Minister Sato a month later told the New York TIMES's James Reston that even had he known of this development weeks in advance it would have made little substantial difference.

g. **Long Range Benefits.** Despite the initial shocks, the opening of a new Sino-American dialogue set into motion a whole series of repercussions beneficial to Japan and other nations. It furthered the spirit of détente and opened opportunity for a new structure of peace. As the months wore on after July 15, 1971, this new vista unfolded in several quarters, including Japan. Once again adjustment to new realities had been a painful experience, but it was essential if a healthier and more durable international equilibrium were to be achieved. ■

A new orientation for Peking includes a political and economic accommodation.

CHINA'S POLICY OPTIONS

ROBERT F. ROGERS

SINCE THE ENDING of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, domestic dissonance and fractionalism within the Chinese leadership over policy issues have been largely muted. Simultaneously, the role of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the self-appointed ideological champion of Marxist-Leninist revolution in the world appears to have gradually decreased. The reassertion of Chinese nationalism has been both causal and derivative of the Sino-Soviet split and of the principal threat which China now faces: possible overt military attack, including nuclear strikes, from the USSR. With a more stabilized domestic political base, but weak economic and military capabilities to confront the USSR alone in a war, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have initiated a revisionist foreign policy of seeking international support, primarily through détente with the United States, but also among the smaller powers of the third world against both the Soviet Union and the United States.

The new orientation in Peking's foreign policy is tending to reduce the scope of China's earlier global ideological concerns to those of pragmatic national self-interest at the Asian regional level. The policy includes greater political and economic accommodation, increased trade and state-to-state diplomacy, and a growing appearance of flexibility in China's external relations, notably in the United Nations. A significant question in regard to the future stability of the Asian region is whether the new policy pursued by China is a long-term commitment or merely a tactical shift which may be reversed at any time. Two significant aspects of Chinese foreign policy—nuclear armaments and the economy—will have particular bearing on the policy options China will follow.

Increased Nuclear Military Capability

China's security, and that of Asia as a region, is a function of the power relationships among the nuclear powers interacting in the area—the United States, the Soviet Union and China itself. The problem for China lies precisely in the fact that these power relationships are *not* balanced; China is the most vulnerable of the three states. China's goals of national security and great power status have not changed, but the means to assure them are shifting temporarily to greater reliance on external counterbalances to the Soviet threat until a credible Chinese nuclear deterrent is attained.

A contradiction is inherent in China's nuclear development for the next few years; a contradiction between Marxist-Leninist ideological principles which reject association with "imperialist" powers, and the expedients of policy which encourage deviationist alignments with those same powers. While Chinese fears of Soviet attack may be exaggerated for the purpose of rallying foreign and domestic support for the current Peking leadership, Chinese inferiority in nuclear arms is clear. The PRC possesses several hundred nuclear devices at present, and the stockpile is expected to expand rapidly over the next few years with little serious constraint on the availability of fissionable material.[1] The delivery systems comprise approximately 100 *Tu-16* bombers with a range of 1600 miles, some 20 to 30 deployed midrange ballistic missiles with up to three megaton warheads and 1000-mile range, and, possibly, some intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) of 2500-mile range which would reach Moscow as well as most of Asia. Development of multistage intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) of 3500 to 6000-mile ranges is underway, but these are not expected to be fully deployed and operational until the late 1970s. In addition, China is reportedly constructing nuclear-powered submarines which naval authorities estimate could launch operational nuclear missiles in five to eight years.[2] These forces are all, however, inferior to presently deployed Soviet forces.

Thus, China is building a strategic deterrent force aimed at creating a regional second-strike capability which would deter preemptive attack by the USSR, or by the United States from the Western Pacific. It does not appear, however, that China is placing priority at present on efforts to create a capability to strike at the Continental United States.

With China's reduction of ideological emphasis in foreign policy and the opening up toward international exchange of information, Chinese science and technology, as well as its research and development programs, should rapidly improve in general, and specifically in the war-supporting nuclear field. However, because China has an extraordinarily long border with the USSR, Peking cannot permit its conventional forces to be entirely neglected. In addition, Chinese strategy must address the contingency of defense against

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[1] *The military estimates are taken from statements by Elliot L. Richardson and Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, US Congress, House Committee on Armed Services, Cost Escalation in Defense Procurement Contracts and Military Posture, Hearings, on H.R. 6722, 93d Congress, First Session, 1973.*

[2] *See Jane's Fighting Ships, 1972-73, Edited by Raymond V. B. Blackman, McGraw-Hill Book Co., N.Y., 1972, p 64.*

both the United States and the USSR at some future point. Therefore, a small, Gaullist-type nuclear capability backed by a mobile strategic strike force of complementary conventional arms is not a viable security option for China.

Peking must aim for a large IRBM capability backed by a selective ICBM force and a large, modernized conventional ground force. In this regard, China can be expected to continue to reject disarmament proposals while it concentrates on strengthening its position both politically and in terms of operational and potential nuclear force requirements. How far along China has gone in this direction is, of course, unknown, but, until its nuclear capability makes it a credible superpower (and a huge force is not required for such credibility), national security issues will constrain Peking to continue a foreign policy of détente which avoids provocations of the USSR, the United States and also Japan.

If the above considerations are fairly realistic, then the possibility of a nuclear exchange (initiated by a Soviet nuclear strike) between China and other nuclear powers is not probable during the remainder of the 1970s. Therefore, in consideration of PRC foreign policy, the option of a nuclear war initiated by China as a policy decision is not realistic although escalation of conventional border clashes could, of course, occur.

Expanding Economic Relations

As an agricultural nation attempting a quantum jump in industrial development, China's future foreign policy must involve expanded economic relations in the context of the present trend toward expansion of multilateral relations. Bearing in mind that the Great Leap Forward was an attempt to overcome technological inferiority by mobilizing the entire population, and that the "red versus professional" debate continues to simmer, an important concern of Peking's leaders will be to utilize foreign relations to enhance domestic economic and technological development to attain eventual self-sufficiency.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan which began in January 1971 illustrates that, although the PRC still concentrates on heavy industry which can place the nation in the high-technology, great-power class, the PRC is also developing agriculture and light industries in a moderate, realistic fashion. These are not mutually exclusive priorities, yet China's need to balance sector growth will have a moderating impact on industrialization. The PRC's future economic development may be envisioned as a pyramid with agriculture and a few heavy industries such as steel, coal and chemical fertilizers at the base. China's independent technical advances will probably be limited to small-scale production in electronics, petroleum technology and computers.[3] In order for the Chinese economy to continue to grow at the rate of the 1970s (gross national product [GNP] of roughly $130 billion annually with $145 billion estimated for 1972),[4] and assuming that the Sino-Soviet split continues, a policy of complete self-sufficiency, however appealing ideologically, would not be economically feasible.

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The move away from self-sufficiency could be accentuated by economic setbacks such as another series of poor agricultural seasons and subnormal harvests, poor management of a depression (as occurred in the 1959-62 period), or simply falling behind in the race between food supply and population. All of these contingencies are unlikely, however, and the impact of any becomes less and less with each passing year. The increased economic growth and healthier agricultural sector with which China emerged from the cultural revolution should continue. In other words, China has developed a sufficient base to propel it toward becoming eventually an advanced industrial power.[5]

Because China will encounter difficulties in maintaining such growth by itself, the PRC has to permit necessary imports. Therefore, whether or not the PRC believes self-sufficiency to be possible in the years ahead, it will probably need to liberalize its trade policies. One aspect which may become more important is the Chinese need for long-term loans to finance imports of machinery and equipment. Thus, China may relax its conservative policy of financing capital goods out of current earnings, and increase its credit financing from abroad.[6]

External assistance in nonmilitary related fields is thus likely to increase considerably.[7] In military-related fields, foreign trade will probably be of little significance, mostly as the result of spin-offs from other types of imported technology from Western Europe, Japan and the United States. Self-imposed limits on foreign trade and external assistance will continue, but the prospects for expanded trade are excellent, notably with the United States and Japan. China will import high-technology goods and export labor-intensive agricultural and light manufacturing products.

A major potential beneficiary of any such trend will be Japan. In turn, a problem in the Sino-Japanese trade relationship is the

[3] *Raphael Tsu, "High Technology in China," Scientific American, December 1972, pp 13-17.*

[4] *Arthur G. Ashbrook Jr., "China: Economic Policy and Economic Results," People's Republic of China: An Economic Assessment, US Congress Joint Economic Committee, Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1972, p 5; and Tsu, op. cit., pp 16-17.*

[5] *Kuan-I chen, "The Outlook for China's Economy," Current History, September 1972.*

[6] *For example, in late 1973, Peking for the first time started borrowing hard currency from non-Communist banks to finance imports, The New York Times, 7 December 1973.*

[7] *China's Trade With the West: A Political and Economic Analysis, Edited by Arthur A. Stahnke, Praeger Publishers Inc., N.Y., 1972.*

A more realistic policy approach is that of constructing a new Asian *alliance* system, either bilateral or multilateral in structure. The possibility of a Chinese-sponsored collective security pact for the Asian and Pacific area, a kind of Far East Locarno, is not unrealistic.

large imbalance between the two economies; Japan's GNP, for example, has been projected to a trillion US dollars (current price) in 1980.[8] As the third most powerful industrial nation in the world, Japan is an economic competitor to China of insurmountable proportions for several generations. Such an imbalance in national capabilities inevitably produces friction. For example, Chinese trade flow with Japan in 1971 was $578.2 million imports and $323.2 million exports, an imbalance which will tend to grow in Japan's favor if not limited by China. This is a substantial but not large trade pattern when compared to Japan's exports alone to the United States in 1972 of $9.5 billion.[9]

Chinese apprehension of Japanese economic power is likely to inhibit any tendencies toward a Sino-Japanese political axis or a "Pan-Asianist" policy by the two nations. Improved Sino-American relations thus became a logical option for China not only to counterbalance the Soviet threat, but also to counterbalance Japan in the Asian economic context. For this reason, along with Chinese hesitation to allow Japan to attain a dominant position in China's foreign trade, a clear surge in Chinese trade with Japan is not assured despite optimistic Japanese anticipations. A modest projection of three to five percent annual growth in Sino-Japanese trade may be realistic, with Japan continuing to be China's largest trading partner with perhaps up to 45 percent of China's market. Moreover, China, because of its economic weakness, will not be able to limit continued expansion of Japanese economic influence elsewhere in Asia.

With respect to Sino-American trade, two considerations apply: first, China's current trading partners, principally Japan, will almost certainly absorb most of China's import demand; second, the domestic American market for Chinese goods is small compared to Asian and European markets for the same goods, principally food, textiles and textile products and soybeans. An additional difficulty in Sino-American trade is the American concept of most-favored-nation relations. The PRC is not a party to any such agreements with the United States, but the general Peking-Washington détente may well lead to an agreement for selective high-cost, low-quantity sales of sophisticated US technological products such as the limited number of jet passenger aircraft and communication equipment sales concluded after President Nixon's visit to China.

The Principal Chinese Policy Options

Within the above perspectives, what principal alternatives are open to Peking in its future foreign policy? The spectrum of hypothetical options runs from neutral passivity through militant nationalistic expansion. Neutralism has never been a viable option for ideological reasons.[10] It is also incompatible with China's armament efforts in both modernization of conventional forces and development of strategic nuclear capabilities. On the other hand, as long as Chinese leaders perceive a real threat from the USSR, and China lacks the military capability to overcome that threat, militant nationalistic expansion by China is also not realistic.

While neutralism is ruled out as an alternative, a modest isolationist policy would be more compatible with Chinese tradition and internal economic and social pressures. Free allocation of resources to raise the standard of living and solve pressing domestic needs instead of expensive and problematical military programs is a classic dilemma for national leaders. Moreover, a realistic evaluation of China's position shows that it cannot hope to reach strategic parity with the USSR or Japan during the next decade. On the other hand, a low-risk, minimal foreign policy would leave China vulnerable militarily and would injure its relations with the third world and other Socialist states. Thus, complete noninvolvement is not a realistic option for China through this decade.

Another option is the use of the traditional Marxist-Leninist united front policy. Such a policy would attempt to gather regional anti-imperialist nations and movements into an anti-USSR/US alignment. Ideologically, this option is attractive to the Chinese and has been utilized at times (the Bundung period, and at present in the Alliance of Indochinese People), especially in support of Maoist revolutionary movements. But Peking's efforts at rallying an effective united front on either a regional or a global scale in the third world have mostly failed. Therefore, while the united front is still tactically useful in limited times and places, the current decrease in revolutionary ardor within China and in many developing areas makes the front approach a relic of the "Socialist revolutionary" past.

A more realistic policy approach is that of constructing a new Asian *alliance* system, either bilateral or multilateral in structure. The possibility of a Chinese-sponsored collective security pact for the Asian and Pacific area, a kind of Far East Locarno, is not unrealistic. Nor is the possibility of a revived Sino-Soviet alliance out of the question. An Asian Locarno agreement would help contain Russia, replace the reduced US security structure and perhaps permit additional Sino-Japanese accommodations. As regards a renewed Sino-Soviet alliance, the CCP has already manifested sufficient revisionism (in its recent acceptance of international coexistence and a state-to-state plurality in international relationships) to accept rapprochement

[8] *Saburo Okita, "Japan's Economy and Foreign Policy," Survey, Volume 18, Number 4, Autumn 1972, pp 126 and 138.*

[9] *Tomiyama Eikichi, article in Toyo Keizai Tokei Geppo, cited in Keizai Tokei Nenkan, 1972, p 384.*

[10] *The discussion of options draws on Robert A. Scalapino, Asia and Major Powers: Implications for the International Order, AEI Hoover Policy Study, Washington, D.C., 3 November 1973, pp 23-35.*

with the revisionist Communist Party of the Soviet Union. A change of leadership in Peking toward younger, pragmatic professionals could enhance the possibility.

Nonetheless, a formal alliance system is antithetical to traditional Chinese attitudes and has already failed once in the original Moscow-Peking alliance. The anti-Soviet bias of the current leadership is not likely to evaporate completely even when Mao dies. In short, the Chinese are at present seeking friends, not formally committed allies, in the United States, Japan and elsewhere.

What remains is a foreign policy of *conservative* and *flexible nationalism*, based on an increasingly powerful military capability, domestic and regional stability, and an independent but a generally more cooperative stance (in comparison with the 1950s and 1960s) with the non-Communist world on the international level; in short, a policy of pragmatic revisionism involving peaceful coexistence and other familiar elements introduced long ago by Nikita Khrushchev into Soviet policy. Ideology will not have been sacrificed, but Chinese thinking in foreign policy will still be dominated by a tendency to subordinate economic and military matters to broader political considerations. In this respect, Chou En-lai at the 10th CCP Congress elliptically noted that, while China's compromise with the United States is ideologically correct, the Soviet Union's compromise with the United States is not. In addition, Chinese policy can be expected to continue to mix a variety of traditional approaches, including alliances (with North Korea and perhaps Pakistan), people-to-people diplomacy and united fronts (with the Indochinese states and selected revolutionary movements) and formal diplomacy (in the United Nations, for example).

A proviso to this assessment is that the present Chinese policy-making leadership, representing a moderate centrist faction, will not lose power when Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai leave the scene. The ramifications of changes in succession are beyond the scope of this brief overview, but the possibility of a radical alteration of party

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leadership is now slightly reduced in view of the postcultural revolution consolidation of power by Chou En-lai and his supporters.[11] If the leadership does change dramatically with resulting socio-political trauma, projections of future Chinese policy would be extremely tenuous owing to the lack of information on potential leaders in the next Chinese generation.

A Chinese foreign policy of pragmatic nationalism in which negotiations play a larger part than in the past will allow for ideological concerns, notably self-supporting people's wars of "national liberation," but not with damage to Chinese objectives. Chou En-lai at the 10th CCP Congress noted that the 1970s would be a period of continuing "disorder," but his report did not call for as much support of revolution abroad as did earlier Party Congress reports.[12] The general parameters of what might be expected of PRC foreign policy until the 1980s are as follows:

- Containment of the threat of surgical strikes against Chinese nuclear installations or of general attack by the Soviet Union. Corollary to such efforts may be a continuing hostility toward the USSR balanced by prudence, including acceptance of the existing unresolved border situation.
- Creation, largely through diplomacy, of stable Pacific, Southeast Asian and South Asian rim areas around China. Although continued strain in Sino-Indian relations may be expected, a rapprochement with a nonnuclear New Delhi would be consistent with the general patterns of PRC policy.[13] Peking will also seek to inhibit acquisition of nuclear weapons by either Japan or India. China may not seek tightly knit alliances with any power, but, rather, will depend on cumulative economic, political and psychological pressures in place of force or ideologically inspired activity. Eventual absorption of Taiwan, perhaps involving some island autonomy, may be realized, but a reduction in tension regardless of political outcome appears assured.
- Expansion of external trade and communications with greater access to the technology and expertise of Japan, the United States, Canada and Western Europe. The cost to China will be in the contradiction this trend poses to the Maoist tenet of self-reliance, and also in the contaminating bourgeosization (from the Chinese viewpoint) which may ensue if China is opened up to non-Communist influences.

While such estimates are hazardous in view of the tremendous uncertainties involved, the above parameters provide a cautiously optimistic assessment in which war involving China is avoidable in Asia during the next few years as the PRC becomes more moderate, or at least less overtly hostile, internationally than at any time in its past. Peking will still seek hegemony where possible in Asia; however, rather than the past impulsion to dominate, the pattern for the next few years at least may be one of China relying more on negotiations in its relationships with other nations. ■

[11] *For a similar conclusion, see Ting Wang, "The Succession Problem," Problems of Communism, May-June 1973, pp 73-74; Mark Gayn, "Who After Mao?," Foreign Affairs, January 1973, pp 300-309; and Ching Ping and Dennis Bloodworth, Heirs Apparent, Farrar, Strauss & Giroux, N.Y., 1973, pp 193-201.*

[12] *Chou En-lai, "Report to the Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China," Daily Report, People's Republic of China, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Supplement 31, Number 175, 10 September 1973, p 13.*

[13] *For example, see "India Sees Hint of Chinese Amity," The New York Times, 4 August 1973, p 7.*

Mrs. Malaprop: Oh, there's nothing to be hoped for from her! She's as headstrong as an allegory on the banks of the Nile.—Richard Brinsley Sheridan

A HOUSE IN CAIRO

LUCIUS D. BATTLE

TUCKED AWAY in the numerous stories of President Nixon's recent visit to Cairo—among the reports of nuclear reactors and aid in opening the Suez Canal—was an item of particular interest to me. President Nixon agreed to give to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt a piece of real estate overlooking the Nile on which stands a replica of an 18th century French chateau. No transaction could have interested me more.

Before I arrived in Cairo in 1964 as Ambassador, there had been a search for a new embassy, as the residence in Cairo had for some years been a rented house formerly owned by a very rich member of the old regime of the country. It was not totally suitable, neither was it all bad. It had a large number of rooms in poor arrangement. There was adequate reception space although a good part of it was unusable since the entire house, as was frequently the custom in the Farouk era, was built around one large central hall with a skylight that ran through the entire structure. The intense sun poured through the skylight and kept the largest room on the first floor at the temperature of a Turkish bath through the hot months—and there was no air conditioning!

The garden was almost nonexistent. By the time we arrived in 1964 apartment houses completely surrounded the building and the view from the garden was of balconies with laundry drying, screaming children and secret service men of the UAR Government watching our every move.

Buildings—like people—representing the United States Government abroad should be chosen for the setting, for their American qualities and should in every respect be typical of our country. I considered buying ground and building an American residence but there were very serious arguments against this. In the first place the laws of the country would have been difficult if an American architect designed the building; moreover, the cost would have been infinitely greater and largely in US dollars. During my time in Egypt we had perhaps $200 million in "blocked" Egyptian pounds which could be used for necessary purchases, so I reluctantly began to look for a building already in existence. All of the houses I saw were badly planned, miserably designed and largely of early Farouk architecture.

During this period my wife and I were invited to tea one afternoon at the home of Madame Ghalli, a Frenchwoman and an Egyptian citizen, who was the widow of a former Foreign Minister of Egypt. She was not only beautiful but highly intelligent and, although advanced in years, had a very great zest for life and for the world around her. I went there several times and was fascinated both by her and by her house.

The house was a copy of an 18th century French chateau. The architecture was restrained, totally balanced in a square shape that was externally entirely French and very elegant. The interior decor was a mixture of French and Egyptian tradition. It was full of beautiful things of many countries and many periods with perhaps the Arab influence the predominant one.

I wondered why we were being invited there. I was soon to find out. Madame Ghalli said to me on perhaps the third occasion that she knew I recognized the beauty of her house and she very much wanted me and the American Government to have the property after her death.

She asked whether I would be interested in acquiring the property through an arrangement outside of Egypt under which I would arrange for the United States Government to pay dollars into an account in Switzerland and then take over the house at her death. I told her this was absolutely impossible, for under no circumstances would I do anything to circumvent the local laws. She admitted that she knew little of laws and would accept my judgment. "But," she said, "I want you to have the house and at my death you will be approached immediately by my executors."

Little by little I learned more of Madame Ghalli's life. Most of her adult years had been spent in Egypt. She had lived there during the Farouk era and had been part of the glamorous circle that made up international society of that era and in that place. She told me of dinners and balls that she had given in the house and of the many royal personages who attended. She spoke with pride of her past but

Lucius D. Battle entered the Foreign Service in 1946, serving as Special Assistant to Secretary Acheson, as first secretary in Copenhagen and on the staff of Lord Ismay with NATO. He then spent five years as Vice President of Colonial Williamsburg and Williamsburg Restoration, Inc., returning to the Department in 1961. In 1964 he was appointed Ambassador to the United Arab Republic.

ANWAR SADAT
. . . house on Nile

Sadat Gets U.S. Site For Palace

By Jim Hoagland
Washington Post Foreign Service

CAIRO—In another touch of personal diplomacy designed to please Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, the United States is quietly ceding property worth $1 million or more to Egypt so Sadat can build a mansion beside the Nile in Cairo.

The transfer of a 6,540-square yard plot of land owned by the American government here follows an

with no deep regret that the world had changed and that the era that she had known was a thing totally removed from today's reality.

She told me of the years since her widowhood. She had planned to close her lovely house and return to Paris. A few days before her departure, she took one last walk around the wide expanse of gardens accompanied by her head gardener. She spied a cardboard box under a large bush which she thought to be trash, and told the gardener to throw this unsightly thing away. On looking inside he found, to her astonishment and perhaps even to his, a small baby boy.

Madame Ghalli had long wanted children but had never had any. She was a deeply religious woman and had prayed for years for a son and heir. God had responded, although rather late. The young boy had been sent to her for her watchful care during her declining years. All plans for departure were immediately changed.

Under Egyptian law it was impossible for Madame Ghalli legally to adopt the child. A single woman, regardless of status, former marital position or wealth, was not permitted to adopt a child. She therefore arranged for the gardener to adopt him, so that he could remain on the property and under her care. He became a little prince, pampered, spoiled, not very bright and not very attractive. He was, however, affectionate and hers, so Madame Ghalli spent the next years arranging for his security as best she could.

Madame Ghalli urged me to get ready for a quick transaction in the event of her death, for she had arranged that on the day she died a lawyer would approach me with papers for me to sign. I must have money ready and be able to move rapidly and decisively.

I obtained permission from the Foreign Buildings Office of the Department of State to acquire the property should it become available at an amount up to approximately $300,000, less than one per cent of our blocked holdings in Egypt. Permission came through and so did her plan.

In the fall of 1966, Madame Ghalli passed away. Within hours her lawyer came to the embassy. At first he would not come in. At that moment relations between the United States and the UAR were very tense indeed and he wanted to have none of us. With some difficulty and with the help of others, including our lawyer, I managed to get him to come into the drawing room and discuss the matter. The property was available; Madame Ghalli had requested that I be approached immediately after her death and the property sold to me. It was offered at a price of approximately a quarter of a million dollars in Egyptian pounds which was a remarkable bargain. It encompassed a full city block on the Nile, huge gardens and a very handsome house of impeccable architecture. The furniture and objets d'art were to be sold in time. They were not included in the contract offered me, except as I specified. I went through the house very carefully, specified as many things as I felt the contract would permit, and left the remainder to fate or the auctioneer. The United States Government made a substantial down payment on the house and, under Egyptian law, we therefore had legal possession although not final title.

Within twenty-four hours after signing the document, I called on the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and informed him that we had bought the property and left a diplomatic note telling him of the details, the price, the arrange-

ments. He assented and indicated no objection on the part of the Government of the UAR.

Then began the farcical side of the affair. First, the lawyer was arrested for absconding with the down payment we had made. He appeared to have taken the money and had failed to pay it into the estate or whatever the legal equivalent thereof is in Egypt. According to the press he was found with thousands of dollars worth of gold bars under his bed, allegedly given him by the American Ambassador. I had given him no gold bars, only a check for a large number of Egyptian pounds and had nothing whatever to do with the presence (or absence, for that matter) of gold bars under his bed. It developed, to my surprise, that he was a Greek subject. The Greek Ambassador called me in a high state of indignation, saying that his national was being badly treated and that I should do something about it. I told him that as far as I was concerned it appeared that his national had absconded with many thousands of pounds, or at least that was the charge made by the Egyptians. There was nothing I could do unless it could be proved that he had turned in the money to the proper authorities. I had a receipt signed by his Greek citizen, who, by this time, had been whisked off to an unknown desert jail.

AT THIS POINT the French Government came into the picture. The French Ambassador called excitedly to inform me that there were two antique cars in the basement garage of the Ghalli house, one of which he claimed was his, having been given to him by Madame Ghalli. The car was of special interest as it was one of the taxis that drove French poilus to the Battle of the Marne in World War I. He said that he hoped I would assure him he could have the car since the property was now that of the US Government and I was responsible for it.

I told him that I made no claim to any personal pieces within the house and had no interest in either the old LaSalle or the antique taxi, neither of which looked as though it could operate under its own power. This transaction was now between him and the Egyptian Government and it was to them he must prove ownership, not to me. Being French, he obviously continued to suspect that I was absconding with his taxicab, which created some restraint between us for the remaining year of my service there.

Madame Ghalli's aunt and uncle, by this time declining in years and in other capacities, arrived to settle the estate, and offered to sell me privately pieces from Madame Ghalli's collection of antiquities, an offer I declined pending approval of Egyptian tax authorities. This approval finally came through, and, with Egyptian initials on each transaction, I purchased some fine bronzes and a few pieces of porcelain, none of major importance but each attractive and rare in today's world.

The Greek Ambassador again called to see what steps I was taking to protect the lawyer, now rumored to be in a miserable cell with no water, no food and no national protection. I reminded the Greek Ambassador that the gentleman in question was in fact Greek, was said to have absconded with my down payment, and was in no way my responsibility. All I wanted was the house or the return of our initial payment to the estate. He urged unsuccessfully that I, as an American having greater influence in Egypt, should take on the protection of this gentleman, who in his opinion had rendered me real service. Eventually the deposit was returned to the estate and that detail cleared up. I never learned what happened to the lawyer or the gold bars.

The Deputy Foreign Minister then moved into the act by evicting the aging uncle and aunt, who had now been in the house for many weeks and both of whom found the various types of Egyptian wine not as good as French products but equally intoxicating. They had illegally sold off bits and pieces of the estate and had many caches of currency in secret hiding places all over the house. The Egyptian police moved in, took down the American flag, removed the signs saying "Property of the US Government" and searched every nook and cranny and mattress for funds, allegedly finding substantial amounts.

The uncle and aunt rushed across the street to the French Ambassador who again called me in the mistaken notion that I was responsible for their security.

The Deputy Foreign Minister claimed that I had purchased personally and illegally certain artifacts and said that in fact the legality of the entire transaction for the property was in serious doubt. I insisted that I had approval for each purchase duly initialed by the tax authorities and that I wanted the police out of this American property immediately, the American flag flown again over the building, and my signs saying "Property of the US Government" replaced. I reminded him that I had weeks before given him an official note of the transaction and had a written acknowledgement from him of the purchase.

Within an hour, in remarkable speed for Egypt, the police were gone, the signs were back and the American flag flew once again over the property. The Deputy Foreign Minister attributed the removal of signs to the fact that they had been hung with string. All ten or so had fallen from the fence at the same time. The flag had not been up because I had a lazy servant who overslept. He urged that I get a new servant.

At about that time I left Egypt to come back to the United States to become Assistant Secretary for Near East and South Asia. The War of 1967 occurred, relations with Egypt were broken and I was sure under the circumstances that we would never get final title to the house.

A few days after the War, when relations had never been in greater shambles, a telegram reached me, informing me that legal title had passed to the United States and we now owned the Ghalli property in all its glory.

ANWAR SADAT always admired the property, and he told me several times that he found the site an attractive one. Whether the gift to Egypt stemmed from his initiative or that of President Nixon, I do not know. At any rate, the Egyptians now own the property and are in the process of tearing down the house to make way for construction of a new official residence for the President of Egypt. ■

AFSA's Golden Anniversary

THOMAS D. BOYATT

THE FOREIGN SERVICE and the American Foreign Service Association both celebrate their golden anniversaries this year. The Service as the institutional dimension of US diplomacy and the Association as its human dimension have shared more than a common birthday over the years. Both experienced the isolationism of the '20s and '30s, the crisis of World War II, the ravages of McCarthyism, the vilification and ultimately the vindication of the China hands, and the burdens of Vietnam. Today, both share the new challenges of America's involvement in the ever-changing challenges facing the international community; both share the new relationships growing out of our own rapidly evolving institutions.

With due regard for the subjectivity of hindsight and the risks of prediction, our half-century mark provides a fitting occasion for a Janus-like look at the past and the future. Since its beginning, the Association and its programs have provided a forum for professional discussion and a focus for the development of an extended family *esprit de corps* among Foreign Service people. While the professional and familial functions will remain the core of AFSA's activities, the organization has undergone a basic change in recent years—a change that is still in the process of definition and digestion.

Each of us would undoubtedly describe the Association's evolution and purposes differently. For me, the essence of the AFSA of recent years is its conversion from a passive reflection of the Foreign Service to an active force generating and managing change in that Service, in the foreign affairs community and in the profession. For many years the Association observed and discussed within the family what was being done with and for the Foreign Service. Now AFSA is a mechanism for *determining* in important measure what will be done, and for linking the Service in an active dialogue with political decision-makers and the public at large. The Association arrived at this point by an evolutionary process stretching over several years. I thought our 50th birthday would be a fitting occasion to present one participant's views on how the changes took place.

Professional Reform. The initial stirrings of an activist AFSA were sparked by professional concerns. In the mid-'60s a group of junior and middle-grade officers, disturbed by rumors of yet another "blue ribbon study" of the Foreign Service imposed from the outside, began to meet to discuss the novel concept of self-reform. The proposition was—and is—that Foreign Service professionals have the most important contributions to make in perfecting the bureaucratic structures and personnel systems of the foreign policy process. The "Young Turks" (o tempus) understood perfectly well that a serious political base would be required if the Congress and the Executive were to be made to accept the Service's views on reform. AFSA was agreed upon as the logical vehicle for the reform effort. The "Young Turks" were elected to head the Association with a strong mandate for change; "Toward a

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Tom Boyatt, President of AFSA, joined the Foreign Service in 1959 after receiving his MA at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and serving in the Air Force for three years. Mr. Boyatt has served at Luxembourg and Nicosia and received the merit honor award in 1969 and AFSA's William R. Rivkin award in 1970.

Modern Diplomacy" was published as a blueprint for reform, and eventually the highest levels of the Department undertook "Management Reform" as an exercise in bureaucratic renewal to establish a "Diplomacy for the '70s." One can debate the achievements of "Management Reform," but the basic point that change in the Foreign Service should come primarily from within, from the career professionals, is still recognized. It is no accident that Career Ambassador Robert Murphy chairs the latest effort, or that the Association is involved in the activities of the Murphy Commission. Professional development was the original impetus in the changes in AFSA and a concern for the profession remains the Association's primary responsibility.

Diplomats vs Bureaucrats A second major impulse for reform was the fact that the administrative and personnel aspects of the Foreign Service were being increasingly dominated from the outside by individuals who had no knowledge of or interest in the Foreign Service, and whose actions were governed instead by their own bureaucratic imperatives. Over the years, this problem had become progressively more severe in the three Foreign Affairs agencies. Administrative management made nearly all of the decisions affecting the lives and careers of Foreign Service people; yet administrative management usually consisted of political appointees and GS bureaucrats who, with few exceptions, simply were not concerned about the men and women of the Foreign Service. Moreover, political appointees consciously seeking to politicize the Foreign Service and GS bureaucrats trying to expand their own empires often found natural allies with outside groups, agencies and political interests such as OMB and the Civil Service Commission, which in turn were seeking to dominate one or more aspects of Foreign Service life for their own parochial reasons. In short, while the people of the Foreign Service were playing vital roles in the formulation and implementation of Foreign policy, administering complex overseas missions, managing wide-reaching information and cultural programs,

The political hacks, guard-house lawyers, GS empire builders, and green eyeshade penny pinchers should be given the chance to work their "magic" on some other agency (preferably the Pentagon) and stop ruining the Foreign Service.

and directing immense and often highly expensive foreign assistance programs, some bureaucrat who had never been further abroad than Ocean City would inevitably decide what was good for the Foreign Service and its people. Something had to give and it did on two points.

First, AFSA conceived and then made the major contribution to writing the law providing for a mechanism—the election of an exclusive representative of Foreign Service personnel—to assure that administration is seen in the broad context as the necessary support of what the Foreign Service actually does and the people who do it, and that some Foreign Service perspective is actually brought to bear on decisions affecting the Service. Executive Order 11636 provides for a politically legitimate (freely elected) corporate voice of Foreign Service people juridically equal with administrative management. The impact of this revolutionary development is still evolving.

Second, the Association has consistently pursued the concept that the Foreign Service should manage itself; that the administrative management of the three agencies should consist of fellow Foreign Service professionals sharing the common experiences and problems of Foreign Service life: that sound management and good administration do not exist apart and separate from the mission of any organization, least of all the Foreign Service: and that the political hacks, guard-house lawyers, GS empire builders, and green eyeshade penny pinchers should be given the chance to work their "magic" on some other agency (preferably the Pentagon) and stop ruining the Foreign Service.

Real progress has been made but the picture is still mixed. The administrative management of USIA is almost entirely in the hands of GS bureaucrats at lower levels, and political appointees at higher levels, hand-picked by a now-departed administration. In AID more Foreign Service personnel are in key administrative jobs than in USIA, but vast areas of AID's administrative bureaucracy are controlled by that same coalition of the possessors of political influence and GS bureaucrats. The result has been a rapid acceleration of the "Washingtonization" of AID at the expense of the Foreign Service, at the expense of the best interests of the taxpayer, and at the expense of the best interests of the United States Government.

In State, the picture is brighter. We now have a career Foreign Service officer, who has had a valuable combination of both administrative and substantive Foreign Service experience in the job as Deputy Under Secretary for Management for the first time since the days of Ambassador Henderson. The Director General, the Director of Personnel and the Assistant Secretary for Administration and most of their staffs are all broad-gauged, competent, genuine career Foreign Service personnel for the first time in memory. Moreover, the Department is developing a group of first-rate, administratively oriented younger officers who are giving the Department a strong capability in the administrative field for the future.

Participatory Decision-Making The Foreign Service is not, and should not be, immune from the great movements and changes which affect the larger society which we represent abroad. Beginning in the '60s, there was a ground-swell of sentiment for change, and much of that change centered on the need for participation in the decision-making process of the great institutions of this country by the people who had to live by the decisions. College students and recent graduates were selected to sit on the Boards of Trustees of major universities, both public and private. New legis-

Continued on page 25

FSJ BOOKSHELF

The Reality of China

CHINA PERCEIVED: *Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations, by John K. Fairbank. Knopf. $8.95.*

IN HIS 1946 EVALUATION of the situation in China, Dr. Fairbank (then Director of the US Information Service in China, now Harvard University Professor) concluded that "our best chance lies in developing and maintaining contact with Communist China as well as with the rest of China—the opposite of a policy of quarantine or cutting adrift . . . Freedom of contact, meaning reciprocal contact, is our chief hope of avoiding fatal misconceptions on our part as to Chinese realities."

Well, they were fatal misconceptions and we did not avoid them, as the mass slaughter (and devastation and refugees) in Korea and Vietnam have so damnably demonstrated. Dr. Fairbank's prescience, his wise counsel to his country and humanity, like that of Jack Service, John Davies, Edmund Clubb, and other Foreign Service officers in China in the 1940s, was then dismissed and later vilified.

Today, US relations with the Chinese People's Republic have reached a difficult phase—in the afterglow of the Nixon TV spectacular of February 1972. "We have to face a Chinese reality, one which though distinctly un-American nevertheless exists quite independently and will not go away. It is massive, profoundly collectivist, and professedly anti-individualist; it is also viable and growing in power."

For those who would understand this reality and who would look behind and beyond all those happy travelogues of neophyte visitors to mainland China (with their almost homogenized impressions of friendly courtesy, delectable cuisine, excruciating honesty, unremitting industry, invariable orthodoxy, *et cetera*), these 17 lively, scholarly articles by the *doyen* of Chinese studies in America will be invaluable.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

Vietnam vs. Intellectuals

THE LONG DARK NIGHT OF THE SOUL: *The American Intellectual Left and the Vietnam War, by Sandy Vogelgesang. Harper & Row, $8.95.*

SANDY VOGELGESANG observes that Western intellectuals traditionally have been concerned about moral conscience, obsession with their identity as intellectuals, and their relationship to power. All three concerns lay behind much of the American Intellectual Left's response to the Vietnam war, and, in the opinion of the reviewer, the response a decade earlier of French intellectuals to the war in Algeria. A comparative analysis of the two responses and their impact of the political-foreign policy establishments should be a fascinating undertaking. As we know, the war in Algeria was instrumental in returning de Gaulle to power; the war in Vietnam was instrumental in the decision of President Johnson not to seek re-election.

The changing attitude of the American Intellectual Left toward the conflict in Indo-China is the subject of FSO Vogelgesang's book. From an initial view of the war as a political-diplomatic error, most leftist intellectuals came to view the escalating involvement in terms of morality and, later, of political legitimacy. Their response to the war and the means used to rally public support against it were ineffectual, yet they seemed at times to gain a disproportionate influence—partly because of the malaise and growing divisiveness in American society. The ultimate rejection of the war by the average American was influenced mainly by the mounting casualty tolls and stark realization of what continuation of that war demanded; there was little, if any, moral condemnation, concern over political legitimacy, or need for re-examining national priorities or foreign policy —the preoccupation of the Intellectual Left. Whatever their failings, FSO Vogelgesang notes that the leftist intellectuals did reflect some of the most important issues of the 1960s and sought, by their opposition to the war in Vietnam, to underscore their claim to be the nation's conscience.

One can hardly find fault with FSO Vogelgesang's judgments or conclusions. There is no doubt but that she has thoroughly researched the pertinent materials and sources, and has maintained objectivity throughout her work. For those interested in understanding intellectual perceptions of the war in Vietnam from the Kennedy to Nixon periods, this book should prove a rewarding experience.

—P.K.

Anatomy of Foreign Policy

UNITED STATES NATIONAL INTERESTS IN A CHANGING WORLD, *by Donald E. Nuechterlein. The University Press of Kentucky, $8.00.*

THIS SMALL BOOK looks at today's complex challenges to US and world stability, and offers the ambitious prescription that American foreign policy ought strictly to follow the imperatives of underlying national interest. These are defined on a descending scale ranging from "survival" and "vital" to "major" and merely "peripheral" interests. The viability of a given course of action is to be judged according to where it fits on this ladder of interests. A resort to force would match a threat to national survival, but might serve also to cover interests classed as vital, e.g., the security of allies. For major interests, diplomacy alone should suffice; and peripheral interests would qualify only for low-key treatment.

The author of this plea for greater precision in diplomatic thinking is a senior faculty member at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville, which offers refresher courses in management to career civil servants in the supergrade ranks. Professor Nuechterlein's interest-hierarchy serves as principal teaching tool in his foreign policy workshop, and does so (in this reviewer's observation) with enlivening if not always enlightening effect. His book reflects something of the pedagogical design, and much of its content may strike readers of the JOURNAL as superficial or dated. Nevertheless, it is rather more than a primer on the anatomy of foreign policy for the educated layman. Behind the diagrams and the narrative examples, there are a few ideas worth the attention of chronically burdened practitioners of diplomacy.

The book's central concern is that the process of diffusion in the world balance of power may be

leading us into a confusion of aims. Professor Nuechterlein suggests that we need to relate the possession of national power more explicitly to the interests that power should protect and foster. Too often, in his view, the country's needs with regard to external challenges tend to be obscured by special claims or partisan considerations, which impose their own coloration and their own priorities on what should be managed in the common interest. In a democracy, foreign policy must be to some degree salable, and therefore cannot operate wholly free of the pressures of established influence. Professor Nuechterlein would like to see cool calculation applied to cut through the weight of these pressures and make foreign policy more nearly what he calls "the handmaiden" of national interest.

—PHILIP WOLFSON

Reporter's History

WHERE HAS LAST JULY GONE? *Memoirs, by Drew Middleton. Quadrangle, New York Times Book Company, $7.95.*

THIS IS A distinguished book. Drew Middleton has distilled more than thirty years of reporting on war, national and international affairs and social change in Europe, Africa and Asia into a lively and rewarding memoir. His book surprises, not by its keen observations, which one would expect of Drew Middleton, but by its freshness.

Fate and the AP precipitated Middleton from his sportswriter's beat into the unfamiliar role of foreign correspondent in London in the portentous summer of 1939. When Hitler struck at France a year later, Middleton girded on a Sam Browne belt and got his baptism of fire with the British Expeditionary Force in France. He describes graphically the fight of the British troops against great odds and the cool professionalism that made possible their epic evacuation at Dunkirk. Back in London again, Middleton shared with the Londoners "England's finest hour" and eye-witnessed the aerial Battle of Britain.

It is a moving experience for a Foreign Service officer of my vintage to relive the years of World War II through his vivid "history of a man as a reporter" which tells honestly the way war was and recalls the deep anxieties of the period when Britain stood alone against Hitler.

The author enlivens his narrative with scores of conversations he had with soldiers, generals, colleagues and refugees during the invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Normandy. His eye for significant detail and his skill as a writer make the backdrop of the war come alive. His anecdotes and recollections of Churchill, Eisenhower, de Gaulle, Bedell Smith, Alexander, Montgomery and less famous leaders are pithy and enlightening.

The war, and Middleton's obvious relish for his role as war correspondent, combine to make the first half of his book dramatic reading. The second half gives us views in depth, from 1947 through 1972, of Germany, France and the United Nations, where Middleton held successive posts as Chief of Bureau for the TIMES. The Berlin Blockade," "Britain in the Soft Twilight of Empire," and "France under Good King Charles" are

especially good. His travels in Africa and Asia while covering the UN provide perceptive insights. The Middle East is repeatedly visited. As European Affairs, and later Military Affairs, correspondent (1969-1972), Middleton has many observations on the Soviet Union (which he had seen firsthand in 1946-47).

The book, though filled with action, is also studded with forthright political judgments. For example: "The leaders of Communist Russia have never, even during the worst days of World War II, when they desperately needed American help and friendship, regarded the United States and Americans as anything but enemies."

On de Gaulle: "France and Europe are better off without de Gaulle. He tried to return both to another century, to fasten upon his countrymen and their neighbors nationalist ideas that have been destroyed by two great wars."

On the British: "I conceived a great admiration for the British during the war. I still admire [them] . . . but I wonder whether that spasm of greatness between 1939 and 1945 was not the last effort of a degenerating people."

On the war in Vietnam, he comments: "The reader, the listener and the viewer [in the US] were short-changed. There was another side." He adds that in his opinion the war could and should have been won. The future, however, "will hold no peace for Indo-China and, consequently, no honor for the United States."

Drew Middleton ends his book with a sense of foreboding about the state of the world; but for himself there is no complaint. "I've had a hell of a good life and I'm grateful."

—FREDERICK P. LATIMER, JR.

A Personal Triumph

IF YOU CAN'T STAND TO COOK: *Easy-to-fix Recipes for the Handicapped Homemaker, by Lorraine Gifford. Zondervan Publishing Corp.*

THIS COOKBOOK is a foreign service success story, albeit one that started out unhappily. Lorraine Gifford, whose husband served at a number of Foreign Service posts, developed multiple sclerosis in the early 1960s. This book represents a triumph over the limitations of the disease. It includes a couple of hundred "family-tested" recipes, designed to be made from a wheelchair if need be. The title is somewhat misleading: Mrs. Gifford clearly likes to cook and does it well, and a surprisingly large proportion of her recipes are more elaborate than one would expect (as she puts it in her preface, for those days when you feel "on top of the world"). The largest and most original part of the collection is in the desserts and sweets category, but there are some recipes for everything from soup to nuts. The wheelchair-bound reader will find her hints and bibliography on kitchen design helpful.

—TERESITA SCHAFFER

Indira's Life

INDIRA GANDHI, *by Krishan Bhata. Praeger, $10.00.*

KRISHAN BHATA'S "Indira Gandhi" is probably not the definitive biography of the Indian Prime

Minister but it is a very readable account of her life and much better than the dozen or so other biographies of her I thumbed through which are on the shelves of the State Department library. Bhata provides a fascinating account of her early life, schooling, strong and intimate relationship with her father (which continued throughout Nehru's life) and her not always harmonious family relationships (tension between her and Madame Pandit was always high). As the President of the Congress Party, party leader, Minister in Shastri's cabinet, and finally Prime Minister, Indira emerges in this portrait as a tough political manipulator who constantly gains in her skill and ability to out-maneuver her political opponents and competitors. Recommended reading.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

Who Has All the Virtues?

BREZHNEV. *The Masks of Power, by John Dornberg, Basic Books.*

BIOGRAPHIES of a deceased Soviet leader are hard enough to write, but when the leader is both living and still in power, the task becomes close to impossible. So the reader of John Dornberg's journalistic biography of Brezhnev can expect neither to come away with an understanding of the man or even with a fair knowledge of Brezhnev's position on the major issues of Soviet policy. What one can learn from Dornberg's biography is the stages of Brezhnev's career against the backdrop of what was happening at the time. Through the full use of the available research materials, Dornberg has carefully traced Brezhnev's career from his childhood in Kamenskoye in the Dnieper industrial region through his rise in the Party/industrial bureaucracy, the war, and finally the twists and turns that led him to become General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The book contains more than the customary quotient of speculation, little of which has any solid evidence behind it. This reviewer regrets that Mr. Dornberg felt it necessary—probably to liven up his biography—to indulge so often in the old question of who is against whom in the Soviet leadership. Many decades will have to pass before anyone can judge whether Dornberg is correct in attributing more virtues to Khrushchev than to Brezhnev. It took Milovan Djilas's "Conversations with Stalin" before we learned that Khrushchev had been more than simply another of Stalin's yes-men. Does Brezhnev really show his "sprightliness and ductility by an expeditious compliance with fashions or vices" in Samuel Johnson's phrase? Dornberg would have us think so. It will be a long time before we know whether he is right.

—PETER SEMLER

"The most worried, wearied, unthanked, and necessary public servant in any government today is its Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is like a mother-in-law—in the bosom of the family, yet not of it. Essentially, he is related to a world outside, a go-between harried by what the family thinks is its due and by what the neighbors say it deserves, which is invariably a lot less." —PARIS JOURNAL 1944-1965, by Janet Flanner (Genet), edited by William Shawn, Atheneum, New York 1965, p. 89.

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lation required that Labor unions be subject to stringent democratic control. Major corporations sought out women and blacks to serve on Boards of Directors. Legislation required the participation of citizen groups before decisions were taken regarding federally-supported projects such as highways and urban renewal projects. In short, while this wave of participatory democracy was not all encompassing, substantial changes have taken place. In spite of some set-backs, institutions have not quite been the same since.

The Foreign Service was not immune from these influences. Individuals who were at the locus of this country's involvement in negotiations with the Soviets, or developing new approaches to information and cultural programs in the Far East, or running a vital development assistance program for West Africa could nonetheless feel estranged, remote, helpless and alienated from the decisions which affected their own personal lives, careers and well-being. This was particularly serious in the Foreign Service, because, as mentioned earlier, the people who did make those decisions were not only remote, but often had no interest in or knowledge of the problems of the Foreign Service. Moreover, these problems were aggravated by the uniqueness of the Foreign Service, with its rank-in-person (until recently called rank-in-man) system, its Service discipline, its need for world-wide availability, its risks and hardships, and for many, its system of selection-out. These features made it even more important for Foreign Service people to have a real input into the rules and decisions which affected their lives and careers. The Foreign Service did (and continues to) accept assignments based on the "needs of the Service," but would no longer accept the notion of assignments based on the whim of some "manager." Foreign Service people would accept the risks of personal danger, inconvenience and, for some, selection-out, but only if they had confidence that there was a reciprocal obligation on the part of the Agencies to be fair and equitable.

In short, with peoples' financial interests, life-styles, careers and sometimes lives at stake, people in the Foreign Service were increasingly unwilling to leave such decisions solely in the hands of administrative management, no matter how benign. People wanted an input, both a personal one into the individual decisions affecting them individually, and a collective input so that the corporate voice of the Foreign Service could be heard on personnel policies and procedures.

Finally, in the '60s and '70s several developments took place to accelerate greatly the development of "unionization" of government employees.

First, beginning with President Kennedy, the official policy of the Federal government towards the unionization of its own employees changed from one of hostility to one varying between positive encouragement and auspicious resignation. Second, the desire for participation in the decisions which af-

fected their lives and careers did not escape government employees who increasingly saw selecting an exclusive employee representative as the most effective means of dealing with their own personal and economic frustrations. The late '60s thus saw a partial shift in the activities of the major government unions towards white collar concerns. This fact could particularly be seen in the growth of such essentially white-collar unions as the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees.

Third, and perhaps most significant was a radical change in the attitude of professionals towards "unionism." Beginning in the late '50s and early '60s, nurses, school teachers, airline pilots and then university professors increasingly began organizing themselves to deal with working conditions, personnel policies and (where permitted) wages. The overwhelming majority of these professionals turned not to labor unions—whose experience was in the private sector and whose skills involved achieving a larger slice of the return on the production of "things"—but to their already established professional associations. Indeed, the trend toward professionals becoming "unionized" (or employee organizations becoming professionalized) by having these Associations take on this new employee relations function has been perhaps the single most significant trend in employee relations in the United States in the last 10 years.

The Foreign Service was not immune from this trend either. Faced with an increasingly strong desire to organize ourselves, and to have some real say in our own well-being and our own careers, we Foreign Service people turned to our own professional organization—AFSA. We did so not simply out of familiarity and habit, but also because we felt more comfortable with our professional organization than with a trade union. Moreover, we felt this professional organization could use the new power not only to advance employee interests, but also to enhance and protect our profession. Certainly, the record of the last 18 months indicates that a professional association is in the best position to represent effectively professional employee interests, and that the cachet of being an exclusive representative gives an association a stronger professional voice.

These four strands then—professional reform, making the bureaucracy responsive, participatory decision-making, and "unionism" in government—then merged and shaped the AFSA of the '70s. We have now earned prestige and respect on the Hill, on the 7th floor, at the White House, with the press, and increasingly with the public by working to enhance our professionalism and by defending our own interests with pride and dignity. Certainly, the future of AFSA and the Foreign Service should properly be the subject of constant Service-wide debate. The proposition that Foreign Service professionals through AFSA should help to determine that future will remain, I hope, undebatable. If we do not foster and define our own interests in both the professional and employee spheres, others will again assume that function for us with the usual unhappy results! ■

LETTERS *from page 7*

gallant struggle.

Frank's was not a towering, public reputation of the kind which marks the Foreign Service in the American mind. Yet I know how many of his friends will join me in doubting that any officer of the generation contributed more to the health, vitality and growing equity of the system in which we live and serve—or sought less public credit for his contributions.

He was the original "Young Turk," almost two years before the phrase became a part of AFSA's history. His careful, illuminating contributions to the efforts to rethink the service's future formed a major part of AFSA's "Toward a Modern Diplomacy." The task force on benefits and allowances which he chaired wrote one of the most useful chapters in "Diplomacy for the '70s." He was a wonderful personnel officer: patient, wise, warmly humorous, and straightforward when others were not. And, in the end, he was American Consul General at Zurich.

Those of his friends who saw Frank in the last 15 months of his life, when he endured two kidney transplants and almost half a dozen other major operations, learned that a bed of pain need be no stranger to gallantry, gentle humor, compassion even for others. He fought, he cared, he laughed—and in the end, if the brightness of our memories is the mark, he won.

"God bless," he used to say. "God bless," we might now reply.

CHARLES W. BRAY III
Washington

Alas, Poor Quagmeier

■ I would like to comment on Stefan Barff's letter to Mr. Quagmeier of our Consulate General in Leipzig (FSJ September 1974).

I fear that Mr. Barff was neither fair or forthright in his statement that a movement of a mere quarter of an inch of the "x" in Mr. Quagmeier's rating box (Part III of the new OER form) would have resulted in his promotion. If Mr. Quagmeier was in any part of the middle 50 percent segment of this box, as is clearly stated in Mr. Barff's letter, he had no chance of promotion. Indeed, if Mr. Quagmeier does not shape up rapidly, he will be in danger of selection out.

As we know, at least 80 percent of all Foreign Service officers are in the upper 25 percent of their classes; probably no more than 2 or 3 percent are in the lowest 25 percent, and the remaining 17 or 18 percent fall into the middle 50 percent.

A junior officer on my staff who has a university minor in mathematics has pointed out that these figures cannot be correct. One-quarter of every Foreign Service class, he maintains, *must* be in the bottom 25 percent; an equal number *must* be in the top 25 percent and a full half *must* be in the middle 50 percent. I am tentatively rating this officer as lacking in "judgment," "perceptiveness," "perspective" and "policy orientation." But before I submit his report, I would appreciate receiving the Department's computer readouts on the breakdown of each class as drawn from the recently completed OERs.

JAMES E. AKINS
Ambassador

Jidda

Hatching Cuckoos

■ In the Sunday (22 September) issue of the Miami HERALD there was an article by the well known writer Lloyd Shearer on William Egan Colby, the new Director of the CIA, which includes information about his activities with the OSS during World War II in Norway, and with the CIA. The article refers to his assignment as a Foreign Service attaché in Stockholm in 1951-53; in Rome in 1953-58 as "one of Clare Boothe Luce's boys"; then as First Secretary of the Embassy in Saigon from 1959-62; again in Vietnam 1968-72 as a Class 1 Reserve Officer, Director of CORDS, "and given ambassadorial rank." The article is very complimentary to Mr. Colby and I do not doubt his qualifications as the new Director of the CIA.

What I do question is the propriety of using the American Foreign Service officially as a cuckoo's nest for the CIA. It seems to be well known in every country where CIA men are serving in Foreign Service officers' clothing that they are there, and who they are. Their real position is no secret however mysterious their actual activities may be.

The Foreign Service now shelters the Information Service, AID and the Peace Corps openly and successfully. Also in places the Post Office, Immigration Service, Treasury Department and other branches of the Federal Government. Military, Naval and Air attachés are open about their status and their presence is recognized as proper by international law. If they commit improprieties they can be recalled without damage to the reputation of the Foreign Service.

It is generally understood that Soviet diplomatic missions shelter KGB officials as diplomatic officers of various categories and it is apparently generally assumed that all Soviet diplomats are either KGB men or controlled by them, from the ambassador on down. So, who is fooling whom?

Popular literature in this country makes no bones about describing the CIA operations, especially in Saigon, under the aegis of the Embassy. Although Vietnam is an especially nasty can of worms militarily and diplomatically, the recently exposed CIA activities in Chile would seem to be only the tip of the iceberg worldwide.

Is this something the Foreign Service must live with from now on? If so, could we at least label CIA personnel under their true identity so that when such employees are caught red-handed in "dirty deals" the Foreign Service itself is not blamed for it?

RICHARD FYFE BOYCE
Wilton Manors, Fla.

AFSA NEWS

Rick Williamson

THIS MONTH IN WASHINGTON

In Capistrano the turning of the earth around the sun each year can be reliably demonstrated by the return of the swallows.

In Washington we have different indicators. As the leaves begin to turn colors, the bums move out of Potomac Park and back onto the heating grates. Willie, the most disheveled of the lot, is already back on the grate on the corner of 21st and Virginia Avenue. I am personally pleased to see the bums return. It's a kind of symbol of the changing of the seasons, and the inexorable workings of the cosmic order. Yet a few unfriendly individuals have suggested that AFSA is "anti-bum." We have fairly been accused of being somewhat anti-AFGE and very anti-OMB. But anti-bum—never! One of the bums sometimes sleeps in our trash bin, and our Club manager, Gloria Thompson, adopted the mongrel dog of another bum.

Last year we were able to establish conclusively that none of the bums was a selected-out FSO, but we still have not disproved the rumor that one or more of them may be RIF'd AID FSRs, who were left without an immediate annuity.

AFSA certainly can't be anti-bum so long as there is the slightest possiblity that in doing so we might be anti-Foreign Service. This is particularly true since—with AID management hell-bent on RIFing anything that moves—those heating grates may get a little more crowded.

A great deal has happened this month, some of it especially good news, some especially bad.

Annual Education Travel

Without a doubt, the best news this month is that the Senate and House have approved and sent on to the President the 1975 State Department/USIA Authorization Act. This bill includes provision for the annual travel at government expense of Foreign Service dependents who are studying in high schools or colleges in the United States while their parents are abroad. The present legislation authorized only one trip each for high school and college, which meant that some Foreign Service parents could not see their children more often than once in four years, except at extraordinary expense to themselves. Next to the need for a kindergarten allowance (which we obtained from the Congress last year), AFSA felt this was the single most serious problem in the benefit area requiring immediate legislative change.

AFSA proposed this legislation last spring (for more details see Tom Boyatt's statement before the SFRC, on p. 38 in the May 1974 FSJ), and provided a detailed legislative proposal including draft legislative language. Subsequently, the Association lobbied hard to get this legislation through the Congress.

While we proposed the legislation, we received help from a great many people, including the AAFSW and a number of members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, particularly Senator Pell. We also appreciate Chairman Hays's willingness to agree to this provision in Conference, in spite of the House's antipathy to authorization bills which contain "extraneous" provisions. Finally, a great deal of credit goes to Mrs. John Sherman Cooper, who learned about this problem from our Chapter in Peking while on a visit and, after we proposed the legislation, made it a personal cause. Needless to say, we are absolutely ecstatic that we have been able to eliminate this longstanding inequity.

Other Provisions

Benefits for Terrorist Victims

In the last two Authorization Bill hearings, AFSA has proposed a $50,000 one-time payment to the families of those US government employees abroad who are the victims of terrorist actions. This year, the House inserted a provision —agreed to by the Senate in Conference—which seeks to resolve this special hardship in a different way. The bill, as passed, provides "for payment of a gratuity for the surviving dependents of any Foreign Service employee who dies as a result of injuries sustained in the performance of duty outside the United States, in an amount equal to one year's salary at the time of death." While our provision for an equal payment irrespective of salary would have been fairer, this special benefit is nevertheless a major step forward, and constitutes tangible evidence of the Congress's recognition of special risks taken and sacrifices made by Foreign Service personnel.

Disclosure of Political Contributions

Last year, the Association proposed and the Congress passed legislation requiring each ambassadorial nominee to make a full disclosure to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of any political contributions made in the previous four years. This year, we proposed that this information be made a part of the public record so that large contributors would be subject to public as well as Senatorial scrutiny. Senator Pell took a strong interest in this provision, to which the House agreed in Conference.

Safeguarding the Promotion Process in USIA

The worst news this month relates to the longstanding dispute we have had with USIA, seeking to obtain for USIA employees an agreement similar to the one signed last year with the State Department, which precludes any possibility, actual or hypothetical, for the promotion lists to be manip-

ulated for reasons of personal or political favor by Agency management. That agreement in State, usually referred to as the "Safeguards Agreement," is working well and I, for one, think it is one of AFSA's most significant accomplishments with respect to protecting employee rights, and also with respect to protecting the professionalism of the Foreign Service from political abuse.

USIA has consistently refused to sign an agreement sufficiently similar, which would really guarantee that no tampering was possible. When we could not reach agreement, we filed an appeal with the Board of the Foreign Service. USIA then successfully delayed the process by claiming that the issue was not "substantive." That proposition was ultimately rejected by the Board of the Foreign Service. After the issue went to the "Disputes Panel," the Panel attempted to mediate the dispute. When Agency management refused to make any serious concessions in the interests of reaching an agreement, the Disputes Panel held a formal hearing (the whole "bit" with witnesses, cross-examination, submission of documents, written briefs, oral arguments, etc.), and finally made to the Board of the Foreign Service its findings of fact and recommendation which were almost entirely in favor of the AFSA position.

The Disputes Panel has included in its membership two of this nation's finest, most knowledgeable, best known and most respected experts in the field of collective bargaining in the public sector. We assumed, therefore, that the Board of the Foreign Service, recognizing the enormous work and the extraordinary background and expertise which went into the Disputes Panel's findings, would make an expeditious determination (as it is required to do by the regulations) in AFSA's favor.

Instead, for nearly three months the Board did nothing at all, and when it did act it was to permit one of the Agency's top managers, sitting as an Alternate on the Board of the Foreign Service—and supposedly acting as an impartial judge—to present a detailed written motion prepared by USIA's Office of the General Counsel to the Board in private session. AFSA was not informed that this was going to be permitted to take place, nor were we offered the opportunity to state our views in response. The Board, instead of being an impartial tribunal with both parties accorded equal rights and equal opportunities, turned out to be a star chamber procedure violating every known and published standard of equity and proper administrative procedure. Presented with the views of only one party—USIA—the Board then approved the USIA motion that since USIA felt the entire question was "nonconsultable" ("labor managementese" for none-of-your-damn-business), the issue should therefore be referred to the EMRC for a determination as to whether there was an obligation to consult.

The claim of nonconsultability is entirely spurious, and made by USIA at this time solely because it puts USIA in a no-lose situation. The EMRC, given its composition (Labor, the Civil Service Commission and OMB), is a highly conservative body particularly in light of OMB's attitudes. USIA evidently felt that even though its case on the merits was extremely weak, given the nature of the EMRC the Agency had a pretty good chance of winning; but even if they lost, they would have successfully delayed the process further, since the EMRC has a habit of taking its sweet time in making its determination. We have already filed our brief with the EMRC on the merits of the "consultability" question, but pointed out that the entire procedure whereby this matter reached the EMRC is illegal and, worse yet, highly unethical. With the USIA Boards due to meet in January, it is unclear whether by these actions USIA will be successful in delaying for another year having its employees' promotion system covered by a safeguards agreement.

The sorry record of this case clearly indicates that we are faced with two problems of monstrous proportions—a USIA problem and a Board of the Foreign Service problem. On this particular issue, USIA has treated its employees, the Association, and the expressed wishes of the Congress with contempt. This case, like the celebrated Shakespeare case, the Agency's record on selection-out, and its abuses of the FAS system, indicate that there are serious problems with the Agency which go far beyond a simple disagreement on a particular negotiation.

We also have a Board of the Foreign Service problem. Mr. Macomber, in forwarding the initial draft of E.O. 11636, made clear that the use of the Board of the Foreign Service as the ultimate adjudicatory body for employee management relations in the Foreign Service was an experiment. This is the second major case (there have been many minor ones) where the Board of the Foreign Service has taken illegal actions and has given special consideration to the views of the Agencies without according equal treatment to the organization representing the employees (the other case being the AID Ship Travel Case, which we reported on in our Editorial on p. 4 of the August 1974 FSJ). We have concluded with great reluctance that the Board of the Foreign Service is a failure and is inherently incapable of providing fair, evenhanded treatment to all of the parties. Short of a major, widereaching reform, we see little alternative to the abolition of the Board of the Foreign Service.

Selling Ambassadorships

On a brighter note, you will see from the Editorial that we are beginning to make some progress both with the public and with the Senate in our efforts to assure that our ambassadors, whether career or noncareer, must be competent and must not obtain their embassies by outright purchase, by indirect reward for major contributions, or as a pay off for their role in brokering ambassadorships for others. On the public front, we have received expressions of editorial support or front page news articles on our stance from the New York TIMES, the Washington STAR, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, the Copley chain, the Des Moines REGISTER, the FEDERAL TIMES, and many others.

On the Congressional front, we have now indicated our concerns on three nominations, and while we lost on the Firestone case, the White House has just announced as this is going to press, that it has agreed to the request of Stanton

Anderson that his nomination to Costa Rica be withdrawn for personal reasons. In the case of Mr. Flanigan, his confirmation now appears in doubt as a result of the actions of the Association, and more significantly of Senator Eagleton, and there have been some indications that the President will not resubmit his nomination when the Congress reconvenes after the Election. At the same time, the Senate passed an amendment to the AID bill proposed by Senator Mathias which would express the sense of the Congress that those who have contributed more than $2,000 should not be made ambassadors, and requiring that no more than 20 percent of all ambassadors be from outside the career service. Though this bill was sent back to Committee, the passage of such an amendment by the Senate clearly indicates growing unhappiness in the Congress with the unseemly abuse of selling embassies.

The Association, meanwhile, is considering steps to broaden its role in assessing the qualifications of ambassadorial nominees. This could involve two components, first the establishment of criteria that all nominees, whether career or noncareer, should meet in order to be nominated and confirmed as ambassadors and second, establishment of a blue ribbon AFSA committee which would assess individual nominees against these previously established criteria. We will be communicating with the entire membership shortly, requesting your views on this vital matter.

State Precept Negotiations

As this is going to press, it appears that we have broken a major deadlock with State management on the senior precepts, which will permit the senior officer selection boards to meet as scheduled. A full report on these negotiations will be made in a subsequent issue.

USIA Negotiations

In spite of our difficulties with the Agency over the safeguards issue, we have reached agreement with the Agency on a number of small but important questions. Following a poll of the USIA membership, we consulted with USIA on the possibility of changing the USIA efficiency report form. Most of our members had felt that the existing USIA form was a distinct improvement over the old State form, but many members favored instead the new State Department form. In our consultations, it was agreed, in the interest of maintaining a unified Foreign Service, to adopt a modified version of the State Department form, eliminating those features of the State form which we had had trouble with in State, particularly the "officer's qualities" checklist. Though we had real problems with the timing, on balance our USIA negotiators felt the new modified State form as used in USIA will be the best form used in the Foreign Affairs Agencies.

We also reached agreement with USIA on the selection-out criteria to be utilized for last year's selection boards. The Agency agreed with the Association's position that in addition to the criteria utilized by the selection boards (identification of those officers, if any, whose performance was so deficient as to warrant separation), that no one would be eligible for selection out as a result of last year's selection boards' actions who had not been previously low-ranked while in the officer's present class.

Finally, we reached agreement with USIA on a proposal made by our joint Members' Interests Committee, that USIA establish a committee similar to the State Committee on Exceptions which would rule on requests by employees for waivers on exceptions to the regulations, particularly those relating to shipping and travel. While a great many months went by between our initial proposal and management's final acceptance, we are delighted that the Agency agreed to take this step. The grievance system protects employees from arbitrary or unfair interpretation of the existing regulations, but the Grievance Board does not have the authority to waive the regulations, though there are often circumstances where such a waiver is fully justified, either in terms of the best interests of the US government or in fairness to the employees.

Steve Wallace

AID'S THREAT TO THE F.S.

For AID Foreign Service personnel, having "career status" with a temporary agency is somewhat of a contradiction in terms and provides, at best, only a limited sense of job security. However, when this Foreign Service "career-temporary" status is aggravated by the assertion that a Foreign Service person's value is equated only with the six digit Area Occupational Specialty Code (AOSC) assigned on one's position, the incumbent has neither the protection of the rank-in-person system traditionally afforded Foreign Service personnel, nor the many adverse action appeal rights afforded Civil Service personnel. Conceptually and substantively, this is even more ludicrous than being an AID time-limited Foreign Service employee, for "limited" employees are not deluded into a sense of security. AID's system has kept most of the "L" employees insecure all of the time. When it is to management's advantage, such as for assignments, rank-in-person criteria are applied; when not, such as for RIF purposes, the person is considered in no other terms than the six digit code carried by his position. Even worse, it is also possible that such tactics could be applied to the thousands of nonexcepted Foreign Service personnel in State and USIA if RIFs were to become necessary in these Agencies. Understandably, AFSA wants no such precedent to be allowed to stand in AID.

AID is trying to have its cake and eat it too, with its Foreign Service employees comprising the cake. AID management is the first to claim the need for flexibility of the rank-in-person system to assign personnel and short circuit the kind of protection available to Civil Service personnel, because such procedures would be applicable in the Civil Service as adverse actions; but then AID turns around and says that it must follow its rather bizarre interpretation of Civil Service regulations for RIF purposes and terminate personnel only on the basis of a position code.

The above situation was painfully illustrated at a hearing before the Grievance Board this month. The grievant had recently been RIF'd and the undated retention registers supported his charge that the RIF retention registers were prepared before the grievant's code

was changed. The grievant had returned from an overseas assignment in 1973 with his old personal code. He was assigned to an AID/W position with another code, and continued to carry his old code. In June, AID unilaterally changed the applicable regulations without the opportunity for AFSA to consult on the change; and in July, AID reclassified and recoded the grievant's position, assigned the grievant a new code, and then notified the grievant of his imminent RIF one day after he had been notified that it had been changed. As Rick Williamson argued at the hearing, the new regulations add up to: ". . . a pattern of arbitrariness and capriciousness, no one element of which may, all by itself, be considered arbitrary or capricious, but which add up to a pattern which can only be characterized as random and bizarre."

The Association remains cautiously hopeful that a RIF procedure can ultimately be negotiated which is tailored to the special rank-in-person concept of the Foreign Service. If that fails, we will have no other reasonable alternative than to seek a change in legislation to apply rank-in-person criteria for RIF as well as assignment purposes.

AID Affairs

On the positive side for a change, agreement was reached on the AFSA-proposed Foreign Service Staff Career Management Program. The program is designed to upgrade outstanding Staff Corps employees through a two-year career management work-study program in AID/W and overseas. A minimum of 10 FSS personnel will be chosen for the program each year, with the maximum number dependent upon the projected availability of junior-level professional positions.

AID management has also been receptive to AFSA's suggestion that the new PER form be changed in the near future, and consultations are about to begin. Widespread dissatisfaction with portions of the new system and form has been expressed, and AFSA intends for revisions to be made in time for the next rating cycle.

After three months of waiting, the Disputes Panel finally convened in an attempt to mediate AFSA's consultability appeal on the issues of conversion and termination of time-limited employees, and on administrative promotions. Time permitted debate only on the "L" issue, and AID still argued "nonconsultability" in relation to its position that "limited" employees should be terminated on the basis of position abolishment, rather than on the basis of comparative employee performance. Since mediation has proven unsuccessful, a formal Disputes Panel hearing is now scheduled on the two issues on October 23.

Joint Agency Members' Interests

In response to an AFSA initiative, agreement was recently reached whereby posts will take affirmative action in assisting claimants with private personal property losses stemming from transportation. In the past, employees have had to spend a great deal of time merely trying to learn the identity of carriers or packers, and simultaneously suffer significant out-of-pocket expenses until the claims were ultimately processed. Active assistance of management to the employee vis-a-vis third parties will hopefully streamline claims process, significantly saving the employee time and interim financial loss.

The Association has just reached agreement with the Agencies to ensure that employees receive compensation for irregular or occasional overtime. Now, when unusual circumstances preclude the authorizing of essential overtime work in advance, supervisors may order up to eight hours of overtime. As soon as practical, such an order must be supported by a memorandum explaining the emergency and the inability to seek prior authorization. These new procedures will permit due compensation to thousands of employees formerly denied overtime compensation because of the inability of supervisors to authorize it.

As a result of a recent AFSA initiative to the Department, a new legal interpretation of Section 527 of the Foreign Service Act in conjunction with PL 90-494, will now permit retiring FSRUs to seek reappointment as limited FSRs immediately following retirement. In this respect, FSRUs will now be afforded the same re-employment rights as FSO, FSIO and FSS personnel. Heretofore, the Department has not differentiated between the FSR and FSRU categories.

THE ELECTION CHALLENGE

As we have mentioned in earlier issues, two of the losing candidates in the 1973 AFSA election raised challenges to the conduct of that election of Officers and Representatives constituting the AFSA Governing Board. These complaints, in keeping with the rules of the Election Committee, were submitted to the Committee which investigated the charges, and prepared voluminous replies that determined the charges were not valid.

The losing candidates then exercised their rights to appeal the matter to the Department of Labor. The Department undertook an exhaustive investigation which found most of the charges to be totally without foundation; all but one of the remainder were dropped after discussion with AFSA and a further investigation.

The Department of Labor did, however, discover one area which it believed to be in technical violation. The AFSA election call, which appraised members of the opportunity to nominate and be candidates for AFSA office, was contained in the August issue of the JOURNAL. As it turned out, that issue of the JOURNAL, for reasons having solely to do with the fact that our printer began going bankrupt that month, was not delivered until October, after the deadline for filing in the election. Fortunately, the "Redtops" we circulated through the "keyman" network and posted here on the bulletin boards (which the Association was not required to do, but did in an effort to achieve maximum opportunity to obtain advanced notification) were determined to be adequate notice. However, these "Redtops" were allegedly not received or seen by some of our retired members, who were thus not accorded an opportunity to nominate and be candidates.

The Department of Labor investigators, while complimenting the Association on the many features of its Bylaws and procedures which greatly exceed the requirements of the law, believe this delay by the

printer in delivery of the JOURNAL to be a technical violation, and have so informed the Association. In doing so, they made clear that they were in no way asserting, and had found no evidence, that the Association had deliberately or even through negligence sought to undermine democratic standards.

AFSA, in turn, has written to the Department of Labor, indicating that we do not agree with their legal interpretation. As we go to press in mid-October, the Labor Department still has the matter under consideration. Our differences of legal interpretation may ultimately be decided before an administrative law judge.

75-76 Scholarship Time

You've just paid this year's college tuition bills and now you can relax. Right?

Wrong! The time to think about paying next year's bills is right now. AFSA's Annual Scholarship Program is already gearing up. To send for an application packet write Mary Jane Brown or Clarke Slade, AFSA Scholarship Program, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. Counselors in the Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center, they both also serve AFSA's Scholarship Committee as Counselors for Scholarship Matters. They'll be glad to answer your questions on behalf of AFSA's Board of Directors and the Scholarship Committee which guide the Scholarship Program.

Foreign Service People

Marriage

Wiesner-Manna. Elizabeth Quincy Wiesner, daughter of FSO and Mrs. Louis A. Wiesner, was married to Charles Robert Manna, on August 20, in Chocorua, N.H.

Births

Gralnek. A daughter, Karin Patience, born to FSO and Mrs. Maurice N. Gralnek, on September 7, in Bangkok.

Hall. A daughter, Nancy, born to FSO and Mrs. James H. Hall, on August 22, in Saigon.

Deaths

Ludlow. James M. Ludlow, FSR, died on August 8 in Arlington, Virginia. Mr. Ludlow joined the Department of State in 1942, serving as UN adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State, senior faculty member of FSI and most recently as Special Assistant to the Chief of the Historical Studies Division. He is survived by his wife of 4311 Vacation Lane, Arlington, Va., a son, two daughters, his mother and two brothers.

Owen. George Hodges Owen, FSO-retired, died on September 3 in Washington. Mr. Owen joined the Department of State in 1945 and served at Rio de Janeiro, Guayaquil and as the director of the Visa Office before his retirement in 1972. He is survived by his wife of 3018 P Street, N.W., two sons and two daughters, and two sisters.

Rowell. Edward J. Rowell, FSO-retired, died on August 12 in Lafayette, California. Mr. Rowell entered the Foreign Service in 1944 and served at Rio de Janeiro, Copenhagen, Oslo, Bucharest, La Paz, Paris, Geneva and as consul general at Recife with the personal rank of minister before his retirement in 1967. He was one of the three original labor attaches in the Department of State. He is survived by two sons, FSO Edward M. Rowell, 5414 Newington Rd., Bethesda, Md. and Frederic C. Rowell of Lafayette, California. The family suggests that contributions in Mr. Rowell's memory may be made to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

Solana. Joseph Ramon Solana, AID, died on October 1, in Lauderhill, Florida. Mr. Solana joined the Foreign Service in 1944 and transferred to an AID predecessor agency in 1952, serving at Rio de Janeiro, Managua, Georgetown and Tegucigalpa. He is survived by his wife of 6361 Falls Circle Dr., N., Apt. 208, Lauderhill, Fla.

Wentzel. Wilfred H. Wentzel, FSR-retired, died on September 8, in Washington. Mr. Wentzel joined USIA in 1956 and served at Belgrade and Karachi before his retirement in 1972. He is survived by his wife of Berkeley Springs, West Virginia, a son, two daughters, three brothers and three grandchildren.

Wile. Frank S. Wile, FSO-retired, died on October 7 at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Mr. Wile entered the Foreign Service in 1949 and served at Port of Spain, Rotterdam, Monrovia, Sierra Leone, Amsterdam and Zurich before his retirement earlier this year. He is survived by his wife, Virginia D., and three daughters, Sara Sloan, Susan Bowman and Katherine Taylor, of 9611 Byeford Road, Kensington, Maryland. The family suggests that contributions in his memory may be made to the National Kidney Foundation.

Wood. Jeanne V. Wood, wife of FSO-retired John R. Wood, died on June 14 at Nice, France. Mrs. Wood accompanied her husband on his assignments to Paris and Washington from 1919 to 1961 when he retired. She is survived by her husband of 14 bis Avenue Villebois Mareuil, Nice 06000, a daughter, Mrs. E. W. Weaver of Williamsburg, Va., two sons, Jack G. Wood of the Department of State and James W. Wood of Brussels, and a brother.

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WHEN YOU'RE GOING TO TAKE ROOTS ABROAD...

...INSURE!



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