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FSJ EDITORIAL

ASSIGNMENTS—"CROOKED, BUT IT'S THE ONLY GAME IN TOWN"

"I know the game is crooked, but it's the only game in town." Thus, the reply of the card player in an unfamiliar town when asked why he played in a poker game well-known to be fixed. This comment eloquently represents the sentiments of Foreign Service people regarding the assignments processes of the three Foreign Affairs Agencies.

In response to our 1974 telegram to all posts on the Cone System in State, the Association received over 100 cabled replies and numerous letters. Without exception, posts urged the establishment of an open assignments system. In cable after cable our respondents criticized the present system as unduly favoring persons assigned to Washington, and as being liable to all kinds of political abuses and favoritism. Similar complaints from AID and USIA Foreign Service personnel have become pandemic.

As usual, the collective wisdom is accurate. Consider the following:

- The political section of an pleasant EUR post will soon be staffed by a 7th floor special assistant and the former staff assistant to the current ambassador;
- The cases of favored colleagues finding niches in comfortable embassies and remaining 6, 8, or 10 years are well-known;
- In State, Regional bureaus retain their authority to treat assignments like club memberships;
- In all three Agencies, top-level management can and does manage favorable assignments for favored loyalists;
- In all three Agencies, "who you know" matters more than your qualifications for a particular job, particularly in AID.
- Foreign Service colleagues in State working in Personnel continue consistently to pick off choice assignments, while AID is plagued with the opposite problem of Foreign Service assignments largely in the hands of GS personnel;
- Politically appointed ambassadors can and do arrange to corrupt the assignment and appointment processes in order to place hordes of FSR personal assistants (Ambassador Saxbe has two FSR-1s with him in New Delhi; Ambassador Richardson took three high-ranking FSRs with him in London);
- AID continues to RIF on the one hand and make forced placements on the other: and
- The term "black bag job" as a description for all of the shenanigans in the assignments process has become a common phrase in the corridors.

These horrors are merely indicative. To get you the specifics we will publish in the JOURNAL each month a new feature called THE OUTRAGE OF THE MONTH.

Serious abuses apply to the assignments processes in the three Foreign Affairs Agencies. In this, as in other matters, AID's normal disorganization has been compounded by the current RIFs, the elimination of assistance in Southeast Asia, and the resulting forced placements, etc. State and USIA can take little comfort that their procedures are marginally better and fairer.

Our criticisms, though accurate and real, are not aimed at the hard working professionals in all three Agencies who try to make some sense out of the assignments chaos and who try to be fair while working within a system which is inherently corrupt. The fact remains, however, that assignment processes are not working equitably and have no credibility with the men and women of the Foreign Service.

Recent Directors General have deplored the "lack of Service discipline" and "an unfortunate tendency toward negotiated assignments." Regretably, "service discipline" is in fact a euphemism for the majority of us accepting assignments made by the system and remaining quiet about the hanky-panky going on around us. Of course, assignments will be "negotiated" as long as it is the only way for the rest of us to try to have some input into the system, and as long as the system itself encourages "negotiations" with the White House, politically appointed Ambassadors, geographic bureaus and assorted ageney potentates.

To deal with this problem, the Association is developing proposals which will be tabled shortly with the three Foreign Affairs Agencies. We seek an agreement designed to establish policies and procedures which will guarantee an open and equitable assignments system. Our proposals will be based upon the following elements:

- A firm tour of duty policy;
- A strengthenced, centralized panel system which will have authority to make assignments, coupled with an oversight role for AFSA in panel determinations;
- A prohibition against ambassadors and other high-level officers interfering in the assignments process, except in the case of their personal staff and of DCMs;
- The publication and distribution to all posts of all assignment availabilities to be brought up-to-date each month; with ample opportunities for employees to express their preferences based on a knowledge of which jobs are actually available.
- A clear set of guidelines setting forth how the assignment process is to be integrated with career planning, career development and training.

The assignment process is central to the whole Foreign Service concept. Where you are assigned has a critical impact on career development, job and professional satisfaction, "life-style" and off-duty activities, the health, education and economic well-being of you and your family, promotion prospects, future assignments and your chances to rise to greater responsibilities. While Foreign Service personnel will continue to play "the only game in town" until something better comes along, it is in all our interests—the people of the Foreign Service and the three agencies—to bring about radical reforms in the assignment system as a matter of real urgency. The game cannot be crooked.

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COMMUNICATION
re:

EXCESS BAGGAGE

AUDINE STIER

The JOURNAL has reached new heights of unintended humor with "Excess Baggage" (April, 1975). The title is wonderfully apt.

The article begins with the problems of life overseas faced by a wife. First she must often spend months in a hotel after arriving at a new post. True enough, but I suggest that her husband and children are suffering the same trauma. And she spends "the last six months packing up and preparing herself psychologically for the next post." Now any woman who does that needs the counsel of an expert on home management and a first rate psychiatrist. I fear her problems are beyond the help of mere "consciousness raising."

Then she has problems with linguistic barriers, whereas her husband "has the advantage of gaining complex language proficiency on the job." Do tell. Most wives gain language proficiency a lot faster than their husbands because they are dealing with the butcher, the baker and the maid who, as a rule, don't speak English, while the husband is surrounded by people who do. And who would rather speak their excellent English than listen to him grope about in FSI Urdu.

She finds herself burdened by entertainment responsibilities, giving parties at which women often serve only as decorations. Only, say I, those women who haven't the wit to be anything else. One hopes they have the looks.

Even having help in the home is a problem. With a maid around it is hard to "sustain any meaningful sharing of household responsibilities in a marriage contract." Which is to say that you can't very well expect your husband, after eight hours in the office, to do the washing up if there is hired help to do it for him. And he may get into bad habits this way. Ladies, be of good cheer. Not all posts are Colombia, and your time will come to be servantless. You can easily train your spouse once again in the way he should go. It may be harder to get used to it yourself.

So to ease all these pains the writers started to have consciousness raising sessions once a week. Consciousness raising is like a lot of currently fashionable terms, a euphemism for something that has been around for a long time. Janitors are now building superintendents, and the old fashioned female gabfest has now been elevated. The ladies get together and discuss the shortcomings of their husbands, their own boredom, how to rear children, and other personal matters. Especially revealing about the tone of these sessions is the paragraph about some members' dropping out and the formation of

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


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
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
two other groups, each with its own "tone and style." In other words you raise your consciousness only with a congenial "bunch of the girls." Somewhere along the line Colombian women were invited to speak to the group. Shades of all those wives' meetings we are all supposed to despise!

There is an alarming bit about what all this self examination has done to their feelings about their maids. "Maids are often treated as servants rather than employees" is another of those linguistic niceties that doesn't mean much. Anybody who works for someone else is a servant—he serves his employer. The maid would be happy just to be treated as a human being, and one hopes the writers aren't going to raise her consciousness to the point where she is no longer willing to be a domestic. For in all likelihood this is her only way of earning a living, unless she takes over the job of her male counterparts in society, such interesting and lucrative occupations as dishwashing in a restaurant or being a hall porter, for instance. The writers say that they, "as much as our maids, are culturally tied to a lifetime of lowered expectations simply because we are women." Which is a lot of hogwash. The maid is tied because of a lack of education and/or capability. Household workers in many countries are men, glad to have a job, rather than women. The Foreign Service wife is tied to a lifetime of lowered expectations only if she is lazy or not very bright.

The writers of this article put themselves in the latter category by some of their sloppy thinking. One of them has enrolled at the university to study Spanish. This seems a fairly obvious thing to do if you are having trouble with linguistic barriers. But this poor woman had to have six months of consciousness raising before the thought occurred to her. The group finds that the sessions have enabled them to like and respect other women better. I am glad this has happened, but most of us don't need a year of nattering to each other to "see women as worthwhile people" and thus to discover that "we ourselves are persons of value." The only women I see as someone's wife, mother or secretary are those I know only in a secondary way (I know the husband, child or boss first or better) or those who are so dim in their own right that they must be defined by such reference.

The writers find themselves, as a result of their communing, likely to challenge an anti-woman remark. Without consciousness raising I find myself very ready indeed to challenge the kind of whining and self delusionary thinking this article abounds in. Coping with the problems of overseas life as married women is what troubles the writers. What robbed them of their identity was "the ultimate triviality of the problems we were expected to handle." This from a group of women the majority of whom have children! While they were out paying calls or shopping for brass their husbands were solving the world's problems. I suggest that most of the husbands were really overseeing the travel of a great many papers from an in-box to an out-box, and that if the ladies were shopping for brass it was their own fault. They speak of worrying about the maids' taking care of their children,

Continued on page 25



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BASIL WENTWORTH

Said an Arab whose name was Abboud:
"Here's a thought that I hope is not rude:
The millennium's close
When your GNP's gross,
But it's here *when your product is crude!"*

Sighed a spouse-hunting spinster named Lake:
"These Arabians make my heart break:
I hardly expected
Them so *dark-complected*
When I'd dreamed of a pretty fair sheik."

"I get homesick at times for a while,"
An Egyptian remarked with a smile,
"And that explains why,
Whenever I fly,
I put in for a seat by an aisle."

A Northern Iraqi was heard
Protesting his bill was absurd:
"I insist it's not fair,
But I can't tell you where–
It's because of the charges in Kurd!"

An Iranian said, "Don't demean us
By calling us Arabs–you've seen us:
There's a slight ethnic tie;
Our reserves are both high–
But there's also a great Gulf *between us."*

Said a Middle East tourist named Clancy:
"I suppose it might tickle your fancy
To hear me peruse
A list of the Druse:
There was John . . . there was Pearson . . . there's Nancy. . . ."

Said a nomad, "It's great, in a sense,
That we're not circumscribed by a fence;
But we still offer prayers
To be freed from our cares,
Since our manner of living's intense."

Said the date-farmer, "Try to be calm.
There's no possible cause for alarm
In the chap spreading ghee
On the trunk of my tree—
For it's baksheesh: *he's greasing my palm."*

Said the Consul, "Whenever my peers
Reminisced on their varied careers,
And they asked by which post
I felt challenged the most,
I would answer: the three Muscat years."

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Part II

FOREIGN POLICY MAKING IN A NEW ERA

UNITED STATES MISSIONS AND CONFERENCES

RICHARD N. GARDNER

In Part I, Professor Gardner proposed organizational changes to improve the performance of the Department of State in the field of multilateral diplomacy. The article is adapted from a report written at the request of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

United States Missions and Conferences

Whatever reforms are carried out in Washington, the United States Government will not be meeting the challenges of multilateral diplomacy unless it makes some basic improvements in the "delivery system"—US missions to international organizations, US delegations to international conferences, and the handling of multilateral issues by US country missions.

Missions to International Organizations

The most important of all the US multilateral missions is the United States Mission to the United Nations. Little more than a decade ago, the five Ambassadorial posts at USUN were occupied by Adlai Stevenson, Francis Plimpton, Charles Yost, Philip Klutznick and Jonathan Bingham. Stevenson, of course, was a man of world stature, but it is also significant that all four of his top associates brought exceptional professional qualifications to their assignments. It is no reflection on those who have occupied these posts in subsequent years to state the simple fact that a similar concentration of talent has not been assembled since.

One frequently debated question is whether or not the United States Ambassador to the United Nations should be a national political figure. A good case can be made on both sides of this argument. There are undoubted advantages in having a UN Ambassador who can telephone the President at will, command headlines with his statements on world affairs, and force the reconsideration of major policies by the threat of resignation. On the other hand, someone with his own national constituency may be tempted to run "a second State Department" in New York and to ignore or even sabotage policy directives emanating from Washington.

It is doubtful that this question can be answered in the abstract. It will certainly help if the Ambassador to the United Nations has "political clout," but it is even more important that he be a solid professional with substantive knowledge in the main areas of UN activity. A US Ambassador who has to turn to a staff member for advice before he can respond to an argument made during a Washington policy conference, a visit with a foreign diplomat, or an attack on US policy in a UN debate, will not be able to provide the kind of leadership in support of stronger multilateral institutions that is now required. Moreover, whatever the background of the US Ambassador to the United Nations, he must be willing to serve as a loyal member of the United States Government team—fighting hard if necessary to shape or change his instructions but prepared to carry them out when a policy decision goes against him.

One of the most serious deficiencies of the United States Mission to the United Nations is its lack of competence in economics and other important specialized areas. It is paradoxical that these "nonpolitical" subjects now account for half the items before the General Assembly, most of the items before subordinate UN bodies and a preponderance of the work of the Secretariat, yet of the five Ambassadorial appointees at the US Mission there has seldom been more than one at any given time with a solid academic background or practical experience in these subjects—and sometimes there has been none at all. In view of the increasing prominence of economic and functional issues in the work of the United Nations, this kind of competence should be a major factor in the

choice of the United States Permanent Representative and the other four Ambassadorial appointees.

What has just been said about professional qualifications at the top level of USUN also applies at the staff level. In recent years men who had spent ten years or more specializing in UN work have left the Mission, to be replaced by Foreign Service officers on two to four year assignments. With a few notable exceptions, the decline in competence and commitment at USUN has been alarming. Service with the Mission is rarely an asset in the career of a Foreign Service officer, and the expense of living in New York imposes a heavy financial burden (though this has been somewhat eased by the recent decision to grant housing allowances). To make matters worse, USUN has been obliged to reduce its staff in response to budgetary economies at a time when the variety and complexity of the items on the UN agenda are greater than ever.

To give just one example of what the present staffing pattern means, USUN now has only four officers assisting the Ambassador to the Economic and Social Council to cover trade, development, food, energy, environment, population, the law of the sea, science and technology, and US interests in the UNDP and other voluntary funds to which the United States makes major contributions. These officers spend much of their time trying to satisfy the General Accounting Office that US contributions to the UN are well spent.

With the decline in both the quality and quantity of personnel at USUN, it is not surprising that the Mission has made a smaller and smaller contribution to the making of policy. In matters as diverse as disarmament, outer space, environment, and the law of the sea, USUN has been reduced to a transmission belt for decisions made in Washington.

The situation is even more discouraging at the United States Mission to the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva. For years the Geneva Mission has been treated as a second-rate Foreign Service assignment, or, even worse, as a resting ground for the politically deserving. Yet more and more parts of the UN Secretariat have been located in Geneva and the conference schedule there is even more crowded than the one in New York.

With the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, attention is now being given to establishing another US Ambassador in Geneva to handle the multilateral trade negotiations following the practice that was employed during the Kennedy Round. But creating a separate Mission in Geneva to deal with trade negotiations will only make it harder to build up the quality of the regular Geneva Mission. It will also create serious jurisdictional conflicts, for the regular Geneva Mission is supposed to deal with UNCTAD and ECE, as well as ongoing GATT problems. The next round of trade negotiations will cover a much broader field than the trade negotiations of the past, ranging broadly beyond tariffs into non-tariff barriers, commodity problems and access to supplies. This will make it even harder to separate the activities of the Mission in charge of trade negotiations from those of the regular Mission responsible for the UN economic agencies. For all these reasons the United States would do well to follow the practice of most major foreign governments, who head their Geneva Missions with men of substantive competence and employ them both for trade negotiations and general UN business.

Special importance should also be attached to strengthening the United States Mission to the OECD in Paris and the United States Mission to the European Communities in Brussels. The Paris post is now more important than ever, in view of the initiatives recently undertaken among the industrialized countries to deal with the energy crisis.

It is sometimes argued that US missions to international organizations are unimportant because significant business is handled by high-level officials from Washington and other capitals. There is no doubt that international organizations tend to be more effective when they bring together the people in national governments who have the power to take policy decisions and see that they are carried out. Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to treat the heads of US missions to multilateral agencies as glorified hotel-keepers and airport-greeters. The national interest in multilateral diplomacy requires that we have outstanding representatives maintaining good relations with other delegations and with the international Secretariat. This is essential if the high-level meetings of people from capitals are to be well-prepared and effectively followed up.

One vitally important area in which US missions to international agencies are not adequately performing their tasks is the recruitment of qualified people for the international Secretariat. Time after time US interests have suffered as a result of unfortunate personnel decisions by the UN Secretary-General on programs of major interest to the United States. Much more attention needs to be paid to personnel questions by our Ambassadors in New York and Geneva and by senior officials in the Department of State. The issue is not just one of promoting qualified Americans for international posts, but of working with other governments to see that better candidates from all countries are made available so that the management of essential multilateral programs is put in capable hands.

In view of the national interest in more effective international institutions, a much more systematic effort is needed to identify key positions in the Secretariats where vacancies will occur—and the qualified persons from the academic, scientific, professional and business worlds who can step into these assignments. Preparations for filling vacancies should be made months and even years in advance. Otherwise the United States will become more and more dependent on Foreign Service officers to fill such posts. There is a particular need to attract more qualified young people and women into UN service. An important step forward would be the creation of a UN Fellowship Program, in which a small number of outstanding young people could be recruited by worldwide competitive examination.

Another notable failure in US multilateral diplomacy is reflected in the disarray of the non-Communist industrialized nations in the United Nations on issues such as the Middle East and the

New International Economic Order. To be sure, the North Atlantic nations and Japan frequently perceive their national interests on these subjects differently; nevertheless, more could be done in forums like NATO and OECD to harmonize positions in the global forums, both on matters of substance and on administrative and budgetary questions. It is a sad state of affairs that the twenty countries accounting for two-thirds of the world's GNP and two-thirds of the UN's budget should so often act at cross-purposes while the nearly 100 developing countries work together as a potent bloc.

Delegations to International Conferences

Also neglected in the "delivery system" for multilateral diplomacy are the US delegations to international conferences. Given the importance of the global agenda and the difficulty of mobilizing support for US positions, every delegation member should be able to function effectively as a member of the US team. Yet this is seldom the case. In recent years, for example, the public members of US delegations to the United Nations General Assembly have often lacked professional qualifications or have been absent for much of the session. United States representation on the Sixth (Legal) Committee of the General Assembly has been a notable victim of this practice—we repeat our commitment to the "rule of law," yet there has hardly been a General Assembly in the last twenty years in which the United States has been represented by a distinguished jurist. Under both parties, the White House has used delegations for easy political rewards. This has hampered the US performance, not only in the General Assembly, but in meetings of the Specialized Agencies and in specialized UN conferences like the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.

If we are serious about our commitment to the strengthening of multilateral institutions, the President should appoint the public members of delegations on a merit basis. Nominations should be made by the Department of State in consultation with other executive agencies and, where appropriate, with business, labor, scientific and academic groups. Members of the delegation to the UN General Assembly should be named three to six months in advance of each Assembly, so that they can prepare themselves with the help of USUN and the Department of State. In some years, public members have been appointed only a few days before the opening of an Assembly—in one case an appointment was actually made after an Assembly was already underway.

United States Country Missions

United States policy in multilateral institutions cannot be effective unless US country missions are able to deal effectively on multilateral issues with other governments. Reflecting the change in the nature of modern diplomacy, issues before multilateral forums now account for as much of the work of our country missions as traditional bilateral questions. But this fact is not yet adequately reflected in the way US missions are organized and staffed.

The failure of US country missions to give adequate priority to multilateral issues can prove extremely costly to the national interest. For example, in the 1960 Geneva Conference, the United States lost by one vote in its effort to achieve a six-mile territorial sea with an additional six-mile fishing zone. The day after the voting took place, the representatives of several developing countries indicated that they would have voted with the United States, had their instructions arrived in time. It was subsequently learned that the United States Ambassadors in these countries had not considered the law of the sea as a subject important enough to take up on a priority basis at a high level of the host government. As a result, the world community was left without any agreement on the territorial sea and fishing limits, a vacuum which has led to unilateral claims of up to 200 miles. Had our country missions done their job in 1960, the United States would now be negotiating in the Law of the Sea Conference from a far stronger legal and political position.

The ability of our country missions to perform effectively on multilateral issues is not much better today than it was fifteen years ago. During recent State Department-sponsored tours of Africa and Asia, the writer was repeatedly asked by the personnel of US Embassies to explain US positions on specialized questions ranging from the law of the sea to UN peacekeeping procedures and international monetary reform. This is not intended as a criticism of the officers involved—they had carefully read the telegrams of instructions and other material forwarded by the Department. But they simply did not have the necessary specialized background to understand the significance of the material and to present it convincingly to experts in the host government.

To be sure, the major United States Embassies have Treasury or Agriculture representatives and personnel from other Executive departments to perform certain specialized functions. But most United States Embassies do not. Moreover, such representatives owe their first allegiance to the Executive departments which control their careers; they tend to reflect the Treasury or Agriculture view. Finally, the system of seconding from Executive departments often leaves important gaps in the expertise of the country missions—such as oceans, environment, population, and the whole array of constitutional and procedural matters arising in the UN system.

It is time to reorganize the US missions to all but the very smallest countries with which we have relations to reflect the new importance of multilateral diplomacy. In line with the changes suggested earlier in the Department of State, the Ambassador in each mission should be supported by a senior political aide and a senior aide for economic and multilateral affairs. The former would be responsible for the multilateral and bilateral aspects of political-military affairs; the latter would supervise not just bilateral economic affairs but all multilateral economic and functional questions. In the major Embassies, the senior aide of the Ambassador for economic and multilateral affairs would carry the rank of Minister and might have as many as three or four staff members to deal with multilateral issues like oceans, energy, environment, and population.

A New Personnel System: An Essential Reform

It is frequently acknowledged in theory, but not always reflected in practice, that people are more important than tables of organization. If the basic ideas emphasized thus far are to be translated into action—giving central priority in US foreign policy to multilateral diplomacy, developing a more coherent interdepartmental effort within the Executive Branch, giving the State Department a new leadership role, improving the "delivery system" for the conduct of multilateral diplomacy—then there will have to be a new personnel system in the Executive Branch.

To begin with the most obvious point, the Department of State does not have the specialized competence in either economic or other multilateral affairs to enable it to assert its leadership in relation to other parts of the government, such as Treasury, Agriculture or Commerce. The "Wristonization" program of the 1950s destroyed the critical mass of economic and international organization experts which the State Department had built up during the wartime and early postwar years. Although the Foreign Service has recently put emphasis on the need for economists and other specialists, its system of recruitment and career development works against this objective. The nation's top graduate students in economics, business, law and other relevant specialties for the new diplomacy are only rarely attracted to a Foreign Service career, because this means a succession of foreign assignments mostly unrelated to their fields of specialization. With a few notable exceptions, outstanding specialists who join the Foreign Service find their specialty an obstacle in career development. Country ambassadorships tend to be reserved to Foreign Service officers specializing in the particular region, while the few ambassadorships to multilateral institutions are usually awarded to political appointees.

In addition to crippling the State Department's potential as a lead agency for multilateral diplomacy, the present personnel system reinforces the separatist tendencies of the different Executive agencies. Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture Labor, the Federal Reserve Board, the Environmental Protection Administration, etc., have their own career services with their own departmental loyalties and perspectives. This makes it even harder to achieve a coherent US government policy in multilateral diplomacy and helps explain why our system of "portfolio government" is so often exported into the system of international institutions.

It is recommended, therefore, as an essential element in the package of reforms advocated in this paper, that there be created a new career service for economic and multilateral affairs. This new service would take its place alongside the Foreign Service as a second "track" for careers in the Department of State. It would also provide personnel for the international divisions of other executive agencies. In contrast to Foreign Service personnel, officers in the new service would spend at least half of their careers in Washington, could look forward to a series of jobs making full use of their professional specialties, would be able to stay in assignments longer than the two to four years that is standard in Foreign Service careers, and would be free to move back and forth between the State Department and international work in other Federal agencies. The members of this new career service would serve at USUN and other US missions to multilateral organizations. They would also serve with US country missions in assignments in economic and multilateral affairs. The new career service would encourage lateral entry of distinguished persons from the private sector and grant liberal leaves of absence for career personnel to take positions in private business, law and the academic world.

In addition to crippling the State Department's potential as a lead agency for multilateral diplomacy, the present personnel system reinforces the separatist tendencies of the different Executive agencies.

The new service in economic and multilateral affairs would aim to develop the kind of prestige that has been acquired by the French "inspecteurs des finances." It would be an elite service with entry restricted to approximately 100 persons per year based on competitive examination, academic records and professional experience. Members of the service could look forward to a much broader range of career possibilities than are available to economists and other specialists now in the Foreign Service—they would move into senior assignments throughout the Executive Branch and leading positions in the private sector. Corporations, law firms and universities would regard this elite service as a prime source of top level personnel.

The new career service would bring together economists (including experts in international trade, international finance and international development) and also specialists in international law, international organization, energy, agriculture, population, environment, oceans, and relevant areas of science and technology. A young expert concerned with the world food problem could move from back-stopping FAO in the State Department's IO Bureau to a related assignment with the Department of Agriculture to the United States Mission to the FAO in Rome and perhaps also to a period of service with the FAO or the new World Food Council. Similarly, a specialist in environmental matters could move from the State Department's Bureau of Oceans, Environment and Science to the Environment Protection Administration to the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Agency and perhaps to service with the United Nations Environment Program.

The new career service would provide a natural channel for the recruitment of outstanding talent for the international agencies. By facilitating movement back and forth between the Federal Government, the international institutions and the private sector, the career service could promote better communication and cooperation between three essential elements of the international system. ■

In the modern world the intelligence of public opinion is the one indispensable condition of social progress.—Charles William Eliot

The United States in Opposition

DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN

"WE ARE FAR from living in a single world community," writes Edward Shils, "but the rudiments of a world society do exist." Among those rudiments, perhaps the most conspicuous, if least remarked, are the emerging views as to what kind of society it is. A measure of self-awareness has appeared, much as it did for smaller polities in earlier times. These assessments tend at the international level to be as diverse as those commonly encountered concerning national societies, or local ones. Some will think the society is good and getting better; others will see it as bad and getting worse. Some want change; some fear it. Where one sees justice, another sees wrong.

The notion of a world society is nothing new to Americans. It dominated the rhetoric of World War II, of the founding of the United Nations, of much of the cold war. It is now a received idea, and its impress may be measured by the success with which advocates have found audiences for issues defined in international terms: the world environmental problem; the world population problem; the world food problem. Not a generation ago, these were national issues at most.

Much of this internationalist rhetoric is based on things real enough. There *is* a world ecology; there *is* a world economy; and some measures important to individual countries can only be obtained through international accord. Thus the concept of interdependence has become perhaps the main element of the new consciousness of a world society. This is a valid basis on which to posit the existence of a society; it is almost a precondition of a society's coming into being.

Yet societies rarely stop at the acknowledgment of the need for cooperation which is implied by the term interdependence. The image of a society as a family is a common one, and with reason, for in both cases the idea of cooperation is frequently supplemented or even supplanted by the idea of obligation. What does one member *owe* another? This is something new in international pronouncements. If one were to characterize the discomfiture and distress with which Americans responded to the events of the 29th General Assembly of the United Nations in 1974, some measure would have to be attributed to the discovery that a vast majority of the nations of the world feel there are claims which can be made on the wealth of individual nations that are both considerable and threatening—in any event threatening to countries such as the United States which regularly finds itself in a minority (often a minority of one or two or at most a half-dozen) in an assembly of 138 members.

The tyranny of the UN's "new majority" has accordingly been deplored, and there has been much comment that whereas opposition to the United Nations was once a position of "conservatives" in the United States, it is increasingly one of "liberals" also. Yet while there have been some calls to boycott the General Assembly, or not to vote in it, there have been but few calls for withdrawal from the United Nations. It is almost as if American opinion now acknowledged that there was no escaping involvement in the emergent world society. All the more reason, then, for seeking to understand what has been going on.

NOW, OF COURSE, a lot is going on, and no single element dominates.

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Yet it may be argued that what happened in the early 1970s is that for the first time the world felt the impact of what for lack of a better term I shall call the British revolution. That is the revolution which began in 1947 with the granting by socialist Britain of independence to socialist India. In slow, then rapid, order the great empires of the world—with the single major exception of the Czarist empire—broke up into independent states; the original membership of the United Nations of 51 grew to 138. These new nations naturally varied in terms of size, population, and resources. But in one respect they hardly varied at all. To a quite astonishing degree they were ideologically uniform, having fashioned their polities in terms derived from the general corpus of British socialist opinion as it developed in the period roughly 1890-1950. The Englishmen and Irishmen, Scotsmen and Welsh, who created this body of doctrine and espoused it with such enterprise—nay, genius—thought they were making a social revolution in Britain. And they were. But the spread of their ideology to the furthest reaches of the globe, with its ascent to dominance in the highest national councils everywhere, gives to the British revolution the kind of worldwide significance which the American and French, and then the Russian, revolutions possessed in earlier times.*

**The term British revolution is open to objection as seeming to exclude the influence of continental socialism on the new nations, and indeed a good case could be made for calling the phenomenon I am trying to describe the revolution of the Second International. But the term British can be justified by the fact that of the 87 states to have joined the UN since its founding, more than half—47—had been part of the British empire. Even apart from the empire, British culture was in the first half of this century incomparably the most influential in the world, and that culture was increasingly suffused with socialist ideas and attitudes. I anticipate and hope for a rigorous critique of the arguments of this paper, but I also hope it will not be too much distracted by the difficulties of finding a concise term to describe what was on the whole a concise phenomenon; the development of socialist doctrine and the formation of socialist parties in Western Europe at this time. I should also note that the political ideology in the new states of the Third World of which I will be speaking was best described by the late George Lichtheim as "national socialism." This term has, of course, acquired an altogether unacceptable connotation.*

From the perspective of their impact on others, the American and French revolutions can be treated as a single event. They were not of course identical in themselves, and profoundly important distinctions can be made between them. But these distinctions were little noted in the political rhetoric of the century that followed, or in the forms of government fashioned in the likeness of this rhetoric, or in the goals of governments so fashioned. Men sought a constitutional regime which disestablished ancient privilege, guaranteed liberties, and promoted the general welfare through what came to be known as liberal social policies. Liberalism was at first characterized by the opposition to state intervention in economic affairs, and later by the advocacy of such intervention, but the intervention in question was a fairly mild business, it being no liberal's view that the state was an especially trustworthy servant of the citizen. The citizen, as liberals viewed the world, was a very important person, especially perhaps if he tended to clean linen.

The Russian revolution of 1917 brought into existence a regime even more dramatically different from its predecessors than had the liberal regimes of a century earlier been from theirs. Everything, it was understood, had changed. Those who would change everything, or who believed that, like it or not, everything was going to change, rallied to this rhetoric. As for the rest of the world, it came soon enough to know that a wholly extraordinary event had occurred, even that the future had occurred. For three decades, culminating in the triumph of Communist arms in China in 1948, this was quite the most vivid, and the most attended to, movement in the world.



. . . The intervention in question was a fairly mild business, it being no liberal's view that the state was an especially trustworthy servant of the citizen. The citizen, as liberals viewed the world, was a very important person, especially perhaps if he tended to clean linen.

The British revolution of the second quarter of the 20th century attracted no such attention. Everyone certainly recognized that new states were coming into existence out of former European, and indeed mostly British, colonies, but the tendency was to see them as candidates for incorporation into one or the other of the older revolutionary traditions then dominant elsewhere in the world. It was not generally perceived that they were in a sense already spoken for—that they came to independence with a preexisting, coherent, and surprisingly stable ideological base which, while related to both the earlier traditions, was distinct from both. This most likely accounts for the almost incurious initial reaction in what would soon be known as the First and Second Worlds. In the Republic of India the United States could see democracy; the Soviets could see socialism. In truth, a certain Hegelian synthesis had occurred. On the one hand, the Minimal State of the American revolution; in response, the Total State of the Russian revolution; in synthesis, the Welfare State of the British revolution.

Samuel H. Beer describes the doctrine of British socialism as follows:

. . . it is especially the socialist's commitment to "fellowship" that fundamentally distinguishes his approach. . . . For private ownership he would substitute public ownership; for production for profit, production for use; for competition, cooperation. A cultural and ethical revolution would also take place, and motives that had aimed at individual benefit would now aim at common benefits. Industry,

which had been governed by individual decisions within the competitive system, would be subject to collective and democratic control. . . . Government would consist in comprehensive and continuous planning and administration.

Two general points may be made about this British doctrine. First, it contained a suspicion of, almost a bias against, economic development which carried over into those parts of the world where British culture held sway. The fundamental assertion of the age of the Diamond Jubilee was that there was plenty of wealth to go 'round if only it were fairly distributed. No matter what more thoughtful socialist analysts might urge, redistribution, not production, remained central to the ethos of British socialism. Profit became synonymous with exploitation. That profit might be something conceptually elegant—least-cost production—made scarcely any impress. "Production for profit" became a formulation for all that was wrong in the old ways, and Tories half-agreed. (For it was the Liberals and the Radicals who were being repudiated by such doctrine, and it was the Liberal party that went under.) This, too, was passed on. When Sir Arthur Lewis in 1974 gave the Tata lectures in India and found himself pleading, as a socialist and as a man of the Third World, but also as an economist, that profit was not a concept public-sector enterprise could afford to ignore, no less a personage than the head of the Indian Planning Commission felt called upon to rebut him.

To be sure, much of this redistributionist bias was simply innocent. British socialists, for example, proved in office to know almost nothing about how actually to redistribute income, and British income has not been significantly redistributed. Coming to power just after World War II, the socialists appeared to think they had abolished wealth by imposing a top income-tax rate of nineteen shillings six pence in the twenty-shilling pound, which is to say confiscating the rich man's pay envelope. Few seemed to note that capital gains remained exempt from income tax altogether, so that in large measure thereafter only those with property could acquire property: the very antithesis of the social condition socialism sought. (This detail perhaps did not escape the well-to-do of the developing nations when the prospect of socialism on the British model first appeared there.)

THE SECOND general point about socialist doctrine as it developed in Britain was that it was anti-American. More anti-American, surely, than it was ever anti-Soviet.

What the civil service began, British education completed. Has there ever been a conversion as complete as that of the Malay, the Ibo, the Gujarati, the Jamaican, the Australian, the Cypriot, the Guyanan, the Yemenite, the Yoruban, the sabra, the fellaheen to this distant creed? The London School of Economics was often said to be the most important institution of higher education in Asia and Africa.

The reasons for this are not that obscure. The British were not overmuch admiring of Americans in that era, nor we of them. In part their attitude began as aristocratic disdain. (An intimate of Pandit Nehru's describes once asking India's first Prime Minister why he was so anti-American. This was in 1961. Nehru's first reaction was a rather huffy denial of any such predisposition, but he then became reflective and after a moment admitted that, yes, it was true, and that probably it all dated back to his days at Harrow. There was one American boy there at the time: filthy rich, and much too pushy.) But more importantly, of course, America was seen as quintessentially capitalist.

With the Russian revolution, and then especially with the world depression of the 1930s and the onset of popular-front movements in Europe, a considerable number of British socialists, despite their party's fundamental and central attachment to democratic processes, became supporters of the Soviet regime. Russia was the future. America was the past. With the coming of the cold war this attitude became institutionalized and almost compulsory on the British Left. The NEW STATESMAN, a journal which tended to follow Asian and African graduates after they had left Britain and returned home, became near Stalinist in its attachment to Soviet ways with the world and its pervasive antagonism to things American.

And yet the NEW STATESMAN was never Communist, and neither, save in small proportion, were its readers. They were British socialists, part of a movement of opinion which spread in the course of the first half of the 20th century to the whole of the British empire, a domain which covered one-quarter of the earth's surface, and which an inspired cartographic convention had long ago decreed be colored pink. It was British civil servants who took the doctrine to the colonies. (How curious, in retrospect, are the agonizings of Harold Laski and others as to whether the civil service would carry out the policies of a socialist government. What more congenial task for persons whose status comes from the power and prestige of government? But in the Britain of that era it could be thought that class origin would somehow overcome occupational interest.)

What the civil service began, British education completed. Has there ever been a conversion as complete as that of the Malay, the Ibo, the Gujarati, the Jamaican, the Australian, the Cypriot, the Guyanan, the Yemenite, the Yoruban, the sabra, the fellaheen to this distant creed? The London School of Economics, Shils notes, was often said to be the most important institution of higher education in Asia and Africa. In her autobiography, Beatrice Webb wrote that she and her husband felt "assured that with the School [LSE] as the teaching body, the Fabian Society as a propagandist organization, the LCC [London County Council] as object lesson in electoral success, our books as the only elaborate original work in economic fact and theory, no young

man or woman who is anxious to study or to work in public affairs can fail to come under our influence." For reasons that are understandable, this was true most particularly for young men and women coming from abroad in that long and incongruously optimistic intellectual age that began amid late Victorian plumpness and ended with the austerity of postwar Britain. In 1950 the conservative Michael Oakeshott succeeded to the Fabian Harold Laski's chair in political theory at LSE and in a sense *that* party was over. But by then not Communists but Fabians could claim that the largest portion of the world's population lived in regimes of their fashioning. Before very long, the arithmetical majority and the ideological coherence of those new nations brought them to dominance in the United Nations and, indeed, in any world forum characterized by universal membership.

But if the new nations absorbed ideas about others from the doctrines of British socialism, they also absorbed ideas about themselves. The master concept, of course, is that they had the right to independence. This idea goes back to the American revolution, and even beyond to the Glorious Revolution in 17th-century Britain, but British socialism readily incorporated and even appropriated it. As the 20th century wore on and the issue of independence arose with respect to these specific peoples and places, it was most often the socialists who became the principal *political* sponsors of independence. It was a Labour government which in 1947 granted independence to India and formally commenced the vast, peaceful revolution that followed. The Indian Congress party had been founded in 1883 by a British civil servant, Alan Octavian Hume, whose politics were essentially Liberal. But by the time of independence, it was a matter to be taken for granted that the Congress was socialist and that its leaders, Gandhi and then Nehru, were socialists too.

Two further concepts triangulate and fix the imported political culture of these new nations. The first is the belief—often, of course, justified—that they have been subject to economic exploitation, exactly as the working class is said in socialist theory to have been exploited under capitalism. The second is the belief—also, of course, often justified—that they have been subject to ethnic discrimination corresponding to class distinctions in industrial society. As with the belief in the right to independence, these concepts, which now seem wholly natural, rarely occur in nature. They are learned ideas, and they were learned by the new nations mostly where they mostly originated, in the intellectual and political circles of Britain of the late 19th and early 20th century. Gandhi greatly elucidated the moral dimensions of exploitation and discrimination, but he did so in the context of a worldwide political movement that was more than receptive to his ideas, a political movement of which he was a part. At root, the ideas of exploitation and discrimination represent a transfer to colonial populations of the fundamental socialist assertions with respect to the condition of the European working class, just as the idea of independence parallels the demand that the working class break out of bondage and rise to power.

Now it is possible to imagine a country, or collection of countries, with a background similar to that of the British colonies, attaining independence and then letting bygones be bygones. The Americans did that: our political culture did not suggest any alternative. International life was thought to operate in Wordsworth's terms:

The good old rule
. . . The simple plan
That they should take, who have the power.
And they should keep who can.

So in their own terms might Marxists judge the aftermath of Marxist triumph: history was working its ineluctable way; there would be no point, no logic, in holding the past to account. Not so the heirs of the British revolution. British socialism is, was, and remains a highly moral creed. It is not a politics of revenge; it is too civil for that. But reparations? Yes: reparations. This idea was fundamental to the social hope of a movement which, it must ever be recalled, rested on the assumption that there existed vast stores of unethically accumulated wealth. On the edges of the movement there were those who saw the future not just in terms of redistribution, but of something ominously close to looting. In any event, the past was by no means to be judged over and done with. There were scores to be settled. Internally and internationally.

Political traditions in each case were different from the British. But only slightly different: viewed from Mars, London, Paris, and The Hague are not widely separated or disparate places. By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a socialist intelligentsia and often as not a socialist government.

A final distinctive character of the British revolution concerns procedure. Wrongs are to be righted by legislation. The movement was fundamentally parliamentarian. The Labour party came to power through the ballot, and proceeded to change society by statute. This was dramatically so with respect to the empire. For the first time in the history of mankind a vast empire dismantled itself, piece by piece, of its own systematic accord. A third of the nations of the world today owe their existence to a statute of Westminister. What more profound experience could there be of the potency of parliamentary majorities in distant places, and of their enactments?

Plainly, not all the new nations of the postwar world were formerly British. There were French colonies. Belgian. Dutch. Portuguese. Political traditions in each case were different from the British. But only *slightly* different: viewed from Mars, London, Paris, and The Hague are not widely separated or disparate places. By the time of the granting of independence, all were democratic with a socialist intelligentsia and often as not a socialist government. With the exception of Algeria—which is marked by the exception—the former French and Dutch colonies

came into being in very much the manner the British had laid down. For a prolonged initial period the former British possessions had pride of place in the ex-colonial world—they speak English at the UN, not American—and pretty much set the style of politics which has become steadily more conspicuous in international affairs.

NOT EVERYONE has noticed this. Indeed, there is scarcely yet a vocabulary in which to describe it. In part, this is because the event is recent; but also because it was incomplete. As with the liberal revolution which came out of America, and the Communist revolution which came out of Russia, this socialist revolution coming mainly out of Britain carried only so much of the world in its initial period of expansion. The liberal revolution of America was not exactly a spent force by the mid-20th century, but (*pace* the Mekong Delta Development Plan) there was never any great prospect of its expanding to new territories. On the other hand, the heirs of the Russian revolution did capture China, the greatest of all the prizes, in 1948, and at least part of Indochina a bit later. But in the main the Communist revolution stopped right there, and the two older revolutions now hold sway within fairly well-defined boundaries. Since 1950 it has been not they but the heirs of the British revolution who have been expanding.

Almost the first international political act of the new states was to form the nonaligned bloc, distinguishing themselves—partially—from the two blocs into which the immediate postwar world had formed. From politics the emphasis shifted to economic affairs. In 1968 these countries, meeting at Algiers, formed the Group of 77 as a formal economic bloc. Their Joint Statement described the group as "comprising the vast majority of the human race"—and indeed it did. The B's in the list of members gave a sense of the range of nations and peoples involved: Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi. And yet there was—now somewhat hidden—unity to the list. Of these eight countries, five were formerly British-governed or British-directed. At its second Ministerial Meeting in Lima in 1971, the group (now numbering 96) drew up an Action Program which stated, *inter alia*, that developing countries should

> encourage and promote appropriate commodity action and, particularly, the protection of the interests of primary producers of the region through intensive consultations among producer countries in order to encourage appropriate policies, leading to the establishment of producers' associations and understandings. . . .

This was represented in the press as a major gain for the black African states who carried the point over objections from Latin Americans accustomed to working out raw material and commodity arrangements with the United States. But the idea was fundamentally a heritage of the British revolution, and if the black Africans took the lead in proclaiming it, there is no reason to think it was any less familiar to Arabs. They had all gone to the same schools. Was it not right for those who have only their labor to sell, or only the products of their soil, to organize to confront capital? Had they not been exploited?

HOW HAS the United States dealt with these new nations and their distinctive ideology? Clearly we have not dealt very successfully. This past year, in the 29th General Assembly, we were frequently reduced to a voting bloc which, with variations, consisted of ourselves, Chile, and the Dominican Republic. As this "historic session" closed, the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations declared: "The activities of the Soviet delegation at the session showed once again that the Soviet Union deeply understands and shares the aspirations of the Third World." This was not Krishna Menon, but a balanced and considerate Asian diplomat. If no equivalent pronouncement on China comes immediately to hand, this may be because the Chinese feel free to identify themselves as members of the Third World. As such, at the end of 1974 they declared that the new majority had written a "brilliant chapter" during the twelve months previous, that it was "sweeping ahead full sail as the boat of imperialism [the United States] and hegemonism [the Soviet Union] founders." "These days," the Chinese statement continued, "the United Nations often takes on the appearance of an international court with the Third World pressing the charges and conducting the trial." A statement to which many could subscribe. But no such statement could come from an American statesman, no such praise would be accorded American policy. Clearly at some level—we all but *started* the United Nations—there has been a massive failure of American diplomacy.

But why? Why has the United States dealt so unsuccessfully with these nations and their distinct ideology? A first thought is that we have not seen the ideology as distinctive. Not recognizing it, we have made no sustained effort to relate ourselves to it. The totalitarian states, from their point of view, did. They recognize ideologies. By 1971 it was clear enough that the Third World—a few exceptions here and there—was not going Communist. But it was nevertheless possible to encourage it in directions that veered very considerably from any tendency the bloc might have to establish fruitful relations with the West; and this was done. It was done, moreover, with the blind acquiescence and even agreement of the United States which kept endorsing principles for whose logical outcome it was wholly unprepared and with which it could never actually go along.

A RELATIVELY small but revealing example of this process may be seen in the development of the World Social Report, a document of the Economic and Social Council. The first volume, covering the year 1963, was directed almost exclusively to problems of the developing countries, and the United States took its advent as a promising event. The 1965 report, concentrating on "practical methods of promoting social change," might have caused some to take note, but American officials were entirely unwary: this was, after all, a report designed to help the developing world. In actual fact, it was becoming a document based on the veritably totalitarian idea that social justice means social stability and that social stability means the absence of social protest. Thus by 1970, the Soviet Union—not much social protest there!—emerges as

the very embodiment of the just state, while the United States is a nation in near turmoil from the injustices it wreaks upon the poor and the protests these injustices have provoked. And Western Europe hardly comes off any better.

What happened here was that a "Finlandized" Secretariat (the official in charge of preparing the document was indeed a Finn) found that the developing countries and the Communist countries had an easy common interest in portraying their own progress, justifying the effective suppression of dissent, and in the process deprecating and indicting the seeming progress of Western societies. It is easy enough to see that this would be in the interest of the Soviet bloc. (The Chinese did not participate in the debate.) But why the developing world? First, the developing nations could ally with the totalitarians in depicting social reality in this way, in part because so many, having edged toward authoritarian regimes, faced the same problems the Communists would have encountered with a liberal analysis of civil liberties. Secondly, the developing nations had an interest in deprecating the economic achievements of capitalism, since almost none of their own managed economies was doing well. To deplore, to deride, the social effects of affluence in the United States is scarcely a recent invention. For a generation the British Left has held the patent. Further, there is an almost automatic interest on the Left in delegitimating wealth—prior to redistributing it—much as the opposite interest exists on the Right.

Small wonder that officials could describe the Social Report as the most popular document in the UN series, a statement intended as more than faint praise. Yet it has been more representative than otherwise. There are hundreds like it, suffused with a neo-totalitarian, anti-American bias.

American protests at the 26th General Assembly have evidently influenced the most recent Social Report, submitted to the 29th, but here the significant fact is that this protest—entered at the very last moment, when the document was being presented for pro forma approval—was the first of its kind, or one of the first. In fact the United States until then did not protest. To the contrary, the United States actively participated in preparing this sustained assault on American institutions. The 1970 Social Report had been three years in the making. During those three years it made its way through layers of bureaucracies, all manner of meetings. Americans were always present, and Americans always approved. This was, after all, a Third World document; it was to be treated with tolerance and understanding. Complacency of this order could only arise from the failure to perceive that a distinctive ideology was at work, and that skill and intelligence were required to deal with it successfully.

THE BLINDNESS of American diplomacy to the process persists. Two large events occurred in 1971, and a series of smaller ones were set in motion. China entered the United Nations, an event the Third World representatives saw as a decisive shift of power to their camp. In that same year the Lima conference established the nonaligned as an economic bloc intent on producer cartels. Less noticed, but perhaps no less important in its implications, a distinctive radicalization began in what might as well be termed world social policy.

This radicalization was first clearly evidenced at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, held at Stockholm in 1972, or more precisely at the 26th General Assembly, which was finally to authorize the conference. The conference was in considerable measure an American initiative, and while American negotiators were primarily concerned with ways to get the Russians to join (which in the end they did not), the Brazilians suddenly stormed onto the scene to denounce the whole enterprise as a conspiracy of the haves to keep the have-nots down and out. The argument was that the rich had got rich by polluting their environments and now proposed to stay that way by preventing anyone else from polluting theirs. This, among other things, would insure that the rich would continue their monopoly on the use of the raw materials of the poor. Thus was it asserted that matters originally put forward as soluble in the context of existing economic

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and political relations were nothing of the sort. To the contrary, they were symptomatic of economic and political exploitation and injustice which could only be resolved by the most profound transformation: to expropriate the expropriators.

At Stockholm itself, this quickly became the dominant theme—espoused by a dominant majority. "Are not poverty and need the greatest pollutors?" Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India asked. "There are grave misgivings," she continued, "that the discussion of ecology may be designed to distract attention from the problems of war and poverty." She was wrong in this. They were not so designed. But at Stockholm the nations who feared they might be took control of the agenda. The conference declared as its first principle:

> Man has the fundamental right to freedom, equality, and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality which permits a life of dignity and well being, and bears a solemn responsibility to protect and improve the environment for present and future generations. In this respect, policies promoting or perpetuating apartheid, racial segregation, discrimination, colonial and other forms of oppression and foreign domination stand condemned and must be eliminated.

The American delegates routinely voted for this resolution. It was, after all, language the new countries wanted. What wholly unwelcome meanings might be attached to "other forms of oppression and foreign domination" which stood "condemned" and had to be "eliminated" was a thought scarcely in keeping with the spirit of the occasion.

THE STOCKHOLM Conference had been turbulent. The United Nations World Population Conference, held nearly two years later, in August 1974, had an air of insurrection. This conference too was largely an American initiative, the culmination of years of State Department effort to put population on the agenda of world social policy. The Secretary General of the United Nations proclaimed the gathering would be "a turning point in the history of mankind." The centerpiece was a Draft World Population Plan of Action, which in essence set 1985 as the year crude birth rates in developing countries would be reduced to 30 per thousand (as against an anticipated 34) and when "the necessary information and education about family planning and means to practice family planning" would be available "to all persons who so desire. . . ." There can be no doubt of the social change implicit in such a conference's even meeting: in most industrialized countries, family planning has only just achieved the status of an accepted social value deserving of public support. Yet neither should there be any doubt that a disaster overtook the American position in the course of the conference, and that this disaster was wholly predictable.

To begin with, the conference was thought up by Americans to deal with a problem we consider that other people have. (In fairness, not long ago the United States itself was thought to have a problem of population size, while the provision of family-planning services is an issue of social equity as well as of population growth.) Specifically, it was considered a problem of the developing countries: countries, that is, of the British revolution who are animated by the liveliest sense that their troubles originate in capitalist and imperialist systems of which the United States all but offered itself as an exemplar. Further, the conference met in Bucharest, capital of a Communist country. At one level no great imagination would have been required to anticipate the outcome. President Nicolae Ceausescu opened the conference by declaring that "The division of the world into developed and underdeveloped countries is a result of historical evolution, and is a direct consequence of the imperialist, colonialist, and neo-colonialist policies of exploitation of many peoples." He called for "a new international economic order" and condemned "a pessimistic outlook" on population growth.

But if this was to be expected, few could have anticipated the wild energy of the Chinese assault on the Western position. China has the strictest of all population-control programs. Yet the Chinese arrived in Rumania to assail with unprecedented fury and devastating zeal the very idea of population control as fundamentally subversive of the future of the Third World. The future, the Chinese proclaimed, is infinitely bright. Only the imperialists and the hegemonists could spoil it, and population control was to be their wrecking device. A theory of "consumerism" emerged: it was excessive consumption in the developed economies which was the true source of the problems of the underdeveloped nations and not the size of the latter's population. None dared oppose the thesis. The Indians, who are thought to have a population problem, went to the conference rather disposed to endorse a Plan of Action. But they did nothing of the sort. Instead, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, who headed the Indian delegation, found himself denouncing "colonial denudation" of the East, and the "vulgar affluence" of the West. The scene grew orgiastic.

In the end, a doctrine emerged which is almost certainly more true than otherwise, namely that social and economic change is the fundamental determinant of fertility change, compared with which family planning as such has at most a residual role. There need be no difficulty with this assertion. The difficulty comes with the conclusion said to follow: that economic growth in the West should cease and the wealth of the world be redistributed. We are back to Keir Hardie, expropriating the expropriators. Not to produce wealth, but to redistribute it. As with the environment conference, the population conference turned into another occasion for reminding the West of its alleged crimes and unresolved obligations.

THIS TONE attained to manic proportions in Population Tribune, an unofficial, American-financed parallel conference of a form that first appeared in Stockholm. Ritual recantation became the order of the day as one notable after another confessed to a class-bound past which had blinded him to the infinitely bright future. Most of the recanters were American, but it was Professor René Dumont of France who epitomized the argument in a statement, "Population and Cannibals," which was subsequently given the full front page of DEVELOPMENT FORUM, an official, five-language, UN publication. Professor Dumont—blaming the "Plunderers of the Third World" for world conditions—"They . . . 'under-pay' for the rare raw materials of the Third World and then squander them"—put the case with some vivacity:

Eating little children. I have already had occasion to show that the rich white man, with his overconsumption of meat and his lack of generosity toward poor populations, acts like a true cannibal, albeit indirect. Last year, in over-consuming meat which wasted the cereals which could have saved them, we ate the little children of the Sahel, of Ethiopia, and of Bangladesh. And this year, we are continuing to do the same thing, with the same appetite.

Dr. Han Suyin, a sympathetic commentator on Chinese Communist affairs, summed up for others:

You cannot cut off any talk about population, about people, from economics and politics. You cannot put in a vacuum any talk about population and world resources without relation to the present as it exists. I admire people who can talk about a noble future where there will be an equal society and where resources will be controlled by all. But, forgive me for saying so, if this is to be done, then we have to begin by sharing now everything and that would mean that a lot of people who have a lot of private property, for instance, should divest themselves immediately of it in favor of the poor. It means that at this very moment we should start to implement a very simple thing—something which we heard . . . at the United Nations at the sixth special session of the United Nations where the voice of the Third World—the majority of the world—at last formulated their demand for more equitable terms of trade, and for an end to

exploitation, for an end to the real cause of poverty and backwardness, which is not population, but which is injustice and exploitation. The Third World has a word for it, it calls it imperialism and hegemony.

And the American delegation? The official view, flashed to diplomatic posts around the world, was as uncomplicated at the end as it had been at the outset: "ALL BASIC US OBJECTIVES WERE ACHIEVED AND US ACCOMPLISHMENTS WERE MANY. . . . US DELEGATION UNANIMOUSLY PLEASED WITH FINAL RESULT."

THE WORLD Food Conference which followed in Rome in November was even more explicitly an American initiative. Yet as the American delegation somewhat sadly noted, the plenary forum was used to the fullest by LDCs (Less Developed Countries) to excoriate the United States and other developed nations as responsible for the current food crisis and the generally depressed state of their part of the world, calling for "radical adjustment in the current economic order and, in effect, reparations from developed countries" to the less developed. Such negotiations as took place were somewhat more sober since something immediately of value—wheat—was at stake and obviously only the United States and a few such countries were prepared to part with any. Even so, by the time the conference was concluded, one of the great, and truly liberal, innovations of world social policy—the American-led assertion that the hungry of the world should be fed by transfers of resources—had been utterly deprecated. Thus the Indian Food Minister's statement with respect to the needs of the developing countries:

> It is obvious that the developed nations can be held responsible for their [the developing nations'] present plight. Developed nations, therefore, have a duty to help them. Whatever help is rendered to them now should not be regarded as charity but deferred compensation for what has been done to them in the past by the developed countries.

The UN General Assembly pursued this theme with notable persistence throughout 1974, commencing with a special session in the spring which dealt with the economic crises of the underdeveloped in just such terms. Occasioned as much as anything by the devastating impact of oil price increases, the special session dwelt on every conceivable abuse of economic power save that one. At the end of the regular autumn session, the General Assembly solemnly adopted a Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which accords to each state the right freely to exercise full permanent sovereignty over its wealth and natural resources, to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments, and to nationalize, expropriate, or transfer ownership of foreign property pretty much at will. The vote was 120 to 6—the United States, Belgium, Denmark, West Germany, Luxembourg, and the United Kingdom. What was being asserted was a radical discontinuity with the original, essentially liberal vision of the United Nations as a regime of international law and practice which acknowledges all manner of claims, but claims that move in all directions. Now they moved in one direction only.

In general a rhetoric of expropriation became routine. At year's end, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, opening the 56th Conference of the International Law Association meeting in New Delhi, declared:

> Laws designed to protect the political or economic power of a few against the rights of the many, must . . . yield place to laws which enlarge the area of equality, and . . . law itself should be an ally and instrument of change.

She spoke a now common language of resentment over population issues:

> Is it not a new form of arrogance for affluent nations to regard the poorer nations as an improvident species whose numbers are a threat to their own standard of living?

She suggested a reversal of roles had taken place as between the new nations and the old:

> An obligation rests on the haves to generate confidence among the have-nots . . . A new approach to foreign investments is indicated, in which investments abroad are regarded more as a service to the recipient community than as an enterprise where profits and their repatriation must be secured at all cost.

Now there is nothing unfamiliar in this language: only the setting is new. It is the language of British socialism applied to the international scene. American diplomacy has yet to recognize this fact and, failing to recognize it, has failed even to begin dealing intelligently with it.

Because of the British revolution and its heritage, the prospect now is that the world will not go totalitarian. In the Christian sense, has there been such political "good news" in our time? But there is bad news also. The great darkness could yet consume us.

BUT IF the beginning of wisdom in dealing with the nations of the Third World is to recognize their essential ideological coherence, the next step is to recognize that there is every reason to welcome this ideology, and to welcome the coherence also. Because of the British revolution and its heritage, the prospect now is that the world will not go totalitarian. In the Christian sense, has there been such political "good news" in our time? But there is bad news also. The great darkness could yet consume us. The potential for absorption of these states into the totalitarian camp is there and will continue to be there. This is perhaps especially true where one party states have been established, but even where multi-party democracy flourishes the tug of the "socialist countries," to use the UN term, persists.

The outcome will almost certainly turn on whether or not these nations, individually and in groups, succeed in establishing sufficiently productive economies. If they do not, if instead they become permanently dependent on outside assistance, that assistance is likely more and more to come from the totalitarian nations, and with it the price of internal political influence from the totalitarian camp through the local pro-Moscow, or pro-Peking, Communist party. For everywhere there are such parties. They appear able to go on indefinitely in a dormant state, and can be awakened pretty much at will. India, with a

population equal to that of the whole of Africa and South America combined, is the best current example. Parliamentary democracy is vigorous enough there, but economic incompetence on its part and diplomatic blunders on ours have led to an increasing dependence on Soviet support, which in the space of three years has brought about an open electoral alliance between the Congress party and the Moscow-oriented Communists, an alliance we would have thought worth fighting a war to prevent two decades ago, but which we scarcely notice today.

This alliance would not have come about save for the failure of the Indian economy to prosper and the success—typical—of the argument that the cure for the damage done by leftist policies is even more leftist policies, which in practice translates into dependence on the Soviets and alliances with their internal allies. And here is the nub of the bad news: for all the attractions of this variety of socialist politics, it has proved, in almost all its versions, almost the world over, to be a distinctly poor means of producing wealth. Sharing wealth—perhaps. But not producing wealth. Who, having read British political journals over the past quarter-century, would be surprised to find that during this period (1950-73) the United Kingdom's share of the "Planetary Product" has been reduced from 5.8 to 3.1 per cent? Why then be surprised that those who have made British socialism their model have trouble taking off in the opposite direction? Yet even so, one must be surprised at the decline of economies such as those of Burma and Sri Lanka: immensely productive places not a generation ago. Sri Lanka, for example, having first got to the point where it was importing potatoes from Poland, has now got to the further point where it can no longer afford to do so. A recent survey of the Ceylonese economy in the FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW was entitled: "Conspiracy or Catastrophe?" For what else could explain such failure?

What else, that is, to those experiencing it (with all that implies for political instability)? The outsider can indulge a more relaxed view. The fault lies in ideas, not persons. Americans—Westerners—do not have any claim to superior wisdom on the subject of these economies. Starting in the 1950s a large number of first-rate economists began working on theories of economic growth designed to get the LDCs on a path of self-sustained growth. "To be perfectly brutal about it," Jesse Burkhead recently stated, "it hasn't worked." And yet there is no need to stand mute. Two assertions may be reasonably put forth, of which the first is that to say these economies haven't worked as well as hoped is not to say that none has worked at all. There *has* been growth. In the main, things are better than they were. For every Argentina—that "miracle" of economic nongrowth—there is a Brazil. For Ghana, Nigeria. For Calcutta, Singapore. The second assertion is that relative failure is particularly to be encountered in economies most heavily influenced by that version of late Fabian economics which compounded the Edwardian view that there was plenty to go around if justly distributed with the 1930s view that capitalism could never produce enough to go around regardless of distributive principles.*

STILL, THERE are gains in the relative loss of income associated with the managed economies of the Third World which need to be appreciated. An Asian economist has said of his own country, plaintively yet not without a certain defiance: "We are socialists, so we do not believe in capitalism. We are democrats, so we do not believe in terror. What, then, is our alternative save one per cent a year?" There *is* a welfare state of sorts; there is protection of industrial labor; and in some countries, at least, there is freedom to protest.

But the most distinctive gain and the least noted is that in the course of its outward journey, the managed economy was transmuted from an instrument of economic rationality to an instrument of political rationality. It is sometimes difficult to recall, but early socialist theory expounded the greater *efficiency* of production for use rather than for capital, and put much stress on capitalist wastefulness. In practice, however, the real attraction of the managed economy has been the means it provides to collect enough political power at the center to maintain national unity—almost everywhere a chancy thing in these generally multi-ethnic states.

One must still conclude, however, that these political gains are purchased at the expense of even more conspicuous economic losses. India will serve for a final example. In the year of its independence, 1947, India produced 1.2 million tons of steel and Japan only 900,000 tons. A quarter-century later, in 1972, India produced 6.8 million tons and Japan 106.8. These outcomes are the result of decisions made by the ruling party of each nation, and only an innocent could continue to accept Indian protestations that the results were unexpected. The break in Indian growth came precisely in 1962 when the United States, which had been about to finance its largest aid project ever, a steel complex at Bokharo in Eastern India, insisted that it be managed privately. India insisted on a public sector plant, for which read a plant that would do what the Prime Minister of India wanted done. In the manner of the Aswan Dam (and with as much political impact), the Russians stepped in to finance the public-sector plant. By 1974 this plant had yet to produce sheet steel. For the period 1962-72 Indian steel production grew by a bare 1.8 per cent, while Japanese grew 13.4 per cent.

There is no serious way to deny that India has in a very real sense desired this outcome, just as there is no way to deny that high living standards in the modern world are associated with relatively free market economies and with liberalist international trade policies. Granted that much economic policy does not have high living standards as its true objective, but is rather concerned with political stability, and granted that such a concern may be wholly legitimate in a new nation—in any event it is not

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** This latter idea is very much alive. On leaving my post as United States Ambassador to India, I gave a press conference in which* inter alia *I touched upon the failure of India to achieve a productive economy. The* NATIONAL HERALD, *the Nehru family newspaper, commented in an editorial: "Mr. Moynihan may be justified in some of his criticism of the state of the Indian economy, but what he is trying to sell is the capitalist system which can only impoverish India's millions further."*

anyone else's business—it nevertheless remains the case that the relative economic failure accompanying political success in regimes such as that of India sooner or later begins to undermine that very success. Promises are made and political stability, especially in the more democratic regimes, requires some measure of performance. When it is not forthcoming, regimes change. They become less democratic. They become less independent.

Neither of these developments can be welcomed by the United States. The United States in the past may have cared about the course of political events in these nations, but only in the most abstract terms. (Consider the casualness with which we armed Pakistan and incurred the bitter and enduring hostility of India, the second most populous nation in the world.) But India has now exploded a nuclear device. *That* may well prove the most important event of the turbulent year 1974. Other Third World nations are likely to follow. Hence political stability in the Third World acquires a meaning it simply has never in the past had for American strategic thinking, as well as our general view of world politics.


WHAT THEN is to be done? We are witnessing the emergence of a world order dominated arithmetically by the countries of the Third World. This order is already much too developed for the United States or any other nation to think of opting out. It can't be done. One may become a delinquent in this nascent world society. An outcast in it. But one remains "in" it. There is no escape from a definition of nationhood which derives primarily from the new international reality. Nor does this reality respond much to the kind of painfully impotent threats which are sometimes heard of America's "pulling out." Anyone who doubts that Dubai can pay for UNESCO, knows little of UNESCO, less of what the United States pays, and nothing whatever of Dubai.

In any event, matters of this sort aside, world society and world organization have evolved to the point where palpable interests are disposed in international forums to a degree without precedent. Witness, as an instance, the decisions of the World Court allocating the oil fields of the North Sea among the various littoral states in distinctly weighted (but no doubt proper) manner. Witness the current negotiations at the Law of the Sea Conference. Two-thirds of the world is covered by the sea, and the United Nations claims the seabed. That seabed, especially in the region around Hawaii, is rich in so-called "manganese nodules"—concentrations of ore which American technology is now able to exploit, or will be sooner than anyone else. At this moment we have, arguably, complete and perfect freedom to commence industrial use of the high seas. This freedom is being challenged, however, and almost certainly some form of international regime is about to be established. It can be a regime that permits American technology to go forward on some kind of license-and-royalties basis. Or it can assert exclusive "internationalized" rights to exploitation in an international public corporation. The stakes are considerable. They are enormous.

And then, of course, there remains the overriding interest, a true international interest, in arms control, and here true international government has emerged in a most impressive manner. If we were to ask who is the most important international official, a persuasive case could be made for choosing the Inspector General of the International Atomic Energy Authority, the man who supervises the safeguard agreements of the world's atomic reactors. Few would know the name of this unobtrusive Swiss chemist; few, perhaps, need to. But more than a few do need to know that the post is there and that its viability derives ultimately from the international system of which it is a part. For the moment, American security derives primarily from our own armaments, and our strategic agreements with the Soviet Union and a few other powers. But the international regime of arms control is already important and certain to become more so.

If, that is, it does not go down in the general wreckage of the world system embodied now in the United Nations. But assuming that the new majority will not destroy the regime through actions that drive nations like the United States away, is it not reasonable to anticipate a quasiparliamentary situation at the international level—the General Assembly and a dozen such forums—in which a nominally radical majority sets about legislating its presumed advantage in a world which has just come into its hands? The qualification "quasi-parliamentary" is necessary, for in fact the pronouncements of these assemblies have but limited force. So did the pronouncements of the

If we were to ask who is the most important international official, a persuasive case could be made for choosing the Inspector General of the International Atomic Energy Authority, the man who supervises the safeguard agreements of the world's atomic reactors. Few would know the name of this unobtrusive Swiss chemist; few, perhaps, need to.



Continental Congress. They are not on that ground to be ignored. What then does the United States do?

The United States goes into opposition. This is our circumstance. We are a minority. We are outvoted. This is neither an unprecedented nor an intolerable situation. The question is what do we make of it. So far we have made little—nothing—of what is in fact an opportunity. We go about dazed that the world has changed. We toy with the idea of stopping it and getting off. We rebound with the thought that if only we are more reasonable perhaps "they" will be. (Almost to the end, dominant opinion in the US Mission to the United Nations was that the United States could not vote against the "have-nots" by opposing the Charter on the Rights and Duties of States—all rights for the Group of 77 and no duties.) But "they" do not grow reasonable. Instead, we grow unreasonable. A sterile enterprise which awaits total redefinition.

Going into opposition requires first of all that we recognize that there is a distinctive ideology at work in the Third World, and that it has a distinctive history and logic. To repeat the point once again, we have not done this, tending to see these new political cultures in our own image, or in that of the totalitarians, with a steady shift in the general perception from the former to the latter. But once we perceive the coherence in the majority, we will be in a position to reach for a certain coherence of opposition.

Three central issues commend themselves as points of systematic attack: first, the condition of international liberalism; second, the world economy; third, the state of political and civil liberties and of the general welfare. The rudiments of these arguments need only be sketched.

It is the peculiar function of "radical" political demands, such as those most recently heard in the international forums, that they bring about an exceptional deprecation of the achievements of liberal processes. Even when the radicalism is ultimately rejected, this is rarely from a sense that established processes do better and promise more. American liberalism experienced this deprecation in the 1960s; international liberalism is undergoing it in the 1970s. But the truth is that international liberalism and its processes have enormous recent achievements to their credit. It is time for the United States to start saying so.

One example is the multinational corporation which, combining modern management with liberal trade policies, is arguably the most creative international institution of the 20th century. A less controversial example is the World Health Organization. In 1966 it set out to abolish smallpox, and by the time this article is read, the job will more than likely have been successfully completed—in very significant measure with the techniques and participation of American epidemiologists. While not many Americans have been getting smallpox of late, the United States has been spending $140 million a year to keep it that way. Savings in that proportion and more will immediately follow. Here, as in a very long list, a liberal world policy has made national sense.

We should resist the temptation to designate agreeable policies as liberal merely on grounds of agreeableness. There are harder criteria. Liberal policies are limited in their undertakings, concrete in their means, representative in their mode of adoption, and definable in terms of results. These are surely the techniques appropriate to a still tentative, still emergent world society. It is time for the United States, as the new society's loyal opposition, to say this directly, loudly, forcefully.

THE ECONOMIC argument—which will appear inconsistent only to those who have never been much in politics—is that the world economy is not nearly bad enough to justify the measures proposed by the majority, and yet is much worse than it would otherwise be in consequence of measures the majority has already taken. The first half of this formulation will require a considerable shift in the government mind, and possibly even some movement in American elite opinion also, for we have become great producers and distributors of crisis. The world environment crisis, the world population crisis, the world food crisis are in the main American discoveries—or inventions, opinions differ. Yet the simple and direct fact is that any crisis the United States takes to an international forum in the foreseeable future will be decided to the disadvantage of the United States. (Let us hope arms control is an exception.) Ergo: skepticism, challenge.

The world economy is the most inviting case for skepticism, although it will be difficult to persuade many Americans of this during an American recession, and although the rise in oil prices is now creating a crisis in the Third World which is neither of American contrivance nor of American discovery nor of American invention. But until the dislocations caused by OPEC, things were simply not as bad as they were typically portrayed. *Things were better than they had been.* Almost everywhere. In many places things were very good indeed. Sir Arthur Lewis summed up the evidence admirably:

> We have now had nearly three decades of rapid economic growth. . . . Output per head has been growing in the developed world twice as fast as at any time within the preceding century. In the LDC world, output per head is not growing as fast as in the developed world, but is growing faster than the developed world used to grow.

The data can be quite startling. In 1973, as Sir Arthur was speaking, the "Planetary Product," as estimated by the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, grew at a real rate of 6.8 per cent, an astonishing figure. The Third World product expanded by 5.75 per cent, no less astonishing.

Simultaneously it is to be asserted that these economies do less well than they ought: that the difference is of their own making and no one else's, and no claim on anyone else arises in consequence. This will be hard for us to do, but it is time we did it. It is time we commenced citing men such as Jagdish N. Bhagwati, Professor of Economics at MIT, an Indian by birth, who stated in the Lal Bahadur Shastri lectures in India in 1973:

> In the 1950s our economic programs were considered by the progressive and democratic opinion abroad to be a model of what other developing countries might aspire to and emulate. Today, many of us spend our time trying desperately to convince others that

somehow all the success stories elsewhere are special cases and that our performance is not as unsatisfactory as it appears. And yet, we must confront the fact that, in the ultimate analysis, despite our socialist patter and our planning efforts, we have managed to show neither rapid growth nor significant reduction of income inequality and poverty.

It is time we asserted, with Sir Arthur—a socialist, a man of the Third World—that economic growth is governed not by Western or American conspiracies, but by its own laws and that it "is not an egalitarian process. It is bound to be more vigorous in some professions, or sectors, or geographical regions than in others, and even to cause some impoverishment."

A commentator in THE STATESMAN, Calcutta's century-old and most prestigious journal, recently warned:

> It would be unwise for policy planners in the developing world to dismiss too easily . . . the basic premise of a society that worships success: if you are poor, you have only yourself to blame. Development is a matter of hard work and discipline. So if you are not developing fast, it is not because the rules of the game are stacked against you or that structural changes are never easy to bring about, but because you are lazy and indisciplined. The general disenchantment with economic aid flows from this. It is difficult for Americans to understand why such substantial flows of food and money have made so little impact.

Well, the time may have come when it is necessary for Americans to say, "Yes, it *is* difficult to understand that." Not least because some Third World economies have done so very well. For if Calcutta has the lowest urban standard of living in the world, Singapore has in some ways the highest. It is time we asserted that inequalities in the world may be not so much a matter of condition as of performance. The Brazilians do well. The Israelis. The Nigerians. The Taiwanese. It is a good argument. Far better, surely, than the repeated plea of *nolo contendere* which we have entered, standing accused and abased before the Tribune of the People.

CATALOGUING the economic failings of other countries is something to be done out of necessity, not choice. But speaking for political and civil liberty, and doing so in detail and in concrete particulars, is something that can surely be undertaken by Americans with enthusiasm and zeal. Surely it is not beyond us, when the next Social Report comes along, to ask about conditions and events in many countries of the Third World of which almost everyone knows, but few have thought it politic to speak. The AFL-CIO does it. Freedom House does it. Amnesty International does it. *American* socialists do it. The time has come for the spokesmen of the United States to do it too.

It is time, that is, that the American spokesman came to be feared in international forums for the truths he might tell. Mexico, which has grown increasingly competitive in Third World affairs, which took the lead in the Declaration of the Economic Rights and Duties, preaches international equity. Yet it preaches domestic equity also. It could not without some cost expose itself to a repeated inquiry as to the extent of equity within its own borders. Nor would a good many other Third World countries welcome a sustained comparison between the liberties they provide their own peoples with those which are common and taken for granted in the United States.

For the United States to go into opposition in this manner not only requires a recognition of the ideology of the Third World, but a reversal of roles for American spokesmen as well. As if to compensate for its aggressiveness about what might be termed Security Council affairs, the United States has chosen at the UN to be extraordinarily passive, even compliant, about the endless goings-on in the Commissions and Divisions and Centers and suchlike elusive enterprises associated with the Economic and Social Council. Men and women were assigned to these missions, but have rarely been given much support, or even much scrutiny. Rather, the scrutiny has been of just the wrong kind, ever alert to deviation from the formula platitudes of UN debate, and hopelessly insensitive to the history of political struggles of the 20th century.

In Washington, three decades of habit and incentive have created patterns of appeasement so profound as to seem wholly normal. Delegations to international conferences return from devastating defeats proclaiming victory. In truth, these have never been thought especially important. Taking seriously a Third World speech about, say, the right of commodity producers to market their products in concert and to raise their prices in the process, would have been the mark of the quixotic or the failed. To consider the intellectual antecedents of such propositions would not have occurred to anyone, for they were not thought to have any.

And yet how interesting the results might be. The results, say, of observing the occasion of an Algerian's assuming the Presidency of the General Assembly with an informed tribute to the career of the liberator Ben Bella, still presumedly rotting in an Algerian prison cell. The results of a discourse on the disparities between the (1973) per capita GNP in Abu Dhabi of $43,000 and that of its neighbor, the Democratic People's Republic of Yemen, with one-thousandth that. Again, this need not be a uniformly scornful exercise; anything but. The Third World has more than its share of

For the United States to go into opposition in this manner not only requires a recognition of the ideology of the Third World, but a reversal of roles for American spokesmen as well. As if to compensate for its aggressiveness about what might be termed Security Council affairs, the United States has chosen at the UN to be extraordinarily passive, even compliant, about the endless goings-on in the Commissions and Divisions and Centers and suchlike elusive enterprises associated with the Economic and Social Council.

attractive regimes, and some attractive indeed—Costa Rica, Gambia, Malaysia, to name but three. Half the people in the world who live under a regime of civil liberties live in India. The point is to differentiate, and to turn their own standards against regimes for the moment too much preoccupied with causing difficulties for others, mainly the United States. If this has been in order for some time, the oil price increase—devastating to the development hopes of half-a-hundred Asian and African and Latin American countries—makes it urgent and opportune in a way it has never been.

SUCH A REVERSAL of roles would be painful to American spokesmen, but it could be liberating also. It is past time we ceased to apologize for an imperfect democracy. Find its equal. It is time we grew out of our initial—not a little condescending—supersensitivity about the feelings of new nations. It is time we commenced to treat them as equals, a respect to which they are entitled.

The case is formidable that there is nothing the Third World needs less—especially now that the United States has so much withdrawn—than to lapse into a kind of cargo cult designed to bring about our return through imprecation and threat rather than the usual invocations. The Third World has achieved independence, and it needs to assert it in a genuine manner. The condition of the developing countries is in significant measure an imported condition. In the main a distinctive body of European ideas has taken hold, not everywhere in the same measure. Sri Lanka will be more cerebrate in its socialism than will, say, Iraq, Brazil more given to actual economic expansion than Syria or Egypt, Algeria considerably less libertarian than Nigeria. Still, there is a recognizable pattern to the economic and political postures of these countries, of which the central reality is that their anti-capitalist, anti-imperialist ideologies are in fact themselves the last stage of colonialism. These are imported ideas every bit as much as the capitalist and imperialist ideas to which they are opposed. The sooner they are succeeded by truly indigenous ideas, the better off all the former colonies will be, the United States included.

The Third World must feed itself, for example, and this will not be done by suggesting that Americans eat too much. It is one thing to stress what is consumed in the West, another to note what is produced there. In 1973, 17.8 per cent of the world's population produced 64.3 per cent of its product—and not just from taking advantage of cheap raw materials.

In the same way, the Third World has almost everywhere a constitutional heritage of individual liberty, and it needs to be as jealous of that heritage as of the heritage of national independence. It should be a source of renown that India, for one, has done that, and of infamy that so many others have not.

Not long ago, Alexander Solzhenitsyn, speaking of the case of a Soviet dissident who had been detained in a mental hospital, asked whether world opinion would ever permit South Africa to detain a black African leader in this fashion. Answering his own question, he said, "The storm of worldwide rage would have long ago swept the roof from that prison!" His point is very like the one Stephen Spender came to in the course of the Spanish Civil War. Visiting Spain, he encountered atrocities of the Right, and atrocities of the Left. But only those of the Right were being written about, and it came to him, as he later put it, that if one did not care about every murdered child indiscriminately, one did not really care about children being murdered at all. Very well. But nothing we finally know about the countries of the Third World (only in part the object of the Solzhenitsyn charge) warrants the conclusion that they will be concerned only for wrongdoing that directly affects *them*. Ethnic solidarity is not the automatic enemy of civil liberties. It has been the foundation of many. If there are any who can blow off the roof of any such prison—then all credit to them. If you can be against the wrongful imprisonment of a person anywhere, then you can be against wrongful imprisonment everywhere.

It is in precisely such terms that we can seek common cause with the new nations: granted that they, no more than we, are likely ever wholly to live up to either of our protestations. Yet there exists the strongest possibility of an accommodating relationship at the level of principle—a possibility that does not exist at all with the totalitarian powers as they are now constituted. To contemplate an oppositional role to the Soviet bloc, or the Chinese, in, say, the General Assembly would be self-deceptive. One may negotiate there as between separate political communities, but to participate as in a single community—even in opposition—would simply not be possible. We can, however, have such a relation with most Third World nations. And we can do so while speaking for and in the name of political and civil liberty.

AND EQUALITY, what of it? Here an act of historical faith is required: what is the record? The record was stated most succinctly by an Israeli socialist who told William F. Buckley, Jr. that those nations which have put liberty ahead of equality have ended up doing better by equality than those with the reverse priority. This is so, and being so, it is something to be shouted to the heavens in the years now upon us. *This is our case*. We *are* of the liberty party, and it might surprise us what energies might be released were we to unfurl those banners.

In the spring of 1973, in his first address as director-designate of the London School of Economics—where Harold Laski once molded the minds of so many future leaders of the "new majority"—Ralf Dahrendorf sounded this theme. The equality party, he said, has had its day. The liberty party's time has come once more. It is a time to be shared with the new nations, and those not so new, shaped from the old European empires, and especially the British—and is the United States not one such?—whose heritage this is also. To have halted the great totalitarian advance only to be undone by the politics of resentment and the economics of envy would be a poor outcome to the promise of a world society. At the level of world affairs we have learned to deal with Communism. Our task is now to learn to deal with socialism. It will not be less difficult a task. It ought to be a profoundly more pleasant one. ■

COMMUNICATION RE: EXCESS BAGGAGE

from page 6

as if some law from on high said that if a maid is available you must hire her and turn your young over to her care.

The funniest and at the same time saddest thing in the whole dismal article is the reference to talk about one's marriage—" 'Why did you get married?' How painful but how liberating to say, 'Because I was 26, broke and he wanted to.' " Here is woman at her finest, giving that pearl of great price, herself, to some poor unsuspecting bloke who thinks he's getting a wife. No wonder men regard women with extreme wariness, when there are women who find such a self-regarding admission "liberating."

I'm not anti-woman, but I begin to be very tired of the liberated woman. The excess baggages who wrote this article, like a lot of their sisters, would have been better employed taking lovers instead of crying on each other's shoulders. At least there wouldn't have been so much talk involved.

LETTERS TO FSJ

A Caveat

■ Thank you for publishing that excellent, informed, generally insightful, article by professors Stupak and McLellan of Miami of Ohio (FSJ, April, page 23). Articles like this one, telling it like it is about contemporary US foreign policy-making and execution, are all too rare these days except in a very few professional journals.

If there is a single significant weakness in the argument (and I believe there is), it is in the patent over-optimism of the authors concerning reinstitution and revitalization of the role of the State Department as long as Ford-Kissinger stay in power. "The retrenchment has been made" from Nixon Doctrine adventurism, they say in effect, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary, especially the continued power of the Pentagon expressed in that monstrous war budget, still unlikely to be reduced in any significant way by a still-hawkish, hyper-nationalistic, congress.

What realistic cause for confidence in "The Conceptual Insights of Henry Kissinger," as actually applied in the Nixon-Ford (Kissinger) era? What basis, in concrete evidence, of *any* substantial change unless and until there is installed an Executive Establishment which is devoted to principles of integrity, justice, and reason, instead of deception, elitism, machismo, and irrational pride?

I would suggest that the two professors are too intelligent and perceptive by far not to have anticipated this obvious objection to their otherwise admirable article. It would be most interesting to read their comment on this point.

REUBEN R. THOMAS
FSSO Retired

Fayetteville

The Stepford Wives

■ Some women will not be able to relate at all to the article "Excess Baggage" by the Superfluous Spouses in the April JOURNAL or to "The Wasted Resource: Foreign Service Wives" in the May issue. But many women will say when they read these articles, "That's what I have been saying (or feeling but not saying) for years!" The articles express well the concern of many for the problems confronting the capable, intelligent, independent woman who gets dragged around the world as a hostess and charity volunteer.

If Foreign Service wives are to be anything more than Stepford wives abroad, the Foreign Service itself must do some serious thinking about the problems raised in the articles. There are still enough old-line, traditional thinkers in the Foreign Service (both men and women) who would keep the old system going in more or less the same fashion regardless of any new policies. But (thank God!) there are some young, independent thinkers who will insist that the Foreign Service catch up with the 20th Century.

JUDITH P. STUBBS

Alexandria

USIA Specialists Jeopardized by Supervisor's Ignorance

■ In our age of specialization, specialists in USIA continue to be treated as second-class citizens. Promotion of specialists to the FSIO/FSR-3 level is very difficult; grades 1 and 2 are normally reserved for generalists.

A new rationale for the downgrading of specialists was provided in the "Board Statement on Low Five Percent" received last summer by an FSIO of our acquaintance. It begins as follows:

"The Board has placed Mr. ____ in the low 5 percent ranking of his class. This position is far from indicative of the quality of his performance in his field of specialty . . . As a matter of fact, his record, past as well as recent, amply demonstrates the high regard with which he is viewed by his superiors, both as a person and professionally."

How can an officer who has consistently received good ratings end up in the low 5 percent? Easy.

"Mr. ____'s evaluation suffers from the unfortunate fact that neither the rating officer nor the review officer can provide a meaningful evaluation because of (. . .)* Instead, rating and review are confined to description of activities. As a result, Mr. ____ appears to the Selection Board as a diligent, hard-working man, who by nature of his professional experience and his grade can be expected to do just that."

**(unfamiliarity with his specialty.)*
Words omitted to mask the rated officer's identity.

In other words, high evaluation by supervisors must be disregarded if these are unfamiliar with the officer's specialty. Since most specialists in USIA are rated or reviewed by generalists, or by officers whose specialized competence lies in some other field, how can specialists avoid being selected out? Or does USIA feel it really has no need for specialists? Our Board provides the answers:

"The Selection Board recognizes the agency's need for specialists, especially with Mr. ____'s ability. It therefore recommends Mr. ____'s retention in the Service. The Selection Board also recommends that Mr. ____'s request for a generalist assignment be heeded as soon as possible so that he can prove himself in the broader fields of USIA."

This particular story has a happy ending. Despite being rated in the low 5 percent last year, our specialist friend has just been promoted—and given a generalist assignment.

But, what if a specialist lacks a good fairy?

KENNETH P. ADLER
Research Specialist

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Social Architecture

REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE 1947-1958, *Vol. I of Selected Works of Fidel Castro, edited by Rolando E. Bonachea and Nelson P. Valdes. MIT Press, $12.50.*

THIS SELECTION of Fidel Castro's writings up to January 1, 1959 shows Cuba's Prime Minister to be a clear thinker, a skilful organizer, and the one leader able to weld the disparate elements of the Cuban Revolution together for common action. There is no evidence here that he had Communist ties or accepted Marxist-Leninist doctrines, and we can remind ourselves that Cuba's Communists sat on the sidelines until he had all but won his struggle.

Actually, Castro is not revealed as an innovative thinker, or even a very radical one. Samuel Adams and Patrick Henry could have endorsed his insistence on his country's freedom from foreign domination; the Knights of Labor, the National Grange, the Farmers' Alliance, and the early American Federation of Labor could have supported his program of economic and labor reform; William Jennings Bryan, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson would not have blanched at many of his political and social ideas; and Norman Thomas repeatedly campaigned on their like. Indeed, Castro can be fitted within the US Populist and Progressive reformist mold. This isn't strange, for intellectual currents in this country were usually reflected in Cuba from 1762 on, as shown by the fact that Cuba's major revolutions have traditionally been incubated in this country.

Castro frankly advocated violence as an essential means of righting Cuba's social and political wrongs—following an illustrious example, we may recall, in this bicentennial season. While we comfort ourselves in the belief that our enlightened people repudiate force as a means of bringing about progressive social change (forgetting our own Revolution, the Civil War, and more than a few bloody riots), we can hardly expect such saintly forbearance on the part of the downtrodden elsewhere. What are the heavy-laden to do if they can see no peaceful means of easing their weary burden?

From the earliest days of his activism, Castro dedicated himself to freeing Cuba from foreign domination and improving the lot of the poor. He has richly accomplished the second objective, but, with respect to the first, Cuba seems merely to have exchanged one foreign patron for another. If Cuban-US relations are ever "normalized," it will probably result from Castro's desire to find an alternative to Cuba's unnatural dependence on the Soviet Union, and to gain freedom of action by playing his country's present and previous "benefactors" off against each other.

The personal image of Castro that comes through these early writings is that of a smart, purposeful, resourceful and humane leader. That he also developed into a successful social architect is evident in the New Cuba he has built during the 16 years of his power.

This useful record of Castro's thinking and actions shows him to be as Cuban as the rumba. But the entire hemisphere, if not all the Third World, vibrates to an appeal that reaches beyond Cuba's borders, for the charisma that powers his leadership now spans geographical, generational, and ideological gaps.

The lengthy biographical and historical introduction provides a handy framework on which events and writings can be related to one another.

—JOHN P. HOOVER

Humane Foreign Policy

IN SEARCH OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, *by Lincoln P. Bloomfield. Oxford University Press.*

PROFESSOR LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD of MIT has written a long and personal essay on American foreign policy which describes his own discomfort and even anguish in the '60s as he tried to respond to the radical views but compassionate feelings of students, his analysis of where we have gone wrong in



foreign policy (too militaristic, too much deceit, lying by the White House, bureaucratic resistance to new ideas), and his prescription for the future in the form of a "decalogue" or ten assumptions that should guide policy.

Bloomfield's prescriptions are bland and general and unfortunately don't match his forthright analysis of our past mistakes. His plea for a "humane" foreign policy is well intentioned but only of limited help in defining the national interest or in deciding how best to influence developments outside our borders. Bloomfield's perspective is both academic and governmental (he consults actively with various agencies) and the result is almost too restrained and well-balanced to have much effect on either thought or action.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

The Countess Keeps House

THE GUEST HOUSE: *The Witnesses at Nuremberg, A Memoir by Countess Ingeborg Kalnoky, with Ilona Herisko. Bobbs-Merrill.*

THIS BOOK has been prepared by a team of two perceptive women. The protagonist is a German-born Hungarian Countess, who returned to her native country at the end of World War II in 1945, to find a home for herself and her four children. Her biographer-translator-co-author, also German-born, is a former dancer, now a free-lance writer.

Arriving in Nuremberg as the International Military Tribunal was getting under way in the trial of Nazi high officials charged with war crimes, the multilingual Countess Kalnoky was a natural choice to become the "hostess" of one of the so-called "guest houses" requisitioned from the private sector to accommodate the flow of trial witnesses of various nationalities who were to testify, either for or against, the high-level former officials in the prisoners dock. Some of the witnesses were later to face criminal charges on their own account.

The Countess was required to serve the functions of hotel director, smoother of ruffled feelings, recreation coordinator, preventer of mayhem among political dissidents, and, on occasion, jailer for individual witnesses in a detention status. Among the more memorable of her "guests" were a survivor of the abortive attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944; the flirtatious founder of the dread Nazi secret police agency, the Gestapo; Hitler's clownish personal photographer and eternally faithful friend; the wife of the Nazi High Command Chief of Staff, whose devoted efforts to save her husband's life were in vain; and the beautiful, young wife of the Nazi youth leader, who saw her husband saved from the death penalty, only to be tried and sentenced later by a German de-Nazification court.

The writers probe, with considerable insight, not only the most subjective experiences, thoughts and feelings of the hostess and her guests on the personal everyday level, but also their attempts to cope with the complex concepts of the larger guilt of individuals, peoples, organizations and nations for crimes committed by their leadership. If you are interested in searching for answers of your own, this book could help. It was written with dignity and creditable objectivity.

—E. HORECKY

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The Establishment's Asia

THREE AND A HALF POWERS: *The New Balance in Asia by Harold C. Hinton. Indiana University Press, $15.00, paper $3.95.*

HAROLD HINTON, once of FSI and now of George Washington University, has had two successful books on China, "Communist China in World Politics" and "China's Turbulent Quest." He now expands his view to include the two superpowers and Japan. He misses the mark this time.

The author claims to have no great "political emotions" about the subject, and at the same time not to be "uncritically laudatory" about American policy. Truth is, the history and analysis are often slanted against Peking (four separate references to the India-China War manage to avoid the point of Neville Maxwell's "India's China War" although that book appears in the suggestions for further reading). But the main complaint is that Mr. Hinton, if not uncritically laudatory of American policy, has accepted in almost all cases official explanations or official elisions of American policy or actions. One exception is his willingness to criticize President Nixon, usually to point up that the actions criticized were Mr. Nixon's not Mr. Kissinger's; in fact p. 156 makes it appear that Mr. Nixon said "peace is at hand" back in October 1972.

When one shakes an uneasy feeling that he is being conned on US roles, the analysis presented and the predictions made seem probable, if bland, save for some hairy but not implausible scenarios about a Sino-Soviet war.

Events in Indo-China have taken the edge off Mr. Hinton's book (finished September 1974), but even without that dramatic denouement there would have been disappointment that he did not choose to take a cooler look at Washington, a closer look at Tokyo and a longer look at Peking (he was refused a CPR visa in 1973).

—J.K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Toward World Cooperation

LOOKING FORWARD, *by Livingston Hartley. Branden Press, $3.95.*

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AFSA NEWS

STATEMENT OF THOMAS D. BOYATT BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY APRIL 28, 1975

Mr. Chairman, the Association is pleased to have an opportunity to appear before this distinguished group and to present testimony on the basic question before the Commission—how best to organize the government for the conduct of foreign policy?

As a life member of our Association, Mr. Chairman, what I am about to say will be "old hat" for you, but for the other members of the Commission a few words of introduction may be in order. For fifty years the American Foreign Service Association has been the professional organization of the Foreign Service of the United States and in that capacity has long been concerned with the same issues which are before this Commission. Indeed, in times past the Association took a very active role in the enactment of the Act of '46, in the Herter and Wriston Commissions, and in the "task force" reforms in the late '60s and early '70s. It is largely in this capacity as a professional association intimately concerned with the organization of the government in the foreign affairs field that we are appearing before you today. In addition, however, two years ago the Association won contested elections to be the exclusive employee representative of the nearly 12,000 men and women of the Foreign Service of the United States in the Department of State, the Agency for International Development, and the United States Information Agency. As an employee organization, we are also concerned with those elements of the Commission's mandate which could involve changes in personnel policies or procedures, or organizational changes affecting the career of Foreign Service employees.

One of the real strengths of this Commission's mandate is that it goes far beyond the mandate extended to other investigatory commissions, and thus avoids the narrow strait-jacket placed on previous commissions to concern themselves solely with reform of the Foreign Affairs Agencies or of the State Department. In consideration of this broader mandate, the Association will make recommendations on a wide range of issues before the Commission and not restrict ourselves solely to matters related to the three Foreign Affairs Agencies. For the sake of convenience, I would like to group our major recommendations under the following 9 headings:

1. **The Imperative of Change**

The current organizational structure of the government has evolved over the years through a series of *ad hoc*, often uncoordinated decisions, each of which might have been justified in the abstract but which, taken together, constitute an organizational structure of the government for the conduct of foreign policy that could hardly be justified by anyone. The mandate of this Commission is itself a recognition of the need to step back and take a careful look at how this government guides its foreign relations, and to see whether human ingenuity cannot devise a better system than the one under which we are presently forced to operate.

Moreover, it is clear that changes which have recently taken place in the international environment have brought about profound changes in the nature of international relations and of America's interaction with the other nations of the world.

We proceed from the assumptions —demonstrable in today's world:

- that post-World War II US foreign policy was based on public (Congressional) support for the application of massive US resources to clearly defined problems through established alliances in a bipolar world;
- that today and in the future US policy will be based on limited public (Congressional) support for the application of limited resources to complex problems against a background of shifting alliances in a multipolar world:
- that while the US remains the single most important factor in world affairs, our *relative* power has declined as a result of political, economic, and military changes;
- that while the present fluid international environment presents dangers, it also presents opportunities for encouraging and broadening areas of interdependence with a view to establishing a more cooperative world; and
- that the nature of international involvement has changed dramatically since the end of the war and, while security and international political considerations continue to be the single most important questions of American foreign policy, some questions, particularly trade and finance, have increased enormously in importance, while other questions such as energy, population, development, the environment, oceans policy, information and cultural—to name but a few—have become central questions of foreign relations.

These changes have in turn caused not only policy shifts but require new means of dealing with international problems and, in our opinion, new organizational approaches for the government in carrying out this country's foreign relations. In short, this Commission with its broad mandate could not have come at a more propitious time, for, in the opinion of the Association, a thorough overhaul based on a careful review is already long overdue.

2. **The Role of Congress and the Power of the President**

The authors of the Constitution had a firm grasp of the importance of foreign affairs and built an Executive/Legislative balance of power in the foreign affairs field into the Constitution itself. The Constitutional requirement that two-thirds of the Senate approve treaties, and that the Senate advise and consent to the appointment of ambassadors and ministers, as well as the power of the legislature to declare war and appropriate funds, were measures meant to establish the balance of power doctrine in the field of foreign affairs. Legitimate differences on the details of the Executive/Legislative balance in the foreign policy process are possible. There can, however, be no argument regarding the intent of the Constitution to give the Legislative Branch a substantial voice in foreign affairs.

Throughout our history the relative balance between the Executive and Legislative Branches has fluctuated. During and since World War II, however, the balance has swung dramatically toward the Executive. Since 1941 US foreign policy involvement has been in the context of war—hot (1941-45), or cold (1947-72). War, of course, even for a democracy requires a large and capable military establishment and concentration of power in a strong

President. Over the past 30 years we have had both and the result has been a derogation of the Constitutional intent for a strong legislative input in the foreign policy process.

Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that in structural, bureaucratic and resource terms the American military and intelligence establishments during and after World War II came to dominate, and still dominate, the foreign policy process.

With regard to leadership from General Marshall to Colonel Rusk, from General Hershey to Lieutenant McNamara, and not to mention General Eisenhower, military men or men with long military experience have played an extremely important role in the critical foreign policy decisions of the country. This is a fact which does not detract from the great contributions to our nation made by such men. I might say that the distinguished Chairman of the Commission, Ambassador Robert Murphy, entitled his autobiography of a lifetime in diplomacy during this period, "Diplomat Among Warriors." I can think of no better description of the reality of the foreign policy process during the '40s, '50s and '60s than that title. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to say that during the 1947-73 period the US reversed von Clausewitz's dictum; diplomacy became war carried out by other means.

In resource terms, our military alliances, and the bases and military assistance groups involved therein, have created a situation in which over 80 percent of the official United States personnel overseas are military, and in numerous countries the reality of the American presence is seen in the enormous quantity of American arms present.

In structural terms the Cabinet, composed of officers appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate and subject to Congressional oversight, has been replaced by a "national security" system.

The National Security Act provided for a Cabinet-level body to advise the President on foreign affairs. What has happened in practice is that the Cabinet-rank National Security Council has atrophied, and a system of "committees" and "groups" dominated by Presidential advisers and military and intelligence officers—none subject to advice and consent—have assumed decision-making authority—not subject to legislative oversight—in foreign policy formulation and implementation processes. The American people were warned of the power of this group in connection with its impact on the economy by none other than President Eisenhower when he spoke of the "military-industrial complex." It is time to focus on the power of the national security/military-intelligence complex in the foreign policy area.

Paralleling the pervasive military influence in the foreign policy process—and reinforcing the trend—has been the centralization of power in the Presidency itself. Recent Presidents, dealing with wars, hot and cold, have opted for the speed, efficiency, responsiveness, loyalty and security of a Presidential staff. Such persons are responsible to the President only, and not subject to advice and consent or Congressional oversight. From 1960 until Dr. Kissinger was named Secretary of State, the primary departments of government in the foreign affairs field—Department of State, USIA and AID—were divorced from the policy-making process. Officials with long experience in foreign affairs in the three Agencies were shunted aside because their contrary advice was not welcomed and their loyalty was questioned. The result was rather dramatically described in a 1973 newspaper article which stated that the affairs of the nation were conducted by "battalions of faceless ministers who now swarm through the corridors of the White House, the Executive Office Building, and perhaps other structures whose existence has not yet been disclosed. These men are not advisers; merely to listen to them for five minutes each would consume most of a Presidential term. They are an independent bureaucracy whose authority extends to every function of government. In a kind of Constitutional mockery, the Congress dutifully evaluates and confirms Presidential appointees, and its committees sternly interrogate Cabinet members, while the real government toils on in seclusion, its activities so extensive that even the President cannot keep informed of its myriad deeds."

The system described above still exists. Were it not for the fact that Dr. Kissinger is concurrently the Secretary of State and the President's NSC Adviser, the situation described would obtain as it did under Kennedy-Bundy, Johnson-Rostow, and Nixon-Kissinger.

I have outlined in very broad terms what AFSA believes to be some of the fundamental problems in the foreign policy process. Essentially, it is a matter of reestablishing the legislative and professional inputs in foreign policy and limiting what has come to be the total power of the Presidency and the pervasiveness of military influence. No amount of bureaucratic reorganization will have significant impact unless these basic problems are attacked. To achieve this AFSA recommends that the Commission:

- Recommend legislation revising the National Security Act and mandating the Secretary of State concurrently serve as the National Security Council coordinator of all intergovernmental activities in foreign affairs and requiring the Secretary (or his Congressionally approved designee) to chair all NSC subordinate bodies.
- Recommend legislation which would prohibit assistants to the President from being interposed between the President and the heads of foreign affairs departments in the exercise of their statutory functions.
- Recommend that through the appropriations process, a severe limit be placed on the size of the President's foreign affairs staff and that the regular staff (as opposed to the President's political advisers) be subject to the Hatch Act.
- Recommend that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee be charged with oversight of the role of the military in the foreign affairs policy process, and that the Committee initiate an immediate investigation of the current situation with a view to reporting any appropriate legislation.

3. The Need for a "Macropolicy" Perspective

In the period since the end of the war, as new tasks or challenges have arisen, the reaction of this government has been consistently to deal with questions on an *ad hoc* basis, which almost inevitably resulted in the creation of new agencies or bureaucratic entities to deal with new problems. For example, faced with the rising tide of street crime caused by the narcotics epidemic, the government first created the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, and subsequently the Drug Enforcement Administration. To deal with the international implications, BNDD, and subsequently DEA, officials in enormous numbers were assigned overseas. Similarly, faced with a need to place more emphasis on disarmament considerations in American foreign policy, an entirely new Agency—the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency—was established. To cope with the increasingly complex problems of the coordination of these rapidly proliferating agencies in the Foreign Affairs field ever more complex and cumbersome coordination devices were attempted, most of which have proven to be unsuccessful.

If the sole term of reference for an analysis of the organization of the government to carry out its foreign affairs responsibilities is a problem-by-problem, agency-by-agency evaluation, it becomes difficult to quarrel with any one of these decisions. Yet, the total effect has been to diffuse responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs to such a degree that no coordinating mechanism can hope to cope with the

enormity of the problem, or hope to place the US government in a situation where it can speak to foreign governments with one voice. The horror stories—of a CIA person in a given country seeking to "destabilize" the same government the ambassador was seeking to strengthen; of BNDD agents making representations to foreign governments totally at odds with goals being pursued by local American military commanders seeking to obtain support for American installations in the same countries—these and many others are undoubtedly well known to this Commission.

What is clearly called for here is the need not only to look at each constituent element of American foreign policy responsibilities and how best to carry them out, but also the need for a careful overview. Such an overview, we are convinced, would argue for far stronger centralization of policy and authority in the Secretary of State in Washington, and in the ambassador in the field. With respect to this latter question, the Congress of the United States has already taken an extremely useful step by codifying in legislation the authority of the ambassador which had previously been unilaterally delineated by the Executive Branch. With the role of the Secretary, however, a great deal remains to be done. In addition to our recommendations with respect to the National Security Council, we would also recommend that serious consideration be given to:

1) A single foreign affairs budget. Some argue that budgetary control is the ultimate control in government. Ultimate authority in this process should, of course, rest with the appropriations and authorization process in the Congress. In the shorter run, however, a great deal could be done to improve the budgetary process both by the Congress and by the Executive Branch. In particular, the Congress could insist that the Executive provide it with one single budget for all foreign operations, with the sole exception of the support for US military forces abroad.

Moreover, the Executive Branch could vest in the Secretary final review authority for that same single budget. By doing so, the Executive Branch could greatly improve its capacity to assure the Congress that the allocation of resources to foreign policy goals was in fact consonant with overall foreign policy objectives and simultaneously eliminate the disingenuous and even mischievous role of OMB, which presumes to "manage" the resource allocations in foreign affairs without foreign affairs experience and without itself being subject to legislative oversight.

2) The authority of the Secretary of State to provide policy direction to all elements of the government involved in foreign affairs should be made explicit. Unlike the vast majority of other government agencies, the Department of State operates without any basic enabling legislation. Within the limits of his own Constitutional role, of course, nothing should undercut the capacity of the President to provide overall foreign policy guidance to all elements of the government, including the Secretary of State. Nevertheless, in the absence of explicit instructions from the President to the contrary, it should be made clear that the Secretary of State has the principal responsibility for providing policy guidance to all other elements of the government with respect to foreign affairs. In the present circumstance, we have seen such bizarre developments as the Federal Aviation Administration making foreign policy arguments with respect to landing rights of the *Concorde* in Washington and New York. The Secretary might well have taken the same position, but it is absurd for an agency such as the FAA to be making foreign policy determinations on its own.

3) In a more basic sense, careful consideration should be given to the question of whether we need to have so many agencies involved in foreign affairs at all. A single foreign affairs budget and a central policy role for the Secretary would, of course, go a long way toward resolving some of the bureaucratic problems inherent in the present situation. But before relying solely on these approaches, the more fundamental question should be addressed in the case of every agency having foreign programs or operations, as to whether that agency has any business being involved in the foreign policy of the United States whatsoever. It is our impression that such a review by this Commission and the Congress would almost inevitably result in a determination that some agencies could be eliminated, others absorbed, and yet others told to shed certain foreign affairs-related functions. Consideration should be given, for example, to transferring the Bureau of International Commerce from Commerce to State, similarly shifting the Bureau of International Labor Affairs from Labor and eliminating or drastically curtailing the international offices of Treasury, HEW, HUD, DOT, the Department of Agriculture and the 50 plus other agencies with an "overseas presence."

What is being stressed here is the urgent need to assure that the question of organization of the government for the conduct of foreign policy not be looked at solely on a problem-by-problem or an agency-by-agency perspective, but also be viewed from the larger "macro" perspective of how foreign policy should be made and implemented.

4. **Changes in the Role of Public Diplomacy**

The Association has previously testified at some length concerning the recommendations of the Stanton Panel before a Subcommittee of this Commission, and although we commend it to your attention, we will not repeat that testimony here. We do wish, however, to emphasize strongly that in the Association's view information and cultural programs are and ought to remain an integral part of American diplomacy; that the current integration of short-term informational, long-term informational, and cultural programing abroad under a Public Affairs Office responsible to the ambassador should not be splintered along the lines recommended by the Stanton Panel; that a substantial reform of the Washington organization in the informational and cultural fields is overdue—either bringing USIA and CU together within State or establishing a modified version of USIA under closer direction of the Secretary; that administrative services be amalgamated (see below); and that a more independent structure for the Voice be established.

5. **The Urgent Need To Do Something About AID**

For over twenty-five years this nation has been administering "temporary" bilateral assistance programs utilizing "temporary" agencies to carry out this task. In the Association's opinion, a further continuation of this situation is unacceptable on both professional and employee grounds. AFSA recognizes, and many in AFSA would support, the view that excessive emphasis has been placed in times past on bilateral assistance, that we have had difficulties in justifying programs whose basis in many cases was primarily to support short-term foreign policy objectives, and in other cases to support development or other largely humanitarian goals on the grounds that these were in the long range national interest. We anticipate that support for large scale bilateral assistance programs will continue to decline, and that in future years there will be little or no support for large scale bilateral infrastructure or industrialization schemes. Instead, American participation in this form of development assistance will increasingly be through multilateral agencies. Nevertheless, the Association believes it is a serious mistake to view bilateral assistance and humanitarian aid as temporary and transient aspects of American foreign policy, and we reject the notion that multilateralization of all foreign assistance is a viable alternative.

In fact, it is highly probable that the US will maintain a capability for bilateral assistance for immediate foreign policy reasons; because of non-shared US interests in assistance targeted to key areas, e.g., population control; and because of the need for quick and effec-

tive humanitarian disaster relief, an area in which the record of the multilateral agencies is spotty at best.

In any case, of primary importance is the need for the US to have a professional development structure which can deal with both bilateral and multilateral AID issues and operations as these impinge on US interests. Unfortunately, the Association does not believe that AID as presently structured meets this basic need. Accordingly, we are convinced that the time has come to recognize that the developmental assistance function is a long-term feature of American diplomacy, and to structure the government to take this into account. A number of concrete steps are necessary:

1. The Congress should officially acknowledge that foreign development assistance has become a continuing part of US foreign policy and that appropriate structural adjustments via enabling legislation are therefore required.

2. The leadership of the USG foreign development assistance program should flow directly from the Secretary of State. Under "Department of State Delegation of Authority No. 104—Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Certain Related Acts" the Secretary of State has delegated to the Administrator of AID most organizational, operational and personnel matters. However, as is noted under Section 7(c) of that Authority, the Secretary can exercise executive control over AID if he so desires. The Secretary's exercise of this existing authority would at least eliminate the country ever again being witness to the unseemly activities of AID in pressing for one kind of AID bill while the Secretary wanted another, and should eliminate the capacity of the Agency to flout openly the orders of the Foreign Service Grievance Board and other adjudicatory bodies under Executive Order 11636.

The Association believes that the Secretary should exercise such control immediately by temporarily assigning the delegation to the Deputy Secretary of State pending the development of a program and enabling legislation outlined as follows:

A. An amalgamation of the administrative support functions of State and AID should be undertaken (see below) in a phased manner. This we believe will lead not only to greater efficiency and lower costs but enhanced career opportunities. Such an amalgamation should lead in a step-by-step process to the merger of offices concerned with security, employee management relations, travel and personnel support functions, and payrolls.

B. A career system should be established around a core of development-oriented Foreign Service Development officers with the same career status presently accorded FSOs and FSIOs. At the same time a system, perhaps similar to a modified Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited (FSRU) authority should be created to facilitate the acquisition of specific technical expertise when and as needed. Moreover, such a career system should do something about AID's huge Civil Service bureaucracy, which has made AID increasingly a Washington-focused agency, dominated by individuals who know little or nothing about overseas conditions. This aspect of the problem could be resolved by either phasing out or converting to FSRU or FSDO all Civil Service personnel except those in essential occupational specialties having no overseas equivalent positions and who should therefore remain GS. A separate assignments and promotion system for all Foreign Service personnel in the new development structure is envisaged.

C. A systematic long-range career development program should be created with particular attention to (1) disseminating the knowledge of and techniques for foreign development assistance programs and (2) undertaking research to learn more about the generic development process than we now know. Since a great majority of AID's research at present is sectoral and unidisciplinary, our proposal would be of great value to the whole foreign development assistance community.

D. Under the new arrangement (1) all US bilateral and multilateral policies, programs and personnel should be integrated; (2) there should be a more formal leadership and coordination role of all US official foreign development assistance activities; and (3) there should be a central and catalytic role for the new AID structure within the community of private, voluntary, and university development resources.

6. Improving the Personnel System in the Foreign Service

Mr. Chairman, if this Commission were meeting even three years ago, we would have come before you with a long "shopping list" of recommendations in the field of personnel problems in State, AID and USIA. We do not intend to do so, with a few exceptions, here today. The reason for this is that a mechanism has finally been established which provides for a beneficial employee input into personnel policies and procedures, and thus establishes an entity, the Association, committed to reform and which has legal authority to have substantial influence on a day-to-day basis. This mechanism is the employee-management relations system for the three foreign affairs agencies established by Executive Order 11636. There are enormous problems—in particular the fact that the system is not working at all in AID—which we believe can be resolved only through the establishment of a legislatively mandated employee-relations system for the Foreign Service. However, the existence of an employee-relations system for the Foreign Affairs agencies, and AFSA's election to be the exclusive employee representative of Foreign Service personnel make it possible for the employees to exert literally daily pressure for improvements in the personnel systems of the agencies. Frankly, with a few exceptions, we are in a position to bring about changes almost as rapidly as we could recommend them to you.

In the personnel field, therefore, we will limit our remarks to those matters requiring legislation and beyond the scope of our negotiations.

One area which urgently needs legislative reform is the continued use by the three agencies of the flexibilities inherent in the Foreign Service Act of 1946, and Public Law 90-494 for purposes of political patronage, or personal favor, rather than keeping the Foreign Service strictly an apolitical merit system as intended by the Congress. The only solution to this problem is for the Congress to close several major loopholes in the Foreign Service Act, P.L. 90-494 and the Foreign Assistance Act. We believe this can be done in a manner consistent with other widely-recognized merit principles without undermining legitimate management needs for flexibility. The Association has researched this problem area thoroughly, and is prepared to supply the Commission with concrete legislative proposals designed to strengthen the merit system in the Foreign Affairs agencies.

The other matter which greatly concerns us and for which no remedy is apparently available outside of legislation is in the area of compensation for Foreign Service people. Senior officers, faced with a four year period in which they have been totally unable to obtain any form of pay increase, and who have watched their real incomes decline by as much as 43%, are finding it increasingly difficult to justify remaining in the Foreign Service, particularly when they have families and college educations to underwrite. While $36,000 per year is an amount greater than many of us in the Service have any reason to aspire to in the near future, the fact is that this situation is terribly unfair, and completely contrary to the national interest. The reason is that the best younger senior officers are being given offers commensurate with those available to first rate executives in private industry, while less capable officers are more likely to remain in the Service. Unless this process is quickly brought to a halt, it will greatly under-

mine the quality of the Senior ranks of the Service. While we recognize that in this time of economic difficulties, the Congress is unlikely to take action solely on the basis of the unfairness of this situation, we hope that this Commission will add its voice to those emphasizing the rapid, negative impact the senior level freeze is having on the capacity of the government to govern.

A closely similar problem is that of pay-comparability of our junior and middle ranking personnel. Under present law, the pay of the Foreign Service is linked to that of GS personnel, and the Civil Service Commission and OMB are required to make annual surveys of these "linkages." These two agencies for over three years ignored this legal requirement. Finally this past year they got around to living up to their legal obligations and finally conducted a survey. The results of that survey convinced the Association that the game is rigged. In particular, the survey was based solely on what are technically called "classification factors," by which levels of responsibility, number of Americans supervised, etc., are compared. Such a system severely disadvantages the Foreign Service, by failing to take into account:

(1) The quality demanded of the personnel to perform these tasks. The Foreign Service is enormously more difficult to get into than even the most competitive sectors of the Civil Service system. Personnel of comparable quality are paid far more in the rest of the government and in private industry than in the Foreign Service. Moreover, in addition to doing a job for which "classification factors" known to the CSC apply, Foreign Service officers must do so in one, two or more languages under difficult circumstances over a career.

(2) The slow rates of promotion in the Foreign Service. Outstanding personnel in the Civil Service system usually come in through one of a number of established intern programs, are typically hired out of college at the GS-9 level, and are then promoted annually to GS-13, at which time they would be approximately 26 years old. In the Foreign Service, on the other hand, 26 is the average age for entry at FSO-7 (slightly below GS-9), and, according to this year's statistics a Foreign Service officer can expect to wait an average of 11 years until age 37 to be promoted to FSO-4 (GS-13 equivalent).

(3) Pay comparability linkages are based on assessing comparable "40 hour weeks." Yet a 40 hour week in the Foreign Service is rare, particularly abroad, where officers typically spend 40-50 hours per week in the office, and then spend from 10-20 hours in additional tasks outside the office which are a traditional part of representing this country abroad (mandatory social activities, giving speeches or holding seminars, rescuing distressed Americans, meeting and briefing visiting dignitaries, etc.).

These factors, in our opinion are relevant to providing genuine pay comparability, but when we raised them with the Civil Service Commission, we were told they are "interesting" but "outside the scope" of their study. Yet a detailed study done by the Association indicated that Foreign Service officers were being disadvantaged by as much as a quarter of a million dollars when compared to GS interns by the time both reach age 50.

In short, the current law is rigged against the Foreign Service, and needs to be changed so that Foreign Service people at all levels are paid an equivalent amount to that paid individuals of comparable quality, holding comparable responsibilities, with comparably demanding workloads. In that regard, a useful first step could be taken by providing Foreign Service personnel a premium, based on the hours typically worked, in lieu of any overtime pay. This is already done for the FBI, which had previously faced a somewhat similar problem.

7. **Organizational Reform in the Department of State**

The Association's study of structural and organizational problems in the State Department indicated most of them are not of sufficient urgency to bring to the attention of this Commission, with one exception:

Administrative amalgamation: The Association will be testifying this summer before the Brooks Committee on the need to eliminate the duplication of certain administrative and personnel support functions in the three Foreign Affairs agencies. Many of the functions are already consolidated in Washington, and most are run jointly overseas. The Association believes that some further economies could be brought about, employee rights strengthened, and better and more even-handed services provided to Foreign Service personnel if the Security, Employee-management relations, and eventually the payrolling, shipping and travel sections of the three agencies were combined.

8. **Reforming the Role of Intelligence**

We suspect that nearly everyone in the Foreign Service favors the current investigations into allegations of illegal domestic involvement by the CIA, on the grounds that as citizens we share a concern for assuring that all agencies operate within the rule of law. On the other hand, as professionals in the field of foreign affairs, we are convinced of the necessity of an effective intelligence community for the conduct of our foreign relations. Indeed, a good case can be made that as the role of the United States in world affairs has changed, intelligence has gained in importance, particularly with respect to strategic warning, and with respect to verification of arms control agreements.

This growing importance of intelligence in strategic matters, however, does not mean that there is not room for considerable improvement in the way this country carries out its intelligence functions. The Association would suggest the following changes:

(1) Eliminate unnecessary duplication. For years it has been argued that more than one source of intelligence, and more than one center of assessment were in the national interest. With respect to strategic intelligence involving potentially significant adversary states, we believe the argument is a sound one, and that the duplication of functions between the CIA and the military services, though costly, should be retained. When one moves from this critical field of strategic intelligence to other kinds of intelligence, however, it does not follow that if two agencies are good, an unlimited number is even better. We would strongly urge that intelligence gathering and assessment be limited in the areas of political and economic developments exclusively to the Department of State for overtly obtainable information and the CIA for the covert area. DIA and all other military intelligence organizations should get entirely out of the business of reporting on political and economic developments. Their involvement is not only a totally unnecessary and wasteful duplication of effort, but the level of professional competence in reporting on developments is markedly below that of regular diplomatic Foreign Service personnel or of the CIA.

Another kind of duplication occurs when the CIA abroad obtains either overtly or covertly and reports in its channels information readily available to regular Foreign Service personnel at no cost. This can and should be controlled by ambassadors abroad and by CIA and State Department monitoring in Washington.

(2) Curtail substantially the level of CIA and military intelligence personnel overseas, particularly in "Third World" countries. If, as we have suggested, a strong case can be made that the changing nature of American involvement in the rest of the world requires greater reliance on intelligence in strategic matters and with potential adversary states, the same cannot be said of the role of intelligence in the rest of the world. The US is no longer going to function as the world's omnipresent policeman. Therefore, much of the information previously collected is useless, and its collection a waste of money. Do we need five military staffers in Uruguay to obtain that country's order of battle? Do we need current

levels of CIA officers in various Embassy sections around the world to report on everything? No, we do not. Moreover, in third world countries, CIA operations and attache presence have been a source of embarrassment on a number of occasions, have exacerbated relations with governments for no useful purpose, and have undermined the effectiveness of the Foreign Service, because, since we provide the CIA cover in our missions, all Foreign Service personnel are suspect.

To correct this situation the Association believes Congressional action is necessary since the Executive has proved itself incapable of limiting the CIA and attache presence abroad. Two actions are necessary: a legislatively imposed limit on the number of CIA and military attache personnel serving overseas; and the establishment of firm guidelines requiring them to concentrate largely on activities of and developments in potential adversary states, and leave the great bulk of political and economic reporting to the Foreign Service, which does this task most professionally, at less cost or risk, and without the clientism that sometimes develops between host country and US military and intelligence services. A 25% reduction in CIA and attache presence abroad is a reasonable target.

(3) Place far stronger limitations on covert operations. The issue of covert operations, of efforts to "destabilize" other nations, manipulate other governments, etc., has been given considerable public attention. While opinions on this issue vary within the Service, we believe there is a consensus that at best, covert operations are a highly overrated tool of international politics. The Association believes that the Congress should revise the National Security Act to establish clear definitions of the scope of CIA activities and that then the Congress should supply far greater oversight than at present. In addition, the CIA should be instructed in no uncertain terms that its present practice of briefing ambassadors on operations only in general terms without revealing agents and sources is a violation of law (in particular the amendment of the Foreign Service Act, contained in the 1974 State Department Authorization Bill which makes clear the preeminent role of the Ambassador abroad).

9. Scaling Down the Scope and Number of Other Agencies Overseas

Since 1968, the size of the Foreign Service has declined from 16,000 to 12,000 with corresponding reductions in personnel overseas. Americans with USIA overseas, for example, have dropped from 1500 to just under 1000 in the same time frame, and AID Foreign Service personnel have decreased from about 4500 to under 3000. Further reductions are still underway in AID. The Association has taken violent exception to the way those reductions are being carried out in AID, through an illegal RIF, which hits entirely AID's Foreign Service personnel, while leaving the huge, bloated GS bureaucracy in Washington virtually untouched. In any case, while we are not arguing for substantial increases in the number of Foreign Service personnel, we hope that this current decline has hit bottom, and that the number of Foreign Service personnel can now remain stable.

The same cannot be said of other agencies, which, by and large were either able to escape the 1967-68 BALPA/OPRED reductions entirely, or have quietly brought their overseas levels back up. What all these people are doing overseas remains something of a mystery. DOD alone has, according to the most recent published statistics, some 23,000 American civilians abroad. That is the equivalent of one and a third combat divisions. While many of these individuals perform useful, and in some cases essential functions, their numbers are clearly excessive, and should be curtailed sharply. Other agencies have proliferated abroad in an orgy of wasted effort. One survey indicated that at a typical American embassy abroad, only 17% of the personnel were Foreign Service personnel from State, and yet a smaller number from USIA and AID. While there is clearly a rationale for retaining in substantial numbers both CIA and DOD personnel (but in reduced strength), the only apparent rationale for many agencies to have their own personnel abroad is that having your own overseas operations has become a badge or symbol of being a "real" agency. What the Bonneville Power Administration is doing with personnel overseas escapes us entirely. Leaving aside the three Foreign Affairs agencies, DOD and CIA, the remainder—some 1900 personnel from 19 government departments and agencies—could be cut in half and no one would ever know the difference.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen of the Commission, the Governing Board of AFSA and numerous AFSA committees have spent months in lively debate over the matters covered here today. Our indictments of some past and present foreign affairs structures and operations have been severe. This does not imply any questioning of the motivations or capacities of any individuals or institutions involved, but rather reflects the importance of the issues and our responsibility to deal with them frankly and openly. The nation's past performance in foreign affairs and the fundamental changes occurring today in the international environment underline the critical need for change in the organization of our government for the conduct of foreign affairs. Thank you for this opportunity for AFSA to make its contribution.

International Affairs Award

The Rochester Association for the United Nations, Xerox Corporation, and the University of Rochester have established the Joseph C. Wilson Award in international affairs. The Award honors the late Mr. Wilson, who was a founder of the RAUN, chairman and chief executive officer of Xerox, and longtime chairman of the University's Board of Trustees. The Award will recognize an individual for high achievement and potential in activities contributing to the peaceful resolution of international problems. The recipient will be chosen annually, after a nationwide canvass, by a panel of prominent citizens.

The winner will receive $10,000, contributed by Xerox Corporation, to provide some form of enriching experience, training, or study that might not otherwise be available or to assist in the completion of a special project of international significance.

The winner will be announced each United Nations Day beginning October 24, 1975.

Nominations for the 1975 Award are to be made before July 31, 1975 and should be addressed to:

Joseph C. Wilson Award
Box G
Midtown Plaza
Rochester, New York 14604

ELIGIBILITY GUIDELINES: *A nominee must be a US civilian near mid-career. Each nomination should be accompanied by a biography of the nominee, a supporting statement of two to five pages, and the names of four other persons competent to appraise the nominee's qualifications. Additional details may be obtained by writing to the above address.*

Correction concerning taxes

The March FSJ article on taxes was in error in the section concerning Medical Expenses. Transportation in connection with medical treatment is deductible at the rate of 7 cents per mile, *not* 15 cents. The 7 cent rate is also applicable to transportation in connection with moving expenses and work for charitable purposes.

THE OUTRAGE OF THE MONTH

Terrible things happen in the Foreign Service. Sometimes they become known in the rumor mills and the corridors, sometimes not. Beginning this month, the Association is launching a new feature, THE OUTRAGE OF THE MONTH, which will name names and spell out details. Herewith, the first OUTRAGE:

Lateral entry has been a contentious problem in the Service for years. In theory an excellent concept providing the service with fresh blood and needed skills it has been, in practice, abused almost as often as used. Perhaps the worst form of abuse occurs when an individual lands a non-competitive FSR appointment (often the result of personal or political influence), and then seeks to convert to career status. In the meantime, job opportunities and promotions are taken away from the career service by individuals who have never proven whether they were competitive, and who often got the appointment for the wrong reasons in the first place.

Consider the case of James J. Soldow, formerly of and receiving a pension from the military establishment as a retired Colonel. Mr. Soldow was assigned as Administrative officer to USNATO in Brussels, as an FSR-2. The job probably should have gone to an FSO, though at least the integrated State/Defense character of USNATO would allow some to argue that former military experience was desirable. Now Mr. Soldow is being assigned to the position of Counselor for Administration in Athens, in spite of the fact that he must leave the rolls as an FSR by September 1976. It's an outrage. The job should go to a senior FSO who is an administrative specialist; indeed there is a long list of first rate administrative officers already in the career service who would give their eye teeth for that particular job.

Meanwhile Colonel Soldow wants to become a career officer. He has already been turned down for conversion to FSO and now wants to become an FSRU, which would be a clear violation of the differing purposes of the FSO and FSRU authorities. AFSA and "Two Thousand Plus" (the association of administrative personnel) have expressed our alarm and chagrin at Colonel Soldow's assignment to Athens, and our firmly held view that his appointment as an FSO or FSRU would be a serious violation of the merit principle. If that happens, it's another OUTRAGE—only worse.

Insurance and You

The Association considers the issue of foreign service insurance benefits and the functioning of the American Foreign Service Protective Association (AFSPA) to be matters of critical importance to the membership. The Board has recently taken two important actions in this area. First, an AFSA sub-association has been established to provide an insurance cover organization responsible to the people of the Foreign Service in State, AID and USIA. Second, AFSA has asked John Krizay, FSO-2, to head up a committee to examine the problem.

Krizay is former Research Director of the Twentieth Century Fund Study on Medical Cost Financing and is co-author of "The Patient As Consumer" (D. C. Heath Co.) which won the Norman Welch Award as the outstanding contribution to the literature of medical economics in 1974. He is currently a contributor to various medical and insurance journals. John has prepared a report on his preliminary findings on the current foreign service health insurance plan which will appear in these columns next month. We urge all members to watch for this report and to read it carefully.

More Progress on FSRs

We reported earlier on our successful efforts to ensure that FSR political appointees are identified and required to depart 30 days after the end of the administration or the departure of the individual who provided their patronage. Recently, the practice of hiring FSRs as aides to non-career Ambassadors was getting out of hand, Ambassador Saxbe took two FSR-1s to New Delhi, Ambassador Richardson sponsored three (count 'em, three) high level FSRs in London, Ambassador Silberman arranged for an FSR-1 Commercial Attache, etc. The following exchange of letters between AFSA President Tom Boyatt and Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger constitutes an additional element of control on the FSR loophole, until the Congress can pass more wide-reaching reforms (see our testimony in last month's AFSA News).

AFSA Letter

The Association has learned, on good authority, that the Department is in the final stages of clearing for outside hire, two political associates of Ambassador Saxbe to accompany him to India and perform unspecified tasks in a fully and competently staffed embassy.

The individuals involved, irrespective of their competence in past association with Ambassador Saxbe, have no competence whatsoever in the field of foreign affairs, and presumably can be hired solely to serve in a confidential capacity to the Ambassador. Both individuals are to be hired at the FSR-1 level, at a salary of $36,000 per annum. This raises a number of serious issues:

- Most ambassadors have no "special assistants," and none has two officer-level personnel in a confidential capacity. To permit Ambassador Saxbe to bring two of his cronies to New Delhi or to permit this situation to occur anywhere in the world is a total waste of the taxpayers' money. This is double the case at the R-1 level.
- Neither position to be filled is in the "Plum Book," containing a list of Schedule C positions. For the Department to hire these individuals for Schedule C type positions is a violation of the Department's own regulations, the Secretary's recently enunciated policy, and Civil Service Commission regulation and authority.
- No merit procedures were utilized in this case. These individuals were hand-picked by Ambassador Saxbe. Their hiring is a clear violation of the letter and spirit of the President's Directive of September 20, 1974, against such actions.
- It will be extremely expensive to maintain two unneeded FSR-1s in New Delhi. Their direct salary expenses alone over a two-year period will drain the Department's budget by $144,000, to say nothing of the costs of shipping and travel, allowances and housing, retirement and insurance costs, etc. We conservatively estimate the cost of such an action to the taxpayers at a quarter of a million dollars.
- In turn, $250,000 is considerably greater than the amounts which the Department has indicated to AFSA require separate budgetary increases in order to bring about changes in the employee benefits field. The fact that the Department cannot locate $20,000 to put into effect low-cost improvements in employee benefits, but can suddenly discover the money necessary to hire on two unneeded FSR-1s casts doubts

as to the necessity of the Department's incessant claiming of budgetary problems in our employee benefit negotiations, and raises similar doubts as to the Department's good faith in bargaining with us.

In summary, the Association is shocked and appalled that at a time when President Ford is calling for economy in government, when the budget of the Foreign Service is under severe pressure, when the Senate has expressed itself in favor of a reduction in overseas staffing, and when the Department claims it cannot scrape together a few dollars for the benefit of single and junior personnel serving overseas, the Department would even contemplate spending one-quarter million dollars to send two friends of Ambassador Saxbe to Delhi with him. As Foreign Service professionals concerned with preventing abuses of the career principle, as employees desiring elementary fair play, and as taxpayers, we call upon you to take immediate steps to prevent these two political outside hires and to inform Ambassador Saxbe of this action.

Department's Reply

Your letter of March 10 raised the issue of reserve appointees hired as aides to non-career ambassadors. Although the Department has in the past followed a general rule of thumb on such requests, it is clear that we have not developed a consistent policy to govern outside hires for overseas duty.

We must continue to recognize that ambassadors appointed from outside the career system may require personal assistance at their embassies which could not, appropriately, be provided by a Foreign Service officer or Foreign Service secretary. Accordingly, we have developed the following guidelines which will be applied in future cases when a non-career ambassador requests the appointment of personal aides:

1. An ambassador at a Class I post may have approved for outside hire not more than one officer-level assistant and one personal secretary.

2. An ambassador at a Class II mission may have approved for outside hire one officer-level assistant or one personal secretary.

3. The Department will consider a request for one personal secretary for an ambassador at a Class III or IV post, but approval would be extended only in exceptional circumstances.

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HERTER, HARRIMAN AND RIVKIN AWARDS—AN AFSA TRADITION

It is again time for nominations for AFSA's three awards honoring Foreign Service people who "tell it like it is" and who have the courage and integrity to question the system's conventional wisdom. The three awards, established in 1968, are one of AFSA's most important professional activities.

The awards are sponsored each year by the families of three distinguished modern statesmen: retired Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, the late Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, and the late Ambassador William R. Rivkin. The awards, each carrying a $1000 tax exempt grant, are given to a senior, mid-career, and junior level officer or staff personnel who are nominated by their colleagues NOT for all-around high performance or super-efficiency, but rather for outstanding intellectual originality, courage, forthrightness, and constructive dissent. Although past recipients have often been chosen on the basis of their contributions to the debate on general foreign policy issues, this is not the only field in which these characteristics can be displayed.

The Herter Award honors FSO 1-2 and equivalents; the Rivkin Award goes to FSO 3-4 and equivalents; the Harriman Award is for FSO 5-8 and equivalents.

NOMINATION PROCEDURES. Nominations should be sent to:
AFSA Awards Committee
2101 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037 in time to be received by September 15, 1975. Please send two copies of each nomination, unbound on regular size paper, marking each page with the name of the nominee. The format for nomination should be as follows:

PART I—Biographic Data: Name, Birth date, Grade, Agency

PART II—Association with the Candidate (Strictly limited to 250 words)

PART III—Justification for Nomination (500-750 words) Summary of specific reasons for nominations. The narrative should discuss qualities of mind and spirit which qualify the nominee for the award AND specific examples of the candidate's accomplishments, particularly evidence of outstanding initiative, integrity and intellectual courage.

Anyone with knowledge of a Foreign Service colleague's accomplishments can nominate for these awards—in fact, the idea is to emphasize peer nominations, unlike most other awards in which nominations can only be made by supervisors. The more nominations AFSA receives, the more certain we can be of having sought out and found the most deserving candidates. We hope that some person at each post meets the specifications for one of these awards, and that each chapter will send in at least one nomination.

We want to emphasize that the awards are open to any Foreign Service employee, irrespective of Agency, rank or pay plan. In previous years AFSA has received a substantial number of nominations from all three Agencies and at all ranks; however, we have not received the strong representation from the Staff Corps that we think it deserves. We urge the Staff Corps to participate more fully this year in the awards program.

This has been a momentous year for the country and for the Foreign Service. As we look forward to the Bicentennial observances, let's nominate our best for these awards.

UNGRACEFUL LOSERS

There are a variety of independent, third-party adjudicatory bodies established under E.O. 11636 to resolve differences between the agencies and the exclusive representative. State, AID and USIA must, like AFSA, present their positions and take their chances. Recently, faced with a series of AFSA victories, the administrative managers have adopted a policy of trying anything to avoid compliance with the decisions which go against them. Thus, when the Grievance Board ordered AID to rehire an improperly RIFed officer, AID claimed Civil Service jurisdiction and appealed to the GAO; when Judge Chaitovits found AID guilty of a massive unfair labor practice by not negotiating RIF procedures with AFSA, AID attempted to re-try the case before the EMRC; when the Disputes Panel appeared to support AFSA's view on promotion safeguards, USIA appealed on a procedural gambit to the EMRC; and now that the EMRC has found State guilty of bargaining in bad faith and using coercive practices, the Department has appealed the

decision where no appeals procedure exists.

All of this whining in defeat would be ludicrous if it were not also destructive. In addition to being unattractive, graceless losing by the agencies blocks the proper functioning of the Order. The managements of State, AID and USIA must learn that in an independent system they can—and will—lose cases. Here are some independent judgments.

In the AID RIF case Judge Chaitovits recommended that AID post a "Notice to All Employees" stating that:

"WE WILL NOT, during bargaining, withhold, conceal and fail to furnish, the American Foreign Service Association, facts and other matters that are important, relevant and necessary for the American Foreign Service Association to know in order to bargain intelligently and meaningfully.

WE WILL NOT unilaterally change our reduction in force procedures, procedures for assigning agency occupational specialty codes (Manual Order 476.2 V. G.) and the implementation of such procedures without consulting and conferring in good faith with the American Foreign Service Association.

WE WILL NOT in any other similar manner interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights assured by Executive Order 11636.

WE WILL rescind and disestablish the reduction in force procedures, procedures for assigning agency occupational specialty codes (Manual Order 476.2 V. G.) and the procedures for their implementation.

WE WILL upon request consult and confer in good faith with the American Foreign Service Association with respect to any proposed reduction in force procedures, procedures for assigning agency occupational Specialty Codes (Manual Order 476.2 V. G.) and the procedures for their implementation, informing the American Foreign Service Association of the basic facts necessary for it to bargain intelligently.

WE WILL, should it develop, in the light of any new reduction in force procedures arrived at, that any employee was incorrectly laid off, reinstate such employee or employees and make them whole for any loss of back pay occasioned by the layoff."

On the State unfair by coercive use of the budgetary process the EMRC has ordered the Department to cease and desist and post a "Notice to All Employees" stating:

The Commission has found that the Department's representatives engaged in a course of conduct which induced the American Foreign Service Association to accept July 1, 1975, as the effective date of an agreement on a schedule of increased allowances for limited shipment of household effects, by stating that the Department otherwise would withhold funds for such increases for the Fiscal Year 1976 budget submission. The foregoing conduct constituted a refusal to consult with the Association, in violation of Section 13 (a) (6) and (1) of Executive Order 11636. Upon request, the Department will consult with the Association over the effective date of the schedule of increased weight allowances. The Department will not in any like or related manner interfere with the right of the employees to consult collectively through representatives of their own choosing.

Tax Tip

Preaching against communism is not "church work" allowing the parsonage allowance

Colbert, a director for the Chris-

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Those Foreign Service women eligible for membership are dependents, officers, and staff of all government agencies serving or who have served overseas. The annual dues are $10 which includes a subscription to the Newsletter. Send dues to Membership Chairman at address above.

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tian Anti-Communism Crusade, argued that his rental allowance was taxfree. The Treasury considered the rent taxable pay. The minister was paid for making speeches, in and out of church, on the dangers of communism, not for performing the ministerial functions of his religion. The Tax Court agrees. That a man is ordained does not mean that he is actively practicing his ministry. The main thrust of Colbert's work was not teaching the tenets of his church but educating people on the dangers of communism.

Your Income Tax, ¶2.05 Colbert, 61 T.C. No. 50, 1/15/74

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ON BOOKS . . . . . AND BOOK FAIRS . . . . . BROWSING . . . . . AND BUYING . . . . . AND . . . . . *Oops! October's Just Around the Corner!*

There was a time when second-hand books were rather grubby items in a musty corner of a Spring Bazaar, when ancient recordings were stacked in boxes on the rummage counter, and when serious savants could browse at leisure and buy at will.

Today, with a nudge, via the media, by the likes of Sylvia Porter and William Safire, plus an exploitive shove from the dealers, Book Fairs have become Big Business. And one of the biggest is our own AAFSW Book Fair, which, last year, handled some 100,000 books, representing 20,000 titles, and which, come October 6, will be a strapping 15 years of age.

Volunteers began work on Book Fair '75 as soon as Book Fair '74 closed its doors. Co-Chairmen Judy Clark and Dorothy Wolfson established a new Book Fair Committee, collectors began picking up donated books throughout the communities which make up Greater Washington (and beyond), and the Abigail Adams Book Room of the Department of State was again in business. Five days each week of the year, volunteers sort, price, box, and store books which will reappear on the shelves in the Exhibit Hall for the October 6 public opening.

As the books are sorted, an occasional title of special interest, or of unusual value, or a significant first edition, is turned over to Mildred Bell for The Collector's Corner. Foreign language books are routed to Kathy Philpott for the Foreign Book Section. Betty Potter supervises the volunteers, while they categorize and price books for the General Book Sales area.

While all this is going on, Marjorie Forbes is busy garnering stamps from overseas posts, and Kyle Davila and Sue Mason, with their Creative Art crew, are diligently matting, framing, polishing, cleaning, and otherwise rendering attractive the contributions coming in for the Art Corner.

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With a goal of "at least as many salable books and collectibles as last year," there is always a feeling that things are not coming in fast enough: that the officer packing for Bamako, where his or her books will simply mildew, does not even know about the Book Fair; and that the couple whose last offspring just married and who plan to run a garage sale are not aware of the side benefits of contributing books to the AAFSW Book Fair—the knowledge of having helped a worthy cause and the legitimate tax deduction.

Proceeds from the annual Book Fair are used primarily for the AFSA Scholarship Fund and the Counseling Center, although the D.C. Boys' Club and other community education projects also benefit.

Books, stamp collections, and Art Corner contributions may be arranged by calling Lois Heginbotham (493-9192).

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Director Needed

The American Research Center in Egypt invites candidates to apply for the position of Director of its Cairo Center. The position will become open some time between January and June of 1976.

The ARCE is a consortium of universities, museums and individuals which sponsors research in Egypt and on Egypt from ancient times to the present. The Cairo Director administers in Egypt the fellowship program which provides for research by individual junior and senior scholars on the history and culture of medieval and modern Egypt, and the archaeological program of projects and expeditions to explore ancient and medieval Egypt and art history. The Director is the Center's liaison with Egyptian government officials and scholars.

The work schedule is designed to afford the director time for pursuit of individual cultural interests. The Center's office hours are 8:30 to 1:30 every day except Sunday. Salary depends upon experience and qualifications; it is largely in Egyptian pounds with a small dollar component. The position requires ten months per year residence in Egypt.

Applicants should state education, experience, special interest in Egypt if any, as well as the names and addresses of three to five references. Applications should be sent to Prof. Morroe Berger, President, American Research Center in Egypt, 20 Nassau Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540.

ARCE invites applications from qualified women and members of minority groups.

Breakfast Meeting

Political Scientists Interested in Diplomacy will hold a breakfast meeting on Thursday, September 4, at 7:30 A.M., at the San Francisco Hilton Hotel. Retirees and others interested are welcome to attend. Additional information from James S. Pacy, Department of Political Science, University of Vermont, Burlington, Vermont 05401.



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Foreign Service People

Births

Preeg. A daughter, Terri Elizabeth, born to Sally and Ernie Preeg, proud parents at last, on April 23, in Arlington, Virginia.

Boyle. A son, John Matthew, born to FSO and Mrs. John A. Boyle on March 20, in Cambridge, Mass.

Deaths

Black. Elsa L. Black, wife of Myron L. Black, FSO-retired, died May 31 at the Washington Hospital Center, in Washington, D.C. Mrs. Black traveled with her husband to posts in Copenhagen, Rome, Halifax and Ottawa in addition to being an accomplished violinist in her own right. She is survived by her husband of 3217 Klingle Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. and two sisters, Mrs. M. L. Lipton, of Baltimore, and Mrs. R. L. Martin, of Galveston, Texas.

Carey. Reginald S. Carey, FSO-retired, died May 15 in Denver, Colorado. Mr. Carey entered the Service in 1931 and served in Mexico, Argentina and Brazil. He resigned as a Foreign Service officer in 1936 to accept a position with the National Sugar Manufacturing Co., of which he became president. Surviving are a daughter, Mrs. Elise Carey Goidl, of Manzanillo, Mexico, and a son, James Bayard Carey, of Port Richmond, California.

Dery. Velma S. Dery, wife of FSO-retired Jean-M. Dery, died on May 7 in Sarasota. Mrs. Dery accompanied her husband on assignments to Rangoon and Benghazi before his retirement in 1969. In addition to her husband of 624 Waterside Way, Siesta's Bayside, Sarasota, Florida, she is survived by a daughter, Mrs. Robert Jones of Lafayette Hill, Pa., her mother, three sisters and four grandchildren.

Foley. Francis L. Foley, FSO-3, died May 24 in Virginia. Mr. Foley entered the State Department in 1950 and served in Dhahran, Stuttgart, Munich, Bonn, Vienna and with the Departments of Commerce and Defense. In 1973 he received the merit honor award. He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth Zankl Foley of 9916 Lindel Lane, Vienna, Virginia 22180.

Fry. Clara Coughlin Fry, mother of FSIO Frances E. Coughlin, died on April 27, in El Cajon, California. She accompanied her daughter on assignments to Buenos Aires, Rome, Florence, Washington and Santiago. In addition to Frances, now with USIS at Lima, she is survived by another daughter, Mrs. Barbara E. Young of La Mesa, California and four grandchildren.

Lepperd. John R. Lepperd, FSIO-4, died in El Paso, Texas on March 12 while on home leave before assignment to Jakarta. Mr. Lepperd had been with USIA since 1963 serving in New Delhi, Calcutta, Kathmandu, Yokohama and Nagoya. He is survived by his wife, Katherine Hemlata Samuel; his mother, Mrs. Robert L. Lepperd of 41232 Crab Tree Court, Plymouth, Michigan 48170, and a sister, also of Plymouth.

Silverberg. Louis Silverberg, FSO-retired, died June 6 at George Washington University Hospital in Washington, D.C. Mr. Silverberg entered the Service in 1959 as a labor/political officer assigned to Tokyo where he served for ten years. He subsequently distinguished himself as executive secretary of two employee management relations boards in the State Department where he was respected and well-liked by both management and AFSA officials. Mr. Silverberg is survived by his wife, June Rom, children Miriam and Joseph, all of the home of 6914 Wilson Lane, Bethesda; two sisters, Mrs. Max Danow, of Margate, Florida, and Mrs. Seymour Brown, of Cape Coral, Florida, and a brother, Irving, of Beaumont, Texas.

Summers. Lionel M. Summers, FSO-retired, died on March 30, in Winter Park. Mr. Summers entered the Department of State in 1943 and served at Rome, Tripoli, Benghazi, Yokohama and Tokyo before becoming dean of the School of Foreign Affairs, FSI, in 1960. He retired in 1962 and became an Associate Political Science instructor at Rollins College. He authored "The Law of Peace" in 1973. Mr. Summers is survived by his wife, Lucy Bailey Summers, c/o Mrs. William Brennen, 2101 Central Park Ave., Evanston, Ill., two daughters and eight grandchildren.

Wight. Alice Leonard Wight, wife of FSO-retired Royce A. Wight, died May 28 at her home in Alexandria. Mrs. Wight traveled throughout Europe and Asia with her husband, and taught school while they lived in Korea. She is survived by her husband, of the home on Wakefield Drive, Alexandria, Virginia; two sons, Alan C. of El Toro, California, and Royce A. Jr., of Alexandria and three grandchildren.

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Museum of African Art Needs Docents

The Education Department of the Museum of African Art is currently seeking applicants for its docent training program, scheduled to begin in September 1975. After the 15-week orientation, docents will be required to volunteer 2½ hours per week at the Museum.

Located on Capitol Hill in the first Washington residence of Frederick Douglass, the Museum is the only major institution in the United States dedicated exclusively to the explication of African art and culture.

For further information, the Museum encourages all interested persons to write Mrs. Georgetta Baker, Docent Training Program, Museum of African Art, 316-318 A Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002, or telephone 547-7424.

The selection of applicants will be completed by July 15, 1975.

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