THE WEEK WE WENT TO WAR
by Barton J. Bernstein

THE UGLY AMERICAN REVISITED
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AFSA EDITORIAL

A MESSAGE FROM THE NEW AFSA PRESIDENT

I am honored by the Governing Board's decision to appoint me as President of the Association for the remainder of its term.

As a State Representative on the AFSA Board, I have been painfully aware of the problems that have faced your Governing Board as it has attempted to carry out its serious responsibilities in serving you, the members of AFSA. The circumstances we continually encountered are well documented and need not be reviewed here. As President I shall direct my efforts and energies in getting on with the day-to-day business of representing you, of listening to your problems and solving them as they can be solved, and of improving the working conditons and effectiveness of AFSA's membership.

I recognize that the present Board is in its final months of stewardship. There remains much to be done, however, and with the multiple approach of effectiveness, honesty and dignity, I know our Board can and will accomplish much to prove our worth to you. I can honestly state to you that every current Board Member—elected and appointed—is a dedicated competent representative of his or her constitutency. I am proud to serve with them. We have survived much. In our future deliberations on your behalf our differences will be professional and final positions that we take will reflect collectively the best possible, the best attainable, and the best thought out solution.

I do not consider myself to be a lame duck president. With your support I will not be. With your support, we, the Board, will give you honest, dedicated representation. I ask that special interest groups communicate with us on a regular basis as required or desired. An informed Board will have a basis, a consensus, of what is needed by whom. In the same manner, individuals are encouraged to help us in our deliberations. Write to us, come to our meetings, volunteer as you can to help us with your particular expertise, I want your Board to be open in the conduct of its affairs, and you have a necessary, a valuable role to play. The Board *from here foward* will reflect your contributions. To this end, beginning in January 1977, there will be a Board meeting every Tuesday at 12:00 noon in the Levin Library on the second floor of the AFSA headquarters building, unless for some special reason otherwise indicated. Additional meetings will be called when and as necessary.

AFSA in the past has survived slings and arrows cast about. We will do more than merely survive now. I hope you will find my performance as your President satisfactory and timely. I look forward to serving you in the months ahead.

Patricia A. Woodring
AFSA President

(Approved by the Governing Board at its December 14 Meeting).

LEGAL DEFENSE

This month's *AFSA News* describes the activities of the Association since Mr. Hemenway's recall took effect on November 17. This issue also reports, on page 39, on Mr. Hemenway's continuing lawsuit against the Association and individual members of the Governing Board and the Recall Committee, which makes it impossible for the Association to put the matter completely behind us.

That legal action, by Mr. Hemenway and four other AFSA Members, was initially aimed at stopping the counting of the recall election votes. That failed, and the Membership expressed its will decisively, in the largest percentage turnout ever in an AFSA election, by a vote of 94 percent in favor of recall. The Governing Board had hoped that this would resolve the matter, and appealed to the plaintiffs on November 23 to drop their lawsuit to avoid further substantial legal costs. But the plaintiffs persist, seeking to return Mr. Hemenway to office and obtain $100,000 for him in "compensatory and punitive" damages.

The plaintiffs' disregard of the expressed will of the Membership, the lack of substantive merit in their allegations, and their failure to exhaust, or even to pursue, less costly administrative remedies through the Employee-Management Relations Commission and the Department of Labor, make this matter more than just a dispute of the type in which an association such as ours could normally expect to be involved. This lawsuit is nothing less than an attack on AFSA's ability to represent its Membership, and State and AID Foreign Service employees, under Executive Order 11636; and an attack on the right of these employees to be represented effectively. Therefore, we believe that it is necessary and proper to appeal directly to Members for contributions to meet the costs of litigation, as we did to fight the AID RIF and to establish the tax deductibility of home-leave expenses.

Over the longer term we hope that members will contribute regularly to the AFSA Legal Defense Fund, building it into a formidable war chest for legal fights on issues affecting the interests of our Membership and the Foreign Service and the effectiveness of the Association itself. There is a box for such contributions on the AFSA membership application and we suggest that the Fund would be an excellent beneficiary for profits from the sale overseas of automobiles and other personal property. We are taking steps to ensure that contributions to the AFSA Legal Defense Fund may be treated as deductions for taxable income on federal income tax returns.

But the need is immediate, for funds to defend AFSA *et al* against Hemenway *et al.* Please let us have your contribution as soon as possible.

"To my mind, the arguments put forward in favor of maintaining USIA as a separate agency are outweighed by the disadvantages."
—Hans N. Tuch

USIA: A COUNTER PROPOSAL

GUNTHER K. ROSINUS

In "Tom" Tuch's well presented proposal for the joining of USIA with State, he puts the cart before the horse, for me, at least. He brushes aside too lightly, I fear, the overriding objection to this move that he himself lists in his essay: the ultimately crushing effect of subjecting an operational Agency all down the line to the clearance and supervisory role of a bureaucracy whose orientation and psychological makeup point—quite legitimately—in an almost opposite direction.

More of that below; but Tom must know from his own experience what an immense rush there would be by our best FSIOs out of the public affairs cone or cones and into the economic or political ones should an amalgamation with State take place. A keen nose for survival will surely undermine optimistic constructions of equality under one roof. ACDA and AID are hardly cheerful examples; and Tom has only to recall his own fairly recent service with a principal officer who, in the weekly senior officer sessions would, with typical delicacy, always refer to POL and ECON as the "substantive" sections while leaving no doubt that USIS, along with ADMIN and CON, presumably, belonged to the *non*-substantive side of the ledger.

USIA's lack of recognition should not be attributed to its somewhat truncated independence, but rather to our inability over the 23 years to develop a consistent concept of public affairs from which some logical and permanent operational and organizational imperatives could flow. Let me venture to suggest such a concept, somewhat in "action memorandum" fashion. There is no quarrel with Tom's central point that USIA and the cultural component of State should be joined—but this should be outside State and under USIA, precisely as they have long been joined in large measure overseas under the supervision of the PAO. That worthy creation, incidentally, somewhat like the sturdy bureaucracy under five French republics, has run well-integrated public affairs programs for more than two decades. And this despite the unrealistic domestic separation of the cultural and informational components and despite the even more unrealistic, repetitive and largely irrelevant annual debates within our own Agency whether USIS program orientation around the world should be more one than the other. This futile flagellation back home stems from that

Mr. Rosinus joined the State Department in 1951 and USIA in 1965. He has served in Japan, Germany, Brazil and the Philippines.

same lack of concept lamented above. So let us try:

On a Permanent Concept and Role for the United States Information Agency

The Problem: An Agency after 23 years of existence without effective morale, with frequently changing, uneven leadership, with no consistent concept of public affairs to guide its operations, with little standing in the foreign affairs community and the frequent subject of debilitating studies with invariably shelved recommendations.

The Assumption: That America's national security—i.e., the preservation of our democratic ways and values—rests ultimately and essentially in a world environment pluralistic in nature, largely free of ideology-driven behavior, and containing as many "open societies" as possible; that this basic security goal must be consciously served by our diplomacy; and that therefore the sum total of our official international information and cultural activities and exchanges known as "public affairs" is as integral a dimension of American diplomacy as the economic, political and military dimensions.

The Operational Concept: That the essential purpose of this public affairs dimension of diplomacy is to help preserve and project the Open Society and to explain the foreign and domestic policies that flow from ours; that as corollary to this the most basic public affairs function everywhere must therefore be the maintenance and development of effective channels of communication with and among relevant public and private sectors; and that this exercise must employ in cohesive fashion all the tools of international communication and exchanges now available to us.

The Organization: Removal from the Department of State and inclusion in the United States Information Agency of all cultural and exchange activities currently administered by the Department but invariably managed overseas by USIS personnel. Some current duplication of personnel and functions could be eliminated in this amalgamation.

State-USIA Relations: Retain the Washington separation and, in the field, the large current degree of operational autonomy under the general guidance of the ambassador. Initiative and efficiency are best preserved in this way. The element of our diplomacy dedicated to operations, exposition and the stimulation of controversy and debate is not best served by submerging it within a larger bureaucracy dedicated to observation, reporting, careful phrasing and the smoothing or avoidance of controversy. Collegiality is a far better setting for creativity—and even for creative tension—than subordination. For the longer run, frequent functional interchange throughout the career ladder among officers in political, economic and public affairs should be instituted to build a well-integrated foreign affairs leadership and a pool of talent properly conversant with all the major dimensions of our diplomacy. Then and only then, when good intentions have become tested reality, will the time have arrived to consider possible alternatives to our domestic separation.

In brief, then, the impulse toward separation 23 years ago was sound but, like most half-way measures, it was not enough. Rather than sneaking back into the tent now, let's try it all the way.

"How happy he who crowns in shades like these,
A youth of labour with an age of ease."
—Oliver Goldsmith

Hiring myself an employer

NANCY COLE

During the spring of 1976 graduating college students throughout the United States participated in an annual scramble for employment. Many, like myself, were looking for entry-level positions in government or business that would provide opportunities for international work. Accordingly, many scrambling students applied for appointment as junior Foreign Service officers (FSOs).

The process was anything but a novel one for me in 1976. I first took the FSO written exam in December 1972, in the hope of joining the Foreign Service upon the completion of my bachelor's degree in economics the following spring. My scores that year were good enough to qualify for the oral examination. Anxious as I was to join up, I flew from Houston to Washington, D.C., at my own expense, for the oral exam. Like many other candidates, I found the oral to be a very unnerving experience. When the head examiner called me back to the examination room to give me the oral panel's decision, I had already prepared myself for the news that I did not pass.

Not to be deterred, however, I asked how I might better prepare myself for a second attempt at passing the oral. My examiner suggested three things: (a) wait until I was older to reapply, (b) accumulate relevant work experience, and (c) consider obtaining a master's degree in international relations. Suggestion (a) came naturally enough, without any special effort on my part. As for suggestion (b), I went to work for a year at the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) as an

Continued on page 28

Nancy Cole is a Fulbright-Hays graduate study grantee in Ecuador, studying Andean pact regulations on foreign investment until August of this year. She received her Master of Public Affairs from Woodrow Wilson School in 1976.

1950 marked the end of an uneasy peace in the Land of Morning Calm

the week we went to war: American Intervention in the Korean Civil War

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

[Until June 25, 1950] the view was generally held that since the Communists had far from exhausted the potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pressure and intimidation, such means would probably continue to be used rather than overt military aggression.

It was fully realized that the timing of any move in Korea would be ordered from the Kremlin.

Dean Acheson, 1951

The attack upon Korea makes it plain. . . .that communism has passed beyond the use of subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and war.

Harry S. Truman, June 27, 1950

At 4 a.m. on Sunday morning (Korean time), June 25, 1950, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) launched a bombardment against the Republic of Korea (ROK), according to the ROK, and at about 6 a.m. crossed the 38th parallel to attack the South's armies. During the early hours, the reports from the battle area were piecemeal and often unsure, and did not conclusively indicate that it was a massive attack. At General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo, officers first judged the conflict another "incident"—one of the many ongoing border clashes between the forces of the North and South in the recently divided Korea. By late morning, however, Pyongyang charged that the ROK had initiated the attack and that the North Korean forces had responded strongly to the assault.

In Washington (14 hours behind Korean time), at 9:26 p.m. on Saturday, the State Department received from its Ambassador in Korea, John J. Muccio, its first official news of the attack: "According to [South] Korean Army reports which are partly confirmed by [US] Korean Military Advisory Group field advisor reports, North Korean forces invaded Republic of Korea territory at several points this morning"—at Ongjin, Kaesong, and Chunchon, and south of Kangnung. "It would appear from the nature of the attack and the manner in which it was launched," Muccio tentatively concluded, "that it constitutes an all-out offensive against the Republic of Korea."

Shortly before midnight, Secretary of State Dean Acheson telephoned President Harry S. Truman, then in Independence, Missouri. "I have very serious news," the Secretary reported. "The North Koreans have invaded South Korea." Acheson did not contend that it was a full-scale attack, but he treated it as more than just another border clash. Upon the Secretary's advice, Truman decided not to rush back to Washington, because the information was still skimpy, but approved Acheson's strategy that the United States should bring the matter of the invasion before the United Nations Security Council on Sunday.

By early Sunday morning (Washington time), the situation in Korea was still confused, but not bleak. American officials could find evidence for their cherished notion that the South Korean forces could resist the invasion. Ambassaador Muccio, who had warned in early June that the South's armies were weak, told Americans in Seoul that "Korean officials and Security Forces are handling the situation calmly and with ability. There is no reason for alarm. As yet, it cannot be determined whether the north-

Barton J. Bernstein, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University, is the author of "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconsidered: The Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945" (1975) and the editor of, among other volumes, "Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration" (1970). He is writing a series of studies on WWII and postwar foreign policy.

ern communists intend. . . .all-out warfare." KMAG officers were widely quoted that the attack had been "virtually stopped." One South Korean official lamented, "Our only cause for dissatisfaction is that there has been no order to advance into the North. By tomorrow morning," he predicted, "we shall have defeated them completely."

During the next five days (June 26-30) these hopes slowly collapsed. In incremental steps, Truman committed American forces —first, the Air Force and Navy, then the Army—to the battle. By Friday, the 30th, America was substantially engaged in its first shooting war since 1945. It was an undeclared war ("a police action," said Truman) without formal congressional approval, but with widespread popular and informal Congressional support in the early months.

The war dramatically altered the course of American foreign policy, promptly spurring the Administration to redefine other commitments: to increase military aid to the French in Indo-China, to reverse its position (disengagement) on Formosa and to support Chiang Kai-shek, to expand its military aid to Europe and to push for substantial European rearmament, and to escalate its military budget—the enactment, in effect, of National Security Council (NSC) document 68. The Truman administration, following the counsel of Acheson, was girding for a long struggle with the Soviet Union and seeking to organize and strengthen the "free world." America would have to create an international environment in which the American system of democratic capitalism could flourish.

Even a quarter century after the outbreak of the war, many of the critical questions remain in dispute: Who started the war? If North Korea, as seems most likely, why? Did the Soviet Union know about the scheduled attack and even initiate the scheme? Why did American policy makers assume that the Soviets had conceived the scheme? Why did policy makers in June commit their nation to a large-scale armed intervention? After defining Korea as outside America's "defense perimeter" as late as January 1950, why did they reverse themselves in June? What was the role of NSC-68 in their thinking?

Who Started the War?

Did the North or South start the war? Some analysts suggest that the events in Korea on the 25th are too unclear to allow any conclusion. They point out that the accusations against the North depend basically on South Korean reports (not American or UN observers), and a few writers even contend that Syngman Rhee, president of the ROK, may have started the war to force the United States into buttressing his position both within the South and against the North.

"In view of this evidence, Rhee had good reason to be cautious and fearful —unless he was suicidal, which he was not. His frantic pleas during the first week of war underline how unsure he was that Truman would commit troops to defend the South."

These analysts are technically correct on some matters. There is no *impartial* direct evidence (reported observations) on who started the war. The reports by American and UN observers rely upon South Korea's claims for the critical period (4 a.m. to 6 a.m.) or describe events after the outbreak of the conflict. And it is true, the way matters turned out, that the embattled Rhee, whose party had just lost the election, gained greatly from American intervention.

Yet, the indirect evidence indicates that North Korea, not South, started the war on the 25th. A UN field report of the 24th (filed later) by two Australians who observed the South Korean army, concluded, it "is organized entirely for defense and is in no condition to carry out attack on large scale." The lack of air support, armor, and heavy artillery would make "any action with object of invasion. . . .impossible." The report also noted that North Korea "had recently removed. . . .civilians from areas adjoining the [38th] parallel [, that] there was increased [Northern] military activity. . . .about four kilometers north parallel [, and that North Korea had taken possession of] salients on south side parallel, occupation in at least one case being of fairly recent date." This information, when viewed in retrospect, suggests DPRK preparation for an attack.

Even though Rhee had threatened repeatedly to unify the country by arms and had good reason to want to increase American support, it is unlikely that he initiated the war. Despite MacArthur's affection for him, and the friendly visit in June by John Foster Dulles, a special representative of the State Department, Rhee did not have ample evidence for believing that the United States would come to his aid with troops if the North attacked. In fact, there was substantial evidence to suggest that the United States would probably abandon him: the recent reluctance of Congress to provide military and economic aid; the Truman administration's suspicion of him and its pleas for less repression; the warning in May by Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that the Communists would force the United States to quit South Korea; and Acheson's refusal the next day to "say whether the United States might have to abandon South Korea to Russia." In view of this evidence, Rhee had good reason to be cautious and fearful—unless he was suicidal, which he was not. His frantic pleas during the first week of war underline how unsure he was that Truman would commit troops to defend the South.

In the months before June, Rhee knew that his military forces would be at a decided disadvantage in any sustained battle with the North—a point that South Korean officials emphasized in the spring. In January 1950, according to official American sources, North Korea had begun rapidly expanding her formerly "defensive-type" army into an offensive force. The Russians supplied about 150 tanks, some heavy artillery, and a small tactical air force—equipment that made the North considerably

stronger than the ROK, which lacked tanks and combat planes. Partly because the Truman administration feared that Rhee might attack the DPRK, he was left without adequate supplies for an invasion to unify the country.

Other evidence supports the conclusion that the North started the war and offers likely motives. Nikita Khrushchev's memoir reports that Kim Il Sung, premier of the DPRK, had informed Stalin in late 1949 that he wanted to act to unify Korea. "The North Koreans wanted to prod South Korea with the point of a bayonet. Kim Il Sung said that the first poke would touch off an internal explosion in South Korea and that the power of the people would prevail, that is, the power which ruled in North Korea."

Khrushchev's recollection, as well as some military evidence, indicates that the North Korean government expected that its strong attack, and its quick capture of Seoul, would unleash the anticipated revolution in the South. Probably for this reason, the North Korean government did not originally give its attacking divisions orders to go beyond Seoul, and the North did not await mobilization of its full army but used only seven of 13-15 divisions in the attack. Even Kim Il Sung's calls in earlier June for the overthrow of Rhee, unification, and elections can be interpreted within the framework of the anticipated revolution.

The South had long faced an internal revolutionary threat. An official American army history describes "an organized guerrilla movement" in the South, and notes by late 1949 that deserters from the ROK army, guerrillas from the South, and infiltrators from the North "were attacking villages and installations and becoming . . . a grave threat to the internal security of . . . [South] Korea." So great were the problems, according to a recently declassified KMAG report, that 30 per cent of the South's forces were engaged in trying to put down the rebellion in late 1949.

When Rhee's supporters suffered a massive defeat in the May elections, Kim Il Sung could find additional evidence that an upheaval in the South was likely: Rhee and his cohorts would be cast out of office, and the divided country would be reunited. "Kim had believed," according to Khrushchev, "that South Korea was blanketed with Party organizations and that the people would rise up in revolt when the Party gave the signal." According to a Japanese study, Communist agents from the South reported that the party was strong, that there were about 500,000 in the underground, and that "members were asking them to start a war and invade the ROK as soon as possible. This was a major reason why [Kim] decided to attack the ROK." Later, the leader of the Southern faction, Pak Honyong, was indicted by Kim for, among other charges, falsely reporting in 1950 that the South was ready to overthrow Rhee.

Undoubtedly North Korea did not expect a speedy—if any—armed American intervention in the civil war. If the expected revolution had developed in the South, such intervention would have lacked the patina of legitimacy and, more importantly, would have been logistically very difficult, if not impossible, because there would have been no safe landing area for American troops. Even aside from logistical difficulties, American intervention should have seemed unlikely to Kim Il Sung, as it did to Rhee. The American withdrawal of troops in mid-1949 implied that Korea was not an area of significant interest for the United States. The presence of a 500-member American military advisory group and the continuation of economic aid were inadequate, despite an Administration claim, "to deter overt moves on the part of neighboring powers." Statements by Acheson and MacArthur, among others, excluding Korea from the American defense perimeter seemed to confirm that Korea was of marginal concern to America. Who would have made much of Acheson's implication in his January 1950 speech that South Korea would have to rely for assistance "upon the commitments of the entire civilized world under . . . the United Nations," and that this action might mean American intervention? Moreover, with only four under-trained divisions in Japan, and a relatively small army already strained perilously thin by global obligations, the United States did not seem prepared for military intervention in Korea. In view of all this evidence, why then should not the North have sought to achieve what Rhee periodically threatened but could not accomplish—unification of the country? The civil war, abetted by the revolution in the South, promised speedy success.

The Role of the Soviet Union

Did the Soviets originate or accede to the North Korean attack? Khrushchev claims that Stalin "had his doubts about a North Korean attack but acceded to it . . . the war wasn't Stalin's idea but Kim Il Sung's." The prospects of uniting a divided country under communism, establishing a counterweight to Mao's China, emboldening Japan's communist party, assisting a liberation movement, and nibbling away at American power—all should have seemed attractive but not risky to the usually cautious Stalin. He thought, according to Khrushchev, that the United States would not intervene if the war was fought and won swiftly.

Did Stalin know when the North Koreans would attack? Or did Kim "jump the gun"? There are various reasons—indirect evidence—suggesting that Stalin was surprised by the early date of the attack. First, and most important, the Soviets did not even return to the United Nations and temporarily end their boycott (on the issue of seating Communist China) to block the American-sponsored resolutions on the 25th charging North Korea with a "breach of the peace" and on the 27th urging aid for the ROK. Had Stalin known the scheduled date for the attack, he would have probably prepared for the first meeting of the Security Council and most certainly for the second meeting. Given the Soviets' concern about legalism and their fear that the UN was an American-controlled instrument, Stalin had good reason to want to block these resolutions. It would not have been difficult. A simple strategy could have been devised. Since North Korea claimed that Rhee had started the war, the Soviets could easily have endorsed that charge, delayed a vote in the Security

Council for a few days, and demanded that Kim's government, as well as Rhee's, be heard by the UN. Not only did the Soviets seem unprepared in the UN, but they seemed so surprised by the outbreak of the war that they even delayed a few days in commenting on its origins and, in line with Kim, charging Rhee with aggression. Had they known that the DPRK would attack on the 25th, they would not have floundered for a few days.

American Analysis of Soviet Responsibility

Why did American policy makers assume that the Soviets had planned the attack? Despite Acheson's earlier thoughts of ultimately prying China out of her alliance with the Soviet Union, American leaders assumed comfortably that the Soviet Union orchestrated nearly all major events in the Communist world—certainly matters of aggression. Since North Korea was a Soviet satellite, according to Washington, no one doubted that this analysis fit the events of late June.

NSC-68, of which Acheson was the spiritual father, confirmed and dramatized this mode of thinking. Put together primarily by Paul Nitze of the Policy Planning Staff in the winter and early spring of 1949-50, NSC-68 contended that "the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith . . . and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world . . . . To that end Soviet efforts are now directed toward the domination of the Eurasian land mass." NSC-68 warned that "the Communist success in China, taken with the politico-economic situation in the rest of South and South-East Asia, provides a springboard for the further incursion in this troubled area." Indo-China and the Philippines, by implication, were in danger. With a minor revision, the general analysis, when stretched geographically, could easily include Korea as an endangered region.

The document foresaw the dangers of "piecemeal aggression," which the United States lacked the conventional forces to resist. The Soviet Union—employing aggression by satellites or subversion—could nibble away at sections of the "free world." The United States, with her depleted conventional forces, would not be able to halt these encroachments. The choice for America would be painful—acquiescence or nuclear weapons.

For Acheson and Nitze, Stalin's goals were insatiable expansion, ultimate conquest of the rest of the world. He would probe and test, exploit areas of weakness, nibble at the West, and slowly spread the Communist menace. It was a doctrine in 1949-50 that sounded remarkably like the analysis of the famous "Mr. X" essay ("The Sources of Soviet Conduct"), published in 1947 by George Kennan. By 1949-50, however, Kennan and Charles Bohlen had modified—even repudiated—parts of the "Mr. X" analysis, and they objected to NSC-68 on various grounds. They viewed the Soviet Union, in Bohlen's words, as "largely motivated by its interests as a national state, and that the idea of spreading Communism was secondary to such considerations."

> "In addition, in the case of Formosa, Acheson may still have had serious doubts about ending the policy of disengagement. . ."

Despite these disagreements on the goals and nature of Soviet policy, none in the high ranks of government questioned the conclusion that Stalin had planned North Korea's attack; but some—notably Kennan and Bohlen—challenged Acheson's thesis that the war was part of some "grand design." They rejected that conception. "NSC-68's misconception of Soviet aims," wrote Bohlen, "misled . . . Dean Acheson and others in interpreting the Korean war." It was not, Bohlen and Kennan contended, the beginning of a new phase of Soviet policy: attacks by satellite armies elsewhere. "The Soviet action in Korea," in Bohlen's words, "was limited strictly to Korea."

Kennan argued that Stalin was responding primarily to the proposed American peace treaty with Japan, which excluded the Soviet Union and guaranteed a longterm, formidable American military presence in the Pacific. "For some reason this connection—the idea that in doing things disagreeable to our interests the Russians might be reacting to features of our own behavior—was one to which the mind of official Washington would always be strangely resistant," wrote Kennan. "Our adversaries had always to be demonic, monstrous," he complained. "It was unthinkable that we, by admitting that they sometimes reacted to what we did, should confess to a share in the responsibility for their behavior." At the time and later, Acheson deemed this analysis fanciful, bizarre, and wrong-headed, and in late June the Secretary also barred Kennan from the high-level meetings with Truman.

Even Kennan and Bohlen, who challenged some of the assumptions about the war, would not endorse what now seems a more reasonable interpretation of that conflict: it was a civil war, initiated by the North for its own purposes, and approved by Stalin, despite some doubts. It was not a Soviet-directed or initiated scheme. Much of the explanation of the war lies in an understanding of politics in Korea and especially in the DPRK. Unfortunately the Cold War thinking of 1949-50, with the assumptions that satellites in both the Soviet and American camps lacked the capacity to initiate bold ventures, made it impossible for most Americans—both policy makers and attentive citizens—to formulate an interpretation that rested upon an analysis of politics in Korea.

American Decisions for War

By Sunday, the 25th, in Washington, the evidence began to accumulate that the North Korean at-

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"The old universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion and sacrifice."—William Faulkner

William Faulkner-STAG

(Short Term American Grantee)

JACK H. SHELLENBERGER

It is hard to separate the fantasy from the reality. That he came to Japan in the summer of 1955 is real enough. A certain Japanese inn in the hill city of Nagano has a plaque at the reception desk which says so—the only American guest in the inn's history so honored.

I remember his leaving because it was handled as if he was arriving. USIS was making a documentary film based on Faulkner's brief essay entitled "Impressions of Japan." The essay surfaced in the final days of his six-week stay and we faced the problem of making it the basis for a film, with the author, of course, depicted as arriving at those impressions.

Northwest Orient Airlines cooperated. Faulkner got to the airport early for his departure. He was hurried through the formalities, rushed into a DC-7 and then told to leave the aircraft at the head of a procession of American Embassy staffers and their wives and children. This was filmed as was a simulated press conference at Haneda Airport's VIP room. The questioners were USIS locals whose jottings in Kanji and Hiragana ideographs reflected something of what the novelist had stated in the essay.

This reversal from reality was nothing new to Faulkner. He had worked in Hollywood as a screenwriter.

I recall him sitting in the rear seat of a car which was being bounced up and down by hand; a branch of a tree was waved rhythmically to cast its shadow upon the car and the novelist. Through the lens of a fixed movie camera, the idea that Faulkner was being driven through Japan's countryside was conveyed. He tolerated all of this; patiently, even stoically, but not out of obligation. Some might have assumed so, given what occurred during his first days in Tokyo.

Faulkner arrived tired after a 30-hour flight from California. Time change affected a metabolism unused to more than summer's early dawn and the late coming of darkness to a Mississippi farm.

The plane was late and the welcoming reception at Tokyo's International House began within an hour of the novelist's arrivial.

The guest list was impressive enough. But not as extensive or prestigious as the American Ambassador's affair scheduled for the following evening. Faulkner made his appearance at International House and retired quickly, pleading exhaustion. Wholly justified. No incident.

The following morning a courtesy call on the Ambassador was the first appointment. It went badly. Faulkner had slept little and poorly. He did not really want to meet the American Ambassador. And, arriving late, he terminated the conversation suddenly by rushing to a toilet. The Ambassador is reported to have been understanding in a pursed-lip sort of way.

The Foreign Correspondents Club of Tokyo planned that day's luncheon in honor of William Faulkner without regard for decor or menu but with considerable concern about seating space. The announcement went out to members in the usual nondescript mimeographed form several weeks in advance.

In those days, Tokyo was not the watering spot for celebrities that it is today. The number of takers at the equivalent of $4.00 a head was unprecedented, save, as one old-timer remarked, when General Douglas MacArthur was rumored to be feted on the occasion of his recall. The General did not show.

Neither did Faulkner.

Picture 400 journalists and their guests squeezed into the club's limited dining space for a relatively expensive but unexceptional lunch. Note how they glance at the head table and the empty chair of the one to be honored this day. Every opening of the main door stops conversation for an instant as nobodies slip in embarrassed by what they assume to be their tardiness.

The eating is done, and coffee cups are refilled. "Members, friends of the Foreign Correspondents Club!" The attention is unusually rapt. "I won't say anything more. And I gladly turn the microphone over to Leon Picon, Cultural Affairs Officer of the United States Embassy."

The applause is negligible. The murmuring noisy. Not one person in the room now doubted the rumors that had flown since Faulk-

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ner's Tokyo arrival.

Leon did his best. He mentioned the long flight and the heavy schedule, and Faulkner's personal regrets. And then as a sincere, but, under the circumstances, somewhat limp gesture, he invited everyone's attention to the sheet of paper now being passed out (by me and other USIS junior officers). It was a reproduction of Faulkner's acceptance statement on receiving the 1949 Nobel Prize for Literature. Leon then proceeded to read the statement. Its nobility of tone and directness of sentiment make it a classic, worth hearing and quoting from again and again. But in Tokyo that day, it was no substitute.

That evening, the Ambassador's tolerance, already strained by what he'd learned about the Correspondents Club affair, was further tested. The turnout of Tokyo's intellectual, political and diplomatic establishment was above average. Not that Faulkner's works were that well known. But here was America's first Nobel Prize for literature winner ever to visit Japan. Japan would honor a laureate of such stature.

The Residence glittered with the assemblage. Faulkner nearly missed it all. How he arrived is as unclear as is the timing. He was too late to stand in the receiving line (the Cultural Attaché was his stand-in and unintentionally convinced many that he was the novelist). The Ambassador and his wife, not unlike those in a similar circumstance, who had invited and planned and laid out an elaborate reception with extra help and a catered buffet, were less than amused by his late arrival.

Faulkner finally appeared, dazed and uncomfortable. He greeted his hosts and promptly downed a drink. It was his first. It was his last. To potted plants in an out-of-the-way alcove, he fled, and got sick behind them. Among those who observed his furtiveness was, of course, the Ambassador. "Get him up and out, quickly and quietly," was the reported instruction to his Cultural Attaché whose career high in finally delivering a leading American novelist under United States Governmental auspices to a significant overseas audience had been reduced to a rebuke.

On the morning of the third day of Faulkner's projected six-week visit, a special meeting was convened in the Ambassador's office. "I want him out of here within 24 hours!" That was how the meeting began. It ended a short time later in something of a compromise. In bureaucratese, it could be summed up as follows: If Faulkner failed to meet any single commitment during the remainder of his stay, or should his conduct prevent him from meeting the requirements of whatever that commitment entailed, then, not only would William Faulkner return to the United States, but he would be accompanied by certain key USIS officers whose Japan tours would be prematurely terminated.

"He [the writer] must teach himself that the basest of all things is to be afraid; and, teaching himself that, forget it forever, leaving no room in his workshop for anything but the old verities and truths of the heart, the old universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion and sacrifice."
—December 10, 1950

Interviews with Japanese literary critics and intellectuals had been scheduled, an entire day set aside for them. It was Faulkner's last day in Tokyo before traveling—either to Nagano in the hills of central Japan and the long planned seminar on American Literature or to Haneda Airport and a flight home to Mississippi.

"Just get in on the sessions," I was told. "Keep track of the time. Make sure the schedule is observed." So it was that I found myself at nine o'clock on a steamy August morning, sitting in a large USIS office with the novelist and an interpreter. The Japanese critics were scheduled in and out of the office at 30 to 40 minute intervals. I felt silly if not guilty under the circumstances, but also immensely lucky to eavesdrop on conversations with a literary giant.

"What phases of Japan do you wish to explore, Mr. Faulkner?

"Can the soul be evil, and if so where is truth?

"What is the task of the writer?

"How do you like Ernest Hemingway?

"Why did you write *Sanctuary*?"

"To buy a horse," was the novelist's answer to the latter. As for the other questions, what was impressive and revealing to me was Faulkner's utter lack of boredom or condescension. He seemed to welcome the questions, responding fully and creatively to all that was asked of him in a soft voice and sincere manner. I was amazed at his patience and struck by his subtlety in drawing from his questioners insights about Japan and *its* intellectual life.

The morning passed quickly. During a break, we stood on a balcony outside the office and gazed down at a pair of scavengers picking through the rubble of a war-destroyed building. "They have their work and their reasons," he muttered, adding "those bricks are exceptional having withstood so much heat. Get some for yourself." (I did and they have accompanied us as support for a slab of mahogany to three continents.)

Lunch was in-family. Picon, and another who had staked his job on the Faulkner visit, the novelist, and me. The Union Club was an American military officers' facility nearby. Leon rushed us past the noisy bar and then moved from dining area to the snackbar chattering about how great the cheeseburgers were and ostentatiously suggesting milkshakes all around.

"Beer," stated Mr. Faulkner. "Beer it shall be," said Leon, resignedly. He motioned me to join him in the Men's Room. "For God sakes, try to siphon his beer! Even a little will affect him. I don't care how you do it. . ."

We returned to the table as the

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"We have had no novel called *The Ugly Senator*. Nor have we had *The Ugly Journalist, The Ugly Barrister*, or even *The Ugly Ad Man*. But we might have. Like the Foreign Service, each of these professions has its share of misfits, mischief-makers, buffoons and shirkers." — J. William Fulbright

The Ugly American Revisited

DINO J. CATERINI

America loves any anniversary that is divisible by five: witness the Bicentennial. And yet three years ago, the anniversary of a very important event went by unnoticed—the fifteenth anniversary of the publication of *The Ugly American* by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, the best-seller *par excellence* of the Cold War years.

Looking back at the Cold War from the vantage point of détente, it's hard to recreate the impact of *The Ugly American* in 1958. And for those who think the book is a mere relic of the past, here's news for you: *The Ugly American* is alive and well and living—in the American psyche. Though I think the time has come to eradicate the premises upon which it was based, it won't be easy, for few books have ever made a more lasting impression on the American mind.

A fast-moving story with plenty of action, *The Ugly American* drilled into the American consciousness with the force of a jackhammer cutting through sand. It had Zowee and Zoom. Power. Force. The book packed a wallop, pushing its way into the American psyche with the POP! WHAM! BAM! of a Superman comic strip.

When the New York *Herald Tribune* called it a "bombshell," it wasn't kidding. The blast threw shock waves throughout the world, shaking up an America that had become fat and complacent in the middle '50s.

"If the book's message seems too severe," Jim Walls wrote in the San Francisco *Chronicle*, "this reviewer for one doesn't think it goes far enough."

Percy Wood of the Chicago *Sunday Tribune* agreed, writing "We do send a lot of fatheads to the far east as our diplomatic and economic representatives, as this reviewer has reason to know, and the authors of *The Ugly American* have done a good job of blowing the whistle on them."

The respected New York *Times* gave the book an unqualified endorsement. Robert Trumbull, the *Times* reviewer, said, "The collaboration of this experienced pair produced a book that is not only important but constantly entertaining. . . . The attack on American policy in Asia this book makes is clothed in sharp characterizations, frequently humorous incidents and perceptive descriptions of the countries and people where action occurs."

Action: that's the key word. For *The Ugly American* set the scene for "diplomacy as action"—the precursor of an era of active diplomacy that led directly to Vietnam.

But *The Ugly American* as a book is certainly dead, you say, a passé remnant of the nostalgic '50s.

Negative.

Item: *The Ugly American* is still in print. It sold more than a thousand copies in hard cover last year and 120,000 copies were published in paperback as well.

Item: Monarch Press has published a critique on the book in its Monarch Notes series which is aimed at college students as a study aid. Why? Because the book is taught in many courses in American Literature on many college campuses. Other Monarch Notes cover such literary greats as Shakespeare, Aristotle, Chekhov, Chaucer, Dostoevsky, Twain, etc.

Item: On the Metroliner to New York recently, the lady sitting next to me strikes up a conversation. When she discovers I am in the Foreign Service, she says, "What a coincidence! I was just reading *The Ugly American* last week. And now, what happens? I meet an American diplomat for the first time in my life." She was delighted with the chance to get the "inside story." She sized me up for the rest of the trip, comparing me to the people in the book. In the end, she granted I was more "human" than the characters she had been reading about—but that was as far as she'd go. Her reference to me as "human" irritated me, forcing me to reflect about the book and my career. What was *The Ugly American* all about anyway, I asked myself. What was the secret behind its success? For the book was nothing if not successful. It was one of those books whose time had come, a best-seller in the original sense of the word: it sold well.

The book was first published in

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hardback by W. W. Norton in October 1958. It quickly became a main selection of the Book of the Month Club, and a paperback edition was put out by Fawcett. Between the hardbound and the paperback sales, the book sold more than 2,500,000 copies during its first three years of publication.

Almost overnight, the book's title worked its way into the everyday language of America. It was the *in* book of its day and its influence was great.

Why? Because it was published at precisely the right moment in time. Only a year earlier—in October 1957—the Russians electrified the world with their bombshell of a propaganda victory: Sputnik. With the launching of the first man-made satellite, Russia—in one brilliant stroke—put America on the defensive. We began to question ourselves—and especially our foreign policies—and *The Ugly America* rode the crest of the Sputnik backlash.

The Ugly American was the kind of book that spoke to the gut. It shook people up and it gave them the answers: we weren't sending the right kinds of people overseas. We needed movers and shakers, men and women who spoke the local language and weren't afraid to act. The book didn't pull any punches, and because it was read and believed, it influenced a whole generation of Americans as few other books did.

As literature, the book was controversial from the start. There was much discussion at the time as to whether *The Ugly American* was really a novel at all. There was no story-line or plot to the book in the traditional sense; instead, the book, in essence, was a series of short vignettes. Each vignette was meant to make a point and to make it stick; each chapter had a "moral" akin in style to the ancient morality tales.

An analysis of a few chapters will give the flavor of the book and show what I mean. For example, in Chapter 3, entitled "Nine Friends," Father Finian, a Catholic priest, fights against Communism in Upper Burma. Father Finian studies the Burmese language and Burmese culture; he learns to eat the native food. He sees Communism as a secular religion but he knows he cannot fight Communism unless the local natives—in this case the Kachins—are willing to do so themselves. He knows the natives do not trust white men and that the worst thing he can do is to try to "tell them what to do." They must see the light themselves. He gets nine trustworthy native friends together to discuss the Communist problem in their area and to abide by whatever decision they may make. "This was, he was sure, the first time that these men had ever been told by a white man that a big and important decision was entirely their own . . . and would be followed by the white man." The nine natives are all Catholics who see Communism as a menace to their religion. They decide to organize against the local Communists, and above all to set up an anti-Communist intelligence gathering team. They do so and in the end are successful in discrediting the local Communists.

MORAL: An American who lives with the natives, knows the local language, eats the food, understands the customs and is not paternalistic can organize the natives into a coherent group capable of defeating the Communists.

Chapters can be picked out at random and the moral always emerges clearly at the end. Take Chapter 11, for example, entitled "The Iron of War." In it, Major James "Tex" Wolchek is an American army observer attached to the French army in Vietnam. His body holds pieces of iron from two previous wars—World War II and Korea. The year is 1954. Dienbienphu has just fallen and MacWhite, the visiting American ambassador, wants to know why the French are losing to the Viet Minh. Major Wolchek tells him why: "We're fighting a kind of war here that I never read about at Command and Staff College. Conventional weapons just don't work here. Neither do conventional tactics." Later Wolchek puts it another way: "It's just that the Communists are fighting by a different rule book. And like a damn fool, it's taken me almost a month to remember that I once read it. When I was in Korea, I picked up a book by Mao Tse-tung . . . Mao is one hell of a bright guy. I hate what he stands for, but he does have a kind of genius . . . The kind of fight he made in China may have become the model by which all Asian Communists fight." Wolchek discusses Mao with his French counterpart, Monet. At first, Monet is skeptical about applying Mao's tactics against the Viet Minh. He says that a nation that has produced Napoleon, Foch and Lyautey doesn't need to learn anything from Mao. In the battle following the conversation, both Wolchek and Monet are injured. Wolchek now has the iron of three wars in his body. The chapter ends with a rather grisly account of a Viet Minh atrocity against two French soldiers—the vocal cords of one soldier are ripped from his throat, one eye of another is torn from the socket. Appalled, Monet is finally convinced that he should fight Mao with Mao.

MORAL: Understand your enemy and read all about him; a nation and its army must remain flexible and must be able to adapt its strategy and tactics to fit the enemy: a nation underestimates an enemy at the risk of failure.

And so it goes, each chapter with its neat little moral:

Keep the backslapping club-joining American Babbits at home; send Americans abroad who have a feel for foreign cultures.

Understand the culturc and mores of the country in which you are assigned; don't be above using palmistry and astrology or anything else accepted by the local culture—if it works.

Americans abroad on important missions shouldn't "live it up" and shouldn't attend too many cocktail parties; the gentle art of negotiation requires the full control of all one's faculties.

American advisors abroad must understand the masses and win the hearts and minds of the people if their advice is to influence the country's leadership.

The chapters, action-packed, roll on; each with a clear-cut moral whose cumulative effect leads the reader to conclude that America is losing the battle in the underdeveloped world to an astute Communist Russia. The "ugly American" of the title doesn't appear until the end of the book, in two small chapters, but he epitomizes what the authors believe an American abroad should be. He and his wife live with the natives, learn their language and develop small schemes of direct benefit to the people and with which the people feel directly involved.

In the final chapter of the book, entitled, "A Factual Epilogue," the authors write: "It is not orthodox to append a factual epilogue to a work of fiction. However, we would not wish any reader to put down our book thinking that what he has read is wholly imaginary. For it is not; it is based on fact."

The authors then go on to recapitulate many of the points already made in the fictionalized account and then end the book with these ringing words: "We have been offering the Asian nations the wrong kind of help. We have so lost sight of our own past that we are trying to sell guns and money alone, instead of remembering that it was the quest for the dignity of freedom that was responsible for our own way of life. All over Asia we have found that the basic American ethic is revered and honored and imitated when possible. We must, while helping Asia toward self-sufficiency, show by example that America is still the America of freedom and hope and knowledge of law. If we succeed, we cannot lose the struggle."

Wow! No wonder many people put down the book wondering if it was really a novel at all. There had been other novels on contemporary themes before, but none that so explicitly claimed to be based on fact. The "Factual Epilogue" was a stroke of genius that gave credence to the story by its claim that the incidents depicted were in fact true though couched in the form of fiction. In a sense, *The Ugly American* was the first of the "non-fiction novels" in American fiction, the first really successful modern appearance of the novelist as pamphleteer.

For the final analysis, the book was a call for action and the last words of the book—"If we succeed, we cannot lose the struggle"—are the words of a pamphleteer, the lineal descendant of Paine's declaration in "The American Crisis" that these are the times that try men's souls.

And the format worked. The message got across, for the book was fated to influence a whole generation of Americans for whom the launching of Sputnik was a tremendous shock. The book was believable at the time because it said, in substance, what Americans of those days were ready to believe, on the evidence they saw around them of American foreign policy failures: the loss of China, the stalemate in Korea, the take-over of Eastern Europe by the Russians, the brutal repression of the Hungarian uprising, the Berlin question, and the crowning blow—Sputnik. The book captured the imagination of Americans—of an America whose pride had been deeply punctured by Sputnik and which was ready to believe the worst about Americans abroad, especially official Americans. After all, hadn't American diplomats abroad already lost China? Now they would lose the world.

The Ugly American created the impression that the American abroad was an inveterate bungler and that the Russians were giants in pin-striped pants. It doesn't matter that, in fact, the book had some worthy, heroic Americans in it; they weren't the ones the readers remembered. In this respect, it's significant to recall that the "ugly American" was actually the hero of the book; he was the American other Americans abroad were supposed to emulate. But in the popular mythology which followed hard on the publication of the book, this was forgotten. The "ugly American" took on the connotation that the very name implied: repulsive, loathsome, incompetent and corrupt. People who had never even read the book took up the slogan of "the ugly American" and made it their own. People who read the book should have known better, but even they used the title in a sense exactly opposite to what the hero of the book was supposed to personify: all that is good in the American abroad.

Perhaps nothing better reflects the mood of those days than the fact that a character that was supposed to be heroic was transformed by the reading public into an ogre. Certainly McCarthy and his vindictive crucifixion of the old State Department China Hands had already set the stage. Americans were ready to believe the worst; and when *The Ugly American* came out, they believed with a vengeance, even going so far as to transform the hero of the book into an American anti-hero.

Intentionally or not, *The Ugly American* created the image of the American abroad as an inveterate bungler; obversely, it elevated the Russians to the position of the supreme diplomats of our age. At this point, it's worth asking the question: Were the Americans as bad as they were portrayed? Were the Russians as good? In reality, both were exaggerated. The Russian failures in Guinea, in the Congo with Patrice Lumumba, in Indonesia—areas in which they had everything going for them—attest to the fact that the Russians of the late '50s and early '60s were not diplomatic supermen. Nor were the Americans all that bad. On the contrary, they were quite good and showed a great deal of creative imagination in an era of diplomacy that was admittedly not easy. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine, the Berlin Airlift, Point Four, the response in Korea, the rebuilding of Western Europe, NATO, the creation of a strong, non-militaristic Japan, the reestablishment of stability in the Congo—these are examples of imaginative diplomatic responses that turned out to be successes.

But these facts hardly mattered for, as a novel, *The Ugly American* did not concern itself with facts in the traditional sense. Despite the "Factual Epilogue," the book was essentially a work of fiction and as such, it had to grip the imagination of the reader. The book concentrated on "action diplomacy"—on foreign policy as "involvement"—because real diplomacy is quiet, painstaking, methodical and rather dull. It is not the stuff of which action novels are made, and *The Ugly American* was an action novel.

Its very message was that America must *act* and *act now*. The concept of action permeates the novel and keeps it moving along. The book was basically concerned with American failures in the dramatically active areas of counter-insurgency and economic aid. As such, the book ushered in the era of "diplomacy as action" and was the inspiration for two of the major action-oriented diplomatic maneuvers of the '60s: the creation of the Peace Corps and the American intervention in Vietnam.

In retrospect, it's easy to see that *The Ugly American* was the literary mother of the Peace Corps. The book fostered the idea that Americans should live with the

people of the underdeveloped world, that they should know their language, create community involvement and work on small projects at the rice-roots level. There is no doubt that the book helped create the climate of public opinion in which the idea of a Peace Corps could grow. Neither President John F. Kennedy who created the Peace Corps, nor Hubert Humphrey who espoused the idea originally, nor the hundreds of others who pitched in to make the idea a reality were aware of the debt they owed the book in laying the groundwork for the Corps. In a sense, the fact that no one ever correlates *The Ugly American* with the foundation of the Peace Corps attests to the fact that the book had so deeply embedded itself into the American consciousness of the period that it was, in effect, taken for granted. By the time the Peace Corps was established in 1961—only three years after the book was published—the necessity for a Peace Corps was so accepted in principle that hardly anyone questioned the basic premises upon which it was founded—premises embodied in the book itself

The other action-oriented policy that *The Ugly American* inspired in the '60s was the American involvement in Vietnam. A good deal of *The Ugly American* was devoted to Vietnam and the French failure there in the war against the Viet Minh. Implicit in the book was the fact that, though the French had failed, the Americans need not. If America would only understand the real nature of insurgency—if we would read the works of Mao Tse-tung and grasp the underlying essence of his theories of revolutionary warfare—we could then beat Mao at his own game. Once again, though very little mention was ever made of it—none, in fact, that I can think of—*The Ugly American* played a subtle but significant role in creating the background atmosphere in which the "counter-insurgency" programs of the early '60s could grow. President Kennedy was very much taken by the concept of counter-insurgency. Early in his administration, he set up a course in counter-insurgency and required all foreign affairs personnel to take it. He also threw his presidential weight behind the expansion of the Special Forces and the counter-insurgency program at Fort Bragg.

Whether President Kennedy himself ever read *The Ugly American*, I do not know. But it hardly matters whether he did nor did not. By the late '50s, the book and its basic concepts had become so much a part of American thought that even people who had never read the book knew what it stood for and what it proposed. It had helped create a body of public opinion in which the concepts of counter-insurgency would be readily acceptable.

"When one looks at our government's record in Asia over the last decade or so, it seems that if our leaders have shown any persistent failing, it has been an excessive hunger for action."

And they were accepted. There were very few experts in counter-insurgency in the early '60s who did not think that America could succeed in Vietnam where the French had failed. The public in general—let alone the experts—was even more willing to believe this based on the undisputed fact that the Americans were better than the French. Period. The counter-insurgency experts were just waiting for the chance to prove that they were right. Public opinion, nurtured by *The Ugly American* mentality, was behind them. And it wasn't long before the opportunity came. Already under Kennedy, the build-up in Vietnam had begun. It continued under President Johnson and blossomed into full-scale warfare in 1965.

It's interesting to note that two of the most oft-repeated rationales for our massive intervention in Vietnam were: (1) America must prove that aggression doesn't pay; and (2) revolutionary warfare is the war of the future and we must show that counter-insurgency can stop it, lest it spread all over Southeast Asia and from there to the world. These arguments were right out of *The Ugly American* and there were very few people who took issue with them at the time.

So by the late '60s, two of the major objections posed by the authors of *The Ugly American* had been overcome: (1) a Peace Corps had been established in which volunteers lived and worked with the people of the underdeveloped world at the lowest level, speaking the native language and executing small projects that truly benefited them; and (2) a corps of counter-insurgency experts well-versed in Mao, had been established and their theories were being tested in real-life experiments on the battlefields of Vietnam.

And yet by the end of the '60s, despite the fact that the authors had basically gotten what they called for, American diplomacy was not much better off than it had been ten years before in the late '50s. Most people would say it was worse.

So where had *The Ugly American* failed? What had gone wrong?

In my opinion, its major fault was that it concentrated on aspects peripheral to foreign policy—mainly economic aid, counter-insurgency and propaganda. By doing so, it concentrated on *action* as opposed to *policy*. As *The New Yorker* put it recently, ". . . when one looks at our government's record in Asia over the last decade or so, it seems that if our leaders have shown any persistent failing, it has been an excessive hunger for action." By concentrating on action as opposed to policy, *The Ugly American* gave a false impression of what was wrong with the United States abroad—not foreign policy but the *implementation* of those things peripheral to it. What's more, it presumed that these peripheral aspects of policy were good *per se*.

Nowhere, for example, does *The Ugly American* question whether the non-diplomatic aspects of diplomacy are valid—i.e., economic aid, military assistance, cultural diplomacy, etc. Instead, it presupposes that they are and attacks inadequacies, mostly in personnel. The book, in sum, has little or nothing to say about *policy* and traditional diplomacy.

Make no mistake about this: I

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"To what expedient, then, shall we finally resort for maintaining in practice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as laid down in the Constitution?"
—*The Federalist*, No. 51.

Values and Consensus in American Foreign Policy

A new Administration comes to power in Washington lacking what most of its postwar predecessors have enjoyed: a national consensus on America's role in the world.

Powerful changes at home and abroad have discredited old doctrines. Containment and American economic liberalism—the intellectual underpinnings for the remarkably coherent foreign policy of one generation—no longer command unquestioning support from the next. Optimism has been tempered by self-doubt about the creativity, dynamism, and moral certitude of America. Yet, in our recent Bicentennial celebrations, Americans exhibited a mood of vibrancy, hopefulness, and a determination to rise above the adversity of the recent past.

Today, a new set of forces—some of them created in part as a reaction to American power—challenge both the capacity and the will of our nation to act with decisiveness and effect. In East-West relations, we no longer have the conceptual framework of undifferentiated anti-Communism, even as we must live with both the insecurities of immense nuclear arsenals and the demonstrated knowledge that military power alone is severely limited as an instrument of national will. In the North-South context, we face demands from new and complex forces. And domestically, we sense the increasing interdependence of our world through the impact of international events on our daily lives.

The Congress increasingly is willing to challenge executive competence in every phase of international activity, from détente and strategic arms to intelligence, trade and aid. In attempting to recapture some of its lost influence in foreign policy-making, the Legislative Branch is beginning to offer an alternative vision of what American foreign policy should be—a vision more attuned to the preoccupation of America with domestic problems, more accepting of the relative decline of American power, and less ambitious to control events abroad. Yet the Congressional vision lacks completeness and coherence, and with the recent emphasis in Washington on constitutional prerogatives, these challenges so far have been as much a source of conflict as a search for consensus.

With regard to the public, recent polls and State Department "Town Meeting" public forums across the country strongly suggest a sense of estrangement between America and the federal bureaucracy in Washington. Many Americans feel that Washington is out of step with

This article is excerpted from a paper prepared by ***Arnold Schifferdecker, Peter Lydon, John Graham, Adrian Basora, Warren Zimmerman*** *and* ***Richard Thompson****. All are officers of the Department of State. The paper was developed in discussions with a larger group of professionals in the Department and related agencies. It represents the personal views of the authors.*

the country—that somehow our priorities and values here are different from their own. In particular, the sentiment has been repeatedly expressed that Washington seems to be preoccupied with an essentially coercive foreign policy—to the detriment of more humanist ideals.

In short, 1977 is a time of great challenge and flux—a time when America can either remain captive to outworn conceptions or become a creative force for a new world order. Our task as a nation, then, is to absorb the lessons of the past, to make a fresh analysis of our own and the world's situation, and to strive to realign our foreign policy with our own deeper values and with world trends.

This paper is an effort to begin the process of reassessment with a discussion of values in the conduct of our foreign relations since World War II and to suggest some shifts in foreign policy priorities on which a renewed national consensus can be built.

American Values

Prompted by the ethical legacy of Vietnam and Watergate and by questionable American covert actions and commercial misdeeds abroad, both Congress and the public are sharply questioning whether US international relations continue to adequately reflect the values of our society as a whole. To paraphrase a question put by "Town Meeting" respondents: "We know what our values are—but does Washington?"

American values are those ideals for which our society has a special affective regard. We believe that there remains general agreement among Americans on what these values are. A basic list acceptable to most Americans, for example, would include:

- *Security.* Peace, physical security, preservation of our society and our way of life.
- *Freedom.* The personal freedoms we have enjoyed and refined over the last 200 years and the democratic processes and structures we have built to protect them.
- *Individualism.* Diverse, self-reliant personal development through expression of one's own identity in the context of the social and governmental systems in which we live. Economic *laissez-faire*.
- *Equity.* The provision of basic economic opportunities to every individual.
- *Dignity of the Individual.* Human rights, social justice, free exchange of ideas.
- *Power, Prosperity and Material Progress.* Status, affluence and faith in the fruits of continuing technological progress.

Such a list, broad enough to gain general agreement, is *too* broad to be very helpful as policy guidance. Yet there is a real worth to an explicit reaffirmation of our values, even at an abstract level:

- First, events of recent years have clouded and confused our vision of our values. It is important at this stage in our history to clarify and reaffirm what we believe those values to be in 1977. In what directions can we be led without the misgivings evident in recent years?
- Second, our nation's value system constitutes a vital set of guidelines for behavior which cannot be significantly ignored for long without producing serious internal tensions. An effective foreign policy for the future must demonstrate both to the American public and the world at large that Washington *does* know what American values are and that they constitute a solid, consistent base for our policies. Reaffirmation of our values does not of itself solve policy problems, but it provides key elements of the framework for intelligent policy choices.
- Third, leaving our value assumptions implicit ultimately serves only to obfuscate and weaken them at our risk. Our problems over the last decade have arisen in part because it has become unfashionable for policymakers to weigh value and ethical factors as explicit and integral components of policy debates.
- Fourth, a closer look at our values leads us to acknowledge what all of us instinctively know—that there are internal conflicts among our values and restraints on their complete fulfillment. It is relatively easy to come up with a list of values that covers the American spectrum. Yet we all assign different priorities to different values within the same spectrum. And our external environment presents a dynamic series of restraints on the fulfillment of any of them. *How we as a nation weight our values in relation to each other in a world where we cannot fully achieve any of them is at the root of the problem we face in defining a foreign policy for the future.*

> "Our relatively easy path to prosperity tended to reinforce a post-war sense of hubris and to skew our value system in the direction of maximizing economic profit, sometimes to the detriment of our commonly held standards of both equity and ethics."

Value Priorities

There is one generally agreed hierarchy among our values. Those which satisfy our most immediate needs are most important to us. Only when basic needs are met do we gain the means and will to move toward fulfillment of our lesser needs or the needs of others. For example, it is more important for us to be alive than to be well-fed; it is more important for us to be well-fed than to feed others well.

Beyond this simple exposition, however, in our large and complex society the ranking of our values today is much more difficult. To understand the nature of the difficulty, we must look at our national experience since World War II.

As in all wars, we developed and exercised means of defeating an enemy which required difficult sacrifices involving suspension of many of our traditional values to insure one—our survival. Soon after the war's end, we perceived the Soviet Union as a threat to our security and renewed the rationale for assigning an exceptional priority to our survival. This, to some extent, again conflicted with our individual rights and freedoms, our democratic process of checks and balances, our ability to meet domestic economic and social needs and our support abroad for human rights, self-determination,

and social justice.

World War II also thrust America into a great power role in the world. As the Cold War began, we alone had the means and the will to counter the new threat. Sometimes brilliantly, sometimes awkwardly, in the succeeding decades we adopted the customary tools of that role: massive military efforts, global diplomatic involvement, propaganda, covert actions and Executive dominance of foreign policy—all of which had their effect on values shaped by almost two centuries of more insular tradition.

As America's global role grew rapidly in post-war years, so did the scope and depth of our material prosperity. We became accustomed to unprecedented riches and to domination of the world economy. It became axiomatic that American enterprise, technological genius and economic liberalism could continue to sustain and expand our prosperity. As a corollary, we came to expect that others could insure their own economic well-being too, if only they cooperated with and emulated us. Our relatively easy path to prosperity tended to reinforce a post-war sense of hubris and to skew our value system in the direction of maximizing economic profit, sometimes to the detriment of our commonly held standards of both equity and ethics.

In short, over the last 35 years conflicts have arisen as one set of priorities among our values has been challenged by factors stemming from:

- the prolongation of wartime exceptionalism regarding our security into nominal peacetime by way of the Cold War;
- our rapid rise to great power status;
- our equally rapid rise to world economic dominance.

If any one message prevailed at the State Department's "Town Meetings" last year it was that Americans are acutely conscious of these conflicts and uncomfortable with Washington's present priorities as they perceive them. Given this disharmony, *we believe that a central task in mapping foreign policy directions for the future is to better reconcile the traditional American value priorities which still clearly exist with the global responsibilities, status and wealth we now enjoy.*

In the recent past, successive Administrations have tried to build consensus on foreign policy direction through tighter Executive secrecy and control combined with extensive manipulation of the media and appeals to public trust. These efforts often produced a counterfeit consensus. Perhaps none was less valid as a guidepost for foreign policy than the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Foreign policy, to be effective, cannot reflect only Executive control or the sporadic and esoteric initiatives of small pressure groups. True consensus, of course, does *not* mean rubberstamping. Serious persons will continue to differ. But the consensus we seek must rest on a broad national base and reflect as nearly as possible a common perception of our values and their relative weights.

Recent failures to achieve such consensus—trade with the Soviet Union, aid to Turkey, intervention in Angola, and American intelligence activities—all represent serious differences within our society on the definition and degree of predominance accorded our value of national security.

Rebuilding A Consensus

We believe that the most important step toward a new and effective synthesis of our values is to realize that the events of the Second World War and the Cold War have skewed our value system in favor of security needs beyond today's legitimate requirements of self-defense. We will pay what we must to maintain the strategic balance; we will provide for the armies, fleets and bases essential to protect our legitimate interests abroad and deter aggression. But the only genuine security threat we face is from the Soviet Union, a nation whose capacity to project military power abroad for the foreseeable future will remain more limited than our own, and whose efforts toward economic and political leadership appear increasingly empty.

Not every global crisis constitutes an element of Soviet conquest. Not every threat to our interests abroad justifies wartime-like exceptions to traditional standards of personal freedom, equity, and right and wrong. It was a warped perception of both our security interests and the limits of our power which led us to the commitment we made in Vietnam and subsequent abuses. Certain CIA and FBI activities, ordered or sanctioned by higher authority, undermined—in the name of national security—those very values in the American system which those actions are supposed to protect.

We need to stay alert, powerful and responsive to real threats, but we need to define more carefully and more narrowly our security and perceived threats to it. *Vis-a-vis* the Soviets, we have lived long enough with nuclear equivalence to understand that what we have, while a strange kind of peace, is by no means a justification for wartime exceptionalism to our value system. Globally, we can provide leadership without viewing every problem primarily in terms of the superpower balance and without seeking hegemony. We can, for example, afford to turn more of our energies toward creative solutions to problems of nuclear and conventional arms limitation and to nuclear proliferation. We can also take note of the many forces and trends which already work in ways favorable or at least tolerable to us without American efforts to control them in detail.

The second step in a rebalancing of our values is to understand better the interdependence between our prosperity and that of the rest of the world. The fact that economic and environmental solutions are increasingly multilateral suggests restrictions on some aspects of traditional American individualism and economic *laissez-faire*. Our discomfort with recent malfeasance by American companies abroad further suggests that Americans are not content with unquestioned primacy of the profit motive. We are willing to accept limits on profit for other social goals—to serve our sense of equity, for example.

The third—and complementary—step in achieving a more supportable relationship among our values is to re-emphasize, within the constraints imposed by our external environment, those values short-changed by our pursuit of se-

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"Or what man is there of you, whom if his son ask bread, will he give him a stone?"
—Matthew, VII, 9

Manuel's Son

ELIZABETH E. MCNEILL

Manuel hovered in the doorway of the Ambassador's outer office. Shifting his chauffeur's cap from hand to hand, he waited for the secretary's attention.

Finally, looking up from her typewriter, "Oh!" she said, "Hello, Manuel."

"Good afternoon, Miss Andersen. Please I want to see the Ambassador."

"Can't I give him a message?" she asked kindly. "You know the Ambassador is a very busy man."

"It will take only a minute," he insisted.

Standing up, she hesitated for a moment, then picked up some papers from her desk and went into the Ambassador's private office.

Manuel straightened his narrow shoulders, pulling himself up to his full five-feet-six. But his nervousness betrayed itself when he reached up to smooth a no-longer-existing mustache.

Five months earlier when the Ambassador arrived he had ordered Manuel to shave his mustache, cut his hair short, clean his shoes and have his uniform pressed. This militant attitude had frightened Manuel, made him fear for his job. The previous Ambassador had promoted him to the position of chief chauffeur with an award for fifteen years of meritorious service. But the new Ambassador's manner was cold, almost hostile.

The door opened. Manuel's face and neck muscles tensed.

"Come in," the secretary said to Manuel.

The Ambassador, a wiry gray man, sat at a large desk which stretched the distance between them to a seemingly vast plane.

"What do you want?" he asked impatiently.

Manuel's mouth was so dry he could hardly speak. "Good afternoon, Señor Ambassador," he said, standing at attention. "Please forgive me, sir, I know you are busy, but I want to give you the good news."

"Well, what is it?" His apathetic pale-blue eyes and short restless fingers were already involved in a sheaf of papers.

"I have a son at last!" A smile spread along his full mouth and his yellowed black eyes glistened.

"It's about time, after three

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girls." The Ambassador's thin voice had the cutting edge of a razor. "Now I suppose you'll take my advice and have yourself sterilized."

"Yes, sir," Manuel replied, looking down at his worn but highly-polished black shoes.

Without another word, the Ambassador went on leafing through the papers. Obviously the audience was ended.

"Sir, may I go home now and see my son?" Manuel took a step forward.

There was no response.

Manuel's arms fell limply to his side. He turned to leave past the reception desk.

"Oh, Manuel, what wonderful news!" the secretary said, closing the Ambassador's door. "I'll bet he's a handsome boy."

"I don't know. I haven't seen him yet. He was born only an hour ago."

"Which hospital is your wife in?"

"She wouldn't go to the hospital. She thinks it's a place where people die."

"I'm sure you are anxious to get home," Miss Andersen said, glancing at the Ambassador's closed door. "Is there anything I can do to help? Could I send my doctor?"

"You are very kind, but Maria is frightened of doctors."

Later, sitting all alone in the chauffeurs' room, Manuel wished he had someone to talk to. Walking back and forth across the long narrow room he asked himself, what shall I do? Should I follow the Ambassador's advice? Or was it an order?

"Hola! Manuel," Pablo said, closing the door behind him. "What's new?"

"I have a son!"

"Congratulations! Now you'll have someone to take care of you in your old age. Are you going to pass out cigars like the gringos do?" he asked, laughing.

"I'm going to do better than that. You are invited to the christening party. Will you be one of the compadres?"

"With pleasure. I . . ." He was interrupted by the telephone ringing.

Manuel picked up the phone. "Hello."

It was the secretary. "The Ambassador wants to go home now."

"Good," he said, smiling. "Now I can see my son."

"I'm sorry," she said, "but he's got a cocktail party at his residence and then a dinner at the Foreign Minister's."

The smile on his face faded. He stood up slowly as if his body were ancient. "Looks like I'll be working late again tonight."

"Give my congratulations to Maria," Pablo called out as Manuel left.

The Ambassador, in his usual preoccupied manner, got into the car without speaking. On the way to his residence he read the newspaper.

During the cocktail party Manuel helped in the kitchen. The servants were happy with the news of his son. They teased him about his luck changing. "Manuel, you've finally proved your machismo," the cook said, picking up a martini from a tray of drinks. "Señores!" he said in an authoritative voice, mimicking the Ambassador's heavy accent in Spanish, "I wish to propose a toast to our distinguished colleague, father of a newborn son, His Excellency Manuel Lopez!"

The other servants took drinks from the tray. "Salud!" they cried, raising their glasses with comic pomposity.

Just at that moment the kitchen door swung open. There stood the Ambassador. His icy stare went slowly from face to face. Then, without a word, he turned and went back through the open door. The headwaiter made a rude gesture at the Ambassador's back before picking up a tray of drinks and following him. The others laughed nervously and finished their drinks in one gulp.

"Horse's ass," someone mumbled.

"You'll catch it tomorrow," Manuel said.

The cook laughed. "We're not afraid of him like you are."

"But I can't afford to lose my job. I've got a wife and three, now four, kids to feed."

Later, while driving the Ambassador to the Foreign Minister's residence, Manuel set his jaw and asked if he could go home to see his wife and son.

"Oh, all right, but be back within an hour." The Ambassador's voice was resentful as always where use of the official car was concerned. His predecessor had allowed Manuel to drive home for dinner when he had to work late. It had taken the administrative officer a long time to convince the present Ambassador that it was unfair to expect Manuel to go without dinner. He couldn't afford to eat in restaurants and there was no reliable public transportation to his *barrio*, south of the city.

Manuel found his wife, Maria, sleeping, their newborn son cuddled in her arms. He leaned over and touched the child's downy black hair.

Maria's mother gave him a plate of rice and black beans. He ate a few bites and then pushed the plate aside.

"What's wrong?" she asked. "You look depressed."

"Oh," he sighed heavily, getting up from the table, "I'm worried about something the Ambassador told me to do."

He stretched out on the children's bed. The house was silent, except for the faint sound of his wife's breathing. On an altar in the corner a candle flickered at the feet of a plaster figure of the Virgin. One night, over a year ago, when Maria finished praying at the altar, she had asked Manuel why he had stopped going to mass. He hadn't answered and she never mentioned the subject again. Recently, though he hadn't told her, he had been going to the cathedral across from the Embassy to pray for a son.

"Papá!" Consuelo called from the open door. Running to him, she threw herself into his open arms. "Didn't you say we were going to name the baby Antonio?"

"Yes, don't you like it?"

"Oh, yes, papá, but Isabel wants to call him Jesus."

About a month later, on their way to the Embassy, the Ambassador suddenly looked up from his newspaper. "Have you been sterilized yet?"

Manuel's face flushed and his eyes tightened. "No, sir, I want to wait until my son is at least six months old."

"By that time your wife will be expecting another one. Better take my advice and have it done right away."

One morning, in the chauffeurs' room, Manuel found Pablo looking at a pamphlet. "What are you read-

ing?" he asked.

Pablo grinned. "Propaganda on family planning. It shows how much happier and healthier a family of four is than a family of ten. After a man has the ideal family of four children, it says, he should be sterilized."

"And what if his only son should die?"

"Then he wouldn't have anyone to help him in his old age. What crap!" Pablo said, throwing the pamphlet on the table.

Manuel picked it up and looked at the pictures of a boy and girl and their parents seated around a table, their plates heaped with food; going to the movies together, shopping for clothes. Other pictures showed the boy as a young man working on machinery in a big factory and the grown girl sitting behind a typewriter in a comfortable office.

"I don't know, Pablo," he said. "It looks like a small sacrifice to make for such good rewards."

"Are you serious? This is just propaganda put out by the rich. I wouldn't give up my manhood for anything."

"But it says here that you don't have to give up sex. The operation just keeps your wife from having more children."

"And takes away your virility! No," Pablo shook his head, "not me."

"Well," Manuel said, still looking at the pictures, "I finally got my son. I don't think I want any more children."

When Antonio was about eight months old, Manuel had a vasectomy. The Ambassador sent him to a doctor who was leading a crusade against over-population. He performed the operation free of charge. Manuel didn't tell anyone, not even his wife. He was physically well, but fears remained, and anxiety made him less and less interested in Maria, who belittled him with sarcastic remarks about his manhood. During spare moments he sat and stared into space. His eyes looked troubled, and traces of weariness showed on his face.

The rainy season attacked with a vengeance. Tropical storms swept into the city, leaving his neighborhood a sea of mud. Maria complained because the roof leaked. The children, unable to play outside, constantly quarreled among themselves. Mosquitoes multiplied. There were no screens. Manuel couldn't sleep at night. The Ambassador lectured him continually because he couldn't keep his shoes clean. His face remained sad in spite of the laughter of his son, now almost a year old.

The rainy season was followed by a hot, dry period. Mud became dust, water pipes ran dry, and small biting gnats were out in full force. But Manuel was at least able to give his family the comfort of ice water to drink. Someone from the Embassy had given him an old refrigerator. To celebrate Antonio's first birthday they had homemade ice cream with the birthday cake.

"It was late that night when he got home. He hurried up the narrow street, anxious to tell Maria about the house. But when he opened the door, the smile on his face faded."

Antonio was a beautiful child with big black eyes, long heavy lashes, and soft dark-brown curls. His fair skin was the pride of the family. He was alert and quick to learn. All the family, except his mother, showered him with love. She had become increasingly passive and careless in caring for the house and children. Sometimes Manuel found Antonio, half naked, playing in the open gutter with the neighborhood children. He would go into fits of rage. Maria seemed not to hear.

When Manuel married Maria he boasted to her brother that he would earn enough money to move out of the neighborhood. Before the birth of their third daughter he found a place he could afford in a new *barrio* where the houses had running water and flush toilets. But Maria wasn't happy there. She complained of being too far away from her family and made no effort to find new friends. When she was expecting Antonio she fell ill and begged to go back to her mother. Manuel, pressed from all sides with work and worry, finally gave in to her wishes. They moved back to the old *barrio*.

Soon after Antonio was born Maria became just like the other women in the neighborhood, barefooted, hair uncombed, and wearing a dirty dress. Every time Manuel complained of her appearence she answered with cutting insinuations about his impotency.

For Antonio's second birthday party Consuelo had taught him to talk.

"Papá," she said, when Manuel came home with the birthday cake, "Antonio wants to tell you something."

She put him down and he wobbled on his short fat legs into Manuel's open arms. "Papá, I love you," he said shyly, hiding his round face against Manuel's cheek.

"My son!" Manuel said, his face glowing with pride and happiness as he hugged the child to him.

A month or so later, when Maria's mother died, Manuel talked of moving. Maria agreed. He found a place nearer the Embassy where he could have lunch at home and spend more time with Antonio.

"Now I can send my son to a good school," he told Pablo. "At last," he sighed, "the future looks brighter."

It was late that night when he got home. He hurried up the narrow street, anxious to tell Maria about the house. But when he opened the door, the smile on his face faded. Maria was standing in the middle of the room weeping as she rocked Antonio in her arms. The little boy's face was pale and motionless. A trickle of blood ran from the corner of his tiny mouth.

"What's wrong?" Manuel cried, grabbing the child's limp body.

"He was playing on the roof," Maria sobbed, "and fell into the courtyard."

"On the cement?"

"Yes."

"My God!" he cried out, tearing a blanket from the bed and wrapping it around Antonio. "Get your shoes on!" he ordered. "We've got to get him to the hospital."

Clutching Antonio to his chest he ran, stumbling down the dark unpaved street, to where he'd left the Ambassador's car.

"Here!" he said, handing An-

tonio to Maria while he unlocked the door. She hesitated. "Get in!" he yelled. "There's no time to waste. I'll explain to the Ambassador in the morning."

The hospital emergency room was empty, except for an arrogant receptionist who ignored Manuel's presence.

"Please, Miss," Manuel pleaded, as she began slowly and deliberately selecting a sheet of carbon paper from her desk drawer. "May I see the doctor?"

"He's busy," she said mechanically without even looking up.

"But my son is unconscious. I must see . . ." He was interrupted by the phone ringing.

The receptionist answered it. "Oh, Ramon, it's you." She leaned comfortably back in her chair. "Why didn't you call earlier?"

"Miss!" Manuel cried, "can't you see my son is dying?"

She looked straight through him, continuing her conversation.

Suddenly Antonio's body stiffened into convulsions. Manuel looked around desperately and then ran wildly down the long corridor screaming, "MY SON IS DYING! MY SON IS DYING!" His voice broke against the white-walled emptiness. "PLEASE, SOMEBODY HELP ME!" he begged. "PLEASE!"

A nurse appeared from one of the rooms. "What's all this noise? You're disturbing the patients."

"MY SON IS DYING!" he shouted, running past her like a madman.

Before he reached the end of the corridor, a young doctor stepped off the elevator, blocking his way.

"Oh, doctor, please help me!" Manuel pleaded. "My son is dying."

Quickly the doctor took Antonio. Manuel followed him into the operating room. While the white-coated man examined the child, Manuel told of the accident.

"I'm afraid there's been terrible damage." The doctor spoke with a provincial accent.

"Is there any hope?" Manuel's voice already had a tone of resignation.

The doctor pulled the sheet over Antonio. His eyes filled with compassion, he shook his head as though unable to say the word "No."

"He was my only son." Manuel's body sagged as if the words had drained out his life.

The doctor put his hand gently on Manuel's shoulder. "You are still young enough to have many more sons."

"No," he whispered, lifting his dead son tenderly into his arms, "that's impossible now. I will never have a son."

It was almost midnight when they arrived home. Maria got out the suit Antonio wore at his second birthday party. The neighbor women bathed and dressed the child's body and laid it on a narrow cot in the front room. The local shopkeeper brought candles for each corner of the cot.

Consuelo was the only one of the children awake. She knelt in front of the altar, sobbing silently. The doctor had given Maria an injection to calm her nerves and she had been put to bed. Manuel sat stiffly in a chair facing the cot. His eyes were dry.

Maria's oldest brother, Juan, and some of the neighborhood men sat in a row of chairs against the wall. Others stood outside smoking. The murmur of their voices floated through the open door. The women silently served sweetened coffee and bread.

At dawn Manuel went to the kitchen in the small back courtyard and started a fire in the homemade adobe stove. He heated some water. Then he shaved, mechanically looking at his face in the small mirror above an old metal typewriter table he'd salvaged from the Embassy. After rinsing his face in cold water, he turned to Juan.

"I've got to take the Ambassador to the airport. Some important officials are coming in from Washington." His voice was as vacant as his eyes. "Could you make arrangements for the burial this afternoon at five? Tell the undertaker I'll be back in a few hours with the money for the casket."

"I'll take care of everything. Don't worry."

Manuel appeared at the Ambassador's residence like a zombie.

"What's wrong with you?" the Ambassador greeted him.

"My son is dead."

"What a pity. I'm sorry, Manuel," the Ambassador said, getting into his car. "We've barely time to get to the airport before the plane arrives. You'd better take the short cut." He disappeared behind the morning newspaper.

All the Embassy cars were at the airport to accommodate the arriving officials. While waiting for the plane, Manuel had a chance to tell his colleagues of his tragedy. They tried comforting him with assurances that he could have more sons. But his face became even more melancholy and his eyes hard and bitter.

It was ten o'clock when they returned to the Embassy. As the Ambassador got out of the car Manuel asked if he could have the rest of the day off to bury his son.

"What time is the burial?"

"Five o'clock, Sir, but I've got to take money to the undertaker for the casket."

"Well, we'll see," the Ambassador said absent-mindedly. Then his voice became serious. "This is a very important visit. These officials have to see a lot of people. We'll need all the cars and drivers. You can take the money when you go to lunch."

Manuel did not get home until almost two o'clock. A little knot of old men and young boys hovered in the doorway, out of the blinding hot sun. They made way for him, mumbling their condolences as he passed.

Inside, the room was dark, except for the flickering candles at the corners of the cot where Antonio's body lay. Women in black squatted against the wall.

Juan came forward. "Sorry," he said, taking Manuel's arm and leading him to the back courtyard. "the undertaker wouldn't give me a casket without the money."

"What about the grave?" Manuel's voice was hollow.

"That's been taken care of. You won't have to bury your son in a pauper's grave. The neighbors contributed enough for a private plot in the cemetery nearby."

"How soon can you get a casket?" Manuel asked, giving him the money to pay for it. His colleagues at the Embassy had collected half the money and Manuel had drawn an advance on his salary.

"When siesta ends."

Manuel went back into the house and fell on his knees beside the cot. Reaching out he stroked Antonio's alabaster face, repeating softly,

"My son, my son."

"Manuel," Juan was shaking him, "a driver has come from the Embassy. The Ambassador wants you immediately."

Manuel looked across the room at Maria, kneeling at the altar. He started toward her, but then turned and followed Juan out of the room and down the dusty street to where he'd left the car.

The Ambassador was due at the Foreign Minister's office at four. When they arrived there Manuel asked if he could turn the car over to another driver.

"I'm really sorry, Manuel, but all the drivers are busy." His voice was kind. Then it changed to its normal business-like tone. "You'll be needed at the residence this evening. It's a very important dinner party and we are short of help."

"But sir . . . "

"I'm sure you will be able to use the extra money, Manuel."

From the guard's post Manuel telephoned the shopkeeper in his neighborhood to deliver a message to his wife. He would be unable to attend the burial of his son.

After midnight he finally got home to his wife and children. He slept very little. Soaked with sweat, he tossed and turned, crying out for Antonio.

By the following afternoon, he was gray with fatigue. When the Ambassador, accompanied by the visiting officials, came out of the Embassy, he was fast asleep, his head resting on the steering wheel. The Ambassador, deep in conversation, seemed not to notice.

As they arrived at the residence, the Ambassador said casually to Manuel, "We'll be driving up to Chicha tomorrow to visit the Indian ruins. I'll expect you to report for duty at the usual time. And be prepared to spend the night."

"But, Sir . . ." Manuel got no further.

"What are you complaining about? You'll get paid time and a half."

Like a man sleepwalking, Manuel carried on.

The five-hour drive up the mountain was hot and tedious. Saturday traffic was heavy. One hairpin curve followed another on the narrow road without guard rails. Manuel sat rigidly on the edge of the seat, his bloodshot eyes bulging and his face twitching with tension. Every time he passed a shrine to motorists who had perished along the way, he crossed himself.

Only two of the officials had come with the Ambassador. One of them sat in front with Manuel. He was a big friendly man, full of talk and laughter and jokes a bit on the crude side. He was enjoying himself until the Ambassador's icy stare silenced him.

After they arrived at the hotel in Chicha and Manuel had unloaded the luggage, the Ambassador dismissed him. "Be back here tomorrow morning no later than eight-thirty."

"Street lights had just come on when he headed for the red-light district, driving the Ambassador's car. He found a little bar and ordered a drink. His hand shook so that the drink sloshed out."

Manuel took a room in a third-class hotel and fell into bed. After tossing and turning he finally dozed off. Later he woke up screaming, "NO! NO! Don't cut it off!" covering his genitals with his hands.

He lay rigid, staring at the ceiling for a few minutes before dragging himself off the bed. Street lights had just come on when he headed for the red-light district, driving the Ambassador's car. He found a little bar and ordered a drink. His hand shook so that the drink sloshed out.

The bartender looked at him warily.

"I've just had a terrible dream," Manuel explained.

"Oh."

"I dreamed I was running down a long black tunnel carrying my dead son's body in my arms. I was crying out for help, but my voice kept coming back at me like a hundred mocking ghosts. When I finally got to the end of the tunnel there was an iron gate. The Ambassador was standing on the other side. He was dressed like a doctor and had a big knife in his hand. He was going to castrate me."

Manuel finished his drink in one gulp. "Give me another one," he said, sliding the glass across the bar.

Manuel did not report for duty at 8:30 the following morning. By 9:30 the Ambassador, livid with anger, called the police. They located the car. Then, in a room over the bar, they found Manuel, still asleep beside the woman who had made him feel like a man again.

The Ambassador said nothing to Manuel on the trip back, but the friendly visitor, who had told the crude jokes, gave him a couple of knowing winks.

The day after the visitors left, the administrative officer called Manuel to his office. "I have a report from the Ambassador," he said, looking at a sheet of paper on his desk, "saying that on Saturday night you used an official car without permission. And, furthermore, your behavior on that night was unbecoming to an employee of the United States Government."

Manuel hung his head. Other chauffeurs had been put on probation for unofficial use of Embassy cars.

"The Ambassador feels that in order to maintain discipline and set an example for the other drivers you will have to be fired."

The blow splintered into a burst of pain inside Manuel's head. Blinding spots pierced his eyes.

"You can never be hired again," he could hear the voice saying as black velvet darkness engulfed him. He started running. He was in the tunnel again, Antonio's body heavy against his chest. He felt a rush of hot air and then blinding sunlight. His legs moved faster and faster. Faintly, he heard car horns, voices shouting. Something hit him. He was falling. The iron gate! He was being crushed against the iron gate!

"My son!" he cried out.

Those who witnessed the accident said that Manuel was running wildly through heavy afternoon traffic toward the cathedral when a bus hit him.

Manuel was buried beside his son.

The Ambassador sent white carnations.

FSJ BOOK ESSAY

Isolationism or Interdependence?

REMAKING FOREIGN POLICY, *by Graham Allison and Peter Szanton. Basic Books, Inc., $10.95.*

Messrs. Allison and Szanton are prominent among those who study our Government's foreign-affairs apparatus. Allison was a main Murphy Commission consultant in 1975 and Szanton was the Commission's research director. Perhaps their views will carry weight in the Carter Administration. But if they do, our organization for foreign affairs will not see the simplification and effectiveness that Mr. Carter has promised.

Allison's and Szanton's basic views are that the world and our role in it grow increasingly more complex, that distinctions between foreign and domestic policy are now tending to fade away, and that because of all this, major changes in our foreign-affairs organization are not only beginning to occur (in this they are correct) but are both inevitable and desirable. The authors find that domestic agencies more and more claim a legitimate interest in foreign affairs; they welcome what they acknowledge has been a "dramatic" growth in the foreign-affairs staffs of these agencies; and they would leave to the State Department only a role of "advocacy," which they admit is far less than its traditional role—but they want the reader to believe that the Department has "regularly failed to perform" that traditional role.

Unfortunately, their analysis is facile and their changes point toward chaos. As Senator Mansfield pointed out in dissociating himself from some of the Murphy Commission's conclusions, interdependence and the importance of economics are not new facts in the world. What *is* new is some hard facts for America, such as our increasing dependence on shockingly expensive oil and a relative diminution in our world stature. Let us not make universals of these. Can one, for example, imagine Norway, living on ocean fisheries and world shipping (and now oil), *ever* doubting the importance of interdependence and economics? We did so; the authors correctly point out that we in America have only recently shifted into an economics era after a postwar era in which politico-military concerns seemed foremost. But that huge mistake which culminated in Vietnam is peculiarly ours. It would be tragic if we compounded it with a second mistake in government on the organizational plane, and gave up hope of centralization and effectiveness in foreign policy in the name of "interdependence."

It is not pleasant to label as facile the analysis in a book on which the authors have obviously worked hard and on which, as they emphasize in the preface, they have consulted Deputy Under Secretaries and Members of Congress and other names well known in Washington. But the case studies they set forth briefly (e.g. German offset payments, Panama, Nixon's "New Economic Policy," and Vietnam) simply fail to justify their conclusion that the State Department does not deserve to be even *primus inter pares* and that we must have a considerably expanded number of actors on our foreign-affairs scene. What their studies point up, rather, is the foolishness of Nixon's having cooked up a new economic policy in 1971 without reference to State; the fact that the conduct of the war in Vietnam "lay beyond the reach of civilian policy makers"; or (in the case of Peru's expropriation of IPC) that legislation like the Hickenlooper Amendment can leave the Executive little room to maneuver.

Certainly the authors recognize the need for a good decision-making process. I do not mean to imply that they are *calling* for chaos. Indeed, they warn against drift and incoherence in our foreign policy. But their prescription for a larger number of actors in foreign affairs who would (the big ones, anyway) settle differences in an "Executive Cabinet," will hardly work. Why should a Secretary of Agriculture with full powers in foreign agricultural-related (not just agricultural) affairs *ever* follow the lead of the Secretary of State? So the President settles matters. But what tiny, as well as major, matters he would have to settle for this pack of peers. And this is no theoretical possibility; not long ago a certain agency actually threatened to take to the President a case in which an Ambassador forestalled assignment to his Embassy of a clerical assistant to that agency's attaché.

A further fault in this thin but important book (the index ends with Zablocki, Clement on page 238) is its failure to say much about what goes on abroad. The authors are right that significant decisions in American foreign policy are not made by our Ambassadors abroad, but in Washington. But the effective loss of an Ambassador's full powers did not happen yesterday; it came with the invention of the telegraph. That is such an old phenomenon it bothers no one. What does bother any member of the Foreign Service—including a most distinguished Ambassador, according to recent press accounts—and what ought to shock any analyst of our foreign affairs, is the way in which our missions abroad have filled with attachés from a dozen agencies, each of them reporting to his home agency with the Ambassador exercising only a kind of titular control. Much of this activity is probably harmless, and some is useful, to our national interest; but it is inherently wasteful, and promotes the incoherence the authors say they abhor.

What then do we want, we in State and in the Foreign Service of the United States? Allison and Szanton are right in saying that we believe there are extraneous actors on the foreign policy stage. When over 20 agencies in a single year demand access to Foreign Service reporting for the first time, we find it difficult to believe they have all suddenly acquired a legitimate interest in foreign affairs. When we hear that another agency is adding 10 positions in order to analyze Foreign Service reporting, we wonder if bureaucracies have discovered a new way to get fat.

What we want is to be the Foreign Ministry of the United States and the Service that represents our country abroad. What we need is to take full account of all domestic factors that weigh on, or are influenced by, foreign affairs. (Perhaps some future writer will ask whether this is really feasible in our system, or only in a parliamentary one.) What we will fight is the argument about the world suddenly turning complex, which if carried

to a logical conclusion not only rules out a State Department but means that no one can possibly be competent enough to be Secretary of State—or, indeed, President. What we ask is that our leaders take full account of the people the Government requires—not just Washington-bound economists, although we could use a few more of these, but people who know how to deal with the world in all its aspects. This book leaves one with the suspicion that its concentration on Washington, "where the action is," reflects a new kind of isolationism despite much talk of interdependence.

—PETER BRIDGES

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Totally Splendored

WIND IN THE TOWER: *Mao Tse-tung & The Chinese Revolution 1949-1975, by Han Suyin.* THE MORNING DELUGE: *Mao Tse-tung & The Chinese Revolution 1893-1954, by Han Suyin. Little Brown, $12.95.*

Dr. Han Suyin spent part of each year from 1956 to 1975 in China, in addition to her medical work in Chungking from 1939 to 1942. Her two decades of research, travel and interviews in China, besides the fact she is the daughter of a Chinese father and Belgian mother, have given her special insight into the Chinese scene and knowledge of the Chinese Communist Revolution. Her explicit sympathy for the Revolution has given her access to leaders of the Revolution and unexcelled opportunities to travel throughout the Middle Kingdom.

In two monumental, detailed works, *The Morning Deluge* and *Wind In The Tower* ("Wind in the tower,/Herald of the approaching storm . . ."—Chinese poem, quoted by Chou En-lai, 1973), she has completed her biography of Chairman Mao. In describing his background, his personal involvement and the development of his ideas in relation to the events that transformed China between 1893 and 1976, she necessarily also gives an account of the Revolution he led to final victory. As she writes, "The Chinese Revolution brought forth its leader in Mao Tse-tung; Mao Tse-tung shaped the Chinese Revolution. This . . . link between a man's life and the Revolution to which he has given his life makes it impossible to write of one without the other."

Those who are familiar with some of Han Suyin's fifteen books, of which (Love Is) *A Many-Splendored Thing* has been probably the most widely read, know what an accomplished writer she is. Those who are interested in China's history and future—and what may lie ahead for Sino-American relations—will find her two latest books of immense value. It would seem childish caviling to stress that she does not write with any pretense of objectivity. For her, Chairman Mao was a *totally*-splendored thing. As one reviewer of *Wind In The Tower* has remarked: "To Han Suyin, Mao appears to be only one thing—perfection . . . Her book is nothing less than a panegyric to the Great Helmsman . . ."

Dr. Han expresses the hope that these two studies will contribute to the understanding so necessary between the Chinese and American peoples. "For it is upon this closer understanding—whatever the differences in systems—that the peace of the world depends today."

— ROBERT W. RINDEN

Raid and Rescue

THE RAID, *by Benjamin F. Schemmer. Harper and Row, $10.95.*

90 MINUTES AT ENTEBBE, *by William Stevenson. Bantam Books, $1.95.*

The 1970 American raid on Son Tay prison in North Vietnam, and the 1976 Israeli rescue effort at Uganda's Entebbe airport have very little in common. Least of all, in terms of their outcome. But these two books—both published at approximately the same time—make it convenient to draw some comparisons, if not some conclusions, between the two events.

Both accounts are painstakingly detailed. Schemmer obtained access to the classified Son Tay After-Action Report which had been prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He also spent 18 months conducting, by his own account, 173 interviews with men involved in the raid. Clearly a writer who knows his way around the Pentagon, Schemmer quotes one DOD official as suggesting that perhaps he should subtitle his book: "More About the Son Tay Raid Than We Ever Intended to Make Known."

Stevenson's book took less time to write. In fact, it holds something of a current record for instant history. Bantam was able to get it out on the paperback shelves within a month of the actual raid on Entebbe. Stevenson flew to Israel for his research. He had been there before, having written extensively on the Israeli armed forces in two previous books: *Strike Zion* and *Zanek!: A Chronicle of the Israeli Air Force.*

Son Tay was a prison camp twenty-three miles from Hanoi. Sixty-one American prisoners of war were thought to have been there at the time of the raid. This turns out to have been faulty intelligence. In spite of repeated reconaissance overflights, electronic eavesdropping, and CIA agents operating nearby, the American raiding party ended up capturing an empty compound. To complicate the matter further, part of the attacking force landed at the wrong target, according to Schemmer, and soon found itself confronting several hundred. ". . . Russian or Chinese troops who were training North Vietnamese . . ." Schemmer says that in the five minutes it took for the 22 Americans to withdraw from their mistaken location, they had to kill ". . . somewhere between 100 and 200 . . ." of the Russians or Chinese.

The ground action at Entebbe was no less eventful. Much shooting took place there, as well—and there were some unfortunate Israeli casualties. But the effort to rescue the hijacked passengers of Air France flight #139 turned out to be overwhelmingly successful. In the process, the Israelis scored an important victory against international terrorism.

Like Schemmer, Stevenson faced an officialdom reluctant to part with many of the details both authors felt necessary to complete their accounts. Stevenson's task was made somewhat easier by the fact that the Israelis succeeded in their raid, and were therefore less inclined to engage in a cover-up. Otherwise, he might have taken longer in writing his book. By way of additional detail, Stevenson provides a rush course in the basics of Palestinian terrorism—including a Who's Who of particular value for newcomers to this subject.

In sum, both books offer action-packed adventure to the casual reader—who may wish to think twice about taking either of them on a long journey by air, especially to Vietnam or Uganda.

— SEAN KELLY

Fidel and Fidelity

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN CUBA, 1933-1960. *A Political Sociology from Machado to Castro, by Samuel Farber. Wesleyan University Press, $15.95.*

By suggesting that Castro and his Communist government lack legitimacy, this "scientific" analysis of post-1933 Cuban revolutionary politics abandons claim to present relevance. The Revolutionary Government seems securely in power, its legitimacy buttressed by military victory 18 years ago and protracted mass support since. Few governments these days have a better claim to legitimacy. While the author would be happier had it been the Directorio Revolucionario rather than Fidel that overthrew Batista, he is unable to redo history. But he does brandish a paper weapon of possible future value; his study provides doctrinal justification for an attack on the Castro regime. Farber concludes that since Castro and his men were bourgeois elements, not workers and peasants, their struggle fails to meet the proper criteria for a true social revolution. In other words, it wasn't Marxist. The implication is that to undo their spurious handiwork would be no sacrilege against Marxian writ, and might even be seen as the sacred duty of true believers. Years will probably pass before such an implication can generate positive action. In the meantime, the book is a welcome elucidation of the long-ago events that led to Castro's emergence and success.

—JOHN P. HOOVER

A Small Planet

INTERDEPENDENCE, *by Gerhard Mally. Lexington Books.*

Interdependence, as a concept and imperative for international cooperation, has arrived. Its importance is attested to by a growing body of literature coming from foundations, universities, commissions, and so on. A "Declaration of Interdependence," written by Henry Steele Commager and issued on UN Day 1976 in Philadelphia, urges America to "inaugurate a new era in human history" through the building of a more cooperative world community.

Yet some foreign policy practitioners, while affirming the existence—even pervasiveness—of interdependence, are dissatisfied with the term. Clearly it explains a great deal. But equally, it obscures the richness, variety and relative degree of millions of mutual dependencies among nations.

Gerhard Mally makes a sensible attempt to fill the need for greater elaboration and concrete examination of this complex subject. The author, who has worked in both academic and foreign policy worlds (he is currently employed in ACDA), has perhaps wisely limited nearly two-thirds of his study to the patterns of cooperation among the nations of the Atlantic Community—a staggering task in itself. Part I deals with the concept, dynamics and types of global interdependence; Part II focuses on the institutional forums for managing Western interdependence in the realms of security and economics; and Part III is devoted to an evaluation of the designs for achieving intra-European and European-North American integration.

Mally points out, as others have, the dangers posed by the inexorable growth of interdependence which received its greatest impetus in this century with the spread of rapid communications and transportation systems. The problem is that all of us living on this planet are becoming increasingly vulnerable to acts—charitable, uncharitable, or simply unknowing—of others. The central dilemma of our time is to develop competent means of coordination and control of our interdependent relationships without destroying our undeniably shrinking sphere of independence.

Mally's focus on efforts to manage interdependence in the West demonstrates that even at the regional level—among friends—the task of securing the desired level of cooperation is arduous, slow moving and complex. It will require strenuous efforts, then, at the global level (principally through United Nations bodies) to prevent a dangerous gap from widening between the growth of interdependence and the means we devise to regulate it.

—ARNOLD SCHIFFERDECKER

VALUES & CONSENSUS

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curity, power and prosperity. The American people will support modest increases in our efforts to promote global economic equity, provided the burden is distributed evenly here at home. They will support renewed American concern for human rights, self-determination, social justice and increased openness in our dealings with other nations.

The domestic consensus we must seek on a weighting of our values will not, of course, be pursued in a vacuum. To the extent that such consensus is not in harmony with major external patterns and rhythms, its achievement may be more a source of friction than amity. A case in point has been the American espousal abroad of our particular interpretation of democracy—the quintessential American value of freedom. Often it has not fitted the new nations' quest for national order and identity, and our attempted projections of it to the Third World have led to serious misunderstandings. This does not mean that we should abandon the effort to project our values and ideals abroad. It simply means that we should do so fully conscious of the unique aspects of each case, often permitting our ideals to speak for themselves.

But even a domestic value consensus compatible with our external environment only sets the framework. It does not answer the hard policy choices. Policy choices are doubly difficult: not only must policy reflect accurately and in a global context the priorities we assign our values, but it must pick between alternative valid means of serving the same generally agreed ends. The prevention of famine, for example, is central to our values and consonant with the external environment, but the alternative means to achieve it still are the subject of strong debate.

America's involvement in world affairs is growing more complex and inextricable at a time when we are questioning what that role should be. Recent failures have exposed contradictions between the exercise of a world power we cannot—and should not—give up, and positive native values we do not—and should not—wish to yield. The solution lies in seeking broader consultation and support for our policies, both at home and among our kindred industrial democracies, and in realizing that, thus buttressed, we have less to fear and more to hope than we have recently imagined. An exaggeration of security and power concerns has created pressure on internal and external values.

We are strong enough to be our best selves, and sufficiently creative and dynamic to exercise leadership with less coercion than has been our habit since World War II. We can and should invest the substantial economies of energies and resources thus realized in greater support of such traditional values as equality and human rights, while committing ourselves to the long-term risk of building relationships and structures that favor peace and cooperation among nations.

HIRING MYSELF AN EMPLOYER

from page 5

economic research assistant. Finally, regarding suggestion (c), I applied to the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs.

Just to stay in practice, I once again took the FSO written exam in December 1973. Again I passed, and I decided to try the oral once more. I felt I had little to lose, because by the spring of 1974 I knew I had been admitted to all three graduate schools in the fall. Also, this time my trip to the interview was only from South Arlington, Virginia, to the Board of Examiner's office in Rosslyn. The result was once again failure. Again I asked for pointers on how to prepare for the oral, but this time I got no advice whatsoever. When I mentioned I was planning to go on for a master's degree in international relations, the head examiner went so far as to discourage me from what he felt would "probably be a waste of time" on my part.

Persistent as ever, I went to Princeton in the fall of 1974 with very little else in mind other than preparing for the Foreign Service. Accustomed to taking the FSO written exam every December, I once again did so in 1974. For a third time I passed. This time, however, I thought I would be a little shrewder. Knowing I still had a second year of graduate school to complete before I would even be available for appointment, I decided against trying the oral the third year running. Also, through arrangements with Princeton University and the State Department, I was already preparing to spend the summer of 1975 as an "intern" at a United States embassy overseas. I knew that experience would be invaluable when it came to an oral examination by three seasoned FSOs.

The summer's internship did in fact prove to be even more valuable than I had anticipated. Not only did I become close friends with many FSOs, thereby coming to "know the enemy," so to speak, as far as the oral exam is concerned; but I also began to form a much more realistic idea in my own mind of what it means to be a Foreign Service officer. Like a colleague of mine, who has written of his own summer internship experiences (Andrew Spindler, "A Summer's Intern," *Foreign Service Journal,* January 1975), I saw many disenchanting aspects of a Foreign Service career: overstaffing of embassies, routinized busywork, stagnant promotion streams, underutilization of talented people in the actual making and conducting of foreign policy, superficial life styles, uncalled-for smugness in some FSOs, resigned frustration in others, and often a lack of sincere devotion to the real understanding of foreign peoples. The Foreign Service was not too dissimilar from what I had seen of the Civil Service at HEW.

Certainly my enthusiasm for the career was somewhat dissipated, nevertheless I proceeded with my plans to apply for the Foreign Service. For the fourth year running I took the written exam, in December 1975, and passed it. But the spring of 1976 was somewhat out of the ordinary for me. In addition to scheduling the Foreign

Service oral, I also interviewed for jobs in international banking. That broadening of my job search certainly opened my eyes.

Banks, it seems, regularly send representatives to many university campuses to interview students. Here is an employer, unlike the Foreign Service, that goes out actively seeking the best students that can be hired. Not one bank demands a long written examination nor the completion of reams of forms. If a bank's representative is adequately impressed during the campus interviews, that representative will invite a student to visit the bank's headquarters. The student has a full day of individual interviewing with a variety of bank employees and is treated to a free lunch. Students are reimbursed for their transportation expenses, given hotel accommodations if necessary, and very generally treated like the capable, qualified human beings they want to think they are. Students are also encouraged to look the banks over critically, and not just consider employment as a one-way street. The student is "hiring an employer" at the same time that the bank is hiring an employee.

What a contrast this approach was for me, in comparison with the old Foreign Service routine. Nonetheless, when my oral examination date rolled around in 1976, I once more paid my way down to Washington, D.C. Fairly certain by now that the Foreign Service would never want me, I was also beginning to think that maybe I did not "want" the Foreign Service. This oral exam would be, I was certain, my last attempt—a final chance to at least prove something to myself. Ironically enough, I did pass the oral this third time around.

The history of my efforts to hire myself an employer does not end here. The unexpected award of a Fulbright scholarship has delayed for one more year the final decision on what employment I will accept. On the one hand, several banks have courted my favor and will likely reissue job offers to me for the fall of 1977. On the other hand, my name has been added to the rank order register of those awaiting appointment as economic/commercial FSOs. Although my availability date is August 1977, the Foreign Service warns me that I cannot count on any definite offer.

So in spite of all I have done to hire the State Department as my employer, I now have serious doubts about that goal. Certainly other prospective FSOs must have similar doubts. Many capable persons never even apply for the Foreign Service in the first place because of this long and uncertain procedure. Many of those who do start the process never complete it. Finally, many like myself who do complete the process are then unwilling to sit idly by in hopes that a call will eventually come through actually offering an appointment.

Surely the Foreign Service is not getting the best people it possibly can through its current recruitment system. It will, very likely, be getting patient people with a true desire to be FSOs. But it will probably also be getting people without other options, people who have no alternative employment offers. And surely those "job go-getters," as well as those sought after by other employers, are the type of people that the Foreign Service ought to be attracting and vigorously trying to recruit for itself.

WILLIAM FAULKNER

from page 11

San Miguel was being poured into tall glasses. It looked good and we all sipped. Peering meaningfully at me and then at Faulkner's glass, Leon immediately engaged the author's attention. Whether it was a sleight-of-hand trick or a newspaper, I don't recall, but Faulkner was obliged to lean away from his place and his beer. I emptied my glass; edged my hand in the direction of his bottle, grabbed it, and quickly poured about half of what remained into my glass. Faulkner's attention to what Leon was up to faded and he returned to his beer, finishing what was in the glass and then emptying what little remained in the bottle.

"I believe I'll have another," he remarked. Leon looked around wildly and noted the arrival of our cheeseburgers. "Wouldn't it be better if we ate first?"

"I'll take some beer all the same."

A round was ordered and the charade of Leon's engaging Faulkner's attention while I attempted to filch his beer was repeated.

"I do believe you've mistaken my bottle for yours." His eyes caught mine conveying regret and sadness. I gulped, nodded and apologized. He could have his beer, my beer, everyone's beer. I wanted no further part of this subterfuge.

In the event, the exercise was wholly unnecessary. Faulkner finished his beer, ordered some tea, chatted quietly about his morning meetings and then announced he was ready to resume the afternoon schedule.

It went well as did the remainder of Faulkner's stay in Japan. His farewell call on the Ambassador provided an opportunity for the latter to thank the novelist for coming and to state, without exaggeration, that US- Japanese cultural relations had been enhanced by his presence in a more fundamental way than any visitor in memory.

The film based on Faulkner's "Impressions of Japan" was completed several weeks after the author's departure. USIA would enter the film in film festivals that year. A copy was made for Faulkner's personal use and USIA's Director was prepared to present it personally and screen it for the novelist.

Faulkner respectfully declined any such ceremony. While the film may have come into his possession, it is doubtful that he ever saw it.

I have the film and I enjoy it. Faulkner had the words, all right, and I don't need to look at the film to remember them:

"And always the water, the sound and the drip of it as if here were a people making constant oblation to water as some people do to what they call luck. . . .

". . . something fragile contained in the bowl of mountains, but supple and sturdy and enduring, worked wisely by such kind people that with three words the traveler can go anywhere and live. 'Gohan, sake, and arrigato,' and one more when all this is gone which memory will always know though the eye no longer remembers, 'Sayonara.'"

UGLY AMERICAN

from page 15

believe strongly that there is a need for an aid program, for an informational and cultural program, for a military assistance program, for a Peace Corps—for almost all of the post-war accretions of modern diplomacy.

But the organizations which implement these programs—AID, USIS, the Peace Corps, etc. do not (or at least should not) formulate policy; they implement policy and there is nothing they can do to transform bad policy into good policy. If American intervention in Vietnam in the form it took was bad policy, there was nothing the military, USIS, AID or any other adjunct element could have done to make it good policy.

And this brings me to my core criticism of *The Ugly American*: it did a disservice to America by creating the impression that there were cheap substitutes for sound policy-making, for traditional diplomacy. It elevated the cold warriors of the jungles—the agricultural advisors, the technical assistants, the counter-insurgents—to the level of lofty heroes; it said nothing about policy, about the context in which these "heroes" must work. The authors extolled the implementers rather than the makers of foreign policy. That placed everything upside down, for the *sine qua non* of national survival and success abroad is a foreign policy that makes sense.

And that's where the professional diplomat—the expert—comes in. Nothing will replace an expert's understanding of world politics in general and the history and politics of a given country in particular. There are higher politics involved which determine relations between nations; and it is the higher politics and an understanding of them that counts in the end. Diplomacy is politics; nothing will replace an understanding of the local political forces—neither aid, nor cultural exchanges, nor information programs, nor military assistance—all these are peripheral by comparison with the overriding imperative of politics and the necessity of understanding them.

Yet *The Ugly American* hardly touches upon this aspect of America abroad. It says little or nothing about foreign policy and the people who make it. To the authors of *The Ugly American,* the heroes are *doers*—those Americans abroad who are out in the rice fields at the ground level fighting the good fight; the foreign policy expert—the thinker—has no place in this heroic scheme of things. In my opinion, one George F. Kennan sitting in the lonely recesses of the Foreign Policy Planning Board's inner offices is worth a whole legion of cold warriors in the field, but cogitating on foreign policy and America's real interests in a changing world is not the stuff of which heroes in novels are made. There was no place for a George F. Kennan in *The Ugly American.* And in a sense, that's why the book doesn't hold up seventeen years after it was written. It is already a period piece of the late '50s and early '60s.

Or is it?

Well, it is and it isn't. As pointed out earlier the book is far from

dead: it is still in print, it is being studied in our universities, and the phrase "ugly American" is a glib cliché that still slips very easily off the American tongue. Most importantly, the phrase is used as a shorthand figure of speech to signify everything that the book stood for. Americans use the phrase to imply that we're not doing the right things abroad, that we're not acting decisively enough or shrewdly enough or empathetically enough.

Actually, the book was a product of its time and should be read in that light. Certainly no understanding of the America of the late '50s and early '60s is complete without a reading. But what about its applicability to the world of today? That's where the problem arises for, though the premises of the book were steeped in the conditions of the times, there is a perceptual lag which makes most people view the book as still applicable today. Objectively speaking, the world has so changed—the switch from a bipolar to a multipolar world makes everyone talk about the Cold War in the past tense these days—that most of what *The Ugly American* covered no longer applies. Subjectively speaking, however, the book is far from an antique piece of American literature because the premises of the book have so seeped down into the American subconscious that it still influences the way Americans think and act.

Which brings us back to that lady in the Metroliner. When she met me, I was the first American diplomat she had ever met in the flesh. By her own admission, her image of official Americans abroad had been lifted wholesale out of the pages of *The Ugly American*. She had called me "human," however, and though she meant no harm, the word had bothered me considerably. It was only later, while thinking about it, that I realized she had indeed come up with the precise word that applied. The characters in *The Ugly American,* she was saying in effect, were not *human*. They were caricatures, as indeed they were. But as any great cartoonist knows, caricatures can make a much more lasting impression on the psyche than a true photographic portrait.

The characters out of *The Ugly American* are no more real—no more *human*—than the animal figures in Aesop's *Fables* or Orwell's *Animal Farm*. Nor was it necessary that they be. For *The Ugly American,* in essence, was a moral fable of its time and as with all great fables, it has worked its way into the American national consciousness in a way no straight story with *human* characters could ever have done.

The time has come, however, for America to expunge *The Ugly American* mentality from its national consciousness, to exorcise the twin demons of action and involvement that the book enshrined, not because there are no longer any "ugly" Americans left abroad but because they are irrelevant. What counts is foreign *policy* not foreign adventures. Perhaps somewhere in the wings there's a great American novelist who can make a case for heroism out of the lonely labors of the foreign policy expert.

I hope so.

"THE WEEK WE WENT TO WAR"

from page 9

tack was not simply another border incident. MacArthur had already sent a firm report that suggested a crisis: "Enemy effort serious in strength and strategic intent and is undisguised act of war." When asked "for estimate of objective of current North Korean attack," Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby, MacArthur's chief of intelligence, replied, "There is no evidence . . . that the North Koreans are engaged in a limited offensive or raid . . . the size of [their] forces, the depth of penetration, the intensity of the attack, and the landings made miles south of the parallel . . . indicate [they] are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate South Korea." This message dramatized the situation and probably sought to evoke the increased American commitment to Asia that MacArthur had long sought. The Korean war would initially give him the opportunities he wanted, and partly revise American policy in Asia to meet his hopes and sense of destiny.

On Sunday afternoon, when Acheson informed Truman that the military situation was worsening, the President decided to cut short his visit in Independence and to fly back to Washington. During the day, high-ranking officials from State and Defense planned courses of action. Even before the President's conference with his advisers that evening, the army informed MacArthur's headquarters of the likely results: "In event Security Council . . . calls on member nations to take direct action in Korea, to authorize and direct you to employ forces of your Command . . . to stabilize the battle situation including if feasible the restoration of original boundaries at 38 degrees parallel." The prediction, though hedged by the contingency of UN support, was clear: a commitment of ground, air, and naval forces to the war in Korea to roll back the North's troops. "Come over and join the fight," MacArthur's headquarters responded. "We are delighted with your lines of action . . . ."

At the Blair House meeting on Sunday evening, Truman conferred with Acheson, Under Secretary of State James Webb, the JCS, the four civilian secretaries of the military, and three other representatives from State. The President accepted five recommendations: that MacArthur should send military supplies to Korea beyond the foreign aid program (which he was already doing); that the Seventh Fleet should move to Japan; that the Air Force should provide air cover for the evacuation of American civilians from Korea; that the Air Force "should propose plans to wipe out all Soviet air bases in the Far East"; and that State and Defense should make a "careful calculation . . . [of where] Soviet action might take place" in other parts of the world. Truman's program represented an endorsement of most of Acheson's stated program, and the Secretary was the dominant adviser at the meeting.

The President did resist efforts on two important matters—interposing the Seventh Fleet be-

tween mainland China and Formosa, and increasing aid to Indo-China and the Philippines. So far, the President had avoided making commitments that would reverse American policy toward Formosa and involve the United States in the Chinese civil war, or expand American involvement in the anti-revolutionary struggles in Indo-China and the Philippines. The reasons for delaying decisions on these matters are unclear, but probably Truman did not want to move that evening on matters that could briefly wait. There was time. Neither set of issues required immediate action. In addition, in the case of Formosa, Acheson may still have had serious doubts about ending the policy of disengagement, and he and the President were probably both troubled by suddenly reversing this policy.

At the meeting, according to the recently declassified minutes, much of the discussion focused on likely Russian intentions and military capacity, and less frequently—often obliquely—on the wisdom of committing ground troops. Admiral Forrest Sherman, Chief of Naval Operations, "said that the Russians do not want war now but if they do they will have it. The present situation in Korea offers a valuable opportunity for us to act." General Hoyt Vandenberg, Air Force Chief of Staff, "agreed that we must stop the North Koreans but he would not base our action on the assumption that the Russians would not fight." When asked by Truman whether the United States could knock out Soviet air bases in the Far East, "Vandenberg replied that this might take some time . . . it could be done if we used A-bombs." General Omar Bradley, Chief of the JCS, agreed generally with Sherman, "that Russia is not yet ready for war. The Korean situation offered as good an occasion for action in drawing the line as anywhere else . . . ."

None who spoke at the meeting disagreed with Bradley's judgment that Korea was the place to draw "the line." What would that entail? Important questions were not systematically addressed: What would be the nature of the American commitment and on what conditions would they expand it? Should the United States go so far as to send ground troops? That night, only three participants spoke explicitly on committing ground troops, and they opposed such action. Bradley "questioned the advisability of putting in ground units [,] particularly if large numbers were involved." Supporting him, both Secretary of the Army Frank Pace and Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, in the words of the minutes, "opposed . . . committing ground troops in Korea." The recently declassified record refutes Truman's 1955 claim that the group had agreed "that whatever had to be done to meet this aggression had to be done."

Earlier that day, Acheson had received a telegram from Dulles, an eminent Republican, and John Allison, director of the Office of North Asian Affairs, who were in Japan. American "forces should be used," they cabled, if South Korea cannot repel the attack. "To sit by while Korea is overrun by un-

provoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.'' This advice, echoing the perils of Munich, also conformed to Dulles's analysis in May, when he warned that ''a series of disasters [in Asia] can be prevented if at some doubtful point we quickly take a dramatic and strong stand that shows our confidence and resolution,'' even if it is necessary to ''risk war'' with Russia.

Anxiety about Soviet intentions elsewhere in the world prompted State on Sunday evening to send a cable to American embassies throughout the world: ''Possible that Korea is only the first of a series of coordinated actions on part of Soviet. Maintain utmost vigilance and report immediately any positive or negative information.'' Some predicted Formosa or Yugoslavia; MacArthur's headquarters said Iran, which was also Truman's guess. Others feared that Germany would be next.

Amid bleak reports from Korea, on Monday night the Blair House group again met. They agreed on escalation of American involvement—that the Navy and Air Force be directed ''to offer the fullest possible support to the South Korean forces'' by attacking the North's forces but not crossing the 38th parallel. ''Not yet,'' said the President, who seemed to imply that he now foresaw in the next few days a wider and deeper American involvement.

On Acheson's advice, and without dissent from advisers, Truman made the decisions that he had deferred on Sunday—increased aid and military forces in the Philippines, increased aid and a military mission to Indo-China, and deployment of the Seventh Fleet to protect Formosa and to halt Chiang's attacks on the mainland. In the case of Indo-China, Truman's action was in line with the analyses, approved by the NSC in December 1949, that ''Asia is an area of significant potential power—political, economic and military—[whose loss] would threaten the security of . . . the United States,'' for its conquest would strengthen Russia and destroy the ''economic advantage . . . from our trade with non-Communist Asia,'' especially South and Southeast Asia.

By reversing American policy and intervening in the Chinese civil war, Truman was recognizing the domestic and international political costs if Formosa now fell. How could he defend Korea but let Chiang ''go down the drain?'' Johnson, MacArthur, and some military leaders would protest. Republican critics, often Chiang's strongest supporters, would not tolerate it. Americans would not understand. The blows to America's and the President's prestige would be too great in this time of crisis. Yet, as the official minutes indicate, Truman and Acheson remained hostile to Chiang. ''We are not going to give the Chinese 'a nickel' for any purpose whatever,'' Truman stated, according to the summary. ''He said that all the money we had given them is now invested in United States real estate.'' (''Mr. Johnson added or in the banks in the Philippines.'')

Continued next month

LETTERS TO FSJ

An Untold Story

There comes a time in every newsman's life when he can tell a story he could not write before. This is about a remarkable woman.

Twenty years ago, during the heroic and romantic weeks of the Hungarian revolution, the Legation in Budapest reported in a "Secret Niact" (now declassified on my request) that two Hungarian women, described in the cable as "wives of writer leaders," visited an unidentified "legation wife."

The women, the cable said, asked that the Legation "request the Hungarian communist government to declare a 12-hour armistice" during which peace could be negotiated between the revolutionaries and the regime.

This was not the only "active," and therefore, I assume, highly irregular role the unidentified Legation wife played during those feverish days in the Hungarian capital. She never told it to anyone, including her husband, and I got it from her trusted maid that she sent out food and blankets to the "kids" fighting Russian tanks on the Széna Square front, the one closest to her Budapest house. One night she made the delivery herself.

Sarah Rogers, wife of FSO (now retired) Tom Rogers, was always a rebel who disregarded the rules if she thought they were contrary to her conscience. She did that when she attended the University of South Carolina (she graduated magna cum laude) where she was an eloquent advocate of rights for blacks at a time when this was simply not done by an offspring of a southern family. She did it in Budapest, and wherever she was, accompanying her husband on foreign assignments.

In the early 1960s, when her husband was assigned to State, Sarah organized a highly effective program for blacks in the ghetto-enclave of Cabin John. The couple was already in Pakistan when in 1965 for what she did in the Cabin John area the Bethesda Chamber of Commerce named her the "outstanding citizen of the year." Mrs. Rogers accepted the nomination but, being a few thousand miles away, asked that her deputy in the Cabin John program represent her at the award ceremony. The trouble was that the deputy was black and the ceremony was to be held somewhere where blacks are not usually welcome—unless they came to wash dishes. Sarah was asked to name someone else. She refused.

Dr. Sarah Flinn Rogers, 53, died of cancer a week ago. In addition to her BA degree (she also was a Phi Beta Kappa) she had a master's degree in journalism from Columbia University, another master's degree in education from American University, and got her Ph.D. from Catholic University last spring. She was assistant professor at Lebanon Valley College, Pa., and the author of a book: *Parents as Teachers at Home*.

In my long career as a newspaperman I have met hundreds of diplomats' wives and greatly appreciate their important role in foreign countries, not necessarily in Paris or Rome, but definitely in Eastern Europe or in the capitals of less developed nations.

Many of them were good in their unpaid jobs as unofficial diplomats. Some were lousy, and a few outstanding. There was nobody like Sarah Rogers.

ENDRE MARTON
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
AP staff writer 1947-1976

Foreign Service List

Tom Donovan's November reflections on the end of the Biographic Register were well put; in large part they apply to the Foreign Service List as well. This was a useful and handy document, well-thumbed by all. I'm told that it, like the Register, was taken from us because it made easier the job of identifying the CIA personnel among us—not a foolproof guide by any means, but an aid.

A small alteration could restore the List to us, pruned of its usefulness to foreign agents: publish the names without rank or career status, but listing personnel at posts in their sections in rank order. This would avoid invidious and often misleading comparisons between FSOs and FSRs, and restore a welcome reference tool. When I submitted this idea last spring through the Department's suggestion program, I received a curt reply: "The Foreign Service List has been discontinued." Which was, of course, the reason for the suggestion in the first place. Are there others who would like to see the List again? Are there other, undetected dangers in its publication not solved by the suggestion above?

CHARLES O. CECIL
Washington

Comment on the VOA Petition in this Issue

While proposing innovations, this VOA statement nevertheless reflects the continuing belief of some VOA staffers that they can both have and eat cake.

Either the VOA should be an arm of American diplomacy—in which case it *must* be closely controlled by State—or it should be an independent journalistic organization which simply uses State as a *source* (albeit a prime one). And the world should know which one it is.

If the VOA is to be a public corporation (perhaps combined with PBS), it cannot at the same time have a structural "special relationship" with State.

Let the Voice be one or the other—an arm of diplomacy or an independent public corporation. Trying to have it both ways, as in the past, will simply perpetuate the hoopla in Washington and the confusion of foreign listeners.

RALPH STUART SMITH
Washington

Stamps Wanted

I am retired and my hobby is to gather used stamps of all kinds which are sent to the lonely boys in our Veterans Hospitals.

Could you please write a few words about this in one of your future issues so that those readers who have stamps they do not want or cannot use can send them to me?

I could show you hundreds of letters from the Red Cross and The USO—Veterans Hospitals and Naval Hospitals all over the globe thanking me for the stamps I have already sent.

Believe me, it's real therapy as it keeps the mind alert and active.

DAVE SCHOENFELD
522 Shore Road
Long Beach, N.Y. 11561

AFSA NEWS

PAT WOODRING APPOINTED NEW PRESIDENT OF AFSA

Patricia Woodring, State Representative, was appointed to the vacant position of AFSA President by unanimous Board vote on December 7. Nominations for the position had been sought by circular telegram to the Chapters and by fliers to the Washington agency keypeople. The three other nominees, Vice President Lars Hydle, Retired Representative Olcott Deming and State Representative Samuel Hart, declined the call.

Pat, elected to the Board in July 1975 by 918 votes, has made her name in AFSA through her vigorous championship of F.S. employee matters as the head of the Members' Interests Committee.

During her 14 years in the Department Pat had served in Vientiane, Zagreb and Manila. Formerly a Foreign Service secretary, Pat, through the Mustang program, is now a Foreign Service Reserve Officer. She is an aviator, skier and active in church affairs.

AFSA ELECTION

AFSA's biennial election is approaching and the Bylaws provide that the Governing Board shall appoint an Elections Committee on or about January 10. The Board would welcome volunteers to serve on this important committee, which requires five members, including at least one member from each constituency.

This portion of the JOURNAL *is the responsibility of the Governing Board of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.*

Members wishing to send letters on employment, working conditions or AFSA affairs should get them to AFSA by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication.

AFSA News Committee
Room 3644, N.S.

AFSA GOVERNING BOARD

The Governing Board has met four times since mid-November, dealing with the immediate consequences of the recall certification and moving ahead on several other issues.

On November 17 the Board (1) declared that the Vice Presidents, the Secretary and Treasurer, in order of precedence, should act as President while that office was vacant; (2) opened nominations for the Presidency; and (3) arranged to inform the Membership, the press, management, the Congress, and the AFSA staff of the recall action.

On November 23, the Board (1) having received State Representative Woodring's acceptance of her nomination as President, decided to inform the Membership by telegram and memorandum within Washington; (2) approved actions to fight Mr. Hemenway's anti-recall suit; (3) approved the text of a letter to President-Elect Carter; (4) decided to request a meeting with his State Department Transition Team (subsequently scheduled for December 15); and (5) established an Organization and Management Committee, chaired by Paul Ward with representation from all three foreign affairs agency constituencies, to consider questions relating to the organization and management of the official foreign affairs community.

On November 30 the Board (a) approved an article by Presidential Appointments Committee Chairman Olcott Deming for the Op-Ed page of the *New York Times,* explaining our proposals to strengthen the merit and career principles in the process of appointment of Ambassadors and (b) approved a letter by the AFSA Secretary to the editor of *Esquire,* pointing out numerous inaccuracies and distortions in a December article on AFSA.

On December 7 the Board (a) met in executive session to discuss matters relating to published identification of two AID Foreign Service people as "CIA agents"; (b) agreed to change the format of the Herter, Rivkin, and Harriman Awards from an exclusive eighth-floor luncheon to an open ceremony in the Dean Acheson Auditorium; (c) approved the disbursement of honoria to consultants to AFSA on the epideniological study of people exposed to microwaves in Moscow; (d) reached consensus on the next steps in the establishment of an indenpendent advisory committee to vet Ambassadorial nominations; and (e) closed Presidential nominations and unanimously appointed State Representative Patricia Woodring as President.

CONTENTS

COMMITTEE ON EXTRAORDINARY DANGERS REPORT

The Committee on Extraordinary Dangers (CED) will be pressing the new Administration for a comprehensive review of our terrorism policy, especially as it relates to governments that assist or harbor terrorists. AFSA believes that such a review should include our strategy for dealing with kidnapping situations.

On October 8, 1976, the President signed the "Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons" (H.R. 15552). This Act provides extraterritorial jurisdction to prosecute persons who commit offenses such as murder, kidnapping, and assault against "internationally protected persons." It also includes in its jurisdiction extortionate demands in conjunction with threats or commission of any of the specified crimes against internationally protected persons. US jurisdiction for these new offenses is also extraterritorial.

This means that, in general when a specified act is committed against US government employees serving abroad who are "entitled pursuant to international law to special protection" and their families who are part of their households, those persons committing the act are all punishable under US law, irrespective of the place where the offense was committed or the nationality of the victim or offender. Details on this law can be obtained at each diplomatic or consular post.

AFSA is encouraged by this Act which is an important step in the direction of strengthening our anti-terrorism efforts.

Further, the President has also signed the instruments of ratification for the "Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes against Persons and Related Extortion" (OAS Convention) and "the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents" (UN Convention). The first convention is in force, while the second convention is not yet in force. Details can be obtained at each post or at the Department's Legal Office.

AFSA has also approached the Department on the question of US efforts to have those who attacked our Embassy in Cyprus resulting in the death of our Ambassasdor and a secretary arrested and tried. AFSA also has approached the Department to see if the costs of shipping guard dogs abroad might be paid by the US government.

The AFSA Governing Board approached both President Ford and President-elect Carter about our terrorism policy, requesting a review. The White House has responded (by the "Director of Correspondence") to our appeal without really providing any substantive answers. While we have not yet heard from President-elect Carter's office, we do expect to follow up with the new Administration.

The Johns Hopkins University Epidemiological Study of the Moscow radiation situation is getting a slow start. Members of the "study review committee" have been named and AFSA is nominating a member who is professionally competent and who will also consult with us on the effectiveness of the study. Radiation on our Embassy continues in Moscow, and AFSA has emphasized that this must stop completely. We will be raising this issue again with the new Secretary of State.

HONOR ROLL OF AFSA POSTS

The following posts have reached 75% or more AFSA membership. Additional posts will be listed as the records become available. Help your post become a part of the honor roll. Sign up a member today.

U.S. Consulate General, **Auckland;** U.S. Interests Section, **Baghdad;** Douglas Broome, U.S. Embassay, **Banjul;** Robert E. Prosser (Madrid), U.S. Consulate General, **Barcelona;** U.S. Consulate, **Belem;** John E. Bennett, U.S. Consulate General, **Bremen;** Donald Kreisberg, U.S. Consulate General, **Curacao;** Eugene D. Schmiel, U.S. Consulate General, **Durban;** Ovsanna Harpootian, U.S. Consulate, **Florence;** U.S. Consulate, **Isfahan;** U.S. Embassy, **Maputo;** U.S. Consulate, **Oporto;** U.S. Consulate, **Ponta Delgada;** K. Patrick Garland, U.S. Consulate General, **Quebec;** U.S. Embassy, **Suva;** U.S. Consulate, **Trieste;** Robert E. Prosser (Madrid), U.S. Consulate General, **Seville;** U.S. Consulate, **Shiraz.**

USEFUL TAX INFO

In the July, 1976 issue of the *Journal,* AFSA members were requested to report instances of IRS questioning of tax returns of members of the Foreign Service who had filed for capital gains tax deferrals on the sale of a home and the reinvestment of the proceeds in a new home where they have complied with the time period and other conditions set forth in the statute.

There has been reported a case which has been used successfully by a retiree in Florida. In the case of *Arthur R. and Elizabeth M. Barry vs Commissioner,* (Docket 2157-69TC—Memo 1971-179) an Army officer and his wife conformed to all requirements of the statute except for the IRS challenge that the residence sold was not in fact their home because they had rented it out while on assignment away from the area and that they were not living in the house at the time of the sale. The Tax Court held for the complainants because:

1. They had always considered the property as their home;
2. They rented the property only when they were assigned away from the area;
3. They did not realize exorbitant profits in the rental contracts;
4. The home was not actually offered for sale until change of living plans had been agreed upon;
5. They had rejected several unsolicited offers to buy, and
6. It was the only home owned by the couple.

The retiree using this case received a favorable ruling from IRS even though at the time of the sale he and his wife were only "camping-out" on the premises for a short time.

FSJ SPECIAL REPORT — The State-USIA Recreation Association (DSRA) said in a recent travel flier advertising "15 exotic days" in the Soviet Union. "The Russians are justly proud of [their] scientific, technical and artistic achievements and take a friendly interest in showing what they have to visitors. You can ask any question about any aspect of Russian life and expect a straight answer."

It's disheartening to think we have thrown away so much money on electronic surveillance and other tiresome gimcrackery; but now at least we know. Thanks, DSRA, for showing the way.

STATE STANDING COMMITTEE

The State Standing Committee has written to management, asking for consultation on the abolition of End-User Reports, now written only by the Commerce Department. The Department appears sympathetic to our views but is awaiting the completion of an Inspection Report on the commercial function before taking a position.

The Junior Subcommittee, led by Joe McBride, is consulting on the results of the Junior Threshold Selection Board, and on the implementation of the umbrella agreement on the establishment of a junior threshold and transitional measures for current junior officers. (Incidentally, we have high hopes that the promotion list will be published before the change in administration, as it was in 1969.)

A subcommittee including an FSO, a communicator and a secretary, on length of overseas tours of duty drawing upon the views of more than 60 overseas posts is consulting with management on policies. At this writing it is not clear whether we will be able to reach agreement, or will have to go to the Disputes Panel.

We have written to management expressing concern about the situation at a small mission headed by a non-career Ambassador. At the latter's request a career FSO has been transferred from there after dissenting from the Ambassador's position on an issue; the officer apparently is the fourth such early transferee in less than 2 years. We are concerned about the rights of the officer concerned; the implications of the transfer for dissent within the Foreign Service; and the Department's unwillingness, until very recently, to make an inspection or otherwise deal effectively with situations at missions headed by non-career appointees.

To prevent Schedule-C-Type FSR appointees from sneaking into the career Foreign Service in the final days of the Ford Administration, we have written to the Department asking that they be identified and that the Department take appropriate measures. We would also like to tighten up, and establish quality control, over the entire process of conversion from FSR to FSRU. We hope to begin consultations soon on these interrelated issues.

We have asked the Department to provide information on 121 positions which they have agreed to eliminate in response to a Congressional mandate; they say they will do it by attrition. We are also seeking further information, and consultations and conferral if necessary, on recent Department decisions to reprogram existing positions (eliminating some and creating others).

The Department appears close to a decision to present us with their long-awaited proposals for a worldwide specialist program, which may well include a reversal of policy since 1971 on the creation of domestic FSR positions. We are seeking further information on reports—thus far denied by the Department—that they have already begun to assign GS people for Department positions previously held by FSR-domestic employees, in a manner contrary to current policy.

The Committee has expanded its membership to represent more of the principal groups within the State Foreign Service, and has appointed Dave Noack, a communicator, and Anthea De Rouville, a secretary, as co-chairmen of a Specialists Subcommittee which will deal with the special problems of specialists, and seek better promotion prospects for secretaries and communicators.

NEW STATE REP DAVID NOACK

David Noack joined the AFSA Governing Board last month as one of the four State Department Representatives, his nomination having been endorsed at a State Caucus meeting. Since entering the Foreign Service in 1966, Dave has been active in AFSA, serving on both the Elections Committee and the Staff Advisory Committee. He has also been the AFSA Keyperson in A/OC. In addition to serving in the Office of Communications in the Department, he has had overseas assignments to Frankfurt and Bonn. Prior to 1966, Dave had a tour in the armed forces and worked at the Eastern Missile Test Range at Cape Kennedy.

HEMENWAY ET AL FILE SUIT AGAINST RECALL

On November 12, three days before the recall vote count, a suit to block the recall was filed in US District Court of the District of Columbia by then-AFSA President Hemenway, and four AFSA Members: Cynthia Thomas, John Harter, Harris Huston, and Samuel Parelman. The Complaint named as defendants AFSA, all thirteen other Board Members, and the Chairman and four members of the Recall Committee. The Complaint alleged that the recall process was designed to punish the plaintiffs for exercising their rights as citizens and AFSA Members, and violated applicable legal requirements. In addition to stopping the recall, Mr. Hemenway sought $100,000 in "compensatory and punitive damages."

The Court on November 16 denied a motion by the plaintiffs for an order temporarily restraining the defendants from counting the ballots or taking further steps to effectuate the recall pending a hearing on the merits of the case.

On December 2 the Association filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, on the grounds that the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust or to pursue their administrative remedies through the Employee-Management Relations Commission and the Department of Labor; that the will of the Membership should be allowed to stand, and that the Court lacked jurisdiction over organizations of federal government employees. The plaintiffs have 10 days to reply. We do not know when the Court will act.

NEW AID REP

William S. Lefes was born in Mercer County in Western Pennsylvania and grew up on his father's dairy farm near Sharpsville, Pennsylvania. He attended Thiel College in nearby Greenville where he received a B.S. in Chemistry and Biology in 1951.

Bill joined ICA in 1960 and served in the Somali Republic from 1960 to 1964 as an Agriculture Program Assistant and Assistant Program Officer. His next assignment was in Uganda as Assistant Program Officer from 1964 to 1967 after which he attended the FSI Economics course. While in AID/W he served on the Ethiopia Desk, Africa/DP and PPC/RB.

In 1971 he was assigned to Saigon as USAID Evaluation Officer for 2 years. In April 1973, he joined PHA/PRS as Evaluation Officer and in December 1974, he was assigned to his present position as Chief of the Program Division in AS1A/DP.

Bill is married to the former Sue Nichols of Raleigh, North Carolina. Sue was North Carolina's 4-H delegate to the International Farm Youth Exchange Program in Australia in 1951. They have two children, William Lee, at the University of Chicago and Patti Sue at Duke. Lee is interested in the physical sciences while Patti's interests are in language and political science.

The Lefeses live in Vienna, Virginia and are members of Wesley United Methodist Church.

AFSA BUDGET PROBLEMS

Earlier this year the Governing Board approved a $404,420 cash flow budget for FY-77 for operating expenses. That required some stringent spending controls and reductions in the salaries of some AFSA staff, plus the termination of one employee. The budget was based on estimated dues income from 6,100-plus active members.

During the fall months the Association experienced a further decline in membership and suffered several unanticipated expenses, including legal costs resulting from attempts by the former President to obtain a court order restraining the recall process. This has left us now with an anticipated deficit for the fiscal year unless we have a substantial increase in membership early this year. If this does not occur the Association may be forced to eliminate some current programs in order to live within its income. The only viable alternative to reduction in our activities is a larger active membership.

The membership drive launched last month is beginning to produce some positive results but this effort to recruit new members must continue to be given top priority. AFSA Keypersons in Washington have held a series of meetings and more are being scheduled. Letters have been sent to AFSA Reps abroad suggesting how their local membership drives can be more successful. Here in Washington, letters are being sent to all non-member Foreign Service personnel pointing out what AFSA has done, is doing, and will be doing to win better working conditions and otherwise make AFSA more effective.

GRIEVANCE REPORT

The new statutory grievance system has been in effect for six months now, and this seems an appropriate time to make a status report. The Foreign Service Grievance Board inherited a backlog of 44 cases when the Board was activated on June 23, 1976, due to the accumulation of cases since the public members of the Interim Foreign Service Grievance Board resigned the previous July. As of early December, the Board reports that 16 of those cases have been closed, and most of the remainder are in preparation and may be expected to be decided very shortly. Overall, the cases may be broken down very roughly as follows: 45% financial and administrative problems; 27% falsely prejudicial material in official personnel files; 25% selection-out or related termination problems; and several miscellaneous problems.

AFSA has been active throughout in counseling and assisting employees with grievances and other personnel problems, helping in the preparation of grievance cases, and representing individuals before the Foreign Service Grievance Board. We are currently the designated representative in 25 of the formal cases before the Board, and we represent approximately 40 others in various earlier phases of grievance proceedings. AFSA has appeared on behalf of grievants in five of the formal hearings held under the new system.

We are in the process of preparing an AFSA Grievance Checklist for inclusion in the AFSA Chapter and Keyman Manual and hope to distribute it shortly. If you would like advice on a grievance, write to the AFSA Grievance Committee, or to our Counselors, Cathy Waelder or Wilbur Chase, at Rm. 3644, N.S.

SALARY RAISE FOR SENIORS

The Quadrennial Commission on Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Salaries has forwarded its recommendations to the President. The proposed Executive Level V salary is $49,000, which would become the new limit imposed on the general schedule. The President should include this proposal or another version in the January budget message to Congress. Either House of Congress could block the proposal by action taken within 30 days. The new Executive V pay level establishes the ceiling on the F.S. salary schedule.

AFSA filed a strongly worded statement in support of the upward revision with the Commission during its hearings held prior to making its recommendations to the President. We cannot predict at this time the reaction of either the President or the Congress, but we trust that enough concern has been expressed to obtain some favorable action for our senior officials.

NOTE: The two papers appearing on these three pages of AFSA News, "USIA and the Future of Public Diplomacy" and "The Future of the Voice of America," do not reflect AFSA positions. Each of these papers has, however, been supported and signed by a large number of Washington-based employees of USIA and VOA. AFSA presents these points of view as a service to members of the foreign affairs community.

USIA and the Future of Public Diplomacy

Introduction

Those of us who have endorsed this statement speak only for ourselves. We believe our views are shared by many of our colleagues in the Washington elements of USIA and in the 110 countries around the world in which our programs operate. Moreover, we believe this statement represents a positive and reasoned approach to the conduct of American public diplomacy.

We are convinced that the overseas information and cultural programs of our government can be made more responsive and more effective. To that end, we propose redefining the function of USIA, and reorganizing it to support that function.

Much of what we propose is not new. We believe that a realistic and workable public diplomacy can be conducted within the framework of the original mandate set out for the country's information and cultural programs in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948:

> ". . .to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries."

USIA has been largely ignored by the Executive Branch and threatened by the Congress over the past decade. Our accomplishments have come in spite of, rather than because of, those to whom we are accountable. Not surprisingly, our achievements have fallen short of our potential. We believe the time has come to establish realistic goals and to seek the active support of the Administration in providing the leadership and resource stability needed to achieve those goals.

Our statement includes three major recommendations:

- government-wide agreement that the mission of USIA is not to manipulate foreign attitudes, but to seek understanding of American policy as well as the society and values from which it flows;
- acceptance of an operating style characterized by open, frank discussion of issues (including responsible non-government opinion) and the depiction of American society and culture in all its diverse aspects;
- integration of the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs into a revitalized, independent USIA.

The Role of USIA

Our Agency was formed in an age when the media were regarded as powerful weapons in the battle for men's minds. If propaganda could be directed against the enemy in wartime, it was argued, why not use the same means in peacetime to win friends? USIA has long since outgrown that simplistic view. We know that manipulation through international communication fails on two counts: its pursuit represents a naive conception of human nature and a self-defeating contradiction of the values we seek to represent in the world.

We also know that USIA is a comparatively small voice in an increasingly sophisticated and noisy communications environment. Our role must be carefully defined, lest our message be lost in the babble of competing voices.

The basic task of USIA has always been to support American foreign policy. From this mission devolves a responsibility not only for the careful representation of government polices, but also for the candid depiction of American society and values.

In the long run, the response of foreign nations to our policies will be motivated first by their own self-interest, and second by their perception of ours. USIA can sharpen these perceptions and can seek understanding. But we cannot change deep-seated attitudes. Rather than trying to make policy more palatable, we must strive to make it more understandable. And rather than trying to make America more lovable, we must strive to make it more comprehensible.

If this definition of our role as one of representing foreign policy and depicting American society is more modest than the rhetoric of past years we believe it will lead to a program that is more fruitful.

Although what we say is necessarily limited by our resources, our message must encompass the diversity of our pluralistic society. We must not fear portraying America as it is. USIA should be expected to present persuasively the Administration's policies along with responsible non-government opinion, even though such opinion may at times be critical of those policies. Presenting the diversity of American opinion produces long-term benefits which far exceed the occaional short-term risks.

To represent our society and its values with candor and to enunciate the policies of the government with precision, we believe the proper mode of discourse is the dialogue, in the sense suggested by Harry Ashmore: "As opposed to argument or debate, dialogue is not intended to resolve issues, but to clarify and illuminate. It is essentially a rational exercise by which differences may be narrowed and perception improved."

We recommend dialogue not because American views will necessarily prevail, but because rational discussion will best ensure their fair exposure in the world marketplace of ideas.

Dialogue involves listening as well as speaking. USIA has traditionally reported on foreign public opinion. We urge that this role continue. Otherwise the dialogue we advocate becomes a monologue—we speak and they listen. Even if government action is infrequently influenced by foreign public opinion, it should at least be heard before policy is formed.

In summary, we urge the promotion of responsible discussion abroad of American policies and purposes, and the repudiation of the sometimes captivating but superficial notion that USIA's goal should be simply to win friends and influence people. There is, we submit, a considerable difference between responsible and representative public diplomacy (which we advocate) and public relations (which we reject).

Audiences

USIA has long been plagued by arguments over whether we should address mass audiences or opinion leaders. We dispute those who would exclude either; the relationship is clearly complementary. Moreover, a nation which represents the Jeffersonian principle of full public participation in decision-making can hardly disavow this ideal abroad by channeling its efforts only to elites. In fact, it is because of our concern with publics outside government that the mission of USIA is fundamentally different from that of the Department of State. However, our interest in communicating with the broadest possible audience must be tempered by budgetary pragmatism and by an awareness of inter-cultural sensitivities.

As a practical matter, mass audiences are accessible, if at all, only through the Voice of America or through materials placed in the indigenous media. With the press, television, and other media in most countries subject to government control or sanction, placement of all but the least controversial materials is frequently limited. Access to the media in democratic societies is less a question of ideology than of willingness to accept materials from a foreign government, even a friendly one. In each case, access is at the pleasure of the media gatekeepers (e.g., editors, producers, and commentators), with whom we must unquestionably seek to develop a relationship of mutual trust. For unless we first establish a dialogue with those who control the foreign media, we will fail in the broader dialogue between America and the people of other nations.

There are other publics whom we must continue to address because of their pre-eminent role in the development of ideas: scholars, artists, writers, and government officials concerned with education, information, and cultural affairs. We look upon them as essential interpreters in the process of cross-cultural communications.

US officials must also maintain close personal contact with administrators, foreign affairs officials, military officers, and business leaders. However, it is clear that other elements of the American mission abroad—particularly State, Defense, and Commerce—must bear primary responsibility for these relationships. We can often support these contacts with media skills and resources, but our primary concern should

remain those audiences with whom we uniquely share a community of interest.

In this information-rich age, we must carefully shape our programs in each country to complement the existing patterns of influence, culture, and communication. This strategy requires both mass communication and personal contact.

Organization and Leadership

USIA has been the subject of a number of studies. The most recent of these is the Stanton Panel Report. While we endorse the Stanton Panel comments on the essentiality of public diplomacy, we disagree with its proposals for reorganization. They would compound the fragmentation that already exists in Washington—the separation of USIA and CU (the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs)—and would create fragmentation overseas where none exists.

The purposes of public diplomacy are best served, we believe, by an independent organization combining USIA and CU. USIA already administers the State Department's educational and cultural exchange program overseas. Our programing experience has shown that the present distinction between information and cultural programs is arbitary and awkward. Both relate to policy; both relate to the society we represent.

By bringing USIA and CU together, we can ensure that the dialogue we seek involves the flow of ideas and people to, as well as from, the United States. We are confident that this can be accomplished without violating the Congressional stricture that USIA not be used by any Administration to pursue domestic political goals, nor to mobilize American public opinion in support of Administration objectives.

The Stanton Panel would have USIA join the State Department, with the Voice of America remaining outside as an independent agency. In support of this proposal, the Stanton Panel argued that the differences between association with State and continued independence "are more cosmetic than substantive." We wish to argue that the differences are substantive indeed, and must follow logically from the definition of USIA's role. If that role is primarily advocacy of State Department policy, we rightly belong in the Department of State. If, on the other hand, it is the representation of US Government policies and the depiction of American society, it follows that our continued independence must be assured. But neither role is enhanced by the creation of new and overlapping bureaucracies.

We advocate the full integration of CU within a revitalized and rechartered USIA committed to the support of American policy through the exchange of persons and ideas.

There is a second option which we believe is far less desirable, but still preferable to the fragmented organization proposed by the Stanton Panel—combining USIA with all educational and cultural exchange activities in a single inter-cultural communications agency within the Department of State. This position was taken by the State Department which, like USIA, has opposed the Stanton Panel reorganizational recommendations.

Even if the second option is chosen, we believe that VOA should remain closely associated with USIA. But we fear that the State Department, whose primary responsibility is the formulation and execution of American foreign policy, will find itself particularly uncomfortable with an independent news gathering and reporting organization to which the Congress recently granted a charter for news integrity. If USIA becomes an element of the State Department, VOA's special responsibilities must be protected. And if the redefined role we seek for USIA is accepted, it, too, will need special guarantees.

As representatives of the US Government serving abroad, we do not seek or expect to be exempted from official accountability for our actions. Since we are part of the American diplomatic mission, our activities may understandably be regarded by others as indicative of the direction of US policy. Where we present, as we must, dissenting voices, they must be identified clearly as such. And we accept the necessity, in sensitive circumstances, to avoid the creation of dangerous confusion over US policy directions.

For this reason, the desire of some employees of the Voice of America for complete and unfettered freedom of action could only be realized were the Voice cut loose from all organizational ties to State or USIA—including access to classified information, the protection and advantages afforded by official status for its employees overseas, and the negotiation for and protection of its overseas transmitters by our embassies.

We think this extreme course inadvisable. VOA is an integral part of our information program. We believe its employees can perform with journalistic integrity alongside their USIA colleagues, and that the requirement for VOA news to be reliable and authoritative can be further protected if our redefined goals are accepted.

Whatever structure is chosen, we support the goals proposed by the Department of State for strengthening a reorganized international communications organization:

> "Encourage respect for America and American policies in our interdependent world. This requires coherent articulation, honest explanation and fidelity to our commitment to individual liberty and cultural diversity.
>
> "Promote interactions which deepen mutual understanding, encourage rationality, and strengthen cooperation among Americans and other peoples."

We recognize and strongly support the need for organizational change. And we believe that one organization, not two, should be responsible for international communication. Hence, we reject the Stanton Panel proposals to divide the functions of USIA. We endorse the consolidation of public diplomacy within a restructured, independent USIA.

Finally, there is the question of leadership. If caution is the preserve of the State Department, boldness must be that of USIA. The necessary catalyst for successful public diplomacy is leadership which is politically sophisticated, culturally sensitive, experienced in international communications, and dedicated to the pursuit of ideas and the promotion of understanding.

We believe the national interest is best served by a public diplomacy based on dialogue. And we believe the considerable energy and talent of the Agency's personnel should be directed toward this end.

The Future of

of

For nearly two years, there have been recommendations and suggestions for reorganizing the US overseas information and educational exchange operations. By year's end, the Executive Branch will be reporting to the Congress on aspects of US international broadcasting efforts. President-elect Carter has made clear his intention to organize the entire government in a more rational and efficient way.

Obviously, some kind of change lies ahead. Since the professional career corps of the Voice of America has had no direct input into the numerous studies looking toward reorganization, some of us felt it would be appropriate to express our own views, at least in general terms,. of what should and should not be done. We felt it would be presumptuous to recommend specific details concerning the structural rearrangements to be made, but that it might be useful for the Congressional committees most immediately concerned to have a statement of our views of the present and possible future governmental relationships affecting our ability to do our job in full conformity with the now-legislatively underwritten VOA Charter.

This statement by VOA professionals is a serious attempt to remind ourselves and others what we are and do and how we feel it could be done better.

We, the professional staff of the Voice of America, having given long and serious thought to the future of this international broadcasting institution, have arrived at a consensus of views regarding its present and future structural relationship to other elements of the United States Government and of the American society it is charged by law to represent.

The purposes of the Voice of America are well and succinctly outlined in "the Charter," a brief document dating from the closing years of the Eisenhower Administration and in 1976 made the law of the land. That "Charter," as revised by the Congress, reads as follows:

> "The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America (the Broadcasting Service of the United States Information Agency) must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will therefore

the Voice

America

govern Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts:

"(1) VOA will serve as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective and comprehensive.

"(2) VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society, and will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

"(3) VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively, and will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies."

Since its issuance in 1959, the VOA Charter has been accepted and supported by each succeeding Administration; but in its brevity and conciseness, it has been subject to a range of interpretations based on different viewpoints and perspectives from different locations within the Government. Some outside observers have considered the VOA role and function fundamentally impossible to perform because of the organization's position at the intersection of journalism and diplomacy. Those of us who have served as professional international broadcasters in behalf of the United States Government over many years consider the unique combination of VOA responsibilities a challenge requiring special skills, and we confidently believe it can be met.

We have long urged our colleagues within the government to recognize the uniqueness of this organization among the information techniques and media available to the United States in dealing with other societies; VOA is the only American governmental medium going directly to the recipient without any middleman, American or foreign, to interpose another judgment on the information conveyed. As a long-lived, responsible, credible and dependable source of information, VOA provides a context within which listeners can reach an understanding of American foreign and domestic policies and actions.

The question as to where this unique institution should fit within the US Government remains unresolved to this day. A variety of options has been discussed in recent years for relocating and reshaping the organization:

- made an independent entity within the federal family;
- placed alongside Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty under the Board for International Broadcasting;
- returned to the Department of State, along with the rest of USIA;
- joined with the Corporation for Public Broadcasting or National Public Radio.

(No outside group that has studied the future of the US information and cultural effort abroad has recommended maintaining the status quo.)

In its nearly thirty-five years, the Voice has been administratively located in several different "parent" institutions and its mission variously defined and interpreted. In every case, VOA has not merely been placed in a subordinate position; it has been made subservient in every area of management and operations, with repeated unwarranted restrictions on its output, and a generally adverse effect on its ability to perform.

Now, in 1976, we of the VOA staff have concluded that an independent status within the foreign affairs community is necessary. The progressive assertion of "parental" control and dominance in recent years has significantly reduced the role of VOA's own leadership. All authority and responsibility for fundamental VOA decision-making is held by the Agency leadership. Even the optimists among us have lost hope that a viable relationship can ever be achieved between an organization like VOA, which reaches its audience directly and immediately, and one like USIA, which is an adjunct of diplomacy.

Our long experience and genuine efforts to bridge the gaps prevailing in the present system have convinced us that VOA will be rationally and effectively operated in conformity with the Charter only when it has control over its programing, its administration, its personnel system, its policy application, and the defense of its operation and exposition of its hopes and plans to the Administration and the Congress. The present layering of bureaucracy, both administrative and substantive, leads to inordinate delays, difficulties and even total omissions in the broadcast treatment of major stories and issues. The emphasis of the policy mechanism on saying little or nothing on sensitive issues, which may be at the heart of the listener's concern, discourages efforts to clarify and explain American foreign policy developments and issues to audiences abroad. It also renders VOA irrelevant to the interested listener at critical times. The transient kind of management system, by which foreign service officers are assigned to supervise major journalistic and programing elements of the organization for two or three years, results in a lack of continuity of leadership, and in management by people of other than broadcasting expertise. We have great respect and high regard for many of our foreign service colleagues, and hope VOA can continue to "borrow" qualified individual officers for appropriate assignments.

It is obvious to us that VOA has and must continue to have a special relationship with the Department of State in order to explain and interpret American foreign policy decisions and trends accurately and clearly, as BBC does so successfully for Great Britain. We believe that a small policy liaison staff attached to the VOA Program Manager's office can provide the kind of useful contacts with political and public information offices in the Department that will enable VOA to carry out its mandate of supporting US foreign policy in the most responsible and effective way. It has been suggested that writers on US policy matters should be assigned to the State Department and provide analyses and commentaries for broadcast. Experience has shown that such program materials would not be forthcoming with the speed necessary to compete for radio audiences. We of VOA prefer not to abdicate or transfer such responsibility. VOA wants to work closely and cooperatively with the Department of State—and all other departments and agencies of government, for that matter—but to be responsible and accountable for its own editorial and programing judgments and decisions in reflecting national policies. We serve the same government, but in vastly different ways, and our separateness should be preserved to the advantage of both.

A final note about the relocation of VOA within the government: an earlier tentative proposal that the Voice be placed under the Board for International Broadcasting in parallel with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, while superficially plausible in the search for economy and efficiency, contains potentially dangerous implications for the future of the nation's ability to communicate by radio to the rest of the world, including an effective, unjammed Voice of America. The BIB was established as a governmental device for getting appropriated funds into the hands of non-governmental radios operating as surrogate national broadcasters in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The Board was set up to legitimize, in the American and foreign mind, operations that had been funded by the CIA for two decades. VOA does not need legitimizing; it *is* governmental, and requires no special middleman between itself and its OMB and Congressional providers. Its being joined with RFE and RL, even if only in technical facilities, could be misinterpreted by foreign and domestic observers and critics as a delayed admission of a long-existing clandestine relationship, and seriously damage the hard-won trust and credibility enjoyed by VOA today. Further, the evidence suggests that most foreign governments and publics—notably including those in countries where VOA has major transmitter facilities—are not convinced that those radios' former connections have in fact been broken. In our view, to connect VOA with BIB, even tenuously, would be to ask for trouble. The ultimate cost could be very high, not only affecting the US capability of broadcasting to the countries reached by RFE and Radio Liberty but, even more importantly, to the rest of the world.

To summarize: we of the professional VOA staff believe it to be in the national interest to insulate this worldwide, many-language broadcasting entity from other radio operations whose missions are of less than universal scope or interest; from other foreign information activities that have little or nothing in common with broadcast journalism; and from the direct control of that department of government whose role is policy planning and the conduct of diplomacy.

At a time when freedom of information and the right to know are under increasing threat in the world, we of VOA believe strongly in the importance of our work in behalf of those concepts and of this nation. To succeed over the long term, this institution must have the continuing trust of listeners throughout the world. We believe that maintaining such trust depends on VOA's ability to escape the many-layered bureaucracy of the present and be allowed to assume full authority for carrying out its unique responsibilities in support of the US national interest.

COLLEGE APPLICATIONS DEADLINE APPROACHING

In most cases college applications must be in by January fifteenth. If you are still searching for the "right" college or university come and browse through our catalogues and talk to us. We can also help those who will be applying late.

For eleventh graders, now is the time to start thinking about the colleges to which you will want to write for catalogues, any time now, and visit, any time after their 1977 acceptances are completed in April. Come in, or if abroad, write to us.

People leaving for assignments abroad whose children are approaching these years may want to familiarize themselves with the procedures.

We urge you to consider a wide range of colleges and universities: academic strengths and weaknesses in the subjects that interest you, geographic location, size. It is never wise to count too highly on any one college.

We have the following resource books in our library:

1. Patterson's Annual Guide to Undergraduate Study, *Two-Year and Four-Year Undergraduate Institutions in the U.S. and Canada.*
2. The College Entrance Examination Board's *The College Handbook.*
3. *Lovejoy's College Guide.*
4. Barron's *Profiles on American Colleges.*
5. The American Council on Education's *American Colleges and Universities.*
6. The American Council on Education's *American Junior Colleges.*
7. *A National Directory of Four Year Colleges, Two Year Colleges and Post High School Training Programs for Young People with Learning Disabilities.*

All college catalogues are available on microfiche at the Library of Congress, Room 140A, Main Building, Monday-Friday 8:30 A.M.-9:30 P.M., Saturday 8:30 A.M.-5:00 P.M., Sunday 1:00-5:00 P.M.

Bernice Munsey
Patricia Squire
Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center (FSECC)
2101 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202/338-4045)

Foreign Service People

Births

Perina. A daughter, Alexandra Hetherington, born to FSO and Mrs. Rudolf Vilem Perina, on September 7, in Ottawa.

Deaths

Beyerly. Harold S. Beyerly, FSS-retired, died on November 1, in Vienna. Mr. Beyerly entered the Foreign Service in 1920 and served at The Hague, Rotterdam, Belgrade, Panama, Budapest, Madrid and Lisbon before his retirement. He is survived by a son, Harold, of Krapfenwaldgasse 9, A-1190 Vienna, Austria, and two grandchildren.

Dean. James C. Dean, FSO, was killed in a bus accident on November 24 near Beersheba. Mr. Dean was serving as first secretary at Tel Aviv at the time of his death. He entered the Foreign Service in 1967, after serving with the Peace Corps, and served at San Pedro Sula, Santiago and on detail to AID and OAS. He is survived by his wife and a three-year-old son.

Heller. Philip A. Heller, FSO-retired, died on December 6, in Washington. Mr. Heller served with ECA from 1959 to 1953 and joined the Foreign Service in 1955. His posts included Vienna, Bonn, Conakry, Nairobi, Bujumbura and Frankfurt. He received the superior honor award in 1967. After retirement in 1970 he taught courses at Georgetown University, Federal City College and the Civil Service Commission. He is survived by his wife, Evelyn, of 6647 Western Avenue, N.W., a sister and a brother.

Rankin. Pauline Jordan Rankin, wife of retired Ambassador Karl Lott Rankin, died on November 12, at Bridgeton, Maine. Mrs. Rankin accompanied her husband to all his posts abroad, including his assignments as Ambassador to China and to Yugoslavia. Ambassador Rankin is at his winter address, 140 S. E. Sinclair St., Port Charlotte, Florida 33952.

Rogers. Dr. Sarah F. Rogers, wife of FSO-retired J. Thomas Rogers, died on November 18, in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Dr. Rogers accompanied her husband on assignments to Stuttgart, Berlin, Frankfurt, Budapest, Buenos Aires, Quito and Rawalpindi. She was named "Outstanding Citizen of the Year" in 1965 by the Bethesda-Chevy Chase Chamber of Commerce. In addition to her husband of 148 Old Ford Dr., Camp Hill, Penna. 17011, she is survived by four daughters, a son, two sisters and her mother.

Swanson. Harry O. Swanson, for 36 years with the Internal Revenue Service, nine in the International Operations division as Treasury Attache in Ottawa, London and Western European posts, died November 3, in Seattle. Mr. Swanson was serving as Court Commissioner in Point Roberts, Washington at the time of his death. He is survived by his wife, Alice, P.O. Box 191, Point Roberts, Washington 98281, a son, Stephen, a daughter, Alice Sterling, and three grandchildren.

AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS

This is our final notice. All applications and supplementary materials for the AFSA 1977-1978 Financial Aid Grants and Merit Awards for the dependent daughters and sons of members of the Foreign Service community, active, retired or deceased, must be postmarked by February 15, 1977.

For application forms and related materials call or write to: Mrs. Patricia Squire, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 (202-338-4045). Please note that a new application must be submitted for each year that a candidate wishes to be considered.

Seventy Financial Aid Grants have been made for 1976-1977 ranging from $350-$1500 with a maximum of $2000 to any one family. Twenty Merit Awards of $500 each were awarded last June to graduating high school and preparatory school seniors.

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

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