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
FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
DECEMBER 1977 75 CENTS

Panama by Don Bohning

The Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War
by Dino Caterini

Targeting Foreign Aid to the Poorest of the Poor
by Noel V. Lateef

The Katerina S. by James Boughton





Riggs House (Anderson Cottage), circa 1850

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
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
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Letter from Quebec

PATRICIA G. ERICKSON

What better inducement could one have to join in Quebec's yearly pre-Lent Winter Carnival? The winter blahs have really set in by February. The January temperatures—counting ever-present wind-chill factor—can drop as low as −50°! To solve the problem of "indoors-itis," a natural result of such conditions, French-Canadians thumb their noses at Old Man Winter by welcoming "Bonhomme Carnaval" to town. It's a time to bundle up in the warmest clothes you have—don't come without your long johns or you'll be sorry. Good warm boots, a woolly long scarf to wrap around your head, mouth and nose, and warm gloves are absolute necessities. Ski clothes are the popular dress although the scene is always enlivened by some colorfully and fantastically dressed beings—usually male—in long fur coats, raccoon-type caps, or wild plaid blanket-coats reminiscent of outfits worn in 1920s movies portraying typical French Canadians in the northern wilds. Even at the best restaurants, people dress for warmth, not style.

Jacques Cartier was probably the first Western tourist when he visited Stradacona, the Indian town on this site in 1535. But it wasn't until 1608 when Samuel de Champlain founded a trading post and called it "Quebec"* that its European history began, soon making Quebec the key entry point into the New World and the most important city in North America. The French held it until 1759 when it fell to the British; from then to 1852, it was the capital of Canada. During the American Revolutionary War (1775), Generals Richard Montgomery and Benedict Arnold of the colonial forces tried to capture Quebec but were repulsed. This was undoubtedly the beginning of Canadian suspicions regarding American aspirations towards colonization of the north which continue unchecked to this day among certain Canadians.


In 1867, confederation came about with the passage of the British North America Act. Under this act, the provinces were granted control over three matters considered vital to protect the French Canadian minority from assimilation and eventual absorption into the greater Anglophone population: education, civil law, and matters respecting religious life. It was at this time that French became one of the two official languages of Canada; the Napoleonic Code became the basis for Quebec's legal system; and Roman Catholicism became the undisputed religion and cultural conscience of the

**The story goes that upon seeing the massive, outjutting crag of Cape Diamond, one of Cartier's followers exclaimed "Que Bec!" (What a beak) and thus the city was named.*

Patricia Gordon Erickson graduated from UCLA with a degree in International Relations which took her first to a job at the Department and then to the Foreign Service. She served in Japan and Laos, where she met her future husband, and finally, Honolulu where they were married. The Ericksons have served at Kobe-Osaka, Beirut and Rotterdam and are now in Ottawa.

Mrs. Erickson recommends earliest reservations for those intending to attend Quebec's Carnival in 1978.

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region.

In spite of its trials, confederation has worked moderately well. However, French Canadians have become increasingly sensitive about their ability to preserve their cultural heritage because of their minority status, and the Parti Quebeçois victory on November 15, 1976 with the election of Rene Levesque as premier, puts the future of confederation in doubt. Rene Levesque is a man with a golden tongue—a sincere man with a vision and a mission—and a man dedicated to independence for Quebec. His speech to the Economic Club of New York on January 25th, 1977 eliminated any doubts about his direction and objectives. And with that speech, the relationship of Quebec with Canada, the world at large, and also with the United States, comes into question.

According to published provincial government figures, 96 percent of the population of Quebec City is French speaking and 66 percent is under 30 years of age. This means a young society—nationalistic—with Latin temperament and culture. The non-French-speaking tourist needn't worry about communication, however. "Le commerce" comes high on the list of Rene Levesque's priorities to set his economic house in order quickly before holding a referendum for separatism and tourism is a major industry not to be ignored.

The Winter Carnival did not originate as a lure for tourists. It was a natural outcropping of the local need to blow off steam at this time of year—to break out of the confinement caused by extreme weather conditions. Entertainment and contests held today are traditional activities which were part of the villagers' daily routine in the early days, with the addition of modern embellishments. It's still a local happening and we wanted to join in the fun.

When we left Ottawa to drive to Quebec, visibility was minimal, roads were slick, speed was reduced to 45 miles per hour, and temperatures were well below freezing. Snow crunched crisply underfoot and the road was treacherous with ice patches, unseen below the light snow dusting of the previous evening. Never mind, nothing short of a major family disaster would have kept us home. For once, the weather man was accurate in his prediction of clearing and eventually sunny skies, and by the time we have left Montreal behind us, the sun was out blinding us with reflected light glittering across the hillocks of snow.

We've seen the mighty St. Lawrence wide and lazy as it traverses southern Ontario, but it wasn't until we crossed the Pierre Laporte Bridge into Quebec City and looked down on boxcar-sized blocks of ice floating sluggishly up and down with the tide that we grasped the meaning of "mighty." We arrived in Quebec City five hours after departure from Ottawa, driving down the Grande Allee through the ancient Porte St. Jean to the Chateau Frontenac—our hotel destination.

The site of the Chateau on Cape Diamond, a cliff of solid rock rising 350 feet above the river bank, is truly magnificent. The St. Lawrence is all around, white ice with black water showing through; the town of Levis beckons from across the frozen waters and a snow-covered landscape can be seen in the distance. If you want character and history as part of your surroundings, the Chateau Frontenac is the place to stay.

The Carnival is a 10-day event filled with activities to wear out even the most hyperactive, starting with the crowning of the Queen and ending with fireworks. There are two parades—one on each Saturday evening—special balls held at major hotels, nightly dancing in the Place du Carnaval, tobogganing from the ramparts of the Citadel to Dufferin Terrace—and beware the absent-minded bystander who might wander carelessly in the path of the toboggans hurtling down at breakneck speeds

One must see the snow sculptures at the Place du Carnaval, the meeting place for revelers. This year, the Italians took first prize with a mythological winter scene; the German entry was most unusual and worth a double-take—four *pissoirs* in ice. The US entry was artistically very commendable though perhaps too severe in its simple, elegant lines for the occasion—but every sculpture had its supporters. More ice statues can be seen on the Rue du Carnaval (actually Ste. Thérèse Street renamed for the occasion) where students and local residents compete in a friendly way to create unique ice art works.

At the Place du Carnaval, there's a stage constructed of great blocks of ice where open air dancing and other festivities take place; a well-populated-with-small-fry-slide; a maple sugar house with fast-moving lines of people buying suckers or tins of maple syrup to take home; and an ice hut where one can buy Caribou by the ounce to ward off the cold. Caribou is something special—a traditional Quebec drink made from red wine well fortified with alcohol. The name comes from an ancient Indian custom of drinking the hot, fresh blood of newly-slain caribou during great hunts.

Every day there are new activities to lure spectators outside—a hockey tournament, speed skating championships, soapbox derby, dog sled races, snowshoe races, "Petanque" competition, cross-country ski races, the

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Esso Grand Prix motor-car race, and the most exciting of all—canoe racing across the ice-packed St. Lawrence where amateur teams consisting of four paddlers and a steersman alternately paddle and push or pull their canoes through the ice water. For those who can stand the pace, there are Carnival breakfasts, lunches and dinners galore.

Calèches (horse-drawn carriages peculiar to the Quebec scene), museums, reconstructed Lower Town houses, handicraft shops, art galleries, all beckon the visitor, now as well as any time of year. Quebec is also proud of its tradition of fine cuisine and no small pleasure of a visit to this historic walled city is discovering your own favorite restaurant.

A well-recommended one which didn't disappoint us was the *Continental*, just a minute's walk from the Chateau Frontenac. The Gaspé Crab received rave notices; the sweetbreads were delicately flavored, tender and moist, and the kidneys were sliced and served in a well-seasoned sauce. Soups were excellent; desserts tasty but heavy in their preparation—the light touch of Belgian or French pastries was lacking. We were very pleasantly surprised at the reasonable prices for wines although the selection was not extensive.

Our second evening we tried the *Vendome* located in the old part of Lower Town—a section full of atmosphere. While the service was attentive and the decor cheerful with red and white checked tablecloths, the food does not deserve any special accolades. My lobster tails were overcooked, dry, and drowned in garlic sauce. . . .the best choice seemed to be the pepper steak which would satisfy any gargantuan appetite. The *Vendome* has an added attraction, however. They lay claim to the most extensive wine cellar in Quebec and, if you ask, you might be taken underground to visit the storage area which has been carved out of the side of the cliff.

Other restaurants recommended by former residents of Quebec are, Chez Guido (Upper Town), the Restaurant Georges V in the Hotel Chateau Laurier, and, for French Canadian specialities, Restaurant Aux Anciens Canadiens.

There are numerous small hotels, formerly private homes and less expensive than the deluxe hotels such as the Frontenac, the Quebec Hilton (centrally located in Upper Town), Loews-Le Concorde, the Auberge des Gouverneurs (also Upper Town Plaza) or the Holiday Inn (Lower Town). Three in the near vicinity of the Chateau Frontenac and on the same square with the United States Consulate-General are recommended by AAA: *Au Manoir Ste. Genevieve,* 13 Ave. Ste. Genevieve; *Au Chateau Fleur de Lys,* 15 Ave. Ste. Genevieve; and *Le Chateau de Pierre,* 17 Ave. Ste. Genevieve. Prices at all hotels are elevated considerably during Carnaval—for example, rooms normally renting for $18.00 double would go for $28.00, and the least expensive room we could get at Chateau Frontenac was a back room without view at $42.00 double.

If you are starting your travel from Boston, you might like to know about a brand new air route via Bar Harbor Airlines, a small commuter line which has been plying this route for the past four years. There is now a direct flight from Boston to Quebec City with flight time of just over an hour. ■

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A treatise on treaties, traditions, trade
and the transformation of relations between the United States and

PANAMA

DON BOHNING

When then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack signed in Panama, on February 7, 1974, their Agreement on Principles that was to provide the framework for negotiating a new Panama Canal treaty, it was hailed as the dawn of a new era between the two countries. And when Panamanian and US negotiators announced in Panama on August 10, 1977, that "agreement in principle" had finally been reached on the "basic elements" of a new treaty package, it was trumpeted as a major breakthrough in headlines throughout the hemisphere.

Both events were rightly accorded their historic significance. What nearly everyone failed to acknowledge, however, was that the Kissinger-Tack declaration and later agreement on the "basic elements" of a new treaty were positions that essentially had been reached years before. The progress achieved was illusory. Had that been acknowledged, perhaps the enthusiasm that greeted the Kissinger-Tack negotiating principles and the 1977 treaty agreement itself might have been more muted; the showmanship surrounding each event less extravagant. Expectations would have been less and the reaction to ultimate failure—a very real possibility at this writing—reduced.

With a showdown not likely until early 1978, it is still instructive to put the Kissinger-Tack "Principles," the newly negotiated treaty agreements and the current national debate over them into historical perspective.

The Kissinger-Tack declaration called for a new treaty to replace the existing 1903 pact. It would have a fixed termination date. US jurisdiction over Panamanian territory would end "promptly" in accordance with terms specified in the new treaty. Panama would receive a "just and equitable" share of the benefits derived from operation of the canal in its territory. Panama would participate in the administration, protection and defense of the canal. Finally, the two countries would agree "bilaterally on provisions for new projects which will enlarge canal capacity," were these to become necessary.

The Kissinger-Tack negotiating principles were essentially a refinement and restatement of a joint pronouncement September 24, 1965, by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Panamanian President Marco Robles.

The five-point Johnson-Robles declaration specified that the 1903 treaty would be abrogated; a new treaty would "effectively recognize" Panamanian sovereignty over the US-controlled Canal Zone; it would terminate after a specified number of years or upon the opening of a new sea level canal, whichever came first; a primary objective would be to "provide for an appropriate political, economic and social integration of the area used in the canal operation with the rest of the Republic of Panama"; and that both governments recognized the "important responsibility" they had to be "fair and helpful to employees of all nationalities . . ."

President Johnson had added that "the present canal and any new canal which may be constructed in the future shall be open at all times to the vessels of all nations on a non-discriminatory basis. The tolls would be reasonable in the light of the contribution of the Republic of Panama and the United States and of the interest of world commerce."

On the day before the joint announcement, Washington had presented Panama's negotiating team with a draft agreement on military base rights and status of forces. Three months later, in January of 1966, the United States presented to Panama drafts of a new canal agreement and a sea-level canal treaty. All three of the drafts had been discussed with selected members of Congress prior to submitting them to the Panamanians.

By June 26, 1967, Presidents Johnson and Robles were able to declare, in simultaneous announcements, that "negotiating teams of the United States and Panama have reached agreement on the form and content of new treaties relating to the present canal and a possible sea level canal in the future."

Secretary of State Dean Rusk hailed the three-treaty package as representing "a major step toward a peaceful and honorable settlement of the problem of the canal. I think they ensure the effective operation of the canal and they ensure the security of the canal."

Ten years, one month and 15 days later, US and Panamanian negotiators were to announce "agreement in principle" on the "basic elements" of a new canal

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Don Bohning is Latin America Editor of the Miami Herald, *a position he has held since 1967. He has received awards for Latin America reporting, including IAPA's Tom Wallace and Columbia University's Maria Moors Cabot.*

agreement. Ambassadors Ellsworth Bunker and Sol Linowitz, the co-negotiators for the United States, declared their confidence "that this treaty will not only protect but strengthen our national security interests. It will also . . . preserve our vital common interest in an open and efficient canal."

There was no mention of the 1967 accords just as there had been no mention by Kissinger and Tack in 1974 of the Johnson and Robles declaration nine years earlier.

In much the same fashion as President Carter and Brigadier General Omar Torrijos of Panama did, Johnson and Robles planned a treaty-signing ceremony to dramatize the 1967 agreements. Carter and Torrijos signed the 1977 treaties in Washington September 7 in a televised ceremony at the Organization of American States before a live audience that included 26 other hemisphere heads of state or their representatives. The Johnson-Robles signing ceremony never came off.

Vociferous opposition to the 1967 draft treaties developed in the United States and particularly in Panama, delaying and eventually killing them. In Panama, opponents said the treaties didn't go far enough; in the United States critics said they went too far. With presidential elections scheduled in both countries in 1968, prudence dictated a treaty delay that was to become a burial.

Today's arguments, pro and con, echo those of 1967, and in many ways the treaties are similar.

"Agreement at the negotiating level on new treaties governing the Panama Canal and its replacement is a major hurdle on a long and rocky road," editorialized the Miami *Herald* on June 28, 1967.

A Washington-datelined news story in the same edition noted that "Florida Congressman J. Herbert Burke Tuesday urged the Senate not to ratify the proposed canal treaties with Panama because 'US security and prestige has been bartered away.'" Another Washington-datelined story the next day observed that "both President Johnson and Panama President Marco A. Robles seem to have a selling job ahead in trying to obtain ratification of new treaties concerning the Panama Canal."

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright declared on June 30, 1967, that United States security interests in the Panama Canal would not be jeopardized by the proposed new treaties. Ten days later Fulbright said the treaties had been fully reviewed by the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff who found no threat to US security in them.

On July 12, 1967, the New York *Times* reported in a dispatch from Panama that "despite substantial US concessions to Panamanian national interests and feelings, approval of the new treaties governing the operation and protection of the Panama Canal and a possible new one is expected to be difficult."

> "Vance and others were even more explicit about their interpretation of the neutrality provisions in responding to committee questions, implying that the United States had the right to intervene militarily if need be."

And the Los Angeles *Times*, in its July 23, 1967 editions, observed in a Washington-datelined story that "even before they have been made public, much less signed, debated or ratified, the three proposed new Panama Canal treaties are in hot water."

Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower rallied to the defense of the new treaties in a July 26, 1967 press conference, declaring that "it offers hope for a new era of harmony in our relations with Panama. It gives promise of far reaching benefits for world commerce."

Columnist James Kilpatrick disagreed, declaring in a July 31, 1967 column that "what the United States is here proposing, in a shameful display of self-abnegation, is the needless surrender of valuable property rights . . ."

On October 11, 1968, Panama's National Guard ousted constitutionally elected President Arnulfo Arias after 11 days in office. Torrijos eventually emerged from the coup as the country's military strongman. He rejected the 1967 treaties out of hand and negotiations began anew in 1970. They faltered until 1973 when Bunker became chief US negotiator. He was joined by Linowitz as co-negotiator in February, 1977.

Just as the 1974 Kissinger-Tack statement did not differ substantially from the Johnson-Robles declaration of 1965, neither do the treaties negotiated in 1977 vary greatly from the agreements reached in 1967. A comparison of major provisions of the 1967 and the 1977 pacts reveals:

Duration: The 1977 agreement calls for the canal treaty to expire December 31, 1999, at which time the waterway will be turned over to Panama.

The 1967 package had an expiration date of December 31, 1999, with the canal to be turned over to Panama on that date.

Economic: The 1977 treaty calls for annual payments to Panama from toll revenues of 30 cents per canal ton to be adjusted periodically for inflation. Panama will also get a fixed amount of $10 million annually, plus another $10 million if traffic and revenues permit. The total is expected to be between $50 and $70 million annually. Additional aid programs, not included in the treaty, are to be developed totaling nearly $300 million in loans and loan guarantees to Panama. Panama presently receives $2.3 million annually in direct payments from the canal.

The 1967 agreements provided annual payments to Panama of 17 cents a ton the first year, increasing to a maximum of 22 cents per ton by the fifth year of the treaty. It would have meant about $20 million annually to the country.

Administration: The 1977 pact says the United States will retain primary responsibility for the canal administration with Panama assum-

ing an increasing role. The present Panama Canal Company is to be replaced by a new agency with a policy board of nine members, five from the United States and four from Panama. The chief administrator will be a US citizen and his deputy a Panamanian until 1990. The positions will then reverse, with a Panamanian as administrator and a US citizen as his deputy.

The 1967 agreement called for the Panama Canal Company to be replaced by a Joint Administration with a governing board of nine members, five from the United States and four from Panama.

Jurisdiction: The 1977 agreement calls for Panama to assume immediate territorial jurisdiction over the canal and Canal Zone as the treaty takes effect. US legal jurisdiction over the Canal Zone is to be totally phased out over the following three-year period.

The 1967 package called for the joint US-Panama canal administration to establish and maintain a police force which would have exclusive authority in a newly designated Canal Area.

Lands and Waters: Under the 1977 treaties, about 70 percent of what is now the Canal Zone will be transferred immediately to Panama when the treaties take effect. The United States will retain those areas necessary for the canal's operation, maintenance and defense.

The 1967 treaties specifically recognized Panama's sovereignty in a new Canal Area that would have replaced the Canal Zone and would have been greatly reduced in size. All US property in the Canal Zone not included in the new Canal Area would have been turned over to Panama.

Defense: A separate treaty under the 1977 agreements says that the United States and the Republic of Panama "agree to maintain the regime of neutrality established in this treaty, which shall be maintained in order that the Canal shall remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding the termination of any other treaties entered into by the two contracting parties." It is here much of the conflict in interpretation has arisen, threatening to send the 1977 accords to the same fate as the agreements reached in 1967.

The 1967 treaty stated that Panama and the United States would "provide for the defense, security, neutrality and continuity of operation of the canal under provisions of a separate treaty on defense and status of forces" to be signed on the same day as the main canal treaty. The separate defense treaty authorized the United States to continue use of certain defense areas, but military measures outside the designated areas could be taken only with the consent of Panama.

Rights of US Employees: The 1977 treaty allows all US civilians currently employed by the Canal Company and the Canal Zone Administration to continue in United States government jobs until retirement. They will enjoy rights extended to all United States government employees overseas but will come under Panamanian jurisdiction as the Canal Zone is phased out.

The 1967 agreements would have transferred all employees of the Canal Company to the new Joint Administration under terms of employment provided by an agreement that was to be annexed to the main treaty.

Sea Level Canal: The 1977 agreement says that the United States will negotiate with no country other than Panama for a new sea level canal during the duration of the treaty and that no new sea level canal may be constructed in Panama without the agreement of the United States.

The 1967 pact gave the United States a 20-year option to build a sea level canal in Panama if it chose a route in that country.

Just as in 1967, much of the early criticism in the United States focused on the security aspects of the 1977 agreements. That, in turn, generated a serious conflict in interpretation and what the United States does and does not have the right to do.

As noted earlier, Article IV of the neutrality treaty says that the "United States of America and the Republic of Panama agree to maintain the regime of neutrality established in this treaty, which shall be maintained in order that the canal shall remain permanently neutral, notwithstanding the termination of any other treaties entered into by the two contracting parties."

Article VI adds Panamanian and US warships "will be entitled to transit the canal expeditiously" in time of emergency.

The United States has interpreted those provisions to mean it can do whatever it believes necessary to keep the canal open and neutral after the canal pact itself expires and that US warships can, in the words of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, "go to the head of the line" in time of emergency. Panama disagrees.

"After the year 2,000, as I indicated earlier, the United States will have the permanent right to maintain the canal's neutrality, including the right to defend the canal if necessary. Our warships are given the right to use the canal expeditiously," Secretary of State Vance told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 26 in prepared testimony. Vance and others were even more explicit about their interpretation of the neutrality provisions in responding to committee questions, implying that the United States had the right to intervene militarily if need be.

Recognizing the reality of the situation, Panama's chief treaty negotiator, Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, acknowledged before Panama's Assembly of Community Representatives on August 19 that the criticism against the neutrality pact by a number of Panamanians "who like to nitpick is that we are giving the United States the right to intervene in our country after the year 2,000.

"Those people believe that the right to intervene is granted, but nobody grants the big powers the right to intervene," said Escobar. "They intervene wherever they damn well please with or without a pact . . . A country like the United States can land its troops in Panama whenever it pleases after 2000 with or without a neutrality pact." But, added Escobar, "with the neutrality pact we are not giving them the right to intervene. What we are giving them is an assurance that the canal will remain permanently neutral, that we are not going to close the canal to their ships or those of any other country."

The United States, said Escobar, does "not need the neutrality pact to tell them whether or not they

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Like events may be expected to happen hereafter.
Thucydides

Repeating Ourselves: The Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War



DINO J. CATERINI

Most Americans don't realize that at the opening of the 20th century, America was engaged in a guerrilla war very much like the Vietnamese war. Historians refer to the war as the Philippine Insurrection, the bitter, extended American campaign to defeat the Filipino guerrillas following the American occupation of the Philippine Islands in the wake of the Spanish-American War of 1898.

By the time the Vietnamese War began, more than a half-century later, however, America had conveniently forgotten the Philippine Insurrection. We are now going through a period in which we are fast forgetting the Vietnam War. Yet the similarities between the two wars are eerily striking, and a comparison of the two wars sheds light on America as a nation and offers some guidelines for decision-makers should "like events . . . happen hereafter," as the Greek historian Thucydides implies they will.

Gloria Emerson's recent book on Vietnam, *Winners and Losers*, comes up with the depressing conclusion that America has already forgotten Vietnam. Ms. Emerson traveled around America interviewing Americans about the impact of the Vietnamese War on them and the basic American response could be summed up by the reply she received from one interviewee: "It bores me. It's ancient history."

But a nation forgets the past at its own peril, and if we hadn't completely forgotten the Philippine Insurrection at the time the decision to enter Vietnam was being made, our decision might well have been different.

I'm not saying that the American response to the Vietnam War was an exact repetition of the American reaction to the Philippine Insurrection. History is never that neat. But by stressing the similarities, I intend to delineate certain fundamental issues common to both wars in the belief that a study of such common issues may shed light on America as a nation and lead to some basic conclusions applicable to the future should similar circumstances develop.

The Philippine Insurrection: Historical Setting

The United States acquired the Philippines as a by-product of the Spanish-American War. At the time the war began, few Americans had even heard of the Philippines. But a Spanish fleet was stationed in Manila Bay, and though the main focus of the war was in the Caribbean, and especially Cuba, once the war began, the Navy Department—through the manipulations of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Theodore Roosevelt—ordered the destruction of the Spanish Fleet at Manila.

The order went out to Admiral Dewey, who had been sent to Hong Kong for just that purpose. After receiving the order, Dewey sailed to Manila and easily defeated the rather decrepit Spanish fleet. The date was May 1, 1898, only five days after war had been officially declared against Spain. Dewey, in American eyes, had avenged the controversial sinking of the battleship *Maine* in Havana harbor on February 15, 1898. Overnight, Admiral Dewey was a national hero and the Philippines a household word. President William McKinley reflected the average American's prior ignorance of the Philippines when he supposedly said, "Before the battle I could not have told where those darn islands were within two thousand miles!" In the same vein, columnist Finley Peter Dunne, who wrote under the

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Dino Caterini joined USIA in 1960, after receiving his B.A. from Miami University (Ohio) and his LL.B. from New York University School of Law. He has served in Berlin, Mogadiscio, Asmara, Vietnam, Rangoon, and is now in Islamabad.

pseudonym of Mr. Dooley, said that before the Battle of Manila Bay, the American people didn't know whether the Philippines were canned goods or islands.

To the Filipinos, however, the islands were their homes and an independence movement had been afoot before the arrival of the Americans. The Philippines had been under Spanish rule for more than three hundred years before Dewey's victory at Manila Bay. Spanish rule was harsh and there had been a number of revolts over the centuries, though none quite as serious as the one led by Emilio Aguinaldo less than six months before Dewey's victory.

At that time, the Spaniards had managed to hole up Aguinaldo and his insurgents at Biac-na-Bató. On December 14, 1897, a pact was signed whereby Aguinaldo and his followers agreed to go into exile in return for a sum of money and a grant of rights by the Spaniards to the Philippine people. Aguinaldo, in exile in Hong Kong, had been in touch with American officials, and on May 19, 1898, less than three weeks after Dewey's victory, he was brought back to the Philippines, on one of Admiral Dewey's ships, to help fight the Spanish troops still in possession of Manila and the rest of the Philippines. At that time, though Admiral Dewey had defeated the Spanish fleet, he had no American troops with which to attack the Spanish land forces. There is still dispute as to what promises, if any, were made to Aguinaldo, but Aguinaldo and his followers were no doubt buoyed by the fact that America had gone to the aid of the Cubans not for imperialistic or territorial ambitions but for idealistic reasons. The Teller Amendment, foregoing any interest in the annexation of Cuba, confirmed America's good intentions. What America was doing for Cuba, Aguinaldo and his followers hoped, it would likewise do for the Philippines.

With that in mind—while perhaps also hoping to foreclose any contrary policy on the part of the United States—Aguinaldo on June 18, 1898, signed the Philippine Declaration of Independence. A Provisional Republic was established with Aguinaldo as Provisional President.

Meanwhile, back in Washington, the United States was trying to determine what policy it should adhere to with regard to territory captured from Spain. Cuba was to be free, but what about the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico? A spirit of jingoism was in the air and much of public opinion was expansionist in outlook. But many Americans were opposed to an expansionist policy and they were beginning to organize. On June 15, 1898, only three days after the Philippines declared their independence, an Anti-Imperialist League, composed of some of the most famous names in America, was formed in Boston.

President McKinley was under pressure from both sides. His own party, the Republicans, was basically expansionist. Sound arguments could be made for the annexation of the Philippines—strategic, economic, religious and moral rationales were used—and in the end, McKinley decided to annex the islands.

In a much-quoted passage, McKinley later explained how he made his decision:

> I walked the floor of the White House night after night, until midnight, and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed to Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way. . . . that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all and to educate the Filipinos and uplift them and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace to do the best we could by them, as for our own fellowmen for whom Christ also died. And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly, and the next morning, I sent for the chief engineer of the War Department (our map-maker) and I told him to put them on the map of the United States, and there they are and there they will stay while I am President!

American troops were sent to the Philippines, and on August 11, 1898, Manila was captured without the aid of Aguinaldo's Filipino troops which held the area surrounding Manila. With American policy now at odds with the Philippine independence movement, a clash appeared inevitable. The Treaty of Paris, signed on December 10, 1898, legitimized the Spanish cession of the Philippines to America. A wobbly armed truce still prevailed between the American armed forces in Manila and the Filipino troops outside the city, but the chances of a peaceful settlement became slimmer when on December 21, 1898, President McKinley issued a proclamation stating that "the military government heretofore maintained by the United States in the city, harbor and bay of Manila is to be extended with all possible dispatch to the whole of the ceded territory."

American troops, in sum, were to push out of Manila and pacify the countryside. American troop reinforcements were on their way to Manila, and negotiations with the Filipinos were carried on while awaiting their arrival. Aguinaldo and his followers still hoped the Treaty of Paris might not win ratification in the United States Senate and they too were perhaps willing to negotiate while awaiting the results. Meanwhile, on February 4, 1899, the inevitable first clash took place on the outskirts of Manila. The war was on. Two days later, the Senate ratified the Treaty of Paris by only one vote more than the required two-thirds majority. The anti-imperialists had lost their battle in the Senate and the Filipinos had lost hope for independence without war.

At first, the Philippine Army was organized conventionally and it proved no match for the better-trained American forces. The Filipinos lost battle after battle and soon most of Luzon was in American hands. Finally, in November 1899, Aguinaldo decided to forego conventional warfare in favor of guerrilla operations. At that time, American authorities considered the war as good as over. The guerrilla war, however, proved to be tougher than the conventional war which had preceded it. The insurrection continued for another two and a half years, until July 4, 1902, when President Theodore Roosevelt, the successor to the assassinated McKinley, officially proclaimed the Philippine Insurrection at an end.

Before it was finished, a total of 120,000 American troops had been employed in the suppressing campaigns, 2,811 separate battles had been fought and 639 military posts established. American battle casualties amounted to more than 6,000 killed in action, a figure far surpassing 2,446 Americans killed in the

entire Spanish-American War. On the Philippine side, more than 16,000 Filipino rebels died in the fighting, along with an estimated 200,000 Filipino civilians who died either directly from the war or from war-related causes.

The Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War: The Common Issues

The Philippine Insurrection represents one of the forgotten periods of American history. It is most often treated, merely in passing, as a part of the Spanish-American War, a part usually de-emphasized because it detracts from the glories and the ideals of the war against Spain.

There were issues common to both the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War that should not be forgotten. These include:

Insurgency: Guerrilla Tactics: Once Aguinaldo decided to drop conventional warfare in favor of guerrilla tactics, the Filipinos adopted all the classic methods of guerrilla warfare. The Filipinos knew they could not match the United States in fire power, marksmanship, tactics, naval support or sheer economic power in a conventional fight, so they adopted guerrilla warfare on an organized and elaborate scale. The Americans, who figured the war was essentially over once Aguinaldo's conventional forces had been routed, were not prepared for this new, baffling kind of war.

General Elwell Otis, in command of American troops, was quoted in *Leslie's Weekly* as saying:

> You ask me to say when the war in the Philippines will be over and to set a limit to the men and treasure necessary to bring affairs to a satisfactory conclusion. That is impossible, for the war in the Philippines is already over . . . all we have to do now is protect the Filipinos against themselves. . . . There will be no more real fighting . . . little skirmishes which amount to nothing.

In fact, the real war was just beginning.

Aguinaldo went into hiding; his hideouts became secret even to his commanders. The troops were ordered to return to their various home provinces. The Philippines were divided into guerrilla districts. Aguinaldo knew the war could not be sustained without the support of the people. The Philippine Insurrection is a classic case of Mao Tse-tung's dictum that in guerrilla warfare, the fish are the guerrillas, the people the water and that like fish, guerrillas cannot exist without the water of the people. As in Vietnam, Aguinaldo's guerrillas were not above using terror in order to bring the people into line.

General Arthur MacArthur, who succeeded General Otis as Military Governor, testified to the unity of the Filipinos. "Wherever throughout the Archipelago there is a group of the insurgent army," he commented, "it is a fact beyond dispute that all of the contiguous towns contribute to the maintenance thereof. . . ."

The insurgents wore the clothes of the common peasant, and it became impossible to distinguish the combatant from the non-combatant. The Katipunan Society, a secret organization founded in 1892 with the aim of achieving Filipino independence, became a key link in the guerrilla scheme of power. Akin to the secrecy surrounding the Communist Party in Vietnam, the Katipunan Society's methods were clandestine, with stealth and assassination playing their parts.

The Katipunan Society was useful in establishing "Shadow Governments" throughout the Philippines. Whenever the Americans would capture a town and set up a friendly local government, the guerrillas would simultaneously create a hostile "shadow" government. The underground government secretly levied and collected taxes, and the Americans often found, much to their chagrin, that supposedly friendly functionaries set up by them were actually working for the insurgents.

Confronted with a new type of war and with a cunning and imaginative enemy, the American forces in the Philippines began to create new tactics of their own to combat the wily guerrilla.

Counter-Insurgency: The American Response: Although the word counter-insurgency had not been coined at the time of the Philippine Insurrection, many of the methods used by the Americans in suppressing the Insurrection were identical or similar to those used 60 years later in the Vietnam War.

As the Philippine Insurrection turned more and more into a guerrilla war, larger areas of the islands were occupied by American troops, but occupation did not mean pacification. For the most part, the Filipinos permitted the Americans to occupy any town they wished or to garrison any outpost they desired. The number of occupied areas grew, but still there was no peace.

Military officers in Manila made requests to Washington for more and more troops. Troop levels rose steadily over the years from 10,000 to 20,000 to 47,000 to 59,722 to 69,420. Despite the troops, it was difficult to come to grips with an enemy that blended with the population and only chose to fight on its own terms. One major problem was trying to distinguish a combatant from a non-combatant. The inability to do so resulted in many civilian casualties which in turn shocked public opinion in the United States.

Basically, the insurgents controlled the countryside through control of the people. American troops made sweeps of the countryside. Villages friendly to the enemy were often burned in reprisal. Finally, in order to separate the guerrilla from the people, a policy of reconcentration was established. Filipinos were forced to leave the countryside and settle in towns or camps. One order stated that after January 1, 1902, "any able-bodied male found by patrols or scouting detachments outside of protected zones (reconcentration areas) without passes will be arrested and confined or shot if he runs away."

Large areas of the Philippine countryside became desolate due to a combination of war, disease and reconcentration, but still the war continued. It became apparent that something more than a pure military victory was needed. The political aspects of the struggle began to be recognized. Although independence was eschewed, the American government decided to replace military government with civil government and to bring Filipinos into the governmental processes. William Howard Taft, the first civil governor of the Philippines, explained the policy this way: "Now, the problem there was on the one hand to suppress the insurrection, and that had to be

done with the Army. On the other hand, it was to teach the people that our purpose was not to continue a military government, but by object lessons to show them what civil government was by legislation and by putting it into force . . . the . . placing of more and more power in the civil government . . . [has] had a marvelous effect in showing the people what our purpose was."

Civil-military relations in the Philippines were not always amiable. There was considerable bickering and resentment between the two. When Taft first arrived in Manila, General Arthur MacArthur, the Military Governor, did not even come to greet him. It was a struggle before Taft was able to assert civilian leadership over the military, and then only because he controlled the purse-strings. Taft was often impatient with army authorities while the military often looked upon civilian policy as being soft and bungling.

In the end, the American counter-insurgency effort proved successful through a combination of relentless, sometimes brutal, military action coupled with a shrewd political policy that recognized the paramountcy of the civil aspects of the struggle over the military.

The Question of Atrocities: Atrocities provided one of the crucial issues arising out of the Philippine Insurrection. No other issue shows the resemblance between the Vietnam War and the Philippine Insurrection more clearly.

Guerrilla warfare has never been noted for its chivalry and once Aguinaldo foreswore conventional warfare, both sides committed atrocities. Terror was a weapon used by the insurgents against their own people in order to discourage cooperation between the Filipinos and the Americans. Collaborationists were often assassinated, and threats were common. Captured Americans were found badly mutilated and American prisoners were tortured or mistreated.

The Americans, on the other hand, became adept at two types of torture that received considerable publicity: the so-called Water Cure and the Rope Treatment. Both were used in order to induce suspected insurgents to divulge information regarding guerrilla activities. The Water Cure involved pouring water into the suspect's body through his mouth or nose until he became bloated and then beating the water out of him so that it spurted forth like a geyser. The treatment was reportedly quite painful and usually resulted in the suspect's divulging the desired information. The Rope Treatment, which involved hanging a victim by his neck for a period of about ten seconds, was equally effective.

The tortures were so well-publicized that they eventually became the subject of extensive Congressional investigations during the 1902 Senatorial hearings on "Affairs in the Philippine Islands."

The American press was filled with atrocity stories. Somewhat typical was a story by the Manila correspondent of the Philadelphia *Ledger* in November 1901:

> The present war is no fake, *opera bouffe* engagement; our men have been relentless, have killed to exterminate men, women and children, prisoners and captives, active insurgents and suspected people from lads of 10 up, an idea prevailing that the Filipino as such was little better than a dog. . . . Our soldiers have pumped salt water into men to "make them talk," and have taken prisoners people who held up their hands and peacefully surrendered, and an hour later, without an atom of evidence to show that they were even insurrectos, stood them on a bridge and shot them down one by one, to drop into the water below and float down, as examples to those who found their bullet-loaded corpses . . . .

Such reports were especially embarrassing to President McKinley whose pronounced policy was one of "Benevolent Assimilation." The Anti-Imperialist League, which opposed the Philippine war, printed a pamphlet entitled "Benevolent Assimilation" which emphasized such statements as that of Brigadier General James F. Bell, commander of the Southern Luzon district, to the effect that "one-sixth of the natives of Luzon have either been killed or have died of the dengue fever in the last two years." Since the War Department itself estimated the Luzon population at 3,727,488, that meant, the pamphlet argued, that 616,000 Filipinos had died in Luzon as a result of the war.

The burning of villages, along with the razing of churches, also received great publicity and shocked the American public. The military responded that the troops had orders that "The burning or looting of houses . . . the abuse of unarmed citizens . . . will be punished with the utmost severity known to military law." Such standing orders were, in fact, in existence, but they were largely ignored. The fact remained that the war was a cruel one, that the guerrillas also practiced atrocities on American soldiers, and that such atrocities—especially mutilations—inspired a desire for revenge on the part of American troops. While officially denouncing acts of atrocity on the part of American soldiers, military authorities also cited such Filipino acts in defense of our policy.

As public opinion built up, the military authorities in Manila were forced to take action. The most celebrated incident to emerge from the Philippine Insurrection—the Mylai of that period—involved the killing of eleven Filipinos on the island of Samar. In one of the few courts-martial to come out of the war, Major Littleton W. T. Waller was accused of shooting eleven defenseless Filipinos without trial. Earlier, at Balangiga on Samar Island, the Filipinos had massacred virtually the entire Company C of the 9th US Infantry. The men had thought the town "pacified"; they were friendly with the Filipinos there. But the entire town was actually allied to the insurgents. One morning, after lulling the Americans into a false sense of security, the bolo-swinging natives hacked to death 36 soldiers. Nine more died trying to escape. In the end only 26 of 71 men survived.

Those killed were terribly mutilated. The bolo-slashed head of one of the Americans had been filled with strawberry jam; a sack of flour had been dumped into the slashed abdomen of another. "All the dead had been mutilated and treated with indescribable indignities," Secretary of War Elihu Root had reported to President Theodore Roosevelt.

In late 1901, Marine Major Littleton W. T. Waller led his troops on a march across Samar that became an agony of survival. During the course of the march, Waller and his troops became suspicious of certain Filipino bearers. When the

troops finally made it back to safety, after a harrowing march of more than three weeks, Waller, who was still delirious from the trek, ordered the execution of eleven of the suspected Filipinos who had accompanied him.

The incident could not have happened at a worse time for the Senate hearings on the Philippines, with their emphasis on atrocities, were then in session. The administration was already embarrassed by the fact that no significant sentences had resulted to date from any of the ten officer-rank court-martial cases then on record. Three officers had been acquitted, the other seven merely fined or reprimanded.

Under the pressure of public opinion, Secretary of War Root ordered that Major Waller be court-martialed for the Samar incident. At the trial, Waller defended himself by saying that he was acting under orders. He said that Brigadier General Jacob H. Smith had instructed him to kill and burn, to take no prisoners, and to make Samar into a "howling wilderness." Smith, Waller asserted, had told him that the more he killed and burned the better pleased he'd be. When asked to define the age limit for killing, General Smith had replied, "Everything over ten." Three of Waller's fellow Marine officers testified that they too had heard Smith give the oral instructions.

To the Administration's chagrin, Waller was acquitted. Bowing further to public opinion, President Roosevelt then ordered the court-martial of General Smith. The American public, however, was becoming suspicious of military justice. "Roosevelt proposes to please everyone," Charles Francis Adams wrote; "he will be severe in words—on outrages; but no one will be punished." General Smith was tried in April 1902 in Manila. He was convicted, but in keeping with Charles Francis Adam's words, his sentence was only that of admonishment.

Public Opinion and the Problem of the Press: While the part played by the press in revealing American atrocities in the Philippines was a big one, the press—at the beginning of the Insurrection—was not anti-war. Not only had jingoistic "yellow journalism" influenced expansionist elements at the beginning of the Spanish-American War, but the press, for the most part, also supported the government at the outbreak of the Insurrection. When the armed truce was first broken on February 4, 1899, most newspapers rallied around the American cause, blaming the Filipinos for the "shooting incident" that sparked the conflict. Who actually started the war was later to be a subject of great controversy, not unlike the Vietnam War's Tonkin Gulf dispute. But at the time, most newspapers backed the American cause,

"Edward Atkinson, one of the leading anti-imperialists, wrote that 'the way has already become plain for the youth of the land to avoid disease and death in the tropics by refusing to volunteer or to enlist in the army or navy of the United States.' "

with even the New York *Times* calling Aguinaldo "a vain popinjay, a wicked liar, and a perfectly incapable leader."

The *Times*'s reaction was representative of the shock dealt the American public by the first news out of Manila that an insurrection had begun. Most Americans considered the war over when Dewey won Manila and American troops landed to take the city.

At first, one victory after another was reported. Censorship was imposed from the beginning, but as the war dragged on, the first reports began to filter out of Manila that all was not well. Dispatches were slipped by the censors and filed from Hong Kong or other Asian outposts.

One of the most sensational was a report by John Bass in the *Harper's Weekly* in June 1899. The blistering uncensored report claimed the "whole population of the islands sympathize with the insurgents," that the American army was ill-equipped and unwieldy in its management, that American military campaigns were unsuited for the type of guerrilla fighting taking place there, and that American troops had burned villages, looted homes and cut off insurgent ears for trophies.

With such reports leaking out, relations between the press and the military in Manila became strained. General Otis, the Military Governor, told one group of petitioning journalists that if they persisted in writing stories challenging his official line, he would have them expelled.

Defying General Otis, eleven correspondents in Manila signed a cable and smuggled it to Hong Kong whence it was cabled to the States. Printed in most newspapers, the report caused a sensation. A key paragraph stated:

> We believe that, owing to official despatches from Manila made public in Washington, the people of the United States have not received a correct impression of the situation in the Philippines, but that these despatches have presented an ultra-optimistic view that is not shared by the general officers in the field.

The report referred to the "brigand character" of the American army and claimed that "the tenacity of purpose of the Filipino has been underestimated."

The pros and cons of censorship were debated but in the end, censorship remained. Stories at variance with the official line continued to be filed, however, and relations between the press and the administrations in Manila and Washington were often uneasy. The first atrocity stories which began to break in 1900 did not improve the situation. By early 1900, the press was moving into high gear, becoming more anti-war.

This, in turn, caused many of the supporters of the war to accuse the press of treason, claiming that anti-war remarks merely served to encourage the insurgents and prolong the war.

Dissent and the Anti-Imperialist League: The press was merely one element of the anti-war movement in the States. Even before the In-

surrection had begun, an Anti-Imperialist League had been formed in Boston on June 15, 1898. The League grew out of the Spanish-American War in opposition to the pro-expansionist policies of the McKinley Administration.

The League believed in the words of Thomas Jefferson that "If there is one principle more deeply rooted in the mind of every American, it is that we should have nothing to do with conquest." The League eventually had more than 500,000 members, including two ex-Presidents—Benjamin Harrison and Grover Cleveland. Such luminaries of the day as Jane Addams, Andrew Carnegie, William James, Samuel Gompers, William Dean Howells, John Dewey, Mark Twain, and Senator George Hoar of Massachusetts—a fellow Republican of President McKinley—were members.

The League came out four-square against American intervention in the Philippines. "The Administration seeks to extinguish the Spirit of 1776 in those islands," the League's platform declared in 1899. "We demand the immediate cessation of this war against liberty."

As the war went on, many Americans went from pro-war to anti-war. Mark Twain's odyssey was representative. When the Spanish-American War began, he thought the war a worthy crusade, the only justifiable war in history. The Philippine Insurrection caused him much uneasiness, however, and by late 1900, he was beginning to waver. "There is the case of the Philippines," he said at the time. "I have tried hard, and yet I cannot for the life of me comprehend how we got into that mess." He later admitted openly to being an anti-imperialist, even putting his caustic pen to use as a member of the League, as when he suggested a new US flag "with the white stripes painted black, and the stars replaced by a skull and crossbones."

One of the League's most controversial programs was aimed at youth. The program sought to induce the youth of America not to volunteer for duty in the Philippines; at the same time, the program urged volunteers already in the Philippines not to re-enlist. Edward Atkinson, one of the leading anti-imperialists, wrote that "the way has already become plain for the youth of the land to avoid disease and death in the tropics by refusing to volunteer or to enlist in the army or navy of the United States."

It was this same Edward Atkinson who created a *cause celebre* by attempting to send anti-war pamphlets to American soldiers in the Philippines. The pamphlets urged American soldiers to revolt against their commanders and to refuse to fight. Denounced as seditious propaganda, the pamphlets were barred from the Philippines by the Secretary of War. This act, in turn, caused an uproar in the press about freedom of speech.

This affair, coupled with other activities by the League, raised the entire question of whether dissent was treasonous and whether anti-war activity didn't actually prolong the war by encouraging the enemy. General Elwell Otis and General Henry Lawton wrote from the Philippines that the protesters were "giving aid and comfort to the enemy and prolonging the war." Lawton, a hero later killed in action, wrote shortly before his death that if he were to die in action, it would be the result of the dissent movement because "the continuance of the fighting is chiefly due to reports that are sent out from America."

Such claims were not without credence, for Aguinaldo himself later wrote that the Filipino leaders had placed their hopes on the American people pressuring their leaders to end the war. During the election of 1900, the Filipinos hoped Bryan, the anti-imperialist Democratic candidate, would defeat McKinley, the incumbent pro-imperialist Republican. When Bryan lost, Filipino hopes were given a setback.

As a reaction to what seemed like an endless war, some Americans were urging that we should forego overseas expansion and concentrate on our domestic problems. Thomas B. "Czar" Reed, the Speaker of the House, was one of these. Reed, a Republican from Maine, thought that America's greatness lay at home and could be achieved by "improving living conditions and raising political intelligence among Americans rather than by extending American rule over half-civilized peoples difficult to assimilate." In the same vein, a Negro editor wrote that it was "a sinful extravagance to waste our civilizing influence upon the unappreciative Filipinos when it is so badly needed right here in America."

In the end, America did experience a turning-inward, and whether it gave comfort to the enemy or not, dissent remained an integral issue of the war and only ceased with the ending of the war and the restoration of peace.

The Withdrawal Question: Dissatisfaction with the war and with American policy was not confined to the United States but extended to American soldiers stationed in the Philippines. One writer states that "no American army has ever complained so much and so bitterly—to each other, to their officers, and to their families and congressmen back home." Soldiers' complaints were often used as anti-war ammunition by the Anti-Imperialist League.

The Insurrection had barely begun when the Boston *Evening Transcript* of March 30, 1899, carried an uncensored dispatch stating that "a majority of the United States volunteers are eager to return home . . . 'we did not enlist to fight niggers' is a remark that is constantly heard." There was no conscription during the Spanish-American War, but because the war was popular at first, many men volunteered.

By 1899, there were 30,000 American troops in the Philippines, 12,000 of them volunteers. They had volunteered for the popular war with Spain and now found themselves involved in the unpopular war in the Philippines against Filipinos. With the end of the war against Spain, they were eligible for discharge or they could re-enlist. The demand to bring the troops home shook the McKinley government.

Pressure from various states, which had contributed volunteer regiments, began to build up. The California Senate requested that the First California Regiment be returned. A public meeting in Nashville asked for the return of the Tennessee Regiment. The newspapers of Oregon joined with the relatives and friends of the

Oregon Volunteers in calling for the return of their boys "who never enlisted for such a war." Governor Lund of Minnesota released to the newspapers a telegram from the Third Minnesota Volunteers demanding that "the regiment must be ordered home and mustered out of service at once."

Under such pressure, while still determined to pursue the war, McKinley established a policy of returning the volunteers home as quickly as possible and replacing them with either regular army troops or native mercenaries. It was believed by many that if the American troops were withdrawn, a terrible internecine war would ensue.

By returning home the "disgruntled volunteers," the McKinley administration was enabled to continue its policy while at the same time removing from the anti-imperialist camp what was then its most effective support in the form of thousands of American families who wanted their sons back home. In that sense, McKinley succeeded in doing with the volunteers what neither President Johnson nor President Nixon was ever able to do with the draftees during the Vietnam War. He quelled the clamor for withdrawal by relying on professional American soldiers and native mercenaries.

Racism: In the Philippine Insurrection, as in the Vietnam War, there was a feeling that much of the brutality resulted from the conviction of American soldiers that they were fighting a "racially inferior people." In testimony given at the Senate investigations into the problem of the Philippines Colonel George S. Anderson said, "It is true that the word 'nigger' was very often used as applied to the natives, probably correctly." Other degrading terms applied to the Filipinos included dagoes, yuyus and gugus. A common feeling among American soldiers fighting in the Philippines was that all Asiatics "look alike." Regarding racism, it is probably significant that the only recorded American defector to the insurgent Filipinos was an American Negro.

Credibility: The Philippine Insurrection had its equivalent of the Vietnam's War "credibility gap." The gap resulted from the disparity between optimistic official reports and the media's more pessimistic despatches. There was a problem of "rosy reporting," including exaggerations of pacified areas. At times, officials were caught in what appeared to be blatant lying, as in the case of Secretary of War Root's handling of the atrocity charges in 1902.

Brutalization of America: The atrocities on both sides during the Philippine war created fears that America was becoming brutalized. The feeling that America was fighting an inferior race led, some felt, to a growing insensitivity to brutality. A popular song of the day, sung to the tune of "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp, The Boys are Marching," was reflective of the popular attitude of the times:

Damn, damn, damn the Filipino!
Pock-marked Khakiac ladrone!
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize him with a Krag
*And return us to our own beloved home.**

Moral Corruption: The corrupting influence of Asia on American morality was an issue of importance during the Philippine Insurrection. The Senate Hearings on Affairs in the Philippines in 1902 investigated the morals question. Manila was the Saigon of its day, and most of the reports of immorality issued from Manila. One report stated, "Probably in no other country in the world do white men become so degraded and demoralized, through associating with the natives, as in the Philippines. . . ." The same report stated, "Large numbers of Americans here are either married to, or else keep as mistresses, native women of the lowest class, who are mostly drawn from canteen keepers, camp followers, and prostitutes." Governor Taft said it was true that Americans 10,000 miles away from restraining home influences were "more easily led to yield to temptation."

> "Kennan writes: '. . . the ruling of distant peoples is not our dish . . . there are many things we Americans should beware of, and among them is the acceptance of any sort of paternalistic responsibility to anyone.' "

America's Messianic Spirit: As in the Vietnam War, charges were made in the Philippine Insurrection that America was trying to impose its way of life upon Asians against their will. William Cameron Forbes writing in 1928 had this to say about our approach to the Philippines:

> With their keen American minds, their sense of justice and dislike of delay, display, sham, and subterfuge, (the Americans) were turned loose upon a world of medieval mismanagement and abuse like a group of knight-errants looking for wrongs to right and abuses to end. They found plenty of these and literally worked themselves sick in their efforts to bring into the Islands the blessings of the kind of Administration to which Americans have become so accustomed that they take it as a matter of course.

General Arthur MacArthur was one of the chief exponents of exporting American republicanism to Asia. He considered the Philippines as "fertile soil upon which to plant republicanism. He felt we were "the custodians of imperishable ideas" and that we were "planting the best traditions, the best characteristics of Americanism in such a way that they never can be removed from that soil." He believed the "evolution of republicanism in the East as an incident of our occupation" to be more important than either strategic or commercial consideration. Senator Hoar, a leading anti-imperialist, made this retort to Senator Platt, a pro-imperialist: "You have no right at the cannon's mouth to impose on an unwilling people your . . . notions of what is good."

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*Khakiac means brown or copper-colored. Ladrone means bandit or thief. Krag refers to the Krag-Jorgensen rifle, a .30 caliber bolt action weapon with a five-shot clip.

"International redistribution without domestic redistribution only succeeds in shifting resources from the rich countries to the rich of the poor countries."—Robert L. Rothstein

Targeting Foreign Aid To the Poorest of the Poor

NOEL V. LATEEF

A new developmental strategy, namely, that of targeting external assistance to the poorest of the poor in developing countries, has prompted considerable speculation that fresh life is being breathed into the battered corpus of foreign aid. Billed by its supporters as one of the yeastiest concepts to energize the development community in some time, the theme of poor-targeted assistance promises to be a recurrent one in the North-South dialogue.

As opposed to the circuitous "trickle down" theory of economic assistance, the poor-targeted approach concentrates aid directly on the world's billion or so very poor people. The new strategy attempts to reach down to the heartland of world poverty, to several million villages. Ultimately, it seeks to strengthen the political will for (and to lessen the political costs of) undertaking an effective address of basic human rights in the Third World.

The western industrial countries have a long tradition, both of religion and rationalism, favoring a distributive justice that strives toward greater equality. In the face of an unprecedented duality, consisting of great affluence and abject poverty in the world, there is presently a strong humanitarian sentiment in the West for some form of distributive justice—if not in circumstance, then at least in opportunity to better one's circumstance. And there is widespread recognition that adequate nutrition, health, and education are necessary conditions for creating and taking advantage of opportunities for individual betterment.

If ethical arguments are to be used as a rationale for transferring resources, a moral obligation arises to follow up the use of resource transfers to be sure that their ethically-based objectives are being served. Richard N. Cooper states: "If we are to justify resource transfers on ethical grounds, then it must be on the basis of knowledge that via one mechanism or another the transferred resources will benefit those residents of the recipient countries that are clearly worse off than the worst-off 'taxed' residents of the donor country." The task is to see to it that the resources transferred to the recipient country do not wind up in Swiss bank accounts, or simply benefit the more well-to-do socio-economic strata of a society. For this reason, the United States Congress has sanctioned, in its mandate to the Agency for International Development (AID), an "activist" role in pursuing its efforts to aid the developing world's poorest.

AID is in the forefront of those organizations—public and private—that are exploring relevant designs for the implementation of poor-targeted assistance. In many respects, the new developmental approach is an amplification of the congressionally dictated "new AID strategy" of 1973 onward. A disenchanted Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 to orient American foreign aid in the direction of "people" programs, geared to such specific needs as food, population planning, health care, and education. The legislative reforms stressed integrated rural development, i.e., those activities in support of rural production rather than simply agriculture.

In the formulation of its current strategy to rural development in the developing countries, AID has drawn heavily on the expertise of veteran AID personnel, who have had extensive experience in hundreds of projects to promote rural development. However, the assumptions underpinning AID's new approach have also benefited from a growing body of development literature, whose major theme is that problems of growth, employment, and income distribu-

Noel Lateef is the author of The Zorma of Niger *and several articles relating to development in Africa. He is a senior at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and has been a student intern with the Agency for International Development.*

tion are interrelated and must be addressed simultaneously. According to this literature, the growth and equity goals of developing countries are not inherently incompatible, provided appropriate development strategies are those which are supportive of integrated rural development. The break with the past is in the total commitment of the Agency to concentrate on areas fundamental to basic human needs and to attempt, on a broad basis, to engage the poor in the development process.

As ambitious a strategy as poor-targeted assistance is not without its stumbling blocks. One of the most delicate issues is how to institute such a far-reaching strategy in a manner that minimizes perceived threats to national sovereignty. This is at a time when developing countries want maximum freedom to assert their demands for sovereign equality, including noninterference in their internal affairs.

Considerable tension could arise in the future as the industrial countries stipulate that their economic concessions be targeted to the low-end poor, while the developing countries insist on the principle of total noninterference in their internal affairs. This conflict is symptomatic of the inherent paradox in the platform known as the New International Economic Order that has been put forth by the Third World. Unfortunately, as the developing countries call for transfers of resources in the name of fundamental rights of individuals, the indifference of some of these same countries to their own populations —those on whose behalf these claimed rights are advanced—is frequently egregious. Without efforts to rectify this shortcoming, fundamental reforms of the international order could be rendered meaningless. Indeed, they would be almost impossible to achieve without corresponding reforms in the national orders.

Another sensitive question confronts donors when a real commitment to targeting the poorest of the poor fails to materialize irrespective of a recipient government's impassioned rhetoric to the contrary. Is there leverage available to foreign assistance agencies to either negotiate or engineer a fundamental change in the recipient country? A number of developing countries are still choosing what Mahbub ul Haq calls "soft options" consistent with the disjointed classical approach to development and are unwilling to adopt a more equitable strategy. Haq argues that policy and performance conditioning, albeit infractions of national sovereignty, are no more interventionist than the whole concept of foreign assistance and are nonetheless legitimized by their humanitarian ends. Clearly, however, the feasibility of performance conditioning depends on the individual country and whether the various foreign donors could close ranks to lever the desired changes.

As Samuel Huntington has observed, it was with the Alliance for Progress that social reform, i.e., the more equitable distribution of material and symbolic resources, joined economic development as a conscious and explicit goal of American policy toward developing countries. Thus, the Alliance for Progress was a precursor of the poor-targeted assistance strategy. In the early stages, the two most critical and now familiar-sounding questions, were: (1) Do Latin Americans really want their reforms to be undertaken by pressure from the outside? and (2) From the point of view of the United States, how effective a vehicle is the Alliance in bringing about the desired socio-economic changes in Latin America? In the initial implementation of Alliançe programs, few attempts were made to be even cynically cosmetic in the ubiquitous policy and performance conditioning essays. Due to the resulting friction, the Alliance fell short of realizing its full potential.

"While it is possible to bring pressure to bear on a recipient country to make the necessary institutional reforms and to install the required delivery systems, no foreign do-gooder is capable of forcibly instilling the requisite political will for self-improvement."

The principal lesson to be learned from the Alliance for Progress is the need for sensitivity in dealing with the developing countries. It is clear that an activist strategy that is not wholly solicited and that fails to engage the recipient country's will to participate in its own development is doomed from the start. Political will is the keystone of any developmental program to target the poor. John W. Mellor has emphasized that the will for a change in strategy must first come from the developing countries. Only then, he believes, can the industrial countries contribute to progress toward broad, participatory economic growth by acts consistent with a higher set of social values. Since what exactly constitutes "will" is fuzzy and quite amenable to waffling, we must be wary not to set too much store by it or a stalling tactic might emerge.

The donor's role should be supportive of national development endeavors to assist the poor, not an initiating effort. The donor can strengthen the hand of those parties working for a development strategy that targets the very poor if the recipient country has set such a course. While it is possible to bring pressure to bear on a recipient country to make the necessary institutional reforms and to install the required delivery systems, no foreign do-gooder is capable of forcibly instilling the requisite political will for self-improvement. In the last analysis, it is of paramount importance that the host country be convinced that its own actions and decisions concerning its socio-economic development are critical, and that no amount of foreign assistance can displace this reality.

For the most part, decisions regarding development postures and practices in the developing countries lie with the sovereign governments of those countries. In making their individual decisions on the development strategy they wish to adopt, recipient governments are now aware of the emphasis of AID's own legislation. In many cases, recipient governments share similar goals. There are developing

countries, on the other hand, who are concerned that the United States may be construing the necessities of national development too narrowly. This is especially true in Africa, where basic infrastructure is most needed. Indeed, when Lester Brown asserts: "The basic challenge for the poor nations is to design a development strategy that will provide a relatively satisfactory standard of living with a minimal level of resource consumption," from the Third World perspective this smacks of hypocrisy. It is evident that although AID's new approach rarely funds major infrastructure projects, this does not obviate the need for them, particularly in Africa.

Although in a number of Third World countries (especially those that actually fall under the rubric of the Fourth World) average and total incomes remain abysmally low, a good many of these countries could do a better job on the distribution and employment fronts, and therefore need to change or amend some of their modes of agricultural and industrial expansion. However, even with improvements in domestic policies, the developing countries need reinforced economic expansion in order to cope more effectively with their internal equity problems. John P. Lewis states emphatically: "There is no way they (the developing countries) can meet their welfare needs simply by reshuffling existing income—or by accenting new (non-economic) dimensions of social ambience. If they would be more egalitarian, they need more aggregate growth and more growth-supporting investment, so that they can spread income increments over a broader base."

While there are obstacles to poor-targeted assistance in the developmental milieu of recipient countries that suggest proceeding with caution, the strategy's high political salability within the United States could rebuild domestic support for foreign aid. In part, the greater acceptance of poor-targeted assistance is due to the elimination of many of the more controversial aspects of participating in the classical, capital-intensive approach to development (in 1974 American aid disbursements [in 1967 prices] were 44 percent below 1967 levels).

Since 1945, the United States alone has spent $221 billion in foreign aid. During the Cold War years, much of this sum was allocated for military assistance and visible construction projects that also served as status symbols for prestige-conscious governments. The bankruptcy of a policy of targeting assistance to governments in the Third World rather than people became apparent every time a government fell. Frequently, this aid shored up repressive regimes and failed to earn the goodwill the American people expected in return from the people of the recipient country. Consequently, and not surprisingly, there have been long periods of public disillusionment with foreign aid.

"In addition to ensuring that the neediest people are in fact the recipients of foreign aid, this more activist approach enables the aid donor to be a positive force in the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights."

In revising the goals of American foreign aid, the Congress sought to resolve the program's human rights dilemma. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 mandates a cessation of security and economic assistance to countries which engage in a "consistent pattern of gross violations" of internationally recognized human rights. More recently, the Harkin Amendment stipulates that the Executive vote against international development institution loans to countries engaged in human rights violations. This linkage of human rights and foreign aid is entirely compatible with the poor-targeted assistance strategy, heightening its political attractiveness.

Under both the 1973 Act and the Harkin Amendment, aid can flow to a country that practices torture, as long as the aid directly serves the basic human needs of the very poor. Congressional flexibility vis-à-vis the low-end poor is based on the rationale that a human rights-aid linkage in every case is a negative and counterproductive approach. United Kingdom Minister for Overseas Development, Judith Miller (who was responsible a few years back for cutting off British aid to Chile), takes the same pragmatic position. When you come right down to it, she points out, "The most basic right is to survive and be fed."

In the past, policymakers adhered to a strict dichotomy between rights contained in the 30 articles of the UN Universal Declaration of Rights, which could be classified as "economic" and those that fell under the rubric of "political-civil." It was assumed that either the two were incompatible or that, in the long run, the pursuit of one would lead to the other. Today, due also to the widespread disaffection with the amorality of separating the human rights dimension from considerations of foreign aid eligibility, the two domains have all but congealed in a novel union.

Economic development strategies have human rights consequences that are seldom articulated by the economists who promote them. It is not that proponents of the 1950s-1960s growth model are heedless of the state of human rights, but they presuppose that economic and other rights will eventually trickle down to everyone. The process requires patience on the part of poor people and discipline or repression of political-civil and economic rights for substantial segments of the populace. Likewise, the socialist models also contemplate or require repression, although their proponents argue that they have a greater interest in the near-term well-being of the poor.

While little attention has been

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THE KATERINA S.

JAMES H. BOUGHTON

Whenever today some past CIA caper makes the news, I think of the *Katerina S.*, a mangy, rusty tub of a ship, which put into Colombo harbor sometime after midnight one steamy South Asian evening in 1956 and became a tiny monument of sorts to John Foster Dulles and the vagaries of the Cold War.

Parenthetically and parochially, however, these thoughts first bring memories of the smell of ships' grease and the rancid odor of a small herd of emaciated goats held in a makeshift pen far aft on the ship's only deck. (The vessel had no refrigeration and at sea the goats provided the only fresh meat for the crew.)

I was Chief of the Political Section of the American Embassy in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, a Section composed entirely of myself and one capable secretary. For many weeks before it arrived, the Embassy's attention had been riveted on the progress of this tramp, an ancient Greek freighter registered in Panama. Its voyage had begun in Burgas, Bulgaria, on the Black Sea, and its destination was Haiphong in Vietnam, the city then as now securely in Communist hands after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954.

The reason for our attention was that a "United States intelligence agency" had earlier told the State Department that the *Katerina S.* was running arms from Bulgaria to Communist-held Vietnam. Our chiefs in the Department, presumably including the Secretary of State, mulling over this bit of news, concluded that within the arena of the Cold War, this was a combat issue. Thus, for a brief moment in its long life, the *Katerina S.* figured as a decrepit and pathetic symbol of that era.

As soon as it made its decision, the Department instructed its foreign posts located in all possible ports of call along the way to board the ship, search it, and, if arms were found, to seek some way of detaining it.

While pondering the legal and other implications of officers from the American Embassy board, trying to board, detain, and perhaps even search a Greek ship of Panamanian registry bound for North Vietnam with an Eastern European cargo in Ceylon's waters, our Ambassador fingered the Naval Attaché and myself ("You're paid to be brave," he told the former) as the party to make the first assault.

We waited. In retrospect, there seems to have been almost infinite waiting connected with this episode. The governments in Panama City and Athens had to give their consent. Along the ship's course, the authorities of the countries where the ship might put in also had to give theirs. In Ceylon, when the time came to approach the Government, the Prime Minister, English-educated, English-oriented, and a wealthy land-owner of English acres, after dwelling on the opposition after his scalp, not to mention his job, also gave his.

The Colombo Harbor Master was told to call our Embassy night or day if the *Katerina S.* should appear; the Colombo Police Chief was told to give us whatever help might be needed; and our Embassy Marine Security Guards were informed where we—the Naval Attaché and I—could be reached from dusk to dawn, drunk or sober. We were presumably immediately available at other times.

Amid all this activity, there was an embarrassing oversight. We had forgotten that Ceylon a few years earlier had received an Honorary Panamanian Consul, an American who was manager of a US gasoline retailing firm on the island. A little

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Jim Boughton is a retired FSO who spent most of his career in Near Eastern and South Asian affairs. Since retirement he has been a consultant and a writer, the latter, he says, primarily for his own amusement.

late, he was drawn into the circle, but not happily. His sole official function on behalf of the Central American Republic heretofore had been to fly the Panamanian flag on its National Day. Presumably, his secretary kept a record of the date on her calendar.

At first, nobody could invent a function for him. His honorary status seemed to preclude him from boarding the ship if and when it first arrived. The legal minds in Washington finally agreed, through some obscure formula, that in the unlikely event the Attaché and I were able to get on board and the more unlikely event that the master of the vessel would agree to it, the Honorary Consul would be in charge of the search.

At this hour, the *Katerina S.* was inching onward from Burgas. Our Consul General in Istanbul reported that an effort to intercept the ship failed and it continued to steam, however shakily, through the Bosporus. The report, much later, from the American Consul in Alexandria, was more alarming. When trying to board the vessel, he had been threatened with murder by the captain. When the ship docked in Aden, then a British Protectorate, and after a similar lapse of steaming time, our Consul received the same treatment.

In Colombo, the captain in our eyes was rapidly becoming a pistol-packing Commie bent on thwarting the forward progress of American foreign policy.

By sea, it is about 2500 miles from Aden to Ceylon, a distance which the Naval Attaché and his aides, armed with slide rules, compasses, charts, and other tools of their profession, found this aged, coal-burning wreck could not possibly navigate without coming to a dead stop far short of Colombo's harbor. It was reported, therefore, in our then daily staff meeting (in the languid climate of Ceylon we had generally not been convened more than once or twice a week) that the *Katerina S.* would have to put in at Karachi and probably also Bombay to refuel, a circuitous route.

Our naval contingent was ecstatic about this extra duty. At the time, the Ceylon Navy was composed of three small gunboats. Only one was ever operative at any particular moment, the other two generally being laid up with worn-out parts or other complaints. Whichever one was operative devoted its attention full time to efforts to catch illegal Dravidian immigrants from South India who were sneaking with considerable success across the Palk Strait to be absorbed with their fellow Tamils in the North of Ceylon or to work as tea-pluckers on the British-owned plantations in the interior, where no questions were ever asked.

The Attaché was an agreeable, handsome, young Reserve Lieutenant Commander. He had, I recall, three principal duties: being on good drinking terms with the Commanding Officer of the Ceylon Navy, a commodore in rank; keeping track, mostly by telephone, of the three gunboats' varying illnesses; and entertaining the Commanding Officer of the US Persian Gulf Command, headquartered in Bahrein, when he visited Colombo.

(In 1956, this Command did not compare too favorably with the Ceylon Navy. Its flagship was a leftover submarine tender and the rest of it consisted of two pre-World War II destroyers. It managed, however, to show the Stars and Stripes around the perimeters of the Arabian Sea, parts of the Indian Ocean, and the Bay of Bengal a couple of times a year, its ports of call being determined by the state of political relations between the United States and countries bordering on these tepid waters. India was always very sticky and never met its quota.)

While the Persian Gulf Command did not, to the best of my recollection, play any role in the saga of the *Katerina S.*, the American Embassy in Colombo did.

After the ship left Aden, we heard no more. The Embassy at Karachi was mute, as was our Consulate General in Bombay. Slide rules in hand, as the days slipped by, the Navy finally concluded that the ship must have foundered or was wallowing, its furnaces unfed and cold, somewhere in the Indian Ocean.

Weather, fuel capacity, knots to the hour (not many, to be sure), all possible courses were analyzed and later fed into the Embassy staff meetings which by this time had taken on the atmosphere of Admiral Nimitz's chart room during the battle of the Coral Sea. We were all suddenly experts on navigation, Greek freighters, nautical distances, as well as the temperament of one Greek sea captain. When the Consular Officer, a highly talented young lady, suggested that perhaps the craft had bypassed Colombo and was on its way to Singapore, to the East another 2500 miles, tempers and tensions ran high and the basic divisions between the Military and Civilian Establishments were never so apparent.

These fences patched, on the night of the arrival, I was at a party being given by a member of what is termed euphemistically the United States intelligence community. Sometime after midnight the telephone rang and a Marine Guard at the Embassy reported that the Harbor Master had called with news that the *Katerina S.* was lying outside Colombo harbor, pratique had been granted, and the ship was about to move into port.

Wearing a brand new white suit cut to order by a Ceylonese tailor for not more than thirty dollars, I picked up the Naval Attaché, hastily but tastefully outfitted in a white uniform with as much braid as rank would allow. We drove in the humid murk to the Customs Shed where a small boat belonging to the port authorities waited to take us out to the *Katerina S.*

At the time Colombo harbor was the largest man-made harbor in the world. In 1956, it was usually jammed with shipping from all over the world. For not only was Ceylon a major exporter of tea, rubber, and coconut products, its capital was also an important bunkering port for vessels traversing the Indian Ocean.

Often more important to its operations, or their lack, was the fact that Ceylon was the uneasy home of a Communist Party controlled from Moscow, a Trotskyite party larger than any outside of Mexico, and a splinter wing Trotskyite Party run by a Ceylonese graduate of the University of Wisconsin.

The ambitions of these groups were mutually exclusive, although their tactics and strategies were not. Their favorite battleground was Colombo's port. Through their labor unions, one party controlled the stevedores, another controlled the tally clerks, a third controlled

the bunkering workers. If memory serves, one even controlled the harbor pilots.

The result, more often than not, was sheer chaos. Dozens of ships, immobilized by strikes, would be anchored outside the jetties in the sea, waiting to load, unload, refuel —frequently all three—day after day, their distant silhouettes seeming to exude a kind of lonely patience. The truth, however, was that from distances of many thousands of miles, their owners, in exasperation at the swelling demurrage costs of idleness, regularly would order the masters to weigh anchor and steam on to Madras or Calcutta or Chittagong or Bombay or Karachi.

The frustrations of running the port were compounded because its lighting was not adequate to permit ships to enter after dark. An exception—a political exception—to this rule was made in the case of the *Katerina S.* Guided by a pilot whose union was not on strike that early morning, the relic found a mooring space in the middle of the vast, crowded, dark and dirty waters.

Meanwhile, back at the Customs Shed, the American Navy and I, armed only with a document in Spanish from the Panamanian Government, liberally decorated with red ribbons fastened with red wax seals, and a hasty English translation, climbed into a small, open boat. A tiny group of frightened, miserable Ceylon police looking for all the world as if they had been plucked from *The Pirates of Penzance*, was waiting in another boat to follow. One was being sick.

The two of us set out with our helmsman and it became evident soon that the first trick was to find the ship. We found sleek tankers, a couple of lovely P. & O. liners, dozens of more or less distinguished vessels of many, many kinds and nationalities, but it was over an hour before we found the *Katerina S.* From varying distances, its principal characteristics were its odor, chiefly that of unwashed goat, an absence of electricity (kerosene lamps with red or white chimneys were suspended where lights were required), rust, and no sign of human life.

An oily rope ladder hung the twenty feet or so from the railing to the water's edge. We climbed it. I forget who went first, whether there had been a protocol problem mulled over and solved by our Ambassador, but it didn't matter. I was the one to slip and fall into the pool of black grease on the deck. The new, white linen suit now two-toned, we groped past the goat pen along the deck to the bridge. (The local constabulary had not yet arrived.)

A dim light came through a window of the wheelhouse where a swarthy, brute-like creature sat in filthy underwear at a little table drinking from a bottle of that stinking Greek wine strained through resin. The master of the *Katerina S.* looked exactly as we had imagined. A pistol was lying on the table in front of him. We knocked on the door and went in.

Looking back on this humble incident, I cannot, after 21 years, explain with any certitude why this thuggish captain did not throw us off his wretched ship and why, after long minutes of argument and invective on his part, a drunken study of Panama's document (both in Spanish and English, neither of which we thought he understood), he agreed to what we asked.

Perhaps it was because of the hour, perhaps because he was tired of being badgered by American Foreign Service posts along his route. His crew, we learned later, was largely disaffected—not quite to the point of mutiny but clearly to the point of desertion—and then there was the nature of the cargo. Whatever the reasons, this surly Mediterranean, his English not very good and our Greek nonexistent, suddenly shrugged as if he didn't give a damn any more. We all had a swig from the bottle and the ship in one sense was ours.

A sixth sense having told the Ceylon police that boarding now presented no physical perils, they performed their equivalent of swarming over the side, armed and presumably prepared to ensure that the vessel did not attempt to slip away before dawn. While there was grave doubt that they could have prevented it in the face of any opposition by the captain and a small part of his crew, we had even graver doubts that the *Katerina S.* was still capable of weighing its own anchor. Thus, in its own singular way, the ship settled in for what was left of the night.

"Within a few days the search for arms was on. Its progress was severely hampered because the *Katerina S.* squatted like an obscenity in the very middle of Colombo harbor. There was and would be no empty berth or other docking space for her, so the cargo had to be offloaded onto lighters, towed to an obscure and distant section of the port, stacked, opened and examined."

The Attaché and I avoided the pool of grease, went down the ladder into the little boat, and chugged through the darkness to shore. We woke up an Embassy code clerk—a fine, bright Irish girl—and composed a cable to Washington assuring it that Western civilization could now sleep more securely. Then, for its part, the American boarding party went to bed as the sun came up.

At a more reasonable hour, the Ambassador activated the Honorary Panamanian Consul and within a few days the search for arms was on. Its progress was severely hampered because the *Katerina S.* squatted like an obscenity in the very middle of Colombo harbor. There was and would be no empty berth or other docking space for her, so the cargo had to be offloaded onto lighters, towed to an obscure and distant section of the port, stacked, opened, and examined.

The considerable cost of all this motion was borne by the United States Government, not by the

Continued on page 30

FSJ BOOK ESSAY

Soybeans and Atomic Bombs

THE MAKING OF AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY: *Principles, Problems, and Proposals for Reform, by Stephen D. Cohen. Praeger, $17.50 and $6.95 paper.*

Economic policymaking lacks the glamour and excitement of high political intrigue, threats of war and top secrecy. It is devoid of national security chic. The management of international economic policy, however, has become a major preoccupation in the game of nations as it is played these days. With the existing balance of military superpower and the global dispersal of economic and political influence through the evolution of multilateral organizations, attention has focused on the ways the United States organizes itself to deal with the complex and important challenges of international economic policy. Stephen Cohen's new book is one of the most thoughtful, informed, detailed and provocative treatments of the subject to have appeared in print.

The day when the US and Britain could alone set the global monetary, trade, and development system and define the institutions to run it has long been gone. National economies today are interwoven through the rapid growth of world trade, investment, technology flows, communication and the movement of people. The resulting interdependence brings certain advantages in expanding variety and opportunity in our economic well-being, but it also means a sharply reduced ability to control events.

A *Journal* article earlier this year* described the linkage connecting the Arab-Israel problem, domestic Brazilian food shortages, the global oil price crisis and consequent search for nuclear energy resulting in the famous Brazil-West Germany nuclear deal. Not mentioned in that article was the fact that Brazilian food shortages, caused by diversion of farm land to soybeans for export, were linked to the Nixon embargo of 1971. This act cast serious doubt on the US's reliability in meeting Japan's crucial demand for soybeans, and thus encouraged Japan to look to Brazil as another source. Very few people or government institutions were capable at the time of seeing the potential link between soybeans and atomic bombs.

Former US trade representative Harold Malmgren told Congressman Lee Hamilton's Subcommittee on Special Investigations last year that dealing with the great array of nations, policies, and product problems in a timely and effective manner requires a system. Such a system, he said, has to be negotiated on the basis of international consensus. "No single man, no matter how versatile and clever, can handle it all— not the President, nor any of his individual Cabinet stars."

In a 1976 inquiry into the role of Congress and Foreign Policy the Hamilton Subcommittee found that:

> Neither the executive nor the legislative branch are well organized to deal with regional and global economic challenges . . . Congress's ability to consider international trade, finance, monetary, and energy matters, the entire fabric of interdependence, is just as hampered as that of the executive branch by lack of coordination and clear mandate. Competing executive agencies pursue varied and often conflicting interests in the area of international economic policy. A coherent and consistent global economic strategy and effective coordination will remain elusive if the internal structures of both branches are not overhauled.

Cohen quotes former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Weintraub (in the June 1976 *FSJ*) describing executive branch economic decision-making in more pithy language: "We make economic policy decisions in the most disorganized, fragmented and incoherent way imaginable. If there is consistency among decisions we make in our relations with less-developed countries, trade negotiations, selling agricultural products abroad, and so on, this is purely coincidental."

The State vs. Treasury Issue

After systematically laying out his own comprehensive indictment of bad or non-management Cohen says, "The formulation of economic policy in the United States cries out for coordination . . . the urgency is exceeded only by the sheer volume of work involved and the difficulty of assuring effective coordination." The book goes into detail on why present and former bureaucratic arrangements have failed. It examines post-war developments and the decline of the State Department's control over international economic policy and the growth of Treasury's influence, often by default.

After recounting events that led to the establishment by Congress of the office of the President's Special Representative for Trade over President Kennedy's objection, Cohen notes that the perception of the State Department as a "knee-jerk spokesman for foreigners" had grown extensively. There was evidently little confidence on the Hill that State would defend America's economic interests effectively and vigorously in trade negotiations.

In his testimony before Hamilton, Malmgren said that "State has seemed unwilling, or unable, to cope with the need to interweave domestic and international economic factors." Cohen offers a controversial analysis (which I think is outdated) to explain this perception. State's performance he writes, "is affected by the existence of an extensive Foreign Service subculture and by the fact that it is a career service. The subculture syndrome includes the belief that the only experience relevant to the activities of the Department is experience gained in the Foreign Service." This career syndrome "may encourage parochialism, undue self-satisfaction, a low estimate of the value of other agencies and groups, excessive caution, organizational rigidity, and an intolerance for change."

Cohen identifies an increasing economic consciousness in State, however, and his analysis becomes quite intimate in dealing with intramural dynamics in Foggy Bottom. He says a kind of bureaucratic politics model operates between the global view of the technocrats in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) on the one hand and the "relatively more parochial" political officers in the geographic bureaus. There has been, in Cohen's view, a noticeable shift in the balance recently in EB's favor. This reflects the overall tough posture assumed by the US

*"A Mature America and the Global Social Contract," by Joseph Montville, June, 1977

in international economic relations, the increasing domestic politicization of American international economic policy, and "the belated discovery" by State of just how important economics has become to the conduct of foreign policy. Cohen writes:

What was once a backwater of the Department has become a growing and active glamour spot. Where there had once been a career disincentive to join the "economics cone," economics-oriented Foreign Service officers are moving up the ranks somewhat more quickly than their political colleagues. Ultimate equality has begun to appear: economists are being elevated to the Ambassadorial ranks.

Despite this perceived new strength in the State Department, Cohen still believes international economic policy management suffers from an inevitable bureaucratic rivalry between State and Treasury. He covers the well-known era of the Nixon shocks to our trade relations with Europe, Japan, and Canada, former Treasury Secretary John Connally's bull-in-a-china-shop performance that was so harmful to America's relations with its closest allies, and the less than lovely rivalry between Secretaries Kissinger and Simon.

On top of the competition for influence between two powerful departments Cohen notes the confusion caused by the multiplicity of committees, task forces and interagency groups dealing with specialized economic issues. No one knows how many there are, he says. Treasury listed a total of 58 interagency groups in which its staff took part in 1975.

The book details the various attempts by the White House to establish effective coordination, including the ill-fated Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) set up in 1971 and which the Carter Administration has decided to let die. Cohen says the Presidency has lacked for many years a senior advisor on international economic policy with both clout in dealing with the bureaucracy and substantive economic knowledge. But he also notes the crucial point that the key to implementing a policy system is at the very top.

To deal with the dispersal of economic policy authority in Washington, the alleged lack of domestic sensitivity of State and the perceived excess of domestic sensitivity of Treasury which is unbalanced by foreign policy expertise, Cohen proposes some basic organizational changes worthy of detailed examination.

A New Government Department

To start with, the author proposes the establishment of a Department of International Commercial Policy. This would eliminate what he calls the senseless scattering of responsibilities in the international trade and investment sectors. This new Department would take over all the current trade and investment operational responsibilities in Washington of the State, Treasury, and Commerce Departments.

The new Department of International Commercial Policy would, in Cohen's view, correct the administrative deficiencies caused by today's dispersal of authority. It would manage policy in the areas of imports, exports, and direct investment flows. The author notes that the United States is unique among industrialized countries in not having a single ministry or agency charged with the overall direction of trade policy.

The author justifies combining trade and foreign investment policy by describing their *de facto* linkage. There is first the conceptual reality of trade and foreign investment being the two principal market-oriented phenomena with the common business objective of increasing sales to foreign consumers. There is also a technical link—a significant proportion of US-manufactured exports consist of intracorporate transfers, i.e., within the structures of multinational corporations.

As for the import side, the author says that increasing foreign direct investment in the US will inevitably change the composition and level of US imports, just as US export patterns have been affected by US corporate foreign direct investment. He also sees demands by less developed countries for increased transfers of technology, as well as prospects for tighter host country control over multinational corporations pointing to further longer-term effects by overseas investment on the US export sector.

To critics who might immediately react against the creation of yet another bureaucracy, Cohen notes that virtually all of the requisite parts already exist and are budgeted. A comparison with the new Department of Energy, created out of existing units, comes immediately to mind.

The new Department would have no domestic responsibilities. It could be located in the Commerce or Treasury buildings. Its personnel, budget, supply, library, security, etc., could all be covered by modest increases in the resources of the "host" department. Total personnel "including officials stationed abroad" would be well under 750. Its establishment would mean the end—or rather transformation of—the STR office, but State, Treasury and Commerce, which would undergo sizeable reductions of existing trade and investment staff, would continue to have a role to play in the interagency policy-making process. Furthermore, 10-20 percent of its top professional staff would be seconded from such departments as State, Treasury, Commerce, Labor and Agriculture.

One of two Under Secretaries would supervise multinational trade activities and probably spend most of his or her time negotiating at Geneva. The other would supervise bilateral relations with industrial countries and East-West trade. The department would also manage trade relations with the LDCs. One bureau would oversee policy aspects of international investment issues associated with multinational corporations. It would handle international investment, investment in the US, expropriation problems, boycotts, bribery and corrupt practices issues, technology transfers to LDCs and advice to American businesses with limited foreign investment experience.

For the first time there would be a full-time effort to quantify the effects of international investment. There would be, for example, extensive macro-economic research on international tax policies and on the impact of foreign investment on employment, prices and competition in both host and owner countries. While assuming responsibility for all export activities involving direct contact with the private sector, the new Department would *not* assume any of the overseas economic functions—analysis and

forecasts, and representation to and negotiations with host governments—currently performed by State.

There would be changes in the field, however. Cohen maintains that assistance to businessmen and product promotion are activities too specialized for FSOs "whose career goals and talents typically lie in the finer arts of diplomacy, as well as political and economic reporting and assessment." The Department would staff and direct commercial offices in embassies abroad which would, however, be subject to the overall supervision of the Ambassador. Other significant innovations would be the attachment of the Export-Import Bank and OPIC to the new department as semi-autonomous units.

The Cabinet Committee for International Economic Policy


With the trade and investment policy functions rationalized in a new department, Cohen proceeds to the broader function of executive branch coordination of international economic policy. He would establish a Cabinet Committee for International Economic Policy (CCIEP). Its basic membership would be the President as chairman and, at a minimum, the Secretaries of State, Treasury and International Commercial Policy plus a member of the Council of Economic Advisors. Depending on the issues, the Secretaries of Agriculture, Commerce and Labor and the OMB and NSC chiefs could participate. Meetings would be chaired by the President and held only when needed. The active role of the President who, it must be assumed, accepts the crucial importance of international economic policy, would mark the difference between CCIEP, CIEP and its various feeble predecessor bodies.

The post of Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs would be filled by a prominent, nationally respected professional. He or she would combine a broad substantive knowledge of international constraints and foreign policy objectives. The Assistant would have no operational responsibilities, but would present the President with options and judgments reflecting the appropriate bureaucratic viewpoints.

The Assistant would also be executive secretary of the Cabinet Committee. He would coordinate the activities of five specially created subcommittees, each chaired by a Presidentially designated official of sub-Cabinet rank. The full CCIEP would meet only in crisis situations, where the subcommittees could not reach a consensus, when the President had to give formal approval to an important policy initiative, or for occasional briefing sessions to pull the major strands of US international economic policy together.

An immediate function of the five subcommittees would be the abolition of all task forces. Under the proposed system, lines of responsibility would be clear, an improved system of checks and balances of bureaucratic interests would be achieved, and, no small blessing, fewer interagency meetings would be required.

These are controversial proposals. There is a strong body of opin-



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ion in the bureaucracy that "orderliness" in the management of American international economic policy can never be achieved *per se*. The broad and diverse foreign policy responsibilities of this country will always be in at least occasional conflict with short term domestic economic interests. In this point of view, the establishment of an international trade and investment department would in fact compound the confusion by adding a new party to the already existing collection of competing parties. For reasons cited below, the debate on this issue is bound to intensify.

Relations with Congress

Cohen's study can be faulted in its cursory treatment of the crucial connection between the international economic policy bureaucracy of the executive branch and the Congress which possesses Constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce. He recognizes that rational oversight is limited because members of Congress are traditionally firm in resisting challenges to established, and conflicting, committee jurisdictions—although there have in fact been some significant changes as a result of the Bolling Report in the House and the Stevenson Committee recommendations in the Senate this year. He recommends as much parallel reform in both Houses of Congress as is necessary to work effectively with a restructured executive branch bureaucracy.

There is a limit to how much one should criticize the author for his brief treatment of the Congressional angle, however. Students of international economic policy management tend to agree that it is up to the executive branch to get itself together first so that the Congress knows how to organize itself for proper and effective oversight.

There has been a start in the right direction on the Hill, however. The 1976 Hamilton Subcommittee report entitled "Congress and Foreign Policy," emphasized the importance of international economic policy as a fundamental aspect of foreign policy. The first of its 17 recommendations was that:

Both Houses of Congress should reform committee structures, streamline jurisdictions and improve intercommittee coordination on foreign policy issues. The foreign affairs committees of both Houses should have overall responsibility in coordinating the foreign policy activities of Congress. The practice of using sequential or concurrent referral of the most important legislation affecting foreign relations to the foreign affairs committees of both Houses should be established.

In the fourth recommendation, the Report calls on both the legislative and executive branches to organize themselves to handle the "many pressing economic issues confronting the Nation."

The significance of these recommendations is that some members of Congress see the connection between soybean exports and atomic bombs and that they believe the US Government as a whole must have the institutional capacity to see the connection.

—JOSEPH V. MONTVILLE

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Foreign Service People

Marriage

LeCaignec-Cariddi. Marylise LeCaignec was married to Alan Cariddi, son of FSO-ret. and Mrs. Charles A. Cariddi, on October 22, in Lorient, France.

Deaths

Elliston. Thomas R. Elliston, FSIO-retired, died on October 20, in Lima, Peru. A former Washington newspaperman, Mr. Elliston joined the State Department in 1951 and transferred to USIA in 1953, serving at London and in Vietnam. He received the Meritorious Honor Award in 1968 for his reporting of the Tet offensive and the Superior Honor Award in 1976 for unusually imaginative and effective election year programs. He is survived by his wife, Gisela, a stepdaughter, Michelle, of the home in Lima, Peru, three daughters, Judy Anne Coughlin, Aldie, Va., Mary Lynn Elliston, Arlington, Margaret Smiraglia, Oakton, a son, Harold T., Oakton, a brother, Warren, of Houston, and his mother, Frances Elliston, of Washington.

Mathews. Elbert G. Mathews, retired Ambassador, died on October 31, in Washington. Ambassador Mathews entered the Foreign Service in 1935 and served at Kabul, Istanbul, Oslo and as Ambassador to Liberia and Nigeria before his retirement in 1972. He was promoted to the rank of Career Minister in 1961. A life member of the American Foreign Service Association, Ambassador Mathews had served on the Governing Board of AFSA several times. He was also President of the State Department Federal Credit Union from 1972-1977; Corresponding Secretary of the Advisory Panel and Trustee of the World Population Society; member of the Board of DACOR and member of the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs. He is survived by his wife, Naomi M., 3257 O Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007. A memorial contribution may be made to any charity of the individual's choice.

Rawson. Viola Mae Rawson, wife of FSO David Rawson, died on June 29, following a car accident near Marion, Ohio. The Rawson family was on annual leave from assignment in Bamako. In addition to her husband, Mrs. Rawson is survived by two children, Christina and Jonathan, her parents, Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Mosher, Cardington, Ohio, three sisters and three brothers. A memorial to Viola Mac Rawson has been established at the Gilead Friends Church, Mt. Gilead, Ohio 43338.

Tenney. E. Paul Tenney, FSO-retired, died on October 15, at Stuart, Florida. He is survived by his wife, Louise, 3744 S.E. Old St., Lucie Blvd., Stuart, Florida, 33494, three sons and two grandchildren.

Young. Walter C. Young, FSO-retired, died on July 3, in Florida. Mr. Young joined the State Department in 1950 and served at Frankfort, Addis Ababa, Naples, Montevideo, Mogadiscio and Canberra, before his retirement in 1963. He is survived by his wife, Eunice, 2171 N.E. 66th St., Apt. 831, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida 33308.

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PANAMA

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may intervene. They need it to show to their Congress; in order to tell their Congress: 'Look, we are turning the canal over to the Panamanians, but we still have the right to watch over them so they behave.' That is the truth. It is a question of internal policy. They (The United States) are solving an internal problem regarding a Congress that is largely opposed to these negotiations . . ."

Later, Carlos Lopez Guevara, a member of the Panamanian negotiating team, was to complain privately to US diplomats and publicly about how Carter Administration officials were interpreting the neutrality pact in testimony before Congress.

Lopez was said to be "disturbed" by Vance's testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee suggesting that the neutrality pact gave US warships the right to "go to the head of the line" in time of emergency and permitted the United States to take any steps necessary, including the use of military force, to keep the canal neutral after it passes to Panamanian control at the end of the century.

Lopez was reported to have told US diplomats in Panama that Panamanian negotiators had tentatively agreed to "preferential" treatment for US warships using the canal. However, he added, "this was specifically rejected" by Panama at a later session and the word "expeditious" was substituted for "preferential."

Lopez also rejected the US right to intervene militarily to keep the canal open and neutral. "Intervention is simply forbidden by international law," he was quoted as saying. "Panama cannot agree to the right of the US to intervene."

In a subsequent nationally televised interview in Panama, Lopez said the new treaties grant the United States the primary right to protect and defend the canal until December 31, 1999. But, he said, that will change after 2000 "because, in order to act in the same way unilaterally without consulting Panama on the defense of the canal, the United States would need to have an article with language to that effect . . . Neither that language nor that article exists and, as a result, that right doesn't exist."

It has become obvious that the conflicting interpretations will have to be reconciled to the satisfaction of a skeptical United States Senate before there can be any hope of mustering the required two-thirds vote needed for ratification. If the process of clarification also means renegotiation, the treaties are in serious trouble.

Panamanian nationalism will not permit further concessions on the issue without jeopardizing Torrijos's ability to retain power. Torrijos himself has been quoted as saying that "the negotiations are over. The treaties have been signed. I am not interested in what is said."

The tactic of the negotiators was evident: treaty language vague enough for a flexibility of interpretation but specific enough to ease reservations about the treaties in both countries. The dilemma is that they can't have it both ways.

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THE KATERINA S.

from page 23

Panamanians whose interest level, never high, had reached zero, and not by the Greek owners who had, in effect, disowned the ship forever as the crew began to desert, harbor fees mounted, and the passage of time carried its scrap value to new lows.

The hunt went on. Weeks and then months went by, punctuated by monsoons, Marxist and Trotskyite strikes, joined now and then by Socialists and wildcat walkouts.

Crate after crate was taken from the foul dank hold. Crate after crate was opened. We were treated to a view of hundreds of thousands of cakes of evil-smelling, Eastern European soap, tens of thousands of glass chimneys for the oil lamps of North Vietnam, and an uncountable number of rolls of rough, Eastern European toilet paper. But not one mortar, not one machine gun, not one rifle, not one bullet appeared to ease our minds.

At the Embassy, we waited, hoping against hope that a case of hand grenades, one case of anything imaginably lethal, would emerge from this ghastly vessel, but we had no luck. To boot, its simian master was reliably reported to be spending his time—and God knows whose money—in Colombo's sleazier bars, laughing hard at American stupidity and incompetence, surrounded by a widening circle of Ceylonese admirers.

The captain's cargo was mouldering on Colombo's steamy docks, his ship was flaking its corroded, iron plates into the harbor, his crew had vanished, but for months he lingered on. Eventually he, too, disappeared. (The gossip was that he had been offered a small fortune to skipper a gold-smuggling Arab dhow between South India and the Trucial Oman.)

His tributes to American stupidity and incompetence were echoed in that important part of Ceylon's press ever alert to our foreign misfortunes, shortcomings, and wayward policies. The Embassy absorbed it all with no real alarm. (A strong belief in transigence not only sustains, but can often be the backbone of the Foreign Service.)

Nonetheless, there remained tantalizing questions. From within our immediate orbit, how did the *Katerina S.* steam all the way nonstop from Aden to Colombo? From a more distant galaxy, how and why did some faraway agent of unknown nationality, race, color, and creed send this minor burlesque onto our stage?

The American posts which played an active role were, of course, in time given a pat on the back by the State Department. It was something to the effect "if we didn't get 'em this time, at least it showed 'em we were weren't foolin'."

When I left Colombo for another assignment early in May of 1957, the *Katerina S.* still festered in the harbor, deserted by crew, master, and owners. For all I know, she is still there, a moldy symbol of false rumor and the iron, rusty will of John Foster Dulles.

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REPEATING OURSELVES

from page 17

Some Conclusions

Conclusion One: America must believe in the war it is fighting. The war must embody an ideal. There is an idealistic—almost visionary—streak that runs through the American democratic experience. In a war, America as a democracy can therefore never stray very far from its avowed ideals, as expressed most cogently in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, without creating opposition. For a war to have the support of the American people, the American people must believe it is a just war in keeping with their democratic ideals of justice, fair play, independence and freedom.

Conclusion Two: Any *long* war of a *limited* nature will create dissent and opposition in America unless the war is (1) completely in keeping with our expressed ideals and/or (2) so obviously in our national interest as to be incontrovertible.

Conclusion Three: The American public will support a *short*, quick, victorious war, even though it may not be in keeping with our ideals nor completely in our national interest, provided the war is, in fact, *short*. Dissent takes time to consolidate. The Spanish-American War was basically popular at first because it was short, quick, idealistic and victorious: only when Dewey's victory in Manila led to an extended, doubtful insurgent war of attrition did opposition consolidate.

Conclusion Four: In a democracy like America, a long, limited war not indisputably in keeping with our national ideals and interests will at some point become a political issue along party lines, as did the Philippine Insurrection in the election of 1900 and the Vietnam War in the elections of 1968 and 1972. Bipartisan support is not likely in a long, limited war; on the contrary, the war is likely to become enmeshed in domestic politics, creating another divisive element beside that of non-party dissent.

Conclusion Five: An insurgency using guerrilla tactics with its reliance on terror will tempt the counter-insurgent to use like tactics in retaliation. Atrocities are almost bound to ensue unless the strictest military discipline is practiced beginning at the highest level and reiterated at each lower echelon down to the common soldier. For a democracy to use terror as a counter-insurgency technique would seem to raise doubts on two counts: (1) the tactics will become public knowledge in a free society and opposition to them is almost bound to develop, and (2) such techniques will probably alienate the local population whose support is needed if the insurgent is to be defeated.

Conclusion Six: Where American troops commit atrocities, the military must be its own harshest judge if it is to foreclose criticism. The Samar and Mylai incidents would seem to indicate that reacting only under pressure of public opinion is self-defeating. If the military is to survive a long, limited war with its reputation untarnished, it must be above reproach. The rule is crucial

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


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in the case of atrocities but is equally applicable to other issues as well. Where the military is given self-regulating powers, it should in fact regulate itself without the compulsion of outside pressure or public opinion.

Conclusion Seven: In a free society, where freedom of the press is enshrined in the Constitution, Government antagonism towards the press serves no purpose. A policy of outright candor, short of giving away vital military secrets, is the best policy for the Government to follow.

Conclusion Eight: In a long, limited war, a reliance on professional soldiers rather than on draftees or volunteers will lessen opposition on the home front, though it will not quell dissent entirely.

Conclusion Nine: America lives in the present. It is a "Now Nation" disinclined to dwell on the past. There is very little historical input into decision-making.

A Summation

In the final analysis, the bedrock issue in both the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War revolved around the question of just how deeply involved America should get into another nation's internal affairs. Were both the Philippine Insurrection and the Victnam War examples of American "over-involvement?" Could American foreign policy objectives have been achieved through less direct involvement? George F. Kennan, one of the keenest intellects in the field of American foreign affairs, seems to think so.

In commenting on American foreign policy following the Spanish-American War, Kennan writes: ". . . the ruling of distant peoples is not our dish . . . there are many things we Americans should beware of, and among them is the acceptance of any sort of a paternalistic responsibility to anyone."

In the same vein, Kennan makes a further incisive observation relevant to America's involvement in the Orient when in 1950—long before the American intervention in Vietnam—he wrote: "What is saddest of all is that the relationship between past and present seems to be visible to so few people. For if we are not to learn from our own mistakes, where shall we learn at all?"

In light of the links connecting the Philippine Insurrection with the Vietnam War—links that should have been there for all to see—the question is still worth pondering.

Hegel, the great German philosopher, once wrote, "Peoples and governments never have learned anything from history, or acted on principles deduced from it." The American inability to learn from its experience in the Philippine Insurrection would seem to confirm Hegel's thesis. The American experience in the Philippines was almost forgotten by the time the United States plunged into Vietnam. Yet the historical similarities between the two events are downright uncanny, so much so that one is tempted to cite the Philippine Insurrection and the Vietnam War as ineluctable proof of Santayana's dictum that those nations that do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it.

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TARGETING FOREIGN AID

from page 20


given to the design of development strategies which seek to maximize both types of rights for the largest numbers of people, the poor-targeted approach, emphasizing rural development, small farmers, and decentralized decision-making structures, is capable of hitting two birds with one stone. In addition to ensuring that the neediest people are in fact the recipients of foreign aid, this more activist approach enables the aid donor to be a positive force in the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights. The present AID effort to involve Third World women in the development process is illustrative of the possibilities for human rights in this direction. Other initiatives could include drives to help the rural and urban poor gain effective access to rights and protections provided under law and in development programs. The role of public interest law as an instrument for economic and social development in the Third World is a new frontier that has not yet been explored.

In addition to the debate on the linkage of human rights and foreign aid, there is a ramifying set of issues affecting poor-targeting that falls under the domestic-politics heading. These issues include not only the influences of such actors as interest groups, the Congress, and congressional-executive relations, but the interaction of different perceptions, drives, styles, priorities, and agency interests within the Executive—i.e. bureaucratic politics. For instance, what is the impact of the congressional constituencies connection in this sphere? The conventional wisdom is that the constituency for aid has splintered and eroded. A minority view has been that the need to obtain consent for external assistance has been vastly overrated and that in most congressional constituencies, it is essentially a tertiary issue over which no congressman ever won or lost his seat. Therefore, this view holds that it is an issue of exceptional congressional discretion (individually), subject to a considerable measure of presidential leadership. However, if the latter interpretation has any foundation, how much has it depended on a baseline acquiescence on the part of key group and interest leaders?

There is the critical bureaucratic politics question: What are the relevant comparative stances among such actors within the Executive as AID, State, Treasury, Commerce, Labor, and Agriculture? Ironically, the need for an integrated approach to foreign aid is as acute a problem for the donor within the matrix of its governmental organization as it is out in the developmental milieu of the host country. Clearly, in order to assist the recipient country more effectively, and in order to cooperate more fully with other concerned donors, the actors involved in the mechanics of foreign aid must *a priori* be working synergistically.

New policy options are needed regarding the organization and coordination of foreign economic policy and the appropriate organizational and procedural arrangements for poor-targeted assistance.

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As they are formulated these options will probably share the starting assumption that the present US Government posture vis-à-vis poor-targeted assistance requires greater policy *cum* organization foci. It is evident that there is some indecision as to who the principal actors are in the foreign economic domain. This was highlighted by the rampant confusion in the US delegation to the World Employment Conference in June 1976, where the central topic of discussion was a basic needs strategy that could achieve certain minimum standards of living prior to the end of this century. The absence of coordination at the international forums is indicative of the failure of the extant organizational structure to deal in a systematic and comprehensive manner with the Third World.

Complexity generates the need for coordination. Like policy, complexity has to be managed if it is to be coordinated. The cumbersome amount of paperwork generated by AID to initiate development projects exemplifies one minor facet of bureaucratic complexity. The time span between the completion of a Project Identification Document (PID) through the intensive review stage when a Project Review Paper (PRP) must be filed to the preparation of the Project Paper (PP), in the final stage, can take anywhere from six months to several years. In the meantime, government officials and villagers in the recipient country may have played host to team after team of foreign experts without seeing a shovel to dig the promised wells for an irrigation project.

In addition to streamlining where possible, there is a need for greater flexibility. Flexibility is not a bureaucratic panacea. However, in the business of foreign aid, an open outlook and a malleable bureaucracy are vital. The more foreign aid is pigeonholed, the more difficult it becomes to align the aid with the intricacies of the development milieu. Not only does this increase the complexity threshold of the development program but it can also result in a pipeline scenario, with aid being backlogged into obsolescence. Inflexibility invites sloughing over country-specific variables and considerations that often, in particular cases, are more important than the generalizable factors.

Despite the fact that the United States has extended succor to the poor and the disaster-stricken for a number of decades, Hans Morgenthau asserts that it has yet to develop an intelligible "theory of foreign aid." This criticism bears witness to the uncertainty and continuous change in conditions and goals that characterize the foreign aid effort and the world it must contextually mirror. The poor-targeted assistance strategy is still evolving but its guiding tenets show it to be an eloquent and humanitarian gesture of concern for the plight of others. With time, the many questions that this new approach has raised will receive definite answers, and maybe, in the process, some of the millions of our fellow humans who are now crippled by poverty can be helped to conquer their affliction.

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If you thought there were fewer career officers serving in top Departmental positions under the Carter Administration, you were right. This is the conclusion of the AFSA Committee on Presidential Appointments which has just completed a study of who is assigned to top-level positions in the Department.* The Committee's report, which follows, found that a smaller percentage of FSOs have been selected for presidential-appointment-level jobs in this administration than in any previous administration since the end of the 1940s.

Lowest FSO Share Under Vance

Excluding the Secretary of State, there are currently 22 presidential appointees serving in the Department, and only six, or 27 percent, are FSOs. During 1974, the initial year of Secretary Kissinger's term, the numbers were almost reversed. Twelve of 21 presidential appointees, or 57 percent, were career officers. Under seven secretaries of state in office since 1949, the average for career officers serving in their initial year has been 48 percent. The highest level was in 1949 when Dean Acheson had 60 percent career officers. Table 1 provides detailed statistics.

TABLE 1
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES SERVING IN THE DEPARTMENT IN SELECTED YEARS

SECRETARY	YEAR	CAREER	NON-CAREER	% CAREER
Acheson	1949	9	6	60
Dulles	1953	7	8	47
Herter	1959	9	7	56
Rusk	1961	6	13	32
Rogers	1969	11	9	55
Kissinger	1974	12	9	57
Vance	1977	6	16	27

Another way of looking at this question is to compare all appointments during a president's tour, rather than simply the initial round or the first year of a new secretary of state. Beginning with FDR's inauguration, the statistics (see Table 2 for details) indicate that Gerald Ford named the largest share of career officers (72 percent) during his term. Richard Nixon was second with 56 percent and Dwight Eisenhower third with 53 percent. President Kennedy named the smallest share with 29 percent. So far, President Carter has appointed only 16 percent career officers, but three holdovers are not counted in the data, and of course his term is not over.

TABLE 2
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS TO THE DEPARTMENT, TOTAL 1933-77

PRESIDENT	CAREER	NON-CAREER	% CAREER
Roosevelt	12	13	48
Truman	13	26	33
Eisenhower	26	23	53
Kennedy	9	22	29
Johnson	13	19	41
Nixon	25	20	56
Ford	13	5	72
Carter	3	16	16

Conclusions from the Statistics

A number of interesting, and possibly surprising conclusions emerge from the statistics:

1. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there is not too much change between the initial round of non-career appointments and those for the entire presidential term. The number of career officers increases in second terms, but by less than is often assumed.

2. Republican Presidents have drawn more heavily on the career service for top departmental positions than have Democrats.

3. There is little correlation between a President's appointments in the Department and his ambassadorial nominations. With a few exceptions, departmental appointments have not been for patronage purposes. In contrast, substantial numbers of ambassadors have been and continue to be appointed for such purposes.

4. The number of presidential appointees in the Department has steadily increased: 8 in 1933, 15 in 1950, and 22 in 1977.

For the past twenty years, the top position held by a career officer has been the Department's No. 3 job, the undersecretary for political affairs, while the No. 2 position, the deputy secretary, has been a political appointee. However, under Franklin Roosevelt the No. 2 position, then the Under Secretary, was generally a career officer.

In contrast to the political undersecretary, the economic counterpart has always been a political appointee. The top management position has varied between career and non-career appointees. Regional assistant secretaries, except under Presidents Kennedy and Carter, have primarily been career officers. At present three of the six regional assistant secretaries are non-career appointees, as in the Kennedy presidency.

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LETTERS TO FSJ

Recruiting Inducement?

Ms. Nixon's letter in the October *FSJ* ("Mandatory Retirement—Con") has, perhaps unwittingly yet very cogently, spelled out precisely one of the stronger objections to extension of the retirement age in the Foreign Service context. She proposes—and this is undoubtedly precisely what will happen—that those undergoing the health and other problems of age be assigned not only to Washington but to Western Europe, Canada, Australia, and the like. Fine for them, to be sure—guarantees of the comfortable, pleasant, safe, and healthy posts. And equally, a guarantee of the dangerous, unhealthy, miserable posts to the under-60s who by definition are also those in the lower pay grades as well. Unrelieved hardship posts for the first 35 years: a splendid recruiting and retention inducement, no?

RICHARD S. DAWSON, JR.
Mexico City

Retirement Enjoyment

As I am one of the survivors of the period in 1945-46 when the Foreign Service Act was being drafted, perhaps some readers would be interested in hearing why it was decided to provide for early retirement and selection out in that legislation. The group in the Office of Foreign Service, heading up under Selden Chapin, Julian Harrington, Alan Steyne and Andrew Foster, felt that there was just too much accumulated dead wood in the Service under the old system, not just blocking promotions for able younger officers but cluttering up assignments as well; for senior officers in many cases were too rigid mentally and socially and too backward-looking to be effective leaders for the new postwar Foreign Service.

Chapin was one of those who was particularly concerned. He asked Walton Ferris in the old Division of Foreign Service Personnel (FP) to study personnel records and try to identify the sub-standard officers who should be weeded out. Ferris did this and identified a considerable number of such officers —at least a score or more. Charges of incompetence were brought against these men preparatory to legal dismissal, but in just about every case they were able to line up enough political support for themselves to hold on. Yet their records, many of which I had occasion to review later on when selecting candidates for senior training assignments, were truly dreadful. These men constituted a solid block at the bottoms of Class 2, Class 3 and Class 4 and were known as "Ferris cases." They did tremendous harm to the Service, giving it an "old fogy" reputation; and they mistrained and wrecked the morale of many promising younger officers.

If we couldn't get rid of such liabilities by existing legal procedures, we reasoned, at least in the new legislation we could make sure that we wouldn't accumulate such cases in the future. We had no trouble agreeing on the principle of selection out, but as I remember, we argued long and hard over the mandatory retirement age of 60. Certainly there were some excellent officers in their 60s at that period, and we hated to see them retired while still able to render superior service. But there were also some occupying senior positions who were a real liability. And we eventually decided that, on balance, we were best off to make 60 the mandatory retirement age for all who had not reached the grade of Career Minister. I favored this decision, for I had just completed a six-months survey tour of some 18 embassies and consulates, personally interviewing about 300 FSOs. What I learned in the course of this tour convinced me that a good many officers stopped learning and adjusting as they reached senior years, and after 60 were likely to be placement problems.

Later on, in 1968, the calendar caught up with me personally, and I was retired at 60 just when I was working with the Policy Planning Council and writing long-range think-pieces about preparing for the 21st century. But while I think I was still creative at 60, and even that I have remained so, I have never for one minute regretted early retirement, for the last ten years have been the most intellectually exciting of my life. I am inclined to think that if a man is so limited in his interests that the only thing he wants to do at 60 is to stay on in the Foreign Service, maybe he is just the kind who should be getting out and starting a new career.

Let me conclude by saying that I am truly appalled at the court decision disapproving mandatory retirement at 60 or earlier. I hope that the Department and the Foreign Service Association will fight this one with all possible vigor. If we have senior officers too valuable to be spared, we should promote them to Career Minister rank; but others, however reluctantly, we should retire. I am a strong believer in keeping the Service young, vigorous, imaginative, adaptable, and above all future-minded, with eyes fixed on the national and world problems of ten to thirty years ahead.

FRANK SNOWDEN HOPKINS.
Washington

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
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