



# FSJ

**FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL**

**OCTOBER 1978**

**75 CENTS**

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by Charles Maechling, Jr.

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
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ISSN 0015-7279



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The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the official views of the Department of State, the United States Information Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

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For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); \$7.50; two years, \$12.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add \$1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Articles appearing in this journal are abstracted and indexed in *Historical Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

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Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional post office.

## UNCOLA . . .

We accept that the Department may have been required to eliminate shelter and utilities from the COLA calculations, since federal employees overseas already receive housing, or housing allowances. And we welcome the rise from \$20,000 to \$50,000 in the base salary for COLA comparison which enables higher-paid employees to receive take-home pay comparable to counterparts in the United States.

But taken together, these changes have a regressive impact on federal employees at COLA posts overseas, benefiting those making more than \$32,000 and disadvantaging those making less. And the Department of State, acting for all federal agencies with overseas employees, has insisted on implementing the changes in one fell swoop on August 27, with no effort to "grandfather" or phase-in the changes along with pay increases, as the federal government normally does with adverse changes which are not the fault of the affected employees.

Nor has management yet implemented, with the money it saves from the COLA recomputation, any employee benefit proposals recommended by the same Interagency Committee on Allowances which recommended the COLA changes.

AFSA is particularly disappointed with the way management has dealt with us on this problem. Rather than exploring seriously the possibilities suggested by AFSA in our July 12 letter of easing the adverse impact of the COLA changes, management stalled for nearly a month, then stonewalled in its August 10 response. Finally, as the August 27 implementation date approached, management claimed it could not delay the effective date because the Defense Department's computers had already been programmed more than a month previously for the new changes. Machines triumph over man.

## . . . and the Pay Raise

There is an implicit contract between us federal employees and our employer, the government. We don't get to bargain over wages or to strike, but they are supposed to pay us comparably to the private-sector. This 5.5% across the board annual pay raise breaks that implicit contract. It is less than the 8 percent which the Administration concedes is justified to maintain pay comparability and less than the current 9 percent annual rate of inflation. All of us who work for the government can properly feel a glow of patriotism at work; we are making our country a free gift of some of our labor.

If federal employee pay restraint really helped limit private-sector pay increases, stop inflation, and protect the dollar, we could probably live with it. We are accustomed to asking not what our country can do for us, but what we can do for our country. But the 5.5 percent pay cap has not encouraged moderation on pay claims or slowed inflation. And we know perhaps as well as any group of Americans that it has not stopped the plunge of the dollar.

Ironically, the impact of the pay raise is progressive, in contrast to the regressive impact of the COLA changes. The 5.5 percent across-the-board increase means that the higher your grade, the farther behind your private sector

counterparts you are falling. In fact, this year, no one's salary is being increased beyond \$47,500, where it has been frozen since February 1977.

In the Department the only exception to the executive-level freeze has happened through the decision, in the FY 1979 Foreign Relations Act, to reclassify the Deputy Under Secretary for Management position, presently Executive Level II with a salary of \$50,000, to Under Secretary for Management, an Executive Level III position with a salary of \$52,500. This will enable the incumbent (who need not be reconfirmed as a result of this change) to compensate at least partially for the ravages of inflation.

Congratulations, Ben. Enjoy.

## MEMBERSHIP

On pp. 52 and 53 of this edition, we report the action being taken by the AFSA Governing Board in response to last spring's survey of our internal operations by two Retired Members who are former Foreign Service Inspectors. The survey, much like an inspection report, was gloomy about AFSA's ability to satisfy all its constituencies, perform its employee and professional role, and still balance its budget.

Taking the report seriously, the Governing Board has adopted a balanced General Fund budget for the fiscal year which began in July. The budget assumes continuation of Membership and AFSA services at current levels. But we've taken additional measures to increase income efficiency:

- a drive aimed at increasing Membership to 7,000;
- measures to enable the Foreign Service Club and the *Journal* not only to pay their direct costs, but also contribute to overhead operation and building occupancy costs;
- appraisal of the current value of the AFSA headquarters building, and consideration of partial rental or sale of the building;
- negotiations with management to improve AFSA's ability to use official facilities to communicate with and represent Foreign Service employees;
- more effective use of volunteers on matters such as Congressional liaison to forestall the need to hire an additional employee for that purpose.

The more we look at our operations, the more exasperated we become about Foreign Service people who benefit from AFSA's efforts as exclusive employee representative but who are unwilling to share the costs—from \$1.50 to 22.50, which is tax deductible, per pay period per person—of continuing these efforts.

Executive Order 11636 requires that we represent equally in our collective dealings with management all members of the bargaining unit, whether or not they are AFSA Members; and prohibits us from coercing anyone to join AFSA. But when we can distinguish between paying Members and non-paying non-Members, we are determined to do so; our decision not to represent non-Members before the Grievance Board is an initial step.

We have sent Membership solicitation materials to virtually all non-Member Foreign Service employees. We urge all AFSA Members, in conjunction with AFSA Chapters and Keypersons, to follow up with personal visits to individual non-Members.

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# Memories are made of this, but **NOT MEMOIRS**

S. I. NADLER

## Two: Rates of (Cultural) Exchange

During the era of colonialism, the countries of the western world concerned themselves little with the cultures of those over whom they established dominion. Taboos were duly noted, as were any unique values held by a society, to render more efficient the process of governing. The military demands of World War II changed this relationship, and the political realities of the post-war years rendered that change irreversible. Colonies became sovereign nations, diplomatic equals of the great powers and each with a vote in the United Nations. Understanding the cultures of these "new" countries became a matter of overriding importance. Efforts to achieve this understanding, on more or less a crash basis, ranged from laudable to ludicrous, results from spectacularly successful to downright counter-productive. It was heady stuff while it lasted.

In his classic *Mirror for Man*, anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn wrote: "Culture is like a map . . . If a map is


accurate and you can read it, you won't get lost. If you know a culture you will know your way around in the life of a society." This was taken as gospel, but the qualifying *ifs* tended to be overlooked. There is no equivalent of the AAA to provide members with handy-dandy cultural Triptiks through assorted societies.

Jawaharlal Nehru re-stated the Kluckhohn thesis, in *Visit to America*, observing, "If we seek to understand a people, we have to try to put ourselves, as far as we can, in that particular historical and cultural background." He cautioned, however, that it "is not easy for a person of one country to enter into the background of another country." He understated the case. In the 1950s and 1960s, we learned that just about the only way to enter into the background of another country is to be born and grow up there.

Other approaches to the problem are considerably more feasible, but less reliable. Even the best of students, after completing the best of language and area studies, finds that there remain gaps in his understanding of

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
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another culture. Too often, he tries to handle this by filling in with bits and pieces from his own culture, and the transplant is rejected. I recall an incident in Buenos Aires.

My tour in Argentina coincided with the rapid spread of television in that country. Local programming was unable to fill available air time on the increasing number of channels, and, as elsewhere on the continent, US television shows were imported, via Mexico City (where they were dubbed into Spanish). At a reception one evening, an Argentine lady cornered me and informed me, with feeling, "I have five children and a television set at home, and your North American programs. . ."

I interrupted: "We also have children, and they also watch our television shows, but we don't worry, because studies show that children are not really affected by violence on TV, and. . ."

Now, she interrupted me: "Who's talking about violence?" With a mix of equal parts anger and despair, she lamented: "My kids are starting to talk with a Mexican accent!"

Sometimes, one encounters a situation in another culture so alien to one's own experience that it can be frightening, or funny, or both. In Tientsin, in 1947, the consul general's wife decreed that all government-owned houses would be redecorated. In the case of the one we occupied, this included a complete redesign of the living room, with the ceiling to be lowered, existing lights removed, and indirect lighting installed. As the work neared completion, I noticed that, in addition to the switch to turn on the indirect lighting, there was a second switch. I asked the Chinese contractor about it.

He pointed to where a pair of wall lights had once been and said, "It's for them."

Beginning to feel foolish, I said, "But they've been removed."

"Yes," he replied, patiently, "and that's why there are no wires connected to this switch."

On occasion, one gets lucky and is shown a short cut. A British colleague in Singapore once imparted to me, in a single sentence, what a cultural anthropologist would assuredly have taken a complete chapter to describe about a certain Anglo-American societal difference, one which helps explain a lot of others. "I would never trust a fellow Englishman," he said, "who called me by my first name a half-hour after our introduction to each other." After a moment's thought, he added, "Or an American who did not."

Soon, this matter will be of interest only to historians and nostalgia buffs. Cultural differences among peoples are disappearing. The decline of indigenous crafts coupled with the emergence of the indiscipline known as airport art, the mushrooming of hyphenated Hiltons in deserts, jungles, and ancient centers of civilization, and the cancerous spread of fast-food emporia around the globe are symptoms. The causes include American movies, Japanese transistor radios, television, and jet aircraft which spew forth tourists by the hundreds per plane wherever landings can be made.

Even as the unisex approach to attire and to hair and life styles has metamorphosed the sexual landscape, so the homogenization of cultures is transforming the arena of international relations. There may be a relation between the two phenomena. In any event, another battle cry may be added to the list of those which did not work: *Vive la difference!*



# TWO POPES OF ROME

J. GRAHAM PARSONS

Prompted and saddened by the death of Paul VI, memories come flooding back of the Vatican in 1947 and 1948. The United States had, and has, no diplomatic relations with the Vatican government, but President Franklin Roosevelt had appointed a personal representa-

*J. Graham Parsons is a Stockbridge resident and retired Foreign Service officer who served as ambassador at several posts and as an assistant secretary of state.  
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tive to Pius XII before World War II to help in preserving peace. An assistant to the personal representative still resided there after the war, thus providing a contact. This happened to be me.

At that time Monsignor Montini—the future Paul VI—was an undersecretary of the Papal Secretariat of State under Pius XII, who had no secretary of state. The occasion of my first meeting with the monsignor was at a time which he set aside each week to receive foreign

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ambassadors and ministers. I was neither, merely a young Foreign Service officer in an ambiguous situation calling to pay my respects. As a non-Catholic, I knew little then of the Church of Rome nor of its extraordinary government.

Speaking in the same thick Italian accent now so familiar to all who have heard Paul VI, Montini put me at my ease, politely saying that he hoped I would come to see him often. Then, further confirming the Vatican's interest in the United States, he added that as we had no diplomatic relations, I should feel free to come whenever I wished, either on the day set aside for ambassadors or the one for ministers. This was a privilege I came to use freely.

It was not long before I became aware of the extraordinary role of Monsignor Montini, the most influential of the pope's subordinates in foreign affairs. Akin to Pius XII in temperament, outlook and background, he was already being spoken of as "papabile," a possible future pope.

The most devastating, the most godless, war in history had ended less than two years before. The Iron Curtain had already descended, isolating Eastern Europe under the materialistic—and atheistic—grip of the Soviet Union while most of Western Europe lay prostrate, divided and torn between hope and fear. Clearly, a catalyst was needed: leadership to redeem the victory over the Nazis and to set the world again on a path more worthy of the human spirit. It became apparent that the Vatican considered only the United States capable of providing the

spark which would ignite the forces of rehabilitation and recovery.

Accordingly, when the Marshall Plan was proposed, it was recognized—tacitly but unmistakably—as that spark. When senators and congressmen began to come in droves to Europe to see for themselves, to prepare for the decision which would commit the United States to a momentous role, Pius XII sent word that any who wished to see him could do so even on short notice. No less than 17 groups of our legislators were received in audience, either in the pope's private office or at Castel Gandolfo, where Paul VI died Sunday. Each of these groups listened to a brief "allocution" typed by the pope on his small white portable and alluding to the importance, the necessity, of hope, faith and recovery from the War.

There can be no doubt that the future Paul VI was as deeply concerned and involved as Pius XII. Both sought to aid in bringing to fruition what was on the one hand a great humanitarian endeavor, wholly compatible with the interests of the church of Rome, and on the other hand, a farsighted foreign affairs initiative, wholly compatible with the interests of the United States. While never permitting anyone to forget the primacy of their spiritual role, both men were thus engaged in practical diplomacy to further the end they considered vital.

I felt then as I do now, that in temporal matters, the Vatican brought to bear a perspective not often possible for national governments. Conscious of the 2,000-year history of the church and detached from most mate-



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rial concerns, Pius XII and Paul VI could and did take the long view, could set aside short-term maneuvers and considerations as relatively unimportant, could adhere to principle over expediency and work always for the primacy of reason over force. In so doing both had a unique role in world affairs at a crucial moment in history. Foreign Service people by reason of their calling have occasion to observe directly many of the world's leaders; these two rest indelibly and pre-eminently in my memory.

To others more qualified remains the appraisal of these two popes in their pastoral leadership. I would make but one comment. Already one reads opinions as to whether Paul VI, like Pius XII before him, was too "conservative," not enough open to "liberal" change, not sufficiently "reformist" following John XXIII. All this is, of course, legitimate; but, remembering that at the Vatican the accumulated lessons of two millennia were in the consciousness of its leaders and that they were taught to believe (and did believe) in terms of eternal rather than limited verities, I do not think that the application of such political terms as "conservative" or "liberal" matters much.

Imbued with the long history of the Church of Rome, through good periods and bad, these two men would remain rooted in faith and principle, aware that what is thought outrageously conservative or liberal today will in the fullness of time appear differently, given the essentially unchanging nature of man. Meanwhile, they persevered in their great mission as they were given to see it.

### A Shepherd of Afghanistan

When the village fires are warm, gray ash,  
and the evening prayers are through—  
down from the hills in his tattered robes—  
comes the shepherd boy playing his flute.

When the charpoys are laid for the long night's rest  
and the children are tucked away,  
and the proud minarets are tall dark silhouettes;  
then the shepherd boy comes to play.

The tune that he plays brings joy to the heart  
and hope for the coming days;  
for the villagers know that in spite of their woe  
they will welcome his song with praise!

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# The American Intellectual in Foreign Policy

CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

Only in recent times has the American intellectual, in the academic or scholarly sense, been regarded as having a legitimate role in statecraft or diplomacy. As recently as thirty years ago the career of a Henry Kissinger would have been unthinkable, not only because of his refugee background. Specialist or technical adviser, yes—perhaps even, as in the case of historians or men of letters, a few years of dignified retirement as ambassador in some tranquil foreign capital. But not principal national security adviser to the president or secretary of state.

Today, the pendulum has swung to the opposite extreme. At every level of the United States foreign affairs establishment—State Department, Defense Department, Central Intelligence Agency—the intellectual exercises an influential role, sometimes acting in the capacity of consultant, sometimes settling in for a prolonged period of government service after an initial career in a university or think tank. In no other country except the United States has the career government servant, and military officer, been ousted from primacy as planner and policymaker in the

field of foreign affairs by a class immune from career pressures and too often devoid of practical experience.

Before discussing the role of intellectuals in foreign policy, a few words should be said about their place in American life. Although there have been periods in American history when they have been depreciated in favor of those with riches and practical achievements—notably the post-Civil War period of continental expansion and industrial growth—education and scholarship have always been cherished ingredients of American civilization. The Puritan heritage exalted the life of the mind and respect for learning and education was deeply ingrained in the population of the thirteen colonies, especially in New England. Harvard University was founded in 1636, only a few years after the first emigration of settlers to Massachusetts, and Yale, William & Mary, Columbia, and Princeton were established shortly thereafter. Many of the early leaders of the thirteen colonies were intellectuals, chiefly theologians and scholars of Greek and Latin.

Nevertheless, in the United States as in Europe, the proper place for the scholar and scientist was traditionally supposed to be the library, the laboratory, or the classroom. Statecraft and foreign policy in particular were considered to be the province of the politician or professional diplomat, or occasionally of the professional

soldier. While there was general agreement that, if possible, the shapers and practitioners of foreign policy should be well-educated, and even cultivated in the European sense, the nature of the subject matter seemed to require a fund of practical experience that by definition excluded individuals whose knowledge and experience was derived from the world of books. Except for distinguished historians, the conventional wisdom decreed that the qualifications of the intellectual, however distinguished in his own field, were irrelevant to war or diplomacy.

Nevertheless, by broadening the definition of intellectual only slightly, the current fashion for employing intellectuals in foreign policy-making can be detected in American history from an early date. The founding fathers and political leaders of the new American republic were also the intellectual elite—not perhaps in the sense of scholars or university professors, for except in theology and the classical languages that breed scarcely existed, but as men of affairs, widely read and provided with the best education then available. Except in part of the old South, America has never had the equivalent of a European aristocracy and members of the patrician class had to work or fall into obscurity. In a sense, degrees in law and medicine were a substitute for titles of nobility and provided a working avenue to community leadership. The Constitutional

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*This article in slightly different form previously appeared in the ICA Japanese-language publication Trends. Charles Maechling, Jr., formerly in the State Department and now practicing law in Washington, is himself an ex-professor.*

Convention of 1787 was dominated by graduates of Harvard, Columbia and Princeton—John Adams, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and Gouverneur Morris, to name only a few. Indeed, the example of the American intellectual as statesman, in all his strength and weakness, is epitomized in the life of the greatest genius of them all, Thomas Jefferson.

In some respects, law and lawyers have always provided an indispensable link in American society between the world of the intellect and the realm of practical affairs. Except for the occasional military hero like George Washington, William Henry Harrison, Zachary Taylor, and the later generation of Civil War generals, lawyers dominated Congress and public office in the 19th and early 20th centuries; to some extent they continue to do so today. It is therefore not surprising that from the beginning prominent lawyers have most often been selected for the office of secretary of state. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance is only the latest in a long line starting with Thomas Jefferson and including John Quincy Adams, William E. Seward, John Hay, Dean Acheson, Henry L. Stimson, and John Foster Dulles.

As a corollary, American foreign policy has from the beginning laid great stress on law and the letter of international agreements. Like other Western nations, the United States incorporates international law into its own corpus of domestic law; unlike others it takes it much more seriously. It has always been a strong supporter of the World Court, arbitration and judicial settlement of disputes. It frequently takes a legal view of problems that other countries regard as political. It expends enormous intellectual effort both within government and without on the laws of war, the law of the sea, the law of international organizations and questions of treaty interpretation. The War of 1812 with Britain and the entry of the United States into the first World War could not have occurred without provocations which the United States regarded as flagrant violations of international law. The legalistic approach of the United States to many important aspects of foreign policy has been

noted—and sometimes deplored—by many outside observers.

Yet, though belonging to a scholarly profession, even the most distinguished lawyers are not in the strict academic sense intellectuals. For one thing they are very much part of the real world, and in the United States play the role of mediator between the public and the complex network of statutes and regulations through which society is ordered. For another, they are generalists rather than specialists, trained to evaluate each particular problem in the broader context of public policy. Furthermore, they cannot help but be pragmatic in their approach to problems and quest for solutions. Their training obliges them to accept factual situations and then try to engineer solutions within that framework, rather than to impose their own model or grand design on the outside world. Hence, however cultivated and scholarly he may be as a person, the well-trained lawyer tends to give ideas as such short shrift unless adaptable for purposes of advocacy or translatable into operational terms.

As foreign policy-makers lawyers have not found favor either with professional diplomatists like Sir Harold Nicolson and George Kennan or academic intellectuals. As negotiators their search for certainty and predictability leads to efforts to cover every contingency and tie the other party down instead of leaving obligations flexible or undefined to allow for changed circumstances and shifting relationships. Their professional lives leave little room for sympathetic exposure to foreign cultures or sensitivity to the aspirations of the poor and exploited. Their identification with the "establishment" and their professional bias for order and the rule of law nearly always place them on the side of the *status quo*.

Another species of quasi-intellectual participant in the foreign policy field is the historian and man of letters. Throughout the 19th century it was the custom in the United States and Western Europe to bestow diplomatic sinecures ranging from minor consular posts to important embassies on distinguished literary figures. The great British constitutional author-

ity, Lord Bryce, was for a long period ambassador to the United States, and the distinguished *littérateur* Paul Claudel was his French counterpart. At one time or another American literary figures like Nathaniel Hawthorne, Herman Melville, and Washington Irving were provided with consular posts abroad, sometimes to tide them over periods of impecuniosity. Claude E. Bowers, a writer of American political biography, served as ambassador to Chile during the 1930s. The Columbia University historian Carlton Hayes was ambassador to Spain during World War II, where his sedulous flattery of the Franco regime was considered by many to exceed the most generous bounds of diplomatic courtesy. A successful recent example was President Kennedy's appointment of America's most eminent Japanese scholar, Professor Edwin O. Reischauer, as ambassador to Japan.

Nevertheless, while falling within the formal definition of intellectual, most of these figures exerted little influence over US foreign policy, which in general was farthest from their interest. Historians in particular have tended to bury themselves in the area of culture of their interest with the result that as diplomats they usually end up as dedicated apologists for the regime to which they are accredited. Their greatest asset is the detailed knowledge of an area's history and culture which they bring to policy-making and their insight into foreign perceptions and probable reactions. As negotiators, however, they are virtually useless; their long-range perspectives and empathy with the other side make it difficult for them to arrive at fixed positions or to bargain with conviction.

Fitting into no single category, yet certainly the purest intellectual of all US foreign policy makers until modern times, was President Woodrow Wilson. Lawyer, educator, and constitutional historian, Wilson combined traits typical of American *academia* with a Puritan rigidity of character that later led to doctrinaire positions and the collapse of his policies. In many ways Wilson exemplified the predicament of both the intellectual and lawyer in the field of foreign affairs,

as will be more closely examined shortly. He, and his even more illustrious predecessor Thomas Jefferson, were exceptions to the general rule that until recently intellectuals have had little influence in the American foreign policy process.

Although law professors and economists had been recruited into government since President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, intellectuals did not really surface in American foreign policy-making until the Kennedy Administration. A few were influential in shaping post-war foreign economic policy, and in framing and executing the Marshall Plan. In the aftermath of Sputnik (1957) scientists and engineers—Conant, Teller, Kistiakowsky, Vannevar Bush, von Karman, and Braun—exercised significant influence over defense policy and programs relating to weapons development, arms control and space exploration. But in general intellectuals held no position of real influence in the foreign affairs field until 1961. In the post-war administrations, Secretary of State Dean Acheson and his successor John Foster Dulles kept foreign policy-making firmly inside the State Department; to the extent that they imported outside advisers from civilian life they were nearly all young lawyers and businessmen. Except in the CIA, which under the imaginative direction of Allen Dulles made a determined effort to recruit scientists, economists and the like from universities, there were few academic appointments of significance in the Pentagon and other parts of the national security organization.

Moreover, it was the fixed policy of the executive leadership in the Roosevelt, Truman, and Eisenhower administrations to treat academic experts as specialists, and therefore subordinate to generalists. In the Defense Department, the bankers, lawyers, and businessmen who served as post-war secretaries of defense and of the military service departments had no qualms about consulting "long hairs" but at the same time believed in keeping them in their place. As late as 1960, scientific advisers in the Pentagon were kept

in the military chain of command instead of directly under the civilian secretaries lest they erupt into a policy-making role. House intellectuals in general were expected to speak only when spoken to, and to confine themselves to executing missions requirements laid down by the operating arm.

Eventually, science and technology became too explosive to be kept in the bottle. The transformation of warfare by the atom bomb, guided missiles, nuclear propulsion, and electronics guidance systems raised defense technology to such a plane of complexity that its role became pre-eminent. During the 1950s, the Defense Department, Space Agency, Atomic Energy Commission, and CIA began to pour immense sums of money into mission-oriented research at universities and think tanks. In the beginning such large-scale contract research was confined to the application of the hard sciences and high technology to weaponry, electronic guidance systems and counter-measures. But the projects soon spilled over into contingency planning and areas of military strategy that had hitherto been the exclusive province of war colleges and military planning staffs, and eventually into the socio-political realm of counter-insurgency operations and "nation building."

The new emphasis on science and technology, together with the deluge of government funds into the academic community, spawned a generation of engineers and systems analysts specializing in defense technology and brought the scientist out of the laboratory and into the councils of government—a healthy development, considering the radical transformation of the nature of warfare. Once the floodgates were opened, however, it was no longer easy to confine the invasion to the experienced and technically qualified.

On the defensive because of their prior neglect of science, and under pressure to upgrade their intellectual capabilities, the Defense Department, Atomic Energy Commission, and CIA began to broaden their definition of defense technology and to compete with each other in recruiting the new breed of defense intellectuals re-

gardless of qualifications. In so doing, the government capitulated to the charlatany that had begun to permeate the academic community in the new age of affluence. Lavishly funded by government grants, academics with no prior record in war or diplomacy, nor conceivable claim to expertise outside the classroom or laboratory, began to churn out books and monographs on every aspect of foreign policy and strategy. On the basis of these flimsy credentials many gravitated to Washington, either as consultants or permanent staff.

The Kennedy administration was the first to install intellectuals as a class in the seats of power. John F. Kennedy came to office with only the skimpiest entourage of experienced advisers as he himself admitted, with a circle of acquaintances largely made up of politicians and society figures. For various reasons, including his own youth, he was fearful of falling into dependence on the traditional figures of the East Coast foreign affairs establishment—Acheson, Lovett, McCloy and their counterparts. The one source of expertise totally amenable to his influence was the submerged class of academic intellectuals, eager to move into the limelight after years of second-class status. Several, like Schlesinger, Galbraith, and Goodwin, had already proved their worth as idea men and speechwriters. All of them were also immediately available for employment, since they had no lucrative law partnerships or business interests to be extricated from.

Within a few months of taking office, President Kennedy had stocked the first and second levels of his administration with intellectuals. A few, such as Professor Reischauer, owed their selection to qualifications alone; most personnel appointments, however, were made with an eye to colonizing the bureaucracy. In the Pentagon, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara brought in a team of civilian technocrats dedicated to eradicating the influence of outdated military traditions and interservice rivalries on decision-making, and to instituting cost-effective weapons systems and homogenizing the military establishment. The State Department

and its ancillary information and foreign assistance agencies were more difficult institutions to dominate since their operations were decentralized and multifaceted, and their personnel were almost exclusively career employees, but the president solved this dilemma by transferring the true seat of foreign policy-making to the White House.

Kennedy had privately decided

Kennedy appreciated the value of intellectuals as idea-merchants and phrase-makers but was wary of their fickleness and notorious susceptibility to changing academic fashions. He therefore exploited their talents and flattered them with White House invitations and the panoply of office, while keeping decisions to himself and his inner circle.

Lyndon B. Johnson retained

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“By the 1960s the average member of the New York Council on Foreign Relations—an obsolescent institution itself—was no longer as well-equipped to give an intelligent opinion on events in Africa or Latin America as countless Peace Corps volunteers or social scientists.”

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to be his own secretary of state. To this end he proposed to consign the trappings of that office to a capable foundation executive of conservative, almost para-military views, while surreptitiously building up the National Security Council staff under the direction of McGeorge Bundy, formerly Dean of faculty of Harvard. Bundy accepted Walt Rostow, an economist from MIT, as his deputy and other intellectuals were recruited for positions on the National Security Council staff and the departments of State and Defense. This inner cadre had the dual function of flagellating the bureaucracy into compliance with administration policies and extracting information from it on which to base presidential decisions. Since the Kennedys were basically ward politicians elevated to a national level, this left the actual formulation of policy to the intellectuals, and Kennedy himself, during his brief presidency, relied on them to rationalize, conceptualize, and repackage policies not too different from those of his predecessor, General Eisenhower. But Kennedy was too sophisticated to fall into dependency on them. Coming from the Harvard environment himself,

most of Kennedy's staff when he succeeded to the presidency in 1963 after his predecessor's assassination. But lacking Kennedy's sense of proportion he fell into much greater reliance on his house intellectuals, swallowing whole their grandiose rhetoric about America's duty to lead the revolution of rising expectations and withstand the communist challenge in Vietnam. Needless to say, as soon as the full horror and devastation of the Vietnam war became known the intellectuals were the first to abandon ship, leaving Johnson with 500,000 men on the mainland of Asia and the home front in turmoil. Nevertheless, to the end of his presidency Johnson continued to recruit intellectuals for his administration in the vain hope that they would rally the intellectual community behind him.

President Nixon completed the process by appointing the arch-intellectual of them all, Henry Kissinger, first as national security adviser and then as secretary of state. President Carter continues the tradition by having another foreign-born professor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, as his national security adviser, and an intellectual of singularly unmilitary cast, Harold

Brown, as secretary of defense.

Today the place of the intellectual in the American foreign affairs establishment is supreme. Within the United States government his influence on policy far outweighs that of the harassed diplomat and career-deadened civil servant. The military services, immersed in technology and totally submerged by a civilian hierarchy, seem to have abdicated their policy functions to the point where they supinely allow themselves to be lectured on every aspect of strategy and tactics by amateurs with no credentials except advanced degrees. Outside the government, the universities have become virtual incubators for producing opinion-makers on every aspect of public affairs. The task of keeping up with foreign affairs is now so time consuming and requires such specialized information that the citizen-statesman and interested professional man have been squeezed out. By sheer dint of numbers and free time for literary production, academics now dominate the pages of *Foreign Affairs*, *Foreign Policy*, and newspaper guest columns; they also monopolize the public affairs talk shows. The typical business tycoon is flattered to be invited to a symposium of intellectuals and ranks at the bottom in influence on foreign policy.

How the ascendancy of the intellectual came about in a field from which he had traditionally been excluded is a question not easy to answer. The answer seems to lie in the nature of the modern state and the special situation of the United States.

Until the 20th century, the isolation of the United States between two broad oceans, an ignorant immigrant population mainly concerned with survival, and a wariness of foreign entanglements, had confined an informed interest in foreign affairs to the same minority of the affluent and well-educated that in other respects ran the country. By and large, the members of this elite were generalists—lawyers, journalists, businessmen, bankers—and so were the American diplomats and military men that served abroad and rounded out the old foreign affairs establishment. In both America and Europe

the conventional wisdom was that foreign policy was best left to men of this class, not to ideologues and academic specialists. It was an article of faith that on military matters the opinion of the civilian amateur was worthless.

Three factors radically changed this orientation; the advent of technology as the dominant factor in warfare; the rise of the Third World; and the emergence of the media as a prime instrumentality of policy. The first surrounded warfare with an aura so technically complex, not to say futuristic, that the generalist felt increasingly uncertain and dependent on the specialist for the information on which to form a judgment. From this it was only a small step to dependence on the specialist for the judgments themselves.

At the same time, the fragmentation of the old colonial empires, which shifted the center of gravity in world politics away from Europe, destroyed the elite's monopoly on personal familiarity with foreign countries and their ruling circles. Its members continued to be as well-traveled and well-educated as ever—more so, with transoceanic air travel—but their orientation and interest remained fixed in the civilized portions of Europe and Asia. By the 1960s the average member of the New York Council on Foreign Relations—an obsolescent institution itself—was no longer as well-equipped to give an intelligent opinion on events in Africa or Latin America as countless Peace Corps volunteers or social scientists. Nor did the advent of the jet age make an understanding of Third World social movements and economic problems a necessary corollary of five-day business trips to tropical capitals.

Finally, the new public dimension of global politics destroyed the character values of the old diplomacy. The invasion of the mass media into the private domain of statecraft has put immense pressure on political leaders and foreign ministries to justify every move in the field of foreign relations in terms of national policy and ideology. The voracious appetite of the media for "copy" creates an incessant demand for official comment on events as they unfold and for definitions of policy before the facts are available. These pressures

vastly complicate the task of conducting foreign policy by drawing the administration into an endless cycle of explanations and clarifications of every governmental action and change of position, attended by the usual risks of misinterpretation and distortion. Complicating the picture is the government's own propensity to use the media to send "signals" to foreign governments and otherwise manipulate the news for purposes of its own.

In theory, press secretaries and public affairs officers exist to formulate the government's position in handouts and press releases. These officials, however, are usually incapable of articulating policy or otherwise dealing with substance and most are mere conduits between the policy-makers and the public. This puts a premium on the ability to lend credibility to moves that are usually purely reactive and policies that generally rest on nothing more than political or military expediency. A talented stable of intellectuals, capable of dressing up policy in ideological finery and resounding rhetoric, is of far greater use in enlisting the sympathies of opinion-makers and the media, than the equivalent number of civil servants and diplomats trained in the sober arts of analysis and negotiation.

There is no denying that under modern conditions the intellectual fills an important niche for his political masters. But the attributes he brings to the formation of policy are not always the obvious ones. No one would dispute the value of the specialized knowledge of academics in their chosen disciplines. Walt Rostow brought the Kennedy and Johnson administrations a knowledge of development economics at precisely the time when, metaphorically speaking, the United States discovered the Third World. Zbigniew Brzezinski is an expert on Soviet and Eastern European politics. Henry Kissinger has an unquestionable grasp of 19th-century power politics. Nevertheless, this quality should not be overstated. Academic specialties are usually much narrower than they appear to the outsider and often have little relevance to the pressing problems of the moment. On assuming

office, neither Rostow, Kissinger, nor Brzezinski had any more comprehension of the politics of Southern Africa or the Middle East than lawyers or bankers with petroleum and mining clients.

What is unique to the modern intellectual, and sets him apart from other professional types in his approach to foreign policy is the intrinsic value that he assigns to ideas. He has an urge to synthesize and his own perceptions of patterns in the conduct of nations and models of world order against which this conduct should be measured often take precedence over more pragmatic conclusions reached by others after first-hand observation. American academics also bring along in their personal baggage a whole complement of ancillary characteristics that affect the style and content of foreign policy in ways not readily detected by the general public or even by their political masters.

To appreciate how radical is the difference in approach to the conduct of foreign relations between the intellectual and the more traditional kind of foreign policy-maker, one must again recall who made foreign policy in the past and what qualities were most esteemed. Up to the present age, statecraft and diplomacy were the province of the ruling class. With their feet set firmly in the practical realities of domestic politics, the governing class knew only too well how much a viable foreign policy depends on strict apportionment of ends to means, a strong domestic power base, and tangible factors like military strength, accessibility of natural resources, and financial solvency. Scholarship was respected, but in its proper place in the laboratory or library—admiration for intelligence was combined with a healthy distrust of ideas because of their unpredictable and inflammatory effect on the untutored. In the past, neglect of these truths had ruined one dynasty after another.

The qualities esteemed in diplomacy were of a piece with the traditional approach to policy, and are gracefully summarized in Sir Harold Nicolson's famous treatise *Diplomacy*—discretion, decorum, understatement, reliability, responsibility, and if possible, mutual trust in each other's word, though

not necessarily in his intentions.

Nothing could be more different than the values of the academic intellectual, stated and unstated. On the university campus, ideas are valued for their own sake, and with them the raw material of ideas, words. Silence is, of course, no longer golden, while terseness of expression, and purity of diction are positive handicaps in comparison with volubility and fluency in the fashionable jargon of one's discipline. High visibility and prolific publication, parading under the euphemism of intellectual productivity, have now replaced a life of scholarly seclusion, regardless of the quality or literacy of the person and product. From the standpoint of personal qualities, such admirable traits as modesty, dignity, discretion, and reserve are passports to oblivion. Informality, aggressiveness, self-promotion, and upward mobility are the characteristics that induce respect from one's peers.

The intellectual also brings vanity and intellectual arrogance into personal relations with colleagues in a way best described by Hoffer: "The businessman just wants your money; the military man just wants you to obey. But the intellectual wants your soul. He wants people to get down on their knees and love what they hate and hate what they love." These unpleasant characteristics, combined with the well-known academic propensity for gossip and intrigue, are totally at odds with the code of military men and civil servants, which stresses job performance and personal relations and considers a person's ideas his own business unless they interfere with operational efficiency.

The danger of employing intellectuals in positions of responsibility in foreign affairs is that they confuse the values of the university with those of government and statecraft. As verbalists, they instinctively confuse talk with action. In fact, the "tough" speeches which they put into the mouths of their political masters, when not backed up by military or diplomatic strength, are perceived as windy rhetoric or bluster by nonintellectual audiences—which of course include both the governmental cadres and public of most other countries.

Moreover, the indiscriminate proliferation of ideas and endless definition and re-definition of policy—so desirable in a university context—generate confusion and acrimony in the field of foreign relations. They give no room for the normal inconsistencies and compromises inevitable in real life situations. They arouse expectations that cannot be fulfilled and give offense without inducing fear of retribution. They also promote irresponsibility by inviting rhetorical experimentation on the part of officials who have no formal role to play and who can be counted on to evade all responsibility for the consequences of their advice. Public competition of ideas is most dangerous of all in the national security area since it leads to a fatal separation between planning and operations, and gives theoreticians devoid of institutional loyalty or long-term career commitment a free license to promote their own academic career without regard to feasibility or the safety of the country.

Perhaps the most arrogant fallacy of all, propagated by intellectuals to prove their own indispensability, is that high intellectual content is an indispensable ingredient of a successful foreign policy, especially if formulated by the "best and the brightest." In fact, the best and most durable foreign policy is always the simplest, the most down-to-earth, and the most comprehensible to the broad mass of the educated population. In this generation intellectuals have been responsible for more foreign policy failures than plodding lawyers, unimaginative generals, or pragmatic politicians.

The hazards of the intellectual approach to foreign policy run all the way back to that many-faceted genius Thomas Jefferson. As Minister to France, he became enamored of the French revolution or rather the idea of it, choosing to overlook its propensity for violence in favor of the glorious vision of mankind throwing off its chains. As secretary of state, he inflamed the politics of the post-revolutionary Federalist period by urging that the United States align itself with the French revolutionary regime against England on grounds of ideology. Jefferson demonstrated great statesmanship in con-

sumating the Louisiana Purchase, but his "tendency to endow abstract ideas with the attributes of personality" (to quote his biographer, Dumas Malone) led him into acquiescence with French policy that in turn provoked the British blockade of Europe and the consequent seizure of neutral American ships by the British navy—to which he responded with the ostrich-like policy of nonintercourse (the Embargo) in a vain effort to avoid entanglement. As a defense expert, Jefferson was somewhat impractical. Instead of a navy building program, he favored the construction of small, open-deck gunboats to defend American rivers and harbors—in defiance of the ability of European ships-of-the-line to chop these little vessels to matchwood with their long-range cannon. For all his intellectual versatility, the judgment of this great American on matters of foreign affairs or defense left room for improvement.

Later in American history the theoretical and dogmatic approach of another intellectual President led to consequences both anomalous and self-defeating. In 1914, Woodrow Wilson's aggressive stands on principle led him inexorably into small-scale aggression against Mexico. Shortly thereafter, his dogmatic position on neutral rights at sea led the country into war against Germany in specific contradiction of his promise to keep it out. The 14-point peace platform was then proclaimed without ascertaining the secret war commitments of his allies, Britain, France, and Italy. At the 1919 Peace Conference Wilson's devotion to the principle of self-determination was allowed to override all practical considerations of geography and economics resulting in unviable countries and boundaries that invited protest and revision. The culminating impracticality was Wilson's insistence on inclusion of the League of Nations in the peace treaty with Germany. Thereafter he refused to modify provisions that he could well have compromised on, alienating key members of the Senate and resulting in the Senate's rejection of both the Versailles Treaty and US membership in the League.

More recently, the academics brought into the Kennedy adminis-

*Continued on page 45*

# Human Rights and American Policy in Africa

ARMISTEAD LEE

It may be presumptuous for an Old Africa Hand, who took early retirement and hasn't read the cables for a decade, to imagine that he has anything useful to suggest on Africa policy and human rights. Although I certainly have less knowledge of the immediate problems, perhaps I can offer some historical perspective.

My first exposure to Africa was as a 27-year old Foreign Service officer in Dakar during the War, and it was there that I became first aware of the many ways in which African reality contrasts with our European and American preconceptions. I learned that ethnocentrism—or racism, for short—exists among African nationalities without any instruction from Europe or America. The pastoral tribes like the Tuareg and the Fulas feel superior to the darker-skinned agricultural tribes. Yet the French colonial officers, whom I would have expected to have preferred the herdsmen of desert and savannah, who more closely resembled the Europeans in features, seemed

instead to rank them at the bottom, while at the very top—in their array of tribal preferences, were the pure Negro Mossi tribe of Upper Volta, praised for their valor as soldiers and their industriousness as farmers.

In these days when America is the favorite "imperialist" whipping boy for some of the more dogmatic Third Worlders, it is pleasant for me to reflect on another memory of my two years in colonial, wartime Dakar. This was the problem of the stolen American flags, which became a major challenge to our security system. Once stolen, they would soon appear carried aloft at the head of some procession of native nationalists, demonstrating against French colonialism, and the French naturally suspected us. The America of Franklin Roosevelt was a symbol of freedom and self-determination. I remember reading a letter from a tribal chief, urging us to send troops into the interior and promising us his followers would rally to our banner.

The end of empire was to bring fragmentation to the great federations of French West and French Equatorial Africa and a retrogression to the economies of the poorer provinces, now independent but unviable entities. In some cases, even though territorial unity was preserved, at some cost in bloodshed, as in Nigeria and ex-Belgian Congo, there was a revival

of ethnic animosities. Before independence, the trains running through the Kasai province of the Congo, coming up from Katanga, were manned entirely by Africans. Within two years of independence, they had to have all Belgian crews. Otherwise, the Baluba trainmen would be massacred by the Lulus as they went through Lulus territory—and vice versa. The mutual slaughter here, and in Burundi a few years later between Tutsi overlords and the Hutu majority, was nothing less than genocide. And that is a word which Milton Obote, the former President of Uganda, has just applied to the rule of his successor, Idi Amin.

Frequently the protagonists in what are essentially ethnic or tribal contests will attract foreign sponsors and adopt the jargon of foreign ideologies, so that their struggles appear to Europeans, and sometimes to other Africans, as local skirmishes in a worldwide struggle. Depending on the viewpoint they were battles between tyrannical Communism and the Free World or (if you prefer) between the peoples' liberation forces and international imperialism. Depending on the viewpoint, this is exactly how the civil war of the early 1960s in the Congo (now Zaire) appeared to most of the elites in English-speaking Africa. And since our academic African specialists in this country got their opinions on Congolese affairs from the articulate spokesmen of Accra and Dar es Salaam (which seemed "front-line" to a New Yorker), this was the version generally accepted here, of a struggle between progressive liberation forces and stooges of European capitalism. And yet, nothing could be more simplistic. There was not a single Congolese political leader, at the time of independence from Belgium in 1960, who did not have the support of some faction of Belgian business. The conventional wisdom had it that Tshombe was the stooge of Belgian capitalism while Lumumba was the socialist idealist and revolutionary. I recall a delegation of Belgian business executives coming to see us at the Brussels Embassy shortly before independence and assuring us that Lumumba was the man we should all back. He was a scoundrel, to be

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sure, they conceded, but at least he was one man who would keep the country from breaking apart.

I mention these recollections not to praise colonialism, an archaic anachronism, or to disparage the newly independent regimes of black Africa. I am seeking merely to sweep away some of the mythology that obscures our appreciation and understanding of Africa.

Thus, it is mythology to assume that the comparative poverty of most black Africans is due primarily to the legacy of empire, the vestiges of colonialism and the exploitation by foreign based multinationals. It is a mythology widely held abroad, and by African students abroad, but by very few leaders of independent African governments. They may have shared such beliefs at one time, and they may even use such jargon at the UN, but they don't seem really to hold these beliefs now. I understand that even Samora Machel of Mozambique, that citadel of Marxist sloganeering, is welcoming American private investment. For that matter, it has attracted surprisingly little attention that Mozambique is now largely dependent on a thinly disguised South African subsidy for its foreign exchange and that Neto in Angola is also largely dependent on revenue from the Gulf Oil Company, whose installations are now being protected by the Cubans. Have we heard recently from those campus activists who demanded their college endowment managers dump their holdings of Gulf? They are still busy. Now they are demanding that all churches and all universities divest themselves of the shares of any company with investments in South Africa or any bank having normal commercial dealings in South Africa.

At the State Department's Human Rights Conference, a featured panelist was Sister Janice McLaughlin, of the Catholic Justice and Peace Mission, proudly introduced as having once been in a Rhodesian jail. She displayed a sign demanding: "Stop Exim Bank Loans to South Africa." I could not resist whispering to another attendee that this demand was easy to comply with, since there are no Exim Bank loans for South Africa. But this detail is really inci-

dental. The assumption, held passionately by the True Believer, is that American capitalists, American corporate investments, are sustaining the apartheid government in South Africa.

It is hard to make a flat denial. The American company pays taxes, doesn't it? And doesn't the Vorster Government depend on taxes? But—by that token, I can be said to have supported Nixon and Watergate. And the blacks—at least those in South Africa with

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**"The resolution clearly repudiated apartheid without mentioning any single country. We hoped to get the Indians to withdraw theirs, but they accused us of wanting to dilute the opprobrium which racist South Africa had justly earned."**

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enough income to pay taxes—also supported the Nationalist Government. The implicit assumption of those who advocate these economic sanctions, and the withdrawal of all American investment, is that if these actions were taken, the Nationalists would fall—be overthrown. Possibly even the threat of sanctions would work. And surely the South Africans must take note if the General Assembly of the United Nations, speaking for the conscience of the world, overwhelmingly condemns them!

That is the assumption which the true believers have adhered to, for the last 25 years, in the face of repeated disappointments and overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It was the assumption underlying the first resolution condemning apartheid introduced in the General Assembly just over 25 years ago. In 1952 the Indians attempted, for the first time, to introduce a

resolution singling out South Africa for condemnation for the treatment of its own African population. India rallied a dozen co-sponsors of the Arab-Asian bloc for a resolution stating that the policy of apartheid was "creating a dangerous and explosive situation, which constitutes both a threat to international peace and a flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms which are enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations."

This may seem tame enough language in 1978, but in 1952 it was precedent-shattering, because it defied the clear restriction of Article 2(7) which prohibited the UN from interfering in what were "essentially domestic" affairs.

The British, the French and others voted against the resolution as being clearly illegal under the Charter. Our own department and delegation were split, and I can remember, as desk officer for South Africa, having heated arguments with another country desk officer, who felt we must "stand up and be counted." The issue escalated to Secretary Acheson, who finally decided in favor of my faction. We would abstain on the Indian (the 13-member) resolution denouncing South Africa but would encourage friendly delegations (the Scandianvians, in this case) to introduce a resolution which would apply to all member countries with multi-racial populations. To be in compliance with the charter, it declared, a country had to encourage the full participation of all racial groups in its political, economic and social life. The resolution clearly repudiated apartheid without mentioning any single country. We hoped to get the Indians to withdraw theirs, but they accused us of wanting to dilute the opprobrium which racist South Africa had justly earned. In the lobbies, we warned the Indians that if their resolution were adopted it would be used to advantage by the National Party in the elections to be held in less than a year.

And that is just what happened. Both resolutions passed, but the Scandinavian resolution was overshadowed by the more widely publicized 13-member resolution, and it was that fiery document which Malan and his fellow candidates

quoted gleefully in the 1953 election campaign. It helped bring the Nationalists, until then a minority in the popular vote, a resounding victory.

Last November, history repeated itself. Understandably indignant at the Vorster Government's crackdown on dissidents and over the tragic death of Steve Biko, the Carter Administration threatened sanctions. Under the heading "How to Make more Diehards," the *London Economist*

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**"First we must abandon what Denis Brogan called 'the myth of American omnipotence.' There are some events in the world, like the so-called 'loss of China,' which we cannot either cause or prevent. But one thing we can always do: we can avoid making things worse."**

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reported: "In private, Nationalists expressed unashamed delight at this electoral godsend. They talk of uniting the traditionally divided 'white nation,' the Afrikaner and English-speaking communities—in the face of the world pressures and internal threats from the black majority . . ."

And Colin Eglin, leader of the liberal Progressive Federal Party, was so exasperated at this outside interference that he denounced the Carter Administration for "posturing." Predictably, of course, the Nationalists won by a landslide.

This, I submit, is *not* the way to promote human rights in Africa.

So—what is my response to those who keep insisting that we "stand up and be counted? What's my alternative to complete disinvestment in South Africa, the boycott of South African exports to the US and the support of various guerrilla freedom fighters in neighboring countries?

I cannot pretend to have all the answers, and I approach the question with a proper humility. If I had lost a friend like Steve Biko

through the brutality of the South African police, and if I had been subjected personally to the cruel sanction of "banning," I might well react like Donald Woods. I might conclude that there was no hope for a policy of communication—that we might just as well precipitate the confrontation—get it over with. I have a real sympathy and, I hope, understanding, for those who have suffered as he has.

But having said that, I still cannot remain convinced that I should jump on the bandwagon. I'm still not persuaded that to prove our respect for human rights we should join the OAU establishment in rejecting the internal settlement in Rhodesia even as a starting point. I don't believe we should join in denouncing the Bishop and the Rev. Sithole for allegedly "selling out." Is it a sellout to agree to a phased transition to a condition of democracy which doesn't begin to exist in the other Black African countries? And would it really help the human rights of the masses of Zimbabwe to precipitate the sudden and massive exodus of the whites, the economic collapse and the bitter tribal fighting this scenario has produced in Uganda, Angola, Mozambique and some other countries? Will it improve the human rights of the various Southwest African tribes who fear SWAPO if power goes to that faction whose leader, Sam Nujoma, has acknowledged, "We are not fighting for majority rule. We are fighting for the seizure of power in Namibia for the benefit of the Namibian people." As for South Africa, there would be no such exodus of whites, who are not expatriates and have no other place to go.

I should mention, parenthetically, that I am not attributing the views I criticize to the State Department or to any particular individual or office there in.

Those who say that a race war in South Africa is inevitable and might as well be hastened are sketching a ghastly scenario. The Government has an overwhelming preponderance of power, and would most certainly be able to call on the support of elements of the African population. The result would be a massacre.

Is this likely to improve the human rights of the survivors? And

even measures short of this, like disinvestment, would primarily victimize blacks. While industrialization has been eroding apartheid—with painful slowness, to be sure—a reversal of industrialization would widen the divisions and increase the paranoid "laager" complex of the dominant Afrikaners. Andrew Young himself has acknowledged that total economic sanctions won't work. He has pointed out that South Africa is exceptionally self-sufficient economically.

Does this mean that there is nothing we can do to help? Not necessarily. But first we must abandon what Denis Brogan called "the myth of American omnipotence." There are some events in the world, like the so-called "loss of China," which we cannot either cause or prevent. But one thing we can always do: we can avoid making things worse. We can follow the Hippocratic Oath: Above All, Do No Harm!

But that is not all. I'm not rejecting all types of external pressure. As individuals, and as members of churches and other nongovernmental bodies, we can—with a proper humility and awareness of our own flaws—express our abhorrence over a policy of separation.

But constructive influence need not be confined to the private sector. It is proper that our government reassert the traditional American devotion to democratic principles and human rights. But our spokesmen should not be focusing exclusively, or even primarily, on the domestic audience or even on the audience in third countries, whether or not they are "front line states." If we are trying to help a peaceful, constructive and progressive outcome in country X, then it is the people of that country we should be concentrating on when we choose our words, when we choose the arena of our demarche or the form of our "linkage" if any.

In tennis, I find that if my feet are right and my eyes are on the ball, my racket is more likely to do the right thing. Similarly, if we agree to forego ethnic and tribal politics in the US and the UN, and concentrate on the peace and welfare of the people of Africa, we are

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"Suffused throughout cross-national training and education there is paternalism and also romanticism about the contribution to peace that comes from open channels of communication."

# THE NEXT PROBLEM IN ARMS CONTROL: THE DIFFUSION OF EXPERTISE

ROGER A. BEAUMONT

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, underway since 1968, have dealt with control in terms of numbers. The discussions have focused on incremental developments in a lineage of weapons which can be traced back to the Manhattan Project. There are, however, some problems inherent in the nature of past arms control discussions and agreements, and other examples from history, which suggest that caution is vital in building a survival strategy. The most dangerous ingredient or contaminant in the equation of arms control is creativity. It is, of course, virtually a matter of faith that innovation in high technology is based on spending large amounts of money.

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Thus, in the realm of strategic weapons—atomic and hydrogen bombs and their delivery systems—large research establishments are "the name of the game." This is also true in the case of systems which are emerging as the rivals or replacements of nuclear weapons, like the laser and ion generator. There is, however, evidence to suggest that big money and organization and significant innovation are not correlated. Since the late 19th century, at least, civilian innovators, academicians, entrepreneurs and inventors of the classic type have come to play a growing part in the development of strategic weapons systems and the working out of methods for their employment. "Think tanks," ever more numerous and expensive, have been growing for a century and a half, from the Franklin Institute in the early 19th century, through Arthur D. Little and Battelle to RAND and the Hudson Institute down to the myriad "Beltway Bandits," now of con-

cern to those who fear the dependency of government on extra-mural expertise.

Such mechanisms for applying expertise and creativity have not always shown as much promise as many hoped. Indeed, some students of innovation, like Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman in *The Sources of Invention*, have argued that a very high percentage of primary inventiveness has continued to come from individual inventors, at much lower costs. There is no question, however, that the bureaucratization of research and development, and the growing role of academicians in controlling the professionalization of expertise has created a kind of momentum which, although it may be a more expensive way to go, is also vital in dealing with the forms of exploration in science and technology that depend on teamwork and expensive equipment. It is the dissemination of expertise from the industrial states to the Third World which threatens continued uncertainty

and destabilization of order in the world, confounding the hopes of seekers after peace in their goal of controlling major weapons types.

The awareness of the danger of allowing knowledge to move freely in the world is not a modern concern, although the bureaucratization of the security function is. The "trade secret" is still respected by the law. In the early Industrial Revolution, the British passed laws

peaceful ends.

Hopes in this area have been confounded in a number of ways. First, many of the "best and brightest" from developing countries have chosen to stay in the West for various reasons, political, social, or economic. The pervading sense of guilt among Westerners about the more rapacious episodes in the age of imperialism has, of course, been one influential factor

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"If a Western nation with international interests which does not wish to become identified with neocolonialism or racism cannot cut off weapons, then what of a nation that would close its doors to the training of citizens of particular Third World nations, or all of them? The question of nuclear proliferation is already tinged with this problem."

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against skilled artificers emigrating, and one of the major breakthroughs in the history of American technology was the arrival of one of those mechanics, Samuel Slater, who laid out a textile factory along British lines after many charlatans had failed. In the 1920s, Oswald Spengler argued the dangers of exporting technological skills and ideas from Europe and America in *Man and Technics*. Americans who watched the Red Chinese atomic and hydrogen bomb programs progress with scientists trained in American universities with Boxer Affair indemnity money may have some cause to reflect on the matter. The major nations of the West have not slackened in their training of scientists and technicians. Their goals are many, the main purpose being the bringing of the benefits of advanced technology to developing nations without the long and arduous march that characterized the evolution of Western science and technology from the Renaissance onward. Implicit in these hopes has been a premise: that the skills and techniques would be applied to

in the maintenance of large scale programs for the training of developing nations. A rather less idealistic search for allies, bases, resources and "influence" is another, so that much of the training has been of little use to the immediate needs of the recipient nations. Suffused throughout cross-national training and education there is paternalism and also romanticism about the contribution to peace that comes from open channels of communication—a hypothesis not borne out by history. Thus, the results of the flow of students and scholars and technicians from the developing nations through the West—and vice versa—is as yet difficult to generalize about. It is not clear whether such practices have been beneficial to Western nations that have engaged in them—or to the Third World nations that have been the "beneficiaries" of such practices.

What has the training of technicians, physicians and the like to do with arms control? There are clear boundaries, are there not, between

military and civilian categories of aid? Unhappily the answer is "no." "Civilian" scientists and experts have been more and more not merely advisors but also developers of weapons. Edison, Weismann, the Haber Brothers, Einstein, Heisenberg, Tizard, Szilard, Fermi, Blackett, Conant and a host of others became prime movers in the development of major weapons systems in the World Wars. The American response to the Soviet launching of Sputnik in 1957 was to expand the training of scientists in all fields to counter a major Soviet victory in the Cold War. The clear implication of the National Defense Education Act of 1958 was that scientific potential was a strategic resource. Indeed, the American self-flagellation in the late 1960s which ruptured many of the academic-defense linkages was not paralleled by a severing of such relationships in other industrial nations. Some of the American links have been re-forged. Just as the Allies argued in World War I, in setting blockade rules, that there really were no "non-strategic" raw materials in modern war, it is difficult to draw a wide, bold line between the civil and the military in the realm of science. In spite of formal treaties prohibiting the militarization of space, militarization is already well under way and the first battles may have already been fought. A computer sort of NASA abstracts and journal articles in the realm of space science could produce a field manual for space warfare very quickly, bearing out the truism that it is the context that gives facts their meaning. It is with this in mind that the phenomenon of "qualitative proliferation" must be analyzed—a particularly thorny problem at a time when conventional warfare technology overlaps with the strategic weapons systems that predominated from the late 1940s until recently. Indeed, some cynics have suggested that, like political platform planks, systems under debate at SALT have little relation to the real agenda of power, and that both sides are trying to tease out each other's secret projects. There is a basic faith implicit in disarmament discussions, that in spite of whatever stratagems may be used, curtailment and control will keep future conflict from

becoming too destructive. The pattern in modern history to date, however, is that development goes on at some level whether subsidized or not, and that separate elements of pure research or technology developed for peaceful intentions can be warped to military purposes (like the track-laying tractor's rapid evolution into the tank). Beyond that, qualitative proliferation poses a problem since it cannot be measured in the way that weapons can be numbered. Advance in technology is often synergistic, that is, the whole becomes greater than the sum of the parts.

An example is the *blitzkrieg*, or "lightning war," seen in the Second World War and more recently in campaigns in the Middle East, usually described popularly as a spearhead of tanks with air cover. It was, however, something more than that. In 1940, when the Germans crushed Holland, Belgium and France in a month and drove the British off the continent and, in Russia in 1941, when they inflicted five million casualties on the Soviets and drove to the gates of Moscow, they faced opponents who in both cases had larger numbers of tanks, aircraft, radios and infantry. While their opponents already had their wills weakened by the imagery of Nazi power, as well as Stalin's purges and humiliation at the hands of the Finns, the significance of the *blitzkrieg*, however, was the way in which disparate elements were orchestrated and how the new configuration had a significant difference in effect. Similar examples of synergy appeared in the Allied camp in World War II. The Royal Air Force's use of Operations Research teams—scientists from various disciplines solving military problems—led to the development of the RAF Fighter Command which broke the *Luftwaffe's* nose in 1940. The continued use of civilian experts trained in "pure research" led to other changes in military technique and new technologies which aided weapon development, in the defeat of the German submarine menace in the Atlantic and in the building of the atomic bomb and the first electronic digital computer. A fusion of academe, industry, the military and bureaucracy in the nuclear age, in which all became targets, caused the distinction between mil-

itary and civilian to become yet further blurred.

A discontinuity developed after World War II, between the industrial nations and the new states emerging out of the demise of the colonial empires of France, Britain, Holland, Belgium—and America. The problem of arms transfers, which shows little sign of abating in spite of the naive rhetoric of the American presidential campaign of 1976, is but a symptom. If all the weapons in the arsenals of the Third World produced by Western industrial nations vanished magically, it would not constitute a nullification of arms proliferation which has been under way since the end of World War II. The expertise diffused to those nations would still be there, and in time—probably much less time than experts might predict—the Third World would deploy its own variants, in the way that Brazil, India and China, for example, have already begun to do.

One problem in respect to "qualitative proliferation" is that if one nation does not vend, grant or train, another one will. A decision to not supply arms, then, at this point, may be more generally destabilizing than a decision to send in the hardware. The connection between national interest and arms transfer becomes a very thin strand, indeed, in such cases as the Saudi-Israeli fighter case. In more general terms, if a Western nation with international interests which does not wish to become identified with neocolonialism or racism cannot cut off weapons, then what of a nation that would close its doors to the training of citizens of particular Third World nations, or all of them? The question of nuclear proliferation is already tinged with this problem. The suggestion by big, mostly white Russia, the United States and Britain that little countries, mostly brown and yellow, should not have their own bombs seems dangerously close to the kind of rationale heard in the defense of the big stacks of chips that those countries garnered in the heyday of imperialism—and which some of those nations still hold. The fact that "Atoms for Peace" programs were probably milked for the development of atomic bombs by Third World nations does not stand up as an argument in the face

of the heavy burden of historical guilt for an epoch of slavery, exploitation and gunboat diplomacy, however distorted and selective the use of history may be in respect to details of that experience, and no matter how irrational it may be for people so far removed by time and culture from the events in question to feel guilt.

The problem of qualitative proliferation is further aggravated by the change in "conventional" weapons as opposed to strategic weapons, i.e., atomic and hydrogen bombs. Since the final days of American involvement in Vietnam, a revolution has taken place in non-nuclear weapons systems. The "Electronic Battlefield" of which General Westmoreland spoke while Chief of Staff is a reality—including battlefield sensors, area weapons, laser communication and guidance systems, drone aircraft for reconnaissance, bombing and combat, "smart" bombs and artillery shells which vastly increase accuracy. One new weapon, the fuel air explosive or "aerosol" bomb produces overpressures as powerful as small nuclear weapons. The extremely high casualties caused by the use of many of the new weapons in the Middle East War of 1973—the "Yom Kippur" War—have caused a massive reexamination of American tactical doctrine as well as visions of the future which include: a Soviet blitz driving to the Channel in two weeks; a replay of 1914-18, in which both sides dig in after destroying their hardware; and a fleet of airbuses launching "smart" weapons in the eastern Atlantic while tiny bands of elite forward observers elude Soviet masses on the German plain and guide the "smart" rockets onto targets.

The problem posed by this series of developments is that conventional weaponry's renaissance threatens to blur the nuclear threshold. If a new combination of weapons and techniques produces chaos and panic, then the use of the Bomb may be seen as the only remedy in a rapidly deteriorating situation. The introduction of such sophisticated hardware, or the expertise to build, use and maintain it, into Third World locales might also overlap with nuclear potential. A small nation with the Bomb which might ordinarily keep it in

reserve might, if faced with the sudden appearance of the new generation of conventional hardware in a neighboring state, cross the nuclear threshold. Even if a ban were placed on moving such sophisticated equipment, the training of people or putting them to work to make such weapons could replace the hardware itself as the provocative act. Ironically, at a time when it seems to many that Europe

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"Indeed, foreign or  
domestic  
controllers—or  
both—with their  
prestige at stake may  
be forced to  
demonstrate the value  
of their wares to the  
rulers, like Allan  
Quatermain with his  
rifle in the kraal of a  
doubting king in *King  
Solomon's Mines*."

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seems to be retribalizing into pre-Roman sub-units, the Third World has been made into one vast Europe, nationalistic, anxious about boundaries, alliances, and the perceived advances of its neighbors. It is hard to see that the forces of diplomacy, of perceptions of threat, of strategy and the money earned by arms sales and influence bought by grants, have not mucked things up to a fare-thee-well. In view of the current state of SALT and the UN disarmament sessions, therefore, it seems none too soon to point out that seeds of further instability have been transplanted. Indeed, truly effective disarmament must be total and universal. Otherwise, one faces the "in the Kingdom of the Blind, the One-Eyed Man is King" quandary.

In respect to the dangers of non-compliance, it is not necessary to note that many nations formerly under imperial control are now ruled by oligarchies or dictators. Diffusing sophisticated weapons systems into this unstable milieu is obviously dangerous. Such governments may not be ready to accept the fact that the resort to mili-

tary force in the face of determined opposition has been very unreliable of late. The vast majority of those in power at the beginning of major modern conflicts have been dead or out of power by the end of those wars. Europeans, fresh from the devastation of the Age of Dictators and but a generation away from the Epoch of Kings and Emperors, can hardly pontificate to the successor states under the rule of demagogues or sociopaths. Nor can Americans, with their record of supporting authoritarian regimes of many hues since 1942. It is, moreover, obvious that conveying weapons to unstable areas has yet a deeper financial rationale as the western industrial world reels under the erosion of access to cheap energy. Whatever other factors there may be, such as prestige, maintenance of physical presence, with attendant diplomatic and intelligence implications, and acting as a safety catch on the triggers provided to the buyers, at what point does such dissemination in itself produce momentum which leads to its use? At what point can inventories no longer be monitored or controlled? Since the problem often relates to volatile aspects of local politics and culture, it defies rational analysis by outsiders at least. Further, qualitative proliferation generates instabilities beyond those stemming from misperception or distortion. The equipment itself is a symbol of commitment, of a kind of letter of credit or blank check issued by the vending or donating powers. Prestige and profitability are thus intertwined. An unsophisticated or unstable possessor may feel a panacea at hand, and perceive that the new technology put him within easy reach of a decisive victory. Indeed, foreign or domestic controllers—or both—with their prestige at stake may be forced to demonstrate the value of their wares to the rulers, like Allan Quatermain with his rifle in the kraal of a doubting king in *King Solomon's Mines*. A clash of competitive weapons systems also poses grave problems in terms of space and internal balance. Weapons sponsors may lunge forward into intervention, a particularly dangerous situation not only because "conventional" weapons effect overlap into the realm, but because sheer volume may lower

the nuclear threshold. The growth of naval power, for example, is not usually seen as part of the problem, since the massing of ships in a zone of tension or conflict is usually seen as less provocative than the positioning of troops or aircraft. This has not always been the case, however, nor may it always be.

In the abstract, qualitative proliferation is a destabilizing agent, a contaminant which polarizes areas of the world *vis à vis* imminent general or specific conflict. An increasing number of friction points are being created which could go to the flash point or generate escalation scenarios. This pattern suggests yet another dimension of the Nth country problem, in which uncertainty or the interaction of various instabilities—whether by design of the major powers and arms vendors or not—produces a heating up, which crosses the threshold to major conflict in spite of the original intent of the opponents. Students of conflict since at least Lewis Richardson have argued that the massing of military hardware is a precipitator of conflict. If so, the current volume being projected outward by industrial states constitutes a tangle of burning fuses.

In respect to proliferation in general, catalysis is the main concern, the fear that a general war could stem from the use of nuclear weapons by small countries. It is also argued that at some point sheer numbers could produce instability—again the Nth country effect, a clash between little nuclear powers drawing in the great powers, with the implication being that geographically smaller states would be more desperate, and that their regimes tend to be more erratic and so on. On the other hand, the factor of perceived space is usually ignored. Yet most nations are geographically small, so that suffering attack by even small nuclear weapons would constitute annihilation. Space acts as a control, which is at least marginally assuring since most nations are at close quarters with other nuclear or near-nuclear hostile states. Since desperation may occlude self-interest, other variants of the model are grimmer. What if Israel, about to be overrun, targeted cities in South Russia with A-bombs yielding high fallout—or hydrogen

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found, when it came to practice, that  
open negotiations were totally unworkable."

# What Is Public Diplomacy?

KENNETH WIMMEL

Sir Harold Nicolson, writing in 1938, began his book *Diplomacy* by defining his terms. "It is essential, at the outset of this study," he wrote, "to define what the word 'diplomacy' really means and in what sense, or senses, it will be used in the pages that follow." He went on to distinguish five different meanings commonly associated with the word. Those meanings, he charged, are used indiscriminately in English-speaking countries "with the result that there are few

branches of politics which have been exposed to such confusion of thoughts." As the definition he proposed to use, he quoted that given by the Oxford English Dictionary:

"Diplomacy" is the management of international relations by negotiation; the method by which these relations are adjusted and managed by ambassadors and envoys; the business or art of the diplomatist.

Some scholars and practicing diplomats have argued that Nicolson's definition does not adequately encompass all the varied activities now commonly associated with the practice of diplomacy. But whether or not one fully agrees with Nicolson and the OED, one must admire Nicolson's method. The reader of his book knows from the outset exactly what

Nicolson means to examine.

Harold Nicolson did not define the term "public diplomacy." It had not been coined when he wrote. It has gained increasing currency in recent years, and it cries out for the rigorously logical examination that Nicolson devoted to its older parent term. There are thousands employed by the American federal government today who, if asked, would probably say that they are engaged in some aspect of public diplomacy. Congressional committees have affirmed the desirability, indeed the pressing need, for vigorous, effective public diplomacy by the United States. What is public diplomacy?

If one begins with the definition of diplomacy agreed upon by Nicolson and the OED, "public diplomacy" is logically the management of international relations by negotiations carried on in public. That idea recalls the first of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points about "open covenants, openly arrived at," and it sends shivers down the spine of a traditional diplomat like Harold Nicolson. Openly conducted negotiations, Nicolson argued, almost never work for a variety of reasons. He maintained that Woodrow Wilson did not practice what he preached, because the Treaty of Versailles was by no stretch of the imagination openly arrived at. On the contrary, it was the product of some of the most secret negotiating in history. This only proved, Nicolson concluded, that

the highest apostle of "open diplomacy" found, when it came to practice, that open negotiations were totally unworkable. And it shows how false was the position into which President Wilson (a gifted and in many ways a noble man) had placed himself by having failed in January 1918 to foresee that there was all the difference in the world between "open covenants" and "openly arrived at"—between policy and negotiation.

Yet, the idea that traditional diplomacy can be carried on in the full glare of the public news media and hence in public has gained adherents in recent years, and it is usually described as being public diplomacy. President Sadat of Egypt, in the weeks before and during his trip to Jerusalem, was often described as conducting public diplomacy in this sense. Strictly speaking, Sadat did not conduct

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negotiations in public, but on a few occasions he seemed to come close to doing so. His astute use of television to sway public opinion, especially in the United States, towards support for the Arab position in the Arab-Israeli dispute has undoubtedly affected significantly the Middle East negotiations conducted since his Jerusalem trip. In many quarters, he was credited with having brought the dream of permanent peace in the Middle East closer to reality in late 1977 than it had been at any time during the previous thirty years. But when the widely anticipated breakthrough to peace failed to occur, the intense publicity surrounding Sadat's Jerusalem trip probably made the inevitable disappointment that followed more intense than it otherwise would have been—as Nicolson probably would have predicted.

Nicolson, writing before World War II, could not anticipate Sadat's use of television, but he was familiar with the personal involvement by heads of governments and foreign ministers in the conduct of international negotiations, and he deplored it. He argued that politicians should not engage in diplomacy, a field of endeavor quite different in many ways from the one they know best. He did not, of course, have Anwar Sadat in mind, but his argument across the span of forty years seems almost designed to question the Egyptian President's methods: Repeated personal visits on the part of the Foreign Secretary of one country to the Foreign Secretary of the other should not be encouraged. Such visits arouse public expectations, lead to misunderstandings and create confusion . . . such visits, naturally enough, are very dear to the heart of all politicians. They are called "the value of personal contact." Yet in truth, as I have said elsewhere, diplomacy is not the art of conversation, it is the art of negotiating agreements in precise and ratifiable form.

As recently as 1976, George Kennan echoed Nicolson's argument in *The Cloud of Danger*. Nevertheless, it seems obvious that Nicolson's cautiously traditional views have been all but forgotten in this age of international television communication by satellite and international travel by jet aircraft. Increasingly since World War II, American secretaries of

state have spent almost as much time traveling abroad and engaging in direct negotiations with foreign leaders as they have spent administering their department and directing the work of the diplomats they supervise. The summit conferences among heads of government so feared and disliked by Harold Nicolson have become routine occurrences in international affairs.

Whether the Camp David summit conference on the Middle East will produce lasting, positive results and thus disprove the arguments of Nicolson and Kennan about summit conferences remains, at this writing, a question. If it does, and if the Arab-Israeli dispute is finally ended on terms reasonably favorable to the Arab cause, one result may be that Sadat's use of the public news media will be regarded as vindicated, and the movement of diplomacy out of the confines of conference rooms and foreign ministries into television studios will accelerate. But it remains to be seen whether Sadat's methods ultimately will prove successful. The traditionally discreet and private diplomacy advocated by Nicolson may yet prove to be the only really effective means to achieve peace in the Middle East, if any means other than total defeat of one side in a total war exists.

Traditional diplomacy carried on in public rather than in private is one currently accepted meaning of public diplomacy, but it is not the meaning usually intended by those in the American government who say that their profession is public diplomacy. The United States Information Agency some years ago began to say what it did was public diplomacy, and the term became increasingly popular in that agency and in its successor organization, the International Communication Agency. As used in the American government, the term is intended to denote an adjunct to traditional diplomacy, a complementary effort which, its practitioners say, is demanded by modern communications technology. Discussions of the subject before Congressional committees usually begin with what has by now become a familiar recitation of the improvements wrought during this century in transportation and communications, especially communications

by electrical and electronic means. The inventions of radio and television and more recently the linking of those inventions with satellites to achieve instantaneous global communications are usually cited as comprising a "revolution" in communications which demands that governments employ these improved instruments to communicate with the peoples as well as with the governments of other countries. The means are available, this line of reasoning seems to run, so they should be used. What they should be used to do, it continues, is something closely related to, but differing from, traditional diplomacy.

This different variety of diplomacy, as it is practiced by the ICA, is most often defined—when it is defined at all—in terms of the activities it undertakes. Last year in a speech at Knoxville College in Tennessee, John Reinhardt, Director of ICA, defined public diplomacy as "meaning those efforts through which your government enters the international marketplace of ideas." By this definition, public diplomacy is the sum of the government's activities in the administration of educational and cultural exchange, in the distribution of books and other publications abroad, in the operation of libraries in foreign countries—to name but a few of the many activities carried on by the International Communication Agency. The reason the government chooses to enter the international marketplace of ideas with these activities is obviously to affect the thinking of people in other countries. But in what manner and to what end? Are these activities intended to persuade or to inform? The difference between the two is important.

To persuade someone to agree with your views is almost always more difficult than simply to inform him of those views without the need to move him to agreement. For that reason, efforts at persuasion always run the risk of becoming coercion on the one hand or dissembling and falsification on the other. When a government undertakes to persuade, the ugly name of propaganda more often than not arises.

The word "propaganda" derives from the verb "to propagate," and, strictly speaking, it means the dis-

semination and advocacy of a particular doctrine or set of beliefs. It should be a word denoting a perfectly respectable activity, assuming the doctrine or beliefs to be respectable. But, thanks in large part to Adolf Hitler and Joseph Goebbels, the word means simply "lies" to most people today, especially when it describes activity by a government. During its quarter-century of existence, the United States Information Agency could never bring itself to say outright that it was in the business of propaganda, although some USIA officials argued that such was, or should be, the case. In a book published in 1968, *The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda*, Thomas Sorensen, a former high-ranking USIA official, tried to give the word respectability and associate it with USIA:

To propagandize means in many minds to lie, to exaggerate, to manipulate, to subvert. So the US Government employs a euphemism, but in this book we will not . . . there would, perhaps, be fewer qualms about American propaganda if it were better understood that there is not necessarily a conflict between veracity and advocacy, that it is possible to be both truthful and persuasive. American propaganda has not always been persuasive, but it has always tried to be truthful.

But Sorensen was fighting a losing battle with the English language. Propaganda to most people is bad by definition, and hardly anyone wants to be associated with it. Certainly, the American government does not. In his Knoxville speech, John Reinhardt said:

It should be eminently clear that propaganda has no place in our scheme of things, that there is nothing within us that enables us to be propagandists.

But propaganda\* undeniably exists, if only in the eye of the beholder. One man's "information program" or "cultural exchange activity" is often another man's propaganda. Should propaganda, with its connotations of guile, deception, manipulation and dissembling, be embraced by a definition of public diplomacy? Hitherto, public diplomacy has been an exclusively American expression.

\*Acknowledging the force of popular usage to determine word meanings, this paper will use "propaganda" in the popular, pejorative sense rather than try, as Sorensen did, to maintain a distinction between a pejorative and a more literally correct—and respectable—meaning.

Other countries have not been accustomed to use it, but many other countries engage in activities the American government regards as part of public diplomacy. The staffs of many embassies around the world include cultural attaches, and even more of them include someone with the duties if not the title of press attache. A great many governments engage in radio broadcasting directed to audiences in other countries. When these activities are conducted in such a manner as to be undeniable propaganda, should they still be regarded as public diplomacy? Those who profess to engage in public di-

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plomacy would probably want to answer "no." Certainly, the traditional diplomat finds propaganda odious and is usually repelled by attempts to associate it with diplomacy. Harold Nicolson was uncompromising in his distaste for what he called "this terrible invention":

A new and serious problem of modern diplomacy is the problem of propaganda . . . it is difficult to suggest by what means diplomacy can mitigate the dangers of this terrible invention. International agreements on the subject are evaded or ignored; counter-propaganda only intensifies the conflict. The most that can be hoped is that the very virulence of the method, the actual iteration of demonstrable untruths, may in the end defeat its own purpose. And that the best antidote to the hysterical school of broadcasters is a policy of truth, understatement and calm.

Nicolson obviously had in mind the monstrous lies of Nazi propaganda, and he specifically distinguished between what the Nazis did and what an organization like the British Council does. He did not consider the latter to be prop-

aganda.

The term "diplomacy" has proven able to embrace the connotations both of an honorable and respected profession, and of the employment of guile and deception. The definition of a diplomat as one sent abroad to lie for his country is a familiar one that usually prompts a smile. It has become familiar through repetition, because most people suspect there is more than a grain of truth in it. Is "public diplomacy" capable of connoting both a policy of truth, understatement and calm, while also including the concept of propaganda with its associations of guile, deception and outright lies? If it cannot, it runs the risk of becoming suspect as the latest euphemism for propaganda alone. If those who profess to engage in public diplomacy insist that the word means an activity dealing exclusively in goodness and truth, and incapable of being tainted by association with the odious lies of propaganda, they risk the very debasement of the term they wish to avoid. To say that propaganda can be an element of public diplomacy is not necessarily to condone the use of propaganda. Not all the activities embraced by "public diplomacy" are propaganda, but the disinterested observer will find it hard to accept the proposition that none can be.

American public diplomacy specifically dissociates itself from propaganda as John Reinhardt firmly stated in Knoxville in May, 1977. In October, that dissociation was made official for the organization most closely identified with American public diplomacy. On October 11, President Carter submitted to Congress *Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1977*, the plan which joined the United States Information Agency and the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs together in a new agency to be called the International Communication Agency. In his letter transmitting the plan to Congress, Carter explained that several principles guided him in shaping that reorganization. One of the most important, he said, was:

The new Agency's activities must be straightforward, open, candid, balanced and representative. They will not be given over to the advancement of

the views of any one group, any one party or any one Administration. The agency must not operate in a covert, manipulative, or propagandistic way.

It is interesting to note that "public diplomacy" appears nowhere in either the reorganization plan or in the letter of transmittal. Whether this represents a deliberate omission can only be conjectured except by those who wrote those documents, but the omission does seem to indicate that the term has not yet been incorporated into the official lexicon of the government, despite its current widespread use.

The reorganization plan is devoted to specific problems of bureaucratic reorganization and does not address itself to the purposes or philosophy of the new agency. The President's letter does discuss briefly the purposes of ICA as he sees them. He emphasizes that the agency is charged with two distinct but related goals: "to tell the world about our society and policies, in particular our commitment to cultural diversity and individual liberty; and to tell ourselves about the world so as to give the understanding to deal effectively with problems among nations." This two-way exchange of information is in contrast to the responsibility of USIA which was charged with only a one-way flow of information about the United States directed towards people overseas. A two-way exchange of information suggests that ICA will undertake to inform rather than to persuade those it addresses, a goal logically consistent with the Agency's avowed dissociation from propaganda. This goal is made explicit by the language of the President's letter:

The purpose of this reorganization is to broaden our informational, educational and cultural intercourse with the world since this is the major means by which our government can inform others about our country and inform ourselves about the rest of the world.

The International Communication Agency formally came into existence on April 1, 1978. In a memorandum dated March 13 to the Director of the new Agency, President Carter set forth what is, in effect, a statement of mission for the organization. The President explained that "I want to outline my views of the purposes and functions of the Agency, and the manner in which it should conduct its

affairs." He went on to specify five main tasks for the ICA Director and his colleagues:

- To encourage, aid and sponsor the broadest possible exchange of people and ideas between our country and other nations.

- To give foreign peoples the best possible understanding of our policies and our intentions, and sufficient information about American

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**"When peoples of different cultures, languages and values come to know each other better, their tendency to engage in disputes and wars apparently does not necessarily diminish; it may even increase."**

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society and culture to comprehend why we have chosen certain policies over others.

- To help insure that our government adequately understands foreign public opinion and culture for policy-making purposes, and to assist individual Americans and institutions in learning about other nations and their cultures.

- To assist in the development and execution of a comprehensive national policy on international communications, designed to allow and encourage the maximum flow of information and ideas among the peoples of the world.

- To prepare for and conduct negotiations on cultural exchanges with other governments.

These multi-faceted, unimpeachably high-minded goals make it clear that public diplomacy, as it is practiced by ICA, specifically excludes any intention to persuade. Each goal clearly aims to establish an objective and unbiased exchange of information and ideas devoid of any exercise in advocacy.

No one would expect the American government to become an advocate for a foreign country and try to persuade the American people of the correctness of that country's policies. But an American taxpayer might become uneasy and even in-

dignant if he thought that his government was spending his tax dollars to dispense information about the United States in a purely neutral and non-partisan fashion to people in other countries. He might prefer his government to be a vigorous, open advocate of his country, to espouse its values and policies. Is it proper, then, for a government to undertake to stimulate and promote, in a neutral and non-partisan manner, a two-way exchange of ideas and information between its own people and the peoples of other countries? Indeed, is it really possible for a government to do so? Is any governmental effort in two-way international communication inevitably a process of informing in one direction but persuading in the other? If it is, should the government imply that it can be otherwise?

If one compares Nicolson's definition of traditional diplomacy with the concept of public diplomacy set forth in President Carter's memorandum of March 13 to the Director of ICA, a striking difference in the ultimate objectives of the two processes becomes apparent. Diplomacy as defined by Nicolson has as its ultimate goal the reaching of agreement; the goal of any process of negotiation is to reach agreement by compromising differences. The process demands that the skilled negotiator not only be capable of informing his opposite number accurately and comprehensively as to what his position is; he must also be skillful in persuading his opponent to agree with that position. He will seldom be completely successful in his persuasion, but he would be derelict in fulfilling his responsibilities if he did not undertake to do so. By contrast, the principal function of ICA, according to President Carter,

should be to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the United States and other nations. In international affairs, as in our personal lives, the starting point for dealing effectively with others is the clearest possible understanding of differing points of view.

Thus, it seems that ICA's responsibilities extend to this "starting point" but not beyond it. There appears to be an implication that misperceptions and misunder-

*Continued on page 42*

## Getting to Know the Arms Trade

SEAN KELLY

THE ARMS BAZAAR, by Anthony Sampson. Viking, \$12.95.

WAR, BUSINESS, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, edited by Benjamin Franklin Cooling. Kennikat Press, \$12.50.

UNITED STATES ARMS TRANSFER AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, a report prepared for the Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, March 21, 1978, Washington, DC GPO.

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY, by Tom Gervasi. Grove Press, \$7.95.

WORLD ARMAMENTS AND DISARMAMENT, SIPRI Yearbook 1978, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Crane, Russak & Co., \$35.00.

STRATEGIC SURVEY 1977, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, \$4.75.

WORLD MILITARY AND SOCIAL EXPENDITURES 1978, by Ruth Leger Sivard. WMSC Publications, Box 1003, Leesburg, Virginia 22075, \$2.50.

CONTROLLING FUTURE ARMS TRADE, Council on Foreign Relations. McGraw-Hill, \$5.95.

By most any standard, the international arms trade is a growth industry. Known sales are currently running about twenty billion dollars a year in signed contracts, and the figure increases annually. President Carter's election campaign pledges notwithstanding, the United States is still the world's number one arms salesman. Our position has been made even more secure by the Carter Administration's recent 4.8 billion dollar arms "package" to Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. Arming both sides of a potential military conflict—as Anthony Sampson points out in his excellent history of the world arms trade—has always made good business sense.

Krupp and Vickers pioneered this game in the early days of this century, and Sampson's book is filled with specific and not infrequently amusing examples. But they pale in comparison with the prospect of multi-million dollar US fighter aircraft targeted against each other across the Suez canal, or the deserts of Arabia.

Simply stated, no matter what happens in the Middle East, there are bound to be major corporate profits for Northrup and McDonnell-Douglas. Fighter aircraft wear out even when they are not flown. In actual combat—as evidenced by the 1973 Mideast War—their attrition rate can become astronomical.

If it seems excessively cynical to examine our "military supply relationships" in such a light, Anthony Sampson reminds us that there is good precedent for such an approach. George Bernard Shaw wrote a play called *Major Barbara* in which the hero, a European arms merchant, proclaims this objective: "To give arms to all men who offer an honest price for them, without respect of persons or principles." That was in 1905; not a bad year for the arms trade, but they have gotten better—especially here at home.

Eisenhower was right. There is a military-industrial complex in the United States, and *War, Business and American Society* may tell you more about it than you really want to know. Moving from the 19th century right up through the "Merchants of Death" days in the 1930s to the really big profits of World War II, this collection of essays also shows how we acquired an Interstate Highway System along the way. The book's emphasis is on historical perspective; don't look for moral judgments.

Equally free of judgmental concern is the Congressional Research Service study on current *United States Arms Transfer and Security Assistance Programs*. It is a straightforward effort to brief the Congress on the multiplicity of official US arms dealings abroad. In doing so, it successfully negotiates the bureaucratic swamplands of Military Assistance Programs vs. Foreign Military Sales vs. Security Support Assistance without burdening itself down with any specific conclusions or recommendations. It is both a good primer, and an excellent companion for Tom Gervasi's *Arsenal of Democracy*.

Both books deal with the Carter Administration's new policy on arms transfers, as enunciated by the President May 19, 1977. This policy statement, developed from the Carter presidential campaign philosophy, begins with the general

observation that: "The virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world." As the world's largest arms seller, the United States, says the President, "must take steps to restrain its arms transfers."

The President's proposals include cutting the dollar volume of new US commitments (with several notable exclusions) for the sale of weapons and weapons-related items. He also intends to stop the United States from introducing into a region "newly-developed, advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability." Such weapons could not, in any event, be sold or coproduced abroad until "they are operationally deployed with US forces, thus removing the incentive to promote foreign sales in an effort to lower unit costs for Defense Department procurement."

President Carter categorically ruled out building, or modifying advanced US weapons solely for export, and he said that coproduction agreements for "significant weapons, equipment and major components" would henceforth be prohibited. The President also made it clear that he was against State Department and Pentagon officials abroad promoting the sale of US arms.

Tom Gervasi points out in *Arsenal of Democracy* that the President's May 19th arms policy is well laced with loopholes; enough of them to permit the sale of over one billion dollars worth of AWACS radar aircraft to Iran, plus coproduction agreements with Japan on fighters and anti-submarine warfare aircraft. These commitments would seem to conflict with the President's policy of not introducing newly-developed, advanced weapons systems into regions where they had not existed previously, particularly the AWACS to Iran. Allowing Japan to build the F-15—America's most advanced fighter aircraft—and the P-3C Orion anti-submarine and reconnaissance aircraft raises questions about the seriousness of the President's intentions regarding foreign coproduction agreements.

Actually, Gervasi says that there are a total of 19 major developed countries understood to be exempt

from any restraint on US arms exports under the new Carter policy. He sees no future reduction of any significant proportions in the flow of US arms abroad. Existing contracts create obligations reaching far into the future, amounting to more than thirty billion dollars. And our system of alliances exempts many of our most important arms purchasers.

The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies is more charitable towards the President. In its *Strategic Survey 1977*, IISS says that the May 19 policy statement "has much to recommend it, since it imposes not substantive but procedural constraints, capable of doing justice to specific circumstances in each case, and at the same time establishes that only criteria of national security interests (and not economic or political opportunity) will be applied." As always, the IISS annual survey is an unparalleled source for documentation on the arms trade.

But before leaving Gervasi, his comments on the uniqueness of weapons as a commodity deserve repeating here. "No other commodity can expand its market by the simple device of selective sales. All the salesman need do is sell the latest weapon to one country and wait for its neighbor to respond with jealousy or fear. That is how arms races are born. Generations of weapons quickly obsolesce their predecessors, and that is how arms races are continued. What we have not learned is how they are ended."

*Arsenal of Democracy* will enjoy brisk sales, particularly abroad. In doing so, it may achieve precisely the opposite effect of that intended by Gervasi. With its detailed photographs and descriptions of more than five hundred weapons currently available in the United States, Gervasi's book makes an excellent shopping catalogue. It may actually help the arms trade along—not that any real assistance is needed.

The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute describes itself as an independent institute for research into problems of peace and conflict, with particular attention to the problems of disarmament and arms regulation. Founded in 1966, SIPRI is financed by the Swedish Parliament

and has an international staff and governing board. The *SIPRI Yearbook* has become something of a classic as a guide to the arms trade, especially from the point of view of the arms control activist. At \$35 a copy, the annual SIPRI publication is more than a casual investment for the average reader, but it is increasingly available in American libraries and there is probably no more authoritative source on the subject.

SIPRI's 1978 yearbook discusses, in some detail, the growing scale of arms transfers to the Third World. It notes the changing pattern of these sales in recent years. The overwhelmingly dominant suppliers remain the United States and the Soviet Union, accounting for more than seventy percent of the market. But the quantitative aspects of this trade no longer tell the full story. SIPRI is concerned over the qualitative changes that have occurred in arms sales to the Third World. It used to be that the US and the USSR concentrated mainly on modernizing their own armed forces and those of their allies—with the resulting surplus weapons and obsolescent aircraft then made available to the Third World.

SIPRI sees this pattern as having shifted to the point where Washington and Moscow are now providing top-of-the-line weapons directly out of the active inventories of their combat forces. Thus Israel was resupplied from US stocks in Europe (aircraft, tanks and munitions) during, and immediately following the 1973 Middle East War. And, says SIPRI, "some types of nuclear delivery systems have been transferred to Third World countries (for example, the US Lance surface-to-surface missile to Israel and the Soviet Scud to Egypt, Iraq and Syria), and if the spread of production capacity for nuclear weapons in the wake of the spread of nuclear energy production is not safeguarded in time, the arms traffic may eventually come to include traffic also in nuclear weapons."

Not a pleasant prospect. Neither is the fact that Third World nations are now mortgaging their development priorities in order to buy supersonic fighter aircraft. And missiles and bombs to go with them. Ruth Leger Sivard used to be chief of the economics division of

the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. She wrote a study for ACDA that related world military expenditures with what was being spent on education and public health. The Nixon Administration didn't like it, and ordered the publication stopped. Mrs. Sivard then resigned from ACDA, and began publishing *World Military and Social Expenditures*, annually, on her own.

It is a sobering document. We learn from it that the average family pays more in taxes to support the world arms race than to educate its children. That developing nations, despite severe food shortages, use five times as much foreign exchange for the import of arms as for agricultural machinery. And that in Third World nations there is one soldier for 250 inhabitants, and one doctor for 3,700.

"Modern technology," says Mrs. Sivard, "has made it possible to deliver a bomb across the world in minutes. Women in rural areas of Asia and Africa still walk several hours a day for the family's water supply." Her book is filled with tables of statistics showing, for instance, that Somalia spent 22 million dollars in 1975 on military expenditures, and only nine million on education. Or that Pakistan spent nearly twice as much on national defense as it did on education and public health combined. She quotes World Bank President Robert McNamara, a former US Secretary of Defense: "It always comes down to a question of priorities. A new generation of fighters for the air force; or a new generation of infants who will live beyond their fifth birthday."

What can be done?

The Council on Foreign Relations, as part of its 1980s Project, commissioned a series of papers on the general subject of *Controlling Future Arms Trade*. The dimensions of the problem were studied, and projected well into the next decade. One author explores the possibility of cooperative restraints among the arms suppliers. Another suggests ways that arms purchasing countries might organize themselves regionally to institute restraints on demand. More than anything, the Council study demonstrates the complexities of the problem—and the fact that it is getting worse.

Except possibly for the people who profit from the sale of arms. Even then, the new Carter policy of discouraging US officials abroad from pushing arms sales has already had some impact. An authoritative trade journal reports that US Embassy officials were recently asked by members of the House Armed Services Committee, who visited London on a NATO fact-finding mission, how best to get to the Farnborough air show—a major international exhibit for the arms trade.

They were told that, unless Washington officially recognizes the event and makes funds for VIP transportation available, they should plan on buying a ticket on the hourly train from Waterloo Station.

## FSJ BOOKSHELF

### Covert Activities

STAINED GLASS, by William F. Buckley, Jr. Doubleday, \$8.95.

William Buckley, after success in other fields, appears here as author

of a book of spy fiction. His hero, Blackford Oakes, is a deep-cover CIA agent on an important mission in West Germany. The mission is accomplished, but Oakes is not altogether happy about the result. He does not believe in killing a friend, particularly one who is also a friend of America, but orders are orders—in the CIA as elsewhere. The plot is ingenious, the narrative holds our attention nicely, and one ends the book hoping to learn more about Oakes/Buckley in future volumes.

The book, in short, is well worth reading, even though many questions come to mind when one finishes it. How much of the detail on Langley tradecraft, one wonders, is a product of the novelist's imagination? How much is the result of Mr. Buckley's brief employment many years ago as a junior officer trainee in CIA, working for Howard Hunt (himself a novelist, by the way, of more talent than reviewers have given him credit for)? Did Buckley, whom one at once assumes takes such matters very seriously, get Agency clearance for publication of the

book? Regulations require such clearance, do they not? And what do his old friends in the profession think about the way he focuses attention on some of the more controversial aspects of the Agency's activities. For some in the Agency must feel, as one would have expected Buckley to feel, that a moratorium on public discussion of political murder might now be in the national interest.

It is a measure of Mr. Buckley's artful handling of his material that, as the reader looks back over the book as a whole, a final appalling possibility forces its way forward. Is *Stained Glass* quite the simple spy story it pretends to be (note, by the way, the layers of meaning one can find in the title alone)? Can it be that Buckley, harboring reservations about the morality of his old associates in the Company but unwilling to surface with the Snepps and Stockwells of our time in openly criticizing the Agency, has turned novelist to get into the public domain his inner doubts about the ethics of espionage? Might it not even be that *Stained Glass*, far from being an entertaining jeu

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
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
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*d'esprit* of an impeccable conservative, is in reality Buckley's *cri de conscience* as a secret enemy of the political jungle of which he writes with such evident familiarity? If this be so—and there is ample historical precedent for such covert literary dissidence—then *Stained Glass* is an important book indeed.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

### Diplomatic Memories

**MULTIPLE EXPOSURE:** *An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues*, by Jacob D. Beam. Norton, \$10.95.

It is by now a well-established tradition that our ex-ambassadors to the Soviet Union write books about their adventures in Moscow. Of the thirteen holders of this important post between 1933 and 1973, only Laurence Steinhardt and Llewellyn Thompson failed to leave books behind them, and these two would surely have done so had they not been cut off by early deaths. *Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues* is Ambassador Jacob Beam's in-

formed and readable contribution to this series.

In rapid and concise fashion, Ambassador Beam gives the reader a brief account of his earlier tours of duty in the Department and abroad, leading up to longer descriptions of his experiences as ambassador in Warsaw from 1957 to 1961, in Prague from 1966 to 1969, and in Moscow from 1969 to 1973. Political trends in the countries in which he served are treated at considerable length, but with sufficient accompanying anecdotal detail for the book to qualify as a political memoir rather than as potted history. Future historians will find in the volume much that will aid them in their understanding of the personalities and points of view of the men responsible for the conduct and execution of American foreign policy in these years.

But if future scholars will thus necessarily have to include Ambassador Beam's narrative in their bibliographies, it is unlikely that any will see in the book a source of new insights into the foreign policymaking process. There is lit-

tle discussion in depth, for example, of the conduct of affairs by either President Nixon or by Secretary Kissinger. Of the former, Beam contents himself with the somewhat sanctimonious explanation that "unlike some other officials who served the president in similar fashion, I do not feel called upon to comment on the events which led to his downfall and the culmination of a vastly depressing human tragedy." On Kissinger, he is a bit more forthcoming: "His towering intellect would have brought him to the top without the need to deploy his gifts of intrigue and defamation, which he enjoyed doing." But then we look in vain for the kind of first-hand circumstantial detail which Ambassador Beam could presumably provide and which we would need if we are to give credence to such a damaging appraisal of Kissinger's performance.

On another subject, now much in the news, the ambassador is much less reticent. He makes it clear that he does not altogether approve of the attention which has been given



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edited by Ralph Hilton,  
foreword by Jack K. McFall

This collection of 18 tales of life in the Service ranges from the Cannes film festival to cannibalism and from Helen Keller to the Cuban missile crisis. *Journal* readers will recognize some of these as old friends, entries in the McFall Contest of some years ago, now packaged in a handsome volume, published by the University of South Carolina Press. The book has been acclaimed by Henry Kissinger, Mrs. Dean Acheson, Loy Henderson and the late Robert Murphy.

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to the Russian dissenters, and says that while he was ambassador "the embassy thought it best to avoid direct contact with dissenters which might embarrass us and cause them serious trouble. . ." He is particularly out of sympathy for Alexander Solzhenitsyn, as the following gratuitous passage makes clear:

"Solzhenitsyn in particular posed a problem for all concerned. One of his former Russian editors told me that Solzhenitsyn's first drafts contained masses of eloquent but undigested writing which had to be organized into a coherent whole. The original manuscript of his *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, which Khrushchev allowed to be published, was three times the length of the finished book and was overloaded with vulgarisms and obscure passages which had to be edited out."

And on relations between the regime in Moscow and the country's non-Russian minorities, one comes on the observation—an astonishing one for a man who is now president of the Free Europe Committee—that "the Russians are accustomed to ruling and, as I have remarked before, have on the whole probably done it as well as any other group

could."

The Medvedev brothers, incidentally, are mistakenly referred to as sociologists, when in fact one is an historian and other (whose first name is also misspelled) is a biologist.

—THOMAS A. DONOVAN

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methods employed by the French army foreshadowed the American experience, but with one difference—in the strict military sense they were almost successful, and at one point had driven virtually the entire enemy guerrilla force into Tunisia.

But politically the war was a disaster. In the process six French prime ministers were successively toppled and France found herself locked in a struggle with her own settlers, led by French generals. In the end she was only saved from a military *coup* by the inflexibility of de Gaulle and the ineptitude and thin political base of the conspirators.

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## ARMS CONTROL: THE DIFFUSION OF EXPERTISE

from page 26

bombs? True, the great powers can read the emissions of bomb explosions with sensors and determine the components, the quality of finish and probable origins. Such a direct assault on a super power would nevertheless offer grave provocation. The question of how much great powers control their client states' actions is always murky, even to the controllers. A judgment of such linkages and appropriate responses might have to be made quickly and under great stress. In such cases, the same problem emerges as it does in a general nuclear exchange scenario: do new techniques of monitoring and response really mean that the great powers might exchange nuclear weapons shot for shot without escalating to a full broadside, the so-called "limited strategic option scenario?" Is it valid to expect that *probably* there would be no nuclear sneak attacks by one smaller nation against another small nation, but rather that the use of such weapons would come at the *end* of a series of

provocations, and probably only after conventional invasion of the initiating power's territory? This is the heart of the problem.

The boom in arms sales and transfer in which the United States has had clear dominance has such questions built into it. When nuclear weapons and their control systems were relatively crude, from 1949 to the early 1960s, the use of a nuclear weapon by either side would have been a clear signal that the gauntlet was down. In the conditions of stalemate and an uncertain American will to use power and force, and the new technologies of jamming, would the same kind of insouciance shown by the Carter administration toward the Finlandization of Angola be displayed toward Europe if NATO C<sup>3</sup> (Communications, Command, Control) was jammed out for three days while a Soviet conventional invasion isolated American forces from communication? Would the fatigue, anxiety, uncertainty and blank display screens produce paralysis—or some kind of nuclear response? It may be that the option of a dazzling, super-infiltrating *blitzkrieg* in Western Europe would

increase the likelihood of a nuclear counterspasm. Yet, who can foretell if this would be the case? Little consideration has been given to the fact that poverty may enhance innovative capacity, and reduce cost and superfluity.

In spite of these uncertainties and the complexities of keeping a balanced view of developing systems, the main focus of policymakers and military leaders is on the quantity of weapons. The values of a world that saw military power in terms of "rifles" on land and "the main battle line" at sea are with us still; vital parts of the military support system are still viewed as being as marginal as "the tail." In spite of attempts at reform, prestige and promotability still lie in careers close to the combat "teeth" as opposed to the administration "tail," although, in some cases, a military organization may better survive a loss of weaponry than of its support system. Nevertheless, a basic assumption underlying the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (as was the case with the Naval Conferences of the 1920s and '30s) is that a reduction of principal units of power

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constitutes effective disarmament. Fixating on ICBMs and SLBMs as modern equivalents to battleships tends to depreciate the power of innovation in science and technology, for innovations are often a response to the shelving or curtailing of other weapons types. Like a flashflood moving over sand, the flow is unpredictable, especially since boundaries between pure and applied civilian research and military application blur as developments in technology and science follow an exponential growth curve. A treaty curbing weapons numbers can more easily be presented as a politico-diplomatic triumph.

The implications, then, of the expanding wave of military-related technology are many, for proliferation goes beyond weaponry. The focus of arms control and strategy alike must extend beyond weaponry to related systems, and must keep in mind that instability may be masked in the complexities that arise from qualitative proliferation. This is especially true in regard to advantages perceived as components and designs change,



for there is a particularly strong potential for conflict when advantage is perceived after a long period of stalemate. The sense that a panacea is at hand, and that the all-too-fleeting moment of advantage must be seized, is a very heady and dangerous feeling. The only immediate control over such instabilities lies in accepting uncertainty as the ultimate control. The diffusion of technologically complex systems, less and less visible by surveillance satellites, and the incentive to develop circumventing innovations must be kept in mind. Such dispersal, inadvertent or intentional, will place a greater premium on conventional intelligence gathering, on synthesis and evalua-

tion of information and on measured response. As heartening as evidence may be of common interest and good will in the field of arms control, nevertheless as military-related science and technology continue to develop, and as smaller nations develop larger pools of expertise which are part of modern military power, gains made on one part of the game-board are lost on others, and the reduction of major weapons is but a shrinking of the loaf. The toughest part of the crust lies ahead, for qualitative proliferation has a momentum which is difficult to perceive and to arrest. A problem no less critical than conventional and strategic weapons proliferation, it is of such a nature that inattention to its potential may confound the achievements and hopes of those who aimed their efforts at controlling weapons *per se*. That current proliferation of all types of weapons constitutes a virtual polarization of much of the Third World cannot be of comfort to those who remember how the Balkans proved to be the tinder-box of more than Europe.



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
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## WHAT IS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

from page 34

standings having been eliminated and mutual understanding of differing points of view having been achieved, agreement will somehow flow from those achievements, or, alternatively, some other process will take over to resolve the differences. At any rate, understanding but not necessarily agreement appears to be the ultimate aim of ICA's public diplomacy in contrast to traditional diplomacy's aim of seeking agreement, however tentative or ephemeral it might prove to be.

Those who advocate governmental sponsorship of international exchange of information and ideas usually base their advocacy on a familiar chain of reasoning. A strong, free, unimpeded flow of truthful information between peoples of different countries, they argue, promotes better mutual understanding. Better mutual understanding leads to increased tolerance, respect and perhaps even affection, and it decreases the likeli-

hood of conflict arising from misunderstanding or ignorance. Thus, the causes of world peace and international brotherhood are served. Unfortunately, this reasoning ignores abundant evidence, past and present, to the contrary. In every period of history and in every quarter of the globe, peoples of different languages and cultures who, it can be assumed, know each other as well as it is possible for different peoples to know each other have been the deadliest of enemies. Peoples living for centuries in adjacent lands or even intermingling have engaged in bloody slaughter and repeated wars: the French and the Germans in Europe, the Hindus and the Muslims in the Indian subcontinent, the Vietnamese and the Cambodians in southeast Asia—the list could go on both historically and geographically. When peoples of different cultures, languages and values come to know each other better, their tendency to engage in disputes and wars apparently does not necessarily diminish; it may even increase. So the advocate for public diplomacy seems to be inclined to use an ar-

gument based in large part upon wishful thinking that flies in the face of the evidence of human experience.

Whatever its intended purpose—whether it is to persuade or to inform—and whatever its utility to serve the cause of world peace, public diplomacy implies a need for governments to communicate, not only with the governments of other countries after the fashion of traditional diplomacy, but with the people of those countries as well. That is the principal difference between traditional and public diplomacy. If the purpose of public diplomacy is to inform rather than to persuade, it further implies a deficiency of some kind in the movement of information across international boundaries by non-government means, a deficiency demanding assistance or correction through governmental efforts. In his letter transmitting *Reorganization Plan Number 2* to Congress, President Carter prophesied that "the new agency will play a central role in building . . . two-way bridges of understanding between our people and the peoples of the world." Lest

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
anyone become alarmed about the government playing a central role in international communication and perhaps thereby displacing some existing private channels of communication, John Reinhardt in Knoxville had explained that "it is not the function of public diplomacy to compete, rather to enhance and supplement existing efforts." Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to ask why a government must play a central role in international communication, why a government must enhance and supplement existing efforts. Technological improvements in the means of communication have made international communication more widespread than ever before in history. Barriers to the movement of information across national boundaries exist, but they are man-made barriers and whether governments can effectively penetrate them when private means cannot is questionable. More often than not, when private means are frustrated, governmental efforts suffer to about the same degree.

Moreover, governmental activities in international communication always run the risk not only of being suspected to be outright propaganda, but of actually degenerating into the self-serving half-truths and lies of propaganda. Is this a risk worth taking in the interests of serving some higher, overriding need? In brief, what particular dimension can government bring to international communication (apart from the communication of traditional diplomacy) that is clearly needed and that non-governmental means cannot bring? To ask the question is not intended to imply that the answer is necessarily "none;" it is meant only to call attention to the need for a convincing explanation of what public diplomacy is and why we need it.

So long as the world is composed of a congeries of sovereign, independent nations, there will be an obvious and demonstrated need for the management of relations among those nations by negotiation—in short, for the foreseeable future, there will be a need for traditional

diplomacy, however it is carried on, whether by ambassadors or heads of state in person.

Is there an equally obvious and demonstrable need for something called public diplomacy? Does traditional diplomacy now require a complementary effort it did not require in the past? Is the movement of information across national boundaries—so accelerated in recent years thanks to improvements in communications technology—yet deficient in some respect so as to demand that governments stimulate and enhance international communication and officially communicate not only with the governments of other countries but with the people of those countries as well? If so, does a government's responsibility in this undertaking end with establishing mutual understanding of differing points of view (i.e. informing) or does its responsibility properly extend beyond that "starting point" in two-way communication to seek agreement (i.e. persuading)? Indeed, is it really possible for a gov-



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ernment to communicate with the people of another country in any way except as some form of advocacy and persuasion (propaganda, if you will), however truthful and mild that propaganda might be? The answers to those questions remain uncertain. Public diplomacy remains an ambiguous term and a doubtful concept, the utility of which is usually defended with an argument that is, at least in some respects, demonstrably wrong.

"Public diplomacy," if the term has meaning, signifies a process closely and directly related to traditional diplomacy which is the principal means by which foreign policy is carried out. Hans Morgenthau, with characteristic insight, has written that "the ultimate aim of foreign policy is always the same: to promote one's interests by changing the mind of the opponent . . . All foreign policy, then, is a struggle for the minds of men." As a presumed element of a coordinated effort to achieve that aim, public diplomacy logically seeks to persuade foreign peoples and gov-

ernments to agree with American policies and purposes, or so the term itself suggests. There is nothing wrong in seeking to do so. The American government considers those policies and purposes correct, or it would not embrace them. To seek agreement on them is both logical and responsible. The first step in that process is to achieve mutual understanding, but it seems altogether proper and necessary for a government's public diplomacy—if a governmental effort of that kind is proper and necessary in the first instance—to take the next step which is to seek the ultimate objective of all diplomacy, i.e. agreement.

In the absence of a convincing and logically consistent explanation of what public diplomacy is, those who say they practice it risk being regarded as propagandists—in the worst sense of the word—on the one hand, or on the other hand as people engaged in an undertaking of questionable utility which fulfills no demonstrated need and lacks any legitimate purpose. Is

public diplomacy really just a euphemism for that familiar old bugaboo, propaganda, practiced either by heads of government personally making astute use of the devices of international mass communication for their own ends, or, more familiarly, by bureaucratic organizations doing the same? If it is not—as the American government says it is not—is public diplomacy nevertheless still an element of diplomacy as those who use the term obviously mean to imply? If it is, are its ultimate aims the same as those of traditional diplomacy? Or is the term currently being employed as a euphemism for something which seeks identification with a respected and needed traditional activity but which shrinks from the difficult choices that inevitably arise as a part of that activity? Whatever it is, public diplomacy awaits its Harold Nicolson to define convincingly and with precision what it is, why it is needed, what it should try to accomplish and how it should be carried on.



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## THE AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL from page 19


tration were among the greatest enthusiasts for expanding the American involvement in Vietnam and providing it with intellectual justification—that is, until disaster became apparent, at which time they abandoned ship in a body, leaving President Johnson with an unwinnable war on his hands.

While it is probably too soon to judge the ultimate success or failure of the foreign policies of Henry Kissinger in the Nixon and Ford administrations, it seems clear that his belief in "linkage" and obsession with America's pivotal role in the balance of world power played an instrumental part in extending the Vietnam war six years after the date that President Nixon took office. The same obsession with authority at the expense of dissent led him to ignore public opinion at home and to dictate conformity to his subordinates, including telephone taps on their private conversations. Kissinger's most unattractive quality, considering his own refugee origins, is his callous-

ness to human suffering. He cold-bloodedly placed balance-of-power considerations above considerations of common humanity in "tilting" toward Pakistan at the time of its sadistic extermination of unarmed Bangladesh civilians, and he connived with Greek and Latin American military *juntas* in their oppression of their own citizens.

President Carter's dependence on his own stable of intellectuals is even more pronounced than was the case with his predecessors Nixon and Ford, who were experienced politicians with lengthy exposure to foreign affairs. An excellent case can be made for the argument that Zbigniew Brzezinski made Jimmy Carter president of the United States. By introducing Carter to the Trilateral Commission, and thereafter becoming his tutor in foreign affairs, Brzezinski provided an entree to larger horizons than Carter would otherwise have aspired to. Only prior indebtedness can explain why yet another foreign professor, devoid of practical experience and a stranger to this country's wars,

should be giving advice on national security matters and actually setting himself up as a rival to the secretary of state. The damage to American foreign relations inflicted by the periodic effusions of this erratic and excitable intellectual is all the greater because of the political inexperience of the president.

So long as the symbiotic relationship between the politician, the intellectual and the media continues to dominate government, we can expect an increasing drift to public diplomacy. The inevitable result will be sweeping policy pronouncements and inflated expectations followed by diplomatic retreat in the face of practical realities, with public disillusionment and howls of execration as the sequel. For the last decade the intellectual has profited in every material way from this state of affairs. It is now time for him to recognize his responsibilities. No reasonable person would contest the rightful place of the intellectual in a civilized society. But unless clothed in integrity it should not be in the field of foreign affairs. 

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from page 22

less likely to make the wrong moves.


And if our priorities are right, we'll be more likely to avoid error in the choice of the arena for action. We will avoid taking actions in the UN which, because they violate the charter, are perceived as illegal and hypocritical by the people we are trying to influence, and are therefore destined to be ineffective. We will avoid actions or statements which encourage paranoia and self-righteousness on the part of rulers as well as promoting, on the side of the challengers, a radicalization, a refusal to compromise, and an unjustified reliance on salvation by outside intervention. And finally, with our eyes on the ball, we are less likely to make the serious mistake of attempting the wrong kind of linkages.

I am not objecting to linkage as such in diplomacy, any more than in collective bargaining between management and labor. I just object to ill-chosen and ineffective linkages such as that represented

by the Jackson-Vanik amendment. For policy-makers in Africa and elsewhere, this is a classic example of what not to do. If the primary objective is to get exit visas for Soviet Jews, you start by recognizing that this is an essentially domestic issue and hence extremely sensitive for any country. So you should prefer quiet diplomacy to public confrontation. And you also avoid linking this objective with the quite unrelated issue of whether to end our trade discrimination against the USSR. In a nutshell, a simple rule to follow is that linkage, to be successful, should associate like objects. It is appropriate to link the neutron bomb or cruise missile with Soviet rocket launchers, for instance. We'll forego ours if they forego theirs. This doesn't guarantee that our offer will be accepted. But one thing we can count on. We won't make matters actually worse, as the Jackson amendment has done. I hope the Department draws the proper lesson from this experience as it reviews some of the hasty proposals for leverage and linkage now being urged on the Administration,

and even within the Administration, in the name of human rights.

Should we apply linkage, in the form of conditions, to our economic aid? Well, that depends. In the most tyrannical and cruel dictatorships, we can avoid initiating aid programs in the first place. But for countries where programs already exist, I think we can usually do more for human rights if we confine our linkage to conditions relating to the practical effectiveness of our aid in attaining its objectives. The host countries will understand and accept the argument that we can hardly use tax-supported resources on projects which do not really reach or benefit the people.

The advancement of human rights is an objective which, like the pursuit of happiness, can most often be achieved by indirection, rather than frontal assault. 



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
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# LETTERS TO FSJ

## From the Silent Majority

 For far too long I have been a silent member, similar to many others, in the majority of lower ranking people in Foreign Service. After the latest affront to the lower ranking, I feel that I no longer can remain silent. I, like many others, have voiced often and sometimes loudly to those around me my feelings about the seemingly endless ways that management has found to undermine the staff corps, in particular, and now, much to my surprise, even the lower ranking officers. The latest issue of September 17 headline RICH GET RICHER AND POOR GET POORER really states what is happening. The recent change in the cost of living allowance borders on the point of being ridiculous. All the statistics, graphs, and charts cannot prove a thing to me. The only thing that I see is that my allowance has been cut to add to the already, in many cases, overpaid pockets of our illustrious leaders. After the last promotion lists came out, there was a great gnashing of teeth about how the poor officers took a beating for the first time in 25 years. More cables and airgrams were transmitted on this subject than I thought was possible.

It is not really strange to those of us in the staff corps that not too many of our leaders have been upset about the constant beating the staff corps has been taking for years. The answer to our problems has always been: "Why not change fields—go Mustang—go Lateral." Without the staff corps, Foreign Service cannot survive. Management apparently finds it difficult to understand that many of us in the staff corps consider ourselves professionals. I cannot imagine any ambassador wishing to have a Staff-9 or -8 as his secretary, or a Regional Communications Officer with the same rank. I, like many others in the staff corps, happen to enjoy my job. I feel that it takes a great deal more technical expertise to be a good communicator than to be a good officer. I also feel it is the same for the secretarial staff. I can hear now some of the comments that will be coming from some officers reading this—comments such

as: "He doesn't have a degree and doesn't realize what it takes to get one, if he could." Comments like that will no longer be valid for many of us. I, like many others in the staff corps, have such credentials—a B.A. in Business Administration and most of my Masters in International Relations. Even with those credentials, I don't think that I would like to be an officer any more, as was once my desire. I like to think of myself as a professional and am more concerned with getting the job done as best I can. I am not saying that all officers are not concerned with getting the job done, but the majority that I have met, and especially the fat cats back in the Department, are more concerned with their own personal ego trips and maintaining themselves as an elite group above all others.

Let's get to some of the basics. An ambassador or consul general, and, as I have seen, all the officers from a major section of a post may be absent and the work goes on as usual. If the secretary or communicator is gone, there is pandemonium. If the secretary is missing, there are plaintive cries of "Who will type this letter" or "Who will make my coffee." When the communicator is gone, there are not only the too frequent and ridiculous questions such as "What about the stamps that I need" or "Who is going to pick up our mail" or "Who is going to mail my package," the blunt truth is that in many cases (one man posts) there are no communications *period*. Without communications a post cannot function. And, it is about time that management realizes this plain and simple fact. It would be interesting to check and see who has the most home leave accumulated, because it is never possible for a communicator to be gone for too long. The same result would be found by checking annual leave for the same reason.


It is about time that pay and promotions should be given according to merit. It is about time that management realizes that it costs the same to house and feed a family of four for a Staff Six as it does for an 0-6. Allowances should be paid on need, not rank. If it is necessary for an officer to entertain, then give him representation allowances. Don't take the money from the

lower ranking to add additional lining to the higher ranking. If management is trying to completely destroy the morale and initiative of the staff, they are certainly doing a great job. I find myself in the same position as many others in my bracket. I don't really want to leave Foreign Service. Because I have a family, it is difficult to leave without having another job waiting (difficult to find when 10,000 miles from home). But, if I had a good job offer, I would leave tomorrow with only a few small regrets. I would like to feel that things are going to change in the not too distant future, but I doubt it, and I don't wish to wait until I am 50 to see if it will change.

I sincerely hope that many more of the silent majority will now start to come out in the open and state their feelings as loudly and as well as they can. Without this happening, I don't think the future of the staff corps has a prayer.


DENNIS E. HINEN  
C&R Assistant  
AmConGen Sydney

## Correction

 The last time I had an article in the FSJ, some years ago, you identified me as going to Bucharest, whereas I was headed for Prague. In my article about DCM-ships in the August issue you said I had served as DCM in Prague and Moscow. Actually it was Prague and Stockholm, and I thought maybe I should write to set the record straight.

JACK PERRY  
Washington

## Long Distance Biking

 Having served with Jorma Kaukonen in Sweden from '62 to '67, we would like to respond to "A Report from Sweden and Finland."

Bravo, Jorma! As veterans of three long-distance bicycle trips, we applaud your trip from Sweden to Finland and your telling of it.

You made a number of points which were dear to our hearts. First of all, that one is never too old to embrace new experiences, particularly experiences which involve physical effort.

Secondly, we couldn't agree more with your choice of tube tires


over sew-ups, heavier spokes and panniers, as opposed to any sort of encumbrance on the back.

Most of all, we were smiling in agreement as you said: "I love long, sustained physical effort in an andante tempo . . . a daily schedule with a specified geographic goal of at least a hundred kilometers . . . I must have warm food . . . They . . . don't like to stop in small town restaurants. . . ." You see, our trips through Switzerland, Ireland and Scotland (on Raleigh 4-speeds, I might add) were taken in the company of 15 teen-agers, 14 through 19. Let's face it, there is a "generation gap" when it comes to long-distance biking styles.

Problems do fade, and the "golden glow" does indeed remain. We're ready to set off again any time. How about it?

JANIS AND PHIL BENSON  
Burke, Va.

### America's Foreign Policy

 There's nothing wrong with America's foreign policy in Asia, bad as it is, that a little old-fashioned graciousness couldn't cure. It's not so much what we're doing but how we're doing it that's so shameful.

There are few students of foreign affairs who would deny that establishing relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam would be in the best interests of the United States. Yet in the corridors of Foggy Bottom that project now has all the urgency and priority of distracted inattention. Normalization of relations has been put on the back burner.

Aside from our precedent-setting expulsion of the Vietnamese ambassador to the United Nations, admittedly done without the prior consultation with Hanoi required by the 1947 US-UN treaty, our diplomatic initiatives in six days of Paris negotiations have been marked by a distinct lack of imagination. Holding up conclusion of the whole venture is a matter of \$4.25 billion in postwar reconstruction grants and rehabilitation aid. We have let this meanness smolder and fester; we ourselves have created it as a thorny issue. How much more gracious it would have been if years ago we had beaten the Vietnamese to the punch by offer-

ing such aid unilaterally and magnanimously and then reaping worldwide plaudits for our sincere arrangements to implement the program of reconstruction. Did we lose our sense of graciousness when we lost a war?

Likewise, there are few students of international affairs who would deny that maintaining our unsinkable launching pads at Clark Field and Subic Bay is very much in the interests of the United States. Yet again bitter words are being exchanged in Manila as we renegotiate our rights to Philippine bases. The majority of the vast acreage we hold outside of Angeles and Olongapo has never been used. Some of that acreage is still virgin jungle. How gracious—and how diplomatically fruitful—it would have been if years ago we had ceded this unused and unwanted land back to the Philippines, keeping only what we could use, and thus won the applause of the world for our enlightenment in working out arrangements to assist in developing this land for low-cost housing and agricultural resettlement.

What seems to be lacking in Foggy Bottom that these solutions never were followed through by those mapping our diplomatic ventures? To what university or institution or establishment should we turn in the search for men with a sense of graciousness? Isn't that any longer a facet of diplomacy?


RICHARD P. WILSON  
(FSIO, Ret.)

Hauula, Hawaii

EDITOR'S NOTE: *This correspondent's ire with the corridors of Foggy Bottom is misdirected. He should instead address Capitol Hill, since the issue of non-provision of economic assistance to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is neither evidence of bureaucratic meanness nor a lack of AID and State Department graciousness, but rather results from explicit statutory mandates.*

*Provision of economic aid to Vietnam is currently prohibited by a number of congressional enactments: language in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1977 and Section 107 of the 1978 Foreign Aid Appropriations Act, forbids the expenditure of any foreign assistance funds for Vietnam. Also, Section 411 of the P.L. 480 "Food for Peace" legislation, prevents either concessional sales of US agricultural commodities (Titles I and III) or donations (Title II) of food aid to Vietnam.*

### For Moral Courage

 In Martin Herz's recent article " 'Prostitution' in the Foreign Service—And What to Do About It" (*Journal*, August 1978) he told the story of his encounter with a Foreign Service inspector who was afraid that his own career would be damaged if he reported honestly on a certain ambassador. Mr. Herz concluded that "Perhaps one can learn from this tale that sometimes an extra dose of moral courage is most likely to be found among officers who no longer have much to lose . . ."


My suggestion is this—Consideration should be given to using retired Foreign Service officers as members of inspection teams. They are certainly knowledgeable about the workings of Foreign Service posts, they are not being drawn away from other duties, and, importantly, they have no personal axes to grind. They are no longer affected in their judgments by career possibilities.

The chief inspector of the team should probably continue to be an active officer—he is most currently aware for counseling purposes of personnel trends within the Department. But a retired officer on the team could be a strong element, especially in cases such as those cited in Mr. Herz's article.

I realize that at this time, with so many senior officers floating around without good assignments, it is not practical to suggest that inspector assignments should not be available to them. But, hopefully, this is a passing phase, and some thought will be given to using retired officers on inspection teams, for the good of the Foreign Service.

ARTHUR D. FOLEY  
Washington, D.C.

### DCM Selection

 Jack Perry's article in the August *Journal*—On Being a Deputy Chief of Mission—was excellent. Congratulations to him for writing and to the *Journal* for publishing such a well-considered assessment of the needs, and at times pleasures, of a job that does not always get the attention it merits.

Having been deputy to ambassadors on six occasions—and twice more for temporary periods—in about ten years, I was especially gratified to read and agree with

practically all of Perry's words of advice and warning to those who hold DCM positions or are about to assume them. My only doubt was raised about his view that ambassadors should, presumably in all instances, select their own DCMs. No DCM should, of course, be forced on a reluctant chief, nor should one be continued long whose personality obviously conflicts with the man in charge. Yet I have known ambassadors, usually political ones, who were clearly in need of a DCM who would not hesitate to correct procedural mistakes the chief was about to make or, more important, to challenge the ambassador's judgments on substantive questions. Such ambassadors are not likely to select such deputies.

EDWARD A. JAMISON  
Chevy Chase

### Of the Making of Books

James Hansen's article on bookbinding (*FS Journal*, August) brings to mind the Foreign Service's own bookbinding ritual in former times. Once a year each of our file rooms the world over would clear a table for some local binder, who would arrive with thread, needles, glue pots, and previously prepared covers (some with spines that often were covered with gorgeous red leather, with gold lettering) and bind up the paper debris of the previous year, classified as well as unclassified. The resultant volumes would then join those of previous years, in some dusty closet.

And in time those handsome volumes were packed off to the National Archives where, I am told, each was broken up and bindings thrown out, so as to discard as well those items that duplicated what materials had already been received from the State Department. I had the pleasure shortly after World War II, for instance, of removing from the empty, bomb-damaged legation residence in the Soviet sector of Vienna the accumulated archives of our mission in that city, covering the years from when it was first opened in the 1820s. Inter alia, these volumes included an instruction, signed by the Secretary of State, directing the United States minister to offer congratulations to the Empress on

the birth of her latest daughter!

MICHAEL GANNETT  
Chevy Chase

### On Professionalism

Congratulations on the high quality of the August issue. The fine, professionally-oriented articles by Herz, Perry and Schutz are what we should expect of the magazine of a professional organization. What a shame that our Association devotes only a few lines in its five-page annual report in the same issue to professionalism and then only notes that its Committee on Professional Affairs has sponsored lunches and "considered the feasibility of developing" a code of ethics and a statement of the uniqueness of the Foreign Service.

JACK B. BUTTON

Tokyo

**AFSA President Hydle replies:** The Annual Report published in the August *FSJ* devoted about a column-and-a-half to professional affairs and the *FSJ*. The Professional Affairs Committee, through the January *FSJ*, asked Members to participate in the consideration of the uniqueness/ethics issue; response from the Membership was disappointing.

### Bibliophile Needed

I have read every page of the July *Journal* and am moved to say that it is the best issue since 1920. Of course in 1920 it was known as the *Consular Bulletin*, but that does not change the facts

of content. In the 1920s Fred Simpich, a popular writer of magazine articles along with his service as a consular officer, used to have to beg, in the pages of the *Bulletin*, for contributions from the field, and then write unsigned articles for the *Bulletin* himself as he was one of the editors. I think I have read, cover to cover, every issue of the *Bulletin* and the *Journal* (and the *Newsletter*) since then.


We have not solved the problem of a publisher of a second volume of *Foreign Service Authors*. Foreign Service people do not stop writing, of course, and their books are appearing every few weeks. We have recorded about 300 additional authors and/or books which have appeared since 1973 which we will give to the person who will compile a second volume.

Work on a second volume has to be a "labor of love" as I have not found another publisher. The publisher of the first volume, the Scarecrow Press, Ltd. of Metuchen, N.J. did not make a fortune on it and we bought the last 40 volumes, of which a few have gone to the Foreign Service Women's Book Fair. Still, the Foreign Service goes on and a bibliography of its authors does have an increasing value as the years go by. There *must* be someone, either active or retired, who would like to take on the second volume.

RICHARD FYFE BOYCE, SR.  
Santa Fe



"Almost think he was trying to tell us something!"



This portion of the JOURNAL is the responsibility of the Governing Board of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.

Members wishing to send letters on employment, working conditions or AFSA affairs should get them to AFSA by the 10th of the month preceding desired publication. AFSA News Committee, Room 3644, N.S.

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## RESULTS OF SURVEY ON BIO REGISTER

Following are the results of the survey on publication of the Biographic Register which appeared in the February 1978 Journal.

"1. I want the Biographic Register as a public document.

YES: 238 NO: 24

2. I agree that my biographic information be published."

YES: 263 NO: 10

A total of 280 individual eligible votes were received. This represents 4.7 percent of total Membership eligible to vote. 11 ineligible ballots, consisting of either non-members or Associates (GS employees) were received.

### DISTRIBUTION BREAKDOWN

#### A. By Area:

|                 |            |
|-----------------|------------|
| Washington      | 85         |
| Academic Detail | 6          |
| Retired         | 7          |
| Overseas*       | 182        |
| <b>TOTAL</b>    | <b>280</b> |

\* 60 votes were received from London; 15 from San Salvador

#### B. By Rank and Pay Plan:

|                | FSO        | FSR       | FSRU      | FSS       | FSIO      | Retired  |
|----------------|------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| Senior (1,2,3) | 79         | 19        | 4         | 6         | 14        | 6        |
| Midlevel (4,5) | 65         | 12        | 7         | 6         | 1         |          |
| Junior (6,7,8) | 18         | 6         | 5         | 4         | 1         |          |
| <b>TOTAL*</b>  | <b>162</b> | <b>37</b> | <b>16</b> | <b>16</b> | <b>16</b> | <b>6</b> |

\*15 votes received from San Salvador did not indicate rank or pay plan; 2 other votes were similarly unmarked for pay plan and rank.

## AFSA LOOKS AT ITSELF

Last June two retired Foreign Service officers who had served as Inspectors—Ambassador Ed Clark and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for Budget and Fiscal Joe Donelan—conducted a survey of AFSA's internal management at the request of the Governing Board. The survey reveals several financial and organizational problems and influenced the Board's Annual Report, delivered at the June 30 Annual Meeting of the Washington Membership and published in the August AFSA News, pp. 45-49. The Board discussed the survey at Board meetings on August 30 and September 5 and 12. As of early September, the Board has taken the following actions with respect to the areas covered by the survey.

### Membership Drive

A vigorous Membership Drive has been launched, with a target of 7,000 Members and Associates. Letters have been sent to non-Member Foreign Service people assigned overseas, and in State and AID in Washington. The goal is 7,000 Members and Associates, including 3,400 State, 1001 AID, 300 ICA, 1,900 Retired, and 500 Associates (which would add up to 7,001). The Board is considering using its authority under Article 11.2 of the Bylaws to create a category of affiliation called "International Affiliate," which would be for certain groups of non-Americans, and would have entitlements similar to those of Associates.

### Internal Communication

Communications must be improved, especially with the Washington Membership. We will increase Redtops and other communication media. We plan on reviewing framework agreements with management to see whether we can use official facilities more effectively for this purpose. We will establish a log to keep track of correspondence. We are further strengthen-

ing the Keyperson Network in the course of the Membership Drive; more help is needed.

### Internal Structure

The President will review the Association's internal structure—the roles and missions of the Board, the Officers, the Committees, and the professional staff—and make recommendations to the Board on how these might be made more efficient.

### Finance

We will obtain an appraisal of the current value of the AFSA headquarters building at 2101 E Street, NW and consider options such as refinancing our mortgage, rental of part of the building, or sale of the building and reinvestment of funds derived therefrom. Meanwhile, we will review the allocation of overhead costs of occupancy of the building and operations among AFSA's various activities to assure that these are fair. The FY 1979 Budget calls for a new roof on the building. If the financial situation of the AFSA General Fund improves, after adjustments in the salary of the professional staff have been implemented, and to the extent permitted by the need to avoid a negative cash balance due to uneven cash flow, the Treasurer will make recommendations to the Governing Board on how such additional money should be used. Priority will be given to proposals which would increase income or net worth, reduce expenditures, or improve our services to the Membership in employee relations.

### Employee Relations

The Board has decided to continue the present priority attached to AFSA's role of representing the career and employee interests of Foreign Service people. We will continue collective actions on behalf of large groups of Foreign Service people, as well as individual grievance counseling; but in case

## ARE YOU A PROBLEM SOLVER? INTERESTED IN MAKING THE CITY WORK EFFECTIVELY?

We need volunteers at the City Hall Complaint Center. District Building, Room 220, 10 am to 2 pm once a week. Call Alice Rowen 652-4158 or Sue Okun EM 3-7845.

of a conflict, greater priority will go to collective actions. Because of limited resources, AFSA will no longer represent non-Member grievants before the Grievance Board and will consider requiring payment for counseling in excess of a certain number of hours. To the extent feasible, we will shift to other members of the professional staff the work the Office of the Counselor presently does which is not directly related to employee relations. We will handle our relations with the Congress, not by hiring a professional lobbyist, but through our professional staff and volunteer AFSA Members who have a good understanding of and/or contacts with the Hill.

#### Foreign Service Journal

The Board recently approved a statement of purpose for the *FSJ*. The Board is asking the Editorial Board to undertake a survey of readership interest which would raise, inter alia, the possibility of more investigative reporting. With a proper allocation of membership dues and the cost of publishing *AFSA News* in the *FSJ*, and consideration of other income-producing and cost-saving measures, the *Journal* should be made to pay all of its direct costs, contribute to overhead operation and occupancy expenses of the Association as a whole. The Finance Committee, in consultation with the Editorial Board, will study this matter and make recommendations to the Governing Board.

#### Foreign Service Club

The Board has directed the Finance Committee to examine once again and make recommendations to the Board concerning measures which might increase usage and revenues of the Club, to enable it not only to meet its direct costs, as projected in the FY 1979 budget, but also contribute toward overhead costs.

#### Scholarship Fund

The corpus of the Fund should not be decreased. The Treasurer will make recommendations concerning the proper allocation of Fund income among increases in the corpus of the Fund, scholarships, and budget support of the Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center.

#### Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center

The Board has rejected a proposal calling for the separate corporate status of the FSECC. We support a review, with the Association of American Foreign Service Women, of the Center's guidelines in order to make it more autonomous in its day-by-day operations, consistent with its present legal and tax status. The Board hopes that

### AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS for dependent sons and daughters of FS Personnel

Materials for the 1979-1980 AFSA Merit Awards and Financial Aid Programs will be ready for mailing in November. All students graduating from high school in 1979 interested in entering the merit awards program and 1979-1980 undergraduate students interested in applying for a financial aid grant from the AFSA Scholarship Fund should apply to:

AFSA Scholarship Programs  
2101 E Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20037

Again this year the deadline for completion of the materials is FEBRUARY 15th.

These programs are made possible by funds from the AFSA Scholarship Fund and funds raised by the AAFSW Book Fair. This annual event needs support throughout the year.

In addition to the 57 scholarship recipients announced in the September *Journal*, **Kristen Coor** was awarded the American Consulate General Ladies' Club, Frankfurt, Scholarship (Northern Arizona University), and **Harrison B. Sherwood** the Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship (Kenyon College).

#### NEW TREASURER



M. James Wilkinson, FSO-3, is currently Deputy Director for Exchanges in the Department's Office of Soviet Union Affairs. He has also served as Administrative Officer at the American Embassy in Moscow (1974-76). Other prior assignments have included the Thai and Soviet desks in the Department, Australia, Germany, and Thailand. He has been active in AFSA as Chapter Chairman in Bangkok and more recently as an EUR Keyman.

the Center will be able to provide more services and earn more income so that AFSA and the AAFSW will be able to avoid increases, and possibly obtain reductions, in their support to the Center's budget.



#### KEN ROGERS NEW VEEP

On July 18 the AFSA Governing Board selected State Representative Kenneth N. Rogers to be Vice President of the Association. Ken has been a Governing Board Member since September 1975 and has served as Chairman of the Standing Committee on State Department Affairs since July 1977. He has also served on the Legal Committee and as Chairman of the Referendum Committee. Most notably, he has been in charge of the negotiations on selection board precepts and many other personnel issues for three years.

Ken (an FSO-3) has been in the Foreign Service over 21 years and has served in Hong Kong, Vietnam, Angola and Jamaica. He also served in PM, ACDA, ARA and AF. He received the Meritorious Honor Award in 1962; the Superior Honor Award in 1972; and the Award for Valor in 1977. Ken has just concluded over two years as a Foreign Service Inspector and has been assigned to the National War College.

#### FLEXITIME

AFSA's AID Standing Committee is consulting with AID Management concerning procedures for implementing Flexitime in Washington. While a variety of problems have to be worked out, we have already encountered one simple issue which seems to become unnecessarily complicated: scheduling of staff meetings.

It should be obvious that staff meetings and other occasions when a number of employees are expected to be present should be scheduled during "core time," that is when all employees not on leave will be in the office. Supervisors should not schedule a meeting during those hours at the beginning or end of a work day when some employees on flexitime may not be on duty in the office.

## Foreign Service People

### Deaths

**Bliss.** Don C. Bliss, retired Ambassador, died on June 25. He served as commercial attache and trade commissioner overseas before joining the Foreign Service in 1927. He then served in Singapore, Batavia,

Bangkok, Prague, The Hague, Athens, Cairo, Calcutta, London, Ottawa and as Ambassador to Ethiopia. He was appointed Career Minister in 1956. Ambassador Bliss retired in 1961. He is survived by his wife, Gabriela, of 25 East End Street, New York, New York 10028.

**Bradley.** John A. Bradley, FSSO-retired, died on June 12. He joined the Foreign Service in 1956 and served at Tokyo and Bangkok before his retirement in 1974. He is survived by his wife, Takako, 4430 7th Street, South, St. Petersburg, Florida 33705.

**Bay.** Charles A. Bay, FSO-retired, died on June 2. Mr. Bay joined the Foreign Service in 1920 and served at Dublin, Casablanca, Port-au-Prince, Tampico, Corinto, Tientsin, Bangkok, Bucharest, Tirana, Rome, Seville, Tegucigalpa, Mexico City and Milan before his retirement in 1958. He received a personal commendation from Secretary Cordell Hull for his role in evacuating Americans during the Spanish Civil War. He is survived by his wife, Opal, of Lahaska, Bucks County, Pennsylvania 18931.

**Cox.** Raymond E. Cox, FSO-retired, died on August 25, in Washington. Mr. Cox entered the Foreign Service in 1921 and served at Lima, London, Buenos Aires, Prague, Oslo and Wellington before his retirement in 1946. He also served with the Tacna Arica Plebiscitary Commission in 1925, as secretary of delegation to the Conference of Wheat Exporting Countries in 1931 and with the US delegation to the United Nations in 1945. After retirement he was President of the National Symphony Orchestra and a member of its Board of Directors. He is survived by his wife, Margaret, of 2346 S Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20008, a son, Alan B., and three grandchildren. Contributions in his memory may be made to the National Symphony Orchestra.

**Furness.** Paul Robert Furness, six-year-old son of FSO and Mrs. Brian R. Furness, died on August 29 of Reye's Syndrome in St. Louis, Missouri. In addition to his parents of 441 2nd St., SE, Washington, D.C. 20003 he is survived by a sister, Gioia, of the home. The family suggests contributions in his memory may be made to the National Reye's Syndrome Foundation, P.O. Box 829, Bryan, Ohio 43306.

**Hewitt.** Lyle R. Hewitt, FSO, budget and management officer in Nairobi, died there on July 1. Mr. Hewitt joined the Foreign Service in 1955 and served at Addis Ababa, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Paris and Nairobi. He is survived by his wife, Marianne, also a Foreign Service officer in Nairobi, c/o US Embassy, Nairobi, Kenya.

**Orr.** Peter D. Orr, FSO-retired, died on July 30, in Manila. Mr. Orr joined the Foreign Service in 1966 and served

at Saigon, Ouagadougou, Istanbul and Port-au-Prince before his retirement on medical disability in 1977. He received the Superior Honor Award that year. Born in Korea, he had also served as an interpreter with the Department of the Army and as a Peace Corps volunteer in East Pakistan. He is survived by his wife, M. Patricia Wazer, c/o American Embassy, Manila and two sons, Benjamin and Thomas.

**Price.** Arthur L. Price, FSO, died on September 5, in Washington. Mr. Price entered the Foreign Service in 1955 and served at Hamilton, Berlin, Halifax, Vienna, Stuttgart and Mexico City. He is survived by his wife, Nancy, and three children, 1206 West Armory Ave., Champaign, Illinois 61820.

**Waring.** Frank A. Waring, FSO retired, died on July 12, in California. Mr. Waring joined the Foreign Service in 1935 and Served at Tokyo and Sydney before his retirement in 1961. He also served as director of research with the Office of Inter-American Affairs and adviser for the Export-Import Bank, as well as adviser to the US delegation at the UN conference in San Francisco in 1945. He received Japan's Order of Sacred Treasure and the Legion of Honor of the Philippines. He is survived by his wife, Peggy, 7214 Fairfield Dr., Santa Rosa, California 95405, a daughter, Joan, and four grandchildren.

### UNION AFFILIATION???

The ad hoc Committee on Union Affiliation, having examined the possibilities of affiliating with various public-sector unions, the responses to the Membership questionnaire published in the May *FSJ*, and the views of the AFSA Survey completed in June, is recommending to the governing Board that AFSA not affiliate with a public-sector union at this time.

In reaching this conclusion, the Committee carefully considered the following:

- the scattered and limited response to the Membership questionnaire;
- the close division between supporters and opponents of affiliation;
- the reluctance of many supporters to pay the substantial dues increase which would actually be required, sooner or later, to affiliate with AFSA;
- the stated willingness of many opponents to drop their AFSA Membership if AFSA did affiliate, or to support an increase in the AFSA employee-relations staff as an alternative to affiliation—an alternative acceptable also to some supporters of affiliation.

The Governing Board will consider the Committee's recommendation and its decision will be reported to the membership in a subsequent issue of the *Journal*.

## FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

In order to be of maximum assistance to AFSA members and *Journal* readers we are accepting these listings until the 15th of each month for publication in the issue dated the following month. The rate is 40¢ per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail copy for advertisement and check to: Classified Ads, *Foreign Service Journal*, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

### HOUSES FOR EXCHANGE

HOME EXCHANGES, rentals worldwide for current and retired members of foreign services, international organizations. INTERSERVICE, Box 87, Glen Echo, Md. 20768.

### BOOKS

DO YOUR CHRISTMAS shopping now. Nancy's Nook, owned by AID/FSR retiree giftwraps and mails. 20% off popular books, 10% technical books. Box 368, Hyden, KY 41749.

IF YOU ARE LOOKING for an out-of-print book, perhaps I can find it. Dean Chamberlin, FSI-retired, Book Cellar, Freeport, Maine 04032.

### SEASHORE RENTAL

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### GIFTS

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### REAL ESTATE

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# American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc.

1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006 Suite 1305 — Phone (202) 393-4220

CHANGES IN Group Life Program effective March 1, 1978

## **Additional insurance available up to \$30,000 for those who have or take the basic \$17,500 policy.**

It is with pleasure that we announce that our Board is able to offer an additional unit of \$10,000 group life and AD&D for the active member, making a total of \$30,000.

Members of the Association under 60 years of age and on active service may subscribe for an additional \$10,000, \$20,000 or \$30,000 Group Life and \$10,000, \$20,000 or \$30,000 AD&D, effective March 1, 1978, at \$85 a year per each \$10,000 of additional insurance, provided that this additional coverage must terminate upon resignation or re-

tirement or age 65 (whichever is first).

Officers who are now members of the Association may make application by using the amended form including information necessary to satisfy the Underwriter that they are in good health (see section of booklet entitled ENROLLMENT).

Officers joining the Association who wish the additional insurance should make their application therefore at the same time as the application for Group Life.

## **NEW PREMIUM RATES**

Regrettably inflation has forced some changes in our premium rates for the first time since 1929. The new rates for old or new members for the basic \$17,500 Group Life plus \$17,500 AD&D, plus up to \$3,000 family coverage are:

|   |                            |
|---|----------------------------|
| To 41st birthday                                    | \$100 per year (unchanged) |
| To 51st birthday                                    | \$150 per year             |
| To 65th birthday                                    | \$185 per year             |
| Over 65 for those who qualify for reduced coverage, | \$37 per \$1,000 per year. |

### **Coverage After Age 65**

There is a minor change in retirement coverage for old or new policies and the provision effective

as of March 1, 1978 reads:

**RETIREMENT.** Members who retire on an immediate annuity may retain this policy unchanged until age 65. If at age 65 they have held this policy continuously for 20 years, they may continue to carry \$5,000 plus reversionary if any, AD&D at \$5,000 and Family Coverage (if they have been carrying \$17,500) at \$185 per year (lesser amounts at lower premiums if they have been carrying less than \$17,500).

Members who transfer without a break in service from the Foreign Service to another civilian position with the United States Government may continue their policy unchanged as long as they continue such Federal employment and have the same privileges as noted above if they retire on an immediate annuity.

**Application forms and Booklet available on request.**


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| <input type="checkbox"/> Diplomat  |                                  | <input type="checkbox"/> Newport    |
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