

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

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ANNUAL REPORT OF AFSA's GOVERNING BOARD

Introduction

The Governing Board is required by the Bylaws to provide the membership with an annual report of its stewardship of the Association, including a financial report and budget; and to conduct an annual meeting of AFSA's Washington membership. This is a final report, current as of early June 1979, submitted by the Governing Board which will leave office July 15. It will offer a basis for discussion for the annual meeting to be held on July 9 in the Department of State's East Auditorium.

During the past year, AFSA has won some and lost some for the career Foreign Service—in the Congress, in the courts and in bargaining with the management of the Department of State and the Agency for International Development under Executive Order 11636. We have tried to continue to fulfill our dual obligations to our membership and the Service—as a union and as a professional association.

Foreign Service Act of 1979

Since December of last year the Association's principal project has been the Department's proposed restructure of the Foreign Service personnel system.

The Department's proposals arose out of an effort to deal with a number of problems in the Foreign Service, particularly in the Department of State—the slowdown in attrition from and promotions to the top, the patchwork of personnel categories and pay grades and of amendments to the Foreign Service Act, the continuing lack of pay comparability and the blurring of the distinction between the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. AFSA had been urging the Department to come to grips with these problems and so had the Congress. However, we also had successfully urged the Department and the Congress not to allow the Foreign Services to become submerged in the Civil Service in the Civil Service Reform Act. Enacted last October, the CSRA did exempt the Foreign Service from the Senior Executive Service as well as the Labor-Management system, which would have cut deeply into our bargaining unit. At the same time, the CSRA also institutionalized pressures to make the Foreign Service and other exempted services more "compatible" with the Civil Service. In particular, performance pay was created as a way to increase the pay of at least some SES members toward comparability with the private sector.

The Department first discussed its plans with AFSA leaders twice in December. From the beginning, AFSA stressed the importance of full consultations with the Foreign Service before implementing or seeking legislative authority for any changes, and of creating a strong legislated system of labor-management relations to enable the career Foreign Service to co-determine its working conditions and defend itself against any arbitrary use of the powers management was seeking.

The AFSA State Standing Committee assumed the principal burden of keeping the membership informed, and seeking its advice, on AFSA positions on this issue. It conducted two public meetings in Washington, sent many messages to the field, collated the responses and established task forces to work on various aspects of the problem. Members of other constituencies joined the task forces to make sure their perspectives were taken into account. Since late April, the Governing Board itself has been handling the issue. The Board wrote twice to the Secretary, met twice with him and met once with the acting AID Administrator. AFSA activists marked up the entire 200-page Act and met with management officials to press our views.

We agreed that there are indeed a number of serious problems in the Foreign Service, but that it would be unnecessary, perhaps dangerous, to seek comprehensive legislation when what we need can be accomplished through the use of existing authority and selective amendments to the Foreign Service Act. The Board of the Foreign Service and the ICA Director, among others, shared this view.

While the Secretary decided nevertheless to seek a comprehensive Foreign Service Act of 1979, he did accept a number of our views on specific aspects of the plan.

- The labor-management relations system gives the Foreign Service essentially the same bargaining rights as the Civil Service, while maintaining essentially the same large, agency-wide bargaining units as we have now under Executive Order 11636.
- Merit pay, in the CSRA sense, has been abandoned, and there will be authority to use extra within-grade increases to reward outstanding performance.
- There will be a statutory Board of the Foreign Service, chaired by a career member of the Senior Foreign Service, to advise foreign affairs agency heads on personnel policy.
- There will be some protection for current staff corps members exposed for the first time to selection-out for substandard performance.
- The concepts of Secretarial recommendations to Selection Boards, and the Senior threshold window, are not entrenched in the bill.
- The bill explicitly refers to the goal of controlling attrition from the senior ranks in order to provide adequate promotions from below, and to the possibility of either lengthening or shortening allowable time in class.
- Though there will be a Senior Foreign Service with performance pay similar to the Senior Executive Service, Chief of Mission positions will continue to be classified, and there will be a three-year transition period. The rank of Career Ambassador will be retained.

Thus the Foreign Service bill is one on which the career Foreign Service has had a significant impact. If given the opportunity before its term expires, the Governing Board intends to testify on the bill, supporting elements that are in the interest of the Service, opposing elements with which we disagree, and seeking to improve the bill further through amendments or the creation of legislative history. The Board believes it would not be in the interest of the Service to oppose the bill on the grounds that we think comprehensive legislation is inherently risky because of legislative hazards; that could become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Nor would generalized, emotional and vague declarations of opposition to the bill be useful. What will continue to be necessary is the same sort of painstaking work on the substance of the bill, as well as on the legislative tactical situation, which has achieved the improvements cited above.

Pay Comparability

Closely related to the draft bill cited above is the Department's study of pay comparability mandated by the Congress, and recently completed by a consulting firm, Hay Associates. An AFSA Committee closely followed the progress of the study. The draft bill would make it easier to achieve comparability by creating a link between GS-15 and the top of the new Foreign Service salary schedule, and abolishing the other existing links at GS-13/FSO-4, GS-7/FSO-8, and GS-4/FSS-10. It is, however, too early to say what impact the Hay study may have on Foreign Service pay.

We are concerned that the report is much less favorable for the staff corps than for FSOs. The report does not recommend any decrease in current compensation, however, and does not recommend that the overseas aspects of Foreign Service work be considered in determining compensation.

Exclusive Representation

During the past year AFSA has continued to give top priority to its role as a union representing the career Foreign Service in the Department of State and AID. However, the Governing Board, on the recommendation of an Ad Hoc Committee, and taking into account the results of a questionnaire to members, decided not to pursue attempts to affiliate with another union. The scattered response to the questionnaire showed a majority who supported such affiliation in principle. But taking into account those advocates of union affiliation who were unwilling to increase their dues to anything like the amount such affiliation would require, the opponents of affiliation who said they would resign if it happened, and the adherents of both positions who

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Philip Mazzei—Virginia's Envoy to Europe

FRANK LANCETTI

Next year will mark the 250th anniversary of the birth of Philip Mazzei, a figure strangely neglected by historians, who nevertheless had a definite influence on Thomas Jefferson and on the events of the American Revolution.

Born near Florence in 1730, Mazzei studied at the hospital of Santa Maria Nuova, where he received his degree in medicine and surgery. After practicing in Tuscany for a short while, he moved to Smyrna, in the Ottoman Empire, where he practiced successfully for about three years.

Driven by the restless versatility that he displayed throughout his long life, he decided in 1756 to settle in

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London, where he stayed for 17 years, abandoning medicine to devote himself to teaching Italian literature to members of influential English families. But after a while he decided that commerce was his real calling and established a thriving firm specializing in imports from the Grand Duchy of Tuscany.

It was during this London period that Mazzei became acquainted wtih Benjamin Franklin, who was in London as the commercial representative of Pennsylvania, and through Franklin he became friends with the merchant Thomas Adams, who encouraged him to establish himself in Virginia, then the most populous and prosperous American colony.

With keen political instinct Mazzei became convinced that the tensions between England and her American colonies would result in an open conflict leading to the eventual independence of the colonies. Such a view was by no means shared at that time by all Americans, many of whom were unconvinced that the remedy of independence would not be worse than the disease.

Having recruited ten Italian farmers, one tailor and a young student, Charles Bellini, who was to become the first professor of modern languages at William and Mary, Mazzei sailed from Leghorn in September, 1773 and arrived in Williamsburg in November. Cordially received by Thomas Jefferson, with whom he soon recognized a great affinity, Mazzei purchased a property contiguous to Monticello. To the delight of the Italian farmers, Jefferson expressed himself fluently in their language although he had seldom heard it spoken. The newcomers proceeded to plant the vines and the fruit trees they had brought from Italy on the hillsides of Virginia.

Mazzei had come to America to start an agricultural enterprise and to engage in international trade, particularly with Tuscany. But in the intense political and social ferment which preceded the American Revolution he felt impelled to answer an irresistible call to participate in his adopted country's struggle for independence and the establishment of an original form of government.

Urged on by Jefferson, Mazzei wrote several articles for the *Virginia Gazette* and other publications. Through his compelling and lucid writings and his active participation in the political events of Virginia, Mazzei contributed to the development of the political awareness of his new compatriots. Many colonists in fact could not overcome their psychological dependence on England and seemed fixed in a children-father attitude toward the authority of George III.

The fact that he had lived 17 years in England and had directly observed, as an intellectual and as a businessman, the social and economic situation of Europe, gave Mazzei a special authority. Jefferson himself, who at their first encounter was 30 years old, had had no direct political experiences other than those he had gained in the Assembly of his native Virginia. It is not surprising then that Jefferson would be captivated by the cosmopolitan and learned Italian.

Never considering himself an alien in America, Mazzei grasped immediately the fundamental issues faced by the colonies, and with sure political insight, foresaw the historical importance of the American Revolution. Just as he had predicted, England decided to quell militarily the

rebellious colonies and when in 1775 a British contingent landed in the Chesapeake area he and two other Italian farmers joined the Independent Company of Albemarle county. They saw little military action, however, for the British re-embarked after a few skirmishes and the Virginia companies were disbanded.

Now completely absorbed in political activities, Mazzei increasingly neglected his agricultural and commercial undertaking, which were in any case hindered by the war. Therefore, when Jefferson and the governor of Virginia, Patrick Henry, asked him to go as an agent to Europe to negotiate loans for the continuation of the war, Mazzei with typical self-assurance accepted this difficult and dangerous mission. In a letter to John Hancock, dated October 19, 1778, Jefferson wrote: "(Mazzei) is I think more likely to negotiate this matter to our advantage than a native alone. He possesses first rate abilities, is pretty well acquainted with the European courts and particularly those above mentioned (Genoa and Tuscany), is a native of Tuscany with good connections and I have certain proofs of the Grand Duke's personal regard for him. He has been a zealous Whig from the beginning and I think may be relied on perfectly in point of integrity."

In the summer of 1779 Mazzei sailed for Europe. His ship, however, did not escape the British blockade and he was held a prisoner in New York for three months before he was allowed to resume his voyage.

Despite his diligence and skill, Mazzei's mission was destined to failure. In the first place, he had thrown overboard his compromising credentials and instructions just before being captured by the British. Secondly, the governments to which he turned for loans, including the Grand Duke of Tuscany, were not at all sure that the Americans would win the war against England. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Franklin, who was now in Paris as the representative of Congress, was opposed to separate initiatives by individual states and put obstacles in Mazzei's path.

When Mazzei returned to Virginia in 1783, he learned that his friend and neighbor, Jefferson, was on his way to Paris, having been entrusted by the Congress to conclude trade agreements wtih European countries. (Jefferson was subsequently appointed ambassador plenipotentiary to the court of France.)

To remain in rural Virginia, devoting himself to agricultural and commercial activites, was obviously contrary to Mazzei's natural vivacity and political bent. Not surprisingly then, in 1785 he crossed the Atlantic for the last time and went to Paris to continue there his indefatigable work as a propagandist for the American cause with the support and advice of Jefferson.

In 1788 Mazzei completed a substantive work which he wrote in French: *Recherches historiques et politiques sur les Etats-Unis*. In this four-volume work, which may be regarded as the first comprehensive history of the founding of the United States, he refuted the false information then circulating in Europe concerning the presumed chaotic conditions of the ex-colonies and the uncertain future of the new nation. Defending the cause of his adopted country, Mazzei relied upon his first-hand knowledge of

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Bombers, Inspection, and the No Invasion Pledge

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

On Sunday morning, October 28, 1962, Americans awakened to discover that the Cuban missile crisis seemed over: The Soviets had agreed to remove their missiles, and the United States would both withdraw its quarantine and promise not to invade Cuba. Sticky issues soon emerged: Premier Fidel Castro refused to allow on-site inspection, a brief quarrel developed over removal of the Soviet bombers, the United States pushed for Soviet withdrawal of their 15,000-20,000 troops, and the administration refused to give a firm, public "no invasion" pledge.

In private negotiations, the two powers speedily agreed on inspection at sea to establish withdrawal of the missiles. But for about three weeks, until November 20th, American and Soviet negotiators vigorously disputed other issues. On at least two occasions, American advisers flirted with bombing the Soviet bombers (IL-28s) in Cuba if the Soviets did not promise to remove them speedily. And through much of this period, the president worried about what action he should take if the Soviets or Cubans shot down an American plane conducting surveillance of Cuba. Finally, on the 20th, the Soviets promised to withdraw their bombers, and the United States accepted aerial inspection of them at sea. In the next few weeks, the two powers vigorously negotiated but never agreed on two remaining problems—the "no invasion" pledge and continued American surveillance of Cuba. By early January, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that they could not agree on these problems.

These two months of negotiations raise important, neglected questions: Why did President John F. Kennedy insist upon removal of the bombers, which had been a marginal issue during the missile crisis? Why did the Soviets concede on this matter? How close did Kennedy come to taking military action against the bombers? What were the roles of domestic and international-political influences on his decision? Did the administration insist upon on-site inspection in order to avoid a firm "no-invasion" pledge?

Barton J. Bernstein, associate professor of history at Stanford University, is the author of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconsidered: The Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945 *(1975) and the editor of, among other volumes,* Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration *(1970). He is writing a series of studies on WWII and postwar foreign policy.*

Facing Problems

When Premier Nikita Khrushchev publicly capitulated on October 28th, the president knew that he still had to confront two sets of problems—negotiating a settlement with the Soviets, and rebutting domestic critics who wanted to overthrow Castro and heap greater humiliation on the Soviet Union. How, they asked, could the president settle for so little when more was within his grasp? America's conventional and nuclear superiority, they argued, could achieve more victories.

On the 28th, Theodore Sorensen, the president's counsel and trusted adviser, sketched the administration's future response to these charges: The United States had used moderate force and diplomacy to compel the Soviets to retreat, but greater goals and additional threats would have estranged allies and might have provoked the Soviets to retaliate elsewhere. They might have grabbed Berlin and "blame[d] . . . us." Put simply, rejoice in an important but shrewdly limited American victory but don't take risks that could

provoke retaliation.

The administration was not guaranteeing that Castro would remain in power, Sorensen stressed, but "only repeat[ing] assurances not to invade" and thus restoring the status quo. "[The] effect on Castro of having [the] rug pulled out from under could be profound." The defeat might topple him from power. Other advisers pointed out that the widespread cut-off of trade with Cuba and CIA pressures on his regime and economy could drive him from power.

At the morning meeting of the executive committee of the National Security (ExComm) on the 28th, Kennedy stressed, in the words of the minutes, that "many serious problems will be encountered in the withdrawal of Soviet weapons from Cuba." He wanted to secure the removal of the 42 IL-28 bombers "by making a private approach to Khrushchev, [but] said we should not get 'hung up' on the bombers. . . ." He proposed a deft solution to accomplish his goal—including the bombers "in the Soviet definition of 'defensive weapons' " and of "weapons we call offensive." Since the Soviets had agreed publicly on the 28th "to dismantle the arms which [Kennedy] described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union," Kennedy was acting within the framework of their informal public agreement.

When General Maxwell Taylor, chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed the importance of returning to the status quo ante, Kennedy agreed that the goal was desirable but he was also uneasy. He seemed to fear that the bombers were not clearly covered by the Soviet message, and, according to the minutes, "he did not want to get into a position where we would appear to be going back on part of the deal. The IL-28 bombers were less important than the strategic missiles. Admittedly, we would face the problem of Soviet armaments in Cuba if the Russians continued to build up their defense capacity there."

As Kennedy knew, he would find it politically difficult to accede to the Soviet bombers in Cuba, for, like the missiles, they were capable of offensive use and could bomb the United States. But, on the other hand, the bombers did not raise the same *sense* of peril domestically or internationally. They were slower and more familiar than missiles, so for psychological and military reasons they were not generally alarming. Yet, to reduce political objections at home, he would find it desirable to remove the bombers. And, unlike the missiles, the bombers could be operated by Cubans, and thus might be very dangerous if they fell into Castro's control and he was as unpredictable as many Americans feared.

Kennedy was seeking to achieve a settlement with the Soviets and to avoid creating unnecessary problems. For example, he briefly halted aerial surveillance of Cuba, and hoped that the United Nations would take over this task. For personal, political, and military reasons, he believed that he needed almost daily evidence on Soviet activity at the missile sites and air fields; he did not want to be caught unprepared. But he also did not want to provoke an incident (a downed American plane) and then have to confront the painful problem of whether to retaliate militarily. And to expand its room for maneuvering, the administration tried to block Cuban emigrés from broadcasting inflammatory statements. In the laconic words of the minutes, the USIA director "was authorized to discuss with the FCC some way of dealing with this problem [emigrés buying radio time for angry comments] without appearing to be asking for radio censorship."

On Monday, the 29th, John J. McCloy, Kennedy's special representative, and Adlai Stevenson, ambassador to the UN, began negotiations in New York with the Soviets to settle the crisis. They promptly agreed to a modification of the quarantine—in troubling cases, the International Red Cross, and not the United States, would inspect cargoes from the Soviet Union to Cuba to assure that offensive weapons were not being shipped. There was quick agreement that the missiles would be dismantled and sent back to the Soviet Union, but there were fears that Castro would bar on-site inspection. They suspected that he would *insist* upon terms that the United States would reject—the return of Guantanamo, termination of subversive activities against Cuba, and a halt to both aerial surveillance ("violation of Cuban air space") and the trade embargo. Since Kennedy still hoped to topple Castro and defined Castro's relationship with the Soviet Union as "non-negotiable," the administration would not yield to his terms. How, then, would verification be conducted? McCloy indicated that termination of the quarantine rested on guaranteed verification of dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles, and he implied that on-site inspection was essential.

When UN Secretary General U Thant conferred with Castro, he learned that the Cuban leader would not permit inspection. It was a violation of Cuba's sovereignty, Castro argued, unless America also allowed inspection. His demands for a quid pro quo included inspection of possible emigré camps in the southern United States. Temporarily thwarted by Castro, on November 1st, Kennedy sought to increase the pressure on both the Cubans and the Soviets. He authorized low-level flights over some medium-range missile sites, where there was evidence of dismantling, and over airbases with IL-28s. "The major reason for overflying the IL-28s," according to the minutes, "is to make clear that we consider these planes 'offensive weapons' to be removed by the Russians and, therefore, we must know whether they are being dismantled." If an American plane was shot down, "the president decided that no retaliation would take place *today*." (emphasis added) Then what? The evidence suggests no clear answer. The president did not want to attack the anti-aircraft weapons, for that could mean killing Soviets, and provoke more hostile responses. But he did want to maintain aerial surveillance and could not long tolerate attacks on the spy planes. His credibility would be impaired, and domestic critics would skewer him.

Kennedy and his associates did not know, or even suspect, some very unsettling information: that the Cubans, not the Soviets, had shot down the American U-2 on Saturday, October 27th. A few years after the crisis, American intelligence cracked a key code and then discovered that Cuban troops

had briefly seized the surface-to-air (SAM) site and fired the deadly missile.

Had Kennedy realized this by the 29th, what would he have done? Halted surveillance lest the Cubans capture another SAM? Attacked the SAM sites and risked killing thousands of Soviets? Most likely, Kennedy would have tried to work out a speedy deal with the Soviets to gain the dismantling of the SAMs. The Soviets, anxious to avoid another clash with the United States or another reason to justify an American attack on Cuba, would probably have conceded.

Struggling with the Soviets

The Soviets were deftly trying to block the aerial surveillance in order to assuage the embittered Castro and probably to forestall another Cuban effort to seize a SAM site. The Cubans warned UN officials that they could shoot down the planes, and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetzov informed McCloy that all the anti-aircraft equipment, including SAMs, was in Cuban control. American intelligence contended that the Soviets were bluffing, and the CIA concluded that "the SAM sites are under exclusive Soviet control."

To try to calm Castro and possibly to secure on-site inspection, Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan visited Cuba. The CIA forecast that the Soviets were sincerely seeking a way out of the crisis, and thus they "might exert pressure on Castro" and offer him more financial aid, while trying to wring from Kennedy a pledge to halt Cuban exile attacks in addition to his promising not to invade Cuba. Roger Hilsman, the State Department's director of research and intelligence, offered a more cynical interpretation: The Soviets were exploiting Castro's opposition to inspection for their own purposes. They would dismantle the missiles, he forecast on the first, but not remove them from Cuba until they could wring more concessions. Like the CIA, Hilsman believed the Soviets would ask for stronger guarantees for Castro.

Through this tense period, as the ExComm minutes make clear, Kennedy was maintaining close control over negotiations with the Soviets, the handling of press releases, and the conduct of aerial surveillance. Often meeting twice daily with the ExComm, he determined the number and focus of the surveillance flights, and even which pictures of sites and weapons would be distributed within the government and to the press. Fearing leaks and wanting to quiet fears in America, he circulated pictures showing the dismantling of the missile sites but not those of the assembled bombers.

He kept insisting privately that the bombers had to be removed and that the quarantine would continue until their withdrawal. Because Castro was blocking inspection in Cuba, Kennedy agreed that the United Nations or the Red Cross would inspect the ships removing the missiles. He "instructed [the] USIA . . . to emphasize Castro's obstruction to UN inspection and to measures necessary to restore peace to the Caribbean rather than to depict Castro as a Soviet puppet." By focusing attention on Castro, Kennedy presumably hoped to minimize the continuing Soviet-American disputes over removal of the bombers and when the quarantine would end.

By the third, after only five days of negotiations, Kennedy was becoming more uneasy. The crisis might heat up again, he feared. Undoubtedly, he recalled the warning, a few days before, from former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, who reminded Kennedy of the two years of wrangling over the Korean armistice, after a settlement seemed imminent. The president warned Stevenson and McCloy of Soviet perfidy: "[This] is a course in which bargains are fudged, secrecy prevents verification, agreements are reinterpreted, and by one means or another the Soviet government seeks to sustain and advance the very policy which it has apparently undertaken to give up." The assembling of the bombers continued, and he had some sketchy evidence that the Soviets might be establishing a submarine base in Cuba. "In blunt summary," Kennedy told his negotiators, "we want no offensive weapons and no Soviet military base in Cuba, and that is how we understand the agreements of October 27 and 28."

He was not prepared to admit what he had implied on the 28th—that the bombers might not be clearly included and thus that the United States should not "get hung up" on their removal. Nor did he acknowledge that he was adding a new requirement—no Soviet submarine base. What would he do if the Soviets *publicly* admitted that they were establishing such a base? Since he had justified the quarantine primarily on the grounds that the Soviets had *clandestinely* sought to alter the balance of power, and he had even tried to distinguish American missiles in Turkey from Soviet missiles in Cuba on the basis of open vs. clandestine deployment, how could he justify opposing an openly acknowledged submarine base? Most Americans would not be troubled by the problem of justification, but the administration might need international support if it chose actions reaching beyond words—a continued quarantine, attacks on Soviet subs, and destruction of the base. Undoubtedly, Kennedy would have also argued, as he did in distinguishing the missiles in Turkey from those in Cuba, that American weapons were "defensive" and Soviet weapons "offensive." But such claims, rooted in self-righteousness, would not have won much international support.

Fearing that negotiations were stalemated, Kennedy cabled Khrushchev on the sixth to stress that the bombers must be removed and that anti-aircraft weapons, even in the hands of Cubans, must not interfere with American surveillance. He emphasized that "we attach the greatest importance to the personal assurance you have given that submarine bases will not be established in Cuba." (Though much of their correspondence remains classified, Khrushchev had probably *implied* that he would not create such bases, and Kennedy was converting the implication into a firm promise.) American relations with Cuba could not improve, Kennedy stated, until the Soviets withdrew their troops and offensive weapons. It was a temperate but firm message, which avoided threats but stressed that the solution of these problems was essential to the restoration of confidence and the broader negotiations (on a test ban and disarmament) that

Khrushchev wanted.

By November 8th, with the issue of the bombers still unresolved, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, a Republican, foresaw two alternatives, as Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson noted: "Hit planes or strengthen the quarantine." The scattered declassified materials make clear that the president was not about to launch an attack but was considering a stronger quarantine, which would bar petroleum products. He was also resisting the arguments of some advisers, including his negotiators, to let Khrushchev "wiggle off the hook" and leave the bombers in Cuba. That was unacceptable for reasons of domestic politics and probably of pride.

At the same time, Kennedy was trying to reduce domestic fears about Soviet weapons in Cuba and thus to deflate the political pressures on the administration. It was not a time for candor, he apparently concluded. So the administration did not admit publicly that the procedures for verifying the withdrawal of the missiles had led to confusion. One Soviet ship that was supposed to "have carried two missiles had none and another had one more than [the] number forwarded by the Soviets," an administration member complained privately. The United States "observed [only] 38 of 42 missiles [that the] Soviets had reported," he noted.

Even after the Soviet shipment of the missiles from Cuba on the ninth and the widely publicized pictures of their removal, rumors continued that the Soviets were hiding additional missiles in Cuba. To kill these rumors, Kennedy directed CIA director John McCone to have the agency check on every emigré report on missiles in Cuba, to ask for the source of information, and to refute the charge in the press if the "refugee is unable to give any significant substantiating information."

On the 13th, the ExComm again discussed strategy for forcing the Soviets to remove the bombers: a private message to Khrushchev threatening a stiffer quarantine, and OAS and UN action dramatizing the "incompleteness of Soviet compliance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding" and also exhorting Cuba to cooperate. Appraising this strategy, U. Alexis Johnson, the deputy under secretary of state, acknowledged that "it would be difficult to mobilize opinion in the UN to exert pressure on the USSR to get the IL-28s out of Cuba since Communist arguments regarding their obsolete character, limited range, and the apparent disequilibrium between such weapons and our own, would make an impact on a good many countries. [Many] members of the UN will adopt the view that the Soviets have acted in good faith and have fulfilled, to the degree possible, their part of the bargain."

> "Kennedy followed Bundy's strategy, and the Soviets had to settle reluctantly for a presidential statement reaffirming that 'there will be peace in the Caribbean . . . if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes.' "

Winning Removal of the Bombers

During the next three days, the two powers failed to break the stalemate but they did narrow their differences. The Soviets said they would withdraw their bombers, but *first* they wanted certain United States acts—termination of the blockade and announcement of the "no invasion" pledge. "Our view," explained McGeorge Bundy, special assistant for national security, "is that the *first* step must be a Soviet order to remove [the bombers] in 30 days," and *then* the United States would lift the blockade. He implied that a pledge required on-site inspection, and Castro had barred such inspection. In addition, Bundy stressed, the Soviets had refused to promise that they would not reintroduce offensive weapons in Cuba. "We may soon find ourselves back in a position of increasing tension," the administration warned the Soviets.

The Joint Chiefs, as General Maxwell Taylor told Kennedy, were delighted that he was insisting on removal of the bombers. But they hoped that the Soviets would reject Kennedy's offer to lift the blockade in return for Khrushchev's promise to remove the bombers soon. The chiefs wanted to use the quarantine to secure more concessions—withdrawal of Soviet technicians and soldiers, and acceptance of on-site inspection. They left unclear how the Soviets could force Castro to allow inspection, and perhaps they would not have been unhappy if the Soviets failed to meet their terms. They proposed an expanded quarantine to include petroleum products. "If the expanded quarantine did not succeed in obtaining withdrawal of the IL-28s, we should be prepared to take them out by air attack," the chiefs concluded.

The Soviets continued to insist that the bombers would be withdrawn as part of a final solution, in which the United States would pledge not to invade Cuba, support covert activities against Castro, or conduct air surveillance. To put pressure on the Soviets, McCloy informed them on November 18th that Kennedy was scheduling a press conference on the 20th, at 6 p.m., and that the Soviets had to promise before then to withdraw the bombers. There is no evidence that McCloy communicated a direct threat, but the early evening press conference scheduled at such an unusual time, was probably designed to remind the Soviets of Kennedy's early evening speech of October 22nd, when he had surprised the Soviets by declaring a quarantine.

To put additional pressure on the Soviets and to prepare the way for military action, the State Department notified OAS and NATO allies that the Soviets had not agreed to withdraw the bombers and that Castro was threatening to attack American surveillance planes. "Situation is fluid and may take one of several courses [including] the reestablishment of the quarantine and its extension to [petroleum products]," the State Department warned. In a special message to Harold Macmillan, Konrad Adenauer, and Charles de Gaulle, Kennedy stated, "we have to face the fact that a second backdown for

Khrushchev may be harder in some ways than the first. For this and other reasons we see some advantages in concentrating any action we take on Castro, from now on, if it can be managed. But the Soviets say the IL-28s are still under their control, and until they are removed we have very little choice but to apply at least part of our pressure against direct Soviet interests."

As Under Secretary Johnson had pointed out earlier, many nations would not support American demands for withdrawal of the planes. Even an expansion of the quarantine would seem extreme. Military action would provoke fear and antagonism among most allies. Even though the chiefs and possibly Secretary Dillon were ready to move beyond an expanded quarantine to bomb the planes, Kennedy and others were far more cautious. They hoped to succeed through hard bargaining and minor threats. If such threats had failed, would the president have done more? Perhaps he would have warned the Soviets that America might increase activities against Castro, but it is unlikely that Kennedy would have bombed the planes. Such action would have frightened allies, outraged neutrals, and unnerved many Americans.

The Soviets, as they had indicated in earlier negotiations, were not hoping to keep the bombers in Cuba. Perhaps they, too, feared that Castro might seize these weapons and thus provoke a crisis that would drag the Soviets into another confrontation with America. Or possibly dominant forces in the Kremlin had simply concluded that Kennedy would not accede to the maintenance of Soviet bombers in Cuba. For about ten days, Soviet negotiators had tried to wring concessions from the United States in return for withdrawal of the bombers. But the administration had refused to offer more than the termination of the quarantine. That would not be sufficient to assuage Castro or to puncture the charges of the Chinese, who accused the Soviets of cowardly retreating and abandoning Cuba. Possibly the announcement of the evening press conference, with the implication of such drastic American action, alarmed the Soviets. They did not want to deal with another dramatic crisis after having been humiliated.

On Tuesday, the 20th, the Soviets capitulated. A few hours before the press conference, Kennedy received a message (still classified) from Khrushchev that he had ordered withdrawal of the bombers in thirty days and that he would also remove some of the Soviet troops. At his evening press conference, the president announced the Soviet promises, implied that aerial surveillance of Cuba would continue, and avoided giving a no-invasion pledge. (In an earlier draft, prepared by Sorensen, the refusal of the pledge had been explicit: "In the absence of necessary safeguards, there is no occasion for formal assurances on the subject of invasion.") Having been thwarted by Castro, Kennedy probably feared that a pledge, in the absence of guaranteed inspection, would have enraged many Americans. And since he was reluctant to tie his hands permanently, he was undoubtedly quite pleased that he could avoid granting such a promise. He had not initially stipulated a condition (on-site inspection) in order to avoid the pledge, but evidence had accumulated by mid-November that his condition would have that consequence. He clung to it when he knew that an embittered and outraged Castro was not prepared to yield.

Bundy suggested that the President might meet some of the Soviet needs by issuing a vague statement, like his announcement of the 20th, which "the Soviets can readily interpret as promised assurances against invasion." He noted that Khrushchev had so construed the earlier statement. "You should emphasize," Bundy counseled Kennedy, "that there is in fact no present danger of invasion of Cuba, but that we cannot be put in position of giving blanket guarantees to a man who has refused to cooperate with UN to fulfill [Soviet-American] understanding of October 27 and 28."

Kennedy followed Bundy's strategy, and the Soviets had to settle reluctantly for a presidential statement reaffirming that "there will be peace in the Caribbean . . . if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes." America had no "intent to launch a military invasion of the island," the president said. Publicly, Khrushchev treated Kennedy's statement as a firm pledge and told the Supreme Soviet that he would take "appropriate action" if America broke its promise. Despite Soviet objections, Kennedy would not renounce America's right to conduct aerial surveillance of Cuba to guard against reintroduction of offensive weapons. Because the Soviets were unhappy about these positions, the two great powers were unable to achieve a complete settlement. As a result, in early January, after weeks of haggling, they jointly informed the UN that some issues remained unresolved.

Conclusions

Three weeks of difficult negotiations, followed by a few weeks of less anxious negotiations, had ended the crisis. The Soviets had gained a very weak, carefully hedged, "no invasion" pledge. And the administration did not feel barred from continuing covert activities to overthrow the Castro government. The American government had gained removal of all offensive weapons and some Soviet soldiers, and a Soviet promise not to reintroduce the weapons. Cuba, while asserting her sovereignty by resisting inspection, had been both an impediment and a pawn in the negotiations.

Kennedy had carefully guided the negotiations to settle the crisis. Rejecting the counsel of those who would have liked an attack on Cuba, he had bargained shrewdly and avoided direct threats. While delighted by his dramatic victory in forcing the Soviets to remove their "offensive" missiles, he had sought to avoid a public crisis over the bombers. That effort had required that he manage the news by blocking the emigré groups and by concealing troubling evidence that the government had not observed the removal of all 42 missiles from Cuba.

By January, when the two great powers submitted their report to the UN, the rumors in America about missiles in Cuba were dying out. In fact, the faith in the president and his ability to protect American interests in dealing with the Soviets was so great that he was soon able to secure American approval of a limited test-ban treaty.

US Interests in the Persian Gulf

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN

Persian Gulf oil became a major issue in United States foreign policy for the second time in five years during the past winter and raised anew the question of just how important the Persian Gulf oil-rich countries are to US national interests.

Oil is only a part of the equation, however. Equally important is the prospect that internal changes in countries bordering the gulf will tip the regional balance of power away from the United States and its allies, and toward the Soviet Union. Pro-Moscow governments in Afghanistan, South Yemen and Ethiopia are seen by "realists" as the vanguard of a new Soviet effort to increase its influence in the Indian Ocean area generally, and in the Persian Gulf specifically.

The overthrow of the Shah of Iran and the creation of an Islamic state early in 1979 represented a serious setback for the United States, as had Saudi Arabia's decision in 1973 to embargo oil shipments to this country. President Carter's decision not to help the shah remain in power, after a thirty-year history of strong support for his regime, sent shock waves around the Persian Gulf and caused Saudi Arabia—the other pillar of US influence in the area—to question whether Washington was truly a friend. Although the situations are not similar, the impact in the Middle East of Washington's acquiescence in the shah's downfall was not unlike the impact in East Asia of the US unwillingness to help the Thieu regime in Vietnam when Hanoi launched its final attack in 1975 in violation of the 1973 Geneva Accords.

The challenge for the Carter administration is to find a way both to increase the flow of Persian Gulf oil to world markets and prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its political influence in the Middle East. The key to solving both problems is a peaceful settlement between Israel and its neighbors which provides a homeland for Palestinians and the relinquishment of control by Israel of East Jerusalem. The internationalization of East Jerusalem and the return of most West Bank territories to Jordan is probably the only way Saudi Arabia and other Arab states will be persuaded to support a new "Carter Doctrine" in the Middle East.

Carter Administration's Response

In a speech at Georgia Tech on February 20, 1979, President Carter put the best face on the setback for American diplomacy when he stated: "The revolution in Iran is a product of deep social, political, religious and economic factors growing out of the history of Iran itself. Those who argue that the United States should or could intervene directly to thwart these events are wrong about the realities of Iran." Then he issued a veiled warning to the Soviet Union not to take advantage of the turbulent political situation there: "The independence of Iran is also in our own vital interest and that of our closest allies—and we will support it."

The president also sought to reassure Thailand (which was deeply worried about the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia) and Saudi Arabia (whose monarchy now wondered what the United States would do if it was threatened by internal or external forces): "Let me repeat: In the Middle East, in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world, we will stand by our friends—we will honor our commitments—and we will protect the vital interests of the United States."

What are these US "vital interests?" On the television program, "Face the Nation," Secretary of Defense Harold Brown sought on February 25 to be specific. The flow of Middle East oil, he said, "is clearly part of our vital interests." He added that "the United States is prepared to defend its vital interests with whatever means are appropriate, including military force where necessary—whether that's in the Middle East or elsewhere."

Secretary of Energy James Schlesinger said in a separate interview on February 25: "The United States has vital interests in the Persian Gulf. The United States must move in such a way that it protects those interests, even if that involves the use of military strength or of military presence."

President Carter was asked at a news conference two days later about plans to send US military forces to the Middle East. He asserted that "we have no desire to open military bases in that area or to station American troops in Saudi Arabia, and this proposal has not been made. . . However, we do want to strengthen the combined responsibility and capability of our friends and our allies who seek moderation and peace and stability to preserve the integrity of that region." The president also affirmed Secretary Brown's statement about oil: "It's important for others in that region to know that we have a real interest, a real national interest, in the stability and peace of that region, and particularly for the supply of oil, the routes through which the oil is delivered to ourselves and to allies and friends throughout the world."

In March, the Carter administration decided to send emergency military aid to North Yemen and Saudi Arabia to help deal with a military incursion launched by the Moscow-supported government of South Yemen on its northern neighbor. This action was taken without the normal congressional review, under a provision of the

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Arms Export Control Act permitting such action if "the president in a notification to Congress states that an emergency exists which requires the sale in the national security interest of the United States." In addition, it sent a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean to show American concern.

To underscore Washington's determination to reassure Saudi Arabia of the US resolve to protect it, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated in an interview on "Face the Nation" on March 18: "There is no question that we have vital interests in the area. We consider the territorial integrity and security of Saudi Arabia a matter of fundamental interest to the United States. We're talking about the stability of the region, which is important not just to the United States but to the world."

Finally, the administration received support from the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Frank Church, who stated in an interview on "Issues and Answers" the same day that he believed the United States would be willing to commit American forces to counter aggression that might be launched against Saudi Arabia by an outside power. The senator drew a distinction between internal and external threats, however, citing Iran as an example of an internal problem, on which the United States could exercise little influence.

New US Security Guarantee?

By mid-March 1979, the United States government seemed ready to propose a new security arrangement in the Middle East to replace the discredited Central Treaty Organization, which had embraced Turkey, Iran and Pakistan. The new pact would, it was hoped, include Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and several Persian Gulf states. The Camp David peace treaty signed between Egypt and Israel in March was to be the foundation of a broader accord embracing Israel and the moderate Arab states, which would then lead to security arrangements designed to protect the oil-producing states—principally Saudi Arabia—against external threats. The problem was that the Saudi government had little interest either in the Israeli-Egyptian accord or in Washington's proposal to increase US military presence in the area.

Don Oberdorfer, a *Washington Post* staff writer, reported from Riyadh on May 5 that the Saudi government had rejected "a far-reaching American security offer by Defense Secretary Harold Brown in February." His sources told him that the United States had offered a US military presence in Saudi Arabia in return for a Saudi commitment to double its oil production and support the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement. Oberdorfer characterized relations between the American and Saudi governments as "marked by deepening frustration, conflicting goals and misunderstanding."

Another key country in the American design, Jordan, also resisted American overtures. King Hussein flatly rejected suggestions from Zbigniew Brzezinski, the president's national security adviser, that Jordan support the Israeli-Egyptian accords in return for additional American military and economic aid.

The results of these efforts by Washington to foster new security arrangements to insure the flow of Persian Gulf oil were disappointing. Two moderate Arab governments on which the Carter administration had counted to support its new military assistance program had refused, because of their opposition to a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, one which they believed would do nothing to solve the key issues of a Palestinian homeland and the return of East Jerusalem to Arab control. Without the support of Jordan and Saudi Arabia, there was no chance Washington could entice other Persian Gulf states, such as Kuwait and Oman, to agree to an American security role in the region.

The stark reality for the United States, therefore, is that a collective effort to provide security for the oil-producing states of the Middle East has foundered on the Arab states' refusal to be drawn into support of the Israeli-Egyptian accord. Until there is progress on the Palestinian homeland issue, this impasse is likely to continue.

How Deep is the US Interest?

Traditionally, US interests in the Indian Ocean and the Middle East have been secondary to those in Europe, Latin America and East Asia. Until 1968, the Indian Ocean was considered a British sphere of influence and the British navy had a substantial fleet and bases located at strategic points in this large area, from Aden to Bahrain to Singapore. When Britain decided to withdraw "East of Suez," a power vacuum seemed to emerge and raised the question whether the Soviet Union or the United States might seek to fill it. The United States leased a British island, Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean in the 1960s for the purpose of constructing a communications station, and in 1975 Congress authorized its expansion into an air and naval facility. After the British departure from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the United States obtained permission from the government of Bahrain to use its naval facility for a small squadron of ships. Occasionally, the United States has dispatched a carrier task force into the Indian Ocean from its Pacific fleet to "show the flag." However, until 1979, Washington did not see a necessity of expanding its naval presence in the Arabian Sea or the Persian Gulf, or in seeking air bases in the Middle East.

One reason the United States did not increase its military presence following the British withdrawal was the reluctance of the Nixon and Ford administrations to take on new military commitments while Washington was winding down the Vietnam war and withdrawing its forces from Southeast Asia. Instead, they decided to build up the shah's Iran as "policeman" of the Persian Gulf, and provide the shah with the most advanced US military equipment. Although Saudi Arabia was at first concerned about the growing military power of its traditional competitor across the Persian Gulf, the Saudis became persuaded that Iran's new power was not a threat to them but rather insurance that Soviet-supported regimes in Iraq and Yemen would not be able to intimidate other Gulf states. The shah's ouster early in 1979 brought this US policy to an abrupt end and raised anew the question whether the United States would now fill the power vacuum itself. Heavy Soviet involvement in Ethiopia, Moscow's assistance in bringing to power a Marxist regime in Af-

ghanistan, and its support for South Yemen's attacks on North Yemen—Saudi Arabia's ally—were factors in pushing the Carter administration into a more forceful approach to the security problems of the Middle East and Indian Ocean.

Nevertheless, the question remains: just how important are US interests in this area? Is the continued flow of Persian Gulf oil indeed *vital* to the United States—so important that Washington should use US forces to protect the oil fields and the shipping lanes if they are endangered?

World Order Interest Paramount

The United States, like most great powers, has four basic national interests: (1) defense of its territory, (2) enhancement of its economic well-being, (3) creation of a favorable world order, and (4) promotion of its value system in other countries. The question for policy-makers is to assess correctly which of these interests is affected by a foreign crisis, and the level of concern (stake) that the United States should have in its resolution. Making this judgment is the job of a nation's highest political leadership, and it is the outcome of a process which engages the principal elements of its foreign policy establishment.

Therefore, when Secretary of Defense Brown declares that the flow of Middle East oil is a vital US interest, he presumably reflects a decision made by the president and the National Security Council that the Persian Gulf area is now a vital American interest. Five years ago the Nixon administration decided that this region was only a *major* US interest, and that the United States would use diplomacy rather than military power to deal with the oil embargo. What had changed in five years? First, Iran did not join the Arab oil boycott in 1973-74, and its large exports continued to flow to Europe, Japan and even Israel. In 1979 the export of Iran's oil is no longer assured, and it may be terminated to certain countries for political reasons. The second change is the huge increase in US petroleum imports, and its growing dependence since 1974 on Saudi Arabia as the principal source of its imports.

If the Carter administration has decided that Persian Gulf oil is a vital US interest, the question may properly be asked which of its four basic national interests is so endangered that Washington must now contemplate the use of force to keep the oil flowing? Obviously, the first category— defense of US territory—is not at issue, nor is the fourth category—promotion of American values in other countries. At first glance the second interest—economic well-being—seems to be the obvious basis for concluding that Middle East oil is vital; but is this true? Isn't the growing US dependence on Middle East oil supplies a function of its own ravenous consumption of oil? A little appreciated fact of oil politics is that the United States still produces about 8.5 million barrels of oil daily, roughly equivalent to Saudi Arabia's production, and is able to obtain additional supplies from Mexico, Venezuela and Ecuador in the Western Hemisphere. Thus, rising US consumption, rather than Persian Gulf production, is the real problem.

> "The Soviets have gained influence in East Africa by playing on historic enmities among the African tribes and on anti-white sentiments in Southern Africa."

Assuming, then, that higher prices, or rationing, or some other measures to reduce US consumption of oil could reduce American dependence on Persian Gulf oil, can it reasonably be argued that Saudi Arabia's oil is a vital interest of the United States? Probably not.

That leaves the third category, promotion of a favorable world order, as a possible justification for a determination that Persian Gulf oil is a vital US interest. Here the Carter administration is on firmer ground because Japan, Europe and other friends of the United States have a very deep stake in the continued flow of that oil, as well as its price (which is a function of the size of the flow). If the United States were in a period of neo-isolationism in its international relations, it might be feasible for its government to adopt a narrow view and let Europe and Japan fend for themselves in dealing with volatile Middle East politics. But that is not the mood of the American people, nor of the principal leaders of both major political parties. Furthermore, President Carter's personal diplomacy in arranging peace between Israel and Egypt, and Secretary of State Kissinger's similar role in arranging the 1974 cease-fire between these two nations, now make the United States a key power factor in the Middle East.

Balance of Power Factor

The key reason why the United States now considers the Persian Gulf to be a vital interest is that, for the first time, the possibility exists that the Soviet Union may make substantial political gains there at the expense of the Western position. This is partly the result of revolution in Iran; but it also reflects the new feeling of insecurity in Pakistan resulting from Soviet gains in neighboring Afghanistan and the growing disenchantment of all Arab states, except Egypt, with the United States because of its role in removing Egypt from Arab solidarity against Israel's plans to retain control over the West Bank of the Jordan and Jerusalem. In addition, the Soviets have gained influence in East Africa—in Ethiopia and Mozambique—by playing on historic enmities among the African tribes and on anti-white sentiments in Southern Africa. In sum, Moscow has made substantial political gains in the Middle East and Africa in the past two years, and countries like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, with long friendly ties to Washington, are no longer convinced that the United States has the will, and the wisdom, to foster political stability in the Middle East or Africa.

The United States may, therefore, be obliged to exert its power and influence unilaterally in the Persian Gulf, if there is a serious threat to the flow of oil. Such a policy is fraught with dangers, both in terms of its impact on the countries of the area and on American public opinion. For countries such as India, Iran and Saudi Arabia, a sud-

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"Political oratory aside, the issues of SALT are indeed elemental."

SALT

The Obstacles to Judgment

THOMAS H. ETZOLD

The debates of SALT II have acquired fundamental importance for the foreign policy and national security of the United States. Discussions of controversial technical issues under negotiation have broadened into far-reaching reappraisals of trends in Soviet-American relations and of American strategic doctrine and strategic force development decisions. This, however, is no advantage when it comes to judging the written results of years of negotiation. For the broader and more important these discussions have become the more difficult it has grown to assess the significance and merits of terms proposed in the treaty, protocol and other documents of SALT II. Thus, examination of obstacles to judgment is an essential step toward evaluation of SALT itself.

Long a trait of American foreign policy, the tendency toward suspicion of negotiation with foreign powers forms one of the most substantial obstacles to assessment of SALT negotiations and agreements. As a weak new nation, vulnerable to the machinations of Europe's great states, the United States began its traditions in foreign affairs with a hearty rejection of the power politics and diplomatic style of decadent empires. The dangerous deceitfulness of that style seemed to be summed up in the aphorism of the seventeenth-century Frenchman Jean de La Bruyère: "The aim of diplomacy is to avoid being the victims of deception while practicing it upon others."

American public opinion has never quite dismissed this residual concern about motives and methods of negotiating adversaries. Typically, Americans fear the wiliness and faithlessness of adversaries, suspect the competence or perhaps the over-generosity of their own leaders, disdain compromise on matters of principle, and abhor the unenforceability of most international agreements. As debate has already demonstrated, SALT II is reviving all of those traditional attitudes forcefully enough to influence any treaty's chances for ratification in the Senate later this year. Thus it is particularly important to examine the uses of negotiation on vital political-military issues, and especially those of SALT.

Two general points about the use of negotiation on vital political-military issues have bearing on current SALT discussions. First, most nations have no real alternative to bargaining over at least some of their vital concerns. Few states ever possess such overwhelming power and such favorable situations that they can cope materially with all possible threats. Certainly the United States today does not enjoy that luxury of circumstance. The most-used phrase in American defense studies, especially inside the government, is probably "limited resources." When threats exceed capabilities, it is simple and inescapable logic that in some portion threats will have to be met with means less costly than military posturing or materiel competitions such as arms races. Negotiation is one method for attempting to manage security problems at relatively low material cost.

In a second general point about negotiation over vital political-military issues, it is important to realize that most liabilities attaching to negotiations in American experience are self-induced handicaps relating to attitudes set out above. In negotiation, the typical American determination to get things done leads to expectations that negotiation should be expeditious and should have results, that is, produce treaties. This is perfectly logical, but it is not always reasonable. For this expectation often encourages premature results. Pressure for premature results poses considerable hazard, increasing the chances of error, technical shortcomings, and inappropriate compromise or concession. Of course, Americans not only expect results, they expect issues to be resolved completely, and preferably once and for all. In negotiation on issues such as SALT, this attitude fosters a political requirement to exaggerate results. Indeed, the normal political environment almost guarantees a certain exaggeration of achievements in any case. But this too is a liability. For the exaggeration of actual or potential results from negotiations such as SALT may set unrealistic standards for evaluation of treaty terms and subsequent developments. Such exaggeration also invites dissent, and it heightens the risk of eventual disillusion, both of which are significant in our type of political system.

The openness of American society further encumbers it in some negotiations, and this is also of moment for SALT II. For informally but in fact, SALT has been at least a four-party negotiation, with six or more parties at times: Soviet hawks, Soviet doves, American

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hawks, American doves, American allies, and other interested states from China to Sweden. The non-American parties to SALT II debates enjoy an ease of access and a potential for influence on the American public that at times undoubtedly burdens US negotiating ability. To put it bluntly, the American public is being endlessly propagandized from abroad. This, surely, is no aid to thinking through SALT's intricate implications.

In addition to fears about the use of negotiation, another obstacle has interfered with clear assessment of the negotiations and agreements of SALT II: the lopsided nature of the SALT debates to date. As the SALT discussions have enlarged in press and in print, critical and negative viewpoints have virtually overwhelmed more favorable views, at least in numbers and intensity if not always in substance. Ths is not, one must hasten to add, solely a reflection of the editorial policies and predispositions of the many periodicals carrying articles on the subject. Nor does it seem simply to reflect the relative merits of the pro- and anti-SALT cases.

There are perhaps several reasons for the unequal character of the SALT debates. One was the virtually universal failure to address defense issues in the 1978 election campaigns. This was a major lapse, and SALT has suffered from it along with other important national security concerns. An associated and equally disturbing reason for the disproportion in SALT debates has been the surprising lack of a sustained effort by administration figures and spokesmen to make a pro-SALT case, especially in the leading periodicals. Inexplicably, many official supporters of SALT have chosen to rely on speeches and statements generally suggesting that SALT will lead to peace.

There has been a notable absence of authoritative and effective rejoinders to the specific, and often detailed, anti-SALT critiques apparing in leading opinion journals and in the publications of private interest groups. The pro-SALT article by Jan M. Lodal (*Foreign Affairs*, Winter 1978/79) is virtually the only significant exception, which makes it required reading for people in search of the debate's missing link. To be sure, there is plenty of pro-SALT material in print. But far too much of it is "soft," that is, by virtue of focus or origins unsuited for juxtaposition with the views of well-informed SALT critics. The anti-arms race, anti-nuclear devices jeremiads of Concerned Scientists and University Professors are not, one suspects, much counterweight to the oracular warnings of, say, Nitze and Solzhenitsyn.

"Can we extend common understanding of nuclear and security issues enough to grasp Soviet security concerns and to reassure the Soviets in terms that have meaning and bring results?"

It is, of course, obvious that the events of recent months have made it impossible for administration figures to focus only, or even largely, on SALT. But this scarcity of substantive pro-SALT argument has given SALT's critics a free hand in shaping the opinion environment as well as the terms of debate in which SALT's sponsors must seek ratification of agreements. This may prove as great an obstacle for the treaties as it is for reasoned, well-rounded public understanding of the SALT issues. As the debate stands, technical and technological issues predominate; political and processional aspects of SALT which may be equally important, remain relatively undeveloped. Further, the challenges to SALT based on technical concerns remain unmet in detail; the longer this continues to be true, the more these challenges gain in importance and influence in the public mind. Thus the immediate issues surrounding SALT's technical provisions threaten to obscure, at least to some extent, other elements of interest pertinent to SALT debates and decisions.

As suggested at the outset of this discussion, the expansion of debate now one of the most notable fetures of SALT II has developed into still a third obstacle to ready assessment of SALT's issues. As noted, debate over expected treaty terms has opened into a far-reaching reconsideration of basic strategic doctrine and indeed of the premises of Soviet-American relations. This broadening of discussion leads to two problems. First, it has increased the difficulty of discriminating between immediate needs and longer-term concerns in the SALT context. Second, there is a logical problem with substantial implications for American strategic development: Logically, it would be desirable to conclude reconsiderations of strategic doctrine and political premises before making decisions as consequential as those of SALT II may prove, but in practice the treaty ratification process seems likely to require specific decisions before the conclusion of general reappraisals.

In these circumstances the American people will have to endeavor to assess what is at issue, and what in prospect, in the sensitive Soviet-American strategic arms relationship. It will help to keep in mind that, political oratory aside, the issues of SALT are indeed elemental. SALT is at best a tentative and somewhat fragile effort to explore Soviet and American attitudes, doctrines, responsibility, and restraint in the possession of nuclear weapons. SALT revolves around these questions: Can we cope advantageously with any portion of current and expected Soviet-American strategic relationship by means of negotiation rather than material competition? Can we extend common understanding of nuclear and security issues enough to grasp Soviet security concerns and to reassure the Soviets in terms that have meaning and bring results? Can we present our own security concerns effectively enough to elicit some adjustment from the Soviets?

It should be clear by now that even fully successful arms negotiations will bring neither permanent peace nor an end to US strategic problems. The Soviets will in all likelihood build whatever weapons they desire with or without SALT. Their behavior since SALT I has left little doubt on this point. Similarly, we also will surely acquire

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"I was born an American; I will live an American;
I shall die an American."—Daniel Webster

JOHN N. GATCH, JR.

There are, I suppose, very few Foreign Service people who do not have a favorite story about the annual celebration abroad of our Independence Day. To us who served in Iraq in 1959, the Fourth of July that year will forever be etched, perhaps seared, in our minds as *the* most memorable.

Things were at a high pitch in Iraq as the great day approached. The preceding years had indeed been turbulent. Ever since the United States had backed out of building Nasser's Aswan Dam, the Middle East had been racked by crises. The Russians took on the dam and began shipping arms to Cairo. Nasser, hugely popular with the Arab masses everywhere, nationalized the Suez Canal, precipitating the Suez War in October 1956. Egypt and Syria merged as the United Arab Republic in early 1958, causing alarm in Israel, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq. Civil war erupted in Lebanon.

American policy, seeking stability and exclusion of Soviet influence in the area, was heavily invested in the Baghdad Pact. As the name implies, Iraq was the linchpin of this alliance. A Hashemite monarchy, Iraq was dominated by Prime Minister Nuri Said, whose authoritarian regime was troubled by Muslim sectarian rivalries and reformist agitations. But the country had a lot going for it—millions of acres of arable land, unlimited water from the Tigris and the Euphrates, oil wealth and a skillful and energetic people. Supporting Nuri seemed a good gamble.

On July 14, 1958 the script was radically rewritten. That day an Iraqi brigade was to transit Baghdad en route to the Jordanian border. Nuri Pasha had always seen to it that army units passing through the capital were without live ammunition. This time—busy preparing to leave for a Baghdad Pact meeting in Istanbul—his vigilance lapsed. Brigadier Abdul Karim Qassim executed a lightning-fast coup before daybreak. Many members of the royal family were murdered; some were mutilated and strung up on city lamp posts; Nuri was hunted down, shot, buried, dug up, and dragged through the streets. Mobs killed three American businessmen, burned the British embassy residence, and pulled down the statue of General Maude who had liberated the country from the Ottoman Empire in 1918.

The expatriate community in Iraq was in a state of shock. Bewildered diplomats, when they could get cables out, could only report that Qassim and his victorious gang looked very pro-Nasser and anti-American. The new regime immediately reestablished relations with the Soviets—adding to Western unease.

The next day—such was the Middle East of that era—the United States Marines landed in Lebanon, responding to the Lebanese president's appeal to Washington. British commandos parachuted into Jordan. An American airborne division in Germany was airlifted to Turkey and alerted for quick action in Iraq in support of a hoped-for counter coup against Qassim. That hope went begging, although the US-UK actions kept the Lebanese and Jordanian dominoes erect.

In Baghdad the American embassy came under virtual siege and we evacuated our dependents to Rome, where they spent the next eight months. Meanwhile a purge of old-regime officials and sympathizers was carried out by a military tribunal, presided over by Colonel Fadil Abbas Mehdawi, who made much of the victims' alleged complicity with American imperialism.

A painful time—"learning to live with Qassim"—unfolded for the Americans. Ambassador Waldemar Gallman, a master of his trade but too closely identified with Nuri Said, was replaced by Jack Jernegan, tall, owlish, tough-minded. He joined us in sizing up the enigmatic, soldierly/prophetic figure of Abdul Karim Qassim.

Qassim was given to odd behavior. Like his predecessor of long ago, Haroun al-Rashid, he would wander the streets of Baghdad in the early morning hours, talking to laborers and other night people. One night an old woman complained about the price of tomatoes: 50 *fils* a kilogram. Qassim that morning issued a decree that tomatoes were to sell for no more than 20 *fils* per kilogram. Next day there was not a tomato to be found in the market. Politically, Qassim saw enemies everywhere and allowed the communists to build up a personality cult around him.

The diplomatic community was all at sea. There seemed to be no way to relate to this strange, distrustful Arab head of state, no basis for sound political reporting to distant foreign ministries. Then came a breakthrough: January 26, 1959, India's National Day. Observing Qassim's need for adulation—his

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John Gatch entered the Foreign Service in 1947 and spent most of his career in or dealing with the Arab world. He retired in 1975 to form a Washington-based Middle East consulting firm—the Sitra Corporation, of which he is president and principal stockholder.

equanimity in being hailed as the "Sole Leader" of his nation—Ambassador Inder Sen Chopra turned his embassy's celebration into a showcase for the Iraqi leader. The evening was a huge success. Qassim came early, followed by a throng of (uninvited) young supporters, and stayed late, obviously enjoying himself. Very shortly thereafter Qassim received a high-level Indian government delegation and concluded a trade agreement.

Flattery, it seemed, could get you somewhere after all. Other embassies pulled out all the stops to put on similar adulations of Qassim on their National Days. If Qassim came, as he always did—and if his claque came with him as it usually did—the party was a success. As winter turned into spring there was a dazzling succession of celebrations: Morocco, Hungary, Pakistan, Japan, The Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Tunisia, Italy and Great Britain went all out. Qassim was the most feted person in the Middle East.

As July the Fourth approached there was much debate in the embassy about our party. One school recommended a low-key approach saying the ambassador should invite the chiefs of mission plus a representative from the foreign office for a quiet glass of champagne at noon. The evening of the Fourth could then be devoted to a picnic for Americans only. Others argued (successfully) that we should follow and improve on the Indian model. Our embassy resolved to spare no effort in putting on the biggest and best National Day celebration in the history of Iraq. Every American official—and his wife and children if necessary—were mobilized for the effort. Ambassador Jernegan and his wife Mary made it clear to all that this was a country team affair. Mary Jernegan was, in modern televisionese, a "dyn-o-mite lady" as an ambassador's wife.

What made this ostensibly simple decision tricky was a substantial agenda of unresolved US-Iraq problems. These included questions of indemnity for the three Americans slain on July 14; the US stake in the Iraq Petroleum Company; and compensation for several US organizations, commercial and educational, seized by the new regime. Besides which, American policy hoped to encourage Qassim to remain aloof from Nasser.

Fortunately we were physically well situated for the celebration. The American embassy residence and chancery occupied a garden surrounded by a high brick wall in the section east of the Tigris River. We had leased the property in the late 1930s and our landlord, Mr. Bahoshy, had erected a fairly exact replica of the White House. It was, and still is, a noble structure. The circular drive runs up to a pillared front porch as it does in Washington. Inside is a center hall of immense but pleasing proportions, flanked by a vast salon on one side and an equally vast dining room on the other. From all three rooms there was access at the back through french doors to a broad tiled terrace, which descended by stairs into a truly magnificent garden as big and well-kept as the one at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The embassy had a good staff and its servants, supplemented by those of other Americans, were available for the big party.

Two special Fourth of July committees were established—one, headed by DCM Rodger Davies, to consider all substantive aspects of the party; and another, headed by the administrative officer, to plan for and execute the many different things that had to be done. The activity of both committees was closely monitored by the ambassador and his wife.

From my vantage point in the political section, and especially as protocol officer, I witnessed and became deeply involved in all of these preparations. Our families had returned from their evacuation exile in March and my wife, along with others, was pressed into service by Mary Jernegan. (These were the days before wives in the Foreign Service were "liberated.") Our cook was assigned his quota of hors d'oeuvres to prepare and the houseboy was one of many slated for duty at the embassy party.

We had important decisions to make. First was the size and composition of the guest list. Second was whether to involve the Iraqi army.

On the first count we resolved to go all out. The orders were to invite everyone in whom we had the slightest interest—new regime, old regime, the media, the total diplomatic corps (except the mainland Chinese), the commercial community, the oil executives, the educational and artistic community, plus of course the Americans generally. A master list was maintained in the political section and all were asked, nay urged, to make suggestions. Names from the biographic files of our various sections were carefully cross-checked with the more elaborate CIA files. The list grew and grew to the point where Ambassador and Mrs. Jernegan "requested the pleasure of the company of" approximately fifteen hundred people to attend a National Day Celebration at 6:30 p.m. on July 4, 1959 at the American embassy (RSVP; regrets only).

In normal times a great many of the invitees would have been away in the cooler climate of the Lebanese mountains or the watering holes of Europe. The new regime was, however, holding a tight rein on travel and everyone was expected to be in town. We did not entrust these invitations to the Baghdad post office. Embassy drivers fanned out around the city delivering invitations by hand.

The question about the Iraqi army was more difficult. There was deep distrust on both sides. Those Iraqi officers who had been closest to our people had either been victimized by Colonel Mehdawi or forced to resign. Whether to invite Mehdawi was a crucial question by itself. Our only real contact in the Iraqi army following the coup was essentially a non-political one—with the army band. In happier days we had done much to assist this band, enabling it (for example) to excel in a spirited rendition of "Dixie," which our army attache had encouraged it to learn. We finally decided to limit the number of invitations to the military to the very top few, reluctantly including Colonel Mehdawi; and we did ask the Iraqi army band to come play in the garden for the guests.

Meanwhile, the administrative committee grappled with the logistics of food, drink and service for the expected inundation. To keep everyone circulating, escort officers and their wives were to herd people along a definite path from the receiving line, through the salon, out onto the terrace, and down to the garden. Use of the outside

space was essential. But Baghdad in July is one of the hottest places in the world—shade temperatures of over 120° F and sun temperatures of over 160° F are common. Even at night the natural inclination of the guests would be to remain inside the centrally air-conditioned house. Our administrative officer, Randy Dickens, came up with what seemed a brilliant idea: We would air-cool the entire garden!

The heat in Baghdad is so dry that it allows the operation of a simple but effective "desert cooler." This device consists of an oblong housing containing a revolving drum covered by a fibre mat with an electric fan blowing over it. Water falls continuously on the mat and the drum, and the quick evaporation of the resulting air currents provides real reduction of the temperature. Most Baghdad houses were cooled by a variation of this device. Randy's inspiration was to set up fifty of these coolers on each side of the embassy garden to bring the temperature down to where the guests could be tempted outdoors, preventing a terrible crush inside. Admittedly the coolers would look like a line of portable toilets, but no one could come up with a better idea.

It went without saying that the total embassy strength would arrive an hour before the party to rehearse the vital preparations. The receiving line was to be on the left as the guests walked from the hall towards the grand salon. Having been greeted by Ambassador and Mrs. Jernegan, the guests would debouch into a rotating circle of embassy personnel and their wives charged with getting them out into the garden. To the right of the center hall hors d'oeuvres were to be laid out in the dining room, which could be entered from the garden. An army of waiters would be available to carry trays to the garden. There were to be four bars—one on the terrace, two at the back of the garden, and one in the dining room. The Iraqi army band was to sit at the right-hand side of the garden about half-way back. The plan went through endless refinements but as the days wore on it began to look foolproof. And, judging by the few "regrets" to our invitations, we could anticipate a full turnout.

How to receive Qassim—if he came—was the $64 question. Upon his arrival he was to be met by a Marine honor guard and ceremonially escorted to meet Ambassador Jernegan. Other Marines were to shunt off the members of Qassim's claque to a limbo in the grand salon. After they had greeted each other, Qassim and Ambassador Jernegan were programed to retire to a corner of the grand salon for cordial, and perhaps even substantive, talks. Members of the claque were to be permitted to shout slogans to their hearts' content and then persuaded to go on into the garden for refreshments. Based on observation of Qassim's peformance at other National Days, we judged he and his chorus might stay at least an hour.

On July third the embassy staff did a final run-through of its elaborate plans. Uncle Sam's representatives in Baghdad were keyed up to give the Fourth of July their best shot.

Our own residence in Baghdad was in the Hindiya section about a mile from the embassy, quite near the Tigris River. My wife and I had a quiet supper with our children, discussed our forthcoming roles at the party over a nightcap and retired early to be ready for the great day.

A premonition of disaster struck me at about five the next morning. Our bedroom had a conventional window air conditioner which served a threefold purpose. It cooled the room, strained out the night noises (mainly barking dogs), and kept the infiltration of dust to a minimum. Despite this protection, I awakened gradually under the impression that I was being choked to death. I got up and groped my way to the window. Pulling back the curtain I looked out on a scene straight from the third ring of hell. Our small garden was surrounded by a brick wall to which were affixed at regular intervals short poles with lights on them, kept burning at night for security purposes. My first impression was of a power failure since all was gloom. Suddenly the enormity of the situation dawned—the lights were being obscured by a colossal dust storm.

Let me say here that I am an expert on dust storms. I have experienced the ghibli in Libya, the shamal in Kuwait, and every gradation of similar afflictions native to Iraq. These Middle Eastern storms generate a finely powdered dust of desert sand that casts a pall over city and countryside for days at a time. Visibility shrinks, nasal passages clog, and the powdery invasion seeps through the cracks of doors and windows, coating everything with a superfine grit. The storms are often prolonged by a condition similar to the scourge of American air pollution—i.e., an inversion holding the dust over the city. Dust storms cause, among many people, myself included, an adverse psychological reaction: They are profoundly depressing.

The July Fourth weather report for Baghdad deserves entry in the record books. I went downstairs, opened the front door, and walked onto the porch—and saw that we were enveloped by a red dust storm, the absolute worst kind. These can come at any time of the year, spawned by a strong north to northwest wind that scoops up tons of red soil from the arid lands between the Tigris and the Euphrates and howlingly dumps it on the city. I looked to the east for the rising sun but saw only a reddish glow through the swirling clouds of dust. The porch floor was already thickly coated and my breathing became increasingly difficult. Our houseboy came running from his quarters with a large plastic cover which he threw completely over our car parked in the driveway. Our exclamations were a kind of acclaim for the worst storm either of us had ever seen.

The summer workday for the embassy began at 7:00. Despite the holiday, almost every American and many local employees braved the thickening dust and came in. The streets of Baghdad were an eerie spectacle as cars, taxis and buses crept along with the headlights on, trying to pierce the suffocating red cloud. To see ten feet ahead, with or without lights was a triumph.

A mood of consternation gripped the embassy. The Jernegans called an informal staff meeting. There was little anyone could propose. A hand-wringing session resulted only in pious hopes that the storm would pass or at least diminish by

evening. A standby work crew was organized to remain in the public areas of the embassy charged with the hopeless task of cleaning up the dust as it fell, as King Canute contended with the sea. The morning passed with all of us casting anxious eyes at the sky. The storm grew worse. The ambassador finally sent everyone home, but requested the country team committees to come back at 3:30 for a final assessment.

This last meeting reached the grim conclusion that the show must go on. Stuck with a huge guest list, there was simply no way that we could notify all the invitees that the party had been canceled. The ambassador took consolation in our belief that not many of the invited guests would actually show up. Meanwhile, we were to stick by our game plan.

The staff appeared on schedule at 5:30, followed almost immediately by the Iraqi army band whose presence created the first major problem. The band leader took one look at the chairs—seen dimly in the dusty garden—and said it was impossible for his men to play outside. A solution was proposed. Inside the residence there was a small mezzanine porch jutting out from the stairs going up from the center hall. The band leader said he could put most of the band up there provided an amplification system could be arranged. Embassy communicators quickly rigged up a microphone and speakers for the purpose and part of the band ascended to its place. The brass section was greatly reduced in the interests of saving space, and only one tuba player, one trombonist and two trumpet players stayed on. The last-minute preparations of the embassy staff were enlivened by the brassy tune-up efforts of the band.

The dust storm raged on undiminished. The enormous interior of the embassy resembled the hold of an ocean freighter unloading flour or cement. It was impossible to see clearly from one side of the front hall to the other. Servants scurried around wiping all exposed surfaces but succeeded only in rearranging the dust. The impressive buffet of food was carefully covered with wax paper and the four bars were consolidated into two, both inside the house. The doors leading to the garden had been closed all day in a vain effort to keep out the dust.

At 6:20 Mary Jernegan, resplendent in a floral evening gown and oblivious to the streaks of dust on her face, said "The hell with everything; let's just go ahead and have the party!"

Our most serious miscalculation was in believing that many of the guests would not come. They *all* came, beginning on the stroke of 6:30, and they kept flooding in, dressed in a motley mix of Western and Arab attire. The attempts to regulate traffic and parking outside the embassy degenerated beyond coherent recapitulation. Diplomats, government officials, teachers, artists, American businessmen, Iraqi army officers, newsmen, and others soon filled the grand salon and began spilling out into the hall and the dining room beyond, squeezing off access to the receiving line. In an effort to prevent clouds of dust from engulfing those entering, a well-intentioned but misguided gardener hosed down the front driveway and steps. Guests were soon tracking in red mud, and the front hall took on the aspects of a construction site.

"These pressures converged on Qassim just as he reached the ambassador and a wild scene ensued in which honored guest and host were caught in the center of a human maelstrom."

Upon arrival of the first guest the band began to play from its aerie in the mezzanine. The amplification system was more than successful and rousing marches ("Dixie" included) began to drown out all conversation—notwithstanding the reduced brass section. Shortly after seven o'clock, with the party eddying about in all three rooms, there occurred a moment of high comedy mixed with near tragedy. As the band reached the crescendo of a lively march, the brass section at the rear of the mezzanine porch stood up to lend final emphasis. The tuba player's foot caught in the wire leading from the microphone to the speakers below. There was a blinding blue flash as the whole system shorted out, and the terrified tuba player, still encased in his instrument, burst completely through the ranks of the band in front of him and went sailing headlong over the small railing to crash heavily on the floor below. This effectively ended the musical portion of the evening.

It was later determined that the tuba player had broken three ribs, his left arm, and had dislocated his right knee.

As hysteria began to set in, the Marine guards sent word in that Prime Minister Qassim was arriving with his followers. The tuba player was carried away and the receiving line reassembled. By this time the crush of guests had almost completely filled the hall. There was only a narrow and ill-defined aisle leading up to the ambassador. The Marine NCOIC decided, rightly, that he needed help in bringing Qassim forward. He ordered his fellow Marine guards to forget the two busloads of Qassim's supporters and instead form a human square around the prime minister as he approached the ambassador. This decision possibly saved Qassim from serious injury for, as word spread that he had arrived, all of the guests shoved toward the receiving line to catch a glimpse of the great man himself. At the same time the claque of young supporters poured unrestrained through the front door in the wake of their hero. These pressures converged on Qassim just as he reached the ambassador and a wild scene ensued in which honored guest and host were caught in the center of a human maelstrom. Only the strong arms of the Marines kept Qassim from being trampled to the floor. The claque pushed guests aside ruthlessly to be near the "Sole Leader" and began their ritual hop-step dance accompanied by the rhythmic chant—"Maku Zaim, Illa Karim." (There is no leader save Karim.) Hundreds of people were crushed against the walls during this eccentric performance. Many were bruised or more seriously injured.

Qassim and Ambassador Jernegan were naturally shaken by the

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FSJ BOOKSHELF

Camels Rising

ORIENTALISM, *by Edward W. Said. Pantheon, $15.00.*

"The East is a career," wrote Disraeli in his romantic novel of the Crusades, *Tancred*. And so it is, not only to State Department Arabists, but to generations of Western scholars and writers who contemplated the Orient. Edward Said, a Palestine-born professor of literature at Columbia, examines this career and the system of ideas, prejudices, and categories—"Orientalism"—which was constructed to define, interpret, and subjugate the Middle East.

Said's thesis—and it should be noted here he confines himself to the Levant and to British, French, and a few American writers—is that generations of Western observers have perpetrated a "system of ideological fictions" which reduced the rich variety of Middle East experience to a few stereotypes like "Islam," "Arab," "Semite," "Oriental," etc. These stereotypes are almost always posited upon the assumption of Western superiority over the decadent, effete East. This intellectual imperialism, argues Said, prefigured and justified the Western political and economic imperialism which subjugated practically the whole of the Middle East by the end of World War I. Worse, claims Said, Western cultural imperialism has skewed the Arabs' perception of themselves and their society, promoting frustration and inferiority.

Said has examined scores of Western travel accounts, novels, poetry, political tracts, and scientific and pseudo-scientific works. He surveys the ideas of scholars such as Gibb and Lewis, romantics like Chateaubriand, Flaubert, Burton, and T. E. Lawrence, and politicians such as Disraeli, Cromer, and Kissinger. All are contaminated with Orientalism. Few Westerners who have hazarded a generalization about the Middle East escape Said's censure. He does briefly cite a few scholars—Berque, Rodinson, Malek, Owen—who by rigorous methodological self-consciousness have avoided the pitfalls of Orientalism. Nowhere does he mention the late Marshall Hodgson.

Said's ideas merit respect. His nominalism is a refreshing corrective to the tendency to rush to generalization on the basis of superficial learning and received ideas. His caution against interpreting Middle East developments excessively in the light of religion should be heeded by US experts who have suddenly discovered the "resurgence of Islam" in the wake of Iran's revolution. One might as well look to Christianity as the point of departure in understanding such diverse Western phenomena as punk rock, women's lib, and the election of Jimmy Carter. Similarly, his observation that a culture tends to interpret other cultures in a manner which reinforces its sense of superiority, if not original, is worth repeating; one is reminded of snobbish European travelers writing home about rude, frontier America, and, conversely, smug American travelers in decadent Europe congratulating one another on their democratic virtues.

Unfortunately, Said's writing is marred by the jargon of currently fashionable Structuralist sociology. He has in addition the annoying pedantic habit of translating some passages taken from a foreign language source and leaving others inexplicably in the original, and of dropping a French phrase in the middle of an English sentence where it contributes nothing. Nor does he altogether escape his own Orientalism. When Said says, "The Arab World today is an intellectual, political and cultural satellite of the United States," he indulges in the kind of dubious generalizing for which he condemns Western writers.

In his eagerness to savage the Orientalists, he occasionally loses his critical moorings. For example, in criticising Bernard Lewis's comment on the relation of the modern Arab word for revolution, *thawra*, with the classical Arab root, *th-w-r*, meaning a rising up (e.g. like a camel), Said leaps to the assumption that Lewis means to belittle the modern Arab revolutionists; Arab revolutions are no more meaningful than the rising up of a camel. Further, he asserts that Lewis "hints" at a demeaning, sexual innuendo in the Arab concept of revolution. Said: "since Arabs are really not equipped for serious action, their sexual excitement is no more than camel's rising up. Instead of revolution . . . there is more excitement, which is as much as saying that instead of copulation the Arab can only achieve foreplay, masturbation, coitus interruptus. These, I think, are Lewis's implications." This reviewer, admittedly no expert on arcane classical Arab roots, rising camels, or the private sexual practice of Arabs, can find nothing in Lewis's words, as quoted by Said, to support such an astonishing and vulgar interpretation, an interpretation which is far more a comment upon Said than upon the writer he is assaulting.

Finally, Said's critique of Orientalism is highly colored by his own political consciousness and alienation from the Western society in which he lives and writes. As a Palestinian living in the United States, he feels himself a victim of Orientalism. "The web of racism, cultural stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has come to feel as his uniquely punishing destiny." For Said—a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization's National Council—Zionism and the state of Israel are the bitterest fruit of Orientalism. There is much truth to this: many early Zionists were astonished to find already in Palestine inhabitants who resisted their colonization. But this dislike of Zionism sometimes distorts Said's vision, "Orientalism governs Israeli policy towards the Arabs throughout as the recently published Koenig report amply proves." Whatever influences Israeli policy towards the Arabs, the Koenig report proves nothing about that policy; it was a report on Arab landowning in the Galilee which was widely criticized in Israel when leaked to the press and was disavowed by the Israeli government.

Said has written a provocative and flawed book, rich in ideas and caveats. Highly recommended for careful, critical reading by those within and without the State Department who have made the East a career.

—MICHAEL DAVIS

Relevant To SALT

FORCE WITHOUT WAR, *by Barry M. Blechman and Stephen Kaplan. The Brookings Institution.*

Between 1946 and 1975 the United States used its armed forces in some way not involving actual conflict on 215 separate occasions to influence an international or intranational situation. On most of these occasions the results were favorable from the United States point of view—but only for the short term. In the somewhat longer term, the situation would again deteriorate. The threat of force might provide a respite but was not enough to solve a problem. More was needed—diplomacy, aid, a change in political relationships.

This is the principal conclusion of a comprehensive study by Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan of post-war American experience in using its armed forces for political purposes. Blechman and Kaplan reach their conclusions by correlating military moves with political change. They eschew use of the words success or failure, and they decline to express any opinion about the "wisdom" of US military moves—thus avoiding controversy but greatly reducing the value and relevance of their work.

But this careful and passionless study is relevant to the forthcoming Senate debate about SALT II. Some critics of the SALT II agreement fear the Soviets will be able to engage in political blackmail if they achieve strategic nuclear superiority. Blechman and Kaplan would not agree. They say that their "data would not support a hypothesis that the strategic weapons balance influences the outcome of incidents in which both the United States and USSR are involved. Relative strength in unusable nuclear overkill at the strategic level has little bearing on the outcome of local or regional issues."

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

Misleading Title

THE SECRET WAR FOR THE OCEAN DEPTHS, *by Thomas S. Burns, Rawson Associates Publishers, $12.95.*

If you read this book to learn about the secret, undersea war you will be disappointed. It strings together a series of essays about the Soviet and American navies since World War II, most of the details of which have appeared in the press already. The undersea portion is only about half the total and except for reference to the Cuban missile crisis the subject is not war but the naval arms race betwen the two super powers. The sub-title *Soviet-American Rivalry for Mastery of the Seas* is less misleading than the title.

Many chapters promise fascinating revelations on such mysteries as the loss of the US submarine *Thresher,* CIA's recovery of the Soviet sub with Howard Hughes' exotic ship *Glomar Explorer* and the undersea sonic tracking system called "Caesar." Alas, there is little new on any of these topics, particularly the long discussion of "Caesar" which reads like an early Watergate briefing by the Nixon administration—lots of language but no clear picture of the subject. And so it goes.

One good section recounts the successful efforts of Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr. in organizing the Navy and industry to build the Polaris missile submarines. "Red" Raborn is a hero of the author, as is Admiral Hyman G. Rickover.

In terms of unity the book is held together mainly by its bindings. The author strays often from his theme to throw in such gratuities as "Politicians are notoriously inept and frequently stupid." Mark Twain said it better: "It could probably be shown by facts and figures that there is no distinctly native American criminal class except Congress." Mr. Burns's feelings about pols doubtless explains why he has omitted any reference to the recently signed UN convention which bans weapons of mass destruction on the international seabed. It was originally proposed by an ex-FSO, Senator Claiborne Pell.

Mr. Burns is most impressive when dealing with his own experiences as a naval officer and employee of industrial suppliers of military hardware. Like other ex-government officials he enjoys his freedom to criticize sacred cows such as environmentalists. Even as

an ex-EPA person I must share Burns's disgust with the people who refused to let the Navy use its ingenious low frequency radio system to communicate with our Polaris submarines. Their reasoning stemmed from alleged, but unprovable, ecological dangers. Burns rightly calls it a "flippant disregard for American's (sic) military capability and the communications involved in supporting the country's number one deterrent, the SLBM submarine fleet."

—FITZHUGH GREEN

Kissinger Trivia

TRAVELS WITH HENRY, *by Richard Valeriani. Houghton Mifflin, $12.95.*

Several Washington bookstores report that there are indeed readers who will pay thirteen dollars for four hundred pages of Kissinger anecdotes—but there are not very many of them. And some of these readers will have already discovered that the book reveals more of Richard Valeriani than it does Henry Kissinger.

Be prepared for a lengthy ego trip, starting with the opening lines of Chapter One (which Valeriani entitles "The Vit and Visdom of Kenry Kissinger"):

Two tourists were standing outside the Sheraton Hotel in the resort town of Macuto, Venezuela, as I was walking in.

"Look," said one of them. "There's Richard Valeriani."

"Oh," said the other one. "Kissinger must be here."

There follows an insider's account of what it was really like to travel 500,000 miles with the former secretary of state—through SALT, the Middle East shuttle, Peking, and more. Interspersed between the mileposts is the hard-to-escape Valeriani humor.

On one occasion, he wonders whether the Jordanian soldiers sent to chase birds off a telephone line were subsequently given "a distinguished shooing cross with tail-feather clusters."

And then there is the Kissinger trivia. Oceans of it. We are told, for instance, that Henry wore a blue business suit, white shirt and tie in Aqaba (which he consistently mispronounced as Ak-waba instead of Ah-kaba) that he ate grilled shrimp and drank Pharaoh wine (it was a good Pharaoh, says Valeriani, but not a great Pharaoh) in Cairo, and that he fell asleep at the ballet in Peking.

John Kenneth Galbraith found that historically speaking, much of this information virtually cries out to remain unknown. That tends to sum up my feeling about the whole book.

—SEAN KELLY

Japan Revisited

JAPAN: THE FRAGILE SUPER POWER, *by Frank Gibney. Norton, $12.95 (revised edition).*

When the first edition of this book appeared the *Journal's* review in June 1975 said: "Both the specialist and novice can profit from this fine book." The revised edition retains the virtues of the original with added emphasis on what the dust jacket calls "the world's dynamic new business society." A new chapter has been added, concentrating on the problems of "slow growth and fast exports," which does not convey fully the dangerous implications of a US-Japanese trade war.

—J. K. HOLLOWAY

THE GLORIOUS FOURTH
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violence that had engulfed them. They did manage to move on to a corner of the grand salon where Qassim accepted a glass of fruit juice and toasted our Independence Day. All thought of substantive talk was put aside. There had been too much adulation, even for Qassim. By this time there were perhaps a thousand people in the residence jammed almost shoulder to shoulder. Some were close enough to a bar or the dining room to get refreshments but most stood helplessly immured in the crowd, dusty and perspiring. Qassim wisely decided to leave almost at once and was quietly escorted by the ambassador and the Marines through a side door to his car. Shortly thereafter the sinister Colonel Mehdawi materialized in the murky entrance hall but his appearance was by then anticlimatic. With Qassim's departure, the other guests began slowly at first and then more rapidly to take their own leave. Eventually there were only a few members of the American community who stayed for a final commiserating drink and then they too departed.

The Jernegans contemplated a shambles of dust, mud-stained floors, broken glass, remnants of food, ground-out cigarette ends and the usual residue of a big party magnified a hundredfold by the bizarre circumstances of revolution and dust storms. This was no time for regrets, recriminations, or excuses; nor could we, red-eyed and gasping, see any humor in the situation. It was simply a moment of dull relief. A great ordeal was ended.

Outside one hundred desert coolers blew a ghostly pattern of red dust back and forth across the garden.

US–Iraqi relations continued strained. Ambassador Jernegan was declared persona non grata *by Qassim in 1961 when Washington recognized Kuwait as a sovereign state in the face of Baghdad's claim that Kuwait was part of Iraq. He went on to become ambassador to Algeria. Qassim and Mehdawi were shot and killed during a 1962 coup and are largely unlamented. Waldemar Gallman was named director general of the Foreign Service before he retired full of honors. Rodger Davies later became ambassador to Cyprus where he was killed by rifle fire during an attack by Cypriots on our embassy in Nicosia in 1974.*

There was a brief revival of US–Iraqi cordiality during 1964-66 under the stewardship of Ambassador Robert Strong, but this was washed away by the Six-Day War in 1967. Iraq, along with several other Arab states, broke diplomatic relations with us at the time and Iraq alone has not renewed. The United States maintains an interests section (USINT) in Baghdad under the aegis of the embassy of Belgium.

The Foreign Service wheel of fortune made its last turn for me in 1974 and ironically sent me back to Iraq to be head of USINT Baghdad. I celebrated the Fourth of July that year by entertaining two itinerant American oil field supply salesmen at the official residence in a quiet part of town far from the scene of the party fifteen years before. The temperature hovered around 115° F but there was no wind kicking dust in from the desert.

US INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

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den increase in American naval power in the Indian Ocean might well be considered a "new imperialism" to replace the British presence. Without the cooperation of these littoral states, an American military buildup in the Indian Ocean also would be perceived by a large segment of the US public and Congress as lacking legitimacy, just as the American buildup in Southeast Asia in the 1960s was perceived as being unwise (or immoral) because it was done unilaterally rather than in concert with allies and friends, as was the case during the Korean conflict in 1950.

The Future

At the present time, the real problems of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf are *political*, not military, and they should be dealt with through diplomacy rather than through the visible build-up of American military power. Except for the South Yemen incursions into North Yemen, which resulted in a prompt US supply of military aid to the North, there has been no recent *military* threat by one country to another in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region. The only continuing warfare is between Israel and Palestinian terrorists based in Lebanon. The real problems of Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and other oil states are primarily political in nature and result from internal dissension (Iran and Iraq) or deep foreign policy frustrations.

The principal foreign policy issue which tends to unite all Arab countries, and recently Iran as well, is the continuing injustice they see in Israel's refusal to concede the right of Palestinians to a homeland. Until this vexing issue is resolved, there is little likelihood that the United States will be able to gain either political support or military cooperation from the key countries which control Persian Gulf oil.

My conclusion is that the Carter administration has done a good job of bringing about peace between two key countries in the Middle East after thirty years of refusal by both Egypt and Israel to negotiate seriously. But this accomplishment will pale in comparison to the larger effort to build a new structure of peace in the Middle East unless it is now followed by real progress on a homeland for the Palestinians. Until there is a breakthrough on the Palestinian issue comparable to the Camp David accord on Sinai and the Suez Canal, the United States is not likely to win either the respect or the cooperation of major Arab countries. In that case, the flow of Arab oil may be slowed for political purposes. Will the United States then consider the oil as *vital*, i.e., worth the use of military force? Or will it use diplomacy to insure that the Camp David accords are broadened to achieve peace between Israel, Jordan and Syria based on a Palestinian homeland on the West Bank? Whether Washington likes it or not, "linkage" between oil and a Palestinian solution is real, and will grow more so in the coming year.

PHILIP MAZZEI—VIRGINIA'S ENVOY TO EUROPE

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the facts, as well as upon detailed notes, on legal and historical aspects, supplied by Jefferson. He gave expression also to his own deep belief in liberty, and his rejection of economic and sexual inequities. "Bias in favor of riches has no other foundation than ancient injustice and is very similar to that which, under different circumstances, exists in favor of the stronger sex. Anyone willing to rid himself of prejudice and become himself again, will find no satisfactory justification for such discriminations."

As if the *Recherches* represented the culmination of Mazzei's capability to serve the American Revolution, he accepted at this point an unexpected assignment as political observer and adviser to the last king of Poland, Stanislaus Poniatowski. Before doing so, he sought assurance from Jefferson, who was himself an admirer of the liberal Polish king, that this assignment would not be incompatible with his obligations to the United States.

Unable to be a mere spectator without becoming involved, Mazzei was not only a keen and objective reporter of the situation in France, but protagonist as well in the historical events of the first phase of the French Revolution, and was among the founders of the Club of 1789, which advocated a liberal and moderate political program. The numerous reports he dispatched during the four years (1788-1792) when he was in the service of Stanislaus cast light on events of the epoch and have remarkable historical value.

After the fall and partition of Poland in 1792, Mazzei returned permanently to Italy and established himself in Pisa, where he remained for the rest of his life, dedicating himself to gardening, writing his memoirs and maintaining a steady correspondence with Jefferson, who had in the meanwhile become secretary of state (1789-1793) and president (1801-1809), and who kept him informed on the progress and tribulations of the new republic, of which Mazzei continued to be a proud citizen.

On learning of Mazzei's death, which occurred in 1816, Jefferson wrote: "He had some peculiarities, and who of us has not? But he was of solid worth; honest, able, zealous in sound principles moral and political, constant in friendship, and punctual in all his undertakings. He was greatly esteemed in this country." To Professor Carmignani, of the University of Pisa, Jefferson wrote: "An intimacy of forty years has proven to me his great worth, and a friendship which had begun in personal acquaintance, was maintained after separation, without abatement, by a constant interchange of letters. His esteem too in this country was very general; his early and zealous cooperation in the establishment of our independence having acquired for him a great degree of favor."

Although the cosmopolitan Florentine and the Virginian gentleman differed in temperament, they shared what was of the utmost importance to both: hatred of tyranny, unshakable commitment to the rights of man, and faith in the future of the new republic. Upon this base was founded their enduring friendship and reciprocal esteem.

SALT: THE OBSTACLES TO JUDGMENT

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whatever weapons and supporting systems can rally the necessary executive-legislative consensus. The question, then, in the face of disturbing trends in Soviet power, is whether we can affect the Sovets' ideas about what they may wish to build without compromising our ability to build what we may need.

These central questions pointing to SALT's essential issues have no firm answers at present, and may not for some time. This raises the importance of the immediate US needs in SALT II. Out of SALT II, with or without ratification of proposed agreements, the US needs, at a minimum, time to decide how to modernize US strategic forces. In practice, this means that the United States must somehow defer the vulnerability of US land-based ICBMs long enough to conclude those portions of the strategic reappraisal dealing with the necessity of maintaining a viable strategic force triad, as well as with the questions of deterrence requirements and of follow-on force development considerations. In addition to time for modernization decisions, the United States needs freedom to exploit its technological superiority in pursuing whatever force modernization seems necessary for essential competence in the Soviet-American strategic relationship. Finally, the United States must have the freedom to develop alliance capabilities in consonance with the conclusions drawn from strategic and political reappraisals and force modernization decisions. These, it bears repeating, probably constitute the irreducible immediate American needs in the SALT II framework.

The constellation of factors discussed here—American fears of and liabilities in negotiation, the absence of a well-developed, authoritative pro-SALT case, and the inability to defer important strategic decisions until the current strategic reappraisal has run its course—holds considerable potential for adversity. At this point it seems impossible to reject the SALT II agreements without damaging the framework of ongoing SALT negotiations and the structure of Soviet-American relations, to say nothing of the possible internal political damage that may also result. Thus we may pay a high price for having attempted too much too soon. Further, attempts to follow up on SALT II agreements, whether ratified or rejected, may lead to force development decisions better left to moments of greater domestic consensus and less emotion. Finally, there seems a real possibility that to gain approval for the SALT II agreements the president will have to promise massive investments in US strategic force modernization and the preservation of an effective triad. Although such investments may seem appropriate in any case, as the capstone of SALT II they would be at best an irony. At worst, they could undo whatever SALT may have accomplished.

This portion of the JOURNAL *is the responsibility of the Governing Board of AFSA and is intended to report on employee-management issues, conditions of employment and the policy and administration of AFSA, including its Board, Committees, and Chapters.*

DUES REFERENDUM

The Elections Committee wishes to give notice that it has received from the AFSA Governing Board a resolution proposing a dues increase. As provided for in Articles II.5, V and XII, the Elections Committee will submit this proposal, accompanied by statements, if any, from the proponents and opponents of the proposal, to the AFSA Membership in a secret ballot referendum. A majority of valid votes received will determine the Association's policy on this proposal.

The text of the proposal, which was approved by a unanimous vote of the Governing Board on June 12, 1979, together with a statement of explanation, is given below. The Elections Committee will circulate the proposal and appropriate voting instructions in early August to all persons who are AFSA Members as of July 31. The Committee will include with the voting instructions appropriate statements it has received by July 31 from proponents or opponents of the resolution. Such statements can be submitted by mail addressed to the Elections Committee c/o AFSA, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037 or by AFSA channel cable. The Committee has decided that in order to be acceptable for circulation, a statement must not be longer than 500 words and must be signed by at least five current AFSA Members. A Member may not sign more than one statement. The Committee reserves the right to shorten statements from the end if necessary to meet space limitations.

The exact mailing address and last receipt date for voted ballots will be included in the voting instructions.

RESOLUTION

RESOLVED:

That the Governing Board is authorized to change the dues schedule as follows:

Members (Foreign Service)

Active-Duty—$26 ($1 per pay period), plus $13 (50c per pay period) for each $10,000, or fraction thereof, of the basic salary of step 4 of the Member's Foreign Service class.

Retired—$25 for Foreign Service Annuity up to $20,000; $40 for Foreign Service Annuity more than $20,000.

Associates—$25

STATEMENT EXPLAINING PROPOSAL FOR DUES INCREASE

The last increase in AFSA dues was approved by the Membership in a secret ballot referendum during the summer of 1977. In the past two years, despite our economies, our costs have risen about 20 percent, roughly in line with the Consumer Price Index. The salaries of active-duty Foreign Service Members have risen about 11 percent, except at the senior ranks. Because the dues of active-duty Members are based on class, there has been no increase in dues revenue, and dues continue to decrease as a percentage of Foreign Service income, ranging from .37 to .14 percent. The annual report, including the report on the AFSA General Fund performance for Fiscal Year 1979 and the budget for 1980, is published in the July issue of the Foreign Service *Journal* and explains in greater detail the Association's financial situation and prospects.

The proposed adjustment in dues structure is designed to increase revenue from dues by 20 percent in the fiscal year ending in June 1980 and to shift the basis of the dues structure for active-duty Members from class to income, so that, other things being equal, dues revenue will tend to rise automatically with annual comparability increases in Foreign Service income and meet the uncontrollable increases in the Association's costs..

If the proposed dues structure were in effect today:—all active-duty Members would pay $26 per year, or $1 per pay period if on allotment, plus $13 per year or 50c per pay period for each $10,000, or fraction thereof, of the basic salary of step 4 of the Member's Foreign Service class, regardless of the Member's own step within that class. (Dues are deductible from federal income tax for active-duty Foreign Service personel.) For example:

- an FSS-8, step 4, currently makes $12,855. The dues of any FSS-8 Member, regardless of his/her step, would be $52 per year or $2 per pay period. ($26 plus $13 for first $10,000 plus $13 for fraction of next $10,000.)
- an FSO/R/RU/IO-5 or FSSO-3, step 4, currently makes $24,351. The dues of any Member of those classes, regardless of step, would be $65 per year, or $3 per pay period. ($26, plus $26 for first $20,000, plus $13 for fraction of next $10,000.)
- an FSO/R/RU/IO-1, step 4, currently makes $47,500. The dues of any Member of the class, regardless of step, would be $91 per year, or $3.50 per pay period. ($26, plus $52 for first $40,000, plus $13 for fraction of next $10,000.)

For Retired Members, dues would continue to be based on Foreign Service annuity. But the breakpoint between the low and the high rates would change from $15,000 to $20,000 annuity. The low rate would rise from $20 to $25, and the high rate from $35 to $40.

For Associates (non-voting, non-Foreign Service), the annual dues would increase from $20 to $25.

Life Membership would remain unchanged, at $1,000.

PAY SCHEDULES

The Foreign Service pay schedule, is currently undergoing re-examinations. As for the Foreign Service pay schedule, the re-examination of its suitability was called for by an AFSA-sponsored amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1979. As an unrelated development, the Office of Management and Budget began sometime ago to study the bases for the federal payroll and this study resulted in President Carter's proposed revision of the federal pay schedule submitted to Congress June 6.

AFSA is active in respect to both of these two efforts to protect the interests of Foreign Service employees. To comply with the requirements of the 1979 Authorization Act, the responsible AFSA Committee has held a series of meetings with representatives of the Department and of Hay Associates, the management consultant firm retained by the Department to complete the required study. The central element of Hay Associates approach has been to define the job content of Foreign Service work and then to determine the relative job content and pay level of selected Foreign Service positions, domestic and overseas, to that of comparable positions in the civil service, military and private sector. Preliminary results of the Hay study are generally encouraging. Applying linkage analysis techniques, a comparison of the Foreign Service and other pay/grade classification systems on the basis of evaluated job content indicates that no Foreign Service positions are overpaid and that at certain levels upward adjustments are warranted. The final results of the Hay study are expected to be known by early July.

Annual Report

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said they would be willing to pay more dues to AFSA to upgrade its own performance, affiliation seemed divisive and risky. September 17, the special interest group which has many State Foreign Service staff corps members, was dissatisfied with our decision not to affiliate, and sought for a time to find a suitable affiliation partner and to mount a representation challenge to AFSA. They later abandoned the effort at least temporarily to involve themselves in the AFSA Governing Board election and avoid further division during the debate over the Foreign Service Act.

The Governing Board firmly believes that the career Foreign Service cannot rely on outside unions for effective representation and "clout." A union big enough to have substantial clout is also big enough to ignore the special interests of a small Foreign Service local within it. The experience of the ICA Foreign Service with AFGE Local 1812 proves that bigger and more expensive is not necessarily better.

It is true that effective representation of the career Foreign Service requires more resources. But these resources can be generated from within:

- More Foreign Service people, who benefit from our activities as exclusive representative, can and should join AFSA. Our State Membership includes only about half the FSO corps, and about one-fifth of those in other pay plans; our AID Membership includes about 45 percent of FSRs and 33 percent of FSS personnel. Those who don't join have no effective way to make sure their interests and views are adequately reflected in AFSA positions, and they are denying us the resources to do the job.
- Career Foreign Service members can afford to pay more dues. Since the last dues increase was approved nearly two years ago, costs have risen some 20 percent, and salaries, about 12 percent. Dues as a percentage of income have dropped accordingly and are at a trivial level, between .37 and .14 percent of income (tax deductible) compared with a typical one-percent among private sector unions, and somewhat less in the public sector. The Governing Board is proposing a referendum to increase dues and to index them to basic salary rather than class in order to keep abreast of inflation while keeping dues roughly stable as a percentage of members' income.

A somewhat related problem hampering AFSA's effectiveness as exclusive representative, and therefore the ability of all Foreign Service members to influence their working conditions, is the proliferation of special interest groups and their efforts to bypass AFSA and deal directly with management. In some cases, those groups predate Executive Order 11636, or were originally formed in response to a perception that AFSA did not adequately represent their particular views. At their best, they articulate special interests and make a useful contribution to overall AFSA positions. The problem is that once established, they tend to perpetuate themselves by emphasizing the special characteristics which, in their view, distinguish them from other Foreign Service colleagues; and they become an institutionalized chip on the shoulder, complaining about their second-class treatment. Their most energetic members tend, in some cases, to spend more time telling AFSA what to do than actually pitching in and helping AFSA do what they want it to. Their members may come to believe that it is not cost-effective to join AFSA; that one can achieve the same results by paying a few dollars to an organization which will pressure AFSA from a distance. The leaders of such a special interest organization often tend to believe they can accomplish more, or at least stand taller in the eyes of their own constituents, by seeking meetings with senior management officials rather than trying to persuade AFSA to adopt their cause.

Such activities in turn stimulate the paternalistic tendencies of some senior management officials, who succumb all too easily to nostalgic remembrances of the days before there was an exclusive representative, when they could receive petitions from the common folks and then do what they liked.

Of course, AFSA Governing Board candidates seek the endorsement of such special interest groups, and so help to perpetuate their existence and influence.

No doubt AFSA must always strive to improve its internal democratic processes so that everyone in the Foreign Service feels he or she has in AFSA a responsive representative. But AFSA is a democracy, meeting Landrum-Griffin Act standards of conduct for labor unions. We have elections every two years, and members can control the Governing Board through recall and referenda, or even remove AFSA as exclusive representative through a representation election. But so long as AFSA is exclusive representative, it is in the overall interest of the Foreign Service that its members work through it to strengthen it and make it better, not circumvent it and thereby undermine it.

Professional Affairs

AFSA continued during the year to pursue its professional vocation through:

- the *Foreign Service Journal*;
- Sponsorship of the Harriman, Rivkin, and Herter Awards for intellectual courage, including disciplined dissent, with Governor Harriman as the principal speaker at the December event;
- The November 30 Janet Ruben Memorial Lecture, named for the late AFSA USIA Representative, featuring ICA Advisory Commission Chairman Olin Robison;
- A luncheon speech last fall by retired Career Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson on Asia policy;
- A joint AFSA-DACOR dutch treat party for new retirees on April 12, featuring Ambassador Marshall Green;
- A June 20 luncheon featuring retiring Ambassador to Iran William H. Sullivan;
- Collaboration with the Department's Bureau of Public Affairs to arrange luncheons in connection with Scholar-Diplomat Seminars;
- Cooperation with the Department and DACOR in sponsoring Foreign Service Day in May for returning retired colleagues, and the AFSA breakfast the following morning;
- Continued monitoring of Presidential appointments. As of May 12 the Carter Administration maintained its relatively good record of 74 percent career Foreign Service Chiefs of Mission. One of the five non-career ambassadors to whom we had objected has resigned. We did not object to any new appointees during the year. Perhaps in retrospect we should have been more diligent in objecting to more non-career appointees who have public service records, although they lacked knowledge of the region to which they were sent;
- Maintenance of the Memorial Plaque in the Diplomatic Lobby of the Department. This year at Foreign Service Day, AFSA and the Department conducted a ceremony recognizing the addition of the name of our murdered Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph "Spike" Dubs, to the plaque.

Retirement and Retired Members

On February 22 the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 632 of the Foreign Service Act, which mandates retirement at age 60. The case was the first in which AFSA filed an amicus curiae brief in the Supreme Court. A number of AFSA's arguments were picked up by the Court in its 8-1 decision. AFGE and the Thomas Legal Defense Fund which AFGE controls were on the losing side of the case.

AFSA also sponsored legislation to encourage voluntary retirement by allowing those whose pay had been capped by executive-level pay constraints to compute their annuities on the basis of a high one rather than high three years of service. The legislation took effect October 1, but was repealed October 17. Sixty-four members of the

Foreign Service retired under its provisions; after a legal hassle, they were told recently that they were entitled to the "high-one" computation.

One of the regrettable aspects of the "high one" issue was the Office of Management and Budget's ultimately successful effort to kill it, by circulating grossly inflated estimates of its cost on the Hill, and reportedly tattling to the White House on senior Department officials for allegedly leaking to AFSA a memo from the Secretary to the President setting forth the true minimal costs of the provision. (Actually, it wasn't they who leaked it to us!)

Another, silly aspect of the retirement issue was AFGE's effort to claim credit for the high one. Though they had neither drafted it nor even testified on it throughout its passage through Congress, they sent at the last minute a letter to the President urging him not to veto the high one. (He didn't, since it was buried in the authorization bill, but made a statement against it.) They then fed a reporter their story of their deep involvement, which the reporter printed without bothering to check with AFSA, or the executive or legislative branches. Then they obtained the reporter's "permission" to reproduce his column in their newsletters. Had they devoted the effort to obtain the high one that they devoted to claiming credit for it, and if they had as much clout as they claim, maybe we would have obtained the high one permanently.

AFSA continues to value its retired members, who enjoy the full rights of membership, can use the Club and participate in our professional activities, and staff most of AFSA's professional employee positions. Our new Executive Director, retired USIA FSIO Robert Beers, is also a former vice president of the National Association of Retired Federal Employees. He is improving our coordination with DACOR, NARFE, and other federal retiree groups on issues such as maintaining twice-yearly cost-of-living adjustments to annuities, and keeping the adjustments in line with actual increases in the cost of living rather than the lower increases in federal pay.

A survey of members, taken at the behest of two retired members, firmly contradicted statements by the Department that Foreign Service people wanted the Biographic Register to remain administratively controlled, and would oppose inclusion of their own curriculum vitae in a published Biographic Register. Nevertheless, the Department rejected AFSA's urging that the Register be decontrolled.

Conditions of Employment

AFSA testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Diplomatic Relations Act which will strengthen the Secretary's hand in demanding reciprocal treatment from other governments for Foreign Service members and their families overseas. We favor facilitating employment of family members overseas, but believe equal priority should be given to reducing or eliminating import restrictions and taxes on staff corps members and others, or compensating them for such unfairly imposed costs. We are not optimistic, however, about persuading Congress to compensate for such costs if they are already covered by a cost of living allowance, or if overall costs of living at a post are lower than in the United States.

Last summer we tried to obtain a phase-in or other easing of the change in the basis for computing cost-of-living allowances, which adversely affected those making less than $32,000, especially at high-COLA posts. We didn't succeed.

We continued, using our Committee on Extraordinary Dangers, to press management for measures to minimize security risks for Foreign Service employees overseas. Our effort was stimulated by the tragic assassination of our Ambassador to Afghanistan and the occupation by anti-American forces of our Embassy in Tehran, both on February 14. We continue to urge

- optimum security measures;
- closer cooperation with host governments and a more flexible policy in hostage situtions;
- broader international adherence to anti-terrorist conventions, and sanctions against pro-terrorist governments;
- more realistic and flexible evacuation policies in potentially dangerous situations; and
- greater public awareness of the fact that Foreign Service people do not live in relaxed opulence, but suffer real risks from terrorism, as well as constraints on their personal liberty from necessary security measures.

Meanwhile, we followed the microwave situation in Moscow. The long-awaited Johns Hopkins report indicated there appeared to be no adverse health effects from microwave radiation there, and urged further study of those more recently stationed in Moscow when radiation levels were higher, as well as the establishment of an epidemiological capability in the Medical Division. We support both and have so informed management. In late May the Embassy in Moscow revealed that the microwave radiation had been stopped.

We also supported successfully our Moscow Chapter's request for higher post differential and better fire protection in the wake of the fire at the Chancery.

An AFSA ad hoc interagency committee completed formal consultations with the three foreign affairs agencies on comprehensive suitability criteria for initial and continuing employment in the Service, and signed an agreement. The related consultations on new comprehensive and clarified disciplinary regulations appear close to completion.

The Members' Interests Committee worked during the year to maintain Section 912 of the Internal Revenue Code which exempts most overseas allowances from federal taxation. Indeed, the Congress is recognizing the importance of providing good tax treatment for US private citizens overseas. The tax law now also includes a provision which essentially extended to members of the Foreign Service assigned abroad the same status as military personnel by deferring taxation on capital gains resulting from the sale of a principal residence up to an additional four years grace before having to reinvest the gains in a new principal residence or to pay the tax.

In addition to the provisions already cited above, the annual authorization bill last fall contained authorization for R & R travel to the US as well as locations abroad and exemption from the Fly-America Act for official travel between two overseas locations. We are pressing management to issue implementing regulations on which we can consult on these two issues.

The Members' Interests Committee began consultations with management on the adoption of a standardized housing policy overseas. Management then broke off the talks and unilaterally issued regulations, and AFSA charged management with an unfair practice.

Language from the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1978 abolishing premium pay for FSOs and FSIOs, provided special allowances for those FSOs and FSIOs who regularly work extra hours. The Members' Interests Committee negotiated implementing regulations enabling 77 FSOs to receive the allowance. We believe AFSA should continue its efforts to repeal or substantially modify the premium pay ban, and/or improve the special allowance by increasing the amounts, loosening the criteria, and extending it to cover any Foreign Service personnel who have to be on-call or standby duty for periods of time in substantial excess of normal working hours.

The AFSA Counselors' Office persuaded the Board of the Foreign Service to accept a number of significant amendments to proposed regulations for handling separation for cause cases.

Although AFSA initiated legislation to give family members of government employees training and employment overseas, management has ignored AFSA in implementing regulations. We have filed an unfair practice charge. We favor such training, but believe it is necessary to establish at least equal

priority for the needs of employees, notably staff corps, for similar training.

State

The State Standing Committee, composed of Board Members in the State Foreign Service as well as representatives of other groups within the Service, met at 4:30 p.m. Mondays in the AFSA Counselors' office to deal with State personnel policy issues and other issues peculiar to State. In addition to annual consultations on Selection Board membership and precepts, the Committee:

- handled the early work, as mentioned above, on the State restructure proposal;
- bargained agreements on excursion tours for staff corps members, procedures for skill code changes, the FSRU conversion procedures and some aspects of assignment procedures;
- carefully reviewed the McBer proposals for a new OER form;
- focused on the affirmative action program. We reached agreement on most issues, including one which required mediation by the Disputes Panel. We lost an appeal on the consultability of the numbers for the Department's two special hiring programs, but have made a number of new proposals to mitigate their adverse impact on the career Service and to make sure the programs are carried out effectively and fairly. We reserve the right to oppose the programs themselves in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of our government, as well as in public.

One draft reorganization plan, which would have given visa policy-making to Justice, is apparently moribund. Various proposals to reorganize export promotion and trade policy are very much alive, and an AFSA subcommittee of FSO Econ/Commercial officers is monitoring it closely.

AID

The AID Standing Committee holds open meetings on Wednesdays at noon in the AFSA Office, Room 3644, New State. During the past year the Committee has devoted a very large amount of time to the Unified Personnel System (UPS) proposals prepared by management. When management found that its initial radical proposal was unacceptable to all concerned, including AFSA, it decided not to submit anything. At that point the Committee intensified its lobbying on the Hill. Management finally submitted a new proposal in April 1979, which while hardly a system and far from fully satisfactory, will at least significantly increase the percentage of AID/W positions encumbered by Foreign Service employees by reserving a number of positions for the Foreign Service. The Committee was also instrumental in getting management to revise a section of the proposal that would have eliminated the requirement that Foreign Service personnel be assigned overseas within two years of appointment (an obvious ploy to escape the consequences of having to assign Foreign Service employees to FS positions); management then opted to request a change from two to three years which was acceptable to AFSA. Numerous telegrams on the UPS proposals from overseas chapters greatly aided the Committee's presentation of the membership's views to management.

The Committee also:

- rode herd on the RIF which was to affect almost 250 employees. In the end, one employee was RIF'd, and he was eligible for retirement;
- badgered management until it presented a Foreign Service Staff Crossover Training Agreement for consultation. Under the negotiated Agreement now signed, the FSS employees have a permanent system for selection and training which enables them to qualify for appointments as FSR;
- negotiated improved language training availabilities for spouses; and
- persuaded management to review all FSS positions for appropriate grading as part of our successful effort to unfreeze FSS promotions. Nineteen positions were upgraded; one was downgraded.

Some of the items on the agenda now are:

- close oversight and consultations on the classification of AID/W positions as either FS or GS;
- assuring that any revisions in the FS pay scale benefit FSRs as well as FSOs (a recent Congressionally mandated pay comparability study performed by a private contractor covers only State);
- continued pressure to regularize the number of promotions, especially now that mandatory age sixty retirement is thinning the upper ranks of both FSRs and FSSs; and
- picking up the loose ends, e.g., career counseling, now that we know the narrow focus of the UPS.

ICA

The ICA Foreign Service continued to suffer under the yoke of mediocre representation by AFGE Local 1812, which seemed determined to prove that affiliation with a large public sector union is bad for the Foreign Service.

The light at the end of the tunnel was that the composition of the ICA Foreign Service is changing. The reestablishment of mandatory retirement is leading a number of domestic-oriented FSRUs, who are excellent employees but have no commitment to serve overseas, to reconvert to the Civil Service. Someday, ICA will be ready once again for AFSA. Meanwhile, ICA AFSA members have participated in AFSA committees, including Members' Interests, Education, Professional Affairs, AFSA News, the former Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center Governing Committee, and the Ad Hoc Committee on Suitability Criteria and Disciplinary Procedures. They also took part in the AFSA Task Forces on the Foreign Service Act of 1979 to make sure AFSA's position took into account the ICA perspective.

Insurance

The Insurance Committee has been inquiring into the unprecedented increase in the 1979 premium for family coverage under the Foreign Service Health Benefit Plan, an inquiry undertaken because of the number of complaints received from AFSA members. (A preliminary report by the Committee Chairman appeared in the May issue of the *Journal*.) In addition, the Committee is continuing its efforts to develop (1) a new group life insurance plan, apart from that offered by the Protective Association, that will provide term life insurance at competitive rates and in greater amounts than are offered in most group contracts, and (2) a plan for overseas automobile insurance that would be advantageous to members.

Scholarship Fund

The AFSA Scholarship Fund continues to receive tax-deductible contributions from members and others. In 1979 the fund totalled approximately $645,000. Contributions from the American Association of Foreign Service Women (AAFSW), income from investments, and Members contributions provided a total of $55,925 for 86 scholarships awarded this past year to Foreign Service dependents. 22 of these were in the merit award program while 64 scholarship grants, ranging from $225 to $1,500, were awarded on a basis of financial need.

Foreign Service Club

The Club is licensed by the District of Columbia for the use of AFSA Members, Associates and their guests. It is open for lunch on workdays and for special events.

The Club deficit in FY 1979 was about $3,800 in terms of its direct costs exceeding income from patrons. The comparable figure in 1978 was about $1,000. A further $20,600 was charged against the Club for the FY 1979 budget as its share of the building and headquarters staff overhead costs to AFSA. It should be noted that closing the Club would not generate income by

itself beyond saving its direct costs deficits, unless the space it occupies was rented or otherwise used to produce income.

Foreign Service Journal

The *FSJ* goes to all Members and Associates, to public subscribers, and to a list of people, including Congressmen and others with whom AFSA wishes to communicate regularly. The Editoral Board and the Editor are responsible for the FSJ's day-to-day operations and for its general content. The editorial page and the AFSA News insert are, however, the responsibility of the AFSA Board directly.

The *FSJ* is financed by a combination of Members' dues, advertising sales and public subscriptions. For budget purposes in FY 1979, $6.50 of each Member's dues was allocated to *FSJ* expense (excluding the costs of *AFSA News*). On this basis, the *Journal's* income was about $1,000 less than its direct costs to AFSA during the fiscal year. A further $29,500 was charged to the magazine's operations as its share of the building and headquarters staff overhead costs of the Association.

Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center (FSECC)

After six years of operations as a pioneering counseling center for the mobile US foreign affairs community, the FSECC was discontinued in May 1979 when the Department of State incorporated its functions into the Department's Family Liaison Office. The FSECC's Director, Mrs. Bernice Munsey, was appointed by the Department to its new position for this purpose.

Throughout its history the FSECC was jointly funded on an equal basis by the Association of American Foreign Service Women (AAFSW) and the AFSA Scholarship Fund. The Center was widely commended for its unique and innovative contribution to the community it served since 1973. AFSA welcomed the Department's initiative which recognized the value of FSECC functions and which should give a broader resource base for the services performed.

The General Fund

The budget table presented as part of this report shows the actual receipts and disbursements from the General Fund during FY 1979 and the estimated receipts and disbursements for FY 1980.

The FY 1980 budget projects a 20 percent increase in dues, effective October 1, 1979. Such an increase, if approved through referendum by AFSA's members, will keep AFSA's dues income in line with the effects of inflation over the past two years since the present dues schedule was established. While the overall financial position of the Association is sound, any expansion of member services is circumscribed by current financial limitations. The proposed increase in dues, if granted, will restore some degree of flexibility to AFSA's financial position and permit a significant widening of the services available to all segments of AFSA's membership.

The decline in the estimated receipts to "Reimbursements" from FY 1979 to FY 1980 reflects the transfer of the Foreign Service Educational and Counseling Center from the AFSA building to the Department of State. Much of this loss of income is offset, however, by correspondingly decreased disbursements previously made by AFSA for the Center's operations.

The direct expenses of the Club in FY 1980 should be covered, under this estimate, by Club receipts. Also, the direct salary and production costs of the *Journal* should be covered by advertising and subscription revenue, plus an allocation of approximately $6.50 from the dues paid by each AFSA member.

AFSA's auditors complimented the organization for holding operating costs down in the face of inflationary pressures and they also found AFSA's accounting and cost allocation procedures to be appropriate. The Association's financial position is also buttressed by the equity accrued in its headquarters building which has been unofficially appraised at a value in the order of $900,000 against outstanding mortgages totalling less than $300,000.

Should the projected surplus in FY 1980 actually be realized, its use will be determined by the new Governing Board. The outgoing Board has recommended that priority attention be given to improving communication with AFSA members as, for example, by more frequent "Red Top" news bulletins, and to the recruiting of additional staff for promoting members' interests, a stepped up membership drive, and improved maintenance of the building and grounds.

AFSA GENERAL FUNDS
Recepits and Disbursements
Actual FY 79—Proposed FY 80

(See explanatory notes under "The General Fund" section.)

Receipts	FY 79	FY 80
Dues	246,145	287,500
Club Receipts	116,324	125,000
Journal Revenue	61,095	65,000
Reimbursements	46,261	20,000
Total receipts	469,824	497,500
Disbursements		
Admin. Salaries	144,563	145,000
Club direct expenses, including salaries	120,168	125,000
Journal publication exp.	76,445	79,000
Operations	70,195	72,000
Building occupancy exp.	56,764	60,000
Total disbursements	468,135	481,000
Reserve for additional member services	1,690	16,500

Internal Affairs

The Governing Board proposed a number of amendments to the Bylaws to:

- shorten the Bylaws;
- take account of experience since 1973, when the Bylaws were last amended;
- firmly subordinate individual officers to the overall authority of the Governing Board;
- extend the autonomy and expertise of the Standing Committee on Elections to cover referenda, bylaws amendments, and recall procedures;
- streamline recall procedures;
- entrench the role of the constituency standing committees.

The draft amendments attracted little interest, were approved by the membership in a light vote, and took effect December 18, 1978.

The Board and its Committees attempted to keep the membership informed and to seek its advice on important issues through open meetings of these bodies and of the Washington membership, frequent circular telegrams, AFSA News, and the creation of task forces to deal with spescific issues. Our own self-assessment is that we did reasonably well overseas, less well in Washington. The FY 1980 budget contains $3,000 specifically earmarked for Redtops in Washington which should help to remedy this deficiency.

Individual AFSA members have the right to complain to the Employee-Management Relations Commission about alleged violations of democratic standards. During the year the EMRC rejected a complaint from John D. Hemenway about the 1977 Governing Board Election. However, in December the Department of Labor ordered a hearing on a complaint by John D. Harter alleging that Governing Board action against Mr. Hemenway when he was AFSA President in 1975-76 violated his (Mr. Harter's) rights as an AFSA Member. The hearing was held in April, with Mr. Hemenway joined at his request as a co-complainant. Post-hearing briefs are due in July. The Administrative Law Judge will make findings of fact and recommendations some time thereafter to the EMRC which, after taking into account exceptions, if any, by the parties, will make a final decision.

In AFSA's judgment, the complaint was frivolous and harassing. The weeks which the AFSA Counselor's office put into preparation and presentation of the case, while necessary in order to defend AFSA from the complaint, could have been much better spent on helping individual grievants or the Foreign Service as a whole.

The AFSA professional staff continues to be the backbone of the Association, supplying continuity on a day-to-day and year-by-year basis.

FSJ SPECIAL SERVICES

In order to be of maximum assistance to AFSA members and **Journal** readers we are accepting these listings until the 15th of each month for publication in the issue dated the following month. The rate is 40¢ per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail copy for advertisement and check to: Classified Ads, **Foreign Service Journal**, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

REAL ESTATE

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WASHINGTON UPDATE

THE WASHINGTON OVERSEAS NEWSLETTER invites you to write for a free introductory copy of our monthly newsletter. It has the news—real estate prices, food prices, restaurants, special shopping, etc.—that you need to keep up-to-date with changing Washington. Write to: Phoenix Enterprises, Box 406, Vienna, VA 22180.

HOME LEAVE

ANSWER TO your home leave/hot summer problem. 3-br. mountain home on Deep Creek Lake in Western Maryland. Private dock. Monthly/weekly summer rentals. Write Ramsay, 1705 Cedar Park Road, Annapolis, Md. 21401. (301) 267-8735.

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Foreign Service People

Births

Bensky. A son, Brian Philip, born to FSO and Mrs. Jonathan Bensky on May 27 in Madras. The Benskys will be assigned to Colombo beginning in October.

Nolan. A daughter, Meghan Elizabeth, born on April 23 to FSO and Mrs. Robert B. Nolan in Clearfield, Pennsylvania. Mr. Nolan is the administrative officer in Antananarivo, Madagascar.

Marriages

Midthun-Brooks. Karen Midthun, M.D., daughter of FSO-retired and Mrs. Kermit S. Midthun, was married on June 9 to Robert L. Brooks, Jr. in Washington, D.C. The bride is a 1979 graduate of GWU Medical School.

Moore-Casey. Cynthia Moore, daughter of Ambassador-retired and Mrs. C. Robert Moore, was married to Frank Casey on June 9 in Washington, D.C. The couple, both former Peace Corps Volunteers, met in Africa. They are doing graduate studies in rural development at Cornell University.

Deaths

Bower. Roger Bower, former FSO and international broadcaster, died on May 17 in Sharon, Connecticut. He joined the State Department in 1949 and served in Nigeria, the Middle East and Vietnam. Mr. Bower then became a managing director of the National Broadcasting Company International until his retirement in 1965. He received the Pope's medal for work in Nigeria and the Psychological War Medal of Honor from the then government of South Vietnam. In 1974 he evaluated Iran's television system as a member of the International Executive Service Corps. He is survived by his wife, Jean Stewart Bower, Lime Rock Lodge, Route 1, Box 238, Lakeville, Connecticut 06039, a son, Roger of Waynesburg, two daughters, Mrs. Wendy Kakutis of Bloomingdale, N.J. and Mrs. Nancy York of Mattapoisett, Mass. and a sister, Mrs. Kathryn Jorgensen of Orlando, Fla.

Greenup. Julian C. Greenup, FSO-retired, died on April 29. Mr. Greenup entered the Foreign Service in 1919 and served at Oruro, Las Palmas, Madrid, Lima, Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo. A few months after his retirement in 1951 he was recalled to active duty as representative on the Inter-American Economic and Social Council, OAS, with the personal rank of ambassador. He retired for the second time in 1953. Ambassador Greenup is survived by his wife, Jessie E., 5171 Willow Wood Road, Rolling Hills Estates, California 90274, a daughter, Eleanor Bohning, a son, Julian Greenup, Jr., five grandchildren and two great-grandchildren.

Hahn. Elizabeth Sober Hahn, daughter of FSO and Mrs. Sidney Sober, died on May 30 in Washington. Mrs. Hahn was born in Prague and accompanied her family to assignments in a number of countries. She worked as an account executive with Henry J. Kaufman and Associates and as executive secretary in the law firm of Koteen and Burt. Survivors include her parents, 5009 Hawthorne Pl. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016 and a brother, Stephen, of Annapolis.

Juddson. Harte M. Juddson, FSO-retired, died on May 12 in the Bronx VA Hospital. He joined the Foreign Service in 1911 and served at Istanbul, Brussels and Berne. After leaving the Foreign Service he taught in the high schools of Brooklyn and at City College and Brooklyn College. A member of the Air Force Reserve, he was called to active duty in World War II and served with the Flying Tigers in the Pacific theater. He is survived by a daughter, Clare Juddson Kagel, 425 Riverside Drive, New York, N.Y. 10025.

Malone. Kemp G. Malone, son of FSO and Mrs. Gifford D. Malone, died on May 24 in a motorcycle accident near George Washington Parkway. He is survived by his parents, 907 Turkey Run Road, McLean, Va., a sister, Elizabeth, and his grandparents. Contributions in his memory may be made to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

Peterson. Oliver A. Peterson, FSO-retired, died on May 10 in Brattleboro, Vermont. Mr. Peterson began his government career with the WPA, then went with the Office of Price Administration during World War II. Post-war he served as field representative for the Stimson Committee for the Marshall Plan. In 1948 he became one of the first labor attaches and served in Stockholm and Brussels. He retired in 1962 as labor adviser in the Bureau of African Affairs. He was associated with several educational programs, including service as visiting professor at the School of International Service, American University. He is survived by his wife, Esther, President Carter's Special Assistant for Consumer Affairs, of 7714 13th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20012, a daughter, Karen Wilken of Lesotho, three sons, Eric N., Brooklyn, N.Y., Iver E., Detroit, Mich., and Lars E., Washington, D.C. and five grandchildren.

Tyler. S. Roger Tyler, Jr., FSO-retired, died on May 23, in Olney, Maryland. Mr. Tyler entered the Foreign Service in 1935 and served at Toronto, Mexico City, San Jose, Moscow, Geneva, Jerusalem, Alexandria and as consul general at Nassau and Seville before his retirement in 1964. He is survived by his sister, Esther Campbell, 1233 Oakmont Rd., Charlestown, W. Va., a son, Cheever Tyler, 45 Lincoln St., New Haven, Conn., a daughter, Zora Tyler Mills, 8 Bristol House, 67 Lower Sloane St., London SW1, England, and six grandchildren.

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