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FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

NOVEMBER 1977

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
From Thomas Jefferson to Cyrus Vance
by Edward Devol

The Case of John Paton Davies, Jr.
by James Fetzer



**Letter from Japan and
Part II of China-Burma-India**

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Hiring an Employer

 As a postscript to my January 1977 article in your journal, you may be interested to learn of the conclusion to my efforts to "hire myself an employer."

This past April I conducted one week of interviews in New York, Chicago, and Caracas, with eight different commercial banks; the full round-trip airfare from Quito covered by the banks as a group. Within two weeks of my interviews, I had received offers from the Bank of America, Citibank, and Chase Manhattan.

Without hesitation I decided to accept the extremely generous offer of Citibank, to begin with Division II (Latin America) of their International Banking Group as a loan officer/management trainee. Given complete freedom by the bank, I chose to start in their September ten-week training course in New York—that training to then be followed by eight additional weeks in Caracas, before eventual assignment in Latin America.

Returning to the US from Ecuador on July 28th, I received a call the following day from Richard Masters at the State Department. Based upon my availability date of August 1977, he wanted to offer me a place in the Foreign Service Institute class beginning August 24th. When I told him of my previously-made commitment to Citibank, he said he regretted that I had not waited to hear from the Foreign Service first.

There is yet one final footnote to all of this. In late August I was in a car accident, and am now in a leg cast and on crutches for eight weeks. Not desiring to brave New York in my present condition, I telephoned my contact in the personnel department at Citibank to discuss my dilemma. Not only did she willingly agree for me to postpone my starting date until I am off crutches, she also sent numerous textbooks and training materials for me to study until I can fly to New York (travel paid by the bank), and move into housing she has arranged for me there.

In conclusion, I only wish to say that the Foreign Service has some very tough competition as far as the recruiting process is concerned. And, the sooner changes are made in that, the more likely it will be that the Foreign Service can attract and hire good people in the future.

NANCY COLE
Mountain Home, Ark.

Human Rights in Spain

 The *Foreign Service Journal*, in its issue of September 1977, contains an article ("Third Basket at Belgrade," by Sean Kelly) in which the Human Rights situation in Spain is described in incomplete and inaccurate terms.

For the interest of your readers, I would like to clarify the following facts:

1. In a time of political transition and historical acceleration, the article refers "to the first year after Franco's death" and details facts which took place only until March 1976, that is in the politically complex first few months following November 20, 1975.
2. Nothing is said, however, about the intervening period, in which a new government was formed, the Francoist Press Law was abolished, a political amnesty was decreed and all political parties were legalized and took part in the free elections for Parliament that took place earlier this year. The present situation is best characterized by these factors, whereas in Mr. Kelly's article the report of the International Press Institute is presented as suggesting that the press restrictions "still" exist as of today.

JUAN JOSÉ ROVIRA
The Ambassador of Spain
Washington

The Spy Thriller As Counterfeit History

 I offer my enthusiastic agreement with Charles Maechling, Jr. on his book essay in the September *Journal*, "A Spook Called Intrepid: The Spy Thriller as Counterfeit History." And my thanks to the *Journal* for giving him space to do it properly.

I have been bemused for more

than a year by the steady progression toward best-sellerdom by William Stevenson's book, *A Man Called Intrepid*. After reading the book and reviewing it for the *Richmond Times-Dispatch* (I called it "abominably organized, atrociously written . . . overblown, preposterous" etc.) I watched for month after month as the ads grew larger and more brassy and battalions of supposedly intelligent reviewers praised it—fulsomely, I think the word is.

How gratifying, therefore, it is to read Mr. Maechling's essay. He sets the record straight, and in an authoritative manner demolishes a piece of work that should never have been published, or having been should have vanished without a trace. More importantly, he states some valuable conclusions about the way such "fraudulent glamorizations" corrupt history and feed public illusion.

I would add that the publishers whose big budgets go to make something out of nothing, and the reviewers who were taken in by it, don't get my vote.

LEWIS C. MATTISON
USIA-Retired
Hilton Head Is., S.C.

The Consular Shanty

 I recently ran across the following quotation from O. Henry:

"You can't appreciate home 'till you've left it, money until it's spent, your wife 'till she's joined the women's club, nor Old Glory 'till you see it hanging on a broomstick on the shanty of a Consul in a foreign town."

We may go back to that kind of situation if it is decided to tax our allowances.

JOHN EDGAR WILLIAMS
Auckland

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
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Of baseball, yen, elections, Korea, the Emperor's audience and Japanese-American meetings

Letter from Japan

Eastern Japan, including Tokyo, suffered the rainiest August in recent memory. Then came the typhoons of September. Number 9 (the Japanese graciously refrain from naming their typhoons after girls) came appropriately on September 9. But in August the sun shone thoughtfully over the stadium near Osaka where the annual baseball tournament among the high schools of the country was being played, watched certainly by 95 percent of the 95 percent of all citizens who own television sets. Forty-one schools competed day after day until one team was champion. Foreign affairs and high prices were blotted out during these continuous hours when bright,

fresh, tall, good-looking kids pitched, batted, and ran their way to victories or defeats.

But the country's attention was galvanized when their national hero, baseball player Oh Sadanori, hit his 757th home run on September 4, thereby beating the American champion, Henry Aaron, to set a world record. The Japanese went wild, all on television. Incidentally, Oh, the Chinese character for which means "king," is not an ordinary Japanese name and the baseball star is reportedly not a Japanese subject. The Prime Minister decorated Oh and President Carter sent congratulations.

Tokyo is still the most expensive city in the world, according to a September survey published in Geneva, Switzerland. A Scotch-and-soda costs Y1,000 at the revolving bar on top of the New Otani Hotel, which at the present rate of exchange is about \$3.77. The new strength of the yen (about Y265 to the dollar) is welcomed by American exporters who can get more for their products but hits the American visitor who has to change his dollars for fewer yen. The Japanese, however, seem to get along. The most recent poll, published in August, reveals that 90 percent of them believe they belong to the "middle class" and 64 percent agree that they are content with their present life. One Japanese reportedly mused that he hadn't heard the adjective "poor" for a long time. In spite of gloomy forebodings constantly being mouthed by economists and business forecasters, the government stoutly maintains that the growth rate this year will be 6.7 percent, a figure it has been publishing for some time.

The country has adjusted easily to the results of elections to the upper house held July 10, which were ex-

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pected to snatch the majority away from the almost continuously postwar ruling party, the Liberal Democrats. The LDP squeaked through, however, and now, with a recent by-election in its favor, clings to something like a three-seat majority. The opposition parties are hopelessly divided and the prominent political news is the struggle within the Socialist party between the Marxist-Leninist and more moderate factions. They seem on the verge of splitting, as they have seemed before, but they may just manage to stick together to save the vote-getting power they still have. The trend in the last two elections has been toward a vague "middle-of-the-road" represented by the New Liberal Club, the Komeito (a Buddhist-originated party), and the Democratic Socialists. The Communists have lost heavily in the last two elections and are licking their wounds. Some people think Japan is headed for a confused, pre-de Gaulle, French-type, bickering, multi-party system, but others see the Liberal Democrats in power or as the core of a coalition for a considerably time to come. Sometimes the more Japan looks politically like a "fragile blossom," the tougher and more ingenious those at the top become.

Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda, after his "endorsement" by the July electorate, embarked on what was billed as a historical tour of the five countries belonging to ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), plus Burma. Spreading largesse as he went (totals of promised aid and loans added up to about 1½ billion dollars), Mr. Fukuda was welcomed in Bangkok, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Rangoon, and Manila, and met none of the rock-throwing student protesters who battered his predecessor, Kakuei Tanaka, in 1974. The Prime Minister proclaimed the three principles of the "Fukuda Doctrine": Japan will, 1) reject the role of a military power, 2) wants "heart-to-heart" understanding with its Asian neighbors, and 3) will be an "equal partner" of the ASEAN nations. Some Japanese labeled the Fukuda trip as Japan's first true postwar initiative and at least one answer to the constant prodding of Japan by Americans to "take a more active role in Asia."

Korea has been much in the Japanese headlines this summer. President Carter's decision to withdraw American ground forces from South Korea has produced both favorable and adverse reactions. The Foreign Office is reported to have tried unsuccessfully to get the word "withdraw" changed to "reduce" in the joint communique issued after the March Fukuda-Carter talks in Washington, which suggests some nervousness among Japanese officials. Prime ministers since 1969 have consistently signed statements with US presidents about the security of Korea being vital to the security of Japan. The leftists want all US forces out of Korea and many conservatives prefer the status quo. A hundred of the more conservative conservatives made their views known to Americans in a full-page advertisement published in the *New York Times* of Sunday, July 17, signing themselves as the Committee of Citizens Concerned about Peace and Prosperity of East Asia. The ad took the form of an open letter to President Carter, opining that "criticism in the US of the current governments of the Republic of China and the Republic of Korea is largely incorrect and unfortunate" and asserting that a "major change in the status quo [meaning withdrawal of American troops from South Korea] would surely be a tragic mistake." Signers included no present government officials or Diet mem-

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From Thomas Jefferson to Cyrus Vance

EDWARD DEVOL

Like so many vital American institutions, it began with Thomas Jefferson.

He returned to America in 1789 after four years as US Minister to France. He had told French friends it was the last public office he would accept. On his arrival in Virginia he received a letter from George Washington, offering him appointment as the new government's first Secretary of State.

Jefferson reluctantly postponed his return to private life and spent the next four years in a job made distasteful by the constant struggle with Alexander Hamilton over the shape the young government should take. In 1793 he wrote his friend James Madison that while every citizen owed his country a tour of duty, his had now been served. Soon afterward, he wrote President Washington that he wanted "to retire to scenes of greater tranquility," and by January was back at Monticello. Perhaps the 55 men who have followed Jefferson as Secretary of

State were less reluctant to accept the job. Surely few have found as much pleasure in private study and contemplation. Yet, when we look at them we find similarities between the first Secretary and his successors.

Jefferson was trained as a lawyer, served in the Continental Congress, was governor of his state, was chief of an overseas mission—all before taking up his cabinet duties.


Of the 56 Secretaries, 48 have been lawyers, eight serving as Attorney General before taking the foreign affairs post. Thirty-three had previously served in Congress (ten in both houses). Ten had been state governors. Eleven had been chiefs of permanent overseas missions. Two others had served in subordinate positions in such missions.

It would be surprising today if a new Secretary had already headed a permanent mission abroad. A number of recent incumbents have carried out special overseas assignments before joining the cabinet, but for more than 52 years no one has assumed the office with day-to-day responsibility for a

country team under his belt. Frank Kellogg was Ambassador to the United Kingdom when President Coolidge appointed him Secretary in 1925. The last previous instance occurred 27 years before that, when John Hay returned from the London embassy to join the cabinet of William McKinley.

More than a third of the pre-Civil War Secretaries had served abroad. James Monroe had been minister to both France and Britain; James Buchanan to Russia, Lewis Cass to France. Louis McLane and Edward Everett had been ministers to Great Britain and John Forsyth minister to Spain. Less common in the early days, and unheard of for over 60 years, was a man accepting appointment to an overseas mission after having been Secretary. The last was Robert Bacon, the Wall Street banker who was one of Theodore Roosevelt's Secretaries of State before going to France as Ambassador. Four former Secretaries in the nineteenth century were willing to take such subordinate positions, among them Martin Van Buren and James Buchanan, both of whom went to London as minister after

Edward Devol is a former USIA Foreign Service officer and editor now free-lancing in the Washington area.



FIRST MINISTER TO ENGLAND. RECEPTION OF JOHN ADAMS.

their service as Secretary.

Some of the nineteenth century secretaries brought really extensive diplomatic experience to the office. None was better prepared than John Quincy Adams when James Monroe appointed him Secretary in 1817.

Adams was only 14 when he went to St. Petersburg as private secretary to the United States envoy. After a few months in Russia he went to Paris as secretary to his father, who was one of the commissioners negotiating a peace treaty with Britain. At the age of 27 he was appointed Minister to the Netherlands. Two years later he was named Minister to Portugal, but his father's election to the presidency changed his assignment to Berlin, where he headed the mission for four years. After service in the Senate he returned to the scene of his first foreign experience as Minister to Russia. In 1814 he was one of the negotiators of the Treaty of Ghent; Henry Clay, who became Adams's Secretary of State 11 years later, was another member of the delegation.

In 1815, James Madison appointed Adams Minister to Great

Britain, a position his father had been the first to occupy and which his son was to hold during the Civil War. (Following another family precedent, Charles Francis Adams took his young son Henry with him as private secretary.)

Another experienced man was John W. Foster, the Indiana lawyer and editor who was Benjamin Harrison's second Secretary of State—and the grandfather of Dwight Eisenhower's first. Foster had previously headed overseas missions for three other Republican presidents—Minister to Mexico under Grant, to Russia under Hayes, and to Spain under Arthur.

John Hay, who began public service as one of Lincoln's White House secretaries, was in Europe on an assignment when Lincoln was assassinated, and spent the next several years as legation secretary in Vienna, Paris, and Madrid. Before McKinley named him to the cabinet, Hay had also been Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Britain.

Presidents and Secretaries of State are sometimes a trial to one another and there have been

remarkable disagreements between them through the years, starting quite early. Edmund Randolph resigned in disgrace after George Washington confronted him at a cabinet meeting with evidence that the Secretary had solicited money from the French envoy. Washington replaced him with Timothy Pickering, whom John Adams retained in his Administration.

Pickering hated the godless French republic as an agent of the devil and was delighted by the outbreak of the undeclared naval war with France. When the French made overtures of peace, Adams appointed a commission to go to Paris, then went home to Massachusetts for a vacation. Pickering, disgusted that the President was abandoning the contest with evil, deliberately delayed the departure of the commission. They did not sail for France until Adams returned from vacation and ordered them aboard ship. Pickering rejected Adams's request for his resignation and finally was informed he had been dismissed.

James Buchanan, Polk's Secretary of State when war was declared against Mexico, offered the

President a draft circular which would inform overseas missions that the United States desired no territory whatever from Mexico. Since Polk wanted California at the very least, the unnecessarily idealistic draft went into the wastebasket. Even more incredible incomprehension of the President's policy was displayed by Secretary William Seward in 1861. He sent Lincoln a memorandum proposing that the best way to get the seceded states back into the Union was to go to war against France and Spain.

The desire to acquire more territory was a preoccupation to many Americans in the nineteenth century and they did not always care how they got it. Buchanan, who had wanted no territory from Mexico when he was Secretary in 1846, felt differently as Minister to Britain eight years later. When President Pierce instructed Buchanan and two other US diplomats in Europe to draw up a plan for the purchase of Cuba from Spain, they produced a document stating that if Spain refused to sell, "by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power." This threat of war was leaked to the New York *Tribune*, causing consternation at home and abroad, and had to be disavowed by Pierce and Secretary of State Marcy.

The young, bumptious democracy of the Western Hemisphere often felt contempt for the undemocratic decadence of the Old World, and even a Secretary of State was capable of expressing such sentiments, especially if they could be accompanied by a stirring comparison of American liberty and European repression.

A classic example was Daniel Webster's note to the Austrian chargé in 1850. Many Americans had sympathized with the Hungarians in their revolt against the Hapsburg monarchy in 1848. In response to this popular feeling a US agent was sent to Hungary to report on developments and enable Washington to ascertain when conditions were right for recognition of an independent, democratic Hungary. The agent arrived in Hungary too late to be effective; Russian troops had already crushed the revolt. When papers relating to the

agent were made public in 1850, the Austrian chargé complained to Webster about this interference in the domestic affairs of another nation. The Secretary, who had just assumed office, sent a reply that began with a ringing statement of the US role as a successful example of free and democratic government, and went on to belittle the Austro-Hungarian Empire in these undiplomatic words:

"The power of this republic at the present moment is spread over a region, one of the richest and most fertile on the globe, and of an extent in comparison with which the possessions of the House of Hapsburg are but as a patch on the earth's surface."

Samuel Flagg Bemis, the historian of American diplomacy, said Webster's note "illustrates how in a democratic government responsible political leaders, even statesmen of Webster's stature, are tempted to take advantage of the domestic predicaments of friendly foreign powers in order to curry popular favor at home and serve their own political purposes."

Webster told friends he had couched his note in insulting terms "to let the people of Europe know who and what we are," and to encourage a national feeling of pride and unity at a time when there was much talk of disunion over slavery.

In an era when public men were deemed capable of handling a variety of public offices, Presidents usually filled the cabinet with the leading politicians of the day, instead of seeking experts in the various subjects. Indeed, there were few "experts," since the chains of specialization had not yet been forged.

The State Department was the most valued of cabinet posts, and for the first decades of the nation was seen as a stepping-stone to the Presidency. Six of the first 18 Secretaries went on to become president. Viewed in this light, it was a job ambitious politicians were usually happy to fill, and many of the most famous did so.

The three giants of the pre-Civil War Senate—Webster, Clay and Calhoun—all served as Secretary of State. Webster held the job twice, under William Henry Harrison and Millard Fillmore, dying in office in 1852.

A later power in Congress was

James G. Blaine, Speaker of the House, Senator, three times candidate for the Republican presidential nomination and once the nominee. He, too, was twice Secretary of State, appointed by Garfield and Benjamin Harrison. F. T. Frelinghuysen, who succeeded Blaine in the office in 1881, had been Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, as had John Sherman before McKinley appointed him Secretary in 1897.

The many Secretaries with previous Congressional experience were rather better equipped to deal with a Senate that was aggressively protective of its constitutional prerogatives. Secretaries who lacked "indoctrination" from prior Senate experience, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., wrote, "reacted bitterly to senatorial aggression, considering it the mindless expression of institutional jealousy."

Secretary John Hay, who had considerable foreign service experience but none in the Senate, came near despair at the difficulty of persuading the Senate to accept what ambassadors had negotiated. "The attitude of the Senate toward public affairs," he said, "makes all serious negotiation impossible." He told his friend Henry Adams he sometimes felt the "real" duties of a Secretary were limited to resisting foreign claims, pressing those of US citizens on other nations, and finding overseas jobs for the friends of Senators. "Is it worthwhile for me to keep up this useless labor?" he asked. Hay died in office in 1905, having contended with the Senate—and with some successes—since 1898.

It is hard to imagine a Secretary of the 1970s bringing to the office the varied background possessed by some of the politician-secretaries: Lewis Cass, for instance—frontier lawyer, Ohio legislator, major general in the Ohio militia, brigadier general in the regular army, governor of Michigan territory, all before he was 32 years of age.

After 18 years as territorial governor, a post in which he was much involved in dealings with Indian tribes and problems with the British along the Canadian border, Cass became Secretary of War under Andrew Jackson and directed military operations in the Black Hawk and Seminole Wars.

Jackson then sent him to France as US Minister and Van Buren kept him there until 1841. Back home, he was elected Senator and was the unsuccessful Democratic nominee for President in 1848, losing to that other Regular Army general, Zachary Taylor. Cass wanted the nomination again in 1856, but it went to Buchanan. He also lost his Senate seat, but Buchanan named him Secretary of State. He resigned in December, 1860, because he considered Buchanan too timorous in opposing secession.

Even more impressive variety shows in the life of Edward Everett, who succeeded his good friend Webster in the cabinet of Millard Fillmore. The first Secretary not trained as a lawyer, Everett was a Unitarian minister at the age of 20, the first American to receive a Ph.D. from Gottingen, professor of Greek literature at Harvard (simultaneously editor of the leading literary magazine of the day, the *North American Review*). He left Harvard in 1825 for six years in the House of Representatives, then was elected governor of Massachusetts. In 1841 he became Minister to Great Britain. On his return from London Harvard made him its president.

In a period when oratory was a popular form of entertainment, Everett was one of the most admired public speakers. He delivered the last of his great orations at Gettysburg, November 19, 1863, speaking for two hours in his ornate, learned style, before Abraham Lincoln rose and read his two-minute masterpiece.

Lord Bryce wrote in 1888 that the Office of Secretary of State "is the great prize often bestowed on the man to whom the President is chiefly indebted for his election, or at any rate on one of the leaders of the party." It was bestowed both as an outright reward for services rendered and as a consolation prize for those who had wanted to be president but lacked the votes.

The precedent for awarding it to a defeated contender was set in 1825. In the 1824 election, none of the four leading candidates (John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, Henry Clay, and William Crawford) had received a majority of the electoral votes. When the House of Representatives met to choose the

President, Henry Clay threw the three states he controlled to Adams, thus giving the New Englander the victory. Adams promptly named Clay his Secretary of State and there were cries that a "corrupt bargain" had been made between them. Andrew Jackson never forgave his fellow Westerner for depriving him of the White House. In the recriminations that followed, Clay and John Randolph of Roanoke fought a duel; neither was injured.

Never again did a loser in the na-

"Thomas Hart Benton, the Missouri Senator who had survived a wild gun battle with Jackson and his friends in a Nashville hotel in 1813, knew better. He said, 'You have broken a minister and elected a vice president.' "

tional election obtain the Secretaryship from the winner, but new presidents often appointed men who had tried hard for the nomination of the party to which both belonged. It encouraged the loser to support the candidacy of the nominee. Secretaries put into office in this consoling manner included William March (Franklin Pierce's Secretary), Lewis Cass (Buchanan's), William Seward (Lincoln's chief rival in the 1860 convention), and James G. Blaine, who vied with Grant for several ballots in the 1880 Republican convention that eventually chose James Garfield on the 36th ballot.

In the 1912 Democratic convention, the party was not interested in giving the nomination a fourth time to William Jennings Bryan. However, Bryan was still a power in the party and his lobbying for Woodrow Wilson was a major factor in Wilson's obtaining the nomination on the 46th ballot. Wilson rewarded Bryan by naming him Secretary. In 1920, Wilson gave the Secretaryship to Bainbridge Colby, the New York lawyer (clients had included Mark Twain and William Randolph Hearst) who had led a

group of former Theodore Roosevelt Progressives into the Wilson camp in the 1916 campaign.

In recent decades there have been occasional rumors that a new president would award the State Department to an unsuccessful aspirant: that Eisenhower would appoint Thomas E. Dewey, that Kennedy would name Adlai Stevenson. But Stevenson got only USUN, and Dewey's chief claim to a place in history remained only his surprising defeat by Harry Truman in 1948.

Truman himself was the source for the thought that failure to get the vice-presidential nomination could be seen as deserving consolation. He wrote in his memoirs that among the reasons for his appointment of James F. Byrnes as Secretary of State was that Byrnes had been disappointed not to get the nomination Truman received in 1944, and "I thought that my calling on him at this time might help balance things up."

As political expediency could confer the office on a man, so could it bring about his removal. An early instance of this occurred two years into Andrew Jackson's first administration. Jackson's cabinet was a mixture of his own men and adherents of Vice President John C. Calhoun. When Jackson and Calhoun became enemies, Old Hickory decided he would make the cabinet entirely his own. Martin Van Buren obligingly volunteered to resign as Secretary of State; this would oblige the other cabinet officers to do likewise.

It was done. As a reward, Jackson nominated Van Buren Minister to Britain, and the former Secretary sailed away to take up his duties in London. He had been on duty at the post for three months when word came from Washington that the Senate had rejected his nomination. Calhoun had gotten revenge: a tie vote had been carefully arranged, enabling the Vice President to cast the deciding vote against Jackson's minion. The grim-faced Calhoun said, "It will kill him dead . . . He will never kick." Thomas Hart Benton, the Missouri Senator who had survived a wild gun battle with Jackson and his friends in a Nashville hotel in 1813, knew better. He said to a Calhoun man, "You have broken a minister and elected a vice

president." A President, too, it turned out.

Eleven years later, a president was eager to obtain the support of John C. Calhoun and an unexpected vacancy in the Cabinet gave him the chance to do so.

John Tyler was not content merely to serve out the term of William Henry Harrison. He wanted to be president in his own right and his prospects would be much improved if Calhoun could be persuaded to help him get the vote of the Deep South states. Tyler also wanted to annex Texas, a move which Calhoun favored because it would add another slave state.

In February, 1844, the President, cabinet members and other officials cruised down the Potomac on a new naval vessel. When a new type of 12-inch gun was fired, it burst, killing the Secretary of the Navy, a New York state senator and Secretary of State Abel Upshur. Tyler named Calhoun as Upshur's successor.

Congress was persuaded to vote in favor of annexation, but John Tyler failed in his quest for the nomination, which went to James K. Polk. However, the 54-year-old widower President got a bride from the unfortunate accident: a few months after the explosion on the Potomac, he married the 24-year-old daughter of the dead state senator.

A sad little political drama was enacted by a group of Ohio politicians in the administration of William McKinley. It opened with the appointment of 73-year-old John Sherman as Secretary of State. Sherman had been a Washington fixture for 40 years and an important one: Representative, Senator, and Secretary of the Treasury under Rutherford B. Hayes.

The old man had seen his best days. His memory was failing and he found it hard to carry out his duties. But McKinley had put him in the cabinet for a special reason: he thereby created a Senate vacancy to which the governor of Ohio could appoint Mark Hanna, the rich Cleveland businessman who had collected the large campaign funds that helped put McKinley in the White House. It was said Hanna could have had a cabinet position instead, but declined the honor because it might be inter-

preted as a pay-off.

Because of Sherman's ineffectiveness, most of the important business in the Department was conducted by Assistant Secretary William Day, an Ohio lawyer and old friend of the President. After a year Sherman resigned, lamenting that "they deprived me of the high office of Senator by the temporary appointment as Secretary of State." Day became Secretary but quit after a few months to make room for John Hay, who also had Ohio connections, having married the daughter of another wealthy Cleveland businessman.

Sherman was not quite the oldest man appointed Secretary. Lewis Cass was a year older when Buchanan chose him in 1857. The youngest was Edward Stettinius, 44, when he succeeded Cordell Hull. The longest tenure was Hull's 11 years, the briefest that of Elihu Washburne, the veteran Congressman who left Grant's cabinet after only 12 days, saying the job was too much for his health. Washburne's health evidently improved rapidly once he left the Department, for he soon sailed for France as Minister and endured the rigors of diplomatic life in Paris for eight years.

The last professional politician of national reputation to become Secretary was James F. Byrnes. He had been Representative, Senator, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, and FDR's Director of War Mobilization. The primary reason for his appointment, Truman wrote in his memoirs, was that he was well-qualified to succeed to the Presidency, which he would have done under the existing law in case of Truman's death in office.

Whatever Byrnes's qualifications for the Presidency, Truman soon began to doubt his suitability for the Cabinet post. "He came to think," Truman wrote, "that his judgment was better than the President's . . . Byrnes was beginning to think of himself as an Assistant President in charge of foreign policy." The President informed the Secretary of his dissatisfaction at learning only from others what Byrnes had said or done. "It was understood between him and me that he would quit whenever I could designate his successor." A

year later, Byrnes resigned and was replaced by the man Truman had long wanted for the job, George C. Marshall.

In relating his troubles with Byrnes, Truman offered some characteristically tart advice for Secretaries and Presidents: "A Secretary of State should never have the illusion that he is President . . . Some Secretaries of State have had such illusions but they would never admit it. There have been some Presidents, of course, who acted as if they were Secretaries of State. They are not and cannot be, and they will get into trouble if they try."

As the professional politician is less often seen in the Secretaryship, so is the lawyer. Half since Cordell Hull have had no legal training. And the twentieth century lawyers in the job have tended to be connected with large New York or Washington firms, with appointive government service only a temporary (even if lengthy) interruption in their practice. Most of the earlier Secretaries trained as lawyers had practiced only in their home states as young men, before deciding that politics held greater appeal or reward. Also less common is previous cabinet experience. Fourteen Secretaries of State prior to 1900 had already served in Cabinets in other capacities; only three had done so among Secretaries of State since 1900. No Secretary of State had previous cabinet experience in the 60 years between Taft's appointment of Philander C. Knox and Nixon's choice of William Rogers. Both had been Attorney General.

Although Secretaries of State in the modern era come from somewhat different backgrounds than the old-timers, they face most of the old problems. They also face many new ones that would have been inconceivable to Thomas Jefferson. We assume they would agree with Jefferson that every citizen owes his country a tour of duty. Perhaps, after an especially frustrating day, they have also agreed with the sentiment he expressed shortly before resigning as Secretary: "It is not easy to say of what length exactly this tour should be, but we may safely say of what length it should not be. Not for our whole life, for instance, for that would be to be born a slave." 

PART II

"The Burma night is long . . .

The war, too is long . . .

When will the Burma night end?"

CHINA-BURMA-INDIA

JOHN K. EMMERSON

In April 1944 I received orders to report to the Northern Combat Area Command which was Stilwell's Forward Echelon for the war in North Burma and was directly under the command of Brigadier General Haydon L. Boatner. I was to be "supervisor in charge of all psychological warfare activities in the area and advisor in civil affairs matters."

The "civil affairs matters" had to do largely with the disorganized state of the civilian population due to the war and with our interest in winning their cooperation and maintaining as much tranquility as possible. The British wanted to re-establish order quickly; the principal problem in the Hukawng valley was the resettlement and rehabilitation of the Kachins who formed the dominant tribe in the area. I worked closely with Major J. A. Liddell, a rugged, old-time colonial service professional who had spent his career in Burma; he was the senior British Civil Affairs Officer but reported to General Boatner.

I spent some days traveling up and down the Ledo Road with Major Liddell, or "Jim" as I came to call him. I, who had forgotten my razor and toothbrush, was im-

pressed by the Major's meticulous planning. His bearer sat ceremoniously in the back of the jeep holding down the mass of paraphernalia that belonged to Jim: a wash basin with collapsible stand, camp stools, stoves, tents, mosquito nets, and rations, including ample supplies of bottled spirits.

One day we stopped by the roadside to investigate a quarrel between Nagas and Kachins in which two Nagas had been killed and one injured. The Nagas were demanding six human heads (two for each Naga casualty), one elephant, two buffaloes, and three rifles. The Major tried to get them to accept a thousand rupees in lieu of the heads, animals, and arms, but they refused and he postponed the hearing to another occasion.

In the evening we had dinner at a British officers mess. Jim was concerned over the propriety of my dress; my jungle suit was rumpled and muddled. He asked whether I did not have some "regalia" to wear, since he had told his colleagues that his guest was to be a representative of the United States State Department. All I could produce for him in the way of regalia was a pair of khaki pants and a clean shirt. After the messkit lines and the soup ladling I had been accustomed to with the Marauders, this British mess in the Burma jungle was the Waldorf itself with the meal amazing: soup, fish, Spam (the brutal reminder of war!), a sweet (pudding), and a savory (cheese and toast). My hosts became talkative after the whiskey,

gin, and rum had flowed, and their true feelings about Stilwell came out. The Ledo Road was nonsense. They joked about the Naga-Kachin dispute and the Major proclaimed loudly that "America was sitting in; America had seen British justice in action!"

Psychological warfare was tailored to the changing military situation. Since we knew the Japanese had no access to news, we set about to break their morale by informing them in our leaflets about the allied advances in Burma: "Maingkwan falls! . . . Walaw Bum taken! . . . Kamaing falls! . . . Mogaung captured!" We tried to play on their isolation and shortages of food: photographs of heaping plates of rice and fish awaiting them on the Allied side, and nostalgic reminders of home. Prisoners later told us that one leaflet was well known, many could recite it verbatim. It was called "Burma Night" ("China Night" was then one of the most popular songs in Japan) and had a drawing by Chris Ishii, our young *nisei* artist who had worked for Walt Disney. All in blue, a lone Japanese soldier stood in a small clearing of the crowding, dark jungle: "The Burma night is long. . . . The war, too, is long. . . . When will the Burma night end?"

The effect of our leaflets was hard to judge. Distribution was a problem; pilots preferred to drop bombs instead of paper: "pieces of bumph," as an Air Force officer expostulated. Sometimes we had regular leaflet-dropping planes as-

John K. Emmerson began his Foreign Service career (1935) in Japan and his last post was Tokyo, 1962-66. In between he served in Lima, China-Burma-India war theater, occupied Japan, Moscow, Karachi, Beirut, Paris, Lagos and Salisbury.

This is a chapter from his book, The Japanese Thread: Thirty Years of Foreign Service, which will be published in 1978 by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York.

signed to us. Most captured prisoners had read our leaflets, found them interesting, but denied that they had inspired a desire to surrender.

The climax of the North Burma campaign came with the battle of Myitkyina. On May 17 Colonel Hunter led the limping Marauders on to the airstrip and sent General Stilwell the code message "in the ring." Jubilation was soon replaced by chagrin when crucial supplies failed to arrive and confused Chinese units started shooting indiscriminately at each other. Meanwhile the Japanese brought in reinforcements and dug in for a stubborn, last ditch resistance. They had been ordered: "You will defend Myitkyina to the death." It was only on August 4 that Stilwell could record in his diary: "over at last. Thank God!"

Myitkyina, which had a population of 7,000 in peacetime, was pulverized by the fury of the frustrated American army and its Chinese allies. I wrote to the State Department at the time: "Almost every weapon of war which can be transported in an airplane has been used against these Japanese defenders. B-25s have blasted their positions (sometimes not too accurately, as for example, the day they killed six of our own men); dive bombers have strafed them; artillery and mortar fire has been almost continuous. There is said not be a house left standing in the city of Myitkyina. Yet the Japanese refuse to budge." It was natural that General Boatner, then in charge of the Myitkyina Task Force, would call for psychological weapons. More than 125,000 leaflets were dropped during two months of the siege from liaison planes flying low over the city at night, announcing defeats, calling for surrender, and promising good treatment to prisoners.

In June when the discouraging battle was grinding on, the Allies making little progress, someone picked up a crudely mimeographed letter, written by hand in English and addressed to "General Merrill and His Doomed American Troops." The leaflet began: "The Americans have again used their propaganda organs to the full by stating that they would capture Myitkyina and for 23 days made further attacks against the Imperial

Forces who have refused to yield even an inch to the enemy forces" and ended: "Poor General Merrill and his so-called fighting forces. Your days are numbered and the tide has now changed its course. The vital hour is fast approaching for the Americans as the Imperial Forces are again display (sic) its (sic) prowess to the world by making a sweeping victory against the enemy." The letter was signed: "The Commander, Imperial Japanese Forces."

baseball games and his elocutionary talent was put to good use at the battle of Myitkyina. We set a schedule for two daily broadcasts at five in the morning and seven in the evening. I described how it was in a letter to my wife: "Five o'clock in the morning is very early, especially when it has been raining steadily all night long and is still raining. You have to get out into that rain and every excuse for not doing it comes roaring into your semi-consciousness. But I always

"When the music began, the firing diminished and then ceased. There were a few interruptions during the course of the program but of short duration. When the last record was played, weapons were set off again and the Colonel suggested we play another side. Immediately our listeners were silent, only to open up again when the last notes died away."

Ready to try anything, no matter how unlikely, Colonel Hunter asked the OWI Team to install a public address system at Myitkyina. Finally I would get my chance to "talk to the Japanese!" We set up the microphones in a dugout at the command post of a decimated engineer regiment (drafted into combat to replace Marauder casualties) 150 yards from the front. Two loudspeakers were installed, one on the front line itself only 50 yards from the Japanese, camouflaged by brush and mosquito nets, and another 100 yards east of the command post facing a paddy field. We devised a 30 minute program, to begin with a record of the "Washington Post March" to identify us as Americans, followed by news of Japan and the war, interspersed with Japanese music intended to induce nostalgia, and ending with a surrender appeal.

We started July 14 at 7 p.m. Hank Gosho, who had been evacuated from combat because of his malaria, dysentery, and a hernia, was commentator. He was well-known for his uproarious imitations of Japanese announcers of

wake up at hours I'm supposed to, so I have to punch Hank and he punches Proc and Proc punches Adie. . . . So you pull on your old shirt soaked with sweat and rain from the day before, and your pants which are stiff with mud and sweat; then you pull on socks that never dried and dig your feet into big shoes with mud all over them." In the jeep we would drive as quietly as possible through the dark, the rain, and the mud, to the command post. Years later Hank recalled that one morning a Lieutenant friend whispered to him as we piled into the jeep, "You're out of your mind!"

I wrote about our first effort: "When the music began, the firing diminished and then ceased. There were a few interruptions during the course of the program but of short duration. When the last record was played, weapons were set off again and the Colonel suggested we play another side. Immediately our listeners were silent, only to open up again when the last notes died away."

On July 20 I got my chance. A news bulletin had just come in. I seized the microphone from Hank

and announced in my best and most stentorian Japanese that General Hideki Tojo had just resigned as Prime Minister of Japan and that this was bad news for the Imperial Army.

The operation went on until Myitkyina fell. The results were not spectacular. On July 16 the engineers were able to make their first advance in three weeks, a quarter of a mile, following a Japanese withdrawal. The intelligence officer of the unit thought the broadcasts might have contributed to low morale which made the enemy withdraw rather than stick. During the same night about 15 natives of the area made their way to our lines, stating that the American march music had convinced them that Americans and not Chinese, were in charge. On following nights numerous local inhabitants picked their way across the lines, many able and willing to impart valuable intelligence. On July 24 the first, and so far as I know, the only, Japanese surrendered in response to our appeal. An unexpected result of the broadcasts was a morale-building effect on the American troops; in response to their desires, we began to include brief newcasts in English and to play jive records, both much appreciated on dark nights by soldiers in lonely fox-holes half filled with water.

My second preoccupation, related to psychological warfare but more rewarding to me personally, was contact with the Japanese soldier. Our intelligence officers and interpreters were continually amazed at the readiness of the ordinary infantryman to talk freely about whatever he knew. Since the Soldier's Code contained no provision for capture—death was always to be the way out—prisoners had no guidelines to follow. For them one life had ended and another had begun. They never expected to return to Japan and the disgrace which would surely await them; consequently their previous life had no connection with their present existence.

In February and March I interviewed 12 prisoners of war. All had been interrogated for military information; mine was an attempt to learn their general attitudes, feelings about the war, and their hopes for the future. Except for one,

these POWs belonged to the 18th (*kiku* or chrysanthemum) Division and were from the island of Kyushu. None was an officer; four had been factory workers and two, mining engineers; the rest were: farmer, fisherman, policeman, bank clerk, storekeeper, and soldier since 1937. Six of the group had been wounded either before or at the time of capture.

"What would the soul of Sato-san think if he knew about the services today? The *hi-no-maru* on the coffin, the firing squad and the service read by the Chaplain. The setting was a naturally beautiful one—a garden cemetery near the jungle."

In my interviews I tried always to persuade the Japanese soldier to think about the outcome of the war. Most clung to the certainty of Japan's victory although some Burma veterans who had experienced prolonged misery and repeated retreats were beginning to harbor doubts. Of these 12, only one was prepared to return to his homeland after the war. The rest felt disgraced for life and believed it better that their families think them dead. Many prisoners were antagonistic toward the British and Chinese but had a healthy respect for Soviet strength. One pleaded with me earnestly, "If you send us to China or to England, we prefer to die. Our one wish is to go to America."

These men had been fighting the same war as the Americans, British, Indians, and Chinese, coping with the same dark, entangled jungle, the same mud, disease, insects, and animals. The Japanese laughed when you asked them about airplanes; they had never seen one of their own. Progressively cut off from supply lines, they lacked food, clothing, ammunition, medicines, and hospital facilities. Reduced to foraging for

food, and debilitated by the sicknesses of the jungle, many died. A Japanese veteran of the campaign entitled one of the chapters in his *Burma War Diary*, "The Graveyard of North Burma." During the battle of Myitkyina 27 patients from a field hospital were captured as they tried to escape on rafts down the river to the city. I reported: "Racked with beriberi, malaria, and open wounds, they were piled in jeep trailers one on top of the other, caked with mud. Blood was streaming from an abdominal wound in one of them . . . According to their stories, a temperature of 103 was prerequisite for medicine; bandages had been used over and over until they were blood-soaked and worn out."

The last days of the defenders of Myitkyina, remnants of the division which had taken Singapore, must indeed have been excruciating. They were surrounded by Allied troops—in the end "700 men against four divisions," as a Japanese participant described it, with personal weapons rationed to five bullets a day and artillery pieces to three shells—facing the Irrawaddy River as their only escape route. On August 1 further resistance became patently hopeless and the order was given to build bamboo rafts for escape. The bamboo was green and heavy, the river swollen by heavy rains; many rafts overturned and the weak soldiers were drowned; others were swept down the river by the current. It was the belief of some of the POWs in our Ledo camp that the officer in charge, Colonel Maruyama, expected the soldiers to be drowned; such an end would, in his view, avoid their capture and their divulging secret military information to the enemy. One soldier who miraculously survived the combined perils of river, raft, and enemy fire made it down the Irrawaddy to Bhamo and lived to write his story, *Raft of Death*, (Shino Idaka).

One day at a hospital well behind the lines, one of these emaciated Japanese soldiers died. I wrote in my notes: "Witnessed a funeral today. What would the soul of Sato-san think if he knew about the services today? The *hi-no-maru* (Japanese flag) on the coffin, the firing squad and the service read by the Chaplain. The setting was a

naturally beautiful one—a garden cemetery near the jungle. War is a strange thing. We devote all our energy to killing and then when faced with one poor soul like Sato, we give him only honors. . . . It was a sunny Sunday afternoon.”

With the fall of Myitkyina, the flow of prisoners to Ledo suddenly swelled from a trickle to a torrent. By early August almost 200 of them crowded newly built wards at the 20th General Hospital and a specially constructed stockade. G-2 and the *nisei* interrogators were overwhelmed by sheer book-keeping duties and sought help from the POWs themselves. A Lieutenant and two enlisted men were chosen to assist in clerical work and the organization of the stockade. This cooperation developed until a small group of prisoners, with OWI encouragement, began to hold discussion sessions (*zadankai*) among themselves. Since these proved successful, the Lieutenant (Hirata) was asked whether he would head a committee of six selected prisoners to assist in propaganda activities. Hirata and his associates stipulated four conditions before they would agree: they would not be asked to do anything showing disrespect for the Imperial House; their names would be stricken from the official Allied list of prisoners of war; they would be excluded from any future prisoner exchanges; and they would be permitted to make new lives for themselves in the United States when the war ended. We could assent to the first of these conditions since established policy prohibited derogation of the Emperor in American propaganda, but the other three were obviously unacceptable. A promise to refer their requests to higher authority satisfied the group, however, and, under assumed names, they went to work for OWI.

At first consultative, criticizing OWI-prepared leaflets and suggesting revisions in them, Lieutenant Hirata's volunteers were soon on their own, writing leaflets and preparing illustrations. Later they edited a stockade newspaper, written by and for POWs, called "New Life," which was dropped regularly as reading matter behind enemy lines. OWI's official report on psychological operations in North Burma concluded: "It

would be difficult to find anywhere a group more enthusiastic in its application to the job."

The *nisei*, particularly Kenji Yasui, provided the inspiration and direction for the POW group and won their respect and even affection. The principal problems were not with the Japanese but with our military compatriots who could not easily persuade themselves to better the living and working conditions of enemies, even those who were helping us to defeat Japan. To encourage Hirata's committee,

"One prisoner told how the tears came to his eyes when he awoke at night to find that an American military policeman had pulled a blanket over him and was quietly covering his comrades and lowering the mosquito nets on their beds."

Yasui and the other *nisei* personnel scrounged cigarettes from the Red Cross, contributed clothes and shoes of their own, and themselves paid for toothbrushes, toothpaste, soap, towels, fresh vegetables and meat.

No special efforts were made to indoctrinate the Ledo POWs although they were given access to news files from both Japanese and allied sources and to anti-war materials prepared in China. The discussion meetings were productive because they offered a friendly, free atmosphere for the prisoners to think and talk about their own experiences, ideas, and perceptions of the future.

I attended several of these sessions although most of them were held without the presence of Americans, a careful record being kept by one of the participants. A variety of subjects was discussed; Japan before the war, Japan after the war, conditions in the Japanese Army, the position of the Emperor, Japanese-American relations and how the two countries came to war, and their own complaints.

These prisoners, in September and October 1944, had not yet ac-

cepted the inevitability of Japan's defeat. One of them who had come through battles from South China, Malaya, and Singapore, to North Burma, wrote anonymously that Japan without question would win the Great East Asia War. "Defeat is miserable. . . the military is the pillar of the nation." In the *zadankai* the participants were ready to consider the implications of both victory and defeat. They were interested in the anti-war propaganda produced in China—which portrayed defeat as certain—but disagreed with its "Marxist orientation." Some of them had qualms of conscience in criticizing the military of which they had been a part. But others pointed out that they must detach themselves and look at things as outsiders, as "newly-born." Only then could they apply the "surgical knife of criticism."

The depth of reverence for the Emperor emerged in the discussions, although there was general cynicism regarding the patriotic slogans of "holy war," "Eight Corners of the Universe Under One Roof," and the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." These infantrymen had seen starving, ill-clad people in China and Southeast Asia and questioned whether the force of arms was the way to win their support. One quoted an old poem: "To compare hunger, love, and the cold: shamefully but true, hunger comes first." They groped to understand the causes for the war. Japan and America had had close relations in previous decades but there had been troubles. They remembered the shock of the order freezing Japanese assets in the summer of 1941 but they had also heard that their government had blocked a last minute message to the Emperor which President Roosevelt had sent on the eve of Pearl Harbor. They described how their attitude toward Americans had changed since capture. Hostility engendered by wartime propaganda had been replaced by admiration for unexpected humanity. Those who had undergone hospital treatment praised the American doctor who had become in their eyes a benevolent angel, a "bodhisattva of mercy." One prisoner told how the tears came to his eyes when he awoke at night to find that an

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The case of John Paton Davies, Jr.

JAMES FETZER

It is clear that the search for Communist subversives that took place in the United States during the late 1940s and the 1950s reached beyond the pursuit of leftists. Anti-Communists and implacable foes of the Soviet Union were also subjected to criticism and persecution. A person such as Secretary of State Dean Acheson, whose anti-Communist credentials were impeccable, was victimized by the anti-Communist campaigns. John Paton Davies was also such a victim. The events leading up to Davies's dismissal from the Foreign Service in 1954 provide an interesting and tragic case study of this strange process. In Davies's case, a career characterized by a desire to contain the Soviet Union was terminated in the midst of charges which claimed that Davies was pro-Communist and insensitive to the threat of Communism.

John Davies was born in China in 1908. His parents were missionaries in China, and Davies spent his boyhood there. After receiving a college education in the United States and at Yenching University, he passed the Foreign Service examination in 1931 and

was assigned to China where he remained stationed for most of the 1930s. Following Pearl Harbor, Davies was appointed a political adviser to General Joseph Stilwell, the American commanding general in the China-Burma-India Theatre. The reports Davies wrote during World War II eventually became the basis for charges placed against his loyalty and competence.

While Davies was attached to Stilwell's staff, he shared the general preoccupation with advancing the war against Japan. Given the tangled condition of command in the CBI and the various political cross-currents found there, this was a time-consuming task. However, Davies's analytical reports were also made with an eye toward the future. He was particularly concerned about the distribution of power that would occur in East Asia after the war. Davies foresaw the likelihood that the Soviet Union would attempt to expand its influence in Manchuria and North China as a part of the final push against Japan. Such a Russian move, in Davies's view, was detrimental to American interests. Reasoning from a perspective that desired the United States to maintain an effective presence in Asia, Davies concluded that the American response to this Soviet advance

would determine "the future balance of power in Asia and the Western Pacific." He strongly urged that the United States give close consideration to how the Soviet threat might be blocked.

Davies's prescription for containing the Soviet Union arose out of his analysis of Chinese politics. The Chinese political scene was characterized by the uneasy truce that existed between the Chinese Communists in North China and the Nationalist government of Chiang Kai-shek. For the Chinese Communists, the war against Japan marked a period of tremendous growth in terms of political power and mass support. Chiang Kai-shek's response to this growth was to marshal his resources for the coming struggle against the Communists and use his best troops to blockade the areas controlled by the Chinese Communists. Davies's evaluation of this situation was conditioned by two factors. As a member of Stilwell's staff, he witnessed the intransigence, maladministration, and corruption frequently displayed by the Nationalist government. At the same time, Davies was very impressed by the gains registered by the Chinese Communists. This good impression was enhanced by his direct contact with the Communist

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movement after a US observation team was established in Communist territory in mid-1944. Witnessing the vitality that was on display at the Communist headquarters in Yen-an, Davies observed, in words that were later to haunt him, "China's destiny is not Chiang's, but theirs."

Davies was aware of the ideological kinship that existed between the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists. However, he also noted that the Chinese Communists were nationalists and had undertaken a pattern of development that was not dependent on the aid of the Soviet Union. Davies hoped that the United States would encourage these latter characteristics. If this could be done, the chances for increased Soviet influence would be diminished. If the United States did not establish the necessary contact with the Chinese Communists, the field would be clear for Soviet gains. Davies knew that there were no guarantees that the United States could supersede Soviet influence among the Chinese Communists. Nevertheless, he consistently contended that if the United States did not try to befriend the Chinese Communists, America would be throwing away an opportunity to blunt the advance of the Soviet Union in Asia.

Given these views, Davies could not take much encouragement from American policy during World War II. His concern was not over the goals of American policy. He supported the idea of making China an effective partner in the war and working toward the development of a unified, independent, and friendly China. The way in which the United States pursued these ends deeply bothered Davies. He was particularly worried about the tendency to back Chiang to the exclusion of any support for the Chinese Communists.

Davies's fears were heightened with the appearance in China of Patrick Hurley, who was initially sent out as President Roosevelt's personal representative and became ambassador to China in November of 1944. Hurley embarked on the task of reconciling the differences between Chiang's government and the Chinese Communists. His efforts along these lines were geared to achieving a result which would keep

Chiang's government in an ascendant position. Hurley's belief that such a result was possible was linked in large measure to his view of Soviet intentions. The American ambassador felt that the Soviet Union would be willing to support the Nationalist government and thereby force the Chinese Communists, cut off from the possibility of Soviet aid, to accept a position under Chiang's leadership.

Davies took issue with Hurley's analysis on several points. In the first place, there was a serious underestimation of the strength of the Chinese Communist movement. Even if Hurley's guess about Soviet intentions proved correct, the growing independent capabilities of the Chinese Communists meant that they were not steadfastly linked to the designs and policy of the Soviet Union. What could move the Chinese Communists to a position of greater dependence on the Soviet Union and increased hostility toward the United States, Davies argued, was an American policy that backed Chiang Kai-shek and excluded the Chinese Communists. Davies saw Hurley's efforts as moving in just this direction. Hurley's underestimation of the power of the Chinese Communists and his unqualified support for Chiang would not lead to a unified China, Davies asserted, but would, instead, encourage Chiang to wage a civil war which he could not win and drive the Chinese Communists to seek closer relations with the Soviet Union.

Davies was sufficiently vocal in stating these differences that Hurley was prompted to seek his removal from China. In January of 1945, he was assigned to the American embassy in Moscow. Davies served in Moscow until 1947 when he returned to Washington to serve on the Policy Planning Staff. By July of 1945, Davies observed from Moscow that the United States mis-estimates had done their work. Although still contending that the Chinese Communists were not under the control of the Soviet Union, he concluded that the United States could no longer reasonably expect to politically capture the Chinese Communists.

It is possible to find some fault with Davies's reports during World

War II. On balance, he underestimated the degree to which the Chinese Communists were social revolutionaries. Davies saw the Communist program as leading only to "elementary agrarian reform and the introduction of political democracy." Also, no one can say for sure that his formula for winning the friendship of the Chinese Communists would have been successful. American policy went in a different direction, and Davies's hopes remained largely untested. However, he was quite correct in viewing the Chinese Communists as a very potent and independent force in possession of mass support. What is very clear and lends irony to Davies's later purge is that so many of his recommendations were based on a fundamental suspicion of the Soviet Union. At a time when the terms Truman Doctrine and Cold War were not yet part of the American vocabulary, John Davies perceived a need to contain the Soviet Union and urged his superiors to adopt such a course of action.

While Davies was in Moscow, American policy toward China was characterized by ambivalent moods. On one hand, the desire to secure a united and friendly China still remained. Increasing suspicion about Soviet intent in Asia also encouraged the United States to remain involved in Chinese affairs. But there was also an American reluctance to become too closely tied to Chiang Kai-shek. American officials realized that the process of supporting and cooperating with Chiang's regime was filled with many pitfalls. American policy eventually took refuge in the Marshall Mission to China. Seeking to head off civil war in China, General George Marshall spent most of 1946 there attempting to reconcile the differences between the Nationalist government and the Chinese Communists. Marshall was given an impossible task. He was asked to be an effective mediator and, at the same time, continue to support the regime of Chiang Kai-shek. Frustration was his only reward. He returned to Washington to become Secretary of State criticizing both sides in the Chinese dispute and expressing the feeling that the United States might do well to refrain from further in-

terference in Chinese internal politics.

Throughout 1947, the Truman administration ruminated about the position to take toward the civil war that had begun to engulf China. In other areas of foreign policy, however, the United States was moving with great decisiveness. In the name of containing Soviet Communism, the Truman administration asked the American people to support substantial European-oriented aid programs. The requests of the administration were made in terms beyond matters of self-interest and tangible gain. Appeals were also made in highly ideological tones which emphasized that the United States must combat an opposing way of life that was threatening the whole world. This type of appeal had ramifications for American policy toward China. Once the Truman administration cast the Cold War in ideological and moral terms, it became difficult for the United States to step back from the Chinese civil war. If Communism was evil and a global threat, were not American actions called for in combating Communism in China as well as Europe? In these Cold War terms, Chiang Kai-shek was not just fighting revolutionaries who possessed a vision of a new and independent China. Instead, he was fighting part of a world-wide conspiracy. Within this context, it was not easy to advocate a disengagement from Chiang's cause. John Davies was to learn that it was dangerous to have once recommended amicable relations with the Chinese Communists.

This developing Cold War atmosphere provided a background for specific occurrences that affected the future of John Davies. In the aftermath of World War II, claims were made that the State Department, particularly the Far Eastern Division, was a haven for Communist sympathizers. This line of thought was given impetus by the resignation of Patrick Hurley. Hurley's angry resignation in November of 1945 marked the frustrating climax of his effort to bring an end to the Chinese dispute. Hurley did not find fault with his own activities or account for his failure in terms of the complexity of the situation in China. Instead, he singled out Foreign Service officers,

who had disagreed with him, as being responsible for his failure. Hurley claimed that his mission had been undermined by State Department officers who were pro-Communist and destructively critical of his efforts. He warned that he knew "the names, the numbers, and the places where we have supported ideologies that are in conflict with those we asked our men to fight for and to die."

In a Senate hearing called to investigate Ambassador Hurley's charges, Hurley named the Foreign

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Service officers, who, he claimed, had undermined his mission and were "disloyal to American policy." John Davies was among those named. Due in great part to Hurley's confused and sometimes contradictory presentation, the hearings did not have an immediate effect upon the careers of Davies and other Foreign Service officers. Yet an important seed had been planted. The Hurley hearings broached the idea that the United States had a loyalty problem. This loyalty problem was frequently described in terms of insufficient enthusiasm for Chiang Kai-shek and too much concern for the position of the Chinese Communists. In short, the Hurley imbroglio promoted the view that pro-Chiang enthusiasm and attitudes toward the Chinese Communists were suitable litmus tests for loyalty. The eventual widespread adoption of this insidious standard of judgment played a major role in ending Davies's career.

For the remainder of the 1940s, the alleged suspicious practices of

the State Department and its Far Eastern Division were made part of the campaign to maintain an American commitment to the government of Chiang Kai-shek. By 1947, certain members of Congress had begun an intense drive to obtain more American aid for the Nationalist government. Included in this effort were claims that American policy had been too lenient toward Communism. The promotion of a coalition government in China and the Far Eastern agreements made at Yalta were cited as examples of the American willingness to appease Communism in Asia. John Carter Vincent, the head of the Far Eastern Division, was singled out for special attention. Vincent, it was charged, had been "leftist to an extreme" and had seriously harmed American policy toward China. Although the case made against Vincent was far from impressive, it was sufficient to secure his removal from East Asian affairs. He was posted as the American minister to Switzerland. The possibility that other State Department targets might be selected was raised by a confidential memo sent to Secretary Marshall by the Senate Appropriations Committee. Chairman Styles Bridges informed Marshall that in the State Department there was "a deliberate calculated program being carried out not only to protect Communist personnel in high places but to reduce security and intelligence protection to a nullity."

The Truman administration was responsive to this increased pressure. A loyalty-security program was established in the executive branch. John Davies and other Foreign Service officers would have to pass through this apparatus in the 1950s. The Truman administration also failed to disengage completely from Chiang Kai-shek. American assistance, such as the China Aid Act of 1948, continued to go to the Nationalist government. This was done even though many in the Truman administration were very dubious about the worth of such aid.

The failure to disengage from Chiang and the maintenance of a reluctant commitment were important for several reasons. It guaranteed the animosity of the Chinese Communists, the emergent victors

in the Chinese civil war. It also meant that as American policy entered the 1950s, it did so with a legacy of commitment to Chiang rather than an accomplished disengagement. From such a position, the Truman administration could more readily be pushed or move on its own initiative toward a resurrection of a firm American commitment to the Nationalist government. The failure to disengage was also important in terms of John Davies's future. Because the Truman administration frequently compromised with those who desired strong ties with Chiang, debate over American responsibilities in China was not brought to a conclusion before 1950. The administration was unwilling to draw the line and say, in effect, "We have done enough, we shall do no more." The attempts that were made by the Truman administration to put some distance between the United States and the Nationalist government's fate were greeted with heightened partisan criticism. Consequently, the post-war debate over American policy toward China dragged on and on. A working consensus was never reached about the proper limits of American involvement in China. Therefore, when the Chinese Communists took power in late 1949, ambiguity still existed concerning the degree of American responsibility for events in China. In this context, the query "Who lost China?" was not an incredible question, much as it might seem so in retrospect. This being the case, the search for those responsible for the "loss" of China naturally followed. John Davies became a target in just such a search.

John Davies would become a target despite the fact that his distaste for the Soviet Union had not abated. While in Moscow, he observed that the political philosophy of Russian leaders was as "intolerant and dogmatic as that which motivated the zealots of Islam or the Inquisition in Spain." This perspective did not change when Davies moved to the Policy Planning Staff in 1947. *U.S. News*, which would later find much fault with Davies's work, described him in 1947 as a person "with a quick mind that, nevertheless, weighs decisions carefully." According to *U.S. News*, Davies fitted in well

with a group whose "thinking . . . lies behind the campaign to stop Russian expansion."

Davies's lack of softness on Communism was clearly evident in a memorandum he wrote in August of 1949. The memorandum was addressed to the problem of devising "a decisive form of pressure which can be exerted on the Chinese Communists to compel them to respect the United States and moderate their behavior." Written at a time when the Chinese Communists were threatening American officials and property in China, the memo argued that the United States had to demonstrate to the Chinese Communists that America was not a "paper tiger." Davies recommended that the United States seriously consider launching a selective bombing campaign against installations on the Chinese mainland. He saw the use of air power as a practical way of emphasizing American determination. This would have a salutary effect not only on the Chinese, but also the Soviet Union. Davies saw "Soviet intrigue and incitement" as one of the factors promoting Chinese Communist hostility toward the United States. Therefore, the selective bombing campaign would apprise both the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Union of United States capability and resolve. Davies argued that the risks involved in this course of action would be superseded by achieving a Communist realization that any move against American interests would be prohibitively costly.

The bombing memorandum, never made public during the later investigations, did not play a role in deciding Davies's fate. Instead, attention turned to his reports from China. The publication of the *China White Paper* in August of 1949 made it possible to focus on Davies's wartime reports. The State Department's *White Paper* was designed to blunt some of the criticism directed at the Truman administration over the issue of China. The *White Paper* tried to demonstrate that a good deal of effort and concern went into the American attempt to bring about a favorable conclusion to the conflict in China. The report concluded that the outcome of events was not determined by shortcomings in

American policy, but by the Nationalist government, "which had lost the confidence of its own troops and its own people." Included in the documentation of the *White Paper* were excerpts from the reports of Foreign Service officers who were stationed in China during World War II. The publication of this material proved a disaster for Davies. For the excerpts provided unintended grist for the mill of those who were seeking to pinpoint blame for the "loss" of China. They were a source in which one could find comments favorable to the Chinese Communists, remarks deprecating the Kuomintang, and predictions that the Communists would carry the day in China. These excerpts became, in effect, an ammunition depot for those who were willing to take remarks out of context and ignore the totality of reporting submitted by Davies and other Foreign Service officers.

By early 1950, there were many people who were willing to step forward and explain the American failure in China. One major attempt at explanation and casting blame was provided by Joseph Alsop. In a three part series entitled "Why We Lost China," Alsop offered the readers of the *Saturday Evening Post* a picture of American blunders and incompetence. Concentrating on the period 1943-1945, Alsop was particularly critical of General Stilwell and the Foreign Service officers on his staff. John Davies was singled out as a major example of the type of person who "actively favored the Chinese Communists." While conceding that Chiang's government certainly had its faults, Alsop argued that the activity of people like Davies contributed to the weakness of the Nationalist government by undermining confidence in Chiang's regime and providing aid and comfort to the Chinese Communists. Through faulty political intelligence, persistent criticism of the Nationalist government, and ill-advised attempts to force Communists into Chiang's government Davies and others "came close to offering China up to the Communists like a trussed bird on a platter."

Joseph Alsop did not intend to cast doubt on Davies's loyalty. His article noted the Foreign Service

officers in question were not disloyal. Also, his later testimony in behalf of the loyalty of Davies and John Service speaks against the existence of such an intent. Alsop probably intended to have his article serve as a final word and knockout blow in relation to the bitter Chennault-Stilwell dispute that had existed in the CBI for much of World War II. General Claire Chennault, who commanded the American air forces in China, had waged a running feud with Stilwell over such matters as the disposition of lend-lease goods and the proper attitude to take in dealing with Chiang's government. Alsop had served as an aide to Chennault and had participated in the struggle for influence Chennault waged against Stilwell. His words in 1950 clearly indicated that General Chennault had been right and wise while Stilwell and his advisors had been the mistaken precursors of disaster. It is likely, however, that the intent of Alsop's article bore an imperfect relationship to its effect. The article, authored by a major columnist and appearing in a mass circulation magazine, was a significant contribution to the growing debate over China. As such a contribution, it helped to cast the debate in terms of losing China, pro-Communist sympathizers, and the betrayal of American interests. These are categories of discussion easily shifted to questions of loyalty and conspiracy. Articles such as Alsop's made it easier for such shifts to occur.

While critics such as Alsop did not dabble directly in charges of disloyalty, people like Senator Joseph McCarthy showed no restraint at all in operating against the background of the "loss" of China. According to McCarthy, the Far Eastern Division of the State Department was "almost completely controlled and dominated by individuals who were more loyal to the ideals and designs of communism than to those of the free God-fearing half of the world." McCarthy was not alone in voicing such charges. Other Republicans took note of McCarthy's words and saw in them the promise of fruitful campaign issues. As one student of the period has commented, Joseph McCarthy became "a hot Republican commodity."

McCarthy's activities became the reckless pacesetter for others who also began to demand an investigation of pro-Communist sympathizers in the State Department.

Unfortunately for the State Department, resulting congressional investigations frequently served as publicity gathering devices for those who made charges of conspiracy and betrayal. Such was the case, for example, in the 1950 Senate investigation of the State Department chaired by Senator

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Millard Tydings. In this instance, Senator Tydings' anxious desire to attack McCarthy and belittle the charges made against State Department personnel worked against the possibility of running an orderly investigation. The Tydings subcommittee hearings frequently broke down into wrangling over procedures and various forms of partisan bickering. Senator McCarthy was given an arena of confusion in which to operate. He thrived in such an environment. Although John Davies was not a major target during these hearings, alleged sympathy toward the Chinese Communists was emphasized, and Davies, therefore, could take little comfort from the happenstance lack of emphasis on his own past work. He was grouped among those whose reports from China had "reflected pro-Communist leanings." Once he was placed in this category, it only became a matter of time before his turn would come to go before the inquisitors.

Davies's day of reckoning was

also advanced by the outbreak of the Korean War. The war in Korea meant that the charges against Davies and others were made against the backdrop of American soldiers fighting Chinese Communists and forces aided by the Soviet Union. The fact of Americans dying in Korea tended to preclude understanding Davies's World War II comments in their proper context. Instead, the reports of 1943-1945 made by Foreign Service officers were often interpreted within the context of the early 1950s. From this perspective, the work of controversial State Department officials was treated as favoring Communists who were killing American soldiers. At a time when "GIs are consecrating the hills and the valleys of Korea with American blood," Senator McCarthy warned, it was necessary to redouble the effort to get rid of those who "paved the way for disaster." The Senator from Wisconsin indicated that attention should focus on the "group of Communists, fellow travelers, and dupes in our State Department—a group who make Benedict Arnold look like a piker." According to Senator George Malone "what happened in China and what is now happening in Korea were brought about deliberately by the advisers of the President at Yalta and by the advisers of the State Department since then." With such rhetoric being thrown about, it was not easy to get people to take a close and objective look at the conditions under which earlier reports and recommendations had been made.

This was a particularly difficult development for Davies. As noted above, his reports during the war were filled with suspicion about the Soviet Union and a desire to wean the Chinese Communists from a Soviet attachment. One might suspect that Davies's distrust of the Soviet Union would have worked to his advantage during the excitement over pro-Communist sympathizers in the government. This was not the case. Davies's reports were not judged according to the possibilities existing in 1944. They were judged, instead, in terms of the Sino-Soviet alignment of the early 1950s and the perceived Sino-Soviet unity in the Korean War. Consequently, Davies's past hopes for separating the Chinese

Communists and the Soviet Union were often greeted with derision. They were treated as evidence of the blundering estimates that had led the United States to ignore the unity of Communism and underestimate the Communist menace in Asia. Thus Davies's suspicion of the Soviet Union was acknowledged as part of a discredited scheme to separate Chinese Communists from Russian Communists. By 1954, Davies's past endorsement of separating the two was made part of the formal charges placed against him.

The time of trial for John Davies began on June 27, 1951 when he and O. Edmund Clubb were suspended from duty pending an investigation of their behavior by the State Department Loyalty-Security Board. The suspension was the first of a series that extended over a period of three years. The suspensions and official inquiries that followed were also accompanied by transfers in duty. Davies would be moved from the Policy Planning Staff in Washington to the staff of the Military High Commission in Germany and from there to the embassy in Peru. The transfers clearly moved him away from policy decisions and matters relating to East Asia. While these events lay in the future, the Loyalty-Security Board did act with dispatch to end Davies's first suspension. He was cleared and returned to active service by the end of July. Clubb was not so fortunate.

Although Davies's case moved swiftly in its first passage through the loyalty-security apparatus of the State Department, the policy guidelines that were developing in the State Department loyalty program indicated that future trips would not be as smooth. When the federal loyalty program was launched in 1947, the grounds for employee dismissal bore a fairly close relationship to the standards of judgment employed in the American judicial system. President Truman's executive order of March 25, 1947 deemed that dismissal should occur when "on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States." This standard was interpreted to mean that substantial evidence must be furnished in support of a

charge of disloyalty. The burden of proof was on the investigators bringing the charges. By April of 1951, however, the standard was changed so that if only reasonable doubt existed about an employee's loyalty, the doubt would be resolved in favor of the government and against the employee. This cast the loyalty-security program in the direction of allowing suspicion, rather than substantial proof, to lead to dismissal. In practical terms, the change of standards represented an endorsement of existing procedures rather than the initiation of something completely new. Acting under the rising pressure and accusations about lax security procedures, the State Department had already begun to judge security risk allegations in terms of resolving reasonable doubts in favor of the government. In addition, the State Department was not hesitant about bringing charges against Foreign Service officers. As George Kennan has noted, the officials of the State Department "simply took any charges that came to them from outside, however, absurd or implausible, haled the officer before a loyalty board, and said to him, in effect: 'Here is what you are charged with. Defend yourself if you can. We, the department, have nothing further to do with the matter.'"

The fact that a person such as John Davies could be cleared under the revised ground rules became a source of concern for some. In an editorial commenting on the collapse of the initial investigation of Davies, the *Saturday Evening Post* charged that the Davies case "illustrates the folly of charging officials with disloyalty when what you mean to say is that they were inept, naive, and unable to represent correctly the foreign policy of the United States." Davies, the editorial concluded, "can be impeached on his judgment." The Eisenhower administration went a long way toward implementing the *Saturday Evening Post's* criteria for dismissal. In April of 1953, the loyalty-security standards were broadened to insure that continued employment was "consistent with the interests of national security." Determining fitness, however, was not limited to matters of loyalty or violations of security regulations. Consideration was now given to

broad categories of possible character defects which became grounds for dismissal. Questions of personal demeanor and impressions about judgment and reliability also became relevant. Moreover, there was no guarantee that the issue of competence would be decided by people qualified to pass judgment on this subject. It is fair to say that the situation reached a point where dismissal was possible if the members of a loyalty-security board did not take a liking to an employee. The combination of such criteria with the tendency to jerk reporting and analysis out of context made continued employment in the Foreign Service a precarious matter.

John Davies's troubles were not limited to questions about his reporting during World War II or the direction taken by the federal loyalty-security program. He also became caught up in charges that he had attempted to infiltrate Communists and Communist sympathizers into the government. These accusations grew out of the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations (IPR) conducted by Senator Patrick McCarran's Internal Security Subcommittee. The IPR hearings began in July of 1951 and did not end until June of 1952. During this time, the subcommittee covered a wide range of issues including the behavior of controversial Foreign Service officers. Davies's appearance before the subcommittee on August 8, 1951 was part of the subcommittee's attempt to point out the alleged subversive influences that had affected American policy toward China. Davies soon discovered that he had more to answer for than his wartime reporting.

In November of 1949, John Davies had met with two members of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), a unit attached to the fledgling CIA. The OPC was involved with developing various plans for covert operations. The meeting with Davies, who was then still with the Policy Planning Staff, seems to have been part of an OPC effort to solicit ideas for covert projects. Davies suggested that OPC might consider secretly establishing a group of China hands who could be utilized in an effective manner. This group would be connected to an office outside of Wash-

ington, presumably as a research organization. They would produce information and analysis and also serve as a conduit for sending unofficial messages to mainland China. Davies named six people as possible participants. They were Agnes Smedley, Anna Louise Strong, Edgar Snow, Benjamin Schwartz, and John and Wilma Fairbank. The operation was to be handled in such a way that none of the six would know that they were part of an OPC operation. Contact between the CIA and the six would be maintained by a cutout, who, unbeknownst to the six people, would channel information to and from the CIA.

Davies's murky and fanciful venture into the world of covert operations was stillborn. No action was taken to implement his suggestion. Instead, Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter, then head of the CIA, was shocked to find that Davies had urged contact with people who, in Hillenkoetter's mind, had evidenced pro-Communist sympathy. The FBI was called in, and depositions were taken from the two OPC agents who had talked to Davies. Nothing of consequence followed, however, until the Internal Security Subcommittee got wind of the matter. Walter Bedell Smith, who succeeded Hillenkoetter as director of the CIA, attributed his predecessor's reaction to inexperience in handling intelligence operations.

When Davies appeared before the Internal Security Subcommittee, it soon became clear that he was going to encounter difficulty. His interrogators, particularly committee counselors Robert Morris and J. G. Sourwine, sought to establish that Davies had urged the CIA to employ pro-Communists. Davies was reluctant to provide details of the proposal, claiming its top-secret classification prevented him from doing so. He did try to emphasize, however, that his proposal was designed to utilize the six people rather than have them "placed on the CIA rolls as a regular part of the American Government." As was their habit, the members of the committee and counsel did not trouble to make distinctions concerning the political disposition and motives of the six people suggested by Davies. Moreover, they persisted in the view that Davies's plan was a way

of infiltrating undesirables into the government. They simply refused to recognize Davies's point that the difference between utilization of the six as opposed to directly hiring them was "a very important distinction." He labored in vain in attempting to convince the committee that the six people were supposed to be used by the CIA, not the opposite.

The subcommittee's questioning of Davies was guided by the depo-

"In summarizing the work of these Foreign Service officers, Wedemeyer noted that he did not want to label them disloyal, but 'if I had followed their advice, communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly than it did.'"

sition that one of the OPC operatives, Lyle H. Munson, had given to the FBI. In February of 1952 Munson appeared before the subcommittee to enlarge upon his deposition. The line of questioning put to Munson was designed to elicit the assertion that the CIA would somehow be subject to the influence and control of the people recommended by Davies. Munson proved cooperative and consistently maintained that the six people were to provide "consultation and guidance" to the CIA. Munson agreed to a proposition put before him that the six "were to give the guidance rather than be guided." There were certain things, however, that Munson did not explain. He admitted that Davies's plan called for the six people not to know they were working for the CIA. He also acknowledged that this fact would be kept secret through the use of a cutout who would serve as an intermediary between the CIA and the six China hands. Munson noted that Davies had never suggested himself as the cutout but had urged, instead, that the OPC should choose the intermediary. Just how

these people might be able to manipulate the CIA from his position is not clear. The subcommittee chose not to pursue this matter. In addition, there was not one iota of evidence introduced that challenged Davies's denial that he had ever discussed his proposal with any of the six people in question.

Walter Bedell Smith, head of the CIA from 1950 to 1953, testified in 1953 that Davies's proposal "was not one which would have caused me to consider it a grave security risk." The Internal Security Subcommittee, however, claimed to see a treacherous plot and charged further that perjury had been committed. The Justice Department was repeatedly requested to determine if Davies should be indicted for perjury. The Department of Justice parried these requests but was unable to prevent the final report of the subcommittee from concluding that Davies had testified falsely about his proposal.

Although the Justice Department did not move against Davies, the publicity eventually resulting from this affair certainly did not redound to Davies's credit. *U.S. News & World Report* ran a lengthy article on the investigation. A front page article in the *New York Times* by James Reston raised questions about Davies's motives. Both pieces were done with a mystery-thriller air about them. The impression was left that skullduggery was afoot, and Davies may very well have been its source. This whole affair and the attendant publicity allowed Davies's critics to contend that his alleged sympathy for Communists continued beyond World War II.

The attention focused on the proposal to the CIA did not mean that Davies's reports from China were forgotten. The final report on the IPR investigation concluded that certain Foreign Service officers stationed in China during World War II wielded a major influence on United States policy and used this influence in a manner favorable to the Chinese Communists. Davies's role was featured in this accusation. In an article entitled "China: Did She Fall or Was She Pushed?", *U.S. News & World Report* noted that the blame for the "greatest defeat in US history" was finally being pinned down. The article charged that the

activities of people like Davies played a major role in the "loss of China." In the midst of such accusations, it was not surprising that Davies's 1952 trip through the government's loyalty-security program also emphasized his reports from China. Nevertheless, a State Department Loyalty-Security Board, not yet willing to hold Davies accountable for China's development, again found that he was not disloyal nor a security risk. In December, a Loyalty Review Board, established to audit departmental decisions, also concluded that there was no reasonable doubt as to the loyalty of John Davies. While clearing Davies on loyalty, the Loyalty Review Board did raise the issue that provided the eventual grounds for Davies's dismissal.

The Loyalty Review Board went out of its way to state that it was not ruling on Davies's competence and judgment. This backhanded slap at Davies's competence was important. As already noted, by 1953 the loyalty-security standards for government employment would encompass vague considerations of competence and personal character. The Loyalty Review Board's comments in December of 1952 indicated that there was already official concern present about Davies's ability. Also, influential men such as Joseph Alsop, Walter Bedell Smith, and General Albert Wedemeyer refused to charge Davies with disloyalty but were willing to question his competence. In effect, a foundation was being prepared for building a case against Davies on the grounds of incompetence.

The positions taken by Wedemeyer demonstrate both the elusive nature of the charges of incompetence and the ease with which such accusations could be made. Wedemeyer had succeeded General Stilwell in China and was Davies's superior for a few months. In June of 1951, Wedemeyer appeared before the Senate committee investigating the dismissal of General MacArthur and American policy in the Far East. When questioned about the controversial Foreign Service officers with whom he had worked, Wedemeyer testified that he did not consider them disloyal. The general did note that there were reports written which were critical of

Chiang's government and favorable to the Chinese Communists, but these reports mainly bothered him because of the trouble they caused with Patrick Hurley. After commenting on the excellent relations he had with John Davies, Wedemeyer was asked if any of the Foreign Service officers assigned to him were Communists, fellow-travelers, or held a sinister purpose of turning China over to the Communists. "No, sir," Wedemeyer replied, "quite the contrary. I thought they were very keen, fine men, very affable and intelligent men."

By September of 1951, Wedemeyer was telling an interviewer from *U.S. News & World Report* that the United States failure to support Chiang was due, in part, to sinister influences conveyed by misguided Americans, including some in the State Department. Appearing before the IPR investigation shortly thereafter, Wedemeyer indicated that some Foreign Service officers in China, including Davies, had been among the misguided. Wedemeyer cited reports from Davies which he claimed were mistaken, unrealistic and harmful. According to the General, Davies had failed to recognize that the Chinese Communists made no real contribution to the war against Japan and that the reason for their growth during the war was not mass support, but Soviet assistance. Wedemeyer contended that the recommendations made by Davies and others worked in the direction of turning China over to the Soviet Union. In summarizing the work of these Foreign Service officers, Wedemeyer noted that he did not want to label them disloyal, but "if I had followed their advice, communism would have run rampant over China much more rapidly than it did." In a matter of weeks, then, Davies moved in Wedemeyer's estimation from being part of a band of fine and intelligent men to a participant in an unwitting and incompetent effort to turn China into a Soviet satellite.

The final ingredient leading to Davies's dismissal was the appointment of John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State in the new administration of President Dwight Eisenhower. This is not to say that the controversial China hands enjoyed special protection in Dean

Acheson's State Department. Both John Service and O. Edmund Clubb were purged during Acheson's tenure. The case against Service was flimsy at best. The forced retirement of Clubb was a disgrace. However, the appointments made by Dulles and the concerns he held meant that Davies's stationing in Peru was not going to be a sufficient palliative for those who desired his head.

Dulles began his new job with the announcement that "positive loyalty" would be expected from employees of the State Department. The Secretary was never very clear about what he meant by this term. Dulles did harbor a suspicion that the years of Democratic administration had produced a bureaucracy that would be intransigent and in need of airing out. Whatever the intent of Dulles's statement, his appointment of Scott McLeod as head of the department's office of security meant that security and loyalty investigations would be undertaken with renewed vigor. McLeod, a former FBI agent, came to the State Department from a position on the staff of Senator Styles Bridges, a tireless searcher for subversive influences in the government. McLeod set about reviewing loyalty and security cases in terms of the new standards established in April of 1953. Dulles, who hated to be bothered by any facet of administration, largely gave McLeod a free rein.

Secretary Dulles was very concerned about a shortcoming he perceived in his predecessor. Dulles felt that Dean Acheson had suffered because of a deteriorating relationship with the Congress. Part of this deterioration was ascribed to Acheson's failure to provide full satisfaction regarding loyalty and security cases. Dulles was determined to build a strong position on Capitol Hill. He was not about to put himself in a position where he could be criticized for being inattentive to loyalty and security matters. With this in mind, the signals coming from Congress about John Davies could not be ignored. The Internal Security Subcommittee was still pushing for a perjury indictment. In November of 1953, Senator McCarthy told a national television audience that although the new administration was doing a

Continued on page 31

The Ascent of Women

ON TOP OF THE WORLD, *Five Women Explorers in Tibet*, by Luree Miller. Paddington Press, \$10.95.

In this engaging account of women explorers in Tibet between 1872 and 1944 we find the five heroines had little in common besides a dogged desire to make their way up in the mountainous world of the Himalayas. Apparently they were the first western women to penetrate the particular areas they chose and all of them wrote about their arduous and chilling experiences. Historian and Foreign Service wife Luree Miller has accompanied her carefully researched biographies with maps of the women's trails.

Several of these determined women hoped to reach Lhasa, then, as now, a closed city but only the last one, Alexandra David-Neel, did, an exploit that gives the book a very satisfying climax. In fact, the chapter on this eccentric, talented Frenchwoman is by far the best—and longest. The reason may be because Alexandra provided so much information on herself and because, unlike the others, she devoted her life to Tibet, even to the point of putting aside for a time her European self and taking on the dress, languages and ideas of a Tibetan. It is a high point in more than one sense when Alexandra, disguised as a pious peasant, climbs to the roof of the sacrosanct Potala monastery and looks out over Lhasa on the plain below. Stout Alexandra. She was worth a book herself.

Still there is a nice historic progression. In 1872 the British curate's lady, Nina Mazuchelli, swathed in petticoats and accompanying her indulgent husband, was carried by coolies on high trails near Everest (naturally she sketched it). In 1892-3 the intrepid spinster missionary Annie Taylor rode almost alone for four and a half months through snow and ice only to be arrested and sent back within three days of Lhasa. Isabella Bird Bishop and Fanny Bullock Workman, one British, the other American, were successful travel writers. Mrs. Bird spread

herself so generously around the world and wrote so broadly that her contribution to Central Asian exploration seems minor though she did approach Little Tibet in 1889 and Somo on the fringes of Tibet in 1896. Fanny Workman from Hartford, on the other hand, with her husband and collaborator led six major expeditions to the remote Karakoram area between 1899 and 1912. Not only was she a professional explorer who held the women's altitude record (22,810 feet) for 25 years, she was an early feminist who proudly planted a plea for women's suffrage beside her icepick at 21,000 feet. Given our reported need for female heroes, it may seem captious to fault this book for being at times almost a feminist tract (shades of the saints and the proletariat) but then Ms. Miller is legitimately concerned with the successful ascent of women and tells it well.

—DALLAS FINN

The Workings of State

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, by Thomas S. Estes and E. Allan Lightner, Jr. Praeger, \$10.00

This is the first methodical presentation of the Department in some time and while it is hardly riveting it deserves recognition as a valuable manual of the Department's organization and what its various parts do. The authors are career Foreign Service officers now retired; they know their way through the labyrinths of the Department; and they have refined their competence as guides by considerable research. No reader will fail to discover gaps in his own knowledge being filled and his perceptions sharpened.

It is all too common to look down one's nose at manuals. "Pot-boilers," they are called, but when well done, as is this one, they serve a useful purpose for any serious student. Manuals do not go in for behavioral dynamics, which do so much to explain the character and workings of an organization, and they therefore can never supersede behavioral studies, but they play the useful role of a reference book.

Among deficiencies is one which grates on me every time I come across it. It is an organization chart lifted from the State Department's own publications which has as its

bottom line an elongated box reading: "Diplomatic missions and delegations to international organizations." What about consular posts? If, as the authors make clear in their text, such posts do indeed figure in the Department's operations, why go on endlessly reproducing the Department's mindless omission?

Another concerns the end objective of the Department, which is not to help make policy but to get results from those policies. This is what we call diplomacy and academicians are calling "foreign policy interactions," "administration of foreign policy" and anything but diplomacy, as though the term were obscene. Any book on the Department—including manuals—should, it seems to me, be cast in that perspective, with every office and bureau described not simply in terms of "programs," daily work and contributions to policy advice but contributions to diplomacy as well. Not only is the term "diplomacy" all but eschewed by the authors until a near-the-end chapter on multilateral diplomacy, but the concept fails to crystallize as the end result to which all the Department's efforts are—or should be—directed. In this way, the authors both reflect and aggravate that lack of "a sense of mission" so much deplored these days. The mission is there if only we would see it.

A basic issue not only for Department and Service personnel but for diplomacy itself, and thus for the mission of a diplomatic establishment, is whether the system described by the authors is mastering them or they, the system. This issue is not addressed, yet foreign policy and diplomacy as well are highly judgmental, demanding the maximum individual education and such qualities as initiative, resourcefulness, tact and intuition, along with promptitude in the anticipation of problems and preemptive action. Perhaps this is beyond the limits of the usual manual on a governmental department—but State is an unusual department because of its mission of guiding our total national interests in the community of nations in such a way as to maximize the chance of peace. It cannot be treated as just another department in a library of manuals on departments and agencies of the

US government. A final synthesizing chapter could have been added to this study to present this perspective.

If the Foreign Service Institute had an adequate course for newly commissioned officers, this manual, along with other books on the Department and Service, would be recommended for its required reading list to form the basis of a searching discussion of our role and mission in the federal and international communities. Pending the arrival of that millennium, one can only recommend it to colleagues and others as a useful guide to how the Department is organized and its relationships with other parts of the Executive Branch and with Congress. If its alphabet is manual, what it communicates very much needs to be known.

—SMITH SIMPSON

Investigating an LDC

BANGLADESH: THE TEST CASE OF DEVELOPMENT, by *Just Faaland and J. R. Parkinson*. Westview Press, \$20.00.

Since the audience for this book (despite the title) is those interested in Bangladesh it is perhaps not inappropriate that a noneconomist review it even though it is a book of economic analysis written by two economists.

Published in 1976 and written, at least in part, two years earlier, the book is admittedly a little outdated. The stability which the authors recognize as prerequisite for development in Bangladesh has been achieved and some useful agricultural policy actions taken. But the basic picture remains the same and the authors' blueprint for action ought to be still generally valid if it ever was. I don't think it was.

The key to almost everything in Bangladesh is agriculture and population. Of the book's 200-odd pages, agriculture gets 30 pages and much of this is historical rehash done better elsewhere. On population there is no discussion of incentives and disincentives at all. Neither on how these can be used as a factor influencing family size nor, more importantly, on the social factors in Bangladesh which make it sensible for a family to want more children from the point of view of its own welfare, calamitous though this may be for Bangladesh as a whole.

The authors make a strong ar-

gument for large transfers of concessional capital resources. They speak of \$1,500 million per year as being necessary. Perhaps it is. But at present most aid donors, bilateral as well as multilateral, have more aid money available for Bangladesh than they can spend which hardly persuades one that this is a most important consideration.

Crucial distinctions are not clearly spelled out. Bangladesh has not been well-governed since independence. This makes discussion of what is achievable under even the best possible government particularly necessary. Such discussion is blurred by incorporation within criticism of a particular administration. Similarly, discussion is needed to bring out, and thus justify the title, where Bangladesh differs from other LDCs versus where its problems are comparable.

Any book of analysis on what can be done in Bangladesh is welcome. This one brings to bear a wealth of experience, intelligence and sincerity on what all recognize as one of the world's most intractable problems. Whatever the criticisms, then, it is particularly welcome as a contribution to a continuing debate.

\$20 is far too dear!

—ERIC GRIFFEL

The Dismal Record

VIETNAM—*The Unforgettable Tragedy*, by *Joseph Buttinger*. Horizon Press.

Joseph Buttinger, who has written four widely-respected scholarly books on Vietnam's history and politics, has now added a somewhat disjointed polemic.

Apparently, the book was written to explain and justify his evolution from Diem supporter and lobbyist to anti-war critic, as well as to get some zingers out of his system.

In the process, Buttinger reviews some of the many contradictions in America's Vietnam policy over the years, including a contrast of the pious rhetoric and fatuous predictions of many public figures with the unnecessary waste, destruction, and death we were causing.

While it is occasionally instructive to review this dismal record, Professor Buttinger does not offer any new ideas, insights, or scholarly analysis. His sources are

mostly newspapers and his personal recollections, but an exchange of previously unpublished letters between the author and Diem is useful as evidence of prevailing attitudes in 1955 and 1956.

The American policies and practices that anger Professor Buttinger are now acknowledged by millions of Americans across a broad ideological spectrum as an American mistake. But Buttinger raises the valid point of whether or not American leaders have learned the lessons that Vietnam should have taught us.

The answer to that lies in the development of future policies. In the meanwhile, new books on Vietnam are in need of fresh sources. Unfortunately, much of the material that would fuel new inquiries is still inaccessible to researchers, locked away in government archives.

—WILLIAM LENDERKING

New Economic Order?

ALTERNATIVES TO MONETARY DISORDER, by *Fred Hirsch and Michael Doyle*. McGraw Hill, \$3.95 paper.

The post-war international economic order was essentially a US order. Based on a western, especially American, liberal view, dependent upon a certain amount of US hegemony, a dominant US dollar and held together by US sweeteners and sanctions. By the late '60s the conditions which gave rise to the system no longer existed so it disappeared. The problem addressed in these two brief, jargon-free, analytical and worthwhile essays, is, given the new economic and political realities (the description of which is the highlight of the book), *how* do we design, and move toward, *what* kind of a new economic order? The problem is perhaps more difficult than at any time in modern history because there are many more actors, several more philosophies and some fundamental incompatibilities.

When the Bretton Woods/GATT economic order was created, the third world, to the extent that it existed at all independently from the major industrial powers, didn't count. Now it very much wants to be counted, but its world view and perceptions of its interests are fundamentally different from our own. The marxist neomercantilist view, which characterizes much of the second and third world, perceives



nations much as pure marxists view classes, as becoming alienated in the process of production and exchange. Hence they seek a greater degree of politicization as a means of enhancing their income shares. Liberals view the politicization as leading to conflict-generating gaming behavior from which all will lose. The liberals therefore seek a constitutional process whereby the political bargaining takes place in the process of setting up an order in which, once established, heavy reliance on market forces minimizes political intervention and use of economic leverage. The marxist/mercantilists view the constitutional order as a framework within which a more highly politicized exchange and bargaining takes place.

In both essays the authors agree that the major industrial powers will remain at the center of whatever system emerges, but they discuss some of the features the new order must consider in order to induce the third and second worlds to play our liberal game. There is much nonsense written these days about the "new economic order," not all of it by third world spokesmen. This book, prepared as part of the Council of Foreign Relations 1980s project, is totally lacking in nonsense and should be readable and stimulating for economist and noneconomist alike.

— JOHN H. PENFOLD

Microcosm of the Cold War

CHINA DIARY: Crisis Diplomacy in Dairen, by Paul Paddock. Iowa State University Press, \$7.50.

This is a valuable memoir about American-Chinese-Russian relations in the early period of the Cold War (1948-1949).

It is a truly absorbing, detailed account of serving in the Foreign Service under extremely difficult circumstances. Paddock, in retrospect, saw "the situation in Dairen as a microcosm of the cold war itself . . . a war that is still without an effective truce."

This book might well be required reading for those studying and aspiring for a career in the Service. And for all those who would know what the Service is really like and about, this diary is highly recommended.

It is valuable also as a possible inspiration to others in the foreign Service (or retired) to record and recount their own experiences in a book, a monograph or an article. How about an article for our favorite review, *Foreign Service Journal*? The American people know regrettably little about the Service and much of what they know isn't true. Those in the Foreign Service or out, by speaking up for it and by writing about it, can do much to correct misunderstandings and raise it in public esteem.

This diary is a prized memorial for all of us for whom, as for Paul Paddock, the supreme dignity of our life was to have been one of that goodly company—the United States Foreign Service.

ROBERT W. RINDEN
FSO-Retired

China—A Trip Report

THE CHINESE: Portrait of a People, by Alain Peyrefitte, translated from the French by Graham Webb. Bobbs-Merrill, \$15.

The "I don't know much about China, but . . ." introductions to books, articles and lectures dealing with that country have proliferated over the past years and, unfortunately, all too often the text proves the caveat. Alain Peyrefitte's insightful observations following his visit to China represent an outstanding exception to the rule. His experience as a widely traveled former French career diplomat, his training as an anthropologist, and his obviously extensive background and keen intellect more than compensate for his (self-avowed) not being a Pekinologist or a Sinologist.

Little about China escaped Peyrefitte's notice in the scores of vignette-like sections which are fitted into the 28 chapters. Subjects range from the daily life of the people to China's policies and developments in science and technol-

ogy; and from his talks with nursery school teachers to discussions with Chou En-lai. But what makes Peyrefitte's "trip report" worth reading, even though China has experienced and is continuing to experience some significant changes since the author's visit, are his comments, observations and expressions of both skepticism and admiration about what he saw and what he was told. His comments reflect keen perception—no doubt a skill he perfected during his diplomatic career. The prose is extremely readable (and, obviously, well translated).

It is too bad, however, that the American publishers of the book went to such great lengths to hide the fact that Peyrefitte's visit took place in the summer of 1971. By up-dating some footnotes and including a chronology that runs through October 1976, they felt justified in saying on the flyleaf that this is "the first book about modern China since the death of Mao Tse-tung." The book is much too honest for this type of ploy.

—LEO A. ORLEANS

Well, Who Is on First?

JAPAN AND THE NEW ASIA, edited by Akira Iriye. Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, \$1.50

Three big names of American foreign policy students—Allen Whiting, Marshall Shulman and James Morley—are joined in this little book with Yukio Matsuyama, the *Asahi Shimbun's* Washington chief, in a look at Japan's relations with the US, the USSR, and China, and the effects of Japanese domestic politics on those relations. There is not much optimism here, if one starts with the idea that international relations should be smooth, harmonious and mutually beneficial. If one accepts as normal the essentially competitive and dynamic nature of those relations, then these four well-presented views are stimulating. It remains for one of the discussants of the essays, Jackson Bailey, to put the hardest questions: Are the perceptions and assumptions the Japanese make about themselves and their relations with the outside (note that word) world the real unknown that these four studies are

dealing with? Are the Japanese "in some sense masochistic in their subconscious desire not to be understood?"

—J. K. HOLLOWAY

Faith, Sincerity, Diligence

ENTREPRENEUR AND GENTLEMAN, by Akira Sueno, translated by Neal Donner. Charles E. Tuttle Company, \$12.50.

This is a case history in which the entrepreneur himself tells how he made his contribution to Japan's economic miracle by building up a small packaging company. It's all there—the hard work, the enterprise in overcoming the disaster of war, the staunch belief in the capitalist system, the familial attitude toward the company and its workers, even the company song, the semi-annual bonus for the wives of employees, and the company motto—not Think—but Faith, Sincerity and Diligence. The book was a best seller in Japan. Akira Sueno, entrepreneur and gentleman in the Horatio Alger tradition, was decorated for his services to Japanese industry. Charles Tuttle, the publisher of this

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and so many other valuable works about the culture, society and politics of Japan, deserves a decoration from both governments for his many contributions to US understanding of Japan.

—RICHARD B. FINN

Invaluable Shop Talk

RICHARD CROSSMAN, *The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister, Vol. 1. 1964-1966*. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, \$16.95.

HAROLD WILSON, *The Governance of Britain*. Harper and Row, \$10.95.

The economic and social difficulties which currently beset Britain have focused attention on their methods of solving public problems. The long English history of stable development based upon shared underlying attitudes in the political culture no longer seems able to arrest economic, ethnic, and social fragmentation. Both of these books concentrate on decision-making in government—the Crossman volume by a detailed record of Cabinet meetings; the Wilson book, intended as a popularized 20th century Bagehot, by its emphasis on the role of the Prime

Minister.

When Richard Crossman was first elected to Parliament as a Labor M.P. in 1945 (Wilson was only elected in 1950), he was already well-known as an Oxford intellectual and political journalist. His next twenty years were spent on the backbenches where he led a group of left-wing M.P.s who in 1964 supported Harold Wilson's first successful accession to the P.M. post. Crossman's reward was his appointment as Minister of Housing. This 700-page posthumously published diary (the first of three volumes; the second "Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House 1966-1968" [850 pp] is now available in England and will be published in the US this fall) not only details his struggles with the bureaucracy (personified by battles with "The Dame," permanent secretary Dame Evelyn Sharp) but also presents an irreverent account of Cabinet meetings and the Labor establishment.

One not familiar with British politics would probably find the *Diaries* a bit tedious. But to a historian or political scientist they are invaluable shop-talk. Their informality mirrors that of the British decision-making process. One can see clearly how the clubby atmosphere of the Labor Party leadership tends toward a centrist, moderate ideological position. Crossman's elitist and conformist tendencies were strengthened by his seat of power. He became very comfortable, somewhat isolated even from members of his own civil service, many of whom he found incompetent and unimaginative. It became easy to postpone and compromise hard economic decisions, particularly when the Prime Minister, who is described as "unimaginative," "curiously methodical," and a "drifter," lacked vision and firmness. Ultimately, Crossman's own limitations were self-imposed and self-accepted.

Harold Wilson's book on how Britain is governed is more valuable for the layman than for the specialist. Less self-serving than his *Memoirs*, although still characterized by a selective memory, it is the book of a realist with few intellectual pretensions. In an interesting comparison with the American presidency, Wilson, like

Crossman, feels that the Prime Ministership is the more powerful office. In my opinion, however, his power may be diluted not only by party factionalism but also by the lack of adequate staff—no National Security Council, no long-term planning mechanisms. Much of his time seems to be wasted on endless meetings, and the current vogue of summit meetings exacerbated his tendency to spend time on foreign policy when the crucial problems are at home.

Far fewer books have been written on the Office of Prime Minister than on the American Presidency. Harold Wilson who served as head of four administrations, a record equalled only by Gladstone and Asquith, may have mediocre qualities as chronicled by Crossman, but his simplicity and pragmatism laid the groundwork for the present centrist Labor-Liberal coalition which bids fair to rescue Britain from permanent crisis.

—CHARLES R. FOSTER

Some Thoughts on China

CHINA POLICY, by A. Doak Barnett. Brookings Institution, \$8.95.

A. Doak Barnett, senior fellow

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
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in the Brookings Institution's foreign policy program, has written or edited more than a dozen books on Chinese affairs. His current work, "China Policy," is based on interviews with refugees from China, visitors to China and his own personal observations there during the winter of 1972 and 1973.

There are no shocks and no great revelations in this work. There is, rather, sound scholarship, dispassionate reasoning and a wide-ranging analysis of the alternatives confronting the US in formulating a policy for the PRC in "the post-Mao era."

In the author's view US and PRC interests on Taiwan will continue to diverge with no final resolution of the Taiwan problem likely for many years. Nevertheless, a sound proposal based on "the Japanese model," with modifications, is offered as a guideline for US policy.

The cultural exchange effort between the United States and the PRC is revealing. Since 1971 some 10,000 American visitors have been to the People's Republic of China whereas 700 Chinese visitors have

made the American pilgrimage. PRC visitors show an overwhelming interest in US science and technology while the bulk of the American academic contingent is represented by specialists in the social sciences and humanities who want to study Chinese society.

Author Barnett reminds his readers that US relations with Japan together with the need to avoid a major conflict with the USSR represent higher priorities for the United States than normalization with the PRC.

Mr. Barnett regards Korea as a cornerstone of US Asian concerns today. The United States must do what is necessary to maintain stability on the peninsula, including maintaining as long as necessary American military forces in South Korea, although a phased and careful withdrawal of US troops, with due consideration to South Korea's ability to defend itself, is a realistic course to follow. No nuclear arms should, under any conditions, be provided South Korea.

He argues that Southeast Asia is not, and never has been, vital to US security interests since, unlike

northeast Asia, local military conflicts there do not pose an immediate and direct threat to the security of a major power allied to the United States.

Author Barnett sees an intensification of the rivalry between the USSR and the PRC as a key destabilizing factor in the region. The future role of a united Vietnam is likewise an imponderable that must be factored into any policy.

If the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is unable to bridge the gap with the communist nations of the Indochina peninsula a hostile confrontation between these two blocs is inevitable, in Mr. Barnett's view.

He suggests, as a series of US policy goals towards the PRC: the achievement of formal, diplomatic relations, the promotion of peace on the Korean peninsula and the involvement of the PRC in new international arms control measures. The goal of the United States, in the post-Mao era, must be "to convince China's new leaders that a dynamic but peaceful equilibrium among the powers is in their interest."

—JAMES D. McHALE

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LETTER FROM JAPAN from page 5

bers and were mostly university professors and political commentators.

Japan has its own Korean problems, including a rumored "Korean connection" suggesting bribery and corruption along the lines being probed in Washington. On the same day, September 6, two communiques were signed, one in Tokyo, by the delegates to ministerial talks of the governments of Japan and the Republic of Korea, and the other in Pyongyang, by a Japanese "supra-partisan" parliamentary group and North Korean officials. These simultaneous meetings suggest Japan's attempt to conserve its lucrative relationship with Seoul (Japan-ROK trade in 1976 was \$4.7 billion) while making private overtures to the North. The Pyongyang communique expectedly called for the prompt withdrawal of all foreign troops and nuclear weapons from South Korea while the Tokyo statement, on the Japanese side, expressed hope that the projected phase-out be conducted so as not to jeopardize peace and stability in the region, and, on the Korean side, noted only the fact of recent consultations with the United States on the Carter withdrawal plan.

The Japanese observed the Vance visit to China with interest, but without expectations or disappointments. The government was glad to be briefed by the Secretary and his party both before and after the Peking talks. Japan's own peace treaty with the People's Republic is stalled over the word "hegemony" (the Russians say a statement against hegemony is a slap at them) and it may take a while to sign on the dotted line. Meanwhile

Japanese trade with Taiwan goes briskly along, amounting to \$3.5 billion in 1976, nearly a half billion more than the two-way exchange with China.

In August Japan always remembers the 1945 surrender and the Emperor comes to Tokyo from his summer retreat to attend a memorial service on August 15. This year, on August 24, the Emperor gave an unusual "audience" to the Tokyo press corps and made headlines, such as the *Japan Times's* irreverent "History from the Horse's Mouth." The Emperor referred to his renunciation of "divinity" in his imperial rescript of January 1, 1946, which, it has been suggested, was inspired by officials of General MacArthur's Headquarters. In his 1946 statement, the Emperor quoted the "Charter Oath" of his grandfather, Emperor Meiji, which had been proclaimed in 1868 and which had included the democratic admonition that "deliberative assemblies shall be established and all matters be decided by public opinion." The Emperor in his talk with the representatives of the mass media asserted that the primary purpose of his 1946 rescript was not to renounce his divinity but to remind the Japanese that democracy was not something which they had to import. "We issued the rescript," the Emperor stated, "because I did not want our people to forget our pride—to show them the great ideas of Meiji Taitei (Meiji the Great) so that they would not forget their pride."

Early September was Japanese-American time, with two important conferences taking place, one, the Japan-America Assembly, the fourth in a series of private meetings held at Shimoda since 1970, and the second, a regular session of State Department and Foreign

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Office officials, taking place at the mountain lake resort of Chuzenji, above Nikko. The Shimoda Conference was attended by Japanese and Americans, including prominent members of the Diet and the Congress, in addition to officials, academics, business and professional people. Two former Ambassadors to Japan, Robert Ingersoll and James Hodgson, were there in addition to the present Ambassador, former Senator Mike Mansfield. Senator John Glenn, who had been feted widely in Japan when he made his first trip in space, went on television to tell the citizenry that defense was their country's business but it didn't make sense to limit their defense budget to one percent of gross national product. Apparently Korea was a lively topic at both private and official meetings. At Shimoda Americans disagreed sharply among themselves over whether or not American troops should be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula. The Shimoda sessions received extensive publicity, commentators and editors emphasizing the importance of the continuing dialogue with the United States and the close consultation which had become more necessary now than ever before.

The Japanese, although not yet quite used to his seemingly somewhat austere style, highly respect the new American ambassador, Mike Mansfield, and feel reassured that a man with such a distinguished public record and with influence in Washington, should represent the United States in their country.

JOHN K. EMMERSON

Nikko, Japan
September 9, 1977



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JOHN PATON DAVIES JR.

from page 20

better job on security than the Truman administration, the fact that John Davies was still on the payroll indicated that mistakes were being made. Any desire Dulles had to let Davies languish in Peru was overruled by the necessity of defusing these charges.

On December 29, 1953 the State Department's Office of Security recommended that John Davies should be suspended and his case processed under the new security standards. After reviewing the matter, Dulles did not suspend Davies but asked that a special Security Hearing Board be established to consider Davies's record. According to Dulles, there were "matters bearing upon reliability" that needed consideration. A five man board was established, and hearings were held in June and July of 1954. None of the board members could be considered an expert on East Asian affairs. It was the ninth time John Davies's case went before a security board.

The charges made against Davies contained nothing radically

new. The accusations centered on his activity regarding China. His criticism of Chiang's government, estimates of the Chinese Communists, and resulting recommendations were alleged to have constituted active opposition to and circumvention of United States policy toward China. The fact that Davies had thought it possible to separate Soviets and Chinese Communists was also part of the indictment. He was also charged with carelessness and indiscretion in establishing contacts with sources ranging from Communists to members of the American press corps.

The security board eventually concluded that Davies's "personal demeanor" in confronting these charges "did not inspire confidence in his reliability." Until the detailed records of the hearing become available, it will not be possible to reach a final judgment of the board's estimate. However, Davies's summary defense of his behavior in a letter to board chairman Daniel Noces suggests that Davies's problem may have been a lack of sufficient contrition.

His letter was respectful but not at all contrite. He defended his behavior in China as being quite consistent with the duties of a Foreign Service officer. Davies argued that in World War II he had felt that aspects of US policy in China were not consistent with American goals in that area of the world. He claimed that under these conditions he was duty bound to point this out and not remain silent. Davies admitted that the judgments of any Foreign Service officer, including himself, were open to criticism because they were usually made under the pressures of time and circumstances and often based on imperfect information. Nevertheless, if these judgments were ever to have any value, he argued, they had to be made under less than perfect conditions. To wait until every piece of relevant information was available meant that decisions would be reached too late to do any good. Davies also noted that the educated guesses of Foreign Service officers were improved by a wide range of contacts, including sources that later critics might view as suspect. Davies's letter did not

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contain an admission of error or extensive self-serving excuses. He would not kowtow before the view that Communism, past and present, was an immutable monolithic force. The whole tenor of his letter attacked the idea that one's attitude toward Chiang Kai-shek in the 1940s should be a key determinant in reaching decisions about fitness for government service.

On August 30, 1954, the security board unanimously recommended that John Davies's continued employment was not consistent with the interests of national security. It was held that he exhibited a "lack of judgment, discretion and reliability." Secretary Dulles once again reviewed the record and accepted the security board's judgment. In early November, the Secretary informed Davies that he was fired.

Reflecting upon Davies's dismissal puts one in mind of Goya's painting of Saturn devouring his children. John Davies, an anti-Communist, found himself trapped in a particular anti-Communist consensus that devoured him. His wartime appraisals of Chinese Communism, criticism of Chiang

Kai-shek, and comments on the separability of Communist movements could not find sufficient tolerance and understanding in the prevailing views of the 1950s. The proposal to the CIA, which reflects little credit upon Davies, was not treated as a contribution to Cold War tactics. Instead, it was twisted in such a way to suggest that Davies continued to embrace Communist views. Davies's position in the State Department, a suspicious place, and the willingness of the Department to sacrifice a few of its own to lessen the suspicion certainly worked against his survival. His failure to offer *mea culpas* for the views he had honestly offered also served to heighten the zeal of his pursuers. John Davies was not an infallible sage whose every policy recommendation should now be applauded. Yet his analysis and estimates hold up better in retrospect than that of many others, including the bulk of his accusers. Moreover, Davies's views were consistently offered with the interests of the United States foremost in his mind. He deserved more than the fruits of

viciousness, ignorance, and fear.

Davies's immediate comment on this dismissal reflected an air of resignation and exhaustion. Noting that he was "content to let history be my judge," Davies concluded: "There has been enough recrimination. I am not prepared to add to it and thereby detract from the strength of my country in its mortal struggle with the Communist enemy." However, some of the hurt and bitterness that must have been present did surface in remarks Davies made several weeks after his dismissal. He decried the state of affairs in which "a man is constantly under the compulsion to demonstrate that he is innocent." John Davies also had a word of advice for young people considering a career in the Foreign Service. "I think," he said, "a prudent young man would enter the Foreign Service knowing another trade."

In 1969, 15 years after his dismissal, John Davies was granted a security clearance. Under Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach's recommendation noted that the issuance of a security clearance to Mr. Davies "would be clearly consistent with the interests of national security." 

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CHINA-BURMA-INDIA

from page 14

American military policeman had pulled a blanket over him and was quietly covering his comrades and lowering the mosquito nets on their beds. This soldier was one of those put on a raft and left to float on the Irrawaddy River. He and others burst out in rage at the civilian and military leaders who had guided Japan to war in "pursuit of a phantom." The "slavery" of a prison camp was better than the slavery of being a "living bullet" for the Army or of submission to unscrupulous rulers.

These Japanese were simple men—only the Lieutenant had a university education—but their thoughts and feelings hinted at a state of mind which probably prevailed among many of their countrymen, both in the armed forces overseas and at home. These experiences naturally set up a train of thought leading toward the major problems: how to end the war and how to plan for the future of Japan.

The announced Allied policy of unconditional surrender was a hin-

drance not only to psychological warfare but to any efforts to end the war by agreement. While the policy had been deliberated within the State Department and confirmed by the British, President Roosevelt's public, unpremeditated call for the unconditional surrender of Germany, Italy, and Japan, at the Casablanca conference on January 24, 1943, was a surprise even to Churchill. The demand was not included in the joint statement issued at Casablanca and FDR admitted later that, when confronted by a press conference, "the thought popped into my mind." Unconditional surrender as a war objective was never clearly defined although Roosevelt and Churchill made general statements, usually with special reference to Germany, that the Allied intent was not to annihilate the enemy peoples. The Japanese leadership claimed, however, that the alternative to resistance to the end was the destruction of the nation, if not of its people. A Japanese author warned his readers in a book published in 1943 called *Western Devil America*

(Yóki Amerika): "Roosevelt has threatened to wipe every last Japanese from the face of the earth. . . . Should we be defeated in this war, untold numbers of Japanese people will be brutally slaughtered at the hands of these American friends."

American military leaders, in turn, expected bitter, last-ditch resistance by Japan and prepared for landings on the main islands with consequent hand-to-hand fighting and enormous casualties. Moreover it was the accepted belief that resistance would continue on the Asian mainland wherever imperial troops could be found and that they would have to be tracked down and destroyed to the last man.

It was with this horrible prospect in mind that I approached the captured Japanese soldier for clues to the behavior of his countrymen at the moment of final defeat. It was difficult to persuade these shamed and sickened veterans even to think about losing the war, a consequence for the homeland no loyal subject of the Emperor would at first contemplate. Finally, by coax-

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ing them to stretch their imaginations, to conceive the inconceivable, I was able to elicit answers. They came slowly, with hesitation, but their purport was always the same. Soldiers in the field, wherever they might be, fought in obedience to the Emperor's command. Should the Emperor, in his divine wisdom, order them to lay down their arms, they would of course do so in response to His Majesty's stated wish. It was just that simple.

As early as July 1944, more than a year before the Potsdam Declaration finally brought about the surrender of Japan, I reported to the State Department my conclusion, on the basis of discussions with officer prisoners of war, that capitulation by the government (which would mean the Emperor) would assure the cessation of military action. In August, writing from New Delhi, I amplified my ideas in a despatch called "A Policy Toward Japan," a copy of which I later discovered was sent to the White House and can still be found among

the Harry Hopkins papers at Hyde Park; there is no evidence, however, that it was ever shown to the President. I began my memorandum: "We should speak directly to the people of Japan. We should encourage elements in the country opposed to the war." (Not until nine months later did Navy Captain Ellis M. Zacharias begin his broadcasts designed to appeal to just these elements.) I then analyzed the mental change occurring in a Japanese prisoner of war after capture, describing his complete detachment, his feeling that "he no longer belongs to his own country." My despatch emphasized that we should "say more than unconditional surrender," that we should "offer some hope for the people of Japan in a future changed world." I suggested that we should allow the Emperor to remain, that he would be very useful to us in the first days following an armistice, and that proclamation of surrender by imperial rescript would end resistance. The memorandum concluded with a summary of a proposed "official statement" to Japan, demanding

the destruction of militarism but assuring the Japanese government that unconditional surrender would not mean the end of the country's existence, that the nation's peace would be guaranteed, that peaceful industries and international trade could be freely developed, and that Japan would be permitted to form her own government with the sole condition that it would not be usurped by a militaristic group.

It was not until May 8, 1945 that President Truman, in a statement paralleling his announcement of the defeat of Germany, proclaimed to Japan that "unconditional surrender does not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people." And it was not until July 26 that Harry Truman, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, with Stalin concurring, spelled out in the Potsdam Proclamation the allied terms for Japan's surrender. Even then the status of the Emperor was ignored, an omission which unnecessarily prolonged a war the Japanese civilian leadership was desperately trying to end.



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AFSA NEWS



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Members wishing to send letters on employment, working conditions or AFSA affairs should get them to AFSA by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication. AFSA News Committee, Room 3644, N.S.

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GOOD NEWS CONCERNING PROPOSED TAXATION OF FS ALLOWANCES

Following representations by AFSA, the Secretary of State, and others, Secretary of Treasury Blumenthal signed a letter dated September 15, 1977 stating that Treasury does not intend to propose the repeal of Section 912 of the Internal Revenue Code in its Tax Reform proposals to the President. Further, Secretary Blumenthal promised that no modifications of Section 912 will be proposed without having been discussed in advance with the InterAgency Committee on Overseas Allowances and Benefits, which is chaired by a representative of the State Department and includes representatives of all Federal agencies with personnel assigned abroad.

NEW RED TOPS ISSUED

Two new Red Tops were issued in September. In case you did not see a copy, you may write for one. Red Top #77-3 of September 19, 1977 outlined what the Members Interests Committee has been doing toward improvements in pay and allowances. Red Top #77-4 of September 20, 1977 circulated the text of a Department of State proposal submitted to AFSA for consultation for revamping selection-out procedures.

USIA-CU REORGANIZATION

President Carter sent to Congress October 11 a Reorganization Plan creating a new Agency for International Communication. The new Agency will bring together the functions now exercised by the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the United States Information Agency. The new Agency Director will be the principal advisor on international information and exchange activities to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of State. The USIA and CU Advisory Commissions will be combined into a single, seven-member Advisory Commission.

President Carter emphasized that the reorganization plan was guided by two principles: maintaining the integrity of the educational and cultural exchange programs; keeping the Voice of America's news gathering and reporting functions independent and objective.

The new Agency's distinct but related goals are: to tell the world about our society and policies—in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty; to tell ourselves about the world, to enrich our own culture as well as to give us the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations.

The Agency's structure will be built around a Director, Deputy Director and four Associate Directors. All of them will be Presidential appointments by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. The four Associate Directors will be responsible for: 1. Educational and Cultural Exchange; 2. Voice of America; 3. Program Planning and Development; 4. Administration.

The question of personnel was only very generally dealt with through a statement that the rights and career achievements of USIA and CU employees will be respected and recognized by the new Agency. It promises that the best possible use will be made of their professional skills and abilities.

The new Agency will carry out

most of the basic functions now found in USIA and CU. An important caveat is the maintenance of the Board of Foreign Scholarships. An additional function, long sought after by AFSA, is the coordination of international information, education, cultural and exchange programs conducted by the US Government. The new Agency is also to serve as a focal point for private US international exchange programs.

An important function will be the assessment and advisory role for the United States Government on the impact of worldwide public opinion of American foreign policy decisions. The President emphasized that the new Agency will be as much a listener abroad as a communicator. Straightforward, open, candid, balanced and representative communication is to be stressed while covert, manipulative and propagandistic techniques are forbidden.

The timetable for Congress's opportunity to act on reorganization is 60 legislative days. If Congress does not specifically vote the plan down within this time period, it automatically becomes law. Hearings began in mid-October and AFSA plans to present testimony. While nobody can accurately predict when the new Agency will come into being, it will not be for several months.

AFSA OPPOSES S.S. MERGER

The House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Social Security approved a surprise proposal in mid-September to refinance the Social Security Trust Fund by sweeping into it all retirement systems for Federal employees, including the Foreign Service Retirement system.

AFSA immediately wrote the Committee strongly opposing such action and asked for an opportunity to testify. We trust that our opposition, in conjunction with that of others interested in the Civil Service retirement system, will persuade the full Committee to drop any merger plans.

1978-1979 AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS AND OTHER SCHOLARSHIPS FOR F.S. JUNIORS

Applications are being mailed out for the 1978 AFSA Merit Awards Program for 12th (and graduating 11th) grade high school and preparatory school students and for the 1978-1979 AFSA Financial Aid Program for college and university undergraduate study.

AFSA also has a very limited number of scholarships which may, under special circumstances, be awarded to secondary school students in need of financial aid.

For applications and information, write to The AFSA Committee on Education, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037. The deadline for completion of the application is February 15, 1978.

OTHER SCHOLARSHIPS AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN SERVICE CHILDREN

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to children of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information to the schools, colleges and universities indicated:

Castilleja School, Palo Alto, California. Scholarships are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas who are registered at Castilleja School for admission to grades 7 to 12, inclusive. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Castilleja School, 1310 Bryant St., Palo Alto, California 94301.

Dartmouth College: S. Pinkney Tuck Scholarship. For students at Dartmouth College who are the children or grandchildren of Foreign Service officers of the United States and who are in need of financial assistance. Address inquiry to the Director of Financial Aid, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

Middlesex School Scholarship: Offered on a competitive basis for Grades 9 through 12 to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service family. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Middlesex School, Concord, Massachusetts 01742.

The Hall School: For the daughters of Foreign Service Personnel, a \$1,250 tuition reduction is available. Formerly known as Miss Hall's, the School enrolls 160 students from grades 9 through 12. This reduction is offered in recognition of higher travel costs and represents 25% of the total tuition cost for 1978/79. For further information, contact Mr. Diederik van Renesse, Director of Admissions, The Hall School, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201.

The New Hampton School: Offers a \$1000 abatement on tuition to foreign service boys and girls. The school enrolls approximately 225 students in grades nine through postgraduate. For further information write to Mr. Austin C. Stern, Director of Admissions, The New Hampton School, New Hampton, New Hampshire 03256.

Northfield Mount Hermon School: A \$1,000 reduction in tuition is offered all sons and daughters of US Government personnel stationed overseas in grades 9 through 12. This reduction is afforded in recognition of the higher travel cost experienced by such personnel. Additional financial aid is available on the basis of need. At present students from 35 states and 35 countries are enrolled. For further information contact President Howard L. Jones, Northfield, Massachusetts 01360.

Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts. The Charles and Jane Stelle Memorial Scholarship awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service person. The award is based on financial need. For further information, and to apply for this scholarship, write to Mr. Joshua L. Miner, Director of Admissions/Mr. Robert Griggs, Director of Financial Aid, Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts 01810.

St. Andrew's School: Middletown, Delaware. The Norris S. Haselton Scholarships awarded to children of Foreign Service families where need is indicated. Write to Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware 19709.

The Shipley School: Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. In addition to the regular financial aid program, the Trustees of The Shipley School announces a \$1,000 scholarship for daughters (entering grades 8-12 and a new postgraduate program) of officers of the American Foreign Service or of US Military & Government personnel serving overseas. Grants are based on need, as computed by the Educational Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. For

further information, contact Mrs. Joseph N. Ewing, Jr., Director of Admissions, The Shipley School, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukens Memorial Scholarship is awarded at Vassar to children of Foreign Service personnel. Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the child of an American Foreign Service Officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the child of an employee of the Federal Government or of a State Government. Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Vermont Academy: An Edward R. Cheney Memorial Scholarship is being awarded at Vermont Academy to the son of a Foreign Service person. Those interested in applying should write to the Director of Admissions, Vermont Academy, Saxtons River, Vt. 05154. The Academy enrolls approximately 180 students in grades nine through postgraduate; girls, day students only.

Yale University Scholarship: A scholarship given by an anonymous donor is awarded each year to the son of an American Foreign Service Officer who demonstrates financial need. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the son of a member of the United States Military Services, or of an employee of the Federal Government. Complete information is obtainable from the Director of Financial Aid, Box 2170 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

Westover School: Middlebury, Connecticut: Financial aid and scholarship awards for grades 9 through 12 are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas. Write Director of Admissions, Westover School, Middlebury, Connecticut 06762.

Dana Hall School is accepting applications from ninth grade girls who wish to compete for the Congdon Merit Scholarship, awarded annually regardless of need on a competition basis to an entering sophomore resident student. In addition to the \$1,000 prize, the winner is eligible for financial aid up to full tuition when warranted. Applications must be completed by February 1, 1978. Inquiries should be addressed to: The Congdon Prize Scholarship, Dana Hall School, Wellesley, Mass. 02181.

AFSA'S VIEWS ON PRESIDENT'S PROPOSED REORGANIZATION OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

AFSA has prepared the following statement given by President Hyde to the Senate and House Committees when they held hearings in mid-October on President Carter's reorganization plan for combining USIA and CU to form the Agency for International Communication:

In both its professional and employee representative roles, AFSA has a long-standing interest in the shape and the performance of our overseas information, cultural and educational exchange programs, and we have expressed our views on this matter before various Committees of the Congress, and before the Congressionally-mandated Murphy Commission which studied foreign affairs organization. We appreciate the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee on Reorganization Plan Number Two, which deals with the reorganization of what has come to be called "public diplomacy."

Unfortunately we, like you, have only seen this plan and the President's transmittal letter over the past few days. The plan to establish the new Agency for International Communication was conceived in some haste and secrecy. So the comments we make on it today should be regarded as our initial views, subject to change as further information becomes available or as we subject the available information to further analysis.

In general, we support the consolidation of the United States Information Agency and the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs into a new entity. And we welcome many of the statements in President Carter's transmittal letter regarding the missions of the proposed new Agency and his own plans for it. But we have misgivings about some aspects of the reorganization plan.

- The President states that the purpose of the plan is "to broaden our informational, educational, and cultural intercourse with the world," a purpose with which we concur fully. We have seen our national effort in this area decline relative to that of other western democracies, reflected in a reduction from 1,500 American USIA personnel abroad in 1967 to fewer than 1,000 this year. We hope that the

President's reaffirmation of the value of public diplomacy implies a reversal of this trend. But the reorganization plan itself is nothing more than the consolidation of the Washington offices involved, and we believe this reshuffle should not be oversold as a panacea.

- The President states that one goal of the new agency will be "to tell the world about our society and policies, in particular, our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty." The agency's activities are to be "straightforward, open, candid, balanced, and representative" but not "covert, manipulative, or propagandistic." We heartily agree, not only because we believe the agency should reflect the diversity of American society and opinion, but because we are convinced that the credibility it develops by so doing can be a great asset to our nation when it becomes necessary to explain American policy. But we are concerned that the position of the Director of the new agency as reporting subordinate to the Secretary of State may create pressures to orient the agency's programs toward immediate foreign policy goals at the expense of long-term international understanding and of the agency's credibility. We believe that this relationship will bear close watching, and that it is desirable to put into legislation some statement of the agency's mission comparable to that in the President's letter, or in the 1976 legislated charter of the Voice of America.

- The President promises to maintain the integrity of the educational and cultural exchange program, and to keep the Voice of America's news gathering and reporting functions independent and objective. He says he plans to nominate Associate Directors who will be responsible for the administration and supervision of these two programs. We welcome these pledges, but we regret that they are not guaranteed in the reorganization plan itself. Section 4 of that plan provides only that the four Associate Directors "shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Director may from time to time prescribe." To preserve the integrity of these two programs,

and to enhance the ability of the Congress to exercise oversight over them, we recommend that the Congress urge the President to amend the plan so that two Associate Directors are appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, for these two specific functions.

- The President states that the new agency will also "tell ourselves about the world" and "lay heavy emphasis on listening to others" while its Director "will assess and advise on the impact on worldwide public opinion of American foreign policy decisions." We concur with this statement of mission, but we believe that it will be difficult to carry out. Analyses of foreign public opinion could become matters of US domestic controversy as well as foreign sensitivity; and our policymakers may not welcome information detailing the adverse impact of their policy proposals on foreign opinion. Careful Congressional oversight and public scrutiny will be required to assure the integrity of the agency's reporting in this area, both from the field and in Washington. Perhaps the Congress should consider requiring the new agency to provide to it "foreign public opinion impact statements" with respect to major foreign policy proposals, as the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency provides "arms control impact statements" on proposed weapons systems or arms sales.

- The reorganization plan leaves intact present legislated prohibitions against the domestic distribution of materials produced by USIA. This prohibition would apparently end the distribution of publications and other material to the American academic and other concerned communities by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs which are an essential part of the cultural exchange program. Furthermore, in some of its current activities that Bureau overlaps with the Department of State's Bureau of Public Affairs. These practical problems should be resolved, one way or the other, before the reorganization plan takes effect.

- The President designated the new agency as the coordinator of the international information, cul-

tural, educational and exchange programs conducted by the US government and as "a governmental focal point for private US international exchange programs." However, we do not find in the reorganization plan any change in present USIA and State authority with regard to these programs, and it is not clear to us whether the President really wants to extend the new agency's writ over other agencies' exchange programs.

• Finally, and of vital importance to us as exclusive employee representative of Foreign Service people in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, we welcome the President's statement that "rights of United States Information Agency and State Department employees must be protected." But we are very concerned that they will not be. Section 8, paragraph c of Executive Order 11636, which governs employee-management relations in the Foreign Service of its United States, gives the exclusive employee representative—the bargaining agent—the right to consult—that is, to negotiate—with management regarding "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the impact of realignment of work forces or technological change." If this reorganization is not a realignment of work forces, what is? Yet Department of State management has thus far indicated that it has no obligation to consult.

This is important not only to Foreign Service people, but to all federal employees. For Executive Order 11491, which governs labor relations in the federal civil service, has similar language regarding the requirement of management to consult regarding the adverse impact of a realignment of work forces. If management avoids consultation with us on the impact of this reorganization plan, it will not only put the Carter Administration in the ironic and embarrassing position of violating employee rights guaranteed by an Executive Order signed by Richard Nixon; it will make it impossible for all the other federal unions to protect the rights of their constituents—and thereby to help the President keep his promises.

The rights of Foreign Service employees affected by this reorganization may also be threatened

STRENGTHENING OF ANTI-TERRORISM POLICIES

In mid-September, the Senate Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy held hearings on the problem of international terrorism. Noting that Foreign Service and other governmental employees, their colleagues and families are often the targets, if not the victims, of terrorist attacks, AFSA urged the Committee to adopt policies which will provide better protection.

AFSA recalled that certain foreign governments harbor and support terrorists while certain other governments have yielded to intimidation by terrorists. With others who testified before the Committee, AFSA advocated a comprehensive set of incentives to foreign governments in their dealings with terrorists. As profes-

by another aspect of our Executive Order, which provides that the agency—currently State, USIA, or AID—is the bargaining unit with which eligible employees select their exclusive representative. The creation of a new agency from USIA and various components of existing ones is not specifically envisaged. We believe that there can be no break in employee representation as a result of the reorganization, and that our status as the representative of Cultural Affairs Foreign Service people cannot be questioned except as the result of a representation election in the agency once it is established. The handling of this issue may also have some precedential impact on the rest of the federal government, if the Administration could reorganize, and then claim that the new unit was so changed that no union had a claim to represent its employees, the ability of the employees to protect themselves against the adverse impact of reorganization would be diminished.

In conclusion, we welcome the consolidation of international information, educational and cultural exchange activities into a single entity, and the concepts in the President's transmittal message. Now that the plan has emerged from the secrecy in which it was conceived, we stand ready as professionals to offer our suggestions and our help to make it work in the national interest.

sionals we understand and support the need for Presidential flexibility in the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy, but we are concerned that too often even minor considerations of bilateral relations have led our government not to act effectively against governments which cooperate with terrorists.

We believe that there are a number of measures our government should take including:

- further improvements should be made in physical-security abroad;
- the Foreign Service Institute's anti-terrorist courses should be expanded, and more employees and dependents encouraged and enabled to participate;
- the office of the Coordinator in Combating Terrorism in the Department of State should be strengthened;
- in hostage situations, US officials should stop saying we will never negotiate or make concessions, and adopt tactics flexible enough to maximize the prospects of saving lives, while discouraging further such incidents;
- in our diplomatic contacts with other governments, the United States should continue to strongly urge their adherence to the 1973 Convention on the Prevention of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, as well as other existing anti-terrorist conventions. We should support other anti-terrorist proposals such as that of the Federal Republic of Germany against the taking of hostages.

We also asked the Committee to examine the present provisions in the Foreign Service Act which provide for compensation to victims of international terrorist attacks, and to their survivors. Present provisions include a death gratuity of one year's salary, and we have recommended that this be amended to not less than the annual salary of an FSO-4, Step 1. Yet even these provisions, in our view, are totally inadequate. It is tragic when individuals are killed and the family is left with inadequate compensation to care for growing children and other needs.

While the implementation of the above suggestions may reduce

POLLUTION: "DON'T DRINK THE WATER AND DON'T BREATHE THE AIR"

The ever-growing dangers of pollution prompted a humorist of a few years ago to write a lyric advising those who wished to stay healthy "Don't drink the water and don't breathe the air!" Unfortunately, the problems of pollution continue to grow worse and few of us have found successful means for protecting ourselves or others. In an attempt to know as much as we can of how this dismal situation affects Foreign Service employees, the AFSA Members' Interests Committee recently obtained a briefing by a Departmental team, including chief of MED, Deputy Assistant Secretary William Watson, and EPA representative Dr. Robert Lee. The Medical Division's message was a mixture of "good news" and "bad news."

Health dangers originating from contaminated food, water, and air obviously predate the Foreign Service by centuries, and, unfortunately, are becoming more complex (see article "Gut Issues" July 1977 *F.S. Journal*). Even though we may have a growing understanding of the problems of amoebas in food and water and carbon monoxide in the air, neither the State Department nor the United States Government has much influence for correcting such conditions in localities abroad where we have foreign service posts. However, AFSA is ever more convinced that management must make maximum efforts to afford foreign service employees and their families with maximum health protection. Protection can take several different forms, depending upon the immediate problem, from better medical advice and medicine to a better tour of duty or assignment policy and in some cases, the provision of specialized equipment,

somewhat the exposure of our diplomats and our citizens to acts of international terrorism, there is a need to deal with the more fundamental conditions which give rise to these politically-motivated attempts to destroy innocent lives. In this respect, we recommend strongly that the Congress, while continuing to reject and abhor the terrorist's methods, examine systematically the roots of international terrorism and support efforts to provide fundamental solutions.

such as air filters.

As stated by Dr. Watson, the first step toward improving a situation is to identify where and what type of pollution problems exist at foreign service posts. Heretofore, MED has largely followed a passive role, waiting for posts and employees to lodge protests about their pollution problems. A basic procedure for alerting MED to adverse local conditions is to submit a post Health and Medical Information Report. As provided in 3 FAM 682.2-6, posts should review and update this report each January 31. AFSA Chapters, as well as individual Foreign Service employees, are well advised to reassure themselves periodically that their post's Health Report is correct and complete. At any time that a new health problem arises, the post can and should submit a supplemental report to MED.

In an effort to become more responsive to health problems resulting from pollution, MED recently obtained authorization for several new positions which will be used to create shortly a new section of Environmental Coordination and Preventive Medicine. This new section will be responsible for handling pollution related problems. In addition to receiving information from posts abroad, it will further develop and improve a system whereby MED will automatically receive and analyze reports on developing public health problems from other branches of the US Government, from foreign governments, and from international organizations. It is hoped that these new resources for information will enable MED to identify and act on problems as they emerge.

Especially in the area of air pollution, MED is handicapped by the lack of reliable standardized data. Worldwide there are an insufficient number of facilities for collecting data and a lack of standardized systems of measurements. Further, for at least some pollutants, there is no common agreement on what constitutes the so-called safe level of pollution or the point where concentrations become hazardous to health and warrant positive remedial action. Some pollutants, such as amoebic dysentery, create both an immediate and long-range danger to good health. On the other

hand, air pollution creates a current danger, especially for persons with cardiovascular problems, but presently available data indicate that whatever damage, most bad effects appear to be self-correcting when the period of exposure ends.

The AFSA Members' Interests Committee will continue to monitor the pollution problem and, as appropriate, raise the issue in respect to certain posts having particular problems. AFSA Chapters abroad can help by monitoring local medical conditions and alerting AFSA/W when difficulties arise.

CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED

The AFSA Governing Board has established a new standing committee for congressional liaison. Chaired by AFSA President Hyde, the committee membership will include John Gunning from AID, Sean Kelly from USIA, Retired Ambassador Maurice Bernbaum and Joseph Montville from State. The Board instructed the Committee to prepare a report as soon as possible outlining AFSA legislative objectives for the remainder of the Current Congressional session which ends in January 1979.

A notice has been circulated in Washington and to overseas chapters inviting suggestions regarding possible legislative goals.

AFSA MERIT AWARDS

Materials for the 1978-1979 AFSA Merit Awards Program will be mailed out in November and for the Financial Aid Program in December.

All 1978-1979 undergraduate students interested in applying for a financial aid grant from the AFSA Scholarship Fund and all students graduating from high school in 1978 interested in entering the Merit Awards Program should apply to:

AFSA Scholarship Programs

2101 E Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20037

The deadline for completion of the materials is *February 15, 1978*.

These programs are made possible by funds from the AFSA Scholarship Fund and funds raised by the AAFSW Book Fair held yearly.

AID/AFSA NEWS

AFSA/AID is continuing to keep a careful eye on the AID personnel system to insure that employees are protected against actions that impact adversely on their careers. AFSA representatives met with the Deputy Administrator of AID recently to protest three contemplated assignments which fit this pattern. The first concerned the nomination of a State employee who has absolutely no experience in the administrative general services area to an important GSO position. A meeting has also been requested with the Director General of the Foreign Service to strongly protest this flagrant violation of assignment policies.

FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

In order to be of maximum assistance to AFSA members and **Journal** readers we are accepting these listings until the 15th of each month for publication in the issue dated the following month. The rate is 40¢ per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail copy for advertisement and check to: Classified Ads, **Foreign Service Journal**, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

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The second is the attempt to go out of the agency to hire an FSR-2 when a number of qualified career employees are available to fill the position, including one who is an R-1 with 26 years with the Agency and a file replete with honors and awards. The third case involved a political appointee in a senior AID position who insisted that even a regular AID employee have at least one and preferably two recommendations from the Hill in order to qualify for an assignment and on this basis turned down an FSR-2 for a position overseas.

Careful monitoring and appropriate action has also taken place on actions designed to deprive AID employees of privileges and benefits accruing to their positions as foreign service employees. We have protested strongly any attempt to pull the foreign service retirement pension system into the social security system and the taxation of overseas allowances. We are insisting on full and equal access to the Foreign Service Lounge and expect an AID/State answer to our proposals shortly.

Negotiating News

We have successfully completed negotiations on opening up frozen backstop codes for promotion opportunity and are currently in negotiation on Chapter 4, Handbook 28 regarding foreign language training and the implementation of the "Pell Amendment, Authority for Retroactive Promotions and Pay Adjustments."

Finally, AFSA/AID was instrumental in pushing through a program whereby awards will be given to 89 AID employees honoring their services in the evacuation of Vietnam.

The next big step for AFSA and for all AID employees is the drive we are beginning in conjunction with the drafting of the 1978 foreign aid legislation for a Career Foreign Service Development Corps.

Any suggestions or comments about any of the above or any other problem or direction you think we should be taking in the coming months would be welcomed and appreciated by your AFSA/AID representatives.

JOIN AFSA
(OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO JOIN)

CHANGES ON GOVERNING BOARD

Ms. Julie Ann McGrath submitted her resignation as AFSA Treasurer and member of the Governing Board effective October 4. Pending action by the Board to nominate a permanent successor, State Representative James Vandivier was appointed to serve as Acting Treasurer.

Foreign Service People

Marriage

Nicholson-Rogers. Dulcie Mary Nicholson was married to FSO-ret. Jordan Thomas Rogers on September 3, in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. Mrs. Nicholson was the widow of Malcolm J. T. Nicholson, formerly with the British diplomatic service. The marriage was performed by Mr. Rogers's daughter, the Rev. Arabella Meadows-Rogers.

Deaths

Janke. John J. Janke, FSO-retired, died on August 24 in Phoenix, Arizona. He entered the Foreign Service in 1949 after service with other government agencies and served in Vienna, Herford, The Hague, Stockholm, Rome, Karachi and Damascus before retiring in 1964. He is survived by his wife Dorothy of 10833 Manzanita Dr., Sun City, Arizona 85351, a sister, Mrs. Ernest Miklavic of Euclid, Ohio and several nieces and nephews.

Kingsley. Martha Bush Kingsley, wife of FSO-retired Thomas Drowne Kingsley, died on September 28, in Ellicott City, Maryland. Mrs. Kingsley accompanied her husband on assignments in Montevideo, Caracas, Asuncion, Dusseldorf, Lisbon and Sao Paulo before his retirement in 1969. He is now a senior economist at the Export-Import Bank. In addition to her husband of 5105 Battery Lane, Bethesda, she is survived by two daughters, Martha Goshen of Columbia, Md., and Mary Lee Kingsley of Arlington, two sisters and two brothers.

Lindquist. John A. Lindquist, former director of the International Police Academy and, since 1974, of the Customs Service Academy, died on September 1, in Chevy Chase. Mr. Lindquist joined the public safety office of AID in 1966 and was considered an expert on police administration, training and communications. He joined the Customs Service in 1974. He is survived by his wife, Evelyn, 5100 Dorset Ave., Chevy Chase, a son John G., of Campbell River, British Columbia, his mother, a brother and a sister.

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