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JOSHUA B. POWERS, LTD., 46 Keyes House, Dolphin Sq., London SW1 01-834-8023/9. International Representatives.

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Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional post office.



The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

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For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); $6.00; two years, $10.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life.*

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

FSJ EDITORIAL

HAIL AND FAREWELL

COMING TOGETHER and parting are an integral part of Foreign Service life. Each of us has rejoiced in service at a personal Camelot and watched sadly as time and transfers dissolved the "best post ever." Perhaps the Embassy or Consulate was a purgatory and the sentiments were reversed. Either way, reality for Foreign Service people proceeds in finite segments—all assignments end; change always comes.

The assignment is now ending for a group of colleagues who have seen the Association through the advent of Executive Order 11636; the winning for AFSA of exclusive representation of the Foreign Service people of State, AID and USIA; the establishment of the Association as the Foreign Service's respected spokesman in Congress; and the development of a relationship with the administrative managements of the three Foreign Affairs Agencies based upon AFSA's negotiation of personnel policies and procedures affecting our lives and careers.

It has been a turbulent and creative period. Achievements by any standard—professional, monetary, increased equity and due process—have been enormous (see the President's Annual Report in the AFSA NEWS Section). More important than achievements, however, are the fundamental lessons learned for the survival and prosperity of an independent Foreign Service and its people amid the swirling political, bureaucratic, ideological and institutional currents of Washington. For you and our successors we would describe these lessons as follows:

- The Washington environment is not friendly. Most of us, concerned with policy and operational problems overseas, assume that the Washington scene is reasonably benign. Not true. Many Washington institutions would like to see the Foreign Service's independence eliminated, or its autonomy sharply reduced. The Civil Service Commission (CSC) does not hide its desire to absorb the Foreign Service. OMB supports these ambitions, and in the meantime arrogates much of the management of State by using the budgetary and Congressional clearance processes to impose its will. Other Departments of government and their Congressional allies stand ever ready to divest the Service of its functions, viz., Commerce and the Magnuson Bill. There is also the "Ribbon-clerk Conspiracy," an underground of budgeteers from OMB, the CSC, the General Accounting Office, and—all too often—the Department's own administrative managers, committed to interpreting law and writing regulations to keep costs down at the professional and personal expense of Foreign Service people. There is nothing sinister in all of this, at least not most of the time. Rather, the CSC, OMB, and other Departments all respond to their own bureaucratic imperatives; and, together with the GAO, are in the business of saving money. These institutions *will* strive to achieve their goals; if that happens to be at the expense of the Foreign Service and its people, that is not their concern. It is ours.

- An organized and purposeful AFSA guarantees that the interests of the Service and its people will be defended. Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger and Director General Laise, like their immediate predecessors, are fellow professionals who care about the Foreign Service and its improvement. Secretary Kissinger's status in the Washington power structure needs no elaboration. But what about tomorrow? Will we not again face situations in which the Service is hostage to the political ambitions of a Deputy Under Secretary? Or the proving ground for a Director General intent on bureaucratic experimentation? Or the object of a power play by a Secretary of Commerce, Labor, or Treasury with more "whack" than some future Secretary of State? Or the target for political trashing by some future Senator McCarthy of the right or left? The only question is whether the Service passively accepts or actively seeks to confront and resolve such problems. The challenge for AFSA is to develop its independent capacity with the Congress, its access to and communication with the media, its juridical and political legitimacy as the exclusive representative of Foreign Service people, and its status as the professional voice of the Foreign Service, so that the respect and capability for achievement we currently enjoy are increased. Never again should a few colleagues stand alone as did the "China hands," nor the career service become a tool in the hands of anyone.

- Finally, the Association's capacity for achievement depends upon maintaining and enhancing its dual role as professional organization and employee representative. These two dimensions are mutually reinforcing and the basic source of AFSA's strength. As highly selected careerists committed to the Service's mission and sharing in the realities of life and work overseas, AFSA representatives are uniquely capable negotiators in the employee sphere. As the freely elected and legally certified exclusive employee representative, AFSA's representations to the Congress and the public on professional issues are greatly enhanced. If the employee dimension is lost, the Association will revert to being a quasi-social, quasi-professional club. If the professional dimension is lost, AFSA will become just another white collar union. But if the Association's dual role is sustained, we will remain unique and uniquely effective.

The achievements of the last four years will continue to be enjoyed by all of us in foreign service. Some problems are resolved; most will change shape and reappear. We hope our hard learned lessons will provide a useful legacy for our successors. *Ave atque vale!*

—Thomas D. Boyatt


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The last time I saw Paris, her heart was warm and gay,

I heard the laughter of her heart in every street café.—Oscar Hammerstein, 2nd

Paris under the Dog Star

JOHN BOVEY

"Non, cette année je ne pars pas."

You occasionally hear this announcement as the great summer exodus from the capital approaches, or even during the mid-August vacuum when one astonished Parisian runs into another amid the alien horde that has taken over the city. Delivered in the accents of doom, the words usually evoke an exclamation of pity from French compatriots, who bracket the stay-at-homes with St. Stephen and the early martyrs.

But perhaps the pity is misplaced. If August is only the lengthened shadow of a Sunday for those who depart, it must be equally so for those who stay. Life has few greater pleasures than watching from a curbside café or a snug upper window as the serpentine traffic crawls toward the Périphérique, cars crammed with gaping suitcases, whimpering children, and shouting mothers. Father is crouched desperately over the wheel, maneuvering like a toreador, while on the *galérie* over his head, tents, parasols, and bedding shift restlessly under the elastic cables, and plastic covers snap in the breeze, sure harbingers of curses, if not catastrophe, during the first hundred kilometers of the Auto-route. And as you envision the lines of *conducteurs énervés* waiting in the bottlenecks at Vienne and Narbonne and Biarritz, you can reenforce your enjoyment, a la Rochefoucauld, of the misfortunes of others with the knowledge that for the next four weeks, you and other Parisians will breathe an air ten times less polluted than usual.

Even in the rue du Faubourg St. Denis or the narrow canyons of the Fifth Arrondissement, it becomes possible in August for pedestrians to come out of the street and, as the French say, "to borrow the sidewalk," since 40 percent of the cars that park there and many of the animals that excrete there have departed. Other pets are less fortunate: abandoned by their owners on vacation, they wander about the city, sniffing at garbage cans and dodging trucks outside the crosswalks, mute witnesses to human callousness and *je m'en foutisme*. Their lords and masters are the same people, no doubt, who strew cigarette packages along the canals of Burgundy or scatter broken bottles on beaches frequented by children.

One of the great compensations of the Parisian August

John Bovey is a former Foreign Service officer who has served in Rotterdam, Casablanca, Paris, Oslo, Washington and The Hague. He and his wife now live in Paris and in a small village in the Cevennes.

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is utopian transport, with empty aisles on buses and seated comfort on the *strapontins* of the Metro, so sternly forbidden during rush hours. Automobilists face the delicious prospect of zooming at illegal speeds down expressways beside the Seine and even on the boulevards near the Opera. Any momentary irritation over the clots of sightseeing buses around the Eiffel Tower or Notre Dame or the Sacre Coeur can be quickly cured by the roar of paving blocks under your wheels as you drive straight to a parking place near the theater, restaurant, or *grand magasin* of your choice.

At the end of July the city has the air of a suicide whose opened veins are rapidly being drained, but the alien blood bank of August is not long in coming to the rescue. The Champs Elysées and the rue de Rivoli are crowded with strangers, each wearing that childish pout that is generated by foreign travel. You see them lingering disconsolately before the windows of costume jewelers and purveyors of Arcs de Triomphe in fake bronze. Anglo-Saxons in sweated panamas and loud ties eye the porno racks and music-hall ads with furtive hope as they demand the HERALD TRIBUNE or the London TIMES. Nowadays they will be disappointed: Paris has yielded the role of scarlet woman to Copenhagen and Amsterdam and been recast as the prude of Europe.

The streets and arcades of the Eighth and Ninth Arrondissements are ornamented during August with the psychedelic cottons of Germany and the shimmering synthetics of Japan; with blue ringlets tightly coiled like those of the Jack of Spades; with harlequin glasses and chains all a-dazzle with sequins, and enormous Italian sunglasses that render their wearers indistinguishable but at least serve to differentiate front from rear. Levis and bangles are temporarily submerged in a sea of print dresses. If you spot a sweatshirt emblazoned with the name of an American college, you may be sure you are looking at another French non-departee. What, you may ask, does Jean-Pierre know of Wisconsin, or Marie-Claude of UCLA? They might equally inquire why John and Birgit and Suzuki are running back home with scarves bearing the imprint of the Eiffel Tower or pictures of those dreadful bug-eyed children who coyly flaunt their behinds from every *bouquiniste's* stand.

The self-dramatizing chirps of Parisians are engulfed at this season by the deep-lunged bayings of the Fatherland, by the piercing quack of the American midwest ("Well, dear, I guess they just didn't give you the right rate"), and by the gabble and hiss of crew-cut Japanese, who, even during economic crises, seem to operate under a law forbidding travel in groups of less than a hundred. Occasionally one tunes in on linguistic treasures. Three Texans pause before the curt commands at the subway portals: "Pow-sezz," the first one transliterates. "Tie-rezz," says the second. "Ah believe that 'Z' is silent," says the third. Or a flustered woman flings open a taxi and asks to be taken to Mallesherby's Boulevard.

Few of these well-intentioned explorers seem even dimly aware that since nearly half the city's population has fled, they are not really visiting Paris at all but only a hollow shell that has been left for their pleasure. Athens must have been like this when the Roman trippers ar-

Continued on page 31

Security follows up. Even to China.

Regular readers of the Journal will recall that, in 1973, three of our steel liftvans followed German Ambassador Pauls from Washington to the new Diplomatic Mission in Peking.

Readers might also be interested to know that, in April, 1975, our President, Mr. Gore, followed up with a visit to the People's Republic of China. With other members of the Mayor's Committee for International Visitors, he was briefed, in the absence of Mr. Bush, by his Deputy, Mr. Holdridge. And in addition, the General Services Officer, Mr. Morin displayed the two remaining liftvans to Security's representative. (One of the vans already had been used outbound by the Administrative Officer, Mr. Blackburn.)



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The frequency of the warnings and the continued abstinence of Mr. B. with respect to Hiroshima had made its citizens jittery; rumor was going around that the Americans were saving something special for the city. — Hiroshima, by John Hersey

HIROSHIMA RECONSIDERED – Thirty Years Later

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

ONE-HUNDRED AND TEN THOUSAND killed, including some prisoners of war. One hundred and thirty thousand maimed, burned, or scarred. That was the toll three decades ago, when on August 6 and 9, 1945, the United States dropped two atomic bombs on Japan. The first of these awesome events helped end the war in the Pacific and both marked the opening of a new age. Most Americans enthusiastically welcomed the use of nuclear weapons against the hated enemy. "Thank God, we got the bomb first and used it," wrote one citizen, epitomizing American responses. In some American towns and cities, children danced with delight in the streets.

Few citizens then questioned the morality or necessity of these two attacks. Most believed, as President Harry S. Truman explained, that the bombs were used "in order to shorten the agony of war, in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans." Was it then a purely military decision? Were both bombs necessary? In the years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, some Americans have raised troubling questions, and a few have even contended that policy makers knew that Japan was near surrender and that both bombs were unnecessary: they were dropped primarily to intimidate the Soviet Union and thereby helped create the Cold War. "The dropping of the atomic bombs," P.M.S. Blackett charged in 1948 in an often-quoted statement, "was not so much the last military act of the second World War as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia. . . ." More recently, William Appleman Williams and Gar Alperovitz, among other historians, have promoted variations of this interpretation.

Barton J. Bernstein, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University and a Hoover Peace Fellow, is the editor of, among other volumes, "Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration" (1970) and "The Atomic Bomb: The Critical Issues" (1975). He is writing a book on atomic energy and American foreign policy.
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Roosevelt's Legacy: The Uses of the Bomb

An analysis of these charges and doubts must begin not with the Truman administration, which ordered the nuclear attacks, but with the Roosevelt administration, which shaped the assumptions and policies on atomic energy that Truman inherited and never challenged. The Roosevelt administration defined the bomb as a legitimate weapon, assumed that it would be used in combat against the enemy, and knew by 1944 that the likely target was Japan, not Germany. The administration also recognized the great postwar power of the bomb, allowed the British to join the wartime project as a junior partner, and acted repeatedly to exclude the Soviet Union even from knowledge that there was a project. The bomb, policy makers believed, might be a guarantor of peace in the postwar years: it could serve as a threat, military counterweight, bargaining counter, or weapon to achieve America's goals.

Secrecy on the project was directed both at Germany, our enemy, and Russia, our ally. The Grand Alliance was always uneasy and marked by mutual mistrust and suspicion. Roosevelt was willing to strain it further in order to maintain the secret of the bomb. On a number of occasions—in December 1942, in August 1943, and in June and September 1944—he made specific decisions *to continue to exclude* the Soviet Union from the project. By 1943, he knew that the Soviets were spying on the project and that they had learned that the United States was building an atomic bomb. But Roosevelt was still unwilling to extend any form of nuclear partnership to them. Was Roosevelt naive or innocent on this issue, as some interpreters have argued, and was he pressed into this anti-Soviet action by the wily Winston Churchill, long an ardent anti-Bolshevik? The evidence of Roosevelt's *systematic* pattern of decisions will not support this contention, especially since Roosevelt acted in 1942 to bar information from the British, partly because he thought that they might pass it on to Russia. The President was not innocent or naive about the potential power of the bomb. He carefully husbanded it. He believed that it would be useful, in some undefined way, in securing concessions from the Soviet Union. His policy was based on that assumption and endorsed by some advisers.

On the last two days in 1944, at the White House, Roosevelt and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War, discussed the intimately related problems of Soviet-American relations and atomic energy. Stimson told the President that the United States could not permanently keep the secret of atomic weapons, "but that I did think that it was not yet time to share it with Russia. . . I believed that it was essential not to take them into our confidence until we were sure to get a real quid pro quo from our frankness." Roosevelt agreed. A month before Roosevelt's death, on March 15, 1945, they again discussed these issues, concluding only that America would have to

define its policy before the first bomb was dropped. Roosevelt never resolved this great matter. He left open the options for future atomic diplomacy: the use of the bomb as a lever or threat to gain concessions from the Soviet Union.

At Yalta in February 1945, Roosevelt had also avoided dealing with Stalin on the Soviet Union's earlier request for a large American loan. The President had delayed, he confided to associates, because he did not want to "give . . . [the Soviets] any promises of finance until we get what we want." Economic assistance and atomic energy—options bequeathed to Truman would both be possible levers for effecting Soviet concessions. Roosevelt's policy, rather than stressing trust and cooperation that might reduce tensions with the Soviet Union, was promising not accommodation but division. Would Roosevelt have squandered the options he jealously husbanded? Would he have freely shared economic assistance and atomic secrets? Had he lived, probably he would have used atomic diplomacy and economic force to achieve his goals, for his policy made such actions possible. Perhaps he would have sought to use these powers to open Eastern Europe and reverse his previous agreements that ceded this sphere of influence to the Soviet Union.

He did define another issue on atomic energy more clearly and bequeathed to Truman an unambiguous legacy: the bomb was a legitimate weapon to be used in combat against the enemy. Only once in four years, on September 22, 1944, did Roosevelt indicate any clear doubt about using the bomb, and then his comments were very brief. He never pursued the subject again, and none of the advisers at the meeting ever recalled in later months his fleeting doubt. By 1944, policy makers who knew about the bomb assumed that it would be used. "There was no question," Gen. Leslie Groves, director of the Manhattan Project, later asserted, "but that we were developing a weapon to be employed against the enemies of the United States." Even memoranda on postwar atomic problems often stated, "after the bomb is used." That is testimony to the subtle force of this assumption. It went unchallenged, for it seemed both obvious and reasonable.

The Truman Administration: The Confirmation of Assumptions

When Harry S. Truman ascended unexpectedly to the presidency on April 12, 1945, he was largely uninformed of foreign affairs and ignorant of the atomic-bomb project. In his few months as vice-president, Truman had only a few meetings with Roosevelt and they were not especially illuminating about foreign affairs. Truman, as head of a Senate investigating committee, had been curious about one of the Manhattan District's plants, but Stimson had succeeded in shooing him away from an investigation.

Truman inherited from Roosevelt the advisers, assumptions, and policies about the project, and Truman was psychologically and politically unable or unwilling to reassess this legacy. He lacked the incentive and the independence. Unless others raised fundamental questions about the project, he was unlikely to resist its momentum and to redefine the course of accepted policy. Only a bolder man, moving into the White House upon the death of a great leader and lacking a popular mandate, might have been able to challenge this legacy. Uneasy with power, the new President sought to continue his predecessor's policies in foreign affairs in areas where Roosevelt's course had been clearly defined. Truman felt, he told reporters, "as if the moon and stars have fallen"—so awed was he by the responsibilities of the presidency.

Within a few days of Roosevelt's death, James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt's former "Assistant President" for domestic affairs and soon to become Truman's Secretary of State, told the new President (in Truman's later words) that "the bomb might well put us in a position to dictate our terms at the end of the war." Byrnes, a shrewd southern politician who had lost the vice-presidential nomination to Truman in 1944, had recently been suspicious that the Manhattan Project might be a gigantic boondoggle, but Stimson and leading scientist-administrators had converted him from doubt to enthusiasm. Byrnes became an architect of atomic diplomacy: the bomb would make the Soviets "manageable in Europe."

On April 25, Stimson and Groves met with Truman to inform him of the project in considerable detail. The Secretary explained that planes carrying the bomb against Japan would soon leave for the Pacific theatre, and predicted that the first weapon would be available on about August 1. Their conversation assumed that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that it would be used against Japan. None of the three questioned or even pondered that assumption. What troubled the Secretary, and presumably the President, was the question of sharing the bomb and upon what terms—what Stimson called "a primary question of our foreign relations." Stimson, the aged Secretary whom Truman then admired, was unprepared to suggest the answers to this question. Groves, a foe then and later of sharing any secrets, was apparently silent.

Stimson received permission to establish a special top-secret committee (the Interim Committee) to consider "temporary war controls and . . . postwar research, development and controls," At no time in his discussion with Truman, in the planning of the committee, or in the formal correspondence with its members did Stimson or his associates ever indicate that the committee should consider *whether* to use the bomb.

Stimson was chairman of the committee and George Harrison, Stimson's assistant, then on leave from the presidency of the New York Life Insurance Company, was acting chairman. The other six members were: James B. Conant, president of Harvard University and chairman of the government's National Defense Research Committee; Vannevar Bush, director of the government's Office of Scientific Research and Development and president of the Carnegie Foundation; Karl Compton, physicist and president of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Ralph Bard, financier and Under Secretary of the Navy; William Clayton, millionaire cotton broker and Assistant Secretary of State; and Byrnes, the special representative of the President and soon to become Secretary of State. The

committee represented an elite of big business, the civilian leadership of the military, research-oriented universities, and the administration of science. No military brass or liberals, nor, obviously, women or blacks were among the members. Stimson had considered adding some congressmen but concluded that a politically balanced delegation would increase the committee beyond manageable size. Perhaps he also feared letting the secret of the bomb project leak beyond the few congressional leaders who knew about it and furtively smuggled its appropriations into other bills.

With the exception of Bard and possibly Clayton, the members of the Interim Committee had long known of the bomb. They had been involved in making decisions on the project and had comfortably accepted that the bomb was a legitimate weapon and that it would be used against Japan. They were not prepared to question their assumptions and could not gain the distance that might allow them to reassess most policies. Some members of the committee, at lunch, did briefly discuss a noncombat demonstration as a warning to Japan. They rejected the suggestion on the grounds that it was too dangerous: a dud might stiffen Japanese morale and the Japanese might move prisoners of war into the target area.

On June 12, the issue arose again when some scientists at the Chicago Metallurgical Lab submitted a petition (the Franck Report) calling for a noncombat demonstration. Their proposal was sent to the scientific advisory committee of Arthur Holly Compton, Nobel physicist and director of the Chicago Lab; Enrico Fermi, Nobel physicist; Ernest O. Lawrence, Nobel physicist and director of the Radiation Laboratory; and J. Robert Oppenheimer, a brilliant theoretician and director of the Los Alamos Laboratory. Like most members of the Interim Committee, these scientists had long lived with the project and apparently never questioned its purpose. They had been appointed to this advisory panel largely because of the political ferment among working scientists on the Manhattan Project who feared, like the Franck Committee, a postwar arms race if the United States did not inform the Soviet Union of the bomb. Stimson had selected scientists whom he trusted and respected, and his definition of those standards may have subtly assured that his appointees would not challenge widely-held assumptions.

Considering the Franck report on the weekend of June 15, the scientific panel rejected the proposal of a noncombat demonstration: "We can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use." In making this recommendation, the scientific panel knew little about America's war plans in the Pacific. "We didn't know beans about the situation," Oppenheimer later admitted. The panel members did not know that there would be a thirteen-week gap between when the bomb would be ready (about August 1) and the scheduled invasion (about November 1). Nor did they know that it was not a full-scale invasion of one of Japan's mainland islands, but a relatively small attack on an outlying island (Kyushu), involving about 770,000 troops and possibly 31,000 casualties in the first month. Because they were reporting nearly a month before the scheduled Alamogordo test, they did not know that the bomb would have such a dramatic impact, create a huge fireball in the sky, and be equivalent to about 20,000 tons of TNT—well beyond many earlier estimates. Nor did they know what scientists learned after Hiroshima and Nagasaki: the radiation was unexpectedly lethal and would kill thousands.

Even had panel members known about the war plans, met after the Alamogordo test and even forecast the danger of radiation, probably they still would not have endorsed a noncombat demonstration. Compton and Oppenheimer, and perhaps the other two, thought that combat use was attractive, partly because it would "impress" the Soviets and help keep the peace. It would make Russia and the world face the new facts and make concessions. Lawrence had briefly flirted with the notion of a noncombat demonstration a few weeks earlier, but had quickly backed away from the thought. Fermi, delighted by what he described as the "superb physics" of the bomb, had no interest in what he sneeringly dismissed as "conscientious scruples." To panel members, the question of a noncombat demonstration was of "slight" importance and did not take much time or involve soul-searching. Their report of June 16 simply confirmed the assumption of policy makers on this issue: the bomb should be dropped on Japan.

The scientific panel and the Franck committee did change thinking on one issue: informing the Soviets about the bomb before it was used against Japan. The Franck Committee had urged disclosure on the grounds that secrecy about the use of the bomb might frighten the Soviets and unleash a postwar arms race. The scientific panel presumably shared this analysis. The Interim Committee, including Byrnes and Stimson, who had both opposed disclosure, reversed its earlier decision and recommended that Stalin should be informed before the nuclear attacks. Acting on this advice, Stimson proposed that, at the forthcoming Potsdam meeting, the President could tell Stalin that the United States had developed a bomb, planned to use it against Japan, knew the Soviets were also at work on the project, and looked forward to discussing international control later.

The Bomb and The Soviet Union

Ever since the project had been initiated, policy makers had understood that the bomb might help define relations with the Soviet Union. "It was already apparent," Stimson later wrote, "that the critical questions in American policy toward atomic energy would be directly connected with Soviet Russia." On June 6, Stimson learned happily that Truman had postponed the meeting of the Big Three at Potsdam until he would know about the success of the test at Alamogordo. The bomb, Stimson repeatedly counseled, would be the American "master card." It could determine what price the United States would pay for Soviet entry into the war against Japan. The bomb could also be valuable in settling disputes: in return for a partnership on the bomb, Truman and Stimson agreed on June 6, the United States should receive "further quid pro quos . . ., namely

the settlement of the Polish, Rumanian, Yugoslavian, and Manchurian problems." The United States might greatly reduce, even practically eliminate, Soviet influence in these sectors.

In the few months before Potsdam, the atomic bomb, still merely a probable weapon, did not have a significant effect on the general course or content of American foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union. Perhaps Truman postponed some matters until the Alamogordo test and the Potsdam meeting, but there was no elaborate strategy of "delayed showdown." At Potsdam, after Truman learned of the immensely successful test, the bomb did influence American policy in dealing with the Soviets. Churchill explained that the bomb had given Truman a new sense of confidence: "He stood up to the Russians in a most emphatic and decisive manner." The bomb, now a tested weapon, greatly reinforced Truman's resolve and made him more demanding in seeking long-desired goals: free elections in Eastern Europe and the reduction of Soviet influence there. The military power of the bomb, viewed as a counterweight to Soviet conventional forces, may also have reduced the importance of a strong postwar Germany in American calculations and made it easier for American policy makers to push agreements that divided Germany economically.

The bomb also reduced or eliminated Truman's desire to have the Soviets enter the war against Japan. Though he told some associates that he was going to Potsdam to secure Soviet entry and made a similar claim in his memoirs ten years later, at the conference he did nothing to encourage Soviet entry and actually followed policies that would delay or prevent it. He encouraged Chiang Kai-shek's government to drag out negotiations with the Soviets, who had made an agreement with China a prerequisite to fulfilling their pledge of entering the war in August. At Yalta, Stalin had promised to enter within about two to three months of V-E day (May 8) *if* the Chinese agreed to terms. At Potsdam, Stalin said that Soviet armies would be ready on about August 17.

By the Potsdam meeting, General George Marshall, the Army Chief of Staff whom Truman greatly respected, indicated that Soviet entry was not necessary, stated that Soviet troops massed on the Manchurian border would meet American needs by pinning down the Kwantung army, but warned that Russia could enter the war at any point and still gain some spoils for her efforts. Byrnes, who was more optimistic, hoped at times to end the war before Russian entry and thereby to restrain Soviet gains in China and Manchuria. He hoped, as he told a friend, "to outmaneuver Stalin."

At Potsdam, American policy makers never questioned whether the United States should use the bomb against Japan. That remained unchallenged policy. Churchill and his few advisers who knew about the bomb also comfortably accepted the prevailing assumption.

At Potsdam, despite the counsel of the Interim Committee, of Stimson, and of Churchill, who thought an announcement of the bomb would strengthen Truman's hand in negotiations, the President did not explicitly inform Stalin of the atomic bomb. Instead, on July 24, Truman casually told the Premier only that the United States had developed a new powerful weapon and that it would be used against Japan. Byrnes and Churchill anxiously watched the conversation and concluded that Stalin did not understand that America had developed the atomic bomb—a conclusion later rebutted by Marshall Georgii Zhukov.

Why was Truman evasive and eager to conceal the development of the atomic bomb from Stalin at such a late date? No definitive answer is possible. Probably Truman was evasive for at least two, and possibly three, reasons. He was unprepared then to discuss atomic energy at length with the Soviets, for he had not yet formulated a policy and did not want Stalin to press him on the subject. Truman also believed, along with Byrnes and others, that the bomb would be more "impressive" and perhaps render the Soviets more tractable in the future if they had no advance warning. He may also have shared Byrnes's fear that explicit disclosure would prod Stalin to enter the war earlier and allow the Soviets to gain territorial advantages that they might not otherwise receive.

American fears about the postwar power of the Soviet Union also influenced the removal of one Japanese city, Kyoto, as a target for the atomic bomb. On July 24, Stimson gained Truman's approval to eliminate this city, known for its religious shrines, from the list. Truman, according to Stimson, agreed "with my suggestion . . ., [for] the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act [a nuclear attack] might make it impossible during the long post war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely, a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Japan."

Using The Bombs

At Potsdam, American policy makers never questioned whether the United States should use the bomb against Japan. That remained unchallenged policy. Churchill and his few advisers who knew about the bomb also comfortably accepted the prevailing assumption. At Potsdam, neither Truman nor most of his associates, except Stimson, seem to have given the matter of military use much thought. There was no meeting specifically on the subject. Nor is there any evidence, contrary to Truman's memoirs, that he even asked the military chiefs for their approval. Stimson dwelled on the details, not the question, of combat use. He eagerly received cables on the schedule for the bombs, and discussed with Truman the list of target cities, but it is not clear that Truman ever saw the final order or understood that it permitted the air force to drop the first weapon as early as August 1 and as late as August 7. By the Potsdam meeting, the use of the weapons had become a matter of military tactics. Policy makers relied upon the skill and judgment of the air force

commanders to drop the bombs as soon as possible. The process seemed automatic.

The second bomb was to be dropped, according to the official order, as soon after the first bomb as possible. When Gen. Carl Spaatz, commanding general of the Strategic Air Force in the Pacific, warned the War Department that Nagasaki probably had an allied prisoner-of-war camp near the heart of the city, he was informed promptly: "Targets previously assigned . . . remain unchanged . . . . Information . . . here indicates that there are prison camps in practically every major Japanese city." Having been overruled by the War Department, he kept Nagasaki on the list of targets. When scientists assembling the second bomb were able to work more quickly than expected, the local commander revised the schedule by two days, and so the second bomb was dropped only three days after the first.

Unbeknown to the public, the Nagasaki bomb destroyed an allied prisoner camp, killed at least sixteen Dutch POWs, and apparently spared the few Americans there. Probably even top policy makers did not know that the Nagasaki bomb missed its target by more than a mile, and that if the bombardier had erred about three miles in the opposite direction instead, the bomb would probably have killed more than 1,000 American POWs held in a nearby camp, then presumably unknown to military intelligence. Had policy makers known about this second camp, they probably would have removed Nagasaki from the target list of four Japanese cities, but they still would have retained their plans to use at least two atomic bombs, and probably more, against Japan.

Policy makers assumed that the bombs would speed the end of the war, and they felt no moral reasons to avoid using these weapons. After the fire-bombings of Dresden and Tokyo, with the killing of nearly 200,000 civilians, American leaders were not troubled by using a weapon that would kill an estimated 20,000-30,000 Japanese in one attack. (Scientists seriously underestimated the danger of death or serious injury from radiation, for they did not know how much radiation the bomb would produce.) War had inured leaders to the mass killings of civilians. Stimson, almost alone in considering the moral issues, easily let the problem slide away in the press of demands and in his enthusiasm to use the bomb.

Stimson's thinking reveals the moral insensitivity of American leaders by 1945. In a conversation with Truman on June 6, for example, Stimson explained his objections to area bombing: "first, because I did not want to have the United States get the reputation of outdoing Hitler in atrocities; and second, I was a little fearful that before we could get ready the Air Force might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon [the atomic bomb] would not have a fair background to show its strength." According to Stimson, "Truman laughed and said he understood."

To policy makers, the combat use of the bombs promised only benefits, never liabilities. Ending the war quickly on acceptable terms was the primary and controlling purpose. In addition, there were likely bonuses: they undoubtedly impeded leaders from reconsidering their assumptions and possibly from revising their policy. The combat use of the bomb might greatly impress the Soviets and make them more tractable in the postwar period. Use of the bomb, then, might help guarantee the peace. That was not the controlling reason for using the bomb, but it may have subtly deterred any reconsideration. Had American leaders, like the Franck Committee, concluded that the combat use of the bomb might impair, rather than advance, Soviet-American relations, policy makers probably would have reconsidered their assumption. Even then, they would probably still have decided to use the bomb.

Besides "impressing" the Soviets, the bomb offered another bonus—retribution for Pearl Harbor. Truman revealed this theme a few days after Nagasaki in letters defending the use of atomic weapons against Japan: ". . . I was greatly disturbed over the unwarranted attack. . . on Pearl Harbor and their murder of our prisoners of war. . . . When you have to deal with a beast, you have to treat him as a beast. . . . It does seem as if retribution had overtaken the imperial line of Japan." Retribution was clearly a minor factor and did not shape, but only confirmed, the combat use of the bombs. There may also have been some subtle strains of racism endorsing the decision to use the bombs. Probably policy makers found it easier to use the bomb against yellow people (the Japanese) than against whites (the Germans), but racism did not dictate the decision to drop the bombs on Japan. American leaders would undoubtedly have used the bombs against Germany if they had been developed in time to speed a surrender in Europe.

Alternatives to the Bomb: A Reconsideration

In the years since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, critics have charged that the administration should first have tried other ways to end the war. Some critics even contend that the controlling purpose of policy makers was to drop the bomb to intimidate the Soviet Union and *therefore* they rejected other likely alternatives: (1) providing a noncombat demonstration or warning (already discussed); (2) modifying the unconditional surrender terms and guaranteeing the position of the emperor; (3) pursuing Japanese peace feelers; (4) awaiting Soviet entry into the war, or a Soviet declaration of war, or inviting the Soviets to sign the Potsdam Declaration and thereby announcing their intent to declare war; (5) and stepping up conventional warfare—air bombings and a naval blockade.

Unfortunately, critics do not always distinguish between their belief that the administration was wrong, politically or morally, in not first pursuing one or more of these alternatives, and their contention that the administration rejected these alternatives *in order* to use the bomb to intimidate the Soviets. Critics often err by attributing their own moral values to policy makers, by then assuming that only some hidden ulterior motives could have overcome the moral revulsion of using the bomb, and then by searching for these powerful ulterior motives.

In 1947, Henry Stimson argued that critics made a fundamental mistake in assuming "that American policy was . . . controlled or influenced by a desire to avoid use

of the bomb." That was not the issue. In explaining the thinking of policy makers in 1945, he declared, "the dominant objective was victory. If victory could be speeded by using the bomb, it should be used; if victory must be delayed in order to use the bomb, it should *not* be used." So far as he knew, and he was accurate, that thinking dominated both the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. The bomb was an instrument—for them, a desirable instrument—to achieve surrender. The Truman administration rejected most of the alternatives because they seemed risky: they might even encourage Japan to think that American resolve was weakening and thereby strengthen the Japanese military, who were generally unprepared to countenance surrender on terms acceptable to the United States prior to the double blow of the first nuclear attack and Soviet entry (August 8).

In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, the administration had defined the terms of unconditional surrender to make clear that America did not intend a Carthaginian peace. Truman had contemplated further modifying the surrender terms to guarantee the maintenance of the emperor, but some advisers had warned him against reversing Roosevelt's policy and trying a tactic that might encourage Japan's resistance and prolong the war. In this case, unfortunately, Truman took the advice of Byrnes, who was close to the President, and rejected the counsel of Stimson and Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew, both of whom had been shunted to the sidelines. Perhaps Truman erred in relying upon Byrnes and eschewing generosity at this point, but the President easily succumbed to the often false "realism" of war and power: concessions may provoke not negotiations but more belligerence. Generosity was a casualty of the war. Perhaps a "generous" approach could have saved 110,000 Japanese lives.

The so-called "peace feelers," which the United States intercepted and decoded, were primarily cables between the Japanese foreign minister and his ambassador in Moscow, who was instructed to ask the Soviets to serve as intermediaries in peace negotiations. The foreign minister was never specific about what terms would be acceptable, and he and other civilian leaders in Japan feared that the military leaders might overthrow the government if they found out about these "feelers." Truman and Byrnes apparently concluded that Japan was not yet ready to surrender and that any concessions might stiffen Japanese morale, possibly strengthen the war faction, and prolong the war. Truman and Byrnes may have been wrong and thereby may have missed an opportunity to end the war without the bomb, but probably the war would not have ended as speedily. The bomb, Stimson later maintained, aided Japan's peace faction in its efforts to promote surrender. Yet, even though the first bomb probably did speed the surrender, the second bomb, with nearly 40,000 deaths, was probably unnecessary.

Presumably, the dramatic impact of Soviet entry seemed a remote possibility and therefore did not seem to warrant consideration. In neglecting this matter, perhaps policy makers did miss an opportunity to end the war sooner by having the Soviet Union sign the Potsdam Declaration. But, contrary to some claims, Truman did not avoid inviting Stalin *in order* to continue the war and use the bomb.

American policy makers had seldom thought about the immediate or short-run impact of a Soviet declaration of war. On only one occasion in 1945, at a White House meeting on June 18, 1945, had there been any explicit high-level attention to this matter. At that meeting, General Marshall suggested, in an ambiguous way, that Soviet entry into the war might catapult Japan into surrender. Though some intelligence sources offered similar counsel on a few occasions, Marshall, Stimson, Byrnes, and Truman, among others, never again discussed the subject in these terms. Presumably, the dramatic impact of Soviet entry seemed a remote possibility and therefore did not seem to warrant consideration. In neglecting this matter, perhaps policy makers did miss an opportunity to end the war sooner by having the Soviet Union sign the Potsdam Declaration. But, contrary to some claims, Truman did not avoid inviting Stalin *in order* to continue the war and use the bomb. Probably, Truman was reluctant to ask Stalin for a favor when it seemed unnecessary and of marginal value.

During the war, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the allied commander in Europe, was the only high-ranking military leader who may have forthrightly objected to the planned use of the bombs. After the war, some high-level leaders—especially, Admiral William Leahy, Truman's adviser, and Admiral Ernest L. King, Chief of Naval Operations—revealed that they had wanted to use conventional warfare, rather than the bomb, to defeat Japan. Within the councils of the administration, however, they never forcefully stated their case and never firmly objected to the use of the bombs. Perhaps they did not want to risk opposing Marshall, with whom Truman would side, and they did not want to squander their limited political capital. As ardent supporters of the Navy, they were likely to be viewed as special pleaders for their service. They also would have been taking a great risk, and have endangered their credibility with the new President, if, after they had won stepped-up conventional warfare, instead of the bombs, their predictions of early victory had proved wrong. Even they were not willing before Hiroshima to *promise* victory in August or September.

They were undoubtedly correct that conventional warfare alone could *ultimately* produce an American victory. That was not in doubt. No American leader thought in 1945 that Japan could win. What was in doubt, and still remains questionable, is whether conventional warfare alone could have produced victory *before* November 1, the date of the small-scale invasion with possibly 31,000 American casualties in the first month. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey later reported "that certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and *in all probability* prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the

(Continued on page 32)

ANTARCTICA is a land where few analogies apply. Both physically and politically, it is unique. Yet, to employ a hopefully apt simile, Earth's fifth largest continent will increasingly—and uniquely—interact with world politics just as it has always and more profoundly interacted with man's physical environment, whether he realized it or not.

Physically, the great southern continent (larger than Europe or the land area of Oceania) is significantly dissimilar to any other region of the globe. Roughly 35° F colder on the average than the Polar areas of the North, Antarctica is a vast island continent surrounded by enormous ocean expanses. The reverse is true in the North, where the Polar regions consist of an ocean rimmed by continental land masses and assorted islands. The world's highest, driest, windiest and most frigid continent, Antarctica is about 98 percent buried under a colossal ice sheet in which is trapped approximately 90 percent of the planet's fresh water supply. Antarctica's remoteness from world political and population centers is pronounced. Only Wellington, the most southerly of all national capitals, lies closer to the South Pole than warmish Washington does to the North Pole.

Mr. Montgomery, former Economic and Science Liaison Officer in Canberra, accompanied Ambassador Marshall Green to Antarctica in December of 1974. He is now at FSI for Czech language training. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961.

Ice is the silent language of the peak;
and fire the silent language of the star. — Conrad Aiken

ANTARCTICA

the land belonging to all people

ROBERT J. MONTGOMERY



Lake Chad, in the dry valleys about 40 miles from McMurdo station. US Navy photo.

Likewise unique politically, Antarctica—nearly one-tenth of the world's land area—falls wholly outside the boundaries of any nation state as recognized by customary international law. The continent has no representation in the United Nations and no voice in its own administration. That the place is politically *sui generis* is perhaps most strikingly dramatized by the fact that not one of the world's current major political figures—not even the highly mobile Henry Kissinger, Kurt Waldheim, Pope Paul or Imelda Marcos—has ever bothered to alight there. Antarctica has never witnessed a war, an election, a parliamentary debate, an international conference, or, so far as is known, a human birth. Undoubtedly its most significant political distinction is that it has no indigenous human population and apparently never has. Yet this singular fact does not exclude the continent from man's political affairs.

Seven nations—Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom—have asserted territorial claims, overlapping to some extent, over vast wedges of Antarctica. These claims all converge on the geographic South Pole, creating a theoretical point where the head of a pin covers territory claimed by seven sovereign powers. (The 9,000 feet thick ice cap covering the Pole shifts slowly but constantly, causing objects on the surface—such as the newly dedicated US Amundsen-Scott South Pole Station—to meander gradually between territorial claims as the ice itself slowly wanders.) The United States and other powers recognize no such claims nor any territorial sovereignty over the continent. While the United States has suggested some formula of internationalization in the past, Washington's present view is that Antarctica is *terra nullius*, defined by international law expert Oliver J. Lissitzyn as "belonging to no state."

Because of its political and physical singularity, Antarctica does not lend itself to convenient classification under familiar labels or facile comparisons with established models. The continent is sometimes spoken of as "the world's largest laboratory," accurate as far as it goes. Unquestionably, Antarctica is better understood and appreciated by many scientists than by most diplomats. The range of scientific investigation of Antarctic phenomena is enormous, encompassing upper atmosphere physics, seismology, aerology, glaciology, biomedicine, zoology, botany, geology and geophysics, sociology, genetics and environmental studies, to mention a few of the more recognizable categories. This research is also astonishingly relevant considering the continent's impact on weather, communications, sea conditions and other factors in both hemispheres. Another analogy often applied to Antarctica and its vast though still unquantified resource endowment is "global patrimony," rather like the world's oceans beyond territorial waters. Just as it is hoped that the current Law of the Sea negotiations will clarify, in a universally accepted code, the rules for exploring, developing and sharing ocean resources, future multilateral efforts may soon be exigent to elaborate similar rules for Antarctica's natural wealth. (The metaphoric relationship between Antarctica and the high seas has another interesting dimension: because the continent is largely buried under frozen water up to nearly 3 miles thick and because huge sea areas, one the size of France, are virtually permanently frozen into massive ice shelves that are largely indistinguishable from adjoining land areas, in many respects it may be just as meaningful to think of Antarctica as an ocean as it is to apply to it the potentially misleading term "land.") Thirdly, the great, pristine southern continent is increasingly described as Earth's sole enormous natural, unspoiled area which must be preserved. This view holds that Antarctica, unique and somehow fragile, should forever be inviolable and safe from the spoliations of industrial man. Lastly, concerned observers (particularly in the relatively nearby Southern Hemisphere nations maintaining territorial claims) insist that Antarctica is fair game for national colonization and exploitation just as soon as technology and economics make that feasible. Some southerners assert that theirs is a stronger claim to Antarctic sovereignty because of "proximity," a rather ironical justification to be cited by citizens of nations relatively recently established as distant outposts of Mother Spain and Mother Britain.

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Another of Antarctica's unique distinctions is, of course, the sensible and successful multilateral treaty under which it is administered. The Antarctic Treaty entered into force in 1961 following ratification by all twelve of the nations which originally signed it: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States and the USSR. Born of an American initiative in 1959, when bipolar attitudes and Cold War reflexes required no apologies, the Antarctic Treaty demonstrated long before the Limited Test Ban that ideological hostility need not preclude cooperation between the super-powers in a specific, restricted area where such was perceived to serve mutual as well as particular interests. The Treaty, insofar as it is known, is widely applauded. It has become a celebrated curiosity in the footnotes of international relations textbooks, rather like the New Hebrides Condominium was once cited as an interesting (but ultimately irrelevant) political aberration to the theory of the territorial state. It is hoped that the Antarctic Treaty will bear more nourishing fruit than that sterile and now obscure experiment, but Antarctica's very uniqueness makes it risky to try to apply its lessons elsewhere.

The Antarctic Treaty may be seen as an impressively successful application of the theory of "functionalism" to practical international relations. Inis L. Claude,

Jr., defines that theory as "essentially an assertion and defense of the proposition that the development of international economic and social cooperation is a major prerequisite for the ultimate solution of political conflicts and elimination of war. . . ." Functionalism has perhaps best been articulated and espoused by David Mitrany, who argued that "the problem of our time is not how to keep the nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together." Mitrany described a method of building world peace which seeks, by linking authority to a specific activity, "to break away from the traditional link between authority and a definite territory," visualizing the gradual evolution of overlapping layers of functional collaboration which would in turn lead to world "federation by installments." Frederick L. Schuman, writing in 1952 when the prospects for world peace through international organization seemed considerably brighter than now and when many cheerfully predicted an early triumph of rationalism over nationalism, called this process "peace through pieces."

The naive optimism of functionalism's earlier disciples is too easily ridiculed a couple of decades after Schuman turned his clever phrase. Nation states, particularly those with burning grudges still to settle, have scarcely suffered serious erosion of authority or loyalty to the likes of the Universal Postal Union however much their citizens may cherish post cards from abroad. Today, many states do not hesitate to inject national rivalries and hatreds into the deliberations of international gatherings held to foster world functional cooperation, roundly disproving the functionalists' assumption that the very obvious benefits of functional cooperation would eventually render unthinkable the negative dysfunctionalism of narrow nationalism. Economic *engrenage* may have made future fratricidal wars unthinkable in Western Europe, certainly no small blessing, but world "federation by installments" no longer seems seriously feasible. Whether it is or ever was desirable is another issue entirely.

The benefits of present international collaboration in Antarctica will not induce the shift of citizen loyalties and political authority from national to transnational institutions which functionalism presupposes. If for no other reason, those benefits are patently too indirect and too diffuse. But the benefits of the Antarctic Treaty and the cooperative activities which it facilitates are real and likely to increase in significance. (For example, some scientists believe they could have predicted crucial modifications in the Humboldt Current which evidently caused a drastic fall in the Peruvian anchovy catch a few years ago had they had more extensive knowledge of Antarctic weather patterns and coastal ice accumulation. The sudden and unexpected disappearance of the anchovies resulted in a serious drop in fishmeal exports just when world food production was being cut by other factors.) Any serious weakening of the Treaty, such as could result from an international "scramble for resources" in Antarctica, would no doubt concern governments and statesmen who have never given a thought to the continent before.

The Treaty declares that the area south of 60° South Latitude, exclusive of the high seas, "shall continue forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international discord." During the period the Treaty will remain in force (*i.e.*, at least until 1995), territorial claims are held in abeyance.



ANTARCTICA: selected stations and physical features.

Nothing in the Treaty is to prejudice the position of any Contracting Party regarding its recognition or non-recognition of any other state's right of or claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claims or enlargements of existing claims may be asserted while the Treaty is in force.

The Treaty further provides that "freedom of scientific investigation" shall be facilitated and prohibits nuclear explosions and disposal of radioactive wastes there. Plans for scientific programs and scientific personnel themselves are to be exchanged among participating nations. Scientific observations and results from Antarctic research are to be exchanged and made freely available.

Contracting Parties may appoint observers who shall have complete freedom of access at any time to any area of Antarctica with the right to inspect any other nation's installations, aircraft and ships and to carry out aerial observations. Such inspections have been carried out several times. Observers and scientific personnel exchanged under the Treaty are subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are nationals. Scientists of various nationalities often live and work for extended periods at the research bases of other countries. Consultative Meetings have been held under Article IX approximately every two years since 1961 to exchange information and recommend mea-

sures to further Treaty principles and objectives, the eighth such meeting being scheduled for Oslo in 1975. Meanwhile, six more nations—Czechoslovakia, Denmark, East Germany, the Netherlands, Poland and Romania—have acceded to the Treaty since it entered into force.

Obviously, Antarctica's remote location and peculiarly inhospitable physical characteristics have been more of a determinant than the Treaty in insulating the continent from the confrontations and problems of the rest of the world. The Treaty was largely made possible by these apolitical factors. Far from the cockpits of military power and logical trajectories of existing missiles, Antarctica is that extraordinarily rare area still not considered "strategic," at least not by the Northern Hemisphere superpowers. The five most powerful Contracting Parties, all situated in the Northern Hemisphere where most of the planet's political tensions are generated, sacrificed little of substance in renouncing military ambitions south of 60° South. It is perhaps more remarkable that the five southern signatories made such a renunciation, although there are perfectly sound reaons for their doing so. It might be suggested that the major northern signatories' acceptance of the Treaty is explained less by functionalist rationalism and altruistic considerations than by a cynical axiom of international politics: the degree of obduracy, selfishness and short-sightedness with which a state views a given issue is directly related to the extent to which that state perceives its vital interests to be affected.

Certainly the twelve original Contracting Parties displayed hard-headed astuteness in framing the Treaty so that they enjoy rather exclusive authority for Antarctica. Although any nation ostensibly may accede to the Treaty, Article IX stipulates that an acceding state shall be entitled to participate in Consultative Meetings and designate observers only "during such time as that Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial scientific research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific station or the despatch of a scientific expedition." This in effect codifies the selectivity imposed by economic, technological, scientific and geographic factors: only those nations with a proven capability and interest in Antarctic research will have a say in overseeing international activities there. The fortunate absence of credentials fights and tedious maneuverings over irrelevant political issues from the history of Consultative Meetings and other cooperative activities reflects the utility of this distinction.

A quest for resources, despite the formidable natural obstacles which still protect the continent's treasure, could make Antarctic a source of "international discord."

By building upon the common cooperative spirit and accomplishments of the highly successful International Geophysical Year (1957-58), the Antarctic Treaty has clearly been successful in advancing its stated objectives. For 14 years the continent truly has not become a source of "international discord." Scientific activity has flourished there in a wholly cooperative and distinctly nonchauvinistic atmosphere. Emergency requests for assistance, for example, are typically answered without regard to the nationalities involved. Antarctica's unique natural environment and wildlife have largely been spared the ecological depredations afflicting the rest of the globe. (US Navy helicopters painstakingly fly all wastes, human and otherwise, over 40 miles back to McMurdo Station from the remote field stations in the ecologically vulnerable dry valleys of southern Victoria Land.) Man's knowledge of the continent has grown exponentially since the IGY, but in an era when men are mapping Mercury and probing Jupiter and beyond it is regrettable that almost a tenth of our home planet should be so little known. (Scientists are not even certain whether or not the Antarctic ice sheet is gradually deteriorating, although evidence strongly suggests that a substantial portion is. Since such a drastic change could cause the surface of the world's oceans to rise up to 240 feet and profoundly alter global weather patterns, it seems sensible to keep studying the possibility even if such a calamity would require thousands of years to occur.)

The most serious threat to the Antarctic Treaty and the habits and structures of international cooperation it has fostered is future economic development. The Treaty is silent on this possibility, and the distinction between scientific investigation and economic exploitation remains undefined. Except for butcherings of seals in the 19th century and whales in the 19th and 20th centuries, and a recent trickle of high cost tourism, Antarctica remains economically untapped. That situation could change abruptly. In a world increasingly worried about access to resources, Antarctica's undoubtedly large resources of mineral, fuel and protein wealth cannot be ignored indefinitely. *Glomar Challenger*, a US research vessel engaged in the Deep Sea Drilling Project, has pierced what may be a substantial undersea hydrocarbon reservoir off West Antarctica. Coal was uncovered by earlier explorers, and ore bodies have been identified more recently. In the seas surrounding the continent, where marine life is incredibly abundant, the Soviets have conducted extensive studies of practical utilization of protein-rich krill, a shrimplike crustacean. Antarctica may eventually "export" enormous quantities of fresh water in the form of monster tabular icebergs (which reputedly can exceed Rhode Island in surface area when first calved from ice shelves over 100 feet thick) that could be towed northward to the parched expanses of Western Australia.

A quest for resources, despite the formidable natural obstacles which still protect the continent's treasure, could make Antarctica a source of "international discord." National rivalries are not unknown there, despite the current spirit of cooperation. Since Captain James Cook first circumnavigated it for the Royal Navy 200 years ago, national considerations have challenged zeal for scientific knowledge and lust for adventure and fame as the major magnets drawing men (and women) beyond 60° South.

The tragically heroic Captain Robert Falcon Scott provides a poignant example in almost the last words he ever wrote before his death on the Ross Ice Shelf in 1912. Earlier, he had just missed achieving his life's ambition to be the first man to reach the South Pole when he finally got there only to learn that the Norwegian, Roald Amundsen, had beaten him by 35 days. As Scott and his exhausted party struggled vainly to return, he scrawled in his diary just before he perished: "I do not regret this journey, which has shown that Englishmen can endure hardships, help one another and meet death with as great a fortitude as ever in the past." He was not the only Antarctic veteran to see that forbidding continent as a proper battlefield for winning national glory.

The place names dotting today's Antarctic maps continue to illustrate the point. In addition to those honoring the explorers themselves, their loved ones and colleagues, the continent is sprinkled with seldom seen features honoring otherwise obscure royalty, military heroes and other national celebrities, plus a few titans of industry: Queen Maud, General Belgrano, Grace McKinley, Bismarck, Bernardo O'Higgins, Victor Hugo and Queen Fabiola, along with Edsel Ford and the Rockefellers, are all immortalized in those frozen wastes. Eager to join the club, Adolf Hitler dispatched an expedition in 1938 to "New Schwabenland," perhaps with the intent to memorialize himself or von Ribbentrop with a glacier or nunatak as the Americans glorified John Quincy Adams, Cordell Hull and others.

Should national rivalries again intrude into Antarctica, they will hardly again be so petty. All scientific activity there now is ultimately dependent upon national government support of some sort and therefore presumably serving national as well as possible altruistic objectives. The United States Government spends over $30 million a year there, most of which is spent by the National Science Foundation (including reimbursements to the US Navy for crucial logistic and communications support). An Opposition politician recently castigated the Government in Canberra for not supporting national Antarctic research more generously in order to reinforce Australia's claim to three-fifths of the entire continent. Argentine leaders, beset by seemingly insoluble problems at home, might well be tempted to divert attention by grandiose designs in Antarctica.

The most serious challenge to the Antarctic *status quo*, however, is likely to come from nations possessing the technology, mobility and finances to exploit the continent's dormant resources. Antarctica can no longer be regarded in total isolation from the world's pressing economic and political realities as though it were some nearer, second moon, fit only for abstruse science and feats of bravado. The issue is how, not whether, the humans of the northern nine-tenths of Earth's land area will integrate the unique southern tenth into world affairs.

Most political leaders and senior diplomats of the Contracting Parties seem almost oblivious to the impact recent international developments, most notably the increased concern over access to natural resources, could have on the continent.

The broad and balanced political vision and interest in Antarctica evident at the inception of the Treaty is little apparent today. Most political leaders and senior diplomats of the Contracting Parties seem almost oblivious to the impact recent international developments, most notably the increased concern over access to natural resources, could have on the continent. Obviously, they face more immediate and familiar problems. Certainly there is sparse evidence that policy-makers possess significant knowledge and concern regarding Antarctica. The danger is that narrow, sectoral interests might prevail by default. In the United States, for example, no single regional bureau of the State Department has paramount responsibility for coordinating overall interests in the area, although a clutch of functional bureaus has narrowly defined concerns. Until the recent visit of former Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, now American Ambassador to Australia, no senior US career diplomat had evidently ever set foot south of 60° South. Scientists, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC readers and virtually everyone who has ever had the ineffable experience of visiting Antarctica are fascinated with the place and concerned about its fate. But they are not the leaders who shape national policies toward the continent which has no native constituency.

Marshall Green has noted the irony implicit in the United Nations' flag, with its polar-centric world map that omits the one continent where the UN ideal of vigorous, constructive international cooperation is actually achieved. It is hard to judge whether the political structures and modalities which sustain Antarctic cooperation are applicable to other situations. But the success of this cooperation is worthy enough to be nurtured for its own sake, however dimly it is perceived by the larger world.

Terra nullius is also *terra omnium*, but the "land belonging to all people" requires unique and positive approaches to its unique circumstances. "Steamroller tactics," bloc voting and political confrontation are hardly unique and profoundly dysfunctional in Antarctica's special situation.

Few analogies apply in Antarctica, but there may be a valid metaphoric message in the recent study by a British physician of the cause of death of Chief Petty Officer Edgar Evans, a burly member of Scott's doomed expedition. The study revealed that, in the harsh Polar environment, vitamin deficiencies can cause old wounds long since healed and mended bones once broken to revert rapidly to their former morbid state. Should enlightened cooperation in Antarctica undergo a deficiency of vision, wisdom and concern induced by national selfishness and the ignorance of political leaders, Antarctica's present health could give way to recrudescent sicknesses and the world will have another unneeded and unnecessary "object of international discord." ■

The United States has an opportunity to make its international information, educational and cultural efforts more effective in today's interdependent world.
— Frank Stanton

THREE VIEWS OF THE STANTON REPORT

. . . from the Project Director

I SHOULD LIKE to start out by tracing the reasons which brought the Panel into existence. Over the past few years, the question of the objectives of the US information and cultural programs and the organizational consequences have been raised by the two Congressional committees which have to pass the yearly authorization legislation and by the two Advisory Commissions, the one on USIA and the other on CU. These bodies seemed clearly to prefer the idea of an outside, i.e., non-governmental, group looking into these problems. In 1973, the Center for Strategic and International Studies of Georgetown University was asked by the two Advisory Commissions to organize such a study. Private financing was obtained and Dr. Frank Stanton, Chairman of the American National Red Cross and former President of CBS, was asked to head the Panel. Stanton consented. All members of the two Advisory Commissions were asked to serve as were five other individuals with extensive background in public diplomacy. I retired from the Government to become the Project Director.

The Panel thus came into existence because several important bodies in the area of overseas information and cultural affairs had called for a non-governmental inquiry into the objectives and organization of the programs.

The 21 individuals who worked hard and with enthusiasm for almost a year on the Panel were all experts in the area of information and cultural affairs. Frank Stanton does not need an introduction except to add, perhaps, that he had headed the USIA Advisory Commission for nine years. The 14 members of the two Advisory Commissions have, of course, been totally familiar with the programs. They have traveled to posts overseas, have held monthly meetings in USIA and CU, respectively, have participated in the legislative and appropriations deliberations and have had constant communication with USIA Directors and CU Assistant Secretaries and their staffs. The five other members of the Panel were Dr. Peter Krogh, Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, who had served as Special Assistant to Secretary Dean Rusk; Andrew Berding, who had been both Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Deputy Director of USIA; W. Phillips Davison, Professor at Columbia University, author of the basic book on international political communications, who had headed (with Lloyd Free) a Task Force on Information and Cultural Affairs for then President-elect John Kennedy; Ed Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a former Foreign Service officer; and Dr. Kenneth Thompson, Director of the International Council for Development. I had spent 32 years in US information work both here and overseas and when I retired held the senior career position (Associate Director) in USIA.

I can say without hesitation that a large majority of the Panel started out without preconceived notions and know that many of us arrived at the final recommendations only after sorting out all the evidence which we had gathered.

We thus did not come to this Panel unprepared, even though we all found out soon that much was to be learned from intensive interviewing and free discussion. I can say without hesitation that a large majority on the Panel started out without preconceived notions and I know that many of us arrived at the final recommendations only after sorting out all the evidence which we had gathered.

Throughout ten months of intensive work, we interviewed many people in and out of government—Secretary Kissinger and his two predecessors; USIA Director Keogh and several of his predecessors; Assistant Secretary John Richardson and most of his predecessors, Ambassadors, PAOs, CAOs, etc. No one who represented an important viewpoint was intentionally overlooked.

We began by addressing a basic question. What is the nature and purpose of these programs in a world that has changed greatly in the 30 years since they began? The Panel soon came to the conclusion that what is usually called the information and cultural program is in reality composed of two quite separate functions:

1. The articulation and advocacy of day-to-day US policies—the so-called spokesman role.
2. The cultural communications operations supporting longer-range policy objectives.

The Panel believes that there are basic differences between policy advocacy and cultural communications. Indeed, since all of our programs are intended for overseas audiences, there are clear differences in the way these audiences accept our political messages and our cultural messages. They know that the former flow from the US Government, while the latter come from the American scene as a whole. They accept the political

messages as government-controlled; they welcome the cultural messages precisely because they consider them not to be governmentally controlled. As George Kennan recently stated: "The government does not make culture and should not try to use it as a means of political expression and propaganda. The cultural community, on the other hand, does not make policy and should not seek or bear the responsibility for stating it."

Central to the Report is that there should be a separation between the conduct of *political*-information operations and *cultural*-information operations. Other countries recognize this separation and while the Panel did not recommend this course because of the practice of others, it should be made clear that what the Panel proposes is neither novel or untried.

Having decided conceptually to separate the direct support of foreign policy—the articulation and advocacy role—from the indirect support of foreign policy—the cultural communications role—and having further decided that both are necessary elements of a dynamic foreign policy, the Panel concluded that they must be organized separately if they are to run effectively.

The articulation and advocacy of current foreign policy requires the closest kind of operational integration with the State Department's policy process and hence should be located in the Department. From the testimony of former and present high State Department officers, it became very clear that they have been troubled by the fact that the Department had to depend on an agency outside its jurisdiction to articulate foreign policy.

The cultural communications operation, however, should be a step removed organizationally. It should concentrate on programs designed to create and reinforce favorable attitudes about this country without being harassed by day-to-day foreign policy issues. The long-range strategic objectives should be pursued without the pressure of tactical policy requirements. From the many experienced witnesses who met with the Panel, including professional State and USIA officers, the Panel learned that the longer-range essentially cultural operations have been on the whole more effective. The Report proposes that this cultural-information operation (much of USIA and all of CU) be set up as a separate agency, apart from the State Department, but with its Director reporting to the Secretary of State inasmuch as his operations are conducted in support of foreign policy.

Overseas, the position of PAO would be replaced by a Press Officer (reporting to the Department) and an Information-Cultural Officer (reporting to the new agency). Evidence that the Panel received from Ambassadors, PAOs and CAOs pointed to the ambiguous role of the PAO who, as Ambassador William Tyler (himself a former PAO) stated, "is neither entirely a cultural officer nor a press officer." Tyler added: "He is in the uncomfortable situation of having to ride two horses simultaneously—as though one officer were in charge of, say, the political and the economic sections (both also serving the national interest, but also functionally distinct from each other). With the creation of the new agency, the need for a PAO disappears. Both the Information-Cultural Counselor/Attache and the Press Counselor/Attache proposed in the Report should have direct access to the Chief of Mission and his deputy."

This brings me to the Voice of America. VOA has three functions 1) to broadcast accurate, objective and comprehensive news; 2) to portray the variety and uniqueness of American society; and 3) to present the foreign policy of the United States.

In other words, going back to the Report's conceptual approach, VOA is a tactical tool for policy articulation and, at the same time, a strategic tool for cultural communications. In addition and most importantly, it is a broadcaster of news. The structural conclusion drawn by the Panel is that since it is impractical to divide the Voice or to have it located in three places at once, the problem is to choose the functional location which interferes least with the performance of the other two functions. Placing VOA in either the State Department or the new agency would, in the Panel's view, severely compromise its independence as a source of news. A location outside either of these bodies would avoid this and other problems.

The Report proposes that the Voice be set up as a Federal agency under a Board of Directors, five in number, reflecting its three functions. The Secretary of State would be represented on the Board to see that the policy articulation function is adequately fulfilled. The Director of the new agency would be on the Board to advise on the portrayal of American society and three members from the private sector having broad experience in public diplomacy appointed by the President, with the approval of the Senate, would round out the Board. The Panel believes that this arrangement would permit VOA to function as a credible medium serving the interests of the US Government.

In conclusion, then, it is evident that those who had called for an independent inquiry were right, that the present program could be improved if its functions were properly identified and that this lack of identification has resulted in three problem areas: 1) The division of the longer-range cultural program between two agencies, USIA and State; 2) The assignment, to an agency separate from and independent of the State Department, of the task of interpreting US foreign policy to the world and advising in its formulation; 3) The positioning of the Voice of America at the crossroads of journalism and diplomacy.

Had the Panel put the cart before the horse and addressed the organizational problems before analyzing and identifying conceptually the different functions of public diplomacy, it might have dealt with facile solutions, such as transferring CU to USIA or USIA to State. But since it went about its business in orderly fashion, the organizational recommendations flowed logically from the analysis of the functions according to which some of them should be in State, others a step removed and the Voice of America be set up in a position worthy of its unique three-fold mission. By proceeding this way, the Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations has come up with viable organizational solutions

to the three problem areas encountered in its review.

—WALTER R. ROBERTS

. . . from AFSA

BY NOW, virtually all Foreign Service personnel in USIA and many in State and AID have seen or heard of AFSA's testimony on the recommendations of the Stanton Panel for the restructuring of the Information Agency.

AFSA's position was not arrived at lightly. It originated in a series of meetings held by board members with USIA employees at the Agency's main offices, at the VOA, the Motion Picture and Television Service, and at CU.

It took shape as representatives of major USIA elements hammered out a draft position which sought to take account of the career interests of each employee group, and which was based on a deep commitment to the professional goals of public diplomacy.

It took final form in the course of a series of meetings of the AFSA Governing Board, which were held to reach accord on a unified State/AID/USIA position to be taken before official bodies reviewing the Stanton Panel's recommendations.

Throughout these deliberations, AFSA sought to achieve a position which had professional validity, protected the employment rights of our members, and permitted the Foreign Service to speak with one voice before the Murphy Commission, the Congress and the public.

Our position has been submitted to the test of USIA membership approval in the form of a questionnaire whose results are still being compiled. Thus far, they show substantial support for each of the major elements in the AFSA position paper.

We cannot fault the Stanton Panel's analysis of the objective realities of public affairs programming in a complex world. Its members described the problem as we would: overseas, the public affairs program works well, despite a cumbersome administrative structure in Washington.

Their prescription for a cure was, however, dumbfounding: They would export to the field the problems they found in Washington.

Strip the Stanton Panel report of its understandable effort to be polite to the United States Information Agency and here is what it really says:

USIA has to become more credible. To achieve this, it has to offer programs which may stray from the narrow confines of political orthodoxy, which may be artistically experimental, and which may seem at times intellectually dangerous. The Agency has to do this because the overseas audiences we are trying to reach are understandably unwilling to accept what appears to be political pap, commonplace artistic standards, and the patronizing assumption that they have no other source of information about US society but the Embassy.

Up to this point, we do not disagree. The early returns from our poll convincingly demonstrate that USIA Foreign Service personnel do not favor a narrow, unyielding defense of the *status quo*. Indeed, 86 per cent of the respondents agree there is a need for change.

The Panel offers a second key observation that seems inoffensive on the face of it, but which leads it to offer structural changes in the information and cultural programs which would totally destroy their effectiveness. It is an anomaly, the Report states, that while American foreign policy is formulated by the Department of State, it is articulated abroad by an independent Agency. Acting upon its two basic perceptions—the need for greater credibility in broad cultural and information programs, and the need for policy makers to speak for themselves—the Panel recommends a new division of responsibilities between the Agency and the Department.

The observation that an anomaly exists is a euphemism for the discomfort that has affected the relationship of successive Secretaries of State and Directors of USIA.

The trouble with this prescription is that it creates more problems than it solves.

The observation that an anomaly exists is a euphemism for the discomfort that has affected the relationship of successive Secretaries of State and Directors of USIA. It has not been reflected in the institutions they head.

If there is a valid reason to remove this anomaly, it can be done simply: strengthen the dependency of the Agency upon the Department for policy guidance. AFSA has recommended one way of achieving this—transfer to the Department that office within USIA's policy and plans element which is responsible for policy guidance. Certainly this is preferable to the Panel's own solution, which creates two co-equal directors of the public affairs program overseas.

Of all suggestions of ways to increase the effectiveness of USIA, this seems to us to be among the least useful. There is not now any confusion in the field as to the source of direction of the policy articulation function at the Embassy. It is the Ambassador. The Public Affairs Officer serves him as directly as does the Political Counselor or the Economic Counselor. Creating a new Press Counselor at the Embassy to handle policy articulation and advocacy will not resolve a field problem; it will create one. It will, moreover, undermine what virtually all officers agree has been a healthy and useful development abroad, responsive to many of the changed circumstances which the Panel has so aptly described.

The Panel assumes that it is a handicap to have to advocate American policy, while at the same time conducting programs which explain the context in which that policy is made. In this regard, the Panel is wrong. To the contrary, it is essential that both functions be carried out if either is to be effective. And it has become of increasing importance that they be closely coordinated.

To that end, a great number of posts have been doing away with the old categorization of personnel and function which often inhibited effective operations. Press and information offices have been merged; programing divisions have been created which eliminate the old and misleading distinctions between information and cultural activities. As a result, a more coherent and fully orchestrated program

has begun to take shape at many of our key overseas posts.

The Stanton Panel would restore these distinctions, but with a vengeance. The Press Counselor would operate in the old, post-war mode. Armed with his Wireless File, he would set forth—alone or with a small staff—to inform and persuade his audience.

On the other side of the street, the new Information-Cultural Counselor would be abjured from tainting his program with any hint of support for US policy, lest his motives be suspect. It is observed that, if the need arose to coordinate the activities of the Press Counselor and the Cultural Counselor, it would be the task of the DCM to do so. One hopes for a DCM with a deep interest in public affairs, because he would, under this impossible arrangement, have little time for any of his other duties.

We consider it unfortunate that, having assembled so many good and useful perceptions, the Stanton Panel could arrive at no better arrangement for the field than one resulting in an overstaffed press operation, and a cultural program whose insulation from the central concerns of the Embassy would almost certainly undermine its relevance.

The AFSA position paper spends so much time in opposition to this aspect of the Stanton Panel, because we recognize it as the death knell for effective public affairs programing abroad. If the scheme were abandoned, we would find ourselves in closer harmony with many aspects of the Panel's report.

There is overwhelming support for the integration of CU and USIA. Everyone agrees it makes sense, and the Panel should be applauded for its recommendations in this regard.

There is a greater diversity of views about the VOA. We recognize the need of the VOA to achieve credibility as a news source when operating in so unique a direct-access forum as international broadcasting. And our VOA colleagues assure us that they recognize the need for close coordination with policy sources when commenting on international events, as opposed to reporting them. But no one, the Panel least of all, has suggested how to reconcile the official status of the Voice with freedom from responsibility for the effects of its broadcasting.

In this instance, as in all others, the Stanton Panel relies on the device of bureaucratic separation in order to achieve the goal of freedom of operation. For our own part, we do not want to see the Agency cut up in pieces and distributed wantonly around Washington.

If the AFSA recommendations are accepted, the Agency can exist, within the Department, in a relationship similar to that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency or independently, and still move towards the kind of healthy change we agree is necessary.

Our own perception is that outstanding leadership is going to be needed it we are to respond to the new needs perceived by the Stanton Panel. And the Congress and the Executive Branch are going to have to be less nervous, and more tolerant, when we speak with increasing candor abroad about the realities of American life.

There is no reason to believe that any bureaucratic rearrangements are going to improve anything unless Congress, the Executive Branch and the public will support an overseas information program which is candid and credible.

And, if that support is forthcoming, there is no reason to undertake the radical surgery proposed by the Stanton Panel.

—STANLEY A. ZUCKERMAN
USIA Member,
AFSA Governing Board

. . . from an FSIO

I HAVE no wholesale brief for the Stanton report and its recommendations. However, my personal opinion is that the report is a serious attempt—the first in over two decades—to examine the purposes and operations of US government overseas public diplomacy activities. Moreover, it comes at a time when international events are forcing a fundamental look at all US foreign programs. The Stanton Panel's membership was distinguished and knowledgeable. They were clearly not chosen because they supported a particular point of view. Most of them were there because they had been selected over a period of years by the President and confirmed by Congress as members of the Advisory Commissions overseeing USIA and Department of State Cultural Bureau (CU) activities. They were not uninformed outsiders. Two of them did not sign the report. This suggests vigorous discussion of a complex subject, and an attempt to distill common views from a wide variety of opinions both inside and outside the Panel.

I stress this point because there has been a curious attempt by some AFSA opponents of the Stanton report to dismiss it as just another exercise in re-jiggering the Agency/CU bureaucratic structure. This is a serious misreading of the report, and a disservice to an important and sympathetic effort to redefine the roles and purposes of USIA/CU programs. Although the report does make recommendations on possible restructuring of Agency and CU programs, its important contribution to my mind is in proposing a new conceptual framework for these activities.

The Stanton report does not merely affirm the overall value and necessity of these programs. It tries to match 25 years' experience with current needs. Its strength lies in its willingness to take a fresh look at the new international environment in which we operate and to propose patterns which may improve our operational effectiveness.

The AFSA April 3 presentation glosses over this with a perfunctory acknowledgement of the Panel's support for the continuation of Agency and CU programs. Beyond this, the AFSA executive board takes a largely defensive don't-rock-the-boat approach. This is hardly an imaginative course for an organization that claims to represent professionals.

My primary recommendation is that all of us in AFSA—not just the executive board—take a harder look at the conceptual analysis in the Stanton report. Particular attention should be paid to the sections beginning on Page 32 (of the mimeographed text) recommending

that the media-structure orientation which has dominated the programs since OWI days be replaced by a pattern that puts the focus on subject content (economics, arts and humanities, political affairs etc.) in a new structure in which area media services are supportive, not dominant. This is an important proposal which the AFSA presentation did not address. If AFSA had given it serious consideration, I believe that its presentation to the Murphy Commission would have expressed different conclusions.

I would like to outline briefly some of the points where I believe AFSA was in error in its presentation:

1. *The future of the Voice of America.* Here I disagree with the conclusions reached by the Stanton Panel and by AFSA. Both see the problem primarily in terms of the independence of the Voice's news operations. Both set up a straw man of excessive interference in VOA news content, allegedly undermining VOA credibility. Neither accepts the fact that audiences perceive VOA credibility precisely in terms of the Voice's identification as an official channel whose news is based on American interests.

The fact that VOA presents the bad news with the good reinforces the Voice's acceptability but this does not substantively change audience perception of its official status. VOA has traditionally had wide latitude in reporting the news, but this latitude must be bound by policy considerations. First Amendment strictures against government control of media are not relevant to a taxpayer-supported communications channel directed at foreign audiences for policy reasons.

The Stanton report's recommendations on this subject are clear in advocating a full measure of news independence for the Voice, with only nominal policy review. I don't agree with this, but at least it is a position with its own logic and purpose. The AFSA position is not clear, presumably because it represents an attempt to square a circle as a result of internal differences within its own membership.

I suggest that AFSA bite the bullet on this subject and come up with a professionally-oriented recommendation. Its recommendation should recognize the necessity for a direct official policy responsibility for our overseas radio programing, organized and carried out in a way that continues to respect VOA's need for a wise measure of news independence.

2. *The spokesman/cultural communications recommendation.* The Stanton report's recommendation on this subject was an important conceptual breakthrough which AFSA chooses to approach almost entirely as a bureaucratic problem.

The basic AFSA argument is that the Stanton report proposes to "fragment" an integrated program. There are some erroneous assumptions here. The program is not now integrated. It is fragmented between USIA and CU. The Stanton report proposes to end this division.

In the process of doing this, the Stanton panel recognizes an important fact. It is that simply combining these two operations in a wholesale way would not in itself provide an efficient framework for carrying out the two major functions of our public diplomacy. These are (1) the articulation and advocacy of current US policies (the so-called spokesman role) and (2) cultural communications operations supporting longer-range policy objectives. The Stanton report suggests an organizational framework for carrying out both these functions under the overall direction of the Secretary of State.

The articulation and advocacy of current policy requires the closest kind of operational integration with the State Department's policy process.

The report performs an important service in identifying the essential differences between policy advocacy on a tactical basis and longer-range cultural communications. As Foreign Service professionals, we can add another dimension by looking at the problem in terms of our overseas audiences. There are clear differences in the way these audiences accept our political messages and our cultural messages.

Regarding political messages (i.e. the articulation and advocacy of current policies), we say many things as a government which foreigners may or may not agree with. However, they accept the fact that we are stating our case. Our role in clarifying our policies is clearly understood, and welcomed. Our credibility at this level is in being precise, authoritative and (when possible) persuasive.

Cultural communications are another matter. Our need here is to present a fair view of a complex, pluralistic society in ways that assist our overseas audiences in understanding our motives and actions in areas of mutual concern. Our credibility here does not rest on some sort of officially-articulated idea of what our society is. It rests rather on cumulative impressions about us by foreigners, based largely on what they consider (rightly or wrongly) is relevant and useful to their own lives.

This is quite a different matter from presenting an official cultural "line." However much we may want to emphasize certain aspects of our society over others, acceptability depends on our willingness to include views which may not be in full accord with current official policy. This is always a sensitive point, but it is an essential ingredient in any healthy cultural communications policy. It is one we have to re-learn at intervals.

And it is central to the Stanton report recommendation that there be a separation between the conduct of official-spokesman and cultural-communication operations. The Stanton report does a good job of identifying both the differences and the connections between these two aspects of our public diplomacy. It makes clear that they are mutually supportive elements of a dynamic foreign policy, but they must be organized separately if they are to be run effectively.

The articulation and advocacy of current policy requires the closest kind of operational integration with the State Department's policy process. The specific organizational solution proposed by the Stanton report may need to be examined more closely, but it is on the right track.

The cultural communications operation should be one step removed organizationally from this

process. Cultural communications should concentrate on broader unobtrusive operations designed to reinforce long-term favorable attitudes about this country and its actions. This involves not getting deflected by the current set of policy flaps, and keeping an organizational eye on the wider perspective. It calls for a degree of patience that we have not often been allowed in the past because of the pressure of tactical policy requirements. However, it will be worth it. The net lesson of our programs over the past quarter century is that our most effective achievements are precisely in these longer-range operations. Again, the Stanton report may not have come up with the definitive organizational solution on this subject, but it is pointed very much in the right direction.

3. *The organization of policy information and cultural communications activities at the Embassy level.* Here the Stanton report follows the logic of its recommendations on the distinction between policy information and cultural communications. It proposes that these two operations be handled separately in Washington, and therefore also in the field at the Embassy level. The operational lines between Washington and the Embassy in carrying out these functions would be clear and precise.

The AFSA counterproposal is, by comparison, unclear. AFSA suggests that policy-guidance functions be moved from USIA to State. But it does not follow through by suggesting a direct channel on policy articulation and advocacy between this proposed State function and the Embassies. It proposes coordination, as at present, under a Public Affairs Officer in the Embassy. Having agreed that the PAO should no longer report to two Washington units (USIA and CU), AFSA turns around and suggests that he continue to report to two Washington units—the State Department on policy and a renovated USIA on cultural communications.

The Stanton recommendations make both common and bureaucratic sense. They do not accept the thin mystique of the PAO-coordinator. They recognize that American Ambassadors are perfectly able (through the Country Team mechanism and other consultations to handle a situation where a Press Attache and a Cultural Attache report to them separately. Ambassadors have been handling such situations with Embassy section heads for years.

There is one part of AFSA's critique on this issue which deserves particular attention. This is the contention that a separate Press Attache operation is justified only in large Embassies. The implication is that Press Attaches, under the Stanton proposals, won't have much to do in smaller Embassies. This line of reasoning has the (perhaps unintended) effect of downgrading the importance of the policy articulation and advocacy function. The fact that we have not been able to do as good a job as we might in this area is precisely because we have not had officers who have been allowed to concentrate full time on it.

Without resorting to time-study measures, it is probably true that well over half the time and talents of our PAO and information officers are devoted to projects in the cultural communications area. They juggle their time and attention between these projects and the support for fast-breaking policy issues. This would not happen if these functions could be organized separately in an Embassy, giving each function the personnel and resources needed, including a clear operational channel back to Washington under the Ambassador's guidance.

The enhanced Press Attache function, as defined in the Stanton report, would be a full time one. In particular it would allow one officer (at least) to give all his time to carrying out the important articulation-and-advocacy function, especially concentrating on person-to-person contacts with opinion makers. For the first time, we can have a professional continuing operational approach to the vital job of presenting current American viewpoints to our public-diplomacy audiences abroad.

I hope that the Association will take the above views into consideration in reviewing its positions on this important subject.

—Wilson P. Dizard
Foreign Service Information Officer



FSJ BOOK ESSAY

The Final Tragedy Of Vietnam

IT IS UNLIKELY that we will learn the lessons of Vietnam. That will be the final tragedy of the war.

When I say "we," I mean the Government as a whole—the President, the Secretary of State, the leadership on Capitol Hill, Republicans and Democrats alike.

Signs of this came quite soon after we had completed the evacuation of Saigon. The press reported that because of the collapse of South Vietnam the defense budget would have an easy time in Congress this year. Representative Tip O'Neill no longer favored a reduction in US forces overseas, as he had last year. Senator Mansfield would not press the troop level issue. Senator Mondale felt this was no time to "rock the boat." After suffering the severest foreign policy setback in the nation's history, the immediate Congressional reaction was to be less rather than more critical of the assumptions of American policy. Expediency dictated silence. A critical review of the defense budget could come later, if at all. The time for action slipped by.

Then came the *Mayaguez* affair and the dark hint that the Administration welcomed this chance, after Vietnam, to prove our "manhood," a word that began to appear in the Secretary of State's vocabulary. For a day or two the Oval Office seemed to become an operational command post as the President took personal and immediate charge of the military action against Cambodia. As in Vietnam, we relied on force to resolve the problem, not politics or diplomacy. As in Vietnam, our "credibility" was said to be at stake—Kissinger said the world should be made to understand there were limits beyond which we would not be pushed. As in Vietnam, there was no proportion between means and ends, between 41 Americans and an unknown number of Cambodians killed, and 39 Americans returned. Individual Congressional reaction and a unanimously adopted resolution of support by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee followed lines made familiar by the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution; the only thing missing was LBJ passing out the signature pens, symbolic pay-off for uncritical support. With a few exceptions, no doubts were expressed, no hard questions asked.

In this first post-Vietnam test case—minor league ball to be sure—we did indeed put Vietnam behind us, heeding its lessons not at all.

For ten years Vietnam was in our living rooms every night as we watched the war on TV, immediate and terrifying in its horror. But we could switch it off at will. Is that what we are doing now? Switching it off? Not heeding its lessons? Putting Vietnam behind us?

What are its lessons?

My mind goes back to 1951 to a conversation with R. H. S. Crossman, left-wing British Labor MP, brilliant and unpredictable. "You Americans," he said, "have no imperial tradition and no professional army. You can't fight an imperial war in Korea with a conscript army. You will tear your country apart." Crossman's observation came true in Vietnam: an imperial war and a conscript army. A nation at war, and not at war. A nation split asunder, torn apart. That is lesson No. 1: America cannot fight an imperial war. To fight such a war is too gross a violation of this nation's basic purposes and traditions.

In 1954 I accompanied Robert Murphy, then Deputy Under Secretary of State, to an informal meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discuss the situation in Indo-China following the defeat of the French. It was General Ridgway vs. Admiral Radford and the rest, Ridgway arguing against involvement in a land war on the Asian mainland. Ridgway, of course, had the President on his side and won the argument. This much of the story is well-known. We lose sight of one crucially important point. Ridgway's argument was not based on whether or not there was a "viable" government in South Vietnam; it was based on a judgment of the US national interest. Whether a Diem regime, a Ky regime, a Thieu regime was "viable" was beside the point. Intervention in a land war on the Asian mainland with its inevitable cost was not in the national interest. That is lesson No. 2.

Once the decision was made to intervene with force in Vietnam, then the kind of government we were supporting became of overwhelming importance. Frances Fitzgerald has written a brilliant analysis of this subject in "Fire in the Lake." The Government of South Vietnam was a hollow shell. Some FSOs who served in Vietnam may disagree with her, but in my opinion the issue has been settled beyond argument. Events have done that. But even if this war had had a different ending, the cost to the United States would have been too high. Ridgway's point would have still been valid.

In December 1962, Ben Cohen, that kind and clearsighted counselor, talked to me at length (and on many later occasions) about the dangers he foresaw because of our steadily expanding involvement in Vietnam. He predicted the whole disastrous course of events but could do nothing about it. The White House was no longer interested in his advice. James C. Thomson best explains why in an article in THE ATLANTIC in 1968, entitled, "How Could Vietnam Happen?" He said:

> "To put it bluntly: at the heart of the Vietnam calamity is a group of able, dedicated men who have been regularly and repeatedly wrong—and whose standing with their contemporaries, and more important, with history, depends, as they see it, on being proven right. These are not men who can be asked to extricate themselves from error."

One of Ben Cohen's principal concerns was in the self-enlarging nature of our involvement. One step led to another. To limit the war, we expanded it, many times, finally invading Cambodia. We repeatedly and persistently miscalculated. Even at the end, we—the President—called for still more military aid. Instead of reconsidering our policy and how we might disengage, we "upped the ante" with each successive failure. In 1967, I attended a meeting with a very high Government official to hear him discuss Southeast Asia. At the end of the meeting, as he was leaving, the very high official said he was having trouble justifying the war to critical audiences around the country. Our rationale for the war was thin and unconvincing. We who at-

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tended the meeting were asked to produce new rationale! We had lost our integrity. We had corrupted ourselves. That is lesson No. 3. Our credibility was gone, not with the rest of the world as this and previous Administrations appeared to believe, but with ourselves.

In 1949-50, I worked for Dean Rusk, when he was Deputy Under Secretary of State. He was then in-between two other jobs—Assistant Secretary for United Nations Affairs and Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs. The two perspectives of these jobs—the UN Charter and the American national interest in stability in Asia—fitted perfectly with his reaction, and the nation's, to the aggression in Korea. In that bipolar world, hawk and dove, realist and idealist could unite in support of UN action to resist aggression. But Korea was a bad precedent for Vietnam; the analogy was false in almost every way. Vietnam was civil war, rather than a case of aggression. There was no collective action or collective sanction. The bipolar world (if it ever existed) was gone; our "loss" was no longer necessarily their "gain." But the searing experiences of Korea and of China were in our minds as we moved step-by-step into war. This was our fatal error. Our involvement was an aberration, a legacy of the cold war and of a world that had changed. Vietnam did not represent a vital American national interest or the collective interest of the world community. This is lesson No. 4.

Secretary Kissinger is fortunately in error when he says peace is indivisible. The opposite is true. The world is not that interdependent. We have overworked the concept of interdependence.

Secretary Kissinger is fortunately in error when he says peace is indivisible. The opposite is true. The world is not that interdependent. We have overworked the concept of interdependence. We have had, simultaneously, war in Vietnam, détente with the Soviet Union, and an opening to China. Peace is divisible and wars can be limited. This fact is the best hope for the future. That is lesson No. 5.

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involvement in Vietnam? It seems doubtful. Where are the voices that speak for America? If they speak, will they be heard?

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

FIRE IN THE LAKE, *by Frances Fitzgerald. Little, Brown, 1972.*

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST, *by David Halberstam. Random House, 1972.*

"How Could Vietnam Happen?" *by James C. Thomson, Jr.* THE ATLANTIC, 1968.

THE PENTAGON PAPERS. *Bantam Books, 1971.*

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Don't Give Up the Ship


THE CONTROL OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS: *Prospects and Possibilities, by Barry M. Blechman. The Brookings Institution, $2.50.*

THE BROOKINGS' Studies in Defense Policy reach the ninth volume with Mr. Blechman's cool-eyed look at Soviet and American navies in general and at their roles in the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean specifically. The author is pessimistic on the general question of naval arms agreements because he finds the superpowers now have too many arms control matters on their plate, while at the same time both have slowed the detente process. In the two specific studies (he provides a draft agreement for the Indian Ocean) Mr. Blechman sees NATO and Israeli worries stopping any Med agreement, and US desire for an intervention capacity against the oil states stopping any Indian Ocean accord.

Despite the bleak outlook, the author advocates exploring possibilities with the USSR and to that end he offers a realistic outline of the shape of both navies in 1980 that undercuts the Navy's claim to have only a "very thin margin of superiority."

There is a short resume of the Washington Naval Treaty of 1922, but Mr. Blechman does not deal with the Western Pacific although the possible presence of four navies in that area in the 1980s may make some agreed restraints there very desirable. The Western Pacific

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illustrates Mr. Blechman's canny observation that "the manner in which a naval presence enhances superpower influence . . . is poorly understood . . .". It is also an area whose history since 1945 might make him question the first sentence of his book, "Navies have long been the handmaiden of diplomacy." In East Asia American diplomacy has more often been the handmaiden of the Navy's force and base postures.

The Brookings series is under strong attack from those wonderful folks who brought you My Lai, the C-5A and all those bribes. The June issue of GOVERNMENT EXECUTIVE has three separate, intemperate criticisms of Brookings. But any FSO with political-military responsibilities should study these concise and serious books.

—J.K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Cuba and the US

THE POLITICS OF HOSTILITY, CASTRO'S REVOLUTION AND UNITED STATES POLICY, *by Lynn Darell Bender. Inter-American University Press, $7.95.*

FOR TWO centuries closeness between Cuba and the United States found its base not alone in geographical propinquity but in shared ideals of liberty, justice and equality that prompted Cuba's fierce and undaunted 19th-century struggles for freedom. The unfortunate story of our recent estrangement from so worthy a people is the subject of this thin volume. It is clear that our arrogant and ungracious exclusion of Cuba's battle-hardened guerrillas from the ceremonies attending the surrender of the Spanish forces that had all but defeated them prior to our belated intervention in 1898 had consequences our leaders of that day failed to foresee. The resentment the *mambises* and their progeny couldn't help feeling erupted six decades later in a nationalist convulsion that probably had to mean Cuba's casting off its humiliating client relationship to this country. Mainly our officials' obsession with anti-Communism blinded them to the reality which others could plainly see, namely, that Fidel Castro, in transforming his country from traditional to modern, also changed it from bad to better as far as a majority of his countrymen were concerned.

That in doing so he made Cuba Communist is of doubtful relevance to underprivileged people who, never having known real liberty, can hardly miss its loss; while those to whom capitalism meant commercial rapacity and social injustice can be indifferent to the advent of an economic and social order that promised better things, even at the high price of freedom. A man who felt frustrated by stagnation and underdevelopment can only approve of his country's being built up and modernized at every level. And if, in addition, he can confidently foresee a dignified and secure future for his children and grandchildren, he's unlikely to lose sleep over the prospect that they will live under a socialist system.

In view of the signals now flashing back and forth across the Straits of Florida, this book may be out of date by the time this review is published. But it is a handy compendium of the successive stages and turns of policy in both Washington and Havana since Castro took over in 1959.

—JOHN P. HOOVER



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Foreign Policies

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS: *Leadership, Partnership or Disengagement? Robert A. Bauer (Editor). University Press of Virginia, $2.95 (paper) $10.00 (hard cover).*

LEADERSHIP, partnership, or disengagement are the alternative American foreign policies considered in this volume of six essays edited by Robert A. Bauer of Kenyon College and prepared for a Kenyon Public Affairs Forum in May 1973. Contributions by Seyom Brown and Akira Iriye are mainly historical. Earl Ravenal outlines a most unconvincing case for isolationism. Lewis Dunn, without even so much as a glance at Watergate or Vietnam, wants to proselytize American "ideals." Both Walt Rostow and Tom Thornton (the latter is on State's planning staff) are competent and professional in their analyses of the world situation and the need for adjustments in US policy. However, neither of them contributes a single, useful or valuable new idea for dealing with the urgent problems the US faces in this final quarter of the 20th century.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

An American in the Gulag


ALEXANDER DOLGUN'S STORY, *An American in the Gulag, by Alexander Dolgun with Patrick Watson. Knopf, $10.00.*

"What is your sentence?"
"Twenty-five years."
"What did you do?"
"Nothing. I did nothing at all."
"You are lying, prisoner. The sentence for nothing at all is ten years."

This quote appears mid-way in Dolgun's book and speaks volumes of the seeming mindlessness of the Soviet penal system at least during the 1948-1956 period of which Dolgun writes. It is Dolgun's story of his struggle to survive a brutalizing experience and yet remain a decent human being. He did so, and the reader comes away with only respect and admiration for Dolgun who survived *but not at any cost.*

While the book lacks the intensity of "Ivan Denisovich" and the sweep of "Gulag Archipelago," Dolgun offers something from both in his story. Yet at the same time the book, despite its obvious merits, is a bit unsatisfying. While Dolgun's account of his prison experience is poignant and three-dimensional, his description of his life prior to and after prison remains curiously flat and uninformative. We would like to know more about this admirable man.

Also, as in most books of this genre, the author shares few if any of his insights with us as to the reasons for the Soviet Union's brutal treatment of its citizens. Alas, the reason I suspect lies not with the Soviet State, since it in fact only rationalized a system that it found in place in 1917 and whose antecedents predate the founding of Muscovy, but rather in the Russian experience. Russia did not directly experience the Reformation, Counter-Reformation, Renaissance and the Western feudal system; all contributed to the development in the West of elaborate codes of conduct and of individual rights and obligations which evolved into significant constraints on Western states in their governing of their citizens. To see that the



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Soviet penal system is not a 20th century invention, it might be well to read Dolgun's book together with Dostoyevsky's "House of the Dead" and George Kennan's "Siberia and the Exile System."

—HARLAN G. MOEN

Semper Fidel

THE RISE AND FALL OF FIDEL CASTRO, *by Maurice Halperin. University of California Press, $3.95.*

MAURICE HALPERIN, who apparently worked in Cuba during the first five years of the Castro era, applies dubious social theories to a doctrinaire version of history and comes up with an unconvincing book. Despite the cute title, can we say that Fidel Castro has declined? He's older, true, but still stands strong over a Cuba that gives signs of being about to flourish, his influence and mystique as dominant as ever.

The thesis is that Castro's almost total subordination to Moscow, after only five years, meant that he had "fallen" in the sense of failing in his revolutionary objective of freeing his country from foreign domination. But the story hasn't yet been told, when a decade later a presumably imminent normalization of Cuba's relations will enable Fidel to dance lightly between Moscow and Washington and play off one against the other. Such freedom of maneuver and opportunity—it has been Castro's objective all along—may soon give Cuba the independence it has yearned for, but never had, during its history. If so, Castro will have succeeded beyond perhaps even his expectations.

Mr. Halperin may have screened his data to justify his theories. He also reveals a personal grudge. Since he superciliously judges Fidel to be an "illiterate" in economics and an "amateur" in philosophy, perhaps he resents that his own competence in these fields wasn't recognized. He may think that Fidel would have done better for Cuba had he asked for and been guided by his advice.

Worth reading are the pages dealing with Castro's early interest in an accommodation with the United States and how soon after taking power he realized the urgency of Cuba's lessening its dependence on the Soviet Union. Also interesting, since they are from the *Havana* viewpoint, are the accounts of the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis.

Whatever value it may have as a case history for students of revolutionary theory and participatory mass politics, the book is of little current importance. As the author writes, Cuba has cooled into a stable, austere, Soviet-dominated regime, for which the way to accommodation with the United States is opening. One almost infers a feeling that the Revolution has been betrayed.

—JOHN P. HOOVER

"The most worried, wearied, unthanked, and necessary public servant in any government today is its Minister of Foreign Affairs. He is like a mother-in-law—in the bosom of the family, yet not of it. Essentially, he is related to a world outside, a go-between harried by what the family thinks is its due and by what the neighbors say it deserves, which is invariably a lot less."—PARIS JOURNAL 1944-1965, by Janet Flanner (Genet), Atheneum.

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PARIS UNDER THE DOG STAR

continued from page 6

rived, or Rome when Alaric and the Visigoths descended from the Alps. Even at those desperate moments, however, a few survivors doubtless hung about to minister to the needs of the invaders and to safeguard the Empire's balance of payments.

Stay-behinds in Paris must learn self-reliance. During the last days of July you stock your larder and rush your clothes to the cleaner, if you can still afford one. A canvass of the quarter will tell you which baker or butcher or pharmacist will pick up the dropped torch of your usual supplier. But you should write off any help from plumbers (already a rarity), upholsterers, glaziers, and electricians, and brace yourself to live with explosive water heaters, recalcitrant stoves, and shattered windows. Even the chimney sweepers invoke the classic formula: "*Je regrette, monsieur, mais rien avant la rentrée.*" As for cooks and cleaning women, even if you are lucky enough to have one at the *rentrée*, you are sure to be strictly on your own in August.

The Robinson Crusoe syndrome is mitigated nowadays by the advent of the supermarket and the lavomatic, which, despite radical shifts of personnel, manage to hold fast through the dog-days. But should you hanker for adventure, remind yourself that your shutters and lights are being vigilantly scrutinized by a dozen frustrated burglars, whose informers have probably gauged the contents of your sideboard down to the last oyster fork. Or you can savor the presence of the pickpockets, who arrive like starlings in June and are even now bringing in the sheaves at the Gare St. Lazare, at Orly and in the streets thronged by guileless window-shoppers or the devotees of *son et lumière*.

In general, however, the tone of the Parisian populace is one of relaxation and even of repentance for the wicked practices of the other eleven months. It is true that the age median advances noticeably in August and one finds oneself wondering, not for the first time, how bent old gentlemen with red ribbons in their buttonholes and hobbling ladies in black survived the rigors of the occupation, and what dodges and devices their sharp-eyed successors would discover to outwit any new invader and make his life a misery. But among the indigenous survivors a certain languid solidarity develops. The greengrocer loses the knack of palming off the spoiled tomato and the unripe melon or covering squashed raspberries with fresh. Carnations go at half-price, with a few extras in the bunch, and parsley and tarragon for a few centimes. The lottery ladies doze in their booths, the object of covetous but timid alien stares; you have a feeling that a true Parisian who played his cards right might even get them to offer a rebate.

As for the faithful street cleaners, they open their little sluices and brandish their twig brooms with an air more somnolent than usual, interrupting their labors to give passers-by a gold-toothed smile of complicity. Would they also like to *partir un peu*? one wonders. Or are they dreaming rather of a distant *rentrée* in Algiers or Brazzaville? Go or stay, they will have known Paris under the sign of Sirius, and thus be numbered among the happy few who have experienced the *douceur de survivre*. ■

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
atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even [without an] . . . invasion. . . ." But in the crucible of war, most American leaders were less sanguine about when Japan would surrender. Some feared that the Japanese military might hold out to the end, using kamikaze attacks and other suicide ventures to kill many American soldiers. There was no *guarantee* in July or in the first days of August that Japan would surrender by November or December that year, rather than by, say, May or June of the next year. Policy makers would not gamble. For them, there was no reason to risk American lives to save Japanese lives.

In view of the informed estimates made *after* V-J Day, we can conclude that conventional warfare alone would *probably* have produced a surrender in the autumn of 1945, perhaps even before November and the scheduled invasion. But policy makers were generally unwilling to take the risk of relying only on conventional warfare, and they *saw no reasons—moral or political—to avoid the use of atomic bombs*. Before Hiroshima, they did not believe that the nuclear attacks would produce a surrender within a few days or weeks, or even in August. Policy makers were eager to drop the second bomb, and none advised delaying a few days to await Japan's response to the first. There was no incentive to delay. They expected to drop a third atomic bomb on about August 24, and viewed the atomic bombs as dramatic additions to conventional air attacks on Japan. In American thinking, atomic weapons were not substitutes for, but powerful supplements to, conventional war. Accordingly, the Air Force heavily bombed Japan in the days after Hiroshima: one hundred and seventy B-29s on August 7, 420 on August 8, 109 on the 9th—the day of the Nagasaki bomb—and 110 on the 10th. To emphasize American power and the cost to Japan of further delays, the air force launched its largest attack against Japan on August 14—one thousand aircraft, including 828 B-29s. That raid, with its thousands of deaths, was probably unnecessary. Had Japan not surrendered then, the Air Force would have dropped additional thousands of tons of explosives on Japan—the continuing "rain of ruin" that Truman had threatened.

Policy makers easily rejected alternative ways of ending the war *without the atomic bomb because they were not trying to avoid its use, and because they were unwilling to risk some American lives even to save many more Japanese lives*. That thinking shaped the use of both atomic bombs. In American calculations, Japanese life was cheap. Despite Stimson's later claim that the atomic bomb saved many Japanese lives and therefore was humane, no policy maker before Hiroshima, other than possibly Marshall, ever suggested using atomic weapons in order to save Japanese lives. Had the United States continued firebombing cities and launched its at-

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tack in November, probably the toll of Japanese civilian deaths would have exceeded the numbers killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. For those who measure the morality of weapons by the questionable standard of numbers killed, nuclear weapons may have been moral, or at least less immoral than the alternative of conventional war.

Looking back upon the war, many Americans regret both the failure to pursue alternative tactics and the combat use of the atomic bombs, especially the second one. Even those who regard the war in the Pacific as just and are untroubled by the mass killing of civilians are often morally disturbed by the use of atomic weapons. Their magnitude and power create moral problems for some who are untroubled by mass killings by conventional weapons. Before Hiroshima, Leo Szilard and a few scientists at the Chicago Lab briefly raised these moral issues, but their concerns did not receive an especially favorable hearing, even within the Manhattan Project laboratories. At the Chicago Lab, whose scientists were most sensitive to these issues, only a minority outrightly opposed the combat use of nuclear weapons on moral grounds. More scientists worried about the impact of combat use upon Soviet-American relations and feared a postwar arms race. Probably a majority at Chicago wanted a warning or non-combat demonstration *prior* to the nuclear attacks.

The combat use of the bombs was, basically, the enactment of an assumption. The assumption received subtle confirmation from the anticipated postwar benefits. Bureaucratic momentum made it difficult for Truman, even had he wished, to develop an independent, critical view of the issues. None of his trusted advisers opposed the action. Most strongly supported it. So tight was security and so rare were discussions of the bomb even at meetings of the highest councils that Truman and his close advisers, along with the military chiefs, never met together to analyze the assumption. How then could Truman consider, much less justify, not using the bombs and thus risking American lives? The United States had spent $2 billion on the project and possibly even delayed the war in order to build the bomb. Truman's decision, as Gen. Leslie Groves later explained, "was one of noninterference—basically, a decision not to upset the existing plans." Oppenheimer, sometimes a later critic of the decision, also believed it was a foregone conclusion.

Had the bomb project not been a closely held secret, and if most Americans could have discussed the issues openly in 1945 and then participated in the decision-making, the results would have been the same: both bombs would have been used. Few Americans were willing then to countenance the holding back of these weapons and the risking of American lives to save some of the hated enemy. War had brutalized both rank-and-file American citizens and their leaders. The policy makers, though drawn from a narrow elite and generally without electoral experience, reflected the American consensus on this critical decision.

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The Legacy of Hiroshima

The bomb was a triumph of international science and of American will and money. "Don't bother me with your conscientious scruples," declared Fermi, the Italian-born physicist. "After all, the thing's superb physics." His words summarized the thoughts of many scientists on the project. It was "a sweet intellectual problem," Oppenheimer admitted. Through the application of intelligence and the harnessing of nature, scientists and policy makers had improved the capacity of a nation to destroy human life. For many, the value of the new partnership of science and government, of intellectual expertise and federal funding and direction, was confirmed at Alamogordo, Hiroshima, and Nagasaki.

They ushered in a new, more terrible age. America has remained the only nation to use atomic weapons in war. That is part of the moral legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These awesome events even led some to question their liberal faith in the goodness of human nature, their confidence in progress, and their trust in human reason. Perhaps man could not overcome his arrogance, some argued, and the bomb was the secular admonition that original sin could not be vanquished by hope or philosophy. The bomb, along with the earlier barbarism of war, discredited for many the optimism of John Dewey and gained new adherents to the realism of Reinhold Niebuhr.

The bomb also contributed to the Cold War. Roosevelt had missed opportunities to approach the Soviets on the project, concealed it from them, and thereby further strained the fragile wartime alliance and added new reasons for suspicion and mistrust. During the war Truman continued this policy. Emboldened by the bomb, he stiffened his demands at Potsdam, and tried in the next few months to wrest concessions from the Soviets. In the early postwar months, the bomb remained an implicit threat —one that Byrnes wore "on his hip" at the three-power conference at London. He was not sure precisely how to use it in order to strengthen his hand, and he seemed to assume that mere possession was sufficient. He never brandished the weapon, but he did not have to be so bold. By mid-October, Oppenheimer was complaining privately that the Secretary of State "felt we could use the bomb as a pistol to get what we wanted in international diplomacy." The bomb conferred upon policy makers the mistaken belief in American omnipotence and encouraged them to believe that it could achieve their goals: an open door world of peace and prosperity, with the Soviet Union yielding to United States demands. Byrnes's great expectations soon withered.

America's atomic diplomacy, though ultimately failing, contributed to the Cold War and to the arms race. Without the optimistic policies encouraged by the bomb, the Grand Alliance would still have crumbled and mistrust would still have divided the United States and the Soviet Union, but the great intensity of the Cold War might have been avoided. ■

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
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LETTERS TO FSJ

F. S. Childhood

■ Recently I have been talking to other children of FSO parents about the advantages and disadvantages of growing up in the Foreign Service. I had been thinking about it myself but I had no idea anybody else had the same feelings I did. I am surprised that I have not heard more discussion about it among Foreign Service people since it concerns so many of them.

Several things make a Foreign Service childhood difficult. It is hard to reestablish roots and find new friends after each uprooting, especially when "home" can be such different places in just a few years. The family stays intact when it moves, but it is usually maids who take care of young children, and they have to be left behind. The culture, the language, the faces, and the scenery surrounding a child change much more drastically when moving between continents than moving around within the United States. The resulting discontinuity in hobbies and lifestyle leaves a person feeling scattered and confused.

There are special pressures on children in certain countries. For example; girls in Moslem countries who are restricted in where they can go; the children in Bangkok ten years ago who never knew for certain if their fathers in the Saigon embassy were safe; children exposed to strong anti-Americanism who are too young to understand it objectively; and young girls in Southeast Asia who have to walk past brothels on the way to school each day.

The Foreign Service lifestyle of their parents can be discouraging. Youngsters learn that cocktail parties take priority over sick children. Girls see their mothers bound to unending dull obligations. Adolescents wanting to experiment have to remember that they represent their country when they do not yet know how to represent themselves. Diplomatic communities tend to draw inward and isolate themselves so that children who are removed from the country they are living in, but cared for by nationals of that country, sometimes develop false ideas of American superiority.

For a child who has been a foreigner most of his/her life, being different from the surrounding society gets to be a habit, and when he/she moves to the USA he/she still feels like a foreigner. Even though children may have been to American schools, they do not know much about the United States if they cannot remember having lived there. It is frightening to go back; crime and violence in the US seem even worse from outside the country. The usual problems of fitting into a new place are compounded by the problems of trying to conceive of an adult future in a society barely experienced. Sensitive children pick up characteristics in the countries they live in that may not fit smoothly into American life.

The greatest advantage of a Foreign Service childhood is the strength and wisdom gained by coming to grips with the disadvantages. It is also true that the Foreign Service can give children the chance to understand another people and culture, to learn another language fluently, to experience being a minority, to see a wide range of flora, fauna, and geology, to mix with artists, intellectuals, and political leaders, and to get a good look at the United States from the outside. Families take advantage of these chances in varying degrees. Such a rich background (once a person is mature enough to make sense out of it) is worth all the difficulties. Most of the hardships are not things anybody can change anyhow, except the emphasis on protocol. Easing up on the wives and mothers would be a breath of fresh air for the children. It would be a good thing for the Foreign Service to take a look at itself from the point of view of children as it is now starting to do from the point of view of wives. Even if most of their problems could not be eliminated the discussion would benefit everybody.

CAROL TENNY

Tokyo

One Piece or Bikini

■ I am sure that two of your recent articles, "Excess Baggage" and "The Wasted Resource: Foreign Service Wives," have aroused a great deal of reader interest as well as reader participation—a reflection undoubtedly of the differing points of view of the one-piece bathing suit and the bikini generations.

As a member of the less vocal, under represented one-piece group it seems to me unfair that the Foreign Service should be held responsible for the unhappiness, economic dependence, or maladjustment of certain spouses abroad, with the corollary that the Service thus has an obligation to see that said spouses are happy, economically independent, and adjusted. Whatever the outcome of the battle between men and women it cannot be up to the employer, government, business, or education, to see that the non-employee has his/her place in the sun. In a marriage the question of who works and where is surely an individual and personal one rather than something that can or should be run through a computer in Personnel.

I also feel that it is worth questioning Carman Williams's assumptions regarding the older Foreign Service wife with her four or five children who, like the rest of her generation, laments her lack of a "meaningful" contribution to society. I am unsure precisely what the "disappointments" are (four or five children perhaps?) or how one can generalize that all women of the same generation suffer common discontents, which, of course, will disappear in the liberated, brave, new world. But, just for the record, without being either artist or writer, it has been a great life as a Foreign Service wife. The role is as useful, rewarding, stimulating and varied as one wants to make it. I have never felt like excess baggage, nor an unexploited resource, and I don't want to be a geisha in my next bikini incarnation.

LOIS CHAPMAN HOUGHTON

Washington

Many Questions

■ It was with a mixture of fascination and some horror that I have just read the editorial in the June issue of the Foreign Service JOURNAL which would have been less ineptly entitled, "Losing when you didn't have to," rather than just "Losing."

No one could agree more than I that the local employees of the United States Government in Vietnam who are now in the United States should be provided

for with utmost generosity. The editorial support of the JOURNAL is certainly most welcome.

No one could be more concerned than I that the American employees of all agencies of the United States Government who struggled so hard in the last two years or more to carry out the promises of the Paris Agreement should get a decent break on assignments, compensation for losses and other consequences of the defeat of American purposes in Vietnam, a defeat which was none of their doing and one which they tried so hard to prevent giving in the process incredibly hard work and, in some cases, their freedom and even their lives. I can only wish that some of those whose thinking seems reflected in this editorial had supported them instead of trying to undercut them.

But where does this publication of the Association which presumes to speak for many of them including myself get off with the incredibly glib pretension that "the causes of the war, its meaning . . . , and the future consequences . . . have already been well debated?" Who gave the unidentified editorial writers of the JOURNAL license to talk of a "bankrupt policy line" when most of us who had a professional role in Indochina affairs in the last two years or so would take a very different view of why American purposes were defeated? Who gave the anonymous writers of editorials in the Foreign Service JOURNAL license to use this publication as a device to indulge in intellectual self-gratification?

I am sure many of us would like the answer to these questions. It may also be useful to ask what inevitably will be the eventual fate of the Foreign Service if a few of its members are allowed to use the publication of its employees association as a vehicle to independently peddle their particular prejudices on issues on which they are supposed to function professionally within the constitutional structure of this Government?

W. J. LEHMANN

EDITOR'S NOTE: With regard to the questions raised by Mr. Lehmann, most recently DCM in Saigon, the editorials in the JOURNAL are customarily written by individual members of the Governing Board and are cleared with the Board. Future editorial pages of the JOURNAL will carry an identifying by-line. For another view of recent events, see "The Final Tragedy of Vietnam" in this issue.

Dialogue on Spouses

■ Congratulations on publishing the Carman Williams article on Foreign Service spouses. It's high time that we had an honest dialogue about the changing role of the Foreign Service spouse and the JOURNAL is just the place for it to begin.

The Women's Action Organization has just created a special committee to study the problems of Foreign Service spouses. We hope to come up with some idea of the scope of the problem and make specific recommendations for solving it. Ms. Williams's article is a fine beginning for our project. Let's hope that her article will be followed by others.

ANNE KIMBELL RELPH
WAO Research Committee On Spouses

Fairfax

To Begin the Attack

■ Your feature "Outrage of the Month" is an excellent one but I believe you are attacking the problem at the end that is least effective.

Rather than deny non-career aides to political ambassadors you should attack the system that permits the appointment of political ambassadors. A munificent political contribution does not qualify a person for the arduous diplomatic tasks of an ambassador any more than it qualifies him for a military command as a General or Admiral. The White House politicians should cease degrading the career diplomatic service by appointing political ambassadors.

NORMAN J. BENTLEY

Annandale

The JOURNAL welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary.

Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service JOURNAL, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service



"I know. I'm sick of these damned fresh peaches too, but the commissary has been out of Del Monte for three months!"

AFSA NEWS

THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT
by
Thomas D. Boyatt

Most of the members of the present Board and their immediate predecessors have been involved in AFSA activities during a four year period which has witnessed the development of E.O.11636; the winning for AFSA of exclusive representation for foreign service people in State, AID and USIA; and over two years of negotiations with the three agencies. The departure of this Board and the accession of a new group provides a good opportunity to review not just the past year but the results of two years' experience for AFSA as the exclusive representative of the men and women of the Foreign Service. Many of the following achievements were obtained through formal negotiations, others came though AFSA sponsored legislation—all resulted from the Association's enhanced status and effectiveness.

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- A kindergarten allowance—savings of $300 to $2,000 per child.
- Transfer allowance—savings of $200 to $900 per transfer.
- Upgrading of Foreign Service titles in all three Agencies.
- Elimination of the deductible on R&R travel—savings of $50 or $100 on each R&R trip.
- Elimination of the deductible on claims for loss or damage, and increase in maxima on subcategories for claims—savings of $50 or more on each damage claim.
- New sliding scale for air freight allowance (of particular benefit to single employees).
- Reduction of eligibility period for educational travel from 45 to 21 days.
- Newborn child layette air freight allowance.
- Raised allowances for mandatory medical immunizations and examinations away from Washington.
- Free choice of designated residence for shipment of effects purposes upon separation or retirement.
- Special gratuity (one year's salary) for the families of the victims of terrorism just granted by the Congress.
- Insistence upon equal opportunity for minorities and women.

OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO STATE PERSONNEL

- Pell Amendment requiring rank-ordering for promotions.
- "Safeguards" Agreement protecting the promotion process from any possibility of tampering.
- Major improvements in promotion precepts:
  - Substantial broadening of inter-functional competition.
  - Separate competition for specialists.
  - Special provisions to deal with the "repeated near miss" problem.
  - New definition of senior responsibilities.
  - Improvement in threshold process, including change to class-wide competition and elimination of the 3-year eligibility rule.
- Elimination of extra competition for labor officers.
- Substantial revisions on selection out:
  - Negotiations for stricter criteria for disciplinary actions.
  - Requesting clear policy on senior officer assignments to technical bureaus.
  - Agreement on Special Review Panel and composition.
  - Negotiation of due process standards required by courts.
  - Elimination of the automatic linkage between low-ranking and selection out.
  - Establishment of a new, three-stage approach.
- Agreement on out-of-area policy.

OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO AID PERSONNEL

- Foreign Service retirement for career AID personnel, which was one of our major legislative goals.
- Major steps before the courts, the Civil Service Commission, the Grievance Board, and the Employee-Management Relations Commission to fight the AID RIF.
- New policy for conversion after three years for "Ls."
- Improvements in the promotion process, including a new PER system.
- Saving of temporary promotions in Vietnam.
- Use of multiple modes of travel now permitted (already enjoyed by State and USIA personnel).

OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO USIA PERSONNEL

- The Pell Amendment requiring promotions by rank-order.
- "Safeguards" Agreement for USIA, just won through arbitration, protecting the integrity of the promotion process.
- Improvements in the selection out process:
  - Development of due process standards for selection out through the courts and negotiations.
  - Elimination of the automatic linkage between low-ranking and selection out.
- Major changes in the promotion process for both specialists and generalists:
  - Elimination of the use of quartile ranking system to adversely affect assignments.
  - Special provisions for specialists (of particular interest to VOA personnel).
- Elimination of Agency review of personal mail received from the Congress. Establishment of an "Exceptions Committee" for shipping and travel, similar to the one already in existence in State.

OF SPECIAL INTEREST TO THE STAFF CORPS AND SINGLE EMPLOYEES

- Substantial improvements in the payment of overtime resulting in additional income of nearly *three million dollars* to staff corps personnel.
- Automatic promotions extended to FSS-7 in AID.
- New air freight allowances which eliminate discrimination against single employees.
- Improvements in Staff Corps promotion precepts in State and USIA.
- Housing improvements at several posts.

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- Dozens of individuals helped with credit and other consumer problems.

Professional and Service Activities

In the professional sphere the Association's standing activities and new initiatives have prospered. Our luncheon program was highlighted by (then Vice) President Ford's joining AFSA in a celebration of our 50th anniversary and by Secretary Kissinger's address on the occasion of Foreign Service Day. The Board determined to select Foreign Service Day as the annual time to honor our friends and colleagues killed while serving their country abroad. Given the instability of the international environment and the continuance of savage terrorism, this ceremony appears to be a sad but permanent fixture. In a related development the Board established a Committee on Extraordinary Dangers which is participating at the highest levels in the formulation of the Department's policies and procedures in this area. AFSA's Face-to-Face program, jointly sponsored with the Carnegie endowment continued to present a varied and interesting program and the Herter, Harriman and Rivkin Awards for intellectual courage and creative dissent were again given to outstanding colleagues. In spite of financial pressures, the Foreign Service JOURNAL continues its improvement.

The Association's most important professional activity remains our vigorous public and congressional campaign to defend and improve the professional status of the Foreign Service. Efforts in this area center on working with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to establish qualitative criteria against which Ambassadorial nominations can be judged and quantitative limitations (20% by area) on politically appointed Ambassadors. Meantime the Association has obtained passage of a law requiring all Ambassadorial nominees to make public their political contributions and has testified against three Ambassadorial nominees whose appointments were flagrant examples of political abuse. Two of these nominations were subsequently withdrawn and the Association continues to be heard on these issues.

Finally, our major service activities continue, including:
- AFSA scholarships, sponsored jointly with the Association of American Foreign Service Women.
- The Foreign Service Educational Counseling Center, another major service done in conjunction with AAFSW.
- The Foreign Service Club.
- The three group insurance plans sponsored by AFSA.
- Special discount rate ($15 for two years) for *Foreign Policy* Magazine.

I am happy to report that the Association membership this month reached 7,350, which is the highest figure enjoyed in the last several years. This factor is encouraging in two respects: first, the trend continues on the increase, and second, the total potential membership in the Foreign Service is lower than it has been at any time since the early '60s. Membership as a percentage of those eligible is the highest in the Association's history. The Board had planned to undertake a major membership campaign in the spring of this year but was prevented from doing so by the Labor Department because of the internal election. I trust that a membership drive will be a high priority item for the new AFSA Board.

On the financial side the Association has continued to reduce substantially its short-term debt and to make similar progress with its long-term indebtedness. I do not want this progress to cloud the major financial issue that the Association faces, namely, that the present dues structure will not sustain AFSA at its current level of activity and with current inflation rates. The new Board will clearly be required to face major decisions regarding the allocation of the Association's resources to its objectives. While it will be several months before the annual audit is complete, it appears the Association would have finished fiscal year 1975 with a small cash flow surplus except for the fact that expenditures directed by the Labor Department in connection with the AFSA election were extremely large. The Association had budgeted $3,000 for the election, but mailing costs alone were in the neighborhood of $15,000. In spite of this financial woe, we anticipate that short-term indebtedness, which a few years ago approached $50,000, will be eliminated, providing a sounder basis for the new departures the incoming Board might wish to take.

The Governing Board is required by the by-laws to present a financial plan for the upcoming fiscal year. Since this is a prospective requirement, this Board has determined that that task should be carried out by the new governing Board.

Finally, we were pleased that, towards the close of our term, we were able to strengthen our staff through the addition of a full-time Staff Attorney, Ms. Cathy Waelder.

President's Reports tend to emphasize accomplishments and this one is no exception. I would not want to close without mentioning problems which we have not solved or which are just emerging. Among these are:
- Taxation of allowances;
- Defending foreign service allowances from attacks by OMB and the CSC;
- Pay comparability;
- A complete insurance package;
- Grievance legislation;
- An improved assignments process;
- AID RIF and promotion policies;
- AFGE's effort to win USIA representation.

The above list is indicative, not exhaustive. My colleagues on the present AFSA Board and I wish the newly elected Board every success in meeting these challenges and the others that will surely come.

IS THE AFSPA HEALTH INSURANCE PLAN GOOD ENOUGH?

As promised last issue here is the report of FSO-2 John Krizay, award winning author in the economics of medicine.

Enrollment in AFSPA health insurance plan, though stable over the years, comprises less than half of those eligible for AFSPA membership. Those enrolled are probably content with the plan but most of the enrollees would probably not be seriously discontented if they had no health insurance at all since

few families encounter heavy medical expenditures in any given year. (Only about 1.5% of all American families run up medical expenses in excess of $5,000 in any year, while just over 4% ever exceed $3,000 in any year.)

Nonetheless, costly medical misfortune can occur in totally unpredictable ways and at unpredictable times, and it is valid to consider whether the AFSPA plan offers good enough protection. Under the common tests for judging how "good" a particular health plan may be, the AFSPA plan does not compare favorably with the major Federal Employees Program (FEP) plans or with the average FEP experience. Its overhead costs have been consistently higher—often by a wide margin—than the competitive plans, it does not provide comparable high level risk protection, and its benefits are less widely distributed than those of other FEP plans. More serious, the plan is constructed by people (i.e., the board members of AFSPA) who have no mandate from the employees in whose behalf the plan is presumably written. Competitive bids are not sought; indeed the plan is drawn up in collusion with the Mutual of Omaha representative who participates in AFSPA board meetings.

These are some conclusions arrived at after a thorough study of data filed with the Civil Service Commission and an examination of AFSPA's by-laws and operating proceedures.

Administrative Efficiency

Foreign service employees could have more health insurance for the same price if the plan were run at average efficiency. The overhead costs of the AFSPA plan are high by comparison with the two large, high option government-wide plans (Blue Cross-Blue Shield and Aetna), by comparison with average overhead costs of all employee organization plans, and by comparison with all plans combined. The AFSPA pay-out ratio (the share of premium income returned to employees as benefit payments) has been lower—often by a wide margin—than either the average pay-out ratio of all plans or of all employee organization plans in 11 of the 13 years for which data exists. (1961-1973). In 10 of those 13 years, AFSPA's pay-out ratio was also lower than Blue Cross-Blue Shield, high option and in 9 of 13 years, lower than Aetna, high-option.

High administrative costs, a more conservative reserve policy and higher profits for the carrier all contributed to the inferior performance indicated by the pay-out ratio experience.

Administrative costs of the AFSPA plan were higher than Blue Cross-Blue Shield, (high option), higher than Aetna, (high-option) and higher than the average for all plans in each of the thirteen years and higher than the average for all employee organization plans in twelve of those thirteen years. AFSPA plan administrative costs expressed as a percentage of premiums, have been more than twice as high as either Blue Cross or Aetna in most of the 13 years, and higher than the average for all employee organization plans in 12 of the 13 years.

Mutual of Omaha's profits have also contributed high overhead costs. Profits from AFSPA operations were higher than Blue Cross-Blue Shield (high-option) in 11 of 13 years, higher than Aetna (high option) in 8 of 13 years and higher than the average of all plans or all employee organization plans in 9 of 13 years. Also, Mutual of Omaha's investment income (earnings from reserves) was higher than the Blues high-option in each of 13 years, higher than Aetna (high-option) in all but one year, higher than the average of all plans in all but two years and higher than the average of all employee organization plans in every year. This result is, obviously, a function of the size of the reserves held by Mutual of Omaha which, as one would expect, have also been generally higher than other plans.

While the overhead costs of this plan are high, claims processing by Mutual of Omaha is reasonably efficient, and substantially faster than in the Federal Employees program. A lapse of more than two weeks from time of submission of the claim to receipt of payment is rare in contrast with Blue Cross-Blue Shield.

Risk Protection

Like any health insurance plan, the AFSPA plan includes a variety of limitations, the major ones being: (a) $100,000 in total claims per illness or all sickness resulting from any one cause, (b) 365 days of full coverage for semi-private hospital accommodation for each illness (with 80% coverage after 365 days), and (c) a specific surgical schedule limiting full coverage to the amount specified in the schedule for each procedure plus 80% of any amount over the scheduled allowance. The maximum full coverage for surgical expenses is $800. This contrasts with the major plans under FEP which offer maximum coverage of $250,000 or more and full surgical coverage without limit in the case of Blue Cross-Blue Shield or 100% coverage for all covered expenses of whatever kind above $10,000 in the case of Aetna.

The $100,000 limit on all covered expenses (per each illness and related claims) in the AFSPA plan is inconsistent with the 365 day full hospital coverage allowance for most illnesses requiring such prolonged hospital care. For other than psychiatric cases, where hospital services may amount to little more than room and board, any conceivable illness or injury requiring 365 days hospitalization would almost certainly entail hospital and physician costs plus other related medical costs far in excess of $100,000 (e.g., a serious accident, certain malignancies or cardiac ailments which involve repeated hospital episodes and series of surgical treatments).

Because there are no predictable limits to the extent of medical costs one might incur, adequate high risk coverage is more critical than extensive low risk coverage. At the same time, because the incidence of catastrophic medical expense is rare, high risk coverage is inexpensive. Raising the ceiling from $100,000 to $250,000 or more adds only a few cents to each subscriber's bi-weekly insurance payments.

Limits on full coverage for surgical costs present another kind of problem. For some procedures listed in the AFSPA plan surgical schedule, the amount the carrier (Mutual of Omaha) will reimburse in full is less than the fee customarily charged by many surgeons, especially in large cities like Washington, although, generally, the amount the patient would have to pay out-of-pocket (20% of the charge in excess of the scheduled

figure plus $35.00) would not be large. However, out-of-pocket expenditures for follow-on and ancillary treatment—for which the plan pays 80%—could in some cases be sizable. But more important, many surgical procedures are not listed in the schedule and when procedures are not listed on the schedule, Mutual of Omaha retains the right to determine the amount of full payment. An examination of the California Relative Values Study gives an idea as to how many surgical procedures are omitted from the AFSPA plan schedule. This study—a guide to doctors in assessing fees—lists over 60 double-columned, 8½ by 11 pages of surgical procedures compared with two triple-columned 5 by 8 pages of listings in the AFSPA brochure!

The esoteric ailments for which there are no comparable procedures listed in the schedule, are the most vulnerable in this respect. For example, an aorto-coronary bypass graft—a rather popular modern procedure for relieving patients of debilitating pain and discomfort of cardiac disease—might entail surgical fees of as high as $2,000 or $3,000 plus heavy follow-on and ancillary costs for long periods of time. Kidney transplants also involve heavy surgical costs—the more so since they entail surgery on both donor and recipient (it is not clear whether the AFSPA plan covers both costs.).

While there are gaps in coverage at higher expense levels, the AFSPA plan provides coverage for certain low cost procedures which are hardly worthy of risk protection. Insuring against orthodontic expenses up to a maximum of $150 per year, for example, means that subscribers are paying insurance premiums for an expense which is probably less than the average family's monthly grocery bill. Coverage of such low cost and easily financed expenditures adds considerably to the cost of insurance because of the high cost of claims handling relative to the cost of the claim itself.

Distribution of Benefits

The data available reveal a very low percentage of subscribers receiving benefits, compared with the major plans or with average experience of all employee organization plans. In 1973, for example, benefits were paid to 45% of Blue Cross-Blue Shield high option subscribers, to 33% of Aetna high option subscribers and to 33% of all subscribers of all employee organization plans. At the same time, benefits were paid directly to only 20% of AFSPA subscribers. This is consistent with the experience of all other years since the inception of the plan. However, the figures are not entirely comparable since AFSPA data do not include those beneficiaries whose medical costs are paid directly by State, AID, USIA and others against the lump-sum payment to Treasury. Still, even if we assume that the number of beneficiaries is 25% greater than reported (the lump sum payment represents about one-fourth total benefit payments) the participation rate is lower in every year than all units cited above. More analysis would be needed to explain the relatively low rate of participation in the plan but one explanation is that many subscribers posted overseas either solve their medical problems by using Embassy facilities or do not bother to file insurance claims when they use local private facilities.

Reforming the AFSPA Plan

The employees of the foreign affairs establishment are a unique group in several ways but principally in that a large percentage of them—perhaps 40%—are serving abroad at any given time. This fact has various implications for the health insurance requirements. For one thing, personnel abroad are relieved of some of the financial burdens of medical care that those at home are obliged to face. In many posts, routine medical services are provided through Embassy doctors and nurses. In many countries, certain medical services are subsidized by the state in one way or another so that the charge to the user is modest. In other places, services of any kind may be scarce, and one simply does without medical care. Another factor is that service connected illnesses and injuries, for which the US Government takes responsibility, perforce come under a broader definition abroad than at home. We do not expect Uncle Sam to pick up the tab if a member of our family contracts hepatitis in Washington, but if such a misfortune occurs abroad, the service-connected case at least can be argued. In fiscal year 1973, State, AID, and USIA paid nearly $2 million to health care providers on behalf of employees and family dependents who were hospitalized. This is more than twice the amount paid to Treasury by the AFSPA plan and almost two-thirds as much as the AFSPA plan paid out in benefits in total. This expenditure plus the provision of direct services through Embassy dispensaries (not included in the above figures) adds up to a substantial medical subsidy for employees eligible for AFSPA coverage.

As recipients of this subsidy, the foreign service should be attractive customers for health insurers, and it should be possible to buy more coverage for a lower premium than almost any other group in the Federal Employees Program. No doubt AFSPA subscribers are paying more than they should for the coverage they receive.

Beyond these observations, three steps would seem in order: (1) an effort should be made to see what the subscribers and those eligible to become subscribers most need and want, (2) bids should be obtained from other carriers, and (3) more complete disclosure of the financial operations of the plan should be made.

It may well be that foreign service employees and families as a group have a unique disease profile.

A carefully designed questionnaire completed by a properly chosen random sample of eligible employees could yield information which could be compared with the knowledge of DG/MED to determine what kind of health care coverage is needed and wanted by the employees in whose name the plan is presented. A number of other issues could also be examined: might there be a preference for accepting personal responsibility for small claims—say the first $300 or $400 total medical costs per family annually in return for more complete coverage above that amount? Do subscribers really consider it worth the high administrative cost to buy $150 per year coverage for orthodontic treatment? Or would it be better to apply the subscription income toward defraying some of the costs of half-way houses for the drug-addicted, special schools or re-

habilitation centers for mentally retarded or emotionally disturbed children, or travel costs where non-service connected illnesses or injuries need treatment in the United States? Would the membership be willing to pay a larger premium for such extraordinary coverage?

By the same token, existing subscribers as well as all those eligible to become subscribers, have a right to complete financial disclosure of AFSPA financial matters. In particular, a detailed accounting of the operating costs of AFSPA should be made so that all eligibles could decide whether the administrative services being paid for out of health insurance premiums are worth the price. And, finally, the employees have a right to expect that those who are acting on their behalf in drawing up a health insurance plan will not become wedded to one carrier but will seek the best possible deal by inviting several bids from competing carriers. Certainly, it is totally inappropriate for the Mutual of Omaha representatives to participate in AFSPA board meetings. With these steps, the employees of the foreign service could have an "employees' organization plan" in something more than name alone.

OUTRAGE OF THE MONTH

AID Wrecks System

On July 9, 1975, the seven Public Members of the Foreign Service Grievance Board unanimously resigned in protest over AID's refusal to implement a direct order of the Grievance Board. As a result, the Foreign Service Grievance system is dead. AFSA deeply regrets the necessity for the Public Members to resign. But as individuals of great integrity, we frankly agree that they had no other alternative.

In the next few weeks, AFSA will bend all its efforts to obtain passage of the Bayh Bill (S. 904) which will establish a legislatively mandated grievance system which the agencies cannot ignore. We urge all of you to write your Senators and Congressmen, indicating the seriousness of the situation, and pointing out that as things stand today all Federal Employees, both civilian and military, have some form of grievance procedures except for the Foreign Service.

We quote below the letter from Mr. Simkin, Chairman of the Grievance Board to the Secretary. Incidentally, Mr. Simkin, past President of the National Academy of Arbitrators, and for eight years the Director of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, is perhaps this nation's best known and most respected professional arbitrator.

"We, the Public Members of the Foreign Service Grievance Board, herewith submit our resignations.

We take this action unanimously because of our considered belief that AID's noncompliance with a Board order has fatally undermined the present grievance system for the Foreign Service.

On December 23, 1974, we issued an order in the case of William H. Baumann, Record of Proceedings 74-202-AID-55. AID failed to implement that order, contesting the Board's decision on both jurisdictional and substantive grounds. On May 14, 1975, we invited representatives of the three foreign affairs agencies and AFSA to consider, thoroughly, the implications of non-compliance with a Board order. At that meeting we stressed that our arbitration system could not survive if the participants reserve the right to pick and choose the Board decisions they will honor. We also stressed the fact that when the agencies themselves created the Board, they made no provision whatsoever for an appeals procedure.

On May 30, AID made a submission to the Comptroller General on the Baumann case. That submission came belatedly, and went beyond a purported concern over the legality of a potential payment to Baumann, and into jurisdictional issues. AID thereby unilaterally modified the regulations under which we had agreed to serve.

It is clear that AID, and now apparently USIA as well, do not accept our basic position that the grievance procedures require that the parties to the system must feel themselves bound to honor Board decisions. Under these circumstances, the climate needed for good-faith resolution of grievances in the Foreign Service has been effectively destroyed; a situation not susceptible to remedy by the Comptroller General, irrespective of which way he might rule in the Baumann case.

Although we are not willing to accept grievances filed after the date of this letter, we would be willing, if the three agencies and AFSA so desire, to complete the cases now before the Board.

We do not wish to close without a word about our Agency Board and staff colleagues. We have been greatly impressed by their integrity, impartiality, competence and devotion to the work of the Board. It would be unjust if the fact that we have chosen to resign were to hamper their futures in their respective agencies."

AID management has stubbornly and destructively insisted upon disregarding a Grievance Board order. We are now the only people in government; including the military, who are without the protection of a grievance system. AID deserves the strongest possible condemnation for its action. USIA and State have also failed to cover themselves with glory in this situation. USIA, apparently sensing the Grievance Board's distress, swooped in vulture-like to send a letter to GAO supporting AID and by inference attacking the Board. State, for its part, refused—in spite of our urging—to use its authority to reverse AID's action.

PAFSO WINS INCREASES

In April the Canadian diplomatic union, PAFSO, concluded its salary negotiations with the Canadian Treasury Board. Here are the results. Canadian grade FS-3 corresponds to our FSO-3. Canadian grades FS-4 and FS-5 are the top level and are not negotiated. They are above the $40,000 level. With our Canadian 0-3 colleagues making $40,000 the attraction of their system of free negotiations is obvious.

	1975	1976
FS-1	$13,585- 18,767	$14,975- 20,691
FS-2	18,767- 27,113	20,691- 29,892
FS-3	27,113- 36,468	29,892- 40,206
FS-4 }	executive level—	
FS-5 }	above $40,000	

Outgoing President Tom Boyatt took advantage of official travel this spring to call on diplomatic union counterparts in the UK, Norway, Sweden and Canada. Our colleagues in these countries are most interested in the employee-management system in the US and in AFSA's progress. Many of their structures and procedures have useful applications here. International exchanges among diplomatic unions should be increased.

UNFAIR PRACTICES— GOOD NEWS AND BAD

In recent days each of the Foreign Affairs Agencies has lost an important unfair labor practice before the Employee Management Relations Commission and is being forced to post notices that they will not commit such unfair practices in

the future. Each of these decisions serves to strengthen the rights of Foreign Service employees and sets valuable precedents for the future conduct of our relations with the Agencies. On the other hand, one of the cases, though a moral victory, casts real doubts—particularly when taken in the context of the destruction of the Foreign Service Grievance System (see additional item in this issue), on the ultimate utility of the current employee management relations system for the Foreign Service.

AID: Guilty on All Counts on the RIF

In a decision dated June 25, 1975, the Employee Management Relations Commission upheld in principle the findings and decision of Judge Chaitovitz (see AFSA Red Top No. 75/14, dated May 7, 1975), who found AID guilty on all counts as charged for committing serious and blatant violations of the Executive Order. In particular:

(1) AID committed an unfair practice by misrepresenting a proposed change in M. O. 476.2 concerning AOSC's as necessary for promotion competition when it was actually intended for a RIF.

(2) AID committed another unfair practice by improperly breaking off consultations with AFSA.

(3) AID committed a third unfair practice by unilaterally issuing AOSC notices without consulting with AFSA.

Despite particularly wordy attempts on the part of AID's lawyers, the EMRC's decision fully upholds the findings of Judge Chaitovitz on all of these counts. In its Order, the EMRC puts AID on notice that it will view very seriously any further refusal on AID's part to consult with the Association as required by the Executive Order. This particular case constitutes a serious rebuff to those high officials in AID who have been telling the Congress and Press that everything they have done on the RIF was fair, humane, and in keeping with the law and regulations. It also represents a gain for the Association in that:

1) The principle is established that an Agency cannot flagrantly lie and misrepresent its actions and intentions in bargaining with the Association with impunity.

2) No Agency can unilaterally break off consultations with the Association without thereby violating their obligation to consult.

3) No Agency can promulgate changes in personnel policies and procedures without notifying AFSA and consulting with us.

Unfortunately, the decision by the EMRC undercuts the recommendations of Judge Chaitovitz for relief, which would have given some of those already off the rolls the possibility of returning with back pay. This action on the EMRC's part raises serious doubts as to the utility of the employee relations system for the Foreign Service (see below).

STATE: Guilty of Coercive Bargaining

The Employee Management Relations Commission in another decision dated June 25, 1975, upheld its previous decision which had been appealed by the State Department, which found State (acting as an agent in the negotiations for all three Agencies) guilty of coercing the Association, and thus violating the Executive Order with respect to negotiations on the limited shipment of household effects. In its ruling, the EMRC stated:

"The Department's August 19 letter had the effect of coercing the Association to accept the Department's proposal to defer the effective date of the increased allowances until FY 1976, or the Department would not provide for the increases in its FY 1976 budget submission."

This ruling is of significance because:

1) It precludes State or any other Agency from engaging in the future in coercive tactics when bargaining with the Association.

2) While recognizing the real limitations which budgetary constraints place on the capacity of the Foreign Affairs Agencies to provide increased benefits, this ruling makes clear that the Agencies cannot play games in negotiations using the budget as an excuse to avoid good faith bargaining. In particular, it cannot, as it did in this case, use the threat of an additional year's delay in implementation of a benefit as a club to shut off the bargaining process and force the Association to accept its position.

Incidentally, this is the second "unfair" the Association has won against the Department on this particular negotiation. In an earlier case, the EMRC ruled that the Department's refusal to provide AFSA with data on the cost of our proposal was an unfair practice because it denied the Association information we needed to bargain intelligently.

USIA: Guilty of Violating Employee Rights

In the third case, the EMRC found that USIA had violated the rights of AFSA's President and Vice President by failing to repudiate the actions of John Harter, who utilized Agency materials to mount an unsuccessful recall campaign against the outgoing President and Vice President. In its ruling, the EMRC stated:

"Harter's use of the envelopes to distribute materials seeking the recall of Boyatt as President and Harris as Vice President of the Association was an open and flagrant misuse of Agency property. . . . Section 1 of Executive Order 11636 accords employees the right 'to form, join, and assist any organization as defined herein,' and states that the right to assist an organization 'extends to participation in the management of the organization.' The Commission finds that the failure of the Agency to disavow Mr. Harter's actions tended to interfere with the employees' right to select a representative, and in the internal affairs of an employees organization."

This decision, while limited to the actions of one individual, nevertheless sets two valuable precedents:

1) Agencies have an affirmative obligation to assure that their facilities are not misused in such a fashion as to undermine the rights of individuals or organizations under the Executive Order, and failure to repudiate such improper use itself constitutes an unfair labor practice.

2) This is the first case under E.O. 11636 in which a "derivative" violation of Section 13(a)(1) (Interference With Employee Rights) has been found. Such derivative violations are of considerable significance, since an Agency's improper practices with respect to the rights of individuals and organizations are as likely to be sins of omission as sins of commission.

Now The Bad News

The Association is delighted, of course, to have won these unfair practice charges and to have established valuable precedents. Nevertheless, we are profoundly disturbed by the obviously pro-man-

agement attitude displayed by the EMRC on the AID case. AFSA is not questioning whether the EMRC members are acting with integrity and in good faith, but they are the quintessence of management. (The EMRC consists of representatives of OMB, CSC, and the Labor Department, each of which bears significant management responsibilities for the conduct of employee relations in the federal government.)

In the AID RIF case the EMRC, faced with overwhelming evidence, upheld the Judge's ruling that AID had in fact committed several unfair practices—indeed, some of the sleaziest, sneakiest, backbitingest unfair practices an Agency can commit. But having found the criminal guilty, the EMRC's penalty is to make him stay after school and make him write "I won't do it again" on the blackboard. Totally missing from the EMRC's ruling is any real enforcement mechanism which would redress the wrongs that have been done. "Go and sin no more my son," is fine for minor violations of the Order. It is not enough when jobs are on the line.

The EMRC's toothless scoldings in this case are not likely to inspire confidence on the part of anyone in the Foreign Service that the employee management relations system is worth very much on the major issues. It is not that things are better under Executive Order 11491; every employee organization in the federal sector has exactly the same complaints. What is urgently needed is legislation which will put third party adjudication of such cases in the hands of genuinely impartial bodies, and not leave to one group of management officials the determination of what punishment to hand out to other managers.

THE MURPHY COMMISSION REPORT

The Murphy Commission Report debuted on page 13 of the Washington Post and completely disappeared shortly thereafter. It is probably just as well. In spite of valiant efforts by Ambassador (retired) Robert Murphy the Report does not—perhaps could not—live up to its promise. The analyses and recommendations vary widely; unfortunately, those dealing with State are the worst of the lot. The USIA section endorses the Stanton Commission Report and AID is generally given short shrift although the Report does endorse a *career* development service. With respect to the Foreign Service personnel system the Report reads like a mixture of OMB cant, Civil Service Commission expansionism and vintage Crockett experimentation even unto resuscitating the "foreign affairs executive" concept. Regarding employee-management relations the analysis and recommendations must have been drafted by the Pinkertons, J. P. Morgan's personnel chief, and, of course, OMB's staffers again. In one revealing passage the Report states: "It is difficult to turn the clock back . . ." Unfortunately, many of the drafters of the Murphy Commission Report want to try.

A REAL LOSS FOR AFSA

This month, AFSA is losing one of its greatest "assets." After 7½ years of loyal, dedicated and inspiring work on behalf of the Association, Helen Vogel is leaving to return to what will hopefully be for her a quieter life than AFSA's frenetic pace. Helen has been the Executive Secretary, Administrative Assistant, Committee Coordinator and strong right arm of the Association for years. Much of the Association's success in recent years has to be attributed to Helen's amazing capacity to produce high quantities of first rate work, and her broad knowledge of what AFSA is and is doing. Her last day will be July 15. She will be sorely missed.

TAX TIPS

In response to our request (March Journal) for information on members' experiences with difficult tax matters that may be of interest to others in the Foreign Service, we received a small number of letters. Almost all fell into two categories: (1) deducting home leave expenses; and (2) DC and state taxes.

We again encourage you to let us know how you have fared with IRS or local tax jurisdictions. Information from members has been invaluable in advising other members.

DC and State Taxes. This aspect of taxation has become a perplexing problem to a growing number of members. We cannot stress too strongly that you assess *now* your liability to pay state (or DC) taxes.

Some members believe that living abroad relieves them of any tax obligation to a state or the District. *Such an assumption can be costly in later years.* Many members have not for years lived in or enjoyed any of the fruits of the state which may be their legal domicile. Yet, in order to vote, virtually all the states—and the courts as well—recognize that US citizens *must* have a *domicile* (see explanation in the March Journal) somewhere in the US. District of Columbia tax officials, for example, have told us that the District recognizes that US citizens not working for the US Government may in fact be *domiciled* abroad, but these are mostly retirees or others who clearly have no intention of returning to the US. US Government employees, on the other hand, are assigned abroad for specific lengths of time and then return every now and then to their agency's home base; thus, they could not be legally domiciled in the country of their assignment since the intention to remain there permanently is lacking.

Another danger signal is that since the beginning of 1975, the District and 33 states have entered into a compact by which each will exchange information with the others on individuals who, though living within their borders, claim another jurisdiction as their domicile. As a result, many Foreign Service people have recently been dunned by their states of domicile, to which they may have never paid taxes, for several years of back taxes.

Moreover, in most—if not all—states, *there is no statute of limitations which applies* if an individual has not filed a return for the year(s) in question.

DC. When an individual satisfies the District that he is domiciled elsewhere, the District will require him to file a notarized affidavit to that effect. The District will thereupon send a copy of the affidavit to the state of domicile, but the District will not seek further information about the individual.

FSOs and FSIOs domiciled in the District must pay DC income tax no matter where they are. Only FSOs and FSIOs domiciled elsewhere are exempt from the DC tax

when residing in the District.

Virginia and Maryland. Domiciliaries of both states are required to pay the state tax no matter where they are residing. Some Foreign Service employees who reside in Virginia or Maryland sometimes file a return and pay even though they are not required to do either. In Maryland, you need not file if you have resided in the state less than six months; in Virginia, for less than 183 days.

Sick Pay. One of our members who took advantage of the Sick Pay Exclusion provisions of federal taxation suggested that, because he was unaware of these provisions before, other members entitled to the exclusion may have not availed themselves of this break. See IRS Publication 522 on details.

FLASH! AFSA Election Results: Retired Power

Unofficial election results are just in. Official results appear elsewhere in this issue. The big story in the election is the size and importance of the retired vote. This year 764 retired members voted, more than double previous elections. Even more important was the impact of the retired ballots. Vice President Dan Newberry, Secretary Pete Velott, and Treasurer Ed Stumpf ran up such large majorities among retireds that they were able to lose the State, AID and USIA constituencies and still emerge victorious. Retired voters also were critical in the Presidential contest. Candidate Mathews' and President Hemenway's split of the large retired vote was determining: Mathews lost in State, AID and USIA but still finished second and President Hemenway acquired the largest total while finishing substantially behind in State. Unofficial results tabulated by constituency for officer positions appear below. Congratulations to the retireds for their interest and to the winners!

	Retired	USIA	AID	State	Total
President					
Hemenway	239	171	225	469	1104*
Mathews	412	37	68	529	1038
Williamson	97	189	186	588	972
Vice Pres.					
Newberry	386	78	78	594	1136*
Hydle	120	185	215	619	1059
Harter	216	130	164	348	858
2nd Vice Pres.					
Patterson	230	162	348	800	1540*
President	295	126	99	546	1066
Secretary					
Achilles	245	58	157	499	951
Velott	356	40	82	588	1066*
Palmeri	187	216	219	433	975
Treasurer					
Stumpf	580	106	175	781	1482*
Lamb	151	156	248	757	1312

AFSA's NEW OFFICERS AND BOARD — 1975

In the early hours of July 11 the Department of Labor certified the results in the 1975 AFSA election for Officers and Members of the Governing Board as follows (winners appear in boldface):

For President: Rick Williamson, 972; **John D. Hemenway, 1104;** Elbert G. Mathews, 1038.

For Vice President: **Daniel O. Newberry, 1136;** Lars Hydle, 1059; John J. Harter, 858.

For Second Vice President: **John A. Patterson, 1540;** Samuel R. President, 1066.

For Secretary: Norman Achilles, 951; **LaRue H. (Pete) Velott, 1066;** Bob Palmeri, 975.

For Treasurer: Paul A. Chadwell, 176; **Edward R. Stumpf, 1482;** Denis Lamb, 1312.

For State Department Representative: Cynthia Thomas, 501; **Richard J. Harrington, 575**; William T. Pryce, 380; Kenneth N. Rogers, 439; David Noack, 523; J. J. Paciorka, 571; **Alf Cooley, 718;** Roger N. Benson, 393; **Alan W. Lukens, 676; Pat Woodring, 918.**

For AID Representative: Sherwin Landfield, 113; Campbell McClusky, 104; Paul Saenz, 121; **Charlotte Cromer, 281; Roy A. Harrell, Jr., 265.**

For USIA Representative: Paul **P. Blackburn, 279.**

For Retired Representative: Paul J. Leahey, 246; Peter F. Szluk, 0; **Olcott H. Deming, 477; Glenn G. Wolfe, 461.**

The total number of ballots received was 3192, of which 12 were declared void.

Approximately 215 individuals were the recipients of write-in votes. In no case did any individual receive more than a total of 22 votes for all the positions for which he was a write-in candidate, with the exception of the two Retired Representatives.

Foreign Service People

Marriage

Mulera-Vance. Ruth Mulera was married to Stephen B. Vance, son of Ambassador and Mrs. Sheldon B. Vance, on June 22, in Phoenix, Arizona. Mr. and Mrs. Vance will be living in San Francisco.

Birth

Cadeaux. A son, Daniel Andrew, born to FSO and Mrs. Ralph H. Cadeaux, on May 30, in Reading, England.

Deaths

Higgins. Lawrence Higgins, FSO, died on November 8, in Nelson, New Zealand. Colonel Higgins entered the Foreign Service in 1926 and served at Mexico City, Coatzacoalcos, Panama, Tegucigalpa, Oslo, Paris and in the Department, until he resigned in 1939 to go on active duty with the General Staff during WW II. He is survived by his wife, Angela, of Avenida Ciceron 608, Colonia Polanco, Mexico 5, D.F.

Hutchinson. Herbert M. Hutchinson, FSO-retired, died on June 20. Mr. Hutchinson entered the Foreign Service in 1951 and served at Frankfort, Freiburg, Kabul, Naples, Niagara Falls and Kaduna. He is survived by his wife, Claudie, who has returned to Paris to reside with her family.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

For his accomplishments during the seven years he served in Vietnam, he received the U. S. State Department's Meritorious Honor Award, and he also has had the singular distinction of having been awarded the Presidential Order of Merit, First Class (the highest award that can be given a non-Vietnamese citizen) by President Van Thieu of South Vietnam.

As a foreign service reserve officer with the U. S. Agency for International Development, Mr. Salzburg spent time in all the forty-four provinces of South Vietnam on wide-ranging assignments. And in his several capacities as refugee operations officer in Da Nang, as deputy chief of program coordination in Bien Hoa, and as community development advisor and chief of ethnic minorities activities in Saigon, he came to know the Vietnamese and their country extremely well.









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