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by David Fitzhugh

THE WEEK WE WENT TO WAR, PART II
by Barton J. Bernstein

AFSA ELECTION NOTICE, Page 37

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

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AFSA EDITORIAL

A WARM WELCOME TO SECRETARY CYRUS VANCE

AFSA extends a warm welcome to Secretary of State Vance and the management team he has selected. As the exclusive employee representative in State and AID, as well as a professional organization, we look forward to working with them in our continuing effort to make the Foreign Service the best possible foreign policy instrument. A vital part of this process is the construction of a personnel system which permits the outstanding group of people we have to function at their full potential. The Secretary and AFSA have a strong mutual interest in this objective. Although we may disagree sometimes on the means to this end, we are off to a good start.

A preliminary discussion between AFSA and Secretary Vance's representatives was held during the transition period to identify issues which require prompt attention. Among these are the matters of the appointment of only the best qualified people to top diplomatic posts, the future of AID's FSR employees, and the extraordinary dangers to our overseas personnel. On the first of these, the pattern the new Administration will follow is just emerging and will be carefully monitored by AFSA. On the second, we hope to reach an understanding quickly with the new AID Administrator which will reverse the long history of prejudicial actions against AFSA and AID's FSR employees. On the third, we need a credible policy on terrorism.

We expect that Secretary Vance will have his own list of priority issues—some of which might involve fundamental changes in the personnel system. In AFSA's view, decisions on major changes should be delayed until the new Administration has completed its settling-in period. Meanwhile, AFSA will be developing a comprehensive approach to the problems.

AFSA APPLAUDS JOHN REINHARDT'S USIA APPOINTMENT

The American Foreign Service Association enthusiastically welcomes the selection of the eminently qualified USIA Career Minister for Information John E. Reinhardt as Director of USIA. This is particularly important because, as the first career FSIO to become Director of USIA, Ambassador Reinhardt's appointment reflects President Carter's intention to make Presidential appointments in foreign affairs on the basis of merit and experience.

Ambassador Reinhardt brings to USIA a long and distinguished career within USIA, as Ambassador to Nigeria and, most recently, as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. His professionalism and sophistication will significantly benefit the United States in the representation of our interests abroad.

AFSA has urged that Presidential appointments be based on demonstrated experience and merit. The designation of Ambassador Reinhardt accurately reflects our conviction that foreign affairs leadership should come from the ranks of professional diplomats.

AFSA PROTESTS TERRORIST RELEASE TO FRENCH AMBASSADOR

The Governing Board of the American Foreign Service Association today voted unanimously in favor of a resolution sending a telegram of protest to the French Ambassador to the United States over the quick release of the international terrorist, Abu Daoud. AFSA believes that this act can only encourage further terrorist attacks against innocent persons and weaken international collective efforts of civilized countries to stop such murders.

The text of the telegram sent today to the French Ambassador follows:

The American Foreign Service Association, representing more than 9,000 Foreign Service employees strongly protests the cowardly act by the French government in permitting the quick release of the plotter of the Munich massacre, Abu Daoud. The lives of a number of colleagues were lost through the wanton and destructive acts of Abu Daoud and his fellow terrorists. The act of your government can only encourage further terrorist attacks against innocent persons and weaken the collective efforts of civilized countries to stop such murders. This act is especially regrettable in the light of the slow progress made towards collective action against those who attack internationally protected persons. This abject capitulation to terrorism will be forgotten neither by this Association nor, in our judgment, by the American public. In AFSA's view, this act reflects poorly on the honor of one of our oldest and closest allies.

Signed: Patricia A. Woodring, President

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

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COMMUNICATION re:

CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES

MARTIN F. HERZ

My friend Tom Boyatt, in making a good case in the November *Journal,* has overshot his goal. He is certainly right that career officers are now more likely to get caught in the pulling and hauling between the Executive and Legislative branches, and that the Constitution imposes on us obligations not only toward the Executive. So far, so good.

But he goes on to say that there really isn't much of a problem because *in his experience* the Congressional investigators (in that particular case, the Pike committee) were fair to the witness: "Never was there any activity by any person on or connected with the Committee that could even remotely be construed as effort to 'get' me, the Foreign Service, or anyone."

That has not always been the case. Younger officers may not be aware of the activities for instance of the subcommittee under the chairmanship of the late Senator Thomas Dodd which browbeat witnesses and wanted to know who, precisely, had made what recommendation to whom in the Department with respect to the Katanga lobby—with the obvious purpose or pressuring not only the Department of State but specifically lower-ranking officers and to influence them in the exercise of their duties.

Nor is it entirely correct that at the time of Senator McCarthy, "It was the State Department which . . . .wrecked the careers." Because of the public passions which his investigation generated, based on information elicited by the senator and often presented out of context, my friend Ted Kaghan among others was hounded out of the Service. It is all very well to say that the actual blade was that of John Foster Dulles, but the instrumentality that triggered the descent of that blade was Senator McCarthy and his committee.

There are other examples. I was in the Bureau of African Affairs some 15 years ago when Representative Porter Hardy tried to investigate not just our policy on Angola, but precisely who had said what to whom inside the Department of State, again with the presumption that those items of information were important to him not only for a better understanding of our policy-making processes but very likely also in order to intimidate the lower-ranking officers concerned. And it is not so long ago that an FSO could not obtain a senior assignment because of Congressional accusations that he personally had "lost Cuba."

Now, what to do about all this? Certainly the solution is not for individual Foreign Service officers to withhold their cooperation from Congressional committees when it is officially requested; neither, however, can the solution lie in every career officer volunteering information about his particular policy or tactical preferences to members of the Congress who will fight the particular battle—against the Executive—that he would favor. That would not contribute to an effective process of policy formulation.

In my own case, the situation is fairly clear: Every

Martin Herz, a frequent contributor to the JOURNAL, *is serving as Ambassador to Bulgaria.*

ambassador-designate, when he comes up before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee which recommends that the Senate give (or withhold) its "advice and consent" to the nomination, is now asked routinely whether he will provide information about matters in his purview upon request of the Senate; and he is advised—indeed, instructed—by the Department to answer that question in the affirmative.

When I gave my affirmative answer to Senator Sparkman in March, 1974, I did so without reservation—but I did interpret my answer in the sense that some information might have to be made available in executive session and that it would not be inappropriate for me to seek assistance from the Secretary of State if I needed it. I have had no problems myself, but have heard that other ambassadors have been before subcommittees that were, in effect, looking for information that could be used to support or buttress partisan challenges against the policies conducted by the Executive.

I think the reason why the precedent of the McCarthy period was adduced by the Department in refusing to make working documents available to the Congress, must have been the following one: It is hard enough sometimes to get people on the working level to make confidential recommendations to their superiors which, if made public, might make them very unpopular. But it is one thing to make an unpopular recommendation privately to the Secretary of State (and Secretaries, after all, come and go); it is another to find yourself publicly pilloried for a recommendation made in good faith which may be very sensible and in the public interest although, presented or interpreted in a partisan fashion, it could be made to appear nefarious or idiotic.

The very example used by Tom in his article argues that there is indeed a problem: He reports that in his own situation "a savvy Washington reporter responded to Secretary Kissinger's assertion that the bureaucracy must be 'protected' from Congress by asking in print. 'Why? So they (the career professionals) can go on making mistakes at the expense of the American people?' " Tom seems to have found that quotation reassuring. Let's look at the implications of what that "savvy reporter" wrote.

There is virtually no issue in our foreign policy where someone doesn't feel that "mistakes are being made at the expense of the American people." The adversary process of policy formulation sees to it (or should, at any rate) that real alternatives or "options" are presented to the political leadership; and the dissent mechanism makes sure that any that may have been overlooked will come to the surface within the Department.

Now, if all those who lost out in that process were free to go to the Congress or the press to complain that "mistakes are being made at the expense of the American people," we would have utter confusion—and professionals within the Department could be intimidated by colleagues who had better contacts on the Hill or with the press. Partisan politics wuould have entered the career service, something that Congress itself tried to avoid when it passed the Foreign Service Act.

Tom Boyatt was lucky in that the committee and the press obviously treated him with kid gloves, and apparently for good reason—because he was to be used to embarrass the foreign policy leadership in the Executive.



But that situation may not always prevail: Another Tom Boyatt on another occasion may find himself keel-hauled because of the very precedent that was successfully avoided in his case—because some document written by such an officer may be used to hound and embarrass *not a future Kissinger or Vance, but a future Boyatt.*

So let us not oversimplify this problem. It is a real problem, and the Boyatt article points it up very effectively. But he doesn't really point to a solution. In my opinion a delicate balance has to be maintained between the requirements of an orderly process of policy formulation—which requires a free flow of ideas within the Executive—and the requirements for information by the Legislature. The Boyatt case was one where the balance happened to be just barely maintained.

When John F. Kennedy became President he called for "daring and dissent" within the government service. He needed to, because the career services had become fearful of superiors who asked for "positive loyalty" and of Senators who had "investigated" officers with whose views they disagreed. At that time the *Foreign Service Journal* printed (in its April, 1961 issue):

"Even if an officer is wrong, provided he is loyal and keeps his views within the official family, he has a right—indeed, he has a duty—to make his best thinking on a particular problem available to the Department of State. The Department, on its part, should protect the officer against having labels put on him by outsiders who may disagree with his political views. Unless this is done, only orthodox views will be ventilated, and our policy formulation process will suffer. We have seen this happen in the foreign services of other countries. . . .

"Let there be, then, within the limits of loyal service to the United States, a free play of ideas in the Foreign Service. Such a free play of ideas is only possible, however, if the President and the Secretary of State will actually defend those of their subordinates who may some day, with the benefit of hindsight, prove to have been wrong. In giving our best judgment we cannot always be right, particularly since politics involves constant change, and a judgment made two years ago may look foolish today even though it was quite reasonable at the time when it was made.

"The Foreign Service consists not only of geniuses. We are fallible human beings, but we are less likely to give bad advice to those in positions of ultimate responsibility if we are free from inhibitions about the limits of what it is 'safe' to say. Let this be understood also by Congress, lest there be a new tendency to penalize those who have in good faith advocated the taking of risks. To our readers we say: Speak up! Let there be 'daring and dissent.' The President himself has said that he greets healthy controversy as the hallmark of healthy change."

It so happens that the quoted paragraphs were written by myself. What is more important is that the editorial was inserted into the *Congressional Record* by a present member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who is a good friend of the Foreign Service. At that time he was aware, as some of our younger colleagues today may not be, that the danger does not only come from an Executive that muzzles, but also from a Legislature that can use subordinates as political weapons against their superiors, or that can pillory such subordinates in public for decisions that were approved by their politically-appointed superiors.

The American political process is one of balancing conflicting and countervailing forces. Our foreign policy and the Foreign Service will be well served if individual career officers are not made into political footballs tossed back and forth between two co-equal branches of the government.

COMMUNICATION re:

A Modest Proposal for VOA

GRANT PARR

The satirical "modest proposal" of Jonathan Swift was to solve the food problem in Ireland by eating Irish babies. The proposal which follows may to some seem equally drastic; but it is serious and in no sense satirical.

A continuing drag on American foreign policy is lack of adequate information among voters—and their representatives in the House and Senate.

It may not seem pertinent that two major oversight committees have concurred in recommending drastic changes in our overseas information and cultural programs; but these could be heeded and changes made which would help to improve both our program abroad and the understanding of foreign policy at home.

As a beginning we need to open our minds to concepts that have been ignored or rejected but for which, perhaps, the time has finally come.

Such concepts include the use of "authorities" like Britain's BBC (or the TVA) which, though aided by Government funds, are autonomous in operation; and the possibility of directing some information or cultural efforts towards Americans, as well as foreigners, yet avoiding the peril of a Government propaganda machine.

The public advisory commission which for years had provided an annual critique on the work of the United States Information Agency (USIA) eventually admitted its total frustration. Having seen its advice ignored year after year and watched the Agency repeat old mistakes as well as make new ones, the advisors simply declared that USIA should be abolished. Under a former president of CBS, Frank Stanton, its long-experienced and long-frustrated chairman, the group went on to recommend

Continued on page 29

Grant Parr, FSIO-retired, served at Damascus, Hamburg, Dacca, New Delhi and in USIA Washington and the Department. His previous experience includes service as a war correspondent with the New York TIMES *and as a reporter and teacher.*

PART II

the week we went to war: American Intervention in the Korean Civil War

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

The United States was moving into the war and an increased military commitment in the Far East, but the President and his advisers had not yet faced systematically what would prove to be the major decision: Should the United States commit ground troops? The official summary of their discussion discloses that they did not explore the objections raised on Sunday by Bradley, Johnson, and Pace, and that they maintained cohesion by avoiding the difficult question. Here is the relevant part of the recently declassified summary of Monday night's meeting:

General [J. Lawton] Collins, [Army Chief of Staff,] stated that the military situation in Korea is bad . . . It was impossible to say how much our air [force] can do . . . .

Mr. Acheson stated that it was important for us to do something even if the effort were not successful.

Mr. Johnson said that even if we lose Korea this action would save the situation [and] "suits me." He then asked whether any of the military representatives had any objection to the course of action which had been outlined. There was no objection. . . .

The President said he had done everything he could for five years to prevent this kind of situation. Now the situation is here and we must do what we can to meet it. He had been wondering about mobilization of the National Guard . . . He repeated we must do everything we can for the Korean situation—"for the United Nations." . . . "I don't want to go to war."

They continued to hope, as Secretary Johnson phrased it, that "these steps already authorized will settle the Korean question." The bleak counsel of Collins was neglected, for it raised troubling questions—ones that the group wanted to avoid.

For Truman, there was a sense of desperation and exultation, of pride and fear, of the need to act (at least as far as he had) and of the danger of inaction. He was proud that the government had acted, relieved that the test was dramatic, yet still unsure of whether the next step—what would prove to be the critical step—would be necessary. He had indicated that he would take that next step and commit ground troops, even though others had raised doubts. The course of the Cold War, he believed, had long involved challenges to America and his leadership—especially Greece in 1947-48 and Berlin in 1948-1949. Each time, he had met the challenge.

Backing down now, if troops became necessary, would be too dangerous. "Korea is the Greece of the Far East," he told an adviser. "If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like [sic] we did in Greece three years ago, they won't take any steps. But if we just stand by, they'll move into Iran and they'll take over the whole Middle East. There's no telling what they'll do if we don't put up a fight now." For the President, Korea was the testing ground of American will, resolution, and credibility. The Soviets were probing, and the next place, if America failed in Korea, would probably be the Middle East. "We can lose half a world at this point if we lose heart," the *New York Times* warned, echoing many major newspapers early that week.

The chief significance of Korea, for Truman, was as a test case of America's ability to resist Soviet aggression by proxy (satellite). Korea also had a military-strategic value, though the JCS in earlier years had minimized this theme. Korea was, as Admiral Sherman had said, a dagger pointing at Japan, "a strategic threat to Japan." It was "an area of great importance to the security of American-

Barton J. Bernstein, Associate Professor of History at Stanford University, is the author of "Hiroshima and Nagasaki Recousidered: The Atomic Bonbings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945" (1975) and the editor of, anoug other volumes, "Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration" (1970). He is writing a series of studies on WWII and postwar foreign policy.

occupied Japan," Acheson later emphasized. Japan, with the communist control of mainland China, had become the linchpin of American power in Asia, the bulwark of resisting Communism there. In Asia, as elsewhere, the policy of containment would be endangered if Korea fell. Valuable areas in Asia, essential to the American politico-economic system, would be swept out of the "free world," disrupting the international economy, encouraging communist forces, inspiring neutralism. Presumably, the revolutionary movements in Indo-China and the Philippines might be emboldened. Given this analysis Korea was the first of a series of dominoes.

When conferring with Congressional leaders on Wednesday, the 27th, Acheson and Truman relied upon the same general analysis. Acheson explained, according to the recently declassified summary, that the United States had taken a firm stand because "the governments of many Western European nations appeared to be in a state of near panic, as they watched to see whether the United States would act or not." America's resolution in Asia, he believed, was essential to maintaining the anti-communist alliance in Europe, to halting the forces of neutralism, disintegration, and anti-Americanism.

Truman relied upon the domino theory but, unlike the night before, sketched a slightly different pattern of spreading disaster—first most of Asia, then the Near East, then Europe. "If we let Korea down, the Soviet will keep right on going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. We had to make a stand some time, or else let all Asia go by the board. If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and no telling what would happen in Europe. Therefore, the President concluded, he had ordered our forces to support Korea as long as we could—or as long as the Koreans put up a fight and gave us something we *could* support—and it was equally necessary for us to draw the line at Indo-China, the Philippines, and Formosa." The strategy of NSC-68 was triumphing.

In talking with the Congressional leaders, Truman had provided the rationale for American armed intervention but had still stopped short of committing ground troops to Korea. When Muccio reported that the situation in Korea "had deteriorated," at the NSC meeting on Wednesday the President resisted some efforts to escalate the war. Despite the pleas of General Vandenberg and Secretary of Air Thomas Finletter, Truman refused to let the Air Force operate above the 38th parallel. At the same time, the President admitted that he was worried that the present level of military assistance might not produce "quick results," and he said that he did not want to retreat from Korea unless military danger compelled him.

"How many divisions ultimately—only two, or four, or ten, maybe more? How long a war? At what cost in American lives—5,000 dead, 20,000 or more? The only tentative assurance was that the Soviets would not retaliate with troops."

Slowly the American military commitment grew. On Thursday evening, at a two-hour meeting of the NSC, Truman authorized the use of naval and air forces "to support the ROK units and against targets in North Korea, the use of army service and communication units in Korea . . . , and combat units [in the Pusan area] to retain a port and an airfield [there.]" This decision, while cautious, meant that the service and communication units would be fired upon, and then the question would be whether they should be withdrawn or supported by more American soldiers. The commitment at Pusan, in the far south, where the DPRK forces had not yet reached, assured the United States that a major port and airfield for supplies, incoming troops, or evacuation would be kept open.

Even though the Administration had concluded that Russia was not likely to intervene militarily in the Korean conflict, the lurking fear of Russia lingered. The Administration recognized the need to keep MacArthur in tight reins "if Soviet forces intervened in Korea." His orders were blunt: "defend himself, take no action to aggravate the situation, and . . . report to Washington." MacArthur had already violated earlier orders and sent American planes against North Korea before the President had removed the ban on attacks above the 38th parallel.

MacArthur pressed Truman for a greater commitment. Early Friday morning (Washington time), the General telegraphed, on the basis of his own reconnaissance in Korea, that the South Korean army was incapable of organized action, that there was a great danger of another breakthrough. "If the enemy advance continues much further," MacArthur reported, "it will seriously threaten the fall of the Republic." To hold the present line and to keep open the possibility of regaining lost ground, the United States would have to commit ground troops into the battle area. "To continue to utilize the [air and naval forces] without an effective ground element cannot be decisive." MacArthur wanted immediately to move a regimental team to the battle area and to follow it with two (of his four) divisions from Japan. Muccio endorsed the plan in his message to State.

For Truman, the choices had been narrowed. None challenged MacArthur's assessment. Either Truman would have to accede to the request or risk abandoning Korea. So far as the recently declassified records disclose, there had never been a top-level discussion, involving Truman and Acheson, of what the commitment of ground forces might mean. MacArthur, in his characteristically cunning way, had implied that two divisions might be sufficient. But what did officials in Washington think? How many divisions ultimately—only two, or four, or ten. Maybe more? How long a war? At what cost in American lives—5,000 dead, 20,000, or more? The only tentative assurance was that the Soviets would not retaliate with troops.

At 4:57 a.m., on Friday, in response to a phone request from Secretary Pace, the President authorized the movement of one reg-

imental team to the combat area. Later that morning, probably after conferring with advisers, he approved the sending of two divisions. MacArthur promptly ordered the 24th Division to Korea, where "it will at once . . . contact the enemy . . . and delay his advance."

The decision had been made, and it would be popular in the short run. Though no official publicly questioned the decision, John Foster Dulles, who had earlier argued for military intervention in the war, raised serious questions on July 1st. In a high-level conference that day with Acheson, Pace, and some others from State, Dulles warned that the North Korean army could be assisted by "the virtually unlimited resources controlled by the Soviet Union in East Asia, including Communist China. In that part of the world we could be an [air] and sea power but it was hazardous for us to challenge communist power on the mainland." He mentioned that General MacArthur "had remarked to me . . . , just before I left . . . Japan [on the 27th] that anyone who advocated that ought to have his head examined." Dulles wanted to know "whether the Defense Establishment estimated that [it] was possible to defeat the North Koreans on land [, or] if they thought it was impossible and would lead to a Dunkirk" or the dangerous depletion of American forces elsewhere. Perhaps partly for political reasons, Pace refused to give Dulles, a leading Republican advisor, "any reliable estimate of results." Dulles contended that it would be possible to limit the American commitment to "the use of sea and air power [in Korea.]" That was precisely the position that Truman, MacArthur, Acheson, and others had reluctantly abandoned. Apparently Dulles did not argue vigorously for his position, perhaps because he realized that troops were on the way and that Truman would have popular support for this new commitment.

It is unclear whether the President learned of Dulles's doubts. They would not have deeply troubled Truman, for he was convinced of the necessity and rectitude of his decision, and already dealing with other problems. He was very tempted by Chiang's offer to send about 30,000 Nationalist troops to the battle zone—a scheme opposed by Acheson, who both feared widening the war and judged that Chiang might need the troops on Taiwan. "We probably should use the Chinese ground troops," Truman told an associate. "What that will do to Mao Tse-Tung we do not know. We must be careful not to cause a general Asiatic war. Russia is figuring on an attack in the Black Sea and toward the Persian Gulf. Both are prizes Moscow has wanted since Ivan the Terrible . . . ." Ultimately, Acheson triumphed, and Truman decided not to accept Chiang's offer.

Matters with the Soviet Union were handled skillfully: to bar mediation but to appear conciliatory while winning propaganda victories for the United States. The American note, delivered on the 27th, called upon the Soviet Union to "disavow responsibility" for the attack and "to use its influence" with North Korean authorities to withdraw their invading forces. An earlier draft of the message (still classified) had implied or charged Soviet responsibility, and State had softened it when the American embassy in Moscow had protested the sharp wording. As the Department explained, according to a recently declassified telegram, the strategy of the note was to deter other aggression by satellites and to win a propaganda victory, not to end the war. If the Soviets could be identified with aggression by their satellites and have their prestige directly involved, State reasoned, they will be less likely to "utilize their satellites or stooges to take aggressive action." The American note would also help destroy the Soviet peace offensive, which "is assuming serious proportions and having a certain effect on public opinion in many critical areas." The peace offensive threatened to strengthen the forces of neutralism, to weaken resistance to communism, and possibly to raise doubts in America about the official analysis of the Cold War and the impossibility of meaningful negotiations.

To add legitimacy to American actions and to strengthen the American-dominated UN, Truman was eager to have MacArthur appear to be acting under UN, not American, orders. Though the President expected the General to follow American orders, Truman admitted to Congressmen in a private session, "I don't want it stated . . . that I am telling MacArthur what to do . . . It would spoil everything if we said he was just doing what we tell him to do." Congressmen, as well as the Administration, also wanted the appearance of widespread participation, from the nations of the "free world," in the war in support of the UN. That would contribute to the appearance of legitimacy and thereby also meet political needs at home.

Ironically, in unnecessary ways, the Administration undermined its own quest for legitimacy and long-run political support at home. Truman had not asked Congress for a declaration of war. Perhaps events had moved too fast in the early days, and possibly the Administration did fear that the issue of a declaration would inspire a time-consuming discussion in Congress and thereby delay what seemed necessary action. As early as the 28th, the day after Truman first conferred with Congressional leaders, Senator Robert A. Taft and a few others had publicly questioned the constitutionality of the Administration's action (committing naval and air forces to combat) and wanted a declaration of war. It was quibbling, Acheson later sneered: it was a "typical Senatorial legalistic ground for differing with the President . . . ."

For reasons that remain unclear, Truman also chose to deceive Congressmen in his private meeting with them on Friday, the 30th. After he had sanctioned MacArthur's committing troops to combat to stop the North's onslaught, the President said, according to the official summary, "our plan [is] just to send base troops to Pusan to keep communications and supply lines open." "If there is any necessity for Congressional action," Truman told the select Congressmen at this meeting, "I will come to you. But I hope that we can get those bandits in Korea suppressed without that."

Why Did the United States Reverse Its Policy on Korea?

In June 1949, after building up South Korea's military forces, the United States withdrew its troops from the peninsula; despite Rhee's

plea, the Administration would not commit itself to intervening with armed forces to protect the South in the event of an attack. Yet, in June 1950, within the course of a few days, the Administration reversed that policy. How does one explain that reversal?

In 1949, when the United States withdrew from the peninsula, American policy makers hoped, and therefore believed, that the South Korean forces might soon be strong enough to halt—and therefore to deter—a North Korean invasion. They had delayed withdrawal more than a year to build up the South's military. By late 1949, they seemed to be more worried about Rhee's launching an attack than about the North's doing so. Perhaps partly for this reason, they minimized the ample evidence of the South's military weakness and in 1950 usually stressed the capacity of the South to defend itself from the North.

Did policy makers think that America would fight to stop a North Korean invasion? While Bradley and the JCS discussed this issue in 1949 and decided against intervention under most conditions, Truman and Acheson did not address this question. They answered a different one: Should the United States firmly commit herself to defend the ROK "even to the extent of risking involvement in a major war in an area in which virtually all of the natural advantages would accrue to the USSR?" Their answer was to approve what the NSC termed "a middle course"—arms and money for the ROK to minimize the chances of her being brought under communist domination.

Usually, in 1949 and early 1950, when policy makers thought about war, they conceived of an all-out war, against the Soviet Union and involving nuclear weapons, so they did not dwell upon limited war and the unique problems it would create for the United States. And when Acheson did occasionally consider limited war, he worried about Europe and Southeast Asia, not Northern Asia. As a result, Acheson and Truman never explicitly confronted the question: Would they fight in a limited war against North Korea to defend the ROK?

In fact, events up to early 1950 had never forced Truman and Acheson to consider carefully whether they would commit American troops to a limited war. The three most notable cases of limited war had been, or were being, conducted without American forces. In Greece, the United States had supplied funds and military equipment, and some advisers, but not soldiers for war. In China, despite about 2,500 American marines, the United States had recognized that victory for Chiang was impossible—unless the administration committed millions of troops and billions of dollars. There had been no willingness to pay that price. In Indo-China, where the French were trying to defeat the revolution, the United States in early 1950 was edging toward military aid, not troops. The Administration's belief that the French could triumph prevented Truman, Acheson, and others from considering under what conditions the United States would intervene militarily in this limited war.

"Aggression, if halted in Korea, would not occur in Iran, or Europe, they concluded, in generalizing from Germany's and Japan's expansion in the '30s. Second, by 1950, Asia itself had become more important in American thinking."

On June 25-30, 1950, the *apparent* facts (interpreted by ideology) thrust upon Truman and Acheson the question that they had not directly faced: whether to intervene with American forces in a limited Asian war to stop Soviet aggression by proxy? The main reason for the American commitment was that policy makers believed that they were being tested—that the Soviets would move elsewhere if the United States did not meet this challenge. Aggression, if halted in Korea, would not occur in Iran, or Europe, they concluded, in generalizing from Germany's and Japan's expansion in the '30s. Second, by 1950, Asia itself had become more important in American thinking, especially with the "loss" of China and the revolution in Indo-China. Mao's triumph, anticipated as early as 1947, had led to a shift in American policy, with Japan the new linchpin in the Pacific. Korea, deemed without significant strategic importance by the JCS, could have strategic importance if it fell into communist hands, for, as Admiral Sherman and Acheson acknowledged, it was a dagger pointing at Japan. For all these reasons, Korea—primarily as a symbol and secondarily for its substance—became for American leaders the place to draw the line, the place to make a stand.

Given this analysis, a tantalizing question remains: Would the United States have intervened in, say, July-August 1949, shortly after the withdrawal of her troops? Or had the situation for policy makers changed by mid-1950? It is impossible to answer definitively this "what might have been" question. Probably the United States would not have intervened in July-August, 1949. But, a year later, the context had changed. Events and analysis, in a subtle interplay, had transformed assumptions and strengthened resolve in ways that most men did not recognize until the "test" of Korea occurred. The Soviet development of the A-bomb in August 1949, coming a few years earlier than Americans then expected, and the work on NSC-68, prompted in part by the Soviet explosion, prepared policy makers by mid-1950 to do what they probably would not have done earlier. By the spring of 1950, they had started thinking about the threat of limited war, the need to resist Soviet "proxy" actions, and the weakness of the "free world" arsenal.

In this transformation of official thinking, in this preparation for further militarizing policy, Dean Acheson was a guiding spirit. It was not that he was consciously hankering for a crisis to justify his analysis and to mobilize America and the "free world," but his efforts to build a new policy prepared him to misinterpret the crisis and to seize upon it to justify that policy. Perhaps, also, the attacks by Republican critics, who blamed him unfairly for the "loss" of China,

Continued on page 33

The Voice of America stands upon this above all:
the truth shall be the guide.

—Edward R. Murrow

Shall truth be our guide? A Proposal for Reforming the Voice of America

SEAN KELLY and WILLIAM H. READ

Looking back on his experience as Voice of America Director, NBC's John Chancellor said, "The basic problem is that VOA has been placed at the intersection of journalism and diplomacy: the practice of one of these disciplines negates the practice of the other."

Recent events suggest that in any real confrontation between VOA journalism and diplomacy, the diplomats usually emerge victorious. If the choice is between truth and expediency, candor frequently becomes the first casualty. Examples of direct interference in VOA news broadcasts range from State Department restraints on the final days in Saigon to outright suppression of eye-witness reports from a VOA correspondent in Angola. Comments of prominent members of Congress are censored—the practice has been applied even to the President. In Tel Aviv, the American Ambassador instructs a VOA correspondent to break off all contacts with an important news source. The process is both widespread and ongoing, and it continues to be reported in the American press.

For these and other reasons, we feel that the time is at hand to move beyond John Chancellor's troublesome crossroads. Certainly, the momentum is already there. In the past several years, both the Senate and the House of Representatives have explored the question of greater autonomy for VOA. They have even amended USIA's basic legislation—in an effort to protect VOA news credibility from the sort of interference experienced in Saigon and Angola. Unfortunately, this protection did not work in Tel Aviv.

Now, there is new legislation afoot. Senator Charles Percy, speaking in Chicago on November 30, 1976, said: "I want to do something to help the Voice of America to become truly a voice of America, speaking the truth clearly and without bureaucratic impediment. I don't want American diplomats and bureaucrats distorting VOA newscasts any more." He then pledged to introduce legislation ". . . to make the Voice of America independent of the United States Information Agency, operating under an oversight authority similar to that which now oversees Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe."

It is doubtful that VOA independence ranks very high on the Carter administration's list of immediate priorities. But it is worth noting that the new President has already expressed himself on the question. During the course of the 1976 campaign, he issued a statement charging that VOA ". . . has been entangled in a web of political restrictions imposed by the Department of State, which seriously limits its effectiveness."

Whether the initiative comes from the President, or the Congress, 1977 presents an unusual opportunity for resolving VOA's basic problem. The newly-elected President is committed to reorganizing the government in order to make it more effective. He has campaigned for a reduction in the number of federal agencies, and he wants to streamline their functions. At the same time, several members of Congress have indicated their desire to consolidate the various broadcasting services now operated out of public funds. They have called for a new presidential study on how such services might be more effectively combined.

A further stimulus for VOA reform may also lie in the growing US awareness that many nations of the world are increasingly hostile to the free flow of information. This attitude has been evident in foreign capitals, as well as at international meetings such as the recent UNESCO conference in Nairobi.

We think that both the President and the Congress will support the view that VOA should exemplify and sustain the concept of a free press operating in a free society. In doing so, it should strive to speak for all the American people, not just the Department of State—or, for that matter, the Executive Branch of the US government. The long-standing American commitment to freedom of expression, while not widely shared abroad, should nonetheless be reflected in the broadcasts of the Voice of America.

During a debate last year in the House of Representatives, then Congresswoman Bella Abzug said: "If large segments of the world's population look to VOA for news because their own media are cen-

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sored or government-controlled, then let us make sure that our VOA really is free from external interference and can live up to the highest principles of American journalism."

Such an approach would also serve the interests of VOA's substantial American audience abroad. Given the growing decline in a free press internationally, many US citizens who work and travel overseas now depend on VOA for news*—even though the broadcasts are "targeted" for foreign audiences.

The experience of the BBC External Service provides an example of the course that VOA might follow. Broadcast content is controlled by a Board of Governors, who also serve as a buffer against outside intervention. Members of the Board could be appointed by the President in a manner similar to that followed by the existing Board for International Broadcasting, which now oversees Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The demonstrated success of the BBC example has influenced the Stanton Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations to propose greater autonomy for VOA within the federal structure. This has been subsequently endorsed by the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.

The Stanton-Murphy recommendations were received at USIA with something less than total enthusiasm. Agency Director James Keogh said that USIA welcomed the attention that they brought to the United States Government's overseas information and cultural programs. He said he found it heartening that they reaffirmed the importance of those programs. He then issued a counter-proposal.

Essentially, the Keogh plan envisaged an expanded and strengthened USIA—one that would acquire the programs now being conducted by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. At the same time, the Keogh plan's USIA would retain VOA as part of "a new and strong agency with direct policy ties to the White House and Department of State."

These arguments were restated in the January issue of the *Foreign Service Journal*—twice, as a matter of fact. They formed the basis of the article by Gunther K. Rosinus, and they also appeared in the *AFSA News* under the title: USIA and the Future of Public Diplomacy. Mr. Rosinus did not take up the issue of VOA, but the *AFSA News* article did. By way of rebuttal, we would offer the following comments.

"If large segments of the world's population look to VOA for news because their own media are censored or government-controlled, then let us make sure that our VOA is free from external interference."

The Keogh plan, with its various modifications, never really attempted to take VOA's basic problem into account. Instead of addressing the philosophical issues raised by John Chancellor, it offered arguments based on administrative efficiency and bureaucratic convenience. These tend to be repeated in the *AFSA News* article, especially when they raise the spectre of a VOA denied "access to classified information, (and) the protection and advantages afforded by official status for its employees overseas."

We submit that no newscast was ever improved by VOA having access to government secrets. We are in fact aware of instances where such knowledge, by VOA writers, seriously impaired their editorial judgment. As for official status," if it means that an ambassador can force a VOA correspondent to break off important, and legitimate, news contacts, it becomes less of an advantage than a liability. American news correspondents have existed for years overseas without "the protection and advantages afforded by official status"—as have the correspondents of government-owned broadcasting organizations such as the BBC and Radio Canada.

In our view, VOA journalists should seek no greater privileges than those normally afforded American correspondents abroad. We find "official status" to be inconsistent with the role we propose for a VOA that reflects American commitment to journalistic integrity, and freedom of expression. We also see advantages in a situation where an American ambassador could honestly disclaim responsibility for VOA news—instead of trying to control it. That sort of control is, after all, a characteristic of those societies whose governments restrain freedom of expression as a matter of policy. It is alien to the American tradition, and that is why we feel it should be changed—in the course of reforming VOA.

Just as the Keogh plan represents the views of many USIA employees, the sentiments of a large number of VOA staffers are reflected in a petition also reported in the *AFSA News* section of last month's *Journal*.

It states the argument for greater VOA control over broadcast programing, administration and personnel—without specifying how this might come about. The petition reviews the various VOA reform options that have been discussed in recent years, including: (1) independent agency status within the federal government, (2) co-equal status with Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty under the Board for International Broadcasting, (3) return to the Department of State, along with USIA, and (4) joining

Continued on page 31

**As part of USIA, VOA is not authorized to broadcast to Americans, or even encourage listenership by US citizens abroad. However, a survey of USIA operations conducted by a Congressional subcommittee found a remarkably high number of American overseas listen to VOA. "Forty-two percent listen to VOA occasionally or weekly; twenty-three percent listen regularly or daily" according to a survey conducted in six countries—Brazil, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, and West Germany. Source: Report, Subcommittee on State Department Organization and Foreign Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, December 1972.*

"The lesson of these past years is that when American policy casts loose from American ideals, it is not only immoral but ineffectual."

— Anthony Lewis

terrorism and diplomacy

DAVID FITZHUGH

Of all the problems, present and future, real or imagined, that were discussed in the recent election campaign, one of the most significant—and most ignored—is that of international terrorism. In the eight weeks between mid-June and mid-August 1976, seven American government employees were murdered in foreign countries. They were the American ambassador and economic counselor in Lebanon, kidnapped and executed en route to the Ambassador's first meeting with newly elected Lebanese President, Elias Sarkis; two Army officers escorting a work detail in the demilitarized zone in Korea, bludgeoned to death with an axe and clubs; and three American employees assigned to the Military Advisory Group in Iran, machine-gunned as they drove to work. Between January 1968 and April 1974 there have been 507 incidents of international terrorism, exclusive of those committed in Ireland. Between 1968 and 1975 there have been 77 incidents in which hostages were held for ransom. These hostages have included 30 Americans, eight of whom were murdered. United States ambassadors have been killed in Guatemala, 1968; Sudan, 1973; Cyprus, 1974; and Lebanon, 1976. Terrorists have attacked American embassies in more than 30 countries during the past eight years.

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The response of the American government to these continued attacks, to this ever-growing list of deaths, has been strangely blasé and ineffective. For those diplomat-victims of international terrorism, not a rifle was lifted in their defense or in their revenge. The only rifles raised were those of the shaven-headed, ceremonial military guards who clicked their heels and banged their muskets in salute as the nation performed its tribal rites of death for men who had died in vain.

Before the middle '60s terrorist incidents were rare; in 1968 they began in earnest and their number rose sharply in 1971. During these years the government reacted in confusion, playing each incident by ear, hoping for the best and not knowing how or where to use its power. After the 1972 Olympics in Munich, with the slaughter of the Israeli athletes by the Black September Group, the government decided on a program of concerted action. President Nixon convened a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism which consisted of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury and Transportation, the Attorney General, the Ambassador to the United Nations, the directors of the CIA and FBI, and the President's top national security and domestic-policy aides. This committee formed a Working Group of officials of their own and other agencies, to formulate a response to threats and acts of international terrorism. That response has become known in Foreign Service circles as "the Nixon no-concessions" policy. It states that the United States will not pay ransom, will not submit to international blackmail or extortion and, "in the interest of preserving life," the official policy of the US government is to sacrifice today's hostage in order to protect tomorrow's possible victim.

Not long after the policy was drawn up the United States had occasion to use it. On the evening of March 1, 1973 in Khartoum, Sudan, Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., and Deputy Chief of Mission, George Curtis Moore, were kidnapped by the Black September Group while attending a farewell party in Moore's honor at the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The Palestinians soon released all of the guests except two Arab diplomats, the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires and the two Americans. The Palestinians demanded the release of hundreds of political prisoners then being held in the Middle East, as well as the release of Sirhan Sirhan, the as-

sassin of Robert Kennedy.

As the exchange of cables flowed between Washington and Khartoum, the bargaining took on the appearance of an Arab *souk*. The Arab "last price" was the release of 17 Palestinian guerrillas held by the Jordanian government. In the meantime, President Nixon had sent Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, William B. Macomber, Jr., currently American Ambassador to Turkey, to Khartoum to negotiate. While Macomber was enroute to the negotiations, President Nixon held a White House press conference in which he stated the United States would not give in to blackmail, "We cannot do so and we will not do so . . . we will not pay blackmail." The next morning, while Macomber was in Cairo, the bodies of Cleo Noel and George Moore and the Belgian diplomat were found in the basement. The Palestinians had released the two Arab diplomats and executed the other three hostages.

The immediate response of the Foreign Service was shock, then anger. They demanded a full scale investigation rather than the normal post mortem of the Working Group. A few months later the State Department contracted with the Rand Corporation of California to look into the matter of terrorism and the government's response to it. The Khartoum episode was one of the cases the Rand Corporation was to study. In May of 1976 a draft of the Rand report was given limited distribution to some State Department officers and it is reported that it has come down hard on the "no concessions" policy.

The rationale for the "no concessions" policy is that by taking a hard line with terrorism and terrorists, by refusing to pay blackmail, the United States will deter future acts of terrorism. The policy has obviously been unsuccessful.

Professor Richard Falk of Princeton University, in a hearing before the House International Relations Committee, has said, "We don't have real evidence that deterrence works." Professor Falk added that the deaths of the hostages sometimes serve the interest of the terrorist group better than their release. Brian Jenkins, the primary author of the Rand Study, has pointed out that there have been 647 kidnappings for ransom in the United States in the past 30 years. "If one looks at the record of ransom payment, the ransom has almost always been paid by the family . . . . (But) of the 647 cases, all but three have been solved. The FBI has a better than 90 percent capture record. The conviction rate is extremely high and the sentences are harsh." Consequently, kidnapping for ransom has become relatively unpopular in American criminal circles. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, defended the "no concessions" policy on the grounds that if we "hang tough" in a current crisis we may avoid a future crisis because the terrorists will know the United States won't pay blackmail. That line of logic is questionable at best, say some authorities and many of the State Department officers who stand a better chance of being tomorrow's victim than does Henry Kissinger. There is a tendency, which Henry Kissinger and the State Department have become victims of, to become very moralistic when dealing with other people's dangers. The "no concessions" policy might make better sense, and might even work, if the United States pursued its "hang tough" policy with terrorist-supporting governments with the same vigor with which the government denies assistance to its kidnapped employees. Foreign Service employees ask, "What good is a 'no concessions' policy if the Department refuses to use any kind of pressure on the foreign government for punishment of the kidnappers?" According to the State Department's own figures, an international terrorist involved in kidnapping since 1968 has had an 80 percent chance of escaping death or imprisonment. Of the few who were captured, most were quickly released from jail by administrative process, the swapping of prisoners or by light sentencing. The average sentence for those brought to trial has been between one and two years.

The Khartoum kidnapping is a case in point. The guerrillas were captured, convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Within a few months they were released to Egypt where they were received with a hero's welcome and placed under "house arrest." For a short period after the murder of Ambassador Cleo Noel and George Moore the United States refused to send another ambassador to Sudan and discontinued its foreign assistance program. As soon as the furor subsided, however, another American ambassador arrived and America's foreign aid program was resumed. Within that same time frame, Secretary Kissinger began discussing an aid program for Egypt. So much for the importance of the deaths of Cleo Noel and George Moore.

Perhaps the major reason why America's handling of terrorist attacks has had so little success is that it has had so little consistency. When Sean Holly, the Labor Attaché at the American Embassy in Guatemala, was kidnapped in 1970, a demand was made for the release of political prisoners. Guatemala released the prisoners and the kidnappers released Sean Holly. The next year, 1969, C. Burke Elbrick, American Ambassador to Brazil, was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro. The same demand was made, Brazil released the prisoners and Ambassador Elbrick returned alive. In 1975 American Consul Robert Crimmins was taken hostage, along with others, by a Japanese Red Army Group in the American Embassy in Kuala Lumpur. When a prisoner swap was made, Mr. Crimmins and the other prisoners were released. Later in 1975 American Army Colonel Edward Morgan was held hostage in Beirut. The United States publicly refused to pay ransom while a group of unidentified "Lebanese businessmen" met the demands of the kidnappers and the Colonel was released.

Those in favor of the "no concessions" policy point to the release of Barbara Hutchison, head of the United States Information Service in the Dominican Republic in 1974. When her kidnappers demanded the release of political prisoners in exchange for her release, she convinced her captors that the United States would not bring pressure on the Dominican Republic to release them in exchange for her life and that killing her would accomplish nothing. After several days of discussion and the escape of one of the prisoners, Miss Hutchison was released unharmed. But the score sheet of

wins and losses for this type of argument is not very convincing.

During the summer of 1975 in Tanzania three American students from Stanford University were held hostage while their families and friends raised the ransom. When the money was paid, the students were released. An irate Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, sternly reprimanded, and later fired, American Ambassador to Tanzania, W. Beverly Carter, Jr., for his role in the negotiations for the release of the students. On returning to the United States, Ambassador Carter's case became a *cause celebre* with the Black Caucus, who exerted enough pressure on the Secretary of State to force him to appoint Bev Carter as Ambassador to Liberia. Since Ambassador Carter is one of our more able ambassadors, and a man who more than proved his worth to American diplomacy in Nigeria during the Biafran War, his reappointment was a decided plus for America. No one has ever questioned Bev Carter's value to the United States and the Black Caucus was quite correct in supporting Carter and forcing Kissinger to reinstate him. But by having the Black Caucus press the issue, the case became a racial cause, and Ambassador Carter was reappointed, in part, to avoid escalation of a racial problem. The question at hand had nothing to do with racial problems; it was a question of judgment and Nixon's "no concessions" policy. Ambassador Carter should have been reinstated, as he was; but he should have been reinstated because his judgment and his actions were correct, not because of any racial overtones.

Instead of attacking the problem of terrorism head on, the State Department has sidestepped the issue and responded to the effects rather than to the cause. The majority of terrorist attacks come from one group or another under the umbrella of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Under the direction of Yasir Arafat, the PLO has internationalized its struggle against Israel because of the PLO's inability to organize an effective network inside Israel. Because the United States is the main supporter of Israel in the United Nations and at the bar of world opinion, American embassies, diplomats and businessmen have been the major target of the PLO terrorist attacks. The United States can continue to expect this kind of attack as long as it supports Israel and as long as Israel maintains its successful fight against being pushed into the sea by the Arab nations that surround her on three sides. The United States has done little or nothing to subvert, neutralize, defeat, or even destabilize, the PLO in its efforts to intimidate civilization. Some members of Congress have even suggested withdrawing military aid to Israel in an effort to appease the wrath of the PLO. If anyone in the government should be an authority on the folly of appeasement and pacifist subjugation to international terror, it should be a Jew who grew up in Germany in the '30s, escaped to America, and survived to visit, as American Secretary of State, that shrine to the ultimate in resistance, the ruins of Masada.

While Israel, one of the smaller countries of the world, develops *chutzpah* with confidence, we wring our hands and plan our next discussion of the problem in the United Nations. While Israel carries out a lightning rescue raid in Uganda, we talk about winning over the terrorist supporting countries with military assistance and another round of foreign aid. Perhaps if we give them more they will attack us less.

In answer to armed attacks against American embassies and consulates, the State Department's Office of Security has responded with money but little defense. The Department is encasing the consular sections of potentially dangerous embassies with bullet-proof glass. In an article on "Living with Terrorism" in *The Washington Post* of July 18, 1976, Bruce Howard wrote,

"In the past three years State has spent more than $100 million to protect its personnel abroad from terror. But the dramatic rise in security expenditures—from $14.6 million in 1972 to more than $40 million this year—has been matched by an increase in terror attacks. In 1969 there were four major attacks against US embassies and/or their employees; last year there were 19."

As bullet-proof glass is even harder to talk through than it is to shoot through, conversations with legitimate consular customers either take on the air of a Marcel Marceau pantomime or the consular officer lets the customer into his office behind the glass. A terrorist who suddenly pulls out a weapon once behind the bullet-proof shield just as quickly owns the embassy. All the protective armor, electronically operated doors, bullet-proof glass and assorted James Bond-inspired-devices are not worth a dime until the Embassy officer under attack is capable of saying to the stocking-masked intruder holding an automatic pistol to the head of a child, "Go ahead and shoot, our policy is one of 'no concessions.' "

The basic problem with this type of defense mechanism is that, in reality, it is a cop-out and, therefore, self-defeating. It is easier and cheaper, politically speaking, to build a *Fortress Americana* in each of our embassies than to get at the root of the problem. It is easier and cheaper to lose a few Foreign Service officers now and then, hoping we keep more than we lose, than to solve the problem of Yasir Arafat and the PLO. It is easier to explain to a weeping widow the reasons for the death of her husband than to make a stand against a terrorist attack. Weeping widows are solaced by a funeral flag from a husband's coffin; they go back to their family home in Iowa or California and develop an exterior smile while learning to live with the bitter frustration of the memory of a man who died for nothing; but they don't make waves.

Another problem with the American government's handling of terrorism is the news media. Stephen S. Rosenfeld analyzed part of this problem in an article in *The Washington Post,* November 21, 1975, He wrote,

"Deeds of terrorism, to become political acts, need first to be media events, which, of course, they invariably are in the West . . . So if the purpose of terror is to send a message, we messengers should consider not sending it. Instead of mindless collaboration with terrorists, we should become mindful of the critical relationship of our purpose and theirs. We should publish or broadcast minimal cool factual reports, enough to register the event and limit scare talk but not enough to set up the society-wide vibrations which the terrorist craves. Not a blackout but a brownout . . . . Publicity is the sea which terrorists fish, [which] the handful of desperate isolated figures who

commit these acts, swim in. Dry up the sea."

Brian Jenkins, of the Rand Corporation, has pointed out,

"Terrorism is aimed at the people watching, not at the actual victims. Terrorism is theater."

Jenkins is right, of course, but it is the actors in this drama who die while the audience clucks disapprovingly and turns to the sports pages. The directors, whose hunger for the world stage is never filled, go on to different theaters and repeat performances while the theatre managers plan aid programs for the countries that cooperate with the terrorists.

There are some alternatives to continual defeat, one of which is to stand up and fight. When Ambassador C. Burke Elbrick was kidnapped in Brazil in 1969, he said to his captors, "You guys have changed the rules." "Yes, they replied, "we have. But the government is our enemy and you are part of the government." Perhaps it is time the United States also changed the rules. The State Department labor organization, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA), missed two golden opportunities to change the rules in 1975. When the convicted murderers of Cleo Noel and George Moore were released and allowed to go to Egypt, since the American government was either unable or unwilling to put any pressure on the Government of Sudan to prevent such an action, the time was ripe for AFSA to mount a worldwide walkout of Foreign Service employees to protest the action and put pressure on their own government. When Secretary Kissinger fired Bev Carter for his role in the release of the three Stanford students, AFSA could, and perhaps should, have done the same thing. Granted such actions would have been "bad form," granted such actions would have worsened AFSA's already tenuous relations with State Department management. But would it have been any worse than the President of the United States stating publicly, in the midst of negotiations conducted for the release of his two senior representatives in Sudan, that "the United States will not submit to blackmail" and thereby effectively ending the negotiations. Granted it may have caused some problems for America's foreign relations, or would it have caused just as many people to remark, "The United States is finally going to do something." The United States has so long been courting that will-of-the-wisp notion of world opinion that we have lost sight of world respect, and that more important quality, self respect.

Another alternative, which is fraught with almost as many problems as those of the potential terrorist attack, is the option some people in Foreign Service have already taken, that of buying a gun and learning to use it. Their rationale is that "it is better to die with dignity, fighting, than to quietly take a bullet in the back of the head while others talk." That option is hardly a good answer.

"But would it have been any worse than the President of the United States stating publicly, that 'the United States will not submit to blackmail' and thereby effectively ending the negotiations."

A recent USIS video tape recording on terrorism reviews its history, several of the incidents of kidnapped Americans, the multifaceted technical steps the Department has taken to protect its employees, and counsels complete cooperation with the kidnapping terrorists. The film cites several examples to prove the Department's point. The tenor of the film is opposed to any kind of active resistance other than some defensive driving techniques for an attempted escape should the kidnap try take place while the potential victim is in a car. The film also suggests varying your route and times from going from home to office and return. But how many variations are there from home to embassy when the terrorists know where you live and where you are going?

The defensive driving technique would probably work if the kidnap attempt were to take place on an empty road as demonstrated in the film. But how many back-up-spin-around turns can one make in the rush hour traffic of most of the world's capitals?

The film does not consider the possibility of a self-defense weapon, and such an idea is generally considered anathema. The film advises cooperation so as not to frighten the gun wielding terrorist who is just as nervous as the victim. There are certainly times when cooperation is correct, and they are the majority. There have been other situations, however, when armed resistance was successful, particularly in Latin America. Some Foreign Service personnel have asked the question, "If the Department can't protect me, do they have the right to say I can't try to protect myself?" I believe many would prefer to face the reprimand of the Department for successfully fending off a kidnap attempt by armed resistance than face the ordeal of being kidnapped and the wait while the Embassy and Washington coordinate the negotiations for release.

To date, the variety of terrorist attacks has shown that there is no sure, correct response to a terrorist-kidnap attempt. Whatever has worked is a good response and whatever has failed has been poorly planned and exccuted. There's not much certainty to that kind of logic or instruction.

In the meantime many of us in Foreign Service ask, "How many deaths will it take before we know that too many people havc died?" Some of us see the government's "no concessions" policy as no policy at all and the Department's security precautions as being "too little, too late." Some have asked themselves, "Is it better to die with dignity than to depend on the whim or fear of a terrorist ready to die for his cause?" There seems to be no sure answer. In the final analysis, it will come down to a personal decision, as it always has. A man does what he has to do.

"A revolution, or anything that interrupts social order, may afford opportunities for the individual display of eminent virtues; but its effects are pernicious to general morality."
— Nathaniel Hawthorne

the foreigner

MARY C. SMITH

Manuel had red hair and freckles. Since that was the opposite of Rosana's idea of Latin men, she felt from the start that she understood him better than the others, the dark ones who gazed at her with murky, professional passion. Besides Manuel spoke excellent English. When he accompanied her to Embassy parties, the people who didn't know them addressed him in English and her in Spanish, because she had dark hair and a remotely Italian background. Once at a reception for some visiting astronauts, the Ambassador talked to Manuel for three minutes under the impression that he was the new vice consul from Wyoming. "Very knowledgeable young man," said the Ambassador. "How did he learn so much about Latin America?"

She and Manuel would laugh about these things when they left the parties and returned to her house on the side of the hill overlooking the lights of the capital. Here from her balcony in the daytime the city was cupped between two blue, bare mountains, dipping to the right into a lower plateau and the humid air of the hot country. Colonial churches competed with the sharp, glassy forms of modern skyscrapers rising from the valley floor. The churches were damp, obscure caves, plastered with gold leaf and closed except during Mass and for pre-arranged groups of tourists. The skyscrapers, guarded by green-uniformed *campesinos* with machine guns, glittered with brass, marble, and gaudy murals depicting Indian motifs and proleterian revolutions.

As the Assistant Information Officer at the United States Information Service, she had made several expensive choices at the beginning of this, her third tour. She would live in a comfortable house with a splendid view and entertain lavishly, but mainly host country nationals, as the Embassy so quaintly called them. Single women in the Foreign Service were a sad lot if they didn't make their own lives apart from other single American women and all those close-knit American families, who so kindly invited them every year for Thanksgiving Dinner. "That's thoughtful of you," she would reply. "But Thanksgiving is my favorite occasion for official entertaining." Once the head of the national television chain came to her dinner, once a Deputy Minister of Agriculture, once a famous novelist who wrote articles for the press about North American imperialism.

> "The econony was deteriorating, students were rioting on the coast, the guerrillas had taken another hostage, the President states his faith in the loyalty of the armed forces."

Although she worked hard, she knew that a large part of her success was luck, was due to knowing Manual Rodriguez Melo, who had introduced her to important people and to some not so important, who later became so. A radio producer whose news commentary program ran on six different stations, country-wide, three times a day, Manuel had immediate access to all government officials; opposition leaders sought his support, students threw rocks at him, the guerrillas advised him first when they wished to publicize their activities, although they also branded him a spokesman for the popularly elected, middle-of-the-road, vacillating, and somewhat corrupt government, whose days appeared to be numbered, according to many respectable international magazines.

Every morning Rosana listened to Manuel's program while brushing her teeth in the bathroom. The transistor radio nestled among hand lotion and face powder on the back of the toilet tank. The economy was deteriorating, students were rioting on the coast, the guerrillas had taken another hos-

Mary C. Smith writes, "In 1961 I graduated magna cum laude from the University of San Francisco with a B.A. in history. B.A.'s in history are civilized degrees to possess but not very practical. Not having any other plans, I finally took the Foreign Service exam and to my surprise, passed it. Since 1966 I have served as an FSIO in Guatemala, Nigeria and Colombia. Periodically I consider quitting the Foreign Service, but can't think of an alternative job that would be as interesting."

tage, the President stated his faith in the loyalty of the armed forces.

"Are the armed forces loyal?" she asked Manuel, as she came out of the bathroom, dressed in an orange Moroccan caftan and brushing her long, straight hair.

Manuel was lying naked on the bed, on top of the green striped sheets, reading *News '77* magazine. "So far," he replied. Then: "Listen to this: *News '77* says that people in the southern part of the state are so weak from starvation that during the last rainy season hundreds drowned in two inches of water . . . . Two inches of water! . . . You *gringos* will believe anything!"

Of course he didn't mean her, she knew that. They often laughed together about United States journalistic stereotypes of Latin America. The local *News '77* magazine stringer, Jerry Conaghan, sometimes joined in the laughter, although the implications for him were more serious: twice the Government had threatened to expel him for stories that hadn't been quite to their liking.

Today when Rosana arrived at USIS, she found Jerry with the Information Officer, Ted Lyons, in the latter's wood paneled office. "Come on in, Rosy?" called Ted, a plumpish, balding man on a 700 calories a day diet. Jerry Conaghan got up from the leather couch, which stood beneath a family portrait of the US President. A tall, loose-boned man, nearly fifty, Jerry had lived most of his life in this country, where he owned a cattle ranch and a farm machinery company. Being a *News '77* magazine stringer, however, was the most perilous activity he had undertaken. "How you doing, Rosana? I'm telling your boss about my latest story."

"What's the story?" asked Rosana.

"A *golpe de estado* next week."

"Jerry," said Ted, "if I had a case of Scotch for every time I've heard that rumor about a coup . . . ."

"This is different," the correspondent insisted. He turned to Rosana. "Ask Manuel. He ought to know."

The Information Officer pursed his mouth. Neither he nor his wife approved of Rosana's relationship with Manuel, who was divorced, a modern "Americanized" Latin male. Whatever had happened to the influence of the Catholic Church in these matters? . . . However the radio producer had been useful to USIS programing, no doubt about it, doing all those interviews with the non-Spanish speaking astronauts, for instance . . . .

"I shall," replied Rosana.

That evening at the binational center's art exhibit opening, she bought a horizontal collage of a general, a cardinal, and a politician, all with grimacing white teeth that stuck out of their patched faces like skullwork.

"A perfect souvenir of Latin America," said Manuel, as he joined her at 8:30 after taping the next morning's news program at the studio. "Much better than a mountain scene or a colonial plaza." She had saved him a watery Scotch-and-soda, which she now removed from its hiding place behind a floral wreath of carnations sent to the blue-jeaned artist by the Director of Bellas Artes.

"I heard a rumor there'll be a coup next week."

"Could be." Manuel sipped his Scotch. His eyes flickered restlessly over the crowd, although he kept smiling and waving to familiar faces. "Democracy doesn't settle well with us Latin Americans, you know that. The President's having trouble because of that commission report recommending higher civil service salaries when he can't do anything about raising them at the moment. We are not a patient people. Off with his head if he can't raise our salaries, right?" Rosana looked at him warily, but then he grinned. "Come on, *muñeca*. You know I've always backed the President, crook though he may be; but then so are your Presidents, aren't they? The important thing is that he serve out his term. We've got to stop this cycle of coup after coup. It's the adolescent's idea of a solution."

A beribboned colonel named Francisco Aguirre broke away from one group and joined them, flourishing his cigarette lighter as Rosana pulled out a cigarette. "Ah, Doctora," he said in the exaggerated Spanish style that she always found so funny. "I understand you have bought a painting, one that depicts in a powerful form the corrupt Latin American power structure to which both Manuel and I belong."

Manuel said: "Speak for yourself, Pacho. I'm just a corrupt journalist."

On the following Sunday she and Manuel visited a nearby Indian village because Rosana wanted to do a USIS story on a weaving cooperative, which had been founded there by a Peace Corps couple.

Unbeknown to her, the Indians had planned a party for them, with refried beans and tortillas and roasted ears of corn and lots of beer and aguardiente set out on long tables in the dusty square. The Peace Corps couple were dressed like the Indians. While Rosana danced with the women, Manuel sat chatting with the village mayor and other officials. Everybody became quite drunk except for Manuel, who kept reminding her that they both had to go to work in the morning. The sun set behind the corn fields.

"Did you get your story?" he asked, as they drove home over the mountain roads in the moonlight, a practice the Embassy discouraged because of the terrorists.

"I think so." She had dozens of bits of scribbled notes that she hoped to be able to decipher in the morning. "One thing that bothered me: why do the Peace Corps dress like the Indians? They *aren't* Indians. No matter what they do, they'll always be foreigners, just like the rest of us. Dressing like Indians won't help them."

Manuel said nothing for a moment as he concentrated on maneuvering the car around a jagged curve, lit only by the ivory moonlight that spilled over the black trees and sloping hillsides, the car's rust upholstery and the plastic Virgin dangling from the rear-view mirror.

"That's what I used to think at Stanford," said Manuel. "Why am I dressed like all these US students? Had I appeared as an Indian, they would have understood me just as well."

Rosana frowned. She had always considered both herself and Manuel as "marginal" people, individuals who neither fit completely into their own cultures nor into any other. That was why they got along so well, why they understood each other. "But you *aren't* an Indian."

"True. Life would be simpler if everybody was what he looked like."

On Tuesday the Information Section secretary, Clarita, came into Rosana's sunny office at four p.m. to warn her to go home via the La Playa route instead of Bolivar, which ran in front of the Presidential Palace. "They've been playing music all afternoon on the radio, no news at all. That's a sign something's happening."

Rosana asked Ted Lyons if he'd heard anything. Ted called the Political Counselor, who said he couldn't tell him anything over the phone, why not come by the office? "God damn it!" swore Ted, as he slammed down the phone, which had dozens of nicks in the plastic mouthpiece where he had slammed it down too often. "Why won't those SOBs keep us informed?! Rosana, tell the radio people not to go home. We may be doing a beeper report to Washington."

By the time she finally reached home, exhausted, at 10:30 p.m., the story was out: the air force had rebelled and taken over the Palace, the President had fled to the Costa Rican Embassy, the Swedish Government had broken diplomatic relations with the new regime. Her maid, Teresa, was in the backyard whispering with the gardener and the night watchman; they clustered under the bright spotlights that were turned on each evening to discourage burglars. The red and yellow poinsettias were blooming. The purple bougainvillea spilled over the wall. Teresa said Manuel had come in briefly at six p.m., but then disappeared again and said to tell her he wouldn't be back this evening.

In the morning, as she was brushing her teeth, Manuel's news commentary program suddenly interrupted the syrupy music, his deep, sexy, radio announcer's voice as calm and professional as always. The only thing strange was that he made no mention of a coup. The university at Bello was shut down. An American fishing boat had been seized. The cost of living had gone up 3.5 percent. The Minister of Public Works announced the construction of a new highway to the coast, to be built with West Germany money.

At the Embassy, meetings were held all day long, none of which was she important enough to attend; however Ted Lyons filled her in when he came grumbling back into the Information Section. "Our position is that we are not rushing into anything. We shall not announce recognition right away; maybe next week. Although the Russians already have, you've noticed."

"Recognition, depending on what? The release of the fishing boat?"

"What fishing boat?" demanded Ted. "Your friend Manuel made up that entire news program this morning!"

> "Another military leader had replaced the dead general; that was the advantage of having a junta. Hundreds of suspects had been arrested. After the leader of the attempted coup had confessed, seven people were executed without civilian trial."

That was true, she found out when she got home. Manuel was sitting on the balcony, his shoes off, sipping a drink and reading her latest *Washington Post* by the light from the garden illumination. Portions of the newspaper were scattered among the salmon-colored azaleas and white geraniums that lined the stone railing. He laughed when she told him about Ted Lyons's reaction to his news program.

"Remember now, I never said *who* had seized the fishing boat, did I? Those military boys were afraid to permit *anything* on the air, anything at all, so I assured them I could do a program so innocuous that even they wouldn't censure it." Then he grew serious. "The stupid games a journalist has to play in this country."

Life returned to normal. The United States Government recognized the new regime, although they deplored the trend toward military governments in Latin America. The victorious Junta announced basic reforms. The former President flew to exile in Sweden. Rosana herself couldn't tell much difference between life under the military Junta and life as it had been previously, except that now more soldiers walked along the walled grounds of modern houses beneath the bougainvillea; troops surrounded the universities. Manuel Rodriguez Melo went back to reporting the facts; his commentaries grew vague and tended to touch on foreign affairs, other peoples', like the South Koreans.

Theoretically she agreed with him that the violent overthrow of a democratic government was a bad thing, although since it wasn't her country, she didn't think it was her business. Recently she had become a convert to the idea that Western democracy was a rare plant that couldn't adapt itself to Third World climates. Anthropologists said so, communication experts said so, political scientists said so. The corollary of this sophisticated theory was that the United States Government shouldn't make naive moral judgments about these matters. Power ought to be recognized, not a certain form of government. That was realism.

In October she asked to extend for a second tour since everything about life in this country satisfied her: her job, her house, Manuel, the friends she had made, the red tile roofs, the poinsettias in the garden. When she left on a month's home leave in December, Manuel saw her off at the airport. He promised to pay her maid, Teresa, while she was gone, and see that all of her plants were watered. In return he asked her to bring him a copy of the latest Congressional report on CIA activities.

As usual home leave, spent in Pueblo, Colorado, was like returning to a soap opera serial. Her retired father sat all day in front of the television set, while her mother had taken up ceramics. Her married sister, who taught kindergarten, thought that her husband had, perhaps, a mistress. . . . .Rosana remembered what an AID secretary had once said to her: "I dread home leave. There's nobody to talk to."

The week before Christmas her mother called her attention to a small, two-paragraph item on the back page of the local newspaper.

The Junta President had been assassinated, blown up by a bomb thrown from a rooftop on his way to the Palace. "What a terrible place to be working in," said her mother. "Surely you don't intend to go back there!"

Rosana tried to find out more about the event, but there wasn't much interest in Pueblo, Colorado. Two days later she obtained an old copy of the *New York Times*. The *New York Times* quoted "informed observers" as speculating that the ex-President, now living in Sweden, had been behind the counter-coup, which had failed. Another military leader had replaced the dead general; that was the advantage of having a Junta. Hundreds of suspects had been arrested. After the leader of the attempted coup—Lieutenant Colonel Francisco Aguirre—had confessed, seven people were executed without civilian trial. The government was taking no chances.

Lieutenant Colonel Aguirre! The man with the thin mustache and the instant cigarette lighter—who would have considered him dangerous? Rosana wrote to Manuel, expressing sorrow about events, remembering what he had said about violence breeding violence. At the last minute, however, she felt uneasy about sending the letter through ordinary mail and so enclosed it instead with a note mailed through the pouch to the vice consul from Wyoming.

At 6:30 a.m. on the third of January, the telephone rang. "It's long distance!" called her mother. "From Washington. What could have happened?"

Half asleep, Rosana stumbled down the stairs in her worn, purple Chinese robe that had been lost and recovered from hotel rooms on three continents. "Hi, Rosy!" an unknown, cheerful, masculine voice greeted her. "This is your Careeer Counselor, Blair Wilson."

"Well, good morning, Blair Wilson," she replied. *Rosy,* indeed. Men with names like Blair Wilson had an unfair advantage since you couldn't really call them "Blairie."

"A little something's come up here," said Blair Wilson. She imagined him sitting in this 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue cubicle, all bright blue eyes and blond hair, watching "a little something" creep into his in-basket. "I'm afraid we've had to change your assignment, but don't worry: you've got an even better one, right off your Assignment Preference Questionnaire: Addis Ababa."

"Addis Ababa. . . . ," she repeated. "Now, wait a minute, Blair. All of my household effects are back in ———."

"Don't worry about a thing," the cheerful voice assured her. "Just enjoy your home leave. Your friend, the PAO's secretary, said she'd pack everything up for you."

"Blair, " Rosana said evenly, "you tell the PAO's goddamned secretary to keep her goddamned hands off my goddamned household effects."

There was a moment of strained, static-y silence. *I've ruined his lunch,* thought Rosana.

"Er. . . Rosy. . . . ," began Blair Wilson. The cheer had evaporated from his voice. "Rosy, perhaps I'd better explain a few things."

"Good idea."

"Out there in Pueblo, Colorado, have you, ah, heard about the assassination of the Junta President?"

"Yes. Those things happen."

"I suppose so," Blair Wilson laughed in a hearty false manner. "I'm a European type myself, I wouldn't know; but I can tell you we were sure glad you weren't there when it occurred."

"Why?"

"Why? Well, er, gosh, I don't know how to tell you this, Rosy. You haven't heard then?"

"Heard what?"

"You haven't then. Well, I guess I'd better read you this telegram. It's classified, sort of. I mean, parts of it are. But this part isn't because, well, you know, like they say, if it comes out in the *New York Times*. . ." He laughed again. Rosana began to feel queasy. Her mother, robed in chenille with hair in pink plastic curlers, was sitting on the overstuffed couch by the bay window, rattling a coffee cup, while snowflakes melted outside on the windowsill.

"Look. . . .ah. . .you had a friend, a radio reporter named Manuel . . . Manuel, ah let's see. . . ."

"Manuel Rodriguez Melo."

"Oh, yes, sure, 'Rodriguez Melo,' it is. Well, he seems to have been involved in the attempted coup."

"That's impossible." Her voice was flat. Across the room her mother began to make wild gestures toward her: what's the matter? What's the matter?

"That's what it says in the telegram. 'Rodriguez Melo was arrested after broadcasting Lieutenant Colonel Aguirre's taped message to the nation five minutes *before* the bomb was thrown that killed the President. . . .' "

"I don't believe it." How could she believe it? Manuel hated coups; he believed in constitutional government. Then she thought: *Well, of course he didn't consider the military regime a constitutional government.* "There's been a mistake."

"Well, if there has been," said Blair Wilson, "there's not much anybody's going to do about it because he was executed. So you see, Rosy, why we can't let you go back there. . . ."

Outside in the morning sunlight, snow slid off the limb of a maple tree that shivered in front of the bay window. Blair Wilson's voice kept on, getting farther and farther away, although her sweating hand continued to clutch the receiver against her ear.

". . .Ted Lyons called up, absolutely hysterical. Well, you can imagine the Ambassador- . . . .Anyway the Government wanted to know if the Embassy was involved, were you a CIA agent, that sort of thing. . . .Gosh, Rosy, I'm sure sorry about your friend, but ———."

Rosana set the phone back in its cradle.

"What's the matter?" asked her mother. "Do you want a cup of coffee? Here, have a cup of coffee."

Rosana took the warm mug in her hands. "I don't believe it." She supposed she should cry, but what she mainly felt was skepticism: there had been some bureaucratic blunder. She *knew* Manuel, why, she *knew* him. He couldn't have been involved in a coup. . . .

"I don't believe it," she repeated, wondering what it might mean to her, Rosana, personally, her notions about her life, her relationships with people, her Thanksgiving dinners, if she found out that it *were* true, that she *had* to believe it.

"There was so much handwriting on the wall
That even the wall fell down."
— Christopher Morley

REPORTING GLUT: Clogging the Department's Arteries

JOHN KRIZAY

Information, it is said, is the lifeblood of the State Department. But even such a vital substance, if produced in excess, can have toxic consequences.

There are unmistakable signs that the reporting volume has already reached the toxic level. More is being reported than can possibly be absorbed, and this surfeit of reporting not only adds confusion to the Department's understanding of issues but makes it more difficult to put any information to proper use. Tasks which should be simple like the preparation of briefing papers, are made difficult because so many more documents have to be perused in the search for basic data. The Automated Documents System itself is a victim of the reporting glut. With its store of some two million telegraphic reports (less than three years accumulation), conducting a search on any but the most obscure subjects is likely to bring forth a much longer listing of documents than can possibly be applied toward any typical State Department task.

To make matters worse, much of the material reported is of little or no use. Some preliminary studies with objective panels of experienced Foreign Service officers as judges suggest that the "useless" or "minimal usefulness" component is as high as one third of all telegraphic reporting from some larger posts. These same experiments suggest that as much as one-sixth to one-third of all reports are only vaguely related to policy, and as many as two-thirds of all political and economic reports provide no interpretation or analysis of the event reported on.

The Department does not need the volume of reporting it is now receiving, and it cannot tolerate the ever-growing quantity of information cluttering up the Automated Documents System and already filling 150,000 cubic feet of file cabinets in the Department and at posts around the world. Yet the system rewards those who assiduously ferret out matters to report and penalizes those who fail to find matters "worthy of reporting" even though, in fact, none may exist. Anyone who has the task of reviewing personnel records will note that high reporting output is almost always commented on favorably in efficiency reports and inspection reports while low output—if mentioned at all—is usually cited as a sign of lack of ambition or imagination. And, as if the incentives to produce reports at the post are not strong enough, end users demand more information than might otherwise be reported in their zeal to develop a fund of information—however arcane—that might qualify them as "experts."

There was a time when the Department tried to restrain telegraphic reporting because of the cost of transmittal. Automation and the acquisition of communications lines by the Department under long-term lease arrangements have made the cost of telegraphic reporting less visible. Cost still should not be ignored, but a more compelling reason for bringing the information flow to manageable size today is that our information system has become so overloaded that it can no longer serve the Department's substantive needs efficiently. Changes in the reporting content and in the handling of information are urgently needed.

Establishing a modern and effective information management system involves two separate but related needs: first a clear description of information requirements and, secondly, an efficient and accessible information storage and retrieval system which will give all end-users prompt access to the specific information they need.

Defining information and reporting requirements is one task that the Department has never been able to carry out successfully. In part, this failure can be explained by the fact that earlier efforts have

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always been predicated on an informal (and unscientific) polling of end users. Reliance on this method makes it virtually impossible to reject anyone's claim to a "need" with the inevitable result that information requirements wind up being defined as almost anything that happens in a country. As Coplin, O'Leary, and Rich pointed out in their Murphy Commission study on Foreign Service reporting, one can always find at least one end user who will consider a given report "very important."

But one has to look at such evaluations with a great deal of circumspection. An end user may—and often does—attach great importance to certain kinds of information for reasons having little to do with our real foreign policy or foreign relations requirements. He may have inherited an instruction to follow a certain subject which may have been significant in a previous period, and he may pursue it diligently, totally unaware and even unconcerned that the information is no longer significant. Or, he may misperceive where his job fits into the scheme of things. Or, he may simply be acting under the rather common stimulus, that it is up to each officer to "make something out of his job." And, since the main product of State Department activity is information, it is indeed difficult to "make something out of a job" without generating more reporting from the field. In fact, the Murphy Commission Study mentioned earlier found this "sub-culture," whereby end users and producers of reports conspire in the pursuit of subjects of interest mainly to themselves, to be quite extensive.

Defining the Department's information requirements by the common consensus approach, therefore, is bound to fail. Nor is it likely that a workable worldwide standard could be devised, simply because information requirements will vary from country to country.

How then might we proceed? First, there should be a more thorough understanding of how and for what purposes information is put to use. There are, of course, the numerous inquiries from the public and from the Congress, from top officials who want information for speeches, for testimony or for briefing and background papers. Much of the information used in this kind of effort is very general and quite often available from published sources. Meeting this demand should not translate itself into a heavy reporting workload. Beyond these efforts, there is the greater need for information on which to base policy decisions and actions in the foreign relations field. How much and what kind of information is needed for this purpose will vary from country to country depending on the complexity of the various forces that determine a nation's direction and on the manner and extent in which we may be involved. Only coincidentally, by the way, will the level of information requirements correlate with the strategic, political, or economic importance of the country to our interests. Thus, the factors upon which we might gauge the possible reaction of Saudi Arabia are relatively limited and would not require a very great volume of information. By contrast, Germany's highly sophisticated political and economic systems and close economic, political, and military ties with other countries all have to be understood and taken into account to be able to judge its reactions.

In either instance, however, the information required is normally stable, with critical changes usually occurring gradually. This kind of information does not require the kind of hourly or daily coverage of events which dominates reporting from posts today. Situations where policy actions or policy decisions may hang on hourly developments (e. g., Portugal last year) are after all, relatively rare. Nor is there anything shameful about the Department learning of some happening through the media before the Embassy has reported. Thus, in most areas of the world, most of the time, the flavor of daily events can be safely reported in periodic summaries—perhaps as infrequently as once or twice a week.

The basic information required for most decision making, on the other hand, should be reported in a more stylized manner and integrated into an automated information storage and retrieval system that could be constantly updated and susceptible to aggregation and presentation in analytical models. Modern technology brings such a system well within the realm of possibility. To date, we have applied the technology to store and retrieve documents and to speed up the transmission and distribution of messages. The Department's Automated Documents System is already an efficient archive which satisfies the legal requirement imposed upon the Department to maintain a complete foreign affairs record. As a source of information, however, it has only limited usefulness. If one knows of a document, it can be found rather quickly. Or, if one is searching for coverage of a specific event, the messages pertaining to it can also be rather quickly retrieved. But if we have an urgent need to know, for example, the five most important exporters of cobalt or the combined strength of all Communist parties in NATO countries, such information must be developed manually. Or, if we want a quick assessment of the meaning of a cabinet change in a given country, we have to rely on the impressions of a desk officer, INR analyst, or, if time permits, the impressions of the Embassy. While expert opinion is no doubt valuable and the element we would rely on in the final analysis, the chances of coming up with the correct assessment would be improved if all relevant information could be laid out and appropriately related for the experts to use. Lacking the facilities for pulling together information related to a given problem, we frequently see serious recommendations prepared in the Department on the basis of impressions supported only by the officer's memory. No matter how talented and experienced an officer may be, such an approach to foreign affairs is fraught with risk.

It should not be difficult to agree on the important elements of information we need about each country, and once agreed upon, it would not be difficult to put the information on-line and assign responsiblity for its perpetual updating. Indeed, we have something of a start in this direction with the Country Data Books which already are on-line. The problems with this file are: (1) the data are only updated periodically, (2) the file is not tailored to the political and economic character of each individual country, and (3) the information in it cannot be aggregated or modeled. The first two of these deficiencies

can be remedied with a minimum of effort. Programing the material, on the other hand, so that it could be aggregated by function, (e.g. rank ordering of countries by size of military forces, by grain production, etc.) requires more effort, but this is well within the Department's present technological capability. Building analytical models and putting them on line requires considerably more effort, but this task is also technically feasible.

An automated and systematic arrangement for cataloging information would not only aid policy makers, but would act as a discipline on reporting from posts abroad as well. It would cause end users to focus on information needs with some precision, and producers of information would be more aware of the Department's information needs. In short, this system would automatically provide reporting guidance.

One further element would be required to make the system complete as well as efficient: a channel and a format suitable for analytical, expository reports which are vital to end users if they are to have a feel for the situation in a country. In times past, despatches served this purpose. Though cumbersome to reproduce and distribute, many important messages—some with far-reaching recommendations—were sent by despatch. When the despatch was eliminated, it was intended that the airgram would serve the same purpose. However, with the enormous improvement in electronic transmission, the telegram became far and away the preferred form of reporting. The airgram, in turn has fallen virtually into disuse as a reporting vehicle.

Unfortunately, the telegram is not conducive to thoughtful, descriptive or interpretative reporting. The character of telegraphic reporting is one of urgency, and the language commonly used in telegraphic messages is terse and devoid of nuances. But most important, the image of urgency conjured up by telegrams transfers itself to the subject matter reported on, and it is uncommon to read a telegraphic report discussing matters not perceived to be of some immediate concern.

The lack of analytical and descriptive reporting is sorely missed, and the reporting officers in the field would do well, as Secretary Kissinger urged in his message, "Reporting from the Field," to cut down the volume in order to have "more time to think about events and developments and to analyze them for use here in Washington." Foreign Service officers are capable of this kind of reporting and nothing could add more to the reference material on foreign affairs than the carefully presented analysis and impressions of our own staff. But exhortation alone—even from a dynamic Secretary of State—will not bring it into being. Reporting officers need to be assured that if they go to the effort of writing such reports—and the effort is substantially greater than writing telegrams—their reports will be put to use. Airgrams are not read because, not being urgent, they tend to be filed away in cabinets where their existence is forgotten in the course of the rapid personnel turnover that characterizes Department life. But, if a system of cataloging expository reports in some convenient and accessible way can be devised, making them into an active repository of foreign affairs knowledge, reporting officers would take pride in contributing to it. The repository could be an "official use only" section of the State Department library where the reports would be appropriately indexed and stored under covers to enhance their durability. Here, they could be referred to for months or even years.

"Airgrams are not read because, not being urgent, they tend to be filed away in cabinets where their existence is forgotten in the course of the rapid personnel turnover that characterizes Department life."

A new format could also be devised to distinguish these reports from such typical airgram uses as trade opportunity reports, transmittals, etc. Each message would be prefaced by a subject and brief summary, carefully prepared to give end users a clear idea of the message content. Only this summary would be widely circulated along with a cumulative index of titles which would be circulated only periodically.

A decision to proceed along these lines would recognize that most decisions in the foreign affairs sector turn on a limited number of facts, but these facts have to be presented with precision, must be logically juxtaposed, and should be supported by descriptive and analytical material that tells us how the major institutions of a country work, the forces influencing them, and the areas affected by them.

It is obvious that the volume of reporting can be drastically cut back, the system outlined in this paper would achieve that end. But the quality of information would also be improved as both reporters and end users would have more time to think and consider the facts in a meaningful context, while taking care that data are correctly programed in an automated information system. The programing exercise itself would contribute toward a better understanding of foreign affairs issues and a more precise knowledge of information requirements.

In the long run, there would also be monetary savings. Less reporting staff would almost certainly be required. Savings would also occur because a lower volume of traffic would decrease the pressure for more communications equipment and more communicators. While it is true that with leased communications lines and equipment already purchased, sending any given message by telegram costs "nothing," if telegraphic traffic grows a demand for additional, costly equipment is created. In that event, we have to ask if our real information requirements have, in fact, increased. The hypothesis presented here is that our reporting volume has long since exceeded our information requirements, and that it is now time to turn modern technology toward improvement in the quality, accessibility, and presentation of the information that is really important to the foreign affairs process.

FSJ BOOK ESSAY

Traditional Africa

MAN IN AFRICA, *by Colin M. Turnbull. Anchor Press/Doubleday, $7.95.*

An understanding of African *traditional* societies could help the West to a better understanding of itself. This is a key argument of *Man in Africa,* the latest book by anthropologist Colin M. Turnbull, formerly a curator of the American Museum of Natural History in New York.

In a wide-ranging review of traditional Africa, Turnbull shows how, by studying small-scale, preindustrial cultures, the West could more easily learn in what way its own vast urban societies function or malfunction. He explores the African cultures of grassland, river valley, forest, desert and western woodlands, and describes the effect of these environments on hunters (also gatherers and fishers), herders and farmers. Apart from the trend to industrialization, these groups are pointed out as still forming the three major African economies today.

Running through most African traditions are certain common values as part of *one overall* tradition: unity of the family, communality of economics, egalitarian nature of government, and the integrative power of religious belief.

Turnbull recounts the influence of the family through the far-reaching ramifications of traditional African societies. The biological family, almost always a cooperative economic unit, teaches its members that social personality is more important than individual identity. The same family is a model for wider social relationships extending through clan, tribe and nation. The sense of "kinship" is reinforced by an affinity with the natural environment that contributes to social order and spiritual unity. This, says Turnbull, has led to African societies which, while not perfect or free of disorder, are basically democratic and egalitarian.

Most often associated with ancestors and the concept of family, traditional religious belief in Africa also includes belief in a spiritual power that permeates the world, a force that can be trapped for good or evil. "We misunderstand and misinterpret it," the author holds, "as magic, witchcraft and sorcery. . ." He calls the term "witch doctor," for example, entirely inappropriate as applied to the tribal doctor. (A witch "is considered an unfortunate and sick person who has inherited an incurable malady.") The spiritual force is said to be involved in a tribal doctor's "effective herbal remedies, some of which are new to the Western world. . . .Many traditional African societies have a complex system of diagnostic categories not very different in content from those of Western psychiatry." The same force often pervades traditional dance, music, art and craftsmanship through an intermix of religion and social control. Belief in this vital power is also linked with the land, "the source of the greatest unity. . .for the land is Africa." The traditional African's essentially religious attitude toward life may be the "supreme integrative mechanism of social order."

In all of this, Turnbull declares, the vital ingredient is human relationships. And it is precisely in this area where he sees Western versions of civilization lagging far behind traditional African societies. Africans, he says, relate to each other as human beings, "not as mere cogs in some impersonal social machine."

The values of traditional Africa are in danger of dying out. The old ways, increasingly under political and economic pressures, are further threatened by some colonialized leaders who, judging progress by purely Western standards, are openly ashamed of traditional Africans. This comes at a time when the West—with its urban decay, its tensions and insecurities, its depredations of natural resources, its mechanistic, depersonalizing impact—has begun to question the validity of its own "progress."

But the younger African leaders are in many ways more respectful and mindful of the traditional past. With this legacy, they are putting fresh vitality into making the transition from a tribal to a national level of organization. And the author of *Man in Africa* says transition must come through belief in a spiritual power that unites—through the land—president, bureaucrat and student with hunter, herder and farmer. It is belief that would quicken the new nations as they search for "a form of African society that will avoid many of the dangers and weaknesses inherent in the West, yet which will not be isolated from the modern technological world."

— ROBERT EHRMAN

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

"But I didn't mean *to leave the Ambassador's safe unlocked!"*

FSJ BOOKSHELF

The China Lobby

THE COMMITTEE OF ONE MILLION: *"China Lobby" Politics, 1953-1971, by Stanley D. Bachrack. Columbia University Press, $14.95.*

Although the origins of the term "China Lobby" are dubious, the catchphrase got much attention in the spring of 1950, when US—China policy became embroiled in national hysteria over the "loss of China." This study, using previously undisclosed materials from the White House, State Department and other sources, examines a key part of the "China Lobby": "The Committee for One Million Against the Admission of Communist China to the United Nations," organized in 1953. ". . . (T)he Committee was born—if not totally conceived—in a congressional subcommittee." A handful of congressmen acted as an insider-type lobby. Among them were Rep. Judd and Senators Joe McCarthy, Knowland, Wherry and Bridges.

The "China Lobby" had no centralized, formal organization to direct its efforts; it was essentially an amorphous pressure group of individuals and groups with a common interest in supporting Chiang Kai-shek. Chiang's agents and his American backers exploited events to gain him support and to attack those critical of his regime. The "American friends" are the subject of this book. This transmogrified doctoral dissertation focuses most enlighteningly on China policy within the context of US politics.

Recent criticism of Congress for not taking more active part in US foreign policy is surely not justified in the case of the "China bloc." However, the author asks if Congressmen should be permitted to use executive sessions to organize and provide leadership for political interest groups; to listen in secrecy and then withhold from public scrutiny testimony about such groups. Should lawmakers assigned to foreign policy committees take active leadership roles in such groups? Readers of this scholarly work may answer these questions for themselves.

A historical footnote of possible interest. Nixon and McCarthy did much for the "China Lobby," and for themselves politically, by their demagogic utterances on US-China policy. At his first presidential press conference January 27, 1969, President Nixon said: "The policy of this country and this Administration at this time will be to continue to oppose Communist China's admission to the United Nations." Several days later, however, he sent Dr. Kissinger, then head of the National Security Council, this memorandum: "I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is exploring possibilities of rapprochement with the Chinese. This, of course, should be done privately and should under no circumstances get into the public print from this direction."

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

Remedy or New Disease?

JAPAN IN SOUTHWEST ASIA: *Collision Course by Raul S. Manglapus. Carnegie Endowment, $3.75, paper.*

The North-South confrontation on trade, aid and development has larger aspects than the Japan-Southeast Asia relationship, but the memories of 1942-45 (present strongly in this book, although the author, former Philippine Secretary of Foreign Affairs, sent his son to Tokyo's Sophia University) dramatize and embitter Japan's problem. While Japan's economic and psychological dominance of the area brings resentment, Japan is also seen as "anti-revolutionary" by students, army officers, intellectuals and politicians; is it Japanese democracy or its non-socialist governments that is at fault to these Southeast Asians?

Mr. Manglapus details a long, occasionally tendentious record of Japanese sins. Bribery plays a large part. Thomas Hughes (former INR director) in his preface gives this undue weight, an observation coming possibly from the contrast of Japan arresting a former prime minister and the mild treatment given American firms which practice international bribery. The author sees little hope of reform because of the "bicycle" character of the Japanese economy (keep going or you fall off) and the rigidity of Japanese society. He is also not very optimistic that SEA can develop countervailing economic and political power. After a confused digression into Japanese military power, Mr. Manglapus plumps for an internationally sanctioned switch in development strategy to something akin to China's "intermediate labor intensive industries" with tax and other curbs on the advanced technology-large scale industry which Japan's economic penetration represents. A version of this was envisaged by some American post-war planners who wanted to keep Japan a regional economic power. What was conceivable in 1946, seems quite remote in 1976, barring major swings to the left in SEA; even then, Japan would still be the major source for technology, organization and money. The author's conclusion seems tame after his recitation of Japan's vices; he does not explore how the US and Europe might react to the switch, particularly to the investment, tax and commercial practices which would be part of it.

—J. K. HOLLOWAY, JR.

Revolutionary Diplomacy

THE VIRGIN DIPLOMATS, *by Elmer Bendiner. Knopf, $10.00.*

Elmer Bendiner's popular history of the diplomacy associated with the American revolution concentrates on familiar episodes. After touching on the prewar activities of colonial agents sent to represent various North American colonies in London, the experience which largely shaped the initial diplomatic practice of the United States, the author treats early wartime efforts to obtain clandestine aid from Britain's continental rivals, France and Spain. The rest of the book examines the negotiation of the French alliance (1778) and the Treaty of Paris (1783), although some attention is accorded to wartime missions in Spain, Holland, and Russia.

Popular history is written primarily to entertain, whereas scholarly history seeks principally to instruct. Of the two varieties popular history is much more widely read. Surely its practitioners exert more direct influence on the public than professional scholars. For these reasons good popular history is at least as important as good scholarly history. Unfortunately Bendiner's work fails to meet minimum stan-

dards. In common with most popular historians he stresses biography—the doings of his cast of characters, but instead of sprightly and gripping portraits he produces for the most part tedious and labored sketches. We learn a good deal about the activities of major figures such as Pierre A. C. Beaumarchais, Benjamin Franklin, the Count de Vergennes, and John Adams and somewhat less about minor figures such as Silas Deane, Arthur Lee, Edward Bancroft, and the Count de Floridablanca, but we never discover what made them tick. Bendiner is long on trivia but short on insight.

The reader acquires bits of information about domestic developments in various countries, and he vaguely realizes that at length a continental coalition of Spain, France, and Holland formed to wage war on isolated Britain. What the reader doesn't learn is just how these matters affected the course of negotiations. The American revolution presents the spectacle of an irregular rebel force which won few battles but managed to maintain itself in the field. Eventually Britain found itself entangled in a truly dangerous struggle with powerful enemies rather than the weak colonials. Over time the British people lost the will to sustain their leaders' commitment to war. American diplomacy developed in this larger context. The important generalization about American diplomatic practitioners during the revolution is that, despite their foibles, they eventually exploited Britain's growing difficulties and emerged with a most favorable settlement. Bendiner appears to accept this view, a common one, but he never makes himself clear because he is unable to demonstrate the connection between context and personality.

Most readers would find more entertainment in established scholarly accounts, particularly that of Samuel Flagg Bemis. Perhaps a popular historian with the skills of, say, a Barbara Tuchman, will take up this important subject. Until then most readers would do well to stay with Bemis, or with Richard Van Alstyne and Richard Morris, two other gifted students of revolutionary diplomacy.

—David F. Trask

Arms Limitation

The Dynamics of Detente: *How to End the Arms Race, by Arthur Macy Cox. W. W. Norton, $8.95.*

Arthur Cox exhorts us to be sane and sensible in resolving a central security issue of our time: Should we attempt to curb the Soviet Union through arms limitation accords or should we attempt to stay ahead of them in an ever-spiraling arms race? Cox argues convincingly for arms limitation accords, and urges the two superpowers to exercise parallel measures of restraint in retarding the arms race. Cox also wants the United States to extend détente to the third world—Angola for instance—by adding a political surcharge to trade with the Soviets and by phasing out covert activities abroad, *pari passu* with the Soviets. A new and extraneous political condition to US trade with the Soviets would doubtless be welcome news to Western European and Japanese businessmen—whose trade with the East is already burgeoning. It would probably block expansion of US trade and eliminate any competition from the United States. And it is hard to see why a US judgment about covert activity—say, another Bay of Pigs—should be swayed in any way by what the Soviets may be doing covertly. But Cox's views are thought-provoking and well-argued, and warrant attention.

—David Linebaugh

City of Light

Thomas Jefferson's Paris, *by Howard C. Rice, Jr., Princeton University Press.*

Thomas Jefferson's was the first generation of Americans to have a love affair with Paris. From August of 1784, when it was seduction at first sight, to his departure to become Secretary of State in August 1789, Jefferson partook deeply of the many favors offered by the new Bourbon city of light and enlightenment. Sharing its pleasures during his first year with Franklin at Passy and Adams at Auteuil, Jefferson delighted in the galleries and gardens, the salons and boulevards, the theatre and what we would today call the technology of a city living the Age of Reason while preparing the Revolution.

Drawing from Jefferson's copious letters, travel memoranda and account books; documenting the text with 180 maps and illustrations from French archives and profiting from the leisure of retirement to give his most readable history style and elegance, Professor Rice has evoked the city of Paris as Thomas Jefferson knew it, lived it and loved it as the American Minister to France. It is an evocative and fascinating study. Few among Jefferson's colleagues in later American Legations and Embassies knew that he lived (and grew corn in his garden) where today the Champs Elysées and the rue de Berri intersect, but like Jefferson, many have agreed to help a landlord with his taxes by paying a rent substantially larger than that set forth in the official contract But the book has a value far greater than that of the vignette. By synthesizing and illustrating the intellectual world in which Jefferson lived, by depicting the impressions he formed and the tastes he developed, the author creates the background for the translation of these tastes and impressions to the young republic to which Jefferson returned. For all who know or want to know Paris, this mémoire of a city that no longer quite exists but has not quite disappeared will be a happy experience.

— Robert E. Barbour

US and Southern Africa

The Kissinger Study Of Southern Africa: *National Security Study Memorandum 39 (Secret), edited and Introduced by Mohamed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen. Preface by Edgar Lockwood. Lawrence Hill & Company, paper $3.95.*

In mid-1976, the United States began to consider the possibility of developing a peace formula for the southern part of Africa. The prelude to this American initiative was a visit to Africa by Secretary of State Kissinger earlier in the year. The shuttle diplomacy used in the case of southern Africa had been successfully used earlier in the Middle East. Recently the bugs in the US peace plan have started to show up. A full-blown talk-and-fight stage has opened in Geneva with the black nationalists and Rhodesian whites discussing a timetable for the independence of Rhodesia. The plan's main bug

seems to be that everyone has gotten a different "message" listening to Kissinger.

Rhodesian whites said he promised a slow transfer of power with much of it still in their hands during the next two years. And Rhodesian Premier Ian Smith says that promise is non-negotiable. Black moderates say that the Kissinger proposals are already dead. All that's left to work out are the details of immediate black rule. The British say that Kissinger promised them that no active participation on their part would be necessary whereas the black radicals are saying that without active British and American participation there will have to be a massive guerrilla war, to be waged, they hope, with US help. No one should be surprised at these conflicting signals for this is exactly the type of play-acting Kissinger—while still at the White House—envisioned as the role for the United States to play in Southern Africa. It is about this play-acting and the conceivable US roles in this drama that the National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM #39) was written and it is necessary reading if one is to properly understand what and why the United States is doing what it is in Southern Africa.

The events taking place in Southern Africa make it clear that the end of white minority rule draws closer day-by-day. What was once the subject of leisurely policy planning for Foggy Bottom now becomes a matter of high priority, as the authors of NSSM #39 and the editors tacitly acknowledge. What the editors fail to point out is that NSSM #39 intimately concerns itself with the *kind* of black majority rule that takes over the area—i.e. peaceful, developmental or committed to further guerrilla wars. At the time NSSM #39 was written, the coup in Portugal had not occurred, nor had the United States been defeated in Vietnam, nor had the Nixon administration been toppled by scandal, nor had the Angolan civil war occurred. Yet the overall policy guidelines which were being pursued by America in the late '60s are still being naively pursued today. The fact that the editors do not clearly discern this important fact makes the introduction and editors' notes less valuable than they should be. In addition, the authors could have taken pains to point out that the Soviet Union is getting more deeply committed in Southern Africa with each passing day. A long-term treaty with Angola for vastly stepped-up aid provides a ready example—an example evident even in early 1976 when this book was edited.

The Carter administration will have a king-size headache in its dealings with southern African nations—particularly the front-line nations—in the years ahead. One can only hope that they will not be guilty of relying on the irrational thinking which characterized the production of NSSM #39. In order to gain an insight into the basis of US policy towards the area, this book, which provides the complete, unabridged and hitherto classified text of NSSM #39, is worth reading.

— Roy A. Harrell, Jr.

Marshall on WWI

Memoirs of My Services in the World War 1917-1918, *by George C. Marshall. Houghton Mifflin, $10.*

General George C. Marshall was Chief of Staff of the United States Army in World War II and as Secretary of State fathered the Marshall Plan. The most respected military figure of his generation, he never wrote an autobiography and until his death preserved a forbidding silence about the personalities and events of these years.

Marshall was only slightly less reticent about his important though less visible contribution in World War I. Although too junior for high command, his assignments first as chief of operations of the US 1st Infantry Division, and later of the US First Army, gave him a key role in organizing American combat operations in France. He wrote an account of this experience afterwards which remained buried in his personal effects until 1941 and has only now been published.

Marshall believed that military men should not write, apparently because it might arouse controversy—a curious doctrine in light of Caesar, Clausewitz, Marshal Saxe, Sherman, U.S. Grant and Mahan, not to mention his prominent contemporaries. Hence, he avoids hard criticism of command decisions and rigidly eschews personalities. Instead the book concentrates on the manifold problems of training and organizing the American expeditionary force, keeping it supplied in the field, and deploying it for the final offensive.

To the extent that this volume reveals anything about the author, the picture that emerges is one of iron control and somber devotion to duty, self-disciplined to the exclusion of all human weakness. The writing is stiff, even official in tone. There is no hint of the military erudition and passion for war that permeates the reminiscences of MacArthur—and none of the vanity.

—Charles Maechling, Jr.
(The reviewer served on the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1943-44.)

Chinese History

China: From the Opium Wars to the 1911 Revolution, *by Jean Chesneaux et al. Pantheon, $6.95 paperback.*

"Time present and time past/Are both perhaps present in time furture,/ And time future contained in time past." (T. S. Eliot).

Those who would understand the Chinese Communists' rise to power, as well as important elements and forces in China today and tomorrow, will surely find a basic knowledge of Chinese developments essential, beginning, at least, with the first of the so-called Opium Wars (1840-1842). The collapse of the imperial system (the Confucian order) and the failure of representative government in the Nationalist (*Kuomintang*) interregnum, were preludes to and causes of the establishment of the CPR on October 1, 1949.

The interaction of imperial politics, foreign intervention, and popular movements are analyzed perceptively and lucidly described in terms of their own dynamics and historical unity in this work of rigorous scholarship by three eminent French Sinologists. The economic aspects of these events are given appropriate attention; illustrative documents and excellent bibliographies supplement each chapter. A glossary of Chinese terms with characters is a helpful addition. This history would be invaluable in a college course on modern China and in the library of a serious student.

— Robert W. Rinden

A MODEST PROPOSAL FOR VOA

continued from page 7

that the Voice of America (VOA), USIA's near-adult offspring, should be given a separate identity; and a new organization created to handle all information and cultural activities including those of the present bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) in State. The Department, however, would be in charge of all day-to-day declarations or explanations regarding foreign policy.

Shortly afterward the Murphy Commission on the "Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy" incorporated the Stanton recommendations into its own report.

The Murphy and Stanton reports are already more than a year old and judging from past precedent one might assume that nothing much will come of them. However, with Jimmy Carter, a new and activist President, taking over the White House, we can expect many things to change. He will be likely to seek new methods and patterns. Whether or not one agrees with Murphy-Stanton, this may be a good time to mull over new ideas.

At least one of the Murphy-Stanton proposals can be made the basis for a significant improvement in our information program. Others may afford a useful base to build on.

The proposal offering the most likely benefit is the call to free VOA from the bureaucratic burden of USIA control. In seeking means to exploit such a change, we find at hand an example of how an overseas radio operation can bring much credit to the nation that sponsors it.

The example is the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) which is heard and welcomed throughout the world. VOA can undoubtedly prove that here and there it has more listeners than BBC, but even its best friends can hardly claim that it is as good.

BBC, however, broadcasts not only abroad but in Britain as well. It draws its programs from the full resources of a national network handling both TV and radio—as though VOA and all American networks were combined.

While VOA speaks as a disembodied spirit without the corpus of a domestic audience, BBC gains credibility by serving its foreign listeners fare very similar to what is heard by its audience at home. It can draw from a pool of talent that can hardly be matched by a purely overseas operation.

One of BBC's biggest assets, however, is the fact that it is self-directing and virtually autonomous despite its financial support from the British Government. The limiting of VOA to broadcasts aimed at foreigners gives even its most objective broadcasts the appearance of propaganda.

The combination of VOA with a commercial network is neither feasible nor desirable; but it is not necessary either. The United States Government is already in the domestic broadcasting business through the Public Broadcasting System (PBS). A combination of VOA and PBS would give VOA access to more and better talent, a more acceptable image, and a better programing balance.

PBS, though its financing is weak, is already doing a remarkably good job in presenting public interest programs that are often better than those on the commercial

networks. It carries well-informed commentaries and panel-discussion shows on international news and foreign policy issues. Best of all it has managed to avoid direction by either Government or sponsors.

If VOA were to be combined with PBS and the resulting network operated at home and abroad under the same autonomy now enjoyed by PBS, VOA's reputation for objectivity would get an immediate boost.

There would be many other benefits.

VOA would gain access to a much greater range of talent and a variety of new programing possibilities. Many TV programs of PBS could be filmed or videotaped and offered to fledgling TV stations abroad, particularly in developing countries where programs are now crammed with our worst soap-operas and detective serials, leaving an image of America as a melange of corruption, violence, and sick sex. Some of PBS's better shows would help to counter such an image.

Though PBS occasionally gives credit lines to commercial firms that have helped finance a special program, usually a symphony orchestra or something of this sort, this could be helpful abroad. The firms themselves might at times be willing to pay a small fee to foreign stations that used the program. Some foreign networks even prefer a commercial credit, even without a fee, since this obviates explaining that the program is not foreign government propaganda.

Where such credit lines are not acceptable most firms would agree to having them dropped outside the US.

A VOA-PBS combination would also offer advantages to PBS. First of course would be access to VOA's generous financing, and the use of VOA's tremendous technical facilities should offer a very considerable boost.

Savings through the combination of both programing and technical personnel could help both VOA and PBS.

Best of all, since PBS, despite its Government support, has already demonstrated remarkable objectivity, it should be possible to assure the Congress that the great power of VOA would not be used to support an imcumbent Administration—the bugbear that led to a strict ban on the use of any part of USIA appropriations for programs directed at Americans.

Further benefit to PBS would result from access to the reports of VOA's network of news correspondents. VOA representatives would also be able to "trade" for good local programs suitable for broadcasting or televising in the US. Performances of folk dances and folk music come at once to mind, but there are many other possibilities.

Although PBS already reaches many of the United States outside the Eastern seaboard, it does not cover the nation. It broadcasts on channels that cannot be heard on many TV sets leaving its audience comparatively small. As a bigger, stronger, better-financed operation it could expect a longer reach.

Bolstered by VOA, a bigger, better PBS could provide the American people with much of the information they need to make good evaluations of foreign policy. Better support for good policies might be the result. Voters, if better informed, might be expected to encourage their Congressmen and Senators to make more positive contributions to the policy-forming process.

SHALL TRUTH BE OUR GUIDE

from page 13

the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, or National Public Radio.

The VOA petition then notes that: "No outside group that has studied the future of the US information and cultural effort abroad has recommended maintaining the status quo." Adding: "In its nearly thirty-five years, the Voice has been administratively located in several different 'parent' institutions and its mission variously defined and interpreted. In every case, VOA has not merely been placed in a subordinate position, it has been made subservient in every area of management and operations, with repeated unwarranted restrictions on its output, and a generally adverse effect on its ability to perform. Now, in 1976, we of the VOA staff have concluded that an independent status within the foreign affairs community is necessary."

The drafters of the petition have told us privately that they have no objection to a board of governors overseeing VOA operations and serving as a buffer to ward off outside attempts at intervention. However, the petition specifically rules out option (2), i.e., co-equal status with RFE/RL under the BIB. The risks of being associated with former CIA-funded operations are cited, as is the danger of having VOA transmitters jammed again—if they were to begin broadcasting RFE/RL programing.

"Evidence suggests," says the petition, "that most foreign governments and publics—notably including those in countries where VOA has major transmitter facilities—are not convinced that those radios' former connections have in fact been broken. In our view, to connect VOA with BIB—even tenuously—would be to ask for trouble."

We share the concern over the risks of association with RFE/RL, but we are also mindful of the fact that many Americans see a continued need for the two radios, in addition to VOA. Whether or not one agrees with this point of view, it is a political fact of life that has gained considerable accceptance over the years, particularly in the Congress.

Both radios, however, suffer from technical shortcomings. Much of the transmitter plant originally funded by CIA now needs replacing. And a lot of it is located in Portugal and Spain where the future for anti-communist broadcasting is increasingly less assured. BIB—on behalf of the two radios—has sounded VOA out on the subject of sharing transmitter time, and has received a cold shoulder, so far.

It costs millions of dollars to build international shortwave facilities, and we doubt seriously that the Congress will approve construction of parallel transmitting plants for RFE/RL and VOA—merely on the strength of the CIA-association-risk argument. Congressional approval would seem more likely for transmitter installations that could be shared by all three radios. In other words, a common technical plant for all Congressionally-funded US broadcasting. This would necessarily require a single, coordinating

body to assure maximum effective utilization.

Such a move would be consistent with the Carter administration's efforts to streamline government operations, and make them cost-effective. Either the Board for International Broadcasting or the Corporation for Public Broadcasting could serve as a board of governors for VOA—as well as a coordinating panel for all broadcast services.

If BIB is chosen, we would suggest that the board membership be broadened to reflect the worldwide scope of VOA broadcasting. Further, the board ought to include strong representation from the broadcast journalism profession—if VOA is to carry out the mandate we envision.

BIB has five statutory members, three of whom—including the chairman—are due to leave the board in April. Instead of appointing new BIB members, President Carter may wish to consider the possibility of merging BIB with CPB, and placing the Voice of America under the combined board. This would then open the way for broad cooperation in technical research, administration, and programing—with the results available to RFE/RL, VOA, the Public Broadcasting Service, and National Public Radio. Quite apart from the obvious savings in cost, this would have the very real benefit of assuring that CPB's high standards for broadcasting would apply to the three international radios.

This then raises the question: why have all three international radios? Congress may well decide, at some future date, that RFE and RL—having already combined into a single entity—could further merge into the Eastern European and USSR language services of the Voice of America. We do not propose such a move now because we feel it would encounter strong resistance, possibly enough to jeopardize VOA's urgently needed reform. But we do suggest that the continued rationale for three international broadcast services be closely studied by both the Congress and the President.

A further question: if VOA is removed from USIA, what then becomes of the rest of the Agency? The answer to this must lie with the incoming Carter administration. Several blueprints for action are available, including the report of the Stanton commission. It should be noted that USIA's non-radio activities represent more than two-thirds of its annual budget, approximately one hundred and eighty million dollars. Thus the USIA question deserves thoughtful consideration by the administration.

For VOA, however, the time for action—for moving beyond John Chancellor's intersection of journalism and diplomacy—has come. This means more than merely liberating VOA from its present position within the Washington bureaucracy. It means entrusting control of VOA to an independent board—or to the Corporation for Public Broadcasting—with the responsibility for overseeing a voice of America that speaks for all Americans, and by its broadcasts exemplifies their belief in freedom of expression.

THE WEEK WE WENT TO WAR

from page 11

made him even more eager to prove his resolution: to have America forcefully and successfully resist communist expansion.

Acheson and Truman were the key figures in pushing the Administration to commit forces in Korea, and probably the President was acting upon the quiet education he had received from the Secretary in the preceding months. Throughout the week of crisis, it was also Acheson, of all the Presidential advisers, who most shaped the high-level dialogue and defined the agenda of basic issues. At least as early as Sunday afternoon, the 25th, according to his memoirs, Acheson states, "my mind was pretty clear on where the course we were about to recommend would lead and why it was necessary that we follow that course."

Truman's critical decision of June 26 to commit American air and naval troops was made primarily on the advice of Acheson. "The military neither recommended it nor opposed it," Secretary Johnson later emphasized. Military leaders had previously pointed out some "difficulties and limitations," according to Johnson, but on the 26th they went along with the President and Acheson. Whatever the continuing private doubts of military leaders (especially their doubts about ground troops), they had no desire to oppose Truman and Acheson, the Cabinet member whom the President most trusted and admired.

Speedily, within a few days, the Administration globalized containment, and prepared the way for the large military buildup that Acheson had wanted and that Johnson and Truman had earlier resisted. Analysts of this period often forget that the President, prior to the war, was devoted to a military budget of $13-14.5 billion per year, and that he and Johnson were actually cutting the budget, despite the pleas of the JCS. Without the Korean war, an essential part of NSC-68 (a military budget of $38-50 billion) would have failed. Korea, as Acheson later remarked, "came along and saved us . . . it is doubtful whether anything like what happened in the next few years could have been done had not the Russians been stupid enough to have instigated the attack against Korea . . . ."

The attack, as interpreted by Acheson, Truman, and others, seemed to confirm Acheson's analysis of the Soviet Union and made the President, who was fearful of large military budgets and of deficit spending, willing to endorse huge expenditures for the expanding military system that security seemed to require. Many others in America, including business leaders, accepted this analysis and were willing to endorse large military budgets. The result was a form of military Keynesianism that some feared would weaken the economy and others believed would promote necessary growth, but that most approved because they wanted the military system it could purchase. It would allow the Administration to build "positions of strength"—which, in Acheson's analysis, were essential to halting Soviet advances and to forcing a Soviet retreat. His aim was to save Europe and Asia for the American system, and to

enable America to win the Cold War.

Conclusions

In retrospect, it seems appropriate to ask the troubling questions, critical of American policy, that some dissenting Americans raised in 1950. Should not the United States have stayed out of the Korean civil war? American policy makers were wrong to interpret it as a Soviet-devised or Soviet-instigated plot. In 1950, they should have followed their own earlier recommendations, outlined first in NSC-8 in 1948, and have allowed a communist triumph on the peninsula in the event of an attack. "The US should not become so irrevocably involved in the Korean situation," the Administration-approved NSC paper stated, "that any action taken by any faction in Korea could be considered a *casus belli* for the US." Even though the Administration concluded in 1948 that a communist triumph would "constitute a severe blow to the prestige and influence of the . . . US, . . . enhance the political and strategic position of the Soviet Union with respect to . . . Japan, and adversely affect the position of the US . . . throughout the Far East," the Administration did not intend to get sucked into a war to defend Rhee and the ROK. Acheson and others erred in 1950 when they reversed that analysis.

Had the United States stayed out of the war, America's prestige would have been briefly impaired in 1950. But there were ways of regaining prestige and of meeting the expectations of allied governments without going to war in 1950. In the longer run, the Administration would have strengthened its position in Europe and elsewhere by adhering to the policy of disengagement from Chiang and even moving toward recognition of Mao. Such policies would have met European needs and especially pleased Britain, whose economic interests seemed to require recognition of Mao.

"As a result of . . . erroneous judgment," Charles Bohlen later maintained, "the United States overinterpreted the Korean war and overextended our commitments." The results, he lamented, were a greatly expanded military budget, the squandering of resources, and the over-militarization of NATO. The United States pushed its European allies to build up their forces and to contribute to the Korean war, and thereby compelled them to shift their expenditures and to join in a war that soon became very unpopular. "It is no wonder," Bohlen wrote in 1969, "that we acquired a reputation as a militaristic state . . ."

The Korean war also left another painful legacy: a large-scale sustained military intervention without a Congressional declaration of war. What Acheson derided as Senatorial quibbling, when in his judgment the President properly refused to seek Congressional authorization for involvement in the Korean war, a later generation—having experienced the Vietnam war and having developed an appreciation of Robert Taft's constitutional objections of 1950—would view as wise criticism of the "Imperial Presidency."

LETTERS TO FSJ

In Memoriam

What made Ambassador Robert McClintock, who died at 67 in an automobile accident last November, such an extraordinary diplomat? Having retired in 1975 after 44 years in the Foreign Service, he was not well known by the younger generation—but he was always one of them: Irreverent, willing to stick his neck out for what he thought was right, possessed of enormous energy and originality, he was until his untimely end a *young* man.

Five factors made him almost unique among his contemporaries:

First, he had *style,* that quality to which George Kennan once ascribed the same importance, in the context of our foreign policy, as to the substance of what we do. Rob McClintock had flair, a gift for epigram, a sense of the ridiculous (as well as of the deadly serious), and an interesting way of presenting ideas. Some of his telegrams were classics in the annals of our diplomacy, though their breezy formulations sometimes scandalized his more formal colleagues.

Second, he had an extraordinarily incisive mind, which excelled both in analysis and in the articulation of policy options and recommendations. He did not go in for the "on the one hand, on the other hand" kind of exposition. He was among the handful of officers I have known who could sit down and dictate a fully-organized paper proceeding from objectives to analysis of a complicated situation to fully-reasoned recommendations. There was no clutter in his mind. Discussions under his chairmanship invariably clarified issues and realistic alternatives. Besides, such discussions were *fun*, which is a rare thing in the Foreign Service.

Third, Rob McClintock had great faith in himself, which was sometimes erroneously interpreted as arrogance or superciliousness. It was my experience that he was actually very kind to people who differed with him; but what is more important, he did not lose that kindness when his career would stall or suffer as it did more than once. Like Winston Churchill, whose career was pronounced finished by his detractors many a time, he kept coming back out of adversity for the simple reason that he had a great deal more to offer than most of the others—and that he had never lost confidence, against all the odds, that his potential would again be recognized, as indeed it was, more than once.

Fourth, he had courage, even audacity, as was demonstrated by his unexpected feat when he took General Chehab in his car right up to the Lebanese front lines and through them and past his troops into the headquarters of the United States Marines in 1958 when our landing, due to various misunderstandings, risked being opposed by the very people whom we had come to help. In Venezuela he always carried with him a notice to possible kidnappers that he had asked his government to take no steps whatever to meet any demands that might be made as a condition for his release. (He did this before it was official US policy.)

Fifth, he was a loyal friend to his friends, and sometimes even to his enemies. While he could be cutting for the sake of a joke or a pun that he found irresistible—and he was one of the few truly witty people that I have known in the Service—he took enormous care and delight in bringing along the weaker members of his staff and in pushing those whose merits he thought had not been sufficiently recognized. Among the readers of these lines must be quite a few who owe their advancement to the fact that Rob McClintock recognized and gave credit for ability *especially* if it was not displayed in the conventional manner.

There are many great diplomatists, as he liked to call his profession, in our pantheon. The Foreign Service has produced a few great leaders, a handful of great thinkers, and many very sound and solid executives—but only one Rob McClintock who combined brilliance and flair, acute intelligence and a ready wit, great steadfastness in adversity, physical courage, and towering strength as a friend.

MARTIN F. HERZ

Sofia

Excluding Anarchists

The newly-appointed Historian of the State Department, Dr. David F. Trask, wrote in the November "Letters to FSJ" column about Albion W. Tourgee, United State Consul in Bordeaux in 1898, who began a report with the disclaimer that "I am in mortal terror lest I should again be found guilty of undue levity in reference to official matter."

Trask implies that Tourgee had been scolded for injecting humor into his official reports. Such was not the case. Historical truth demands a fuller explanation of why Tourgee, whom Trask accurately describes as a "lesser but intriguing illuminati," was reprimanded.

Instruction #19 to Bordeaux dated February 23, 1898, among the records of the State Department now in the National Archives, rebuked Tourgee for publishing an article in the *Daily Inter Ocean* of December 25, 1897, "which discussed at length and without reserve the 'Dreyfus' incident and certain instructions sent to Consuls in regard to anarchists sailing for the United States." Publishing the article not only violated the laws and regulations governing consular officials, but the subjects Tourgee chose to write about resulted in "an aggravated instance of such impropriety."

Assistant Secretary Alvey A. Adee reminded Tourgee that the "Dreyfus" incident was a political matter agitating France, and any expression of opinion on the part of a foreign official stationed there might easily involve him in difficulties with the French Government. Furthermore, the free discussion and criticism of the Department's "Confidential" instructions in the matter of anarchists was a security violation, and "a most unbecoming expression of opinion."

Tourgee acknowledged the reprimand in a despatch dated March 21, 1898. His intention in writing about the Dreyfus affair was to make the American system of justice better understood by the French, and not to embroil the two republics in a controversy.

The "Confidential" circular instruction regarding anarchists was another matter. That instruction required consuls to inform the Treasury Department of "the

probable sailing of any anarchists to this country, to the end that this Government may more effectually detect them and prevent their entry should their landing be in violation of the laws of the United States."

As Trask reports, Tourgee did not suffer fools gladly: "It seems a little odd to be reprimanded because of a lack of reverence for an order which seems so evidently unconstitutional that it could only have received your approval by inadvertence. If the right exists to exclude Anarchists by executive order without law because of their political views, might not Monarchists, Mohametans, Methodists,—or even Democrats, be excluded in the same way?"

MILTON O. GUSTAFSON
National Archives
Washington, D.C.

VOA Transmissions

The recommendation of Messrs. Kelly and Read that the Voice of America be linked technically with RFE and Radio Liberty rests on a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the possibility of "sharing" transmitter facilities among American-supported broadcasters to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

A single expansion project and a pooling of technical operations would not change the fact that the three radios need to broadcast during the same prime time listening periods. Major reductions in broadcast time and serious realignments in the program schedules of the three radios would be required to allow any "sharing" of transmitting facilities during morning and evening prime time hours.

Furthermore, while VOA transmissions to Eastern Europe and the USSR need beefing up, VOA's most urgent requirements for new high-power facilities are for broadcasting to other parts of the world—the Far East, South Asia, Africa. Those requirements involve longer distance transmissions and therefore somewhat different transmitter power and antenna configurations than facilities designed to reach Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. So in this respect, too, "sharing" facilities turns out to be an unrealistic prospect.

The political complications of VOA facility arrangements with other governments—some of which have already made clear their determination to have nothing to do with the BIB radios—are another major dimension of the problem, but technical considerations alone suggest the need for extremely careful study before deciding to alter American overseas radio facility arrangements in order to achieve what would amount at best to minuscule savings.

KENNETH H. LANGENBECK
Deputy Director for Engineering and Technical Operations
Voice of America
Washington

Protecting Human Rights

Donald Johnson is right when he says the US should concentrate on multilateral efforts to achieve better international protection of human rights. ("Congress, the Executive, and Human Rights Legislation," Dec. *FSJ*) And he is wrong when he says we should do away with bilateral and multilateral sanctions. We need more carrots than sticks, but we need both to have a coherent and effective policy.

Some of Mr. Johnson's constructive proposals to improve the OAS human rights machinery could be applied to the UN, where I think we should focus our main effort: permitting private individuals and organizations to bring complaints, establishing a time limit for acting on complaints, authorizing the human rights agency to begin an investigation on its own initiative, and granting "automatic" visas to internationally-accredited human rights investigators. We need to press for a complete reconstitution of the UN human rights structure, including the establishment of an internationally-administered indemnification fund for certified victims of human rights violations.

Mr. Johnson also suggests the establishment of positive economic incentives to reward governments with good human rights records: waiver of loan interest, conversion of loans to grants, and the creation of special funds. These are good proposals, and I urge their adoption. But we cannot yet dispense entirely with negative incentives. For the US, this means that we should be prepared to vote against World Bank and other capital development loans to repressive regimes. Mr. Johnson says that this would make the international lending institutions "hostages to pet schemes." But we are not talking about a "pet scheme"; human rights are at the heart of what this country is all about, and our foreign policy should reflect and express the essential realities of the nation. Let's stop "trying to minimize the impact" of Congressional efforts to apply this legislation to maximum advantage in our efforts to promote respect for human rights.

Mr. Johnson correctly calls attention to the need to define more precisely the rights we are seeking to protect. For reasons of both practicality and substance, we should not seek to enact the same level of protection for every right enumerated in the Universal Declaration. The right to "periodic holidays with pay" (Article 24) is simply not in the same category with the rights to security of life and person, and freedom of conscience, belief and expression. The latter flow directly from the human person and therefore belong, in a natural sense, to all people, regardless of the stage of economic or social development of their countries of residence. Violations of these basic rights are the source of the growing Congressional, public, and international concern, and it is on these rights that we should concentrate our attention and our protective efforts.

PATRICK J. FLOOD
Principal Officer
Poznan

Praise for an Author

Congratulations to Elizabeth McNeill on her superb short story, "Manuel's Son," which appeared in the January issue of the *Journal*.

JOE A. ROBINSON
Falls Church

The JOURNAL *welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary. Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service* JOURNAL, *2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.*

AFSA NEWS

This portion of the JOURNAL *is the responsibility of the Governing Board of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.*

Members wishing to send letters on employment, working conditions or AFSA affairs should get them to AFSA by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication.

AFSA News Committee
Room 3644, N.S.

POSSIBLE CHANGES IN BENEFITS FOR FOREIGN SERVICE RETIREES

FIRST: The Tax Reform Act passed last year by Congress eliminated the tax exclusion for sick or disability payments retroactive to January 1, 1976. Therefore, retirees who had not expected to have to pay taxes on a portion (up to $5,200 a year) of their sick or disability pay are now liable for taxes on all money received unless they prove their disabilities are total and permanent. In order to remove the impact of such retroactive legislation, Senator Robert Dole and Representative Robert W. Daniel, Jr. have introduced a bill delaying implementation of this new provision until January 1, 1977. While passage of the bill cannot be assured, taxpayers who might be affected by the Dole/Daniel bill may wish to delay filing their returns until early April to determine whether the bill passes and whether they can claim its benefits.

SECOND: Annuities due retired Foreign Service employees will be increased effective March 1, 1977 as a result of the new law governing the computing and paying of cost-of-living increases. The present base month for payment of c-o-l benefits is May 1976, when the Consumer Price Index was 169.2. The forthcoming increase will be determined by the CPI for December, which is announced in mid-January, and the reading of the November Index indicates that the future increase will be at least 2.7 percent.

AFSA ELECTION NOTICE: 1977 ELECTION OF AFSA OFFICERS AND CONSTITUENT REPRESENTATIVES

The Association's Bylaws provide in Article IX that elections of AFSA officers and constituent representatives will be held each odd-numbered year. Therefore, in compliance with the Bylaws and to conduct this year's elections, the AFSA Board appointed on January 11, 1977, an Elections Committee consisting of: Chairman Leland Barrows (Retired) and Bonnie Bailey (State), Edward Cvetan (State), Michael Dwyre (AID), Wesley Pedersen (USIA) and Samuel Starrett (State).

The new AFSA Governing Board will be installed in office July 15, 1977.

The 1977 Elections Committee has already begun work and has prepared an Election Call which will be issued by the end of January. It will be circulated by individually addressed mailing to all AFSA members at their most recent known address. (The same address which appears on copies of the *Foreign Service Journal*).

The positions to be filled are:

1. The Officer positions to be filled in this election are:

(a) President
(b) Vice President
(c) Second Vice President
(d) Secretary
(e) Treasurer

2. The Constituent Representative positions to be filled are:

(a) State Department Representative (3 positions)

(b) AID Representative (1 position)

(c) USIA Representative (1 position)

(d) Retired Member Representative (2 positions)

(The number of Representatives to which each constituency is entitled is based upon the formula of one Representative for every 1000 members or fraction thereof as of December 31, 1976).

In order to assure a successful election process, the cooperation of all AFSA members, especially keypersons, is necessary. This cooperation should include the following:

(1) Ensure that AFSA has each member's current mailing address. If a member has not recently been receiving copies of the *Journal*, has recently moved, or expects to be in travel status during the next six months, AFSA should be notified with advice on how communications to the member should be addressed;

(2) AFSA keypersons and AFSA members should be alert to notice any AFSA election material which is being misaddressed and should promptly inform AFSA;

(3) Members who do not receive a copy of the election call by March 1, 1977, should assume that their AFSA address is incorrect and alert the AFSA office.

AFSA members assigned in or visiting Washington may visit the AFSA offices (Room 3644 New State and the Third Floor, 2101 E Street) and receive copies of all pertinent documents.

CONTENTS

ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM AND AFSA

Now is a propitious time for real reform in the foreign affairs community: Organizational ineffectiveness has been publicized to such a degree that the public is tired of rhetoric and now expects concrete action. A parallel organization to Common Cause has been created in the field of foreign affairs: New Directions. The new Administration is pledged to a general reorganization of government structures and President Carter has committed himself to certain specific reforms, such as in the appointment of Ambassadors. And finally, AFSA itself is in a period of renewal, able to take the initiative and develop constructive analysis and positive recommendations for action.

In order to undertake this responsibility, AFSA has formed an Organization and Management Committee, chaired by Governing Board Member Paul Ward and including representatives from the State, AID, and USIA Standing Committees and employee groups 2000+, JFSOC and COA.

This Committee prepared a report on AFSA views on reorganization for the Transition Team and at press time was preparing another on a proposed agenda and process for organizational reform for the new State Deputy Under Secretary for Management, Richard Moose.

The Committee plans to hold open hearings in Washington before preparing final recommendations to management. In areas not covered by the provisions of the Executive Order, where management is obligated to consult with AFSA, we will participate in informal discussions with the Administration in our role as the primary professional association in the field of foreign affairs.

The Committee hereby solicits comments from the field on any questions of reorganization and internal management reform. Comments on any issue would be appreciated, but the Committee plans to devote early attention to the issues on the following list:

I. *Organization and Policy*
- — Structure, role and membership of NSC
- — Legislative status of AID
- — Foreign Agricultural Policy (State, AID, USDA)
- — Foreign AID (State, AID, Treasury, USDA)
- — Science, environment, and technology policy (State, AID, Interior, EPA, ERDA, NSF, CEQ)
- — Illegal alien problem (State, INS, Labor)
- — International information and cultural affairs (State, USIA/VOA, AID)
- — International economic policy (State, Treasury)
- — Intelligence (State, DOD, CIA)
- — Arms control and disarmament (State ACDA, DOD)
- — Narcotics (State, AID, DEA, Customs)

II. *Organization and People*
- — AID Career Foreign Service Personnel System
- — Rationalization of personnel system among and within the foreign affairs agencies:
  - — Compensation
  - — Relationship of FS and GS systems
  - — Equitable resolution of FSRU/FAS future
  - — Standards for the use of FSR authority
  - — Status of consular agents
- — Humanization of personnel management within agencies
- — Presidential appointments in the foreign affairs field

III. *Organization and Resource Allocation*
- — Foreign affairs budgeting
- — Staffing of overseas posts

Please address comments to the AFSA Organizational Committee, Room 3644, N.S.

PROPOSED CHANGES IN GRIEVANCE LEGISLATION

The Foreign Service Grievance system was legislated more than a year ago and the new Grievance Board has been in operation for several months. Based on the experience to date (see *FSJ AFSA NEWS* January 1977), AFSA has proposed that the Department of State consider and agree to support three changes in the Grievance legislation as follows: (1) Make selection-out-for-cause subject to the grievance procedures; (2) Provide that if the grievant so requests, hearings before the Foreign Service Grievance Board shall normally be open to the public; and (3) Allow judicial review of agency decision not to reinstate a former officer who had been selected out prior to November 29, 1975.

DATES TO REMEMBER

Foreign Service Day, 1977, sponsored by the Department of State, DACOR and AFSA, is scheduled for Friday, April 22. AFSA is planning a post-Foreign Service Day brunch for Saturday, April 23, at the Foreign Service Club.

LENGTHS OF TOURS-OF-DUTY

An AFSA Committee has been conferring with Management for some time on the question of lengths-of-tours of duty. The negotiations have been complex, and the Committee has sent two telegrams to the field and had constant communication with employees in Washington in order to best reflect the views of all members of the Foreign Service.

Management desires in general to lengthen tours because of budgetary considerations. AFSA desires that any new policy adopted avoid a blanket increase in tour-of-duty. The new policy may provide more senior employees with longer tours at non-hardship posts but should maintain a reasonable balance between hardship and non-hardship postings. However, conferrals have now broken down over the length of tours for senior secretaries. How this issue will be resolved is now under further study.

HEMENWAY ET AL VS AFSA ET AL (Continued)

Since we went to press for the January *FSJ*, the plaintiffs served most of the individual defendants with copies of their original November 12 document and also replied to AFSA's December 2 motion to dismiss.

On January 5, Judge Barrington Parker denied our motion to dismiss "without prejudice to renew." The Judge's ruling does not prevent AFSA from renewing in the future its motion to dismiss, nor does it constitute a judgment on the substantive merits, if any, of the complaint.

The plaintiffs' attorney has now indicated his intention to file an amended complaint, to which AFSA will have 20 days thereafter to reply.

AFSA intends to renew its motion to dismiss at the appropriate time. There is no indication when the Judge will act on that motion.

"L" CONVERSION AGREEMENT REACHED

Following several months of negotiations AFSA and AID have reached agreement on criteria and procedures for conversion of AID's time-limited appointment (Section 625 (d) (2)) appointees to unlimited "career" status. The agreement became effective on January 14, 1977, and supercedes the earlier AFSA/AID accord of April 2, 1974.

The new agreement requires that by April 13, AID convert to career status all "L" employees who meet the criteria established in the agreement and notify in writing any employee not eligible for conversion of the reasons for non-conversion. Criteria which must be satisfied to qualify for conversion are: (a) completion of three years in AID's Foreign Service, 18 months of which must have immediately preceded conversion; (b) satisfactory performance as determined by official records; (c) a continuing requirement for the employee's services as determined by the Agency on the basis of the employee's overall background and experience; (d) demonstrated capacity to function in an overseas environment as evidenced by official records; (e) completion of a full tour of duty of at least 18 months overseas with AID.

In addition, to be eligible for conversion, employees must have a "full foreign service duty" medical clearance and sign a recertification of worldwide availability. The former requirement can be waived by the Director of Personnel and Manpower if the employee's clearance, skills, and requirement for those skills permits an adequate range of possible assignments. In a letter accompanying the agreement, the Agency noted that with regard to medical waivers, the Agency would be as sympathetic and considerate as possible to those employees currently on board and agreed with AFSA that special consideration should be given these employees since the Agency has not offered career status to its foreign service employees during the last few years.

Employees who do not meet the criteria for conversion after three years of service may be continued in limited status at the discretion of the Agency. Those who subsequently satisfy the criteria must be offered conversion within 90 days. Employees who decline conversion are subject to termination at the convenience of the Agency. Employees not selected for conversion have appeal rights under the terms of the agreement. Approximately 270 AID employees currently satisfy the service time requirements of the agreement and will be immediately affected by its implementation.

AFSA trusts that this new agreement will help solve the long-standing, serious personnel problem of some employees being kept on without status for an indefinite number of years.

DO F. S. SECRETARIES AND COMMUNICATORS HAVE A FUTURE?

On September 17, 1976, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel addressed individual letters to all Foreign Service secretaries discussing their promotional opportunities. A similar letter was sent the same day co-authored with the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Communications to all FS communicators. Both letters carried the same message: Because of past mistakes by management, future promotional opportunities for secretaries and communicators are almost nil!

The accuracy of this dire message is confirmed in the 1977 promotion lists just released.

AFSA is distressed by this development which today affects two elements of the Foreign Service and thus threatens the career security of all. Finding a solution to this problem is naturally difficult. Various meetings have been held seeking additional information from all sources. As one means for collecting information, and developing a synthesis of views and preparing for further discussions with management, representatives of the secretaries and communicators have joined to form "The September 17th Group."

This new special interest group is keeping AFSA informed of its progress and looks to AFSA to represent its views before management. AFSA accepts this responsibility.

CHOOSING AMBASSADORS

AFSA's stand on ambassadorial appointments was noted on the editorial page of the *Washington Post* on December 16 with a long quote from the December *FSJ* Editorial. The *New York Times,* on December 18, printed Olcott Deming's statement "Why Not Send the Best as Ambassadors" on the Op-Ed page. Ambassador Deming is chairman of AFSA's Committee on Presidential Appointments.

GALLUP ON JNL. BOARD

Newest member of the *Journal* Editorial Board is Cynthia Gallup, AID. Cindy's association with AFSA now has come full cycle from 1970, when she was a part-time editorial assistant to Shirley Newhall while attending college.

Cindy is a native Kansan whose interest in foreign peoples and cultures began in high school when she spent two summers in Guatemala and Mexico. She attended Kansas University and George Washington University, and graduated from GWU twice with distinction—in 1971 with a Bachelor's in Latin American Studies and in 1974 with a Master's in Anthropology. During graduate school she taught introductory anthropology at GWU and worked as a research assistant at the Smithsonian Institute.

When times were tough in the anthropology business, Cindy traded on the skills learned during her apprenticeship at the *Journal:* in 1974 she served as editor of USAID's weekly bulletin in Turkey, *The Ankara Scene,* and in 1975 was assistant editor of *Devices & Diagnostics Letter,* a weekly trade publication covering the Food & Drug Administration.

Cindy presently is an International Development Intern anthropologist in AID's Latin America Bureau.

RECENT AWARDS FOR FS-ers

Donald S. Brown, Mission Director, AID, Egypt, and **David Shear,** Director of the Office of Sahel and Francophone West Africa, AID, were joint winners of a 1976 Rockefeller Public Service Award for their outstanding work in Redefining the Role of the US in the World Order. The Awards, sponsored by John D. Rockefeller 3rd and administered by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton, are for $10,000 and were presented at a luncheon at the Mayflower Hotel in Washington on December 1.

Kenneth N. Rogers, State Representative on the Governing Board of AFSA, received on January 10 the Award for Valor from the Department of State. Director General Carol C. Laise wrote, "We in the Department admire you for accepting the challenge by going to Angola during difficult times. We are proud of your courageous actions in reporting critical activities from remote areas, helping others escape, and your role in the air evacuation during dangerous circumstances."

F. S. SCHOLARSHIPS

The Oliver Bishop Harriman Foreign Service Scholarships for the academic year 1976-1977 have been awarded to Jocelyn Felicia Moreland, a student at Brown University, daughter of William D. Moreland, Jr., Consul General Retired, and to Michael J. St. Denis, a student at the University of California, Los Angeles, son of John H. St. Denis, FSO currently serving at the Embassy in Seoul.

Attention Former Members of American Women's Club of Geneva, Switzerland

Would like names and addresses of former club members; the Club is planning worldwide activities for next year. If you are in the D.C., Virginia and Maryland areas, please contact Mrs. John Munn, 11022 Marcliff Road, Rockville, Maryland 20852, or phone 897-5072. If you live elsewhere, write directly to the Club, 15 Boulevard Helvetique 1207, Geneva, Switzerland.

Foreign Service People

Deaths

Allen. Ward P. Allen, FSO-retired, died on December 17, in Alexandria. Mr. Allen entered the State Department in 1945 and joined the Foreign Service in 1955, serving at Copenhagen, Guayaquil and Bogota before his retirement in 1974. He also served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs. After retirement he became executive director of the World Population Society. He is survived by his wife, Mildred S., 1220 Shenandoah Road, Alexandria, three daughters, a son, and three grandchildren.

Boardman. Francis Boardman, FSO-retired, died on December 20 in Washington. Mr. Boardman served in ECA, the State Department and the Foreign Service from 1942 to 1960, with assignments in Ankara and Beirut. He had been a contract officer with the Export-Import Bank since his retirement, and an active member of the Middle East Institute, serving on the board of governors for 15 years. He was the author of "Institutions of Higher Learning in the Middle East." Mr. Boardman is survived by his wife, Anne, of 5035 Lowell St., N.W., a daughter, Pamela, of the home address, a sister and two brothers. Contributions in his memory may be made to the Middle East Institute.

French. Mary Stewart French, State Department retired, died on December 23, in Washington. Miss French joined the State Department in 1945 and retired in 1968. For 23 years she was chief of the Voluntary Leaders Program Branch of the International Exchange Service. Miss French was the founder of ANTA, the American National Theater and Academy, in the early 1930s. She is survived by a brother Stewart, of 3900 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, and a sister, Louise Colburn, of Alexandria.

Gist. Justie E. Gist, FSO-retired, died on December 23 in Earlham, Iowa. Mr. Gist entered the Foreign Service in 1945 and served at Warsaw, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Tangier, Nice, Abidjan and Sofia before his retirement in 1966. He then joined the Institute of International Education in New York and served with distinction as a Division Director until mandatory retirement in 1971. He is survived by a son, Robert, of 2600 Hubbell Avenue, Des Moines, Iowa 50317.

Jensen. Mrs. Golda O. Jensen, mother of FSO-retired Olive M. Jensen, died on November 26, in Cocoa Beach, Florida. Mrs. Jensen accompanied her daughter on assignments to the Philippines, the Bahamas and Washington after her husband's death. Miss Olive M. Jensen lives at Hacienda del Mar #560, 1305 S. Atlantic Ave., Cocoa Beach, Florida 32921.

Sanders. Dr. William Sanders, FSO-retired, died on December 5, in Alexandria. Dr. Sanders joined the Foreign Service in 1942, after serving with the Pan American Union, and represented the United States on numerous missions and delegations to the UN, the OAS and NATO. In 1958 he was elected to a 10-year term as Assistant Secretary General of the OAS. Since 1963 he had been president of the Pan American Development Foundation. He is survived by his wife, Elizabeth, 6214 Arkendale Rd., Alexandria, Virginia 22307, two sons, a daughter, a brother, a sister and four grandchildren.

Smith. Schubert E. Smith, FSO-retired, died on November 19, at San Gwann, Malta. Mr. Smith joined the Foreign Service in 1949, after service with the Red Cross and OMGUS; and served at Munich, Stuttgart, Jidda, Frankfurt and Monrovia before his retirement in 1970. He received the superior honor award in 1970. Mr. Smith is survived by his wife, Gillian, of Villa Sol-Y-Aire, Kappara Lane, San Gwann, Malta, G.C.

Meloy. Daniel J. Meloy, FSO-retired and brother of the late Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr., died on January 7, in Yucatan. Mr. Meloy was a specialist in Japanese affairs and spent much of his career in Japan. At the time of his death he was a consultant for a Japanese bank and other Japanese and American firms, in New York. There are no immediate survivors.

Travers. Howard K. Travers, retired Ambassador, died on December 25, in Chevy Chase. Mr. Travers entered the Foreign Service in 1919 and served at Hull, Naples, Palermo, Budapest and Vancouver before his appointment as Ambassador to Haiti in 1951 where he served until his retirement in 1953. He also served as director of the Foreign Service inspection corps. He is survived by his wife, Helen, of 5327 Trent Street, Somerset, Chevy Chase, a daughter, two sons and six grandchildren. The family suggests expressions of sympathy be in the form of contributions to the Dacor Educational Fund.

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