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
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Ambassadorial Nominations—The Next Steps

IN RECENT WEEKS, the White House has announced that the President has agreed to withdraw the nominations of first Stanton Anderson and then Patrick Flanigan to be Ambassadors to Costa Rica and Spain respectively.

In both cases, the Association had indicated to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee our concerns with respect to these nominations; in both cases the nominations were held up because members of the Senate shared the same concerns we had expressed; in both cases the individuals finally requested the President to withdraw their nominations.

In several respects, these developments are highly positive. They reaffirm the wisdom of the Constitutional requirement for the advice and consent of the Senate; they illustrate the valuable role the Senate can play in the confirmation process; they indicate the clear sentiment in the press and the Congress for the need to put to rest the worst abuses of political influence peddling and purchasing, of which the selling and buying of Embassies was a major and longstanding symptom; and they demonstrate the fact that the Association, as the representative of career professionals, can have a real and serious role in joining the fight against worst abuses, and thus in raising the standards of our profession.

In spite of these positive signs, the Association cannot be entirely happy with the present situation. In the first place, the recent events do not add up to a "Not for Sale" sign which we can post on each Embassy, but only that some cases of apparent blatant abuse—either as purchaser or auctioneer—may be stopped by the Constitutional process when the facts of the case can come to light.

Second, and perhaps more seriously, the procedures followed in the most recent cases are hardly the best possible means of assuring that all nominees are given careful scrutiny to determine that they are in fact qualified to perform their functions as Ambassadors. On the contrary, the Association has only been able to focus on a limited number of cases, and has not been able to give even-handed scrutiny to each case. Moreover, the Association, lacking any clear criteria against which to judge Ambassadorial nominees, has been forced to concentrate on those cases which appear to involve serious conflicts of interest, violations of law, or particularly flagrant cases of influence peddling or purchase. Much the same can be said of the role of the Department and the role of the Senate—no one is presently giving each Ambassadorial nomination the serious, consistent scrutiny which we believe it deserves.

One major step which could be taken in this regard would be for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to adopt the criteria which it developed in the summer of 1973, but on which the Committee never took action. The Association at the time took a strong stand in favor of such criteria, and spent considerable time commenting upon and proposing amendments which strengthened the Senate draft.

Another step in the right direction would be to pass legislation which would prohibit the worst abuses. One useful advance was made two years ago, when the Congress passed into law an AFSA-proposed amendment to the State/USIA Authorization Bill, which required each Ambassadorial nominee to make full disclosure to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee of all political contributions. This past year, the Congress approved a further AFSA proposal to strengthen the law, by requiring that this information be published in the Congressional Record thus subjecting political contributors to public, as well as Committee, scrutiny. We are naturally pleased with these two provisions of law, which at least assure that the Congress and the public will have at their disposal the information on which to judge whether individuals gave such considerable funds that reasonable observers might conclude that they were being nominated because of their contributions.

This fall, Senator Mathias proposed an amendment to the AID Bill, which would have precluded any individual from being considered for an Ambassadorship who had contributed more than \$5,000 to the previous presidential campaign. He also suggested legislative language which would have limited the percentage of non-career Ambassadorships to 20 percent of the total. While these efforts were not incorporated into law, they have considerable validity, and would make certain of the worst abuses almost impossible. Unfortunately, the likelihood of such legislative remedies at the moment does not appear to be too good.

In the meantime, the Association, having taken the first steps to comment on certain apparently flagrant cases, now has essentially four options concerning our future involvement in this most critical aspect of our actions as a professional association:


(1) *Do nothing.* Two of our members and other outsiders have suggested that the Association has no business involving itself in this matter. We don't agree. In the first place, the Association is doing nothing other than exercising its own Constitutional rights; in no way is any AFSA role a substitution for or an intrusion upon the Constitutional prerogatives of the President and the Senate respectively concerning Ambassadorial nominations. Moreover, the Senate and the Executive branch have both (in varying degrees) indicated that the comments of the Association are not only proper, but make a positive contribution to the Constitutional processes. Finally, it should be noted that there is nothing unusual in professional organizations commenting upon Presidential nominations requiring Senatorial confirmation.

(2) *Continue our present course.* The Association has been successful in bringing public attention to bear on several particular cases, and we have made our position very clear to the Administration and the Senate with some positive results. It might well be argued that that is all that can reasonably be expected to be accomplished, and that the Association should continue these activities but not seek yet a more active role.

(3) *Oppose as a matter of policy all non-career nominations.* A number of our members, and several outsiders have suggested that the Association's position would be clearer, and more "credible" if we adopted a policy of opposition to all non-career appointments. Proponents of this view point out that all other modern Foreign Services permit only a tiny handful of non-career Ambassadors, if any. They also point out that the record of non-career Ambassadors has been a mixed one at best, and that diplomacy is too important a matter, particularly for the world's leading power, to be left to amateurs. While recognizing the validity of some of these points, the Association has tried scrupulously to avoid engaging in a particularist and parochial campaign. Moreover, there have been too many outstanding individuals from outside the career service who have served this country as Ambassadors with great distinction. We would be less than honest to argue that the Foreign Policy of the United States in each case would be better served if all Ambassadors were from the career service. In short, we believe the Association would be well advised to continue to take the position that *qualified* non-career ambassadors should continue to be nominated, and that what we seek is means of assuring that all nominees, whether career or non-career, are qualified.

(4) *Expand considerably our activities in this field.* Those who favor this option believe that what is needed is a series of criteria which the Association itself can adopt and against which all non-career appointees could be judged by the Board. The Board would then refer its findings in an individual case to the Senate or the Executive Branch. Some have suggested we also establish a Blue-Ribbon Committee which would investigate each nominee in light of the AFSA-adopted criteria, and make recommendations to the Board.

Needless to say, these are matters of considerable importance to AFSA, the Service and the national interest. We would appreciate your views on the future course the Association should take on this matter, before any further action is taken.



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FREDERICK OECHSNER

WHILE IT CANNOT be said that Susi was born into the Foreign Service, she entered it at a very early age (six weeks), was subjected to the usual rigorous examination, and accepted only on probation. She was black, she was female, and these were desiderata of a high order.

It was shortly after we arrived in a grim, dark, 40-below-zero Warsaw that I agreed with my wife and our daughter that a puppy might brighten our lives. But one was not easy to find in the Poland of 1954, still struggling to its knees after World War II, and with a scarcity of food that made dogs a luxury. We followed up various leads, mostly to nearby farmhouses, but without avail. Life continued shut-in, dim, and depressing in the winter quiet.

On the suggestion of a local employee at the Embassy, we finally tried the Kennel Club. They knew of nothing, but would try. A few weeks later, a knock on our door one night brought into the living room an uneasy, bundled-up man carrying a briefcase. From long experience in Germany, I knew that briefcases as often contained sandwiches or overshoes as they did papers, but we hardly expected the contents of this one. Gently the man lifted out three entrancing dachshunds, very wobbly and squeaky, and ready to be adopted forthwith.

It is always difficult to know which one to choose; you want them all. Eventually, we three got our heads together and selected the one with enough wrinkles in the brow to signify concern—but not panic—at the state of the world. It seemed a suitable mien, of a type I had seen so often in the Department, especially on the Seventh Floor.

None of us remembers today how Susi got her name. It means "lily," and that she certainly warn't; but somehow it fitted her style better than, let us say, "Jadwiga." As the weeks wore on, it became evident, too, that she

Mr. Oechsner joined the Foreign Service in 1951 after serving in Berlin with the United Press and with OSS as Special Assistant to General Donovan. He served in Warsaw and Monterrey and as Public Affairs Advisor, Bureau of Economic Affairs.

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The closer you look, the better we look.

was a creature of quality. The papers which the breeder had supplied us, while adequate on the maternal side, showed an almost embarrassed reticence on the father's. Mesalliance? Documents lost in the holocaust of war? Susi seemed indifferent, but we, knowing that issues of prestige can becloud a later life, felt that we should protect her interests. So, back to the Kennel Club we went. We would be grateful if a little further investigation might be engaged in; you never knew; a clue here, a clue there. And, if there were something that we could do in return, we would be more than pleased. Yes, there was. A set of canine tonsil-snares, perhaps, from our coming trip to Berlin? (Don't ask me how they knew that we were going to Berlin.)

Our next visit to them was to deliver the snares. Oh, yes, of course; the papers! With amazement and delight, we looked upon a blood-line studded with some of the most illustrious names in Polish canine aristocracy. It had obviously entailed the most tenacious research for which, in leaving, we expressed our humble thanks. Never were all the parties more completely satisfied in a transaction to which the name of bargain should never be applied.

Equipped now with credentials that would require her to bow to no dog in Warsaw, Susi became a fixture, an integer, a component in almost everything that we planned and did. Like the big mountain, she was always THERE. But her "thereness" had its reciprocal side, too, and she justified—as if with full intent—every expectation we had of her. As with all puppies, her physical and psychological growth was a source of endless interest and amusement. A sponge for affection, she also absorbed along with it many of the tensions of daily life.

Konrad Lorenz notes that dogs at six weeks are entering their socialization stage, and readily transfer their attachment from their natural parents to their owners. In Susi's case, there was no disputing Lorenz: she adopted us "in loco parentis" with bland assurance and absolute trust. The only thing we didn't know was that it was to be for 13½ years, through three assignments and into retirement, through all the pains and pleasures of animal and human life, 'til death did us part.

She was a social little creature. Outside the family, she was reserved, selective. Men she adored; women she could do without, except when necessity or politeness required; with children (seen, perhaps, as small rivals) she was ill-at-ease; and for other animals at this stage of her life, she had mostly a hostile eye. But she did enjoy gallivanting with diplomatic pals at the small club which the Western group maintained at Miedjesin, on the banks of the Vistula nearby. Any exercise was bliss, and for her walks I conditioned her early to the sounds of "Okay, let's GO!"; this triggered her to such excited wriggings as made it all but impossible to get her into either the red or the green outfits which my wife had brought her back from Vienna.

Our own social life in Warsaw was mostly a matter of countless dinners and national days among the members of the Western missions, with occasional visitors from the outside world. For none of us was contact with Poles encouraged, to put it in its mildest terms. Yet Susi's social opportunities, by any dog's standards, were impressive in the extreme. She was no name-dropper, but in telling her story I cannot fail to reveal that her introductions, beginning with John, Robert and Ethel Kennedy, embraced (and in some cases this was literal) a host of

A guide to witch hunting —by a distinguished victim.

When O. Edmund Clubb assumed the post of Director of the State Department's Office of Chinese Affairs in July 1950, he had been in the U.S. Foreign Service for a full twenty-two years. Suddenly, the Department's Loyalty Security Board charged that he had delivered a "sealed envelope" to the office of the New Masses in 1932, had revealed "pink tendencies" in 1934, and had been "100% Red" in 1940.

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distinguished Senators, journalists, and Service colleagues enroute between posts, all of whom made Ambassador in a short time.

In the immediate Embassy family, she developed crushes on two of our officers that were to endure for the rest of her life. Whenever she met them again, her excitement was so theatrical that, unless you knew what a genuine little thing she was, you would think that it was all put on. If she had been able to write their efficiency reports (and "opinion of ratee held by rater's pooch" is one of the few factors that I can think of that haven't been tried at some stage in our perfecting of this instrument), they would have glittered with superlatives.

Susi had her hate-list, too (she didn't like Inspectors, but then who does?), and it included the representatives of two otherwise friendly powers, one of whom pinched her nose sharply for no good reason except that affairs weren't going well for his country at the moment; and the other of whom let a door slam on her tail, inflicting a deformity that she never outgrew. I think that it should be said in extenuation that by the time Susi, from tip-of-nose to tip-of-tail, got through a door, the gent probably had tired of holding it open. After all, he was an Ambassador, and the envoy of a nation of so ancient a prestige that he didn't really like to hold the door open for anybody.

In a contrast to this that warms the heart, I should add that when we started the long journey to our next post in Monterrey at the railway station in Warsaw, the Minister of a wonderful Latin American republic sat with Susi in our compartment (holding her paw, I believe) while we



"True aristocrat enroute to country place" (Washington)

said goodbye in the hubbub outside.

Not to be partial between two idyllic posts, let me state simply that Monterrey was different from Warsaw. Instead of 40-below, it was 110-above. Susi, fast becoming a good Foreign Service dog, took it without a trace of cultural shock, and roamed the 25 acres of our rented "La Chacrita" with eagerness in every sniff. There were possums and rabbits; snakes, lizards, and scorpions; birds without number; and new foods beyond the power of Polish to describe. Of the household staff of seven or five (depending upon the exigencies of pregnancy, booze, or visits to relatives in distant parts) she soon made spineless minions of the cook and maids.

But the really big experience in Mexico was getting

Continued on page 38

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The Cuban revolution may be said to have had an impact in Latin America comparable in some ways to that of France in the Europe of the 1790s.—From *Cortes to Castro*, by Simon Collier

New Cuba. New Cubans

JOHN P. HOOVER

THE SQUALOR of Old Havana is gone—as are the beggars, the loiterers, and the idle; their comrades the bootblacks, carwatchers, and lottery ticket hawkers; and the petty vendors who cluttered sidewalks with their pitiful displays of shoelaces, chewing gum, and plastic combs. Gone too are the prostitutes and pimps. Ragged urchins no longer pester passers-by with whining requests for hand-outs.

For one who, like myself, knew the Havana of old, this is a welcome change. Curiously, it is also a source of grudging satisfaction to that small remnant of the old aristocracy that chose to stay on in Revolutionary Cuba and take its chances with the Castro regime. These remaining well-to-do have been permitted to retain much of their wealth, and have learned to live with an increasingly tolerant

and less fanatical Revolution. Though they have lost their erstwhile privileged status, they concede that the mass of their compatriots are better off than before.

My observations lead me to agree with them that the Castro government is doing more material and social good for a higher proportion of the people than any other regime in the island's history. More significant, in my opinion, is the psychological gain: Cubans have finally broken out of the mold of inferiority which Spanish policy and American prejudice pressed upon them. For the first time in four centuries, Cubans are proud to be Cubans.

Giving expression to this pride, Cubans are building a new nation on new bases: a modern society, an economy perforce dependent on the Soviet Union, and a people who have been retrained in Marxist moral and social values. Like other Communist states, Cuba offers none of the freedoms much of the Western world takes for granted—and the vast majority of Cubans in the new Cuba do not seem to care. Their apparent indifference, however, does not hide the fact that the loss of freedom is

real and has brought palpable social and personal loss: Their options in making the daily decisions of life are reduced in number, and the spontaneity that used to be one of their most delightful characteristics is impaired. Nor does it disguise the fact that revolutionary fervor, though still a basic motivating force—especially among the growing class of bureaucrats and technocrats—has lost its rough, unhone edge.

Moreover, such institutions as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution—there is one in every neighborhood—have acquired permanent status and work day and night to make people's lives easier and the Revolution more secure. In the best wardheeling tradition, they provide care for invalids, keep eyes on truant schoolchildren, make sure everyone gets polio vaccinations, discourage work absenteeism, and mobilize attendance at political rallies. They also make a point of knowing everyone in their area and what he may be up to. From close-hand and protracted observation, I can confirm that these Committees in fact do some innocent things, but also that they are

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instruments that could be converted to their original purpose of totalitarian control, sniffing out and snuffing out counterrevolutionary dissidence.

The mellowed 47-year-old Castro is a revered father figure, generally referred to as "our Commander-in-Chief." He clearly rules by consent of the governed—that great majority who, when speaking his name, lower their voices in affectionate respect. This deference they justify by the advances he has brought. His Cuba is so new and changed that it seems unrelated to the old, and those familiar with the former society can understand the new only at the cost of a radical shift in their preconceptions, interpretation of history, political philosophy, and standard of values. As one who knew pre-Castro Cuba, I felt, on returning recently, like Rip Van Winkle, who went to sleep before the American Revolution and could not comprehend the radical changes he saw on awakening.

Foremost among the changes is the end of unemployment, though the regime has been discovering that in Communist as in capitalist societies a certain proportion of the work force would rather loaf than work. Confronted by such irrefutable evidence of an antisocial attitude, and therefore of the government's failure to eliminate that defect among the people, Castro's officials must be constantly more innovative in devising various persuaders—hidden or open, voluntary or not—to keep workers on the job.

The workers enjoy definite advantages. Medical care, education, welfare benefits, and social security are free; rents cannot exceed 10 per cent of income, and taxes are hidden. (In a system of state-owned enterprises, the government takes its share of the GNP directly from profits at the source.) Since the prices of necessities are relatively low and take-home pay ranges from about \$100 to \$800 per month, even the humblest Cuban father no longer needs to worry about feeding and clothing his family. This is a satisfaction to Castro, fond as he is of proclaiming that his Revolution is of, by, and for the poor.

Education at all levels, from pre-school to university post graduate,

Gone is the shallow gaiety with which they used to meet daily vicissitudes, the sardonic humor that helped them withstand the cruel discipline of hard times, and that, perhaps, shrouded an underlying despair that they or their country could ever be truly free and prosperous.

is another high priority of the Revolution, and it has been energetically promoted and munificently financed. Schools of different levels are within reach of all throughout the island, and all are free. The still dingy streets of Havana swarm with children who, in contrast with former times, are clean, neatly dressed, sturdily shod, and well-fed. While most are on their way to or from the Revolution's revitalized schools, Cuba's leaders worry about the social malaise suggested by the growing visibility of reluctant scholars—bands of school-age boys playing sandlot baseball, fishing along the sea wall, or loitering near tourist hotels.

The educational showpiece is the Lenin Vocational School on the outskirts of Havana, with its 4,500 boarding students of both sexes, rigorously selected on the basis of merit by tough examinations. So excellent are the equipment, the scale, and the work-and-study curriculum offered, that this institution could be a model copied to advantage in some of the world's more developed countries.

The government claims that the emphasis given to education and the nationwide literacy campaign of a dozen years ago have wiped out illiteracy. Allowing generously for exaggeration—for a slippage of, say, 10 or 15 per cent—Cuba would still rank high among the nations of the world.

Perhaps as a reflection of their new well-being, full employment, and better education, Cubans today seem more serious in their attitude toward life. Gone is the shallow gaiety with which they used to meet daily vicissitudes, the sardonic humor that helped them withstand the cruel discipline of hard times, and that, perhaps, shrouded an underlying despair that they or their country could ever be truly free and prosperous. They are sober, not sullen, apparently feeling that a responsible attitude toward the present is at last justified by their firm confidence in the future, their faith that things

will keep on getting better. In social views they are egalitarian—no one is "better" than anyone else by sole virtue of heredity. Acquired socialist merit is the only just basis for hierarchical status. This equality frees them from the need to keep proving themselves, permitting them to be truly courteous.

In its self-extolled socialist idealism, Cuban society gives at least a superficial impression of altruism—the collective good is the greatest good. People do not seem to be motivated by competition for either material possessions or for the worldly position that would make their acquisition possible. The young, especially, ask how much they can do for their fellow man, not for themselves—an exalted attitude my admittedly baser view of human nature leads me to suspect will sooner rather than later be supplanted by old-fashioned selfishness and greed. But for now they contrast socialist ideals with the dog-eat-dog principle they see as the main motive power in capitalistic societies.

The young Communists in day-to-day charge of most of the institutions governing Cuban life are in their 20s and 30s, thoroughly indoctrinated but too young to have taken part in Castro's nation-forming guerrilla campaign, and with only dim childhood memories of bygone times. They are remote from the respected government counselors, the graybeards long in the high bureaucracy of the Communist Party. They hold in awe the veterans of the Sierra Maestra, now in their late 30s, 40s and early 50s, who fill the nation's middle and upper-management and professional slots. But in a few years, today's young will succeed Castro's cronies as decision-makers. Unless future developments change their perceptions of reality and of the national interest, Cuba will keep following the Moscow pattern—striving toward economic autarchy, developing its economy in accordance with Communist models, adopting a

more rhetorical and less active role in promoting Third World revolutions, banking fires of domestic revolutionary change, and slavishly following Soviet foreign policy leadership. It will remain subservient to—and, in major material respects, dependent on—Moscow, in mirror image of its deprecated former relationship to the United States.

The former northward dependency is hardly a memory. Most people in Havana today cannot even identify the former American embassy, before which, in the old days, visa applicants would swelter in blocks-long queues. Inside—the foreign interests section of the Swiss embassy occupies the building now—there is a besieged feeling. Outside, the atmosphere is relaxed. The military presence so prominent ten years ago has been greatly reduced. There are few uniformed men on Havana's streets, except for a normal complement of police, and there are almost no uniformed women at all on the streets.

Despite the reduction in military force, anti-American propaganda is vitriolic and provocative. All media give prominent play to bad news about the United States and find no room at all for the good. From early morning until late at night, the United States is a whipping boy, indispensable to the government in rallying public support.

A prominent Cuban newsman, for example, told me that the local press is mainly interested in telltale evidence that the US society and economy are about to collapse—reason enough for editors to scrutinize the lurid revelations about Watergate and financial reports of commodity scarcities, inflation, and a plunging stock market. Five directors of the Tourist Promotion Institute told me flatly that Cuba is uninterested in American tourist trade, on the spurious grounds that in the past Americans visited Cuba solely to drink, gamble, and whore.

Official hostility to the United States, though dominant in the media, is not reflected in popular attitudes toward individual Americans, who are usually well received. But there is little room for Americans in Cuba. Tourist facilities are jammed, mostly with Cubans who are overcoming traditional provincialism by getting to

know and enjoy some of the good life in their own island, but also with Russians, East Germans, Bulgarians, Romanians, Japanese, and Canadians. The world-renowned Varadero beach throngs with Russians, but hardly a Cuban is seen on the satin sand. On the other hand, crowds of Cubans, but no Russians, sit around the Varadero kidney-shaped pool.

The two nationalities do not fraternize. Apart from the almost total language barrier, pasty white Slavs seem somewhat averse to their swarthy hosts. Soviet tourists herd around in organized groups—bulging in bright-patterned frocks and sport shirts, lugging bulky cameras, balancing awkward baskets, and wearing silly hats. They elbow through shops, lounge blearily in bars, and sit numbly in dim night clubs—dead to the sexy Cuban dance rhythms. What, one wonders, are these people doing so far away—culturally and geographically—from their home?

But the Soviets are everywhere. Passport restrictions mercifully spare all but a few Americans the crude shock of seeing the overwhelming Soviet presence—the degree to which the geopolitical rival seems to be in control, showing little evidence of any East-West détente in either word or action. Local officials' endless reiterations of eternal Cuban gratitude for Moscow's largesse would sit poorly with Americans, who would fume to see the Abraham Lincoln Institute (formerly the Cuban-North American Cultural Institute) taken over—complete with Lincoln's portrait—as a Soviet cultural indoctrination center.

However, enrollments in the language classes at the Institute show English as the two-to-one favorite over French, with Russian a poor third. And there are other signs that suggest Cubans still vibrate sympathetically toward their northern neighbor. Rock music is the rage, recordings of American singing groups mesmerize their hearers, baseball is the national sport, American movies draw mass attendance, and around the Varadero pool every transistor radio is tuned full blast to Miami. This kind of magnetic pull goes far to explain Castro's apprehension for his regime's stability were relations

with the United States “normalized.”

STILL, CASTRO recently took some mincing steps toward softening the Cuban image. The utopian dream of building a pure socialist society is being deemphasized, on the practical grounds that it has failed to captivate the nation's youth. There is a generation gap; today's young are not as fervent revolutionaries as their elders, who in their tens of thousands flocked to follow Castro in overthrowing Batista. High officials voice firm confidence that the young will reject “the loathsome influence of capitalist consumer societies,” only to find themselves fighting a losing battle against long-haired, denim-clad Cubans, part of the world-wide youth culture, who want cars, cameras, radios, television sets, and other conspicuous accoutrements of affluence as much as Cuban-exile youngsters in the United States. Officials are concerned: They see clearly that the Revolution, if it is to endure, must capture the imagination of the young just as Castro, in the Sierra Maestra, captured the imagination of his generation.

In the meantime, at the Tropicana, Havana's fabulous cabaret, modish young men and women writhe ecstatically to a brassy cacophony. The dance floor is a pulsing mass of bodies, bending and twisting like snakes with stomach cramps. Cuban youth has not so much changed as kept abreast of the times—though the high point of the Tropicana's nightly show is a seemingly endless extravaganza, a supercharged evocation of revolutionary fervor and love of country.

Another softening step is a recently announced reversal of farm policy, slowing down the trend toward large consolidated farms, and improving the status of the small farmers, who produce most of the island's tobacco and coffee as well as much of the grains, fruits, and vegetables, despite fifteen years of agrarian reform. The small farmers are, no doubt, pleased at the reassurance that their land tenure is secure, and that future modifications of the agricultural structure will be gradual.

Some wisps of change also waft

Continued on page 39

I came into a place void of all light, which bellows like the sea in tempest, when it is combated by warring winds.—The Divine Comedy

THE GATHERING STORM

WALTER LAQUEUR

ALMOST TWO YEARS ago, in October 1972, Victor Zorza announced in a column in the Washington Post the coming of a new "golden age." Let the skeptics scoff, Mr. Zorza wrote, ten years from now they would be convinced. The world was moving toward a period of reconciliation, toward generations of peace: the Middle East conflict would be settled within the next three to six months, Middle Eastern oil would bring the great powers together. This messianic vision, Mr. Zorza explained, did not derive from an inherently optimistic frame of mind, but from a "cold assessment of the facts of international life, from a judgment that the self-interest of the great powers imposes on them patterns of cooperation that none can evade."

The tenor of the column reflected, if a little ecstatically, the mood of the period. The same message—that peace had come and wars were over—was contained, *grosso modo*, in the speeches and writings of leading Western statesmen from Nixon and Kissinger to Willy Brandt. President

Nixon's Report to Congress on US Foreign Policy for the 1970s promised "an international structure which could silence the sounds of war for the remainder of this century," while Dr. Kissinger himself appeared at a conference appropriately named *Pacem in Terris*.

In short, there was general agreement that the postwar era had come to an end, that a turning point in world affairs had been reached, that the old bipolar system (confrontation) had been replaced by a new multipolar system (negotiation), and that as a result there would be greater stability all the world over. As Professor Alastair Buchan, a former director of the Institute of Strategic Studies in London, was shortly to write in a book entitled "The End of the Postwar Era":

At the beginning of 1973 the ordinary citizen recalling China's admission to the UN in 1971 and her recognition by almost every significant country, having read of the strategic arms limitation and other agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States in May 1972, remembering the signing of the intra-Germany treaty and the electoral victory of the West German who signed it in November, and witnessing the final withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam in 1973, might pardonably feel that for the first time in forty years (that is, since the Japanese invasion of Manchuria or Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland) something that could be called peace has descended on the world. Men must have felt like this when learning of the Treaty of Westphalia.

So too Professor Karl Kaiser, a leading West German peace researcher. "Not only is the probability of military conflict less than it has ever been since World War II," wrote Professor Kaiser, but "the conviction is growing in both East and West that the situation has evolved to a point where relations between the two sides might be put on a qualitatively different level by expanding areas of cooperation and breaking the vicious circle of the arms race." Hence his conclusion that "the next few years can be used to create the conditions for a moderate and peaceful international system in the remaining decades of this century."

Europeans who still felt a little apprehensive with regard to future prospects were assured by George F. Kennan that "Finlandization" was a nonsensical idea. Short of actual occupation, Mr. Kennan said, no nation could fully enforce its will upon another, and anyway "the smaller and weaker a country, the more sensitive its government to any hint of military pressure being applied against it, and the more ready its resistance to anything that smacks of pressure or blackmail from the stronger power." If Europe could muster the political will, it would, according to Mr. Kennan, have nothing to fear from Russia or anyone else (which was rather like telling a patient that he would be quite healthy if he were not seriously ill).

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Of Mr. Zorza's ten years that might be needed to convince the skeptics, only two have passed and some will argue that all we need is a little patience. But the interim balance is not encouraging. The mood has markedly changed, and not just because there have been second thoughts about détente and Soviet intentions. Willy Brandt, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize and the architect of *Ostpolitik*, made his belief known among his confidants well before his sudden resignation that democracy would not survive in Europe much longer. And there were gloomy reflections in a recent editorial in the London *ECONOMIST*:

It may be that the idea of settling a conflict by the splitting of differences, like its brother-idea of limited war, is a relic of the consciousness of the 18th and 19th centuries that is being rejected by the harsher vision of the second half of the 20th century. It is total victory, unconditional surrender, that is required now. It is one more sign, among many others, of the end of a relatively rational period of history.

This is all a far cry from the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 and the golden age of 1972-73. But the apprehensions of the *ECONOMIST* are more realistic than the great expectations of the heralds of a golden age. For in addition to the major international conflicts which have still not disappeared—a possible military confrontation between the Soviet Union and China, the decline of détente, the lack of cooperation between the United States and Europe—a series of new crises is shaping up. It was perhaps the cardinal error of the heralds of the golden age to take internal stability and domestic prosperity and contentment for granted. Yet it is just in those areas that the new crises are developing. There is, furthermore, much reason to believe that these new crises will be only a prelude to a major international upheaval such as the world has not experienced since World War II.

IT IS TO ECONOMICS that we must turn first, and here we find that it is no longer a matter of dispute whether there will be a worldwide depression. The only questions now are how far it will go and what its political repercussions are likely to be.

Between 1960 and 1973 the aver-

age rate of inflation in the US was 2.8 per cent, in Western Europe it was 4.3 per cent, and in Japan it was 4.8 per cent. Between April 1973 and April 1974, the comparable rates were almost 10, 12, and 24 per cent respectively, and at present they are running even higher. Even West Germany, which has the soundest economy in Western Europe, faces an inflationary rate of about 8 per cent this year. Keynes wrote in his "Economic Consequences of the Peace" that debauching the currency is the best way of overturning the existing basis of society—wrongly attributing the saying to Lenin. Nowadays economists agree that a country can comfortably live with a rate of inflation of 5 per cent, and some countries have found ingenious ways to prosper at a higher rate. But with the notable exception of Iceland, there are not many examples in history of democratic regimes surviving years of hyperinflation (i.e., 20 per cent or more). To combat inflation various highly unpopular measures, such as deflation or devaluation, are needed, which do not even always work; "stagflation" and "slumpflation," a combination of stagnation and inflation, have been a characteristic feature of certain economies in recent years. This has resulted in increased social tension (class struggle in old-fashioned parlance), in mass strikes, and generally speaking in all kinds of severe strains and stresses.

Not all industrial countries are affected with equal severity: West Germany, with a GNP now almost as great as that of France and Britain combined, will finish 1974 with a substantial foreign-trade surplus. But most other countries will not be able to cover their balance-of-payments deficits, caused above all by the quadrupling of oil prices. For the general public the energy crisis was over the moment the lines in front of the gas stations disappeared. But in actual fact the quadrupling of the price of oil has created a worldwide crisis, the full financial and political effects of which are as yet to be felt. Britain, Italy, France, and Japan will have a combined trade deficit of some \$34 billion; they have borrowed \$12 billion from American banks which will keep them going for about a year. But they will not be able to

repay these loans, and they will find it very difficult to get new ones unless the price of oil is drastically reduced. Oil priced at more than \$8 a barrel means a world slump (it is more than \$11 at present). Alternatively disaster could be averted if the oil-producing countries invested their revenues in long-term projects in Europe rather than engaging in currency speculation and the purchase of real estate; they may do so one day, they have not done it so far.*

It is only fair to add that the inflationary spiral was triggered off even earlier by price rises in grain and in other commodities. The terms of trade for the producers of raw materials deteriorated between 1950 and 1970, and the theoreticians of the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) such as Raoul Prebisch predicted that this process would go on forever. It was perhaps most pronounced with regard to foodstuffs. The prices of wheat, maize, and rice were considerably lower in 1971 than in 1948; they were in fact below pre-war levels. The prices of milk and soybeans also decreased, though slightly, over these years. Only the price of animal protein rose—twofold in the case of fish, more than threefold for beef and veal. But the main producers of exportable supplies of food are the

*Some economists have argued that there is no real danger to the world monetary system because the oil-producing countries will have to spend virtually all of their increased earnings or lend them to the industrialized world. This theory of "recycling" may well be valid *sub specie aeternitatis*, but it is not of much help in dealing with a crisis which is already at hand. For all one knows, the Arab countries will prefer to invest in currency speculation and the acquisition of real estate rather than in industrial enterprises or banks. Fred Bergsten writes in the *New York Times* that "the Arabs will not bury the money in the ground. Thus, there can be no deficit in the balance of payments of the industrial world as a whole." This reminds one of the now defunct notion that the Arabs cannot drink their oil. In all probability they will "bury" part of their money and invest the rest in rich and efficient economies such as that of West Germany, not in any which are poor risks. It is also unlikely that the United States and West Germany will be willing to cover the payment deficits of the other European countries (not to mention the non-European ones) for many years to come. Some arrangements will no doubt be made to keep world trade afloat, but not before severe shocks, economic and political, are registered, and these new arrangements will probably not be very satisfactory for many countries.

United States and Canada which dispose of about as big a share (80 per cent) of the grain market as the Middle East does of oil. They were not disturbed by the low prices and neither, of course, were the countries of the Third World. Then suddenly a reversal set in with respect not to grain but to raw materials like copper, zinc, tin, and rubber. In 1973 the price of all these materials began to double and treble, and then, most fateful of all, came the rise in the price of oil. Oil is the most important commodity by far in world trade, totaling some \$135 billion, whereas world exports of sugar, the second most important item, are only \$5 billion; of copper, cotton, and coffee, \$4 billion each; and of rubber, \$3 billion. To keep prices high, commodity producers followed the example of the oil producers and established cartels of their own. First were the bauxite producers (Jamaica, Guyana, Australia, Sierra Leone, and others), then the main copper producers (Chile, Peru, Zaire, and Zambia). But it is doubtful whether they will be equally successful, because the dependence of the industrialized nations on raw materials other than oil is less substantial. (The US, to give but one example, produces 90 per cent of its own needs in copper.)

The commodity boom has resulted in a sharp division in the Third World, with some nations earning fabulous riches almost overnight, whereas others are literally being reduced to bankruptcy and starvation. And since nature has distributed its gifts arbitrarily, the sparsely populated countries profit most and the more populous ones face disaster. Thus the oil producers last year took \$66 billion from the industrialized countries, but more than half that sum went to five countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar) with a total population of 11 million—which is not exactly the economics of Robin Hood. To be more specific, per capita income in Abu Dhabi will be about \$47,000 this year, compared with \$40 in neighboring Yemen. Libya, with fewer than two million inhabitants (of whom half are Bedouins who have never heard of Qaddafi and Jaloud), now has a per capita income about thirty times that of neighboring Egypt. Zambia, with 4

million inhabitants, earns \$800 million from its copper exports, whereas neighboring Tanzania (with 13 million people) and Kenya (with 10 million) confront zero economic growth. India has to pay \$1.3 billion for its oil imports this year, which is about half the value of its foreign currency holdings. Black Africa's total bill will be about \$1 billion, which for most African countries means some 30-50 per cent of the value of their exports.

To forestall a general attack and to shift responsibility, the oil producers have admonished the industrialized nations to curb inflation, which in the circumstances is less than helpful advice. Algeria called for a special session of the UN General Assembly; there were endless speeches, a flow of documents, and a declaration of principles, but the outcome in practical terms was precisely nil. Some vague promises were made concerning international funds to the poor developing countries. But eventually it emerged that only a few oil producers were willing to help. Saudi Arabia claimed to have allocated \$2 billion (most of which was apparently paid to the Soviet Union for arms supplied to Egypt and Syria) and the other Arab countries gave a few hundred million dollars. The Shah of Iran promised \$1 billion and, in addition, may actually give India a billion; however poor, India is still a power to reckon with, and the Shah has every reason to fear a breakdown on the subcontinent. By contrast, smaller countries like Sri Lanka (Ceylon), which suffer as much as India but do not pull much weight, were quite unsuccessful in their foraging operations. Altogether, the oil producers promised to put \$2.75 billion at the disposal of the International Monetary Fund, but it is very doubtful whether the money will be forthcoming in the near future. And even if the oil producers should double or treble the amount, it would still be quite insufficient to cover the increased deficits of the poor countries.

THE SITUATION is further aggravated by the food crisis. According to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, world grain reserves now amount only to 27 days con-

sumption, and thirty developing countries face a catastrophe. Stocks have indeed run down during the last two years, but the immediate situation is probably not quite so bad as would appear at first sight, for the UN statistics refer to the time when stocks are lowest in each country—i.e., to the weeks before the new harvest is brought in. The immediate crisis in 1973 was caused by the US-Soviet grain deal, the biggest (and in its consequences most damaging) such deal in history. The price of a bushel of wheat was \$1.40 in 1972; as a result of the Soviet grain deal, the ensuing speculation, and some other factors, it went up to \$6.36. By June 1974, it had fallen again to \$3.40, averting any immediate danger of mass starvation. Nevertheless the outlook for the next five to ten years is still bleak, and for the poor countries of Southeast Asia and Africa, about one-third of mankind, it is disastrous. According to Professor Egbert de Vries's estimate,* those countries will be saddled with a deficit of some \$15 billion. A few of them, like Nigeria and Indonesia, will be able to compensate for the high prices by selling their raw materials at high prices. But this does not mean that 125 million Indonesians and 80 million Nigerians will all benefit from the boom; distributive mechanisms simply do not exist in those countries and the new wealth will not necessarily trickle down. The fact that a few people will amass great riches while the many go hungry will make for an acute revolutionary situation.

The long-term prospects for solving the food crisis are not that bleak, provided the population explosion is brought under control, provided the price of fertilizers is reduced (the price of phosphate increased fourfold during the last year, the price of urea sevenfold), and provided a number of other preconditions are met. Yet whatever happens, for a long time to come food will be scarce, and the "rich" countries—meaning the industrialized West, Japan, and the oil producers—will outbid the poor nations for it. Since there is only a slim chance of establishing an in-

*In a forthcoming study, "The World Food Crisis," Center for Strategic and International Studies and Sage Publications.

ternational mechanism for coping with world inflation and for regulating world production and trade in the near future, the danger of economic chaos is very real, and this, needless to say, could have far-reaching political consequences. There will be a growing trend toward economic nationalism and warfare. Money alone, on the other hand, will not safeguard the existence of the new small super-rich. The Persian Gulf mini-states and Libya may well be taken over by more powerful neighbors. Such action may appear improbable now; at a time of real crisis the temptation will be overwhelming. These tiny countries may want to insure their survival by establishing foreign legions or by acquiring small arsenals of nuclear arms. They will look for insurance by allying themselves with more powerful states—the recent rapprochement between Libya and the Soviet Union could well be a straw in the wind—but in most of these cases the cure will be worse than the disease. Sooner or later, the Abu Dhabi foreign legion will take the country over,[‡] and the Soviet Union is not likely to be guided by altruism in its role as protective power.

A MAJOR economic crisis inevitably exacerbates domestic tensions which can be contained more or less successfully during quieter periods. True, not all severe crises are fatal, and bankrupt countries, too, continue to exist. Pharaonic Egypt survived its seven lean years, but then it did not try to combine free collective bargaining, a welfare state, and price stability; the decision-making process was somewhat simpler than in a modern parliamentary democracy.

Today, poor countries and rich, backward and developed, are confronting the same danger. If, however, an "index of vulnerability" were established, the Indian subcontinent would take first place. India is the one major nation in which standards of living have actually declined since the end of World War II; and yet it has also been near the top of the Asian list of rising consumer prices during

the last twelve months, while industrial output has steadily decreased since 1972. Of India's 580 million inhabitants, about two-thirds are illiterate, nearly 100 million are unemployed, and some 170 million are under-employed. There are more blind people in India than industrial workers, and the overwhelming majority still lives in villages as it did two thousand years ago. About one-third of the rural and almost half of the urban population are permanently undernourished. As for deeper evils such as the caste system and the dead weight of Hindu superstition (with 120 million untouchables), they are well-known and need not be rehearsed.

In the 1960s it was announced that the "green revolution" would transform the countryside; yet it soon emerged that the number of landless peasants was rising rapidly. Then a mere two years ago, after the famous victory over Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi boasted that India was about to solve its problems through its own efforts; foreign aid would no longer be needed, India was about to defeat poverty. But the tide turned, and Mrs. Gandhi—who has inherited all the arrogance and self-righteousness but few of the redeeming features of her father, the late Jawaharlal Nehru—had to admit that 1973 would be the most difficult year in India's history. This was quite true, but 1974 is turning out to be far more difficult yet, and the years to come will be worse still. Close observers of the Indian scene have reached the conclusion that short of a miracle the country will fall apart, perhaps after an interlude of military dictatorship.

At present India is held together by a national party, the Congress, which is rapidly disintegrating, by a fairly efficient army and police force, by a much less efficient bureaucracy, by tradition, and simply by inertia. In the past the strong separatist forces claiming autonomy (there are 14 major languages and countless local dialects in India) were somehow contained. But as the strains grow and the general decomposition continues, the day may come when the central government will no longer be able to impose its will. The most likely outcome is not violent revolution

but the gradual spread of chaos, starvation on a massive scale, and epidemics, with local governments perhaps taking over many functions of the central government (a province such as Uttar Pradesh is more populous than any European country). It is quite possible that smaller administrative units will be better fitted to survive the coming storms. The Communists may come to power in some regions, but a nationwide victory seems out of the question, and not just because of the bitter struggle between the pro-Soviet party and the Maoists. The Indian Communist leaders are not notably more efficient than other Indian politicians, and the magnitude of India's problems would defy even the ruthlessness of a Stalin.

A collapse in India would be a calamity for the Soviet Union, for India would expect assistance from its friend and ally in the north. It need hardly be said that help on this scale (Cuba multiplied by sixty) would be an intolerable strain on the Soviet economy. To make matters worse, there would be no corresponding benefits, for Moscow already exerts all the political influence and has all the military bases in India it needs. Yet a Soviet refusal to help the Indians would automatically strengthen China's position on the subcontinent, and this the Russians could not permit to happen under any circumstances. The Soviet Union would therefore look to the United States, to Iran, and to the Arab oil producers to provide permanent assistance while maintaining and strengthening its own position in India.

It is unlikely that the atomic bomb will save India; the expense involved is staggering for such a poor country. According to fairly reliable calculations, maintaining a small, high-quality nuclear force requires a budget of \$6 billion over a period of ten years. If so, India's GNP will be reduced by 25 per cent. A prominent Indian member of parliament has claimed that his government's professions of peaceful intent are a mere "fig leaf," and that India is setting out to become a global power. Such claims are unreal: India will not become a global power in the foreseeable future. But there is a very real danger that the logic of events may induce the

[‡]"It would be possible for a foreign visitor to spend a week in Abu Dhabi without so much as meeting one native-born Abu Dhabiian" (London TIMES, May 23, 1974).

Indians to export the products of their new industry. India has traveled a long way since the days of Mahatma Gandhi and *Satyagraha*, and there should be no illusions as to the restraint and responsibility of the country's present leaders. Faced with an internal breakdown, would the Indian government hesitate to sell nuclear devices to Iran, to Kuwait, to Qaddafi—or to anyone else who might be in the market? Would it not at the very least use the threat of selling nuclear weapons to blackmail the superpowers—above all the United States—into providing aid on a massive scale? Nuclear devices will not solve India's domestic problems: they will not provide work for the 75 per cent of university graduates who are at present unemployed, they will not provide food for the 175 million Indians who vegetate below the poverty line of \$30 a year. But they might serve as a last desperate measure to prevent total collapse.

LITTLE NEED be said about India's neighbors. After the secession from Pakistan there was a wave of tremendous enthusiasm in East Bengal; by now it is obvious that the new state of Bangladesh is not viable. Per capita income is \$70 (as compared with India's \$110), the price of rice and other staple foods has gone up fourfold, and the assassination of political figures seems to be the main growth industry. Sri Lanka (Ceylon) has not overcome the effects of the abortive student revolution three years ago. Under the mismanagement of Mrs. Bandaranaike's government, this fertile island has become a beggar nation second only to Bangladesh. Burma, like India, is worse off now than ten or fifteen years ago; the population increase outstrips the growth rate in industry and agriculture. The White Flag guerrilla movement, which is supported by China, has not been defeated, and Ne Win's hold is limited to the big cities.

Some Indians would like to liquidate what remains of Pakistan. There has been talk about forcibly dividing the country into four independent smaller units: Punjab, Sind, Beluchistan, and Pakhtunistan. The Indians support uprisings in Beluchistan whereas the Afghans have been active in the

northwest frontier province, claiming that the oppressed Pakistani Pathans long to be reunited with their happy brethren on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistan, for its part, is quietly rearming with the backing of Iran and certain Arab oil states, hoping to recover some of its losses if and when India should collapse. But the Pakistani army has lost its self-confidence and there is no domestic leadership; the governing People's party is in an even more advanced state of disintegration than the Congress party in India. There have been discreet hints from the Shah that he would be willing to extend the benefits of his successful rule to his fellow Moslems on Iran's eastern borders should Afghanistan (backed by the Russians) press for the secession of the northern provinces. Facing undiminished hostility from both India and Afghanistan, Pakistanis may one day avail themselves of this generous offer.

The events on the Indian subcontinent will affect the lives of some 750 million people; the crises in the smaller countries of East and Southeast Asia are by comparison almost insignificant. In Cambodia about four-fifths of the population now lives under Khmer Rouge rule, and the victory of the Pathet Lao seems only a question of time: in the recently established coalition government the Pathet Lao was given about half the seats in the cabinet. In South Vietnam the war continues; some 100,000 South Vietnamese have been killed, wounded, or listed missing since the armistice came into force eighteen months ago. The North Vietnamese do not aim at a quick, dramatic takeover; they seem to be convinced that they are in a "no-lose" position and that the South is bound to fall into their hands anyway in a few years.

South Korea has been hit hard by the economic crisis, and the government is feeling the effects of its foreign political isolation. There is the ever-present danger from the North, but so far as President Park is concerned, there is an even greater danger from domestic opposition, both from within the army and from the students. In the Philippines martial law was imposed in 1972, but President Marcos has not overcome the Moslem insurgency in Mindanao and Sulu.

However, his domestic record is slightly better than average by Asian standards; sizable land holdings have been distributed to poor peasants, and if the oil bill of the country has gone up steeply, so has the income from copra, sugar, and other local exports. The Philippines are not threatened by a foreign invasion and they have an even chance of surviving the flood more or less intact.

As for Indonesia, it has benefited even more than the Philippines from the dramatic reversal in the terms of trade; its foreign exchange income will be 40 per cent higher in 1974 than last year. But the survival of the regime depends entirely on the cohesion of the army—or, to be precise, of the generals (who also happen as individuals to be among the main profiteers of the present boom). There is growing social tension; a rebellion on the outlying islands could spread to Java, and cause the overthrow of the system.

To summarize: in some Asian countries the storm may break in a year or two, in others it may take a little longer, some may be hit harder than others, but it is unlikely that anyone will be spared altogether.

WHEN THE COLLAPSE comes on the Indian subcontinent and in Southeast Asia, it will be unreasonable to blame the Russians, who have little to gain from it. In the Middle East, on the other hand, direct and substantial Soviet interests are involved. The Soviet Union has played, and continues to play, a negative role in the Arab-Israeli conflict; the idea that the Russians would behave responsibly and constructively if only given a chance to act as an honest broker belongs to the realm of fantasy. It is perfectly true that the Russians would be willing to guarantee a *Pax Sovietica* in the Middle East such as prevails in Eastern Europe; but the Soviet Union has no interest in the restoration of peace so long as it is not the dominant force in the area. To strengthen its position it will support the Iraqis and the South Yemenis against Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians and the Syrians against Israel. The great prize is of course not Suez or the Golan, but the Persian Gulf. Whether the road to Paris and

London leads through Peking and Calcutta, as Lenin thought, is a moot point; it is more certain that Kuwait and Abu Dhabi can be reached via Damascus and Baghdad. The Russians have been quietly building up their military position in the area, and they have not neglected the small oil-producing states either, with Kuwait as the focal point of their political activities.

Egypt and Saudi Arabia are at present less than helpful so far as Soviet policy in the region is concerned. Sadat's about-face following the Yom Kippur war has no doubt caused much anger in Moscow, and it serves as a warning that the same could happen in Syria one day. Sadat's foreign policy, to make matters worse, is quite popular inside Egypt, whereas the Russians are not. Generally speaking, Soviet ideology—not to mention the Soviet system—has lost much of its attraction over the last ten or fifteen years; radicalization in the Arab world has taken different directions. But in a long-term perspective, given Egypt's unsolved and perhaps insoluble domestic problems, the intrinsic poverty of the country, and its dependence on outside financial aid, Sadat's position is anything but strong. The workers clamor for higher wages, the intellectuals demand a more radical policy. Despite his successes, Sadat's political base remains fairly narrow; with Soviet help the Libyans will do their best to overthrow his regime.

The political structures elsewhere in the area are equally vulnerable. There has been a great deal of talk in the Arab countries about "our oil," but everyone in the Middle East knows that most Arab countries (Egypt, the Sudan, Lebanon, Syria, the two Yemens, etc.) do not benefit from the oil boom, and even inside the oil-producing countries, the spoils are very unevenly divided. There will eventually be a redistribution of wealth in the Middle East, and it will not be achieved by peaceful means. The survival of the Saudi regime is thus highly problematical; it may last for another decade, it could be overthrown next week.

Turkey and Iran, by long tradition the strongest and most stable countries in the area, have not been by-passed by the general turmoil.

The Shah may talk with pity about Europe's decadence and the dire prospects facing Japan, but the future of his own regime is by no means assured, and its new wealth has, in some respects, made Iran more vulnerable than in the past. Turkey, gradually drifting toward neutralism, also suffers from great economic strains and internal dissension. Once upon a time there was a broad internal consensus in Turkish politics, but it seems virtually impossible now to form a stable government; the forecasts made not so long ago about Turkey's brilliant prospects after decades of eclipse were, to say the least, premature.

The Middle East, in short, is certainly not among the regions threatened with economic collapse, but the political outlook is anything but encouraging; and it would be no better even if Israel did not exist.

FINALLY THERE is Europe. The pessimism voiced by the present writer in these pages more than two years ago* was thought excessive at the time. But in some respects one's worst fears have been surpassed. Italy has in fact opted out of the Common Market, Britain is crippled and will at best be a burden on the community even if its demands for renegotiation are accepted. That the momentum toward political unity had disappeared was obvious two years ago, that greater military cooperation could not be expected was in the cards even then. Since 1972 further cuts in defense spending have become necessary in several countries under the impact of the economic crisis. Two years ago, in other words, the danger was that Europe would no longer make progress toward the goals it had set itself. Today Europe is in full retreat.

Americans have often wondered about Germany's curious reluctance to take the lead. Economically the strongest country, it is now also the most stable politically, and has the most effective army. But a German-led Europe, however discreetly engineered, is an utter impossibility in the light of recent history. In Germany, moreover, there is a growing unwilling-

ness to foot the bill for the Common Market. When Helmut Schmidt took over from Willy Brandt, he told friends that he was no longer ready "to invest in that bankrupt association." A rash statement, not to be taken literally perhaps, but symptomatic of the prevailing mood. West Germany under Schmidt will maintain its ties with the US and so will France under Giscard d'Estaing, partly because these leaders are Atlantacists by conviction, partly because the logic of events is driving them into closer association with the senior partner in the alliance. There will be closer collaboration between France and West Germany, possibly the overall customs union will be restored in due time. But politically Europe is back now where it was a quarter of a century ago—on a higher level of material well being; a house divided, unable to defend itself.

Southern Europe, from Portugal to Greece, constitutes the gravest immediate problem. Everyone, or almost everyone, sympathizes with the cause of revolution in countries which have been subject to military dictatorship; unfortunately, there is always the danger that after a short interval of freedom and general rejoicing, these countries will be as unfree as before. The Communists, however few in number—there were two thousand of them in Portugal—emerge as the only political party with its apparatus intact, because they are best adapted to function in conditions of illegality. Thus they have a head start over democratic forces, of which they make the most. The struggle for power in Portugal is not over; it has just begun.

The turn of Spain may be next. Since the assassination of Prime Minister Carrero Blanco, his successor, Arias Navarro, albeit a right-winger, has followed a comparatively liberal policy. Censorship, relatively mild even before,‡ has been further loosened, and there is talk about the restoration of pluralism in Spanish political life. But the lesson drawn by the Spanish Right from the Portuguese example is that Caetano was overthrown because he was not authoritarian enough, and they are

*"The Fall of Europe?," COMMENTARY, January 1972.

‡Most Western left-wing literature is freely circulated in Spain; only domestic dissidents are muzzled.

opposed to any more "experiments." The Franco regime has to wage war on many fronts—against the trade unions, the students, the separatist movements among the Basques and Catalans, and to a growing degree against the Church. The Church, circumspect as ever, is preparing for the post-Franco era. The Archbishop of Barcelona openly attacked the regime recently for its "institutionalized violence," and there are many indications—not only among the lower clergy—that the Church wishes to dissociate itself from a regime which will not last much longer. There are advocates of liberal reform even in the army: General Allegria, the recently deposed chief of the General Staff, was sent countless monacles by unknown well-wishers after Spinola's coup in Lisbon.

In the past, two important considerations inhibited the revolutionary movement in Spain. First, and most important, there was the memory of a civil war in which one million Spaniards were killed or wounded and many more lost their homes and property. Even for many opponents of the regime the risk of another such war was too high a price to be paid for freedom. But in recent years a new generation has grown up for whom the civil war is no more than a distant historical event. The second factor inhibiting the revolutionary movement was prosperity. During the last decade Spain went through a period of unprecedented economic expansion, partly through the phenomenal growth of tourism and partly through foreign investments. These provided a great boost to Spanish industry and also had a major impact on agriculture. Per capita income increased sixfold from 1959 to 1973, from \$250 to \$1500; Spain is now tenth in the world's list of holders of gold and currency reserves. The standard of living of the working class has gone up substantially, and a new middle class has grown in size, wealth, and influence. At present the boom is fizzling, inflation is running at 16 per cent, and the latent political and social tensions are surfacing with a vengeance. If the Spanish opposition is strong, it is far from united; even among Communists there has been bitter infighting. The Right, on the other hand, is

These economic misfortunes would not be fatal per se . . . but they have coincided with something much deeper. Basically, it is the Italian failure, even after a century, to make one country out of two—the North and the South—which are different in almost every respect.

much more firmly entrenched than in Portugal; it will not surrender its positions without a struggle. Part of Spain's tragedy is that the vital center is still missing. Political change will thus in all probability be far more bloody than in Portugal, and the outcome is uncertain. . . .

WHATEVER HAPPENS in Spain or Greece, it is unlikely to shake the foundations of Europe; events in Italy, on the other hand, could cause a major earthquake. Italy has survived a condition of semi-anarchy for many years, and its infinite capacity for adjusting to this way of life has convinced some foreign observers that such a state of affairs could go on forever. But the latent malaise has become acute as a result of the economic crisis. Earlier this year the Rome statistical office announced that the GNP had risen 6 per cent in 1973 in real terms and consumption had gone up at the same rate: not spectacular progress, perhaps, but nothing to be alarmed about. Then, almost overnight, it was made known that Italy faced an \$8 billion balance-of-trade deficit, that the lira had to be devalued, that inflation was galloping on at 40 per cent, and that price controls and the most stringent import restrictions had to be introduced (in contravention to EEC regulations) to keep the country afloat. More recent figures are not available since the Rome statistical office, like many other Italian ministries, has been on strike.

These economic misfortunes would not be fatal *per se*—England is saddled with an even bigger trade deficit this year—but they have coincided with something much deeper. Basically, it is the Italian failure, even after a century, to make one country out of two—the North and the South—which are different in almost every respect. In the past two decades, the Italian government has invested some \$40 billion in the South, but to no avail:

the South is a bottomless pit. But it is quite mistaken to think of the Southerners as only the miserable slum dwellers of Milan and Turin. Seventeen million of them have migrated over the decades to the North, and they now dominate whole sections of the state administration, including ministries such as Justice and Police (capable young Northerners usually prefer careers in business or the academic world). The Southerners are largely responsible for the paralysis of the central government, for bureaucratic mismanagement and corruption.

The Italian crisis has other facets too: the tendency of Italy's rich to invest their money in speculative building deals (or to smuggle it out of the country), the dissatisfaction of the working class (particularly younger workers), the unwillingness of the clergy to surrender any position, the hopeless division within Italy's leading party which is split into about a dozen different factions (*correnti*). Against this background there emerges a picture of fear, resignation, and hopelessness.

The Italian problem could be solved by dividing the country into two, with the border running somewhere south of Rome. Another possibility is the reorganization of Italian political life on a regional basis with a reduction in the role of the central government and the state bureaucracy. But these are remote possibilities. A coup from the Right by Almirante's Neo-Fascists in collaboration with sections of the armed forces and the Carabinieri is no longer ruled out, at least in the South, though it would stand little chance in the industrial and predominantly left-wing North. The other possibility is a left-wing coup, but the Italian Communists have not been in a hurry: why take risks, if sooner or later they will be asked to come to the rescue anyway? For the Italian CP is one of the abler and more enlightened

Communist parties; it has shown some ability on the municipal level and a growing number of left-wing Christian Democrats have reluctantly accepted the fact that to prevent a total collapse they may have to look to support from the Communists. The Italian Communists are pro-European and the establishment of Soviet military bases in their country is not one of their top priorities; but neither is staying in NATO. An Italian popular front would be a giant step toward the neutralization of Europe.

But why fear a neutral Europe? Would it not in many ways be a fitting solution for the problems of the old continent? The trouble is that neutrality, to be credible, has to be defended, and this Europe is not in a position to do. A strong Europe could be neutral, whereas a weak Europe would be drawn, sooner or later, wholly or partly, into the Soviet sphere of influence. The Soviet leaders are well aware of all this. Ponomarenko, a member of the Politburo, talked in his Lenin anniversary speech this year about an impending revolutionary transformation in one capitalist country or another—there is no reason to assume that he meant the United States. General Maltsev, writing in *Krasnaia Zvezda*, expects “at any moment” a fundamental revolutionary transformation in some link of the “capitalist system”; to be prepared for the opportunity this presents, he argues, the Soviet Union must strengthen its military potential. Thus Maltsev too sees a turning point in world affairs, but it is not quite identical with the *pacem-in-terris* interpretation of some Western observers.

Yugoslavia's fate after Tito has preoccupied Western governments for several years, but this is one of the crises that may never break. In the last two years Yugoslavia has suppressed internal dissent, moved somewhat closer to Moscow, and renewed the old quarrel with Italy over Trieste. While there still is some talk in Belgrade about nonalignment, it has become largely empty. This policy may or may not save Yugoslavia, it may or may not make Soviet intervention unnecessary. There is nothing the West could or would do if the Russians ever decided to take full control of a country which, they be-

lieve, rightfully belongs to their sphere of interest.

Of the major European countries, West Germany will muddle through, though not without such anxieties over the survival of democracy as Willy Brandt is said to have expressed before his recent resignation. Britain will also muddle through, totally absorbed with Ulster (assuming it remains part of the United Kingdom), the timing of tea-breaks, and the strikes of boilermakers and footplate men. The North Sea bonanza seems to be in reach; with a determined effort these oilfields could be in full use by the end of the decade. But such an effort seems at best uncertain in the present-day British climate. In the meantime, living standards are likely to sink to somewhere between those of Italy and Spain.

As for France, commenting on the results of the recent elections, a *NEWSWEEK* correspondent had a glowing vision: the youthful new President of France would be able to do for his nation what Kennedy did for the United States—“make it once more a glamorous, lively, youth-oriented country, brimming with ideas and innovation.” Alas, a few months hence, Giscard d'Estaing will be fighting for the survival of the regime and there will be nothing glamorous in this struggle. He would in all probability not have become President had Pompidou died six months later, for by this fall France will feel the full impact of the economic crisis. Unpopular measures will have to be taken to cope with the emergency, and since the country is deeply split right down the middle, there will be growing unrest and mass strikes. Giscard is a gentleman, a competent finance minister, and an adequate soccer player, but more than public relations and economic expertise will be needed to steer France through the coming years.

YESTERDAY'S PREDICTIONS about the coming of a golden age, of a new era of peace, prosperity, moderation, and great common endeavors, make strange reading in the light of recent events. But since in politics almost anything is *a priori* possible, the predictions of a global crisis must be made with the usual reservations. A sudden

change in the relationships between the superpowers—be it America and Russia, or Russia and China—could transform the world scene overnight (though not necessarily for the better). Sudden scientific and technological breakthroughs could settle the fuel crisis and the other shortages within the next few years. The Soviet leaders could give up Leninism; there could be an Arab Marshall Plan or a Point Four program sponsored by the oil producers. The nations of the world could get together and resolve, in a spirit of unprecedented good will, altruism, and self sacrifice, to tackle the problems facing mankind—the “great disorder under heaven,” as the Chinese call it in their old-fashioned way. All this is possible and it would, of course, forestall a world economic crisis such as has been outlined. But it is more likely that the nations will go on acting as they have been acting, each pursuing its own interests in its own way.

The Soviet Union could only benefit from a breakdown, partial or total, in Western Europe, whereas a collapse in Southeast Asia would certainly not be in its best interests. America, on the other hand, has a vital stake in European stability, whereas a major crisis on the Indian subcontinent, whatever its outcome, would affect American interests only marginally. It could be argued, indeed, that American policy should aim at making the Russians assume responsibility for the well-being of the Indian subcontinent. This would be only proper in view of the strong political position established by the Russians in those parts and the pro-Soviet orientation of the Indian government. An American policy of masterly inactivity would be bitterly attacked at home as immoral and Machiavellian—and this despite the fact that it would be the most effective way to establish a real détente. For if the Russians were forced to face their responsibilities on the Indian subcontinent, their capacity to cause mischief in other parts of the globe would be very much limited for many years to come.

It is quite unrealistic to expect the United Nations, the World Bank, OECD, or the International Monetary Fund to take effective

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Reputation is an idle and most false imposition; oft got without merit, and lost without deserving.—Othello

A Summer's Intern

ANDREW SPINDLER

AS A GRADUATE STUDENT who has yet to choose a career, I would not presume to pass final judgment on the merits of the United States Foreign Service. As someone considering the work of an FSO as a possible profession, however, I have formed some tentative impressions. They are based on my experience this past summer "interning" in the political section of a relatively large US embassy in a developing country. Three months of writing cables and observing diplomats and participating in the day-to-day life of a US mission instilled in me a generally positive feeling toward the Foreign Service. While the profession seems on balance a worthwhile one to enter, many discouraging characteristics diminish its attractiveness. The summer dispelled many of my reservations, but it also left me dismayed at how many of my stereotyped images of Foreign Service life are apparently valid. It seems a tragedy that some of the profession's flaws so long criti-

cized still plague it; I can add that this apparent inability of the Foreign Service to solve several of its most chronic and obvious problems dampens the enthusiasm of at least one of its prospective candidates.

In reviewing specific impressions, I would like to begin on the positive side. The most remarkable attribute of the US embassy at which I worked was the high calibre of persons filling a number of prominent positions. By the internship's end I felt special admiration for the thoughtfulness, political aplomb, and integrity of the American ambassador. Although I often heard FSOs discuss other US chiefs-of-mission as counter-examples, I can only conclude that an organization which permits such a man to rise through its ranks to the top must be doing something right! Several other officers with whom I came in contact, all proceeding up their career ladders quickly, were also extraordinarily capable and personally attractive. Each, I know, has made strongly favorable impressions on citizens of the host country. A notable characteristic of some of these US officials (the observation applies especially to the deputy chief of mission) was an effervescent interest in other people. All in all, the efforts of this

group of exemplary officers are a credit to their profession and country. As an outside observer and a possible Foreign Service candidate, I was impressed.

I also left the post with genuine respect for the competence and thoroughness of much of the reporting on local political, social, and economic matters. This work provided further evidence of the ability and experience of a number of FSOs, and placed their dedication beyond question.

Having mentioned these attributes, I would like to discuss in greater detail some disturbing characteristics of the post. (That my criticisms are not new ones troubles me all the more.) Aside from the small number of officers just discussed, the mission was burdened by the mediocrity of many of its State as well as Defense Department employees. One common fault among FSOs was elitism with no particularly impressive qualities which could begin to justify the pretense; the mere fact of being an FSO seemed enough to make some smug. Another unattractive trait was glibness, which could manifest itself in a pompous 20-minute speech to a room full of busy officers, or simply in the smooth dismissal of another person's point of view, usually

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without having considered it.

I found plenty of evidence to support the stereotyped image of FSOs as skilled paper shufflers. Many officers regularly seemed to busy themselves doing what amounted to almost nothing: "updating the files," proudly sorting through the bushel of paper in one's in-box, seeing how many cables one could write in a single day. In particular, many embassy people, ranging from the top-notch to ordinary in ability, seemed to run in circles as they spent day after day analyzing, condensing, forwarding, sorting reams of information on the host country. I do not yet understand why. This writing, while consuming huge amounts of time and human effort, often produced no more than summaries of local newspaper articles. Everyone spent still more time and effort reading everyone else's output. One person suggested that painstaking reporting and analysis provided good training for lower-ranking FSOs. Several officials also argued that if I thought this particular embassy's written output was large, I should see the reams of paper spewing out of some other posts. Once an official justified the large volume of printed matter flowing back to Washington in terms of the State Department's needs for encyclopedic files to respond to unexpected inquiries from Capitol Hill. I remain skeptical, however, as to how much of this specific embassy's written output impacts significantly on either creation or implementation of US foreign policy. In rough cost-benefit terms, much of the post's product would appear quite expensive relative to its usefulness.

I was bothered further by the fact that much of the embassy's written reporting and analysis failed to identify US interests in the situations at hand, or to recommend directions for policy. Instead, the uncritical recording of a multitude of facts all too often seemed to justify written efforts. This circumstance began to seem farcical when I realized that several offices within the mission regularly duplicated each other's paperwork with minimal coordination. For instance, the political section, the CIA, and the military attachés all kept separate and quite large files on prominent host coun-

try citizens. These three offices continued a practice they had probably observed for years of compiling nearly identical sets of information, all within several rooms of each other, on many of the same people. Speaking of the post in general, I wonder if far fewer people could complete essentially the same amount of work. Many FSOs as well as other mission employees seemed inadequately employed.

A limited sense of common identity among various offices within the mission also makes me question to what degree staff and their spouses really considered themselves part of a unified "country team." Debilitating in-house tensions most obvious to me occurred

My internship has additionally caused me to fear that an FSO's career may still be affected by the spouse's willingness and ability to share in the work . . . a seasoned male FSO cautioned me to find a wife before joining the Foreign Service . . .

between AID personnel and FSOs, and between the military and everyone else. With regard to the AID issue, the wife of one high-ranking official within that agency told me that its people regularly felt treated as "second-class citizens" by FSOs and their families; she added that anyone who denied this fact to me was not telling the truth. I also noted at times a blatant lack of sympathy between AID and embassy personnel for the other group's work. During looser moments FSOs might deride the local AID outfit for pursuing token projects under pretenses of saving the Third World; some AID personnel were equally quick to ridicule the embassy's operations as manipulative and self-serving.

Additional tension seemed to exist between the embassy's political section and the local CIA station. As already observed, communication between these two offices was poor, even though their work overlapped and the physical distance between them was insignificant. Several times I saw an attitude surface among political of-

ficers and other embassy personnel toward the CIA of "I wouldn't do that kind of work." Political officers, at least, were also conscious of the fact that they did not mingle socially with CIA employees. One younger FSO in the political section, to my knowledge, did make concerted efforts to bridge the gap between his office on the one hand and the CIA and military attachés on the other. Regardless of either the causes of the frictions or that person's success in overcoming them, however, their existence remained both real and costly.

If internal divisiveness detracted from the efficiency of operations and attractiveness of community life, the post also suffered from claustrophobia. In particular, I left my internship discouraged by the ingrown nature of many US mission families' social lives. An attitude toward entertaining which seemed to prevail among some Americans was: "Even if we invited locals to our parties they wouldn't come. . . . It makes them nervous to accept Western hospitality because they can't reciprocate." As a result, the same groups of Americans often drank together and exchanged problems night after night. Perhaps even worse, I recall a dinner given by one FSO at which a half dozen local guests spent most of the evening tightly clustered on one side of the living room; the larger number of US mission personnel and spouses who were present contentedly conversed elsewhere among themselves. (In fairness, however, I must add that some US mission officials did regularly invite local residents to occasions at which all guests mixed freely.)

My internship has additionally caused me to fear that an FSO's career may still be affected by the spouse's willingness and ability to share in the work. One official's wife who should know related to me her own feeling that male officers without "good" mates willing to view their husbands' careers as a team effort probably do not make it to the top. In another instance, a seasoned male FSO cautioned me to find a wife *before* joining the Foreign Service so that the two of us could begin my career together; a later marriage would increase my chances, in his opinion, of ending

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Regarding the need for a worldwide approach to the problem of a critical shortage of food, for the results—from runaway inflation and international competition to global war and death by starvation—will affect the lives of all nations and all peoples.

By Bread Alone

LESTER R. BROWN with ERIK P. ECKHOLM

The Rome World Food Conference, held in November, 1974, made a good start toward establishing the new international institutions required by an unstable global food economy. Basic agreement was reached on the need for a new cooperative food reserve system, agricultural information sharing, and a minimum annual world food aid guarantee of 10 million tons. A potentially valuable agricultural development fund was established at the initiative of the "new rich," with major new financial contributions from these capital surplus oil exporters apparently at least in part contingent on renewed aid efforts by the traditional donors. A World Food Council was set up, pending approval by the UN General Assembly, to oversee activities in all these areas.

As the national delegations left Rome, of course, these new institutions existed only as paper structures. Arduous negotiations over the coming year will determine whether the political commitment to reduced insecurity in the world food system is strong enough to give life to the Rome rhetoric.

While the delegates debated these longer-term questions, a more immediate crisis loomed darkly over the Conference proceedings: the spectre of famine and rising malnutrition facing millions over the coming months. The credibility of commitments to long-term progress on the part of the affluent countries was called into question by their failure to promise an adequate response to the massive human tragedy unfolding as the conference met. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization estimated a need

for 8-12 million tons of additional food aid before next fall if the epidemic of malnutrition was to be halted. Given the degree to which the United States dominates the world food market, it was quite clear that a program of the required scale would not materialize without strong US leadership and an immediate expansion of the fiscal 1975 US food aid commitment well beyond the 4 million tons originally planned. As the Rome Conference adjourned, then, eyes turned to Washington, waiting to see how President Ford—who faced a deepening domestic economic crisis as well—would respond.

GROWING GLOBAL FOOD INSECURITY

THE PERIOD since World War II has been characterized by excess capacity in world agriculture, much of it concentrated in the United States. The world was fortunate to have, in effect, two major food reserves during this period—one in the form of grain reserves in the principal exporting countries, the other in the form of reserve cropland, virtually all of it land idled under farm programs in the United States. These two reserves have provided a valuable degree of price stability, since their size could be adjusted to compensate for production fluctuation. Most important, they have provided a cushion when crop failures or droughts, as in India or the Soviet Union, created major unexpected import needs.

Dwindling Reserves

Grain reserves, including both food grains and feed grains, are most commonly measured in terms of carryover stocks—the amount in storage at the time the new crop begins to come in. World carryover

stocks are concentrated in a few of the principal exporting countries—namely, the United States, Canada, Australia, and Argentina. Since 1960, world grain reserves have fluctuated from a high of 155 million metric tons to a low of about 100 million metric tons. When these reserves drop to 100 million tons, severe shortages and strong upward price pressures develop. Although 100 million tons appears to be an enormous quantity of grain, it represents a mere 8 percent of annual world grain consumption, or less than one month's global needs—clearly an uncomfortably small working reserve and a perilously thin buffer against the vagaries of weather and plant disease. As world consumption expands by some 2.5 percent annually, so should the size of working reserves; yet over the past two decades reserves have dwindled while consumption has continued to climb.

For the past dozen years or so, the US government has paid its farmers to keep roughly 50 million acres idle. Although this source of supply cannot be tapped so quickly as grain reserves, most of the acreage can be brought back into production within twelve to eighteen months once the decision to do so has been made.

In recent years, the need to draw down grain reserves and to utilize reserve cropland has arisen with increasing frequency. During the food crisis years of 1966 and 1967, when world grain reserves were at a dangerously low level, the United States brought back into production a small portion of its 50 million idle acres. This happened again in 1971 as a result of a corn blight in the United States. In 1973, in response to growing food scarcities, world grain reserves once more declined, and the United States again resorted to cultivating its idle cropland, but to a much greater extent

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than on previous occasions. Government decisions in early 1973 permitted much of the idled cropland to come back into production, and in 1974 no government payments were made for keeping cropland idle.

Global reserve stocks fell to close to 100 million tons in 1973 and still further in 1974. Thus world grain reserves have dropped to their lowest level in more than two decades, although the world's population has increased by half in this period. The sum of global reserve stocks and the potential grain production of idle cropland gives a good indication of the total reserve capability in the world food economy in any given year. Taking this total as a percentage of world grain consumption provides a rough estimate of global food security for the year. The world is now in a highly vulnerable position. In 1973 and 1974, world reserve capabilities in relation to consumption needs fell far below any previous level in the postwar era, to the equivalent of only 26 days' worth of world consumption. In 1961, reserves represented 95 days' worth of world consumption.

From the end of World War II until quite recently, world prices for the principal temperate-zone farm commodities, such as wheat, feed grains, and soybeans, have been remarkably stable. Since in the years ahead world food reserves may be chronically low, and the idled crop acreage in the United States may be consistently low or even disappear entirely, very volatile world prices for the important food commodities can be expected.

Dependence on the North American Breadbasket

The extent of global vulnerability is demonstrated by the degree of the world's dependence on one region—North America—for exportable food supplies. Over the past generation, the United States has achieved a unique position as a supplier of food to the rest of the world. Before World War II, both Latin America (especially Argentina) and North America (the United States and Canada) were major grain exporters. During the late '30s, net grain exports from Latin America were substantially higher than those from North

America. Since then, however, the combination of the population explosion and the slowness of most Latin American governments to reform and modernize agriculture has eliminated the region's net export surplus. With few exceptions, Latin American countries are now food importers.

Over the past three decades North America—particularly the United States, which accounts for three fourths of the continent's grain exports—has emerged as the world's breadbasket. The exports of Australia, the only other net exporter of importance, are only a fraction of North America's. Moreover, the United States is now not only the world's major exporter of wheat and feed grains but also the world's leading exporter of rice. Indeed, North America today controls a larger share of the world's exportable surplus of grains than the Middle East does of current world oil exports.

Exportable supplies of the crucial soybean are even more concentrated than those of grains. Although as recently as the '30s China supplied nearly all the soybeans entering world markets, continuing population growth has gradually absorbed its exportable surplus. As of 1973, China was importing small quantities from the United States. The position of principal supplier has been taken over by the United States, which provided over 90 percent of the world soybean exports in the '60s and early '70s. With world demand for high-quality protein surging upward, Brazil, virtually the only other nation exporting soybeans on a large scale, has recently boosted its soybean production and exports. For the foreseeable future, however, the United States is likely to continue supplying three fourths or more of the world's soybean exports.

Redefining Famine

Between late 1972 and early 1974, international food prices escalated rapidly in response to the growing excess of world demand over available supplies and the decline of world food reserves. Wheat and rice prices tripled, and soybean prices more than doubled. Soon after the soaring food prices began to have an impact, the exercise of new-found bargaining

power by the oil-exporting nations brought a similar escalation in world petroleum prices. Simultaneously, phosphate and nitrogen-fertilizer prices also soared. For those nations that must import food, fuel, and fertilizer, these price increases had a disastrous effect on foreign-exchange reserves, the terms of trade, and future development prospects.

High food prices and shortages are an inconvenience for affluent societies and individuals, but they place poor nations, and the poor within all nations, in a dangerous predicament. When global food reserves are low, the capacity of the international community to provide relief in response to emergencies such as droughts or crop failures is greatly diminished. At the same time, high prices may keep needed food out of the reach of poor nations and individuals. For the sizable segment of mankind that spends 80 percent of its income on food, a doubling in the price of wheat or rice cannot possibly be offset by increased expenditures. It can only drive a subsistence diet below the survival level.

One factor that today makes it possible for the world's affluent to ignore such tragedies is the change in the way in which famine manifests itself. In earlier periods, famine was largely a geographical phenomenon. Whole nations or regions—for example, Ireland or West Bengal—experienced dramatically high rates of starvation and death. As mentioned earlier, famine today is generally more evenly spread among the world's poor rather than concentrated in specific locales. (The current tragedy in the Sahel region south of the Sahara desert is an obvious exception.) The modern version of famine does not usually confront the world with dramatic photographs, such as those of the morning ritual of collecting bodies in Calcutta during the Bengal famine of 1943, but it is no less real in the human toll it takes. Reports in 1974 of rising rates of nutrition-related deaths in several poor countries underscore the need for closer attention to this ominous trend.

Declining Food Assistance

As food prices soar, seriously limiting the ability of the poor countries (and of the poor within all

countries) to *buy* needed food, sources of food *aid* are drying up as well. Over the last two decades, the only large-scale perennial food-aid program has been that of the United States under Public Law 480. This landmark measure, passed in 1954, made it "the policy of the United States to use [its] abundant productivity to combat hunger and malnutrition and to encourage economic development in the developing countries" through concessional sales and humanitarian grants. For nearly two decades, the PL 480 program satisfied many goals simultaneously—providing an outlet for US commercial surpluses, building future commercial markets, aiding the economic development of recipient countries, supplying UN and voluntary-agency nutrition programs, and forestalling massive famine in situations of natural disaster.

At a time of record international food prices, shrinking reserve stocks of grain, and increased rates of malnutrition among the world's poor—in short, the very time when the world need for food aid is at its highest—the quantities of food supplied by the United States under PL 480 have fallen sharply as a result of tight world supplies, lucrative export markets, and government fears of contributing to domestic food-price inflation. Although the decline in the PL 480 program has not been great in dollar terms, when it is examined according to the quantity of food shipped and the distribution among recipient countries, the shrinkage is quite dramatic.

In analyzing the recent decline in PL 480 aid, it is necessary to distinguish between Titles I and II of the program, since aid under the two titles is disbursed differently for different purposes. Under Title I, most food is sold, for convertible currencies or dollars, under long-term loans, with interest rates set below commercial levels. Since 1971, in contrast to past practice, only small amounts of food have been sold for local currencies, and only where there exists a genuine US need for these currencies. The dollar value of Title I food-commodity exports increased slightly, from \$549 million to \$640 million, between FY 1972 and FY 1974. However, the total quantity of grains and high-protein products

shipped in 1974 fell to less than a third of 1972 levels and less than one tenth the large volume of the mid-'60s. Milk shipments were eliminated entirely. Even these figures are deceptive, for roughly half of all American food aid in 1974 has been supplied to two countries alone—South Vietnam and Cambodia.

Under Title II, most food is provided on a grant basis to governments, voluntary agencies, and the UN World Food Programme (WFP). The commodities supplied are used in nutritional programs for vulnerable groups such as mothers, infants, and school children; in "food for work" programs to build needed infrastructure such as irrigation and drainage facilities, schools, and roads; and in disaster-relief activities.

Food grants under Title II increased slightly between the mid-'60s and 1972, but over the last two years even the dollar value of Title II food shipments has fallen (from \$380 million to \$248 million), and this fact in an era of soaring prices has resulted in a devastating decline in the quantity of food supplied. In 1974 wheat shipments are down one half from 1973, and rice and milk shipments have disappeared altogether. Only the tonnage of coarse grains (corn, oats, sorghum) has risen, reflecting the shipment of 250,000 tons of grain sorghum to the Sahel.

In 1972, some 90 million of the world's poorest people earned or received food originating within the Title II program, including 46 million in maternal, infant, and child-feeding programs; 15 million in food-for-work programs; and 28 million in disaster-relief and refugee programs. An estimated 20 million nutritionally vulnerable people have been cut off from these programs in the past year as a result of the decline in food supplied under Title II.

The shrinking supply of goods provided under Title II over the past year is also having a disastrous effect on many valuable programs of the voluntary agencies (such as CARE, Church World Service, and Catholic Relief Services) as well as on the WFP—all of which depend heavily on US food grants. Ironically, this is happening at a time when the voluntary agencies are putting new emphasis on the

very kind of rural and agricultural development projects that may help provide a long-term solution to the present crisis—and even as the US Congress is advocating increasing reliance on the private sector in foreign-aid activities. Similarly, the nutritional and public-works projects of a growing international institution, the WFP, are being curtailed. The WFP, with projects currently under way in 88 nations, has grown rapidly since it was initiated in the early '60s. To finance its activities, it depends on pledges of commodities and funds from FAO-member governments. In 1974, because of rising prices of both commodities and freight, many planned development projects were suspended or canceled, and some ongoing projects were cut. According to WFP Executive Director Dr. Francisco Aquino, the tripling of many commodity prices since 1972 resulted in an estimated shrinkage of the WFP's "food basket" by about 40 percent, seriously affecting the program's ability to meet its commitments. The WFP pledging target for 1975-76 is \$440 million, but commitments of at least \$650 million will be needed if its planned program is to be implemented.

Climatic Vulnerability

No single factor has a greater impact on food production in any country than the weather. When the weather is good, harvests are generally bountiful. When nature is less charitable, harvests fall. Thus in 1972, when rainfall was poor in the Soviet Union and in parts of Asia and Africa, total world food production fell by a few percentage points, even while demand climbed by a comparable amount. In 1973, by contrast, excellent weather in most regions made it possible to attain a new record in world food production.

Although weather has always been a central concern of farmers and agricultural policy-makers, in the past the availability of substantial food reserves provided a vital buffer against the vagaries of climate. But currently, with global reserves dangerously low, the weather in all producing regions is receiving a new degree of international attention and concern. Economic stability in most nations and survival in some are critically

linked to the climatic patterns of this and coming years. The climate—and possible interventions to alter it—is becoming an important element in international affairs.

At the same time that world dependence on North American food exports is increasing so dramatically, there is growing awareness that this extreme dependence leaves the world in a very dangerous position in the event of adverse crop years in North America. The United States and Canada are affected by the same climatic cycles. There is now considerable evidence indicating that North America has been subject to clusters of drought years that recur roughly every twenty years. Although meteorologists disagree about the existence of weather cycles, some leading American scientists assert that a cyclical drought phenomenon can be traced as far back as the Civil War period, when data on rainfall were first collected. The most recent drought, which occurred in the early '50s, was comparatively mild. The preceding one, twenty years earlier, was far more severe and contributed to the "dustbowl" era in the United States.

If the United States experiences another stretch of drought, quite possibly during the current decade, the impact on production is not likely to be so great as in the '30s because of improved soil-management and water-conservation practices. But, given the overwhelming dependence of the entire world on North America's exportable margin of food, any decline in production can create a situation of great risk. Moreover, one does not have to accept the drought-cycle theory to realize that years of poor rainfall are inevitable in any case.

Complicating the global climatic outlook are the alarming recent findings of several prominent meteorologists. Among others, Dr. Reid Bryson, Director of the Institute for Environmental Studies at the University of Wisconsin, and Hubert Lamb, an eminent British meteorologist, assert that fundamental changes are occurring in global climatic patterns. Bryson argues that the atmosphere's increasing level of particulate matter—to which man's agricultural and industrial activities are

making a growing contribution—is responsible for the global cooling trend in evidence since 1940. He maintains that closely associated changes in the atmospheric wind and water cycles are bringing greater instability to climatic patterns throughout the world.

While there is disagreement about the ultimate causes, many meteorologists agree that the monsoon belt—which customarily provides a vital rainy season for southern Asia and north-central Africa—may be experiencing a gradual southward shift. If this theory is correct, it helps to explain the severity of the recent drought in sub-Saharan Africa; it further suggests that low rainfall years in the densely populated Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia may become more frequent.

Climatology is still an infant discipline, and dependable predictions of future weather patterns remain out of man's reach. But if one indisputable lesson is to be drawn from recent meteorological findings and debates, it is that climate is an unreliable variable. The margin of safety provided by large reserve stocks of food must be restored and maintained to minimize chances for weather-induced disaster.

Global Politics of Food Scarcity

As food becomes more scarce, several already apparent and disconcerting modes of international conduct may become more frequent and intense, particularly the use of secrecy to gain special advantages in food markets, competition between rich and poor nations for limited food supplies, and unilateral decisions to withhold food supplies from dependent importing nations.

A special case of the last of these actions occurred in mid-1973, when the United States failed to respond to Chile's request for wheat on credit. Since Chile's foreign-exchange reserves were then exhausted and bread shortages were developing, this American action undoubtedly contributed to the downfall of the Allende government in September, 1973. Although Americans decry the use of petroleum as a political weapon, calling it "political blackmail," the United States has been using food

aid for political purposes for twenty years—and describing this as "enlightened diplomacy."

The use of secrecy and its consequences attracted much attention in 1972, when buyers from the Soviet Union covertly managed to corner a sizable share of the US wheat crop. Concealing the size of their domestic grain shortfall, the Soviets quietly arranged contracts to import about 28 million tons of grain, most of it purchased from the United States—the largest commercial transaction in history. By withholding information on the magnitudes of both domestic needs and intended purchases, they were able to make their purchases at an unreasonably low price level, supported by unwarranted US government subsidies. The Soviet gain was largely at the expense of other foreign buyers and US consumers, for the world grain-price spiral was greatly intensified when the shock of the massive Soviet purchase hit the market place. An earlier forthright disclosure of intentions by the Soviet Union would have enabled the United States to expand its grain production earlier and also would have allowed for a more equitable sharing among nations of the inevitably higher prices.

The probable nature and results of more intense global competition for tight food supplies were foreshadowed in 1973. Bangladesh, threatened with famine, pressed with only limited success for the United States and the Soviet Union to direct part of the Soviet-purchased grain to help feed its population. India, confronted with an unanticipated need to import several million tons of grain, found that the extremely high prices resulting from international bidding for available supplies had seriously limited the amount it could buy. Fortunately, the Soviet Union agreed to loan 2 million tons of grain to India, which partially helped India to weather its food crisis in 1973. Growing rice purchases by the increasingly affluent nations of the Middle East and North Africa helped to drive international rice prices still higher, reducing the purchasing power of many poor African and Asian nations that badly needed rice imports.

It is in the context of growing world dependence on the United

States for protein and grains that we must view the abrupt and unilateral imposition of export restrictions on soybeans and feed-stuffs by the US government in June, 1973. Although these export controls represent an effort to fight food-price inflation within the United States, they had the inevitable result of greatly intensifying inflationary pressures and food shortages in other nations of the world.

By imposing export controls, the United States placed itself in the morally untenable position of denying food to other nations, all of which had relatively less food. The reliability and integrity of the United States as a trading partner were called into serious question; nations that have been urged to depend on the United States for food suddenly found their promised supplies cut severely and without warning. American negotiators at upcoming trade negotiations may not be permitted to forget the US export controls as they press other nations to lower agricultural trade barriers. Attempts to export inflation—like attempts to export depression in an earlier era—may well prove self-defeating in the end. Nor is the United States the only food-exporting country to impose controls. Thailand, Brazil, Argentina, and other nations all imposed food-export controls in 1973.

These trends in international economic conduct reflect a much more basic shift in national trade-policy concerns. Since World War II, the overriding objective of national trade policies has been to secure access to *markets* abroad for exports—whether soybeans or machinery. While this concern remains vital, the emergence of scarcity in many commodities has brought to the fore another important concern: the assurance of access to *supplies* of needed resources. The international community has gradually reduced tariff barriers and evolved guidelines governing restrictions on imports, but no such guidelines have yet been devised to deal with the other side of the international trade coin: restrictions on exports.

The urgent need for new departures in international food policies becomes clear when we consider what might happen if the global

Political acrimony and a breakdown in cooperative endeavors in nonagricultural areas might well accompany efforts by traditional suppliers to cut off some of those who are dependent on them for food.

grain crop again were to fall by a few percentage points, as it did in 1972—but this time in a situation where neither large reserve stocks nor idled cropland is available to cushion the impact. It is impossible to predict precisely what would ensue, but certain trends seem probable. Governments of the principal exporting nations would come under extremely strong pressure to limit food exports and thus hold down domestic food prices. Although refusal to apply export controls would create domestic political and economic instability, doing so in the cases of crucial commodities would cause great hardship in the importing nations. Political acrimony and a breakdown in cooperative endeavors in nonagricultural areas might well accompany efforts by traditional suppliers to cut off some of those who are dependent on them for food.

Frantic deals, barter, and secret purchases of food supplies by individual nations, presaged in early 1974 by the efforts of oil-importing nations to secure supplies for themselves in the wake of the Arab oil embargo, would also probably develop. Some nations would have the wherewithal to obtain adequate supplies in this fashion, but others—probably including many of the neediest countries—would not. As world prices skyrocketed to new highs, inflation and domestic economic instability would grow even more critical than they already are in most nations. There is little doubt as to who would suffer most. Climbing death rates among the poorest quarter of the world's population would inevitably result as those with the financial capacity to do so outbid each other for limited available exportable supplies.

The Policy Response

UNDERLYING all the policy issues raised by global food scarcity will be the twin imperatives of rapidly increasing world food production, with special emphasis on the prog-

ress of the small farms of the developing world, and of reducing growth in the global demand for food by slowing population growth everywhere and simplifying diets among the more affluent. However, the need to reduce future food insecurity and associated economic instability call for several special policy measures as well.

A Food Reserve

World food production varies with fluctuations in weather; world food consumption needs continue to rise rather steadily regardless of price and supply trends. Under these circumstances, production and prices are likely to fluctuate violently, to the detriment of both farmers and consumers, unless sufficient reserve stocks are available to cushion the market from supply changes.

The prospects of frequently tight food supplies and low reserves call for the creation of a new internationally managed system of food reserves, to be built up in times of relative abundance and drawn down in times of acute scarcity. This can help support prices for producers during the inevitable periods when supply exceeds immediate world demand and to restrain price increases for consumers during times of scarcity. In effect, the stability that surplus American agricultural capacity has provided for a generation can be restored at least partially by a world food-reserve system. Clearly such a system is in the best interests of all nations. Clearly also the world community has a basic humanitarian interest in seeing to it that famine does not occur in the densely populated low-income countries following poor crop years. The affluent nations may be less able to provide this assurance in the future if the current system of autonomous, nationally oriented food planning is allowed to continue without modification.

In 1973, A. H. Boerma, Director-General of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), proposed the creation of a

new system of internationally coordinated national food-reserve policies. Under the FAO plan, all nations—both exporters and importers—would hold agreed minimum levels of food stocks. Governments would consult regularly to review the food situation, evaluate the adequacy of existing stocks, and recommend necessary actions.

The plan received preliminary international approval at the FAO's biannual conference in November, 1973. If it is to be implemented effectively, the United States must give it strong political and economic support at the World Food Conference in November, 1974, and thereafter. In the past, the United States has provided the world with safe reserve levels largely as a side benefit of its domestic farm-income program. As we have noted, in the current seller's market for foodstuffs these reserves—both large grain stocks and idled cropland—have been reduced substantially. In these conditions, it would be highly unrealistic to expect the United States alone to bear the considerable expense of building grain reserves large enough to ensure world security. The FAO plan has the advantage of spreading responsibility for reserve maintenance among both the exporting and the importing nations of the world.

Under any world-reserve plan, special measures will be necessary to help poor nations establish storage facilities and build up needed reserves. Such measures might include concessional grain sales to help the *poorest* nations build up reserve stocks, and a new source of concessional assistance, perhaps in the form of an earmarked expansion of the World Bank's soft-loan program or of a special fund within the FAO.

But spreading responsibility for reserve-stock management more widely among nations does not absolve the United States and other leading exporters from the responsibility of maintaining reserve stocks. There has been formidable resistance in some quarters of the US government to public involvement in reserve management—a practice recently ended by the Nixon Administration. Citing the problems of farm programs in previous decades, when the gov-

ernment found itself saddled with massive surpluses that helped to depress farm prices and were very costly to store, some highly placed officials have suggested that all US reserves should be held in private commercial hands.

The events of the last two years, however, have demonstrated the dangerous and economically disruptive consequences—in the domestic as well as the world economy—of not establishing careful reserve management. Sudden supply and price changes have had a crippling impact on the US livestock, baking, and canning industries, as well as on efforts to manage the national economy and bring inflation under control. Unexpected export controls on soybeans and other high-protein feeds and the threat of such controls for many other commodities (including grains and fertilizers) have not only disrupted normal commercial relations but also threatened the very fabric of the emerging international economic order.

The changing world food situation calls for a US government policy decision to ensure that both governmental and private reserve stocks are built to adequate levels when the opportunity is there. In order to reduce farmers' fears that the presence of large reserves will be used to hold prices to unreasonably low levels, it will also be necessary to guarantee fair farm-price levels. However, food reserves are too important to the national interest to be left entirely in the hands of private traders, whose priorities are necessarily not identical with the national welfare. The United States may no longer have the desire or the ability to hold reserve stocks for the world, but both domestic needs and continuing international responsibilities require new care in reserve planning. The precise reserves needed and the price levels at which government stocks are built up or drawn down will have to be determined through careful analysis of market conditions, climatic risks, and progress in stock-building in other nations.

Assured Access To Food Supplies

Since food scarcity is likely to be a frequent problem in the years ahead, careful consideration also must be given to the establishment

of international standards to govern the conditions under which important food suppliers are permitted to withhold supplies as well as to provide some assurance of access to needed food supplies for importing nations. Either revision of present arrangements under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the creation of new international rules in another forum could define the circumstances in which principal suppliers would be justified in restricting exports and could provide for automatic international consultation and action in the event of international food shortages. The establishment of such international guidelines on access to food—an area in which the United States predominates—would set an important precedent of great potential value in finding solutions for problems of access to *nonfood* resources.

Greater assurance of access to food supplies for importing nations should be linked to participation in a new world system of information-sharing and reserve management. This would help avoid a repeat performance of the Soviet Union's covert buying up of a sizable share of the exportable US wheat supplies in 1972, to the detriment of consumers throughout the world. More open sharing of basic data on harvests and reserve stocks, especially by the Soviet Union and China (which have held most such information secret), would permit potential supplier nations to plan their own production and trade policies far more efficiently.

But the principal exporting nations must also recognize an obligation not to impose restrictions on commercial food exports when world supplies become tight and world prices begin to rise. If major food-exporting nations attempt to isolate their own populations from world market trends, the chances of building a cooperative world trading system with long-term benefits for all nations will be greatly reduced. International conflict and competition for access to needed foodstuffs is bound to spill over into other areas where economic and political cooperation is needed—and the world's low-income groups, as usual, are likely to suffer the most.

Critical Food Needs

Designing appropriate world food-aid policies for an era of frequent food scarcity and higher prices presents many difficult dilemmas. The net effect of long-term concessional sales of food on recipient nations has not always been wholly positive. The ready availability of food aid has permitted governments to postpone difficult agricultural reforms. At times food aid has depressed farm prices, discouraging rather than encouraging the expansion of agricultural output. When accompanied by appropriate recipient-government economic policies, however, food aid can be as valuable as any other resource transfer, and some countries, including Israel and Pakistan, have made highly valuable use of PL 480 food in their national agricultural-development plans. An additional problem with long-term concessional sales has been the possible disruption of commercial export markets of third countries, even though the FAO has hammered out detailed procedures for keeping such effects to a minimum.

When supplies were abundant and inexpensive, large food-aid programs were initiated with little serious analysis of the costs and benefits. When supplies are scarce, however, the direct costs of food aid to the donors become apparent. It is now necessary to identify those functions that food aid can perform best and those for which it is absolutely essential, and then to devise the institutional means that can most efficiently meet these specific needs.

International food aid is most clearly necessary, and most unambiguously beneficial, when populations are threatened with famine due to poor harvests, natural calamities, or other causes. Any proposal for food aid in an era of scarcity must see emergency food relief as the number-one priority and must aim to strengthen the international capacity to respond to emergencies with adequate amounts of food—even at times when supplies are tight in the more affluent nations. The international community should seriously consider recent proposals to create a permanent international disaster-relief agency. The resulting systematic international development

of expertise in identifying potential food needs early, mobilizing adequate resources, and delivering food quickly to stricken areas would be an important step forward in a basic area of international responsibility now handled on a relatively haphazard basis. A further possibility would be the establishment of a sizable emergency food-reserve stock under the control of such an international body, with the foodstuffs available for release only to meet emergency needs.

A long-term food-relief effort of growing proportions is likely to be necessary for the drought-stricken nations of West Africa and probably Ethiopia as well, until very fundamental ecological and economic recovery occurs. It is certain that in future years other emergency food needs will arise in other regions. The global capacity to respond quickly and adequately when famine threatens must be systematically improved now, before a convergence of unfortunate events once again tragically underscores the failure to do so.

Food aid also has an essential and continuing role to play in an equally important if less conspicuous area of emergency relief. Unhappily, the global prevalence of malnutrition is likely to rise, not diminish, in the years immediately ahead. Projects like those of the international voluntary agencies, the WFP, and many other agencies within the developing countries—all of which use food grants to help meet directly the nutritional needs of those who have no means of purchasing adequate food supplies—deserve expansion rather than the contraction that has occurred.

Such programs, of course, cannot meet the nutritional needs of more than a fraction of those who are in danger, but they can make an important difference for tens or even hundreds of millions. Even in the affluent United States, by mid-1974 one of every 13 residents was receiving federal food stamps under a program intended to make more adequate food purchases possible. Among the low-income groups in the developing world, few can hope to purchase an adequate diet in the foreseeable future without some form of assistance.

Given the limited resources

available, food programs in the developing countries need to be focused directly on the most vulnerable groups—pregnant women, nursing mothers, and infants. Inadequate nutrition in the final months of pregnancy and during the early years of life can cause permanent physical and mental debilitation. The voluntary agencies have gradually been shifting priorities away from school lunch programs (which perform a useful role but are less urgent than programs aimed at the most vulnerable groups) toward programs for maternal and infant nutrition. However, school feeding programs are still the most prevalent type of nutrition project, and the pace of change needs to be hastened.

If programs to improve nutrition among vulnerable groups are to be administered effectively, the donors—principally the United States, but also other developed nations that give mainly through the WFP—will have to consider entering multiyear commitments in terms of actual commodity quantities rather than dollar value. Otherwise there will surely be a repetition of the events of 1973, when the food available to such programs was cut severely just at the time when the need for it was at a peak.

Concessional Food Sales?

Clearly food aid is no panacea for eliminating hunger and malnutrition, and it cannot be a substitute for agricultural progress, economic development, and slowing population growth in the foodshort nations. But in the immediate circumstances of serious global economic disruption, there is a need for a special program of concessional grain sales.

Concessional food sales have a crucial role to play in helping to avert a major catastrophe among the poorest quarter of the world's population. A new coordinated world program—led by the United States but also involving Canada, Australia, and possibly the EEC—to provide substantial levels of grain on soft terms to the nations hardest hit by recent energy, food, and fertilizer price rises will be needed during the next few years if a major economic setback in these countries is to be avoided. Indeed, if the shortage of fertilizers in Asia

cuts indigenous production as severely as current developments suggest, only a concerted international effort can forestall a disaster of catastrophic proportions.

Such a program would not have to be viewed as a permanent food-aid effort; rather, the need is for emergency action to tide over the nations most severely affected by the jarring economic shocks of the 1972-74 period until fertilizer and food production can resume an upward trend and the necessary economic adjustments to new world commodity market conditions can take place.

The question of concessional food sales over the long term yields no easy answers. As noted earlier, many economists have serious doubts about the effect of continuing large-scale food-aid programs on progress toward the essential goal of increased food production within the developing countries. Furthermore, the psychological effect of a state of chronic dependency is not likely to produce a healthy relationship of respect and cooperation between the nations involved on both sides of the transfer.

These considerations are tempered, however, by the fact that when a real food-import need exists in a developing country, any softening of the terms of the sales will represent a real resource transfer, saving valuable foreign exchange for other purposes. And if a developing country is in serious economic trouble and simply lacks the foreign-exchange capability to buy needed food on the commercial market, concessional sales may be the only alternative to widespread malnutrition and starvation, or even economic and political collapse.

Food For Development

One important way to maximize the long-term benefits of food sold on concessional terms or of food grants to recipient nations is to tie at least a substantial share of the aid to programs that mobilize manpower and resources for the construction of needed agricultural infrastructure. The most direct utilization of food aid in this fashion is in rural public works projects, which take advantage of idle manpower in the slack seasons between

harvest and planting for the labor-intensive construction of roads, irrigation and drainage channels, and other facilities needed to spur agricultural output.

For example, the very successful works program in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) during the early '60s was financed largely through the sale of wheat supplied by the United States. Workers in Morocco and Tunisia have received PL 480 wheat and semolina as part of their wages in the long-standing rural construction programs in those nations. On a smaller scale than the public works schemes in several countries are the "food for work" projects organized by the international voluntary agencies, the WFP, and governments in numerous developing countries, from Ghana to Brazil. Under these projects, many of which have relied heavily on US grants under PL 480, the donated food is usually provided as wages to local residents, who supply the labor to build a needed school, a farm-to-market road, or some other facility important to the economic welfare of the community. The national or local governments, for their part, generally supply the building materials and engineering expertise required by the projects.

Even when food aid is not used directly in rural construction programs, it can be tied to food production efforts. One possible approach is to earmark the local proceeds from the sale of food received on concessional terms from abroad for needed investments in the agricultural sector—as in water control, small-farmer credit, and extension services.

Agricultural Research Needs

Current research efforts to raise per acre yields and protein content of food crops deserve strong support from governments and private funders. And in the United States, the unfortunate downward trend in the federal agricultural research budget needs to be reversed. Maintaining a given rate of growth in yields will require a steadily expanding research budget.

Higher-yielding, higher-protein varieties of such dryland crops as sorghum and millet are desperately needed in areas that are too dry to take advantage of the new wheats and rices. Higher-yielding varieties

of protein-rich pulses are also needed if the current disturbing tendency for many developing nations to reduce pulse acreage in favor of relatively high-yielding but low-protein grain is to be reversed. Little is known about the potential of agriculture in the tropical regions, where research breakthroughs might open up new areas to food production. The possibilities of highly productive multiple cropping remain unknown in many regions for want of effective research. Cassava varieties with higher yields and protein content are sorely needed in the tropics. New methods also must be devised to achieve a further expansion of grain yields in the more advanced nations. And this is by no means the end of the long list of critical research needs in the field of agricultural production.

A very encouraging recent development with special benefit for the developing nations was the formation in 1971 of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research. With headquarters at the World Bank in Washington, the Consultative Group is actively supported by the FAO, the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations, the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development, and several other bilateral aid agencies, foundations, and international organizations. The Consultative Group is examining developing-country research needs on a systematic global basis and channeling financial support to priority areas. It is coordinating the research efforts and funding of six key research centers in different geographic regions and varied climates: the International Wheat and Maize Improvement Center (CIMMYT) in Mexico; the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines; the International Center for Tropical Agriculture (CIAT) in Colombia; the International Potato Center (CIP) in Peru; the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT) in India; and the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) in Nigeria. In 1974, the various donors allocated more than \$32 million to these centers and others just getting under way, including livestock and animal disease cen-

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The Kalbs's Book On Kissinger

KISSINGER by Marvin Kalb and Bernard Kalb. Little, Brown, \$12.50.

RIGHT NOW, many are bored with foreign policy. Our minds and pocket books are preoccupied with the really pressing problem of the uncontrolled rise in the cost of living and in the price of food and fuel. That seems to be the mood of the country and may explain why Secretary Kissinger's effort to provoke a national debate on détente fizzled.

Boredom with foreign policy may also be a measure of its success. It seems safe to ignore it. We are at long last out of Vietnam, and there are no crises that demand our attention.

How did we arrive at this state of affairs in foreign policy?

Marvin and Bernard Kalb have an answer, and its name is Henry Kissinger. For 549 well-written pages, the Kalb brothers extol in detail what they consider to be the genius of the present Secretary of State and they give us a vivid and at times exciting account of his many secret and highly personal negotiations. The Kalbs write as if they were part of the inner circle—virtual participants, both Under Secretaries of State so to speak—and indeed indicate that their primary source for the book was Henry Kissinger. One must take such claims with a certain reserve but, in any case, one must assume that the interpretations and judgments in these pages are the Kalbs's, not Kissinger's. What about these judgments?

One infers from the Kalbs's account that the state of the world had little to do with Kissinger's success. They write about a personality rather than a change in the world. This drastically reduces the value of the book.

In 1969, when Richard Milhous Nixon became President, three developments had occurred in world affairs with decisive consequences. None of them could be attributed directly to the US. These three occurrences were: First, the Russians and Chinese were no longer communist allies but were hostile

toward each other. Second, Europe was beginning to adjust to the existence of the two Germanys and to the status quo; normalization was replacing tension in East-West relations in Europe. Third, the Soviet Union had reached a nuclear stand-off with the US and either power could destroy the other. These changes could mean greater stability in world affairs. All the US need do in these circumstances was to exercise a modicum of restraint and imagination.

Thus, Nixon was lucky. Advances could be made in our relations with our principal adversaries and, if he would get us out of Vietnam, President Nixon would then emerge as the architect of peace and détente. The Kalbs notwithstanding, none of this needed unique insight or unusual skill or excessive secrecy. Nor need we have put relations with Japan and Western Europe to the test by the absence of consultation with them since their attitudes toward China, if not toward the Soviet Union as well, were well ahead of our own. We had restrained them, not the other way round. Doubtless, President Nixon and his National Security Advisor were aware of these basic considerations. But they are not given due weight in the Kalb's book even though they are essential to an appreciation of the importance of Henry Kissinger's role in the first Nixon Administration.

In a highly eulogistic concluding chapter, the Kalbs suggest that Kissinger may be the first "European" Secretary of State, an appellation they evidently consider both complimentary and meaningful.

A "European" approach to foreign policy could in historical terms refer to the diplomatic method of the royal courts when foreign relations were conducted in great secrecy between royal heads of state, and when the doctrines of accountability and ministerial responsibility were unknown. George Reedy, on the basis of his experience with LBJ, has written about what he regards as a general tendency in recent times for the White House to become insulated from the outer world and for the Presidency to take on some of the characteristics of royalty. Reedy's analysis unavoidably comes to mind in the Kalbs's description of

the conduct of negotiations during the first Nixon term. Indeed, when he was appointed Secretary of State, Kissinger made this point: "In the first term of the President, many important and some revolutionary changes were made. These required, to a considerable extent, secret diplomacy and they were conducted on a rather restricted basis. But now we are in a different phase. The foundations that have been laid must now lead to the building of a more permanent structure. . ." It is obvious that court diplomacy is irrelevant in the modern age when we are so interdependent with other nations in so many areas and when undue secrecy is wholly inappropriate in a democratic society.

The Kalbs's reference to Kissinger as possibly a "European" Secretary of State may refer to what they regard as his *Realpolitik*. They say, with approval, that he has shed American idealism and utopianism in favor of pragmatism, realism, and hard-headedness. While I agree with them that the Secretary is a master of improvisation, I do not share the Kalb's values. But the historian rather than the journalist may be in a better position to make useful judgments about this basic question.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

The Vietgate Connection

FRAGMENTS OF THE CENTURY by Michael Harrington. Saturday Review Press, \$7.95.

THE WOUND WITHIN, *America in the Vietnam Years, 1945-1974*, by Alexander Kendrick. Little, Brown, \$12.95.

WATERGATE, to paraphrase Clausewitz, may be the extension of Vietnam by other means.

Both experiences reflect the abuse of Presidential power. Both may be too close for comfort—in part, because some hypocrisy seems to persist. For many Americans, credibility suffers when leaders pledge "equal justice under the law" and still grant preemptive pardon to exponents of preventive detention.

Hence, the haunting worth of two books which make the Vietgate connection.

Alexander Kendrick, distinguished CBS journalist, calls what Vietnam has done to America and Americans "the wound within." He claims that the war helped

create the amoral climate which nurtured Watergate. It raised questions about the quality of national leadership and validity of our expressed values.

Crisp writing and broad scope mark Kendrick's chronological compendium, 1945-1974. He moves deftly between battlefield and back home, from reportorial quip to historical judgment.

It is a provocative nostalgia trip. By Kendrick's account, for example, containment came full-circle for George Kennan. Eisenhower, with his parting shot at "misplaced power," better served the nation than did Kennedy who asked us to "pay any price . . ." Jerry Rubin's "rip-off" gave us "instant socialism." God was not dead if Jesus Christ became "Superstar." Watts made Black, if not beautiful, News. Nixon said "North Vietnam cannot defeat or humiliate the US; only Americans can do that"—just days before public disclosure of the Mylai massacre.

Kendrick believes that a return to responsive government requires a reassertion of Presidential integrity. Johnson and Nixon verified the axiom of Euripides: Character is Destiny. That destiny looks bleak as long as Americans deify their President and he, in turn, lacks character for the job.

If Kendrick bares the national

psyche, Michael Harrington searches his own soul. (He is a prolific writer, perhaps best known for "The Other America," which inspired the Kennedy-Johnson War on Poverty.) He relates his personal experiences as "fragments of the century."

His is a painfully honest autobiographical odyssey—complete with introspection into his own nervous breakdown. He moves from the Irish Catholic ghetto of St. Louis to the counterculture of Greenwich Village, with detours with the likes of Gloria Steinem, Norman Mailer, Dylan Thomas, Dorothy Day, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. He considers the itinerary a "vicious circle" which began in the anti-libertarian Cold War period, proceeded through the somnolent Eisenhower era, climaxed in the schizophrenic '60s and ends in another decade of repression.

Vietnam is again the decisive event. Harrington details his own opposition to the war and, thereby, the evolution of leftist intellectual critique against that conflict. He finds snobbism in his identification with the wretched of the earth. His own Marxism assumes a Weberian cast. He agonizes over the ethical complexities of the last decade. Vietnam, he concludes, was cruelly subtle, a Hegelian conflict

of goods as well as of good versus evil. He urges a balance between vision and practicality, lest radical critics lapse into self-righteous irrelevance.

This attendant lord to the political and cultural crises of our age ends by surprising himself: "I should be dejected, but I am not." He discerns a revolution at work, even if the President and Intellectual Left do not. He still seeks a "humanely created" future and wagers the rest of his life on hope.

Like Kendrick, Harrington seems to opt for optimism because he cannot bear to do otherwise. The American Dream dies hard.

Yet, both writers leave unresolved the questions of power, raised by Vietnam and Watergate, which still challenge that Dream. Both men give little reason to believe that the nation has learned much from either experience.

- President Ford, like his four predecessors, seems stuck to the Saigon Tar Baby, seeking new billions to fund a discredited war by proxy.
- Shortly after taking office, he has mocked the Constitution and American system of justice by granting premature clemency for Richard Nixon and so perpetuating the Watergate cover-up.

Kendrick opens his book with an apt reference to Yeats with which Harrington, the latter-day Irish poet-philosopher, could concur and conclude:

*"Things fall apart; the center cannot hold . . .
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.
Surely some revelation is at hand . . ."*

—SANDRA VOGELGESANG

A Foreign Service Family

THE SLIGHTEST DISTANCE by Henry Bromell. Houghton Mifflin, \$6.95.

THERE is little doubt that this is a good book of particular interest to JOURNAL readers; there is some doubt as to what kind of book it is. Henry Bromell has written a collection of short stories about the members of a Foreign Service family; the related stories do constitute a compelling view of this particular set of people but they do not constitute, as claimed on the book jacket, a novel.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service



"That's the place we're here to represent, Buster, and don't you ever forget it!"

This is not to say that there is anything wrong with short stories, particularly brilliant ones such as these, many of which will have been read by FSJ readers in *THE NEW YORKER*. Bromell, who is only 26, is already a masterly practitioner of the form (the book is the winner of this year's Houghton Mifflin Literary Fellowship Award). The confusion as to form, however, does lead to reflection that Bromell should provide a novel in the near future. For good as these present pieces are they are a bit slim for \$6.95. 192 pages, 9 stories, lots of space between lines and lots of empty pages between stories.

The slight note of petulance which can be discerned in this notice can probably be attributed to jealousy. Only 26. . . .

—E. GRIFFEL

China's Development

THE IDEA OF CHINA, by Andrew L. March. Praeger, \$8.50.

UNLIKE MANY other geographers, Marsh does not think that environmental factors such as climate, landforms, soils, waters, etc., are the primary determinants of history—and he uses China to prove his point. In a little over 100 pages of text Marsh takes up from ancient Greece and Rome to the present, stopping along the way to cite various scholars and to point out how unfair both classical and modern geographic (and other) thought has been to China and how too much of it was and continues to be fallacious as theory and obsolete as myth. Marsh is not very charitable in his analysis. It should be easy to excuse the simplicity of the early works which view China as an almost mythical land barely distinguishable from the rest of Asia or the Orient. It is also not surprising that 18th century philosophers such as Montesquieu, Turgot and Hegel, to whom March devotes considerable space, would reflect "Europocentrism" in their view of China. Contemporary students of China, however, do have more basic information for a more judicious evaluation of the country and, for the most part, present reasonable views and alternatives for China's development.

Unfortunately, in his last chapter on natural resources which brings

the discussion to the present, Marsh selects quotations that support his thesis but do not necessarily represent the body of contemporary scholarship. It is true, for example, that there is considerable speculation with regard to the population/food balance in China; but the uncertainty is recognized and there is room for such discussion. Mao's optimism, which stresses the value of human resources and minimizes geographic determinism, may be reasonable and is surely admirable, but the basis for this optimism has yet to be proved in the long run. As for Marsh's contention that official American policy considers China to be "aggressive and dangerous"—it hardly seems accurate in a book published in 1974.

—LEO A. ORLEANS

Needed—A Sequel

FOREIGN POLICY AND THE BUREAUCRATIC PROCESS, by William S. Bacchus. Princeton University Press, \$10.00.

WILLIAM S. BACCHUS has assessed the Department's "country director" system in a careful and systematic way. He has interviewed many country directors. He has amassed all the relevant facts and figures. He has fully reviewed the documentation. This is a useful book for those interested in the Department's organization. But the subject won't come alive to a wider audience until we have an analysis on a case-by-case basis of the relationship between the State Department expert—the country director whom Mr. Bacchus shows to be among the ablest of the FSOs—and the policy maker, the Secretary of State and the President.


Apart from the bureaucratic question, there is another broader issue which Mr. Bacchus only mentions in the closing pages of his book. Can the State Department effectively deal with our most pressing problems such as food, fuel and nuclear arms if its basic organizational structure is along geographic lines and if it tilts in the direction of stable bilateral relations with individual countries rather than collective approaches to human problems? Hopefully Mr. Bacchus will write a sequel.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

Sukarno and the PKI

INDONESIAN COMMUNISM UNDER SUKARNO, by Rex Mortimer. Cornell University Press.

MUCH HAS already been published on the rise of the Indonesian Communist Party although less on its spectacular fall in 1965-66. By concentrating on the period 1959-65, this book attempts to explain the PKI's period of greatest success as well as its sudden fall. In some ways it succeeds and, in any case, the author is to be commended for his scholarship and knowledge of much publicly available detail. His conceptual approach generally follows the established academic model of Indonesian politics under Sukarno, a model that this reviewer found increasingly wide of the mark during his own close involvement with the subject in 1963-66. The problem, as I saw it, was that the classical approach underestimated the deep roots of Sukarno's own intellectual commitment to Marxism dating from the early 1920s, in part because Sukarno was impelled both by the strong anti-Marxist suppression that followed the failure of the 1926 PKI revolt and partly by his own nationalist leanings to distort Marxist theory prematurely in directions that later became accepted in Asian communism, especially after the Sino-Soviet split became overt and established after 1960. During the 1948 Madiun revolt, Sukarno was on the other side of the fence, although not very actively, against a PKI then led by the long-time Moscow exile, Musso. Sukarno's position then can be attributed partly to his role as titular president of a then parliamentary system threatened by the PKI but even more importantly to his own intellectual deviation from Muscovite and Stalinist Communism. His idea of revolution was not focused on the proletariat but the peasantry and poorer classes generally (the Marhaen), and it was to be made for the benefit of Indonesia, not Soviet Russia. Mr. Mortimer correctly describes the growing rapprochement between Sukarno and the PKI under Guided Democracy but overstates, I believe, the degree of distrust between the two while underestimating the influ-



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ence of the breakdown in world communist discipline on the PKI's freedom to adopt attitudes that were, and had always been, those of Sukarno.

As with virtually all the published material, the so-called communist coup of 1965 is misunderstood by Mortimer. The September 30 affair was neither a coup by the PKI nor a result of factional problems in the armed forces; it was a conscious effort by Sukarno himself to mastermind a complex purge that would permit Indonesia "to leave the National Democratic stage and enter the Socialist stage," a statement that implied in both PKI and Sukarno jargon the creation of a genuine communist regime rather than a popular front. Mortimer refers to Sukarno's declaration but does not understand it (he even dates it from April, 1965—some two months after it was first proclaimed) and then in terms of initial PKI skepticism (Lukman and some others) that the time was ripe. Some of the youthful PKI leaders thought they could afford to wait; Sukarno wanted the glory of leading the revolution to its final stage and other PKI leaders, including Aidit, probably understood that it took Sukarno's prestige, a time-limited asset, to do the trick. Since the PKI was militarily weak, the whole affair had to be obscured to enlist elements of the military loyal to Sukarno but not themselves Marxist (or pro-PKI) as well as to neutralize other Sukarnoists including some with famous anti-communist reputations such as Adjie. The whole story still remains to be told although Mortimer's book does make some steps in the right direction away from the classical and, I believe, partially erroneous understanding that has limited our scholarship on Indonesia. Much of that scholarship remains sound (and the same can be said of this book); but there is a considerable blindness toward one of the central themes of the era.

—ROBERT J. MARTENS

FSJ REPORT: A recent cable from Embassy-Buenos Aires (No. 06204) announces: "We have amended the draft Country Commercial Program." Our advice to Embassy-B.A. is that while such self-deprecation may be disarming and even admirable in its way, it won't cut much ice in Washington.

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BY BREAD ALONE
from page 32

ters in Africa.

The Consultative Group represents the creation of a global agricultural research strategy. It is helping to rectify a serious deficiency of the past: the overconcentration of research efforts on the problems of temperate zone agriculture in the developed nations, which often had little relevance for the needs of most developing nations. It deserves continuing strong support, and donors should be prepared to increase their contributions when new needs are identified.

There is a strong feeling among research scientists working in this field that the existing centers and the Consultative Group can handle the main research to be done and that few, if any, additional international centers need to be created. The already established institutes focus on the major crops—rice, wheat, corn, sorghum, beans—and on livestock. It is now time to focus attention on systems within

the individual developing countries that can provide the services and inputs farmers need to utilize the new technologies.

Equally important is the strengthening of local agronomic research facilities within the developing nations. Improved varieties must be adapted not only to national environmental conditions but also to the varying conditions within nations. Although a number of countries have made significant progress toward building indigenous research capabilities, the gap between needs and existing facilities is still very large. The FAO estimates that developing country agricultural research efforts need to be raised from their current level of \$250 million annually to \$1 billion a year. Clearly the developed countries will have to help meet a substantial portion of this critical need. Contributions to developing country agricultural research from oil-exporting countries with large capital surpluses would also perform a valuable international service.

With global demand for high-

quality protein rising rapidly, an especially strong need has emerged for a breakthrough in soybean yields per acre. Now that there is little new land available for expanding the area planted to this crucial crop in the world's two major soybean-producing countries, the inability to raise yields substantially is an ominous cloud in the world food economy. The possibility of creating a joint Sino-American soybean research institute has great potential value. China, where the soybean originated, has the most diverse available collection of germ plasm—a vital asset in an expanded soybean research effort. The United States, on the other hand, has already invested a great deal of effort in devising better farming practices and in making the soybean plant more productive.

The critical importance of the soybean to both economies—not to mention mankind as a whole—argues for the pooling of germ plasm and the coordination of research efforts in an all-out effort to raise yields. ■

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A TRUE ARISTOCRAT

from page 10

married. It was not much easier to find a suitable mate for Susi than it was to find her in the beginning, but persistent inquiry resulted in our locating a handsome male. His owner—a grande dame of forbidding reputation—agreed to the union once she had laid eyes on the papers Susi had brought with her. The nuptials, as I got it (having by then gone to Washington to serve on a Selection Board) were somewhat frantic in nature, with a great deal of chasing through the drawing room where Senora X was having a tea party.

The resultant output was one small pup, christened Maximilian, and soon to die. To solace Susi and, he said, to ease the pall which had descended upon our menage (but, in reality, to ease the enormous food bills which he saw looming) a friend made us a present of two Great Dane puppies of tender age. These we called Cortez and Montezuma. Some months later, we bred Susi again, and she was delivered of three healthy pups. Delivered by *me*, that is; for, having read up on the technology, and having been the Medical Member of my Boy Scout troop, I was chosen of all present to be the midwife.


Not surprisingly, the Dane and Dackel young failed to grow at the same rate, and this brought some problems. But Susi saw to it that there was no nonsense. When the Danes, driven wild by the incessant taunting of their would-be siblings, sagged in the role of nannies, Susi brought the whole unruly mob under the discipline of her own sharp teeth. It was a job that she never would have chosen for herself, but she handled it with sagacity and

tact. To save her from collapse, for the Danes were big brutes by then, we offered all five of the little monsters to colleagues in the Consulate. Their thanks (we were sure that's what they were) rang in our ears as we and Susi sped, or fled, to our next assignment in Washington.

Susi found Our Nation's Capital dull after life abroad. Secretary Kissinger had not yet moved—as he was to do—into the house next door, and there was little excitement on the row. Walks along Massachusetts Avenue became the more important, especially after “THAT operation” at Dr. Goudy's, and the threat of unwelcome girth.

Weekends at a place which we took out in Loudoun County restored her contours and her joie de vivre. Leaning perilously out of the window of the car, long ears flapping in the wind, and sucking in every luscious smell along the way, she left the cares of town behind. Once again, there were twenty different kinds of animals to chase and terrify or tease. Plus plenty of “Okay, let's go!”—out into the zing of winter or the limpid air of spring. Four years of that, in fact.

All lives must end, and Susi's did. Congestive heart failure did her in, after eight years in the Foreign Service and five more in retirement. We were not even with her, but on a trip abroad while she was being sheltered and loved by generous friends, in the company of a gay young dachshund named 'Erman. But I am sure that when the Lord said “Okay, Susi! Time to go!”—ignoring her stricken heart and wagging that crooked little tail behind her, she bounced straight into heaven to wait for those two gorgeous guys—and maybe us—from Warsaw days.



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NEW CUBA, NEW CUBANS

from page 14

from north of the Straits of Florida. MLW, Ltd., of Montreal, Canadian affiliate of Studebaker-Worthington, Inc., sold railroad locomotives to Cuba last March, without vigorous objection from Washington. In April, at least tacit approval seems to have been given to the sale to Cuba of cars, trucks, and spare parts by Argentine affiliates of General Motors, Ford and Chrysler—things Cuba has not been permitted to purchase directly in the United States. And there are growing signs that Washington is moving toward "normalization."

Senators Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island Democrat, and Jacob Javits, New York Republican—both members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—returned late in September from an unofficial visit to Havana which persuaded them that the time is "propitious" for US-Cuban talks. Such talks might result, at least, in a resumption of trade relations.

If a direct exchange of Cuban sugar for American products were

possible, the soaring world sugar price would pay for an increasing volume of exports from the United States, a measurable shot in the arm for our export trade. In consideration of the tight world sugar supply, some Latin American countries holding quota rights in the controlled US market have been covering shortfalls in their own production with open-market purchases of Cuban sugar. Thus, in spite of the US-imposed trade embargo, Cuban sugar is already sweetening our coffee and our cornflakes.

A half dozen Latin American and Caribbean countries now have bilateral diplomatic relations with Cuba. With respect to multilateral hemisphere politics, the foreign ministers of two dozen countries agreed at their April conference, following the suggestion of the American Secretary of State, to consult their governments on the tricky question of inviting Cuba to the next foreign ministers' conference, at Buenos Aires in 1975. No firm consensus has developed, but Cuba's revolutionary government seems to think it has been invited.

FOR THE MOMENT, the major obstacle to a normalization of relations is posed by the hundreds of thousands of Cuban exiles in the United States who have not been able to forgive or forget the turn of political fate that sent them to their bitter diaspora. During fifteen years they have organized and funded an effective lobby, which has been at least as influential in preventing any softening of US policy toward Havana as its Taiwan counterpart was for so long in blocking any policy change toward Peking.

Meanwhile, in their resolute struggle for independence, Cubans dangle in suspended animation, still beyond reach of the spirit of détente to which the giant rivals for their affection are dedicated. Nationalism remains a powerful driving force; Cubans are more passionately Cuban than Communist. Their present self-respect, from whatever source it has been derived, augurs well for a more open and happier relationship with their neighbors in the future. ■

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A SUMMER'S INTERN

from page 24

up with a wife who resented or did not understand the dual nature of her commitment. At no time did I see wives openly pressured into accepting social responsibilities, either by high-ranking embassy officials or their spouses. Rather, I sensed a subtler and more nebulous pressure impacting on mission wives, a pressure to attend parties and to host them, to mix socially with other wives, to perform professionally as part of the "country team." I do not question that many officers' wives enjoyed their Foreign Service roles and welcomed the challenge; other wives did not find the "expected" socializing as pleasant, however. My general impression remains that the male officer whose wife could view his career as her own seemed to have both a professional and personal edge.

I felt uneasy, in addition, at the expressed reluctance of many FSOs and their families to accept post assignments in Washington. A number of officers did not seem to

know or much care about the US domestic political process. Still more were hesitant to accept a US assignment because, in their opinion, they could not live as comfortably back in Washington. If part of the problem has to do with the relatively high expenses that FSOs encounter when serving in the States, then another part must relate to the luxurious—in some cases, semi-regal—life styles which many of them can enjoy only at foreign posts such as the one I observed. Many State Department families there, for example, employed small bebies of servants: these often included a cook, driver, nanny, laundress, etc. Certainly life in this particular developing country imposed certain hardships on all West-erners. Mission officials and spouses regularly justified a large domestic staff with the added argument that they were easing local unemployment. Both of these points may be legitimate, but many mission families' life styles at the same time appeared to take adroit advantage of extremely cheap labor, and to provide a sad remin-


der of the host country's long colonial tradition. A number of post officials and spouses clearly flourished in their unreal world of silver serving bells and white-uniformed houseboys.

In conclusion, I want to reiterate that my "bottom line" impression of the United States Foreign Service was on balance positive. My recollections of some genuinely fine Americans associated with the post where I interned are as rich and vivid as any negative memories. The Foreign Service could have impressed me *more* favorably, however. Many of the organization's almost traditional flaws commented on here seem correctable; the apparent sluggishness of the Foreign Service to solve some of its internal problems is not a good selling point. If change is so difficult to effect within the organization, then graduate students with interests similar to mine may come to look elsewhere for their first-choice jobs. At the least, they will straddle the fence a little longer before applying to the Foreign Service. ■

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THE GATHERING STORM

from page 22

action at this stage to combat world inflation, to solve the problem of raw materials, and to cope with the emergency facing the have-not nations. There will be earnest statements of intent, but little else. The natural inclination of governments at a time of crisis is to be guided by national egoism, to adopt protectionist measures—in short, to pursue a beggar-my-neighbor policy. All past experience has shown that such measures do not work; the only predictable outcome is a rapid decline in world trade and a further drop in real income in many countries. Not all the old mistakes will be repeated; a new edition of the Smoot-Hawley Act of 1931 to protect American farmers against foreign competition is ruled out for obvious reasons. But effective cooperation among the industrial nations of the West cannot be expected until palliative measures like import restrictions have failed and the situation has become so desperate that the governments will be driven to act together by the

sheer instinct for survival. Yet even such action will require a long time to become effective: it is easy to cause a collapse in world markets, but it took more than a thousand meetings of the Kennedy round in the early '60s for agreement to be reached on the reduction of import duties. And agreement and concerted action will be even more difficult this time than in the early 1930s. For the world economic crisis of that period mainly involved the industrialized nations, whereas the coming crisis also embraces the conflicting interests between the producers of raw materials and the main consumer nations.

The crisis could be mitigated or at the very least delayed by a general decline in the prices of raw materials and if inflation does not become worse. We have already noted a fall in the price of wheat which will make a considerable difference to the food-importing countries. The price of copper and other metals came down by 20 per cent or more last May and the bottom has not yet been reached. But such

are the complexities of the world economy that too sudden and total a collapse on the commodity markets would itself cause a crisis (as indeed happened in 1930-32). It is virtually certain that the Middle East oil producers, for political rather than economic reasons, will make use of the enormous funds they have accumulated to bribe some countries, invest in others, and extend first aid in yet other parts of the world. It is equally certain that the governments of the West will eventually get together and take action. But one fears that it will be too little and too late to prevent the political convulsions which could be triggered off by a major economic crisis.

THE LAST WORLD economic crisis witnessed the advent to power of fascism in Central Europe. While history, as first year students are taught, does not repeat itself, it is highly probable that compared with the shape of things to come, the 1950s and '60s will appear in retrospect a calm, peaceful, and relatively happy period in the history

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of mankind. The survival of parliamentary democracy will be in doubt in all but a few countries—and there are not that many free countries left even now.

As for the two superpowers, they are both in a favorable position to cope with the crisis (and China will hardly be affected). Americans, like most human beings, tend to regard their own problems as the worst possible, but in comparison with those facing other countries, they appear almost insignificant in scope. Despite Watergate, despite inflation, despite all its other internal problems, the United States is strong; it does not depend on the help of others, its economy will not collapse, and it has enough military power to defend its interests. True, Mr. Kissinger is not to be envied, and his successor even less. American foreign policy is geared at present to dealing with one crisis at a time; soon it will have to cope with half a dozen, and people will think back with wonder and nostalgia to the days when the Secretary of State could afford to absent himself from Washington for five weeks, shut-

Despite Watergate, despite inflation, despite all its internal problems, the United States is strong.

tling between two foreign countries in an attempt to solve a mere regional dispute.

The Soviet Union is also well placed to cope with the crisis. It will try to expand its spheres of influence in Europe, the Middle East, and possibly also in Southeast Asia. Communist regimes may emerge in a few more countries, though this will not necessarily strengthen the cohesion of the Soviet camp. The general political trend will be toward authoritarian regimes and dictatorships, nationalist-populist in inspiration. There may be coups and counter-coups in rapid succession, and some regions may go through long periods of chaos. No crisis lasts forever and eventually a new equilibrium will emerge. Similarly with détente, the prospects for which are less than brilliant in the circumstances. For the essence of Soviet policy will not consist in refraining from seizing an advantage over the United States wherever possible, as stated

in the Nixon-Brezhnev accord, but exactly the opposite. True, even a breakdown in détente will be followed by more détente, détente without illusions, shorn of the misleading rhetoric: in brief, a control system to prevent major wars.

WHAT WILL the new international system be like? If we are indeed in the first stages of a world crisis, it is clearly premature to speculate about its duration and about the new order likely to emerge thereafter. Perhaps the crisis will be less severe than feared and its political repercussions less far-reaching. Perhaps seemingly insoluble problems will give way to human effort and ingenuity. Perhaps the developments sketched in this article will take years rather than months to mature. In economic storms, it has been noted, the time lag between lightning and thunder is often quite long. To which it should be added that there is a further time lag between economic lightning and political thunder. Once the thunder has struck, however, the time for installing lightning rods will have passed. ■

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
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LETTERS TO FSJ

Dispassionate Discussion

■ May a JOURNAL reader respond to Philippe Renard's critique of your AID editorial (FSJ, October 1974)? He makes five major points:

1. *Aid was just a Cold War weapon and is therefore now irrelevant.* But is that the only reason for aid? And is the Cold War completely over? Permanently? Are we to presume that Soviet foreign assistance has ended because of détente?

2. *Congress should support direct aid less and development banks more.* But is development just banking and the transfer of capital? Is there no role for the transfer of commodities, information and skills? And can the LDCs all stand a greater debt structure?

3. *Congress should use privately endowed foundations.* But will Ford and Rockefeller (the Foundations) do what Congress wants, where it wants, when it wants? And are these largely domestic agencies really for sale, without goals, programs and funds of their own? (I enjoyed my own stint with Ford, but the budget was not as "small," nor the labor as "herculean" as suggested.)

4. *Congress should use private US banks.* But if the LDCs can barely afford concessional terms, how will they handle the current interest rates on a strictly business basis as he suggests? Or is Chase Manhattan to compete with the World Bank for USG funds? Will the use of banks free LDCs from "American goals" and "current political relations" as Mr. Renard hopes? Have either the development or private banks fought free of US guidance? And should they?

5. *Countries worth having as friends and allies are not for sale.* Generally not. But when our friends and allies need help, should we not be able to give them more than the address of a good bank? If one of their problems is debt, should we give them more of it? Or should we tell them the United States built itself "without foreign advice and guidance," and hope they know as little US history as Mr. R?

Mr. Renard suggested "dispassionate" discussion, but talks

about AID's "battalions," "contingents," "multilayered bureaucracy," and "stultifying side-effects," as against "equitable" business relationships, and "practical business acumen." Of course he is looking for a quick and easy alternative. So are we all. But there is none! Time, Mr. R., and sweat and professionalization, and institutional security, and some luck will do it. JOURNAL, stick to your editorial guns.

SHERWIN LANDFIELD
Washington

In Memoriam

■ The recent death of Laurence W. Taylor at the age of 78 evokes memories of an officer who made quite extraordinary contributions to the Foreign Service during his active years from 1930 to 1956.

Larry Taylor was already 34 when he entered the Service, having worked in his early years as an agricultural county agent in California. His posts were Vancouver, Copenhagen, Strasbourg, Bordeaux, Paris, Brazzaville, Montreal, the Foreign Service Institute, the Inspection Corps, Yokohama, and Tokyo—where, at the time of his retirement, he was Counselor of Embassy and supervising Consul General. Following retirement, Larry was grabbed by the University of California to give lectures at Berkeley on world agriculture, an appointment which resulted in his spending a full decade supervising foreign agricultural trainees on all eight campuses of the university system. In recent years he and his wife Carmen had been living quietly on their small farm near Santa Rosa, growing grapes and making their own wine.

There were several interesting chapters in Larry's career. He was the officer in charge of closing the Paris embassy when the Germans arrived in 1941, and I recall his giving a vivid account of the duties this involved—the most difficult being to damage the official consular seal in such a way that it would be rendered unusable by the Nazis. Then in 1942 he was sent to Brazzaville, at the time the only French territory under the control of the Free French, where he played a key role as a liaison officer symbolizing American support to the flickering hopes of France.

But what I want to focus on is

the Laurence Taylor who from 1946 to 1948 ran the Institute program to indoctrinate and train several hundred young FSOs who came streaming into the postwar Foreign Service. These young officers, many of them today ambassadors, got their first impressions of their duties and responsibilities from Larry as he shepherded class after class in rapid succession through a 60-day introductory course. Many entering officers knew little about our service, having come directly from the armed forces on demobilization from military duty. It was most important that they be indoctrinated in such a way as to understand the role they were expected to play in the postwar world, and to be given a realistic appreciation of the difficulties ahead and the qualities they would need to display to overcome these.

Larry performed his job at this critical time with the utmost zeal and enthusiasm, somehow managing to take a personal interest in every young officer even when with overlapping classes all during 1947 he had 40 trainees at once. I was not one of his trainees, but as a colleague I was closely in touch with his work and the effect it was having. I cannot imagine that any other single officer ever had as much opportunity to influence the attitudes and the morale of the Service as Larry had during this period, or that the training job was ever done with more generosity and dedication. His efforts were not confined to the classroom. Out of slender personal resources, he and his hospitable spouse entertained at their home every entering officer and every young wife. Scores of officers have spoken to me with great warmth of the skill with which the kind-hearted Taylors made them feel welcome in a strange new career and able to cope with its problems. I hope that this word of tribute will represent the sentiments of many.

FRANK SNOWDEN HOPKINS
Washington

The JOURNAL welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary.

Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service JOURNAL, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.



Rick Williamson

This Month in Washington

Several years ago, when the District Government was still interested in building freeways, signs were put up showing the direction of Interstates which had not yet been built, and which now are not going to be built. But the signs led nowhere and thus led to unending confusion, and recently some of them were taken down. One, near the Department showed the way to Interstate 66-East, which did not exist. Now they have taken down the I-66 sign but forgot to take down "East" and the arrow. So now we have a sign pointing to the West, marked simply "East."

Things have been like that a lot in the past two years—signs pointing the wrong way. Our early relations with USIA, shortly after our election victory, were somewhat like that. Things initially were highly favorable, a false sign of our actual future relations. Now, as we go to press, it appears that the major cause of our difficulties with USIA (reported on below) may have been resolved. The whole month has had so many things of importance happen, it's hard to know where to begin.

AFSA Wins USIA Promotion Safeguards Case

In the Foreign Service, with its rank-in-person concept and centralized promotion system, the integrity of the promotion process has a significance far greater than in the Civil Service. Indeed, the process is so central to success and career satisfaction in the Foreign Service that there is no room for the slightest doubt that the process is entirely fair and beyond any possibility of tampering by agency management. For this reason, AFSA has placed a great deal of its attention in the past three years on seeking improvements in the promotion process, ranging from

AFSA's biennial elections are approaching and the election call will appear in the February JOURNAL. The time to start thinking about candidates, candidacies and issues is NOW.

the Pell Amendment to the Foreign Service Act that promotions be strictly based on rank-ordering, to improved precepts in all three agencies, to agreements and/or standing practice regulating the composition of selection boards.

The largest stumbling block to obtaining a promotion system in which the people of the Foreign Service, irrespective of rank or specialty, could have confidence was the refusal of USIA to sign an agreement similar to the one we negotiated with the Department, to safeguard the promotion process from political or personal abuse. Actual incidents of tampering had occurred in USIA, and rumors of tampering were widespread, particularly among Senior officers, and among several groups of specialists at VOA.

We have been engaged in this fight with USIA for over a year. Last summer, apparently as the result of highly damaging admissions by the then Assistant Director for Personnel, AFSA won the case on the merits at the Disputes Panel level. Thereafter, in spite of a clear legal requirement, the Board of the Foreign Service refused to take expeditious action and did nothing for months. Finally, when the Board did act, it was to take action on USIA's request for which it had no legal authority, to refer the case to the Employee-Management Relations Commission for a ruling on whether the matter was "consultable." (That's labor-management jargon for whether we had a right to negotiate on the matter in the first place.) This past month, the EMRC, having considered the legal briefs of both parties, ruled that the matter was "consultable," a second major victory for us over

Agency management on this question before third-party adjudicatory bodies.

Shortly thereafter, the Board of the Foreign Service notified USIA management that it was upholding the findings and recommendations of the Disputes Panel. While the Director still could overrule the Board, that would be a very serious step—to date without precedent—and the Director has previously stated publicly that he would abide by the decision of the Board. As this goes to press, therefore, we are proceeding on the assumption that the matter has been resolved. If this assumption proves to be correct, this year's USIA selection boards, scheduled to meet in January, will be the first in the history of the Agency under which the Foreign Service personnel of USIA can have confidence that the determinations of the Boards will be scrupulously followed by Agency management in making promotions.

Taxing Foreign Service Allowances Not Likely This Session

This month, we were all given a serious jolt, when the House Ways and Means Committee, (without ever holding hearings to consider the implications) reported out HR 17488 which would have made nearly all Foreign Service Allowances taxable. If the Bill had passed, it would have had a crippling effect on the Foreign Service, would have made serving one's country abroad in most posts more expensive than staying at home, and thus would have forced many in the Foreign Service to resign, and many others to refuse service

AFSA members who may be interested in working on the staff of the Association as Executive Director or Counselor beginning next summer should submit resumes to AFSA as soon as possible.

in expensive posts.

As soon as we learned of this action (the same day the Bill was reported out), we began an intensive lobbying effort with the Congress, tipped off other interested organizations, and held an emergency meeting with top Department officials who did an excellent job of dealing with this crisis. Over the next two weeks, most of our attention was focused on this crisis. In keeping with the strategy worked out previously with the Department, when it appeared that behind-the-scenes work might not be enough, we notified the entire Service, asked their help, and many responded by writing or wiring their Congressmen and Senators.

Last week, the House Rules Committee refused to give the bill a "rule," thus apparently precluding action on this bill this year. However, the matter is likely to be raised again next year, and it is therefore of critical importance that everyone in the Foreign Service who has not already done so write his or her Congressman and two Senators urging them to resist such measures if they come up in the next Congress. We particularly need help from those of you whose Congressmen and/or Senators are on the following committees: House Ways and Means, House Foreign Affairs, Senate Finance, Senate Foreign Relations and the Joint Committee on Taxation.

Bad News on the Retirement Bill and Senior Level Pay

It now appears unlikely, despite pressure from AFSA and DACOR, that the House will have sufficient time left this session to act on S-1791, the bill already passed by the Senate which would make major changes (most for the better) in the Foreign Service retirement system. Furthermore, the Administration has so far refused to take a serious and active interest in dealing with the problem of the Senior-level pay freeze. The Senate and House leadership refuses to bring out such a bill without firm Administration support, because a substantial number of Republican votes will be needed for passage, particularly given the present state of the Economy. However, plans are being drawn now for a joint

Administration-Congressional approach to this question early in the new Congress. In the meantime, however, the unprecedented retirement rates are likely to continue throughout government, including the Foreign Service. With another large retirement bonus coming in February for those who retire by the end of January, the number of senior personnel likely to retire from the Service this time may hit an all-time high.

Steve Wallace

FSO. FSIO. FSDO?

The last few weeks have been most hectic, with AFSA staff scurrying among the myriad events of Foreign Service Day, the AFSA Awards Luncheon, the Memorial Plaque Ceremony, the presentation of the Foreign Service Cup to Ambassador Bruce, and concurrent hearings on grievances and the RIF unfair labor practice. Indeed, the pace of events was so rapid, that there was little time for leisurely reflection on most of them. One notable exception, however, was the Foreign Service Day Brunch at the Club, where the Director General, Ambassador Nathaniel Davis, led a stimulating dialogue on the future of the Foreign Service. Noting the ever increasing number of overseas functions required of our government, Ambassador Davis stressed that the Foreign Service must be ready to meet this challenge or it will awaken one day to find itself as only one voice in a "polyagencied" foreign service.

It is time to heed Ambassador Davis's advice. With the exception of the recent emergence of the FSIO, there has been little change in the traditional roles of the Foreign Service. There are the four major cones in the State Service and a few attache positions; and many aspiring officers still try to follow a traditional mode of advancement by step-laddering successively between the Department and the field. Meanwhile, other agencies such as Justice, Agriculture, Treasury, Transportation, HEW, etc., continue to expand their overseas functions, many of which should optimally be performed by personnel of the three legitimate Foreign Affairs Agencies. By early 1974, the members of these other agencies overseas had

swollen to nearly 1,600. In light of this other agency encroachment, Ambassador Davis suggested that the Foreign Service will have to broaden its horizons rapidly and start meeting head-on the vast array of new requirements inherent to modern-day international relations.

I was little short of inspired by the morning's dialogue about what should be done, but I nevertheless remained disappointed that the managements of the three Agencies are doing little about the problem. USIA is becoming increasingly sophisticated in its capacity to perform its informational and cultural functions, but it can seldom obtain enough funding to do the job expected of the world's first power, and to date has been unable to halt the growing trend towards "Washingtonization" of its activities. State performs well its traditional political, economic, administrative, and consular functions, but has been less than inspired in taking on new tasks. AID, meanwhile, is regressing in comparison.

The direction that AID has been taking in recent years is not only the antithesis of what is required for effectively integrating the development function into the overall pattern of American diplomacy, but also displays the realization of the concerns voiced by the Director General. With the current drastic RIF underway, AID Foreign Service officers are reminded that there is little comparability to the career system afforded their State and USIA colleagues. We are also witnessing AID's ever increasing reliance on contract and other agency personnel who seem to rate higher status and to have greater retention rights than AID's own Foreign Service employees. In FY 1974, fourteen government agencies provided 865.5 man years of services to AID at a cost of \$32.6 million. The numbers and cost of contract personnel were far greater. Comparability should be found in State and USIA, if State were to seek its diplomats from the American Arbitration Association on reimbursable detail, and if USIA contracted CBS to perform its informational activities. AID's policy thus threatens the erosion of the entire Foreign Service by delegating to other government agen-

cies what would otherwise be AID Foreign Service positions, and thereby hastens the day when the three Foreign Affairs Agencies will no longer be serving the unique role for which they were created.

In light of these problems, it would behoove the leadership of State, AID, and USIA to adopt a common strategy which sets forth all of the functions overseas that should be performed by the Foreign Service; which specifies the means by which the Foreign Affairs Agencies would perform these functions; and which establishes a strategy for taking those functions away from domestic agencies. In the meantime, AID should take immediate action to establish a real Foreign Service career and specialist system under the Foreign Service Act which parallels the FSO and FSR system in State. Foreign Service Development Officers (FSDOs) would become the AID equivalent of FSOs and FSIOs, and perform the broad gauge functions now attributed to program officers, economists, and other "technical generalists." Similarly, AID's technical experts should be under a career program resembling (but hopefully better conceived than) the FSRU (FAS) program. With this change, AID could better guarantee a dependable and meaningful career system based on merit, and would be establishing more of a common base with State and USIA from which it can better proceed apace in fulfilling Foreign Service imperatives.

Letter to the Secretary on Ambassadorial Nominations

The change in Administration, and the corresponding requirement of all ambassadors to submit their resignations has provided an excellent opportunity to improve further the caliber of American ambassadors abroad. As you know, the Association has expressed the view, to both the Executive and to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that only the best qualified individuals, whether career or noncareer, should be granted ambassadorships.

In our last meeting with you, we indicated our belief that with a few exceptions you and the President had taken commendable steps to upgrade the caliber of ambassador-

ial nominees. Certain of your recent nominees further support that trend, both within the career service and from the outside. Of those in the latter category, we are particularly pleased with the nominations of Kenneth Rush and Senator Cooper, both of whom have previously distinguished themselves as ambassadors and in other aspects of their public life.

Unfortunately, we cannot be equally enthusiastic about certain other ambassadorial nominations made recently. As you know, the Association has already made known to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee its views with respect to the nomination of Mr. Flanigan to be Ambassador to Spain. The Board of the Association, while deciding against testifying in opposition to the nomination of Shirley Temple Black to be Ambassador to Ghana, has asked me nevertheless to express our disappointment with this nomination, particularly since there are a large number of career officers and distinguished individuals from outside the career service substantially better qualified to fill this position. Similarly, we are disappointed in the nomination of Michael Samuels to be Ambassador to Sierra Leone. While Mr. Samuels has begun a career in foreign affairs, there are scores of career officers his age who are better qualified, but who do not have the advantage of political influence, and hundreds of older officers who are far better qualified. Appointments of this sort have a highly demoralizing impact on the Foreign Service, as career officers can legitimately ask why they should spend a lifetime developing expertise in foreign affairs, and suffering the personal hardships and risks which are part of service abroad, when others can obtain ambassadorial rewards through the short cuts of political connection and patronage.

With the change in Administrations, we would also urge you to take a careful look at the unhealthy situation whereby nearly all Western European ambassadorships are filled by noncareer personnel. This situation urgently needs remedying, both for the sake of our relations with our Western European allies and for the good of the career service. We would urge you to give particular attention to Luxem-

bourg. Recent testimony and press reports have contradicted Mrs. Farkas's statement that she had not purchased her embassy. If she is innocent of the charges implicit in Mr. Kalmbach's testimony on the sale of ambassadorships, she should be accorded the opportunity to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and clear her name. However, if the charges are accurate, the President should immediately accept her resignation. The integrity of the President's personal representatives abroad should not be subject to challenge and we believe it is urgently necessary for this matter to be resolved as quickly as possible.

THOMAS D. BOYATT
President

The Secretary's Reply

Thank you for your recent letter concerning recent non-career ambassadorial nominations.

I appreciate your comment that the caliber of some recent appointments has furthered the trend towards the kind of representation that both of us desire. As you know, I very much share AFSA's views on the importance of nominating the best qualified individuals as United States Ambassadors. This is and shall remain my firm policy.

Indeed it was on this basis that the recent nominations were put forward. I regret that AFSA is not equally enthusiastic in regard to each nominee. Certainly we cannot be expected to agree on every appointment, nor would AFSA be performing a constructive role if it did so.

I want you to know, however, that I value and respect your judgments on this matter very much. I can only hope that future appointments will meet your approval and welcome your comments on these individuals as I have on those named in your recent letter.

Best regards,
HENRY A. KISSINGER

Foreign Service People

Marriages

Bailey-McDonald. Katherine Galloway Bailey was married to James Stuart McDonald, son of FSO and

Mrs. John W. McDonald, Jr. on December 31, 1974 in Quantico, Virginia.

Births

Hauger. A son, Jan Antony, was born to FSIO and Mrs. Donald W. Hauger, on October 21, in Hanover, Germany.

Deaths

Barber. Eleanor Thompson Barber, wife of FSO-retired John H. Barber, died on November 18 in Severna Park, Maryland. She accompanied her husband on assignments to Managua, Genoa, La Paz, Mexico City and Monterrey, before his retirement in 1970. She is survived by her husband, 636 Emerson Place, Severna Park, a son and daughter, John Jr. and Susan, also of the home address.

Fuess. John C. Fuess, FSO-retired, died on October 15 in Carmel, California. Mr. Fuess entered the Service in 1939 serving in Mexico City, Belfast, Milan, Santiago, Rome, and as Consul General in Trieste before his retirement in 1972. He is survived by his wife, Cora F. Henry Fuess of P.O. Box 1492, Carmel.

Jordan. Curtis C. Jordan, FSO-retired, died on November 28 in Santa Barbara, California. Mr. Jordan entered the Foreign Service in 1920 and served at Port au Prince, Helsingfors, Habana, Barcelona, Madrid, Madras, Vigo, San Luis Potosi and Lourenco Marques before his retirement in 1950. He is survived by his wife of 4620 Cresta Ave., Santa Barbara, a son, a daughter, five grandchildren and six great-grandchildren.

Macatee. Robert B. Macatee, FSO-retired, died on November 16 in Washington, D.C. Mr. Macatee retired in 1954 with the rank of career minister, having served with the American Commission in 1919 to negotiate the Peace Treaty of Versailles and at Geneva, London, Belgrade, Istanbul, and Israel. He is survived by his wife, Evelyn Crooks Macatee of 3232 Prospect Avenue, N.W., a daughter, Mrs. Alan Davidson, and a sister, Mrs. C. Baltimore Calvert.

Merrill. Frederick Thayer Merrill, FSO-retired, died December 2 in Washington, D.C. Mr. Merrill, a specialist in Eastern European affairs, served on the staff of the Supreme Allied Commander,

Mediterranean, and in Budapest. Before retiring in 1965 he served on the board of examiners of the Foreign Service. He is survived by his wife, Edith C. Hall Merrill of Villierstown, Co. Waterford, Ireland, and children, Frederick T. Merrill, Jr., Linda Merrill Ciccone and Marianna Merrill Russell.

Rook. Lois J. Rook, FSO-retired, died on October 16 in Carmel, California, where she lived with her sister, Mrs. Ralph J. Osborn, of 3383 Alana Drive, Sherman Oaks, California. In the Service Miss Rook served in Lima, Taipei, Habana, La Paz, and Hong Kong.

Strunz. Mrs. George H. Strunz died on November 25 in Arlington, Virginia. She is survived by her husband of 317 Locust Street, SE, Vienna, Virginia, two sons and a daughter.

Taylor. Laurence W. Taylor, FSO-retired, died on October 4 in Santa Rosa, California. Mr. Taylor served in several European posts as well as at Yokohama and Tokyo before his retirement in 1956. He is survived by his wife, Carmen Bland Taylor of 6611 Sonoma Mountain Road, Santa Rosa.

Weeks. Margaret White Weeks, wife of FSIO Wilbur F. Weeks, died on October 14 in Washington, D.C. Mrs. Weeks, born in Scotland, came to Washington in 1947 and was a secretary with AID. She accompanied her husband on assignments in Japan, Cambodia, Thailand, Italy, and Pakistan. She is survived by her husband of 2421 Stirrup Lane, Alexandria, Virginia. The family requests that expressions of sympathy be made to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

Wolf. Franklin W. Wolf, FSO-retired, died on August 30 in Red Bank, New Jersey. Mr. Wolf served in Montevideo, Karachi, and Caracas before retiring in 1954. He is survived by his son, Marshall Wolf, 744 Broad Street, Newark, New Jersey.

AID Affairs

Congratulations to Maurice J. Williams, global troubleshooter for the Agency for International Development, and former Deputy Administrator, who just received the 1974 Rockefeller Public Service Award for intergovernmental operations. The Awards carry with them \$10,000 tax-free grants. The

awards were initiated 22 years ago by John D. Rockefeller 3rd, and are administered by Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs as a public trust. Five federal officials received this year's awards at a luncheon ceremony December 4 at Washington's Mayflower Hotel.

The Election Challenge

By way of sequel to our report in the November JOURNAL on the challenge to the 1973 election, the Department of Labor did file a complaint that AFSA had been in violation in the distribution of notices regarding the filing of candidacies. AFSA replied to the complaint, also along the lines of our November report, disputing that a violation had taken place. As we go to press in mid-December, AFSA is in touch with the Labor Department and the Administrative Law Judge assigned to the matter, with a view to working out a stipulation whereby the Labor Department could supervise our 1975 election, due to start shortly. AFSA would welcome such a development as a means to enable the election to be held on schedule, and to demonstrate both our Bylaws' high standards for democratic conduct and their observance in practice.

Pursuant to the new Bylaws adopted in September, 1973, the 1975 election follows the last election by only 18 months. Thereafter the normal 24 month interval will be resumed, with an election completed in the summer, rather than winter, of each odd-numbered year.

The Labor Department has advised against commenting on this matter in greater detail at this time.

Proposal for Living Quarters Allowance Increases for Single Employees

In August, AFSA proposed to revise the payment tables for "without family" (WOF) living quarters allowances to bring them in line with "with family" WF rates (one employee and one dependent). The rationale behind this change is that single employees generally have the same representational responsibilities and accumulation of furnishings, and therefore they need to set up a household as adequate as that of

employees of equivalent rank with one dependent. We have received numerous comments from posts abroad about the inequity of the present situation. Management claims our proposal is not consultable, but has agreed to confer with us on the issue. If single employees at your post have housing problems, let us know.

Joint Agency Members' Interests Agreement on Per Diem at FSI

Under an Agreement AFSA has negotiated with management, employees on training assignments from abroad for periods up to six months will be eligible for substantially increased per diem allowances. The new per diem rate will be \$25 for the first thirty days and \$16.50 for the next ninety days. This is an increase of slightly more than 25% over the four month period. Our survey of AFSA

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Chapters showed that this was one of the two most important areas in which members believed higher benefits were needed. We believe that this Agreement will substantially decrease, if not eliminate, the out-of-pocket expenses incurred by employees assigned to FSI from abroad for short-term training.

In addition, FSI has agreed to provide information on additional allowances not covered by per diem to all eligible employees assigned to training. One important item to note is the possibility of exceptions to the standard per diem rate if your family or personal situation warrants. Under current GAO guidelines, which the Department has agreed to test, requests for exceptions must be directed to the Director of FSI prior to the beginning of training.

Diplomatic Passports for FSSO-7s

After several months of urging, the Association finally persuaded the Department to issue Diplomatic passports to FSSO-7 personnel. We had regarded previous denial of such passports to FSSO-7s as unfairly discriminatory within the staff officer corps, since more senior staff officers were being issued Diplomatic passports.

Computation of Claims Losses

AFSA has submitted a proposal which will greatly benefit employees suffering losses of personal effects. In the past, claim awards have been computed on the basis of original cost less depreciation. Under the AFSA proposal, awards would take rising costs and spiraling inflation into consideration with the amount being awarded on the basis of replacement value minus depreciation.

Travel Exceptions Committee

In another step to make the Uniform Travel Regulations actually more uniform, AFSA and AID have negotiated the creation of a Committee on Exceptions which will review requests for relief and take appropriate action when it has been conclusively demonstrated that excesses have occurred through no fault of the employee. The Committee's jurisdiction will cover exceptional charges for

travel, transportation, or storage of effects.

Our Cover Artist

A reward that comes with a career in a foreign service agency is the knowledge that one may have set in motion events that have affected history.

The retirement of Robert Sivard, Art Director of USIA for many years and the painter of the spring-like scene on our cover, brings this thought to our mind.

Eighteen years ago he made the suggestion and negotiated the terms for an American exhibit in Moscow. Unfortunately the Hungarian revolution erupted and the project was vetoed by the NSC. But it was revived in late 1958. Again he participated in the negotiations, made a master plan and as director of the USIA exhibits division, worked feverishly with many others over eight months, to open the resoundingly successful first American National Exhibition in Moscow, in August 1959.

The exhibition and the subsequent series of smaller exhibits he later organized on American culture and technology were seen by almost 20 million Russians.

Two important changes in Russian attitudes may be related to these shows. One was a less suspicious Russian officialdom when it appeared that opening the doors a bit to let Ivan see the fruits of the American free enterprise system did not create immediate and serious disruption of their own system. The other was the stimulus toward a more consumer oriented economy.

Who can say that the relaxation of tensions that resulted from these early exhibits did not plant the seeds for "detente."

What grand design is on the boards next, Bob?

