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# FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

JUNE 1975: Volume 52, No. 6

**Notes from Franklin Park** 4
P. B.

**Foreign Policy Making in a New Era: The Challenge of Multilateral Diplomacy, Part I** 10
RICHARD N. GARDNER

**Will Candor Survive the Leaking Ship of State?** 15
JOHN SYLVESTER, JR.

**Humanity in Government** 17
LOUIS J. HALLE

**From Youth to Middle Age** 20
EDWARD DEVOL

**"You Could Have Them in Tears"** 23
WILLIAM A. KRAUSS

DEPARTMENTS

**Editorials** 2

**The Bookshelf** 25

**Letters to the Editor** 33

**AFSA News** 34

COVER: Zaria, by Richard F. Wolford

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# FSJ EDITORIAL

## LOSING

THE VIETNAM WAR is over. The causes of the war, its meaning in history and the future consequences for American foreign policy have already been well debated, and we will not dwell on them here. The end of American involvement in Vietnam has nevertheless been a cause of immediate concern first for practical and then for professional reasons:

(1) As the situation in Vietnam deteriorated, AFSA became increasingly concerned for the safety of American Foreign Service personnel, and on several occasions expressed to the Department at very high levels our view that American personnel should not become hostages for a bankrupt policy line, and that the Department should move first to get dependents and then employees out as quickly as possible.

(2) AFSA has long considered itself as the "friend in Washington" of Foreign Service locals. We do not come by this role by any legal mandate, but over the years, the Association has taken a number of steps on behalf of local employees. Before the fall of Danang, we pressed the three agencies to take an active role in assuring that Foreign Service locals were evacuated quickly if they wished to be. We then remained in close contact to monitor the situation, and have recently had useful discussions, particularly with State and USIA, on means to alleviate the problems of former locals now in refugee camps. We have written the Secretary and Senator Sparkman and Congressman Morgan, urging them to give careful consideration to the urgent need for emergency assistance to former locals, and pointing out the heavy moral obligation we believe the United States bears to those who took risks on our behalf.

(3) While mainly concerned with the physical safety of Foreign Service personnel, we have been closely involved in discussions with the Agencies to determine what happens to assignments, training, shipment of effects, and other practical consequences of the rapid pull-out and have made a number of a suggestions which the Agencies adopted. On the whole, we think the Agencies have handled these questions fairly well, though we were horrified—but not surprised—to learn that AID's initial reaction was to suggest a "Saigon RIF."

(4) We are deeply concerned that the President's plea to avoid recriminations is being ignored in some quarters. We have already seen one vicious article in the New York TIMES and another almost as bad in TIME magazine which attack individuals in the Foreign Service. That these attacks happened to come from the left is irrelevant; the attacks from the right are almost certain to follow in short order. While we have already protested this first round of insults, we in the Service should not have any illusions; the problem probably will not become serious, but it might.

(5) Finally, while this nation's interests will be ill served by another "China Hands" debacle, it does not mean that we should pretend that Vietnam never existed. The career service left behind in Vietnam a record of dedication and sacrifice, and in many cases, of courageous reporting and responsible dissent. Yet as an institution, we also made mistakes. AFSA believes a careful post mortem of the Vietnam era will be useful to the nation, and that the career service can contribute greatly to that process. We would welcome ideas on how that might best be done.

## WINNING

DURING THIS SAME MONTH, as we were busy with our deep concerns over Vietnam, with our testimony before the Murphy Commission, and before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, we received some very good news. On May 6, Judge Chaitovitz, in a landmark decision (news of which hit page 2 of the Washington POST) ruled in AFSA's favor that AID had engaged in a series of "Unfair Practices" in its conduct of the RIF.

The matter is hardly a trivial one. AID is in deep trouble. Over two hundred career Foreign Service personnel have already gone off the rolls as a direct result of the RIF. Hundreds more have resigned or retired, with the threat of a RIF clearly a factor in the decisions of many. Another hundred are already in receipt of RIF letters, and probably two to three hundred more may face the same fate. In all, the AID RIF constitutes a blood-letting on an enormous scale, a one-time dismissal (actual or impending) of career personnel in less than one year greater than the *total* number of FSOs and FSIOs selected out by State and USIA since the end of the war.

The Judge, in his ruling, found that AID had refused to consult in good faith as required by the Executive Order, and had deliberately misled the Association by misrepresenting a key fact in our negotiations. In his recommendation to the Employee Management Relations Commission, he proposed as a remedy that AID cease its unfair practices, provide AFSA henceforth with information needed to bargain, scrap certain of its RIF procedures, and sit down and bargain new ones with us. If anyone would not be RIFed under those new procedures, who was terminated under the old ones which were found to be defective, AID would be obligated to take the individuals back with back pay.

Before we celebrate too much, we should bear in mind that this decision must be upheld by the EMRC, and that what was at issue was the procedures followed by AID, particularly its failure to consult in good faith, but not AID's right to conduct a RIF. In the last analysis, a shrinking Agency must reduce personnel, though we have pointed out to AID on several occasions that there were alternatives to a RIF which were more humane, less drastic and more in the interests of AID's Foreign Service personnel.

Leaving this caution aside, it was a sweet victory. AID had been caught red-handed by AFSA and was found guilty by the Judge on all counts. The Agency is now on notice that failure to live up to its obligations under the Executive Order will not be tolerated, that it may not deliberately mislead or lie to the Association in bargaining, and that before the Agency makes changes in personnel policies and procedures, it must consult with AFSA.

We hope this decision will usher in new, more cooperative, more productive relationships between AID and its employees. If that happens, AFSA, for its part, will be delighted. We do not relish all-out confrontation, even though this decision proved that we can win in that mode if we need to to protect the interests of the Service. But we would greatly prefer to work more closely with the Agency to try to find solutions to some of AID's extremely serious problems.


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# Notes from Franklin Park

P. B.

GRAY-BOTTOMED clouds are scudding over Rosslyn, patches of clear evening air between them. I ride the bus into Virginia. It has been a sparkling Monday in Washington, the last of September. The weather has buoyed us all. I met the Chief at noon outside the Department, exuberant in the sunny air—rare mood for the Chief, oppressed with office cares.

Seventeen years ago when we first came to live here, we lived in a small apartment in Arlington. I rode home evenings on the bus composing bitter sonnets. I was not reconciled to the paving of the countryside, the sprouting of apartments out of little farms. Now I am older. Still not reconciled; but the farms are a generation gone. Meanwhile I have seen the world, spent thirteen of the seventeen years abroad. To what end? said Yeats's Irish airman; those that he guarded he did not love.

That is not true for me. I am glad to be back in America and (I say to myself on the bus) we are still a good people. Yet sometimes I would rather have lived in

*P. B. is a Foreign Service officer now assigned to the Department and a frequent contributor to the* JOURNAL.


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America eighty or ninety years ago. We are good, but things that we loved are ruined. What did Whymper say after the Matterhorn? Never glad confident morning again. And now clouds are gathering, but not heroic ones: sheer catastrophe on one side, simple smog on the other. I am not reconciled.


But my little part of Virginia fully reconciles me to evening, as I walk home from the bus up the road through Franklin Park, shaded in oaks and tulip trees, fine straight American trees a hundred feet high. And so to dinner with my wife, four children, and a loving black dog. After dinner two of us walk out into the night, down the roads with the dog. Within my lifetime, indeed when I first visited Washington with my father in 1937, at five years old, this must have been still an utterly peaceful wooded place, just six miles west of Key Bridge. For forty years the little trains ran through here on the Old Dominion Railroad, taking Washington people to their modest weekend houses under the tulip trees and oaks. We did not come out here to Franklin Park in 1937, my father and I, but I know how it looked. The tulip trees and weekend houses are still here, and even though many more houses have been built and the railroad has long been a highway, it is still a quiet place, green in the day and sweet-smelling under the trees at night.

That spring my father and I took the overnight steamer from Washington to Norfolk on the Old Bay Line. It was a noble ride, gliding down the Potomac past Mount Vernon in the evening. In Norfolk we stayed with my aunt and uncle who had a little house and seven acres of woods on a tidal creek, a green place like Franklin Park until the bulldozers tore through it for a freeway, ten years ago. A little piece of me, destroyed. How can you reminisce about what is now six lanes of traffic? So I am not reconciled at all, despite quiet evening. I am only older, and memories longer.

But morning is wiser than evening. It is Sunday, October the sixth, and my wife and I walked the dog this morning down the roads of Franklin Park. The leaves are beginning to turn yellow high up on the tulip trees, and the dogwoods are rusty red. The crows caw, the mockingbirds sing pretty songs, and on our sundeck a pair of tufted titmice come take the birdseed, timidly, when the squirrels and dog are not around. Again we are having blue skies. The week began cold but the weekend is almost summery—our first American autumn in eight years. It reminds me of Octobers in Rome, of picnics at Etruscan ruins in Lazio, sandwiches and wine in meadows so full of *mentuccia* that we crushed it as we sat, making a wild mint smell in the air around us.

Or of cloudless October Sundays sitting on top of a rocky ridge in the Monti Lepini, five thousand feet above the sea hazy in the west, the Gran Sasso white with early snow in the east. Of that most perfect day, eight thousand feet up on Monte Velino, the October woods so far below us that they looked like rusty lichen, no sound but our own happy sighs on the mountaintop, two men and two boys.

Now at noon I drive down to Chain Bridge. I park the car, run across the bridge, on the far side walk down the stairs, and then I run two miles west on the Canal towpath, and two miles east again. There are five other runners with Georgetown University shirts, and many walkers, and scores of cyclists. Americans are slowly learning

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
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to do these things again. But very slowly.

I am forty-two years old and I cannot yet envisage being so old that I am ready to die. But I perhaps *begin* to envisagé this. I wonder if I will have any wisdom to give away, when I reach that point. We do not pay much attention to old people now, and old people know this and dry up. In our Service the maximum retirement age is sixty, and one can retire at fifty; very few people stay till sixty. They talk about second careers, and go off to do some marginal thing—to teach perhaps, to represent some small foundation—and they dry up, and die.

Well, we all die. What is sad is that no one really wants to keep our senior officers. We say that there are too many of them, that we need to make room for the up-and-comers. It is a little like saying that we have no need of wisdom. For wisdom, if it comes, comes only with age and experience. But our older men know they are superfluous and so they go wooden, not wise. I do not know if such trends are reversible. I would like to ask my father, but he wore out his heart with business troubles and died at fifty-eight.

I do not think I will wear out my heart with business troubles; I am one of the boys who thinks of retirement at fifty. I won't do it, though, not with a five-year-old to raise and educate. I wouldn't want to work any more if I retired, anyway. Rather I would go be a mountain hiker. To live somewhere in a village under mountains —Apennines or Dolomites would do fine, so would the Green Mountains or western Virginia—and spend my days as a skinny geezer on a sunny trail, with my wife and some hound dog.

THE DAY after Christmas I sat in the Department cafeteria with my friend S., looking out at a sunny cold courtyard and dawdling over coffee, postponing our return to bureaucracy. S. had an intimation that he might be sent to Africa again. After two tours there he wondered if it wasn't time to serve in Europe instead. On the other hand, he liked Africa, the particular job in question was a good one, and if he went he might be able to write his book on a great African explorer.

We began talking of adventure, and explorers, and writing. S. had served at a Consulate in the Congo, and traveled to places few Americans or Europeans visited even now in the 1970s. Tropics for me meant Panama, and I had made some adventurous trips there fifteen years ago. Then I had had two years in the Soviet Union and visited the Baltic and Armenia and Siberia and a lot of other rare places besides. In Italy I had spent happy weekends hiking in the mountains. Our last post before coming home had been Prague, and I had roamed with family and dog through Bohemia's woods and meadows, and through Slovakia's mountains, too.

Now I was in my forties and not too far from another birthday, if I avoided traffic and cancer and the other threats to sedentary man. I told S. that despite a life abroad it seemed to me that I had not had the adventures I once dreamed of, as a boy. Flying to Yakutsk in an old Il-12 might not be luxury travel, but it had been a thousand times easier than John Ledyard's trip to Yakutsk two centuries before. And a thousand times easier, too, than Sven Hedin's two-year trip overland


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"Had we lived, I should have had a tale to tell of the hardihood, endurance, and courage of my companions which would have stirred the heart of every Englishman. These rough notes and our dead bodies must tell the tale." — Robert Falcon Scott's Journal.

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from Russia to Peking in the 1890s, through unknown Sinkiang and Northern Tibet. S. had never heard of Hedin. I told him what I remembered from Hedin's "Through Asia," which I read as escapist literature my first year in Panama, trying to forget the heat. What I mainly remembered were Hedin's attempts on an 8000-meter mountain in Sinkiang, and his discovery of ancient wooden cities in the Sinkiang desert, and his trek along a chain of great mountain-backed salt lakes no white man had ever seen before, in North Tibet. S. thought the possibilities for adventure were minimal today. Neil Armstrong was a great adventurer, to be sure, but there was a difference from old times; he had ridden, not walked or climbed, and with a hundred thousand people behind him measuring, advising, monitoring.

I came back to my office thinking I might write a Book of Modern Heroes. I would start with Whymper and Tyndall on the Matterhorn and Weisshorn in the 1850s, and then progress through chapters on Stanley and Hedin and Shackleton and Scott down, perhaps, to Maurice Herzog on Annapurna. But not Neil Armstrong, though glory be to him. Not Hillary, either—he used an oxygen mask.

THE SPRING has come, bringing promotion to some of us, the excitement of impending transfer to others (S. is going to Oslo), and the time of azaleas, spring fever, and income tax to all. I have not started on my Book of Heroes. Perhaps I never will. What tempts me now as I turn lazy, is the thought of writing a novel about a Czech I never knew, caretaker of a castle in Northern Bohemia. I see him clearly in my mind. He is a man who fled the drab bureaucracy of invaded Prague, hired by the Academy of Sciences to take over a castle on the edge of a wooded hill. The castle is a short walk beyond a village at the end of a minor road lined with untended apple trees, sufficiently far from Soviet garrisons and the demands of conformity in the capital. Life is very quiet there. He takes care of the precious castle library, visited occasionally by scholars from Prague or, very rarely, Germany—for it is the collection of centuries of German-speaking counts. He hikes (I like to think) in the beech woods, and with his wife and son gathers blueberries in the pine woods, and picnics Sundays in the meadow by the Bronze Age fort. He looks at the sweet country and takes a long view, thinking of the first farmers who came to Bohemia six thousand years ago; of the poet Macha who hiked through here, and his Byronic poems; of some distant happy future for the Czechs. And they survive, he and his wife and child, until now, despite horrors, despite possibilities of a final holocaust worse than any invader.

This is not adventure. Hedin and Herzog have gone a-glimmering. But is this stuff for a novel? It takes energy to write a novel. I will not decide now. Anyway I would not mention holocausts. One does not write of holocausts in novels, in Franklin Park, in spring. ■


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## Part I

## FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN A NEW ERA

# THE CHALLENGE OF MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY

RICHARD N. GARDNER

THERE ARE many possible ways to organize the United States government for the conduct of foreign policy. The choice between them will be influenced by the personalities of the President and his principal collaborators, but it should also reflect the nation's basic foreign policy priorities.

The ultimate objective of United States foreign policy is to promote the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the American people. It is increasingly clear that this objective can only be achieved in an international environment congenial to American interests. At the end of the Second World War the United States sought to promote such an environment by creating an institutionalized world order based on the United Nations, the Bretton Woods organizations and GATT. With the onset of the Cold War, the focus of American foreign policy became the creation of a new balance of power to contain the Soviet Union and Communist China. In the thirty years since World War II, "balance of power politics" and "world order politics" have contended for supremacy in US foreign policy-making, with the former steadily gaining ground over the latter.

The capacity of the United States government to promote the "life, liberty and pursuit of happiness" of the American people still requires the maintenance of a power balance. But the greatest threat to our future security and welfare lies in the disintegration of the international order. We talk of a "structure of peace," yet seldom in history have so many existing structures fallen apart. The United Nations system of collective security has broken down, the Bretton Woods financial system has broken down, the GATT system of open and non-discriminatory trade has broken down, the established arrangements for supplying the world's food and energy needs have broken down, the traditional law of the sea has broken down, and essential arrangements for population control and environmental protection have yet to be created.

As the world enters the last quarter of the 20th century, it is more than ever necessary for the United States to re-examine its foreign policy priorities. In this decisive quarter century, the survival of human civilization as we have known it will depend on mankind's capacity to fashion a new international order—specifically, on improved international arrangements to cope with such interrelated problems as population, food, environment, energy, mass poverty, unemployment, inflation and depression, social and political instability, proliferating nuclear and conventional weapons and escalating terrorism and international conflict.

The collapse of the international order cannot be blamed on the United States or any single nation or group of nations. The clash of ideologies, the multiplication of sovereign states, the intensification of nationalism, the drastic changes in the economic balance, the revolutionary changes in science and technology—these developments have combined to shatter the old order before we have been able to build a new one. The United States has been neglectful of "world order politics," but the record of most other countries has been as bad or worse.

Yet the responsibility of the United States is a special one. Vietnam and "covert operations" notwithstanding, the concept of a community of nations working within a framework of law to promote security, welfare and human rights is an important part of the American tradition. The US contribution—political, economic, scientific and managerial—remains absolutely essential to the building of a global order. The creation of new international structures to replace the collapsing old ones will be impossible in the absence of United States leadership.

The recommendations that follow are based on the premise that the central preoccupation of United States foreign policy from now on must be the building of effective international machinery to manage mankind's common problems. Unfortunately, in a divided world of competitive nation-states, we cannot dispense entirely with "balance of power politics" in favor of "world order politics." But we will need to demonstrate the same degree of commitment to "world order politics" that we have demonstrated to "balance of power politics" if we are to have any hope that the latter will one day prove unnecessary.

A commitment of this kind has been notably lacking in recent Administrations, both Republican and Democratic, despite much use of "world order" rhetoric. US foreign

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*. . . it concentrated vast power in the White House in the hands of one individual, limited the accountability to Congress of key foreign policy decision-makers, and undermined the effectiveness of the Department of State.*

policy has favored short-term considerations over long-term interests, bilateral diplomacy over multilateral institution-building, and political and military responses over economic and functional cooperation. To mention but one example of distorted priorities, we spent thousands of lives and billions of dollars in defense of "national security" in Vietnam, while neglecting the much greater threat to national security from our growing dependence on Middle East oil.

The suggestions in this paper for reforming Executive Branch foreign policy-making arrangements are designed for a new era of international institution-building to give mankind a safe passage into the 21st century. In this new era the President, the Secretary of State and the heads of the major executive departments will need to give continuing attention to a range of neglected institutional questions:

- What international problems (e.g., access to supplies, inflation/depression, the spread of nuclear capabilities, direct broadcasting from satellites) require new or strengthened international rules and institutions?
- In developing such rules and institutions, which countries are the appropriate participants (e.g., how do we strike a balance between universality and effectiveness)?
- What voting and other decision-making arrangements are needed to take account of national sovereignty and of the differing capabilities of members to implement decisions?
- What are the best methods for creating and revising international rules (e.g., can we make greater use of independent experts in place of highly politicized international conferences)?
- What are the best arrangements for interpreting the international rules (ICJ, specialized tribunals, mediation, fact-finding, etc.)?
- What rewards and punishments can be used to secure compliance from parties to international agreements and to encourage necessary cooperation from non-parties?
- How do we assure a better coordination of the proliferating number of regional and functional bodies?
- What can be done to improve the administration of international institutions and enhance the efficiency and independence of the international staff?
- How can the United States concert its policy more effectively on multilateral issues with its Atlantic and Pacific allies, with its former enemies in Moscow and Peking, with the new financial powers in the OPEC group, and with the countries of the developing world?

The proposals in this paper are based on the assumption that the President, the Secretary of State and the heads of the main executive departments will regard these as important questions the solution of which is vital to the survival of the United States. If that assumption is correct, the recommendations that follow can make a difference; if it is not, they will be quite irrelevant.

## Basic Elements in Executive Branch Leadership

Since the Second World War, the United States has tried three main approaches to organizing the Executive Branch for the making of foreign policy:

- One approach has been to put the main responsibility for the making of foreign policy in the hands of the President's National Security Adviser. This system, employed from 1969 to 1973, facilitated some significant breakthroughs in bilateral diplomacy. But it concentrated vast power in the White House in the hands of one individual, limited the accountability to Congress of key foreign policy decision-makers, and undermined the effectiveness of the Department of State. It seems particularly inappropriate for an era in which economic and functional questions will share the center of the diplomatic stage with political and security questions. No one individual can handle all of these questions and assure a fair balancing of the viewpoints of all interested Executive agencies and domestic interest groups.
- A second approach has been to combine in one man the offices of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. This arrangement, as we are currently witnessing, has the advantage of giving the State Department a powerful leadership role and of assuring accountability to Congress. But it concentrates even more power in one person. It may be imperfectly suited to an era of multilateral diplomacy, when the President will need strong inputs from other Executive Departments, particularly on economic and functional questions.
- A third approach has been to combine a strong Secretary of State with one or more individuals in the White House performing tasks of interdepartmental coordination. This system, employed during the Truman and Eisenhower Adminis-

trations, may avoid the pitfalls of the other two, but it carries the risk of conflict between the White House staff and the State Department and uncertainty as to the respective functions of both.

Looking toward the future, and bearing in mind that these arrangements must inevitably be tailored to the President's personality and operating style, the following may be a useful compromise between the second and third approaches:

1. Continue the present system under which the Secretary of State serves also as the President's National Security Adviser, but restrict the scope of the NSC to political-military issues.

2. For all other aspects of foreign policy, employ a series of *ad hoc* groups chaired by the Secretary of State, with responsibility for relating these groups to one another and to relevant aspects of "domestic" policy vested in a senior member of the White House staff outside the NSC mechanism.

There are signs that the Executive Branch may already be moving in the direction of such a compromise arrangement. In contrast to several years ago, the NSC is no longer used for the coordination of policy in economic and functional areas. The Council for International Economic Policy, established in 1971, has fallen into disuse, for the very good reason that different issues in foreign economic policy require different groups of people to deal with them. What we now see emerging are a number of interdepartmental groups to deal with specific questions—an "international energy review group," and "international food review group," etc.

For this system to work effectively, there should be a senior member of the White House staff with responsibility for relating these international functional activities both to one another and to United States domestic policies. In effect, this position would be the counterpart to the National Security Adviser, and might be called Assistant to the President for Economic and Multilateral Affairs. It would not be desirable to have this function performed by the Secretary of the Treasury, as was the case in the early 1970s, or by any other cabinet officer; that would "tilt" policy too much in the direction of an executive department with strong domestic interests. The individual should have an exclusively White House role so that he can serve as a disinterested coordinator of the *ad hoc* international groups with the interdepartmental councils outside the NSC (Economic Policy Council, Domestic Council, etc.).

The compromise proposed above is designed to establish the Department of State as the "lead" agency for the making and execution of foreign policy, while recognizing that "foreign policy" today has many functional components (e.g., energy, food, money) which are inextricably bound up with domestic policy. That is why it gives the Secretary of State control of the NSC machinery but restricts that machinery to political and security matters. Other foreign policy questions would be dealt with by interdepartmental groups chaired by the Secretary of State and coordinated by a senior White House assistant with responsibilities in the domestic area.

### Three Special Problems

Three special problems arise in any attempt to assert the State Department's role as the "lead" agency in the field of foreign economic policy—the State-Treasury relationship, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the Office of the President's Special Trade Representative (STR).

Close and harmonious relations between State and Treasury are clearly essential. In addition, the time has come for one admittedly controversial change in their respective responsibilities. The Treasury Department is not only in charge of United States participation in the International Monetary Fund, but also of United States participation in the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Development Association, and other international development institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank. Recently, the Treasury took the initiative in creating a new IMF/IBRD Development Committee composed of 20 Finance Ministers. Given the central importance of economic development to United States foreign policy, it would seem more appropriate to confine the Treasury's role to participation in the IMF, transferring to State the responsibility for managing United States participation in all institutions concerned with economic development assistance, including the IBRD and the new Development Committee.

A further step in the centralization of responsibility for multilateral development activity would be the abolition of the Agency for International Development. The maintenance of AID as a separate entity within the Executive Branch could be justified at a time when the United States was carrying on a substantial bilateral aid program backed by strong Congressional and public support. That time has obviously passed, and there are powerful international as well as domestic reasons for transferring all US development assistance through multilateral institutions. To the extent that the United States maintains a bilateral aid program for political and security reasons, it can best be administered by those parts of the government responsible for the promotion of those interests. If AID were abolished, its responsibilities for bilateral aid could be transferred to the regional bureaus of the Department of State, and its backstopping of OECD/DAC and of UN technical aid programs could be transferred to State's Bureau of International Organization Affairs, as suggested in the following section.

A case can also be made for transferring from STR to State the responsibility for managing US trade negotiations and participation in GATT. However, the Congress has repeatedly made it clear that it does not trust the Department of State to carry on trade negotiations. The maintenance of STR is a better option than vesting this responsibility in Commerce or Treasury, since these agencies would tend to conduct negotiations with primary regard to domestic concerns and with inadequate attention to US interests in the development of strong international trade institutions. A more effective State-STR partnership could be established, however, through some of the recommendations which follow relating to the Geneva Mission and a new personnel system.

### The Department of State

At the risk of repetition, it should be emphasized again that the new kind of foreign policy called for at the beginning of this paper requires a strong Secretary of State who considers the building of multilateral machinery for the management of global problems a central task of US foreign policy. Without a leader totally committed to multilateralism in deed as well as word, willing to delegate complex tasks of institution-building to outstanding subordinates, the Department of State will not be able to play its proper role as the lead agency for the US government in the construction of a better world order.

If this condition is fulfilled, there are a number of organizational changes that could substantially improve the performance of the Department of State. Of all these changes the most important is to create a better arrangement for the direction of multilateral policy-making on the seventh floor of the Department. The Secretary of State, however committed he may be to the multilateral approach, will have to spend much of his time on crisis management and on relations with Congress and the press. The Deputy Secretary will bear a heavy burden of managing the Department. What is needed, therefore, is sustained leadership for "world order business" at the Under Secretary level.

To achieve this leadership, some have proposed the creation of an Under Secretary of State for Multilateral Affairs to work on the seventh floor alongside the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. This proposal has the merit of simplicity, but it runs counter to the central objective of building multilateralism into the political and economic arms of US foreign policy. Much of our international political effort is, and more of it ought to be, carried out through multilateral institutions such as NATO, OAS and the UN. Much of our foreign economic policy is, and more of it ought to be, carried out through multilateral institutions such as OECD, GATT and the agencies of the UN system. An Under Secretary for Multilateral Affairs would be outside the central stream of decision-making supervised by the other Under Secretaries. Given the close relation between bilateral and multilateral affairs, he would be constantly involved in insoluble jurisdictional disputes.

A better way of achieving leadership at the Under Secretary level would be to assign responsibility for multilateral political and military affairs to the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and responsibility for all the rest of multilateral activity to the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. It may be argued that existing arrangements tend to approximate this objective, but this is really not the case. The political Under Secretary does not have responsibility for developing an overall US strategy toward conflict management through NATO, OAS, and the UN. The economic Under Secretary does not have responsibility for all the multilateral economic areas (development aid as well as finance and trade) or for all the related multilateral functional areas (energy, food, environment, population, oceans, science and technology).

What is here proposed, therefore, is that the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, in addition to his existing responsibilities, should have an explicit mandate to oversee and coordinate the work of the multilateral political divisions of the Department (IO/UNP, EUR/RPM, and ARA/USOAS), while the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, in addition to supervising the work of the EB bureau, should have explicit authority to oversee and coordinate all the other work of IO, of EUR/RPE, of ARA/ECP, and of the new Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science (OES). In addition, and this is of central importance, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs would inherit the responsibilities of the Administrator of AID.

It must be admitted that this proposal concentrates enormous power and responsibility in the economic Under Secretary, but this seems unavoidable if the Department of State, and the whole United States Government, is to develop a coherent policy in all the different functional areas which are increasingly linked in international negotiations. The issues of money, trade, investment and development are increasingly related to one another and are now related in turn to those of food, energy, environment, oceans, science and technology. This seems obvious enough to be a cliché—yet it is not yet reflected in US policy-making. To take two recent examples, the US delegation to the Bucharest Conference was not well prepared to deal with population in its larger development context, and the US positions in the Law of the Sea Conference do not take sufficient account of the enormous significance that revenue-sharing from seabed exploitation of oil and hard minerals could have for the future of the international development system.

To exercise the new responsibilities here proposed, the political and economic Under Secretaries should each have a special assistant for multilateral affairs with the responsibility for insuring that the substantive policies and institutional arrangements proposed by the various State Department bureaus and by other federal agencies are mutually consistent and serving a coherent long-term strategy for international order.

The political and economic Under Secretaries should be invested with the further responsibility of serving as the *alter egos* of the Secretary of State in dealing with other federal agencies in the multilateral as well as the bilateral areas of their respective concern. Where necessary they would chair the NSC and other mechanisms for the coordination of Executive Branch policy in place of the Secretary of State and they would be encouraged to deal directly with the President in place of the Secretary of State when he was unavailable. A formal Executive Order, coupled with an appropriate White House announcement, would help dramatize this new commitment to multilateralism and would make these senior positions more attractive for men of outstanding talent.

Finally, as part of these new "seventh floor" arrangements, it would be desirable to change the name of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs to Under Secretary of State for Economic and Multilateral Affairs, in recognition of his new and broader responsibilities for subjects like energy, food, environment, population, oceans and science. It would help the new Under Secretary to

discharge these varied responsibilities with other government departments if he were elevated to the number three position in the Department of State ahead of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs who now outranks him. It may seem a small point, but the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs was the third-ranking officer of the Department for most of the postwar period until very recently. The elevation of the new Under Secretary for Economic and Multilateral Affairs to third place in the Department's hierarchy would help to manifest our new concern with this vital area of international affairs.

**The Bureau of International Organization Affairs**

These new arrangements at the Under Secretary level would not in any way reduce the importance of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Quite the contrary, IO's position has deteriorated over the years partly because it has not had the political "clout" to assert the multilateral interest at the highest levels of decision-making. Under the arrangements here proposed, it would have two "champions" on the seventh floor who could work for better multilateral policies not only in the State Department but throughout the Federal Government.

To be sure, some foreign governments manage to dispense with any equivalent of our Bureau of International Organization Affairs, but these are mostly governments that tend to view multilateral institutions as having little importance—as marginal adjuncts to bilateral diplomacy. The weight of these countries in international institutions is not as great as that of the United States, whose political, economic, scientific and intellectual input is usually crucial for the success of any multilateral enterprise. Nor do these countries have any real commitment to make "world order business" a central element in their foreign policy.

Given the special place of the United States in the international institutional system, there is need of a central place in the Department of State which can (1) determine, in cooperation with other appropriate bureaus and agencies, the day-to-day US policies in international institutions (outside the special regional institutions within the purview of EUR and ARA); (2) decide upon US participation in international programs and conferences and on the level of US contributions; (3) assure that US foreign policy is conducted in harmony with the requirements of the UN Charter and other multilateral commitments and programs; (4) review and evaluate the effectivness of international organizations and develop a coherent long-term US strategy for strengthening them; and (5) serve as a focal point for communicating with US delegations to international organizations and conferences and assure that the US government speaks in them with one voice. Without a Bureau of International Organization Affairs, it is hard to see how these essential functions could be effectively performed.

One obstacle to the effective performance of IO's role at the present time is the dispersal of authority between IO and AID for US participation in the multilateral development activities of the UN system. With the abolition of AID, responsibility for multilateral development programs would be transferred to IO and responsibility for bilateral aid to the regional bureaus. If, as suggested earlier, State were also to assume Treasury's responsibilities for managing US participation in the IBRD/IDA and the Regional Development Banks, IO would be the logical place to exercise these functions, working in close cooperation with EB and the regional bureaus. At last there would be one central place in the US Government where policy could be shaped on all varieties of multilateral development assistance—technical aid, pre-investment aid and the transfer of capital on concessional terms. The function of coordinating US policy in international development institutions, which the Congress assigned last year to AID, would henceforth be performed in IO.

In recent years, it must be admitted, IO has had a declining role in the shaping of policy on substantive issues. On the majority of items at issue in the UN system—whether disarmament, the Middle East, trade, development, food, environment, population or oceans—IO has become mainly a procedural channel to communicate policies established elsewhere. This is in contrast to the situation that existed at key periods in the '40s, '50s and '60s, when the Bureau was able to shape US policy with special regard to US interests in international institution-building.

Clearly IO must look to the regional and functional bureaus of the State Department and to other Executive agencies for the primary input into most of the items that come before the General Assembly, the Security Council, ECOSOC, the Specialized Agencies, and other parts of the UN system. What IO can and should do, however, is to review and adapt these policies in the light of overall US interests in the development of more effective international institutions.

The decision made several years ago to establish Agency Directorates in IO for specialized areas of UN activity was a step toward more effective policy-making, since it did away with the artificial separation that previously existed between responsibility for UN agency programs in the Office of Economic and Social Affairs (OES) and responsibility for UN agency budgets in the Office of International Administration (OIA). But for the system of Agency Directorates to work effectively, these key positions must be filled by people who combine technical competence in the specialized area with an understanding of multilateral diplomacy. The practice of seconding people from other Executive Departments for these positions satisfies the former requirement, but only rarely the latter. Foreign Service officers, on the other hand, are rarely suitable for these assignments—even if they are skilled in multilateral diplomacy, they seldom have the required expertise in agriculture, health, narcotics, science, etc. The more rational organizational structure which IO now has needs to be complemented by a much more fundamental reform to provide personnel with both specialized knowledge and multilateral competence. A proposal to this end is presented in the last section of this paper.

*Continued on page 29*

Trust not him with your secrets, who, when left alone
in your room, turns over your papers. — Johann Kaspar Lavater

# Will Candor Survive the Leaking Ship of State?

BY JOHN SYLVESTER, JR.

CANDOR WITHIN the government is at least as important for our country as government candor with the people. Good decisions in government depend on accurate and frank official reporting and straightforward use of expertise. In recent years the assault of critics on the government's failure to be candid with the public often used the weapon of classified government deliberations and documents which were disclosed without authorization. Ironically, but perhaps understandably, the reaction of officials to this is further inhibition on candor within government. Classified government communications on controversial aspects of our foreign affairs are blander or more closely held, and top officials are more reluctant to bring in specialists and staffs on decisions about sensitive matters of state.

This of course is not a new phenomena in our history. During the late '40s and early '50s, for instance, as China fell and war came to Korea, politicians hunted for "disloyal" and "bumbling" officials, and Foreign Service officers learned among other things that their reporting might soon end up in the public record and thus advisably should be politically propitious and discreet. But in this recent period of high emotion over our involvement in Vietnam, as critics and politicians searched among officials—"the best and the brightest"—for culprits to blame, large scale unauthorized revelations of classified documents and information developed into a major political tool. After its two most famous perpetrators, it perhaps should be termed the "Ellsberg-Anderson weapon." Their defenders might argue that true blame should be borne by President Johnson for dissembling and by President Nixon for outright lying.

As many officials, particularly younger ones, shared the strong feelings of protest on the war, reporters readily found sources within the ranks of government for accounts of what was happening. From Saigon to Washington leaks sprouted. The authorities struck back wth warnings to their staffs and designated appropriately tight-lipped press officers, but the press seemed able to ferret out all too much embarrassing information. Government security was unable to withstand the energy and interest of the reporters and the deep-seated concern of officials within the government about what was going on.

The most dramatic leak, that by Daniel Ellsberg, was more like a breaking of a dam. Government officials had long been lectured by security officers that their careers would be imperiled if they forgot to lock up a simple low grade classified document in their office at night. Feeling the American public deserved to see the record of its government's involvement in war, Ellsberg took a vast collection of the highest classified and most important documents on Vietnam and exposed them to the world. An appalled and flustered government fruitlessly set about trying to prosecute him for his monstrous violation of what were then exposed as equivocal security laws and regulations.

Even more disturbing to senior officials than this one massive disclosure of classified materials was the precedent Ellsberg offered for other discontented officials. Eager recipients for leaks ranged from the New York TIMES to RAMPARTS; the latter even obligingly printed a list of interested listeners and their telephone numbers. Jack Anderson is the most renowned of these, and his account of the high meeting which discussed a "tilt" towards Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan War was as disturbing a revelation as any for the administration. Anderson was given a memorandum recording in summary the most significant and colorful remarks of a group of senior officials discussing (they thought) confidentially what should be our policy towards that war. As with other forthright private remarks they were highly embarrassing when repeated to outsiders. Anderson has flatly defended his action, writing: "Under the license granted the press by the First Amendment, I have the right, and probably the duty, to expose government secrets."

A government increasingly insecure over its ability to preserve secrecy reacts to this by constricting the flow of information within government, or twisting the content. There are of course the usual inhibitions on candor in reporting which range from simple caution in writing about complex and unpredictable events, through intent on arguing a case for one kind of policy, to desire to accord with the political winds in Washington. Individual official's fears, ambitions, prejudices, and degrees of ignorance will inevitably warp reporting. But paranoia over disclosures has become a more significant factor.

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Its consequences are neither clear-cut nor uniform, but they are widespread and deleterious to the effective working of responsible government. They are visible in the following four reactions now seen within our foreign affairs establishment and undoubtedly in other parts of government.

The first is towards blander, more cautious official reporting. With an everpresent fear that the official report will be disclosed, the instinct is to write a report so that it will do no harm in the event it is disclosed. Removing harmful or embarrassing information or phrasing from a document to be released or given to another government is called in the jargon "sanitizing." The tendency now is to write original reports that are pre-sanitized. Descriptions of the warts on a friendly president or his regime are not mentioned. The personality sketch of a negotiating counterpart may well be designed so that he will not be offended if he reads it. Reports on the actions of the police of the local government might be prepared in such a way that they cannot be cited as evidence that the United States Government also knew of and thus could have approved of their questionable conduct. Controversial recommendations or views may be left out or presented with maximum subtlety. In other words, increasingly, supposedly analytical classified reports are written more like press releases. (Current official injunctions to keep classifications low *also* encourage this.) The problem, of course, is that officials have to base their judgments on such reporting. Although most Department of State and CIA reporting remains objective and unabridged, there is more now than before, particularly on controversial problems, that is not. To the extent that reporting is warped by the inclination to be bland and safe, the government's understanding of the world is compromised.

Second, the more sensitive reports and memoranda are distributed less widely. The view is that in this time of an underground of leaks and of a multitude of copying machines to facilitate this erosion of security, the fewer officials who read sensitive documents, the safer. Previously documents and reports were classified confidential, secret, or top secret so that the outside world would not know, but now it is considered of equal importance to label them additionally with an appropriate distribution control or channel indicators so that the lower ranks of government will not see them. They are stamped LIMDIS, EXDIS, or NODIS so that only a limited distribution, an exclusive distribution, or practically nobody but the top dog will see them. With the more important communications restricted to the minimum number of officials who "need to know," lesser officials and specialists increasingly do not know what their superiors know. Since they don't know, they have increasing difficulty in being of service to their bosses. They are not sure what to report themselves since their superiors may know it already, and they may look foolish. They are less educated on the current state of the action, so they are less able to come up with useful recommendations and less able to reinforce their superiors' bureaucratic efforts. Since they get less information routinely, they have to spend more effort trying to find out what is happening. (Like the public they may come to rely on the New York TIMES or Washington POST even on their own official concerns!) The gulf between the highly informed and extremely busy senior official and the less well informed and less involved staff grows wider.

A third reaction is for the senior officials to rely less on paper. An ambassador may telephone key messages to high Washington officials rather than commit himself in a telegram and vice versa. Since memos may stray, it is best not to record sensitive discussions. Although decisions must be implemented, and accordingly must go on paper in the form of outgoing instructions to the Ambassador or orders to the theater military commander, deliberations up to the point of decision are not put on paper. Rather than exchange memos with senior counterparts in other departments or agencies, the official feels it safer to discuss matters over lunch. No record need be kept for present or future embarrassment. There are drawbacks to this. A written memo recording the views of a senior official can be equally and impartially clear to all the subordinates who read it. They can act on it and consult the document again later for guidance. A verbal message relayed several times may change in form or substance. The subordinate may understand it wrong or in twisted form. There is no future record. The spoken words dissolve over time, and it is hard for concerned officials as well as historians to understand and use accurately what is not recorded on paper. (Historians may yet curse Messrs. Ellsberg and Anderson.) While the written document is certainly a mixed blessing for bureaucrats, it is still essential to the exercise of effective government.

A fourth and allied reaction is simply for senior government officials to do more on their own, isolated from their staffs. The staff officers are viewed as possibly inclined to leaking information and, as noted, increasingly ill-informed and thus less helpful. Since an official two or three layers down has been kept unaware of relevant but sensitive message traffic, he is of less use when critical matters arise. The specialists in turn are annoyed about being kept out of affairs of their professional concern, and accordingly more inclined to voice complaint about the thrust of bureaucratic action, and thus more dangerous if brought in when their expertise is needed. The top official is now more apt to write important instructions to the field on his own and more apt to participate in critical meetings without first seeking staff advice and background papers. Aside from resorting to bringing in outside assistants who are personally loyal, the extremely harassed senior people end up doing much more on their own, with less useful advice and candid reporting to rely on.

These four tendencies are not uniformly present within government and should not be exaggerated, but they certainly exist and are coalescing into an unfortunate trend.

Although these side effects of the leaks of secrets are not widely understood outside government there is probably, however, wider recognition that there is a basic dilemma between the principles of the need for an informed public and yet also

*Continued on page 32*

I bid him look into the lives of men as though into a mirror, and from others to take an example for himself. — Terence

# Humanity in Government




**LOUIS J. HALLE**

IN INTRODUCING a new edition of "Dream and Reality," first published fifteen years ago, I shall allow myself to do so in personal terms.

This book marks a watershed between the two professional careers into which my life has fallen. I was already middle-aged when, from being a foreign-office official, I became a professor.

Like any State Department official who begins at the bottom, I had originally been assigned to a narrow specialty as the expert who was expected to have all its details at his fingertips, who was required to keep watch on what happened within its bounds, and who could be called upon for expertise by the higher-ups. Partly, I surmise, because I was not good at this sort of thing, I found myself repeatedly "kicked upstairs"—until I ended with no specialty at all, concerned with the long-range development of American foreign policy as a whole. To be fair to myself and to those who found ways of removing me from each successive assignment along the way, my lack of aptitude for specialization was complemented by my disposition to think of foreign policy problems in large terms. I found myself able to see Bolivia only in terms of Latin America and Latin America only in terms of the world.

This disposition was finally given the fullest scope when, as a result of a benign conspiracy by former officials of the Department, now on the outside, I found myself liberated from government service and with all the time for study that twenty-four hours a day allowed. The result was "Dream and Reality."

Nothing had impressed me so much, during my years in the Department, as the difference between the view from inside and the view from outside. To state that difference in its crudest terms, without the qualification it should have, what those on the inside saw was a succession of dilemmas in which the only choice was among evils, while those on the outside saw only choice between right and wrong.

The ablest and most dedicated men I have ever known have been among those who, in my day at least, were on the inside—many of them men who, when public passion ran high, were widely identified as villains in the public eye.

Another poignant impression of my years on the inside was that the problems were too big even for the ablest men. The men had to base their decisions, perhaps involving the life and death of nations, on predictions of an unpredictable future and on estimates of present circumstances that were largely unknown. This is to say that they had to leap in the dark, and whoever does that repeatedly must sometimes come to grief.

A related impression is that the men in government are of the same human stock as the rest of us. Surely one ought to be able to take this for granted, but most of us seem to assume that public figures ought to be endowed with such mythic qualities as we attribute to the heroes of history. It does not always occur to us, for example, that as a matter of the most urgent necessity a high official may have to deal with more problems than anyone possibly could, read more papers than anyone could find time for, and assimilate more information than the human mind can hold. It does not always occur to us that he may experience physical or mental exhaustion—or just a headache. It does not always occur to us that he may be suffering from a sleepless night and from worry about a sick child at some moment when all his powers are required to deal with a critical turn of affairs. (When he comes to write his memoirs he will omit all these petty

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circumstances in order to associate himself, in the reader's mind, with the myth of the statesman's serene command over events.)

Although I have referred above to the ablest and most dedicated public servants, all the gradations of our common humanity are, after all, to be found in government. There is, in government, as high a proportion of unscrupulous opportunists as in any calling that attracts the ambitious, and such persons sometimes rise to the top. This, too, represents the deplorable state of affairs in which governments are necessarily staffed by people essentially like us, there being no other species to staff them.

It is easier and safer for a teacher to deal with the institutional arrangements and procedures of foreign relations than with the role of human nature. For the appreciation of human nature is subjective, its manifestations being neither quantifiable nor susceptible of scientific proof, so that any writer who claims to be purely scientific in his methodology and conclusions had better leave it out of account, even though he thereby sacrifices reality.

On the face of it, one might be able to deal scientifically with human nature in politics by basing oneself on the discipline of psychological science, adopting an interdisciplinary approach that puts that science under tribute. This proposition, however, makes it necessary to recognize the existence of a troublesome paradox. Perhaps I can best define that paradox in terms of the relation between diplomacy and psychology.

No personal attribute is more important to a diplomat than insight into human psychology, for he must be sensitive to what is going on in the minds of those with whom he negotiates and to the reactions that his own behavior may produce in them. Most of us, however, would hesitate to argue that such psychological sensitivity could be acquired by pursuing a graduate program of psychological studies. A man may be an excellent diplomat, infinitely subtle in his psychological perceptions, without ever having been exposed to academic psychology, and an excellent professor of psychology may be quite without the psychological sensitivity needed in diplomacy. There must be some distinction, then, between the formal learning and the intuitive insight, between academic knowledge and human awareness.

The distinction may lie in the difference between analysis and synthesis, between a knowledge of the parts and a grasp of the whole. Freud, the analyst, taking the human psyche apart, found in it such constituents as the id, the ego, and the superego. Neither Shakespeare nor Tolstoy knew about these constituents, but they manifested, nevertheless, an unsurpassed knowledge of human psychology in their portrayals of individuals who represent, as we all recognize, the most vivid human reality.

Shakespeare gave us Hamlet whole, and Freud later psychoanalyzed him as if he had been an actual man. Freud plumbed hidden depths of the human psyche that Shakespeare had portrayed to discover in those depths certain constituents which had been hidden. Shakespeare showed us a rounded and irreducible whole; Freud revealed some of its inner workings. While these two distinct approaches may be complementary, it is the irreducible whole that concerns the diplomat.

It concerns the historian as well. Indeed, the historian needs the same capacity for psychological insight as the diplomat. The man who writes an account of international politics must see a Bismarck or a Louis Napoleon as Shakespeare saw Julius Caesar, as Thucydides saw Pericles, as John Maynard Keynes saw Woodrow Wilson. An admirable example of the kind of psychological insight a historian needs occurs in Act II, Scene iii of "Antony and Cleopatra." It is Shakespeare's own judgment of the relationship between Mark Antony and Octavius Caesar, uttered by the soothsayer in reply to Antony's inquiry as to whether his own or Caesar's fortune shall rise higher:

*Caesar's.*
*Therefore, O Antony! stay not by his side;*
*Thy demon-that's thy spirit which keeps thee,-is*
*Noble, courageous, high, unmatchable,*
*Where Caesar's is not; but near him thy angel*
*Becomes a fear, as being o'erpowered; therefore*
*Make space enough between you . . .*
*If thou dost play with him at any game*
*Thou art sure to lose, and, of that natural luck,*
*He beats thee 'gainst the odds; thy lustre thickens*
*When he shines by. I say again, thy spirit*
*Is all afraid to govern thee near him,*
*But he away, 'tis noble.*

If I were charged with the education of diplomats or historians I would think it more important that they be made familiar with the humanistic classics of literature and art than that they be taught the findings of scientific psychology. I would think it more important for a historian to study the portraits of Holbein and Goya than to consult experts on the anatomy of the human head and the convolutions of the brain. (There is an element of self-satisfaction in Henry VIII, as Holbein portrayed him, that the historian should take into account; but it is less important for him to know the character of Henry's id.)

In writing this book, I emphasized the role of human nature, holistically conceived, in the behavior of nations generally, in the behavior of one nation in particular. Because I was only too conscious of sharing the basic human weaknesses of the persons I described, I was generally inclined to write about them with compassion, albeit with a compassion to which such irony as is justified by our common inadequacy was not alien.

IT IS CLEAR that I was more consistently sympathetic to the individual than to the collective manifestations of our human nature. A group is rarely as intelligent as the average of the individuals who compose it, and it is commonly less intelligent in its judgments than the least intelligent of its members. This paradox manifests itself most dangerously where issues that arouse public passion are involved. When we professors, for example, succumb to the sway of mob emotion and act accordingly, we dishonor ourselves as individuals and we betray our profession.

The most dangerous moments through which our nation has lived, perhaps, have been those during which important elements in our population, swept by such emotion, have given themselves up to the mindlessness of collective bigotry. In this book I had occasion

to recount a number of such moments. The wave of bigotry produced by the "Neutrality Proclamation," to which I have already referred, was followed by a return wave, in the other direction, which produced the Alien and Sedition Acts. At the time this book was being written, we Americans were just recovering from the wave of bigotry known as McCarthyism; and since its publication we have experienced, chiefly on our university campuses, the wave of bigotry associated with "the new left." (Each of these waves had a basis of partial truth in the circumstances to which it responded—but there is no such falsehood as a partial truth.) Such mass bigotry brought down the Athenian democracy, and our Founding Fathers, familiar with this history, warned against it. This, the most important theme of Washington's Farewell Address, was also the implicit theme of what proved to be Lincoln's own farewell address on the occasion of his Second Inaugural.

I do not concern myself here with the rights or wrongs of the issues associated with the waves of bigotry. They are irrelevant if one believes as I do that all bigotry, inhibiting the uses of the mind and its free expression, is abhorrent in itself, and that it is also dangerous, being inimical to the responsible conduct of public affairs.

Bigotry with respect to public affairs entails Manichaeism, which tends implicitly toward persecution and genocide. Manichaeism is what I refer to in this book as "the fallacy of the two species." It is the conception of a world divided between the good people and the wicked, a world in which all public frustrations and failures may be attributed to the machinations of the wicked species, a world that consequently can establish the good of the virtuous (ourselves) only by the permanent elimination of the wicked. So campaigns are launched against witches, against Jews, against Communists, against Fascists, against capitalist-imperialists, against aggressor nations.

Implicit in "Dream and Reality" is a plea for mutual toleration based on the recognition of our common humanity. Implicit in it is a plea for intellectual humility in the face of problems too big for the best of us.

*This innocence of ours, and the pharisaical morality to which it exposed us (see* Luke 18:1-14*), have had such terrible consequences for the Japanese, the Chinese, the Koreans, the Vietnamese, and ourselves as might properly have been the fruits of an unequivocal wickedness that, in fact, was not a determinant of our policy or a part of our character.*

REREADING this book fifteen years later, after the tragic culmination of a war in Southeast Asia, I am struck by a particular feature of the record that should cause us to engage in a course of national introspection. While the policy governing our transatlantic relations has been generally realistic and successful since 1945, the policy governing our transpacific relations has been consistently disastrous ever since 1898. We have shown ourselves traditionally wary of the Europeans across the Atlantic, regarded as powerful and sinister, but in our transpacific relations we have acted recklessly under the sway of myths that have had little correspondence to reality. From the earliest stage, we allowed ourselves to believe that the Chinese were a nation of childlike people who would be glad to have us make them over in our image (and clothe them, to boot, in the products of our textile mills), and after 1949 we allowed ourselves to believe that they had been kidnapped from under our noses by Stalin, acting through the agency of his puppet, Mao Tse-tung. This led us to suppose that the containment of Stalin's expanded empire necessarily included the containment of Mao's China.

In 1945 we took over responsibility for half of Korea, including its defense, without any appreciation of Korean history and culture, and without any appreciation of the strategic significance that the Korean Peninsula had had for a thousand years. Except during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, we never understood the nature of Japan's vital interests and what they implied for the security of Southeast Asia or the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. Consistently underestimating the nations that inhabited the mainland of eastern Asia, we overestimated our own power to arrange their affairs, as well as overestimating the wisdom we could bring to the exercise of such a responsibility. Traditionally aware of our weakness in dealing with the imperial powers of the Old World across the Atlantic, we thought we would have no difficulty in exercising a benevolent paternalism over the smiling Orientals. This innocence of ours, and the pharisaical morality to which it exposed us (see *Luke 18:1-14*), have had such terrible consequences for the Japanese, the Chinese, the Koreans, the Vietnamese, and ourselves as might properly have been the fruits of an unequivocal wickedness that, in fact, was not a determinant of our policy or a part of our character.

May we not now, at last, give thought to the lessons to be found in a chapter of history that begins with the opening up of Japan in the 1850s and, we must hope, ends with the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam in the 1970s?

BY THE PUBLICATION of this new edition, a book already fifteen years old is being given a new term of life. In spite of all the changes that our country and the world have undergone since 1959, its readers have found it relevant, still, to the 1970s. But the fact is that history never loses its relevance altogether because, as we learn from Thucydides, the political manifestations of human nature do not change in their fundamentals. In order, however, that history should not forever repeat its mistakes, we ought to study it and discuss it with a view to finding out what they are. ■

Public diplomacy is a central part of American foreign policy simply because the freedom to know is such an important part of America. — The Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations

# from youth to middle age

**EDWARD DEVOL**

FACT AND TRUTH are not always synonymous and that is why students of USIA should pay no attention to those who claim it was created by Reorganization Plan 8 of August 1, 1953.

That was only the christening and a delayed one at that, for the creature granted its own name in 1953 had been born three years earlier.

> *"It was in 1950 that an expanded overseas information program was signalled by President Truman when he initiated the 'Campaign of Truth' program. This resulted in the tripling of the State Department's International Information and Educational Exchange (USIE) program budget for fiscal year 1951."*
>
> **– USIA's 41st Semiannual Report to the Congress.**

The key words are "tripling of the. . .budget." In one stupendous shudder at the implications of the Korean War, Congress gave reality to the bureaucrat's dream — dazzling sums of money with which to carry out this vital mission for the nation. Imagine the effect of such sudden wealth today: the budget meetings, the head-scratching, the maneuvering to get slices of the fresh pie; the Solomon-like decisions required of top management.

Spending all that money was not easy. One obvious need was a vastly larger staff, and quickly. The recruiters abandoned the teasing, selective, fly-rod and began to cast nets into the sea of applicants. The nets, in their undiscriminating way, hauled in a little bit of everything. I was part of the catch that reported for duty in October, 1950.

The permanent staff of the Press Division (since elevated to the more impressive status of Press & Publications Service) had been small since the end of World War Two. They must have felt a chill of uncertainty as their peaceful little harbor was flooded by the tide of new employees. They did not know quite what to do with us. The work had not yet expanded to the size of the staff and for a while there was not enough to do.

Most of the permanent staff had been with Elmer Davis's Office of War Information. Since the end of the war, they had worked under swiftly-changing sets of initials both inside and outside the State Department. Although many had started life as newspapermen, some showed little sign of it. They insulated themselves from domestic events, as though years of acting as transmission belts for official statements had atrophied curiosity. On the day Puerto Rican nationalists tried to assassinate President Truman, one of the permanent staff returned from lunch and remarked idly that he had seen men shooting at one another in front of Blair House, where the President was living while the White House was being remodeled. Asked what it was all about, he said he had not lingered to learn, because he was already late. "We'll get it all from the White House later," he said calmly. This indifference to excitement on the streets was bewildering to a newcomer fresh from a daily newspaper.

The new members of the staff were impossible to characterize, although most had been newspapermen. They were old and young, competent and incompetent, normal and otherwise. The net had missed nothing.

For example, there was nice contrast between the drunken New York MIRROR alumnus and the teetotaling young man from a small town paper in Georgia. The New Yorker would sit numbly at his typewriter while at the next desk the Georgia boy told stories of his new hobby: he had learned how to crash Washington cocktail parties and did so several times a week, never drinking the free booze of course, but reveling in the rubbing of elbows with famous people. An ex-Hollywood script writer scurried about, constantly dropping Hollywood names as if they would mark a trail he could some day follow back to Movieland. Another ex-newspaperman talked fondly of the play he had been writing for twenty years but had not quite finished. He had been assured by Thornton Wilder it would be a good play, if ever completed.

Dull days were made lively by the anecdotes of Utrillo and Vlaminck from the amateur painter who had been a reporter on the Paris TRIBUNE in the good old days. I never knew the exact responsibilities of the two lovely young girls whose shimmering progress across the newsroom could be detected by the sudden silence of typewriters.

There was a lesson to be learned from the tall, erect, middle-aged man who stalked the corridors with the stern dignity of a general inspecting his troops. He had to be at least the deputy administrator of the entire information program. But no—and the lesson was that appearance is no clue to importance—he was only a GS 5 clerk-typist. He also was the cause of numerous fires caused by careless sprinkling of cigarette ashes in wastebaskets after long, liquid lunches.

In the beginning the Press Division had an amateurish air. Agreement on exactly how we were supposed to perform our mission was hard to find. The copy we produced was not quite news but the word "propaganda" produced cold

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*Edward Devol came to Washington in 1950 and joined the Press Division of State's international information program. During the past 25 years he served in several positions in USIA, including a tour in Athens. When he retired in January he was Managing Editor of IPS's Press Division.*

stares, as if a four-letter sexual term had been uttered in church. Who were the readers we hoped to convert in other countries? Again, no agreement. Some said we should aim at the man in the street; others were contemptuous of readers below the rank of cabinet minister.

Agreement did exist on our two major functions: to explain the United States and to combat communism. The times were infected with hysteria—especially when Senator McCarthy cast his cold eye on us—and communism got first priority. Standard Americana was produced in large volume, but anti-communist material was the main thing, obsessively so.

It is embarrassing to remember how shrill that anti-communist material was. Communists and their acts were catalogued, exposed, denounced, scorned, and ridiculed. In our eagerness to fight back, we copied every communist propaganda technique but one: we did not use the deliberate lie. In our "news" output, we editorialized without compunction, tossing off sarcastic remarks about the base hypocrisy of the enemy. We unearthed obscure facts to insert in stories and thereby expose communist duplicity. The policy guidance supplied to us in those days was sketchy, but that was no problem. When in doubt it was always safe to be anti-communist.

At the time all this seemed to make sense, for any day we might be fighting for our lives. Hindsight creates doubt that the shrillness was effective. By emulating the enemy, we may have made it more difficult for the fence-sitters (our proper audience) to distinguish between them and us.

From the low-ranking slot where I sat, there was little sign that the organization paid much attention to planning. It was another aspect of enthusiastic amateurism. No doubt top management had its hands full with the paper work of spending the tripled appropriation. But even after the budgetary picture stabilized more attention was paid to gimmicks—even a massive catalog of pencils, bottle openers and lockets printed with slogans—than to the direction we ought to take in the future.

Some gestures at planning were made. A reorganization set up a new planning staff, headed by a sixtyish man from the outside. That staff also became fascinated by gimmicks. One of the few efforts to guide us toward a systematic approach to content was a mass meeting in the news room, during which the head of the planning staff stood on a desk and delivered a pep talk. He concluded by telling us our objectives could be summed up by "the four P's—Peace, Power, Progress, and Plenty." We also received the four P's in writing.

He departed a few months later, calling himself "an angry old man," and vowing to write a book. Several people departed to write books in those days, but nothing further was ever heard of them.

Amateurism was by no means all bad. The negatives were accompanied by a positive blessing to ordinary staffers with gumption. The organization was growing so rapidly that change was essential. Initiative was valued, suggestions were welcomed, skill was rewarded, and promotions came quickly. Even the planning staff man standing on the desk and proclaiming the four P's showed a naive enthusiasm that became unimaginable as the years passed. We were a pioneer community, with both its virtues and its faults.

In 1975 the Agency is quite different. The colorful characters are almost all gone. Eccentricity flourishes in a pioneer community but is undependable on a fluorescent-lit assembly line. The fiercely anti-communist stance is rarely seen, although a few hard-liners still grumble about the deviation from Scripture. The output of the Washington media is more polished; at its best it is as good as anything produced by commercial studios, networks or newspapers.

The Agency of the early '50s was like a clumsy, lusty teenager with high ideals, great energy and imagination, and little self-discipline. The Agency of 1975 is middle-aged. It knows the ideal cannot be attained. It is not yet cynical but it is wary because nothing is certain and bad times follow good. Experience has proved the importance of established procedures: they are the bolts that keep the engine from flying off its mounts. And USIA's reflexes are slower. After all, it is a bit thick in the waist and rear.

Certain traits of the '50s persist. Some Agency officers still insulate themselves from events that do not reflect high policy. They appear to wish the world could be kept ignorant of the fact that the United States consists of people—people who work and sing and go to church but who also complain, strike, riot, curse, make love and sometimes smell bad. These officers may have spent too many years trying to convince foreigners of American superiority. When unpleasant events at home reduce us from superiority to equality, they are so embarrassed they take refuge in silence.

The identity of the proper target audience is still debated, though not as often as it was. The elitist point of view appears to prevail at the moment and there is logic to it. The Agency lacks the resources to reach mass audiences. James Keogh has doubts about the restrictiveness the narrow view causes and would like to broaden the categories a bit.

Nor is amateurism dead, although it wears a different cloak. The old amateurism was most often revealed in careless use—or under-use—of the experienced media people who were hired. Now few experienced media people are hired. The search is for bright, well-educated "generalists" who can be trained as "professional communicators." As the years have gone by many of these generalists have floated higher in the hierarchy. When they are due to serve a period of penance in Washington, after overseas tours, jobs must be found for them. Many are put into the media services, working in the production of films, radio shows, magazines. Some become supervisors in the media services. It is not unknown for these generalists to be unable to distinguish the good media product from the bad, because they know nothing of the trade.

It is a curious thing. No one would assign a generalist to a job as an accountant or an engineer simply because he had mastered college algebra. Yet generalists are casually assigned to positions as writers or editors, evidently on the theory that if they have mastered Freshman English they can be professional journalists.

The problem is not yet acute but it could become so. More than half of USIA's jobs for Americans are in the four Washington media services. In an organization so heavily committed to media output, there should be skill and continuity in key media jobs. Quality in output suffers from the assumption that a generalist will make up for his lack of technical skill by mastery of theories of cross-cultural communication. Those theories are important and more Agency employees should study them. They do not solve tough editorial problems.

The 25 years have brought great change in the attitude toward planning and research. Many people are now assigned to plan, to coordinate activities, to study the past in order to improve the future. The work gets done in a more orderly, less helter-skelter fashion than in the old days, even though the planners have a tendency to talk too much to one another. PPBS in the late '60s was a heroic effort to put the flesh of fact on the bare bones of effectiveness reporting. It failed, but left behind a modest but useful awareness that you should know what you are talking about when you claim to have been effective.

One of the most intelligent developments has been the practice of thematic programing. How sensible to concentrate films, exhibits, pamphlets, and lecturers on a single theme at the same time in the same place. How remarkable that it took so many years to do it.

USIA is unique in several respects among government agencies, especially in the status it accords the writer, the producer, the designer. A USIA writer was offered an excellent job at a higher grade in another agency, and turned it down. As he explained it, "In every other government agency the writer exists only to glorify the agency he works for. In USIA the writer (or the producer, etc.) is the guts of the Agency." To put it another way—every government agency has information officers. They, like USIA officers, practice a form of public relations. But their client is their agency. USIA's client is the United States of America. That has been a gratifying distinction. However, the distinction is not as clear-cut as it once was. The reason is money.

Money was plentiful in the beginning. There was never another tripling of the budget, but Congress was generally persuadable. An occasional fit of spleen by Congressman Rooney or Lyndon Johnson's anger at Arthur Larson did not change the general pattern of increased funds.

In recent years money has become harder to pry out of Congress and the Agency has felt compelled to work more systematically at impressing Congress with USIA's importance and effectiveness. Ordinary employees used to notice this only when appropriation committees held hearings and they would help assemble material to fill the boxes and briefcases that accompanied the director and assistant directors to the Hill. It is no longer a once-a-year matter. Throughout the year many hours are spent by middle and even lower-level employees in preparing reports and copies of output for Congress. Some has been requested; much of it is offered because the Agency believes it will create a badly-needed good impression. On a couple of occasions, when Agency appropriations were threatened with savage cuts, employees were quietly urged to contact friends on the Hill, have their friends contact their friends—anything to summon support for the cause.

Old-line departments and agencies grew accustomed to lobbying generations ago. USIA, because of its privileged origins, was slow to learn the need for self-protection. But then, middle age pays more attention than youth to its image, for it has more to lose.

There has always been doubt about USIA's permanence. It was created to help fight the cold war and that appears to have ended. The public knows little about USIA, the press is suspicious of it, and Congress knows it gets nobody any votes back home. USIA has been the subject of many study groups, task forces, and special commissions. Several are at work now and change in the Agency's status seems inevitable. Most likely it will return to the State Department.

Agency officers in general dislike the prospect. They see more scope for imaginative effort in an independent agency. They know their own prestige would diminish. If you are five levels from the top in USIA, you will be 15 levels down in State. The frog will find itself in an ocean, not a pond.

Of more concern is the serious philosophical difference between State and USIA. The Agency says, "Tell everything that is significant." State says, "Tell only what is in accordance with gospel." They are accustomed to different environments. It is like the difference between pulpit and confession booth. State has little patience with USIA's practice of reflecting all responsible American points of view in its output. Jealous of its role as enunciator of foreign policy, State would have foreign audiences learn only what State itself considers wise, sometimes to the exclusion of statements by responsible spokesmen for other government agencies. USIA could help prepare the way for State's policy decisions if it were more often told of them in advance. A senior Agency officer used to complain: "State thinks we are a fire brigade. The fact is we are quite ineffective once the fire begins. We can help prevent fires, but only if we are given the opportunity and the cooperation and information we need."

Once reinstalled in State, USIA could easily become only a spokesman for a single government department, instead of an outlet for that magnificent, multi-voiced organism called the United States of America.

WHEN HENRY LOOMIS was deputy director of USIA he irritated many old-timers by saying that at age 50 a man should begin a new career. They thought he was trying to push them out. He may have had a point; 25 years in the Agency convinced this old-timer he had remained long enough in the same place.

If that feeling caused unseemly bias to creep into the above remarks, it was not deliberate but simply the unavoidable tendency to view past and present through different lenses.

It was a rewarding 25 years. I know of no better place to have watched capable, devoted people do their best to pay "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." ■

There's something in the parting hour
Will chill the warmest heart,
Yet kindred, comrades, lovers, friends,
Are fated all to part. — Edward Pollock

# "You could have them in tears"

WILLIAM A. KRAUSS

*"-It's this," Mary said. "Mother and Father are going to send Susan and me to a school in the States in September." The last half of the sentence was whispered; almost inaudible, choked. The faces of all the children looked deeply shocked.*

They could not, at first, believe it. Yet the evidenee was clear—the things they had seen, thc things they had scnsed, whispered words, averted glances, the letters that arrived but were not immediately opened. Then they knew it was true.

Mary stood under the almond tree in the corner of the lawn farthest away from the *bassin* where the Negro women were washing the family's clothes.

She said, "Let's go someplaee we can talk. Let us go wherc there won't be any servants with their big ears—"

The sun piercing the branches fell on the wet black faces of the women thumping and rinsing in the eoncrete washbasin. The women seemed to hold their heads catlike in attitudes of listening. You never, never could be sure how mueh Ameriean these people really understood; and they earried tales.

Susan said, "One day Mother let me go walking with Oliver Mueller to the top of the Turgeau road past the spring, where there's a trail up Morne l'Hopital. Let's go there. It's lonely, nobody will see us except some mountain people. I can find the way."

"It's too hot to elimb," Janet piped. She was seven. Shc despised walking.

Susan said, "If Janet thinks it's not important for us to talk together and make a plan, let hcr stay home." She was addressing Mary. Her voice was cold.

"Myself, I'll go," Davy said. "But we have to have sandwiches."

"Water," Susan said.

Janet tugged at Susan's blouse. She said, "I'll go." Suddenly she was very near tears. Her small fat square pink face was puckered up as if the sun was in her eyes, which it wasn't.

The laundry women seemcd to be listening. Sometimcs they turned their heads toward the four children under the almond tree, then looked quiekly, shyly away. Certainly this was more than idle curiosity.

"They're listening," Mary said, hushed.

"Let's go to Oliver Mueller's house," Susan said. "He'll give us sandwiches and a jug of water. He's a really good friend, if I tell him we want to walk up the mountain alone he'll keep it to himself."

"How do you know?" Davy piped. "He's grown up. I don't trust him."

"Keep quiet," Susan said quickly. "Oliver Mueller is my friend."

Davy said "Okay." He wasn't offended. "Then let's go. What's holding us up?"

"Spread out," said Mary. She was the oldest, thirteen, one year older than Susan, and sometimes she gave thc orders. "Do it like this: Wandcr around and then slip through the hedge one at a time so we won't be noticed. We'll meet at Sacre Coeur. Thcn go up to Oliver Mueller's house."

Janet made a last stab. She still hated the idea of walking up a mountain. "Why can't we stay at Oliver Mueller's house instead of walking up the mountain? Can't we sit on his *lawn* and talk?"

"With his servants listening?" Susan said scornfully.

"I want to take my fighting eock," Davy said.

"All *right*," Mary said impatiently. "Take him. But spread out, everybody." She seemed very tcnse and her eyes were touched by angcr.

THEY HAD BEEN in Haiti two years.

At the start, through the first few months, they emphatically did not like the place, they did not like it at all and they knew they never would like it. The prospect was unbearable. They went to a hotel the day they got off the plane, and you could bet it wasn't the best hotel in town. The food was really awful, all rice. The only dessert, for instance, was melon, if you want to call melon a dessert. Melon cvery day, melon for lunch, melon with dinner. Then Susan, who was ten at the time, fell down the stairway and quite bloodied her nose; and Davy, who was only seven, took a certain illness they said came from the change of water—from London watcr to Port-au-Prince water. It gave him a frightful headache; he

*William A. Krauss continues to live in Paris, as Paris Editor of* TRAVEL & LEISURE. *He writes, "I've recently sold my beach in Haiti and bought a house in California (at Ojai in the high mountains behind Santa Barbara) where I think I'll go live one day when European inflation blows right up through the ceiling."*

kept throwing up and much more. He yelled a great deal and the burden of what he said was, he wanted to go home.

But Haiti *was* home.

They were there now, so Haiti *was* home, and Mr. McGurn found a house—a large gingerbread house with a garden full of flamboyants; and settled devotedly to his work. He would be, count on it, three or four years in Haiti (O-4; Nice prin off 10/67. London petrol off 7/70); and so would they. It looked grim. Then four months passed somehow, and abruptly, one day, it occurred to them that they were having a wonderful time.

"*Wonderful*," Mary shouted one morning. She stuck her head up out of the swimming pool and shouted, "Wonderful time! Nobody anywhere has nearly as much fun as we do."

"That's right!" Davy sputtered, and the others shook with laughter. Janet especially howled with joy, not quite knowing why. They agreed they couldn't dispute what Mary said. They were having a grand time, and had been just too stupid to know it. Till now. Till Mary said it.

The pool, for instance—they had their own entirely private swimming pool in the big back yard of the house on the Turgeau road, and cold weather never came to give them blue shivers, and the sun shone hot and bright every day—nearly every day—year round. Mr. McGurn had bought for them, after some hesitancy, a small and gentle Haitian pony which they named Max No Difference, and which they dearly loved. Lessons were not arduous; Mrs. McGurn taught them history, geography, and so on, with classes five days a week from nine to twelve in the cool parlor of the old house.

They learned early on to speak the Haitian patois, a kind of French. On Sunday mornings after mass Mr. McGurn took them swimming at the coco-palm beach club on the fine dark-blue windy bay. Sometimes there were picnics in the mountains above Kenskoff or on the banks of the Rivière Froide, a creek that tumbled out of the hills off by the lighthouse. It was a nice life, it was a whole lot nicer than living in North Audley Street in the London rain—"no fighting cocks in London!" Davy screamed.

That was in July. And it was, if you care to see it so, something of a coincidence of emotions, because scarcely a week later the children first became aware of what their parents were plotting.

THEY MET at Sacre Coeur and turned right and went up the steep narrow gravelly street to Oliver Mueller's house. Oliver was at home. He was a painter; that is, he made pictures of hibiscus and bougainvillaea and such. He was, when they marched through his gateway, sitting under a mango tree making a picture of a very small blue-black boy, the son of Oliver's cook, holding a lemon-yellow rose.

He said "Hello" and the children said "Hello."

"It's nice to see you," Oliver Mueller said. He put his painting brush carefully on a tray. He was quite young, hardly grown up; it had been said he was only a year or two out of some college or other.

Davy spoke. "We need some water in a jug, and if you'll give us some sandwiches, because we're taking a walk up Morne l'Hopital."

For an instant Oliver Mueller looked unprepared to believe them. "But the sun!" he said. "This is no time of day to be climbing mountains."

Davy shifted his docile red fighting cock from one arm to the other. "We don't care," he said.

Janet said, "We have to talk—alone." Her lips were pursed like little segments of orange, importantly.

"You mean you're going to climb the mountain to find a place to talk in?"

"Exactly," said Mary. "Yes," Susan said.

Slowly Oliver Mueller looked from one to the other as they stood before him on the shadow-dappled lawn: Mary, the tallest (of course), with a thin brown face and a good, pointed, slightly contemptuous chin; Susan, the prettiest, with yellow hair; chubby Davy, pert-looking in a not at all clean jacket-suit of raspberry colored linen, and small fat pink Janet, whose eyes were as grey as a falcon's, whose nose seemed an impudent afterthought. They returned Oliver Mueller's gaze, expectantly. Susan's expression was angelic, with a sweet, faint smile on her lips; but Davy looked up darkly, prepared to repulse any interference.

"Now see here—" said Oliver Mueller. "I'll be happy to give you water, I'm sure there's plenty of stuff for sandwiches in the kitchen. But I really do think this is no hour to be climbing the mountain. It's *hot*, man." His glance rested for a moment on Mary, appealing to her as one sensible adult to another. "Maybe it's all right for you bigger ones," he said, "but Janet's pretty little to be clawing uphill in the full sun. Don't you agree?"

"No," said Davy.

"Well—" Mary said, recognizing the adult appeal, anxious to be reasonable.

"If you must talk privately," Oliver Mueller said, hurrying on, "there's no reason not to talk right here under this mango, eh?—cool. And I can have the cook fix up a big pitcher of limeade."

Davy said, "We don't like servants around. They're all ears."

"No problem," Oliver Mueller said, speaking low and seriously. "I can send the servants downhill on errands."

"Would you really?" Susan asked.

"You mean," said Janet, "after they make the limeade?"

Oliver Mueller nodded. He added, "And I've an errand to do myself. You can have the place to yourselves."

Susan looked quickly at Mary. "I don't think Oliver has to go—do you? He can help us."

Davy was blunt. "He might talk."

"If you're all in some sort of desperate trouble—" Oliver Mueller said. "I would help if I could."

"It's trouble, all right," Susan said.

Oliver Mueller turned and spoke in Creole to the black boy, telling him to go to his mother for a big pitcher of limeade, plenty of ice. They watched the boy scurry across the lawn. "What's it about?" Oliver Mueller said.

Everybody sat in the grass. The children's eyes were on Mary. "It's this," she said slowly. "Mother and Father are going to send Susan and me to a school in the States in September." The last half of the sentence was whispered, almost inaudible; choked. The faces of all the children looked

*Continued on page 30*

# FSJ BOOKSHELF

## Judging Achilles

BEFORE THE FALL, *by William Safire. Doubleday, $12.50.*

WILLIAM SAFIRE was the press and public relations agent for the "typical American house" at the American Exhibition in Moscow in 1959 where the Nixon-Khrushchev kitchen debate took place. It was a significant occasion for Safire because he then met Richard Nixon and Harrison Salisbury, both of whom he subsequently worked for—as a speech writer in the White House and as a columnist on the "op-ed" page of the New York TIMES. Safire's public relations background enabled him to establish an empathetic relationship with the former President, who was also preoccupied if not obsessed by the way things appeared, and to write a sympathetic book about him entitled "Before the Fall."

The packaging of the product was a daily concern in the Nixon White House and brought Safire into frequent contact with the boss. The President, concludes Safire, placed "image ahead of reality" and "wanted to be seen as upright and true, long-suffering and pious, cool in crisis . . . and, above all, up there on a mountaintop to make the great and lonely decisions, disdaining the importunings of his aides to cave in and give up and take the popular road, instead taking the action needed to give the nation back its 'driving dream.' "

This "driving dream" collapsed, of course, with Watergate and the tapes—the tapes which were supposed to secure Nixon's place in history, and which, indeed, do just that. In discussing Watergate, Safire believes that Nixon put political loyalty to Mitchell, Haldeman and Ehrlichman (they might think the opposite) above his oath of office and thus made "an unforgivable decision in moral terms" which he compounded in tactical terms by not destroying the tapes. Safire apparently believes the "morality" of tape destruction requires no justification, at least he gives none in this book.

Safire warns that judging Nixon only by the transcripts would be like "judging Achilles by his heel" and takes great pains to assert that there is more to "this many-faceted man than his worst side." What Safire calls the "most revealing" night of the Nixon Presidency occurred on May 9, 1970, following the decision to invade Cambodia when the President impulsively decided to visit the Lincoln Memorial in the early hours of the morning and talk to protesting students. He broke out of the cocoon of the Presidency on that "strange night" in this "act of compassion." Here, says Safire, was a different Nixon. Perhaps. But Safire's hyperbole discredits his judgment. Can this foray all the way to the Lincoln Memorial to talk to some surprised students be called an "act of compassion"—after the decision on Cambodia?

Nixon's driving dream was to create a new structure of peace based on a relationship with China and a new relationship with the Soviet Union. He did not like or trust the Foreign Service and obviously acquiesced in the system worked out by his National Security Adviser "to keep State out of as many decisions as he could." Because of his anti-Communist credentials, Nixon believed he was uniquely able in terms of the domestic political situation to establish new relationships with Moscow and Peking, a view Safire strongly endorses.

Great secrecy with respect to the negotiations with the Soviets and Chinese, justified on the basis of their delicacy and sensitivity, insured concentration of power in the White House even though it might also mean leaving the Secretary of State and the responsible SALT negotiator, Gerard Smith, ignorant of what was happening. But apart from judgments about these nearly autocratic methods, Nixon did turn around our relationship with China and did negotiate an important SALT agreement with the Soviet Union. Safire gives interesting accounts of both events even though he did not accompany the President to Peking. He was present in Moscow and describes the Kissinger/Gerard Smith rivalry and differences regarding the SALT agreement, described also in John Newhouse's book "Cold Dawn." Smith and the JCS, according to Safire, were concerned that we were giving away too much but were over-ruled by Nixon and Kissinger. (We have not yet had an account of these events from Smith's point of view.)

During 1971, the New York TIMES ran a series of stories on foreign policy and reported a widely known fact: "The Department of State . . . is no longer in charge of the United States' foreign affairs . . ." Haldeman asked Safire to prepare guidance on this story for Ziegler, and Safire then consulted Kissinger. The latter was not even slightly concerned about the feelings or position of the Secretary of State. On the contrary, Safire reports that Kissinger saw the stories as a plot against him and said, "If Rogers doesn't knuckle under, I go . . . You and Haldeman don't think I'm serious about this, but I mean it! I like this job. I am equipped for it, but I cannot stay under these circumstances."

In the White House, Safire was concerned with speech writing and public relations. He was not part of the inner circle in policy formulation. And he obviously reappraised Nixon after Watergate. But he writes as one who had a natural affinity for President Nixon and his anecdotal memoir is interesting—though not the last work on the Nixon White House.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

## Japan's Real Steel

JAPAN: THE FRAGILE SUPER POWER, *by Frank Gibney. Norton, $10.*

IN 1953 FRANK GIBNEY had a success with his "Five Gentlemen of Japan"; it was reissued as a paperback as recently as 1973. His present book is a wide angle look at Japanese society and its future based on his residence in Tokyo from 1966 on; his absence from Japan for over a decade after writing the first book has given a good perspective to the present volume.

Both the specialist and novice on Japan can profit from this fine book; the former will enjoy matching his own perceptions against the author's well-honed ones, while the latter will not only get a great deal of current information in a sophisticated context, but also a sense of the challenge that Japan presents to the American observer. It is a well-written book, save for a TIME-style first chapter which in-

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cludes a reference to "Japan's own unarmed neutrality." Mr. Gibney gives the reader a bonus in his familiarity with the scholarly literature on Japan which complements his own intelligent insights.

One could quarrel with the title. Mr. Gibney admits it is not novel. But unlike Zbigniew Brzezinski who popularized the phrase about fragility, the author's extensive background in Japan might have made him leery of inferring fragility from trade statistics, land prices and the admittedly disheartening evidences of pollution and overbuilding. The traditional strengths of Japanese society which he so well discerns provide even in their slightly eroded state a resiliency that compensates for what might otherwise be fatal weaknesses in the modern sector. One is occasionally reminded of the cult of Freda Utley's "Japan's Feet of Clay"—a cult disastrously represented in the prewar myopia of the Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs.

Mr. Gibney may well have written the book of the year on Japan. It deserves to be read widely, particularly in Washington where his comments on American diplomatic styles in dealing with Japan should (but won't) produce some blushes.

—J.K. HOLLOWAY

### A Tough Act to Follow

THIS VAST EXTERNAL REALM, *by Dean Acheson. Norton, $9.95.*
DEAN ACHESON: *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol XVI, by Gaddis Smith. Cooper Square, $11.00*

GADDIS SMITH's work, coming as it did on the heels of Acheson's own masterly "Present at the Creation," 1969, admittedly presented him with a tough act to follow.

To make it even tougher, Acheson's posthumously published "This Vast External Realm" bracketed Smith with a second formidable brief before the bar of history. A collection of articles and speeches by Acheson over a period from 1937 to 1971 selected by his son David, the volume takes its title from the Opinion of Justice Sutherland for the Court, in *United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.* The Justice held that, in dealing with the outside world, ". . . *this vast external realm*, with


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its important, complicated, delicate, and manifold problems, the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation . . ." The subject matter includes: social factors in legal change (1937), legislative-executive interaction (1956), meetings at the Summit (1958), relations with the Soviet Union (1959), ambivalences in American foreign policy (1965), and the eclipse of the State Department (1971). The style is direct; the product, the evident result of hard thinking. As a superb advocate arguing his own case, Acheson demonstrates that a lawyer who represents himself does not necessarily take a fool for a client.

Sitting as history's court of first resort, Smith renders judgment on the performance and policies of Acheson as Secretary of State. On performance, he finds him brilliant: "His bringing together of subordinates, his ability to crank up the bureaucratic machine and spin its motor into a smooth-running mechanism, was nothing short of spectacular." With a President who *liked* to make decisions, and quickly, Acheson's ability to get there "the fustest with the mostest"—which usually meant before the narrow-gauge Secretary of Defense, Louis Johnson—was unbeatable. The "mostest" meant recommendations that were sharp, unequivocal, and fully buttressed with fact and logic so that Truman almost invariably accepted them.

In an article written for THE YALE REVIEW in 1954, and reprinted in "This Vast External Realm," Acheson describes his method for presentations to the President: The Secretary of State should make sure that "all possibilities are tested against the most stringent criticism." He should also bring to bear the other governmental considerations (economic, fiscal, military, and domestic-political) which in the end, of course, could be reconciled only by the President.

As for Acheson's policies, Smith is struck by how accurately they mirrored the will of middle America and its elected representatives. Acheson's style was strictly Eastern Establishment; his phrases, more elegant than most; his reasoning, more carefully honed; but, as Smith acknowledges, the congruence of his politics with the national purpose was repeatedly reflected in legislation enacted (the Marshall Plan, NATO, etc.), decisions supported (H-bomb), the military appropriations passed, and the war in Korea sustained.

Smith considers Acheson's "most avoidable error" to have been his commitment to help the French in Indochina. The Administration, admittedly Europe-oriented, deemed that commitment necessary because of Dien Bien Phu, when the French government was very fragile indeed and the threat of Communist victory at the polls in France was by no means a remote possibility. Smith fails to point out that in later years, Acheson counseled a quick cutting of our losses in Vietnam.

Smith considers that Acheson's diplomacy *vis-à-vis* the Communist world rested on attitudes haunted by the ghost of Hitler. This wafts




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
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the sour odor of revisionism. Smith even brushes aside Khrushchev's view, as expressed in his memoirs, that American policy served to deter Stalin. Just as Hitler's intentions were never in doubt to anyone who read and took seriously his "Mein Kampf," the intentions of the Communist world in those days were never in doubt to anyone who took the trouble to follow its convoluted dialectic and to take it seriously. Acheson's sense of history and his awareness of the nature of totalitarian ideologies would not have led him to equate the Communist threat with the Fascist, except to recognize that they both presented mortal dangers to the Free World and its values.

However history's Court of Appeal may ultimately judge Acheson's diplomacy, the uncontested fact remains: there was no great war. Under the umbrella of nuclear deterrence, Acheson's central policy objective of safeguarding this nation's highest interest: "to maintain as spacious an environment as possible in which free states might exist and flourish" was sustained. At the advent of the nuclear age, Dean Acheson as Secretary of State foresaw the vital importance of strategic nuclear deterrence.

—GORDON ARNESON

### Little Red Book

CHAIRMAN MAO TALKS TO THE PEOPLE, *edited by Stuart Schram. Pantheon Books, $10.00.*

It is generally well known that one of the more drastic effects of China's Cultural Revolution (circa 1966-68) was to halt the formal publication of virtually all newspapers, journals and books and to utilize the printing presses in turning out hundreds of millions of copies of Mao Tse-tung's "little red book" and his many other works. The "barrel of the pen," however, was not silenced. With the appearance of "big character posters" and Red Guard tabloids, the world in general and China-watchers in particular were treated to a unique and uncensored glimpse of China's politics and society.

In addition to these frank and often bellicose sources, various Red Guard organizations also published complete or partial texts of many statements and directives by Chairman Mao and other Chinese leaders that, until now, have had only a restricted circulation even in China. It is a selection of these speeches and writings, some never before available in English, that were collected by Stuart Schram and translated by his colleagues for inclusion in this volume.

Despite the title, Mao was not really addressing the Chinese people in these speeches; they were directed essentially at the cadres and officials—the Communist elite. Neither are the translations intended for the "broad public"—as the editor contends. The collection is useful, however, for those who have more than a casual interest in the People's Republic of China and its leader, who has had such a decisive influence on the country and the people. The informal talks included by Schram reveal Mao not only as the celebrated thinker and philosopher, but also as a man—and a very human one at that.

—LEO A. ORLEANS


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**Foreign Policy Making in a New Era.**
*from page 14*

**Developing a Long-Term Strategy for Multilateral Institutions**

Long-term planning on the kind of institutional questions identified in the introduction of this paper is not now taking place anywhere in the United States Government. Institution-building is approached *ad hoc* in each functional or regional context, with little regard to possible interrelationships. The organizational breakthrough represented by the new International Energy Agency could have important implications for other international agencies, but these are not being seriously examined in IO. The Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea spent months considering rules of procedure for the Law of the Sea Conference that might put a brake on the automatic majority of the "77" until someone recalled the "conciliation" formula developed at UNCTAD I. Without some central place for the accumulation of experience and wisdom on multilateral procedures and institutions, those preparing for each specialized event are likely to go on "re-inventing the wheel."

To perform the necessary long-term planning and overview function for the development of international institutions, there should be a small group of highly qualified specialists working together in the Policy Planning Staff (S/P) and IO. Since the necessary competence in international organization affairs will seldom be found within the Foreign Service, outstanding experts in this area from the academic and professional communities should be brought to S/P and IO on two to four year assignments. In addition, the Department should be given funds to contract out for research in this area to universities and research centers. It is absurd that the Defense Department should be able to spend vast sums for research on weapons systems and strategic problems while the Department of State has virtually no money for research on the organization of peace and the management of interdependence.

Greater use should also be made of part-time consultants, but not through the traditional device of appointing an Advisory Panel on International Organizations. Such standing groups tend to be easy targets for political patronage. Moreover, no one group is likely to be adequate for all the different problem areas. The Department should mobilize one team of outside experts to help it prepare for the September 1975 General Assembly reviewing UN economic institutions; another for the reform of GATT in connection with the new trade negotiations; still another to consider the appropriate structure of an International Seabed Authority. The necessary continuity and coordination of policy among the various consulting groups can be assured by the full-time specialists in S/P and IO who ought to be collaborating with all of them.

*to be continued in July*

***Next month Professor Gardner will advance basic improvements in the operation of US missions to international organizations and the handling of multilateral issues by US country missions.***


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## YOU COULD HAVE THEM IN TEARS

*from page 24*

deeply shocked. But not Oliver's face. He looked blank.

"What about it?" he said. "You don't want to go?"

"No," Mary cried bitterly.

"Of course not," Susan cried. Little Janet's face had puckered again, close to tears. "We don't want to leave here, and leave Janet and Davy, and Max our pony and everything," Susan said tightly. "They're probably thinking about some school on Staten Island, that's where our grandmother lives, classes all day, and cold—"

"Bleak!" Mary said.

"I see," said Oliver Mueller.

"Help us," Susan said. Her eyes were filled to the brim with misery.

Davy clutched his fighting cock with only one hand, and pounded the ground with the other. "Now we've told you," he said. "Somebody's got to do something."

"Yes," Oliver Mueller said. "I suppose I see what you mean. But you have to be fair. Maybe there's something too to be said for your father and mother, you know. How old are you, Mary?"

"Thirteen."

"Susan?"

"Twelve."

"You'd learn a great deal at a good school in the States—"

"We're learning a great deal here!"—Susan.

"No doubt. But the association with other—"

"Please don't insist," Mary said. "Our minds are made up. For one, *I* won't go to any rotten school. *I am going to stay here.* And what we have to do now is find a way."

"You've not spoken at all to your parents, or hinted anything?"

"No good," Mary said. "You know our father and mother. They are very sweet—but I know they think they're right about this. They can be so stubborn."

"If we played sick," Susan said, speaking rapidly. "If we started complaining about pains. Every day pains. Maybe they'd be afraid to send us away then." There was silence. "It's a suggestion," Susan said.

"Not a very good one," said Oliver Mueller. "Your father would phone down for Doctor Lemke, he'd soon enough find you out."

"Wait, suppose they hurt themselves," Davy said. "They could bust themselves in the foot with a rock—"

"Don't be stupid," Mary snapped.


Then the black boy came across the lawn with a tray of cakes and the limeade and glasses. He put them carefully on a bench. Oliver Mueller sent him away. Mary got up and poured the limeade. "What other thoughts have you had?" Oliver Mueller asked.

"None," Susan whispered. She watched a cottonball cloud slip over the mountain, and after two or three minutes she said in a flat voice, "Maybe there isn't anything. I don't know what we can do. What we can say. Maybe nothing."

"But what you've said is important," Oliver Mueller said. "What you've been telling me—that you'd be terribly homesick if you went


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away." His eyes lifted to the cloud above the mountain. "It's perfectly natural—of course you'd be heartbroken."

"Well—" Susan nodded. "You know how it is, Oliver," she said. "It's like we've told you. We love to play with Janet and Davy, and we swim, and we ride our pony. Do you understand? I don't think we could bear a school up north, or anywhere. Shut up indoors. Away from here. We don't want that, we want what we have."

"Maybe you didn't quite hear what I said." Oliver Mueller leaned forward, speaking low. "I said if you were shipped off to a school you'd miss your mother and father terribly—"

Susan watched him questioningly. "Gosh," she said. "Well, I don't know. I suppose so. Father works all day at the Embassy, when he comes home he's bushed and hot, he drinks a glass of beer and reads some magazines. Or what's in his briefcase. Then other men, like Mr. Curtis and Mr. Hawley, they come around to the house and talk—"

"What Susan means," Mary said, monotone, "is that we don't get to play much with Father."

"Not much," Susan said. "Maybe some Sundays, a little. Of course we used to have those famous family picnics, but nowadays Father plays golf with Mr. Curtis, that's his boss, and *we* can't play golf, we've never been invited—"

"Yes," Oliver Mueller said. "Yes. I see how that is. But it's perfectly clear you'd miss your dear mother if you were sent so far away, so many thousands of miles. You'd miss her and be lonely and you could even be a little afraid." He waited.

Susan's eyes were on his face. "Afraid, Oliver? You don't seem to get it—"

Mary touched her sister's arm. "Susan," she said softly. She sat up very straight on the close-cropped green lawn and her mouth made a firm line. "Susan. Listen to Oliver."

"I am listening. I don't know what he's saying."

"Oliver is saying that we'd miss Father and Mother terribly if we were sent to the States, and we'd be sick and afraid and terribly unhappy to be so far away from them—"

"Because you love them so," Oliver Mueller said.

"But—" Susan said. Then, just like that, she smiled radiantly. "Unhappy," she said, tasting the word. "Because we love them so."

"Yes!" Mary said passionately.

"Yes!" Susan echoed. "But you must be the one to tell them, Mary."

"It's so easy. It's all true."

"It's true," Susan said again. "We would miss them terribly because we love them so. We'd *die*." She swung round toward Oliver Mueller. He handed her the limeade pitcher. She filled all the glasses, and gave a glass to Mary. "But you can explain it so well, you talk so well, you have to tell them, Mary. *You* tell them. How we would almost die."

"I could tell them all about us," Mary said.

"You could have them in tears," Susan said. ■


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## WILL CANDOR SURVIVE

*from page 16*

for a certain degree of confidentiality in government. Woodrow Wilson once wrote: "Government must, if it is to be pure and correct in its processes, be absolutely public in everything that effects it." But he undoubtedly had second thoughts on this at the end of his presidency, as he found that negotiation and compromise tended to be frozen by early exposure to political passions and exploitation. Many who feel that "illegitimate secrecy has corrupted our conduct of foreign relations" also concur on the need for some governmental privacy. An official of the American Civil Liberties Union, for instance, has written on the need for secrecy by our Executive on some categories, including "internal records (on the) making of policy, including interdepartmental memorandums, advisory opinions, (and) recommendations of subordinates." A proper balance would seem to allow secrecy for intra-governmental reporting on foreign policy, national security, and personnel affairs, along with deliberations up to the point of decisions on policy. Against this there should be an obligation of the Executive to keep classification to a minimum and to inform the Congress and the public what the decisions are and what is being done. But the dividing line between what should or should not be secret is at best fuzzy and one's view will inevitably depend on whether one's seat is in or out of authority.

Improvement in this situation depends basically on restoral of trust in government, which fell low indeed during our previous two presidencies. Too few Americans believed what the highest authorities of our Republic said, and those who did were sometimes shown to be fools. President Ford's open and frank attitude will, it is hoped, improve public confidence in the credibility of the Executive.

On the other hand, however, government ranks are going to have to be more disciplined. Before senior officials will have any confidence that secrets will stay secrets, we must have enforceable security laws—and at least one case of unauthorized disclosure of confidential information will have to result in public penalties rather than fame and fortune.

Present critics should be careful in resisting tighter security controls on information. In our democratic system they too will have the chance for power later, and the same weapon of leaks can cut them also. The plain truth is it is not unreasonable for any senior official dealing with foreign affairs—not just our present distinguished Secretary—to be apprehensive of unauthorized disclosure of official secrets. For that imperils progress in settling controversial international problems, and God knows with the Middle East, détente, etc. there are enough of those around. In the face of leaks, the instinct would always be to close in tighter, to the sacrifice of both candor within government and the proper use of the talent available for good decisions. ■


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# LETTERS TO FSJ

## Dissent and Loyalty

■ It will perhaps not surprise Mr. Lenderking that I agree with most of his letter commenting on my article in the February JOURNAL—for he agrees with much that I had written; and on at least one point he effectively corrected me. Perhaps this goes to show that in the dialectical process of debate, particularly when it is conducted with Lenderking's civility, one can come closer to a synthesis.

1. He says "staying to minimize the damage" is really a form of acquiescence. All right, perhaps it is. But since he agrees that "in many instances it is both honorable and the only practical course," the difference between us is narrowed—except for the hard cases, which he discusses next. After all, if you wish to make foreign affairs your career, and if you are an American, there is only one foreign service to which you can belong. And policies change, and past positions are sometimes vindicated. It is even conceivable that a critic may in retrospect find himself to have been mistaken!

2. Both of us think that an FSO owes his superiors his (or her) best and unvarnished judgments, and Mr. Lenderking also agrees that if an individual acts on what he terms his moral responsibilities (i.e., "resists" publicly) he must be ready to accept his consequences. On my part I certainly agree with him that individuals have been persecuted for honest reporting, and the example he cites, dating from over 25 years ago, is appropriate. But many things have changes since then—or since the time when an ambassador in Taipei could order the destruction of all copies of a despatch with which he disagreed. Today the Foreign Service regulations place a responsibility on superiors to forward significant dissents. Nowadays FSOs get prizes for courageous reporting. So the real distinction is between acting on one's "moral responsibilities" within the official family, or in public. I think anyone who wants to take his dissent to the public should offer his resignation. Mr. Lenderking seems to say no, he should just not be surprised if he's fired.

3. Mr. Lenderking says that the opposition of some officers in Vietnam was not in favor of pulling out regardless of the consequences, but was about "the dubious wisdom and effectiveness of much of what we were trying to accomplish." But these issues have always been debatable. I do not know of anyone who suffered for making a reasoned case against specific programs or excesses or interpretations. That does not mean, of course, that the advice of critics was always followed. The real trouble, in my own experience (1968/70), was that FSOs who were critical of particular programs rarely went to the effort of making a reasoned, documented case. They only made clear that they disliked what was happening. But revulsion at the suffering of innocent people in wartime, while morally commendable, is not a policy; nor is it a dissent; nor is it significant reporting unless accompanied by conclusions. I could say more, but will reserve this for another occasion.

4. No contest on Mr. Lenderking's statement that "many would argue that our basic policy of containment has embraced both conceptual and practical excesses." He is so right. If I created the impression that the early policy of containment (as defined for instance by President Truman) is still accepted doctrine, or that it should be, then I deserved to be corrected. The Nixon Doctrine was one attempt to redefine containment. It failed. There will have to be a better redefinition.

5. The only point where we may still have a significant disagreement is in the last sentence of Mr. Lenderking's letter, where he says:

> "Ambassador Herz's warning against resistance in every instance seems to imply a role for the Foreign Service as the mere implementer of policies framed by others, rather than as a substantive partner in the creative process of policy formulation."

Here I think there must have been a misunderstanding. We really cannot draw a line between correct and moral policies, which are those of something called "the Foreign Service," and foolish and immoral ones which are the responsibility of outsiders. There is no such thing as a foreign policy of "the professionals." Nothing I wrote, certainly nothing that I believe, is to the effect that the Foreign Service should confine itself to the implementation of policies framed by others, quite the contrary. In the real world the professionals disagree among themselves—and it is a good thing that they do, for only in a clash of ideas can viable policies be hammered out. We do have the opportunity to be "partners in the creative process of policy formulation." My point is that we will lose that opportunity unless we foreswear "resistance" to what individual officers think misguided policies.

MARTIN F. HERZ

Sofia

## Life and Love in the Foreign Service



*"and the Post Report said the temporary quarters allowance was adequate . . ."*

# AFSA NEWS

**The State/USIA Authorization Bill is the principal vehicle for the Association to bring about legislated personnel and benefit improvements for the Foreign Service. For this reason we are printing in this issue the entire text of the Association's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.**

**This month, the Association also testified before the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. Our major recommendations before the Murphy Commission are summarized in Section IV of our SFRC testimony. The full text of the Murphy Commission testimony will be contained in the next issue of the JOURNAL.**

## STATEMENT OF THOMAS D. BOYATT ON THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE APPROPRIATIONS AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1975 BEFORE THE SFRC APRIL 29, 1975

Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to appear today to testify with respect to the Department of State and USIA Authorization Bills.

The American Foreign Service Association has for over 50 years as a professional organization been dedicated to enhancing the professionalism of the men and women of the Foreign Service. In 1973 AFSA was elected by the 11,000 Foreign Service people of State, AID and USIA to be their exclusive employee representative. It is in both our professional and employee representative capacities that we appear before you today.

Before proceeding I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Congress, and this Committee in particular, for its efforts over the past several years to eliminate inequities facing the Foreign Service personnel abroad, particularly those relating to the education of Foreign Service children, the efforts to improve and protect the merit system in the Foreign Affairs Agencies, and to improve and upgrade the professional standing and caliber of those who serve this country abroad, particularly those measures relating to the appointment of ambassadors.

In spite of these recent improvements, for which I can assure you the entire Foreign Service is genuinely grateful, we see a number of tasks ahead, some of which in our opinion should be dealt with this year in the context of the State and USIA Authorization Bills. Our concerns could be broadly grouped into four major areas.

1) **Further efforts to eliminate abuses of the merit system;**
2) **Further steps to assure use of professional criteria in the nomination and confirmation of ambassadors;**
3) **Further steps to eliminate inequities facing Foreign Service personnel; and**
4) **Measures needed to strengthen the organizational structure of this government in carrying out its foreign affairs responsibilities.**

**1) Further efforts to eliminate abuses of the merit system.** As you know, this past summer we celebrated the 50th anniversary of the Rogers Act, which created a unified Foreign Service under strong merit principles. Over the years, the result of the application of these principles has been the development of a Foreign Service broadly representative of this country, both geographically and in other respects, under selection standards which are perhaps the highest to be found anywhere. The average applicant for the Foreign Service test is a college graduate with some additional graduate school training, and relevant work experience. From this group of already well-qualified applicants, only 1 to 2% pass the stringent, written, oral, medical, and security examinations, and are appointed as Foreign Service officers in the Department of State, or as Foreign Service Information officers in the United States Information Agency. In short, many in the Foreign Service are subject to merit standards substantially more competitive than those applied to Civil Service employees in domestic agencies. Yet, this merit system contains a number of loopholes which have made possible abuses of recognized merit principles for the Foreign Affairs Agencies to a degree which would not be tolerated in the Civil Service. In effect, the Foreign Service as it exists today both by law and by practice consists of two groups: one group subject to substantially more stringent merit considerations than those which apply in the rest of government, and another group subject to substantially less stringent requirements than are common in government service.

The Association believes that at a time when violations of the merit principle are receiving particularly close scrutiny in the rest of government, this would be a particularly appropriate occasion to close the remaining loopholes which permit abuses of the merit system in the Foreign Service and thereby undermine the professional integrity of the Service and its capacity to carry out its functions.

To that end, we would propose the following changes:

A) revision of the FSRU (FAS) system. Public Law 90-494 which created the FSIO Corps, simultaneously created a new personnel category for the Foreign Service—Foreign Service Reserve Officers with unlimited tenure, or FSRU. The intent of the legislation was to close a loophole which had existed at that time; namely, that both State and USIA were leaving a large number of Foreign Service Reserve Officers in a limbo status, granting them neither career rights on the one hand nor terminating them on the other. PL 90-494 required that those FSRs who had served at least three years either be converted to FSRU or some other career status, or else be terminated prior to the completion of their fifth year. Passage of this legislation did bring about the halt of what had been up to that time a serious abuse. The Agencies, unfortunately, utilized this new-found authority to create the so-called Foreign Affairs Specialist, or FAS, system. This, in turn, led to a number of new abuses unforeseen by the Congress, one of which—the direct conversion of Foreign Service Staff and Civil Service employees to FSRU in violation of the 3-year FSR requirement—was successfully challenged in the courts. Other abuses, however, arise either as the result of improper use of the FSRU authority or

else are inherent in present legislation and, accordingly, should best be remedied through a substantial revision in the Foreign Service Act and PL 90-494.

In particular, we would recommend the following:

(1) Elimination of the double jeopardy currently facing FSRU personnel. Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service Information officers because of their commissioned status are, in a manner similar to that which pertains in the military, subject to selection out. They are, however, exempt from the reduction-in-force rules. Foreign Service Staff Corps and all Civil servants may be RIFed, but cannot be selected out. FSRUs, however, uniquely in government are liable to both selection out and RIF. As such, their career security is the most tenuous of all government personnel bearing career status. In the Association's view, this is unfair, contrary to sound public policy, and a considerable disincentive for anyone to seek FSRU status.

(2) Establishment of stringent selection standards for FSRUs. FSRs appointed in anticipation of their subsequent conversation to FSRU are currently subjected to selection standards which are among the least stringent in government. Far tighter merit procedures, for example, are involved in the selection and appointment of Building Guards who work for the General Services Administration. As a result, two distinct forms of abuse have arisen: first, the Agencies have hired individuals who meet minimum qualifications for particular positions, but under circumstances which would not guarantee that the best available individuals were being hired; and, second, because the rules are so loose, individuals have been hired solely on the basis of their political and personal connections, who could not have met even the merit standards which apply to all Civil Service personnel, to say nothing of those which apply to Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service Information officers. Abuses of both kinds not only undermine the integrity of the Foreign Service, but are an insult to many of the fine individuals who have been brought in as FSRUs, and who would have passed stringent merit tests had such been in existence. To resolve this problem, the Association proposes that PL 90-494 be amended to require that the initial hiring of FSRs and their subsequent conversion to FSRU be accomplished by the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, utilizing procedures which will guarantee that only the best specialists are appointed and granted career tenure.

(3) Elimination of new domestic FSRU appointments. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Association strongly supported the passage of PL 90-494 not only because of the creation of the FSIO category, but also because in spite of some doubt we believed on balance that the FSRU category offered advantages both for the Foreign Service and many of its people. In particular, we believe such a category was highly advantageous for those categories of specialist personnel whose expertise was needed both in Washington and abroad. Second, the FSRU category offered significant improvements in the status of upward mobility projects of members of the Foreign Service Staff Corps. We never anticipated that this category would be utilized to undermine Civil Service laws and regulations and create a new category of "domestic" Foreign Service personnel who would draw the advantages of Foreign Service retirement, though never suffering the hardships and inconveniences of overseas service. The two Agencies, particularly USIA, have converted hundreds of domestically-based personnel to FSRU who have no prospect whatsoever of overseas service, some of whom never intended to serve overseas, others of whom were falsely misled into believing that they would have reasonable opportunities for occasional overseas assignments.

Having taken this inadvisable step, new injustices would be engendered by forcing such personnel to reconvert against their will to their former status. Nevertheless, the Association believes two measures should be taken immediately to resolve this problem: (a) the Congress should direct the Agencies, through legislation if necessary, to offer all former GS personnel in occupational categories which do not have a high probability of overseas service, the option of reconverting to GS at their present level of pay, but with the clear understanding that such reconversion is not mandatory; (b) preclude all further conversion to FSRU of GS personnel in occupational categories having no overseas equivalents.

B) Establish clear limits of Schedule C-type FSR appointments. As a result of discussions between the Association and the Secretary, the Department of State has agreed to institute certain limits on the discretionary appointment of Schedule C-type FSRs. The Association recognizes and supports the concept applied broadly in the rest of the government that there are in every agency policy supporting positions, and positions requiring the appointment of individuals in a confidential capacity to Presidential appointees which require bending the normal merit rules. In all of the rest of the government, however, these Schedule C-type positions are carefully regulated by the Civil Service Commission to assure that this authority is not used as a cover to undermine the merit system. In particular, the Civil Service Commission limits the number of Schedule C positions available to any agency, and maintains tight control over these allocations. The same does not apply, however, in the Department of State, USIA and AID. While the procedures enunciated by the Secretary help to resolve the strictly procedural problems involved in this question, we strongly believe some of these features should be incorporated into legislation. Moreover, we believe Congress should set numerical limits on the number of Schedule C-type appointments, and require annual reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee as to the number and type of such appointments. Moreover short-term specialists hired as FSRs for other than Schedule C-type positions should be subject to competitive merit procedures.

C) Language requirements for the Foreign Service. In response to a suggestion by the Association for a legislative reform, and in keeping with the expressed wishes of this Committee that the Act of 1946 be adhered to, the Department of State this past year promulgated regulations which require that the same language probation requirements will henceforth apply to all Foreign Service officers, not simply to those appointed as junior officers, as had been the case in the past. While the Association would have preferred such a measure to have been incorporated in legislation, we believe such a requirement will largely resolve the problem in the future. In the meantime, however, there are still hundreds of Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service Information officers who have not been required to meet a language probation requirement. This situation clearly undermines the professionalism of the Foreign Service and requires urgent action. On the other hand, the Association is sympathetic to the argument that a serious administrative burden would be imposed on the agencies if required to train all personnel not yet off language probation in a short time frame. Accordingly, we suggest a more modest proposal which would require that no Foreign Service officer or Foreign Service Information officer could be promoted after July 1, 1982, who had not yet met the minimum language requirement pursuant to the Secretary's regulations.

**2) Further Steps To Assure Professionalism in Ambassadorial Posts.**

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Association has strongly supported the suggestion of this Committee that it establish for its own guidelines criteria against which the qualifications of all ambassadorial nominees, whether career or noncareer, would be judged. We strongly appreciate the refusal of the Committee to be a party to the

worst examples of granting ambassadorships for reasons of political pay off or vast campaign contributions. The Association is likewise gratified at your expressed interest, Mr. Chairman, in again raising for consideration the adoption of criteria previously drafted. We would be delighted to assist such an effort in any way that we can.

In regard to this issue, AFSA also appreciates the decision of the Congress requiring that lists of campaign contributions by ambassadorial nominees be made public through the Congressional record as a matter of law.

We believe, however, that one additional legislative change is needed with respect to ambassadorial nominees: This Association strongly supports the basic thrust of S-202 introduced by Senator Mathias, which provides that one of the criteria suggested by this Committee be made a matter of law. The Association strongly supports this approach, though we would add one refinement: In addition to an overall limitation of 15% noncareer ambassadors, we would also suggest (along the lines of another of this Committee's recommendations) that an additional limitation of 20% be placed on the number of noncareer ambassadors who can serve in a given geographie region. This should serve to eliminate a problem inherent in the present situation in whieh the vast majority of posts in Western Europe have been held by noncareer ambassadors.

**3) Further Steps to Eliminate Inequities to Foreign Service People**

**A) Grievance Legislation.** Four years ago, on March 31, 1971, the American Foreign Service Association proposed grievance and appeal procedures for Foreign Service employees to the Seeretary of State. When it became evident that the State Department opposed adopting any independent grievance and appeal proeedures for its Foreign Serviee employees, the Association brought the matter to the attention of Senator Bayh, who, on June 8, 1971, introduced legislation "to provide members of the Foreign Service and their survivors a grievance procedure to assure the fullest measure of due process." This legislation—S. 904—which the Senate has passed on three occasions, is again before you and is more needed than ever.

In 1971 and subsequently the managements of State, AID, and USIA maintained that they and the exclusive employee representative, the Association, should be given a chance to negotiate their own grievanee systems under the Executive Order for Employee Management Relations in the Foreign Service. In fact, for more than three years the Department of State, and particularly the other Foreign Affairs Agencies—USIA and AID—have refused, absolutely refused, to discuss, mueh less negotiate on, *legislation* to provide a grievance and appeals system for the Foreign Service.

Three and one-half years ago, there was some merit in Ambassador Macomber's statements before the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committees in 1971 that "I don't think it is right to put one procedurc (the Bayh Bill) in the law when management has not participated in the development of it." There is, however, no merit today in the Agencies' arguments for further delay. The Agencies have misled this Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the American Foreign Serviee Association, and, most regrettably, the Foreign Service, by a tactic as successful as it is disingenuous. They have told this Committee and your colleagues in the House that Interim Grievance Proeedures exist and not to pass legislation until "we work it out with the elected bargaining agent." They then told us, the elected bargaining agent, that they do not have the authority to negotiate with AFSA on such legislation. The result is no legislation, exactly what the Ageneies want.

The Agencies are even backing away from working out permanent Agency grievance regulations. Their present grievance regulation proposal is more restrictive in coverage and jurisdietion than the Interim Grievance Procedures which they unilaterally promulgated in August 1971. That is what the Agencies eall good faith bargaining.

What brings this matter to a head is the fact that the Agencies' own Interim Grievance System is breaking down. Two of the Agencies, the Department of State and AID, have refused to implement decisions of the independent Interim Grievance Board, whose members the Agencies themselves appointed. The Department of State, after initially refusing to implement an order from the Interim Grievance Board, complied with the Board's order only after the Board and AFSA protested. The Board had to go so far as to suggest that its members would be forced to consider resigning if the Department of State did not implement the Board's order.

As usual, the situation in AID is worse. AID flatly refuses to implement an order from the Interim Grievance Board to reinstate an employee whom the Board found had been illegally fired. (This AID officer, after having been assigned overseas, with the approval of that country's head of state, was arbitrarily and capriciously fired on the grounds that there was no position available for him.) AID argued strenuously before the Grievance Board that the Board lacked jurisdiction to review the case. The Board ruled against the Agency on both this jurisdictional issue and on the merits. The Board ordered AID to rehire the fired employee. The Ageney has refused. The Interim Grievance Board consists of outstanding professionals of the highest levels of integrity and with a proven record of concern for the well-being of Foreign Service employees, but the Board, being a creature of the Agencies with no legislative basis, cannot foree AID to comply with its order. Its members can only threaten to resign; but that does not solve the problem. Only legislation can do that.

The laek of an independent, comprehensive, and binding grievance and appeals system for the Foreign Service is a matter of the greatest importance to the effective functioning of a career Foreign Service. Repeated disregard for due process standards in the Foreign Affairs Agencies have led AFSA to conclude that legislated due proeess standards are necessary for all Foreign Affairs Agency appeal procedures, including those involving grievances, selection out, separation for eause, and security.

The Agencies will implore the Congress not to act until they can work out appropriate legislation with AFSA. They then refuse even to discuss such legislation with the Association. They now are even refusing to implement the orders of their own appointed Grievance Board. The matter is crucial. The need for legislation is eritical. We urge this Committee to incorporate the Bayh-Cooper Bill—S.903—into the State Authorization Bill.

**B) Improving the Retirement System for the Foreign Service.** Mr. Chairman, as you know, in the last session of the Congress, the Senate passed S.1791, a bill submitted by the Administration to bring about improvements in the Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System. The bill was substantially improved as a result of changes by this Committee, a number of which were suggested by AFSA. Unfortunately, time ran out before the House was able to take up the measure. The Association is convineed that, as a result of the Senate's improvements, the bill as changed constitutes a substantial improvement over present legislation. The bill is elearly in the government's interest because it places the Fund on a more secure financial basis. It is in the interest of present employees and those who have already retired by providing relief for eertain widows who are near destitution, by providing immediate coverage for Foreign Service Staff Corps personnel, and by granting to the Foreign Service a number of provisions which have been in effect for the Civil Service for many years.

Given OMB's notorious incapacity to move quickly on anything, many more months may be required before the Administration is able to bring the

same bill forward. We would urge the Committee, therefore, to incorporate the text of S.1791 directly into the Department of State Authorization Bill, which would serve to speed the entire process greatly.

As you will also recall, the Association also proposed last year a limited proposal which would permit some members of the Service to retire prior to reaching age fifty. We pointed out that our proposal, because it was a modest one, would involve little or no additional cost to the Department, but would have a highly beneficial impact on the Foreign Service by permitting some individuals to retire a bit earlier, thereby making it easier for younger people in the Service to move more quickly into positions of greater responsibility. The Department of State promised the Committee at that time to make a full actuarial study of the suggestion in order to determine what, if anything, the costs of such a charge would be. To the best of our knowledge, they have done nothing to live up to that commitment.

In the meantime, the Association has done further study of the question, and would like to put forward a revised suggestion which would allow certain individuals to retire a bit earlier, but on reduced annuities. Our study indicates that this proposal, because of the reduced annuity feature, would actually save the government money.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the Retirement and Disability System, we regret to have to report to the Committee that the wisdom of the Congress last year in passing the "Hays Act" to provide special death gratuities to the families of the victims of terrorism has been clearly demonstrated, as terrorist actions and other extraordinary dangers resulting in the loss of life have continued to be directed, unabated, against Foreign Service personnel. While we greatly appreciate this action on behalf of the Foreign Service, events this past year, particularly the murder of Consular Agent Egan in Argentina, indicate the need for two steps:

(1) The current legislation makes no provision for consular agents. The risk undergone by consular agents is no smaller, and the senseless loss of human life no less a tragedy, simply because these American citizens are consular agents, and not regular members of the Foreign Service. Broadening the Act to cover consular agents would largely resolve this problem.

(2) Current legislation makes the payment of the special gratuity limited to one year's salary. Even if the consular agents were covered under the Act, Mr. Egan's widow would have received less than $4,000, since his salary was intended largely as a supplement, and not as full compensation. Moreover, it seems to us that one year's salary may be adequate at higher levels of pay, but be quite limited in the case of many of the thousands of lower-ranking officers and Staff Corps personnel in the Service. A gratuity of $36,000 to $42,500 for an ambassador is not unreasonable; a gratuity of $9,000 to the widow of a young Staff-9 communicator, or $11,000 to the widow of an 0-8 consular officer is hardly adequate. To rectify this situation, we would suggest that the legislation be modified to provide one year's salary (as at present), but with a minimum gratuity equal to the minimum pay of FSO-4, currently $21,816.

Finally, we would suggest that a private bill be passed for the relief of Mrs. Egan, providing for paying of $21,816. We have discussed these matters with the Department, and have reason to believe it supports us on these measures.

**C) Expanding Representation Allowances.** An area of increasing concern to the Association is that of representation allowances. Among the major diplomatic services of the world, the Foreign Service of the United States remains one of the most inadequately funded for these purposes. This exceedingly low level of support for the representatives of the US abroad presents career FSOs and FSIOs with two unacceptable alternatives. The first is to attempt to represent the US in a manner commensurate with our national interests and in accord with social practices in the country of assignment by dipping into our own pockets to pay representation costs. This practice, widely followed by conscientious Foreign Service personnel abroad, is in effect a subsidy of the US government in an amount of several million dollars by its employees at a cost to their personal well-being and that of their families. The other equally unacceptable alternative is to neglect the adequate representation of US interests in this area and stand by in embarrassment unable to reciprocate the hospitality of foreign nations, or bypass opportunities for advancing American interests for lack of funds. While the present ceiling on executive pay makes this problem more severe with every passing year of double-digit inflation, it is by no means confined to the upper ranks of our Service. Many low paid officers can be far more effective when a good relationship exists with local officials. This can be crucial when assisting Americans overseas to extricate themselves from the predicaments into which they have fallen. The actual increased cost to the taxpayer of a substantial increase in representation funds would be minor. We respectfully suggest, Mr. Chairman, that in a period of increasing reliance on diplomats and diplomatic skills, our front line Foreign Service personnel abroad should be given substantial increases in their representational allowances. We will be glad to develop and provide suggested levels of increase based on actual out-of-pocket expenses, missed opportunities, and the experience of other major nations with a professional diplomatic service.

**D) Keeping Foreign Service Families Together During Extended Temporary Duty Assignments.** Because of the gypsy-like nature of the Foreign Service, and the need to constantly be developing or improving language and functional skills, Foreign Service employees in all three Agencies are frequently assigned to periods of temporary duty while on transfer status from one post to the next. Perhaps the most common such detail is to the Foreign Service Institute for language training when the employee is being reassigned from one area of the world to another. These so-called temporary training assignments frequently last for as long as six months.

Current laws and regulations literally make no provision whatsoever to keep the employee and his or her family together, and in fact have the effect of either forcing protracted periods of separation, or of forcing the employee to undergo very substantial out-of-pocket expenses.

Consider, for example, the following case. A young FSO-6, with a wife and two children, is assigned from Santiago, Chile, to Jakarta, Indonesia, following home leave in Seattle and six months of language training in Indonesian at the Foreign Service Institute in Arlington. The employee receives a travel authorization from Santiago to Seattle to Washington to Jakarta, and also gets per diem to cover a portion (though hardly all) of the temporary lodging costs in Washington. For the employee, in general, this is a fair system.

However, that same employee's family receives travel orders from Santiago to Seattle to Jakarta. There is no provision for travel to Washington, nor is there any provision for the payment of their temporary lodging costs in either Seattle or the District of Columbia.

We have asked the Department what the family is supposed to do, since they are not authorized to travel to the new post and, if they stay at the former post, all allowances are cut off. The Department has told us there is no answer to that question, but that the family presumably has the option of staying at the home leave address. Frankly, in this day and age, particularly as the Foreign Service has become increasingly representative and almost none of us has private means, few of us have parents with housing with enough bedrooms to accommodate a spouse and two children for a

protracted period of time. Even if we did, the family separation is not justified, and contributes to further strain on the family in a profession which already imposes unusually high stresses on family life.

As a consequence, most of us, faced with this situation, pay the extra travel costs out of our own pockets, and the extra expenses of providing temporary lodging for our families, just so that the family can be together. These additional expenses can be as much as several thousand dollars—an extraordinary amount for anyone, but particularly for low paid junior officers and Staff Corps members.

We urge the Committee to take steps to alleviate this excessive financial and personal hardship by providing that when employees receive temporary duty assignments in excess of 30 days in conjunction with reassignment to another overseas post, the travel costs of family members to the temporary duty assignment be paid by the government, and that partial per diem payments be made to offset at least a portion of the extra costs for lodging for family members during the period of the temporary assignment.

**E) Special Pay for Couriers and Certain Other Personnel.** Mr. Chair- this nation is fortunate to be well-served by a group of highly dedicated and conscientious diplomatic couriers, without whose efforts the capacity of this country to carry out of its foreign relations would quickly come to a halt. Unfortunately, for years our diplomatic couriers have had to undergo extraordinary risks and hardships, and extraordinary expenses which the government has taken no steps to offset. With respect to risks, couriers, because of the very high percentage of their total lives spent on aircraft, have been subjected to far higher risks of death or injury from airplane accidents than almost anyone else faces. The number of diplomatic couriers who have lost their lives or been seriously injured in accidents is regrettably very high. Since World War II, six have been killed and a large number injured, a relative mortality rate greater than that of the FBI in the same time period. Moreover, in this era of terrorist acts, particularly overseas, the risk have been considerably increased because of hijackings and bombings of aircraft. Moreover, couriers must often undergo considerable hardships, flying in and out of areas of high incidence of disease, living in primitive accommodations, etc. Finally, couriers have a number of special expenses not compensated by the government, such as the need to maintain a large wardrobe so that they can fly at a moment's notice to places which may be bitter cold, and shortly thereafter into the hottest and most humid parts of the tropics. Moreover, the incessant travel takes a toll on luggage, etc., which is not paid for by the government, but which amounts to a considerable expense each year. Parallel problems also exist for certain other, but smaller, occupational groups, such as communications technicians, who may spend months in consecutive travel, often forced to leave for new assignments on extremely short notice. I should note in passing that none of these personnel is currently drawing any form of hardship allowance, the payment of which is based on hardship conditions at one's base post, and not on the conditions in areas in which one locates or is temporarily assigned.

To rectify the situation, the Association proposes the establishment of a special premium pay, set at 15% of base pay, and limited strictly to those actually in a flight or travel status. While even this would be below the hazardous duty pay paid elsewhere in government, it would go a long way toward recognizing the special risks, hardships and costs involved in serving this government in these vital functions.

**F) Establishing a Predeparture Lodging Allowance.** Several years ago, Congress established a "foreign transfer allowance" to meet at least some of the necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by an employee, whether in the Foreign Service or the Civil Service, to establish himself at a post of assignment in a foreign country. Perhaps one of the most significant such expenses is the cost of temporary lodging between the time the employee ships his effects from the United States and his or her actual departure for the overseas post and, in turn, at the other end, between arrival overseas, and the time the employee moves into permanent quarters. Under current legislation, both Civil Service and Foreign Service personnel have a portion of this latter expense at a foreign post paid by the government. However, Civil Service personnel also receive that allowance prior to departure from the United States, but Foreign Service personnel do not.

In March 1973 the Association proposed to the Agencies in the course of our negotiations that in light of the considerable expenses involved, and the fact that these expenses were already paid for Civil Service personnel, that comparable treatment be extended to the Foreign Service. During the bargaining, the Agencies agreed in principle that these extraordinary costs were necessary and proper expenses which should be borne by the government, and signed an agreement with us which, however, was conditional upon obtaining the approval of the General Accounting Office.

In reviewing the case, the General Accounting Office did not disagree that these were necessary and proper expenses, and did not assert that Foreign Service personnel were currently being treated equitably, but did rule that since 5 USC 5924(2) does not explicitly authorize such payments for the Foreign Service, there is no authority for the Agencies to compensate employees for these costs.

Since all parties concerned are in agreement that these expenses should be paid by the government, the only reason the Foreign Service is not being given equitable treatment with the Civil Service is an oversight in the drafting of this Section of the US Code. We urge you, therefore, to correct this flaw in current legislation to provide the authority for Foreign Service employees to be paid for necessary and proper predeparture lodging expenses in the US on exactly the same basis as is now done for Civil Service personnel.

**G) Offsetting Extraordinary Costs of Automobile Importation and Conversion.** You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that the Association proposed legislation last year which would provide payment of the extraordinary costs of those members of the Staff Corps who were not on the diplomatic list at overseas posts. Since that time, the Association has conducted a worldwide survey to determine the scope and intensity of the problems we raised at that time. That survey indicated that some of the problems can be solved without legislation, either through negotiations, or through vigorous efforts on the part of the Department to persuade host governments to provide more equitable treatment, and in the absence of equitable treatment, to impose reciprocal treatment in this country—measures which have not been taken to date. However, there is one aspect of the problem which cannot be readily resolved, but is a serious problem in a limited number of countries, particularly for our lowest paid Staff Corps personnel.

Several countries impose duties on the importation by the Staff Corps of personally owned automobiles which can range as high as $500, though those on the diplomatic list can import a car duty free. Moreover, several countries require that automobiles be converted to meet local regulations, regulations which in some cases are waived for diplomatic personnel, but never for less well paid Staff Corps personnel. Some employees have spent as much as $300 to have their automobiles meet foreign standards and then two years later have to spend the same amount to have their cars reconverted to meet American standards. As we indicated, these costs fall most heavily on those least able to afford them, and are costs solely the result of their serving their government abroad. We would urge a revision in the Foreign Service Act which would au-

thorize the Secretary to pay any costs incidental to the importation of an automobile at a foreign post, and to the conversion of that automobile to meet locally imposed standards, or for the reconversion to meet American requirements.

**H) Correcting a Technical Problem in the Act Concerning Annual Step Increases.** Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to raise with you a question of wording in the present legislation which, with the government's proposed change in the fiscal year, causes us great concern. As you know, Foreign Service officers and Reserve officers receive annual step increases which are tied to July 1, the beginning of the fiscal year. This is unlike other parts of the federal government where step increase eligibility occurs exactly one year after promotion. The present system already disadvantages the Foreign Service, since we typically receive promotions in April and then have to wait fifteen months before becoming eligible for a step increase.

With the change in the fiscal year to 1 October instead 1 July, next year FSOs, FSIOs and FSRs would be further disadvantaged by another three months before being eligible for step increases. Were the date of eligibility to be moved forward to October, 25 percent of their first step increase would be lost and thus inequity would continue with every subsequent step increase, and following every promotion. An FSO-8 would lose approximately $83 in one year, while an FSO-2 could lose $271 in a single step increase.

Clearly, this problem is merely the result of a technicality in the present legislation which assumes the fiscal year to be July 1. Now that the fiscal year is going to be moved to October, we request that the eligibility date for step increases be tied to the specific date of July 1 rather than the beginning of the fiscal year. This could be done easily by deleting the words "on the first day of each fiscal year" in Section G 25 of the Act, and substituting instead "on July 1 of each year."

**4) Organizing the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy**

The Association is providing the members of the Committee with copies of our testimony on the organization of government for the conduct of foreign policy before the Murphy Commission yesterday, and of our previous testimony on the recommendations of the Stanton Panel before a subcommittee of that Commission. Although I commend those documents to you for your careful consideration, I would also like to hit a few of the highlights of that testimony this morning.

The current organizational structure of the government for foreign affairs has evolved over the years through a series of *ad hoc*, often uncoordinated decisions, each of which might have been justified in the abstract but which taken together, constitute an organizational structure that could hardly be justified by anyone. In pursuit of a "macropolicy" perspective for foreign affairs, what is needed is far stronger centralization of policy and authority in the Secretary of State in Washington, and in our ambassadors in the field.

We believe that the first task must be to reestablish the legislative and professional inputs in foreign policy and to limit what has come to be the near total power of the Presidency and the pervasiveness of military influence. To this end the Association has recommended: (1) that the National Security Act be revised and the Secretary of State serve concurrently as head of the National Security Council; (2) that by legislation assistants to the President be prohibited from interposing themselves (serving in functions) between the President and the heads of the foreign affairs departments; (3) that a severe limit be placed on the size of the President's foreign affairs staff; and (4) that this committee be charged with oversight of the role of the military in the foreign affairs policy process. In addition to our recommendation with respect to the National Security Council, we would also recommend that serious consideration be given to: (1) a single foreign affairs budget; (2) explicit authority for the Secretary of State to provide policy direction to *all* elements of the government involved in foreign affairs in the form of basic enabling legislation for the Department; and (3) the question of whether we need to have so many agencies involved in foreign affairs at all.

Our position with regard to the future of USIA and AID is also worth sketching briefly for the Committee. As we indicated in testimony on the Stanton Panel findings, in our view information and cultural programs are and ought to remain an integral part of American diplomacy and should not be splintered abroad along the lines recommended by the Stanton Panel. In the case of AID, we recommend urgent legislative action to transform the advisory development function of US foreign policy from a mission of a "temporary" nature into the permanent concern that it must remain for the United States. Some concrete steps we have proposed are: (1) that Congress should officially acknowledge the importance to US foreign policy of foreign development assistance; (2) that the leadership of the USG foreign development assistance program should flow directly from the Secretary of State; and (3) that delegations of authority to the Administrator of AID should be temporarily assigned to the Deputy Secretary of State pending enabling legislation to amalgamate administrative support of State and AID, create a career service of Foreign Service Development officers, develop a long-range career development program for such personnel, and establish a more formal leadership and coordination role for all US official foreign development assistance activities. These proposals for USIA and AID look to the larger task of eliminating the duplication of certain administrative and personnel support functions in the three Foreign Affairs Agencies. Many of the functions are already consolidated in Washington, and most are run jointly overseas. The Association believes that further economies can be brought about, employee rights strengthened, and better and more evenhanded services provided Foreign Service personnel if the security, employee-management relations, and eventually the payroll, shipping and travel sections of the three Agencies are combined.

One matter which greatly concerns us and for which no remedy is apparently available outside of legislation is in the area of compensation for Foreign Service people. Senior officers are faced with the executive pay ceiling and junior officers with slower rates of promotion than their peers in the Civil Service and the military. Part of the problem is the rigid application to the Foreign Service by the Civil Service Commission of "classification factors" which ignore the high quality of personnel needed to perform most diplomatic jobs, the importance of language ability, and typically longer hours worked by Foreign Service professionals—particularly abroad. To this end a useful first step could be taken by providing a premium in lieu of overtime pay as is already done for FBI employees.

A final area that needs consideration is that of scaling down and rationalizing the scope and number of intelligence and nonforeign affairs agencies overseas. In the intelligence field, we believe the Congress should act to eliminate unnecessary duplication; curtail substantially the level of CIA and military intelligence personnel overseas, particularly in third-world countries; and place far stronger limitations on covert operations. The three Foreign Affairs Agencies continue to suffer from the sizable reductions in operations and personnel abroad during the 1967-68 BALPA/OPRED exercises, while other primarily domestic agencies managed to avoid such reductions and in some cases have in fact seen increases in the past five years. Although since 1968 the size of the Foreign Service has declined from 16,000 to 12,000 with corresponding reductions overseas, DOD alone still has some 23,000 American civilians, and a grab bag of other agencies support 1,900 personnel abroad.

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## REPORT BY THE ELECTIONS CHAIRMAN

AFSA members should have received their ballots by the time this issue of the JOURNAL reaches them. Accordingly the campaign phase of the 1975 AFSA elections will largely be over by the time you read this. This phase of the elections has consisted of campaign meetings for all officer positions and all constituencies except USIA (the only candidate for USIA representative is overseas at present). The campaign period has also included three mailings of a substantial volume of material by the candidates at AFSA expense. In addition some candidates have undertaken campaign activities of their own.

Our close and helpful cooperation with the Department of Labor's supervisor, Mr. Howard Naiman, has continued throughout this period. Mr. Naiman has personally supervised the complicated processing and mailing of each of the three mailings of candidates' statements sent to members and has also supervised each stage of the process of the drafting, printing, collating and mailing of the ballots and accompanying material. We have learned a great deal about the conduct of elections from observing and consulting with Mr. Naiman and it is clear to me that future Elections Chairmen will have to recognize that running the election is a full-time occupation during various periods, totalling more than a month, during the elections process. Mr. Naiman has also overseen the preparation of ground rules for the campaign meetings and for the preparation and dispatch of campaign statements and has conducted several meetings with the candidates and their representatives for this purpose.

As many members already know, this election is proving to be an unusually expensive one. I have learned from elections officials in other unions that, in many cases, the conduct of an election is the most time-consuming and expensive single function that their unions undertake and this has been confirmed by the Department of Labor. On the basis of our experience with this election I believe that AFSA will be able to conduct its next election effectively and properly but at less cost. The Elections Committee will be making recommendations to the new Governing Board to this effect after the elections are over.

During this phase of the election four candidates withdrew from the election: Paul Chadwell, Wesley Jorgensen, David Morrison and Peter Szluk. One member of the Elections Committee, Robert Johnson, representing AID, was assigned abroad and he has been replaced by Dr. Stanley Applegate. The present membership of the Elections Committee is therefore: Dan Thal (State), Terry Larson (State), John McCarthy (USIA), John Garner (USIA), Everett Headrick (AID), Stanley Applegate (AID), Maurice Bernbaum (retired) and Niles Bond (retired).

JOHN WASHBURN
*Chairman*
*AFSA 1975 Elections Committee*

## Foreign Service People

### Birth

**Perina.** A daughter, Katherine Hetherington, born to FSO and Mrs. Rudolf Vilem Perina, on April 10, in Ottawa.

### Deaths

**Byrd.** Richard Walke Byrd, FSO-retired, died on May 5, in Washington. Mr. Byrd entered the Foreign Service in 1935 and served at Marseille, Calais, Calcutta, Karachi, Jerusalem, Iskenderun, Adana, Strasbourg, Ankara, Ottawa and Canberra. He served as Faculty Adviser at the Army War College and as Senior Inspector before his retirement in 1959. He is survived by his wife, the former Countess Daria Nieroth, The Westchester, 4000 Cathedral Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016.

**Keating.** Kenneth B. Keating, Ambassador to Israel, former Ambassador to India and former Senator from New York, died on May 5, in New York. Ambassador Keating served in Congress from 1946 to 1964, then as an associate justice of the New York Court of Appeals, before his appointment as Ambassador to India in 1969. He had been serving in Israel since August of 1973. He is survived by his wife, the former Mary Pitcairn Davis and a daughter, Judith K. Howe of Short Hills, N.J.

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