

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

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

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PLAN A AUTO VALUE	TERM IN DAYS						ONE WAY MARINE SHIPMENT
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to $1,000	$47	$75	$88	$100	$126	$155	$22
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3-4 000	50	78	91	103	132	161	47
4-5,000	51	79	92	104	134	163	66
5-6,000	52	80	94	106	136	165	81
6-7,000	53	81	96	108	138	168	95
7-8,000	54	82	97	109	140	171	110
8-9,000	55	83	99	111	142	174	125
9-10,000	56	84	101	113	144	177	140
PLAN B	$32	$56	$66	$74	$94	$115	

C—House Trailers: (Third Party Coverage is automatically provided on UTILITY trailers—free of charge.)

1. For full coverage (Plan A) add value of trailer to auto value (deductibles shall apply separately to auto and trailer) plus 25% of the premium for the identical time period under Plan B for third party liability coverage.
2. For legal liability only (Plan B) add 25% to premiums shown in rating schedule for Plan B only. (All premiums are to be rounded off to the nearest dollar.)

D—Marine Shipment:

All Risk Marine insurance ($50.00 deductible) may be included at the rates shown in the MARINE column (Plan A). Please complete marine shipment data on application. Available only if either Plan A or B is purchased. Rates shown above are for one way only. For round trip Marine Coverage two premiums apply.

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Important: This application must be completed in its entirety and accompanied by a check or money order for the full premium (U.S. Dollars). Mail to A.I.U., 1225 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 415, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Name of Applicant: _____

Date of Birth: _____ Occupation: _____

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Mail Policy To: _____

Model: _____ Make of Auto: _____ Year of Manufacture: _____

Serial Number: _____ Value: $ _____

Will Car be Driven in Canada? _____

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Port of Destination: _____

$50. Deductible Sailing Date: _____

Via: _____

COVERAGE — CHECK INSURANCE PLAN DESIRED	PREMIUM
☐ PLAN A – Legal Liability—All Risk Physical Damage—Medical Payments	
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☐ C – House Trailer coverage under Plan A ☐ or B ☐	
☐ D – All Risk MARINE SHIPMENT ($50.00 Deductible)	
TOTAL PREMIUM ►	$

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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

APRIL 1975: Volume 52, No. 4

COVER: Eighth Station of the Cross, Chartres Cathedral, rubbing by Francine Faulhaber

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Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

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The two newcomers are the all-new Gronoda ond Monorch. They've been designed with internotional tostes and needs in mind. They've got oll-new styling, oll-new luxury. And they're the right size ond economicol to operote ond service.

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

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

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The closer you look, the better we look.

I do not know much about gods; but I think that the river
Is a strong brown god—sullen, untamed and intractable.
— Four Quartets by T. S. Eliot

A Short Stretch on the Bayano

PAUL RIVERS

When I was a young man I entered the American Foreign Service and spent my first two diplomatic years working on the Soviet desk (because I spoke Russian) in the State Department and living (because I had a salary of only $4,900 per annum) in a hot little apartment in Virginia, with my wife and two small children.

Paul Rivers is the pseudonym of a Foreign Service officer presently assigned to the Department of State.

As our second year passed in Washington we began to look forward to orders to go abroad—where, we had no idea. I had filled out the annual Employee Preference Report, due each April First and nicknamed the "April Fool Sheet" because Personnel so often sent a man in the opposite direction from what he dreamed. We had no very strong desires, ourselves. Sometime I wanted to go to Moscow; we would be happy to go back to Western Europe, where we had lived when we were first married

Great news for mothers of cavity-prone children!

Most children don't brush properly or often enough. That's why the dental scientists at Lever Brothers invented a new fluoride dentifrice called Aim®. If you have children, read on:

Most cavities happen between the ages of five and fifteen.

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Why?

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How new Aim encourages children to brush longer.

Dentists have long stressed that there's *no* better cavity prevention than brushing. Even a fluoride toothpaste can't do its best if a child brushes too briefly or too infrequently.

That's why Lever scientists enhanced Aim's fluoride formula with flavoring compounds known to be especially appealing to children. The results were astounding.

Children prefer Aim 2 to 1 over the leading fluoride pastes. Chances are, the better a child likes his toothpaste, the longer he'll brush.

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Why new Aim is a gel, not a paste.

The speed at which a toothpaste dissolves is called the "Dispersal Rate." Because Aim is a gel, not a paste, it has an exceptionally fast dispersal rate.



Aim's new clear blue gel formula spreads faster than paste.

This means when a child brushes with Aim, it spreads its good taste faster than paste in the normal brushing time.

Unique gel formula is low in abrasion.

In order to clean teeth, all toothpastes must be somewhat abrasive. That's how they keep teeth clean.

But many mothers are concerned about abrasion. So Lever scientists designed new Aim to be among the lowest in abrasion of all leading toothpastes.

Aim has stannous fluoride, the proven cavity-fighter.

A child in the cavity-prone years needs all the help you can give. Be sure his toothpaste contains an anti-cavity ingredient that's been established as effective by dental research.



Aim has the precise amount of stannous fluoride established as effective against decay.

Stannous fluoride has been researched more thoroughly than any other anti-cavity ingredient. Aim has the precise amount of stannous fluoride established as effective by dental authorities in reducing tooth decay.

Ask your dentist about Aim.

Add it up: A flavor to promote better brushing. A gel that disperses faster and is low in abrasion. The precise amount of stannous fluoride established as effective against decay.

Like any dentifrice, Aim can be of significant value only when used conscientiously in a program of good dental care and regular visits to your dentist.

If you have a cavity-prone child, ask your dentist about Aim.



Take Aim against cavities!

and I was in the Army; and South America seemed interesting, too.

One sweltering July evening when I reached home in Arlington, my heat-tried wife burst out "I don't care where they send us as long as it's not the tropics!"

Ten days later my orders came, for the tropics —Panama. I was to be Third Secretary of Embassy, and the junior of three political officers. We laughed, or maybe shrugged, and started buying summer clothing. And one evening three months later our DC-7 swooped down over the Isthmus, flew along the sea past Panama City, and landed at Tocumen Airport. I remember that the twilight was fading fast as we got off the plane, and the runway was still wet from a rainstorm that had just passed. My wife told me, much later, that the air was so oppressive when they opened the cabin door that she wondered if she would be able to breathe for the next two years. But I was too excited for such practical thoughts.

We were met by the head of the Embassy's political section, a little man here best called Brown (he retired some years ago), and Mrs. Brown. We said hello and collected baggage and began to drive into town, and suddenly the night had fallen. It was a black, pungent night, with only a few weak lights along the road shining in huts or what looked at best very humble houses. It seemed very exotic, my wife and I were very excited. But what Mr. and Mrs. Brown told us as we drove was the details of good shopping in the American PXs and Canal Zone stores. This was not what I had come for. What about Panama City's people? And the Indians? And the strange deep green that we could smell through the open windows of this Chevrolet?

We were slightly (but only slightly) disillusioned by their conversation by the time we got to our hotel. The hotel itself cheered us up. It was the Tivoli, a big three-story frame hotel with grand porches, built in the days of Teddy Roosevelt on the edge of Canal Zone territory. The latter-day Panamanians took it as a symbol of Yankee imperialism, and just across Fourth of July Avenue had built a modern little skyscraper for their National Assembly, to stick in the gringos' eyes.

We settled happily into big cool rooms in the Tivoli and began to discover tropical life. Brown gave a cocktail party to introduce us to some fellow diplomats, and I called on a few Panamanians, and we began to scout for an apartment, and Tom Harrigan who was next junior to Brown and next senior to me turned out to be very likable.

Inside the Embassy I discovered that Brown's style of work mirrored his primary interest in PXs. For him political work meant drafting long despatches to the State Department composed in equal parts of bits from local papers (of which there were a dozen, all unreliable) and from agencies in the Canal Zone, several of which claimed deep interest in what was going on in the Republic of Panama and were happy to send us copies of their numerous reports. I knew this was not the right way for the Foreign Service to work. We in the Embassy were supposed to know the influential people in the country and find out what they knew and what they wanted; and we were supposed to tell them what our own Government and society were up to, and what we wanted. And

The American Foreign Service Protective Association

ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE INSURANCE YEAR ENDED FEBRUARY 28, 1975

OPERATIONS

		As of March 1 1974	As of March 1 1975
Members carrying Group Life		2955	**2905**
Group Life in Force (exclusive of Reversionary)		$54,638,500	**$53,416,650**
Enrolled in Foreign Service Benefit Plan		9580	**9792**
Claims paid during year:			
Group Life,	Number	36	**40**
	Amount	$ 677,500	**$ 444,350**
Family Coverage,	Number	12	**16**
	Amount	$ 36,000	**$ 44,500**
Accidental Death,	Number	3	—
	Amount	$ 72,500	—
Foreign Service Benefit Plan		$ 2,725,587	**$ 3,300,958**

There can be no Reversionary for the insurance year ending February 29, 1976.

The Association has increased the proportion of surgical benefits paid at 100%.

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here, in this vibrant, volatile and fascinating place, Brown saw very few Panamanians and sat in his office clipping papers. And he was the First Secretary; my boss. At about this same time a young man who had come into the Service with me encountered a Brown in Cyprus, resigned in disgust, and began to write books that eventually made him a name. I instead gritted my teeth and decided I would stay, but do what I could on my own. Harrigan encouraged me, though he himself didn't do much on his own, being forty and fearing to rub Brown the wrong way.

Then came November Third, the national holiday. I walked into the old town to watch the parade pass the Presidential Palace. Brown hadn't thought that a good idea, but I enjoyed it; but two hours later when I walked back to the Tivoli, I found myself on the wrong side of a miniature skirmish line. I was looking at the backs of a ragged bunch of Panama City slum kids who were throwing rocks across Fourth of July Avenue at a line of armed Canal Zone police. Every now and then a policeman would throw a tear-gas canister across at the rock-throwers. I knew immediately what had happened. With the Panamanian national holiday coming up, the Canal Company had given strict orders not to allow any Panamanian to plant his country's flag in the Zone where, we then maintained, the Treaty of 1903 permitted only Old Glory.

Not a few Panamanian politicians thought November Third a perfect date to contest this gringo stupidity. They had rounded up a few hundred barefoot youths to help in their patriotic cause. Before long, when the Zone police pulled up the handsome new Panamanian flags freshly planted in that semi-US soil under the palms across the Avenue, the rocks began to fly.

I waited for a quiet moment and ran between the rock-throwers over to the Zone. Fortunately my wife and children were safe, although the children had gotten some whiffs of tear gas when the wind blew the wrong way. By and by, the scene out front got nastier, and the Army was called in to replace the police. (The Panamanian police were nowhere to be seen.) When we went down to breakfast the next morning there was a machine gun crew and barbed wire on the Tivoli's front lawn. I suspected, rightly, that all this might have a dampening effect on my first diplomatic assignment.

Indeed for almost the next year it was difficult to be on good terms with Panamanians. No matter what their politics, their ethnic origin, or their economic situation (factors not unrelated), all of them thought our policy on the Isthmus was *wrong*.

We moved into an apartment in a newish building in the La Cresta district of Panama City, with a wonderful view over the city and the sea beyond. But it wasn't easy to make friends, although the Panamanians are a very friendly people. Brown of course retreated further into the shadows of his air-conditioned office. Even our Ambassador, a fine old career offficer who had been in Panama five years, seemed to give up on the idea of coming back to our pre-November friendly terms with the Panamanians.

One Sunday my wife and I took the children for a drive out past Tocumen airport, to see the place where the Inter-American Highway ended, only a few miles past Tocumen at the village of Chepo. Beyond Chepo lay several hundred miles of virgin tropical forest, the Darién Gap, beyond which the Highway resumed in Colombia.

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I knew something about that country beyond, thanks to two Swedes. It was the country of the Indians who called themselves Cuna, and earlier this century two Swedish ethnographers had published several works, which I had found in the Canal Zone public library, on the Cunas who lived in the Darién river valleys and the San Blas islands off the Caribbean coast.

I also knew, from friends, that a Dakota missionary named something like Peterson was living in the village of Chepo. We found him that Sunday afternoon, playing with his little boy, in his crude tin-roofed house that stood on stilts to protect it from the floods of the Río Bayano.

Up the Bayano from Chepo lay a large Cuna reservation. The Indians admitted occasional Panamanian officials on business, and practically no others—except Peterson. I was told they had accepted him, after several years, because he brought them medicines. Would he take me along sometime?

He would, and agreed to go on a weekend—I didn't want to have to ask Brown to let me leave the office. He might well think it more important that I scan papers for him. So early one Saturday morning in June Peterson, our Panamanian guides Aniseto and Carlos, and I cast off from Chepo in a 30-foot dugout *piragua* powered by a large outboard motor. Dropping down the Mamoní, a swift tributary of the Bayano, we came in a bit to the big brown river, started our motor, and turned upstream. A slim long *piragua* with an outboard is a perfect craft for a tropical river; we must have made twenty miles an hour at first, before we left the tidal reach and hit the current.

We were in *mestizo* country at first, judging from the occasional frame shacks and gardens on the banks. Soon these stopped, and then occasionally we saw a large thatched shelter without walls, belonging to a family of Chocós, the most primitive of Panamanian Indians, hunters who know nothing of either agriculture or village life. And then before many miles there were no more Chocós either but only forest. We were getting close to the Cunas. A large snake swam by; we heard some monkeys chatter. Otherwise there was only green forest, the brown swift river perhaps four hundred feet wide, and the glittering hot morning.

It was near noon when we came around a bend and saw a concrete marker on the right bank, the limit of the indigenous reservation. Just beyond the marker lay eight very big cane-and-thatched huts with steep roofs, built close together with their ends facing the river.

"This is Majé," Peterson said in English, "And now we will see if they still like me." Aniseto, the only one of our two guides who had been this far upstream, smiled and said in Spanish "Let's hope they like us better than they do the Chocós."

The place seemed deserted. There was no noise. On the river bank in front of the huts, hundreds of yellow butterflies were swarming in the sunshine.

An old man came out of a hut and walked down to us as we came coasting to the bank. He spoke Spanish; no one was there, they were all out hunting for a *fiesta*. But the *saila*, the chief, knew we were coming, it was all

Continued on page 40

SUMNER VILLAGE

2,185 sq. ft. of value in a priceless setting.

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

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The prognosis for two lists of hoped-for benefits, some overlapping, based on detente.

HERBERT E. MEYER

WHEN THE PRESENT era of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union got under way a few years ago, it was predicted on both sides that improved relations would bring a great expansion of trade between the superpowers. That has happened, but in a way that not many Americans foresaw. Detente has become a vehicle for the wholesale transfer of American industrial products and high-level technology to the Soviet Union. To a large extent, this transfer has been financed by generous credits from the Export-Import Bank (which has made similar loans to many other countries, to be sure) and by private loans at very friendly interest rates of around 6 percent. US companies that the Russians have been buying from are understandably pleased with the present commercial relationship, but viewed from the larger perspective of national security, it appears to be considerably more favorable to the USSR than to the US.

Detente, of course, is not solely a matter of trade, and in the long run it may prove to be a good thing for the US, on balance, even though the trade aspect does favor the USSR. For both sides, a combination of political and economic reasons formed the impetus behind the detente. To most Americans, detente was intended to be precisely what the dictionary says the word means—a general easing of tensions. Specifically, detente was supposed to pave the way for a "permanent" agreement with the Soviet Union on arms limitation. This would not only reduce the threat of nuclear holocaust, but would also enable the US to cut back, or at least hold down, its escalating defense expenditures. In addition, American diplomats hoped that detente would usher in an era of closer US-Soviet relations, which in less exalted language meant that the USSR would make less mischief around the world and even be willing to help the US out of its own foreign dilemmas. When detente was conceived, during the period 1969-71, the US was struggling to extricate itself from Vietnam; rightly or wrongly, US officials thought that Soviet pressure on Hanoi could help.

Many American businessmen hoped that detente would open the door to large markets for US goods and services, but Americans also viewed detente as the best route toward increased cultural exchanges and generally to more social contact between the two societies. Quite a number of Americans, businessmen among them, argued that greater Soviet exposure to the West would ultimately change that society, making it more capitalistic and also more tolerant of internal dissent. And to virtually all Americans who supported it, detente was seen as a vital first step toward our ultimate national goal of peace.

The Soviet list of hoped-for benefits overlapped the American list but also included some special objectives. Like us, the Russians wanted an era of eased tensions that would allow them to reduce their own arms expenditures. Although the Soviet GNP is roughly half the size of ours, the Russians spend a larger dollar amount on defense. The strain that heavy defense spending has placed on the Soviet economy in recent years has given Kremlin leaders a powerful incentive to sit down and negotiate with the US. Not even the most rabid critics of the USSR argued that its desire to cut back defense expenditures was, or is, anything but genuine. So to this extent, US and Soviet aims were the same.

But the Russians also saw de-

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tente as a way to gain access to American equipment and technology that the US government, through its control of export licenses, had long denied them. The need for these goods and services was painfully evident. Partly because of the emphasis on defense, the Soviet economy had been unable to provide for the expanding requirements of the consumer and industrial sectors. Although growing in absolute terms, the economy had begun to fall relatively further and further behind the economies of the US, Western Europe, and Japan. Soviet planners concluded that the fastest way to catch up would be to buy what they needed, rather than try to develop everything themselves.

Trying to get into the elite club

Equally important (some analysts say most important of all), the Russians saw detente with the US as their long-sought route to legitimacy. In other words, they hoped that by engaging the world's No. 1 power in an era of detente, the Soviet regime could finally gain acceptance as the legitimate government of the USSR and recognition of its right to rule one-sixth of the earth's land surface. To Westerners this quest for acceptance, by a nuclear power no less, may sound a little like a newly rich businessman trying hard to get into his city's best club.

It is a little like that. The Russians have discovered to their great chagrin that nuclear warheads are insufficient to gain entry into that elite club called Western civilization. It sounds silly, but the Russians are almost obsessively sensitive about being held in low esteem by so many Westerners. In their nonmilitary dealings with Western diplomats, businessmen, and journalists, Russians display an inferiority complex that makes the French seem positively overconfident. Kremlin leaders cherished a vague hope that detente would somehow bring them past the gatehouse and into the club's main dining room.

In addition to this legitimacy, which would imply the right of the Soviet government to do as it pleases within its own borders, the Russians wanted acceptance of Soviet sovereignty throughout Eastern Europe. High on the list of Kremlin obsessions is the prospect of another Czechoslovakia, and the Russians regard as vital the right to abort such a development without fear of military interference by the West.

Trading lasers for lobsters

Despite the Vladivostok agreement (the value of which to the US remains to be seen), it is much too early for a verdict on the success of detente. Secretary of State Kissinger is quite right when he speaks of detente as a process rather than a single event, which means an overall judgment of its impact won't be possible for years to come, possibly not even within our lifetimes. But it is clear that detente has brought a huge expansion of American exports to the Soviet Union. From a mere $58 million in 1968, they rose to an estimated $600 million in 1974. This represents a more than tenfold increase in just six years. (The 1973 total, which included the famous grain deal, was $1.2 billion.) During the same period, Soviet exports to the US rose from $58.5 million in 1968 to $220 million in 1973 and an estimated $350 million last year.

The single largest Soviet purchase from the US is a $200-million contract with Chemical Construction Corporation, a subsidiary of General Tire & Rubber Company, for construction of four ammonia plants in the Soviet city of Kuybyshev. In addition, more than a half billion dollars of US equipment and technology, supplied by more than forty companies, is going into the Kama River truck plant. (See "A Plant That Could Change the Shape of Soviet Industry," FORTUNE, November, 1974.) Last fall the Soviet Union reached a preliminary agreement with Boeing Corp. for purchase of ten 747 jets, and this could turn out to be a billion-dollar deal. On a smaller scale, the Russians have bought more than $1 million worth of lasers; about $2 million worth of Control Data computers for use at a nuclear-research facility; and a $29,000 mobile crime laboratory, from Criminal Research Products, Inc.

Overall, Soviet purchases of US industrial equipment over the last four years add up to sizable totals. For the broad category of nonelectric machinery, the figure (through September, 1974) comes to $414 million. This includes: loading equipment, $100 million; gear-cutting machinery, $30 million; metalworking machinery, $26 million; and rubber-tire-manufacturing equipment, $16 million. Sales of electric machinery over the same span totaled $48 million.

To help pay for all these high-technology imports, the Soviet Union has started exporting to the US a variety of consumer goods, such as sable furs ($8 million worth during the last four years), jewelry ($6 million), caviar ($700,000), lobsters ($200,000), and such brand-name products as Stolichnaya vodka and Zenit cameras. Under terms of an agreement with Pepsico Inc., which recently opened a bottling plant in Novorossisk, thousands of cases of Nazdorovya champagne will be made available to Americans at around $10 per bottle.

Amber lights in the distance

Although the volume of trade between the US and the Soviet Union is larger now than ever, the present wave of Russian buying in the West is not unprecedented. There were two similar waves, one at the turn of this century and then another during the 1920s. Those episodes suggest that Russian buying sprees come and go.

The prevailing opinion in the US today, however, is that the current wave will prove to be more lasting. The most encouraging predictions of all come from the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, a group formed in 1973 by American businessmen and the Soviet government to help expand bilateral trade between the superpowers. President Harold Scott, a former Assistant Secretary of Commerce, believes that US exports to the Soviet Union will increase at an annual rate of 10 to 12 percent for years to come. "We have products and technology the Russians need to modernize their economy," Scott says. "They're determined to do that, so that means they'll keep buying."

The Russians, too, insist that Soviet imports from the US will keep on rising. They say it's a logical development that should have happened years ago, and would have if the US hadn't been so dif-

ficult to deal with.

Since all industrial production in the Soviet Union is centrally planned, authority for virtually all projects requiring imports comes from GOSPLAN, the powerful agency that develops the Soviet five-year plans and then tries to manage them. V. B. Spandarjan, head of GOSPLAN's foreign-trade department, offers this sum-up of modern history: "In the 1920s our task was to make everyone literate. In the 1930s we industrialized. The 1940s were wasted because of the Great Patriotic War and the subsequent need to rebuild. You Americans forget that the Soviet Union lost 20 million people and 80 percent of our industry during that war. We would like to have received American help after that, but you began the Cold War. This occupied our attention through the 1950s and 1960s. It was a pity, was it not? But now that America is less belligerent, the USSR is free to devote itself to improving our industrial and consumer sectors. Trade with the US will be of assistance in this, so it will expand."

Despite these forecasts of continued growth in US-Soviet trade, there seem to be a few amber warning lights glowing dully in the distance. One major hindrance to the growth of Soviet imports will be financial. The present wave of buying in the US and elsewhere in the West has been extremely expensive. It would not have been possible at all without long-term credits and low-interest loans, and the Russians are finding this sort of financing harder to come by now that the first surge of US enthusiasm for trading with them has passed. Private banks are unwilling to make 6 percent loans to anybody, and congressional opposition is forcing the Export-Import Bank to hold down on long-term credits to the USSR.

Double-digit inflation has made matters worse. In the Soviet system, production costs are set not by the factories that do the producing but by the ministries, according to established formulas. These numbers determine how much money will be allocated to each factory for the entire year. But when a Societ factory purchases goods from the West, and the prices for those goods go up in midyear, scraping up the extra funds becomes a serious problem. At the VAZ auto plant in Tol'yatti, for example, American steel is being used to make some autobody parts. The price of this steel has risen 29 percent in the last year alone, a development not foreseen when the Ministry for Automotive Production established the VAZ annual budget. Anatoly Zhitkov, deputy general director of VAZ, says the only way to get more steel is to ask the ministry for more money. Will they give it to him? "Of course," says Zhitkov glumly, "along with a rebuke."

Zhitkov would like to see more Soviet steel production and less reliance on the West, with its sharply rising prices. So would those doctrinaire Russians, many of them holding top-level posts in the party and the government, who believe that the decline of the West is inevitable. The current bout of inflation is providing them with powerful ammunition to support their view; they think the Soviet Union should cut its ties with the West, to avoid being dragged down.

The combination of the safe

Soviet officials who favor increased trade with the US concede that it's becoming increasingly difficult to finance imports. But they add quickly that the potential for expanding Soviet exports to the US is enormous. The Soviet Union is richly endowed with natural resources—which have also been going up in price—and theoretically could finance huge quantities of imports by supplying minerals and fuels to the US, Western Europe, and Japan. There is, however, one formidable problem. The Russians lack both the equipment and the technological know-how to get these products out of the ground and to market. Soviet gas reserves, for example, are estimated at 700 trillion cubic feet, but they are located mostly in two widely separated Siberian fields capped by a thousand feet or so of permafrost. Only American companies have the money, technology, and equipment to bring the gas out. For the Russians, it's a little like having a fortune in a safe, not having the combination, and discovering that the only locksmith in town is your worst enemy.

The Russians would like US companies to make the necessary investment (something like $10 billion), taking their payout in both gas and rubles. Negotiations with at least two US consortia have been going on intermittently since 1972, but so far no contracts have been signed. In any case, the US government, whose approval is required, has not yet reached a decision. The gas deals could easily collapse of their own mass and technical complexity, or be quashed by Washington because they don't fit in with Project Independence. Moreover, executives at El Paso Natural Gas Co., which has been involved in one of the proposed consortia, estimate that it would take between ten and fifteen years from the time contracts are signed to the time Siberian gas could turn a turbine in Boston or heat a can of soup in San Francisco.

For cars you need roads

If the Soviet Union can't find a way to market its gas and minerals, the current buying spree will very likely end for lack of money and credit. Even if the Russians can scrape up enough of both to keep buying US goods and services, a major obstacle will be the limited ability of the Soviet Union to absorb the imports.

The Russians are buying extremely complicated pieces of industrial equipment and sophisticated technology from the US. Folding these imports into the massive, slow-moving Soviet economy is a difficult process for which the Russians do not have enough skilled managers or even workmen. This causes delays in one place that in turn cause delays elsewhere. Because the Kama River truck plant is running at least two years behind schedule, massive amounts of capital, equipment, and labor that planners thought would be available for other projects by now are still tied up at the Kama site.

Aggravating the problem of absorption are inefficiencies inherent in the Soviet system itself. The upshot of these inefficiencies, caused largely by the absence of a responsive pricing system and the general failure of distribution, is that large-scale imports rarely work out as well as Soviet planners thought

they would. The VAZ auto plant, built with extensive help from Fiat of Italy, stands as a notable example. The Russians have provided so few roads, so few service stations, so few repair centers, and so few spare parts that they can't use the plant's steadily rising output of cars. VAZ was recently ordered to export one-third of its production.

This sort of thing becomes widespread after a bout of imports, and Soviet planners become afflicted with disillusionment. In the past their reaction has been to put a clamp on further purchases until those already made can be untangled, brought on stream, and made to operate more or less efficiently.

Yet another likely obstacle to vastly increased Soviet purchases of US goods and services is one that no degree of efficiency, or amount of money, can really overcome. It's a people problem, and the Russians take it far more seriously than most Westerners have recognized. US-Soviet trade has brought American businessmen (more than 5,000 in 1974) flocking to Moscow to make their sales pitches and to negotiate. Later on, sizable numbers of American technicians will have to spend time in the USSR, supervising construction, installing equipment, and instructing Soviet technicians.

A dread of favorable words

The Russians intensely dislike —almost to the point of phobia —the idea of a lot of Americans loose in the Soviet Union. At the VAZ auto plant, American technicians installing machinery were housed in a special hotel on the outskirts of town; they were forbidden to leave the area, or even rent cars, for the duration of their stays, which sometimes lasted for months. The Kama River plant will bring more than a thousand American engineers and technicians to the Soviet Union for stretches of up to six months, and already a special hotel is being built to segregate them from the local population. All foreigners in the USSR are kept under some degree of police surveillance, and the more there are the less happy the KGB becomes. When the police begin to feel that there are too many foreigners running around their country, they start pressuring the government to cut back on such deals.

Even more upsetting to the Soviet government is the idea of a lot of Soviet citizens living in the US while they train with American companies supplying machinery and technology. During the last two years, for example, more than a hundred Soviet engineers have spent varying amounts of time in Pittsburgh, headquarters of the Pullman Inc. subsidiary that's designing the Kama foundries. Soviet citizens like these, who tend to be well educated and therefore curious, have developed a nasty habit of ducking into US bookstores to buy what Moscow considers dangerous literature, such as Pasternak's "Doctor Zhivago" and Solzhenitsyn's "Gulag Archipelago."

This sort of thing drives Kremlin leaders nuts. They fear that Russians studying and working abroad will return with favorable words about life in the US—color television sets, cars in every garage, plenty of meat in supermarkets, apartments available without waiting, and so on. The Soviet government views this kind of information as an infection to be dreaded.

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Russian history suggests yet another impediment to continued expansion of US-Soviet trade over a period of years. The Russians have tended to be profoundly wary in their dealings with the West, torn between a desire to become a part of it and a deep-rooted fear of it. Soviet officials are forever reminding American visitors that the USSR can go it alone again, if necessary; they sometimes seem almost to be looking forward to withdrawal. These reminders are at once a quest for reassurance and a warning.

The impetus behind Russia's periodic retreats into isolation, of course, derives from the backwardness and repressiveness of the society. The worse internal problems become, the less willing the Russians are to deal extensively with the West and in so doing expose themselves to embarrassment, condemnation, and even pressure for fundamental change. So it is a matter of considerable importance to the future of US-Soviet trade, and to political detente as well, that the view from the Kremlin window these days is far less cheerful than Americans have generally recognized.

It's O.K. if you like reading Lenin

Businessmen in particular have a tendency to measure the Soviet Union statistically, and the country's sheer size makes the numbers impressive. Visitors to Moscow are often awed by the city's muscular buildings and broad boulevards, and they are often kept too busy attending business meetings and banquets to poke around on their own and get a sense of how grim life is in the Soviet Union.

Visit Moscow's finest bookstore, and you learn that even the works of government-approved authors, such as Tolstoy and Dostoevski, are unavailable at any price. "Shortage of paper," an apologetic salesgirl explains. Yet sixty-volume editions of Lenin's collected works are available in virtually every major language. The collected works of L. I. Brezhnev, magnificently bound and printed, gather dust in piles that nearly reach the ceiling.

Or stroll through Moscow's finest department store, in the sparkling new Arbat shopping center; you begin to understand how useless money is when there's nothing to buy. Stores are open late in the Soviet Union, and because there isn't much else to do, people come there night after night to browse among half-empty shelves sparsely stocked with Soviet-produced goods so shoddy they can't be sold. Mostly the people gather at the various counters, forming large crowds of more than a hundred at each one. They wait. Suddenly a shipment of ladies' shoes from Yugoslavia is brought out. The crowd at that counter surges forward, and in five chaotic

minutes those shoes are gone. Half an hour later, a shipment of neckties from Italy is dropped at the men's clothing counter, and the process repeats itself. And so on until closing time, at the Moscow equivalent of, say, Saks Fifth Avenue. Things are much worse elsewhere in the Soviet Union; partly to impress foreigners, the government sees to it that the capital is kept well supplied, by Soviet standards.

The Soviet economy, never as dynamic as many Americans thought it was back in the 1950s, has slowed down in recent years. According to such basic economic measures as availability of housing, consumer goods, and diet (percentage of meat and other quality foods), the Soviet Union ranks far behind the US, Western Europe, and Japan. Indeed, it even lags behind Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and East Germany. Soviet leaders are understandably reluctant to publicize this fact, and people in those satellite countries remark gleefully that first-time Russian visitors are fairly stunned by the relative affluence they find.

Within the Soviet Union, the government manages the agricultural sector so poorly that national disaster is a perennial threat. The need for huge imports of grain from the West has become a monumental Soviet humiliation. As part of an agricultural reform enacted some years back, the Soviet government allowed every farmer to sell privately whatever fruits and vegetables he could produce from a small patch of land behind his house. These postage-stamp gardens, which account for 4 percent of all the land farmed in the Soviet Union, now provide one-quarter of the country's fruits and vegetables. Some government officials would like to take back these private plots so farmers would devote more of their energies to working the state acreage and increasing the yields of grain and potatoes. But if they did, the people might be reduced to eating potato sandwiches three times a day.

The Soviet Union boasts a first-class education system, and as Western observers have been predicting for decades, it's beginning to backfire. Young Russians are increasingly aware of their government's failures and are proving less reluctant than their parents to talk openly about those failures. An undercurrent of restlessness is giving Kremlin leaders nightmares. They are uncomfortable with dissent, and unaccustomed to dealing with it by any means other than force. Their reaction to the Solzhenitsyn affair is probably indicative of their future course. Soviet officials vastly overrate the writer's impact on the West, and they view it as a major Soviet disaster that must never be allowed to happen again. Says one government official: "We tried being liberal, during the Khrushchev years. All it brought us was this Solzhenitsyn. We will be more careful in the future."

"This time guns won't work"

Compounding economic sluggishness and intellectual unrest is a growing minorities problem that has received surprisingly little attention in the West. The Soviet population includes diverse racial, religious, ethnic, and national groups, some of which did not exactly volunteer to join up. Russia is the largest of the Soviet Union's 15 republics, and for a long time the Russians have pretty much held control. But recent decades have seen a decline in the proportion of Russians to non-Russians, such as Ukrainians, Byelorussians, ethnic Germans, Lithuanians, Estonians, Latvians, Crimean Tatars, Georgians, Armenians, and Jews. In the last census, taken in 1970, Russians made up 53 percent of the USSR's population. Experts say the next census will show the Russians to be in the minority for the first time, probably at 48 percent or so.

Kremlin leaders are belatedly recognizing that the non-Russians don't like the way they've been treated over the years. Indeed, scattered disturbances and even some riots have made it hard for the Kremlin to ignore the fact. Zbigniew Brzezinski, director of Columbia University's Research Institute on International Change and one of the West's leading experts on the USSR believes that things are going to get much worse in the years to come. "Dissent among the non-Russian nationals is spreading," he says, "and within a decade's time the Soviet Union may be going through a period of dangerous internal instability."

"It's going to be a lot worse than anything this country went through during the 1960s," he adds. "We made mistakes, of course, but on the whole we handled things pretty well. Soviet leaders just haven't got the experience to deal with something like this effectively. The only thing they know is force, and this time guns won't work."

The uncertain political future of the present Kremlin leader, Leonid Brezhnev, adds to the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for US-Soviet trade. It would be risky to assume that detente will survive the next Soviet transfer of power. Brezhnev, who by some accounts plans to step down in 1976, has made his government's policy toward the US very much his own production, and the next Soviet leader may be less kindly disposed toward trade and detente. Whatever opposition there has been within the Politburo to Brezhnev's policies toward the US—and there has been opposition—has come from members who favor less detente and less trade. If anyone's been arguing for still closer ties with the West, his voice hasn't carried very far.

A cornerstone that could crumble

Beyond all this, there is a potential threat to detente and trade in Peking's recent overtures to the Kremlin. A cornerstone of detente has been the USSR's obsessive fear of Sino-American alliance against Moscow. But if the deep rift between the USSR and China is healed, and with the passing of Mao Tse-tung it might well be, Soviet interest in closer relations with the US could be seriously diminished. That possibility, together with the inability of the Soviet Union to continue absorbing large amounts of US imports, could well mean that the limits of economic and even political detente are closer than we think.

There are several schools of thought about what the optimum course for the US would be, given the likelihood that trade with the Soviet Union cannot continue to grow indefinitely. One school of thought holds that American

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Every movement with great aims has anxiously to watch that it does not lose connection with the great masses. — Mein Kampf

American Foreign Policy and East Germany

JOHN STARRELS

THREE YEARS after signing the 4-Power Accords on Berlin, the United States has entered into full diplomatic relations with East Germany. Having sensibly waited upon the former-Brandt/Scheel government to conclude the first, and most comprehensive, phases of Ostpolitik toward the German Democratic Republic, Washington now finds itself in the position of having to define a foreign policy stance toward the Honecker regime. State Department officials were quietly boasting from the spring onward that by delaying our recognition move until "we" had benefited from the experiences of the French and British (both of whom recognized the GDR on February 9, 1973), the United States was in the position to begin relations with the East Germans on an informed note. Aside from learning that communist bureaucracies move even slower than our own, especially when faced with housing and general administrative requests from long-time antagonists, it is unclear what concrete insights have been gained since mid-1973 when all political signs encouraged Washington to move forward to a final resolution of the recognition issue.

Over the past 25 years, the United States has conducted a foreign policy toward the GDR in response to three significant clientele groups: (a) Coordination of relations and strategies with France and England toward the maintenance of Western rights in Berlin; (b) Confrontation and negotiations with the Soviet Union over 3-Power rights in that city, and the maintenance of West Berlin's communication links with the Federal Republic; (c) Support of West Germany's presence in West Berlin, and in a more far-reaching and symbolic sense, a commitment to German reunification within the framework of the Western economic and political community. Whereas the first consideration does not involve a marked change in American foreign policy thinking, the last two elements certainly do to the extent that Bonn and Moscow have specific interests and claims in the realm of East German affairs. Needless to add, a US foreign policy toward East Germany will have to come to grips with areas of choice and action having to do with the behavior of these two powers in their relations with the GDR. While a definition of American foreign policy ends with an examination of future East German relations with Washington, discussion unavoidably begins with an elaboration of how our policy must be synchronized in line with our broader interests tying us to Moscow and Bonn.

AMERICAN foreign policy in Eastern Europe has been conditioned by our assessment of Soviet attitudes, on the one hand, and Washington's conception of domestic political feasibility within various bloc countries, on the other hand. From the vantage point of

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three decades, the record of success has been mixed. In general, one can say that US relations have been increasingly good with Poland and Rumania, both of whom possess governments committed to the extension of economic contacts with Washington. One hardly can forget the even more ambitious set of strategic-political linkages binding Yugoslavia and the US, though Tito's relative independence from Moscow separates him—at least for now—from the other bloc systems. Policy toward Hungary and Czechoslovakia, to the degree there is a policy, languishes on the back burners.

If the American position in Eastern Europe is calibrated to the realities of domestic and Soviet attitudes, with varying mixes of frustration and success on our side, at least there is a continuous tradition of intercourse upon which Washington can make future policy calculation and judgments. East Germany is an exception which Washington has finally decided to come to terms with.

The beginning of a coherent American foreign policy towards East Germany begins and ends with Moscow. Not only does this mean that Soviet foreign policy interests determine the manner and style of East German options, but the design and operation of the GDR's political and governmental structures bears the imprint of Soviet direction and influence. Of particular significance is the close coordination of policy and strategy between the CPSU and the Socialist Unity Party of the GDR (SED). When the supremacy of Soviet influence has been challenged by elements of the SED leadership, as it apparently was by Walter Ulbricht in his last years, Moscow inevitably, and from its view unavoidably, moves against such tendencies with instant success. Soviet-East German relations have never been closer than they are in the wake of East Berlin's most impressive diplomatic breakthrough.

For Washington, the conduct of American foreign policy toward the GDR needs to consider two issues in view of Soviet domination in East German affairs. One, future negotiations on 3-Power rights in Berlin, especially involving defense of transportation links binding the Western sector to the Federal Republic, dominantly involves Moscow, not the GDR. While the formal protocols signed by Arthur Hartman and Herbert Suess last September 4 do not compromise the legitimacy of 4-Power Accords governing Berlin, East Germany's persistent attempt to undermine their operational validity, running the gamut from yearly military parades in East Berlin to arbitrary interruptions of traffic heading to West Berlin on GDR autobahns, obliges State Department personnel in East Berlin to directly turn to their Soviet clients on every occasion when those accords are threatened or violated. The Honecker regime has every incentive to undermine 4-Power status, especially in West Berlin. US interests are better served if we recognize that only the Soviet Union is in the position to make the East Germans act with moderation in an area directly touching upon their most sensitive security concerns.

Secondly, and more broadly, Washington should immediately recognize that the nature of East German-Soviet relations precludes the development of a "special" American link with the SED. Here Moscow has a formidable advantage over the United States in the realm of all-German affairs, for while the Soviet Union has been able to forge a wide ranging consultative relationship with Bonn ever since Brandt launched his concept of peaceful engagement with the USSR and Eastern Europe in the fall of 1969, Washington has only one foot anchored in German politics, namely Bonn. At least on the German level, American influence is asymmetrical. As one tangible consequence, US policy towards East Germany is robbed of that potential dynamism gained when domestic American leverage can be used against the Soviet Union, as has occasionally been the case in relations between Washington and Warsaw, and frequently the case with Belgrade. In terms of the GDR, the Soviet Union cannot be shortcircuited.

HAVING waited upon Bonn to conclude the administrative and conceptual dimensions of Ostpolitik toward the GDR, a new phase in relations between ourselves and the successor Schmidt/Genscher government is perhaps at hand, a reality which the French grasped from the middle '60s onward when De Gaulle accelerated his drive to "build bridges" between Paris and East Berlin. In moving from de facto to de jure recognition, the United States has, with Bonn's implicit acquiescence, called a halt to its symbolic support of German reunification. This new, and somewhat delayed, situation has done anything but displease the French or the British, and it hardly represents a dilemma for the United States. Nonetheless, an American diplomatic presence in East Berlin does oblige the United States to reexamine some aspects of its future relationship with Bonn from the perspective of intra-German affairs.

At the outset, one cannot lose sight of the fact that Washington's final negotiations with the East Germans took place in the aftermath of yet another difficulty surrounding Berlin. In this particular case, the newly formed Schmidt/Genscher coalition apparently decided that a new demonstration of West German independence on the Berlin issue was a necessary strategic counter against an unfavorable trend of domestic dissatisfaction with the policies of the SPD/FDP government. Beginning with a string of electoral setbacks in state elections from the fall of 1973 through the spring of this year, culminating with the dramatic resignation of Brandt in the wake of the Guillaume affair, the successor group decided to establish a Federal Ministry for Environmental Control in West Berlin, a decision which Schmidt's predecessor had delayed making for at least a year.

Berlin affairs had been moving in an unpleasant direction ever since November 1973 when the Honecker regime announced a doubling of exchange rates for foreign travel to East Germany and East Berlin, a measure aimed at the West Germans who had been entering the GDR to the tune of ten million per year. The establishment of a Federal Ministry in West Berlin was the catalytic event which galvanized the East Germans, and their less than enthusiastic Soviet mentors, into action. In response to harassment of traffic on the autobahns carried out by the East

Germans, Washington broke off negotiations with the GDR delegation, sending the Suess group home in early August. Once traffic began to move freely once again, the East German delegation was informed that it could return to Washington for closing discussions. The autobahns returned to normal by late August, relations between America and East Germany were established on September 4.

What the latest Berlin flareup tells the United States is at least two crucial and interrelated things. One, it suggests a rare case where East German anxiety over its real and imagined security concerns occasionally makes it difficult for the Soviet Union to resist cooperating with the SED in its attempt to counter the buildup of West German influence in West Berlin. The East Germans are far more concerned about a Federal presence in West Berlin than the Soviets are, if only because Moscow has enjoyed increased cultural and political entree in the Western sector since the 4-Power Accords of September 1971. Two, it suggests a tendency by Bonn to extend the domain of internal political struggle to West Berlin. On this issue, Washington is advised to be extremely careful in its bilateral dealings with the Soviet Union and Bonn over West Berlin, and the sensitivities of the SED. If the requirements of Berlin politics oblige Washington to directly engage Moscow in the maintenance of West Berlin's security, equal logic applies in Washington's future obligation to remind Bonn that it should trust in our ability to maintain a Federal presence within West Berlin without feeling the impulse to unilaterally decide that a "new" initiative must be made on their own.

It should come as no surprise that a more dynamic West German foreign policy toward Eastern Europe since late 1969 has put an end to the extremely close, and from Bonn's end, dependent, collaboration between ourselves and West Germany. A suppressed tradition of all-German nationalism, temporarily eclipsed by the rise of Adenauer and the premature death of Kurt Schumacher, has been an unavoidable consequence of West Germany's emergence as Europe's second strongest power. In recognition of changes at work in intra-German relations, and the on-going sensitivity of Berlin issues, Washington has every incentive to keep West Berlin out of the domestic politics of the Federal Republic. If Washington has the responsibility and obligation to remind Moscow of its responsibilities toward the maintenance of West Berlin's security, it also has the obligation and responsibility to keep West German party politics from complicating the gradual establishment of political relaxation in one of Europe's most sensitive areas.

The problem and challenge is one of developing a policy which fits into the realities surrounding East Germany's evolution as an increasingly important member of the European community without losing sight of the fact that the GDR continues to be one of the most insecure polities in the world.

UP TO THIS point, the blueprint for an American foreign policy toward East Germany has been directed toward two entities who play crucial roles in East German affairs. But what about Washington's direct engagement with the GDR? The problem and challenge is one of developing a policy which fits into the realities surrounding East Germany's evolution as an increasingly important member of the European community without losing sight of the fact that the GDR continues to be one of the most insecure polities in the world.

There are some issues which are of immediate concern to Washington. They are involved with the setting up of US consulates in major East German cities, the commitment of our government to honor the claims of Jewish organizations in the United States in their demand for material compensation for the crimes of the Hitler era, the establishment of economic and cultural agreements between the two governments.

The establishment of consulates is one goal which the Cooper staff should pursue with vigor for the simple and pressing reason that American nationals travel at their legal risk in a society boasting an arbitrary system of administrative justice. The number of incarcerations in the past does not go beyond one hundred, and in most of these cases defendants have almost invariably engaged in behavior at marked variance with East German legal codes. Trafficking in black market goods and the smuggling of East German citizens to the West are the most important areas of transgression which have landed American nationals in GDR jails. While an American consulate in Dresden, Leipzig, Karl Marx Stadt, and Rostock will not be able to prevent the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority in a one-party state, local East German police and judicial authorities will at least be held to account for their actions in a manner at striking variance with the past.

Washington's commitment to support the New York based "Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany" in their attempt to gain a limited measure of financial compensation from the GDR has been pointedly discussed with the East Germans in Washington and in East Berlin. Indeed, the Honecker regime, in yet another pragmatic adjustment to the requirements of East Germany's newly secured political respectability, combined with a gnawing fear that Washington was in the midst of another tactical stall on the diplomatic front (spring 1974), has agreed to establish a quasi-governmental negotiating counterpart. Named the "Committee of Anti-Fascist Resistance Fighters," the organization has yet to respond to written communications sent by the American Jewish group. Washington must be ready to display some flexibility on this issue in its future dealings with a regime which publicly, if not privately, refuses to acknowledge legal or moral responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich. One member of the New York Conference Group has suggested that a possible solution might be the SED's eventual decision to grant material compensation to *all* individuals who had their property confiscated during the Hitler era. In principal, this would be a world wide payment, in practice American and Israeli Jews would be the main recipients.

Given our commitment to the satisfaction of Jewish claims, future relations with the GDR should be made partially contingent upon the GDR's readiness, albeit grudging, to meet this obligation. Apparently the East German government is finally aware that no amount of delay and legalistic argumentation can rescue them from meeting this requirement.

Economic matters bulk especially large in the plans of Honecker to build a new relationship with the United States. In 1972, for example, the GDR imported DM 270,000,000 worth of goods, mainly industrial equipment, from the US, a ten-fold increase in imports from this country since 1965. While trade deficits are not recognized as such in communist systems, it is worth noting that the East Germans were willing to absorb an "ersatz" deficit of DM 236,000,000 over that same period, or the difference between what they purchased from the US minus the amount purchased from them. Within the next year or two, Washington can and will sign various agreements with the East Germans on the development of economic links, including the possibility for private American industrial investment in a manner paralleling existing agreements with other Soviet-bloc countries. Like Moscow, the East Germans are already lobbying for Most Favored Nation Treatment, but until the SED displays a more forthcoming attitude on Jewish material compensation, there is small likelihood that an already aroused US Senate will extend the East Germans a courtesy which they have so far refused the Soviet Union. An even more troubling obstacle standing in the way of MFN status is the obvious fact that the GDR stringently limits emigration, a reality dramatically underlined by the existence of the Berlin Wall. Until Moscow resolves its differences with the American Congress on this last issue, however, the Honecker regime can hardly do more than watch anxiously since it is inconceivable from Washington's and East Berlin's vantagepoint that the GDR could receive this status before the Soviet Union.

Cultural matters represent one of the less defined areas in a relationship begging for policy definition, though two distinctions can be made at the outset. On the one hand, the East Germans are dominantly interested in gaining access to America's impressive scientific community, while strikingly disinclined to close agreements on the exchange of groups in the social sciences where the role of "subjective" factors, as the SED defines ideological issues, tends to make the regime shy away from contacts and traditions which would bring the mass population into contact with "bourgeois" conceptions of social and political theory. On the other hand, and at slight variance with the SED's near-schizophrenia over scientific (esp., technical) versus social scientific interchange, the GDR appears willing to engage this society on a range of other matters, beginning with an already established pattern of sports competition, and extending through an exchange of literary expertise. While contemporary East German poets and writers are only beginning to establish reputations among the "German study" set in American universities, the novels of Hemingway and Salinger, to name the most prominent ones, enjoy wide circulation in the GDR. While the conduct of American foreign policy toward East Germany involves this government in a wide variety of strategic-political considerations which transcend the cultural realm, Washington can measurably extend the level of "East German-American consciousness" by encouraging progress in these areas.

FEW SOCIETIES in the industrialized world have more to learn about the realities, problems, and potentials of America than do the East German people. Yet there are few places in Europe where the mention of America brings forth greater amounts of spontaneous curiosity than within the GDR. Not only can most people in the GDR receive American television and radio transmissions (translated by the West German networks) beamed from West Berlin and the Federal Republic, but a surprising number of non-Party citizens maintain long-distance written, and occasional oral, communication with near and distant relatives in the United States. Despite nearly three decades of experience with, and indoctrination in, Soviet values and institutions, East Germany remains highly Western in its orientation. There is room and opportunity for an official American presence in the GDR which attempts, if only in the most exploratory and modest of senses, to build upon this fascination with the West in general, America in particular.

What can this government do to extend a realistic image of American values and institutions? Despite a potentially large and sympathetic domestic audience, the development of US foreign policy in the realm of cultural relations should begin and end with the firm realization that Honecker and the SED are strongly opposed to a massive inflow of American cultural influence. While the GDR may unavoidably be moving toward a transnational society, the SED leadership is strongly determined to guard the population against what it views as subversive influences from the West. Here the regime's concept of "delimitation," the attempt to build a sense of "socialist-national consciousness" within the boundaries of the GDR, is certainly applicable to East Germany's future dealings with the United States.

What can the United States accomplish under circumstances pregnant with limited opportunity in the realm of opinion formation? It can make every attempt to protest officially against highly distorted, and invariably, negative, characterizations of American life which are carried on East German television networks, and written about in its daily newspapers. This possibility hardly suggests our ability to dominantly influence, if not actually restructure, the official characterization of American life in the GDR, with its emphasis on soaring crime rates, inflation, and general social pessimism. Nonetheless, the American embassy in East Berlin can begin to embark upon a modest conception of "operation candor" which, at the very least, suggests a healthy concern on our part for the presentation of American reality in all its hues and dimensions. It will take decades before measurable changes are registered in the behavior of the GDR's communications media, but after 25 years of de-facto confrontation,

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Notes From Abroad:

EXCESS BAGGAGE

by
THE SUPERFLUOUS SPOUSES

"A Women's Lib Group? You must be crazy! You have everything-two full-time maids, a beautiful house, and a chance to live and travel overseas. What more do you want?"

Yet, each member of our consciousness-raising group had come to realize about a year ago that she did in fact want more. Life as EXCESS BAGGAGE, no matter how glamorous, does little to foster growth or self-confidence.

Extra household help or the excitement of exploring a different culture may only obscure problems which can make life overseas just another kind of prison for women.

- The wife must devote a large portion of each tour to setting up and dismantling a household. It is not unusual to spend from two to six months in a hotel waiting for household effects to arrive and the last six months packing up and preparing oneself psychologically for the next post.
- Linguistic barriers complicate the settling in process. While the husband has the advantage of gaining complex language proficiency on the job, the wife usually finds herself confined to kids, kitchen and coffee klatches where conversations tend to center on food, children and things to buy.
- Entertainment responsibilities can also be burdensome. Nine out of ten "official" parties are liquid extensions of the office—with women often serving a purely decorative function.
- Having people work in your home presents a new array of problems. It is hard to sustain any meaningful sharing of household responsibilities in a marriage contract if there is the temptation to "let the maid do it." Differences in values between maids and parents can cause difficulties in the rearing of children.
- Volunteer work, though often important and challenging, does not usually enhance a woman's credentials when she wants to reenter the job market. It also fails to offer the continuity which a man takes for granted in his career.

For all these reasons and more, some of us in Bogota began to feel that we were losing touch with ourselves in our efforts to "adjust." The glamor of moving around the world began to dull, while the frustration of being toted around with the other household effects mounted. In January 1972, nine of us began holding consciousness-raising sessions every Monday afternoon.

It was not the coping with difficulties that robbed us of our identity, but rather the ultimate triviality of the problems we were expected to handle.

Although we are far from fitting the mass media's image of "women's libbers," it would be unfair to paint ourselves as that second media creation, "typical housewives." All of us are married and six of us are mothers. We love our children and our marriages are relatively stable and happy. We are housewives. But, we are also well-educated, mature young women all of whom have held and enjoyed responsible positions. While never opting totally for or against serious careers, none of us is content with the position in which we, encouraged by society, have placed ourselves.

Over half the group had lived and worked abroad before marriage—as Peace Corps volunteers, researchers or teachers—and at least four of us had consciously chosen our husbands partially because it seemed likely they would be working overseas. The problems of living in a foreign culture were not entirely new.

What *was* new was having to face them as married women, as men's appendages rather than as independent individuals. It was not the coping with difficulties that robbed us of our identity, but rather the ultimate triviality of the problems we were expected to handle. While our husbands helped to feed hungry kids or set up family planning programs we paid social calls or shopped for antique brass.

Our previous experience and involvement in women's liberation was minimal. None of us had ever belonged to a consciousness raising group before—nor even known anyone who had. Some of us were wary of women in general and viewed women's lib in terms of the underwear argument and equal pay, the former "ridiculous," the latter "almost fulfilled"—or so we kidded ourselves.

Our guidebooks for the first few months were Robin Morgan's "Sisterhood is Powerful" and the preview issue of Ms. As we groped our way toward trust and commitment, to each other and to ourselves, we developed guidelines not unlike those suggested in the July 1972 issue of Ms. We read those suggestions with a feeling of relief and success and a first sense of being part of a wider movement. We didn't feel the need for all of them, but the vague guilt resulting from our decision to keep our discussions totally private, shared

The not really superfluous spouses are Susan Bailey, Marcia Jackson, Janet Kennedy, Nancy Sweeny, Julie Weissman and Phyllis Levine.

with neither husbands nor friends outside the group, was allayed. Others had obviously experienced the same group growing pains.

Because none of us knew each other well, we spent our first few meetings discussing our reasons for joining the group, our childhood, and our education. Gradually we broached more intimate attitudes toward child raising, sex and marriage. ("Why did you get married?" How painful, but how liberating to say, "because I was 26 and broke and he wanted to.")

Our format was generally one of free discussion, although for some topics we adopted the procedure of going around the room and letting each person speak without interruption. After everyone had spoken, a general discussion, with opportunities for questions, followed. We used this format for discussing sexual fantasies, abnegation of responsibility, cultural conditioning of women, and future plans. A recurrent topic was our ambivalence about relinquishing to other women our housekeeping and child-caring functions when we had so little with which to replace them. We found "good meetings," ones filled with new awareness and trust, were followed by slower, more superficial gatherings, but as we recognized the process we came to appreciate and enjoy it rather than becoming discouraged.

"Talkers" tried to appreciate the necessity for pauses and silences that let "quieter" members contribute. Believing that a strong leader is the last thing women need in a consciousness raising group, we shared the leadership role when it was impossible to do away with it altogether.

As we talked, it became clear that the majority of us were both aggressive and ambitious. We were proud of our career accomplishments and yet at the same time torn by guilt because we could not manage to find fulfillment within our prescribed roles as wives and mothers.

When a woman we all liked and were beginning to feel close to dropped out because "you are all so career oriented" the guilt grew. Had we emphasized our past jobs too much? *Were* we too career-oriented (i.e., not real women, bad mothers, etc.?) Working through the guilt, we were forced to face our objectives squarely and accept ourselves and our actions as our own, not something done in response to external pressure. We also came to realize that no one consciousness raising group can answer the needs of every woman. Two other groups formed and each group has taken on its own individual tone and style, shaped by the concerns and personalities of the members. Later, when other new members dropped out, our guilt feelings were minimal and easier to talk about.

Our mobility has presented obvious problems for the group. Just as we began to feel close to each other and develop a sense of group solidarity, someone had to leave. As women left and new members were recruited, the strains and tensions mounted. "New people" felt judged and excluded by "old people" and "old people" struggled with themselves to achieve the same degree of openness with new members that they had managed to attain with old. Afraid of intimidating newcomers by acting "too bossy," the old members often let the meetings slip into trivialities rather than risk domination, perhaps a holdover from old wounds ("No one likes a bossy woman! Stop trying to run the show. You're just a girl!"). But the problems have gradually worked themselves out. We're not as afraid of each other as we once were and we're learning that "I don't agree with what you said," does not mean, "I don't like you." The group has been strengthened by the inclusion of new viewpoints and new experiences. Because no one has "the answer," going over a topic a second, third or fourth time usually means new awareness and depth, rather than boredom.

After holding consciousness raising sessions for about half a year, we began to discuss more and more what responsibilities we envisioned for ourselves outside the group. All of us are seriously re-evaluating our lives in terms of both individual and familial goals. For families overseas, career decisions by women often involve even more serious confrontations and disruptions than might be the case in the States. Adequate training is not always available and job oportunities are scarce. A woman must often ask her husband to take a leave of absence or change careers. If he is unwilling, she must decide whether she is ready temporarily to separate herself from her family in order to study in the States. The group's solidarity and support have given us the courage to begin to take responsibility for our own development and growth while we face and plan for the future. Nancy has enrolled in a local university and begun to study Spanish seriously. Julie has returned to Washington, D.C. and applied to law school. Marcia and her husband have begun to question the viability of overseas assignments.

Most of us feel that our meetings have fostered in us a heightened awareness of women's issues. Since we were all foreigners living in Colombia, one of our principal interests was in the current position of Colombian women vis-a-vis women's liberation. We invited several Colombian women active in the field of women's rights to speak to us about their activities and their views on the position of Colombian women. These meetings have been fruitful in helping us to understand the cultural aspects of liberation for Latin women.

The invitations to Colombian women represented our first efforts as a group to reach outside our own introspective circle and become active in the community. More recent efforts in the same vein have been the recommendation of a special book section on women's issues to the American library here and the placing of advertisements in various newsletters of the English speaking community in order to reach women who may wish to join an existing group or who may want advice on starting a group of their own.

How much we can do as foreigners to affect the Colombian culture is debatable, but we feel a strong obligation to help the women who work in our homes to look carefully at their lives and goals. As our consciousness of the oppression of women grows, we have become increasingly disturbed by our own tacit acceptance of the traditional attitude toward household workers. Maids are often treated as servants rather than as employees. We are trying to change that. The freedom that the availability of household help

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The Bankruptcy of Super-Activism and the Resurgence of Diplomacy and the Department of State

RONALD J. STUPAK and DAVID S. McLELLAN

MANY RECENT commentators have proclaimed the death of the State Department as an essential policy-making unit in the American foreign policy process. Indeed, recent analyses contend that the State Department has been eclipsed in the conduct of foreign policy by the emergency of rival theoretical frameworks and contending agencies which have gutted the perceptual and operational power of the State Department and its personnel.

Traditionally, foreign policy was thought to depend on negotiations that respected the sovereignty of nation states. The principle means of exerting influence upon other states was through diplomacy backed by force. However, under the impact of the Cold War, the revolution of military weapon systems in the nuclear age, and the collapse of the old European empires, a new theoretical base to foreign policy emerged. This approach was championed by ideologues, military managers, and various programatic operators who felt that the United States had entered a new revolutionary age, which rendered traditional diplomatic methods obsolete.

The Emergence of Super-Activism in American Foreign Policy

This new theoretical base held that the revolutionary world situation could be met only by a massive mobilization of resources, weapons technology and an array of manipulative techniques to win the battle for men's minds. In addition, this approach focused primarily on the emerging Third World, which, by the 1960s, was regarded as the essential ideological, strategic, and manipulative battleground. Furthermore, this new conceptual framework spawned a host of competing operational agencies—AID, the CIA, USIA, MAAGs (Military Assistance Advisory Groups), and the deterrent strategists—all of which seemed to elevate the military to an unprecedented role in foreign policy deliberations. As a result of this operational acceptance of superactivism, the role and philosophy of diplomacy was displaced in favor of "can-do" military activists, crisis managers, and programatic operators who acted as "Mr. Fix-its," with little profound understanding of, or commitment to, the tasks of diplomacy. The military ideological theorists and the strategic intellectuals became Washington's main organizational planners for the 1960s and the early 1970s.

As the Cold War deepened and the northern half of the globe became increasingly stabilized, America's image of its world role became more oriented toward helping the struggling nations of the Southern Hemisphere. This was coupled with the Kennedy Administration's belief that the increasing extension of Soviet-Chinese involvement in the Third World was the new revolutionary threat to world stability.

The Soviet Union's attempts to extend its influence into the Third World were to be resisted and the weapon of guerrilla warfare struck from its hand by a new kind of strategy, encompassed in Flexible Response and counterinsurgency doctrines. This enterprise entailed unceasing attention to local upheavals which might allow the Russians to get a foot in the door. This need to solve the crises of the Third World spurred successive administrations into ceaseless and farflung activity and an ever-deeper set of commitments and involvements in the Third World.

This shift to a predominate Third World emphasis began with the world-wide economic and military assistance programs of the Truman Administration; continued with Dulles's pactomania and the Eisenhower Doctrine; was furthered by the Alliance for Progress, Flexible Response, and counterinsurgency-civic action programs; and culminated in outright US military intervention under President Johnson. From a desire for stability in new states which would deny communism a chance to establish itself, it was an easy and deadly step to regarding instability itself as evidence of communist activity. With this motivation, Washington expanded its multifarious operations in the Third World with tools of greater manipulative sophistication. Yet, no strategy seemed to achieve its purpose.

Instead of causing the policy-makers to question their assumptions, each setback led to more grandiose conceptualizations, reaching its apotheosis in Walt W. Rostow's logic that, since "wars of liberation" were likely to sweep over a Third World country's unsettled political and social structure, the US had a responsibility to provide the indigenous governments with economic, political, and even military support if necessary. This analysis spawned a heterogeneity of strategies and agencies, principally for dealing with the Third World, which shifted the emphasis from normal diplomatic dealings and international maneuvers to economic and military aid programs, CIA-sponsored operations, counter-insurgency doctrines, and outright US military intervention. These formal and informal penetration programs consistently reduced the role of the State Department—at least in the conduct of US policy *vis-à-vis* the Third World or South-

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ern Hemisphere states.

The "Can-Do" Mentality

Here was an area with no experience in statehood, with weak and ineffective governments, with societies struggling to modernize and master their destiny, but racked by social and political convulsion, with political forces deemed susceptible to communist blandishments, whether of an economic, ideological, or military sort. Here was an area in which only the most fundamental kinds of operations—including surgery if necessary—would succeed if these countries were not to succumb to communism. The situation in many parts of the Third World seemed to invite the newer mode of operations.

Once it was decided that these new and more dramatic techniques were needed, the whole new set of bureaucratic agencies sprung massively into operation. Instead of the traditional "wait-and-see" philosophy of diplomacy, policymakers were relieved to hear the "can-do" certainties of the CIA and of the military. (Note the ring of confidence in Colonel Lansdale's promises and the corresponding expectations entertained about secret operations in North Vietnam and Laos in the early 1960s.) Given licenses to operate over this vast terrain, the views of the newer agencies began first to compete with, and then clearly to preempt, the role of the State Department.

Instead of determining what was reasonably possible, the new actors came to the scene with a "can-do" operational philosophy. The goal of American economic and military assistance was to stabilize the particular societies undergoing modernization to prevent them from succumbing to civil war, revolution, or communism. That indigenous political and social factors might operate independently of, and beyond, the control of American assistance was not thoroughly understood.

Under the guise of military assistance programs, MAAGs were expected to modernize and shape the national military establishments to insure that they could cope with internal, as well as external, threats to the security of the country to which they were assigned. If bad came to worse, the President could always call upon the Marines or units of the newly established Special Forces to help put down coups or insurgencies which were beyond the power of local forces to contain. Such was the scenario.

The Subordination of Diplomacy

Whether intended or not, the philosophy behind these operations began to preempt the traditional role of diplomacy throughout much of the Third World still open to American influence. Nor was the philosophy of such operations congenial to diplomacy. Even worse, diplomacy itself became bound up with, or subordinated to, the conduct of these operations: "This proclivity for operating against all odds leads to a milling about in the management of programs without advancing an inch toward goals. In 1967-69, for example, the Department of State (and AID) were far more concerned with 'staffing and running' CORDS [Civil Operations and Rural Development Support] than with analyzing what we were trying to do in Vietnam, and why. Programatic approaches in foreign affairs are not only costly in economic terms and risky in political terms; they can also rapidly lose themselves in futility when the means of diplomacy becomes lost to the diplomats."*

Operations such as these and the philosophy behind them were in some sense the antithesis of diplomacy. Diplomacy deals with the external relations among states. It takes their competing interests for granted, and strives to find some basis for adjustment and accommodation. It assumes an element of uncertainty and contingency in every situation, and does not believe that there can be any final and absolute answers. Diplomacy is rooted in the wisdom that states can not continue to shape the external and internal destiny of other states. Prudence warns that states involve themselves in other nations' internal affairs at their own risk. Beyond a certain point, a state risks losing control of its own actions if it goes too far in the direction of intermixing itself in another state's internal development. Diplomacy, like international law, limits itself to manipulations of the international system via armaments, alliances, treaties, and even coercion. However, it does not assume that international statecraft lends itself to direct intervention in, and manipulation of, the internal affairs of other states, at least not with the intent to mold and control the domestic affairs of other states.

Yet this is precisely what American policy-makers since John Foster Dulles have been striving to do. By insisting that the international system was unstable, bipolar, and tightly coupled so that communist gains or instability of any magnitude would lead to disaster, the US put itself in the position of struggling to control change everywhere in a rigid zero-sum framework. Because there is no way of knowing whether a particular developing nation will benefit from development assistance, or military assistance, or direct military intervention, the US has found itself trying to put out fires everywhere. Instead of seeming active and in control, this country has appeared reactionary, insecure, and on the defensive. In Cuba, in Indonesia, in Vietnam, and on the Indian subcontinent, the story has been the same.

The Quick-Fix Syndrome of Crisis Management

The crisis managerial and programatic operators' approach to international politics is the antithesis of diplomacy in still another sense. Dean Acheson used to compare foreign relations to the art of the gardener. You work with nature over a long period of time before you get it to the point you want. You can not force nature. The gardener variety of diplomatist knows that only rarely can you manage a crisis. The diplomatic art is to work with problems in advance so that they do not become crises. However, the operator's philosophy does not allow for slow growth and accommodation to crisis. When failure overtakes his operations, as is far more likely to happen when policy is based upon a recklessly assembled house of cards, the operator has no fall-back position, no diplomatic arts to cushion his fall. Rather, the situation is such

*Paul M. Kattenberg, "Vietnam and U.S. Diplomacy, 1940-1970," Orbis, Fall, 1971, p. 838.

that the leadership is driven to a series of desperate expedients. Slowly, but surely, the cautiousness and sobriety of the diplomatist's craft is eclipsed by the overwhelming confidence of the crisis manager. Each set-back to the operator's assumptions in Vietnam was met by reliance upon a quick fix. First it was strategic hamlets; then it was the assassination of President Diem; then it was escalation and the bombing of the north; then it was full-scale Americanization of the war; and, finally, it was the mining of Haiphong and laying waste to North Vietnam in the holiday raids. This is not the only example. To quote again from Kattenberg: "There is little in all this for which our military leadership can directly be blamed. [Crisis] swamped the reason and perception of top American civilian policy makers in all key departments in 1964-65. On the charitable side, one might adduce the physical and mental exhaustion that overtakes them in moments of 'crisis management' —moments they abhor for their disorderliness (and tend to postpone as long as possible by deferring the necessary reviews and decisions that might avert them), yet embrace avidly because of their exhilaration when they inevitably occur." How insidious to know that our leaders confronted by a shattering situation can take relief by the injection of another quick fix in the excitement of crisis situations.

Finally, the operators were carried along by the perceptual primacy which the American public has accorded to foreign, relative to domestic, policy for the last two decades. Every conceivable weapon and strategy have been amply financed by an unending stream of appropriations. Why bother to examine one's assumptions or the wisdom of one's course of action if one knows that new appropriations will be forthcoming to finance new programs, regardless of the shortcomings of the old?

In dealing with the Third World, America never needed to define its objectives in terms relevant to international politics, apart from such concepts as dominoes, containment, and credibility. Traditional diplomatic terms of mutual interests, regional arrangements, international agreements, and international law were either only fleetingly cultivated—*e.g.*, the Congo and the Tashkent settlement—or considered not at all. Even desired or acceptable outcomes tended to be bastardized by meaningless definitions of goals put forward for the benefit of domestic opinion such as resistance to communism, self-determination for our allies, the capacity to develop a viable state, and the magic of counterinsurgency.

Perhaps it is harder for Americans than for most people to understand how they have been duped by their leaders' rhetoric. They have been led away from the practical possibilities of the diplomatic situation by an endless stream of ideological and technological platitudes. Because the stakes have not been so clear in our dealings with China and the Third World as in our relations with the Soviet Union, we have indulged ourselves with inflated fantasies of our good intentions towards the poeples of the Third World.

Because of the peculiar circumstances in the Third World, for 10 years the US was involved in an orgy of operational strategies which were the antithesis of the diplomatic method. The State Department found itself harried and chivied in that part of the world by the "can-do" antics of the CIA, AID, and military advisory teams, as well as by outright military intervention in Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

The subtleties that differentiate one country or one situation from another are lost from sight when policy consists of applying the same program criteria universally with little sensitivity. One regime was as good as another—an approach that had worked in one case could be applied as easily somewhere else. Like a little old lady at a busy street corner, State Department personnel found themselves engaging in some of the same operational rat races as their competitors. In the scramble for influence and budget, State Department personnel often found themselves reluctantly engaging in the same arena.

The State Department, the Diplomatic Method, and the Northern Hemisphere

Fortunately for the State Department, the excesses of the operator's philosophy were mostly confined to the Third World. In the Northern Hemisphere, where relations are generally between the more-advanced industrial states, no such faddish activism was as realistically possible. Relations were either between the two superpowers or between America and its allies.

The diplomatic method has remained the dominant mode of conducting America's foreign relations in these areas. Even here, however, the State Department has had to share its authority with the Treasury Department, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council. This was not true in the earlier post-war years. The "dollar shortage" was the dominant economic fact in the 1940s and 1950s, and economic policy was made to serve our diplomatic goals. Similarly, NATO was created as an instrument of American foreign policy. Later, it became an end in itself, with all the strategic and institutional rigidities that typified the McNamara strategy and the ill-fated Multilateral Nuclear Force.

The rise of Europe and Japan as economic competitors of America has elevated the role of the Treasury Department and the White House. Because these matters have involved the political fortunes of successive administrations at the highest level, leadership has been taken away from the State Department and put in other hands. This has not guaranteed an improvement in trade and monetary policy.

Turpin has made an interesting distinction in this regard between foreign policy and foreign relations: "Just as no Chief of State can ignore the power position of his country in relation to others, so no American president can act in the foreign affairs field without reckoning the consequences to himself and to his party. For both these reasons while the President can, and indeed must, leave 'foreign relations' to be dealt with by the ordinary machinery of government, he cannot and the record shows, does not relegate foreign policy to the officials."*

**William N. Turpin, "Foreign Relations, Yes; Foreign Policy, No," Foreign Policy, Fall, 1972, pp. 50-61.*

The fact that such a distinction may exist, or that other departments have shared and even dwarfed the role of the State Department, does not mean that it works. Perhaps one reason why this distinction has become so pronounced is because the State Department lost its foreign policy effectiveness under successive administrations and has not been able to get it back. It is a distinction between policy-making and diplomacy that certainly was not true under Acheson and only partially true under Dulles. To be successfully executed, the mass of international government activity can not be separated from the foreign policy decisions of the President, nor can it be carried on successfully separated from the diplomacy and diplomatic methods of the State Department. That successive Presidents have been driven to the expedient of separating foreign policy and day-to-day foreign relations does not mean that this tactic can be successfully employed indefinitely (once we get beyond the policy decisions concerning China and Vietnam).

To be successful, policy in the trade and monetary realm must be negotiated with the interests of our allies and other states clearly in mind. The same is true of a host of other issues which, although technical in nature, are eminently political—such as arms control, relations with the Common Market, the role of the seabed, and the environment. Unless the reporting, judgments, and negotiations that bear on these matters are diplomatic in character, these policies can blow up in the President's face. Even if we concede that the distinction Turpin makes between foreign policy (the President's domain) and foreign relations (the professional diplomat's domain) may exist, it is not one to be welcomed or treated as normal. It is not normal because it is an outgrowth of a period in our history when the shibboleths and routines of the Cold War stultified diplomacy in the traditional sense. The State Department can not expect to be the only fountainhead of foreign policy, but for years it abdicated its vocation, only to find its function challenged by other departments, and then absorbed outright by the Kissinger National Security staff. This is abnormal because there must be an organic connection between the advice the President receives and the belief on the part of the people in the field that what they are doing makes sense. It is time for the State Department to reclaim a coherent sense of what its vocation is—namely, to provide the President with a useful idea of what is politically possible in the international arena, and to do it in a way that takes account of his needs. America is going to need more, not fewer, diplomatic skills in the coming years.

Systemic Transformations in the 1970s

In effect, the coming resurgence of the State Department is tied to a number of transitional changes occurring in the international system and at home. For the sake of clarity, let us list these changes and then explain how we think they affect the role of the State Department in its comeback as the principal architect of American foreign policy in the 1970s. First, the political and psychological intensity of the Cold War has fallen markedly since 1960, with a lessening of the fear that a setback anywhere might lead to disaster everywhere—witness the Nixon Doctrine.

Second, technological developments have confronted the advanced industrial countries of the Northern Hemisphere with a double problem. Technology is an enormous consumer of talent and resources, and it depends on higher levels of stability, amalgamation, and cross-national integration than before. At the same time, people are more mistrustful of technology, and their mistrust extends to the nuclear strategists and technological militarists who have orchestrated a belief in the rationality of nuclear deterrence and flexible response.

Third, the economic and strategic importance of much of the Third World is fading as the dependency of the developed societies—communist and capitalist alike—becomes more manifest. Hence, the value of engaging in every form of economic and military operation to win the Third World to one's own side is diminishing.

Finally, domestic problems have begun to take priority over foreign policy issues. After 10 years of splendor, the American military budget is being subjected to serious scrutiny, and something resembling a ceiling has been set on spending for military manpower and hardware. Whether it will hold is another matter, but it is noteworthy that, whereas spending for military and domestic programs was about equal in 1961, expenditures for domestic programs are ahead today. Foreign aid—although not military aid—has undergone a similar constraint.

Thus, the activities which formerly provided the "operators" with their biggest justification now no longer hold the center of the stage. Apart from the fact that nation-building à la Walt Rostow and protracted, semi-conventional war in Asia have failed, it is no longer a relevant basis for American policy *vis-à-vis* the Third World, and the sooner it comes to an end the better. Except for the Middle East—somewhat a leftover from the Cold War era—the political, ideological, and strategic significance of the Third World is no longer as important as it was once thought to be. As the competitive incentive wanes, the need for costly programatic operations will simply diminish in significance.

Situational Circumstances Replacing Ideological Universalisms

Increasingly, the consequences of domestic upheaval and changes of regime in the Third World can be left to diplomatic procedures to be worked out according to individual situational circumstances. This has always been true of America's relationship to a number of Marxist-revolutionary and Moscow-leaning regimes in the Third World—*e.g.*, Algeria. When revolutionary change in the Third World is no longer assumed to have the major implications for American power and security that it formerly had, the need for the "operators" will disappear. Their place will be increasingly taken by negotiators (whose techniques are not always very nice—*e.g.*, the US threat to cut off loans by international lending agencies to Chile unless it agreed to just and speedy compensation for US property nationalized by the Allende government), and

the State Department will reassume its former role. Relations will be adjusted according to external criteria, rather than by attempts to mold and shape the internal structures of Third World countries. Henceforth, the US commitment to Third World countries will be shaped by the economic and political stake it has in their respective development.

For the immediate future, attention is increasingly likely to be centered on advancing the relations among the economic power centers of the Northern Hemisphere—the sphere where positive movement already exists. The Northern Hemisphere is where the techniques of negotiation already have precedence over conflict and confrontation. Relations here were already primarily diplomatic in character. They either involved the maintenance of security communities such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the negotiation of understandings—about nuclear arms control, Berlin, and East-West relations, for example. The State Department has retained its preeminent role in the conduct of US foreign relations in the Northern Hemisphere—except occasionally when challenged by military opposition to arms control agreements—and, by happenstance, the State Department is now identified with the area in which positive movement and success have been achieved. Whereas the State Department is less directly associated with the recent disasters of American foreign policy in the Bay of Pigs, Vietnam, Laos, and the Indian subcontinent, it is positively associated with whatever positive accomplishments have been realized in the Middle East and with West Germany's *Ostpolitik*.

Technological and Economic Convergence of Industrial Societies

As technology imposes even greater restraints upon national foreign policies (we do not mean to imply that the arms race is coming to an abrupt end or that the dangers of nuclear war have been eliminated), there is bound to be a cumulative shift away from military rivalry and confrontation towards something approximating normal relations between the leading industrial states. The convergence that is taking place is not so much one of systems as of common arrangements, if Russia and America, Europe, and Japan are to manage their affairs with a modicum of order and well-being. This is a situation ready-made for the exercise of diplomatic and negotiating skills, rather than the art and stratagems of war (cold or hot). The Pentagon is already lashing about with the implications of the Summit agreements which confront it. A great deal depends on the wisdom and restraint with which the Soviet leadership responds to the spirit of the arms agreement, but a great deal also depends on the efforts of Washington policy-makers *not* to let the treaty limiting the number of strategic missiles encourage or legitimize a race for more deadly weapons outside the terms of the treaty.

Finally, the State Department is in a good position to regain the initiative in American foreign relations because of the increasing inroads which domestic problems are making upon the resources and attention available for foreign policy programs. As both Russia and America confront demands for more freedom and a better material environment, they are not going to have the time or resources to devote to cold wars or to arms races. (A similar phenomenon is at work within China.) Minority unrest and intellectual dissent are endemic within the Soviet Union. It is falling behind in the technological race with Europe, the US, and Japan. Within this country, the miscalculations in Vietnam— together with the failure of the government to deal effectively with the social, energy, and environmental problems—has raised questions about the whole system. The magnitude of the backlash against the uncontrolled pace of technology is just beginning to be felt. We are living in a post-industrial society in which the major problem is not that of creating material well-being, but one of learning to live with the consequences of a scientific and technological revolution. The traditional values are eroded, the center no longer holds, and more and more people want the freedom and the means to live individualized lives, but the existing social and political system has not found a means of respecting those demands without losing all control.

The challenges of the domestic scene are increasingly likely to draw resources and attention away from the international scene, thereby returning diplomacy to the professionals. President Ford must continue to devote much attention to foreign affairs because the delicate problem of retrenchment is one that requires a great deal of effort and ballyhoo—and maybe even excessive summitry. The routinization and operationalization of many matters in the hands of the professional diplomats is already under way. We do not mean to suggest that the international problems besieging Washington will decline. Rather, they are likely to grow as the complexities of a technologically integrated Northern Hemisphere become more manifest. However, these are the non-spectacular problems of trade, tariffs, international transport, standards, pollution, and air piracy which civilized states will have in common, which manifestly can only be settled satisfactorily by common agreement, and which, therefore, will revert more to the skills of the professional diplomat and negotiator. Foreign policy appears to be the driftwood in the current stream of domestic dominance in terms of political emphasis and technological-economic necessities. Furthermore, the faith in technocrats' ability to solve all our problems is diminishing as both the youth and the general public become outraged at many of the cultural ramifications of systems analysis, computer technology, and managerial conformity. Hence, the State Department, the least of the technetronic bureaucracies, will gain support for its more fundamental, normative approach to problems and issues in a world which is in danger of drifting toward a technological monoculture.

A Different Approach to the Third World: "Benign Neglect" or Diplomatic Maturity?

Clearly, the crisis of the Third World can not be ignored. However, henceforth, the approach is more likely to be one of how to

minimize the damage and potential for disruption of the Third World, rather than how to win victories against the other side. If America's leaders have any wisdom at all, they will begin making serious efforts to channel the problems of the Third World through the United Nations and other international agencies like the World Bank. Again, this is not a terrain for the "operators" in the Cold War sense, but, rather, for international lawyers, professional diplomats, and functional experts.

The Ford Administration is presently constrained both by circumstances and public opinion from doing anything about the Third World. Most of its energies have been directed towards the critical tasks of retrenchment (the Nixon Doctrine) and of reordering America's relations with Peking. However, if and when this process is completed—hopefully without irreparable damage to our relations with Japan, Europe, and other allies—there are signs that it can take up the task of reestablishing our relations with the Third World on a more stable and diplomatically productive basis. President Luis Echeverria Alvarez of Mexico has recently made clear that neither his nor other Third World countries intend to be taken for granted.

A new approach, called the "Third World Averaging Strategy,"* might be a way to recast US policy toward the "new nations." It consists of a policy of abstaining from the internal politics of the underdeveloped countries and dealing with each on the basis of tolerance and generous correctness; an economic aid program in which a regular part of our national income would be channeled through international agencies to genuine development; and an ability to resist overt military aggression by another superpower, while being able to avoid providing immediate assistance either to nations undergoing revolution or to those who would use American participation as a weapon against internal opponents or neighbors. In essence, the US would attempt to adjust its relations with all countries on the basis of diplomacy.

Such an approach also would benefit the State Department. If adjustments in relations are limited to those that can be carried out by external means only, this returns the play to the diplomats, rather than to the "operators." We should see a diminution of foreign aid for Cold War purposes or for purposes of maintaining bankrupt and repressive regimes in power, and we will have an end to CIA-sponsored operations, less need for manipulative informal penetration devices, and an end to excessive American military advisors, American intervention, and counterinsurgency. Quite clearly, the Third World is going to settle for nothing less than a hands-off policy in their relations with the superpowers. Perhaps the superpowers will once again treat the Third World with respect in their international dealings. There are indications that the current administration recognizes that military power can not be used without regard for the contextual situation. The limited war strategists assumed that force could be used in an instrumental fashion with little or no regard for the political and contextual situation. There was little understanding of the circumstances in which political power might or might not be prudently and legitimately employed. There is now a search for such terms—witness President Nixon's frequent appeals to the Soviets for some kind of understanding about the limits to which the two superpowers will go in backing their respective allies and proteges—but this is not sufficient. The US will have to take the lead, unilaterally if necessary, in observing existing criteria governing the use of force in relations with Third World states. Modelski* has suggested that "the answer must be of course that (barring exceptional circumstances) force can safely be employed at the global level, if it is employed at all, for societal purposes alone . . . the threats to use such force, always dangerous, must be governed by purposes wider than national. This would mean that the means of coercion need to be tied to political structures of broader responsibility." This surely augurs an enhanced role for traditional practices of diplomacy in the Third World.

Conclusions and Projections

The coming resurgence of the Department of State as the principal architect of American foreign policy and of diplomacy as the principal instrument of American foreign policy is based upon all of the aforementioned trends. There is a clear sign that the President is preparing the way for a shift in his foreign policy emphasis from broad-based guidelines toward the more operational needs to transpose doctrine into policy.

The retrenchment has been made. Now it is essential to give the State Department the leadership role that is demanded of it in the diplomatic period "beyond the cold war." This should be accomplished under the leadership of Henry Kissinger—an active, professional, capable, and powerful Secretary of State who will galvanize the State Department into an institutional negotiating unit of high professional morale while, at the same time, reestablishing the individual importance of his office as the primary advisor to the President. Diplomacy and diplomatic methods will be the framework and the processes used in working toward a "structure of peace" in the 1970s, especially as the role of the President shifts in emphasis from Commander-in-Chief to Chief Diplomat. The conceptual insights of Henry Kissinger are essential in order to understand the thrust of our analysis:

> The logic of war is power, and power has no inherent limit. The logic of peace is proportion, and proportion implies limitation. The success of war is victory; the success of peace is stability. The condition of victory is commitment, the condition of stability is self-restraint. The motivation of war is extrinsic: the fear of an enemy. The motivation of peace is intrinsic: the balance of forces and the acceptance of its legitimacy.* ■

Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky, "A Third-World Averaging Strategy," in Robert W. Gregg and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., eds., After Vietnam (New York: Anchor Books, 1971), pp. 69-94.

George Modelski, "A Review of the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam. . .," The American Political Science Review, March, 1972, p. 281.

Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh, and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1957), p. 138.

FSJ EDITORIAL

BANKRUPTCY

As THE ECONOMY heads into its sharpest downturn since the great depression, one hears in Washington progressively more discussion of bankruptcy. Business failures, personal filings of bankruptcy and defaulting on mortgages and consumer credit loans are all reaching new postwar highs. At the same time, the national spirit already badly depressed by the Vietnam experience was given a further and traumatic setback with the Watergate revelations—leading to considerable discussion of moral bankruptcy among the nation's political leadership. While nothing quite so historic as the current round of financial bankruptcies or the moral bankruptcy of Watergate has transpired in the foreign affairs community, we have not been entirely immune from bankruptcy talk in recent weeks.

AID—Literally Bankrupt

It wasn't the first time—but as this editorial is being written, AID employees are wondering whether they are going to get paid. The Congress, in a move indicative of the depths to which AID as an institution has fallen, balked at efforts by the Administration to pass a continuing resolution to fund AID. While we doubt that Congress will permit the Agency literally to go bankrupt, it has come dangerously close this time, and we in the foreign affairs community must reckon with the fact that AID's demise appears closer now than at any time in the Agency's history. AFSA, for its part, would have difficulty finding anything good to say about the Agency *per se*. Certainly as an employing organization, AID is among the most callous and least effective in government. Nevertheless, we firmly believe that the development assistance functions must be preserved and that the best interests of the United States demand the continued effort of a corps of career foreign affairs professionals in this vital field. The Association would hope that someone in the Executive Branch or in the Congress would begin making careful distinctions between the development assistance function and the professionalism by which it is carried out on the one hand, and the Agency for the International Development and its management on the other. As things stand now, if the former can be preserved, the demise of the latter would not be mourned by many.

AID—Morally Bankrupt?

It may be a bit strong to suggest that the leadership of any of our three Agencies has become morally bankrupt, but a number of recent events certainly hasn't acted to restore our confidence either. Recent allegations concerning the unseemly capitulation to crass political interests by individuals in leadership positions in AID have raised real doubts in the minds of many AID Foreign Service personnel as to the ethical and legal standards under which AID's leadership seems to operate. In that regard, we are delighted that Administrator Parker has acceded to the Association's suggestion that the entire matter be given thorough investigation, not only to determine whether improprieties and illegalities transpired, but also to determine whether the code of ethics currently contained in rules and regulations is sufficiently clear so as to assure that all personnel in AID, including those at the highest levels, are subjected to the most stringent ethical standards.

The Three Agencies—Orthopedically Bankrupt

Just as we were getting over the shock of allegations of impropriety in AID, we were subjected to another in what appears to be an endless cycle of capitulation to political interests in the hiring of personal cronies and political hacks into high level FSR positions. This obscene spinelessness on the part of top level officials in the three Agencies is nothing new of course. What is new is to see so much of it in such a short period of time so soon after the President's directive of September 20, 1974, to the heads of all agencies, ours included, that he expected merit principles to be observed. After this many years of political abuse, we have come to the conclusion that back bone is a scarce commodity and that the merit principle can only be preserved if the authority to appoint senior level FSRs in all three agencies is severely curtailed by an act of Congress.

And USIA . . .?

It is entirely premature to speak of USIA in terms of bankruptcy, and indeed it may not be the case. However, we have just received the Stanton Commission report, which recommends sweeping changes in the way this government carries out its international public affairs functions. AFSA will be testifying on this matter before the Murphy Commission, and will take strong exception to several of the Stanton Commission's key recommendations. We will have a full report on this matter next month in the JOURNAL.

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Shokku in Tranquility Remembered

ASSIGNMENT: TOKYO, *by Armin H. Meyer. Bobbs-Merrill, $10.95.*

AMBASSADOR Armin Meyer's appointment to Tokyo in 1969 could be called a premature GLOP. Certainly, he was aware that a distinguished career in the Middle East and South Asia was an unlikely preparation for Japan, and the opening pages of his journal, as he sub-titles his book, reflect this. More troubling in the event, although, proved to be the general air of suspicion that surrounded the appointment: An administration whose hallmark was suspicion; the Japanese always suspicious of the unknown; an Embassy as uneasy as its new chief. Thus faced, Ambassador Meyer took a clear and common sense decision that made his political mission a success. He would follow FDR's line about ambassadors which asked not how beloved the man was but rather asked how he did with the agenda given him. Here, Ambassador Meyer's accomplishments are clear. Okinawa reversion, an untumultuous renewal of the Security Treaty and a fine relationship with Foreign Minister Aichi (to whom the book is dedicated) were the results.

Problems not prominent on the 1969 agenda came soon enough and in bunches—the Nixon "shocks" (the chapter on China was excerpted in the October JOURNAL), the unprecedented trade imbalances and the thoroughly nasty textile issue. Ambassador Meyer's journal recounts with a bittersweet touch the handicaps he faced in economic issues. The Department's leadership lacked in equal parts both expertise and enthusiasm; the NSC chief had "only a passing interest in economics"; the White House staff were "young captains of industry, advertising executives and action-oriented antibureaucratic law school graduates"; finally, on textiles, "the Embassy was never involved in the actual negotiations."

One of the pre-publication reviewers rightly suggests Ambassador Meyer's book should be read by a much wider audience than the foreign affairs fraternity. His journal tells just what an ambassador does in all its many-sided and frustrating complexity and it does so with a light touch that extends even to the experience of being knocked to the ground by a knife-wielding youth. Perhaps the audience might also include some of those antibureaucratic types who will now have some time for reading and reflection.

—J. K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Awakening Giant

BRAZIL: AWAKENING GIANT, *by Philip Raine. Public Affairs Press, $7.00.*

IF ONE is interested these days in reading about Brazil he can find a bewildering array of books from which to choose, dealing with virtually every major aspect of that country from its colonization more than 400 years ago to the Modernist Movement in Brazilian poetry. Having read many of these books myself, I can think of no one of them which provides a more "thoughtful introduction to a balanced understanding of this extraordinary country's possibilities, problems, and prospects" (to quote from Dr. Lincoln Gordon's introduction) than this excellent volume by ex-diplomat Philip Raine.

Beginning with the "accidental discovery" of Brazil by Cabral in 1500, the author reviews the history of that inadequately understood nation; its culture and the character of its people; its evolving political institutions and the various interest groups which contribute to their functioning; its changing economic and social patterns; and its foreign relations, particularly with the "Colossus of the North."

In a final chapter Mr. Raine looks ahead to Brazil's future during the remainder of this century and beyond, and to the future of that "Unwritten Alliance" which has characterized Brazilian-American relations since the early 1900s when, under the aegis of that great Brazilian Foreign Minister, the Baron of Rio Branco, the axis of Brazil's diplomacy was shifted from London to Washington. And here, without being overly pessimistic about that future, the author stresses the widely-recognized need for "an effective hemisphere policy and a concomitantly effective relationship with Brazil" if the latter is not to turn away from its traditional friendship with the United States to devote itself to fostering an integrated Latin America under Brazilian leadership.

—NILES W. BOND

All You Wanted to Know

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY, *by Morton H. Halperin with the assistance of Priscilla A. Clapp and Arnold Kanter. The Brookings Institution, $8.95 ($3.50 in paperback).*

UNITED STATES-JAPANESE RELATIONS*: the 1970s, by Priscilla A. Clapp and Morton H. Halperin. Harvard University Press, $7.95.*

THE FIRST WORK might have been usefully subtitled "All You Ever Wanted to Know But Were Afraid to Ask About Foreign Policy Decision Making." As such, its clinical descriptions of the gropings toward less than universal goals by those engaged in the policy making process may offend some who prefer to imagine it as a mystical joining. For the Foreign Service abroad, which has been known to manifest disappointment at not being brought completely into the work of decision-making, the book provides explanatory if not satisfying information of how few are involved in this at any time and what a singular experience it is to unequivocally prevail.

Professor Halperin's puckish wit has not been lost in the course of his passage (1966-74) from service on the Harvard faculty, through DOD/ISA, the NSC staff, and Brookings Institution to the Twentieth Century Fund, as evidenced by his selection of examples of typical State Department style and motivation. However, he would appear to be among those veterans of service in Defense who, more in sorrow than contempt, think of State as "the Department of preemptive capitulation." This volume suggests that this is due to the Foreign Service and its leaders' eschewal of the kind of techniques which are perfected by our uniformed colleagues in the course of their internecine interservice encounters, here laid bare by Dr. Halperin and his helpers with a deft scalpel.

At any one time there are a maximum of a few dozen FSOs in

Washington involved in the processes by which major foreign policy decisions are made, and even fewer in the field. This book should be of help to the members of that weary and ever-shifting band in coming to the understanding that their experience is not inchoate or unique. For the great majority of the Foreign Service who may never be asked to pick up the weightiest policy making burdens, the book will help to explain why, to those involved, this work offers fascinations and failures not available elsewhere.

Connoisseurs of Washington inter-personal styles will appreciate that the Henry A. Kissinger graciously cited in the author's preface as a source of learning, is the same gentleman being sued by the author for a considerable sum for alleged culpability in the wire-tapping of his family.

The second work appears under the guiding hands of two of the three architects of the first, and the contents are not unrelated. Readers of "Bureaucratic Politics" would be aided by first going to Chapter 17, "A Complicated Reality" and students of "US-Japan Relations" are similarly advised to start at the back with Chapter 11, "US-Japanese Security Relations" by Professor Halperin. This provides a helpful matrix for the presentations of a host of distinguished Japanese and American contributors.

Kiichi Saeki's chapter on "Japan's Security in a Multipolar World" is an unusually trenchant articulation of Japanese perceptions in this important area. Henry Rosovsky's largely economic "Japan and the United States —Notes From the Devil's Advocate" is positively angelic in its balanced thoroughness. Miss Clapp's "US Domestic Politics and Relations with Japan" employs the same close-in view of institutional muscle involved in US-Japan relations which characterized "Bureaucratic Politics," again demonstrating the utility of the anatomy student rather than beauty contest judge approach to the policy corpus.

Japan specialists will find a satisfying number of helpful insights in these pages; others may see why it has become impossible to conceptualize most US global concerns without precise knowledge of Japan's interests—and why that knowledge is likely to remain difficult to obtain and frustrating to apply for both Americans and Japanese.

—HERBERT LEVIN

Highroad to Disaster

AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT, *by Robert L. Heilbroner. Norton, $5.95.*

WE CAN add Robert L. Heilbroner's book "An Inquiry into the Human Prospect," to that tradition of works occupied by the Club of Rome's "Limits to Growth," Lester Brown's "World Without Borders" and even Alvin Toffler's "Future Shock." In short, Heilbroner adds his voice to those who are fundamentally pessimistic about our global system continuing on its present course without a major change in direction—essentially a qualitative jump.

Heilbroner's viewpoint is much more philosophical and historical than most books of this type but no less exciting and challenging in its exposition. Heilbroner explores the relevance of both capitalism and socialism (he here means the Marxian variety)—and finds them both lacking in their ability to deal with post-industrial society.

The argument of the book is that we are heading for disaster by our headlong search for industrial growth, by unchecked population growth, by steadily worsening social disorders, by increasing global pollution and by an inevitable movement towards authoritarian government. He foresees spread and use of nuclear weaponry and in particular its use as an instrument of blackmail and terrorism. He sees wars of redistribution as a means by which poor nations remedy their condition. Finally, he believes in an absolute limit to the ability of the earth to support the present rate of industrial activity and feels we are moving toward that limit very rapidly. These are then hard views—but worthy of our thought.

Perhaps the most challenging part of the book for those of us wondering about how to keep our institutions effective, is Heilbroner's pessimism about the possibility of the modern institution's ability to deal with our problems— whether it be democracy, liberalism, Marxism, or capitalism. He wonders, in short, whether any society can bring about alterations of the magnitude he believes necessary to prevent the worse.

This is a *must* book for any diplomat or decision-maker, less for any specific analysis or prescription it contains than for its shaking of the foundations of our neat world-views and narrow preoccupations.

—HARRY C. BLANEY

Analyzing the '60s

TAKING SIDES, *by Richard J. Whalen. Houghton Miflin, $8.95.*

TAKING SIDES gives strong indication that the day of the essayist is not yet done. Richard J. Whalen, a former editor for TIME and writer-in-residence at Georgetown University, worked as an advisor to Richard M. Nixon during 1967 and 1968 and quit shortly before the 1968 election, thoroughly disillusioned with the way the campaign was going and with what the future portended. The author is not only an excellent observer and writer, blessed with a keen insight into the causes of current political events, but is intellectually honest enough to describe these causes, as he sees them, without rancor or diatribe. He is an essayist in the old tradition of "the loyal opposition," when a differing viewpoint was welcomed and weighed on its own merits.

This book is a candy store of goodies. It is composed of articles written for various magazines and re-written for this book. Mr. Whalen, a Republican, a conservative and a critic from early years of John F. Kennedy, now suggests that the Kennedy legacy "is the standard to which the Republicans rather than the McGovernized Democrats can repair," as the perils against which John Kennedy rallied the American people have multiplied to an alarming degree since those wonderful pre-Camelot days.

"Taking Sides" has a number of blessings. Because each chapter is complete in itself, it is neatly, tightly written, yet in a relaxed style. It has none of the excess verbiage of the 500 page political treatise that says, "Well, I didn't make that point very clear, but I

can hit it again in chapter 32." It presents a different side to a number of important questions of today that are vital to tomorrow, and a nation that cannot accept a differing viewpoint is doomed to the dismal death of intellectual malnutrition. His chapter entitled "Cultural Politics" is one of the clearest, most succinct historical analyses of the problems of the '60s yet seen.

For the Foreign Service officer, going from post to post representing America overseas, giving views on cultural and political thoughts that were current when he was in college, confident in the belief that he can catch up on the American scene during a six weeks' home leave talking to hardware salesmen-relatives in Cedar Rapids, this book is not just valuable, it is a must, even if he doesn't agree with the author. One frequently finishes a book and says to himself, "Boy, I wish I could write that well." One very seldom turns the last page of a book thinking, "My Lord, I wish I could think that clearly." This is that kind of book.

—JOHN ST. DENIS

Le Mot Juste

I GIVE YOU MY WORD, *by Francoise Giroud. Houghton Mifflin, $8.95.*

"Life is my joy and my hope . . ."

With that, one of Europe's best journalists concludes her remarkable memoir—58 years compressed into 30 hours of interviews and 275 pages. The book has the searing candor of open mind surgery with one's best friend.

Giroud comes across as a Ms role model *par excellence*. She seems to have done it all, the Parisienne quintessence of what few women (or men) dare and fewer do.

She began as a 15-year-old drop-out from the French upper bourgeoisie. She stumbled and/or finessed her way into the film world of Jean Renoir, Erich von Stroheim, and Antoine de Saint-Exupery. She endured sickness, imprisonment and the birth of an illegitimate child during the Resistance. She gained journalistic renown by helping launch *Elle* and *L'Express*.

Her stinging editorials in the latter and support for Francois Mitterand made her an unlikely candidate for status in the new French Government. Yet, there she reposes as Giscard d'Estaing's resident gadfly and Secretary of State for the Condition of Women.

Most of Giroud's recent TV blitz of the US has focused on her views of women—their rights and roles. She states flatly that "there are two detonators in the society of highly developed nations: women and popular participation in the decision-making process." Women can find themselves and freedom, she stresses, only if they achieve economic independence. She considers the place of women in the world—especially in the US!—"detestable" and yet rebukes the American feminist movement for its "missionary" zeal.

Immersion in a "cause" "bores" her, or so she claims. Her own passionate involvement in politics—perhaps the most interesting part of the book—belies that disclaimer.

Giroud has been a committed witness of the main social, political, and literary events and personalities, pre-World War II to the present. From the Spanish War to Algeria, from the rise of de Gaulle to the revolts of 1968—she was there or wrote as if she were. She has known Gide, Malraux, Camus, Mauriac, Sartre, and Simone de Beauvoir—not to mention Herbert Marcuse, Kate Millett, or Henry Kissinger.

The range of her responses is as wide as that of her acquaintances. She can jab: "Seated there [in 1968] on his pile of gold, de Gaulle could see a long way, all the way to the United States, but he couldn't see directly beneath him." She can purr: "Streets are lovely when you take them by surprise while they're sleeping." She can prod: "What are we doing today that will horrify us in 30 years?"

She beguiles with her gallic short-hand:

Intellectuals: "Never has the intellectual ghetto been more hermetic than since . . . it tried to speak to the people."

The French: "[They] don't like information because it pitilessly reduces their margin of il-

lusions . . ."

Love: "There are no more than two countries where men love women. One is France and the other, Russia."

Politics: "Any intense relationship with power is an avatar of sexuality."

State Department: "That building that looks like it was built as a setting for Kafka."

Giroud reserves a special quarter of her candor for her American readers. Characteristically, she became a saleslady at Lord and Taylor on her first trip to the US—her way of getting a closer look at the natives. She marveled at their casual openness, "the very essence of democracy," and, more fundamentally, at how Americans could suffer civil war, corruption, and assassination and still not really question the bases of their institutions.

Watergate, however, she singles out in that regard. She claims that it is "different, greater," because Presidential deceit betrayed the office and threatened the main unifying factor for the melting pot, the rule of law.

Giroud ends her talk, her book, with a sense of beginning. "The only things that strike me as being interesting or worthwhile today are to seize the movement of life . . ." She speaks with the special poignancy of one not far removed from a desperate period of near suicide.

Giroud gives her reader, not only her word, but the will to achieve and discover. How many writers could give more?

—SANDRA VOGELGESANG

Peaceable Kingdom

THE CHINESE RED ARMY, *Campaigns and Politics since 1949, by Gerard H. Corr. Schocken Books, $8.95.*

GERARD CORR, a professional journalist who spent many years in the Far East and Southeast Asia, believes that too much of what is written on China is done by specialists for specialists and has therefore written this book for the rather unique "general reader" who has an interest in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). He starts with the Red Army's birth in 1927 and ends with two short chapters on "The Army and Politics" and "The Army for the Seventies," but

most of the book is devoted to the four conflicts in which the PLA has been involved: the campaign in Tibet, the Korean War, the war with India and the confrontation with Russia. These he discusses in some detail in an easy journalistic style. The text is unencumbered by footnotes and the knowledgeable reader may wonder about some of Corr's conclusions, such as the dogmatic but questionable assertion that commanders of military regions have such power that they can ignore Peking's directives when it suits them. On the whole, however, the author succeeds in his objective of viewing (wherever possible) the situations "as they may have been viewed at the time from Peking," and his basic conclusions seem quite reasonable. He believes that China's international activities have nothing to do with Communist ideology, but are intended to demonstrate pride and unity and are the product of nationalism and a desire to right past wrongs. Because of these considerations and because of limited military capabilities and lack of mobility, Corr does not believe that Peking is offensive-minded and a threat to world peace.

—LEO A. ORLEANS
Library of Congress

Spies for All Seasons

THE CHINESE SECRET SERVICE, *by Richard Deacon. Taplinger, $14.95.*

THE AUTHOR of "The British Secret Service" and a former Foreign Manager of the London SUNDAY TIMES surveys Chinese espionage from the time of Sun Tzu, the immortal military strategist of the sixth century B.C. ("The aim and end of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy"), through the centuries, down to 1974. His considerable research for this 500-page work has produced many absorbing accounts of intelligence agents and their exploits. Perhaps of special interest is his report on the intelligence activities of the secret service of the Chinese People's Republic, which he describes as having in an "unostentatious, plodding manner achieved some quite astonishing successes in its relatively short history."

A good deal of effort has gone into this readable book—also a lot of Chinese history that is not closely connected with the Chinese secret service. It is well worth the reading but it is not for James Bond buffs or others seeking instant thrills from spy stories.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

It Lurks for Us

THE CROUCHING FUTURE: *International Politics and US Foreign Policy, by Roger Hilsman. Doubleday & Co., $12.50.*

IN AN INTERVIEW last summer with James Reston of the New York TIMES, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said mankind might be at one of those unique and historic watersheds—we will surge forward into an unparalleled golden era or we will plunge into another and more terrible dark age. The Secretary did not elaborate his reasons for this rather foreboding forecast but it would not be difficult at the moment to list a number of economic and environmental factors at least which could make us gloomy about the immediate future. The Secretary went on to cast himself in contrast-

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ing roles of rather heroic dimensions; he said that as a "historian" he would have to take a pessimistic view of the future but that as a "statesman" he was obliged to be more confident and optimistic.

The future is a big subject and a certain amount of modesty and reticence is in order in predicting the unknowable but I did not find the Secretary's view convincing. Are we really headed for one of these two extremes? Haven't any number of years been labeled "watershed" years, even since World War II? Isn't the past we have known, and the present, and the probable future a very mixed affair? And what about our own attitudes and efforts in shaping the future? Need we be either quite so pessimistic or optimistic as the Secretary of State appears to be?

Sensible and generally reassuring answers to questions such as these are given in a large and intelligent book by Roger Hilsman entitled "The Crouching Future: International Politics and US Foreign Policy." Hilsman surveys developments in the US and in all the major areas of the world (he skips over our present recession/inflation) and comes to moderately hopeful conclusions about their implications for United States foreign policy. The Soviet Union will become a superindustrial society like the United States with a change in values away from national power and prestige and with less emphasis on ideology (but still authoritarian).

Although there are dangers in US Soviet relations, in the Middle East for example, they have generally diminished and moves toward detente should be pushed with greater vigor. Similarly, we should press ahead with the normalization of relations with China and reduce the American military posture in Korea and the Pacific. Hilsman sees much turmoil and civil war in the underdeveloped world in the years ahead but urges us, on the basis of our Vietnam experience, to avoid involvement.

Hilsman sees the international problems of the future developing in wholly different ways—for example, as a result of the explosive population growth, and through shortages in food, petroleum and the whole range of resources of industrial society. The content of international politics will therefore be quite different from what we have always known; increasing interdependence among all people of the world existing within an anachronistic and outmoded nation-state system—a system wholly inadequate to our future needs.

Hilsman believes war or the threat of war will remain the central dynamic of international relations. In a thoughtful concluding chapter, he discusses the alternative to war—law and politics as the means to resolve disagreement and conflict and to achieve our goals. World government is wholly impractical at this stage. On the other hand, the European Community is a supranational institution with limited powers created by and coexisting with a group of nation states. This may be the pattern for the future.

This is an important book for practitioners of the trade of statecraft.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

SOVIET BUYING SPREE

from page 16

businessmen ought to push flat out for sales to the Soviet Union, getting as much business and as many signed contracts as possible before the door starts closing. Certainly this would be in the interest of the businesses themselves, as long as the deals were profitable. Advocates of this view dismiss the fear that Soviet purchases of US technology will increase Soviet power, and therefore possibly impair the US position if relations between the superpowers do turn sour. US technology, they argue, is developing so rapidly that Soviet purchases are frequently obsolescent by the time they've been installed. They add that in any event the Russians could make do with imported technology from Western Europe and Japan.

A future that may never come

Another school of thought holds that US sales to the Soviet Union should be regulated on a far more selective basis. Columbia's Professor Brzezinski is among those who advocate this more cautious approach to trade. He believes the US should not provide the Soviet Union with goods and services that relieve pressure on Soviet defense production — third-generation computers, lasers, airborne communications equipment, jet transports, and so forth. Brzezinski argues that the Soviet government has been playing some American businessmen for suckers by enticing them into no-profit deals on the promise of larger and very profitable deals in the future. That future, the professor warns, may never come.

The most extreme school of thought contends that it would be prudent for the US to cut off virtually all high-technology exports to the Soviet Union right now, and thereby put severe pressure on the Soviet economy. In order to get US goods and services flowing again—so the argument runs—the Kremlin will be forced to negotiate and then adhere to an arms pact with us, as well as refrain from international mischief. Advocates of this approach are fond of quoting from a memorandum the Czar received in 1896 from Count Witte, Finance Minister and architect of Imperial Russia's program to industrialize rapidly by importing technology and equipment from the West: "Why should these countries lend us capital?" the future Prime Minister wrote. "They simply build up for themselves a more dangerous rival for the future. However, we should pray that their blindness will continue for as long as possible."

Lenin said basically the same thing when he led the Soviet Union into a massive buying spree during the 1920s. Like Witte before him, Lenin looked upon trade with the West as something for Russia to avoid for as long as possible, and to end just as soon as the economy had taken in as much as it could absorb. Both buying sprees ended as abruptly as they began, and in both instances Western governments and businessmen were fairly stunned to see the door slam shut on them. ■

NOTES FROM ABROAD

from page 22

gives some women can not obscure the fact that we, as much as our maids, are culturally tied to a lifetime of lowered expectations simply because we are women. Sisterhood no longer seems such an extravagant word to us.

Now that our original group has been meeting for over a year, we find ourselves trying to evaluate the significance our meeting together has had in terms of the movement and in terms of ourselves. On the one hand, two more women's groups have formed and a men's liberation group is functioning. There have been our efforts to reach out to other women, to start new groups, to have more exchanges with Colombian women.

But numbers of groups and lists of activities reveal very little of what has happened to us as persons. Talking with another woman, seeing her clearly as *someone* rather than as someone's wife, someone's secretary, someone's mother has had a two-fold effect. We find ourselves liking, respecting, enjoying and understanding women better, not only ourselves, but the women we meet daily in stores, at parties, in school. Seeing women as worthwhile people has meant that we ourselves are persons of value.

Because of our increased sense of worth, we are more sensitive to overtones of anti-womanism among ourselves, friends or in the media. Emerging in us is a greater propensity to tackle women's issues. While a year ago we might have kept angry silence when someone attacked the movement or made an anti-woman remark, today we are quite likely to challenge such statements.

We have found it difficult but soothing to relax our inhibitions against our emotions. Somehow feeling free to cry has made crying less necessary. Yet it is still difficult to come to grips with our anger. Our lifelong socialization patterns distort and subvert expressions of rage: after all, nice girls may cry but they mustn't show hostility. Slowly the depth of our anger against the people, the institutions and the cultural patterns that have closed us to ourselves is being revealed and expressed, but our occasional anger against each other is more difficult to acknowledge.

All of us feel that the group has helped us begin to come to terms with ourselves. We feel better able to cope, but coping with a lifetime of situations we have had no part in making is not enough. If women's liberation is to succeed consciousness raising must imply more than short-term therapy. We do not want to be "patched up" to function in society as it is; we want to become strong enough to change both ourselves and our society.

We have proved to our own satisfaction, if not to others, that a women's liberation group may be even more helpful and important overseas than in the States. The perquisites of life abroad may only blur the outlines of the prison. We have talked, anguished and questioned. Though our inquiry has brought us just to the brink of a new direction, that in itself is a long way, baby! ■

FOREIGN POLICY AND EAST GERMANY

from page 20

a beginning has to be made at this point. As Herbert Suess was moved to observe upon the conclusion of signing ceremonies in Washington last September 4th: "Both sides have a lot of catching up to do."

IN THE AFTERMATH of the Ulbricht era, large segments of East German society have been reorienting themselves to the requirements of membership in a political system of modest proportions and capabilities. While there was a pronounced tendency to exaggerate East German economic and social "accomplishments" during the last years of the Ulbricht era, Honecker has tended to play down GDR particularism in attempting to tightly integrate East Germany into the Soviet political community in Eastern Europe. In private, it may still be the case that many SED cadres believe they "live in the best GDR in the world," but if this is so, the Party is making every attempt to ensure that such beliefs are kept within the realms of private discourse.

American policy toward East Germany should not lose sight of the central, and unalterable, fact that little, if anything, is changed in Europe as a result of Washington's recognition move. National division has now become a permanent fact. Berlin continues to be a focal point of disagreement and potential confrontation. If the East German political system has gained a necessary measure of self confidence in the aftermath of diplomatic successes, this hardly suggests a dramatic alteration in SED leadership thinking or behavior. If anything, the reverse may be the case: Having waited upon the rest of the world to grant them de jure recognition, the SED has ample reason to believe that its conception of politics and social structure has been vindicated.

Such a realization hardly comes as a surprise to Washington, since there is no regime in Europe where geopolitical factors play a greater role. Since East Germany cannot physically remove itself from the framework of obligations and realities it must face in the present and the future, US foreign policy toward the GDR should be geared to the permanent operating realities which have made this other German state the kind of system that it is. The rationale, and justification, behind the US decision to recognize East Germany is not based upon some imaginative and dynamic formula which will eventually transform relations between the two entities into an analogue of US ties with Bonn. History, the Soviet Union, and the SED stand directly in the path of that possibility, assuming Washington ever entertained it. The intelligence behind the new US position toward East Germany is found in the broader movement toward a gradual relaxation of tensions in Europe which respective American and West German governments have found wise to pursue. Seen from this angle, the GDR's delayed entry into the international community represents the most recent example of political intelligence on behalf of the West. ■

STRETCH ON THE BAYANO

from page 10

right. What about the *sailas* of Pintupo and Icantí? He did not know. We did not plan to go all the way to Piriá? No. Then perhaps it was all right.

We started up the river again. A couple of miles from Majé, Peterson pointed to an abandoned campsite. A group of surveyors had been there the year before. There was a plan to build a dam and a hydroelectric station, which would submerge the Cunas' whole valley. There was no other valley for them to move to. The valley of the Chucunaque, the only other sizeable river in Darién, was already inhabited by another Cuna group; nor was it likely that the Bayano Cunas would find much hospitality among their distance cousins in San Blas. But Peterson said these people had no inkling of what might come. In fact, after initial hostility towards the surveyors, they had been happy to make some money selling them their game and produce.

In the afternoon we passed the village of Pintupo, but did not land. There was little traffic on the river; only two *piraguas*, heavily loaded with bananas and the tubers called *ñame*, being poled down to Chepo by Indians who yelled to us they were from Piriá. That was the capital of the Bayano people, fifty miles upstream beyond our own destination. Peterson had been to Piriá the year before. He had walked across the Isthmus, over the wild Sierra, from San Blas to Piriá, and then come down the Bayano with some Indians. The Indians told him he was the first white man to visit Piriá in many years.

Now we hit rapids, two sets of them, where the river ran so fast that even our powered *piragua* made slow progress. The water seemed deep enough, but we bounced off one rock in the upper rapids. Soon after passing the rapids we left the Bayano and turned left, north, up the Rio Aguas Claras to get to Icantí. This was a small river that came rushing down from the low sierra that is the backbone of the Isthmus. Its waters were sparkling, cool and as clear as a spring.

Icantí when we came to it was more clumped huts, a village of three hundred people. They all came down to the bank to greet us, led by the chief or *saila* and his "secretary." (The Cunas have a very complex, though barefoot, officialdom.) This was the largest group of Cunas I had ever seen. They are unusual. The men average no more than five feet tall, the women less. Even in this isolated place the men wore store clothing—mainly khaki shirts and trousers, and occasional felt hats, though no shoes. But the women and girls all wore the traditional costume. Each had a gold nose ring, and most wore large round earrings of thin beaten gold. Their blouses were made of two of the bright appliqued cotton pieces called *molas*, and for skirts and kerchiefs they used bright store-bought cloth. Their forearms and calves were tightly bound with sets of wooden bands—skinny was beautiful—and down the ridge of each lady's nose ran a black cosmetic line. Which, I had to admit, set off nicely those brown exotic eyes. Indeed, some of the women were goodlooking even to a gringo eye.

Peterson had brought the *saila*, who bore the Castilian name of Santiago Aguila, a good-sized box containing anti-malarial drugs, antibiotics, and other sundries like

aspirin. The two of them and the secretary went off to talk, and Aniseto and I strolled. Aniseto told Carlos to stay by the boat. So far as we knew these were friendly people. And we were not much more than 70 miles from Panama City as the crow flies, something over 100 by the way we had come. But the point was, we were absolutely dependent on the boat to get home.

Icantí had been built at the upper limit of navigation by *piragua* on the Aguas Claras. Just above the village, we found there were rock ledges down which the river poured in little falls and channels, through clear pools. It was five o'clock and Aniseto and I were still sweltering. We stripped and swam in that crystal water pouring down from the mountains where jaguars and no men roamed.

When we climbed out and sprawled on a sun-warm rock we still thought we were alone, till there came a tittering and we scrambled to put on our trousers, a little late. Fifteen or twenty damsels of various ages were standing a few feet away giggling at us. I had a sudden warm thought. Gauguin in Tahiti. Nose rings are not unattractive.

When we got back to Carlos he announced that the rock in the rapids had broken off one of the three blades on our outboard's propeller. That would slow us down, but fortunately the way home was downstream.

Peterson came back from his palaver looking a little grim. Aguila, and everyone else, had heard about our bath in the river. It seemed that Cuna women were not much trusted by their men. Neither Aniseto nor I had made any untoward move (except of course to strip naked in order to go swimming), but the *saila* warned Peterson that the men were on edge.

It was already almost dark. Was this a people whose tempers worsened, or improved, after the sun went down? We went down by the boat and ate some cold food we had brought with us, while the people went to their huts to eat. We could see no one in the gloom. Peterson was calm, but serious, especially after he heard about the propeller: "Let's just play it easy. I'll tell Aguila that we have to leave early because of the propeller, but I won't say how early. They've strung hammocks for us in the meeting hut. We turn in early. There'll be a full moon later, if the sky is clear. Soon as the moon comes up, we get up and get out of here. Está bien?" It sounded good to us.

By eight-thirty, after Peterson had spoken briefly to Aguila, we were lying in our hammocks. In the next hut someone was singing in a monotone, some long Cuna tale. Suddenly I heard soft music coming from another quarter, pipes and a drum-like beat, very soft and small. I slipped out of my hammock and walked into the village street toward the music. No moon yet, but the bright stars gave some light. I stopped at the edge of a hut. Just beyond was the little earth plaza of the village, and a small crowd of Indians circling an area a hundred feet across. A kerosene lantern on a pole gave dim light. In the center ringed by the people were four youths and four maidens, the youths with pipes of Pan and the maidens with a kind of tambourine, features and costumes muted in the dark. Someone said two words. Then they danced a round dance, barefoot and so lightly they barely touched earth, and played the pipes and tambourines that

made light, fleeting music like courting birds in a glade. I was enchanted, and stood watching. But they would see me, and what then? I went back to my hut and hammock and soon fell asleep, with the old person next door still chanting in a monotone.

Someone tapped me. It was Peterson; three o'clock. In ten minutes we were in the boat and cast off quietly down the river, the beaming moon so bright that we could see the bottom three feet deep.

Carlos was at the stern, with the motor. As we drifted out of the Aguas Claras into the Bayano he pulled the cord to start the motor. Nothing. Again; nothing. Suddenly we were sweeping down the first rapids at a frightening speed. Aniseto had an oar, trying to steer, and kept us pointed downstream, and then we were in calmer water and Carlos tried the motor again, but suddenly we were in the second rapids and sweeping down along the left bank and a low tree knocked Carlos into the water, while the rest of us shot downstream in our thin vessel.

Fortunately we got out of that rapids quickly, and staying along the left bank we managed to stop in a few hundred yards. We clung to the grass on the low bank and wondered, Where is Carlos? There was a mist on the river, but the moon was so bright that we could still see some distance. We shouted. Soon, by God, Carlos came swimming down, and there we were all safe again.

The rest of the trip was easy. We reached Chepo by noon and I was home in time to find my wife and children still taking a Sunday afternoon nap. In the evening I took my wife to the movies, a million miles away from the Río Bayano.

The rest of our tour in Panama was easy, too. We and the Panamanians decided we had to be friends, there was talk of a new treaty, and suddenly again for a while we *were* friends, though they still thought the Canal Zone should be theirs, if not indeed the great Canal itself. Brown was transferred, and my new chief was all the good things Brown was not. And then one day, after we had settled in so well that we wondered if we could ever bear a northern winter again, we were sent to Europe —and found we could bear the north very well. But the sight of those grand tropic skies stayed with me very long.

A decade later, when we were sending into Vietnam not only hundreds of thousands of soldiers but hundreds of our Foreign Service colleagues, a senior officer in our Service asked me if I would like to go to Southeast Asia. I said that frankly I'd prefer not to. I wasn't opposed to our aims, but I just didn't want to work in a foreign country with so many Americans intruding and stepping on each other's toes. Ah, but he said, it didn't have to be like that. He himself had been director of one of our aid missions in Southeast Asia, and seldom stayed in the Embassy or even in the capital city. He had lived much in villages, and had flown by helicopter to visit the mountain tribes, primitive people such as he knew I'd never seen.

But I had. I had visited the Cuna people of the Bayano, and if I had harmed them by my brief visit I think I harmed them very little. And that is almost a proud statement, considering that the end is drawing near for all wild people and the great dam will finally rise, there on the Río Bayano. ■

LETTERS TO FSJ

How to Treat a Wife

■ My husband is retiring the day after tomorrow at age 60 after a long "middle echelon" career.

I have much to say, but now I would like to make one meaningful contribution to the Foreign Service of the present and the future, a contribution that will result in more cooperation on the part of the liberated Foreign Service wife and also keep morale high. May I respectfully suggest Foreign Service wives be treated with courtesy and consideration? From my personal experience on every continent but Europe these qualities were rare in the "old" Foreign Service. There were always exceptions of course. When I worked as a professional language teacher on a "volunteer" basis, I could do no wrong.

So much may be expected (and demanded) of an F.S. wife. Why is she not also treated like a person in her own right? She may have one post (or more) where the Embassy or the Consulate "controls" the house she lives in overseas and turns it into an inn. (She and her husband run the inn and pay the expenses thereof.) She may be asked to travel thousands of miles to help her husband full time professionally as a teacher and not even have her travel reimbursed. Washington promised to have the post pay. The post said Washington should pay (1960). She may be severely criticized (I was condemned and my husband too) for my not continuing to teach after years of volunteer work.

Most wives, I hope, will continue to cooperate in every way they can—entertain, be active in community affairs, interpret, pitch in at the office, teach, learn a difficult language, etc. However, the FS wife should not be taken for granted. A thank-you note, some flowers, a phone call offering help or expressing concern, a surprise box of candy, an invitation to a briefing of interest to all adults at the post, a special treat from the commissary if a branch post is involved (as well as the free "inn"), a dinner or luncheon out to thank a wife or wives. There are many choices. Each and every one is valuable in recognizing the F.S. wife as a human being with feelings and rights as well as with countless duties. And yet in the "old" Foreign Service some people didn't "budget" for thoughtfulness to the F.S. wife. I forcefully suggest it's time for a change.

BERTHA REHM EWING
APO New York

Irresponsible Journalism

■ It is understandable that members of the Foreign Service feel there have been too many politically appointed ambassadors who have had no qualifications for such a position. However, if you printed Mr. Crile's article on Ambassador de Roulet in Jamaica as an example of such a bad appointment, you are in grave error. Printing it in any case is a terrible mistake. Mr. Crile's article is full of inaccuracies, is deliberately misleading and is an example of irresponsible journalism.

I was Mr. de Roulet's secretary while he was in Jamaica. As a small example of the incorrect effect of the article, one of my colleagues here at USUN asked me if it was true that he "made the officers use those animal stamps." He didn't make them use those stamps. They were part of the fun he created. She couldn't understand why I had enjoyed working for someone who seemed to be such a buffoon and a jerk. But that is because Mr. Crile pictured him as something entirely different from the good, intelligent, kind, humorous ambassador he was.

(MISS) HARRIET B. CURRY
USUN, New York

Ambassadorial Nominations

■ I noted with interest your request in the January JOURNAL for views on the future course the Association should take in regard to ambassadorial nominations. I suppose there are few subjects closer to the hearts of Foreign Service officers, and it would probably be difficult to find one who does not have views on it.

After some reflection I think that option 2 as given in the January editorial would be the most productive course for the Association to follow. Certainly the first option of doing nothing should be rejected. If we do not speak up in regard to ambassadorial nominations, who will? I believe that the firm but steady course the Association has taken in recent months in regard to those nominations with which it disagrees will continue to prove effective.

Should the Association essay a "more active role" it could well be brought into confrontation with the President who, as we all know, has the Constitutional right to appoint ambassadors—and the Constitution certainly has no standards of qualifications for ambassadors. While respecting this right of the President, the Association should continue to point out publicly that in most cases Foreign Service officers by their training and experience are best suited to represent the United States as Chiefs of Mission. This will be a long term educational process but we need not be disheartened, recalling that it took many years of effort by dedicated citizens to effect Civil Service reform in the last century.

What we should vociferously oppose is a "spoils system" in connection with the appointment of ambassadors. The sale of embassies to the highest bidder or the use of them for consolation prizes for defeated politicians is not only repugnant—it is also dangerous. This does not overlook the fact that some of those who have obtained embassies in this manner may be well-qualified, and on occasion our country has been enriched by their contributions in the field of foreign affairs. But these cases are the exception, not the rule in my experience.

I believed it would be counterproductive and probably unnecessarily constraining to set up criteria against which to judge ambassadorial nominees. This smacks too much of the stereotype which we have continually resisted among Foreign Service officers, and which we should not extend to ambassadors. If anything, the Association might consider the establishment of what I would call "negative criteria" against which candidates would be judged. These negative criteria could be related to such things as unsuitability because of lack of background in foreign affairs, political or other notoriety, misconduct, etc. In that way we would consider the President's nominees as qualified unless we were in a position to demonstrate otherwise.

THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN
Copenhagen

AFSA NEWS

Election News

The May issue of the JOURNAL will contain a special section of campaign statements by candidates in the 1975 AFSA Elections. WATCH FOR IT!

The following is a tentative and unofficial list of possible candidates in the 1975 AFSA Elections as available at press time. The eligible nominees named below have either accepted nomination or not yet declined nomination.

For President: John D. Hemenway, Ret.; Elbert G. Mathews, Ret.; Richard L. Williamson, FSO-4.

For Vice President: Norman L. Achilles, FSO-4; David Anderson, FSO-2; Leonard R. Greenup, Ret.; John J. Harter, FSO-3; Lars H. Hydle, FSO-5; Daniel O. Newberry, FSO-3.

For Second Vice President: Norman L. Achilles, FSO-4; William S. Krason, FSO-2; Edwin L. Martin, Ret.; John A. Patterson, FSR-4; Samuel R. President, Ret.

For Secretary: Norman L. Achilles, FSO-4; Robert J. Palmeri, FSIO-4; LaRue H. Velott, FSO-4.

For Treasurer: Norman L. Achilles, FSO-4; Paul A. Chadwell, Ret.; Dennis Lamb, FSO-3; Edward R. Stumpf, FSO-5; Mary Elizabeth Swope, FSR-6.

For AID Representatives: Charlotte Cromer, FSS-6; Roy A. Harrell, Jr., FSR-4; Lynus D. Kelly, FSR-5; Sherwin Landfield, FSR-3; Campbell McClusky, FSR-5; Harry J. Petrequin, FSR-2; Paul Saenz, FSR-4.

For USIA Representative: Paul P. Blackburn, FSIO-3; Dino Caterini, FSIO-4; C. Sigrid Maitrejean, FSIO-4.

For State Representatives: Norman L. Achilles, FSO-4; Roger N. Benson, FSO-4; Alford W. Cooley, FSO-5; G. Ryder Forbes, FSO-4; Richard J. Harrington, FSO-4; Alan W. Lukens, FSO-2; David Noack, FSS-3; David T. Morrison, FSO-4; Joseph J. Paciorka, FSS-3; William T. Pryce, FSO-4; Mary Ann Reed, FSS-6; Kenneth N. Rogers, FSO-4; Cynthia Thomas, FSR-5; A. Joseph Williams, FSO-4; Patricia Woodring, FSR-7.

For Retired Representatives: Richard C. Hagen; William J. Handley; Parker T. Hart; Paul J. Leahey; Samuel T. Parelman, Peter F. Szluk; Bela Zempleny, Wesley E. Jorgensen.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR CANDIDATES

I. ELIGIBILITY

In accordance with the bylaws of the American Foreign Service Association, in order to be a candidate a person must be a member through June 30, 1975. If a member is nominated who is not on automatic dues deduction and has paid through March 14, 1975, but not through June 30, 1975, that member will be contacted and advised that he/she must pay dues through June 30, 1975 in order to be a candidate.

II. LISTING OF CANDIDATES

The Elections Committee will contact nominees to determine whether they wish to be candidates. The April issue of the Foreign Service JOURNAL will contain a tentative list of candidates for the various positions, including those nominees whose candidacy has not been verified by the JOURNAL publication deadline of March 19, 1975.

A final list of candidates will appear in the May issue of the Foreign Service JOURNAL.

III. CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS AT AFSA EXPENSE

Candidates will be permitted three (3) direct mail statements at AFSA expense. In addition, candidates will be allowed one (1) campaign statement, to appear in the May issue of the JOURNAL.

(1) *Direct Mail Statements*

(a) Each statement is not to exceed two sides of a sheet of paper measuring 8½ × 11 inches.

(b) The sheet must be submitted for reproduction "as is" by photo-offset.

(c) Statements must be submitted *no later than*:

1. April 5 (first direct mail statement)
2. April 20 (second direct mail statement)
3. May 5 (third direct mail statement to accompany ballots)

(2) *Campaign Statement for the* JOURNAL

The May issue of the JOURNAL will contain a special "Elections Section."

Space available for each candidate has been determined as:

(a) For Officer Candidates—one (1) page

(b) For Constituency Representatives—one-half (½) page.

Criteria for JOURNAL submission:

(a) For Officer Candidates—a text of not more than 1,100 words *OR* a combination of graphics and text to occupy a rectangle 7 inches wide by 10 inches deep. In the latter case, the material may include photographs or other illustrative material and will be reproduced "as is" in its entirety in black and white.

(b) For Constituency Representatives—a text of not more than 550 words *OR* a combination of graphics and text to occupy a rectangle 3 and ⅜ inches wide by 10 inches deep. In the latter case, the material may include photographs or other illustrative material and will be reproduced "as is" in its entirety in black and white.

The texts submitted to be reproduced will be set in 10 point Times Roman type. Page 14 of the March issue of the Foreign Service JOURNAL is set in this type. Submission of your statement must be **no later than April 5.**

IV. MAILING OF CAMPAIGN STATEMENTS AT CANDIDATES' OWN EXPENSE

(1) Any candidate at her/his own expense may obtain from AFSA a printout of membership mailing labels for the entire membership or any practicable portion thereof.

(2) Any candidate may at his/her own expense have AFSA reproduce, prepare for mailing and mail campaign literature to the entire membership or any practicable portion thereof.

Such requests shall be directed to the Chairman of the Elections Committee and will be honored for the period from February 17, 1975 thru May 30, 1975.

A time period of seven (7) working days will be required for (1) and (2) above.

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(3) *Cost Factors*

(a) For the entire membership	$68.00
*For portion:**	
AID (Washington *and* Overseas)	$35.00
State (Washington *and* Overseas)	$35.00
USIA (Washington *and* Overseas)	$35.00
Retired (Washington *and* Overseas)	$35.00
(b) Entire mailing process (computed on the basis of one printed page)	$600.00
State (Washington *and* Overseas)	$265.00
AID (Washington *and* Overseas)	$135.00
USIA (Washington *and* Overseas)	$ 85.00
Retired (Washington *and* Overseas)	$160.00

Candidates may not add additional material at their own expense to the three direct mailings or JOURNAL statement discussed above. Candidates who have ordered the mailings or the preparation of materials at their own expense, will be required to pay for these services before mailings are posted or materials are delivered.

V. MEMBERSHIP LISTS

Each candidate has the right to inspect a complete computer-produced list containing the names and last known addresses of all members. AFSA has only a single current print-out of this list in its possession and cannot provide copies of it to candidates. However, candidates may, at their own expense, make Xerox or other copies of this list in a manner which will not damage it. AFSA has a Xerox machine which candidates may use for this purpose at 10¢ per page. Candidates wishing to use this machine should make arrangements through Ms. Ginger Levy at AFSA Headquarters, phone (202) 338-4045 between 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m.

VI. OBSERVERS

Each candidate is permitted to have as many observers at the counting of Ballots as may be necessary (as determined by the Department of Labor) to observe the actual counting of the Ballot.

Candidates are permitted to have observers present at all stages of the counting and tallying process including the counting and tallying of the Ballots and the totaling, recording, and reporting of tally sheets.

Candidates are also permitted observers at the preparation and mailing of ballots, their receipt, opening and counting.

Candidates may also have an observer present at the re-mailing of Ballots (see VIII, "BALLOTS" below).

VII. AFSA REPRESENTATIVES AND KEYMEN

AFSA Representatives and Keymen have been instructed, by letter dated February 7, 1975, to reject any requests by candidates to distribute or post campaign literature, and to return such mailings to the candidates.

VIII. BALLOTS

The Ballot will be distributed on May 15, 1975, to each person who is a member as of May 1, 1975.

Ballot format will be dependent upon the size of the final list of candidates. Candidates or their designated representatives are welcome to participate in the meeting with the Elections Supervisor to discuss Ballot format. This meeting is scheduled for 6:30 p.m. March 24, 1975, Room 460 Vanguard Building, 1111 20th St., N.W., Washington, D.C.

The envelope containing Ballot material mailed to members will bear a return address of P.O. Box 5502, Washington, D.C. 20016. The box will be periodically checked after May 15, 1975 in the presence of the representative of the Election Supervisor, for Ballots that have been returned because of improper address. The Elections Committee will diligently attempt to find new addresses for members involved, and will re-mail Ballots to these members. Candidates or their representatives may observe this process of re-mailing.

Voted ballots will be returned to a bank address, to be collected at 1:00 p.m. July 10, 1975. A "double envelope" system, with the ballot sealed in an inner envelope bearing only the marking "Secret Ballot" will be used for the return of Ballots.

More detailed balloting instructions will accompany the Ballots.

IX. ORDER OF PRECEDENCE

Order of Precedence of Statements appearing in the JOURNAL and for the Listing of Candidates on the Ballot will be by lot. The lot will be supervised by the Department of Labor.

X. CAMPAIGN MEETINGS

Campaign Meetings will be held in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area between April 1 and May 14, 1975. The exact dates, times, places and organization of campaign meetings will be discussed at the meeting of March 24, 1975 mentioned in paragraph VIII. All candidates, including those outside the Washington, D,C, metropolitan area will be given adequate notice of the meetings.

Candidates will be allowed equal time at the meetings to present their views either personally, through representatives bearing written authorization from the candidate, or by the submission of statements to be read.

* *Portions have been computed by* Agency *only, further breakdowns, e.g. Washington* OR *Overseas portions of Agencies, are not available.*

Members' Interests

There have been two positive developments in the members' interests area for a change. The first positive item, previously reported as forthcoming, is that the increased per diem rates at FSI went into effect as scheduled on January 1.

The second was in the area of implementation of our recent agreement with the Department on procedures for ordering and compensating irregular or occasional overtime. We learned that the African Bureau was not using the new procedures to order and record overtime for members of the Ethiopian Task Force, which had been in existence on a 24-hour basis for about a month. We thought this was an important case, both because it was the first large-scale failure (of which we had become aware) to implement the new procedures, and because it raised the possibility that a large number of employees were receiving no compensation for extensive ordered overtime. The African Bureau's Executive Director, after discussing the new procedures with representatives of the Director General's Employee Management Relations staff, implemented those procedures the same day and ensured that employees' records reflected all assigned overtime from the time of the establishment of the Task Force. We want to thank the Executive Director of the African Bureau and the Employee Management Relations Office for helping us to resolve this issue quickly and satisfactorily.

This is the kind of prompt, forthcoming response that could lead to a more constructive relationship on members' interests issues if it were the rule instead of the exception. Unfortunately, the three agencies are less responsive on most issues. Two recent examples: an optional airfreight allowance for employees assigned to Cambodia and Vietnam, and a new method for computing claims for losses of household effects. Management proposed that employees assigned to South Vietnam and Cambodia be given the option of a 450 pound airfreight shipment (vice present 250 pounds) instead of the normal surface shipment. As most of you know, practically speaking there is no surface shipment option for Cambodia and the delays in surface shipments to South Vietnam are extensive. On its face, then, this looked like a good alternative for employees to have. We discovered during consultations, however, that the overall cost to the US government would be less if employees chose this option, than if they took the normal surface shipment of effects. We are all for saving the US government money, but think that there are better ways than cutting corners on shipments to employees in war zones. We therefore proposed a larger airfreight allowance option, intended to be equivalent in overall cost to the surface shipment to which employees are entitled. Management refused to budge. Those of you going to Cambodia and South Vietnam can be doubly proud—not only are you endangering your body for your country,

you are saving it money at the same time.

After extended negotiations we reached agreement in principle with management on a procedure for computing claims' losses which would take into account changes in price levels, rather than be based simply on original cost. We have just received word that management does not want the agreement to take effect until FY 77 (i.e., July 1, 1976). The reason—insufficient funds in the FY 76 budget. We do not know how much additional this procedure will cost. Management refuses to provide that information. We are supposed to take on faith alone their assertion that no funds can be found for this agreement for the next 16 months.

Negotiations—A Status Report

Our negotiations with *AID* have reached an absolute low point. With a few very minor exceptions, every issue between the Association and AID is now before some third-party adjudicatory body as an appeal, for a determination of "consultability" or as an unfair practice. The most significant issue, the AID RIF is still before an administrative law judge, and a decision is expected momentarily. We think there is a good chance that the judge will rule in AFSA's favor that the Agency committed an unfair practice in failing to negotiate the RIF rules with AFSA before proceeding to terminate career AID Foreign Service employees.

In *USIA*, we recently reached agreement with the Agency on an upward mobility program for Foreign Service secretaries, which—if carried out faithfully by the Agency—should improve substantially the career prospects for a number of USIA Foreign Service secretaries. We also reached agreement on new regulations which eliminate the current exclusion of periods of leave without pay for the purposes of determining eligibility for annual step increases. However, we refused to agree with an Agency proposal which would have changed the eligibility date for periodic step increases from July 1 to the first of the fiscal year. This change would make no difference this year, but next year when the fiscal year changes to October 1, it would have meant a three months delay in obtaining step increases for every Foreign Service person in USIA, and a consequent loss of income amounting to as much as $250 per employee. The Association intends to propose legislation this year which will eliminate this problem.

In *State*, we have been engaged in a complex series of negotiations concerning lateral entry programs and their abuses, the hiring of FSRs and a number of closely related matters. We have made some real progress in these negotiations, and will make a full report on their status in the near future. We are also on the verge of an agreement with the management of the Department on a new selection out system which would provide substantially improved due-process rights and hope to have a signed agreement in time for the next issue. Finally, we are negotiating now with the Department on revisions to the OER form. You will recall, the Association agreed to a new form last year because it contained provisions for a substantially increased employee input, and incorporated the Association's suggestion for a goal-setting approach to the evaluation of performance. However, we agreed to that form with some reluctance because of the "Baskin-Robbins 28 flavors" check-list of officer qualities. That checklist continues to be unacceptable to us on the basis of a year's experience, and is the major sticking point in our negotiations. Developments in the employee-benefits field are reported on elsewhere in this issue.

AID Officers R-3 and Above Take Note

If you were recommended for a promotion in 1974 make sure that you check your PER file. In the course of perusing an employee's file on an earlier grievance, the AFSA representative discovered that the grievant's Assistant Administrator had subjectively and summarily recommended against promotion and, contrary to regulations, the affected employee was not informed. Had the error not been caught, the employee's career could have continued to be adversely affected unbeknown to him. AFSA stands ready to check any employee's file upon written request and authorization.

CONGRESSIONAL REPORT

The following is a status report on legislation or proposed legislation which is of particular interest to Foreign Service personnel

Taxation of Allowances

To date, no specific legislative proposal has been introduced similar to that contained in HR 17488 in the last Congress which would have made virtually all Foreign Service allowances taxable income. We hope to keep it that way. Once a provision of this sort is reported out of committee and attached to larger legislation which has substantial backing, it becomes far more difficult to defeat. In the meantime, AFSA has received a large number of expressions of support from members of the Congress, particularly on the Senate side. We are therefore moderately optimistic that no bill as sweeping as HR 17488 will become law in the near future. However, if you have not yet written your Congressman and two Senators, please do so; we particularly need help with members of the following committees: Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs, Senate Finance, House Ways and Means, and the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation.

While the attitudes of members of Congress have varied considerably, there seems to be a major, common thread in their views, i.e., Foreign Service personnel should be no worse off, but also no better off financially by virtue of serving their government overseas than federal employees who serve their entire careers in Washington. Accordingly, most members of Congress, once educated to the issues, will agree to oppose provisions such as those contained in HR 17488, which would have had the effect of making service overseas substantially more expensive than staying in Washington. However, most of these same Congressmen are equally opposed to any hint of special favors or extra benefits for Foreign Service personnel, and more than one has indicated —based on this philosophy—some doubts as to the merits of a full exemption from taxation of the housing allowance. There is no quarrel with that portion of the housing allowance which goes to offset higher housing costs overseas, or

that portion needed to provide essential representational housing. Rather, the problem rests with that portion of one's income which one would have had to pay in any case, had one stayed in Washington. The Association believes that there are good arguments in favor of keeping this portion of the housing allowance tax-free, but the arguments are less self-evident than with most other Foreign Service allowances.

Limit on Federal Pay and Retirement

In his report to the Congress, President Ford proposed that as an anti-inflationary measure, pay comparability increases this year for all federal employees should be limited to 5 percent. The President also proposed that cost-of-living increases for federal annuitants be limited to 5 percent over the next 18 months. The Association has written to Senator McGee and Congressman Henderson, Chairmen of the Senate and House Post Office and Civil Service Committees, expressing our opposition to these two measures. We indicated that we felt that most Foreign Service employees and annuitants would support such limits if identical limitations were placed on the entire nation as part of a broader wage-price control program, but that it was patently unfair to single out federal employees and annuitants for special, discriminatory treatment. We pointed out that this proposal was particularly unfortunate for Foreign Service retired personnel, and if allowed to pass, would constitute a breach of faith which, in the private sector, would be a breach of contract.

As things stand now, the chances of such legislation being passed are not good. We have already received a reply from Congressman Henderson, indicating that he sees the issues in essentially the same terms we do, and is opposed to the President's proposals. Unfortunately, however, our position on this matter has been complicated somewhat by recent revelations that Federal annuitants are getting an extra, and some consider unfair bonus under the present law which, over a period of years could prove extremely expensive to the Federal government.

In 1969, the law with respect to cost-of-living increases was modified to provide an additional 1 percent every time annuities were raised. This provision was put into effect to make up for the fact that there is a lag between the time when prices go up and the time when annuities are raised. However, there is a technical flaw in the law, which adds this 1 percent into the new base for calculating future cost-of-living increases. OMB recently discovered that while the effect of the 1 percent in a given year is small, over a period of years it grows geometrically. Already, since 1969, the effect has been to raise annuities considerably faster than the cost of living has gone up. The Association, however, opposes strongly OMB's means of remedying the situation, viz., eliminating the 1 percent feature. Doing so would reinstitute the problem the 1 percent feature was designed to correct, the loss of real purchasing power as a result of the lag in obtaining cost-of-living increases. Furthermore, in a high inflation environment, the 1 percent has been necessary to offset the fact that the rapid rise in annuities to match rises in cost of living has placed annuitants in higher tax brackets. Clearly, what is needed is a revised mechanism which will assure that the annuities of all federal employees, including those of us in the Foreign Service will remain stable after adjustments are made for both inflation and taxes. That, after all, is what the Congress intended in the first place.

Foreign Service Retirement Legislation

AFSA has been in contact with the Department, and with the staff of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to see what progress is likely or possible for action by the Congress this year on the omnibus Foreign Service retirement bill which we were able to get passed by the Senate last year, but which died in the House. We have been assured that Chairman Hays will give this matter careful attention in the relatively near future. AFSA considers this bill a major item in our congressional action program, since it will bring about a number of major, and long-overdue improvements in the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability system including immediate coverage of Foreign Service staff corps personnel under the Foreign Service system, raise survivors' annuities and lower the cost of providing them, and allow individuals who retire to take at least partial advantage of the previous cost-of-living adjustment, a feature which the Civil Service already has.

Other Legislation

Legislation is currently pending which would raise substantially the per diem rates in the Continental United States. This is of considerable interest to Foreign Service personnel, not only for those who have to travel within the US (e.g. those traveling to USUN) but also for individuals assigned between posts to FSI or for other training, those here on consultations, those on selection boards, etc., all of whom have discovered that current per diem rates are woefully inadequate. The President vetoed one such bill last year, but favorable action is likely in the near future now that compromises have been worked out between the Congress and the White House.

Legislation is currently being considered in committee which would loosen some of the more restrictive provisions of the Hatch act, which was designed to "depoliticize" federal employees. Almost everyone except the Civil Service Commission agrees that some changes are needed to preserve the Constitutional rights of federal employees. However, the proposals advanced by the major unions appear designed mainly to increase their own political "clout" with the Congress, and some of their proposals could run the risk of politicizing federal employees. We suspect, therefore, that the final result will be a compromise.

Finally, legislation has again been introduced to provide a legislated grievance system for the Foreign Service. As this goes to press, AFSA is in the final stages of preparing its own suggested legislation, which is somewhat better tailored to the special needs of the Foreign Service, which corrects some of the major defects of the current "interim" grievance system, and which, we believe has a better chance of obtaining the support of all concerned parties, and thus will stand a better chance of being passed in the House than

FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

Listings in this Special Services column are 40c per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail to Special Services, FSJ, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

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SALE. MALLORCA, SPAIN. Furnished house: twin bedroom, terrace overlooking Mediterranean, fireplace. $15,000. Write: Owner, 302 Walnut Street, Falls Church, Va. 22046.

FOR RENT — Furnished 2-bedroom house with swimming pool, 3 months between May and September, $350 per month. 30 minutes to FSI. Carl Nelson, FSO-ret., 241 Panorama Dr., Oxon Hill, Md. 20021. Phone 839-3082.

TOBAGO, Crusoe's Only Isle (We can prove it). For Rent: A charming new cottage directly on Courland Beach (Caribbean), fully furnished and equipped for four, 2 miles from championship Tobago Golf Club. Write Bob Johnson, Box 194, Scarborough, Tobago, West Indies.

RENTAL: remodeled Irish farmhouse on Southcoast at Kinsale, Co. Cork; fully furnished, three bedrooms, bath, dishwasher, two fireplaces, underfloor electric heating. October/March-$100 per week, April/September-$125 per week, including utilities. Write: Howard R. Simpson, American Consulate General, 9 Rue Armeny, Marseille.

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have previous bills on this subject. (For those of you who have not followed this matter closely, the Senate has repeatedly passed grievance legislation which had AFSA backing and the backing of a number of other organizations and individuals, but these bills have consistently failed in the House.)

CHAPTER SUCCESSES

As you know, a significant portion of AFSA's total activities are carried out by our Chapters and Representatives overseas. For this reason, as part of the AFSA News section of the JOURNAL, we plan to report on the endeavors and successes of Chapters in solving problems at the post level. We hope such an item will be a vehicle for inter-post communication and will promote increased Chapter activism by letting others know the kinds of accomplishments possible by individual posts.

If your Chapter has ideas or accomplishments you would like to share with other posts, let us know.

AFSA/Rome—Reduction in the price of gas coupons

As a result of representations by our AFSA Chapter in Rome to the Governing Board of the American Embassy Association, an agreement was reached to halt the practice of applying a flat rate 13% surcharge to the price of gasoline coupons sold in the Consulates in Italy outside of Rome. The surcharge will be replaced by a handling charge of 3% which reflects the costs to the Commissary of handling and disbursing the books.

The 3% surcharge translates into a 45¢ charge per book and saves the Consulate customers about $1.50 per book. The resultant savings to Foreign Service personnel at constituent posts in Italy will be roughly $1800 per year.

AFSA/Bogota—Protecting hard won advances

AFSA/Bogota brought to our attention that the post had been given instructions which implied that due to budget restrictions, R&R and emergency visitation travel were among the first items the post should consider cutting. Upon inquiring of the Department, the post was notified that it was not legal to defer either of these important benefits, both of which are currently the subject of agreements between AFSA and the three Agencies.

The fact that someone in Post management could recommend such action suggests that every Chapter and Representative must be on guard to keep secure AFSA's hard won advances. In any case, AFSA/Bogota is to be congratulated for its vigilance in this matter.

Foreign Service People

Marriages

Sanderson-West. Ivy Lorraine Sanderson, daughter of FSO and Mrs. M. A. Sanderson, Jr., was married to FSO Robert Rush West on February 6, in Khartoum.

Deaths

Allison. Mrs. James E. Allison, mother of Mrs. Stuart Rockwell, died in Chevy Chase, Maryland, on October 26. She succumbed instantly to injuries suffered when struck by an automobile, while crossing Connecticut Avenue with a friend, Mrs. Winslow Van Devanter, who was also killed. Mrs. Allison, who visited Ambassador and Mrs. Rockwell at their posts in Rabat and Tehran, and in Washington, was well known to their friends in the Foreign Service. In addition to Mrs. Rockwell she leaves another daughter, Mrs. Roland S. Homet, Jr., of Washington, and a son, Dudley Digges Morgan, Jr., of Tulsa, Okla. and 11 grandchildren.

Chapman. Raymond E. Chapman, FSO-retired, died on March 8, in Arlington. Mr. Chapman entered on duty with the Department of State in 1946 and served at Wiesbaden, Frankfurt, Bonn, and Madrid, before his retirement in 1965. He is survived by his wife, Kathryn, 212 N. Oak St., Falls Church, a son, Raymond, four daughters, Kathleen Dunham, Laureen, Ann and Maureen, and a brother.

Hummel. Dr. Arthur W. Hummel, Sr., former Asian studies historian for the Library of Congress and father of Ambassador to Ethiopia Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., died on March 10, at Montgomery General Hospital. He is also survived by another son, Sharman of Milwaukee, and 10 grandchildren.

Olson. Waldemar A. Olson, FSO-retired, died on March 8, in Phoenix, Arizona. Mr. Olson joined the Foreign Service in 1947 after serving as a colonel in the Army and served at Sydney, Taipei, Singapore, Bern, Vientiane, Djakarta, Tokyo, Seoul and Beirut before his retirement in 1968. He is survived by his wife, Maisie ("Mooks"), of 10421 White Mountain Rd., Sun City, Ariz. 85351.

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- ☐ CHRYSLER CORDOBA
- ☐ CHRYSLER
- ☐ CHRYSLER IMPERIAL

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State_____ Zip_____

EXPORT DIVISION CHRYSLER CORPORATION