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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

MARCH 1977

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by Barton J. Bernstein

AN EAR FOR AN AFGHAN

by Gordon King

*Also Third World Problems and Assistance from
a Democratic Society and Whole New Game*




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
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COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS

President Carter established on February 3 a Presidential Advisory Board on Ambassadorial Appointments to advise him on the suitability of candidates for ambassadorial posts for which non-career candidates are being considered. This is similar in form to AFSA's own concept of a non-partisan advisory panel to screen out unqualified nominees. The President told the Board he wants to appoint Ambassadors according to merit, not politics, and that he thinks there are now "a few too many" non-career Ambassadors. We couldn't agree more. For the first time, the names of career Foreign Service people will be considered for posts for which non-career people are being considered. Members of the board may not themselves be appointed to an ambassadorial post for at least one year after their own service on the Board, unless the President waives this limitation for stated reasons. The Board's charter provides that in the appointment of its members "knowledge or background in foreign affairs or in matters relating to the Foreign Service will be considered," and there is no doubt of the distinguished foreign affairs backgrounds of some of its members.

The actual composition of the board raises questions about its own objectivity as well as its competence to judge ambassadorial qualifications. Most of its members are Carter campaign veterans, some of whom have already submitted the names of their own Ambassadorial candidates to the President. We believe too many of them lack the foreign affairs background cited in the Board's charter. Out of twenty members, only one had a career in the Foreign Service, and only one has ever actually served as an American Ambassador overseas, the job for which the Board is asked to make recommendations.

We hope that the new Board will limit politics and strengthen the merit and career principles in the Ambassadorial selection process. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that it may become a log-rolling exercise. To enhance the Board's credibility and competence, we have proposed that the President appoint to it five former Ambassadors, career or non-career. We have been assured that our recommendations will be presented to and be considered at the highest levels.

WELCOMING REMARKS AND ADDRESS AT AFSA's NINTH AWARDS PRESENTATION

In a break with tradition, the Awards ceremony was changed from an eighth floor luncheon to a presentation open without charge to all members in the Dean Acheson Auditorium. About 650 attended, four times the usual turn-out for this event wherein AFSA pays recognition to the spirit of initiative and independent reporting and action in our Service. The AFSA President's remarks and Secretary Kissinger's address are abbreviated.

Every year since 1968, the American Foreign Service Association has sponsored the presentation of awards to Foreign Service people "displaying courage in all its dimensions, independence of spirit and dedication to the Service." The awards "are presented to members of the Foreign Service nominated for extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage, and creative dissent." The Christian A. Herter award has been presented since 1969 in memory of the late Secretary of State to senior Foreign Service officers. The William R. Rivkin award is presented in memory of the late Ambassador to Luxembourg, Senegal, and The Gambia to middle-level Foreign Service officers. The W. Averell Harriman award is presented by Governor Harriman to junior officers.

For the first time, one of the awards is not being presented. Only one nomination was received for the junior officer award, and a majority of the judges decided to withhold presentation of the Harriman award. However, we do have a new award to be presented. The newly created Leonard Marks award will be presented by the Leonard Marks Foundation, named for the former director of the United States Information Agency, to a USA officer for "Creativity in Communications."

This occasion has come to symbolize a renewal of the Department's commitment to recognize the right and the duty of its officers to offer independent and sometimes differing policy analysis and recommendations. AFSA, of course, seeks to defend the right of our members to dissent from policy without being victimized in their careers for their dissent. We believe that the exercise of creativity and dissent is good not only for the individual officer, but also for the institution, enabling it to adapt its policies and procedures to change.

Maybe some day our foreign policy institution will work so well that alternative policy recommendations will always be welcome, and this ceremony will become an anachronism. But in the meantime, we would like to offer two suggestions to improve the existing system:

First, dissenting officers should not normally be transferred away from their assignments. No doubt there are occasions on which personal relations between a policy-maker and dissenter have so deteriorated, or the dissenter's credibility or conscience would be so damaged by attempting to execute a policy with which he or she had strongly disagreed, that such a transfer is the only solution. But forced dissent-related transfers are bound to have a chilling effect on creativity within the institution. Second, we believe that policy-making must involve both the decision-makers and the working-level experts, and that the latter should normally be given the policy-relevant information on which useful analysis and recommendations must be based.

We realize that compartmentalization and restriction of such information may be motivated by a desire to avoid

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
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leaks, but we believe that such compartmentalization may not only damage the quality of policy analysis and recommendations, but also create an atmosphere of disaffection in which leaks are more likely. And we recognize that the policy-maker must by definition make policy and therefore we believe that no policy-maker need feel embarrassed simply by public awareness of in-house dissent.

We come now to the introduction of our principal speaker. He needs none, but I am not about to pass up this opportunity.

Even as a private citizen, he had already formed strong views on the problem of bureaucracies in foreign policy. In a 1966 essay he wrote:

"... Decision-making can grow so complex that the process of producing a bureaucratic consensus may overshadow the purpose of the effort... The need to provide a memorandum may outweigh the imperatives of creative thought... The decision-maker will always be aware of the morale of his staff. Though he has the authority, he cannot overrule it too frequently, without impairing its efficiency..."

For the past 40 months, Henry A. Kissinger has been our Secretary of State.

It is not AFSA's place to review our speaker's record in the conduct of foreign policy. But we can say without fear of contradiction that his incumbency has not gone unnoticed. He has been a principal actor during a period of great creativity in American foreign policy. He has been deified, and he has also been severely criticized, but as his term draws to a close, there is forming a bipartisan and public consensus in support of many of his major policy initiatives. He has brought a coherent world view to foreign policy-making and he has articulated to the public what we as career professionals have long understood about American foreign policy—that American involvement in the world is permanent; that our policy must reflect both our national interests and character, as well as our appreciation for those of other nations, and must have a sense of priorities, limits, nuance and timing. He has brought foreign policy-making power back to this building, and demanded that those who have worked with him produce their best, which is the way to institutionalize the role of the Foreign Service and the foreign affairs agencies in foreign policy-making.

There is an old union joke about the local executive committee which sent to the boss, in the hospital, a card which read: "The committee votes, five to three with six abstentions, that you should get well." But we in the AFSA Governing Board have taken a more positive approach. At our January 11 meeting, we voted unanimously to award Secretary Kissinger a lifetime Honorary AFSA Membership. It isn't the Nobel Prize, but should he wish to retain his interest in foreign affairs after he leaves office, he can read the *Foreign Service Journal*, and have lunch at the Club across the street. He also has the right to attend meetings of our Governing Board, which our Members tell us are not without entertainment value.

Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the American Foreign Service Association and at the direction of its Governing Board, I now present to you this Honorary AFSA Membership. With it go our admiration and respect, and our best wishes for the future. Yours, Mr. Secretary, will be a hard act to follow.

Ladies and Gentlemen, it is my personal and professional pleasure to present to you the Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger.

EXCERPTS FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER'S ADDRESS

I know the honor that has been bestowed on me by being given lifetime membership in an organization that its members believe I could never have joined except by Presidential appointment. (Laughter.)

I am honored that I have this opportunity on my last—I suppose my last appearance—I have been making last appearances for the last week—it could be my last appearance in this auditorium as Secretary of State until 1981—(Applause and laughter)—and to share the platform with my good friend, Governor Harriman, who has exemplified the continuity, the vision, and the dedication of our foreign policy.

Now, Abraham Lincoln told the story about the Eastern potentate who asked his wise men to write a statement suitable to anything that might happen anywhere in the world at any time. What they produced was: "This, too, shall pass away." (Laughter.) Evidently that thought comforted Lincoln. No doubt it has been a daily comfort to some of my associates during the past three and a half years. (Laughter.)

If the statement is true, "the one who goes is happier than those he leaves behind," then I do not understand why there are so many smiling faces here. (Laughter.)

For my part, happiness is far from my strongest feeling in leaving the Department.

... I challenged the Foreign Service to do more interpretive reporting, analysis, and conceptual thinking; to clarify rather than compromise policy options in the foreign policymaking process; and to dissent when you differed substantially with the policies we had adopted.

I asked for it, and I got it. From the beginning, it was clear to me that the last of these challenges, at least, would be met with pleasure, with dedication and with enthusiasm.

Thus it is appropriate that my last official public engagement should be a ceremony honoring those who have disagreed with me. And let me say, for the record now, that I forgive them. (Laughter and applause.) Not even the Foreign Service can be right 100 percent of the time. (Laughter.)

In my remarks at the AFSA Awards Ceremony in 1974, I said that I hoped to leave behind a professional service which handled problems as creative opportunities, which has a deep and foresighted perception of the national interests, and the stamina to fight for those at home and overseas.

Today I can look back and say that I believe you have moved substantially toward that goal. . . .

It is no accident that almost all my principal assistants are career Foreign Service officers. I have chosen them because they were the best people available, and because we will never have a professional service if it is not used for all of the positions in the Department.

I strongly support AFSA's attempts to help the President-Elect carry out his commitment to make diplomatic appointments on the basis of merit, and I have no doubt that most of the country's Foreign Service people are the most meritorious, or we do something wrong in our selection process. . . .

I hope that an objective observer, and perhaps even occasionally an AFSA member, will agree that strong foundations for future progress have been put in place in

three central areas—the strength of the great democratic nations, the imperative of global peace, and the cause of cooperative international progress.

The record is one of which you all can be proud. Your role has been, and will continue to be, central and crucial. You share in the achievements of our foreign policy, as well as—I can not really bring myself to say it—since we haven't known it for three years and three months—its failures. (Laughter.) But I leave here with confidence—confidence that America's foreign policy will be in good hands, and that you will give my distinguished successor the loyal and able service which you gave me.

Over the past few years, as Secretary of State, I developed the habit of threatening to resign. I did this essentially as a morale booster (Laughter) for the Department and the Foreign Service, to indicate that every anguish has its terminal point.

Unfortunately, after last November 2nd, I found that the threat had lost its magic. (Laughter.) So now I am warning you that I may be back. (Laughter.)

So I will say farewell and God bless you all. There is much work ahead for this country. Thank you.

Award Recipients:

*Christian A. Herter Award—Thomas D. Boyatt
William R. Rivkin Award—William R. Lenderking
W. Averell Harriman Award—not presented this year
Marks Foundation Award—Gunther K. Rosinus*

Nominations for the 1977 awards are now open and the specifications for these nominations will appear in the April issue.

COMMUNICATION **re:** CONFESSIONS OF A GLOPEE

MICHAEL A. G. MICHAUD

Most of us first heard about the Global Outlook Program (GLOP) in the spring and summer of 1974. As the rumor mill had it, the Secretary of State was concerned about the localitis he found among Foreign Service officers, their special pleading for their countries of assignment, and their inadequate grasp of global issues. Attributing this to regional specialization, he reportedly instructed the Director-General to design a program which would increase the number of inter-regional transfers, broadening the experience of substantive FSOs—particularly political officers.

All of us were aware that regional specialization was a frequent, even normal pattern among FSOs. All of us

Michael Michaud, an FSO, is Deputy Director of the Office of International Security Policy in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. He has served overseas in Dacca, Tehran and Bombay (with USIS) and in the Department in INR, NEA and EA. He has been active in the Secretary's Open Forum Panel and was editor of Open Forum for two years. His most recent piece for the Journal was the book essay, "On Communicating with Aliens."



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knew the various "clubs" in the Foreign Service—the Western European club and its subdivisions, the Soviet and Eastern European specialists, the Arabists, the Chinese and Japanese language officers, the Latin Americanists—and of the near iron grip those clubs had on many positions. We knew of the "shuttle" between the country desk and the capital. And we knew of outrages against the principle of worldwide availability, such as officers who had eight years in London before moving on to Paris, or who spent their entire overseas careers on the Rhine river.

Few of us were inclined to fight this system; better to join it, to seek admission to one of the clubs. Once in, an officer might be assured of access to better jobs, with correspondingly improved prospects for promotion. There were few career rewards for seeing the big picture; bilateralism was rampant. The country desk and the Embassy were seen as the core of the system, where any ambitious political officer would try to be.

There was a new awareness of multilateral and "functional" issues after the oil crisis of 1973-1974. Interdependence became a fashionable word. The Third World was giving us a hard time at the UN. The Law of the Sea negotiations and the nuclear export problem were demonstrating the need for new, globalized specializations. Economic officers, whose fortunes had been rising anyway, found themselves in unprecedented favor. The stage was set for the glopping of regional specialists.


In mid-1973 your humble servant had been a regional specialist (NEA) for 10 years, though not an Arabist. Halfway through a less than satisfying tour on a country desk, on which bilateralism was being carried to an almost ludicrous extreme, I felt the need for a change. Having long argued for a specialization in the Eurasian rimland, I volunteered for EA, calling on country directors at the other end of the south corridor. It was almost alien territory: officers I had never seen, whose names I had never heard, dealing with countries which sometimes seemed to be on another planet. And they looked at me with questioning eyes: why was an NEA specialist asking to leave his bureau? Was his career in trouble? What did he know about East Asia?

By good fortune, a new position was to be created in an EA country directorate at the time of my transfer. So, in mid-1974, I carried my files down the hall to a self-generated broadening experience, coinciding with but not decreed by GLOP.

The first six months in any foreign service job are a time of some uncertainty, as an officer struggles to learn the issues, make his working contacts, and define his role in the pyramid. More so in a new and unfamiliar bureau, and in an office where the workload had increased sharply from an often somnolent past. Only later did I begin to sense a new perspective on issues. The importance of trade became not just a matter for lip service, but a tangible, politicized fact. United States installations became not just a bilateral issue, but part of a network supporting



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the global balance. Allies became not just reminders of the Cold War past and outlets for military sales, but pieces of a global pattern of shared interests and quids pro quo. New issues came to the fore—mineral exporting cartels, nuclear weapon-free zones, multinational corporations. I saw Eurasia from another angle, and found the US position both more complex and more conducive to maneuver than I had imagined. And there were special experiences, doing the US staff work for a trilateral alliance, and helping to establish relations with and policy toward a newly independent country.

EA has its own clubs, of course, and I was never a member. It would have taken more years—or a commitment to long-term language training—to break in. And EA, like other bureaus, has its own problems and its own faults. But I had become intrigued by the experience of variety, and more exposed to functional and multilateral concerns, EB, PM, IO, CU, OES, S/P, L, once little more than acronyms and occasional phone calls, had become real people with useful expertise and meaningful roles. As 1976 dawned, it was time to move on to something new, and perhaps broader in perspective.

So now your scribe is in PM, working on European security, NATO, and space policy. A whole new set of issues and actors to learn; yet they seem to fit more easily in my mind, for the grooves have been widened. Sometimes NEA seems far away, or even my recent bailiwick on the edge of EA. From this new aerie, I am sometimes tempted to raise a tolerant eyebrow at the flapping of certain desk officers over less than vital issues. But then I recall playing that role myself in two

previous incarnations; there, but for a voluntary GLOP, go I.

Enough time has passed now to allow a personal conclusion: that, in principle—and sometimes in practice—a global outlook program is a good idea. But, like every personnel scheme, GLOP is flawed by compromise and inconsistent application. Many FSOs have escaped it entirely; others have quickly sought re-entry into their old bureaus. The clubs still exist, and still have a powerful influence over assignments. There is no sign that glopees will be rewarded for leaving the wombs of their home bureaus; they certainly were not considered “inter-functional” for the infamous 1976 promotion list. As the high-level impetus for GLOP fades from memory, regional specialization will tend to reassert its predominance.

The Foreign Service needs something like GLOP to deal with the future world. But questions must be raised: do GLOP assignments do one's career more harm than good? Are “globalized” officers to be a new source of supply for “program direction” positions, or are they to be the wandering Jews of the system, always a year or two behind on promotions? The rewards must be real to make such a program work; psychic satisfaction is not enough in a depersonalized bureaucracy. The Department must prevent a situation in which glopped officers are perceived as those their regional bureaus want least. And it must convince us that GLOP is not, as one colleague said to the then Director-General in a public meeting in 1974, just another way of treating people shabbily.



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And does not lead to hot dry offices
But is the road of sweet damp autumn
Leaves fading slow, yellow leaves of love
Floating down a clear branch to the Potomac
Leaves falling slowly in a northwest wind.

Luck is the runner doing five miles on the towpath,
Pounding home up the hill from Chain Bridge
Inspired in cell and muscle, sweaty ass
Happy at the breakfast egg, happy in the car pool
Running till the gout gets him good
Or girds to quit a service in small protest
At some ultimate wrong act that we commit,
Proud leaf from a querulous old oak
Floating down the autumn stream to Lethe:
Else plays the foolish constant bird,
The mockingbird that lingers in an icy hedge
With never a gaze for the great wild flock
Southbound above, swimming down the air.

So green gets rare, is humble indoor herbs
And people pale, the careful lawns turn yellow
The autumn's gold all leaks away
And leaves cold limbs and crows against the sky,
The clear unfriendly, high-pressured sky.

O think of our summer love
Below dim elms in flowering streets
Wandering all night in the village
Watching the moon, watching the roaring express-trains
Westbound to the moonlit aspen mountains
With no hate here, only dawn and solace
Following on the acts of our two hearts.

Not pain, but grimaces in offices
Pay the price of the long years in service
We pall and go gray in the face of the winter
But pray for the colors of April,
For the mockingbird that sings all night
In love on my lawn in May.

— Peter Bridges

50 Years Ago in the Journal

March, 1927, "Letter from Mr. Grew"

"I said that while at the present moment we could not expect that all of the higher positions of Minister and Ambassador should be filled from the ranks of the Service, we definitely looked forward to the day in the not too distant future when we should have developed a sufficient number of outstanding officers to justify such a course. For the present we relied upon the application of Napoleon's principle that every private carried a field marshal's baton in his knapsack to encourage every vice consul and young diplomatic secretary to feel that by his own personal efforts he could eventually climb to the very top of the ladder, and that any other system was illogical, wasteful, uneconomical to the country and deadening to initiative, energy and enthusiasm. Those who talked with me afterwards heartily endorsed this principle. As a matter of fact, the reaction of the press of the country, whether pro or anti administration, to ser-

vice appointments to the higher positions in recent years has been wholly favorable. . ."

(From a series of lectures given in principal cities of the south while on a tour to promote "Direct contacts between the Department of State and the American public.")

May, 1927, "Speech By Baron De Cartier De Marchienne"

"The qualifications of a good diplomat are really difficult to define, as is illustrated by the case of the young chap who, in a moment of idleness, went for examination for the Diplomatic Service.

"He flunked completely and was, consequently astonished to receive an appointment to the Service. On expressing his surprise to the examiners they smiled and said: 'Well, of course, we saw that you didn't know anything at all about any of the subjects and you couldn't answer the most elementary questions. Most people in your situation would have found it extremely embarrassing, but you conducted yourself with such absolute aplomb and composure in these trying circumstances that we said at once 'here is the very man for the Diplomatic Service.'"

"We are very often pictured as Sons of Beelzebub and Disciples of Machiavelli — whose very name has become a synonym of duplicity. Even some of the members of our own profession have contributed to this false impression in their anxiety to turn a witty epigram. For example, we often hear quoted Sir Henry Wotton's remark that "An Ambassador is an honest man sent to lie abroad for his country," yet it was Sir Henry himself who advised diplomats always to tell the truth—although he added, cynically, 'for then you will never be believed and will throw your adversaries off the track.'"

(From a speech given at the Foreign Service Luncheon, March, 1927)

COMMUNICATION **re:**

THE DEPARTMENT AND THE PRESS

(From farewell remarks of Department Spokesman Robert L. Funseth, January 18, 1977)

"The relationship between reporters and a Spokesman—between us—is often described as an adversary relationship. That is not my definition, because it suggests incorrectly, I think, the atmosphere of a courtroom and the relationship between plaintiff and defendant . . . Rather, I would describe our relationship for what it really is: simply, a situation in which you as reporters ask the questions, and in which I as Spokesman try to answer them responsively and responsibly. If I was not able to answer your questions, then it was my job to try to get the answer.

"I am especially proud of this briefing room—for what it represents—for the example we try to set—for the reporters who occupy it. There is no other briefing room quite like it in any foreign ministry anywhere in the world. It is for this reason that I have considered it an honor to have had the responsibility to enter this room every day—to try, in response to your questions, to explain American foreign policy to the American people. Those of you who know me, I hope, have come to realize that I have not taken this responsibility or trust lightly and that while I was in this room I tried my best."

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"The security and economic well being of the United States increasingly depend on our full participation in a world in which our interests are intimately bound up with those of other nations."

— Daniel Parker

Third world problems and assistance from a democratic society

BRANDON ROBINSON

Our own security and welfare, and the welfare of other nations, are the main concerns that have guided US foreign assistance since the end of World War II. Helping to raise worldwide standards of living, eliminate hunger and starvation, and reduce the social and economic differences that separate the rich and the poor nations has been repeatedly set forth as an objective by six successive administrations. This broad humanitarian goal has not been viewed as unrelated to our own safety and prosperity. In one way or another, the six Presidents in question and their Secretaries of State have declared that greater equity among nations will increase our national security by strengthening the structure of peace.

What about the American people? They may have doubts about the value of our foreign assistance programs, but they are now much more aware of the Third World and its problems, and of the relevance of these problems to their own society, than they were 30 years ago. The mass media have helped familiarize Americans with the widespread poverty of the southern hemisphere. And as a result of the recent petroleum embargo, the American people have recognized that certain economic interdepen-

dencies are, indeed, global facts of life.^o It seems safe to say that Americans today, as well as their representatives in Congress and the White House, would give sympathetic consideration to proposed changes in foreign assistance policies if such changes appeared to have the potential of accelerating progress in the Third World.

Obviously, before specifying needed changes in foreign assistance we should try to identify the main factors that are holding down the present rates of development. We should make whatever general statements we can about the defects and deficiencies of a process that is supposed to be taking place in more than 100 "less developed" or "developing" countries with radically different histories, traditions, problems, and resources.

Fundamental Conditions of a Successful Development Process

There are three fundamental conditions of a successful development process: 1) sufficient resources; 2) sound policies; 3) effective management and appropriate technical know-how. This is a broad view of the process that is widely shared by the so-called developed countries (DCs) and the so-called less developed countries (LDCs), with an enormous difference in emphasis, the LDCs usually emphasizing resources as the key to development and the DCs usually placing the emphasis on policies, management and technical know-how.

The New International Economic Order (NIEO) demanded by

the Third World calls for radical changes in the terms of trade, reduced consumption in the developed world, and a large consequent increase in the transfer of resources to the developing world. The Third World position is both partial and distorted, but the problem it emphasizes is real. A world in which one billion people are living on less than \$100 per year, and 25 percent of the population is consuming 75 percent of the mineral resources (to use only two of the rather well-known examples) confronts a great social problem. Whether we like it or not, actual and potential global resource flows constitute major parts of this problem. Terms of trade issues, huge differences in national per capita incomes, and limitations in the supply of non-renewable resources are realities which point to the fact that the insufficiency of resources in the Third World is an international as well as a national problem.

Unfortunately, resource shortages are only part of the problem. The LDCs are profoundly mistaken when they assume that the provision of sufficient resources will assure their development. The error of this assumption is demonstrated by the recent production of food. These countries have had the basic resources they need—adequate soil and climate and workers. And yet, according to the World Food Council, one-ninth of the world's population is starving or seriously malnourished. The somber facts in this sector clearly indicate retrogression: the planet's 1972 food production per head was below the 1961-65 level. The

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worldwide failure to increase food production sufficiently, and to hold down population growth, is a policy, management and know-how failure which has taken place in the LDCs.

Similar considerations apply to education and training which need sound policy and good management to develop adequately, and the development of which feeds back into the policy, management and know-how of other sectors. Education is an essentially national enterprise that cannot be steadily sustained by large amounts of imported resources. Many LDCs are right in claiming that their deficiencies in these areas have colonial origins. However, this does not alter the fact that they are weaknesses in policy, management and know-how, and should be treated as such—not as resource insufficiencies. If resources were a sufficient condition for solving development problems, certain OPEC countries that have had large amounts of foreign exchange for decades would not be performing so poorly in the basic areas of agriculture, health, employment, education, and the distribution of income.

In the transactions and interactions among resources, policy, management and know-how, policy has the central coordinating role. Development policy in most LDCs is comparatively unenlightened and uninformed. And this is why LDC policies are so frequently “foreign importations”—imitations, doctrinaire ideas, the latest development fashion or fad. The LDCs have not analyzed their problems properly, and that is why they understand them so poorly. Without better analysis the LDCs cannot achieve significant improvements in policy—a basic contention which will be further explored in the sections that follow.

Inquiry: The Precondition of Fuller Understanding & Improvements in Policy

The policies that have the greatest effects in allocating and utilizing resources, and directly or indirectly regulating human behavior, are the policies adopted by the nation-state. Since policy is predominantly national it should address the issues, histories, traditions, physical, financial and

human resources that vary so greatly from nation to nation, and among regions within nations. The LDCs tend to forget that inquiry into these varying conditions is a prior condition of sound and original policy. Although they would like to shed their “dependency” and obtain the autonomy and freedom that most of the DCs have achieved, they also forget that “dependency” is ultimately intellectual: the inability to observe and analyze for themselves, collecting and interpreting facts, conducting transactions between ideas and data by means of which original policy can be made. Obviously, nations can and should learn from each other, and the fear of exchange is usually a sign of intellectual insecurity. But exchange is not the unthinking transmission of policies between nations with very different conditions. The society that does not continually examine itself is not likely to identify its problems—much less find the solutions to them.

In developed countries inquiry into social phenomena is so very extensive and commonplace that the extent to which analytical outcomes enter into policy tends to be overlooked. In the United States, for example, enormous amounts of data are collected and huge amounts of statistics are continuously displayed in journals, magazines and newspapers. Surveys, opinion polls, interpretative studies and analyses by the academic community, private organizations, state and local governments, federal agencies, Presidential commissions and Congressional staffs are constantly carried out; and the findings that emerge from these activities have widespread effects on the final formulation of policy. In addition, extensive public discussions, disseminated by the mass media, and reflected in elections, are themselves forms of inquiry. In all the developed nations of the western democracies, continuous inquiry into social problems is a fundamental fact of life.

The LDCs are on solid ground when they insist their full freedom depends on development. They are on shaky ground when they declare that larger amounts of resources will, by themselves, assure this development. Without sound policies the development of the Third

World will not proceed at a satisfactory rate.

The Kinds of Inquiry Most Urgently Needed

What kind of inquiry or analysis should the LDCs carry out in order to improve their policies? Since the Third World comprehends over 100 countries with radically different situations, we will specify a limited number of characteristics. In terms of scope, two broad kinds of analyses are required: 1) a comprehensive analysis of the society, usually referred to as a macroeconomic analysis; 2) analyses which focus more intensively on selected key sectors of the society, and their related needs—agriculture, education, health, industry, housing, transportation, for instance.

In terms of method, two other characteristics that are now receiving widespread acceptance can be specified. The analyses should focus on the nation's major and multiple problems and their corresponding objectives (for example, national production, employment and income distribution in the case of a macro-analysis; and food production, rural employment, rural-to-urban migration, nutrition in urban and rural areas, and foreign exchange reserves, in the case of an agricultural sector analysis). Secondly, focusing on various problems/objectives to determine, among other things, actual and potential complementarities and trade-offs calls for utilizing various social science disciplines and achieving collaboration among them.

There are two other basic features. Analysis, whether national or sectoral, must become a continuing process under which the first completed analysis serves as a training experience and produces a set of documented procedures and findings for the second analysis which, when completed, will be updated and refined by the third, and so on. Moreover, the process must be tailored to the country in question, with the first analysis beginning at the level of complexity that is appropriate to that country in the light of its professional expertise, current data collection and processing procedures, etc.

A “least developed” country, for instance, may require a consid-

erable period of preparation and training before it can carry out a macro or sectoral analysis of comparatively limited scope and depth. But since the first completed analysis will be followed by another, and the second by a third, and so on, this will help establish continuity in data collection, analysis, growth in understanding, and improvement in the formulation of policy that is, at present, so seriously lacking in most nations of the Third World.

Foreign Assistance: Needed Changes in Priorities and Procedures

Increasing the Amounts of Resources Transferred

In "Ideals and Realities," an article by Abdus Salam which appeared in *The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* of September, 1976, the NIEO is summarized as a call for: 1) a worldwide commitment to banish poverty and disparities; 2) just relations between the prices of raw materials and the prices of manufactured goods; 3) Third World access to science and technology; 4) an end to wasteful consumption, particularly with respect to food and armaments. The United States, Salam points out, is presently dedicating around .25 percent of its GNP to foreign assistance—an allocation which he compared to Sweden's .72 percent and the 1 percent originally proposed by the UN as a target. By placing the entire emphasis on the transfer of resources, and on "access" to science and technology, and by ignoring the key problems of policy, management, and know-how, NIEO provides a very partial and distorted picture of requirements. Nevertheless, the NIEO highlights a major problem that should not be ignored.

As suggested before, the level of resource transfers required under foreign assistance programs will depend partly upon alterations in the worldwide resource flows resulting from agreements concerning tariffs, trade and disarmament. Worldwide military expenditures, according to Salam, were \$245 billion in 1973 (an amount greater than the GNP of Africa and South Asia). Reductions would liberate resources some of which could be used for development purposes. As Salam indicates, the Third World

share of military expenditures increased from 6 percent to 17 percent between 1955 and 1975—another illustration of the close connection between security and development, and of the fact that reductions in military expenditures also depend on curbing national aggressiveness in the Third World. As important as the SALT negotiations may be, they are obviously not the only negotiations that will affect reduction in armaments and the liberation of resources for development.

In the 30 years following World War II our planet has become more interdependent and, in many ways, more pluralistic. The colonial system has been dismantled, and now there are over 100 LDCs with one-half of the planet's population and only 14 percent of the planet's product. These countries are properly seeking the development without which they cannot obtain true national independence. In pursuing our 200 years-old ideal of freedom and justice for all in today's pluralistic world, we should now begin to increase our assistance. And we should control distribution of the funds we provide in the effort to make our assistance more effective, and to assure that it is not employed to curtail freedom, nor to endanger the peace.

Contributing to LDC Improvements in the Formulation of Policy

As previously suggested, foreign assistance entities should provide assistance to the LDCs in establishing the processes of inquiry on which policy improvements depend. Such inquiries would be carried out by the developing country itself; they would focus on the country's major problems, and take into account its main values and objectives. Moreover, specification of the procedures employed, and use of the findings in the formulation of policy, would establish fuller and more objective criteria for the transfer of resources.

Recent experiences of AID's Latin American Bureau indicate that the LDCs will welcome assistance in establishing inquiries that will have the effect of strengthening the national decision-making process. These experiences also serve to emphasize the importance of recognizing that analytical projects are multi-year projects which can-

not be subordinated to the annual loan process. In other words, an analytical project should be viewed as a multi-year technical assistance project that has two basic purposes: 1) helping the developing country produce a full-scale analysis that may bring about fundamental changes in policies and resources allocations; 2) helping the country establish a process of inquiry under which succeeding and expanded analyses will be carried out unilaterally.

Contributing to LDC Improvements in Management and Know-how

We have made great efforts during the last 30 years to help LDCs improve their management and know-how. In retrospect this is not surprising. Management and know-how are in the American grain. We are by nature dedicated to practice, to the perfecting of technique, and to working at the grass roots level. In our first enthusiastic and optimistic response to the challenge of worldwide development we began placing our citizens in villages abroad to teach the inhabitants how to grow hogs, establish cooperatives, distribute the mail, drill wells, change their ways of hoeing the ground, and so on. After a few years we realized that the indiscriminate task we had set ourselves was too vast to be feasible. There were too many countries, too many villages, too many techniques, and too many US citizens abroad. We sharply reduced our technical assistance and partly supplanted it with the training of foreign technicians and educators in US universities and other institutions.

The developing countries have not yet found the right way to determine which are the specialized technical knowledges and skills they need most urgently. Nevertheless, certain procedures and criteria for establishing priorities can now be recommended. For instance, the LDCs should realize they are much more likely to succeed in persuading the developed world to increase the transfer of resources if the LDCs begin improving their policies. Since most LDCs are not yet able to carry out the inquiries required for improving these policies, technical assistance

Continued on page 30

Money alone sets all the
world in motion. — Publilius Syrus, Maxim 656

Whole New Game

What Floating Exchange Rates Mean for the US Economy . . . and for the Foreign Service

JOHN H. PENFOLD

The demise of the Bretton Woods international monetary system is of fundamental importance to United States foreign policy.* Policies which continue to be based on the political and bureaucratic inertia and the conventional economic wisdoms which developed under the Bretton Woods system may produce unintended and costly results.

The Bretton Woods system and the importance of its demise can be discussed in terms of the three separable phenomena: 1) The Bretton Woods system gave financial independence and freedom to US foreign policy and removed resource constraint, thereby allowing short-term political and public rela-

tions factors to dominate policy; 2) The chronic balance of payments problem that was built into our thinking and our policy was a product of the Bretton Woods system, and has disappeared along with the old monetary order; 3) The overvaluation of the dollar created incentives that had a profound impact on the world and US economics, and the absence of these incentives will be equally profound.

The Bretton Woods System and Resource Constraint

When the Bretton Woods international monetary system was adopted the US became the world's central bank, and like other central banks was given the power to create international money. The international money was the US dollar. The reason international money is necessary is quite simple—it is easier to conduct international business in a single currency with a fixed value than to use all of the world's currencies whose values constantly change. Gold would have been preferred by

many to be the international money but there was not enough of it, and gold had to be dug out of the ground, while dollars could simply be printed. Moreover, under the Bretton Woods system nations agreed to fix the prices of their currencies. To fix the price of anything, you need a unit of value: dozens of apples, ounces of gold, or numbers of clam shells. Moreover, you must hold some gold or apples or whatever is used as the unit of account in order to guarantee the fixed price, because the way to fix a price is to be ready to trade the gold or apples at the price which has been fixed. Since there was not enough gold, apples rot, and clam shells are not valued, the dollar played the role of the unit of value. This meant that the dollar became the primary international reserve asset. In order for the United States to be the world's central bank and for the dollar to be the world's money and reserve asset it was necessary that the dollar play with rules different from those which all other currencies had to

**The 1944 Bretton Woods (New Hampshire) agreement set up a system of relatively fixed exchange rates, with most currencies pegged, in effect, to the dollar.*

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follow. The dollar was the only currency that had to be convertible to gold at a fixed price. When France came to us with dollars, we were obligated to buy them by selling France some of our gold at a price agreed to at Bretton Woods. In this way countries could hold dollars in their reserves and use them for trade at no risk to themselves, for they were as good as gold. This role which the dollar played gave the United States the ability to create more almost costlessly. The United States or any other country can always print all the money it might want, but does not do so because the indiscriminate printing of money is quite obviously inflationary. If a central bank doubles the amount of money and the amount of goods and services remain the same, prices are very likely going to double. This is not cost-free creation of money. However, if citizens should stuff all the new money into their mattresses, neither depositing it in banks nor spending it, then the money will have been created almost costlessly. (And rather superfluously.) This is what happened to many of the US dollars created for the world's economy. When countries built up their international reserves, it was somewhat like stuffing the dollars into a mattress. And when Germany used dollars to buy something from England and England from Canada, etc., it was like taking the dollars out of the mattress to play monopoly—the dollars were used but not in the US economy to buy US goods. The dollars were spent originally by the United States, thereafter they did not return to the United States to demand either gold or goods and services. They came back of course (physically they never really left) but only to demand other pieces of paper—dollar bonds or the like.

The United States had a great thing going. It could spend a certain amount of dollars each year which did not come back to collect in gold or goods. Moreover when foreign central banks used the dollars to buy US Treasury bonds they, in effect, financed US federal budget deficits. Actually the United States spent most of these dollars in the form of economic and military aid, for paying the costs of war, or stationing troops abroad, so

that there was not a massive resource transfer from the poor rest of the world to the rich United States. But then neither was our foreign policy the burden we've come to believe.

As the world's economies grew, the need for dollar reserves grew and as the world's economy expanded so did the need for international money. This yearly growth in the demand for dollars meant that the United States could print a certain amount of dollars each year with which to pay for war, foreign aid, imports or foreign investments, and these dollars never came back to demand US resources. Had the dollar not played this role, United States foreign policy would have been quite different. The US could not have written so many checks, stationed so many troops, fought so many wars, ignored so many trade barriers. US foreign policy had a printing press and operated with a margin within which decisions could be made without worrying about their economic content or costs.

The amount of dollars involved is not trivial. Some 150 to 180 billion dollars* were spent by the United States between 1948 and 1972 that were never used by foreigners to claim US resources. These dollars were simply created. The amount exceeded all US bilateral and multilateral and military assistance minus repayments during the period 1946 to 1972, including the Marshall Plan.

US foreign policy did not face resource scarcity, and it is resource scarcity that causes economic behavior, not greed or any other variable or human characteristic. People behave in an infinity of ways for

an infinity of causes, but in mass the changes in direction of the behavior of economic-related institutions are determined by resource scarcity. In the same way that a 100 percent tariff always leads to a 100 percent non-economic allocation of resources, so a foreign policy that does not cost or cause immediate economic pain will consume the cost-free margin with non-economic allocation of foreign policy resources. If the Boston Celtics are pitched against high school teams, they will play in a way that could not be used successfully against even a tenth-rate pro team. Similarly, policy will get sloppy if it is not disciplined by a resource-scarce playing environment.

The United States foreign policy system simply reacted to political and public relations concerns, and the economic interests were not sufficiently affected to cause the apparatus systematically to look at the costs and benefits or economic implications. This allowed a move toward greater political sensitivity and away from more narrow national economic sensitivity. Unfortunately, political issues are more often than not laggard reactions to economic factors, often with fairly large lags, so that a highly politically sensitive foreign policy with little economic input is a policy concerned with the past. Moreover, political focus with little or no economic content tends toward a preoccupation with ephemeral public relations concerns because these are more immediate and more easily understood. And while politics and political factors (it is to be hoped, not public relations) always dominate the short-term, our long-term strength is rooted in the health of our economy and in the power of our market and our technology to cause others to play our game.

As a result of the lack of resource scarcity—the lack of a disciplined playing environment—US policy was sometimes conducted, particularly in the Third World, as if we were running for elective office. FSOs (not to blame or credit the Foreign Service for basic foreign policy, but we do adapt marvelously), with surprisingly little embarrassment, wrote copiously in options papers about essentially short-term public relations concerns and allotted little space to

**From 1948 to 1972, the foreign exchange component of all international reserves grew from \$13.4 billion to \$118 billion, an increase of \$104.6 billion of which 90 percent were dollars or Eurodollars. Moreover, world trade grew from total world CIF imports of \$51 billion in 1948, to \$325.8 billion in 1972. Assuming that only three-quarters of the transactions were in dollars, and that the velocity of circulation was three or four, some 50 to 70 billion more dollars could be spent by the United States to go from country to country without coming back to demand US resources. The Eurodollar plays a role similar to that of reserves, so that some 50 billion Eurodollars, minus 20 billion already counted in reserves, divided by two, to eliminate autonomous Eurodollar creation, adds another 15 billion in dollar claims built up abroad that were not used to demand US resources.*

substantive interests. Of course public relations concerns can be important because minor PR errors or insensitivity can become catalysts for real problems, but unless such concerns are given importance by their context, they should not substitute, or be traded off, for substance. The clever FSO, however, was one who could think of numerous subtle political (public relations) reasons why something should or should not be done. It was not pointed out often enough why the disfavor, favor, irritation, or whatever was to be avoided, or sought, was of other than transitory and minor interest to the United States. Seldom were probabilities discussed or weights placed, because officers did not have to think in terms of costs and benefits. Subtly clever thinking was far more career-rewarding than analytical thinking. To many Bretton Woods Foreign Service officers the world was a series of exposed nerves divorced from economics or even history, and diplomacy became a directionless short-term game of avoiding these sensitive exposures.

Chronic Balance of Payments Problem and Bretton Woods

When foreign central banks and the world's traders held significantly more dollars than the amount of gold in Fort Knox, it became clear that an instability had been built into the Bretton Woods system. All of these dollars were like checks written against our gold, so that the larger the world's trade and reserves became, the less credible the total gold reserve backing for the dollar. More importantly, as the total amount of dollars spent by the United States abroad exceeded the total amount of dollars needed by foreigners for buying US goods, for trading with other countries, or for holding as reserves, foreigners naturally wanted to spend the excess dollars on the only thing left, i.e. US gold. We usually talked them out of cashing their US dollars for US gold, but the threats and the machinations we had to go through were the chronic balance of payments problem that has so branded our policy and our thinking.

This chronic balance of payments problem has disappeared along with the Bretton Woods system. Now the value of the dollar is

determined by supply and demand, it floats. The dollar is not backed by gold but by US goods and services, and if foreigners have more dollars than they want to spend on US goods they either have to hold them (a dirty float) or allow the price of the dollar to change until the amount of dollars abroad is just right. Nevertheless we continue to rationalize export promotion, tying of AID, and protection of our economy, because of a non-existent balance of payments problem. With flexible exchange rates

**"This was the fatal
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and the rest of the
world would not
revalue."**

an AID grant or loan must eventually cause US exports to expand or imports to decline because the transaction will change the price of the dollar. Similarly, an export stimulated by export promotion simply acts, by changing the price of the dollar in terms of foreign currency, to reduce other exports or stimulate US imports by exactly the same amount. A few dirty floats here and there do not alter the significance of the basic movement away from fixed exchange rates. This does not mean we should not promote exports; on the contrary, export promotion is an effective way to stimulate the most efficient and highest-paying sectors of our economy. But export expansion must be accompanied by an equivalent increase in imports by reducing protective barriers, so that total two-way trade grows, thus stimulating a more efficient allocation of the world's resources. The stimulation of two-way trade will cause non-inflationary growth in the United States and all trading economies. Expanding trade should be one of the priority foreign policy goals. It is through trade that Third World economies will grow healthy and it is through balanced growth that moderate fac-

tions will surface and become strong.

The Overvalued Dollar and a New Structure of Incentives

The means by which the world accumulated the dollars it needed was for the United States to run a balance of payments deficit, to always spend more abroad than it earned. The United States could do this through policy, i.e., foreign aid, etc., or by having an overvalued dollar or both. In fact US deficits were sustained by both an overvalued dollar and by spending policies. Were there no wars, no US troops abroad, no foreign aid, the dollar in the '50s and '60s would have had to be seriously overvalued to cause the required amount of dollars to flow abroad. As the balance of payments problem became chronic, with the world holding more dollars than it wanted, the appropriate policy would have been for the United States to spend much less abroad, or for the price of the dollar to change so that it was no longer overvalued. But these were the days of hyperactive political foreign policy on the one hand, and on the other, there was an additional flaw in the Bretton Woods system, the flaw that proved fatal.

As long as inflation in the United States had been slightly less than or equal to that in the major economies of the world, countries could maintain the prices of their currencies at appropriate levels by devaluing occasionally. Once US inflation began to exceed inflation in some of the major economies, however, the character of the problem changed. Countries will devalue because devaluation expands economic activity, but they are reluctant to revalue because revaluation contracts an economy. This was the fatal flaw in the Bretton Woods system. The United States could not devalue because of the role the dollar played, and the rest of the world would not revalue. This caused the dollar to become ever more seriously overvalued. A seriously overvalued dollar created huge and pathological distortions in the world's economy.

An overvalued dollar meant a dollar could buy more abroad than in the United States. Imports

Continued on page 32

"Guns are left to do what words
Might have done earlier, properly used."—John Waller

The Policy of Risk: Crossing the 38th Parallel and Marching to the Yalu

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

"Every strategic and tactical movement . . . has been in complete accordance with United Nations resolutions and in compliance with the directives under which I operate, every step having been previously reported and fully approved. I have received no suggestion from authoritative source that in execution of its mission [I] should stop at the 38th Parallel or Pyongyang, or at any other line short of the international boundary. [One cannot] attribute any degree of responsibility for the onslaught of the Chinese Armies to the strategic course of the campaign itself. [Their] decision . . . to wage war against [us] could only have been a basic one, long premeditated and carried into execution as a direct result of defeat of their satellite North Korean armies."

General Douglas MacArthur,
November 30, 1950

[It is incorrect] that Chinese Communists onslaught . . . was merely responsive to imagined threat presented by United Nations offensive. This theory doubtless advanced in part as result [of] natural human tendency when faced by unpalatable reality and hard decision to find formula reducing situation to more comfortable dimensions and relieving one's self of need [to face] hard facts.

Dean Acheson, (telegram)
December 7, 1950

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"[It is] an entirely new war against an entirely new power," General Douglas MacArthur, American and United Nations commander, declared in early December 1950, after 250,000 Chinese troops attacked UN forces in Korea. MacArthur's earlier forecasts that the war would be "over by Christmas" had abruptly turned sour. Suddenly there was desperate talk of using atomic weapons, or of withdrawing, or of seeking a cease-fire. The Korean war, which the Truman administration had entered to save both Europe and Asia, had become a bloody debacle that threatened "free world" alliances and provoked rancorous debates in the United States.

In examining the causes of this debacle, policy makers and most scholars have blamed MacArthur, and either exempted the Administration or criticized it for failing to restrain his recklessness. Such emphasis on MacArthur neglects a mass of painful evidence: The Administration initiated most, and endorsed all, of the critical decisions that led to the crisis. It shaped the policy of crossing the 38th parallel and expanding the war aims from *status quo ante* to unification of Korea. It ordered the march to the China border. The Administration, along with MacArthur, misinterpreted China's repeated warnings of intervention as bluffs or blackmail. Even after China's small intervention of October 24-November 7, the Admin-

istration still approved of plunging on to the Yalu, even against Chinese troops. It was a strategy conceived in hubris, not desperation, leading ultimately to tragedy.

America Rejects A Settlement

In July 1950, with American forces struggling at the southern end of Korea, both the British and Indian governments, fearing escalation of the war, had tried to arrange peace settlements. As an ally, Britain worried also that America might get too bogged down in Asia to resist possible Soviet challenges elsewhere—Iran, Yugoslavia, Greece, or Germany.

President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State Dean Acheson rejected the proposed terms for a settlement, which included admission of the People's Republic of China (PRC) to the United Nations. Such a concession, Acheson explained, would "whet Communist appetites and bring on other aggressions elsewhere."

The British government complained that the United States was foolishly assisting Stalin by helping him isolate the PRC. Probably Britain was correct that the Administration was missing an important opportunity to weaken the strained Sino-Soviet alliance, which Acheson himself had recently argued might crack under the impact of Soviet imperialism against China.

Both Britain and India failed to

recognize the powerful constraints created by American public opinion: Even if the Administration had wanted this settlement, many Republicans and some Democrats would have pilloried Truman and Acheson for "selling out" Chiang Kai-shek and for "appeasing" aggression. The war was still popular in America, for the casualties were low and the cause seemed just. With congressional elections near, and the Administration under fierce attack for the "loss" of China, how could Truman have justified such an agreement? For him and Acheson, the constraints of domestic opinion reinforced their own inclinations—no reward for aggression.

The Administration's analysis also reinforced other needs—a continuing war justified the increased appropriations that Acheson wanted for the rearming of America and Western Europe. Contrary to some analysts, the Administration did not cynically reject a settlement because it would impede rearmament. But rejection, though primarily for other reasons, also strengthened the case for rearmament. The Korean situation, as Acheson explained on July 17, "made [rearmament] all the more important. . . ."

Crossing the 38th Parallel: New War Aims

In mid- and late July, the Administration was not interested in proposals for a cease-fire or settlement, but was already looking forward to victory in the South. Some questions about future policy were already clear: Should MacArthur halt at the 38th parallel? Or should he cross the parallel and even march all the way to the Yalu to defeat the rest of the North Korean army? Should the United States (and the UN) expand the war aims to include unification of Korea? What would be the likely reactions of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China? At what point, if there were threats or armed intervention, should the United States modify her strategy and goals?

Pressure was building to cross the parallel and unify Korea. Some prominent officials in State and some Republican leaders were pushing for unification by force. They received support from

MacArthur, who, even with his forces on the defensive, was savoring the same prospect. "I intend to destroy and not [merely] to drive back the North Korean forces," he told two members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). MacArthur's expectations and hopes could be translated, easily, into political pressure on the Administration.

Sections of the State Department, George Kennan lamented, feared that restoration of the status quo would leave South Korea defenseless before a future North Korean attack. Kennan warned instead of the military danger of advancing beyond the parallel: "We would be getting into an area where mass could be used against us and where we would be distinctly at a disadvantage." Crossing the parallel, he feared, might frighten the Russians into entering the war, or even introducing "other forces which would be nominally Chinese Communist forces," to stop MacArthur from moving toward "the gates of Vladivostok." Within State, Kennan found support from the Policy Planning Staff, including Paul Nitze, its director and chief author of National Security Council (NSC) document 68.

They met implicit opposition from Acheson, and strong opposition from Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, John Allison, director of the office of North Asian affairs, and John Foster Dulles, special ambassador and a prominent Republican. Crossing the parallel was not very risky, they concluded, because they did not anticipate Chinese or Soviet intervention—precisely the issue raised by Kennan. Secretary Acheson allowed Warren Austin, American ambassador to the UN, to announce on August 17 that Korea could not survive "half slave and half free." It was probably a trial balloon to test the winds of international sentiment, especially in the Communist camps.

American leaders could not resist the tasty prospects of defeating North Korea, reuniting the country, and winning a dramatic victory for America and the "free world." The triumph would dramatically punish aggression, refurbish American prestige and power, delight allies throughout the world, and emphasize the success of collective security in the UN. Having seized

this opportunity for "liberation," the Administration could quash GOP charges of "appeasement" and atone for the "loss" of China. How could the GOP then question the loyalty or courage of Truman and Acheson? They would lead America in the continuing struggle against Communism.

Liberation of Korea was part—not an essential part—of Acheson's assertive foreign policy: larger military budgets for the United States and European allies, the rearmament of Germany, a peace treaty with Japan plus bases there, and assistance to France to put down the revolution in Indo-China. Unification of Korea would be a valuable triumph. It would weaken Communist morale, protect and expand markets for Japan, and remove the threat of a partly Communist Korea aimed at Japan, the linchpin of American policy in the Pacific. In Asia and Europe, according to Acheson's strategy, Communism would be halted, sometimes even rolled back.

Would China or Russia block this strategy in Korea? Acheson judged that the Soviets would probably not intervene in the war, and he was sure that China would not. His analysis of China's actions was a curious combination of hopeful assumptions producing unwarranted conclusions. He assumed that Russia had exclusively sponsored the North Korean attack and therefore that China had no stake in defending North Korea or stopping the United States from uniting Korea. For Acheson, the great threat to China was Russian imperialism, as he told the Chinese. "It would be sheer madness," he confidently announced on September 10, for China to enter the war to save Soviet interests. The Chinese would antagonize "the free nations who are inherently their friends, . . . as against this [Soviet] imperialism." Ten days earlier, Truman had publicly offered the same analysis while trying to assure Mao about American intentions: "We hope . . . that China . . . will not be misled or forced into fighting against the American people, who . . . are their friends." Strangely, this counsel conflicted with the President's private assurances that the "so-called Communist Chinese Government is nothing but a tool of Moscow."

On September 11, on recommendations from the JCS and NSC, Truman tentatively approved the new policy—crossing the parallel and unifying Korea. The final NSC paper (81/1) was a characteristic bureaucratic effort, hedged and turgid. Its central message was that the United States should unite Korea if the UN agreed and if neither Russia nor China intervened militarily or gave an indication of intervening. “It is unlikely,” concluded NSC 81/1, “that the Soviet Union will passively accept [this],” and it “may” intervene militarily, or (though “politically unlikely”) have China intervene, or offer a settlement before UN forces cross the parallel.

In the “unlikely contingency” that neither China nor the Soviet Union “indicates . . . an intention to prevent” UN occupation before MacArthur’s forces reach the parallel, then, NSC 81/1 stated, “there would be some reason to believe that the Soviet Union has decided to follow a hands-off policy, even at the expense of [losing] North Korea. Only in this contingency could the UN ground forces . . . operate in or . . . occupy North Korea without greatly increasing the risk of general war.” That risk would decrease, but not disappear, if only ROK forces operate in North Korea; certainly, only they should operate in the northernmost areas bordering Manchuria and Russia.

The message was, in summary, that there was danger, that prediction was difficult, that Communist intervention was likely before the UN forces reached the parallel, that if it did not occur the risk of general war was lower, that Communist intervention might still occur, that American troops should probably not cross the parallel, and that only ROK forces should operate in the far north. In short, caution and boldness, as well as luck, in some ideal amalgam, were necessary.

Despite NSC 81/1’s conclusion that crossing the parallel was a dangerous gamble, Truman and his close advisers persuaded themselves that the risk was low and precautions would avoid disaster. They agreed on the crossing, according to a summary of the 15th, if there was “no indication or threat

of entry of Soviet or Chinese elements *in force*” (emphasis added). Two weeks later, on the 27th, the JCS sent MacArthur the final orders, including a newly phrased contingency—provided “there has been no entry into North Korea by *major* Soviet or Chinese forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter our operations militarily in North Korea” (emphasis added).

By reducing the warning about “elements *in force*” to “*major* forces,” the order of the 27th had chipped away at some of the caution proposed on the 11th and 15th. The order of the 27th eliminated the suggestion of NSC 81/1 that only ROK forces should cross the parallel. All that remained of that precaution was the “matter of policy,” also recommended in NSC 81/1, that only ROK forces should operate in the northernmost areas bordering China and Russia. Amid the exultation created by MacArthur’s stunning victory in the South, the caution, confusion, and fear expressed in NSC 81/1 had dwindled by the time that the order, approved by Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, was issued to MacArthur.

MacArthur was a vainglorious, strong-minded, arrogant general in charge of a delicate mission, requiring tact, caution, and trust. Few generals were less qualified by temperament and experience, which Administration leaders both knew and preferred not to worry about. They knew that they could not comfortably afford the political price of replacing him. But there did not seem to be any need to do so. They had come to expect an easy victory, concluded that Chinese or Russian entry was unlikely, and so MacArthur did not seem dangerous. After his recent dramatic victory in the south, few questioned his ability to lead America to another triumph. Nor did they even closely control his plans, though, as a matter of course, the JCS did review his plan, filed in late September, for his march to victory. This plan met their expectations, and even included a provision that only ROK troops would operate in the northern regions near the border.

In the early stages, the Truman-Acheson strategy for unification worked well. MacArthur,

as directed, broadcast his order on October 1, requiring North Korea to surrender and hinting at unification of the country under UN auspices. The same day, ROK troops crossed the parallel. As part of the strategy, the Administration, assisted by Britain and other allies, secured from the UN General Assembly, on October 7, a resolution calling for “all appropriate steps” for the unification of Korea, thereby implicitly sanctioning the crossing of the parallel by American forces twelve hours earlier. (A few days before, Secretary Marshall explained to MacArthur, the Administration did not want the UN to face the issue of formally endorsing the crossing but would prefer “to find you have found it militarily necessary to do so.”)

Disregarding China’s Warnings

The United States and her UN allies had disregarded China’s repeated warnings that she would enter the war if the United States crossed the parallel. For China’s leaders, America’s actions, not her words, would be the guarantor of China’s safety. Why trust the United States—which had again intervened in the Chinese civil war to support Chiang—if American troops eliminated the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and approached China’s border? Why believe America’s promises not to attack the PRC when the Secretary of the Navy spoke of preventive war, MacArthur embraced Chiang, and America gave Formosa military aid? Was there not a larger strategy of rolling back Communism by force—in Indo-China, in Korea, and ultimately in China?

Through July and most of August, China had been cautious in her pronouncements on the war; she had not implied that she would send troops. On August 26, however, just nine days after Austin had spoken of unifying Korea, a leading Chinese periodical (*World Culture*) warned, “American imperialism [by] invading Korea, . . . seriously threatens the security of China in particular.” On September 22, when there were indications that American troops might enter North Korea, China promised “always [to] stand on the side of the Korean people.” Two days later Chou En-lai warned that

America was spreading "the flames of war . . . in the East [and that the] General Assembly [if it remains] pliant to the manipulation of the United States, . . . shall not escape . . . responsibility for . . . war . . . in the East."

These veiled public warnings did not commit China to any particular action; they were little more than hedged hints that China might intervene. Already assured that the danger was small, American leaders saw little reason to worry, even after September 25, when the warnings became forceful. That day, General Nieh Yen-jung, acting chief of staff of the Chinese army, informed K. M. Panikkar, the Indian ambassador, that, in Panikkar's words, China "did not intend to sit back . . . and let the Americans come to our borders 'We know what we are in for, but at all costs the American aggression has to be stopped. The Americans can bomb us, they can destroy industries, but they cannot defeat us on land.'"

If taken alone, this private warning might reasonably have lacked credibility to American leaders. But on the 30th, the day before ROK troops would cross the parallel, Chou En-lai declared publicly that China "will not stand aside" if the North is invaded. Two days later, at midnight, he summoned Panikkar to a special meeting to tell him, in the latter's words, "there were occasions when peace could only be defended by determination to resist aggression. If the Americans crossed the 38th Parallel, China would be forced to intervene." When Panikkar asked whether China would intervene if only the ROK crossed the parallel, Chou En-lai "was emphatic: The South Koreans did not matter but American intrusion into North Korea would encounter Chinese resistance." China had defined the *casus belli*.

What effect did these escalated warnings have on American policy makers? Almost no impact. Despite the cautions in NSC 81/1 only three weeks before, American leaders remained sure that China was bluffing. They had, in effect, revised their own standards for caution and now required more than a statement from China of intention to intervene. They were sure that China would not enter the

war. Perhaps the reason was, as an unidentified American official explained, that if China had been sincere, she would have entered the war earlier, when the United States might have been pushed off the peninsula. In October, according to this analysis, it was too late.

Acheson and Truman easily dismissed Chou's midnight warning, because they neither trusted Panikkar, whom they judged pro-communist, nor the Indian government, because of its neutralism. "Panikkar had in the past played the game of the Chinese Communists fairly regularly," later wrote Truman, "so his statement could not be taken as that of an impartial observer. It was a bluff to block the UN resolution on unifying Korea," Truman and Acheson concluded. In his memoirs, Acheson later wrote, Chou's warning was "not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, [it was] not an authoritative statement of policy."

Even though American intelligence estimated that China had deployed between 250,000 and 450,000 troops in Manchuria, neither the Administration nor the intelligence agencies foresaw a Chinese attack. The CIA based its conclusion on military capacity: China lacked the essential air and naval support, probably would not receive such assistance from Russia, and therefore understood that intervention would be suicidal. Acheson and others added a familiar argument: China had no reason to intervene, since she was not endangered by American actions or plans. They assumed that China was confident of American restraint—the faith that Acheson, Marshall, and Truman possessed.

The JCS did inform MacArthur of Chou En-lai's warnings, as well as some others passed on by foreign embassies with staffs in China. And the JCS, strangely, modified MacArthur's orders by *expanding* his discretion. Earlier, he had been directed to conduct operations in the north "provided . . . there has been no entry by major Chinese or Soviet Forces . . ." The new order allowed him "to continue the action as long as, in *your judgment*, action by forces now under your command offers a *reasonable chance* of success" (emphasis added). MacArthur was empowered to de-

fine, "unilaterally, "reasonable chance." Because so many documents remain classified, we cannot determine why Marshall, and presumably Truman and Acheson, sanctioned this expansion of discretion.

They did not fear a wider war nor MacArthur's recklessness in Korea. Rather, they worried about his attempts to redirect American policy in Asia, to plead his case in America, and to injure the Administration politically at home. To restrain MacArthur from such ventures and to share in the glory of his recent military triumphs, President Truman flew halfway around the world, to Wake Island, to meet with his powerful general, for whom, according to a presidential assistant, Truman had "little regard or respect." "The President feels," wrote the assistant, "that MacArthur is a supreme egotist, who regards himself as something of a god."

The Truman-MacArthur talks assumed that victory was near. They dwelled on postwar matters—occupation and elections in Korea, withdrawal of American troops, economic aid for Korea, and a Pacific pact modeled on NATO. They spent little time talking about the war itself, stopping but briefly at a question that Truman had told Acheson he would ask: "What are the chances for Chinese or Soviet interference?" MacArthur replied:

"Very little. The Chinese have 300,000 men in Manchuria. Of these not more than 100/125,000 are distributed along the Yalu River. Only 50-60,000 could be gotten across the Yalu River [because] they have no air force.

"With the Russians it is a little different. They have [a fairly good air force] in Siberia . . . They are probably no match for our Air Force [and] have no ground troops available for North Korea . . . the coordination between the Russian air and Chinese ground would be so flimsy that I believe Russian air would bomb the Chinese as often as they would bomb us."

Neither Truman nor his advisers, including General Omar Bradley, chief of the JCS, and Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army, questioned MacArthur's sources of intelligence or his optimistic conclusions. Because Washington received most of the intelligence reports of MacArthur's command and sent him reports by

other intelligence agencies (including CIA), he and other military leaders were relying on largely the same information to draw the same comforting conclusions.

None of the participants focused on the recent strong warnings from China. On the 9th, a leading newspaper (*Jen Min Jih Pao*) had emphasized Chou's speech of September 30, and concluded that "the threat of aggression [against] China is more [pronounced]." On October 10, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared, "the Chinese people cannot stand idly by with regard to such a serious situation created by [the crossing of the parallel] and to the dangerous trend towards extending the war."

China's "Volunteers" Enter the War

On October 19, United Nations forces took Pyongyang, with the DPRK government fleeing north. On the 20th, the CIA reported that Chinese forces might cross the Yalu to safeguard the Suiho electrical plant and other installations, on the river's North Korean side, which provided Manchuria with electrical power. The State Department wanted MacArthur to guarantee publicly the safety of this complex, but the JCS deemed the pledge "undesirable from a military point of view." Truman allowed MacArthur to make the final decision; predictably, the general withheld the pledge.

On October 24, MacArthur directed his troops to move toward the Yalu, thus upsetting earlier JCS expectations that only ROK forces would operate, "as a matter of policy," in the northernmost areas. In his operations plan of September 29, MacArthur had agreed to deploy only ROK troops in this area, but he easily abandoned that restriction. When the JCS asked timorously why ("a matter of some concern here," they said), MacArthur arrogantly replied that he had acted out of "military necessity," because the ROK forces, in his judgment, could not alone defeat the enemy. He had generously construed an ambiguous directive ("a matter of policy" was only a suggestion, he said) to conduct the war the way he wanted.

The JCS accepted his interpretation. He was not rebuked or even chided. Using his prestige, he had

carefully maneuvered within the penumbra of orders. No one—including Marshall, Truman, or Acheson—wished to press the matter. Certainly they did not want to countermand MacArthur's interpretation, partly because they did not expect him to run into trouble. Why start a squabble? Victory then seemed so near.

The hopes for easy victory soon wavered. On October 26, MacArthur's army captured Chinese prisoners, and learned that they had crossed into Korea ten days earlier. Between October 26 and 30, these Chinese "volunteers" destroyed one South Korean division and half of the American 5th and 8th cavalry. "The war in Korea has now entered a new "phase," a leading Chinese publication (*Hsueh Hsi*) declared on November 1st. "With China and Korea . . . separated by one river and with the two countries having [an extended] common frontier, we can under no circumstances allow American imperialism, already proved to be China's most fierce enemy, to occupy Korea . . . and threaten the security of China."

This warning, even when coupled with the attack, did not alarm MacArthur. By November 4, while warning against "authoritative" appraisals, MacArthur remained sanguine: China would not intervene with massive forces, but would limit her aid to small groups of "volunteers" and supplies. Two days later, when large Chinese forces began beating back UN troops, MacArthur realized that he had underestimated the danger, so he ordered the bombing of bridges over the Yalu to halt the flow of enemy troops (estimated at 600,000) and supplies.

He sincerely believed that he could freely deploy the air force, without special permission from Washington, to destroy these bridges. His discussion with Truman at Wake Island, when the general guaranteed that not more than 50-60,000 Chinese could cross the Yalu, had implied bombing the bridges. But on November 6, when policy makers learned of his plans, they overruled him, because they feared that the attacks would antagonize allies and might provoke Russia. MacArthur predicted "calamity" and appealed directly to Truman, who reluctantly

granted permission. Restrictions by the JCS that the planes bomb visually and not violate Manchurian air space left most of the bridges usable during November.

Apprehensions and Confidence: The Threat of a Wider War

On the 7th, after doing considerable damage, the Chinese forces broke off the battle and disappeared. Their brief intervention spurred a reexamination of policy, and their disengagement gave Washington officials a few weeks for careful consideration. Speedily they concluded the obvious: "the risk of global war is increased." They discussed some of the obvious issues—China's purposes, whether a buffer zone on the Yalu might meet her needs, whether a slight retreat would be militarily and politically wise, and whether MacArthur's orders should be revised.

The deliberations seemed strangely truncated—a curious mixture of optimism and pessimism, where men had a sense of crisis but believed they would triumph, that major adjustments were unnecessary. At times, the JCS proposed negotiations with China, but Acheson preferred to delay until America had conquered North Korea. In these weeks, Acheson was not a victim of bureaucratic politics, or reluctant to intrude in military strategy, but he was unwilling to revise policy and settle for less than victory in Korea. Both he and Marshall endorsed continuing MacArthur's orders unchanged, and in so doing they unknowingly prepared the way for the massive confrontation with China.

Perhaps only a retreat to the 38th parallel could have definitely avoided that armed clash. In November, American policy makers did not even consider that possibility. Establishment of a generous buffer zone, if announced *before* MacArthur's armies moved toward the Yalu, might have eased tensions and prevented a major Chinese attack. That possibility evaporated when Acheson, Marshall, and others decided on a narrow buffer zone but also decided to delay creating and announcing it until *after* MacArthur reached near or to the Yalu.

In early November, American

intelligence agencies estimated that there were 30-40,000 Chinese troops in Korea, with about 700,000 nearby in Manchuria. Since the river would soon be frozen, even if the bridges were destroyed, the Chinese troops could pass over ice. The intelligence report of the 6th concluded with a dire warning:

"... the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of magnitude are involved. At any point the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war."

Assessing the situation in early November, the JCS were uncertain and anxious, guardedly pessimistic. Only negotiations, assurances, or a "determined military operation" would remove the Chinese troops, the JCS recommended on November 9. The JCS admitted that they were unsure about China's motives and acknowledged three widely different theories: she was protecting the Yalu river power complex, starting a war of attrition to bog down America in Asia, or trying to drive the UN forces off the peninsula. The JCS advice was limited—publicly guarantee the safety of the Yalu complex, and reassure China "with respect to our intent." Perhaps because of their fear of MacArthur and their sense that the administration did not want to revise its war aims, the Chiefs did not recommend halting him far short of the Yalu.

Some friendly nations, with embassies in Peiping, sent America warnings: China was dispatching more troops to Korea, she would "go to any length" to aid the DPRK, and she feared an invasion of her own territory. Some, including Britain, alarmed by the prospect of a wider war, proposed to the United States a cease-fire and a buffer zone along the Yalu.

At the NSC meeting on the 9th, Acheson offered his own analysis of Chinese motives—primarily, keeping the United States involved, and, "the lesser interest," protecting the border and the power plants. He pointed out, according to Truman, "that [the NSC, including himself,] agreed that General MacArthur's direc-

tives should not be changed and he should be free to do what he could in a military way, but without bombing Manchuria. At the same time, the State Department would seek ways to find out whether negotiations with the Chinese were possible."

Why did Acheson believe that he could leave MacArthur free to advance to the Yalu with all his forces (not just ROK troops) while the State Department sought negotiations with China? The answer may seem surprising: Acheson did not believe that there was an emergency, certainly no imminent peril. He assumed that MacArthur's advance would force China to settle for a modest concession—a guarantee of the border with American troops nearby. By delaying negotiations, Acheson concluded, he could easily reject China's likely demand—removal of all foreign troops from Korea, "thus abandoning Korea to the Communists." Given this fear, he wanted negotiations to *follow* MacArthur's victory, so that America could conduct "negotiations from strength." That was a favorite Acheson aim.

At the November 9th meeting of the NSC, political and military considerations became entangled in such a way that officials comfortably gave advice in both areas. At one point, for example, advisers worried that MacArthur's two main bodies of troops were widely and dangerously separated, and Acheson asked whether "there was a line that was better from the military view than the present one." Bradley replied that there was a better place, further back, but that withdrawal to it "might lose us the South Koreans' will to fight." Acheson, along with the others, was unwilling to seek a safer line because they did not want to surrender the advantages that MacArthur's advance promised. Brought together by common apprehension about China's motives, these men persuaded themselves that another Chinese intervention—at least a massive attack—was either unlikely or liable to fail.

This pattern of optimistic thinking is revealed in Acheson's discussion with his advisers on the morning of November 21. That

day, MacArthur's 7th Division had reached the Yalu, and the Secretary and his associates were uneasy, unsure what might happen. "If MacArthur is successful in repelling Chinese intervention and ROK takes over [then] tension may ease," Acheson concluded, "but if Chinese . . . forces cannot be destroyed and strong resistance is met there and we find ourselves with a long struggle, . . . we must turn to negotiation . . ." For Acheson, already apprehensive, negotiation could be necessary *after* the development of a painful crisis, not to avoid it.

At the State-Defense meeting on the afternoon of the 21st, Marshall and Acheson approved MacArthur's plan to march to the Yalu. Their discussion, according to one scholar who saw the still-classified minutes, had an air of "unreality." The main question was whether the United States should negotiate on a buffer zone or simply announce its establishment, with Marshall recommending the latter "following MacArthur's success." "Far from revealing great anxiety or trepidation about MacArthur's advance to the Yalu," concludes this privileged scholar, "Acheson . . . shared the prevailing confidence that MacArthur could accomplish his mission and that Chinese intervention, if it did occur, could be contained within a buffer zone along the Yalu."

In line with the Marshall-Acheson agreement, on the 24th the JCS suggested a course of action (not a directive) to MacArthur: push to or near the Yalu and then pull back "if effective resistance ceased." This was not a strategy of caution, designed to avert an imminent crisis, but a strategy for victory, designed to end the war after achieving a triumph on the field of battle. General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, admitted that this proposal might, from MacArthur's perspective, "leave much to be desired," but stressed that it would meet political needs: Many allies wanted a buffer zone to allay Chinese and Soviet fears, and it "might well provide an out for the Chinese Communists to withdraw into Manchuria without loss of face."

Predictably, MacArthur vetoed the proposal, though his words were not as sharp as two weeks ear-

lier, when the JCS had suggested that his orders might be "re-examined": that he might be directed to consolidate his gains, abandon the drive to the Yalu, and give up trying to unify Korea. Then he had charged "appeasement." On the 24th, he argued that the river line was a natural defense area, and it would be militarily and politically dangerous "to yield this natural protective barrier." How, he asked, could Asians respect America if she yielded, if she surrendered the opportunity for complete "liberation" of Korea? Like Acheson, MacArthur wanted to assert American strength, and their major expressed difference was on how to settle the war after America had marched to the Yalu and defeated the enemy in Korea. Unlike Acheson, MacArthur seemed to be itching to extend the war to China—precisely what China feared and the Administration promised would not happen.

The Administration had been pursuing a strategy of words to assure China that she had nothing to fear: that she was not in danger from UN troops. On November 10, for example, the United States, Britain, and France, among others, sponsored a UN resolution that China's borders would be "inviolate" and that "legitimate" Chinese interests would be protected, including, specifically, the power complex on the Yalu. The American ambassador emphasized that this resolution "should leave the authorities in Peiping in no doubt [about America's peaceful intentions and] remove any foolish fears that the territory of China is endangered." Five days later, implying that America would welcome talks with China about her "legitimate" interests along the Yalu, Acheson declared that America had no "ulterior designs in Manchuria"—a position that Britain promptly affirmed. On the 16th, Truman announced that America would not cross the Yalu and that China was safe.

By the 18th, there was ample evidence—disregarded or misinterpreted by American officials—that their statements were, as China said, "not convincing." The United States, according to a Peiping broadcast, "has lied and smashed her way across the world to Chinese territory." How could

China trust America, the broadcast asked, when she was supporting Syngman Rhee, who had pledged that UN armies would cross the Yalu?

China soon made dramatically clear that American promises did not meet her needs. On November 27, three days after MacArthur boldly opened his offensive to the Yalu to "end the war [and] restore . . . unity to Korea," about 250,000 Chinese troops counterattacked. They shattered his armies. "We face an entirely new war," MacArthur cabled Washington on the 28th, warning that China aimed at "complete destruction" of his forces.

Reassessing the Road to "Disaster"

"As I look back," Acheson wrote in 1969, "the critical period" was the three weeks—October 26 to November 17—when the debacle might have been averted. He went on to offer his interpretation:

"Then all the dangers from dispersal of our forces and intervention by the Chinese were manifest. We were all deeply apprehensive. . . . I was unwilling to urge on the President a military course that his military advisors would not propose [because it] ran counter to American military tradition of the proper powers of the theater commander. . . . If General Marshall and the Chiefs had proposed withdrawal to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line. . . and if the President had backed them, as he undoubtedly would have—disaster would probably have been averted. But it would have meant a fight with MacArthur. . . ."

Acheson contended that MacArthur blocked the Administration from revising its military strategy. There is some merit in this charge, but the analysis should be broadened to explain why the Administration did not retreat from its political goal—unification of Korea. MacArthur's prestige, his arrogance, his political power—all subtly *helped* deter policy makers from revising their war aims and, thus, the general's orders. Even if they never discussed the issues in domestic-political terms, they knew that MacArthur would charge, "You kept me from winning the war." The constraints of domestic politics, the venom of Republican critics, and MacArthur's talent for exploiting hopes and hostilities, helped restrain men like Acheson and Marshall. They

were loyal to Truman, wanted to protect him, and feared that a dispute about Korea might destroy the Administration's general foreign policy.

But, even more, they had desired the victory that MacArthur promised, and they believed—up to the 27th or 28th—that it was imminent and would be easy. Only a commander in Korea who had forcefully dampened their hopes, kindled their apprehensions, submitted chilling reports of likely disaster, and pleaded for moderation might have compelled them to alter their position. Such a commander would have had to stress China's military superiority in the area, her capacity to destroy his forces, and the likelihood that she would intervene massively.

Acheson and Truman were correct that MacArthur had committed grave errors—of overestimating his forces, underestimating the size of the enemy's, and of dangerously deploying his forces. But Washington also made the first two of those errors. The JCS endorsed MacArthur's optimistic estimates even though they, too, had evidence that intelligence reports on the number of Chinese in Korea fluctuated wildly—from 30,000 to 80,000 soldiers. Like MacArthur, the JCS also had forecasts that about 700,000 Chinese troops were in Manchuria; but, unlike MacArthur, the JCS doubted that his air force could stop these troops from entering Korea.

Like MacArthur, leaders in Washington were unwilling to alter their goals because they thought that China would not intervene massively and that victory was near. Policy makers had assumed that China had no good reason to enter the war, so they disregarded or minimized her own statements that her interests were imperiled, that she could not trust America's words, that she would not accede to American forces at her border. In retrospect, these warnings seem clear. To American leaders at the time, they were bluffs.

China may have been wrong—but not irrational, as American leaders later charged—to fear American armies at her border and an anti-Communist Korean state reaching to the Yalu. Embittered by America's renewed military

Continued on page 29

"You should never wear your best trousers when you go out to fight for freedom and truth."

—Henrik Ibsen

AN EAR FOR AN AFGHAN

GORDON D. KING

You don't often see a diplomat wearing an earring.

American. Male. Otherwise normal in gray business suit, or on Sundays given to playing golf in (if I do say so myself) a sharp pair of Dax slacks.

Well—I do. Conservative silver—but there it is. In my right ear lobe, and it all goes back a long time. All the way back to—

The Khyber Pass. I thought, my god, it doesn't seem to be washed in blood like the books say. But I looked with my mouth open. Burnt brown rock, regimental insignia in concrete and stone, tribal fortress villages, sere Gunga Din country. Man, I thought, this is the *real* Foreign Service.

I remember George Harding's sardonic grin. His happiness was double. First, to come down from Embassy Kabul in those days for any reason. Buy fish, for god's sake. Beer. Speak English. And, secondly, to have the pleasure of bringing the new guy into Kabul for the first time. "You'll like it," he said.

He'd found me in the Peshawar train station looking askance at turbans, and turbans were everywhere. Crossed bandoliers of live ammunition. Daggers. Eagle's faces. Hawk's eyes. George's driver Sher Khan came up, bony, thin, twice as tall as anyone else, great wedge of nose, an incredible black mustachio. But kind dark eyes, friendly booming voice, helpful giant's hands.

And the managerial talent of a senior IBM exec. He rounded up the mail, shoes from the Chinese cobbler, fresh vegetables and fish for the snowbound Kabul Embassy, new supply of paperbacks, cases of Murree brew, spare parts for the Green Dragon, Christmas presents for employees' children—and George who'd concentrated on collecting the new diplomatic pouch from the transiting courier at the airport.

Next morning I woke up to a stubborn pounding on the loose wooden door of my hotel room. "Go early!" Sher Khan shouted. "Reach Embassy before dark!"

Drop dead, I thought, it's only a hundred and eighty miles. I'm going to get you guys for overacting.

Well—an hour later in the famous Pass, I was wide awake, keeping a thrilled but suspicious eye on all those armed tribesmen. Then it was the border, the early morning paperwork, the sleepy guards, the switchover to the right side of the road, now unpaved. A mile or so further, we went through more paperwork in the one-story whitewashed Afghan passport building, watched by clusters of hard-eyed tribal truck drivers. More turbans and bandoliers. Every man with a rifle. A scattering of soldiers in coarse brown uniforms. I had an uneasy feeling in my stomach.

Beyond, the valley opened, spread itself out from the rocky shoulders of the road. Mountains climbed up big and crawled over both horizons. The highway was a pushing aside of the largest rocks. We rumbled past an occasional tribesman with donkey, from time

to time a garishly painted high-boarded truck. The skies stayed gray. Light rain fell. Desolate rock-strewn valleys widened and narrowed. Humped up dinosaur mountains showed ravaged flanks of dun stone and red shale.

George couldn't resist. "Looks soft now," he said. "Come clear weather, everything sharpens up. You'll like it."

I gawked at a great wall of snowclad ranges to the north. We came over a rise, our wheels drumming on loose stones. Ahead, low cliffs swept in to loom over and hide the road. To the right, before the road disappeared into a defile, four tribesmen squatted on a hummock, talking among themselves, paying no attention. We watched them as we passed. Little alarm bells rang in my head.

"That's not natural," George said. He twisted around in his seat. "Take a look." I turned back just before a bend cut off the view. The four men were trotting after us toward the defile. They were carrying rifles.

George turned back. "Just a hunch," he said, "but let's hide our wallets and the pouch under the seat." He slipped off his wristwatch and poked it into the hidden store.

In the driver's seat, Sher Khan muttered to himself. The way was clay-slick and narrow. Ropy red mud snaked down from furrowed sides. The car slewed slightly, slowing down, but it took less than a minute to get through the crevice.

Beyond the cliffs, the ground ahead flattened and our eyes focused on a passenger bus painted in bright reds and greens. It stood at a slant on the left in front of two huge

Gordon King, FSO-retired, joined the State Department in 1947, after service with the Army overseas. He has served at Kabul, Tehran, Isfahan, Peshawar, Bonn, London and Lahore.

rocks flanking the road. With their backs to the bus, a scattering of veiled women squatted at the feet of a score of men in white pajama-trousers, dark European suit jackets, black Karakul fur caps. Facing the group, their backs to us, three tall tribesmen were talking and waving their arms like enthusiastic tour guides.

But they were waving something else too. Rifles.

The noise of the carry-all brought everyone around toward us in a single movement that looked rehearsed. The men with the rifles wore the turbans, the white baggy trousers and loose shirts, the vests and jackets of the Shinwaris. All three had black mustaches but the tallest boasted a piratical black beard and wore over his vest a heavy jacket of sheepskin.

Seeing us, he shouted something and raised his gun in our direction with a commanding, arrogant gesture. Sher Khan, concentrating like a man hypnotized on wheeling down the mud-slick road, heard the shout and hit the brakes. George leaned forward tensely.

"Don't stop here, for god's sake," he hissed. "They'll shoot! Do what he says, drive right up to them!" The tall bandit hurried toward us, rifle pointing straight at the windshield. But as we rolled up he stepped to one side and partially lowered the gun.

"Wheew," George whispered, "he's so ugly he must be home-made."

The man's face bent down to peer in the driver's window. Lean hungry cheeks were accented with a vivid scar on one side, smallpox whorls on the other, above the thick black mustache and beard. His eyes outflashed even Sher Khan's. I couldn't take my eyes off the wide wolfish smile and dazzling teeth. My facial muscles twisted like filings before a magnet. I smiled back.

The man laughed in Sher Khan's face, gestured toward me with the muzzle of his rifle. They exchanged rapid volleys of words. Sher Khan turned back to us.

"I tell him no robbing. You diplomats, not good to rob diplomats, make much trouble with government, more soldiers come. He say he spit on government and soldiers. He say why not rob diplomats,

they all rich. Then he say," Sher Khan nodded at me, "he not rob us if Benton Sahib come with them."

"Bastards," growled George, "either want to kill you or adopt you."

"Come with them?" I gasped, ignoring George. "They want to kidnap me?"

"No, Sahib. He say he like your smile. He say you come with them to village, be their guest. He say he like you, give you woman, you stay."

"Sher Khan," my voice went a bit high. "For god's sake, tell him I've already got me a woman—a wife—and a baby." I thought how damned glad I was they were coming later.

The two in front argued, at first with good humor, the bandit's teeth flashing, but then things turned serious. The highwayman's voice raised to a shout, his good humor gone, and he made peremptory gestures toward us with the muzzle of his gun. Sher Khan turned back.

"He say first, Sahib, never mind you have woman, baby. He say he have three women, many childs, no matter, he give you two-three-four women. I tell him American Sahibs only take one woman—"

"—if he only knew," George whispered.

"—not take two women, and Benton Sahib not go village, he get very mad and say out! out! Must do robbing! So—" Sher Khan looked apologetically at us as he reached back to open our door, "must everybody get out, Sahib."

We heaved ourselves reluctantly through the doors. The red-brown clay underfoot was slick, the air chilled with a fine mist. Across the road the bus passengers watched the new diversion with gawking curiosity, some with obvious relief. The bandits stationed at either end of the bus group held their rifles in readiness, watching both passengers and us. Back at the defile the first quartet of tribesmen came into the open. We were trapped.

Under Sher Khan's direction, we lined up across the road. Reacting to a harsh bark from the bandit, the driver moved out in front and with obviously acute discomfort, held out his hand.

"Sahibs must give money, everything. He make me take." he looked worried. "Sahibs give ev-

everything, otherwise much trouble."

We piled his hands full. I had nearly a hundred rupees in my pockets, George even more. The bandit said something, nodding at me. Sher Khan made an embarrassed face. "Your watch, Sahib." I pulled it off my wrist, handed it over. Then both George and I were stripping off rings—mine a simple gold wedding band.

"Does he have to have that?" I asked. "My wife gave it to me when we were married."

The bandit shouted back after Sher Khan spoke. The driver turned back to me. "Very bad talk, Sahib. He say you too much speak about your woman. . . about Mem-sahib. . . he say his house better than your house. . . now he say you give ring quick. . ." I handed it over, ". . . or he shoot everybody. He say we lucky he not shoot already."

All this talk about shooting made my skin crawl. But then the man smiled again. Teeth flashing, he spoke to Sher Khan. Surprisingly, in reply Sher Khan raised his voice. The bus passengers tittered. Out of the corner of my eye I saw several of the men grinning. By this time, Sher Khan was shouting. Suddenly, prodding the driver's neck with his rifle barrel, the bandit yelled something harsh and guttural. Sher Khan sagged, rubbing his neck. He turned to face us.

"Very bad, Sahib. He say. . ." the embarrassed face before us swallowed, ". . . you give him trousers. And quick. . ." the voice became urgent, ". . . or he say he shoot everybody!"

This time we—I—didn't argue. Balancing precariously, we pulled pants legs over muddy feet, George cursing softly.

"Godammit," he whispered, "all this—and a strip-tease too."

George and I wore boxer shorts, both patterned, his red on white and mine blue. We stood there like two bad boys dragged up in front of school by teacher for reading dirty books. The passengers, caught up in the scene, laughed openly. The bandits were convulsed.

"Wonder if he wants us to dance," George scowled.

"Good idea," I grated back. "Keep us warm."

George was gearing up to say something more through the corner of his mouth, and the tribesmen

were still gawking and hooting at our part in the drama, like roughnecks in the peanut gallery. But suddenly the four behind us began shouting. We turned toward them just as they raised rifles and fired over our heads in the direction of the huge boulders flanking the road ahead. Then, like ungainly dancers in their billowing white trousers, they raced back into the cleft.

The shock of the shots still ringing in our ears, we whirled around to witness an eruption of brown uniformed men from the other side of the giant boulders. They came forward in a ragged line, running in a half-crouch, rifles held slanted before them. The nearby brigands, our trousers held high, raced pell mell around the bus toward the opposite side of the boulders. The turbaned figures disappeared as the soldiers wheeled past us in hot pursuit, yelling at the top of their lungs.

While we stared, one man, holding himself detached from the action, approached at a rapid walk from the rear of the squad. Dressed in the smart khaki-brown uniform of an officer, he stopped in front of us and saluted, giving a sharp heel-click for emphasis. Then, turning to Sher Khan he spoke in sharp tones. He was gesturing toward our bare legs.

"Lord help us," George said conversationally, "the critic's arrived and he doesn't like the show."

Sher Khan turned toward us but before he could open his mouth a sudden shout came from behind the boulders where the soldiers had first appeared. It was the bandit leader, come full circle. Trained by his two companions he cut out at a dead run, on a line that led past us toward the cleft to the rear of our carry-all.

George laughed. "Now we've got Peter Pan and the Pirates!"

The bandit leader would have made a great Captain Hook. But in that instant, I saw the Afghan officer at my elbow grappling with his shiny leather holster and my animal instincts signaled danger. The tall brigand abruptly stopped and swung his rifle on us.

For a brief second he held it on me, his hawk face split with a splendid smile. Then, almost casually, he moved it slightly past me

and fired.

I ducked clumsily. My glasses skittered off my nose and dropped into the mud. Down I went, bewildered but determined in a simpleminded way to retrieve those precious lenses. At the same moment I felt an awkward motion next to me. Turning, I watched through a myopic blur as the Afghan officer, his hands still fumbling at his holster, slowly jackknifed over. He fell on his side facing me. When his

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hands stopped moving, my eyes jerked to the red blotch in the middle of his trim uniform jacket.

The soldiers came racing around the great rocks just in time to see their officer go down. They fired in the general direction of the fleeing bandits and then panted up to us, looking uncertainly at the still figure on the ground. Sher Khan shouted at them, pointing back at the cleft where the tribesmen were disappearing. Several began to talk excitedly but none seemed interested in continuing the chase. Sher Khan motioned us toward the carry-all.

With my mud-covered glasses in my hand and suddenly conscious of my bare legs, I crawled into the vehicle, George at my heels. Sher Khan slammed his door, brought the engine to life, and jerked the vehicle back on the road.

We shot forward toward the opening between the rocks but not quick enough. I heard the rear window shatter, something stung my ear, and suddenly I was staring at the center of our windshield at a neat round hole bordered by a sunburst of cracks. Sher Kahn whipped the wagon between the rocks

with the motor roaring and half a breath later we were barreling down the hidden road beyond.

I had my hand to my ear, aware of the blood crawling through my fingers. George handed me a handkerchief and shouted, "What the hell was *that* for?" Sher Khan yelled back at us in bursts, concentrating on the road ahead.

"Bad men get up in hill . . . behind rocks . . . they shoot back . . . kill soldiers . . . and try scare you, Benton Sahib. . ."

"But *why*?" I shouted.

"Because you not go village! He—big fellah—like you too much. . . he want you guest. . . you not go. . . so he unhappy, he scare you!" He concluded triumphantly and slowed the bucking carry-all down to our usual thirty; we were out of rifle shot.

"Well," said George, "it's good to know you're going to be popular here. Not everybody makes it with the locals, but you're off to a good start."

"Now look—" I started to say.

"Oh it's all right," George turned around and tugged at his suitcase. "I didn't like those britches anyway."

Later, we sat around a shaky L unpainted table in a smoky teahouse in Sarobi, only fifty mountainous miles shy of Kabul, sipping lovely blistering hot tea out of glasses set in metal holders. George and I chewed on dry tasteless sandwiches packed for us back in Peshawar while the tall driver munched on freshly charcoaled *shish kebob*.

"Say, Sher Khan," George said, "any idea who that bandit was, the big guy?"

"His name Mohammad Khan, Sahib. He very big bandit that region. Make many robbings, kill many soldiers, very rich."

"Yeah," George blew on his tea, "I'll bet. By the way, Sher Khan, isn't your tribe somewhere around those parts?"

"Oh yes, Sahib. Same tribe."

I looked at Sher Khan's thin angular face, the black mustache, the fierce eyes, and grinned. "Come to think of it, Sher Khan," I said, "you even look like that bandit!"

"Yes, Sahib," Sher Khan looked down at his tea and shook his head mournfully. "Must be so. He is my big brother."

The Tough Choices

SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES—THE NEXT TEN YEARS, Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, Editors. The Brookings Institution, \$6.95 paper, \$14.95 cloth.

Imagine that you were the President-elect and that you knew you would be immediately confronted with a multiplicity of policy dilemmas and competing claims for resources—what single published compilation of them could you turn to?

The Brookings Institution, under the leadership of Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultze, put a book together for just such a contingency. It is called *Setting National Priorities* and in 13 chapters sets forth the tough choices that will have to be made not only in the first year of the new presidency, but during the next ten years. This year's volume is thus different from previous ones in the annual series with the same title.

A book of such gigantic focus cannot, indeed should not, try to cover everything. As the editors say, the omission of a number of problems, such as arms control, crime, health insurance and race relations, does not imply that such subjects are in any sense less important than those that are treated.

From our point of view, the first two substantive chapters, on foreign affairs, "Peace or War" by Henry Owen, and "Toward a New Consensus in US Defense Policy" (by four authors), are the most important and interesting—all the more so since Henry Owen is likely to have the ear of the new President and Secretary of State.

The foreign policy chapter is a conspectus of problems and opportunities around the world, but with a disciplined effort to develop a clear point of view of the relative priorities. For instance, Owen would contemplate withdrawal of the United States Army 2nd Division from Korea, but would maintain the Air Force fighter wing. He seems aware, however, that to move precipitously might upset the power balance in the area.

He thus also discusses the possibility of "negotiations between the US, the Soviet Union,

and China to see if these great powers can agree that none of them will become involved in a future Korean conflict. In this way a climate might be created in which the United States could more readily disengage its forces from Korea without the adverse consequences discussed earlier."

Grappling with the problem of power vacuums in the Third World, Owen first states that "we should reject the notion that our relationship with the USSR requires us to offset its interventions, wherever they occur, even in regions of no intrinsic strategic importance to us."

However, he does not exclude military assistance short of troops, and in fact advocates a "limited investment" in certain situations "to make it sufficiently expensive for the USSR so that they will think twice before repeating the experience." There are intelligent qualifications to that statement but the essential ambiguity is not resolved, for a poker player who knows that his opponent plans only a "limited investment" may *not* think twice before embarking on another seemingly sure thing.

In addition to an exceedingly compressed and well-researched chapter on defense, the book also contains chapters on such subjects as nuclear proliferation, the world economy, stabilization policy and inflation, federal spending, state and local governments, energy and the environment, and income security policy. It boxes the compass, as it were, of most of the big problems that confront a new Administration.

The book, therefore, is invaluable to anyone who wishes to get an overview of the problems of governing America during the period ahead, and who wishes to obtain perspectives on the thinking of the authors, some of whom will occupy positions of influence or responsibility. Naturally, some seemingly technical arguments about the distribution of American military forces in the world, for instance, have direct implications for our posture in particular world regions.

One example: On page 72 one finds the statement: "It seems evident that forces maintained in the United States as backup for those deployed in or near Japan will have little political impact on either

Japan or China. This suggests that one or two of the four Army and Marine infantry divisions on the US West Coast and Hawaii, which are too lightly equipped to be effective in European or Middle Eastern contingencies, and portions of the Third Fleet, which operates from Hawaii and Southern California, might either be eliminated from the force structure or re-equipped (and in the Navy's case, redeployed) for European or Middle Eastern contingencies without causing strain in US-Asian relations."

As a new point of departure for policy reassessments and reorientations, *Setting National Priorities* could thus be a seminal book and a very controversial one, depending on what use is made of it. The great merit of such a work is that it forces the reader to think in terms of choices and priorities since nobody can do everything and some things, however important, are less important than others. One does not have to agree with everything to find it a highly professional and much-needed overview for policy officials—and for those who want to understand the dilemmas of those officials.

—M. F. H.

FSJ BOOKSHELF

Objective Account

THE ARABS, ISRAELIS, AND KISSINGER, by Edward R. F. Sheehan. Reader's Digest Press, \$8.95.

This is the book that created the political stir last spring when excerpts containing verbatim accounts of Kissinger's sensitive conversations with Middle Eastern leaders were published in *Foreign Policy* magazine. In the controversy that followed, the State Department announced that although Secretary Kissinger had approved full cooperation with the author, Assistant Secretary Atherton and his then deputy Saunders had exceeded Dr. Kissinger's instructions (presumably in reading to the author from the "memcons") and were "reprimanded."

Be that as it may, and despite the overly solicitous cooperation received from State, Sheehan has managed to keep his objectivity, reviewing the basic record of US

management of Arab-Israeli affairs from October 1973 to mid-1976. And this is a record worthwhile reviewing, covering the intensive American diplomatic efforts to move the parties involved out of the cycle of violence into a negotiating process.

Sheehan believes that, on balance, the three disengagement agreements negotiated by Dr. Kissinger were brilliantly stage-managed. He tempers his admiration of Kissinger, however, with strong criticism of both Kissinger and Nixon for ignoring clear and repeated warning signals from President Sadat of Egypt and King Faisal of Saudi Arabia throughout the summer of 1973 both about the likelihood of another Arab-Israeli war and an oil embargo, unless progress were made on the negotiating front. Incredible as the risks of ignoring these warnings may seem today, these were among the first costly casualties of Nixon's preoccupation with Watergate. Sheehan also faults Kissinger for failing to fully appreciate the opportunities of the post-October 1973 period to move toward a comprehensive settlement. He attributes this to Kissinger's innate pessimism and his "fear of failure."

—ARNOLD SCHIFFERDECKER

The Roots of TV's Roots

Roots: the Saga of an American Family, by Alex Haley. Doubleday and Company, \$12.50.

"Sometimes I feel like a motherless child" can never quite sound the same again after you have read the story of Kunta Kinte and his descendants. Kinte was born in the spring of 1750 in a small Mandingo village four days upriver from the Atlantic coast of The Gambia. For the first 16 years of his life he absorbed the lore and traditions of his tribe, strengthened and supplemented by an Islamic faith. He herded goats as a young boy and, as an adolescent, stood sentry duty around his village at night. One day, chopping wood to make a drum, he was captured by slave raiders and put on board a ship for America. *Roots* relates the story of Kunta Kinte, and that of his descendants, in America, down through eight generations, to the author himself who, aided by the oral traditions of his family and

genealogical research, has recreated for us the story of his ancestors.

Haley's prose lacks something of the engaging quality of his earlier work, *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. It is plain and spare, neither particularly descriptive nor particularly evocative in itself. The book does have an impact, however, not so much from the author's choice of words as simply from the growing realization that the transition described occurred in millions of individuals, each molded by his personal and private sorrows: the inexorable assimilation—despite his wishes—of the new captive into a slave culture already alienated from and ignorant of its African origins; the gradual fading of any hope of ever returning home to loved ones; the inability of children born into slavery to comprehend the heritage their parents tried to preserve in them; the loss of touch with children, parents, or relatives through sale by owners who viewed them as less than human; the inescapable atmosphere of despair and bitter resignation which permeated Black American existence in the South.

Roots shows that the process of transferring the slaves to America should be viewed as a process of grafting rather than transplanting. The roots of the Black African heritage were left behind, in most cases irretrievably lost, as the unwilling immigrants adopted the culture of their masters as a new common denominator. In tracing his lineage to his genealogical roots, Haley demonstrates that culturally he is of another stock, as much a product of the melting pot as you or I. *Roots* does convey the feelings of enslaved Black Americans in the 18th and 19th centuries fully as well as Wright's *Black Boy* or Brown's *Manchild in the Promised Land* do in the case of 20th century urban Blacks. The three works are likely to be read as a trilogy in university courses on the Black American experience for years to come. White Americans in particular will deepen their understanding of the emotions expressed in much Black American music and literature of the 19th and 20th centuries by reading this book.

—CHARLES O. CECIL

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Nuclear Age Crises

CRISIS MANAGEMENT: *Confrontation and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age*, by Phil Williams. John Wiley.

This short, clearly written and jargon-free little book from a British scholar may be of real value to practitioners of diplomacy. It is a good introduction to a slowly growing field of scholarly speculation ("research" would be a little too strong a word at this point) on Crisis Management. The very distinction between policy-making at the bureaucratic level and that of the crisis managers clears away many confusions, the distinction between pre-1948 crises and the superpower confrontations beginning with Berlin is equally valuable, and an open admission of the sketchy and one-sided nature of available information avoids the smell of didacticism which pervades much scholarship on conflict control.

Williams finds that crisis management has been largely successful, and that this success has rested on tacit rules. Among these are: The opponent's basic integrity and

right to exist are not questioned; Similar respect for close allies of the opponent; Respect for a threshold identified as violent coercion; Asymmetry of permitted tactics in favor of the status quo proponent with most at stake; and Limited issues in limited geographic space.

It is noteworthy that Williams takes the Camelot accounts of the Cuban missile crisis with a grain of salt; he assumes the accuracy of the Gromyko story of the last Dobrynin-Kennedy meeting and the removal of the Turkish Jupiters as a part of the bargain, not as a JFK afterthought.

— JOHN W. BOWLING

China After Mao

MAO TSE-TUNG AND CHINA, by C. P. Fitzgerald. Holmes & Meier. \$9.50.

With the recent demise of Chairman Mao, the publication of this authoritative survey of his life, works, and writings, as well as a concise review of the Chinese Communist movement, is indeed timely. Professor Fitzgerald, formerly Professor of Far Eastern History, Australian National Uni-

versity, has spent much time in China and written other outstanding histories of China.

In revolutionizing so many aspects of the society of the world's most populous nation, through his leadership (and, as the slogan goes, "the correct line and guidance of the Communist Party"), Mao became a figure of foremost rank in the 20th century. His incalculable influence upon the Chinese people will surely continue to be a significant factor in future Sino-American relations.

This readable, reliable, compact work traces Mao's life from his youth to 1975. From the early 1920s, his life is intertwined with the rise of Chinese Communism to power and rule in China.

The succession crisis, the power struggle, that Mao's death created makes Fitzgerald's views on China-after-Mao of particular value. No matter who succeeds Mao—certainly a possibility is "joint leadership with government by the Central Committee of the Party (presided over by a Chairman)"—great changes will come to China. It cannot be foreseen whether successor regimes will support the policies he has laid out for them in his writings or whether, professing fidelity to the Maoist vision for China, they will, in practice, depart from them. Needless to say, if the exigencies of changed circumstances at home or abroad, cause them to change course, all will be done in Mao's name and with appropriate citation from the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

But, "China will remain a Communist society and most of the framework of social and economic life will be unaltered . . . the old China has passed into history."

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

Hitler's Big Error

HITLER'S DECISION TO INVAD RUSSIA—1941, by Robert Cecil McKay, \$8.95.

This is a small, well documented book about one of the most fateful decisions of World War II. Having made his decision to invade the USSR, Hitler then went on, as Cecil says, to fight, not in the way most likely to lead to victory, but in the manner most consistent with his ideological preconceptions.

—AL STOFFEL

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POLICY OF RISK, from page 22

support for Chiang, Communist Chinese leaders would not trust America's promises. China was fearful about her future: Would not an easy American victory in Korea have provoked more demands in the United States for rolling back Communism—this time, from China? Would not America's alliance with Rhee, who might dominate a unified Korea, imperil China? What would happen if the adventurous MacArthur followed his triumph in Korea with an attack on China? Would Truman and Acheson have repudiated him and compelled a retreat even if American armies were winning? Why should China have trusted America's, and MacArthur's, restraint?

China may well have designed her small-scale invasion (of October 24-November 7) as a signal that she would not tolerate an American victory in the North, certainly not on her border. In early November, with "volunteers" in Korea and about 700,000 troops across the river, China charged America with trying to

conquer Korea and then China, and warned bluntly that Chinese troops would assist the DPRK in order to protect China. Having defined her national interests clearly, in her own eyes, how could she back down when America disregarded her warnings? Would that not invite the very aggression she feared? Did not America's march to the Yalu, in the face of China's warnings, prove to Mao and his associates that China was in danger? To protect her own national security, if necessary, she would go to war.

American leaders were unable to understand China's fears and to revise their policy to acknowledge them. There were various strategies—from staying south of the 38th parallel, to halting at Pyongyang-Wonsan, to keeping far clear from the Yalu—that might have avoided the *initial* Chinese intervention. Had American leaders then interpreted that intervention as a grave warning and revised their strategy—at minimum, offering a generous buffer zone, at maximum withdrawing to the Pyong-

yang-Wonsan line—they might well have rendered unnecessary China's massive intervention in late November. They might have averted what Acheson called "one of the most terrible disasters that has occurred to American foreign policy and certainly . . . the greatest disaster which occurred to the Truman Administration."

Unfortunately for the education of Americans, such leaders as Acheson and Truman, among others, insisted that China's attack in late November was wanton, "unprovoked aggression," in no way a response to American provocation. When Asians and Europeans in 1950 argued that China had acted to protect interests that America seemed to threaten, Secretary Acheson, in words similar to MacArthur's, bitingly dismissed their analysis as part of the "natural human tendency[,] when faced by unpalatable reality and hard decision [,] to find a formula reducing [the] situation to more comfortable human dimensions and relieving one's self of [the need to face] hard facts."



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THIRD WORLD PROBLEMS

from page 12

and training in carrying out such inquiries should become a major form of collaboration. Moreover, since inquiry, science and technology are very closely related, large-scale assistance would go a long way in meeting the Third World NIEO demand of "access" to science and technology. In fact, much more than mere "access" is required. The LDCs need to increase their capacities and to improve their capabilities for conducting quantitative analyses. For instance, provision of computers and training in the use of them should become major foreign assistance activities.

Inquiry will help establish other priorities in technical assistance and training. A detailed and comprehensive agricultural sector analysis will identify the skills and knowledge constraints which are holding back increases in food production, agricultural employment, and other sectoral and intersectoral objectives. A study of the

health sector which analyzes problems, quantifying the relations among inputs and outputs, including the various health institutions, health practices, medical and para-medical personnel, will also help pinpoint skills and knowledge constraints in this sector. In short, as each nation identifies its skill shortages it will be in a much better position to establish priorities for technical assistance, for training abroad, and for its own education and training programs.

US Foreign Assistance: An Integral Part of US Foreign Policy

As was previously pointed out, US foreign policy during the last 30 years has been concerned with US security and well-being, with the welfare of other nations, and with the interrelations between these two concerns. We are convinced that our own security and welfare will be threatened if living conditions in the Third World fail to improve, and that the welfare of the Third World will be undermined if anything catastrophic were to happen to us. Why then is proper as-

signment of responsibility for US foreign assistance so invariably and tiresomely raised as an issue by every new commission established to review this assistance?

Proposals to separate foreign assistance from foreign policy almost always reflect a narrow outdated view of the latter. The recommendation that foreign assistance be "removed" from foreign policy will appear reasonable only if "diplomacy" is viewed as focused exclusively on immediate or very short-range problems. We think the issue concerning the proper locus of foreign assistance was quite clearly presented by AFSA in the January 14, 1971 statement, "The Reform of Our Foreign Assistance: Additional AFSA Commentaries."

AFSA questions the Peterson Task Force recommendations that bilateral capital and technical assistance be removed from the Department of State. We concur with the view that long-range development assistance should not be subordinated to short-term foreign policy considerations, which has often been the case in the past. But to conclude that these programs should

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be removed from the Department would appear to involve the assumption that short-range considerations are at present predominant and overriding in the making of foreign policy. If so, this basic error should be corrected, not evaded through the establishment of independent institutions. We fully agree that long-range foreign policy making needs to be strengthened, but that it should be strengthened within, and not without, the agency responsible for foreign policy.

It is high time we recognized the fact that there is no kind of institutional sealing off which can eliminate all future tension or conflict between different values and considerations that on any given occasion may bear on the issue of providing assistance. To illustrate this point we shall select two extreme kinds of cases.

If a developing country is determined to continue pursuing policies which are not solving their problems nor achieving their stated objectives, and which are highly wasteful of resources, it might not be in our national interest to provide that country with large amounts of resources. If a develop-

ing country is carrying out large-scale violations of basic human rights and if, after due consultation and a careful analysis of the situation, we conclude that the incidence of violations will not be diminished by continued assistance but, on the contrary, increased, it would not be consonant with our values, and might not be in our national interest, to provide that country with large amounts of resources. In every case a careful analysis of the entire situation is required. The fact that a future decision or choice may be painful should not lead us into a reorganization that would, in effect, preclude making that choice.

Since foreign assistance is facing difficult, fairly technical problems, the solutions of which will require sustained concentration, certain new autonomies for AID may be required. AID needs to develop new skills and techniques in order to function effectively in today's pluralistic and interdependent world. AID should expand and improve its activities in the areas of analysis and evaluation, developing

the memory it does not yet have, and righting the present imbalance in focus which channels almost all of its energy into meeting the schedules and satisfying the formal requirements for obligating and expending funds. In sum, AID needs to spend more time on analysis, and may require some new autonomies, but these autonomies should be obtained within the Department of State, and not outside of it.

The Department, in turn, has its place within a government composed of three branches, and a much larger society that is dedicated to the proposition that decision-making profits from the collection and presentation of fact and the open discussion of issues. This principle should now find fuller expression in our foreign assistance programs. By contributing to the establishment of inquiry which would improve policy, we would be helping the developing countries achieve the national independence they seek. This would be a proper foreign assistance policy for a democratic society. 

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WHOLE NEW GAME

from page 15

poured into the US and investment dollars flowed out. Since US import-competing industries and some US export industries were losing their markets, and since direct investment abroad was such a good buy, companies increasingly moved some of their production abroad. The process improved the US standard of living, and gave tremendous impulse to the growth and power of US corporations abroad. The rapid growth of the multinational corporation was the product of an overvalued dollar. However, all of these movements and changes caused dislocations. Capital could adjust by buying productive assets abroad, by improving technology, diversifying, etc.; labor could not. The labor dislocation was qualitative as well as quantitative. The industries that were able to grow and prosper the most were those in which the United States had such a technological lead that the overvaluation of the dollar did not affect

their ability to compete. Yet, industries most affected by imports and declining export markets were those where the labor was least skilled. The adjustment that economists talk about so easily simply could not happen without very large and long lags that seriously affected the welfare of many workers. The dislocated happened to include large numbers of blacks and youth, and I believe the public-order problems in the mid '60s were not unrelated to this deterioration in the marginal conditions for low- and medium-skilled persons.

Post-Bretton Woods

The importance of the change away from dollar-dominated fixed exchange rates to a system in which the value of the dollar, like that of all other currencies, is determined by supply and demand, cannot be exaggerated. While I have made some gross over-simplifications, the main point is that we must examine all of our foreign policy conventional wisdoms in light of the new system and we

must even examine our professional approach and perspectives as these too were fundamentally affected by the Bretton Woods system. Americans who lived abroad in the '60s and again since 1973 have seen a drastic change in their standard of living. Americans living in the United States have suffered a similar but more modest loss. The reason for these real income losses is the basic change in the rules by which the dollar now plays. Foreigners no longer keep a significant portion of newly-created dollars in their mattresses. Under flexible exchange rates, dollars created will be spent in the United States. Excess foreign expenditures now cost resources and excess expenditures will increase inflationary pressures. Similarly, federal fiscal deficits from 1948 to 1972 (\$109 billion) were less than the increase in foreign dollar reserves and Eurodollars, and this means that the rest of the world financed US budget deficits as well as US foreign policy. Now the Federal Government must borrow from the US economy—thus raising interest rates and taking re-

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sources away from the private sector. All foreign and domestic policy dollars now cost more than before, and we in the Foreign Service must begin to look at costs and benefits rigorously and systematically.

To summarize—budget deficits cost, and will tend to be more inflationary; dollars spent abroad will come back, and excess spending will cause the dollar to be undervalued relative to a price appropriate for current-account balance; capital will tend to move toward the United States; and capital in general has become scarce (worries about multinationals, except in the natural resource field, will become passé); economic adjustment caused by the foreign sector is no longer a problem; import-caused long-term domestic economic disruption is less of a threat, and the US economy will tend to be labor-scarce. All of these things tend to cause inflationary pressures, and if policies are governed by past conventional wisdom the inflation could become very severe. Noninflationary growth therefore is going to require improved use of

our resources, and this is going to require increased research and development, significant expenditures on technical training, and expanded two-way trade. The United States needs imports and much of the world needs US markets to obtain rapid rates of growth. The US market is our best foreign policy tool and economic growth is our greatest guarantee of long-term security.

The American political system is already adjusting to some of the new realities, but bureaucrats and much of the political system—particularly labor—will continue to operate on inertia. Labor will remain protectionist for a few more years—perhaps most of all because when they were hurting we lowered the average level of tariff protection. (Labor's protectionist instincts in the '50s were correct because if the prices of currencies cannot change, even in the long run, comparative advantage does not work.) Yet it is the responsibility of the Foreign Service to understand the changed realities and to design recommendations and ar-

guments accordingly. This means that instead of glibly accepting that an import liberalization will severely disrupt US markets or that some loan is good for relations or that some bargaining stance is too tough, or some position too confrontational, we will have to learn to do some research and analysis, contracting as necessary, using the new tools of electronic computation and drawing on the resources of the research institutes and universities. We are going to have to do our homework because cleverness will no longer suffice. Policy recommendations based on the new realities will frequently be rejected but in the course of arguing for them and proving our case, we will help peel back outdated conventional wisdom and misinformation. It is hoped that, by the time these changes are recognized and policies adapted accordingly, present economic realities will not yet have been replaced by a new set of realities. If the Foreign Service chooses, it can help shorten the lag, it can be part of the solution instead of part of the problem. 

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LETTERS TO FSJ

Human Rights

 I am writing in reference to Donald Johnson's article, "Congress, the Executive, and Human Rights Legislation" (FSJ, December 1976).

There are many problems inherent in Congressional legislation about an issue that is basically internal to other countries as well as international. Nevertheless, there are more positive aspects to this Congressional action than Mr. Johnson has acknowledged.

First, he fails to distinguish the development assistance legislation from the security assistance legislation. The development assistance legislation bars assistance to any country which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights "unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such country." Therefore the conflict Mr. Johnson raises between the moral uplift regarding human rights versus the needs of the "poorest of the poor" simply does not exist in any case where the latter can clearly be served.

Second, Mr. Johnson assumes that the problem of Executive insensitivity to this issue is now past. The very fact that agreed definitions of human rights and their relationship to foreign policy objectives are still so hard to come by suggests that both the Executive and the Congress will need to study this issue for some time before there is a shared sense of priorities on this matter. Moreover, Mr. Johnson fails to note that the existence of the legislation provides the easiest point of entree for the Executive in raising this sensitive issue with other countries. Because it is in the legislation, Embassies have a formal basis, as well as a requirement, for raising what would otherwise be so troublesome an issue that it might not be raised at all. If the legislation were now repealed before other better mechanisms were in place, the momentum of the last two years toward better recognition of this issue could well be lost.

Other countries express their moral preference in foreign policy. African nations never hesitate to express their indignation about support to racist or apartheid ac-

tivities in international affairs, even though they recognize acutely their limited ability to enforce their values on the actions of others. Reconciling one's moral values with the realities of the nation's other interests and the limitations of its ability should always be a task of the foreign policy establishment and a challenge that the Executive in this case should continue to be pressed to undertake.

PRINCETON LYMAN
Director, USAID/E

Addis Ababa

Land for the Landless

 As one who served AID programs in Iran and South Korea through the 1960-1969 decade, I found Dino J. Caterini's *Ugly American Revisited* (FSJ, January, '77) on target in the aspect of US foreign policy to which it was addressed. Action was the mode in Iran when I was there (1959-65) to the point that some projects were being repeated the third time for lack of any policy of follow-up to assure use of findings already supplied and agreed upon.

In his conclusion that our Vietnam failure stemmed from a misemphasis on action, however, I believe Caterini has missed the main point. The failure of counter-insurgency was a failure of policy, not of action. Action was necessary, but was focused on the wrong point of conflict. US policy did not recognize that communism, being an idea, cannot be shot with counter-insurgency bullets any more than with regular army bullets.

Being an idea, communism can only be defeated by a better idea. The Vietnam conflict offered a plain opportunity to apply a better idea than communism in the matter of land ownership—the key element in the Vietnamese internal conflict. We had already applied this idea (1945-51) with conspicuous success in Japan, where we financed the transfer of land ownership from the landlord class to the peasant class, and in Taiwan, where we assisted in a similar program. The communist idea for South Vietnam, of course, was to con peasant support with false promises of land ownership, then usurp those rights into state ownership as soon as they achieved power.

American policy decreed hands off direct action on the land ownership problem of South Vietnam with the approach used in Japan and Taiwan. There is every reason to believe that US-financed land ownership transfer to the peasant class in South Vietnam would have enlisted massive peasant support to our side, including Vietcong support, and thus robbed the communist insurgents of their ability to continually undermine our efforts through other channels. To apply that idea in South Vietnam would have cost only an insignificant fraction of the war's dollar cost, not to mention its cost in lives.

Not our reliance on combat action, but neglect of a proved line of non-combat action, was the failure. It was a failure of policy.

KENNETH B. PLATT
Moscow, Idaho

Tribute to F.S. Artists

 I would like to say how much I've enjoyed the covers of the *Journal* over the years. They are colorful, imaginative and varied—really unique for a magazine. Many compliments for such a fine production!

JOHN L. KUHN
FSO-retired
Falls Village, Conn.

The Angolan Trunk

 The arm of coincidence is indeed long.

In Rome I attended recently a press conference called by front organizations of the Italian Communist party. The speaker was Lopo di Nascimento, prime minister of Angola. The prime minister was drumming up support in Italy for Angola's membership in the UN (first opposed, then unopposed by the US).

In more than 40 minutes of speech, questions and answers, Mr. di Nascimento never once mentioned the major foreign force in Angola engaged in battle against its citizens. The reporters, prudently leftist as are many "independent" Italian reporters, managed to dig around the edges of Angola's battle without once introducing the words evaded by the prime minister: Cuba, Castro, Russia and Communist.

This performance of Hamlet without the prince of Denmark, despite its dexterity, irked and embarrassed me professionally. I

ventured to ask the guest how many Cubans were fighting in Angola, how long they would stay, how many western correspondents had been expelled, and why.

The prime minister declined to reveal the number of Cubans engaged, but said they would remain as long as the Angolan army needed "training." How many foreign newsmen had been expelled, or why, he was unable to say. "Six," said one of his aides. (The current total is around ten.)

Not long afterward I received my subscriber's copy of the July *FSJ* featuring "U.S. Policy Toward Africa" by Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, chairman of the Senate's subcommittee on African affairs. And it was in reading this 3,500 word treatment of Southern Africa that I met my wholly unlooked for coincidence.

The views of Africa held by the Senator from Iowa and the Prime Minister of Angola were virtually identical. The senator, like the prime minister, criticized the United States for being too niggardly with handouts to newborn states. Neither statesman mentioned that the State Department in April had eased Angola's problem of paying off debts to Cuba and Russia by releasing \$102 million in Gulf Oil Company revenues.

But the most remarkable resemblance was this: the Angola of both gentlemen presented the same paraplegic appearance. No Cuban forces at all. No Castro personality in charge of this daring 5,000 mile lift of 18,000 men. No Soviet transports. No Canadian cooperation, followed up by Trudeau's congratulatory visit to Cuba. Just an Angolan torso, operating by itself.

When those non-existent Cubans have wiped out their last village in southern Angola, and the US moves from tolerance in the UN to full recognition of Russia's victory in Angola, it should not be difficult to persuade Senator Clark to choose the first American ambassador to the new dictatorship.

GEORGE WELLER

Chicago Daily News, retired
Rome

Air Travel, 1939-45

 For some years I have been researching a history of transatlantic air travel. One of the great

"blindspots" is the World War II period and I hope that those of your readers who flew the Atlantic as passengers during the war will assist me by sharing their experiences. Let me explain why.

The first scheduled transatlantic airplane passenger service was inaugurated by Pan American Airways on 28 June 1939. The one-way fare was \$350, about half the price of a new Ford or Chevrolet. And two months later Europe was at war. As a result of the neutrality act PanAm had to suspend services to Marseilles and over the northern route to Ireland and England. The only service remaining was via Bermuda and the Azores to neutral Portugal.

It may be recalled that these aircraft were flying boats. Weather information was poor. The sea conditions in the Azores were often wretched. And many a flight was delayed for days (indeed, days and days), waiting for the swells to subside in the Azores.

The war created a boom in transatlantic air mail services beyond the wildest dreams of the 1930s. Mail was adjudged more important than a traveler's whim and space aboard the PanAm Clippers came to be strictly allocated relative to mail loads. On more than one occasion the Clippers took off with their cabins jammed with mail sacks and only one passenger—a State Department courier. So it went through 1940 and 1941.

In 1942 American Export Airlines inaugurated transatlantic services and was later joined by TWA and American Airlines; and the Army Air Forces and the United States Navy began their own regular services. And the flying boats were gradually transcended by landplanes. All of these operations were cloaked in wartime security and today very little is known about them beyond barebones statistics. By 1944 transatlantic flight service had become commonplace.

As a result of wartime security and the almost "overnight" success of the airway and its operations it is—even 30 years later—impossible to determine what transatlantic air travel was like during those "primitive" years.

RICHARD K. SMITH

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Discrimination Case



On January 13, 1977, Betty (Elizabeth J.) Kirby, an FSSO 3, a valiant member of the Foreign Service, died after a long illness. Despite her physical condition, she literally continued to work until the last minute.

Betty was first detailed to the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission in September of 1971. She came to my office from another area of ARBA in March of 1974. Because she had performed at an officer level in her previous position, I immediately placed her in an officer position in the International Section. She performed her duties in a superior fashion.

Despite her outstanding performance, which was reflected in her Officer Evaluation Reports, Betty was unable to have her status changed from the secretarial cone to an officer level in another area of activity. Indeed, on one occasion, she was firmly told that when she returned to State, she would again be placed in a secretarial job. Being a fighter, she resolved not to be outdone and set in motion various efforts to remedy that situation. After being unsuccessful within the system, she instituted a suit in District Court.

From what I know of this case, it represents a glaring example of sex discrimination and even an element of bigotry is involved on the part of many in the personnel system in State.

There is nothing that Betty can do now, which explains my letter to the *Foreign Service Journal*. As a Foreign Service Officer (Retired) of 31½ years, and a former Chairman of the Board of the Foreign Service Association, I should like to bring this matter to public attention in the hope that the high-handed treatment accorded Betty will not be repeated over and over with other female employees.

I am sending a copy of this letter to the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. However, I would appreciate it if the letter could be printed in the *Foreign Service Journal*, as it will help to publicize an attitude which has existed far too long and which should be brought, as dramatically as possible, to the attention of all concerned.

WILLIAM L. BLUE

THE HEMENWAY RECALL: WAS IT LEGAL, FAIR, AND PROPER?

These questions will be adjudicated pursuant to a full trial within the next few months, following a January 5 ruling by Judge Barrington Parker of the D.C. court. In order to form objective and professional judgments about this case, AFSA members should be apprised of the facts and the issues involved.

The true facts are:

- Hemenway won a plurality of votes cast in the 1975 AFSA election, after campaigning to seek Foreign Service reform and restore professional integrity in the U.S. diplomatic service;
- The elected Governing Board was gradually replaced—in some cases illegally—by appointees representing the Department's Policy Planning Staff and other Management units who spearheaded a determined effort to nullify the results of the 1975 election; and
- At the very first meeting of the new AFSA Governing Board in July, 1975, those opposed to Foreign Service reform passed the first of several illegal resolutions designed to muzzle Hemenway and strip him of his proper authority as AFSA President;
- Despite the illegal and improper efforts to discredit and harass him, Hemenway devoted his full time, throughout his Presidency, without salary, to the pursuit of equitable grievance procedures and other reforms that would benefit the Foreign Service.

Judge Parker will adjudicate three issues in this case:

- Whether the circumstances surrounding Hemenway's recall present a classic case of prohibited retaliation against a member of an organization subject to Executive Order 11636 and implementing regulations (which incorporate the Bill of Rights provisions of the Landrum-Griffith Act) for the exercise of legally protected rights*;
- Whether the defendants were so eager to oust Hemenway—effective the earliest possible date after the national election in November—that they short-circuited their own due process requirements by denying him any reasonable opportunity to defend himself; and
- Whether the defendants' procedural claim that the plaintiffs should have presented their case before the Employee-Management Relations Commission is meritorious. (The Commission itself has tacitly acknowledged that it lacks experience and staff to deal effectively with such matters.)

**Only malfeasance would be a proper basis for condemnation, and this was not charged.*

In short, the Hemenway suit seeks to make AFSA officers responsible to the true professional interests of the career diplomatic service. In the same way, stockholders sue corrupt corporation Directors to improve the integrity and effectiveness of the enterprise in which they have a legitimate interest.

THIS PAID ADVERTISEMENT WAS MADE NECESSARY BY THE REFUSAL OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL TO PRINT THE TRUE FACTS REGARDING THE HEMENWAY PRESIDENCY AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING ITS DEMISE. EACH ISSUE HAS SELECTIVELY INCORPORATED MISLEADING, INACCURATE, AND MALICIOUS ARTICLES CAMOUFLAGED AS "AFSA NEWS" AND ONE-SIDED LETTERS DELIBERATELY CALCULATED TO MISLEAD THE MEMBERSHIP REGARDING WHAT HEMENWAY HAS AND HAS NOT DONE AND TO INCITE HOSTILITY AGAINST HEMENWAY.

.....

At a prouder point in AFSA history—the late 1930's and early 1940's—the *Journal* was a vigorous advocate of Foreign Service personnel reform. Its far-seeing articles and editorials promoted public recognition and Congressional sympathy for an improved atmosphere for the exercise of professional diplomacy. The resulting Foreign Service Act of 1946 was a major advance over the Rogers Act of 1924—but the time is ripe for Congressional review of its premises and prescriptions. The *Journal*—and the AFSA leadership—over the past few years—have adamantly opposed this.

.....

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
THE HEMENWAY LEGAL DEFENSE FUND
4816 Rodman Street, N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20016.

(A more detailed description of the case is available on request.)

.....

This is a paid advertisement, authorized and paid for by the Hemenway Legal Defense Fund, John D. Hemenway, Trustee.

AFSA NEWS



This portion of the JOURNAL is the responsibility of the Governing Board of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.

Members wishing to send letters on employment, working conditions or AFSA affairs should get them to AFSA by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication. *AFSA News Committee, Room 3644, N.S.*

NEW STATE REP



Alta Fowler, FSO-3, is Chief, Division of Claims, Deaths and Estates and Judicial Services, Office of Special Consular Services, SCA. She returned to the Department in March 1975 from Sydney, where she had been Supervisory Consul for Australia for three years. Miss Fowler had previously served in London, the Department, Tunis, Dacca, Dublin, Valletta, Brussels and Sydney.

At her overseas posts, Miss Fowler has been connected with several organizations, such as the Brussels International Women's Club, the Brussels English Language Mental Health Association, and International Toastmistress Clubs in Australia and the United States. She is the current President of the Civil Service Toastmistress Club and Chairman of the Consular Officers' Association.

Miss Fowler obtained her B.Sc. from Northwestern University in 1946 and an M.A. in International Relations at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1950.

AFSA ELECTION NOTICE:

CLOSE OF NOMINATIONS AND OPENING OF CAMPAIGN: ROLE OF FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

The AFSA Elections Committee wishes to remind all AFSA members that the nominating phase of the 1977 AFSA election, which was initiated by the January 28, 1977 Election Call, will be completed on March 11, 1977. Nominations must be received by the AFSA Elections Committee, P.O. Box 40602, Washington, D.C. 20016, no later than 12:00 noon, March 4, 1977. Nominees will have until noon March 11, 1977 to confirm their acceptance of nomination. An official list of candidates will be announced by the Elections Committee immediately thereafter.

In accordance with instructions to be issued to all candidates by the Elections Committee, each candidate will be invited, as provided in the AFSA Bylaws, to distribute a campaign statement to members in a special elections section of the April issue of the *Foreign Service Journal*. Each candidate will also be permitted to circulate a campaign statement in a special elections section of the May issue of the *Foreign Service Journal*.

In order to assure the impartiality of the *Foreign Service Journal* and *AFSA News*, the Elections Committee has ruled that throughout the election period, the *Foreign Service Journal* and *AFSA News* will publish no material, other than the candidates' statements described in the preceding paragraph, bearing upon the election campaign. No letters, editorials, or articles on, by, or referring to candidates or concerning campaign issues may be published during the election period.

Any AFSA member as an individual or as a representative of a

committee or group of members may, however, submit advertisements for publication in the *Foreign Service Journal* in support of any candidate or concerning any issue in the election, provided that such material is clearly identified as an advertisement and bears the name of the member who submits and pays for it.

The AFSA Elections Committee has taken these decisions after careful review of past AFSA election experience and in fulfillment of the responsibility vested in it by a resolution of the AFSA Governing Board, adopted January 25, 1977. That resolution declares, in part, "The *Foreign Service Journal* Editorial Board and the *AFSA News* Committee are authorized and directed to provide to the Elections Committee Chairman any material intended for the *Foreign Service Journal* or *AFSA News* editions, beginning with the March edition and extending through the July edition; and to follow any instructions given by the Elections Committee Chairman with respect to the publication of such material."

FOREIGN SERVICE DAY 1977

Foreign Service Day 1977 will take place Friday April 22 in the Department of State. This year's program will include several general discussions in the morning followed by a series of separate roundtable meetings on specific subjects in the afternoon. The final event will be a Saturday morning brunch in the AFSA Club.

AFSA CHAPTER MANUAL

We are updating the AFSA Chapter and Keyman Manual which was published in April 1976 and sent to all Washington Keymen and to all AFSA Reps abroad. We would like to solicit comment from the general membership as well, either through your keyperson/AFSA Rep or directly to: AFSA MANUAL, AFSA, Room 3644, N.S. Thank you.

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COMMITTEE ON EXTRAORDINARY DANGERS AND TERRORISM REPORT

The Abu Daoud Affair

The AFSA Governing Board resolution (published in the February 1977 *FSJ*) was inserted into the Congressional Record by Senator and former Ambassador Daniel P. Moynihan. Senator Moynihan also stated on January 26th that:

"I would like to point out to the Senate that Mr. Abu Daoud has the blood on his hands, in a metaphoric but real enough sense, not simply of Israeli citizens but of American citizens. On the 2d of March of 1973, Ambassador Cleo Noel and his deputy, George C. Moore, were murdered in cold blood in the city of Khartoum in the Sudan by members of the Black September group, which is the operating assassin corps of Al Fatah, of which Mr. Daoud is an acknowledged member.

"Those murders shocked the civilized world, as they ought, and were a reminder to Americans, among others, of the price which the Foreign Service exacts of its members. Those men went bravely and without protest to their deaths, but in their memory not least, the American Foreign Service Association has sent a telegram of protest to the French Ambassador. . ."

Also, the Senate voted a resolution (93-0) strongly criticizing the French government's release of Abu Daoud. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee also approved a resolution declaring that Daoud's release has served to undermine international efforts to halt terrorism.

High-Level Terrorism Review

The Committee on Extraordi-

nary Dangers continues to press for a high-level review of our terrorism policy and met recently with Ambassador Heck to ensure that management clearly understands our position. We have indicated that we wish to participate in any high-level review of this subject.

Cyprus

Finally, some good news: The Nicosian government announced that they were charging six persons with crimes relating to the killing of Ambassador Davies and his secretary on August 19, 1974. One of the six already is in jail; the other five have been arrested by the police under court warrants. AFSA will be following this case closely and will report on its disposition.

Moscow: Drinking Water

We have been told by management that the cyanide and mercury traces found in Embassy houses' drinking water were due to contamination of the samples. We have requested the original records of the testing so that we may determine for ourselves the facts of this case. We have also suggested that examinations be made of employees and dependents who resided in the houses in question to determine whether or not there may be traces of the toxic substances in their bodies. This will help to determine whether or not this phenomenon actually took place.

Radiation

We are continuing to press the Department to obtain the total

cessation of the radiation of our Embassy in Moscow. This topic was brought up in briefings with the new Administration team and in a letter from the AFSA President to the Secretary of State. We continue to believe that it is an absolute necessity that the radiation be stopped as a matter of principle. Further, we are requesting from the Department all relevant information and studies that have been made within the US government dealing with the Moscow radiation situation.

F.S. EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT LEGISLATION

Executive Order 11636 issued in December 1971 gives Foreign Service employees the right to bargain collectively with the foreign affairs agencies' management on personnel policies and procedures and working conditions. Representation elections were held in the three agencies in 1972, and in 1973 AFSA was certified as the exclusive employee representative for the Foreign Service. (In March 1976, we lost the place in USIA to a challenge from AFGE.) Civil Servants already had the right to organize—under Executive Order 11491—and many are members of AFGE (AFL-CIO).

For several years AFSA has had in draft a legislated framework for Foreign Service employee-management relations. We have now received bills introduced into the House at the behest of the AFL-CIO and several government employee unions which would lump in with the Civil Service the Foreign Service with its unique rank-in-person personnel structure and worldwide assignments system. Congress in this session may act upon such legislation for government employees, and so the F.S. *must* make its views known and protect its unique interests.

On February 1 the Governing Board referred this matter to the AFSA Legal Committee, which believes that this task should be shared with as many members as would be willing to help. If you are interested, please call the Legal Committee at the AFSA office in Room 3644 at 632-8160.

AFSA PROTESTS DOD's MEDICAL CARE INCREASE

Responding to AFSA protests, the Department of State is initiating discussions with the Defense Department regarding DOD's announced decision to raise the charge for medical outpatient care for non-DOD personnel overseas from \$1 per visit to \$20 effective April 1, 1977.

Many State, AID, and USIA personnel overseas are dependent on DOD medical facilities. While the Department is authorized to cover most costs for actual hospitalization, the employees and their dependents are alone responsible for all outpatient charges. Thus, the DOD increase in charges

threatens to place a heavy financial burden on Foreign Service personnel.

When communicating with DOD, the Department has noted that it provides considerable support to DOD medical facilities abroad in the forms of providing consultation support and providing some transportation, housing and per diem for DOD medical personnel. Naturally, it is too early to predict at this time what arrangements will be worked out both between the Department and DOD and within the Department to protect the legitimate interests of the men and women of the Foreign Service and their families.



Shown at AFSA's Annual Awards Program in the Dean Acheson Auditorium on January 18 are, l. to r., Charles Mann, Leonard Marks, Mrs. Christian Herter, Secretary Kissinger, AFSA President Patricia Woodring, Governor Harriman, and Mrs. John Sterry Long.

AFSA's ANNUAL AWARDS PROGRAM

Present as guests on the dais were Charles Mann, Assistant Administrator, AID, Leonard Marks, president of the Marks Foundation and a former Director of USIA, Mrs. Christian Herter, Eugene Kopp, Acting Director, USIA, Mrs. Enid Long, widow of Ambassador Rivkin, and Governor Averell Harriman.

The awards bore the following citations:

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER AWARD: THOMAS D. BOYATT, FSO-2.

Mr. Boyatt, while serving as Country Director for Cyprus in the months prior to the coup which temporarily led to the deposition of the Makarios government, repeatedly warned higher levels of the US Government that events were about to transpire which would seriously undermine US interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Subsequent events have vindicated Mr. Boyatt's exceptionally insightful analysis. After the crisis, he wrote a strong memorandum through the "Dissent Channel" dispassionately analyzing the circumstances and recommending steps to make the best of the situation. Months later, Mr. Boyatt's dissent memorandum became the subject of a Constitutional struggle between the Executive and the Legislative branches of the Government. Despite enormous pressures on him from both sides, he acquitted himself in a fashion which gained the admiration and respect of both branches and thereby reflected the highest credit on himself and the Foreign Service.

WILLIAM R. RIVKIN AWARD: WILLIAM R. LENDERKING, FSIO-3.

Despite strong pressures toward "team play," Mr. Lenderking maintained vigorous and independent views on our policy toward a major ally at a time when that policy was a front-page and controversial issue. He gave an example of real commitment to openness and professionalism by bringing forward his reasoned, moderate and cogent observations both at his mission and twice through the dissent channel to Washington without consideration of potential consequences to his career.

MARKS FOUNDATION AWARD: GUNTHER K. ROSINUS, FSIO-2.

For the designing, organizing and executing of four national student leader seminars, known as the Tagaytay Seminars, of major public affairs importance in the Philippines during a period of rapidly rising anti-American sentiment and demonstrations, especially among university youth. For achieving through the seminars and a series of post-seminar publications, objectives within and far beyond intellectual circles in the Philippines, and directed at stimulating a rational dialogue between Americans and Filipinos on the reasons for US military and economic presence in the Philippines. For showing that the complexities of national development and US-Philippine relations could best be resolved by such rational dialogue, and opening key channels of communication with future Philippine leadership. *Excerpts from the Secretary's and Ms. Woodring's speeches at the Awards program appear on pages 4 and 5 of this issue.*

AFSA PRESIDENT SEEKS MEETING WITH SECRETARY VANCE

AFSA President Woodring has written Secretary Vance requesting an early meeting in order to discuss certain issues "in which we hope you will take a direct interest" including the following:

- *Presidential Appointments* — AFSA has warmly welcomed your and the President's commitment to reform the ambassadorial selection process to end politically motivated appointments of unqualified persons and to base ambassadorial selection purely on merit. We have long favored this approach and look forward to exploring with you ways to assure that Foreign Service professionals as well as outside "professionals" are fully considered for all positions.

- *Timely Solution to Problems of Foreign Service Staff People* — for years Foreign Service Staff people have received second-class treatment overseas. More recently, communicators and secretaries have had hopes of promotion extinguished or deferred, while management's plans to create better career opportunities for specialists keep slipping, and the reclassification of their jobs is not expected before mid-1978 at the earliest. We urge you to instruct your staff to attach a much higher priority to resolving the problems of Foreign Service Staff people.

- *Review of Anti-Terrorism Policy* — we strongly believe that the current policies in dealing with terrorist organizations who hold American diplomats hostage, and the governments who support or harbor such organizations, are in-

adequate. We will be asking you to authorize a fresh look at these policies.

• *Microwave Radiation in Moscow* — we believe that further efforts must be made to stop the radiation, to push forward with the independent biostatistical study of its effects on health, and to handle this matter so as to restore our constituents' confidence in the government's concern for their health.

• *Foreign Service Employee-Management Relations Legislation* — we have found that Executive Order 11636, which governs employee-management relations in the three foreign affairs agencies, has a number of weaknesses, notably its excessively in-house character. We support legislated federal employee-management relations, but believe that the Foreign Service is sufficiently different from the Civil Service to warrant continuing separate treatment. We hope to persuade you to authorize the Department to explore with us the possibility of agreement on appropriate amendments to the Foreign Service Act.

• *Career Status for AID Foreign Service People* — All AID Foreign Service people are in a sense temporary appointees, without career tenure. We support

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legislation to give them status comparable to that of their colleagues in State and USIA, as well as to signal the Administration's long-term commitment to the improvement of our relations with the Third World. We also hope that you will be prepared to use your authority over AID, when necessary, to improve relationships between its management and its Foreign Service employees.

• *Organization and Management Issues* — in our professional capacity, we are interested in the reorganization of the official foreign affairs community to make it more effective, an issue which we know is of great interest to the President and to you. We have established an Organization and Management Committee to consider reorganization issues and to seek the views of our colleagues on these, and we believe that we have the capability to produce useful work in this area. We will be seeking your agreement in principle to confer with AFSA on reorganization issues.

Foreign Service People

Marriages

Weiss-Manes. Susan Rachel Weiss, daughter of FSO-retired and Mrs. Leonard Weiss, was married to Joseph Manes, on January 7, in Washington.

Births

Hall. A daughter, Catherine Cecile, born to FSO and Mrs. J. H. Hall, on January 14, in Manassas.

Deaths

Barnes. Kyle D. Barnes, FSO-retired, died on January 7, in Washington. Mr. Barnes joined the State Department in 1948 and the Foreign Service in 1954. He served at Port-au-Prince, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo before his retirement in 1973. He is survived by his wife, Marcella R. Barnes, 1121 University Boulevard, West, Silver Spring, Maryland, and a son.

Connelly. Bernard C. Connelly, FSO-retired, died on February 3, in Massachusetts. Mr. Connelly entered the Foreign Service in 1931 and served at Trieste, Sydney, Melbourne, Bucharest, Karachi, Kabul, Lima, Pretoria, Zagreb and Lyon before his retirement in 1960. He is survived by a son, Bernard D., 4620 Drummond Ave., Chevy Chase, two daughters, Adelaide At-

wood of Sudbury, Mass., and Elizabeth Johnson, of Taiwan, and five grandchildren.

Kirby. Elizabeth J. Kirby, FSSO, died on January 13, in Washington. Ms. Kirby joined the Foreign Service in 1955 and served at Addis Ababa, Hong Kong, Seoul, Luxembourg and the Department. In 1971 she had a temporary assignment at the White House, followed by a detail to the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration. Since March of 1974 she had served as an ARBA International Program officer. She is survived by her sister, Alice L. Kirby, of 806 Janney's Lane, Alexandria, Virginia 22302, a brother, Edward P. Kirby, 8320 Gulf Blvd., St. Petersburg Beach, Florida 33706 and a niece, Anne Kirby. The family suggests that memorial contributions may be made to the Leukemia Society of America, Inc., 1625 I St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Kriebel. Jane C. Kriebel, wife of FSO P. Wesley Kriebel, died on November 23, in Bethesda. Mrs. Kriebel accompanied her husband on assignments to Birmingham, Ottawa and Seoul. Mr. Kriebel may be reached at 4324 Kentbury Dr., Bethesda, Maryland.


McLean. Rosemary Borst McLean, wife of FSO-retired Allen B. McLean 11, died on December 30, after being struck by a car in Sarasota, Florida. Mrs. McLean was an abstract painter who had exhibited many times in Washington and had helped in the archeological restoration of Mayan pottery while in Mexico from 1956-60. She is survived by her husband, of 8306 Sanderling, Sarasota, two sons, her parents, two brothers and three sisters.

Rabida. Geoffrey A. Rabida, son of FSO-retired and Mrs. Albert A. Rabida, was killed in an accident at sea on January 26, west of Cape Town, South Africa. Mr. Rabida was the youngest Chief Officer in the US Merchant Marine and was serving on the supertanker *SS New York*. He is survived by his parents and his brother, Gregory, of 6621 Sulky Lane, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

Terranova. Helen Jane Mullen Terranova, FSO-retired and wife of FSO Joseph Terranova, Jr., died on January 28, in New York. Mrs. Terranova joined the Foreign Service in 1945 and served at Antwerp, Paris, Pusan, Bangkok, Bonn, Cairo and Paris before her retirement last year. She is survived by her husband, 4936 Tilden St., N.W., Washington, and a sister, Alice Maida, of East Syracuse, New York. The family suggests that memorial contributions may be made to the American Cancer Society, the Memorial-Sloan Kettering Cancer Center or the Church of the Annunciation in Washington.

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