

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AFSA Defends Overseas Allowances Against Unfair Federal Taxation

Letter to Congressman Al Ullman of the House Ways and Means Committee

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing to express the concern of the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) over reports that the Committee has voted to tax allowances of United States Government employees serving overseas by repealing Section 912 of the Internal Revenue Code. AFSA is the professional association of 11,000 American men and women of the Foreign Service. Since 1973 AFSA has also served as the exclusive employee representative of Foreign Service people of the Department of State, Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency.

We are moved to speak not only by our obligation to represent members' interests but also by our role as a professional organization vitally concerned with the quality of American foreign policy. At a time when the United States finds itself confronted with a rapidly changing world of shifting alliances, allegiances, and centers of influence, a world in which American dominance over events is no longer nearly as certain as it was a few years ago, it is more important than ever that this country be served by a strong professional Foreign Service. Such a Service demands an educated, trained, dedicated, hard working and highly motivated corps of people. In order for the foreign affairs agencies to recruit and retain men and women with these qualifications the agencies must be able to successfully compete with private organizations which are in the market for the same people. Taxation of allowances which are paid solely to reimburse personnel for extraordinary expenses would seriously undermine efforts to recruit the very best talent for this vital government Service which benefits every American.

While no one expects to get rich working for the government, dedicated career employees should not be expected to bear unusual financial burdens just because they happen to serve their government overseas. Despite whatever testimony you may have received to the contrary, in fact Foreign Service employees serving abroad do not live in luxury nor often even in circumstances which permit them to save much of their salary. In the normal course of events those who represent the United States overseas have just as hard a time as any taxpayer putting a dollar in savings. Although the US worker has suffered severe inflation here at home, the inflation rate has been modest in comparison to that in many other countries. As a consequence, American Foreign Service employees serving abroad have already sacrificed considerable purchasing power not to say savings because greater rates of inflation in recent years have significantly eroded the worth of their pay.

We, as Foreign Service employees, recognize and accept as part of the conditions of our employment alien and often unhealthy environments, periodic disruption of family life, frequent personal hardships and even the danger which sometimes goes with our chosen career. We are not saints, of course, and there is no denying that we derive great personal satisfaction from the importance of the work we do. Nevertheless, it would be grossly unfair to dedicated professionals of the Foreign Service to place an additional financial burden on them and their families by taxing the allowances which they receive to compensate them for the extraordinary expenses they incur by serving overseas. We are at this moment compiling data which will demonstrate to you the dimensions of the inflation induced financial burdens which our Foreign Service personnel abroad bear. As soon as we have these figures we will send them to you. In the meantime, I strongly urge you in the name of the 11,000 men and women of the American Foreign Service not to repeal Section 912 of the Internal Revenue Code.

Sincerely,
JOHN D. HEMENWAY
President—
American Foreign Service Association

For further information on AFSA's and management's recent activities in this area, turn to the AFSA News in this issue.

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COMMUNICATION

re:

The Myth of Easy Promotion

SOMEWHAT BELATEDLY, I have been reviewing the statistics in the March State Department NEWSLETTER on the 1975 Promotion List. One fact stands out very clearly: the myth that promotions were easier and more frequent for economic than political officers has been laid. In every class and by every standard, it is clear that the bulk of the promotions is going to political officers; indeed, somewhat surprisingly, from Class 2 to 1 there were more "political" officers promoted than people in program direction slots. Even more significant, perhaps, is the fact that the political officers get the nod overwhelmingly in the "general" promotion category, whereas the economic (and to a much greater extent the other cones) have to rely much more on selection within their own professional category.

Even allowing for the natural prejudice arising from the disproportionate number of political cone officers in the personnel system and on the selection boards, the message is pretty clear: although there are a considerable number of able economic officers, and to my mind some of the best in the service came out of that kind of work, the best talent nevertheless continues to gravitate to the political cone. In part this is laziness—political work is relatively easier and less complex, and doesn't require

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doing the kind of often grubby and always detailed analytical backup that "economic" work does. In part it is because to the junior officer "political" work appears romantic and sexy—little do they know that most political sections (particularly in large embassies) are the wastebaskets into which all the miscellaneous problems get dumped, but which rarely get a piece of the real action in the areas where US interests are most deeply involved—usually the military and economic areas. In part, too, those who drift into the political cone think that is where the action and the negotiation will be—though anyone who enjoys negotiation and has failed to taste the delicious complexity of manipulating the internal bureaucratic and just plain politics of two to a dozen countries in an agricultural negotiation doesn't know what real negotiating fun is. In any case, for whatever reason, the cream of the incoming bright and potential comers in the lower ranks of the service has continued to gravitate to the "political" cone, and looking at this year's statistics, they will not even have the countermotivation of promotion to persuade them otherwise.

Yet in terms of real, important US interests, the area of economic policy and negotiation—bilateral and multilateral—is perhaps the most important (along with the political military which will always provide berths for only a relatively few officers), and the one which provides an opportunity for exciting, interesting and often relatively independent work for officers in the middle and even junior grades. So the service is losing the chance to put its best people where the most important action is, and they in turn are losing the opportunity for interesting and significant jobs. In saying this I admit to some prejudice, because I had the good fortune to taste the fascination of this kind of work over more than 20 years of a highly satisfying Foreign Service career; but as an outsider now, it still looks that way to me.

What's the solution? It seems clear to me that it is simple: either abolish the cone system or at least meld the political and economic cones. Any substantive officer in the Foreign Service who is not in his bones a "political" officer—that is to say sensitive to the current of power and influence, and able both to analyze and explain them and to manipulate them in practice in a negotiation—shouldn't be on the substantive side of the service at all.

By the same token, any officer who is not economically literate (meaning having the equivalent of the FSI 22 week course) is unlikely to be capable either of understanding the real problems of domestic and international policy with which in this present day world US foreign policy is really concerned, or of handling the kind of negotiations which are the real meat of our diplomacy at higher levels. This is true even in times when we have Secretaries of State who are relative economic illiterates—as has been the case more than once in recent history.

To make this happen, I would propose (though I am sure that the inherent conservatism and attachment to mythology of the management of the service will continue to ignore such recommendations) at least the following measures:

Christmas at Clark-Ashburton House, circa 1845

Season's Greetings

The Clark-Ashburton House at 1525 H Street, Northwest, was built by Matthew St. Clair Clark, then clerk of the House of Representatives, in 1836, the year of the founding of our bank.

For ten years after 1842 the building served as the British Legation and was tenanted, successively, by Lord Ashburton (for whom it was later named) and Sir Henry Bulwer, both of whom worked out treaties with neighbor Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, for our northern boundaries with Canada.

Subsequently, George W. Riggs, Jr., co-founder of our institution, lived there with his family while awaiting completion of a new home on Eye Street. The venerable structure is now Parish House for historic St. Johns Church.

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- That in the entry process we seek the best minds and the best all around educations, with a particular emphasis on the "political" qualifications as defined above. If in addition, candidates already have some degree of economic literacy, so much the better; but we need very few Ph.D. economists in the service, and it is often better to get them once they have already some professional background behind them (i.e. by lateral entry). By the same token the best young economists coming out of college will undoubtedly tend to go towards an academic or business career, unless they are strongly motivated to the Foreign Service, in which case they should be welcome.
- That the political and economic/commercial cones be unified into one. If this is too much for the service to swallow at once, then at least let us not force officers at a junior stage in their career, and before they have had an opportunity to savor a variety of assignments, to choose the principal line in which they are going to go, and be stuck with it for the rest of their time. After all, college freshmen are not encouraged to choose their major field until they have acquired a certain experience and maturity, and taken the major survey courses; and even then they often change their minds.
- *All* officers in the political/economic (or, if separate cones are maintained, in both the political and economic/commercial) cones should be required to have passed the FSI 22 week economics course or show an equivalent academic background in economics, as a *prerequisite* to entry to Class 3. I realize this requirement would mean expanding the 22 week course and obtaining more money from the Congress. But I think it is generally agreed that of all the things FSI does the economics course is probably the best organized and most useful, and I suspect that there are other FSI activities ("counter-insurgency?") that could well be dropped in its favor; and the Congress has generally shown that with real effort on the department's part it can be persuaded to things that make sense.
- That at an early stage of their career, all officers should have a chance to taste both political and economic work. And by economic I include commercial work, which tends to have a bad name in the service, but which when properly directed gives more opportunity for a junior officer to make contacts and pursue projects on an independent and self-reliant basis than almost any other form of junior activity in the field.

These ideas are not new: indeed most of them have been advocated for years by a number of us, the undersigned included. But in a time when it is becoming increasingly clear that the major US involvements around the world are political/economic in nature, they are even more valid than they might have been before, and I would urge them again to the consideration of the managers of the service.

Let me add one footnote. The Wriston report and a number of equally feckless documents since were based on the assertion that the only way to develop top management talent is through intense specialization through the middle ranks of a career; and this assertion has been supported by the allegation that this is how modern management in American business does it. After a year and a half in the business community, I can testify that this assertion is dead wrong. It is true, indeed, that most business organizations tend to overspecialize careers through their middle ranks; and the experience is that this is the *worst* way of developing good senior managers: which is why businesses so often go outside (including to veterans of the Foreign Service) for their senior managers. If we're going to learn lessons from American business, let's at least get them right.

STANLEY M. CLEVELAND
President-Bendix International

"As soon as any man says of the affairs of the state, what does it matter to me?, the state may be given up as lost."

— Jean Jacques Rousseau

"Courage and Commitment: The Missiles of October"

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

Is there a plan to brief and brain wash the key press within twelve hours or so?-New York Times-Lippmann-Childs-Alsop-key bureau chiefs?

—White House memo, October 22, 1962

There has undoubtedly been great pressure on Khrushchev for a considerable time to do something about our ring of bases, aggravated by our placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

—W. Averell Harriman, October 22, 1962

The Soviets . . . were humiliated by the missile crisis . . . [Khrushchev] never recovered from the setback.

Charles E. Bohlen, 1973

THIRTEEN YEARS AGO, during the week of October 22-28, 1962, the two great powers stood near the abyss of nuclear war. It was a fearsome week, opening with President John F. Kennedy's declaration on Monday evening, the 22nd, that there were Soviet "offensive" missiles in Cuba, that they must be withdrawn, and that he would establish a quarantine, and closing with the Soviet promise on Sunday morning to accede to the American demand. It was a time, as Premier Nikita Khrushchev later said, "when the smell of burning hung in the air." During the week, President Kennedy placed the likelihood of disaster at "somewhere between one out of three and even."

It was a week when the administration skillfully "managed" an often trusting, usually uncritical press and found the nation eager to rally around the President and the flag. The nation was in peril, citizens believed, and the quarantine was essential, possibly as the first act in a series of escalating tactics to remove the nuclear threat ninety miles away. Few Americans then challenged the need for Kennedy's action, lamented his decision to eschew private negotiations with Khrushchev before moving toward public confrontation, or questioned whether the missiles constituted (as administration spokesmen indicated) an imminent military threat to the United States. Only in tiny pockets in the nation did some citizens raise troubling questions about the creation, necessity, and handling of the crisis, and their voices were seldom heard, their reasoning almost never reported in the press.

Since that October, with the flurry of memoirs, many analysts have examined the events of that week, but many important issues remain in dispute: Were the missiles in Cuba an imminent military threat that overturned the military balance of power? If not, why according to Kennedy and his advisers, did the Soviet Union put the 42 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) in Cuba and presumably plan to add about 24 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)? If they were not an imminent threat and did not alter the military balance, why did JFK move toward a public confrontation without first trying private negotiations with Russia? What was the role of domestic and of international political considerations in shaping his tactics? Why didn't Kennedy accept the proposal of some advisers for a summit conference during the crisis? And why, on Saturday, the 27th, when the only issue blocking settlement was American withdrawal of our missiles from Tur-

Barton J. Bernstein, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University, is the author of "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconsidered: The Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945" (1975) and the editor of, among other volumes, "Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration" (1970). He is writing a series of studies on WWII and postwar foreign policy.

key, did the administration reject this condition and risk prolonging the crisis and moving toward nuclear war? Some recently opened (often declassified) materials at the Kennedy Library allow us to address these questions with more authority.

Testing America's Courage and Commitment

On October 17, five days before Kennedy's speech, Theodore Sorensen, his trusted assistant, informed the President that most advisers agreed, "these missiles, even when fully operational, do not significantly alter the balance of [military] power." The missiles, Sorensen explained, "do not significantly increase the potential megatonnage capable of being unleashed [against] American soil, even after a surprise attack." Most members of the ExComm (Executive Committee of the National Security Council) agreed that the addition of missiles in Cuba did not add to the likelihood of a Soviet first strike, reduce the impact of an American first strike, or add significantly to Soviet retaliatory capacity (after an American first strike). Robert McNamara, the Secretary of Defense, argued in the ExComm, "a missile is a missile. It makes no difference whether you are killed by a missile fired from the Soviet Union or from Cuba." After the crisis, Roswell Gilpatric, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, explained, "the military equation was not altered" by the introduction of missiles in Cuba. "It was simply an element of flexibility introduced into the power equation that the Soviets had not heretofore possessed." Despite these judgments, administration spokesmen told trusting reporters during the crisis that the missiles imperiled the United States, and that is what the press told Americans, who would have been reluctant to believe the contrary.

Why, according to the administration, did the Soviets put the missiles in Cuba? Most ExComm members concluded that the Soviet Union was testing America's courage and commitment, her will and credibility—perhaps in preparation for another demand on Berlin or pressure elsewhere. The missiles, they maintained, were not a military but an international political threat. Summarizing the ExComm discussions for Kennedy, Sorensen explained, neither America's allies nor her adversaries can trust "our courage and commitment . . . if we tolerate the known presence of offensive nuclear weapons [in Cuba.]." He quickly disposed of contrary arguments. "Retorts from either our European allies or the Soviets that we can become as accustomed as they to accepting the presence of MRBMs have," he wrote, "some logic but little weight. . ."

For most advisers, this "courage and commitment" thesis explained Soviet behavior and determined the need for the administration to remove the missiles. But why a public confrontation first? There was a safer route. Charles Bohlen, the career diplomat and Soviet expert, argued for private negotiations first. On the 17th and 18th, when the ExComm was still deliberating tactics to secure removal of the missiles, Bohlen proposed that Kennedy first communicate with Khrushchev privately and then decide, after the Premier's response, on whether a blockade, invasion, or air strike was necessary. "No one can guarantee," Bohlen informed Kennedy, "that [withdrawal] can be achieved by diplomatic action—but it . . . seems essential that this channel be tested out before military action is employed." Llewellyn Thompson, another Soviet expert and career diplomat, as well as a number of advocates of blockade, favored this course.

Recently declassified materials indicate that the career diplomats were the chief proponents in the ExComm of using diplomacy to resolve the crisis. At minimum, as Bohlen argued, a private approach would more clearly define Khrushchev's mood and commitment, and thereby allow the administration more accurately to gauge the Premier's future actions, in response to American tactics, if he refused to accede privately. Curiously, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, also a foreign affairs expert but not a career diplomat or a specialist in Soviet affairs, favored a sharply different course: military action to remove the missiles *without* any prior political action or warning. Summarizing the ExComm's deliberations for Kennedy, who had purposely absented himself from the meeting, Sorensen wrote, "If you accept the Bohlen plan, we can then consider the nature of the letter to K[hrushchev]."

Rejecting the Use of Diplomacy First

As Walter Lippmann was soon to lament in his columns, there was no letter, no effort at diplomacy before quarantine. Why not? Why did Kennedy reject this tactic by the 19th or 20th? It was not primarily because Bohlen left Washington, for his own memoir suggests that he knew by the 18th that he was clearly in the minority in the ExComm, and his own conversation with Kennedy probably confirmed his sense that his counsel would not succeed. Why did contrary counsel win out?

Over the years, some participants and analysts have stressed two complementary explanations: that Kennedy feared losing time and letting the missiles become operational during negotiations, for that would weaken his position; and that he feared losing the initiative by letting Khrushchev learn that the United States government was aware of the missiles, for the President believed that he had to take firm action as soon as he disclosed knowledge of the missiles. Both explanations, whether taken separately or together, seem unsatisfactory.

The "operational missile" theory is very questionable, for it assumes that the administration believed that the missiles were not operational on about the 20th and would not be operational for more than a week (about the 29th). A recently declassified CIA report, dated October 23, undercuts most of this assumption. The agency concluded that four of the six MRBM sites were "fully operational" and two others had an "emergency capability." Presumably the earlier CIA reports had forecast, with reasonable accuracy, this rate of progress on the sites, so we must conclude that Kennedy knew by the 19th or 20th that most of the MRBMs were, or would soon be, operational.

The "initiative" theory is also troubling and very suspect. First, contrary to assumptions, American intelligence reports estimated by the 16th that Khrushchev probably

believed that Kennedy already knew about the missiles in Cuba. Second, administration members presumably recognized that any loss of American initiative would be quite temporary, and that the United States, with military superiority in its own hemisphere and with overall nuclear superiority, could regain the initiative quickly. Private negotiations, in turn, had the advantage of giving Khrushchev the time to respond without his being frozen into a public position and facing a stark choice—of military confrontation or of retreat and humilitation for self and nation.

Because the "operational missile" and "initiative" theories are unsatisfactory, we must consider other likely reasons why Kennedy eschewed private negotiations and moved directly to public confrontation. The memoirs and archival sources on Kennedy's prior 21 months in office, especially after his unpleasant meeting with Khrushchev in Vienna and the debacle at the Bay of Pigs, emphasize that he felt beleaguered in foreign affairs: He had lost prestige, failed to win victories, met defeats, and feared that his courage and commitment were doubted at home and abroad. Even America's great nuclear superiority had not brought him a triumph, and he could not even stop the Berlin Wall, which he, like most Americans, viewed as an aggressive Soviet act. A public confrontation and a public triumph would allow him dramatically to recoup these losses and would persuade various "constituencies"—citizens at home, allies abroad, and the Soviets—of his decisiveness and commitment.

Still suffering from Khrushchev's bullying and bluster at Vienna, President Kennedy worried that the Premier would try to rub his nose in the dirt. (After Vienna, Kennedy said, "If Khrushchev wants to rub my nose in the dirt . . . it's all over.") How sweet, how necessary, given Kennedy's personality and analysis, to stand up to Khrushchev dramatically, to block the Premier, to humiliate him publicly, and to affirm American prestige and power. Who then could doubt America's and Kennedy's credibility and will?

In addition, there is another likely reason why Kennedy moved so speedily to public confrontation without first trying private negotiations. He feared that the news of the missiles would leak out at home, that citizens might panic, that bureaucrats and politicians, already pillorying him for what the GOP called the "tragic policy of irresolution" in dealing with Cuba, would block his program in Congress and possibly force a harder line in foreign policy. With the congressional elections scheduled for early November, with Cuba a major issue in many contests, and with major newspapers already piecing together the story of missiles in Cuba, he could not risk the delay of private negotiations. To head off the stories on the missiles and to gain two days, Kennedy and McNamara telephoned publishers of three newspapers and got them, in the name of national security, to kill this news. He had to act quickly, publicly, forcefully.

The political danger was recognized by at least some members of the ExComm. As C. Douglas Dillon, the Secretary of the Treasury and a Republican, noted during a meeting of the ExComm: "Have you considered the very real possibility that if we [do not remove the missiles promptly,] the next House of Representatives is likely to have a Republican majority? This would completely paralyze our ability to react sensibly and coherently to further Soviet advances." Kennedy and his advisers were not acting primarily to protect narrow partisan interests, though he could not be totally indifferent to such concerns, but out of a larger sense that an electoral setback in November would impair their capacity to advance the national interest. For them, this was the reasoning of patriots, not narrow partisans.

Rejecting a Summit Conference

Throughout the week of crisis, President Kennedy steadfastly demanded that the Soviets dismantle the sites and withdraw their missiles. That was not a negotiable demand. In mid-week, when United Nations Secretary-General U Thant suggested a brief relaxation of tension, with the United States suspending its quarantine and the Soviet Union its arms shipments to Cuba, Khrushchev endorsed the proposal but Kennedy rejected it. "The existing threat was created by the secret introduction of offensive missiles into Cuba," Kennedy informed U Thant, "and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." The President wanted to maintain the pressure. Other administration representatives explained that the proposed delay for negotiations was unacceptable because it would allow the missiles to become operational and therefore make removal more difficult. The trusting press, kept ignorant of the CIA reports that the MRBMs were operational, uncritically passed on this explanation to the American people.

On Wednesday, the 24th, Khrushchev suggested a summit conference to discuss the missiles and possibly other issues dividing the two nations. All of Kennedy's advisers agreed that removal of the missiles should remain unnegotiable, but some thought that a summit meeting then could be very useful. It might ease tensions, reduce the possibility of escalation and nuclear war, and maybe produce "a turn-around of some significance [in] Soviet policy." According to a secret memorandum (recently declassified), Khrushchev "might be at a crossroads in policy," the missiles in Cuba represented his effort "to explore the 'hard' fork," and the summit might tempt him "to explore the alternative [fork.]" The results, according to some advisers, including probably Llewellyn Thompson, might be agreements on nuclear free zones in Latin America and Africa, the reduction of tensions on Germany, and the easing of bitterness between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Kennedy rejected a summit then, presumably because he feared that it might suggest that his commitment was flagging, that he lacked the courage for nuclear diplomacy, that he might accede to the missiles in Cuba. How, he undoubtedly believed, could he risk a summit if there was no Soviet promise in advance to withdraw the missiles? In making this decision, he encountered little criticism at home but did miss an opportunity to reduce the likelihood of nuclear war during the crisis week—either through mistakes at the operational levels or through escalation of the

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"Much as we should not plan this country's arms control policy on the basis of intellectualized abstractions and fictions, we also must not develop arms control policy with a stunted moral conscience."

— Fred C. Iklé

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Effective?

DUNCAN L. CLARKE

In 1974 Congress subjected the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to its first comprehensive oversight review since the agency's establishment 13 years earlier. The House Foreign Affairs Committee was concerned about ACDA's "effectiveness" within the executive branch; legislation was introduced in 1974 and again in 1975 with the express purpose of upgrading ACDA's effectiveness in policy formulation.

How conclusive a finding can be made by Congress or anyone else about something as elusive as an entire agency's "effectiveness" (ability to influence policy)? Even an agency's director may be unaware of how or why a particular decision was reached and weighing the relative impact of bureaucratic, personal and other influences on policy outcomes is, at best, a hazardous undertaking. Secondly, by what/whose standard is effectiveness to be judged? An official painfully aware of harsh internal constraints on his agency concludes that, in light of these realities, his agency performed creditably. A congressman employing very different criteria reaches a contrary conclusion. In addition, effectiveness varies over time and changes with the issue. ACDA's role, for instance, has generally been significant in nuclear proliferation issues and insignificant in conventional arms sales; the 1969-1972 time period was uniquely productive for the agency.

Recognizing these limitations, it may yet be possible, with some inspirational assistance from Graham Allison and Morton Halperin, to isolate categories of factors which, together, might shed light on ACDA's *overall* effectiveness. There is no attempt here to be rigorously systematic and comprehensive. Several seemingly relevant considerations will be briefly discussed.

Legal Authority

ACDA's legal authority is the Arms Control and Disarmament Act which clearly indicates that ACDA is not an independent entity. While its director is "the principal adviser" for arms control and disarmament matters to the President and the Secretary of State, he is expressly placed "under the direction of the Secretary of State" (section 22). The degree of autonomy enjoyed by the agency is a function of the Secretary of State's inclination and style.

Additionally, some, like Paul Nitze, have argued that the Act (section 3(a)) further restricts ACDA by jurisdictionally confining it to those arms control and disarmament issues relating directly to international negotiations. But former ACDA Deputy Director Philip Farley seems correct in asserting that, "The charter of the Agency is broad . . . It permits the Director and Agency to do anything relevant to arms control which is acceptable to the President and Secretary of State . . ." ACDA is, for example, authorized (section 31(j)) to study ". . . the arms control implications of foreign and national security policies . . ." All ACDA directors interpreted their legal mandate broadly, but even a liberal reading of the law subordinates the agency to the Secretary of State.*

President Kennedy, John McCloy, Senator Humphrey and others moved, in 1961, to establish a separate agency in order to enhance the importance of arms control in American foreign and national security policy. Political reality, however, foreclosed the possibility of a wholly independent agency. Widespread distrust of "disarmers" contributed to placing ACDA "under the . . . Secretary of State."

Secretary Rusk testified in support of this language and during the Kennedy-Johnson administrations he chaired the body formally charged with responsibility for arms control policy—the Committee of Principals. ACDA was represented but the Committee was dominated by others, particularly Robert McNamara. Dean Rusk enjoyed cordial relations with William Foster, ACDA's first director, and either Foster or his deputy would attend the Secretary's morning staff meetings. Rusk gave general guidance to the agency but, in his own words, ACDA had "a pretty free" hand.

From 1969-1972, in the first Nixon administration, William Rogers gave ACDA a very free hand even in critical areas like SALT where the agency's role actually eclipsed State's. Gerard Smith, ACDA's second director, "had no problems at all" with State and found his relationship with Secretary Rogers "exceedingly close." ACDA had reached unac-

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**U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 77, 86, 134; U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs,* Review of Arms Control Legislation and Organization, *report for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 5.*

customed heights.

This changed drastically when Henry Kissinger became Secretary in 1973 as reflected in candid remarks by ACDA's third director, Fred Iklé. He lamented that, despite Executive Order #11044 (August 12, 1962) affirming the director's authority as the President's "principal adviser," ACDA's role had ". . . become diluted to a significant extent . . . The result has been for the President, the Secretary of State and other[s] . . . to look to their own staffs for their primary advice on arms control, while looking to ACDA for research and analysis and more general services."*

Secretary Kissinger's penchant for close personal control directly affected ACDA. Kissinger seemed to see ACDA as performing two principal functions—serving State and, particularly, his staff (which generally meant producing good papers); and, providing support in bureaucratic encounters with Defense. One ACDA official rightly remarked that the agency either served Kissinger or lost any opportunity for influence; talk of "independence" was out of the question.

While, of course, ACDA/State positions sometimes vary, there is something to the exaggerated comment of a top ACDA officer that, with Kissinger, "ACDA is the State Department." Even some conservative congressmen expressed concern that such tight control could prevent a diversity of policy inputs at higher levels.** However warranted this concern, and it appears to be a problem, it is clear that this Secretary like his predecessors fundamentally affects ACDA's "effectiveness."

Confidence

Without the confidence of the President no agency head can be very effective; this has always been a problem for ACDA since no President has, in fact, considered its director his principal arms control adviser. Presidents Kennedy and Johnson relied heavily upon McNamara while Nixon and Ford had Kissinger. William Foster had great difficulty even seeing President Johnson and neither Gerard Smith nor Fred Iklé *ever* met on a one-to-one basis for an extended discussion with President Nixon.

Image

This lack of confidence is partly attributable to ACDA's image. Particularly in the early 1960s many had difficulty linking ACDA with "national security," traditionally conceived, and it took time for the distinction between arms control and general disarmament to take hold. One ACDA officer still recalls how, after briefing a midwestern senator on the Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963), he was told—"Because of your low level in the agency you probably don't realize you are committing treason."

Every director repeatedly and publicly stressed that he was in the national security business and one deputy director told the author he would never label himself an "arms controller." The arms controller image, in short, is considered a major hindrance to effectiveness. Paradoxically, the agency must flee (or appear to flee) its *raison d'être* in order to affect policy, and, because of this, ACDA is reluctant to make overtures to potential constituencies in the larger arms control community. Indeed, following ACDA's 1973 "purge" when a brigadier general assumed the second ranking position in one bureau and recently retired military officers were appointed to head two of ACDA's four bureaus, there was concern that the agency had gone too far in shedding its essence.

ACDA's sensitivity about image is not misplaced however. In just three months ACDA lost the primary SALT responsibility initially assigned to the agency by National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 28 in March 1969; the Pentagon simply refused to concede primacy to "arms controllers." Later, Gerard Smith's effectiveness as head of the SALT I delegation was compromised because he simultaneously directed the "arms controller's agency." Throughout Secretary of Defense Laird's tenure there were charges that ACDA was "disloyal to the team" so that, for instance, ACDA's publication "World Military Expenditures" was suspended after 1971 because Laird feared that its comparative factual analysis of US/USSR military spending would jeopardize the defense budget in Congress. It resumed publication only with the Ford administration.

Hearing

No bureaucratic actor, especially if he functions largely in a staff capacity, will be effective unless listened to. A hearing is mandatory. ACDA's director has always had difficulty getting to the President. But over the years ACDA has gained a hearing at lower levels on many (not all) arms control related issues. Again, the question of what subject matter arms control legitimately encompasses becomes vital (US weapons procurement?).

At first William Foster struggled to be accepted as a participant in arms control decisions. Later, from 1963-1968, although ACDA was a member of the Committee of Principals, important decisions were usually made elsewhere—in Defense and State. While ACDA has participated in some capacity in all formal arms control negotiations, during the Kennedy-Johnson years it assumed a leading policy role only with the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indeed, nuclear proliferation was the only major national security issue of the 1960s the agency profoundly affected. It often learned of arms control related decisions, like American use of chemical defoliants in Vietnam, only after the fact. ACDA had a negligible role in two of the most momentous "arms control" relevant events of the 1960s—development of ABM and MIRV. The agency did have its say about deploying these two systems, but that came only with a new administration in 1969.

While even today there is no systematic procedure for relating arms control considerations to foreign and national security policy, the 1969-1972 period witnessed some movement in this direction. Telling criticism has been leveled at the Nixon-Ford/Kissinger NSC system, but it did encourage a wider spectrum of participants (below the

**testimony, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Murphy Commission), February 21, 1974.*

***U.S. House, Committee on Armed Services,* Review of Arms Control and Disarmament Activities, *report of the Special Subcommittee on Arms Control and Disarmament, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 10-11.*

highest level) than its two predecessors, at least in selected areas. For ACDA, the new system afforded a hearing on a panoply of issues. Membership on the Verification Panel and its Working Group guaranteed a hearing on SALT and MBFR. ACDA often attended, *inter alia,* meetings of regular and ad hoc working groups and, occasionally, the Senior Review Group and it was present at NSC meetings dealing with arms control.

Ongoing SALT, MBFR and chemical warfare negotiations compelled parallel consideration of defense decisions including MIRV deployment, ABM programs and binary weapons production. NSC officers frequently asked ACDA to study key national security issues in a far broader context than had before been the case. ACDA participated in a variety of NSC studies ranging from a reexamination of strategic doctrine to US force levels in Asia. This partly reflected, as Philip Farley says, "acknowledgment of ACDA as an institution with a legitimate point of view . . ." ACDA played a major SALT role and also contributed to the reassessment of US deterrent posture; it directed an important study, for example, examining the impact of Soviet MIRV deployment on Minuteman vulnerability.

Although there are several signs that ACDA's influence declined after 1972, it was still afforded a hearing in the NSC system and, more significantly, it interacted often with Kissinger's State Department staff. But, as in the 1960s, ACDA has been denied an active and timely voice in many decisions fundamentally affecting arms control; it had no role in the decisions to deploy either Trident or the B-1 and it has virtually no impact on conventional arms sales.

Access to Information

Partly because of these post-1969 developments, ACDA's ability to gain timely access to information within the bureaucracy improved. Throughout much of the 1960s, however, the agency often struggled with the Pentagon to obtain vital information. Arms control was suspect. Hence ACDA would usually learn of major US weapons developments "by the grapevine" and a few of the military officers assigned to the agency during that period acted as though their primary duty was to curb alleged ACDA excesses.*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff remain uneasy about arms control but timely access to information is generally not as critical a problem today. The combination of continuing SALT and MBFR negotiations plus ACDA's presence at NSC and State Department forums has improved the information flow. ACDA's relations with the intelligence community were good (though they have been gravely jeopardized by the current turmoil within the community) and the older problem with military officers on assignment to the agency has virtually disappeared. Indeed, ACDA's military officers have significantly facilitated acquisition of data from the Defense Department.

An area where important difficulties remain is the defense budget. By 1973 ACDA had hired some defense budgetary analysts and Iklé was receiving advance copies of the annual Defense Posture Statement. But here the problem is less informational than it is, first, the Pentagon's determination to retain sovereignty over "its" budget and, second, a reluctance within the agency to move into an area where bureaucratic realities virtually guarantee that ACDA will be humiliated if it is too assertive.

Quality of Analysis

"ACDA's influence on policy," stated Fred Iklé, "will depend on the ideas it develops . . ."** While this statement is misleading (the correlation between good ideas and influence/effectiveness is very imperfect), it does point to another consideration—quality of analysis.

By the mid-1960s ACDA had a formidable array of scientific, political and military expertise. Quality analysis depends upon quality personnel and, generally, ACDA has recruited an unusually high percentage of able professionals from government and academia. With the addition of its Operations Analysis division, ACDA gained the largest systems analytical operation in the national security field outside the Pentagon. Operations Analysis participated in Kissinger's first SALT-related NSSM and has since continued to play a key analytical role in SALT and other arms control matters.

Neither State nor the NSC staff can match ACDA's depth and range of technical competence. Since 1969 Kissinger has utilized ACDA both to complement and check Defense Department studies. Predictably, this has provoked considerable friction between ACDA and Defense but the resulting analysis reaching high-level policy makers has been more balanced than it otherwise might have been. ACDA's analytical role acquired added significance after Nixon's abolition of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

Size

To contrast the Defense Department's budget of $100 billion with ACDA's $10 million budget (and 200 professional employees) underscores the telling remark of a veteran ACDA analyst—"We are only a pisswink outfit." While casual generalizations about the relationship between size and effectiveness are hazardous (witness Kissinger's "small" staff), ACDA's diminutive size, in part, reflects fundamental assumptions of American national security policy and even the post-Vietnam era will not witness a Peace Department eclipsing the Pentagon. Some agency growth could be beneficial—in systems analysis, public affairs and defense budgetary analysis—but ACDA will (and probably should) remain rather small. It will have limited, though not intellectually inconsiderable, resources.

Cohesion/Essence

Able personnel, however, can not be fully utilized unless the agency is internally cohesive and faithful to its essence. Until 1973 this was not a major concern. ACDA's size facilitated interpersonal contact, commitment to arms control and inhibited sharp intra-

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**Lt. Gen. John Davis, interviewed by Nicholas Ruggieri, "Arms Control and the Military Man,"* Foreign Service Journal, *February 1971, 19;* Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *testimony of Adrian Fisher, 43.*

***testimony, Murphy Commission, February 21, 1974.*

"The Constitution . . . is for the executive and legislative branches of this American government 'an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy'."

— THE ANGELS' GAME, by William B. Macomber

Coping with Congress's Foreign Policy

ROBERT A. PASTOR

THE MOST SERIOUS foreign policy crisis facing Secretary Kissinger and the State Department is not in the Middle East; nor is it in Korea. It is in Washington with the Congress.

Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have acknowledged the gravity of the crisis and have proffered solutions. In his foreign policy message to the Congress on April 10th, the President urged the Congress to "help to keep America's word good throughout the world. We are one nation, one government, and we must have one foreign policy." Secretary Kissinger in Los Angeles on January 24th had made the same point, calling on the Congress to embark on "a new national partnership."

Neither policy nor organizational reform has followed from these speeches, however, and Senator Mansfield, for one, remains skeptical: "We have heard such language for twenty or more years. Invariably, what is proposed is a one-way street. In practice, it is Congress that is expected to 'see the light' and accept the Executive position."

Entangled in the crisis of the relationship are problems of prerogative and procedure, but as Senator Mansfield implied, the struggle over prerogative, more often than not, masks a more fundamental difference over policy or priorities. The Executive sought continued support for a "Vietnamization" program, which the Congress considered bankrupt and, by prolonging the agony, inhuman. The Executive prefers not to press Turkey on the Cyprus issue for fear that it will jeopardize our broader security interests in the eastern Mediterranean, while the Congress feels that some pressure on Turkey after its seizure of 40 percent of Cyprus is necessary, justifiable, and unlikely to jeopardize our interests. Congress would prefer that the State Department devote less attention to arms sales (except to Israel) and more attention to human rights issues.

These are legitimate differences. The Founding Fathers had hoped that the interaction between the two branches would produce a creative tension. Since the mid-1960s, however, the tension has been anything but creative, and often the resulting foreign policy is judged a failure by even the most minimal criteria: rather than moving the nation closer to agreed objectives, the policy moves us further away. A few recent instances:

- The provision of the Trade Act, 1974 which excludes all OPEC members from the generalized system of tariff preferences (GSP) provoked a rare, unanimous condemnation from the Latin American and Caribbean governments, a cancellation of the American Foreign Ministers Conference, and a premature muting, if not silencing, of the "new dialogue." The provision, of course, had no impact whatsoever on the price of oil.
- The Eagleton amendment repeats and demands adherence to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act, which bars military aid to a country—in this case, Turkey—which uses it for offensive purposes. Though intended to coax Turkey to the bargaining table, the amendment was viewed as provocative by the Turks, whose position hardened as they moved away from the table and threatened to close US bases.
- The Jackson-Vanik amendment chilled détente and led to a decrease rather than an increase of emigrants leaving the USSR.
- Thirty-seven Senators, enough to block ratification of a Treaty, and 246 Congressmen have gone on record in opposition to a proposed Treaty on the Panama Canal Zone. According to Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, the Chief Negotiator for the Treaty, failure to ratify it might mean the closing of the Canal and the involvement of the United States in another costly and unwinnable guerrilla war.

To Secretary Kissinger and generations of Americans nursed on the belief in the Executive's foreign policy prerogative, these examples illustrate why the Congress cannot and should not make foreign policy. A closer examination of these cases and others, however, will show that the blame should go to State as well as to Congress. Both have failed to adapt to a relationship changed fundamentally by a new reality in American foreign policy-making: a Congress intent on not only influencing foreign policy, but on making it.

In the course of trying to adjust to its newly assertive role, Congress has made some serious mistakes and has yet to adopt a perspective or a sense of responsibility commensurate with its new powers. It is the State Department as the senior foreign policy institution, however, which is in a sense the more culpable, for not only has it failed to ease Congress into a more responsible role, but it has failed to devise any positive means of coping with this new reality. In deeds, if not in words, State doesn't even appear to be willing to accept the new reality.

Instead of fashioning new modes for a new relationship, the State Department laments its lost consensus and holds its breath, hoping

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that the Congress will just go away. But even if by some miraculous wave of Kissinger's wand the decade of distrust between the two branches should end, Congress's interest and involvement in foreign policy will not diminish for the following reasons:

- With the increasing importance of economic issues in international relations, the line separating foreign from domestic policy fades, and the Congress will inevitably find itself involved in important areas of foreign policy—from trade to investment to commodities—even as it handles domestic policy. Furthermore, these are issues in which the Congress has comparatively more power than the Executive Branch.

- In the absence of a compelling security threat like the Cold War, the need for unanimity between Branches has diminished, and legislators are less likely to refrain from articulating their differences with the Executive.

- The success of the Jewish and Greek lobbies is likely to have a "demonstration effect" and lead to the proliferation of ethnic foreign policy lobbies whose constituent bases and special interests will lead them around the impenetrable State Department and to the Congress.

- With improved communications and especially the power of television to project foreign events into the living room, an elitist foreign policy constituency will be giving way to a broader constituency which will make its influence felt through the Congress. The decline in the belief in Executive infallibility caused by Vietnam, Watergate, and other disasters has contributed and will no doubt continue to contribute to this trend.

- An increasing number of legislators are taking an active, ongoing, and independent interest in foreign policy, and many are recruiting full-time foreign policy staffers—a good number of whom are disillusioned refugees from the Foreign Service.

The emergence of Congress as a significant force in foreign policy therefore will not be a temporary phenomenon. The Report of the Murphy Commission on Foreign Policy Organization addressed the question of how to improve the relationship between the branches by focusing almost exclusively on the reorganization of Congress. For that reason and because State needs a *new* role to parallel Congress's, this article will concentrate on State. First, one must begin with an analysis of what is wrong with the present relationship.

Delete or dilute

The principal vehicle for Congressional foreign policy is the Foreign Aid Bill. While the executive views it as "a Christmas tree of restrictions," it represents the nearest thing Congress has to a "State of the World Message."

The process begins when a legislator introduces a resolution which seeks to alter or replace a particular Executive foreign policy. Typically, the State Department will react by first ignoring the amendment, then complaining that it will tie the Executive's hands, then trying to defeat it, and failing that, to dilute it by making it a non-binding "sense of the Congress resolution."

An example of this amendment - making - and - braking - process is the amendment introduced in 1973 by Senator Kenncdy to cut foreign assistance to Chile unless the government demonstrated some concern for human rights. State failed to delete the amendment but succeeding in diluting it. The next year, however, instead of demonstrating its concern to Congress on this issue, the State Department doubled its request for military aid to Chile. The Congress responded in the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act (FAA '74) by making the Kennedy amendment binding. The same pattern held for the Eagleton amendment: (1) a sense of the Congress resolution attached to a continuing funding resolution for the Export-Import Bank; (2) a failure to respond by State; (3) a tightening of the resolution in the FAA '74. One Senate Staffer said: "Several of the Senators voted for the amendment just because they were angry with the State Department."

It is true that Congress sometimes "ties the Executive's hands" but generally this occurs when thc latter has failed to demonstrate sufficient concern to be trusted with discretion. In the debate on legislation authorizing the use of troops to ensure a safe evacuation of Americans from Indochina, Representative Donald Fraser summarized the dilemma:

"The distrust of the executive branch runs so deep in this chamber that members are afraid that any discretion, any grant of authority, to the executive branch will open the door to allow the executive branch to again try to make one more effort to do what ten years failed to do."

Were the United States a Moslem country, the Congress would not tie the Executive's hands, but cut them off.

Mandatory amendments do deprive the Executive of necessary negotiating flexibility and often serve the opposite of their intended purposes: but the amendments are directed as much to the State Department as to the host government, and their message is simple: "We've got you by your purse-strings so you had better take us seriously."

It is incorrect to say that State is totally unresponsive to Congressional concerns, although in a few cases of extreme policy differences, this is no doubt true. In the majority of cases, the problem is that State is *always slow* to respond, and in those cases when State does transmit pressure from Congress to foreign governments, State often fails to communicate this back to Congress. Former State Department spokesman Robert McCloskey admitted that State sometimes finds legislators' demands easier done than said:

"There can always bc legitimate criticism that we didn't say enough publicly about what we were doing privately, but that's a choice we make in the belief that it was not necessary for the United States to be making public pronouncements if it was doing what it felt was right privately" (Washington Post, August 15, 1974, p. A22). McCloskey may be right in refraining from "public pronouncements," but US foreign policy is hurt by the failure to devise trustworthy consultation mechanisms with the Congress, since Congressional frustration is reinforced and compounded by State's *apparent* unconcern.

The first step the State Department could take to demonstrate its acceptance of the Congress as a full and equal participant in the foreign policy process would be to establish a "Resolution-Responsive Procedure." Instead of a reflex negative, the introduction of a foreign policy resolution by a legislator would activate a series of intensive discussions and consultations between the legislator and officials in State. A follow-up Report which responds directly and candidly to the thrust of the Resolution

should be prepared and sent to the legislator within one month after the introduction of the resolution. The Report should detail what the Department has done, intends to do, or feels it cannot do as the case may be. This procedural suggestion is not a panacea, but at least by making the legislator aware of diplomatic constraints and by making the diplomat aware of domestic political realities, it will help to narrow the gulf separating State and Congress.

Department attitudes also need changing. A widely and tightly-held belief in the Department is that State ought to have the exclusive responsibility to formulate and execute foreign policy because it is the only institution with the requisite information, experience, and expertise. Few in the Department ever articulate this "exclusive" right; indeed the rhetoric runs in the opposite direction. But the belief underlies and occasionally creeps into conversations with outsiders. For example, in answer to a suggestion that Carl Marcy, former Chief of Staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and a member of the Staff for nearly twenty years, would be a good appointment as an Ambassador, one State Department official insisted: "But he doesn't have the experience." The condescension towards Congressional expertise in foreign policy is slowly beginning to erode, but the feeling still persists that unless one has spent time in the Department poring over cables, one has somehow not been involved in foreign policy-making.

The professionalism of the Foreign Service officer reinforces the aloofness and insularity of the Department. It is a firm rule that discussions and debates can be as wide-ranging and heated as possible, but they stop at the Department's edge. The publication of articles by FSOs is discouraged even on the most general subjects of foreign policy. With the exception of testimony at Hearings, the expertise of the Department is not harnessed to respond to inaccuracies in the press or on the Hill or to contribute in anything but a cursory or haphazard way to linking the Department to Congressional or public debate.

This "lone ranger" attitude is equally true of State's relationship with other domestic agencies and equally counter-productive. In late 1974 and early 1975, while developing a policy on commodities, State deliberately tried to exclude any input from the Treasury Department, just as State avoids contact with the Agriculture Department as the former negotiates a new International Wheat Agreement. Such tactics may guarantee an Executive policy more attuned to United States foreign policy interests as interpreted by State, but given the superior contacts of the domestic agencies to legislators and Congressional Committees, such tactics are unlikely to produce the results at home which are promised abroad.

"Private consultations with Senators are distinguishable from 'stirring up a debate.' But regardless, Thurmond had initiated a debate and by refusing to join it in any way, State had seen its options narrowed in and of itself."

These attitudes and assumptions, which were well-suited to an era when State's foreign policy prerogative was unquestioned, today only irritate the Congress and undermine the credibility of US foreign policy. The most important example of how the State Department's failure to cope with a new Congress can lead to an ineffective foreign policy is the case of the domestic and international negotiations for a new Treaty on the Panama Canal Zone.

When the 94th Congress convened in January, 1975, it was expected that Senators Strom Thurmond and John McClellan would re-introduce a resolution calling for the "retention of undiluted US sovereignty over the Canal Zone." This resolution had been first introduced with 35 sponsors in March 1974; its intention was to repudiate the Statement of (eight) Principles towards a new Canal Treaty, which was signed by Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack one month before.

With a new and more liberal Senate, Thurmond feared attrition, but nonetheless began circulating a "Dear Colleagues" letter on February 14, 1975. Several pro-Treaty Senators felt that if the State Department would initiate a series of high-level briefings with their colleagues on the general importance of a new Treaty, the number of cosponsors might be kept down to about twenty, well below the 34 which could block ratification of the Treaty. Though a "Congressional Strategy" was drawn up by the Congressional Relations Office in State, it was never implemented, and on March 4, 1975, S. Res. 97—the Thurmond anti-Canal Treaty resolution—was introduced with 37 Senate signatories.

Why didn't the State Department do anything? One explanation might be that disunity in the Administration prohibited the State Department from taking its case to the Congress. In early February, however, the Executive position was more unified than in late June when the State Department finally began to brief Senators. A second explanation, and one which Ambassador Bunker himself volunteered, follows from the traditional diplomatic rule that State does not go to Capitol Hill until it has a Treaty in hand; otherwise, by "stirring up debate," one's options in negotiations with the Panamanians would be narrowed. Bunker and others in the Department also insisted that there was really nothing to discuss until they had completed a Treaty.

This has been the traditional process by which treaties have been drafted, initialed, and ratified, but it is clearly inadequate today. Certainly, a briefing which stressed the need for a Treaty and included explanations for each of the Kissinger-Tack principles would have permitted a wide-ranging general discussion without ever jeopardizing any specific points in the negotiations. Furthermore, private consultations with Senators are distinguishable from "stirring up a debate." But regardless, Thurmond *had* initiated a debate and by refusing to join it in any way, State had seen its options narrowed in and of itself. Bunker failed to see, as the Department fails to see, that the time has long passed when the domestic and in-

ternational negotiating tracks can be pursued separately, the first after the second. The two tracks are inextricably intertwined and concentrating on one to the exclusion of the other will doom the entire effort.

Two days after Thurmond introduced his anti-Treaty resolution, Ambassador Bunker returned to Panama to continue the negotiations. One Senate aide who had been trying unsuccessfully to get Bunker to the Hill fumed in frustration: "How can he return to Panama? Doesn't he know that the Treaty is lost?"

The Treaty is not irrevocably lost, but the State Department decision not to consult with the Senators in early January or February was a critical one. Although some of the Senators who cosponsored the Resolution might be persuaded to sign the Treaty, it would be very difficult for them to renounce the resolution in the same year that they signed it. 1976 as an election year is also out, and the question for 1977 is whether the Panamanians will wait that long. Furthermore, the initiative was clearly lost to the anti-Treaty groups, and that, plus the fall of Vietnam, stiffened the back of the Defense Department and transformed the initial reluctance toward a Treaty into recalcitrance. President Ford also took his cue from the Thurmond Resolution and, for obvious political reasons, is hesitant about alienating the conservative wing of his party by making a strong case for a Treaty.

On June 26th, while State Department officials were just beginning to talk to some Senators, the House, which shares jurisdiction with the Senate on the disposition of US property abroad (and thus would vote on implementing legislation), voted 246-164 to cut off funds for Panama Canal negotiations. This finally galvanized the Department to fight the amendment in the Senate. Unfortunately, though rather predictably, the case they brought to the Senate was not on behalf of a Canal Treaty but on behalf of the Executive's (and the Senate's) foreign policy prerogative. According to State Department officials, the Snyder amendment which passed in the House (and was introduced in the Senate by Senator Harry Byrd) was unconstitutional, since the power to negotiate treaties is the Executive's and the power to ratify them is the Senate's. This argument may win the short-term alliance of anti-Treaty conservatives like Hruska and McClellan, but it may also lose the long-term support of potential pro-Treaty liberals, who believe that the question of negotiations is one which the Congress has a legitimate right to ask.

The battle over funds may be won, but the war over the Treaty will be a long one. A little preparation and work in February might have saved a good deal of Secretary Kissinger's time for the next couple of years. The Canal case thus shows how State's obsolete attitudes and institutional lethargy have contributed to what may become one of the most significant foreign policy failures of the decade.

State's insularity fosters another attitude which leads to inter-branch friction and suboptimal foreign policies. In the course of a series of interviews with State Department officials on foreign economic policy, I asked them how they would like to see the existing laws—the Trade Act, the Export-Import Bank Act, the Export Administration Act, etc.—improved. The answers echoed the candid remark of one official: "We never think about how to improve the laws, only how to implement them or get around them."

On the Eagleton Amendment, the Department devoted virtually its entire effort to fighting or trying to circumvent it, rather than approaching the problem directly and legally by trying to amend the original statute which mandated the cut-off of military sales. Also, when first approached by a group of Legislative aides on developing a comprehensive bill on US-Latin American relations (introduced as S.Con.Res. 41 on May 15, 1975 by Senators Chiles, Bentsen, and Inouye and Rep. Fascell), State Department officials instinctively tried to discourage the idea, fearing the bill would get out of control and grow into a "Christmas tree." No one in the Department saw the bill as a potential vehicle either for educating the Congress or getting both branches to address the issues directly and in a comprehensive manner.

State's reluctance to approach Congress with ideas also serves to limit the range of foreign policy options—particularly on economic issues—considered by the Department. The counter-argument that "Congress won't buy it" usually sounds the death knell for the option since it is assumed that no one will sell it.

Members of the Department seldom take an issue or a problem directly to their Congressional counterparts without going through the Secretary, and since the Secretary can't be bothered with anything but the most serious business, the necessary give-and-take between branches at the staff level is never given or taken. It is Kissinger who has suffered from his own failure to institutionalize a policy, mechanism, or procedure which will keep routine nuisances from becoming routine crises, for he is forced to expend an inordinate amount of time and credibility in defense of causes which are nearly lost—like the Jackson-Vanik amendment, arms sales to Turkey, and soon, the Canal Treaty. Taking his foreign policy message directly to the people, while commendable on its own merits, is in fact a sign that he has failed to cope with Congress.

To resurrect the words of V. I. Ulyanov: "What is to be done?" At its most elementary level, the Department is faced with a choice between two strategies. It can choose to remain as it is: Casting a shell around internal debates, State can remain *impervious and passive*—with the exception of Henry Kissinger, who will be available to exercise his persuasive powers when problems become crises. It is true that the Secretary has allocated a fair share of his time to the Congress, but it is equally true that much of this time is spent inefficiently, resolving crises which needn't have been.

Some in the Department are inclined towards a second, *open-and-active* strategy, not only because it is more compatible with the principles of a democracy but because it is the only way to ensure any policy consistency and to avoid fitful swings between policy statements and legislative outcomes. This strategy means, for example, that instead of ignoring the Con-

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FSJ BOOKSHELF

The Rhodesian Problem

RHODESIA ACCUSES AND RHODESIA CONDEMNS, *by A. J. A. Peck. Three Sisters Books, Salisbury, $3.15.*

GOODBYE ENGLAND, *by James Barlow. Howard Hamilton, London, $3.95.*

THE FAULT, THE BLACK MAN, *by Barnett Porter. Howard Trimons, Cape Town, R3.62.*

THE SILENT WAR, *by Russell Galexie. The Free Press, Salisbury, $4.15.*

THE REAL CASE FOR RHODESIA, *by Charlton Chesterton. Janessonius & Heyns, Honneydew, Transvaal, $2.95.*

"Whereas in the course of human affairs . . . a respect for the opinions of mankind requires nations to declare to other nations the causes which impel them to assume full responsibility for their own affairs . . ."

With these purloined phrases, Rhodesia assumed its independence unilaterally on November 11, 1965. In so doing, Prime Minister Ian Douglas Smith stated, "We have struck a blow for the preservation of justice, civilization and Christianity." On the tenth anniversary of this affair which has had repercussions far beyond the continent of Africa and which then British Prime Minister Wilson assured the British Parliament would be over in a few short weeks—a series of books about Rhodesia by white Rhodesians have begun to roll off the presses. None of these books gives any real insight as to life in Rhodesia during the past decade. All seem to feel morally obligated to justify the reasons for Rhodesia's U.D.I. (Unilateral Declaration of Independence). Most Rhodesian whites readily concede that in taking such an illegal act, Rhodesia adopted a policy of making itself the international pariah.

For the past decade, Rhodesia has had a tumultuous existence. Given the independence of Mozambique, its existence may become even more tumultuous, and Rhodesia will probably find itself increasingly dependent on South Africa, the other white bastion in Southern Africa. However, the Rhodesian problem, though expressed by all of these authors in constitutional terms, has and will continue to be a problem of power, not law. The human forces are too primordial to be sustained by any legal turn of phrase. All of these authors emphasize the profound fear and distrust of blacks, the entrenched position of the whites, a continued dominance defined solely and exclusively by race, sharply differing cultures and Christianity.

What is most distressing about these works is their complete lack of knowledge and insight into African affairs, particularly the politics of nations ruled and governed by blacks. The books by Chesterton and Peck categorically state that *any* African nation ruled by non-whites is communistic, anti-West, and anti-Christian. Both books have been written with the view of convincing the world of the justice of the Rhodesian cause. Any person disagreeing with these views is labeled by both authors as a "misguided liberal" at best and "Communistic and totalitarian" at worst.

The books by Barlow, Porter and Galexie all strike a common theme of being anti-British. These authors point out that Rhodesia was given the right of self-government in the '20s, yet the British at no time conceived of discussing full independence. The authors assert that the British were undoubtedly in conspiracy with those African states who are "communist and have vast armies . . . organized and led by the Chinese, equipped by the British and Russians with every modern weapon, and preparing to cross the Zambian border . . . Thanks to Britain, these hordes have strength enough to compare favorably with American military might which was ruthlessly displayed in Vietnam. The hordes probably can't be stopped." Given this state of affairs, none of these writers can conceive of any way that the white minority can forswear its privileges except under duress. Britain is particularly criticized for its post U.D.I. policies, while at the same time being criticized for wanting to end totally its stewardship responsibilities of kindred souls in Southern Africa. There is no attempt to explain these apparent contradictions.

Specialists on Southern African affairs will gain little from reading any of these books. It is obvious that the world is not at the end of the Rhodesian drama but only at the beginning. No time table for this drama can be given, for a great deal will depend on events outside Rhodesia.

When the drama is developed in the fullness of time, it will undoubtedly affect regions far removed from the Southern African scene including the United States and Great Britain. It is for this reason that objective knowledge about Rhodesia is so essential. The books reviewed here obviously fail to meet the challenge of providing this knowledge.

—ROY A. HARRELL, JR.

Grand Marshall Sucre

SUCRE, SOLDADO Y REVOLUCIONARIO, *by John P. Hoover. Published by Editorial de la Universidad de Oriente, Cumana, Venezuela. Translated into Spanish by Francisco Rivera.*

JOHN P. HOOVER, a former FSO and presently professor of Latin American History at Catholic University, evidently used his diplomatic assignment to Caracas to draw on primary sources with which to flesh out the life and deeds of Jose Antonio de Sucre, the outstanding field marshal of Bolivar's liberation armies and the first president of Bolivia.

Dr. Hoover takes Sucre's life in chronological sequence, beginning with his birth in Cumana in 1795 and ending with his mysterious assassination in 1830 in the mountains of Ecuador while on his way home from his efforts to keep Gran Colombia united. Like other biographers, Professor Hoover has concentrated on Sucre's military exploits and no wonder, as Sucre was the best military tactician in America in his day and a superb soldier. He became a lieutenant colonel in Bolivar's army at the age of 18 and his life, as revealed in the biography, was one of action rather than contemplation. Sucre thought of himself neither as a statesman nor an intellectual, yet Hoover offers bountiful proof of political, diplomatic and administrative qualities.

The chapter on Sucre's brief tenure as President of Bolivia (1826-28) is one of the best as it covers the political and secular as well as the military issues of the times. Sucre's efforts to bring administrative order to that tragic nation and his reforms of the economic, educational and religious institutions are particularly

illuminating and add some dimension to Sucre's personality.

Mr. Hoover is to be commended for not having taken literary license with his documentation. He ascribes no psychological interpretations, imagines no theatrical dialogue, embellishes never on the facts. Well written and factually complete this excellent biography needs to be reprinted in English.

—ROBERT D. BARTON

(The reviewer, a former CAO and author of "A Short History of Bolivia," presently works for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee)

Cold Warrior

KISSINGER'S GRAND DESIGN, *by G. Warren Nutter. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, $3.00.*

G. WARREN NUTTER, a former Assistant Secretary of Defense during Nixon's first term and now a teacher at the University of Virginia, still lives in the era of the Cold War and is against any easing of tension with the Soviet Union except on his own all-encompassing terms. This is the message of his superficial critique of "Kissinger's Grand Design," a brief study with a less-than-ringing endorsement in a foreword by Melvin Laird. Nutter has hit upon the device of comparing the Kissinger views of the '50s with the Kissinger views of the '70s, and discovering that there have been substantial changes. It seems to have escaped Mr. Nutter's attention that fundamental changes in the world also took place in the intervening twenty years. Haven't everybody's views changed? Not Nutter's. His policy proposals seem like a mirror image of those policies of the Kremlin which he condemns.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

Reporting History

POSTSCRIPT WITH A CHINESE ACCENT, *by C.L. Sulzberger. Macmillan $10.*

POSTSCRIPT with a Chinese Accent" is the fourth and final volume of C.L. Sulzberger's "Memoirs and Diaries." It covers two trips around the world, beginning in January 1972 and ending in October 1973, and concludes with the author's two hour interview with Chou En-lai. This last chapter is by far the most interesting and the most profitable.

The underlying theme of the book and the reason for the title are the author's frustrations and difficulties in getting a visa to China. There is very little in the book on China, however, and China does not really become a part of the book until page 282. Mr. Sulzberger had been granted a visa to visit the People's Republic of China in 1956. He was en route there when his uncle, Arthur Hays Sulzberger, the publisher of the New York TIMES, asked him to cancel the visit. Mr. Arthur Hays Sulzberger had promised John Foster Dulles, then Secretary of State, that no TIMESman would make a trip to China without the Secretary's specific permission. This, of course, would never have been given by John Foster Dulles in 1956.

Mr. Sulzberger states, "As the year 1972 began, I found that China—both as the capstone of my career and as an object of an increasing worldwide interest—had become inescapable." The reader is then taken on the trail with Mr. Sulzberger, hopscotching from country to country while he interviews dignitaries and government leaders, with an echoing refrain of his trials and tribulations in obtaining a visa to enter the PRC.

There is no denying the interviews are interesting, timely and informative, although the reader waits patiently (and in vain) for more depth in historical background of various problems discussed. It would seem extremely difficult, if not impossible, for any one man to stay completely on top of and thoroughly knowledgeable of so many international problems, Mr. Sulzberger's experience and expertise notwithstanding. As a result several of the interviews come off as shallow and the reason for the interview appears to be "Because he's there."

As an example, on July 4, '72 in Belfast, he interviewed William Whitelaw, "Britain's minister of state for Northern Ireland and benevolent dictator here." Mr. Whitelaw is quoted as saying, "Eighty five percent of this population is happy to live together: fifteen is not. And the fifteen percent includes extremists on both sides. The situation is totally illogical. Pressure has built up over the years. This is not a logical community. The set-up in 1921-22 (partition) was illogical from the start." The Battle of the Boyne, one of the early benchmarks of "the Irish problem," was on July 12, 1690 and Northern Ireland's lack of logic is uncontested in many corners, but it would have been interesting to know why the State Minister of Northern Ireland came to his conclusion and some explanation for this lack of logic. On June 21, '73 in Dublin, Mr. Sulzberger interviewed Erskine Childers, the late President of the Republic of Ireland and son of Erskine Childers, a leading Irish statesman who was shot during the Irish Civil War (1922-23). The topic discussed (as reported) was the effect of the election of a Protestant (which Childers was) as President of the Republic and its effect on Northern Ireland, with little more.

The book can best be described as interesting but disappointing. Disappointing because there are few reporters who have the experience of being so much a part of so much recent history as Cyrus L. Sulzberger, and fewer still who, because of their name, fame and access, could put so much of that history in its proper perspective.

—JOHN ST. DENIS

China's Conflict Behavior

THE CHINESE CALCULUS OF DETERRENCE, *by Allen S. Whiting. The University of Michigan Press, $15.00.*

PERHAPS ONE indication that this reviewer has spent too many years dealing with Chinese problems is that he persists in guessing even when it may not be appropriate to do so. Because almost four-fifths of the actual text in this book deals with the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962, my guess is that originally Allen S. Whiting planned to limit his effort to this event. The publisher was undoubtedly very pleased with the scholarly and well-documented manuscript (which it is), but reminded the author of inflation and the high cost of publishing books, suggesting that Whiting use his broad experience in and out of government to expand the topic and generalize the conclusions in order to make the final publication more marketable. The author complied by adding three chapters: "Indochina and PRC Deterrence," "Chinese Deterrence: Korea, India, and Vietnam,"

and "Retrospect and Prospect." In these last chapters Whiting also touches on China's conflict behavior on the Soviet border, along the Taiwan Straits and the occasional tension with regard to Hong Kong.

Whether my speculation is valid or not is, of course, immaterial. The obvious imbalance does not detract from the content of the two parts of the book and, indeed, this format does capture a larger audience. Whiting makes a contribution in the detailed but interesting analysis of the one-month Sino-Indian conflict, clearly showing why he feels that the background of this event is useful in understanding China's decision-making process. By using a broader brush, he also makes a contribution in presenting some of his reasonable and carefully worded speculations about China's conflict behavior. Specifically, he concludes that if the past is indicative of the future, then political goals will almost always prevail in how China uses her military forces and, although China will take certain risks if her vital interests are at stake, she is basically rational in her conduct of foreign affairs.

—Leo A. Orleans
Library of Congress

Politics in China

Prelude to Revolution, *by Richard Baum. Columbia University Press.*

In the fall of 1962 Chairman Mao Tse-tung launched a nationwide campaign of politico-ideological indoctrination and Party rectification to reinvigorate China's socialist revolution and to immunize the Chinese masses against apostate "modern revisionism," which he perceived in the Soviet Union. This drive, the Socialist Education Movement, grew in force until, in the latter half of 1966, the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution burst upon China with unprecedented magnitude and intensity.

Dr. Baum of the University of California analyzes basic causes and consequences of Mao's concern about the future of the Chinese revolution and the possibility of a "capitalist restoration" in China, discusses the Chairman's measures for dealing with this threat, and examines the Socialist Education Movement. He also elucidates deep intra-Party conflicts that originated in the Movement and later erupted into the struggles of the Cultural Revolution. Problem areas such as political and administrative decision-making, ideological goal selection, intra-elite conflict, techniques of mass political mobilization, bureaucratic processes, and behavior in a communist system are explored in depth. Although the events and concepts analyzed and interpreted are of considerable complexity, Baum's findings are set forth with admirable lucidity and cogency.

This scholarly examination of important and continuing phenomena in Chinese political life will be of much value to those seriously concerned with these matters, as well as to those interested in the political process in Communist countries.

—Robert W. Rinden

Development

The Assault on World Poverty: *Problems of Rural Development, Education and Health. The Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank.*

This is not a book review, for the title in question is not a book. Books are written by people—individuals—who identify themselves either with their real or pen names. Books are not written by committees. This volume proves this assertion.

It is interesting nonetheless. First of all, because it is one more tangible piece of evidence of the development community's concern with mass poverty, especially rural poverty. Moreover it demonstrates a World Bank concern, indeed crusade, on this subject and the Bank is not normally the institution which one would expect to lead in this area.

The volume is encyclopedic in nature and has something to say on practically every aspect of rural development. What it has to say is often obvious and sometimes simplistic but in an encyclopedic work this is not necessarily a disadvantage. That is to say it is not a disadvantage if the volume is used in the way the above suggests; in Robert McNamara's preface he speaks of the sector papers contained in the book. This is a misnomer. The papers are far short of that.

It is the sort of volume which everyone in the field of development will probably want to have on the bookshelf to dip into on occasion—as long as the institution which employs the owner of the bookshelf pays for the book (price is not indicated on the cover).

—Eric Griffel

Taoist Teachings

Tao: The Watercourse Way, *by Alan Watts. Pantheon Books, $8.95.*

This final book by the prolific idol of the flower children was not quite finished at the time of Watts's death in late 1973. His message nevertheless comes across: Taoist teachings can be applied with profit to the problems of *homo industrialis*. His emphasis is on contemplative Taoism rather than *hsien* Taoism. His treatment of the subject is less painstaking than that of, say, Holmes Welch or Arthur Waley, but the scholarship is respectable and the book is highly readable. As with the Taoist philosophy itself, the reader will react according to the level and nature of his consciousness. At times one wonders whether Watts is not writing with tongue prominently in cheek. The pixyish Watts charm comes through, at least for the large following susceptible to it, but that does not keep this small volume from being serious and very worthwhile. The marginal notes and the quotations from early Taoist philosophers in Chinese calligraphy are helpful to the Sinologist.

Recommended for all Sinophiles, philosophers and those who may have begun to wonder whether they may not be excessively western and want to do something about it.

—Alfred le S. Jenkins

Writing About the Fighting

The First Casualty—*From the Crimea to Vietnam, by Phillip Knightley, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $12.95.*

I. F. Stone's harsh judgment that "Every government is run by liars and nothing they say should be believed" seems to apply without question to governments at war. Phillip Knightley reaches this conclusion in "The First Casualty"

("the first casualty in war is the truth"), a study of the war correspondent in 16 wars during the last 120 years. Knightley's careful review of war reporting reveals the wide discrepancy between what was or was not reported as fact and what actually happened. Some examples, picked at random, include the bombings of Guernica, Coventry, Dresden, and Cambodia; the losses at Pearl Harbor; the real story of Dunkirk; Allied intervention in Russia; Abyssinia's abysmal military weakness; and Spanish civil war atrocities. The list is the length of 16 wars and 120 years although Knightley is less critical of the reporting from Vietnam than from any other war. (On the other hand, David Halberstam wrote to Knightley that there should have been a paragraph added to every story from Vietnam which said "All of this is shit and none of this means anything because we are in the same footsteps as the French and we are prisoners of their experience.")

War reporting is manifestly the acid test of all types of reporting for both governments and reporters: patriotism, censorship, self-censorship, passion, bias, and self-interest get in the way of objectivity—at the very time it is most needed. The first war correspondent, William Howard Russell who reported the Crimean war, asked his editor, "Am I to tell these things, or hold my tongue?" While Knightley describes a few war correspondents who were moral as well as physical heroes, he concludes that too many have held their tongues.

This is an excellent and engrossing book.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

Vital Information

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD: 1975, *edited by Arthur S. Banks. McGraw-Hill Book Company, $19.95.*

THIS ANNUAL Handbook—described as the most comprehensive of its kind available in the English language—contains vital political information on some 150 independent countries and 75 international organizations, including the UN and all UN-related agencies. A brief historical background, leading governmental personalities, principal leaders and programs of political parties, constitutional systems, and the mass media are treated—along with the structure, membership, and activities of international organizations. Information is current as of January 1, 1975. For what it may be worth, this reviewer found the information on those dozen countries in which he has lived or worked to have been carefully researched and more than adequate for some understanding of the political situations obtaining.

—P.C.

Don't Give Up the Symbol

SEA POWER IN THE '70s, *edited by George H. Quester. Dunellen, $15.00.*

THOSE GIVEN to risky historical analogies have cited often the strategic missile race and the Anglo-German naval race of 1895-1914. But in the growth of the Soviet navy in the past two decades some observers now are finding the US reactions and the Soviet next step reactions to be the compelling parallel to 1895-1914. This volume's nine essays from a Cornell University symposium of 1972 (the delay in publication seems excessive) eschews the past to look at sea power in the rest of the decade.

Arnold Kuzmack and Barry Blechman of Brookings contribute provocative analyses of the US and Soviet navies (the latter's book on naval arms control was reviewed in the August JOURNAL). There are chapters on the naval balance in the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and East Asia. The future of the sea-based deterrent and the possible effects of a new Law of the Sea are also covered, and a retired admiral makes the Navy's plea for more ships.

But editor Quester puts the shark among the bathers with a short piece that says the sea is "everyman's sanctuary" and that navies are now symbolic, not functional. He claims the Soviets could put a cruise ship with school children on board in the way of the Sixth Fleet's carriers in the Med to provide a trip-wire, if that were wanted. On the US side, he sees the *Pueblo, Liberty* and those ships strafed by Indian forces as symbols of decisions not to allow the naval function to predominate. His chapter was written before *Mayaguez*, but both the President and the Secretary seem to have proved Quester's point for him in their statements about the reasons for that tragic but absurd symbolic act. Quester concludes that the United States Navy has been "checked" because fear of World War III prevents the Navy from any but a symbolic role. He leaves the reader to infer that the Soviets have built a lot of expensive symbols.

One might think he would leave most admirals speechless but their support will be grudgingly given because Mr. Quester concludes "the side with the most ships can interpose the most trip wires."

—J. K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Food for the Service

DIPLOMATIC DINING, *by Helen Kindler Behrens, foreword by Stanley Woodward. Quadrangle, $9.95.*

HELEN BEHRENS, Foreign Service wife and a Cordon Bleu cook, has produced a cookbook drawn from years of experience with the cuisines and cultures of foreign lands. For those who like to read as well as cook, this book is good reading too—the experiences are included with the recipes. JOURNAL readers may well remember some of Mrs. Behrens's recipes which appeared under the rubric, "Cook's Tour," a few years ago. But, for your permanent cookbook shelf, here are Jansson's Temptation, Hummus, Dolmas, and a multitude of other recipes for all occasions.

The book is beautifully arranged, hors d'oeuvres, soups, entrees, fish, fowl and game, meats, vegetables, salads, desserts and drinks. The last two chapters, "How to Make Do" and "Temperatures, Measures and Substitutions," are invaluable aids to the Foreign Service cook.

As Ambassador Woodward writes in the Foreword, "The recipes that Mrs. Behrens has spread before us in the following pages . . . could only have been written by one with her knowledge, experience and (I cannot resist it) her taste."

—N.R.S.

COPING WITH CONGRESS'S FOREIGN POLICY

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gress while developing a commodity policy or negotiating a Canal Treaty, State would enlist the participation and support of key legislators at the very beginning. The final policy is likely to differ from one which is developed by State acting alone, but it is one which stands a greater chance of success. It is success, one must remember, which enhances the Department's and the country's credibility abroad, not undeliverable promises nor complaints that "Congress is to blame."

An open-and-active strategy would require the full involvement of the Department in a multi-channeled, multi-leveled communication with the Congress and outside groups. Seminars and regular briefings between those people on the Hill and those in State involved in the same issues would be a useful follow-up step as would be the establishment of a "Resolution-Responsive Procedure."

Organizational reforms should follow to provide the institutional resources necessary for the reorientation of attitudes. The Congressional Relations Office (called "H") should be expanded and dispersed to the line bureaus with a core group remaining on the Seventh Floor to coordinate a Congressional strategy. It is partly because H is unbelievably understaffed and partly because State relied on the Liaison Office of the Special Trade Representative that the OPEC amendment to the Trade Act first emerged from the Senate Finance Committee without so much as a murmur from the Administration.

Whereas the rest of the Department would be improved by bringing in more outsiders, "H," traditionally manned by ex-Congressional Staff, is in need of some "insiders," i.e. Foreign Service officers, in order to "root" the Office and indirectly the Congress into the "State Department mentality." Liaison Officers would function as catalysts and conduits keeping the flow of people, information, and policy moving between State and Congress. The Department is beginning to move in this direction, and such movement should be encouraged and accelerated.

UNTIL NOW, the State Department has ignored or assaulted Congressional foreign policy initiatives, and the result has been a widening gap between the Secretary's statements abroad and what he can deliver at home. Blaming Congress or wishing that the new Congressional watchdog were the old Congressional lapdog will make things worse not better. While the gladiators joust, the real casualties are the American people and American foreign policy.

Secretary Kissinger has said: "The Administration stands ready to join with the Congress in devising procedures appropriate to the need for a truly national and long-range foreign policy." The time has come to stop standing and start moving, to stop pointing fingers at Congress and start reorganizing and reorienting the State Department. ■

"COURAGE AND COMMITMENT"

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confrontation by the leaders of both nations.

Trading America's Missiles in Turkey

On Friday, the 26th, the Soviets suggested a settlement—withdrawal of their missiles in return for an American pledge not to invade Cuba. But, by the next morning, optimism in Washington collapsed under the impact of troubling events. The Soviets had shot down an American "spy" plane over Cuba, the FBI reported that the Soviet UN delegation was burning codes and papers in likely preparation for war, and another message, with more demanding terms, had arrived from the Kremlin. "It was the blackest hour of the crisis," reported Roger Hilsman, the head of State Department intelligence.

The Soviets increased their terms to include America's withdrawal of her missiles from Turkey. Why didn't the administration accept these additional terms? The missiles in Turkey were obsolete, vulnerable, and provocative; they were useful, at best, for a first strike, not for deterrence or a second strike. Six days earlier, on Sunday, the 21st, Kennedy had discussed them with C. Douglas Dillon, who, according to the President's scrawled note (recently declassified), "stated that the . . .Jupiters were sent [to Turkey] because they were flops, and this would have been proved if they [had been used]." They were, in short, placebos for the Turks, where the corrupt government found them politically useful.

To the Soviets, the Jupiters were a threat to security and prestige. On October 22nd, five days before the Soviets suggested the trade, W. Averell Harriman, former ambassador to the Soviet Union and a "trouble shooter" for the President, advised Kennedy, according to a recently declassified document, "There has undoubtedly been great pressure on Khrushchev. . .from his military and from the more aggressive group [in the Kremlin] to do something about our ring of bases, aggravated by our placing Jupiter missiles in Turkey." Premier Khrushchev, Harriman explained,

has been compelled to act in order "to offset the humiliation" of American nuclear bases on Soviet borders.

Harriman's unstated implication was that removal of the missiles from Turkey might lead to Khrushchev's withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba. (Perhaps Harriman's proposal was the basis for Lippmann's suggesting these terms in his widely read column on Thursday.) It is important, Harriman counseled, that "we recognize the conflict that is undoubtedly going on within the Soviet Union, that Khrushchev has been induced to take this action. . .by the tougher group. Consequently, we should handle the situation. . .in such a way as to make it possible for Khrushchev to save his own face, to blame this tough group. . . ."

At the ExComm meeting on Saturday, the 27th, after the arrival of the Soviet note demanding removal of the missiles as part of the *quid pro quo*, some advisers, led by at least some of the military chiefs, proposed a zany plot: The United States would disarm her missiles in Turkey and secretly inform the Soviet Union "prior to moving against the Soviet missiles in Cuba"—first by an air strike, and a few days later by an invasion. With many documents still classified, we can only speculate why this scheme seemed attractive, even to a few. It would remove both the missiles and Castro ("the bone in our throat"), establish America's will to use force (at least in her sphere), and yet accede to Soviet demands. The scheme had obvious disadvantages: It ranged far beyond the immediate problem of the missiles in Cuba, expected Soviet leaders to accede to attacks on Cuba and the killing of thousands of Soviet soldiers and citizens, disregarded the importance of Cuba ("support for national liberation movements") in the ideological and political struggle dividing the Soviet Union and China, and also seemed to trim on America's commitment to Turkey.

Finally rejecting this bizarre scheme, the administration also refused formally to endorse the Soviets' proffered trade involving America's missiles in Turkey. Why? Unlike Lippmann, who had first suggested the exchange, the President and most advisers viewed it as a threat to their commitment and courage. They did not want to risk appearing to abandon an ally—even a weak ally like Turkey. ("Appearances contribute to reality," Kennedy firmly believed in determining his policy.) Once more, the problem of commitments to weak allies, as Lippmann had often warned since the assertion of the containment doctrine, jeopardized American security and narrowed the range for diplomacy. The President, as Robert Kennedy later explained, "obviously did not wish to order the withdrawal of missiles from Turkey *under threat* from the Soviet Union" (emphasis added). Once more, the requirement of establishing courage shaped government policy, even though Kennedy had decided before the crisis to phase out the missiles from Turkey. "We all agreed," wrote Robert Kennedy later, "that if the Russians were ready to go to nuclear war over

Cuba, they were ready to go to nuclear war, and that was that. So we might as well have the showdown then as six months later."

To put pressure on the Soviet Union, Robert Kennedy privately told the worried Soviet ambassador on Saturday evening that the United States would launch an attack on Cuba by Tuesday, the 30th, if the Soviets did not agree by Sunday to remove the missiles. Offering a carrot with the stick, the Attorney General also indicated that, if NATO approved, the administration would later withdraw the missiles from Turkey. Would this guarded, hedged, private offer suffice? It did not meet Soviet demands for explicit agreement. It refused to make the terms more palatable and to reduce the impact of the defeat for Soviet policy. The Kennedy brothers were not optimistic. The President had not abandoned hope, Robert Kennedy later wrote, but it "was a hope, not an expectation." War and peace hung in the balance. "It can go either way," President Kennedy said privately.

The Price of Victory

Fortunately, on Sunday morning the Soviet Union announced that it had decided to back down. American nuclear strength had triumphed and Khrushchev accepted the public humiliation while asserting that he had acted for peace. For most observers, then and now, the crisis had produced a great victory for the United States and John F. Kennedy. Was it a desirable victory? Can America afford such victories?

There were neglected costs at home. The crisis helped confirm the dangerous pattern, inherited from earlier administrations, of employing deceit and excessive secrecy on matters of foreign affairs to keep the Congress and the American people behind official policy. Why could not the nation be informed during the crisis that the MRBMs were already operational? Why not tell the people that the missiles, in the judgment of most ExComm members, did not constitute an imminent military threat? Consider what it means when a White House adviser, Brig. Gen. Chester Clifton, Kennedy's military aide, could ask whether there is "a plan to . . . brain wash the key press. . .?"

The crisis produced a mixed legacy in dealings with the Soviet Union and with our allies. To Charles de Gaulle, for example, America's unilateral actions in the crisis confirmed what he had been arguing for some time: Membership in the American-dominated NATO was too dangerous, America could drag European nations into war ("annihilation without representation"), and America would sacrifice her allies to her own interests. Kennedy's refusal to sanction an explicit trade of the missiles in Turkey did not undercut de Gaulle's analysis. But Kennedy's demonstration of courage, as well as his seemingly moderate decision to begin with a quarantine, increased respect for his judgment and his will among other European leaders. The President's actions may have speeded de Gaulle's inevitable departure from NATO and, at the same time, strengthened

ties with those other nations which were committed to the alliance.

The resolution of the crisis led both to an accelerated arms race with the Soviet Union and to détente. Both great powers, having looked into the abyss, were chastened and sought to reduce their differences. The President's triumph gave him the political capital at home to push through the test-ban treaty, despite opposition from the military and right-wing groups. In the Soviet Union, the public defeat and humiliation of Khrushchev contributed to his deposal and probably produced the triumph of those forces that wanted a larger nuclear arsenal to match the United States. His policy of moderation, of allowing a missile gap, had proved bankrupt. The Soviets concluded that they could no longer afford to be at a nuclear disadvantage. (After the crisis, a top Soviet official said privately, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again.") By about 1968-69, the Soviets had greatly expanded their missile arsenal, closed the large gap created by Kennedy's missile-building program, and the two nations were at approximate parity.

Kennedy's triumph in the missile crisis, while allowing him more flexibility in pursuing policies and giving him considerable political capital, may well have taught the American people the wrong lesson: that America could achieve victories in the Cold War and impose her will. In subtle ways, that lesson, as well as the acclaim bestowed upon Kennedy, left his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson, also looking for a great victory. His unyielding commitment to intervention in Vietnam, even after many former supporters had turned against the war, may be explained, in important ways, by his quest for a similar triumph, by his felt need to avoid defeat, by his fear of humiliation.

These mixed results, after the crisis, do raise serious questions about the value of Kennedy's victory for the future welfare of his nation. Most troubling is the often unexamined paradox lurking beneath the administration's argument for establishing "courage and commitment": Such qualities are at the heart of American security and the alliances on which that security is said to depend, so the United States might have to go to war to affirm the very credibility that is supposed to make war unnecessary. It may be, some would say, a potentially fatal paradox.

Would not it have been better had Kennedy struggled, as Bohlen and Lippmann urged, to avoid a public confrontation and sought first to gain removal of the missiles through private diplomacy? Cannot our system work that way? Just as Kennedy believed that retreat and concessions under pressure may betoken weakness and invite more demands, what would have happened if the Soviets had clung tenaciously to the same analysis? What would have happened if Khrushchev and his associates, after foolishly placing the missiles in Cuba and misreading America's temperament, had proved intransigent, had refused to back down, and had chosen war instead of humiliation thirteen years ago? ■

from page 14

agency rivalry. With some noteworthy exceptions, ACDA's complement of active-duty military and Foreign Service officers did not pose a serious challenge to either cohesion or *raison d'être*.

When the agency's leadership was changed in 1973 in what former Deputy Director Adrian Fisher called "Operation Compliance," Gerard Smith was later moved to remark—"Now all officials working in arms control realize it is somewhat hazardous duty." The usually very discreet Farley said (while excepting Fred Iklé), ". . . it is difficult to see what the present top officers . . . bring in the way of special skills, experience, or motivation." Today's (1975) conservative ACDA leadership identifies strongly with Defense Secretary Schlesinger's emphasis on counterforce targeting and supported, *inter alia*, the Secretary's hard-target MIRV program with its profound implications for strategic arms control. Many in Congress, the arms control community and ACDA itself felt insult was added to injury when, in the spring of 1975, former "hardline" NSC staffer John Lehman became ACDA's new Deputy Director (Senator Pell solicited the views of many in State and ACDA on Lehman and failed to find even one supporter). In short, profound concern was being expressed as to whether ACDA had strayed from its very essence.

Personality and Alliances

Among the factors influencing effectiveness are two which, while vital, are somewhat more fluid than those already discussed—personalities and alliances; the latter realign from issue to issue, the former varies in importance depending upon the interacting individuals.

The personal compatibility of William Foster and Dean Rusk eased ACDA's entry into the policy process. On the other hand, tension between Foster and both General Earle Wheeler and John McCloy (chairman, General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament) had a contrary effect. ACDA's access to data from a "natural adversary" (DDR&E) was assured by long and close ties between Defense's John Foster and Gerard Smith. Later, Iklé's past association with James Schlesinger promoted closer ACDA/Defense relations (too close perhaps).

Powerful allies are useful for all bureaucratic actors. For ACDA they are imperative. John Newhouse* correctly reported that, concerning SALT I, the CIA, State and ACDA often allied on such issues as zero ABM, exotic ABM, mobile ICBMs and unilateral MIRV deployment. But ACDA sometimes finds itself supporting a JCS position as it did for a brief period in 1974 when both, for very different reasons, argued that the United States insist upon the reduction of Soviet land-based ICBMs. Kissinger demurred (insisting that Moscow would never accept this) and, again, the Kis-

**John Newhouse,* Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT *(Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973), 26, 164, 228-231.*

singer position became the American position.

Congress

Throughout the 1960s Congress assumed a cautious posture toward ACDA. Appropriations requests were often cut, public affairs activities were severely restricted and contracted research was annually criticized. Hence agency officials rarely attempted to enhance their bureaucratic stance by publicly going to Congress; to do so, they feared, would destroy any possibility of exerting influence within the executive branch.

By 1970 congressional attitudes had changed. Since then ACDA's budgetary needs have been fully met and there have even been attempts to give the agency additional funds. While arms control efforts are lauded by a wide spectrum of legislators and new interest groups have sprung up, there has been mounting criticism from liberals that ACDA is not aggressive enough. The 1973 cutback sparked congressional protests followed by a full restoration of funds in 1974, a one year budget authorization for FY1975 with the sole purpose of assisting ACDA, the first full-scale investigation of the agency and introduction of legislation intended to upgrade its effectiveness. Even so, it is unlikely that Congress, by itself, will have a fundamental impact upon ACDA's longterm effectiveness as Fred Iklé may have discovered in February 1974 when he told the Washington Post that the United States should move away from reliance on land-based strategic missiles. This brought an instant rebuke from Kissinger and Iklé later stated that ACDA should confine its advocacy to formal NSC bodies.

Dilemma

Several of the indices for effectiveness, including presidential confidence, are not readily susceptible to congressional pressure. While ACDA's overall status will wax and wane over time, it will do so within fairly confined parameters. Revolutionary alteration in ACDA's standing and responsibilities is unlikely barring the election of a President holding a very different conception of "national security" than all of his predecessors since Truman; even then, would/could he use the tiny ACDA as one vehicle for reorienting American policy?

For the foreseeable future ACDA will face a central dilemma, one confronting all departments and agencies with varying degrees of intensity: how, on the one hand, to balance the need to conform to executive branch realities in order to maximize internal effectiveness with, on the other hand, the increasingly essential requirement of being responsive to congressional concerns? The dilemma is perpetual, only its form changes; since 1970 it has taken the form of liberal/moderate legislators calling for ACDA to play a more active and effective "advocacy" role. Insensitivity to this urging invites obvious difficulties. But overt responsiveness to this call in light of existing bureaucratic realities (caution about arms control, Kissinger's tight policy control and lack of presidential confidence) could eliminate any opportunity for advocacy.

By early October 1975, despite

intense Pentagon lobbying, the House and Senate had overwhelmingly passed legislation which may have a greater effect upon ACDA (given presidential approval) than any congressional action since 1961. The most significant provision is a requirement for the preparation of an "arms control impact statement" by ACDA's Director, through the NSC, for use both within the Executive Branch and by Congress to ascertain the possible impact that specified categories of military programs could have upon future arms control policies and negotiations. Congress clearly hopes to enhance ACDA's effectiveness by affording it new leverage in obtaining data from government agencies and in regularizing the input of arms control considerations into the weapons acquisition process. Sensitive to the aforementioned dilemma and mindful of the need not to force ACDA unnecessarily into the role of Defense Department protagonist, Congress stipulated that impact statements be administration, not solely ACDA, documents with full NSC endorsement. The legislation also gives ACDA's Director advisory status on the NSC comparable to the Director of Central Intelligence and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; seeks to augment ACDA's role in US conventional arms sales and tranfers; and invigorate the agency's minuscule public information program.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

"And to think, it all started with my assignment to the Law of the Sea office!"

LETTERS TO FSJ

Support for the Secretary's Stand

■ I should think there would be unanimous agreement among FSOs in support of the Secretary's stand on disclosure of the Boyatt memorandum or similar advice whether or not transmitted through the dissent channel.

The issue is not whether Congressman Pike resembles Joe McCarthy. I also like to think of myself as a liberal, but I recognize that the most obvious manifestation of McCarthyism in today's Congress comes from the left. The Senate Health Subcommittee staff has sought out dissidents in the ranks of FDA and publicized their views in order to impugn the integrity of the agency's management. These tactics have had a devastating impact on morale and efficiency of FDA, and they are precisely the tactics used by McCarthy and his minions with State and USIA in the early '50s.

When you are responsible for one regional or functional area, you may feel strongly that the "seventh floor" has ignored what to you seems clearly in the national interest. You may even be right. But it may also turn out that the department head or the White House did consider your views but was persuaded by contrary arguments from another desk. Even if subsequent events appear to bear you out, you must still resist the temptation to enlist allies on the Hill or in the press. Above all, the confidentiality of the written text of staff advice must be respected if the objectivity of reporting, and the independence of the career service, are to be preserved. You can't overlook this principle when it seems expedient and expect it to survive for some other occasion when you really need it.

To be sure, the public has a right to know the basic issues, the broad options considered before the policy decision was taken. Secretary Kissinger has expressed willingness to provide this to Congressional committees. But that does not mean revealing the identity of the advocates of each option or the text of their advice.

I am sure that other retired officers overwhelmingly agree on this. Many, I expect, have had the same bitter memories of McCarthyism in our own service and some may have had my own experience of having to try to repair the damages caused abroad when a Congressional committee released raw (and in this case inaccurate) intelligence data impugning citizens of the host country.

Lest I be dismissed as just another crusty retiree apologist for the establishment, I might just add that my own causes for grievance particularly during the McCarthy period could match any among the current active officers.

ARMISTEAD LEE
FSO-Retired

Washington

All Honorable Men

■ Thomas Donovan's unfair, patronizing and obviously uninformed attack on CIA's overseas activities (FSJ October 1975) comes at a time when that beleaguered agency has had considerably more than its fair share of bludgeoning. I am disappointed that the JOURNAL saw fit to lend credence to this slander by reprinting it.

Like Mr. Donovan, I retired in the late '60s after a quarter century of foreign service, one fourth of it as a Foreign Service employee and the balance as a CIA officer serving in positions of sufficient rank that I knew what was going on. Mr. Donovan's description of CIA activities abroad is unrecognizable to me.

In an article extending over a mere page-and-a-half, Mr. Donovan uses the alliterative triad "blackmail, bribery and burglary" five times to describe the agency's "basic mission," adding a sixth "bribe" and "blackmail" for good measure. He also decries CIA's "shabby expedients"; its "unworthy and ultimately useless activity"; its "slavish imitation of the Soviet KGB"; and its "inflated and thus far undocumented claims to occasional modest successes. . . ." His one example of firsthand knowledge, a failed recruitment of a Czech diplomat, does nothing to bolster his case. Nor does his snide comment that a CIA operative is ready to "ruin the lives of his foreign contacts . . . mostly to win points for himself in his home organization."

Although all the above quoted characterizations are false, I will leave it to the Association of Retired Intelligence Officers (of which I am not a member) or others to provide an "in depth" rebuttal of the article while I concentrate on that portion about which I have some expertise.

During my 19½ years with the CIA I read or participated in the drafting of many basic mission directives for CIA stations abroad. All were primarily targeted on our nation's still implacable enemy, International Communism, but none specified or implied that burglary, bribery or blackmail were appropriate tools for reaching that target. Throughout my service, for which I was awarded the CIA Medal of Merit, I never received or issued orders calling for or involving acts of bribery, blackmail or burglary. Nor did I indulge in them myself. In making this statement I do not mean to imply that such expedients were *never* employed by CIA operatives; merely that they were the exception rather than the rule. (Even a basically honorable citizen could conceivably resort to bribery, blackmail or burglary if that were the last resort method of thwarting an enemy bent on his or his country's destruction.)

In conclusion, I find nothing more appropriate than the Richard M. Helms quote used by the JOURNAL,

> "The nation must, to a degree, take on faith that we, too, are honorable men devoted to her service."

PAUL L. SPRINGER

Aiken, S.C.

E. O. Violation

■ On November 10, formal charges were filed with the Secretary of State, alleging that the Management authorities of the Department of State have violated the letter and spirit of Executive Order 11636, by taking the following actions:

- They sought to influence the outcome of the 1975 AFSA election,
- They discriminated among AFSA members in regard to promotion and other conditions of employment,
- They have blocked implementation of Section 14 of the Executive Order (which explicitly requires that the Secretary of State "*shall* establish by regulation rea-

sonable limitations upon the use of official time for consultation and conferral under this Order"),

- They have permitted the discriminatory use of official time by AFSA members in a manner calculated to promote Management positions,
- They have violated Section 1-b of the Executive Order by permitting a Management official to function as an AFSA spokesman, and
- They have denied the elected AFSA President his rights and privileges under Section 13(a)(5 and 6) of the Executive Order (refusal to recognize an organization, refusal to consult or confer with a recognized organization).

The Regulations of the Employee-Management Relations Commission (3 FAM 651) require an immediate investigation into the merit and validity of these charges. If the investigation is not conclusive, a formal hearing may subsequently be called to establish the facts and develop appropriate solutions.

Satisfactory resolution of these issues should help to immunize AFSA against Management manipulation and abuse.

JOHN J. HARTER

Washington

Reflections on American Attitudes

■ The other day one of the gentle ladies at our Reception Desk startled me with a sudden outburst —almost on the defensive and without any provocation that I know of—"And America has done so much good for the entire world!"

I nodded somewhat perplexed, but then I remembered her frenzied defense of Nixon last year and her attitude that our fighting in Vietnam was the best proof of our patriotism. Suddenly she could stand no more of having been mistaken, having her values shaken by Nixon's shameful resignation and our military withdrawal from Vietnam—she knew deep down that she had much reason to be proud but could not quite put her finger on it. Probably she expressed a malaise which affects many Americans today and it brought back to me the fact that AID has never been permitted by Congress to publicize any of its achievements in about 15 years of economic assistance abroad. I am not certain whether the prohibition is a law, and if it is, when it was passed, but sad it is.

It is evident that AID's popularity probably never was lower among staff members of some Congressional committees. The total silence imposed upon AID about its achievements gives free reign to its antagonists among the people and its representatives.

It is so ironic considering the benefits domestically which AID provides in terms of manufacturing of goods, protection of our shipping and airline industries, incentives to the farmers and contracts established with numerous universities and other institutions and on the other side of the ledger the conditions which our assistance has alleviated for millions of people—and the American people must not know the benefit to themselves nor the aid to others which came from their tax dollars!

Another puzzling factor is that Congress in so many instances has been happy to push its own interests via AID such as the recent efforts to influence AID to use a contractor from the South—and still AID is "kicked around." Apart from such rather personalized interests in AID is of course the tagging on to AID appropriations military projects, and until last year, the Public Safety program which was squelched by Congress.

Beginning with the Public Safety Division's abolishment, AID launched a large scale "reduction in force" project. Public Safety personnel was "riffed" with a minimum of notice and no apparent effort to find placement elsewhere for them.

Completely separate from the Public Safety RIF is the larger scale reduction probably as a result of the inflated personnel roster after the US withdrew from Vietnam both its military and civilian personnel.

The present RIF affects both Foreign and Domestic Service employees with the difference that the Civil Servants have "bumping rights" and can conceivably hold on to their jobs although at lower grades. This is not the fact for a Foreign Service employee—a RIF notice means literally: "You are FIRED" without recourse to alternate positions and apparently without assistance from AID to find other employment. Why are the two personnel categories treated in such different manners? Is it equitable to give lower priority to AID's Foreign Service employees and their needs than to Civil Servants? Is the service of one group more appreciated than that of the other?

AID has stated in notices to personnel that it will help find alternate employment for those they let go. With the employment market so depressed today, this assistance is needed more than ever. I cannot personally recall having heard of any "outplacement" by AID of the officers from the Foreign Service who have been "reduced in force." There is the potential danger that AID might experience similar tragedies as the one State faced when a selected-out Foreign Service officer committed suicide because he could not find ways in which to support his young family—an act which spurred the creation of the interim Foreign Service Grievance Board.

There are several concerns for AID employees who have been dedicated to the goals of this agency. These are:

1) Popular misconception of the proportionate expenditures in AID when compared to other budget items (military-defense, etc.);

2) Strangulation of AID distribution of information about its activities abroad and successes (within the United States);

3) Present handling of AID's reduction-in-force of its Foreign Service staff (Civil Service employees have better built in protection).

PENNY WISE

Washington

The JOURNAL *welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary.*

Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service JOURNAL, *2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.*

AFSA NEWS

This portion of the JOURNAL *is the responsibility of the Board of Governors of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.*

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AFSA Moves on Taxation Of Overseas Allowances

The heat is temporarily off on the issue of taxation of our overseas allowances but changes in the structure of these allowances may be proposed before Christmas by an interagency committee and the Congress will address the whole matter again next year.

You may recall that a bill which included the repeal of Section 912 of the Internal Revenue Code (which exempts overseas allowances from federal taxation) failed late in 1974 for want of a rule from the House Rules Committee. The House Committee on Ways and Means returned to the subject this year, as part of a general tax reform package. In July AFSA testified before the Committee on this issue; the testimony was published on pp. 39-40 of the October JOURNAL. During that period Secretary Kissinger also wrote to Treasury Secretary Simon asking him to intervene with the Committee against repeal of Section 912 pending the outcome of a study being conducted by the Interagency Committee on Allowances. This Committee, chaired by Assistant Secretary for Administration John Thomas and including representatives of some 20 federal agencies whose employees serve overseas, had been formed early this year to study the whole issue of allowances. Secretary Kissinger's argument was that overseas allowances represent compensation for unusual employee expenses incurred due to overseas service. On September 29 the Treasury Secretary wrote to Ways and Means Committee Chairman asking that Section 912 not be considered in tandem with Section 911, which exempts some overseas income of non-government employees from taxation.

On September 30 the Committee nevertheless voted to phase out the exemption from taxation of overseas allowances over a four-year period. They were reportedly influenced in their views by a letter from an unidentified Budget and Fiscal Officer saying we were living high off the hog overseas, and by reports that thousands of people try to get into the Foreign Service to serve overseas (probably they were thinking about the thousands who take the FSO exam compared to the 100-200 who get in).

Representatives of the AFSA Governing Board met Deputy Undersecretary Eagleburger October 7 to express our concern about this action. On October 8 the AFSA Governing Board sent a letter to Chairman Ullman opposing repeal of Section 912 and on October 9 Secretary Kissinger sent a letter to the Chairman opposing repeal pending the report of the Interagency Committee on Allowances which is now expected before Christmas.

On October 22 the House Committee on Ways and Means voted to defer action on Section 912 until their second phase of reform, during the next session. It is understood they are waiting for the report from the Interagency Committee.

The view of the Ways and Means Committee appears to be that if any of the overseas allowances represent additional income they should be taxed (just as our post "hardship" allowance already is).

State rightly takes the position that allowances are intended to compensate employees for expenses required by overseas service and that if any additional income results, the proper remedy is not to tax it, but to adjust the method of computing the allowance so that the allowance corresponds to the actual expense.

AFSA has been strongly urging management not to retreat from this position. We believe repeal of Section 912 would be unfair to colleagues overseas as compared with those at home; to those with high allowances at a given post as compared with those having lower allowances at another post; and to those—mostly lower-ranking and single—who do not itemize their deductions, compared with those who could itemize expenses normally covered by our allowances as employee business expenses.

AFSA will use all means available to us to fight any repeal of Section 912 if it comes up again next year. Meanwhile we are closely following the work of the Interagency Committee and will take whatever measures we can under the Executive Order to see that our views are heard and our interests protected on the overseas allowances question.

Pending issuance of the Inter-Agency Report we urge you to write to your congressmen and urge they not vote for repeal of Section 912 nor support any other tax-reform measure which would penalize government employees who serve overseas.

Grievance Legislation Upon Us At Last

On November 6 the House-Senate Conference on the Fiscal Year 1976 Department of State Authorization Bill agreed to an amendment to the Foreign Service Act providing for a Foreign Service grievance system. The new system, expected to become law by the time you read this, will replace the current "Interim Grievance Procedures" which have existed since 1971 and substitute for the "Bayh Bill." The Bayh Bill had often been passed by the Senate but never accepted by the House because of foreign affairs agency management opposition to detailed legislated grievance procedures and to provisions of that Bill which would have permitted grievances of individual non-promotions or assignments, and the opposition of House Conferee Chairman Wayne Hays to any legislation not agreed to between management and AFSA.

In recent years management and AFSA negotiators have been deadlocked over the content of grievance procedures and on the extent to which such procedures should be explicitly provided in legislation or in regulations. The resignation this July 9 of the public members of the current (interim) Foreign Service Grievance Board, because AID had refused to carry out the Board's decision on the Baumann RIF case, deprived Foreign Service people of grievance protection and jolted both AFSA and management negotiators into intensive negotiations toward agreement on detailed legislated grievance procedures.

On July 17 the AFSA Staff Attorney briefed the new Governing Board on a draft of the same date which revealed some measure of agreement between management and AFSA. On September 22 the Governing Board instructed the Grievance Committee to continue conferring on the basis of the July 17 draft. Further conferral produced an October 3 draft which the Governing Board unanimously accepted on October 17 except for two major points on which the Grievance Committee was instructed to seek further changes in conferral with Deputy Undersecretary Eagleburger and, if necessary, the Congress. AFSA and management negotiators reached agreement and referendum on November 4 on a language change and a letter of interpretation to resolve the two major points of dispute, but the timetable was accelerated when the House-Senate Conference was suddenly set for November 6. At the November 10 Board meeting, these recommendations were approved.

When the legislation is finally passed, management and AFSA will have 120 days to consult on regulations to implement it and to agree on the membership of the new Grievance Board. In future issues of AFSA News, we will describe and analyze the legislation and what it does for you.

Changes in the AFSA Board and Staff

Over a third of the members of the Governing Board newly-elected in July have resigned. In sequence they have been: State Representative Al Lukens who was assigned to Copenhagen, replaced by Ken Rogers (September 2); Vice President Dan Newberry (August 18), replaced by Lars Hydle (September 9); Treasurer Ed Stumpf (September 19), replaced by JoAnn Jenkins (October 28); Secretary Pete Velott (October 10), replaced by Frank Cummins (October 28); and USIA Representative Paul Blackburn (November 10), replaced by Willis J. Sutter (November 19).

Two of the five resigning had been on Rick Williamson's "Progress Slate," the remaining three (the officers) being from the Coalition. The newly-appointed Board members include one Slate member, one independent, one prominent supporter of the Coalition, and two who were not active in the elections. The appointment of Cummins raised USIA participation on the board to two people. Biographies of these latest worthies appear elsewhere in the AFSA Staff News.

Among the AFSA staff, Executive Director Rick Williamson resigned before running for AFSA President, the position being filled on September 2 by Allen Moreland, a retired FSO. The Counsellor, FSO-5 Don Field resigned in mid-August and had not been replaced by November 15. (A Search Committee led by State Representative Dick Harrington is looking for candidates.)

New Secretary

Frank Cummins

Born Erie, Pa., 1932 . . . University of Chicago, Allegheny College, Gannon College (BA 1952) and Columbia University . . . communications and gunnery officer US Navy 1954-58 . . . newsman, commercial radio/television 1958-63.

Joined VOA as editor in 1963; Director VOA Beirut office 1966-69; Information Officer (USAID) USIS Rawalpindi 1969-71; Branch Public Affairs Officer, Kaduna, Nigeria 1971-72.

Currently, Deputy Chief, Near East and South Asia Division of the Voice of America.

Married to former Lilian Banat of Istanbul. Son, Alex, a junior at Fort Hunt High School, Alexandria, Virginia.

Frank is an occasional actor at the Little Theater of Alexandria . . . an amateur Egyptologist . . . and President of the Fort Hunt PTA.

New Treasurer

On Monday, October 27, the Governing Board of the American Foreign Service Association appointed Mrs. JoAnn M. Jenkins to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of recently elected AFSA treasurer, Edward R. Stumpf.

Mrs. Jenkins, who grew up in western Massachusetts, received her BA Degree from Smith College in 1962 and an MAT Degree from The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, in 1963. Following graduate studies, she taught high school history subjects in her na-

JoAnn Jenkins

tive Pittsfield, Massachusetts, for two years before joining the faculty of the American High School of The Hague, Netherlands, where she continued teaching history from 1965-1967.

Mrs. Jenkins joined the Foreign Service in April 1967 and was assigned to her first post in Asmara, Ethiopia, as the Consular Officer. While in Ethiopia she met and married her husband, Bob, who was assigned to the Kagnew Station military communications installation in Asmara. Mrs. Jenkins returned to the Department and worked in the Substantive Information Systems Staff from 1970-1971. She served as a Staff Assistant in the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations during the period 1971-1972. From 1972-1973 she served as Special Assistant to the Executive Secretary of the Department, working primarily in management and modernization programs for the Executive Secretariat. Mrs. Jenkins was obliged to go on LWOP from October to August 1974 for family reasons. Because the Department could find no suitable position for a female officer in either the American Embassy in Jidda or the American Consulate General in Dhahran, she and her daughter, Claire, joined Bob in Taif, Saudi Arabia, where he was teaching English to Saudi Air Force personnel.

Upon her return to duty in September 1974 she was assigned to the Executive Office of the Office of Security as an administrative officer. She expects to serve for another year in this position and plans to make her career in Administration.

Mrs. Jenkins has been a member of AFSA for the past five years and has worked intermittently on AFSA committees, serving most recently on the 1975 Selection Board Precepts Negotiations Committee. She was active in the formation of the Administrative Association "Two Thousand Plus" and has been Chairperson of that organization for the past year. Additionally, she is a member of the Women's Action Organization and the Consular Officer's Association.

Pike-Middle Grade-Policy Dissent and Denouement

AFSA's Governing Board has been following, debating at several regular and special meetings, and finally deciding what action to take on a front-page issue of principle—the compelling of evidence on foreign policy recommendations from non-policy-making officials. In recent months the House Select Committee on Intelligence chaired by New York Democrat Otis Pike has been investigating what it regards as failures of intelligence which have led to foreign policy errors. Among these was the 1974 Cyprus crisis involving Cyprus Country Director (and then AFSA President) Tom Boyatt. The Pike Committee demanded that Boyatt and other State officers below the policy-making level testify about recommendations made to policy-making officials (including a dissent memo from Boyatt to the Secretary) during the crisis. On September 22 Deputy Undersecretary Eagleburger declined to allow such officers to testify on policy recommendations or to allow any disclosure of who made individual policy recommendations. He also said Department representatives must attend any interviews between the Committee and its staff and Department officials, regardless of the presence of the latter's own legal representatives. This, he said, was to protect the integrity of the policy-making process and the careers of individual officers. The Committee ceased trying to get Mr. Boyatt and others to testify against the orders of the Secretary, but did vote to subpoena his dissent memorandum.

On October 15 the AFSA Governing Board passed, 7-0, with its President indicating his disapproval, a resolution to sign and send letters on this issue (run as the November *FSJ* editorial) to Congressman Pike and the Secretary.

The Congressman was urged not to seek evidence of individually-attributable policy advice to avoid a chilling effect upon the policy-making process and the careers of individual officers. The Secretary was urged not to make such evidence available to the Committee and to desist from having a Department representative present at interviews between the Committee and individual officers and to press strongly for grievance legislation to protect career officers from Executive Branch pressures towards conformity and against dissent.

The next day the Secretary formally declined to provide the Committee the subpoenaed dissent memo, using much of the rationale espoused by AFSA, but offered to testify before the Committee to explore other ways of providing the information the Committee was seeking. On October 31 the Secretary dropped the requirement for the Department representatives to attend the interviews between its officers and the Committee. The Committee then voted, 8-5, against requesting contempt authority and for accepting the Secretary's proposal of making the Boyatt dissent memorandum available, by "amalgamating" its paragraphs (without attribution) among those from other relevant memoranda on policy recommendations on the Cyprus crisis.

On November 8 Mr. Eagleburger replied to AFSA's letter to the Secretary stating that "Your expression of support for the position the Department has taken on this issue and your October 16 letter to Chairman Pike were greatly appreciated," reiterating the Department's position on policy advice from middle and junior grade officers and on the Dissent Channel, explaining why the Department had previously insisted on its representatives accompanying such officials when interviewed by the Pike Committee, and asserting that his and the Secretary's commitments to guarantees of due process for employee rights is reflected in the effort to obtain suitable grievance legislation.

AFSA Board Meetings Surface Differences and Consensus

It's in the FEDERAL TIMES, the New York TIMES, and the AFGE

NEWS, and open to members in Washington to see for themselves—the meetings of the new AFSA board are some of the most heated since the Jacobins took over in the Assemblée Nationale. Transferred from the New State Building to the AFSA Headquarters across the way, they have lengthened from one hour to about two hours a week (Mondays at noon) and hardly a week goes by without a special-subject Board meeting being sandwiched in, some even being held in the evening, but all open to members, the public, and the press alike. Attendance by non-board members has increased from the two or three people at the Boyatt board meetings to ten or twenty-five today, many of whom take active part in the discussions.

The discussions themselves are far more wide-ranging than those on the previous board, but the price has been that each current board meeting can cover only a fraction of the topics that the previous one could. Procedure has assumed a major role, a considerable portion of each meeting being taken up with fixing the agenda, correcting prior meetings' minutes, and expounding Robert's Rules of Order and the AFSA Bylaws. Relationships among the President, Board, AFSA staff, committees, FSJ and the membership have received much initial attention with debate and memoranda exchanged on such fascinating subjects as:

Can Board members take public positions opposed to the majority vote of the Board?

What is the authority of a "Presidential Commission" appointed by the AFSA President?

Can a single board member call for resignations of committee members or of AFSA staff members?

What are the proper limits of decorum under Robert's Rules?

Is the President obliged to sign AFSA communications concerning Board actions with which he personally disagrees?

Are delegations of authority to committees being made in derogation of the Board's/President's powers under the Bylaws?

Where are referenda of the membership required and when?

Is the President an ex-officio member of all committees?

However, while buffeted by those weighty issues, the Board by dint of two-hour meetings and extra special-purpose meetings had debated and approved numerous agreements, policies, and letters in a number of areas, which are reported elsewhere in this and previous issues of the AFSA News.

Embassy Guatemala Needs Photos of Mission Chiefs

American Embassy Guatemala City is trying to collect a gallery of photos, for display in the Ambassador's reception room, of chiefs of the US diplomatic mission who served in Guatemala since relations were established in 1826.

Friends, relatives and descendants who have portraits of any of the persons listed below are kindly requested to send an 8 × 10 print to the Public Affairs Officer, American Embassy, APO, New York 09891.

John Williams, Chargé, 1826; Charles G. De Witt, Chargé, 1833-39; Elijah Hise, Chargé, 1848-49; John L. Marling, Minister Resident, 1855-56; Beverly L. Clarke, Minister Resident, 1858-60; Elisha O. Crosby, Minister Resident, 1861-64; Fitz Henry Warren, Minister Resident, 1866-69; Silas A. Hudson, Minister Resident, 1869-72; George Williamson, Minister Resident, 1873-79; Cornelius A. Logan, Minister Resident, 1879-82; Henry C. Hall, Minister Resident, 1882; Pierce M. B. Young, Minister, 1893-96; Macgrane Coxe, Minister, 1896-97; W. Godfrey Hunter, Minister, 1898-1903; Leslie Combs, Minister, 1903-07; Joseph W. J. Lee, Minister, 1907; William Heimke, Minister, 1908-09; R. S. Reynolds Hitt, Minister, 1910-13; Arthur H. Geissler, Minister, 1922-30. Send to: DANIEL GARCIA, Amembassy, Guatemala.

Better Formula for Personal Property Losses

After many months of negotiations, AFSA and management have agreed on the manner in which private personal property losses are to be compensated. Henceforth, awards (made under P.L. 88-558) will be computed on the basis of replacement value less depreciation. Replacement value means the present acquisition cost of a particular item plus a factor reflecting changes in the purchasing power of the US dollar overseas.

The State Department and the other foreign affairs agencies have been some of the last bastions of feudalism in town in seeking to calculate costs on the basis of original cost paid for an item less depreciation for that item. This has caused employees losing a valuable item purchased in the late '50s to find the awards given under management's old regulations totally inadequate to repurchase a similar item. The new agreement will greatly benefit our Indochina evacuee constituents.

The new agreement will become effective after President Ford signs the Department's FY 1977 Appropriation and Authorization Bills. State Department regulations, implementing other aspects of the law need change, and will be broached with management later.

AFSA Board Sets "Openness" Guidelines for AFSA News and Letters

Starting from a misunderstanding regarding the publication of a "statement" of AFSA President Hemenway on the career minister promotion list—prefaced by the "Queen's Navee" quotation and carried in the next November JOURNAL as a "letter to the FSJ"—the Board focused on the question of what sorts of news and what sorts of views it should try to make available to the membership through the JOURNAL. After an October 15 special meeting on the subject, the Board passed a resolution at its November 3 meeting declaring its intent to keep the membership "informed of a wide range of foreign policy issues, of the Governing Board's policies and views, and of the activities and achievements of the Association" while affording all "the opportunity for the expression of a broad spectrum of members' views." A Liaison Committee was established, to operate openly in pursuit of this goal. Mr. Hemenway also proposed on October 15 a reorganization of the FSJ calling for the creation of the office of Business Manager, six Deputy Editors, and an Advisory Board; the JOURNAL at present consists simply of one Editor and an Editorial Board. The AFSA Board has not acted on the President's proposal.

Members wishing to send letters on employment, working condi-

tions, or AFSA affairs should get them to us by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication.

Should the FSJ Carry AFSA News?

The JOURNAL Editorial Board is considering the possibility of running AFSA News and possibly also letters pertaining to it as a four or eight page center signature in the magazine. It would be included in all JOURNALS going out to members, active and retired, but would not be distributed to others. This idea is prompted by the proposition that a large portion of the magazine's readership is not interested in Foreign Service employment and working conditions, bread-and-butter battles, or internal AFSA politics. The Editorial Board's view is that this mass of material is indigestible to the researcher or student of foreign affairs and hinders the magazine from appealing to the broader scholarly readership to which that Board aspires.

If you are a non-member who has gotten this far into AFSA News, and still desire to sip from this possibly turgid spring in succeeding months, please let us know why you (and your fellows) might like to continue getting AFSA News. Equally, members and non-members who think it should come out as a separate publication to be sent to the members should not be shy to say so.

WAO Committee Studies Career Options of F.S. Spouses

For the past four months a Women's Action Organization *ad hoc* committee of twenty women married to Foreign Service spouses and pursuing independent careers has been studying the career options of Foreign Service spouses. The committee believes the three foreign affairs agencies should urgently consider:

1. The need for a Skill Bank: A central office where spouses who wish to work while overseas could register. Skills could be identified, computerized and matched with appropriate openings abroad. This would allow husband and wife to be assigned together as a professional couple whenever possible. The Skill Bank could facilitate the placement of teachers, administrators, researchers, community organizers, nurses, librarians, counselors and others with special skills often needed by posts abroad.

2. The need to identify employment and educational opportunities for spouses abroad and to include this information in post reports on an ongoing basis. This information could also be computerized.

3. The need for bilateral arrangements with other countries to facilitate spouses working on the local economy of host countries.

4. The need for Chiefs of Mission to encourage spouses who wish to use their talents and training to work in host countries when permitted by law.

5. The need for an ombudsperson for dependents who, among other things, would be responsible for the concerns of working spouses.

The committee holds open meetings on the second and fourth Tuesdays of the month at 12:00 noon in Room 3886, New State. It also welcomes comments, suggestions, and accounts of relevant experiences from abroad. Please write to:

Women's Action Organization
c/o "M" Message Center
Room 7310 N.S.
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Referenda Suggested on Three AFSA Policies

On October 20, AFSA President Hemenway submitted to the Governing Board proposals for referenda of the AFSA membership to determine the Association's final position on Grievance Legislation, the Career Ministers List, and the release of information to Congressman Pike's House Select Committee on Intelligence by non-policy-making officials of the Department. Vice President Hydle replied two days later, pointing out the Board had already taken a position on all three issues, and that were the membership to take a contrary view, the Board under the Bylaws would have to reverse the AFSA position. He stated that the Board was in unanimous agreement on two of the issues: that career ministers should "normally" have served overseas had been inserted into the 1975 precepts in August—and that acceptable compromise had been ironed out between AFSA's and Department management's positions. On the Pike Committee issue where there was a 7-1 division within the Board, he urged awaiting ten Chapters' or 100 members' (the Bylaws' minimum) requesting a referendum after they had seen the Board's position.

New Agreement on Basement Parking

AFSA's Members' Interest Committee has finally reached agreement with State management regarding basement and ancillary parking areas.

Previously, of the 950 parking spaces subsidized by the Department, only 40% were allotted for carpools (contrary to the GAO requirement). Many of the remainders were assigned on a "who's who" basis. Under the new agreement, 63% of all parking in the basement as well as the surrounding subsidized parking lots will be allotted to carpools. Carpool spaces will be assigned according to the number of persons per car, and in the case of ties, according to the service computation date of the carpool members. The remaining 37% will go first to the handicapped, Assistant Secretaries and above, then to those employees whose work necessitates their arriving and leaving the building at other than normal working hours, and finally to various support personnel. All but the first category will compete with the carpools for the choice State Department basement location.

This is a marked improvement from the often arbitrary assignment of parking in the past. It represents over a 5% increase in the number of carpool vehicles which park in the reduced rate areas; while some solo-driving senior officials will lose a parking spot. Since the Department has 90 days to implement the terms of the agreement the new system should be almost all in effect by January.

Awards Luncheon Set for December 12

The AFSA 8th floor luncheon at which the recipients of the Herter, Harriman, and Rivkin awards will be announced and the awards presented is to be on Friday, December 12, at 12:15 in the Department's Benjamin Franklin Room. Governor W. Averell Harriman is

the speaker. Invitations have been sent out to the Washington membership.

Bylaws, Minutes Offered

Members interested in the nitty-gritty of the affairs of their association may request the Bylaws (4pp) or certain of the minutes of Board meetings. If you desire the latter, please specify the date(s) or issue(s) in which you are interested, and to the extent possible, we will try to fulfill your request.

1976-77 AFSA Student Programs

Applications are being mailed out for the 1976-1977 AFSA Financial Aid Grant and for the new AFSA Merit Award for high school or prep school seniors.

For application forms write to: The AFSA Committee on Education, 2102 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. The deadline for completion of the applications is February 15, 1976.

OTHER SCHOLARSHIPS AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN SERVICE CHILDREN

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to children of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information to the schools, colleges and universities indicated:

Castilleja School, Palo Alto, California. Scholarships are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas who are registered at Castilleja School for admission to grades 7 to 12, inclusive. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Castilleja School, 1310 Bryant St., Palo Alto, California 94301.

Dartmouth College: S. Pinkney Tuck Scholarship. For students at Dartmouth College who are sons or grandsons of Foreign Service officers of the United States and who are in need of financial assistance. Address inquiries to the Director of the Office of Financial Aid, Dartmouth College Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

Miss Hall's School: An anonymous donor has made possible for daughters of Foreign Service officers four scholarships each year, the value of each being 25% of tuition charged. The school enrolls approximately 160 students in Grades 9-12. Address inquiries to: The Headmaster, Miss Hall's School, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201.

The New Hampton School: Offers a $1000 abatement on tuition to foreign service boys and girls. The school enrolls approximately 225 students in grades nine through postgraduate. For further information write to Mr. Austin C. Stern, Director of Admissions, The New Hampton School, New Hampton, New Hampshire 03256.

Northfield Mount Hermon School: A $1,000 reduction in tuition is offered all sons and daughters of US Government personnel stationed overseas in grades 9 through 12. This reduction is afforded in recognition of the higher travel cost experienced by such personnel. For further information contact President Howard L. Jones, Northfield Mount Hermon School, Northfield, Massachusetts 01360.

St. Andrew's School: Middletown, Delaware. The Norris S. Haselton Scholarship. Awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service career officer where need is indicated. Write to Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School. Middleton, Delaware 19709.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukens Memorial Scholarship is awarded at Vassar to children of Foreign Service personnel.

Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the child of an American Foreign Service officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the child of an employee of the Federal Government or of a State Government.

Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Westover School: Middlebury, Connecticut: Financial aid and scholarship awards for grades 9 through 12 are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas. Write Director of Admissions, Westover School, Middlebury, Connecticut 06762.

International Living

HOMESTAY FAMILIES are needed for international participants in The Experiment in International Living, a private, nonprofit international educational organization founded in 1932. These Experimenters from all over the world come to the United States seeking three-week homestays. They range in age from 16 to 45 and are from a variety of backgrounds. Volunteer host families, with or without children, who would enjoy introducing these Experimenters to American family life, are needed throughout the year. Contact Gil Spaulding, The Experiment in International Living, Brattleboro, VT 05301 or call him at 802-257-7751.

New Ed Board Members

Harriet P. Culley, who joined the Editorial Board in September, says she recently found a three-page document written when she was 10 years old, entitled "The Autobiography of Harriet W. Pullen." She added, "Fortunately for us all, it takes less space to tell now than it did then!"

To prove this statement, Harriet writes, "I was born and brought up in Kansas City, Missouri. I attended Wells College and the University of Wisconsin (B.A. in French and English and M.A. in Comparative Literature). I spent a year at the University of California compiling documents and took a certificate in French civilization at the Sorbonne.

"After marriage to a Foreign Service officer, I traveled and lived in 32 countries. When stationed in the United States, I spent a total of six years as researcher, then writer and correspondent, for the three magazines, TIME, LIFE and FORTUNE, and three years as Associate

Harriet P. Culley

Producer for CBS Television's Face the Nation, Walter Cronkite's Morning Show and Eric Sevareid's American Week.

"I am now a writer-editor in the Editorial Division of the Bureau of Public Affairs."

Wesley Pedersen brings a unique combination of foreign policy, editorial and publishing expertise to his post on the Editorial Board. An award-winning journalist before joining USIA, he became a policy officer after an eight-year Agency

stint as a foreign affairs analyst writing interpretive columns as Paul L. Ford and Benjamin West while attending a succession of summit and foreign ministers' conferences. Later, in Hong Kong, he headed an Agency publications program producing, for worldwide distribution, original books by authors of such stature as Nobel Prize-winner Pearl S. Buck. Back in Washington, he wrote and directed the publication of "Legacy of a President," a hardcover USIA tribute to the late President Kennedy which became an international best-seller. He also produced a wide array of other publications for the Agency, including magazine-style treatments of topics as diverse as foreign policy, presidential journeys abroad, the arts, American history, and space exploration. In the process, he won a series of professional awards for outstanding government publications and was often called upon to

Wesley Pedersen

direct rush publications projects for the White House. He became Special Projects Officer for USIA's Press and Publications Service in 1969 and in that capacity works closely with communications executives throughout the country to obtain publications materials for newspapers and magazines abroad without cost to the Agency. At the same time, he continues to produce original work and in the past two years has won national first-place honors from the Federal Editors Association both as writer and as photojournalist. Until recently, he even managed to sandwich in a column, "White House Report." He has taught creative communications in university classes. His wife, Angela, is prominent in real estate in Washington and suburban Maryland. Their son, Eric, is a student at the University of Maryland.

Arnold Schifferdecker

Arnold P. Schifferdecker, new to the JOURNAL Editorial Board, majored in journalism and history at the University of Missouri. Arnie served in the Navy from 1959-64 and then joined the Foreign Service. He has served at Istanbul, Tel Aviv and Kabul. His present assignment is Deputy Director, Policy Planning, Bureau of International Organization Affairs. In 1969 Arnie attended the Foreign Service Executive Seminar and, in 1972-73, Princeton University.

Arnie received the Meritorious Honor Award in Kabul in 1971 and was nominated for the Director General's Award for Reporting in 1972.

George F. Sherman, Jr.

George F. Sherman, Jr., FSR-2, was born in Boston and received a B.A. from Dartmouth, a Master of International Affairs from Columbia and a B. Litt. from St. Antony's College, Oxford University. George was traveling correspondent in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union for THE OBSERVER from 1956 to 1960, then served as that paper's US correspondent until February of 1961. The Washington STAR then claimed him as Latin American, European, diplomatic and Pentagon correspondent, successively, until June of 1974. George, who speaks German and Russian, came on duty as information officer, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in the Department in May of 1974 and is now Public Affairs Adviser for that bureau. He and his wife, the former Ann Woodberry, have four children, Deborah, Beth Ann, Justin and Drew.

What the JOURNAL Needs

The JOURNAL needs and welcomes contribution from its readers. These can be in the form of short articles, longer feature articles, communications, book essays and letters to the editor. Photographs for illustration are appreciated, as are suggestions regarding the availability of other illustrative material.

Material should be typewritten, double-spaced, on one side of the paper only. Inclusion of a stamped, self-addressed envelope saves staff time and AFSA's postage.

Letters to the editor should be no more than one typewritten page in length. Communications may run as long as six pages and major articles are from 2500 to 3500 words in length. The Editorial Board welcomes queries on possible subjects for articles.

Send submissions for AFSA NEWS marked as such to the Editor at 2101 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20037 or to the Executive Secretary, AFSA, at Room 3644, New State by the 10th of the month preceding publication.

Who's Who in AFSA's Committees

To enable members to know where to bring their bright ideas to improve various facets of the Service we are publishing a listing of AFSA Committees.

As is the case in the Congress, AFSA Board Members have been heard to remark of their own meetings, "don't worry about the fur flying here, the real work goes on in the committees." In fact the committees have already produced a number of draft agreements which have been approved by the Governing Board, the most prolific Committees to date being Members' Interests and State Precepts.

Persons on these Committees are either carried over from the previous Board, appointed under an eight committee resolution of the new Board on July 24 or appointed from time to time by the Board. While AFSA President Hemenway has suggested a 30-committee structure, the committees as we go to press are 14 in number and chaired as follows: USIA Standing, Paul Blackburn; AID Standing, John Patterson; State Standing, Lars Hydle; Legal, Dick Finn; Members' Interests, Roy Harrell and and Pat Woodring; Financial, JoAnn Jenkins; Grievance, Lars Hydle; Red Top (broadsides), Alf Cooley; Insurance, Alf Cooley; Education, unchaired at present, Dr. Christine Hugerth, pro tem; Journal Liaison, Alf Cooley; Terrorism, Harry Blaney; Foreign Service Club, Bob Feathers; Special Counsellor Search Committee, Dick Harrington.

Members eager to help are welcome. Just ask the Committee Chairman what is needed and make your own suggestions.

FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

Listings in this Special Services column are 40c per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail to Special Services, FSJ, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

GIFTS

THE AAFSW OFFERS an assortment of ten informal notepapers with envelopes depicting five scenes from the Department of State Reception Rooms. They may be obtained at the Housing Office, Room 1248, Department of State, for $3.00, or by mail, AAFSW, Publications Sales Committee, P.O. Box 8068, Washington, D.C. 20024 for $3.25. All proceeds go into the Educational Aid Fund.

REAL ESTATE

BEGG INTERNATIONAL, INC. is the sister company and international real estate counterpart of Begg, Inc., Realtors, who have for so many years assisted FSO's to buy and sell their houses in the Washington area. Begg International specializes in best quality real estate overseas. For your retirement or holiday home in Portugal, Spain, the Caribbean, etc., consult: Begg International, Inc., Realtors, 1714 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009. Tel: (202) 387-4805.

BOOKS

BOOKS ON ASIA, Rare and Out of Print on Asia and Mideast. Catalogue from: Stephen Feldman, Books, 1555 West 11th St., Brooklyn, New York 11204. Books bought on Iran and Afghanistan.

THE OWL AND THE PUSSYCAT Children's Bookshop gives 10% discount on overseas orders. Knowledgeable, personalized service. Large stock of paperbacks, hardbacks. We mail everywhere. New catalogue $1.25. 314 South Ashland Ave., Lexington, Ky. 40502, USA.

EDUCATION

BOYS GRADES 8-12, College preparatory. Christian environment stressing high academic standards and dignity of work. Conservative, structured community with fully resident faculty. Rural setting in mountainous Western North Carolina. Athletic program for all students. Transfer during school year possible. CHRIST SCHOOL, Arden, NC 28704. (704) 684-6232.

Foreign Service People

Deaths

Bell. Elsie C. Bell, FSSO-retired, died on August 23, in San Diego. Miss Bell served as a Captain in the Marine Corps during WWII and joined the Foreign Service in 1947. She served at La Paz, Buenos Aires, San Salvador, Naples, Manila and Beirut before her retirement in 1973.

Cochran. Blake Cochran, FSIO-retired, died on November 5, in Bethesda. Dr. Cochran served as director of Encyclopedia Britannica films in Chicago and New York before joining the State Department in 1949 as an information officer. In 1953 he joined USIA and served at Athens, Amman, Madras and Monrovia before his retirement in 1972. At the time of his retirement he was deputy director of the Near East-South Asia division of VOA. He is survived by his wife Clair, of 7502 Lynn Dr., Chevy Chase, a son and a half-brother. The family suggests that memorial contributions may be made to the Blake Cochran Scholarship Fund, c/o AFSA Scholarship Fund, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Foreign Service juniors at the 1975 AAFSW Book Fair.

Chrysler Export announces the Bicentennial Year Diplomatic Sales Program.

The exact car you want. At a discount price that helps you afford it.

The 1976 cars from Chrysler are something special. From the smallest through the most luxurious, they rank among the best-engineered automobiles available at any price.

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Englewood Cliffs,
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D. C. 20036
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PLYMOUTH
- ☐ Valiant
- ☐ Volaré
- ☐ Fury
- ☐ Gran/Fury
- ☐ CHRYSLER Cordoba
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