Foreign Service Journal

OCTOBER 1979 75 CENTS

The Essence of the Debate Over SALT II
by Stephen A. Garrett

John Foster Dulles: Hard-Liner or Tightrope Walker
by Peter A. Poole

Fact: Recognizing the limits of the Claims Act, the government recommends private insurance too.

Claims Act

1. The government will be responsible for only $15,000 of proven property loss.
2. Loss recovery limitations exist on most categories of possessions such as jewelry, furs, cameras, fine arts, antiques.
3. Claims process requires government investigation and documentation.
4. Loss must be incident to service.
5. Comprehensive Personal Liability insurance is not available.
6. Loss evaluation is complicated and includes depreciation.
7. Theft loss requires proof that due care was exercised to prevent the occurrence.

These are only a few of the differences.
Please refer to Foreign Affairs Manual (6 FAM 300).

AFSA Plan

1. You may purchase as much insurance as you need.
2. Valuable articles can be scheduled without limitation on a "valued at" basis.
3. Swift claims settlement begins with a simple telephone call or letter.
4. Coverage is worldwide whether on business or pleasure.
5. Comprehensive Personal Liability insurance is available.
6. Loss settlement on unscheduled items is based on replacement cost *with no depreciation.* Settlement on scheduled articles is based on the agreed amount.
7. No such requirement.

AFSA Desk, The Hirshorn Company 1079
14 East Highland Avenue
Philadelphia, Pa. 19118 (215) CH2-8200.*

Send me your free brochure (with built-in application form) that answers my questions about overseas insurance.

Name ______________________

Address ______________________

City/State/Zip ______________________

**If calling from the Washington, D.C. area: (202) 457-0250*

Note: The insurance policies, not this advertisement, will form the contract between the insured and the insurance company. The policies contain limits, exclusions and limitations not listed here.

Foreign Service Journal

American Foreign Service Association

Officers and Members of the Governing Board

KENNETH W. BLEAKLEY, *President*
ANTHEA S. DE ROUVILLE, Vice President
FRANK DIMOND, *Second Vice President*
GALEN FOX, *Secretary*
DALE L. COLEMAN, *Treasurer*
JONATHAN L. SPERLING, *AID Representative*
FRED M. SHAVER, *ICA Representative*
EVA S. KIM, JOSEPH N. MCBRIDE, ROBERT H. STERN, *State Representatives*
SPENCER KING AND CHARLES WHITEHOUSE, *Retired Representatives*

Journal Editorial Board

JOEL M. WOLDMAN, *Chairman*
JAMES F. O'CONNOR
HARRIET P. CULLEY
WESLEY N. PEDERSEN
NEIL A. BOYER
MICHAEL A. G. MICHAUD
ARNOLD P. SCHIFFERDECKER
GEORGE S. DRAGNICH

Staff

ROBERT M. BEERS, *Executive Director*
WILBUR P. CHASE, *Counselor*
CECIL B. SANNER, *Membership and Circulation*

AFSA Scholarship Programs

LEE MIDTHUN

Journal

SHIRLEY R. NEWHALL, *Editor*
ROBIN JENKINS, *Editorial Assistant*
McIVER ART & PUBLICATIONS, INC., *Art Direction*

Advertising Representatives

JAMES C. SASMOR ASSOCIATES, 521 Fifth Ave., Suite 1700, New York, N.Y. 10017 (212) 683-3421
ALBERT D. SHONK CO., 681 Market St., San Francisco, Calif. 94105 (415) 392-7144
JOSHUA B. POWERS, LTD., 46 Keyes House, Dolphin Sq., London SW1 01-834-8023/9. International Representatives.

OCTOBER 1979: Volume 56, No. 10
ISSN 0015-7279

Communication re: A Question of Numbers
WILLIAM C. DAWSON, JR. 6

Letter from Shanghai
BART N. STEPHENS 9

The Essence of the Debate over SALT II
STEPHEN A. GARRETT 13

Unraveling a Mystery: American POWs Killed at Hiroshima
BARTON J. BERNSTEIN 17

Mr. Black Gets the Sack
CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN 20

The Most Poetic Negotiation in Diplomatic History
MORTIMER D. GOLDSTEIN 29

John Foster Dulles: Hard-Liner or Tightrope-Walker?
PETER A. POOLE 30

Letters to the Editor 4
Editorials 12
AFSA News 23
Book Essay: Fast and Loose
Martin F. Herz 34
The Bookshelf 35
Scholarship Information 45
Foreign Service People 46

Cover: Neither Fish Nor Fowl, by Marie Skora

The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the offical views of the Department of State, the International Communication Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

While the Editorial Board of the JOURNAL is responsible for its general content, statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under Executive Order 11636 on the editorial page and in the AFSA News, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

Membership in the American Foreign Service Association is open to the professionals in foreign affairs overseas or in Washington, as well as to persons having an active interest in, or close association with foreign affairs.

Membership dues are: Active Members—Dues range from $39 to $65 annually. Retired Active Members—Dues are $35 annually for members with incomes over $15,000; $20 annually for less than $15,000. Associate Members—Dues are $20 annually. All dues payments include $6.50 allocation for the Journal and AFSA News, per AFSA Bylaws.

For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues); $7.50; two years, $12.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

©American Foreign Service Association, 1979. The Foreign Service Journal is published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington D.C. 20037. Telephone (202) 338-4045

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional post office.

Letters

NOTE OF PRAISE AND ALARM

IT IS SELDOM that one comes upon as perceptive, thoughtful and informed a contribution to an area of policy-dispute as Smith Simpson's article on "Tribes and Tribulations in Africa" in the *Foreign Service Journal* for December. Not the least of its merits was that it prompted Rebecca L. Bennett's telling letter on the same subject in the May issue.

It is sad to contemplate the almost steady decline in our national standing and influence abroad since I began an eleven-year stint in the Department of State directly after World War II. It is also interesting to speculate on the cause of the decline, which Mr. Simpson and Ms. Bennett help one to understand.

CHARLTON OGBURN
Oakton, Va.

BRING BACK THE REGISTER

I REFER to the article "bioregister" on page 45 of the May *Journal*.

I am delighted to know that steps are being taken by Messrs. Heinrichs. Simpson, Wells, Jr. *et al* to resume publication of the *State Department Biographic Registers*.

As has been amply and tragically proved, while terrorists may have benefited by the availability of the Register and the Foreign Service Lists, they had no difficulty in identifying and attacking their victims without those publications. Those publications are invaluable to researchers in many fields and resumption of publication is more than justified.

RICHARD FYFE BOYCE
Boynton Beach, Florida

A DAY IN COURT

YOUR READERS may be interested in a brief account of our experience relating to a loss from household effects stored during an extended period overseas.

In addition to several lost and damaged items of no great significance, two handloomed Turkish room-sized carpets were lost. Their value in today's market was at least $1,000 each. Bekins' claims agent offered $50 each. We considered this grossly inadequate, appealed for reconsideration and were advised that no more would be offered. Feeling that we should not resort to the Department's claims office and subject the taxpayer to a charge which was clearly due to the storage company's negligence, we filed suit in the District Court of Montgomery County, Maryland. Pursuant to a trial we were recently awarded $1,145 plus court costs without our having to retain an attorney.

I hope others may be encouraged to pursue this remedy where necessary. Would it not be desirable, however, if the contract with the government required the company to accept responsibility for negligent losses rather than to have to resort to the courts?

JOHN H. KEAN
Bethesda *AID/FS (Ret.)*

WHERE THERE'S SMOKE

"MAY I LIGHT UP" by Lucien D. Agniel in *FSJ* February 1979 is timely and in my view an excellently written, comprehensive article. I agree with Jacques Roman's plight and support him to the implementation of no smoking everywhere especially in closed rooms occupied and used by others as work areas. There is an overabundance of uncontrollable pollution without unwisely adding more. Many years ago many people had the foresight to have no smoking in air-conditioned buildings. Insurance cost for smokers should soar yearly proportionable to years of smoking.

The time involved in this grievance is too long. The plea for instant action in line with public health needs is now. Heed the conclusions and recommendations of numerous research and writings on smoking. Do we not do preventive maintenance on machines? Why not then, the human machine?

HELEN ANN LIPINSKI
Dakar

HELP FOR A LOCKSMITH

I AM INTERESTED in gaining as much information as possible on how to correspond with English-speaking locksmiths in foreign countries, or maybe you can tell me what foreign car news publication I can subscribe to. I am a locksmith myself, and with more and more Americans buying imported cars we have to prepare to give service to their locks. Information on foreign car repairs is harder to come by than domestic ones. Any info you can supply will be much appreciated.

JOSEPH LAWRENCE
Lawrence Productions
P.O. Box 53256
Chicago, Illinois 60653

The JOURNAL *welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary. Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service* JOURNAL, *2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.*



American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc.

1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006 Suite 1305 — Phone (202) 393-4220

CHANGES IN Group Life Program effective March 1, 1978

Additional insurance available up to $30,000 for those who have or take the basic $17,500 policy.

It is with pleasure that we announce that our Board is able to offer an additional unit of $10,000 group life and AD&D for the active member, making a total of $30,000.

Members of the Association under 60 years of age and on active service may subscribe for an additional $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000 Group Life and $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000 AD&D, effective March 1, 1978, at $85 a year per each $10,000 of additional insurance, provided that this additional coverage must terminate upon resignation or retirement or age 65 (whichever is first).

Officers who are now members of the Association may make application by using the amended form including information necessary to satisfy the Underwriter that they are in good health (see section of booklet entitled ENROLLMENT).

Officers joining the Association who wish the additional insurance should make their application therefore at the same time as the application for Group Life.

NEW PREMIUM RATES

Regretfully inflation has forced some changes in our premium rates for the first time since 1929. The new rates for old or new members for the basic $17,500 Group Life plus $17,500 AD&D, plus up to $3,000 family coverage are:

To 41st birthday	$100 per year (unchanged)
To 51st birthday	$150 per year
To 65th birthday	$185 per year

Over 65 for those who qualify for reduced coverage, $37 per $1,000 per year.

Coverage After Age 65

There is a minor change in retirement coverage for old or new policies and the provision effective as of March 1, 1978 reads:

RETIREMENT. Members who retire on an immediate annuity may retain this policy unchanged until age 65. If at age 65 they have held this policy continuously for 20 years, they may continue to carry $5,000 plus reversionary if any, AD&D at $5,000 and Family Coverage (if they have been carrying $17,500) at $185 per year (lesser amounts at lower premiums if they have been carrying less than $17,500).

Members who transfer without a break in service from the Foreign Service to another civilian position with the United States Government may continue their policy unchanged as long as they continue such Federal employment and have the same privileges as noted above if they retire on an immediate annuity.

Application forms and Booklet available on request.

BREAKING AND ENTERING • SHIPPING LOSSES OF ALL KINDS • PET LIABILITY • LIGHTNING DAMAGE • TRANSIT/WAR RISKS • SPORTS LIABILITY • FLOOD • WINDSTORM • RAIL • MARINE • PILFERAGE • LOSSES BY AIR • STOLEN LUGGAGE • FIRE DAMAGE • BODILY INJURY LIABILITY •

The preacher—the baker—the candlestick maker—and anyone else who plans to live abroad for a while is welcome to apply for **travel-pak**. You don't have to "belong" to anything to enjoy the advantages of **travel-pak**.

TRAVEL-PAK protects your household and personal possessions from here to there—while there (including storage, if requested)—and back again. Personal liability coverage is also included.

Call us or return this coupon and we'll send you complete details about **TRAVEL-PAK**—promptly.

When you return to the Washington area—call us—we'll be happy to help you set up a sound economical insurance program covering your home, auto and life.

travel-pak

WHEN YOU'RE GOING TO LIVE ABROAD!

James W. Barrett Company, Inc.

REED SHAW STENHOUSE INC.
OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
Insurance Brokers
1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202-296-6440

A REED SHAW STENHOUSE COMPANY

Gentlemen: 23B

Tell me all about Travel-Pak.

Name ______________________

Address ______________________

City ____________ State ________ Zip ______

COMMUNICATION **re:**

A Question of Numbers

The United States, as our national leaders never cease reminding us, is a "great" nation with worldwide responsibilities. This is reflected in our massive official overseas communities which dwarf those of any other nation and have upset the traditional fabric of diplomacy. A perusal of the *Foreign Service List* of August, 1975 (the latest edition extant) reveals that our embassy in Manila employs 285 Americans with a handful of others in Cebu and Davao. This number is startling even if we concede that far from all of our overseas personnel are with the Department of State. The British, I have read, governed India with something on the order of one administrator for every 100,000 Indians. By this yardstick, the American embassy in Manila is capable of governing the entire Philippine archipelago, if we cheat a little by throwing in three or four dozen Peace Corps volunteers. And this doesn't take into account our airmen at Clark Base or our sailors at Subic Bay—the grand total of which possibly equals the British Army of 1847.

It will be argued that our historical, economic and military links with the Philippines necessitate a sizable embassy there, and yet we have a huge mission in Jakarta. (That post, swollen with AID personnel, is larger than our London embassy.) We find it necessary to maintain six political officers in the Dominican Republic and seven officers reporting on Zairean politics. Our embassy and consulates in Vietnam once employed 29 political officers which must be the world's record. John Franklin Campbell has written that at one time our embassy in Rome was ten times larger than the French and British missions, while in Burundi, American officials, in the 1960s, outnumbered the entire colonial administration that had run the country before independence.

Without going into the specifics of what agency fills a designated slot and is ultimately to blame for this situation, I would only suggest that a large embassy is less efficient than a small one and costs more money. Ambassador Ellis O. Briggs was in Prague when our embassy

FORD PRESENTS A SPECIAL

DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

BUY A 1980 LINCOLN CONTINENTAL OR MARK VI AND RECEIVE A DIPLOMATIC DISCOUNT.

THE CONTINENTAL MARK VI FOR 1980. In both 2- and 4-door versions, the Mark remains unmistakably luxurious with custom features, including automatic overdrive, electronic fuel injection, and optional electronic instrument cluster. The Mark VI for 1980, it's unmistakable.

The new elegance of Lincoln Continental for 1980 takes special advantage of outstanding engineering while enhancing traditional luxury and prestige. Lincoln Continental... 4-door excellence that's almost irresistible.

THE LINCOLN CONTINENTAL FOR 1980. Traditional luxury. Sophisticated engineering.

FORD EXPORT DIVISION

Please send me full information on using my diplomatic discount to purchase a new ______.

WRITE TO:
DIPLOMATIC SALES: FORD MOTOR COMPANY

815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006/Tel: (202) 785-6047

NAME ______

ADDRESS ______

CITY ______ STATE ______

COUNTRY ______ ZIP ______

was ordered to cut back by two-thirds at the request of the Czechoslovakian government. He was astonished when the productivity of his mission *increased* after the reduction. Our embassy in Singapore, the staffing of which is kept down at the insistence of the host government, is one of the most efficient in the East Asia region. Former Ambassador George F. Kennan once proposed the axiom that ". . . the damage caused by unnecessary people is equal to the square of their number." Kennan ought to know. He was in Berlin at the outbreak of the second World War where our embassy employed fewer than a hundred Americans. Yet they managed to carry out the diplomatic responsibilities of a neutral power during wartime, deal with the burden of refugee relocation as well as look after the interests of Britain, France and eventually several European governments-in-exile. By way of contrast, it is now considered necessary to maintain 125 official Americans in Nigeria and 145 in Pakistan—to pick two egregious examples at random. These enclaves of Americans, as is obvious, make demands on our swollen administrative staff overseas and at home; make the task of designating and coordinating official responsibilities more difficult; necessitate expanded medical, travel, security and recreational facilities; often create unwholesome "little Americas," and, by sheer numbers, make our presence more visible to host country nationals—a sometimes undesirable state of affairs.

There are, on the other hand, people who are aware of the problem. A determined and successful effort has been made to keep our embassy in Kuala Lumpur at a reasonable level and Ambassador William Sullivan, when he was in Manila, tried to hack away at the bureaucratic jungle under his domain. His task, however, could be likened to that of the Duke of York's:

"Alas, poor Duke; the task he undertakes is numbering the sands and drinking the oceans dry."

Officials of the Department of State will probably go before the Congress this year to argue that personnel ceilings ought to be raised. It is claimed that state's authorized positions have been frozen at the 1961 level while the number of countries in the world and our own responsibilities have increased significantly. But are we not doing enough already? Our foreign affairs community bristles with desk officers gathering data and sending out instructions for the FBI, AID, CIA, Peace Corps, ICA, Department of Defense, Department of Agriculture, Department of State, National Security Council and National Security Agency. Our Foreign Service, the largest in the world, flooded the Department of State, in a recent month, with 94,900 telegrams from overseas posts. The widely recognized problem of digesting, disseminating and storing this information is still a long way from being resolved.

Despite the fact that the American wire services, communication satellites, weekly magazines, television programs, movies, tourists and advertising have made us the most talked-about and read-about society in world history, we still choose to employ 8,000 Americans and foreign nationals to further publicize ourselves. This effort is the responsibility of the International Communication Agency (ICA) which is a direct descendant of USIA and the wartime propaganda offices we created



underwritten by
LLOYD'S OF LONDON
and now exclusively administered by

HUNTINGTON T. BLOCK INSURANCE
2101 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037
Telephone 202/223-0673
Toll free 800/ 424-8830

Call or write our Overseas Department for information about our attractive rates and ON THE SPOT claim service by Lloyd's claim agents posted at every major city of the world.

during the world wars and the Korean conflict.

Thus, on top of our enormous Foreign Service, we have created a public relations bureaucracy which conducts and oversees VOA broadcasts, exchange of persons, libraries, English teaching and the distribution of written materials, films and videotapes. Like our Foreign Service, our press and cultural people possess an enormous headquarters with elaborate administrative backup. The cost of keeping an ICA officer overseas is, according to ICA Director John Reinhardt, about $1,000 a day. By world standards, the ICA is a colossal affair. ICA India, for example, has 50 per cent more personnel than the British Council operation in India—their largest worldwide program. Some voices claim that we need all this to counteract Soviet propaganda activities in the Third World, but the USSR's appeal, such as it is, seems to have more to do with airlifting war materiel than with the appeal of Soviet Communism which is somewhat threadbare after its performance over the past 60 years.

Perhaps it is romantic and quixotic to yearn for the pre-Pearl Harbor years when our overseas activities were handled by a small cadre of professional diplomats. But even today, we might ask whether the weight of numbers in our foreign affairs community—both at home and overseas—is due more to bureaucratic inertia and proliferation rather than to a measured estimation of how our national interests might best be served.

WILLIAM C. DAWSON, JR.

"Let observation with extensive view
Survey mankind, from China to Peru."
—Samuel Johnson

LETTER FROM SHANGHAI

Tuesday

We sat in the special reception room in the Hangchow railway station, drinking cups of hot green tea. We were waiting for the train to Shanghai. There were 21 of us, 17 Thais and four Americans: Bill and Odette Toomey, my wife, Barrett, and I, all four of us from the embassy in Bangkok. We had invested in a six-city, 16-day tour of the People's Republic. Shanghai would mark the mid-point of our tour. It had also been my home 44 years ago.

The train pulled into the station, and our guide, Mr. Yeh, a young English-language graduate of the University of Amoy, helped us aboard, and handed up our box lunches. For two days in Hangchow he had urged us on through the factories and parks of that famous resort area with cries of "Come on, my American friends!" And now he was expecting a party of 120 psychiatrists and their

Picasso Stayed Here.

If we wanted to name drop, we could boggle your mind. Because for decades, Security Storage has been Washington's favorite place to store valuables. And when it comes to FSO valuables, the Government will cover all expenses, providing special arrangements are made in advance with your transportation officer.

Silver, jewels, stamp and coin collections, and rare books are protected in Security's vault. Temperature controlled areas are available for maximum protection and preservation of furs and off-season wardrobes. And paintings in our Art Room receive the same storage treatment as paintings in one of Washington's largest museums.

In addition, hundreds of your colleagues use our insurance department through its Annual Government Service Floater.

Decades of this kind of efficient, personal service, and a dedication to quality, have made Security an FSO moving and storage expert. And that's why anytime you need dependable service, it's good to know Security is there.

Security Storage Company of Washington
MAIN OFFICE:
1701 Florida Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009 (202) 234-5600
MARYLAND:
Bethesda-Chevy Chase, Marlow Heights, White Oak
VIRGINIA: Alexandria, McLean

wives from San Francisco.

Our guides in each city were generally young and eager to improve their English. They never missed an opportunity to ask us what a word meant, often carefully writing our answers down in little notebooks. We decided toward the end of the tour that the China International Travel Service should pay *us* for giving English lessons for 16 days. On the other hand, it may have been necessary to reeducate our guides after we left. We had taught them such capitalist-roader songs as "Row, Row, Row Your Boat" and "Yankee Doodle" and such psychologically suspect expressions as "I am climbing the wall" or "That drives me up the wall." (We discussed these idioms appropriately on the excursion train to the Great Wall.) Our guides told us they listened to the English language broadcasts of the Voice of America. The "Gang of Four" would never have approved of this revisionist behavior, but they are gone.

A note on Chinese trains: seats protected by white slip covers. Doilies, white curtains, potted dwarf trees on each window table. Handleless tea cups with lids, periodically replenished from steaming kettles by female attendants. Feeble overhead lights, which made reading impossible after dark.

And it was dark, after nine in the evening, when we reached Shanghai, and a bus and our new guide took us down long, tree-lined avenues to the Hengshan Hotel in the former French Concession. These were the streets I had bicycled down in 1934, delivering boxes of strawberries to my customers. In the hotel lobby we picked up free copies of Mao's Little Red Book. (Later during our tour we heard this ultimate word would begin to disappear from racks and counters.) Hot face towels and cups of tea (again) were handed us as we stepped off the elevator on our floor and entered a suite of comfortable, old-fashioned rooms.

Wednesday

The Hengshan Hotel, according to our old waiter, was the former Picardi Apartment-Hotel, built by the French in 1937. This was one year after I had left China, when my father had been transferred from the flagship of the Asiatic Fleet back to a base in Connecticut. My mother and I had lived in another apartment-hotel, the Clements, which our waiter pointed out to us from the Picardi's roof terrace. The Clements was now occupied by "the people," he said. I could also make out the small white tower, brick walls and dormer windows of the former Shanghai American School, which I had attended. S.A.S. has become the Shanghai Technical Institute. Its lawns and soccer field had been swallowed up during the years by the slowly encroaching city.

That morning our Shanghai tour began with a visit to the Arts and Crafts Research Center, housed, we were told, in a former French colonialist's residence. It may have been a research center, but it was also the first opportunity, cleverly provided by our hosts, to divest us of large amounts of foreign currency. Purchasers crowded the gift shop, my wife among them.

The Temple of the Jade Buddha, our next stop, now open to the public (at least to tourists), had been boarded

BANK-QUALITY UTILITY BONDS
Currently Yielding over 10%
Not only for six months but Year after Year

Phone—Write—Visit

A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.

Members New York Stock Exchange
147 branches throught the U.S.

Please send information on Bank-Quality Utility Bonds. FSJ

Name ....

Address ....

City ....

State .... Zip ....

Bus.Ph. .... Res. Ph. ....

I am a client of A. G. EDWARDS: YES☐ NO☐

A. G. EDWARDS & SONS, INC.
MRS. RUTH G. ADLER, VICE PRESIDENT
Certified Financial Planner
Barlow Building, Suite 1050
5454 Wisconsin Avenue,
Washington, D.C. 20015
PHONE (301) 654-3000

AN-RS 227 EBM SIPC

up during the Cultural Revolution. Soldiers had protected this treasure during that period, in contrast to many other religious and cultural objects destroyed by the Red Guard. A staff of 20 monks maintained and operated the temple, our guide said. Inside, two of these gray-robed priests assisted our Thai companions, who were lighting incense and candles, kneeling, and striking drum and gong before the Buddha image.

The largest store in Shanghai is appropriately named Department Store No. 1. Constructed in 1937, it is located on Nanking Road in the former International Settlement. This Macy's of Shanghai carries an enormous variety of consumer goods and is jammed with people from morning until night. The focus of interest, however, was not on the goods when we visited this emporium, but the visitors from Bangkok. Foreigners are still a rarity in China, and in every store we visited in the PRC crowds would gather to stare, exactly as they had 40-odd years ago. When our group arrived at the Bund to view the river traffic on the Whangpoo and to gaze at the now rather shabby bank, hotel and club facades along this celebrated riverside boulevard, the blue- and gray-jacketed crowds closed in, staring again. Not unfriendly, but curious.

And we on our side were curious. One puzzle we partially solved. Those men in green and in blue uniforms, with no insignia or rank markings—who was a private? Who was a general? One small difference we discovered. Officers have four pockets on their jackets; soldiers only two.

Our daylight program concluded with a visit to Shanghai's Youth Palace, which occupied, we were told, either a Kuomintang marshal's mansion or again a French colonialist's residence. With its tiled ground floor, halls and small rooms it looked suspiciously like a former French school, particularly as "A.D. 1930" was chiseled in the stone over the entrance. Now, however, the various rooms exhibited a pot pourri of buzzing activity: tiny ballet dancers whirling in tutus, choruses trilling, ping pong players smashing shots, an orchestra playing Strauss (just for us), young apprentices assembling radios, calligraphy classes presenting their latest brush-stroke work to us and, outdoors, tots scrambling through a quasi-military obstacle course. Exhausted by all this action we boarded our bus which took us back to the Hengshan, along suburban streets and sidewalks bordered by plane trees and block-long stretches of wall, partially hiding residences and various types of dwellings. The wall has not vanished from China.

After an early dinner we were bused to the Yenan Theater which was filled to capacity by an audience who had come to enjoy the five act classical drama/dance "The Enchanted Lotus Lantern." This production had been banned during the Cultural Revolution and only rehabilitated in 1977, following the downfall of "The Gang of Four." Costumes, sets and music all extraordinary, and I could imagine it opening to SRO crowds at Kennedy Center. Story (with no revolutionary message) tells of scholar and princess, separated by a powerful god. Their son grows to manhood, under tutelage of "crazy" magician, learns his identity, meets old father and with aid of enchanted lantern, rescues his mother, who has been imprisoned in mountain. Son, in penultimate scene, splits

Continued on page 39





For Fine Properties in the Washington Area

Please contact our experienced, competent staff

John Y. Millar, Welene Goller, Lynn Magruder, Patricia Boorman, William Trueheart, Betty Geldard, Peggy Arrowsmith, Jack Klein, John E. Turner, Joan Pirie, Carol Owens, Toni Collins, Fran Dixon

MGMB, inc. Realtors
362-4480

3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016

LET ME HELP YOU . . . find a home in northern Virginia. I will send you prompt information on taxes, schools, financing, as well as photographs of homes currently on the market. Write me, Carolyn Mooney, at

Phone
(703) 356-8300

Carriage House REALTORS

A REALCORE MEMBER

1401 Dolley Madison Blvd., • McLean, VA 22101

NAME ______

ADDRESS ______

Return date ______ Price range ______

If you need temporary housing, check here ☐

Foreign Service Journal

A TIME OF CRISIS FOR THE FOREIGN SERVICE

As the voice of the Foreign Service your Association is now seized with the critical issues of:

- Transfer of Trade functions to Commerce/STR;
- Restructuring of the Foreign Service:
- Pay;
- And major changes in AID.

All are complex. All contain specific provisions affecting the futures of our individual members. Separately and collectively they go to the heart of the requirement for a Foreign Service of the United States capable of advancing America's integrated interests in an increasingly complex world. We have been overwhelmed by the response of our membership. The Foreign Service does care. Since early this year thoughtful and insightful messages have been pouring in from chapters and individuals overseas. While we have not been able to respond to them individually, they have formed the basis of the positions on which we have attempted to inform you through a series of open meetings and collective messages. In Washington, there are now literally hundreds of members giving thousands of man hours of their free time in support of the governing board and professional staff's efforts to develop a detailed, comprehensive and effective approach to the preservation and enhancement of a vital American institution. Only the Foreign Service could undertake it. If we don't respond to the challenges we now face, no one else will.

In addition to the major speech September 18th on the Future of the Service by the Association's president which was widely distributed, the messages listed below have sought members' comments on the details of our positions. Copies should be available at all overseas posts. They were distributed in Washington through the official mail system under AFSA letterhead and are available at the AFSA office.

Messages on Critical Issues: Outgoing Telegrams to Field

SUBJECT	*NUMBER*	*DATE*
Foreign Service Priorities	197400	7/29
The Foreign Service Days of Decision	216510	8/18
Restructure and Foreign Service Pay	222365	8/24
Status of Trade Reorganization	222977	8/24
Restructure, Pay and Dismemberment	236515	9/7
Report on August Open Meeting With Under Secretary Read and Director General Barnes	232068	9/8

MEMBERSHIP: IN THE NATION'S INTEREST

Elsewhere in this issue, you will find a card that you can use to sign up a new FS Association member. Please do your best to see that card gets filled out and returned. Do it for the good of your country.

The United States needs a strong, unified FS if America is to have an effective foreign policy. Since the late 1940s, we have watched the trend move away from unity. An overseas post today looks increasingly like the hybrid of parochial and special interests that produces the mishmash we get from DOD, Commerce, Treasury, Agriculture, Labor, STR, and CIA at home. OMB and the White House actually *favor* this trend, arguing that American corporations abolish their international divisions and work through their domestic arms once they have acquired significant overseas experience. The attempt to relocate trade promotion activities in Commerce is only the latest manifestation of this view.

Reversing the trend back toward a unified FS means supporting your FS Association. We need money to build a strong professional staff that will produce full-time on behalf of the nation and ouselves. Money comes from dues, and dues come from members. So if you believe that a strong FS is in the nation's interest, then support the only FS Association fighting for this goal by recruiting a new member. Thank you for your help.

Guest Editorial

THE STATE OF STATE by Marshall Green

I deeply appreciate this posthumous honor.

This is not a speaking engagement of my choosing. But, I was suckered into it by Ayatollah Khomeini Cleveland, who casually asked me one Saturday on the golf course whether I'd like to join a small group of retiring FSOs for lunch . . . "Of course," I replied. "And would you make a few humorous remarks?" Somewhat reluctantly I agreed.

Two weeks later on the golf course, just as I was about to putt, Bob remarked that hundreds of invitations for the luncheon had just returned from the printers, and I was billed as the speaker. I missed my putt.

And then, to crown it all, I get a nice letter from President Lars Hydle saying how much everyone is looking forward to hearing my views of the state of State.

Well, Bob, I just called you Ayatollah Khomeini Cleveland because Ayatollah you. I don't know Khomeini times, I will not make a serious speech to my peers.

Many years ago, I reached the fateful decision while working for George Kennan, who was plagued with ulcers, that dedicated FSOs are almost bound to get ulcers, unless they find some way of venting their frustrations on others. This I do through punning—you get the ulcers, I don't.

Yet, I would remind future generations of FSO punsters that there are certain rules to observe.

Rule #1: Don't make plays on words in State Department cables. When I was chargé d'affaires in Korea (by the way, note how all the worst things in diplomacy are spoken in French like chargé d'affaires, débacles, émeutes, coup d'états, and now the worst thing of all—détente).

Anyway, when I was charge daffers (as the US Armed Forces Radio pronounced it), I commented in a cable to Washington on the unjust criticism which the Republic of Korea (ROK) received every year in the United Nations from Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and other citadels of freedom. I expostulated in the last sentence of my cable: Let him who is without sin castigate the first ROK.

Unfortunately, the word "castigate" was corrupted in

Continued on page 37

"Between nations armed with thousands of thermonuclear weapons—each one capable of causing unimaginable destruction—there can be no more cycles of both war and peace. There can only be peace."—Jimmy Carter

The Essence of the Debate Over SALT II

STEPHEN A. GARRETT

They say travel broadens. Whatever the general truth of this proposition, it held true for me during a recent lecture tour I took of the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. One of the topics covered was the current debate over the SALT II treaty and its likely fate in the Senate. The audiences consisted of highranking military officials, members of parliament, foreign and defense ministry personnel, academics, journalists and people from the private community. The necessity of presenting the essence of something as complicated as SALT II in a forty-five minute lecture requires a good deal of reflection on what actually is the crux of the debate over the treaty. There is also the challenge of offering coherent answers to questions about SALT based on only scanty information about the actual strategic nuclear arms situation and—to these audiences—the often obscure political dynamics of the current Senate ratification process. Trying to explain SALT II and its potential fate in the Senate can be a salutary exercise in separating, or at least attempting to separate, the forest from the trees.

Two impressions emerged with particular force out of these sessions. The first was, with virtually no exception, support for ratification of SALT II by the Senate was strong and unqualified. Indeed the wisdom of the treaty was accepted almost as a matter of course. To be sure this support was not necessarily founded on a precise knowledge of its details or, as I point out above, on the general circumstances of the Soviet-American strategic balance. If those facts were more widely known, my own belief is support for the treaty would in fact be even greater. The point is there is a general perception of a fearsome nuclear arms competition between Washington and Moscow, and any measure which promises even a modest amelioration of this competition is welcomed with instinctive relief. Given this attitude, there was perceptible astonishment when I suggested to these groups that prospects for SALT II were at best mixed. The potential rejection of SALT II by the Senate was evidently an outcome that had hardly been considered or, if considered, regarded as most improbable. In attempting to explain why SALT II might be defeated, and what the root issues were in the debate, it seemed to me the following points deserved emphasis. No doubt there were a variety of other elements that could have been touched on. I happen to feel, however, these are among the most important factors to be considered in evaluating what SALT II and the controversy surrounding it is all about.

Actually it's a difficult and disheartening exercise to try to explain why the SALT II treaty is in difficulty in the Senate. The more one ponders the situation the more it seems that opposition to SALT II is basically reflective of a generalized intellectual and emotional *angst* among those speaking out against it. The treaty in other words has become a symbol, a kind of lightning rod, attracting the wrath of people for whom SALT II represents the apotheosis of what they see as a whole series of disturbing developments going back for some years. Certainly an examination of the terms of the accord itself hardly accounts for the emotional broadside to which it has been subjected.

SALT II is nothing more than a modest attempt to put some generalized limits on the quantity and, to a lesser extent, the quality of each side's nuclear arsenals. It is most certainly not any serious attempt at disarmament. Indeed the real charge that can be levied against SALT II is that it does so little to reduce the present overkill capacity of the Americans and the Soviets. The Carter administration had a go at significant arms reductions in its proposal in early 1977 to the Russians to limit the total number of strategic launchers to the 1800-2000 range (as compared to the Vladivostok limit of 2400). Moscow showed a total lack of interest in this suggestion—indeed was offended by it—and the current treaty before the Senate is the

The author is director of international policy studies at The Monterey Institute of International Studies. This article derives from a series of lectures he gave on SALT to foreign audiences following a year spent as a Fulbright scholar in Thailand. The lectures were sponsored by ICA.

melancholy product of this inability to make really substantive progress toward arms reductions. That even the limited achievements of SALT II are now so widely criticized raises disturbing questions about the whole foreign policy theory under which these critics are operating. They may not ultimately be able to prevent ratification of the treaty, but the fact that President Carter decided to go ahead with the M-X missile system, in part to blunt their criticism, is evidence that they will continue to play an important role in determining American policy on strategic weapons.

Another aspect of the current debate which bears particular reflection is the totally altered political climate surrounding arms control negotiations with the Russians compared to that prevailing at the time of SALT I in 1972. Part of the reason for the change may be marked up to Soviet adventurism in the Middle East, Africa and Southeast Asia since that time, which has caused increasing numbers of people to wonder whether the Soviets are "fit" negotiating partners in arms control. This assumes somehow that the Soviet Union should not be "rewarded" with a SALT II treaty if her behavior is objectionable in other areas, thus ignoring that the United States has engaged in the SALT process because it was seen as being in its own independent interest to do so. When one compares the Senate acceptance of the ABM treaty which formed part of the original SALT agreements (it sailed through by a margin of 88-2) with the present doubting mood the degree of alteration in attitude is so drastic as to cause one to search for other potential reasons for the change. These are not easy to find, at least if one searches for them in any objective evaluation of why the premises which led to the original SALT talks are not equally sound today. The changed climate in any event is perhaps best symbolized in the attitude many critics of SALT II have taken toward the *bona fides* of the Carter administration in its arms control stance.

Now the fact is for non-experts—that is to say, for the overwhelming majority of the American people—acceptance of SALT II has to be based in large part on the assumption Carter and his advisors would not have signed the SALT II treaty except after long and careful reflection as to its merits, and in the conviciton it really was in the best interests of the United States. In other words, for something as technical and complicated as strategic arms negotiations, support for a specific treaty by most people has to be a matter of trust. Yet it's precisely the notion the Carter administration should or can be trusted on SALT that has been attacked by various opponents of the treaty. Senator Jackson's thinly-veiled linking of Carter's policy to Neville Chamberlain's sell-out to Hitler at Munich—indeed his actual use of the term "appeasement"—is only the most dramatic manifestation of this phenomenon.

There have obviously been occasions on which accepting an administration's foreign policy pronouncements "on trust" was genuinely ill-advised. President Johnson's defense of the Vietnam intervention comes to mind. Nevertheless, given the resources of the executive for analyzing and identifying foreign policy problems and foreign policy solutions, which far outweigh that available to any individual senator or even the Senate as a body, I would suggest an initial granting of "trust" makes some sense until or unless events clearly indicate such trust is no longer warranted. Sometimes this can be a matter of an external situation developing in ways so obviously at variance with administration pronouncements that executive credibility is legitimately forfeited. At other times credibility may be eroded because the White House position is so clearly tied not just to the objective requirements of a foreign policy situation but also to the domestic political gains or losses anticipated from a given position. The history of American foreign policy does contain various examples of presidents pursuing a particular course, at least in part because it was seen as strengthening their political base at home, e.g., Eisenhower's support for "liberation" of Eastern Europe during the 1952 election, even Truman's commitment to the founding of Israel during the 1948 campaign.

What is both fascinating and disturbing about the lack of trust extended to the Carter administration on the SALT question, however, is that for Carter to have pursued SALT II so vigorously was *not* necessarily in his political interests. At best, given the current mood, strong support of SALT II was likely to bring him little additional support, and at worst it would substantially erode that support, especially in the conservative bastions of the South, Carter's principal power base. Given these realities, for President Carter to have placed so much emphasis on concluding a SALT II treaty seems to warrant at least a tentative conclusion that he and his administration really do believe that the treaty is important to American interests. It is ironic that SALT I, which met relatively little opposition in the Senate, might have been seen as far more directly tied up with President Nixon's political posture. Obviously a key aspect of his effort to convince the American people he was a strong and successful president was the development of the détente policy, of which SALT I was a centerpiece. From the beginning of his administration it was apparent his domestic policies were likely to run into considerable opposition; his initiatives in foreign policy would, he hoped, blunt any significant overall erosion of support for his presidency. For a variety of reasons, then, not all of them necessarily having to do with objective foreign policy requirements, it was important to Nixon that SALT I be concluded and accepted as a good thing. Now I happen to think the Nixon administration did feel SALT I was a valuable step for American policy. The point here is a different one: given the likely personal political payoffs, or lack of same, of a ratified SALT treaty, there is more reason to "trust" the Carter administration on SALT than was the case with President Nixon. In actuality, an opposite conclusion has been drawn by many who themselves supported Nixon on SALT I.

Probing deeper into the reasons for the opposition to SALT II, and the general skepticism about the Carter administration's approach to arms control negotiations with the Russians, there are two main elements that emerge. The

first is that many people have found it exceedingly difficult to accept that the previous clear American superiority in the nuclear arms field has gone forever and that the Soviets have achieved rough overall strategic parity with the United States and, in some areas of nuclear weaponry, even an advantage. The American lead in strategic nuclear weapons was maintained from the first atomic test at Alamagordo in 1945 to the early 1970s, when SALT I for the first time accepted the premise of strategic parity between the two sides.

Now the United States' superiority in nuclear weaponry to the Soviet Union for a twenty-five year period after World War II was seen by many as both legitimate and necessary: legitimate because the United States was viewed as a *status quo* power only concerned with defense of the prevailing international system, and necessary because the Soviets were not a *status quo* power and thus needed to be deterred from unwarranted aggressive moves by the superior power of America's nuclear arsenal. The Cuban missile crisis is widely cited as a prime example of how Soviet adventurism was faced down because of the United States' acknowledged lead in strategic power.

What happened after that crisis was that Moscow embarked on a wide expansion of its nuclear might so that, in a future confrontation, it would not have to give way because of its inferiority in nuclear arms to the United States. More generally, the Soviets felt, if they were ever to be recognized as a superpower equal of the United States, they had to attain at least approximate strategic nuclear parity. Some ten years after the Cuban affair they had reached that goal, and since that time have continued to modernize and upgrade their forces. The concern is expressed now that, as a result of this achievement, Moscow can safely embark on aggressive policies in many areas of the world because there is a nuclear stalemate. In other words, since American nuclear superiority has vanished, the Soviets can do a variety of things they would have hesitated to do in an earlier era, safe from the threat of American nuclear retaliation.

Actually the argument goes beyond this. The suggestion is that Moscow, as a consequence of its nuclear weapons buildup, has achieved its own superiority in certain key areas and may be able to convert that superiority into tangible political gain. The focus here basically is on the 308 "heavy" missiles such as the SS-18 which the Soviets currently have in their arsenal (the United States has nothing comparable). The SS-18 can carry a single warhead of up to twenty-five megatons or can be MIRV'd to carry a series of individual warheads, each with a destructive power greater than anything the United States currently possesses. The theory is, in a first strike against the United States, Moscow could effectively eliminate the American land-based missile force using the SS-18s while still leaving itself an awesome complement of other missile strength. The United States would then be faced with an agonizing decision: whether to retaliate against the Soviet Union with our submarine and bomber forces, thus inviting a second Soviet strike against American cities. A "rational" American president might decide this was a no-win proposition—particularly because Soviet civil defense efforts might well reduce the effect of an American nuclear strike to "acceptable" proportions—and negotiate the best political settlement available under the circumstances.

> "Henry Kissinger himself once commented in frustration about his hawkish military advisers: 'What in God's name do they mean by "nuclear superiority?" How do you define it at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?' "

Now there are really two scenarios being invoked with respect to the Soviet advantage in heavy missiles. The first or "radical" scenario: the Soviets might in fact contemplate one day launching a strike such as the one described above because of their confidence that it would place the United States in an impossible situation. The more "moderate" scenario, and one which has more adherents than the radical version, suggest that the mere *capability* of the Soviets for wiping out our land-based missile force could be converted into political coinage. In some future crisis the United States would back down either because of open Soviet threats to use their SS-18s or because of Washington's own perception that they *might* be used with disastrous results. In either case, the whole balance of world power—say, in the Middle East or in Central Europe—could well be irretrievably altered.

There are several points to be emphasized in evaluating the above line of analysis, both technical and political. Few of the proponents of the "moderate" scenario have offered any systematic assessment of how the American nuclear advantage in the period 1945-1970 actually helped to deter Soviet conventional moves in various parts of the world. A look at this period seems to reveal that Moscow in fact was not deterred from doing much it would have done in the absence of American nuclear superiority. Soviet penetration of the Middle East, massive assistance to the regime in Hanoi, the crushing of rebellions in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, not to mention the establishment of a client state relationship with Cuba—all of these went forward despite the "threat" of American nuclear weapons. The Eisenhower administration's "massive retaliation" doctrine was of course designed to use an American nuclear threat to stem further Soviet advances, but the consensus among informed analysts today is that the doctrine was basically ineffective. The reality is, regardless of whether one side has some measure of nuclear advantage, the other will undertake activities it sees to be in its national interest, perhaps vital to it, without fearing some theoretical punitive

nuclear strike from the adversary. The threat of such a strike simply lacks credibility. Henry Kissinger himself once commented in frustration about his hawkish military advisors: "What in God's name do they mean by 'nuclear superiority'? How do you define it at these levels of numbers? What do you do with it?" The notion then, if the Soviets acquire or already have "superiority" in some categories of nuclear strength, the United States may be forced to concede vital interests has almost no historical basis.

What about the "radical" scenario—a decision taken independently by the Soviets to employ their nuclear superiority simply because they are convinced they can use it to win a decisive victory over the United States? The fact is, even after a Soviet first strike, the United States would still have some 5000 to 6000 nuclear warheads from our bomber and submarine fleet to use in an attack on the Soviet Union. Even given some effort in civil defense measures, would any rational leader in Moscow really believe Russia could avoid what would be genuinely unacceptable damage, or that an American president would not decide to inflict that damage? It ought to be noted that American deterrent doctrine for the last two decades has rested on the notion of the "triad," that is, the United States should have, and in fact does have, adequate power in *each* of the areas of land-based missiles, submarine-launched missiles and bombers to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet Union. It's a little puzzling to observe critics today suggesting that, after a theoretical elimination of our land-based missiles, our submarines and bomber force would not after all be able to do the job. What was the triad developed for if this is the case? In any event the Carter administration's decision to proceed with a new mobile missile system, the M-X, gives promise of restoring much of the invulnerability of our land-based missiles, which should, but somehow doesn't, satisfy even the most extreme among the Cassandras warning of the current Soviet nuclear threat. Actually, to take the "radical" scenario, advanced as a possibility by Paul Nitze and others, as a real concern requires a rather dazzling suspension of the critical faculties. Once again Henry Kissinger, hardly a bleeding-heart liberal on Soviet intentions, may have put it best: "To be sure there exist scenarios in planning papers which seek to demonstrate how one side could use its strategic forces and how in some presumed circumstance it would prevail. But these confuse what a technician can calculate with what a responsible statesman can decide."

There are two final aspects of the SALT II debate deserving comment. One of the most striking gaps in the analysis of those opposed to the treaty is any really systematic discussion of how the United States will in fact be *better off* if the treaty is rejected. Even if one accepts, for the sake of argument, that a tougher bargain might have been struck with the Russians—a generally dubious proposition in itself—simply rejecting SALT as "inadequate," or attaching major substantive amendments to the treaty that Moscow is bound to reject, would be virtually irrelevant to the "redressing" of the Soviet-American nuclear balance. The issue more specifically is how, without SALT II, that nuclear balance will be more advantageous to us by the end of 1985 when SALT II is scheduled to expire.

Consider the matter from the single perspective of defense spending and other demands on limited national resources. The most widely accepted estimates are, without SALT II, the United States would have to spend in the range of twenty to forty billion dollars over the next ten-year period in an accelerated arms race, and that does not include sums budgeted for the M-X missile. It's hardly to be expected the Soviets will be standing still during this stretch of years. Indeed the increased American defense spending described above would have to be undertaken basically as at least a partial countermeasure to an anticipated upsurge in the Soviet nuclear weapons effort in the absence of a SALT agreement. A moderate guess is the Russians will increase their total number of strategic-launchers to around 3000 (versus a limit of 2250 in the SALT II treaty), their MIRV'd missiles to 2000 (versus a limit of 1200 in SALT II), with other equivalent increases in such categories as warheads, overall throw-weight, etc . . . What this amounts to is, even with substantially increased American defense spending, we would be no better off vis-à-vis the Soviets and indeed would likely be in a somewhat more disadvantageous position. (Les Aspin estimates while we would have 91 percent of the Soviet launcher force with SALT II in force, without the treaty the figure would probably fall to about 68 percent; we would go from 51 percent of Soviet throw-weight under SALT II to about 37 percent in its absence). Meanwhile other vital domestic programs would have been postponed or scrapped as a consequence of the rise in defense costs. It is theoretically possible of course, with our larger GNP base, we could outspend the Soviets in a new arms race and perhaps substantially alter the present strategic equation. Given the present political realities in the United States, however, particularly the demand for budget restraints even as the enactment of social welfare programs such as national health insurance is receiving increasing emphasis, the funds for an unlimited arms race are hardly likely to be available.

A particular failure of analysis among critics of SALT II in projecting how the world will look without the treaty revolves around the issue of the Soviet heavy missiles. The intellectual lapse here is especially instructive since it is precisely the Soviet heavy missile arsenal, and the failure of SALT II to reduce it, which lies at the heart of so much criticism of the treaty. The fact is, without SALT II, there is no reason to expect that the Soviets will agree unilaterally to reduce the number of their SS-18s. The existence of these weapons is actually a function of the strategic history of the two sides, and it was idle to hope that negotiations on SALT II could reverse these decisions of history. Much is made of the fact that the United States currently has no heavy missiles to match those held by the Russians, but this is a result of a conscious strategic choice made back in the 1960s. Given our superior technology at the time, particularly in improving accuracy and developing

Continued on page 43

Hiroshima was chosen as the first target city for the A-bomb largely because it did not seem to have any POW camps. Until late July 1945, Nagasaki, Hiroshima, Kokura, and Niigata were the four cities on the target list, and Nagasaki and Hiroshima were the top candidates. But on July 31, 1945, General Carl Spaatz, commanding general of the strategic air forces in the Pacific, had anxiously cabled Washington that "prisoner of war sources, not verified by photos, give location of allied prisoner of war camp [near the] center of Nagasaki." "Does this influence the choice of the target for initial [A-bomb] operation?" he asked. Before Washington replied, Spaatz sent a second message: "Hiroshima [,] according to prisoner of war reports [,] is the only one of the four target cities for the [A-bomb] that does not have Allied prisoner of war camps."

After some consideration of substituting other cities for Nagasaki, Washington replied: "[I]f you consider your information reliable Hiroshima should be given first priority . . . Information available here indicates that there are prisoner of war camps in practically every major Japanese city." The War Department cable concluded by informing Spaatz that the "best

The cenotaph in Peace Park, Hiroshima

Unraveling a Mystery: American POWs Killed at Hiroshima

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

available information here" is in a special study, most recently revised on July 1, on the location of POW camps in Japan. That study, as Washington and Spaatz knew, listed a camp within Hiroshima, on the basis of a 1944 British report.

Spaatz decided to disregard the dated British report and thus concluded that Hiroshima was the better of the two targets: that the first A-bomb would not kill allied soldiers. He was wrong. On August 6, 1945, there were prisoners of war in Hiroshima.

Accumulating evidence makes clear that there were at least eleven and probably more American POWs in the target city on that fateful day. Why hasn't the Department of Defense admitted these facts? Why has so little official evidence surfaced? What role did Japan play in withholding this evidence?

Governments often employ secrecy and deception to cover up mistakes, to hide ugly facts, to protect officials and agencies, and to block information that might alter attitudes on critical issues. Thus, it appears, the United States military concealed information about the A-bomb deaths of American POWs at Hiroshima. And the Japanese army tried to cover up its own atrocities by adding to the list of A-bomb victims the names of eight American soldiers, who died, not at

Barton J. Bernstein, associate professor of history at Stanford University, is the author of Hiroshima and Nagasaki Reconsidered: The Atomic Bombings of Japan and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1945 *(1975) and the editor of, among other volumes,* Politics and Policies of the Truman Administration.

Hiroshima but hundreds of miles from there, after being used as "human guinea pigs" in live medical experiments.

Since 1945, Pentagon spokesmen have repeatedly denied that they have any evidence that the A-bomb killed American POWs at Hiroshima. Since 1973, with the burning of military personnel records in a St. Louis fire, they have contended that they cannot even check on this matter. Yet, as early as mid-September 1945, in the words of a secret US Army message of September 23, 1945, the American Red Cross had informed the War Department that one airman, Sgt. Ralph J. Neal, of the 866th Bomb Squadron, had been "wounded by the atomic bomb on 6 August . . . and subsequently died on 9 August. Apparently two or possibly three more airmen of the same crew [the *Lonesome Lady*, a B-24 shot down on July 28th about thirty miles from Hiroshima] who are now missing possibly died as a result of the Hiroshima bombing." On September 23, the Air Force reported that at least two members of the *Lonesome Lady* crew had been recovered alive: Lt. Thomas Cartwright, the pilot; and Staff Sgt. William Abel, a gunner. The report seemed confused about a third—Lt. James Ryan, the bombardier.

On the 23rd, army headquarters in the Pacific directed the Sixth Army, then in the Hiroshima area, "to investigate fully and report all available information" on Ryan and the other five members of the crew—2nd Lt. Durden Looper, co-pilot; 2nd Lt. Roy Pederson, navigator; Sgt. Hugh Atkinson, radio operator; and Sgt. Buford Ellison and Cpl. John Long, gunners—as well as on any other American A-bomb victims.

On October 9, in a secret message, Sixth Army headquarters replied that "Neal, one Norman Roland Brisset, one Blankbek, and 17 other Americans (names unknown) were being held in Hiroshima at the time of atomic bombing. All except Neal and Brisset were killed instantly, [and these two died] as a result of wounds sustained in bombing." This secret message stated that the records gathered during the investigation would be sent to Pacific headquarters, and that there would be further efforts to identify the 17 unnamed Americans.

What happened to these records gathered by the Sixth Army in 1945? Did it learn more about the unidentified 17? Did the Sixth Army conduct further investigations? It is impossible to answer these questions definitively, for these materials cannot be located by officials at the National Archives and Pentagon officials have repeatedly denied all knowledge of the subject.

Optimism and Doubts

A summary-report of 1946, prepared in the office of the Provost Marshal General, disregarded the earlier correspondence on the POWs and offered an optimistic conclusion: "By reason of the partial annihilation of Hiroshima by . . . the atomic bomb, there was some speculation as to what might have happened to American prisoners of war in Japanese camps thought to be located in that city. Uncertainty as to the fate of these men was set at rest by the receipt of a cable from the Swiss delegation in Tokyo stating that the Hiroshima camps had been transferred before the bombardment." There had been eight major camps in the Hiroshima area, and each of three had contained more than 100 American POWs. This report sidestepped the question of whether smaller clusters of POWs had still been held in military posts and at other places in the city, as some Japanese later testified.

Neither the 1946 summary-report nor the reports by various military teams of the "Recovered Personnel Detachment" in November 1945 was classified. The reports by the military teams, which investigated in October and November 1945, give a confused picture of great thoroughness at some stages and considerable disorganization at others. The teams visited the major Hiroshima camps, which had been moved *before* the atomic bombing, and they collected documents from Japanese authorities on the rosters of those camps. Unfortunately, the surviving reports by the "Recovered Personnel Detachment" do not include information on what POWs were killed, or how they died. There is no attention to the city's military posts and similar facilities in Hiroshima. Nor, curiously, is there any reference in these reports to the questions raised about A-bomb victims in the messages of September 23 and October 9.

Until 1970, then, there were rumors and suspicions that the A-bomb *might* have killed some American POWs at Hiroshima, but there was no publicly available evidence on the subject. Enterprising scholars examining American files could only find the optimistic summary-report of the Provost Marshal's Office in 1946 and the November 1945 reports by segments of the "Recovered Personnel Detachment." Some key documents—including the messages of September 23 and October 9—were kept classified. Others may have been lost or destroyed. Even Lt. Cartwright, the pilot of the *Lonesome Lady*, who had left six crew members behind in a city that he concluded was Hiroshima after being sent to Tokyo a few days before the A-bomb attack, never received adequate replies to his queries from the War Department. He believed that Lt. Pederson had died, for Pederson's parachute seemed to fail when he bailed out of the B-24. But Cartwright still wondered about Ryan, Looper, Atkinson, Ellison, Long, and Neal. And the Japanese, who had some records from 1945 or early 1946 on American A-bomb victims, including these six from Cartwright's plane, remained silent on the matter after apparently giving American authorities a copy of that list sometime during the year after Hiroshima.

New Disclosures about POWs

In July 1970, a key participant broke the silence and provided some unsettling evidence: Hiroshi Yanagida, a former officer in the Japanese secret police, stated that he had been in charge at Hiroshima of 23 American prisoners, including at least one woman. According to Yanagida, the POWs were held on August 6 in three locations near where the bomb fell—the Chugoku Military Police command post, the Infantry 1st Reserve Station, and the Chugoku Military District command post. He said that US Army Intelligence had interrogated him on four occasions in 1946, and that he had explained that the bomb had killed the POWs but that their identification tags, kept in a safe,

had survived. The tags had been given to army intelligence.

There were obvious questions. What happened to the tags and the intelligence reports? Were both sets of materials lost in a bureaucratic maze? Or was the information suppressed somewhere along the line? Even if the documents and tags were lost, why didn't someone push an investigation on the basis of the general information about these matters? Obviously, there was no enthusiasm for revealing—much less pursuing—ugly facts that could embarrass the military and raise new moral doubts about America's use of the atomic bomb against Japan.

Probably spurred by Yanagida's disclosures of July, an employee at the National Archives dug through the records and located the still-classified messages of September 23 and October 9, 1945. On September 10, 1970, on the basis of information from the archives, the UPI reported that "documents listing the names and other pertinent information" about the POWs had been found and that the Pentagon *might* soon declassify the materials. "There was no explanation of why confirmation of the American deaths had been kept secret," the UPI noted.

Though these messages were declassified the next day, apparently the Pentagon did not announce their declassification. Reporters were probably busy with other stories, and the Pentagon's silence helped kill media interest. Apparently the families of the dead POWs received no new information from the Pentagon, and at least some continued to wonder how their young airmen had died in August 1945.

Some new and very troubling information, from Japanese sources, soon appeared: At least three American POWs in Hiroshima had been killed by Japanese shortly after the atomic bombing. Jiro Tamura, a former Japanese captain, had reported seeing, the day after the Hiroshima bombing, a Japanese woman in the city stoning to death an American soldier who was tied to a stake: she was apparently condemning him for the bomb. Probably he had escaped from his military guards in the confusion after the atomic bombing and then had been caught by civilians. According to published reports, the captain also "recall[ed] seeing the bodies of two other American POWs, who had been clearly beaten to death, apparently with rifle butts, by their military captors." In 1970, after the former captain died, his widow disclosed these details to a local Japanese paper. Its report brought forth other Japanese survivors of August 6 who offered similar testimony.

In 1975-76, three former American airmen—Stanley Levine, Walter Ross, and Carleton Holden, who were shot down two days *after* the Hiroshima bombing—provided some additional information on POWs killed by the A-bomb. The three reported that their captors took them on August 16 to meet Neal, of the *Lonesome Lady*, and Brisset, a navy flier, who were dying of radiation poisoning. The dying airmen explained, as one of their guards partly confirmed, that they had been in Hiroshima when the bomb was dropped and had survived the blast by jumping into a cesspool. Brisset said that the other ten American POWs with him and Neal had been killed outright by the bomb. In view of Cartwright's recollections and Neal's presence, the ten probably included the other five crew members of the *Lonesome Lady*—Looper, Atkinson, Ellison, Long and Ryan.

The War Department never informed any of the families—including Neal's, where the evidence was very firm—that the men had been killed by the A-bomb. Nor were the families told that the remains of the dead airmen had been recovered and turned over to the United States Army in December 1945—which did occur, according to a recently uncovered report in a Japanese archive. In 1949, the American military held a memorial service for Looper, Atkinson, Ellison, Long, and Ryan from the *Lonesome Lady*, as well as three others—Sgts. Julius Molnar and Charles Baumgartner, both of the air force, and Lt. (j.g.) Raymond Porter of the navy. Lieutenant Looper's mother reported that just one casket was buried, and that was symbolic, for there were no remains inside. "There was nothing there," she recently said. The military was "just pretending to bring them home." In their mass grave, at Jefferson Barracks Army Cemetery in St. Louis, the tombstone lists their names and gives as their date of death August 6, 1945. How the military determined the date, but not the cause, of death remained unanswered.

Neal's mother, who learned in 1975 through the press of the airmen's meeting with her dying son thirty years earlier, has an attorney who has been trying to secure from the Department of Defense an official account of the flier's death. According to the attorney, who is working through a local congressman, "The Department of Defense says they're 'in the process' of looking into it. But they've been in the process for a long time now."

Attempted Cover-up of Japanese Atrocities

More information, and some misinformation, has continued to trickle out on the American A-bomb victims. Late in 1977, an official Japanese list from December 1945 or early 1946 was found. Satoru Ubuki, a scholar at Hiroshima University, discovered in the Japanese Foreign Ministry records this document, in English, listing 20 American POWs killed by the Hiroshima bomb. The first four parts of the list included Brisset and the six airmen from the *Lonesome Lady*, Baumgartner and Molnar, whose names appear on the St. Louis tombstone, and Ensign Joseph Dubinsky and an unknown lieutenant. The fifth part lists nine others, with six, including Dale Blankbek, described as having been captured in May in Kumamoto prefect, and three others in late July in Fukuoka prefect, both of which are hundreds of miles from Hiroshima. Why were these nine moved to Hiroshima in wartime when transportation facilities were already strained?

In August 1978, new information became available to answer this dimly recognized puzzle: The nine had *not* been moved to Hiroshima but eight were used in medical experiments on live humans at Kyusu University. The experiments included removal of the liver and part of the brain. Two former Japanese army officers recently revealed that the Japanese army had sought to conceal these atrocities by adding the nine names to the list of

Continued on page 40

Being a saga of shipwreck, selection out and a working wife—in Serendib, then Ceylon, now Sri Lanka

Mr. Black Gets the Sack

CHRISTOPHER VAN HOLLEN



The fort and harbor at Point de Galle, Ceylon, in the 1860s.

The accomplishments of America's distinguished statesmen-diplomats are fully recorded in history books, biographies and official publications. Portraits of former Secretaries of State adorn the department's reception rooms and faded photographs of their ambassadorial colleagues form "rogues galleries" in embassies around the world. But except for such notables as Nathaniel Hawthorne and Townsend Harris, the lives and professional experiences of hundreds of lower-ranking officials, especially those who served the United States in the last century, have been largely neglected. One of these was John Black, a Scot, who was the first representative of the United States in the island of Ceylon, now called Sri Lanka.

As the American commercial agent in Point de Galle from 1850 to 1864, Black made no significant contribution to the commercial or diplomatic success of the republic. His name is in no history book, nor is any known photograph extant but his story—based primarily on National Archives' records—is nonetheless worth telling. It gives insights into the department's nineteenth century recruitment and pay policies; it tells about the routine and not-so-routine work performed by some principal officers before the enlightened era of Work Requirements Statements and telegraphic instructions; it shows that Washington sometimes cared little about the welfare of its citizens abroad but that alcoholism and security checks were concerns of the department, then as now; it reveals that there was at least one working wife in the Foreign Service a full century before anyone dreamed of the Family Liaison Office; and it also provides an example of how the department terminated the services of a long-time employee without the benefit of the Selection-Out process and how he retaliated without the help of any-

Christopher Van Hollen joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served at New Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Murree, Ankara and as ambassador to the Republic of Sri Lanka and the Republic of the Maldives. He was coordinator of the executive seminar in national and international affairs and was promoted to career minister in 1977. Since August of 1978 he has been a senior inspector in the office of the inspector general.

thing so elaborate as the Grievance Board.

John Black's appointment can be traced to the increased activity of whaling vessels in the Indian Ocean in the 1840s, a decade during which the whale oil industry boomed and New Bedford became the whaling capital of the world. American whalers who began to put into Point de Galle on Ceylon's southern coast for water and provisions and to sort out problems of fractious or unhealthy crew members were handicapped because they had no one to intercede with British officials. In January 1848, Captain Taber of the bark *Bartholomew Gosnold* of New Bedford and four other whaling captains who were in Galle appealed for help to George Bancroft, the American minister in London.

The captains explained to Bancroft in a jointly signed letter that they faced considerable difficulties at various customs houses, particularly regarding their men when on shore. Therefore, they requested "the appointment of a United States vice consul for this Island, and we at the same time take the liberty of mentioning that we have received every substantial assistance from Mr. John Black, a merchant and Scotsman by birth, and would recommend him as a fit and proper person to hold the appointment."

Black used the captains' letter to clear the proposed appointment with the British authorities. The colonial secretary promptly assured him that the governor "will with utmost readiness bear testimony for your suitability to receive an exequatur as consul for the United States at Galle." Washington was slower to respond and more than two years passed before Black was notified of his appointment as "United States commercial agent for the Island of Ceylon." Although he may have been disappointed at being named commercial agent, his official designation made little difference either to the residents of the port or visitors; both customarily referred to him as "the American consul."

We know little about Black's background except that he was born in Glasgow in 1819 and arrived in Ceylon about 1840, undoubtedly attracted by the lure of adventure and hope of profits. He became a merchant in Galle, established his residence inside the Old Dutch Fort which served as the town's commercial center, and operated a bonded warehouse for cotton, coconut oil, cowries and sperm oil. He also became the agent for several insurance companies, including Lloyd's of London. The young merchant met Isabel Swinburn Darling, visiting from Scotland as a guest of the master-attendant of the port, and Miss Darling soon became Mrs. Black and, later, the mother of four children. More important for our story, she became an active partner in John Black and Company, a most unusual role for a European woman in the East in the nineteenth century.

In 1850 the future looked bright for the town of Galle and for the newly-appointed US representative and his bride. Colombo, the island's capital 75 miles north, surpassed Galle's 25,000 population, but it had only an open roadstead. Galle possessed a small natural harbor, generally well protected except during the southwest monsoon. Galle had one other advantage which was apparent to any mariner: the ships which crossed the northern Indian Ocean almost invariably passed close to the southern coast of Ceylon.

The Department of State sent its recruit a seal of office, the American flag, and a coat of arms, together with instructions to protect the rights of American citizens, promote trade, report commercial and political information, and certify invoices on goods destined for the United States. His only financial compensation was consular fees but the commercial agent undoubtedly hoped that a substantial number of American ships would visit the port and that the American flag would enhance the business prospects of John Black and Company, one of the town's four mercantile firms. Black's personal prestige also was enhanced; he became a member of the three-man consular corps, whose two other members represented Belgium and Portugal, and he and his family could look forward to meeting prominent American travelers who transited Galle.

The first naval ship to visit during Black's tenure was the steam frigate *Susquehanna* which arrived in December 1851 after a sixteen-day voyage from Zanzibar. Then as now, the commanding officers invited local citizens to tour the ship, a practice the *Susquehanna's* skipper, J. A. Aulie, thought paid great dividends. He reported ecstatically to the Navy Department that his ship had been "the admiration and wonder of every place. Not excepting the English ports, so large and splendid a war steamer they had never before seen, and it is easy to perceive that they leave us with more exalted ideas of our national power and greatness than ever before entertained." And in words certain to please Washington's budding cost-effectiveness devotees, the *Susquehanna's* captain boasted that the "effect on our commercial interests alone of displaying this noble ship in these remote seas will, in my opinion, be of more value to the nation than the cost of 20 such vessels."

The expected arrival of another navy ship in 1854 gave Black an opportunity to demonstrate initiative and practice high level diplomacy. At issue were 250 tons of coal which had been off-loaded by an American collier with instructions to Black to store the coal temporarily until picked up by the *USS Princeton*, enroute to join the American squadron in the China Seas. Lieutenant Lennox, the royal engineer, authorized Black to store it on the beach outside the Galle Fort with the understanding that it would be removed after three months at Black's expense. When three months passed without sign of the *Princeton*, Black asked for an extension but his request was curtly denied.

Black immediately went to the

The bark Arab *of Fairhaven, Massachusetts, one of the last American whaling ships to call at the port of Galle in Ceylon.*

top. He penned a letter to the governor in Colombo explaining that removal of the coal would cause considerable inconvenience to the United States government, which "they cannot help viewing with dissatisfaction," and asked for an extension in view of the governor's "enlightened and liberal policy." Perhaps persuaded by both the authoritative and flattering tone of the demarche, the governor granted the request because the coal was required "for the use of a friendly nation." but the royal engineer was not easily overruled. If Black could plead diplomatic necessity, Lieutenant Lennox could raise the specter of a military threat, however far-fetched, and also imply that the US representative was tight-fisted.

Alluding to British involvement in the Crimean War, the engineer wrote his commanding general that Black should be made to understand that the Ceylonese military authorities should not be expected to "endanger the safety of our fortress by affording close to the ramparts a cover which any enemy might take advantage of by impeding the fire of our guns—to save a friendly power the trifling expense of renting some private grounds for a coal depot." Black expressed indignation that the lieutenant had used "language so inimicable and so little calculated to cement our friendly relations," adding that he would have expected that the government he had the honor to represent would have been spared "imputations of parsimoniousness, particularly at the hands of a British officer."

Black's aggressive advocacy of American interests succeeded. Although the *Princeton* never called at Galle, the coal was permitted to remain in place for over two years until it eventually was taken aboard by the grateful captain of the US Navy flag ship *San Jacinto*. Fortunately for Black, British success during the Crimean War prevented the Russians from advancing into the Indian Ocean and vindicating the royal engineer by using the American-owned coal pile as a vantage point to attack the Galle Fort.

Although Black developed cordial relationships with the commanding officers of naval vessels, this was not always the case with merchant ship captains, as witness his cutlass point confrontation in 1857 with James Hall of the *Abby Langdon*. According to Captain Hall, the trouble arose when four of his British crewmen claimed that, because they had not signed seaman's articles, they were free to be discharged. Hall clamped the men in irons after Black told him he did not plan to become involved in the dispute. However, two days later, while visiting aboard a nearby American ship, the captain was surprised to see the US representative coming alongside the *Abby Langdon* in a British man-of-war's small boat. He returned immediately and "when I got on the deck I found the consul, in a more than half intoxicated state, surrounded by men with drawn cutlasses and in a very insolent way he demanded the men I had in irons or confinement."

The ship master said that Black took the men ashore over his protests and encouraged them to sue for assault and battery, cruel treatment and false imprisonment. A police court magistrate fined Hall two pounds and his first and second mates smaller amounts. Lamenting that it was next to impossible to recruit crewmen and that it would be a serious matter if they could break shipping articles with impunity, Captain Hall urged his employers to bring Black's "flagrant abuse of power" to the attention of the United States government. They did; his New York office wrote the department asking that the commercial agent's character and conduct be investigated and that he be dealt with as he deserved.

There was no evidence that the department questioned Black about the *Abby Langdon* flare-up but there were a number of exchanges over the more mundane issues of salary and bonding requirements. Like most other US representatives in the last century, Black was miserably paid and, like most of his contemporaries, he protested that "from a pecuniary point I am a considerable loser." His hopes at the beginning of the decade gave way to disillusionment; whaling vessels began to desert Galle harbor as catches fell below expectations and visits by other types of American ships averaged only seven per year. Also discouraging, the department turned down Black's request to be elevated to the rank of consul despite his argument that six countries were now represented by consuls.

The compensation issue appeared partially resolved when Congress passed a law in 1855 providing for an annual salary of $1,000 for commercial agents in Black's category; this was considerably more than he earned from consular fees which seldom exceed $100 per year. He eagerly drew down some of the salary against a London bank only to be informed by Washington that he would have to return the money because legislation the following year had with-

Association News

TASK FORCE ON CHAPS 1-3 & 12

The task force on professional issues, headed by Ken Hill, was assigned responsibility for reviewing four chapters of the draft Foreign Service act, 1 to 3 and 12. In most cases, the titles of the chapters imply the substantial career and foreign affairs interests that are at issue—"Management of the Service," "Appointments" and "Compatibility of Personnel Systems" (of the foreign affairs agencies using the authorities which would be available under the proposed legislation). The less revealing title of chapter 1, "General Provisions," masks the most fundamental interests of all, for this is the section in which the very *raison d'être,* role, make-up, operating philosophy and future of the Foreign Service of the United States would be brought to substance, or not be adequately addressed, as the case may be.

In developing its recommendations to the AFSA Board whether, or under what conditions, the Association would be able to endorse these sections of the proposed legislation, the task force took a fresh look at how professional issues, foreign policy concerns and career interests fared in the draft legislation. The task force made full use and reference to earlier AFSA and other studies of the bill.

DAYS OF DECISION

The FS Association board has addressed cables to the field, held a series of meetings, and formed several task forces in order to keep members involved in forming our position on FS restructure, pay parity, and loss of the commercial function. These pages contain information from or about the task forces dealing with these three priority issues. We encourage your involvement in your FS Association's activities. Please fill out the questionnaire that appeared in the September *Journal* and make your voice heard for the benefit of the FS.

OMB SALAMI TACTICS: SLICE OFF COMMERCIAL OFFICERS

On September 7, AFSA learned that OMB finally decided that the commercial positions at 75 posts overseas will be transferred to Commerce. AFSA does not yet know exactly how many positions this entails but, if you are spending a substantial portion of your time doing commercial work, your job may belong to Commerce before long.

A number of important questions need to be answered. One is how strongly State will "encourage" its commercial officers to transfer. State management has said that you won't be forced to move against your will. Incumbents can finish their tours. After that, you will be "encouraged" to shift and be allowed to take your pension benefits with you.

If you should choose to move, does that mean you can retire at 50? We don't know. Does it mean that you can aspire for positions overseas above the commercial attache level in most posts? Probably not. What happens to you if you choose not to move to Commerce? Will there be sufficient positions to absorb those of you who do not go? Are you willing to take undesirable jobs in undesirable locations? These questions do not even address the problem of how the glut of commercial officers without positions will effect future promotion opportunities for all FSOs.

What is to become of the Foreign Service? We almost lost the Consular function to INS a short while ago. How long will State succeed in keeping it? Will the commercial function be the last to go? It's conceivable that the economic function might be transferred to Treasury or Commerce. Couldn't GSA take over the administrative section's work overseas? Are political officers the only ones who are indispensable or could the CIA take over their work? It is ironic, to say the least, that the State Department is now pushing for a new act to reaffirm the integrity of a single Foreign Service when Commerce soon will be seeking legislation to establish its own Foreign Commercial Service.

The outlook for preventing the administration's plan from going through appears bleak. In mid-September, the president's proposal was resubmitted as promised to the reconvened Congress. The Congress has thirty days to seek changes in the plan and a second thirty during which one house can vote it down by a majority. If not vetoed within sixty days, it automatically will take effect in mid-November.

Unfortunately, the Congress does not appear inclined to confront the administration over this issue. Those Congressmen who have interested themselves on trade reorganization want some action taken soon. This reflects the desires of many businessmen who are dissatisfied with the present situation. When OMB's Director McIntyre testified on September 6 before Representative Vanik's Subcommittee on Trade of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Committee members generally supported the President's plan. When several questioned why legislation would not be acceptable to the administration, McIntyre replied that legislation would be acceptable if it could be passed in time to permit reorganization to take place before the MTN codes need to be implemented beginning January 1, 1980. Because the Congress could not pass legislation by that time, OMB decided to effect the changes via presidential reorganization procedures.

AID PAY COMPARABILITY

The mini-Hay Associates study started on September 1st. As contrasted with their State counterparts, AID management had not consulted with AFSA and numerous requests for meetings and briefings went unanswered. AFSA has been particularly concerned by the qualifications of the AID participants in the study and the value of the sample. A briefing was finally scheduled for mid-September.

AID POSITION DESIGNATION: FS OR GS?

AID administration made the final decisions on position designations on September 15. AFSA consulted intensively with management at several points in the process. We requested a last-minute input to the administrator before the final decisions were made. Between 800 and 850 AID/W positions will be designated FS on October 1. The major failing of the exercise was management's complete disregard for the Foreign Service Staff corps. Despite repeated representations by AFSA, management chose to interpret the Obey Amendment in its narrowest sense and eliminate the staff corps from the designation study. Certain other anomalies also persisted and AFSA plans strong efforts to rectify these inconsistencies. It is particularly galling to note that IDCA, supposedly the primary policy body for foreign assistance, is entirely GS. LEG is also heavily GS. This is either a massive violation of the spirit of the Obey Amendment or the legal fraternity has finally decided that they have no part in policy. We suspect the latter.

Subsequent to the position designation study, management plans to reclassify jobs in AID/W. It is anticipated that this will take two months. AFSA plans to monitor this closely and welcomes volunteers.

GS to FS Conversion

The Obey Amendment also calls for the agency to encourage the conversion of GS to FS. The AID Standing Committee wrote a letter to Gordon Ramsey expressing our concern that wholesale conversion would have negative implications on both the professional quality of our work and our promotion opportunities if not carried out correctly. A number of precepts were proposed to management on this very critical aspect of the Obey Amendment. We are awaiting management's reply to this communication.

NEW "FLY AMERICA" REGS

Following protracted negotiations with AFSA, new travel regulations are to be announced shortly which relax the stringent requirements of the Fly America Act. This change in travel regulations was allowed because of an amendment to the FY 1979 State Department Authorization Act which AFSA supported. It applies only to travel by Foreign Service employees and their dependents. While still required to use American carriers when leaving or entering the United States, the new regulations allow the traveler to use foreign carriers between two or more overseas points. Unfortunately, because of the legislative history behind last year's congressional action, there will continue to be some limitations on the use of foreign carriers on routes which are also served by American carriers.

The 1979 Authorization Act also provided that the Department can amend R & R travel regulations to provide for travel to the United States. We have pressed the Department to develop a draft of these new regulations and submit them to AFSA for consultations, but the Department continues to drag its heels.

DRAGNICH TO ED BOARD

George S. Dragnich is a political-military analyst in INR. Coming to the Department four years ago after seven years in the academic community, he recently spent a year as a liaison officer to the Egyptian and Israeli armies with the Sinai Field Mission. He has been very active with AFSA's work on the proposed Foreign Service restructuring act, especially with those sections dealing with staff corps/specialists and retirement. His editorial experience includes current membership on the editorial board of the *Open Forum* journal.

FASs WANT SELF-DETERMINATION

Under the proposed restructuring of the Foreign Service, Foreign Affairs Specialists with domestic tenure codes (computer specialists, translators, intelligence analysts, some security officers, etc.) would be converted to GS status. Management will decide who stays in the Foreign Service and who goes. Almost all are likely to go GS. Thus, FAS officers brought in during the 1970s ostensibly to create a unified service, are now being told that to preserve the integrity of the Foreign Service, they must leave it.

For many of those who were coerced into converting from GS status in the first place, or who were hired without a GS option, the opportunity to rejoin or join the GS ranks is attractive—particularly since their Foreign Service retirement benefits are to be transferred with them. These and other FAS officers, however, believe that management's performance record calls into question its ability to make such a major career decision for them.

The restructuring proposal envisions a three-year transition phase. Most FAS officers feel that this probably is an adequate period for them to determine which system offers the greatest opportunity for professional growth. They would still have to weigh the rigors of overseas service (now a possibility rather than a requirement) and less job security against the advantages of domestic tenure. The choice, however, would be theirs. And, if they choose unwisely, it would be their mistake—not management's.

PAPAL VISIT TO D.C.

Concluding a visit to Washington, on Sunday, October 7, His Holiness Pope John Paul II will celebrate a Mass on the Mall before an estimated congregation of one million persons.

For the convenience of those AFSA members who plan to be in the city on this historic occasion the Foreign Service Club at 2101 E Street, N.W., will be open from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. A buffet/brunch will be served (reservations only) from 11 a.m. to 3 p.m., and from 3 p.m. to 5 p.m. refreshments will be available from the bar. Television coverage of the ceremony will be provided.

THREE QUESTIONS ON PAY PARITY

The FS Association statement on pay parity between the Foreign and Civil Services has inevitably generated some confusion. Let's answer some of the most common questions raised.

1. *Why should the staff corps support a proposal that provides some lower FS-GS links than exist at present?*

A. The proposed FS-GS link points below FSS-4/GS-11 will not affect staff corps personnel presently employed. Under both the AFSA and management proposals, all staff corps personnel at FSS-4 and below will move on to the new pay card at the first step that provides you more pay than you presently receive. (FSS-1 through FSS-3 would receive the same substantial pay increases the Hay study justifies for FSO/R-3 through FSO/R-5.) Once you have converted to the new card, you will obtain the pay awarded all personnel at your new step and grade. You will receive annual step increases up to the highest step in grade, which under both the AFSA and management proposals, will be 15 percent higher than what you currently receive at your grade's highest step. Further, because we would substitute annual step increases for the longevity step provisions, you would receive the extra pay earlier and more often throughout a career. Promotions would be from the grade/step you established after conversion to the new card, and would take you to increasingly higher pay levels. Contrary to costing you money, AFSA's pay parity package should give you thousands of extra dollars over a normal career.

2. *What is the "overseas factor" and how does it benefit us?*

A. The Hay Associates study argues that FS personnel should be compensated for the "overseas factor": the extra challenges and costs of living and working overseas. Hay has performed similar studies for private business, which awards an overseas allowance of around 15 percent of salary to any person willing to work overseas. Other allowances (housing, cost of living, hardship) are all in addition to the basic allowance for going overseas. Hay recommended that the FS receive their overseas allowance in the form of increased pay within grade—thus the talk of extending FS pay out to 12 or 14 steps within grade. Staff corps personnel like this recommendation, since they tend to remain a long time within grade, and do not trust Congress to approve a new overseas allowance. Officers are afraid they will never see the bonus if it is awarded at the 10th through 14th years in class, and would prefer to fight for a separate allowance that, since it would go only to personnel overseas, would also operate as an incentive for getting more officers abroad.

3. *Why should we want the extra class of a Ten Class system?*

A. Because it means more money for FSS-3s, FSO/R-5s, and tenured FSO-6s. The Nine Class system makes no distinction between tenured and untenured FSO-6s. They all get the same pay. FSS-3s and FSO/R-5s would be paid somewhere between GS-12 and GS-13. If we add a new class for tenured FSO-6s, they will move up to GS-12 and the FSS-3s/FSO/R-5s will go to GS-13. So we want ten classes.

ICA STANDING COMMITTEE

The USICA Standing Committee has formed. It met with the Agency's Governing Board representatives August 23. Present members of the committee are Jean Mammen, Marilyn McAfee, James Findlay, Michael Canning, James McHale and Ron Reafs. Mammen is representing USICA on the AFSA Members' Interest Committee. The USICA committee is interested in items and resources that would enhance AFSA's efforts to increase its membership among USICA personnel. USICA representative Fred Shaver relayed the Committee's concerns to the Governing Board, at which the Board subsequently agreed to schedule a separate meeting with USICA's Standing Committee in the near future.

ERRATA

The September issue of the *Journal* bore the cover date of October, through a production error. We regret the confusion that this has caused our readers.

AFSA DEFENDS F.S. COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES

An AFSA team led by President Ken Bleakley argued September 6 before the House Ways and Meas Committee that the Foreign Service and State should not be stripped of their responsibilities overseas for the United States export program. The committee was holding hearings on the president's reorganization plan which includes the proposal to transfer most of State's commercial positions from State to Commerce.

In his testimony, Bleakley stressed that the president's plan invites disaster when it proposes to reshuffle the government's various trade functions to meet an artificial deadline of January 1, 1980. "This appears to AFSA," Bleakley said, "to be a classic attempt to shuffle boxes in a reorganization plan rather than treating the underlying causes of an increasingly serious problem."

Bleakley emphasized that our country's competitive commercial position overseas is too weak to withstand experimentation. The US should not remove a trained professional in foreign trade and investment from an integrated team and substitute personnel from a domestic agency. He noted that we and our competitors have learned that effective trade promotion overseas requires the marshaling of all our resources, not just salesmanship. The US needs knowledge of the local market and government, broad ranging contacts, political insights, language ability, knowledge of international finance and regional factors, and diplomatic clout employing the ambassador and the full country team—the resources, priorities and support base to get the job done.

After listening to AFSA's statement, two Congressmen said, while they sympathized with our plight and appreciate our efforts overseas, everyone else wants a change. We are a "voice crying in the wilderness." Since State has not been willing to accord sufficient priority and resources to trade promotion, perhaps the task should be given to a department that will.

Along with testifying on the Hill, AFSA has been talking with staffers of the key committees. A bill presented by Representative

Gillis Long (D-La.) proposes establishing a separate trade agency instead of beefing up Commerce. Unfortunately, it too would move the commercial function to Commerce. We are considering supporting a modified Long bill which puts us in the new agency or leaves us in State while giving the new agency program and budgetary control.

AFSA also has been calling on favorably disposed businessmen to oppose the administration's proposal on the Hill. We are not sanguine that this will be enough to kill the administration's plan, but AFSA will continue to fight hard against moving the commercial function to Commerce.

TASK FORCE ON CHAPS 5-7

State Representative Joe McBride is heading the AFSA task force to identify and prioritize necessary changes in Chapters 5 (position classification, assignments), 6 (promotions, retention), and 7 (career development, training.) The 15-member task force is reviewing and prioritizing the five pages of specific textual changes and comments contained in AFSA's section-by-section analysis presented to the Joint House Committee on July 9 when the Association testified on the bill. In addition to reviewing the prior AFSA work, the task force is identifying possible new areas where AFSA should press for changes as the Governing Board formulates its position on the bill.

NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL

Marie Skora's witty cover for the October *Journal* is merely the most recent contribution this Foreign Service artist has made to the magazine. For the past twenty years her drawings, paintings, collages and woodcuts have enlivened our pages. At present she is exhibiting her graphics, collages and wall hangings at Ampersand Books in the Bethesda Square Shopping Mall. The exhibit runs through November 13.

JOIN AFSA
(OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO JOIN)

HARROP AND WALKER TESTIMONY ON FS ACT

Among those testifying before the House Subcommittees on International Operations and Civil Service on the Foreign Service Act of 1979 were William C. Harrop and Lannon Walker. Messrs. Harrop and Walker said, "We, like the Secretary, are convinced that the moment for fundamental reform of the Foreign Service is now and that this proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979 is needed to institute these reforms. In certain key respects, the Act doesn't go far enough and, if not strengthened during the process of Congressional consideration, it will fail to achieve its essential goals."

One of the areas where strengthening is needed, according to the Harrop and Walker testimony, is in the establishment of the Senior Foreign Service. Harrop and Walker called for a single Senior Foreign Service for all of the agencies authorized to use the Foreign Service personnel system, for clear definition of the difference between the current senior officer corps and the new SFS, distinguishing between senior executives and senior specialists and for other mechanisms than time-in-class as a key egress tool. They also asked for predictable rates of recruitment, promotion and retirement and remarked, "The lack of a realistic personnel model, which requires computer modeling to deal with the dynamics over time of the many variables, has been at the root of the Department's poor personnel decisions." An appendix to their testimony gave the history of personnel actions in the Foreign Service since 1946, as well as principles for an operating model for the future. They closed by urging the passage of the legislation, taking account of their suggestions.

AAFSW TESTIFIES ON FS ACT OF 79

Lesley Dorman, President of the Association of American Foreign Service Women, testified before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Civil Service of the House Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service on July 24. Mrs. Dorman told committee members about the history of the AAFSW and its projects within and outside the foreign affairs community, briefly outlined the problems of the Foreign Service family and described the organization's efforts to find, if not solutions, ameliorative measures. After praising the work of the Family Liaison Office, she asked that Congress monitor future authorizations for the support of this valuable service. She went on to delineate the special problems of the Foreign Service wife in establishing a career of her own and said "many Foreign Service wives will sacrifice the earning potential of their most productive years in helping their families make unending cross-cultural adjustments and in voluntary community responsibilities. The Foreign Service homemaker is a vital resource abroad, enriching the overseas communities with thousands of hours of donated service." Mrs. Dorman described the special problems of divorce for these women, no employment record, no modern skills, no Social Security, no shared annuity, no survivor benefits and exorbitantly expensive medical insurance. She then read a letter from the Honorable Loy W. Henderson supporting the establishment of "earned rights" for Foreign Service wives.

At the end of Mrs. Dorman's testimony she introduced Marcia Curran, chairman of the Forum Committee on Employment and Career Development, and Patricia Ryan, chairman of the Forum Committee on Retirement. Mrs. Curran and Mrs. Ryan offered further testimony on the problems of employment for Foreign Service wives and the situation of divorced Foreign Service wives, respectively.

AID REPS MEET WITH BENNET

The AID elected members of the Governing Board met with Administrator Bennet during his first week on the job. We set forth the needs of the AID foreign service commenting on most of the AID issues discussed elsewhere. It was a good meeting and your representatives came away with the impression that we will receive a hearing in the front office. Time will tell!

drawn the salaries from commercial agents at small posts.

The same law which took away Black's salary also required commercial agents to execute an official bond for which two American citizens were to provide surety. After being prodded by the department for several years, he remonstrated that he could not meet the requirement because, except for the missionaries in the extreme north, there were only two American residents in Ceylon; neither of them, he said, had enough funds to underwrite the bond.

Foreign Service posts are now exhorted to devote close attention to the welfare and whereabouts of American citizens. However, 120 years ago, as Black learned from the wreck of the cargo ship *Colorado*, the department seemed totally indifferent to the welfare of its ordinary citizens abroad—whether they were dead, orphaned or destitute.

A large vessel of 1200 tons, under the command of M. D. Ricker of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, the *Colorado* in April 1859 ran up on the rocks during a gale while approaching Point Pedro, Ceylon's northernmost point. Captain Ricker, his wife, and two others were drowned but the captain's eight-year-old son and the rest of the crew were saved. Before Black could reach Point Pedro, he learned that the government agent there had authorized the sale of the wreck for 500 pounds, an action he protested vigorously because the ship's owners had not been consulted.

Reporting the disaster to Washington, he assured the department that the captain's son would be "treated as one of my own family" until the orphaned boy could be returned to New Hampshire but he warned that the fourteen crew members who had returned to Galle were causing serious problems. Utterly destitute, they refused his offer to arrange passage to Calcutta, arguing that they were due seven month's back wages, and they had filed a suit against him for payment. This was impossible, Black explained, because the ship's papers had been lost with the *Colorado* and because, before leaving Galle, the late captain had told him that most of the crew members were paid up. The British authorities were another problem; they reluctantly provided maintenance to the crewmen but demanded reimbursement from Black from the proceeds of the wreck. This he refused and he also refused to appear in court in response to the seamen's wage suit. The matter had been referred to Washington, he assured the queen's advocate, and he was awaiting instructions.

One would have expected the department to reply promptly to its beleaguered representative's several pleas for instructions—even recognizing that optimum round-trip pouch time was four or five months. Yet, incredibly, Washington ignored the *Colorado* episode. The disgruntled survivors eventually left Galle but more than two years elapsed before Black heard from the department. When a communication finally arrived, he must have reacted somewhat incredulously: the department was interested neither in the ship nor the American seamen but, instead, inquired about the whereabouts of two Belgian seamen who had been aboard. Curbing whatever exasperation be may have felt, Black replied with admirable restraint that he had submitted six reports on the *Colorado* affair but "I regret to say I have received no recognition or reply to my several communications from the Honorable Secretary of State."

"Like almost every other East Indian, he indulges in the free use of malt and spirituous liquors and at all times during the day is more or less under their influence."

Before the *Colorado* left Galle on her last voyage, she had unloaded a cargo of coal which was the most common commodity carried by American ships calling at Galle during the 1850s; however, as the decade of the 1860s approached, two additional commodities—ice and rice—appeared on the cargo manifests with greater frequency. The ice cargoes reflected the expanding business of the Tudor Ice Company, an enterprising Boston firm, which prospered by cutting blocks of ice from nearby lakes and transporting them all over the world in specially constructed ships. The rice shipments related to the advent of the American Civil War when some American shippers, whose regular trade routes had been disrupted, turned to the remunerative India-Ceylon rice carrying trade. Although Black was unaware of the implications, the outbreak of the Civil War and the expansion of the ice business to Galle were destined to shorten his tenure as US representative.

Since his cutlass-drawn imbroglio abroad the *Abby Langdon*, his conduct had not elicited further adverse reports to Washington. On the contrary, the diaries and chronicles of several American travelers record that he and his wife were most gracious to prominent naval and civilian visitors, including William B. Reed, the first United States minister to China, and Townsend Harris, the first US consul general to Japan. Typically grateful sentiments were expressed by Chief Surgeon William Maxwell Wood of the United States Navy who was "made at home by the attentive hospitality of Mr. John Black, United States consul, to whom the petty income of his office can be of no compensation for the hospitalities of himself and family, extended to such of our countrymen as the passing steamers bring to Galle."

Serious trouble, however, arose in 1862 with the arrival of the cargo ship *Paragon* which was engaged in the rice carrying trade. The *Paragon* put into port in distress, with her master, Captain George Howe, also in distress having contracted fever in Calcutta. The ailing captain rented several rooms from the Tudor Ice Company representative, George Washington Prescott, who was the only American citizen resident in the port, and moved ashore with his stewardess who attended him during his illness. While convalescing and readying his ship for sea, Captain Howe had several run-ins with Black which caused him to complain to the department that the commercial agent was intemperate, abusive to American ship masters and seamen, lax in his duties and prone to express dis-

loyal opinions about the Lincoln administration and the Northern cause.

The department this time reacted with alacrity. Consul General Nathaniel Jacobs in Calcutta was promptly instructed to investigate the charges and, if found true, to recommend another person for the job. After taking voluminous testimony from ship masters and others who had visited Galle, the consul general concluded that the charges were "not proven" but, somewhat contradictorily, he went on to confirm that "Mr. Black's sympathies are with the rebels" and that "like almost every other East Indian, he indulges in the free use of malt and spirituous liquors and at all times during the day is more or less under their influence." Black was a Scotsman, he explained, and with "other national characteristics" was irritable and prone to express himself with "the greatest frankness and roughness at all times."

The consul general gave two reasons for recommending a replacement. First, "it is of utmost importance at this time with the piratical steamers *Florida* and *Alabama* off the Cape and apparently making for these waters, that the consul at Galle, the great coaling and watering station for vessels bound from Asiatic ports to every quarter of the globe, should be one of whose loyalties there could be no suspicion, least of all, whose loyalties were with the Rebels." Second, he presumed that the department would not hesitate to replace a foreigner with an American citizen of equal qualifications.

Those in today's Foreign Service who have first received word of their retirement from the wireless file may perhaps be mollified to learn that this bureaucratic art form has long historic roots. Reading the Ceylon government's official *Gazette* of January 22, 1864, John Black discovered that he had been replaced by George Washington Prescott of the Tudor Ice Company of Boston. Obviously stunned, he immediately wrote the department "begging most respectively to express my surprise having received no information that a change was contemplated in their representative, an appointment conferred upon me by the late respected Daniel Webster." Prescott's social and moral position, he warned, would reflect no credit on those who had recommended him.

Black also rallied the support of three American ship captains who were in port and who wrote on his behalf to the colonial government in Colombo—but to no avail.

Black got the sack but he fought back with characteristic bravado; he refused to recognize the ice company representative as his successor or to turn over the office records to him. "My appointment was received from Daniel Webster," Black reportedly told Prescott, "I don't recognize Mr. Seward, there is no United States, it is a Dis-United States." The department's dispirited new commercial agent reported plaintively that the Scotsman's compatriots threatened to make him suffer for taking Black's job. After Andrew Johnson became president, Prescott complained that they circulated rumors that Black would be reinstated as well as rumors that Prescott was a drunkard and had kept a "disreputable house"—an allusion to the "stewardess" who had shared Prescott's house with Captain Howe of the *Paragon*.

Almost three years after he had been deposed, with a lawsuit pending, Black finally gave up the documents and official insignia—but he did not turn them over to Prescott. Defiant to the end, he shipped the entire lot back to Washington, including, he noted in his last communication to the department, a "flag received worm-eaten and unserviceable."

After John Black's final act of defiance, he fades out of official focus, but evidence suggests that he suffered business losses and that his health declined rapidly. The Lloyd's insurance agency passed out of his hands and the financial crisis in Ceylon in 1866 probably took its toll. He died on February 17, 1869 and was buried in the Episcopal cemetery under a headstone which, perhaps understandably, bears no reference to his fourteen years' service for the United States. "The vicissitudes of fortune against which the commercial speculator is never safe ruined his prospects," observed the *Ceylon Examiner* in a poignant obituary, "and from that time his health and spirits began to give way until the final close of a not unchequered life, at age 50." His death certificate, still on file in the Town Hall, gives the cause as "liver complaint."

But our story need not end on these melancholy notes, with John Black struck down in the prime of life after losing his battle with the bottle. After the Scot merchant's death, a remarkable woman took center stage: his widow, Isabel Swinburn Darling, who now became the senior partner in John

(Continued on page 44)

The author (left) and Bradman Weerakoon, government agent in Galle, examining the grave of John Black, the first US representative in Ceylon.

'A vein of poetry exists in the hearts of all men." Thomas Carlyle

The Most Poetic Negotiation in Diplomatic History

MORTIMER D. GOLDSTEIN

This month marks the silver anniversary of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany.

The treaty itself is not much to talk about. The current close relations between the two countries are probably not affected in any material way by its provisions, and the number of people outside the world of diplomacy who are conscious of its existence can surely be counted on the digits of one limb of the South American sloth. The treaty is interesting not because of what is says, but how it was negotiated. It is, in fact, the product of the most poetic negotiation in diplomatic history.

In the early 1950s, as part of the process of restoring German sovereignty after the war, the United States and the Federal Republic embarked on the negotiation of a treaty of friendship—essentially, a commercial treaty. The German government thought that such a treaty would be an important symbol of its new status in the world and of its critical association with the United States. Washington was naturally sympathetic to the German interest for political reasons. Besides, FCN treaties—to use the specialist's symbol—were fashionable in those days: the Senate thought that they were good for American trade and investment and encouraged the Department of State to negotiate them.

The treaty negotiations, initiated through our mission in Bonn, proceeded slowly. The German government was understandably cautious in dealing with the US standard draft, some parts of which reflected concepts new to German thinking. To move things along, the Department of State sent one of its experts to Bonn to help our mission explain our proposals. He had a bit of trouble getting started, not with the Germans but with the Americans. He arrived in Bonn, unfortunately, not too long after the tempestuous visit of the Cohn and Schine team, described at the time as Senator McCarthy's "junketeering gumshoes." Our mission staff, after their experience with that duo, was not about to get on intimate terms with any strange visiting fireman before his credentials had been thoroughly checked out through the grapevine.

Our man from Washington was finally "cleared" and accepted by the mission and was able to make some progress with the German Foreign Office. The negotiations were still far from completed, however, when Konrad Adenauer and John Foster Dulles took a hand. They apparently decided in the summer of 1954 that, when the chancellor came to see the secretary in October, they would sign the treaty. Come what may, the working stiffs had better produce a text ready for signature on the appointed day!

The orders went out on both sides, and a sizable delegation of German officials was promptly sent off to work with an assembly of Washington experts to untie the remaining knots in the treaty draft. At the time, I was the deputy chief of international finance in the Department of State and was assigned to the US negotiating team as an adviser on currency and investment questions. I had dealt with German problems before and had gotten used to the idea—more or less—that, as a diplomat, I had to regard the German representatives no differently from the representatives of any other friendly country.

The German delegation included a number of members who could handle English, including two who were thoroughly fluent. One, a specialist in financial affairs, spoke English with a strong Bavarian accent. The other, an interpreter, spoke English as though he had spent all his life at Oxford. (He had acquired his remarkable facility while working in the British zone of occupation. But regardless of accent, they both enjoyed the language enthusiastically and, to my astonishment, were unashamed addicts of that unique and delightful British-invented verse form known as the limerick.

How I discovered their literary taste I can't recall, but that is not important. It is important that, as the tedious and pressured negotiations proceeded, we were able to use spare moments between serious discussions to review our limerick repertoires and then to undertake, individually and jointly, the creation of new compositions.

In case there is any reader who does not know what a limerick is, perhaps we should illustrate the form with one or two of the few classics that are publishable in a family-type journal. We must confess that there may be more scatology expressed in the literature of the limerick than was ever writ on all the graffiti-laden walls between Pompeii and Pittsburgh. But to illustrate the decorous exceptions:

There was a young lady from Rio
Who loved an old Beethoven trio.
But as in "Pagliacci"
She played it *vivace*
Instead of *allegro con brio*.

Admittedly mild, almost pedestrian, but irreproachable. One with

Continued on page 42

The author served in the Department from 1947 to 1972; first in the Civil Service, then as an FSR. Since retiring in 1972, he has been engaged in free-lance writing, among other things.

"A diplomat's words must have no relation to action—
otherwise what kind of diplomacy is it?—Stalin

John Foster Dulles: Hard-liner or Tightrope-walker?

PETER A. POOLE

In April 1950, Dean Acheson added to his inner circle of advisors a leading spokesman of the Republican party's moderate wing. To help preserve a bipartisan consensus for administration policy, John Foster Dulles became Acheson's special assistant.[1] In this role, Dulles negotiated the Japanese Peace Treaty, perhaps the greatest achievement of his career. His views at the time were not far removed from those of Truman or Acheson. For example, he had just published a book, *War or Peace*, in which he favored admitting China to the United Nations if she met her international obligations.

[1] *Senator Arthur Vandenberg was probably the first to suggest using Dulles in this role, but Dean Rusk and Walton Butterworth (the incoming and outgoing heads of the Asian bureau) were also involved in the appointment. John M. Allison assisted Dulles in the treaty negotiations, and then served briefly as head of the bureau before taking charge of the embassy in Japan.*

Dr. Peter A. Poole is director of the Center for International Studies at Old Dominion University in Norfolk. He is a former FSO and Senate staffer. His books include The Vietnamese in Thailand, America in World Politics *and* Eight Presidents and Indochina. *The present article is part of a forthcoming book to be titled,* Profiles in American Foreign Policy.

Dulles left the Truman administration in time to take part in the 1952 election campaign. With the aim of being nominated Secretary of State, he began to advocate "liberation" of countries under Communist control, though he implied this could be done mainly by propaganda. To foreign diplomats, it was never clear whether Dulles's statements should be taken at face value or discounted as political rhetoric.

In retrospect, it seems plain that he was positioning himself as Ike's indispensable aide in dealing with a conservative Congress and with foreign client states. On broad policy, he invariably deferred to the president, whose instincts and rhetoric were more liberal.

In May 1952, Dulles visited Eisenhower at his NATO headquarters and showed him an article which he was about to publish in *Life* magazine.[2] His thesis was that the Truman administration's strategy of containment was not designed to reduce or eliminate the Communist threat to the free world; it merely aimed at making it possible to live with the threat. Dulles argued that containment required "gigantic military expenditures [which] unbalance our budget and require taxes so heavy that they discourage incentive." Besides, "this concentration on military matters . . . transfers from the civilian to the military decisions which profoundly affect our domestic life and our foreign relations."

[2] *John Foster Dulles, "A Policy of Boldness,"* Life, *May 19, 1952, Vol. 32, pp. 146-160.*

How could the United States reduce its defense budget and at the same time gain greater security? Dulles proposed a new strategy that seemed to rely almost entirely on a willingness to use nuclear weapons wherever US interests were threatened:

> There is one solution and only one: that is for the free world to develop the will and organize the means to retaliate instantly against open aggression by Red armies, so that, if it occurred anywhere, we could and would strike back where it hurts by means of our choosing.

Dulles did not stop at hinting at nuclear retaliation against any and all Soviet offensive moves. He also urged the United States to roll back the Russian gains in Eastern Europe. Soviet leaders have trampled on the "moral or natural law," he said; "for that violation they can

and should be made to pay." The United States must let it be known that "it wants and expects liberation to occur," for that would give hope to captive peoples and "put heavy new burdens on the jailers." He insisted that this was not a call for "a series of bloody uprisings and reprisals." But he did not specify how liberation should be achieved—except to urge that the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe concentrate their programs on this theme.

General Eisenhower wrote Dulles, shortly after his visit to NATO headquarters, thanking him for his article and saying he was "as deeply impressed as ever with the directness and simplicity of your approach to complex problems." This comment may have been slightly tongue-in-cheek. To his old friend, General Lucius Clay, Eisenhower wrote that he agreed with the idea of retaliation where a vital US interest such as Berlin was at stake. But

> . . . what should we do if Soviet political aggression . . . successively chips away exposed portions of the free world? So far as our resulting economic situation is concerned, such an eventuality would be just as bad for us as if the area had been captured by force. To my mind, this is a case where the theory of "retaliation" falls down.[3]

Dulles performed the difficult task of writing the foreign policy planks for the 1952 Republican platform. These had to be acceptable to both the Taft and Eisenhower wings of the party, whose views were often diametrically opposed. Dulles's planks resolved this problem by attacking the Democrats for abandoning the peoples of Eastern Europe to Soviet domination. The GOP platform promised to repudiate the Yalta agreements and any others which "aid Communist enslavements." The platform pledged that "we shall again make liberty into a beacon light of hope that will . . . mark the end of the negative, futile, and immoral policy of 'containment.' "

"Liberation" was the theme of Dulles's campaign speeches on behalf of General Eisenhower. Although Eisenhower himself had reservations about using this theme, it probably helped to draw together the two main wings of the Republican party. After Eisenhower's landslide election, Taft and other conservatives supported Dulles's nomination as secretary of state. Dulles, in return, consistently sought their advice on foreign policy.

Truce in Korea

General Eisenhower promised during the campaign to go to Korea if he were elected. In December 1952, he redeemed the pledge and then issued a brief statement urging the opposing side to accept an honorable settlement. In Eisenhower's view, they would do so only if they were convinced the United States was prepared to use more force to achieve this result. Therefore, shortly after his inauguration, he sent more US aircraft to South Korea, made public a plan to enlarge the South Korean Army, and placed nuclear missiles on Okinawa. He also "unleashed" Chiang Kai-shek's forces by canceling orders to the Seventh Fleet to prevent their return to the mainland of China.

"To Eden, Dulles seemed more concerned with playing up to the China bloc in Congress than with helping France extricate herself from a hopeless colonial war."

It is, of course, impossible to know just what effect these moves produced on Chinese and North Korean leaders. In any case, American pressure was probably reinforced by Soviet advice. Stalin died in March 1953, and his place was taken by a group of younger leaders. Some of them could see the advantage to Russia of "peaceful coexistence" with the West.

On March 28, the Chinese government agreed to an exchange of sick and wounded prisoners, and China then announced that prisoners unwilling to return to their native land could be handed over to a neutral state.

However, the hardest task was to persuade our Asian clients to accept a political settlement; this was a major challenge for Dulles. South Korean President Syngman Rhee refused to sign a truce without an American pledge to resume the war unless Korea were unified in ninety days. President Eisenhower rejected this condition as wholly unjustified and unrealistic. Attempts to console the Korean leader with offers of a US security treaty, economic aid and diplomatic support all failed. After the United States signed a prisoner exchange agreement, Rhee freed twenty-seven thousand North Korean prisoners who refused repatriation. The time had come for the Eisenhower administration to deal firmly with its Asian client.

Dulles sent Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson to Seoul. For two weeks, Robertson allowed the autocratic Korean leader to blow off steam; then he politely but firmly urged him to cease sabotaging the negotiations, trust Eisenhower and Dulles and allow the armistice to go into effect. Next, Robertson, Dulles and Eisenhower all applied themselves to the task of persuading the conservative wing in Congress that the armistice agreement was in the US interest.[4] To mollify potential critics, Washington issued a warning (in the name of all UN members with troops in South Korea) that renewed aggression in Korea might lead to retaliatory action beyond that country's borders. These combined efforts produced success.

Dulles and Indochina

The Korean truce in 1953 released the French government from its pledge to continue the war in Indochina as long as American forces were fighting in Korea. Ironically,

[3] *See Townsend Hoopes,* The Devil and John Foster Dulles *(Boston: Little Brown, 1973), pp. 128-129. Eisenhower never resolved this issue in his own mind during his eight years as president. He told his successor, John F. Kennedy, that he preferred to leave all options open to him for dealing with the 1960-61 crisis in Laos.*

[4] *Dulles had put Robertson (a conservative Democrat who had served in China) in charge of Far Eastern affairs at the suggestion of members on the congressional "China bloc," with whom Dulles wanted to maintain good relations.*

Secretary Dulles had become more committed to the Indochina war than France was. Dulles deplored the speed with which French leaders made contact with Ho Chi Minh and tried to open negotiations. However, in February 1954, the Big Four foreign ministers agreed (over Dulles's initial objection) to convene a meeting of all the parties to the Indochina and Korean wars, including China.

Meanwhile, the French chose the untenable site of Dien Bien Phu for a climactic battle, which served to dramatize their plight on the eve of the conference.

Dulles sought repeatedly to stave off what he considered a disastrous defeat for the free world by organizing a joint Anglo-American-French commitment to defend Indochina.[5] President Eisenhower ruled that the United States would not intervene without a congressional declaration of war—and then only if Britain would join the effort and if France would grant its Indochinese colonies full independence. France seemed willing to meet the final condition, but neither Congress nor the British government was willing to support Dulles's policy of "united action."

Dulles distinguished himself at Geneva by a public display of rudeness to China's Premier Chou En-lai, with whom he refused even to shake hands. He adopted a generally obstructive attitude, even after a surprisingly lenient agreement emerged that would limit the area of Communist control to North Vietnam and two provinces of Laos. To Eden, Dulles seemed more concerned with playing up to the China bloc in Congress than with helping France extricate herself from a hopeless colonial war. Finally, Eden, Churchill, Eisenhower and Dulles met in Washington and it was arranged that Dulles's deputy, General Walter Bedell Smith, would announce that the United States would not use force to upset the agreements that had been reached.

Quemoy and Matsu

Dulles's approach to China policy remained highly ambiguous, though he seemed to believe until his death that a hard-line position was required by domestic politics and the need for world order. Eisenhower, who might have overruled him on this issue, did not. However, he may have helped prevent the situation from growing worse.

The Geneva conference on Indochina was followed by a series of crises over two small islands, Quemoy and Matsu, located only a few miles from the China mainland. Chiang Kai-shek professed to need the islands for his planned reconquest of China. He occupied the islands, and the Chinese Communists subjected them to periodic artillery barrages. Both sides evidently sought to test Soviet and American willingness to intervene in the western Pacific.

The situation offered a wide range of possibilities. Most of America's allies hoped that Eisenhower would see the futility of giving Chiang further support and that he would opt for normal relations with Peking. Conversely, there was a danger of war between Chinese Communist and American forces if the United States went to extremes in backing the Nationalist position.

Eisenhower decided that the United States would not risk war by using force to protect the offshore islands. This condition was spelled out in a December 1954 defense agreement between the Chinese Nationalist and American governments. The agreement was supplemented by an exchange of notes in which the Nationalists renounced the right to use force (clearly meaning against the China mainland) without US concurrence. Dulles carried out these sensitive negotiations, which sharply limited US military support to Chiang.

Detente with the USSR?

The broadest foreign policy challenge faced by the Eisenhower administration was the rise of Khrushchev and his campaign for "peaceful coexistence" with the West. This coincided with evidence of rapid Soviet military and economic progress. However, like many Americans, Dulles simply refused to acknowledge that the Soviet system might be evolving under new leadership. He discounted Khrushchev's achievements in the domestic sphere, such as the reduction of police terror and a partial success in rationalizing agriculture. To have acknowledged these improvements would have meant, in Dulles's view, conceding that the moral gap between Russia and the United States was narrowing. When Khrushchev began to imitate the American programs of military and economic aid, Dulles condemned as "immoral" the neutralist leaders who accepted aid from both superpowers.

The Soviet government used its growing affluence to attain a rough strategic balance with the United States. Eisenhower and other liberal statesmen of the free world saw this as a potentially hopeful development, since it made the use of strategic nuclear weapons unthinkable. Dulles seemed to disagree. He continued to speak as if it was possible to use America's nuclear arsenal to "roll back" communist territorial gains.

However, Khrushchev had his problems too. His denunciation of Stalin and his modifications of Stalin's domestic and foreign policy led to serious tensions within the Communist world by the end of 1956. Soviet leaders had to cope with dissident students, accept a new Polish government of less certain loyalty to Moscow, and send tanks to suppress a major rebellion in Hungary. The United States made no move to support the Hungarians, thus demonstrating that Dulles's talk of "liberation" was mere rhetoric.

Chinese leaders saw in Khrushchev's policy of "peaceful coexistence" with the West a likelihood of reduced Soviet political and military support for China. This became, in a sense, a self-fulfilling prophecy. It was not long, therefore, before Maoism was being proclaimed in China as the orthodox branch of Leninism, and Moscow and Peking were in open competition for political influence in the Communist "bloc" and in the Third World.

While Dulles persisted in viewing the Communist world as monolithic, Eisenhower was more optimistic about the prospects for Soviet-American détente. He probably sensed that the United States would forfeit much of its remaining world influence unless it explored the possibilities for reducing East-West tensions.

---

[5] *At one stage, Dulles and Admiral Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proposed a US bombing attack against Viet Minh bases near Dien Bien Phu.*

Eisenhower and Dulles at Geneva

In 1955, the British Conservative government proposed an East-West summit conference at Geneva. Eisenhower, over Dulles's objections, agreed to attend. In briefing memoranda prior to the summit, Dulles warned Eisenhower that one of the main reasons the Soviets wanted the meeting was to project the "appearance that the West conceded the Soviet rulers a moral and social equality which will help maintain their satellite rule by disheartening potential resistance." Dulles urged the president to avoid social meetings at Geneva where he would be photographed with the Soviet leaders and to maintain "an austere countenance on occasions where photographing is inevitable."[6]

Despite these warnings, Eisenhower allowed his smile and his basic optimism to shine through in public statements immediately prior to the summit. The reason he was going to Geneva, he announced, was "to change the spirit that has characterized the intergovernmental relationships of the world during the past ten years." This was what most people wanted to hear. Even Dulles was not immune to the natural impulse to look for some easing of world tensions; at the public celebration of the Austrian peace treaty in May 1955, he repeatedly shook hands with Molotov and even embraced him and professed to see in the withdrawal of Soviet occupation troops from Austria "something contagious."

The summit conference at Geneva in July 1955 was the first East-West meeting of the heads of government since the start of the cold war. The agenda items included German reunification and European security, disarmament, and development of East-West contacts. As expected, none of these important issues were resolved. However, the meeting was widely hailed as marking the emergence of Eisenhower and Khrushchev as major statesmen who accepted the balance of power and hoped to reduce world tensions. President Eisenhower surprised his colleagues by proposing an exchange of data on military installations by the major powers. The idea was not pursued at the time, in part because none of the delegations had the necessary technical specialists.

In their public comments on the summit, the Western leaders each struck a positive note, claiming that all the major powers now saw that nuclear war was inconceivable. Only Dulles seemed to concentrate on dampening the euphoria. At a press conference, he said it was "premature" to talk about an "era of good feelings" between East and West.

In a secret cable to American ambassadors abroad, Dulles acknowledged that Geneva had created certain problems for the free world, which had been held together for the past eight years "largely by a cement compounded of fear and a sense of moral superiority." He called the Soviets' peace offensive a tactical maneuver forced upon them by their comparatively weak economic and military position. Although he expressed hope that this Soviet tactic might "assume the force of an irreversible trend," he pointed out that the US government "does not acquiesce in the present power position of the Soviet Union in Europe."

The 1956 Suez Crisis

Ironically, just one year later, Dulles's own maneuvering through the maze of Middle Eastern interests and rivalries placed the United States and the Soviet Union side by side in opposition to Britain, France, and Israel. The 1956 Suez crisis emphasized several points, none of them reassuring from the American standpoint. First, the interests of the United States and those of its major allies were not always the same or easily reconciled. Second, the Soviet Union could and would use military aid (a familiar American device) to extend its influence into strategically important Third World countries. Finally, neutralist leaders such as Nasser saw nothing "immoral" about accepting Soviet aid, and they believed they could do so without opening their countries to Soviet subversion.

In early 1956, Nasser tried to assure his leadership of the Arab world by asking each of the major powers for military aid. All except Russia either stalled or refused him outright. A Soviet-Egyptian arms agreement was then reached. Czechoslovakia was the official supplier, to make the agreement seem less provocative to the West.

On July 19, 1956, Secretary Dulles reacted to Nasser's closer ties with Russia by withdrawing an earlier pledge to help finance the Aswan dam, Egypt's major economic development project. Nasser had hinted that the Soviets were willing to finance the whole Aswan project and that he would accept the Soviet offer unless the United States and Britain increased their contributions. Dulles believed the Soviets would be unable to make good their offer. By withdrawing the American pledge to finance any part of Aswan, he thought that he was calling Moscow's bluff. At the same time, he meant to show neutralist leaders everywhere that "free world" states had first claim on US aid funds.

Nasser responded by nationalizing the Suez Canal, which had been run by an international company. His right to do so was firmly based on international law, provided he allowed all powers equal access to the waterway. However, British, French, and Israeli leaders did not trust Nasser. They secretly planned an attack aimed at wresting the canal from his hands and overthrowing him.

Britain saw this as the key to its continued influence in the region. France believed Nasser's support was keeping alive the Algerian insurrection. Israel sought to cut Egypt's military aid links with Russia. Dulles, unaware of the planned intervention, tried to mediate the Suez Canal dispute, but he found it difficult to conceal his own distrust of Nasser, which undermined whatever credibility his mediation might have had.

In October, Israeli, British and French forces attacked, but they failed to seize the canal before Nasser blocked it by sinking some ships. Dulles intervened and threatened to forbid exports of oil to Britain unless it withdrew its forces. The British were temporarily dependent on oil from America

Continued on page 41

[6] *Dulles's memorandum to Eisenhower, June 18, 1955, contained in the Dulles papers at the Princeton University Library.*

Book Essay

FAST AND LOOSE

Etched in the memory of this reviewer is the time when he was home in Washington on leave in 1975 and visited Um Sim, then the Cambodian ambassador to the United States. This was the time when Phnom Penh was under rocket and artillery attack from the *Khmer Rouge*, and when Congress was about to cut off funds that allowed the United States to help Cambodia in its agony.

Um Sim had been a friend of mine for a long time—ever since I had a role in sending him, then a promising student, to the United States under a Fulbright grant. We talked about what he might say to newspaper and other media people if they asked him to comment on the trials that his country was undergoing. (Little did we know that those trials would pale almost into insignificance compared to the trials Cambodia was to undergo after the *Khmer Rouge* victory.)

I suggested that the ambassador might simply say, as tersely as possible so that it might make a headline: "You got us into this war, we have a right to ask you to help us fight it."

"I can't say that," said Um Sim.

"Why not?"

"Because it wouldn't be true. You didn't get us into the war, we got ourselves into the war. The Communists attacked us long before the United States intervened."

I was ashamed. It is true that I had just left the Far East when it happened, but I thought I had followed the news with regard to Cambodia in April 1970. I remembered the explosions on the campuses, notably at Kent State, in connection with our "invasion" of Cambodia in May, 1970. But I had forgotten the sequence of events. So it is not surprising that most people, in looking back at those tragic events, do not recall their sequence.

But William Shawcross, the author of the bestselling book *Sideshow* (sub-titled "Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia") must know the sequence of events, for he was Indochina correspondent for the London *Sunday Times* during that period. Yet, by an extraordinary sleight of hand, he tries to make the reader believe that the effect was the cause, that the United States "pushed" the Communists from the sanctuaries along the South Vietnamese border into Cambodia itself, toward the capital.

It is as if we were asked to believe that elephant tusks are made out of piano keys. And what is worse, Mr. Shawcross—because of the passionate style of his book, and its seemingly scholarly quality with reference to official documents—is widely accepted as a serious researcher, a man who has come to pass long overdue judgment on the American leadership at the time.

As so often, the passion of an advocate is taken as a sign of his sincerity, of his moral stature. Unfortunately, Mr. Shawcross manipulates the historical facts, banking on the general feeling that things went dreadfully wrong to make readers receptive to the concoctions he has put before them. The simple facts, as reported in the world press at the time, are as follows:

March 11, 1970. Demonstrations against the Vietnamese Communists in Phnom Penh (probably encouraged by the Lon Nol government). Sacking of the North Vietnamese and NLF (Vietcong) embassies.

March 13, 1970. The Lon Nol government issues an ultimatum to the Vietnamese Communists to get out of Cambodia within 48 hours. (That this was a terrible mistake is another matter.)

March 18, 1970. Both houses of the Cambodian parliament vote to depose Prince Sihanouk, who at that time is in Paris.

March 29, 1970. North Vietnamese and Vietcong move out of their sanctuaries and attack *in a westerly direction*, into Cambodia. Within two weeks they capture one-third of Cambodia and threaten the capital, Phnom Penh. Then—*one month after the Vietnamese invasion:*

April 30, 1970. American "invasion" of Cambodia, announced as limited in time and depth of penetration, commences—with the purpose of exploiting the Vietnamese Communist preoccupation with the Cambodians and relieving the pressure on Phnom Penh. The American "invasion" (incursion) was thus a consequence, and could not possibly have been a cause, of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970. And that is why my friend Um Sim, who believes that a diplomat must always say the truth, told me that he could not, in good conscience, claim that the United States had "gotten Cambodia into the war."

Equally etched in my memory is *Operation Vesuvius* to which Shawcross refers in his book. Under an understanding reached between Prince Sihanouk and Chester Bowles, the United States was to provide the Cambodian prince with evidence of the presence of NVA/VC bases *in Cambodian villages*, notably in the so-called Parrot's Beak (Svay Rieng province).

At that time we still entertained some doubts whether Prince Sihanouk knew about the precise locations of the Vietnamese bases in jungle areas along the borders. (Later we obtained, after he had been overthrown, documentary proof that the NVA/VC bases had been supplied by the Cambodian army in Cambodian army trucks, with arms and ammunition brought into the port of Sihanoukville.)

However, the existence of Communist bases in Cambodian villages, such as in the Parrot's Beak area, must obviously have been known not only by Sihanouk but by many other Cambodians. It was the hypocrisy of a policy of offering help to the Vietnamese Communists even while denying that they even were on Cambodian territory, which was among the causes of the revolt against Sihanouk in 1970. For if there is one thing Cambodians fear and detest, it is the encroachment of Vietnamese on their territory—an encroachment which has a centuries-long history.

So it is an irony of history, but also a logical consequence of events, that the first demonstrations on March 11, 1970 against the Vietnamese Communist violation of Cambodian sovereignty, were not in Phnom Penh but precisely in Svay Rieng, where the patience of

---

SIDESHOW—*Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, by William Shawcross. Simon & Schuster, $13.95.*

the people had reached the breaking-point.

But wasn't the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk engineered by the CIA? All I can say, on the basis of my own experience, is that in Saigon I saw all communications having to do with Cambodia, and all of us there were completely taken aback by the news. There had been rumors of a forthcoming revolution, but such rumors had circulated for a long time. And Mr. Shawcross's book, while containing sly insinuations and various tenuous chains of inferences and opinions, is unable to come up with any new evidence, despite its painstaking use of communications released under the Freedom of Information Act. According to Walther von Marschall, the (West) German chargé d'affaires in Phnom Penh at the time,

> Soviet and East German diplomats in Phnom Penh, in private conversations, repeatedly expressed their amusement at this "naive belief" in the omnipotent role of the CIA, but also added that they had of course no reason to rectify such a legend which suited their own ends. (Account published in *The Seaforth Papers*, Imperial Defence College, 1975).

Perhaps the most damning indictment in *Sideshow* is about the "secrecy" and "stealth" with which the United States Government in 1969/1970 bombed Cambodian territory. There is no mystery about that secrecy. As Shawcross himself relates the story—although he claims to find some mysterious elements in it—Prince Sihanouk had told Bowles that if the United States took counter-action against Vietnamese Communists in areas that the Cambodian government did not control (and provided no Cambodians came to harm in the process), he would turn a blind eye to such counter-actions.

This could work, of course, only as along as the bombings were not officially announced. If they were proclaimed to the world, then Prince Sihanouk would have to accuse us publicly of violating the sovereignty of his country. Shawcross makes much of the administration's failure to notify Congress, and this indeed raises constitutional issues of some importance, but it cannot be said that the United States was waging war *against Cambodia* when its B-52s were bombing Vietnamese bases along the Vietnamese border. (Nor can it be said that Cambodia was "neutral" at the time.)

The effectiveness of these and other bombings is another matter. This reviewer has serious doubts whether any amount of bombing alone could have stopped the flow of supplies reaching the NVA/VC—or, indeed, whether any amount of bombing could have saved Phnom Penh in 1975. Bombing results in a favorable ratio in casualties (favorable to the side doing the bombing), but in warfare of the kind that we encountered in Southeast Asia it can be effective only when coupled with determined action on the ground.

In assessing the poor performance of the Cambodian army even when it received American material. Shawcross chooses to overlook that the United States Congress prevented American military officers from performing for the Cambodian army the services that the Vietnamese Communists performed for the *Khmer Rouge*. Pol Pot's men had Vietnamese advice and support in battle from the beginning until they were able to do without it. Cambodia's army was rigorously prohibited by US legislation from receiving advice from American military personnel.

The success of *Sideshow* (and the encomiums it has received from some serious reviewers) is surprising—until one reflects on the heartrending news that is reaching us constantly about the fate of Cambodian refugees. Some people, clearly, must be asking themselves whether by their opposition to any help for the ineffectual Lon Nol they may not have furthered the fortunes of the murderous Pol Pot. It is convenient in such a situation to be able to point to a book and to say, "The present tragedy is all Nixon's and Kissinger's fault. It's proved in that book, and the author has lots of footnotes to show that he dug out the facts."

Selective history is a dangerous business. Mr. Shawcross has fashioned an indictment but not a serious, coherent account of what happened in Cambodia between 1970 and 1975. That book remains to be written.

—Martin F. Herz

Bookshelf

Surrender at Sunrise

Operation Sunrise: *The Secret Surrender, by Bradley Smith and Elena Agarossa. Basic Books, $11.95.*

Twenty years ago the late Allen Dulles, in a best-seller called *The Secret Surrender*, wrote an account of his role as OSS Station Chief in Berne in negotiating the surrender of all German troops in Northern Italy at the close of World War II. The book gave a firsthand rendition of these secret negotiations through the eyes of one of the leading protagonists, and from this standpoint remains unchallenged as to accuracy and authenticity.

It appears, however, that Mr. Dulles left so much of the historical context out of his narrative as to create the impression that he alone was the principal actor and his negotiations the decisive factor in ending the war in southern Europe. A corrective to this one-sided view has now been provided by the authors of *Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender*, and the story that emerges is quite a different one. By examining operational directives and the record of communications between London, Washington, the OSS station in Berne, and allied field headquarters in Caserta, the authors demonstrate that the *Sunrise* surrender negotiations were only a minor part of allied military strategy.

The most interesting revelation is that Dulles and his German opposite number, a sinister SS general named Wolff, developed such a personal stake in the success of the negotiations that at key points they acted as a private "Sunrise club," keeping the reins in their own hands regardless of instructions and the march of events. What this book brings out—and the Dulles books omits—is that the surrender negotiated by Dulles took place in an atmosphere of total German military disintegration. In the end *Sunrise* beat the final Nazi collapse in Europe by only a week.

The defects of this useful historical work are its neglect of the personal factor and an unfortunate tendency to indulge in amateurish and needlessly acerbic criticism of the policy imperfections of the allied high command.

—Charles Maechling, Jr.

Inside Perspectives

GLOBAL CHALLENGES: A WORLD AT RISK. *by Harry Clay Blaney III. New Viewpoints, cloth $12.95, paper $6.95.*

Many Foreign Service officers are prone to prose after they retire, but few manage to publish a book while they are still on duty. Harry Blaney, a former AFSA committee chairman who has spent six years on the Secretary's Policy Planning Staff, has done it.

What Blaney gives us is a highly useful global perspective on our work. The problems of avoiding nuclear catastrophe, protecting the environment, coping with energy supply and demand, ensuring adequate food, minimizing disease, limiting population growth, and using science and technology to advance development, are vital to all of us.

It may even be argued that these issues form the "bottom line" of today's diplomacy, that progress on them constitutes the ultimate objective of all our bilateral and multilateral stratagems. We all face daily crises—some of them real, some bureaucratically manufactured—and they tend to divert us from thought and action on these central problems. We could all use a broadening of our vision, and this book is a helpful reminder of what the ultimate challenges are.

The book is especially valuable in pointing out the interrelationships between fields that bureaucrats tend to address separately. For example, population growth, food production, exploitation of the oceans, water supply, health status and education are all intimately related to each other. We need to find ways to integrate them in national, regional and global development schemes, as well as in our own bureaucratic processes.

To a substantial degree the book presents these issues in a manner that permits the problems to speak for themselves. And so it is unfortunate that it engages in so much off-putting alarmist rhetoric, exaggeration, and exhortation to "Get Out There and Do Something! "The more serious danger is that the world system will experience a catastrophic collapse," Blaney says—whatever that means. "The task is huge but the cost of failure will be far greater." "We need to do better next time or there may not be a next time." "The dark alternative is to watch hopelessly as the world marches each day closer and closer to the increased threat of a nuclear cataclysm." "Above all we need the will and courage to persevere to the end."

Blaney's pessimistic view is that "nationalism, regionalism, tribalism and racism are in the ascendancy," but it can well be argued that the world has never seen a period of more active (and even successful) efforts for multilateral collaboration and diminution of tensions.

He claims that world politics, global institutions and techniques of diplomacy are inadequate to the challenges, but his arguments seem to rest on the assumption that nothing new has happened since World War II. He sees a stagnant world rather than one that is in constant political and institutional change.

Thus, the United Nations system is declared to be of "growing irrelevance" to global problems, when in fact the UN is moving *into* global problem areas at a remarkable pace. It started with nothing. In 1951, the UN system had a budget of only $140 million. Today the budget is $2.5 *billion*, mostly due to a proliferation of new agencies and programs dealing with food, water, deserts, population, the environment, narcotics and many other global issues. Overreaching and underfunding may be legitimate charges against the UN system, but its shortcomings are not due to a lack of trying.

It may well be said that no multilateral institution, national government, or private agency is doing everything it could in the face of growing global challenges. But the fact is that the world has not surrendered. Even Congress may soon permit an energy policy. The outlook is far more optimistic than apocalyptic.

The chief solution proposed in this book is to reshape or re-create international institutions so that they are more responsive to the challenges, or so that (as others may read this) the United States may more frequently get what it wants.

But the specific thrusts seem misdirected. Blaney is disturbed that there is a growing number of mini-states, each with the same voting strength as that of the major powers in the UN General Assembly, and that resulting resolutions are sometimes empty and even preposterous. While that may be true, he has the wrong target. Achieving weighted voting in the Assembly—which would be politically difficult, if not impossible, in any event—need be a goal only for the thinskinned. The real UN action on global problems lies in the secretariats and the specialized agencies, where one-nation/one-vote procedures are not nearly so problematic. In fact, it is often the stinginess of the United States and other industrialized countries—especially in voluntary contributions that are subject to no vote at all—that inhibits the work of these agencies.

Nevertheless, Blaney argues that only countries "prepared to play a constructive role" should be admitted to international organizations: "It makes no sense to include nations in important, even vital, organizations if those governments play either a passive or negative role—despite their great wealth or power." On this basis, he would exclude OPEC countries as well as the Eastern bloc and others "led by the Soviet Union" unless they mended their ways.

Requiring a pledge of allegiance to this book in return for a license to negotiate would seem to be a markedly new form of diplomatic strategy. Certainly it would be a retrogression from an evolving system that concedes no progress may be made unless all nations have a say in decisions that concern them. The world, unfortunately, is made up of foreigners, with differing viewpoints, and we have to deal with them. We are accustomed to seeing proposals like this from ivory-tower academics, but one might have hoped that an inside perspective would give us more than proposals for a new set of Icarian wings.

—NEIL A. BOYER

THE STATE OF STATE *from page 12*

transmission.

Rule #2: Don't try to be funny about solemn events. When our Apollo astronaut clasped hands in space with the Soviet Soyuz cosmonaut, I wired Admiral Gayler (CINCPAC) and Bill Sullivan in Manila—both of whom had great senses of humor:

Fancy our brave Astronaut
In outer space with perils fraught
Was some great peace achievement wrought?
Or did he risk his ass for naught?

That message was not corrupted in transmission, but it was taken by my two friends as an expression of serious concern over the Apollo-Soyuz link-up—and I was on the receiving end of two semi-humorous messages explaining the great significance of this epochal event.

Rule #3: Never make puns to foreigners—puns just don't translate. Also, remember the great cultural gulfs between us and, say, the Japanese.

Bob Hope tells the story of the Japanese who went to the oculist. After the eye examination, the doctor said to the Japanese: "Sir, I think you have a cataract." "Oh, no, doctor," said the Japanese. "I have a Rincoln Continentar." Also, some phrases can be tricky in translation. For example, there was a sign in the old Imperial Hotel in Tokyo during a water shortage. The sign said: "All vegetables served in this hotel have been washed in water personally passed by our Chief Cook."

Rule #4: Do not make jokes or puns about your bosses which might get back to their ears. During the Kissinger-Nixon administration, I described to a class at the National War College Henry's fondness for preserving his options. In fact, I said, that was why he had not yet gotten remarried, because he wanted to preserve his options, and judging from the social columns, some of those options were remarkably well preserved.

Remember all those NSC papers with their options A, B, and C—and how we always ended up with the predetermined option B? Remember all those NSDMs and NSSMs? Which caused me to comment that "the Good Lord in his infinite NSDM would some day take Henry from us, and I was sure we would all NSSM. The Lord giveth and the Lord taketh away, but the Lord always preserveth his options."

I am not sure there is much else I can impart to future generations of FSOs.

Oh, yes, there is one other thing I might mention. Years ago my boss and Yale classmate, Bill Bundy, was assistant secretary of FE, and I was his deputy. His annual efficiency report on me was great, but he ventured one criticism:—"Marshall is not enough of an SOB." Fair enough! I worked hard over the years to correct it: for it is not enough to be an FSO . . . To get ahead in Washington, you've got to be an FSOB.

Before closing, let me point out that I am under strict instructions from Mission Control—my wife, Lisa—not to blow this golden opportunity here today with a lot of lousy puns, but rather to give this glittering assembly, representing the crême de la skimmed crême of our profession, the benefit of my views on what Lars calls the state of State and the Foreign Service.

When I mentioned this possibility to Len Unger (who is my equal in seniority, though he is obviously Unger—and who is about to earn some extra Taipei as a typist at Tufts), Len replied: "Marshall, supposing I were the speaker today, would you want to hear my views?"

"Heavens, no," I said. So that settled that.

Thus, you will not get to hear my views about how our diplomacy must concern itself far more with the human condition—especially the rapidly growing fetid, pullulating slum areas of overcrowded cities, a major breeding ground of tomorrow's turbulence and instability.

Nor, will you get to hear my views about State Department reorganization, grievance boards, the preparation of efficiency reports, and mandatory retirement at 60 for FSOs in contrast to retirement at 70 for the Civil Service and at God knows what age for the Supreme Court that handed down this decision, 8-1.

Yet, it is these things I just mentioned that made retirement from the Service such an agreeable experience.

And for that I am deeply grateful.

Moving to the Washington, D.C. Area?

Our Relocation Services Are Just For You!

Whether you're buying or renting, TOWN AND COUNTRY REALTORS has the most up to date information on all desirable areas, prices, taxes, financing, local schools and recreational facilities in northern Virginia, Maryland, and D.C.

Town and Country is one of the largest general brokerage real estate firms in the area and has complete rental and sales listings. For immediate assistance call collect or write:

P.O. Box 567
Merrifield, Va. 22116

Town & Country REALTORS®

Call Fran Hudson or Betty Olen
VA. Relocation Div. 703-573-9370

or Call Pat Baughman
MD & D.C. Relocation 301-468-2112

The Book Annex/Record & Tape, Ltd.

"Complete Discount Book and Record Stores"

"In years of buying records, I have found Record & Tape, Ltd. to be the most satisfying record store in the Washington area."—Forecast, Jan. 1979

"Overall, the best stock can be found at The Book Annex."
—The Washingtonian, April 1978

Mail Orders: 1219 Wisconsin Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C. 20007

GEORGETOWN
1239 Wisconsin Ave., NW
Mon-Thurs 10-10
Fri-Sat 10-mid, Sun 12-6
338-9544

DOWNTOWN
19th and L Streets, NW
Mon-Sat 9:30-6:30
296-1296

Mastercharge • Visa • Central Charge • NAC

MARTIN HERZ TESTIFIES ON SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE

Retired Ambassador Martin F. Herz, now professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service, testified before the Joint Subcommittee of the House of Representatives on September 7, with regard to the proposed Foreign Service Act of 1979.

Stressing that he spoke for no one but himself, Ambassador Herz said, however, that his views coincided with those of a number of senior officers of the Foreign Service who were still on active duty. His concern with the proposed Act was with the provision for limited appointments to the Senior Foreign Service. In elaborating on this concern, he said, "I have seen loyal Foreign Service officers, who had been cleared again and again and again by the most rigorous security procedures, dismissed from the Service because the Secretary of State, and those whom he had brought into the Department with him, did not share their views and their outlook.

"You may say that McCarthy was an isolated phenomenon that is not likely to be repeated. To this I would reply that it is a misreading of history to associate McCarthyism with only one man. There were a number of senators and representatives who shared his attitudes and who outlived him and who continued to do damage to the Service and whose views were given very much weight in the Executive Branch."

Calling on his recollections of over 32 years in the Service, Ambassador Herz remarked that both the Kennedy and Nixon administrations had distrusted the views of the professionals and that one Secretary of State had called for "positive loyalty," which "others would call conformity."

He said, "I believe that Section 602, which makes retention in the Senior Foreign Service a matter of the Secretary's appreciation of the 'needs of the Service to plan for the continuing admission of new members' and Section 641, which allows the Secretary, by regulation, 'to increase or decrease such maximum time for a class . . . as the needs of the Service may require' opens the way to mass dismissals of Senior Foreign Service officers by some new administration that might be convinced that they all 'lost China' or 'lost Africa' or were 'pinks' or 'fascists.' "

In closing, Herz said, "My career in the Foreign Service is behind me. It has been a good career. I think today's Service is excellent and should be protected against some future ravages by irresponsible politicians. If my testimony has sensitized you to that danger, if I have been able to point out that the danger is not fanciful, then I have, perhaps, rendered a service not only to your subcommittee but also to the Foreign Service that I love, including the younger officers who may be inclined to worry about testimony such as mine because it tends to be in favor of lengthening the escalator to the guillotine."

Flags Galore

P.O. Box 10014 • Rochester, N.Y. 14610

DESK & GIFT SETS
- "Flags of Our Country" Set
  10 US Historic Flags - 4"×6" - Ebonized Wood Base
  Attractively Boxed ($15.00)
- 50 US States Flag Set
  4"×6" Flags ($50.00) Wood Base ($37.50)
- OAS Flag Set
  28 Flags 4"×6" ($26.50) Fan-Shaped Wood Base ($15.00)
- UN Flag Set
  151 Flags 4"×6" ($127.50) Blue Wood Base ($67.00)
- Armed Forces Flag Set
  6 Flags - Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps & US 4"×6" Fringed Flags and Wood Base ($12.00)

Free 16-page Colored Catalog on FULL-SIZED FLAGS
US ★ STATES ★ INTERNATIONAL
★ HISTORICAL ★ MARINE
★ POLES & ACCESSORIES

Tucson, Arizona!

Outstanding retirement or investment properties—town or country, mountains to lush desert

Walter "Stoney" Stoneman and Jack Murtha (FSR's-Retired) are Associate Realtors with Roy H. Long Realty Co., one of Tucson's leading real estate firms since 1926 which now has eight offices serving greater Tucson.

Give us your likes and price range by mail or phone collect and let us send you information on residences, acreages, taxes, financing, schools, recreational and cultural facilities, growth trends, Foreign Service retirees and their activities, etc.

Roy H. Long Realty Co.
ATTN: Stoneman/Murtha
252 W. Ina Rd., Tucson, Arizona 85704
Tel: (602) 297-1186



Stoney

ROY H. LONG realty co.

DATSUN Triumph VW VOLVO DATSUN FIAT BMW ALFA MG MERCEDES MG MERCEDES

FREE Master Catalog!

All leading foreign cars, U.S. Fords, Vans, cycles delivered **STATESIDE** or in **EUROPE** at special **FACTORY** prices. We arrange every detail, send for our free 40 page catalog today.

Name ____________

Social Security # ____________

Address ____________

☐ States Delivery ☐ European Delivery

Date of Rotation ____________

NEMET AUTO INTERNATIONAL FSJ1079
153-03 Hillside Ave., Jamaica, N.Y. 11432
Tel: (212) 523-5858

LETTER FROM SHANGHAI

From page 11

mountain open with his ax. A marvelous evening, only slightly marred by guide's whispered questions, as he read from the English synopsis, his pen poised. What does "crazy" mean? "Fog?" "Scarf?" "Classical?" *How* do you define *that* word?

Thursday

Odette not feeling very well because of bad cold. Bought some Chinese medication containing rhinoceros horn, toad cake, bear gall, borax and ground pearl. We are still not sure whether these pellets cured her. The rest of us were driven to the Shanghai Industrial Exhibition, a permanent fair located in the former Sino-Soviet Friendship Palace. This Stalinesque structure, with its wedding cake towers and high interior ceilings, recalls Moscow architecture and Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science, also a gift of the Soviet Union, which dominates that capital. I was reminded of the Warsaw joke. Question: Where is the best view of the city? Answer: From the top of the Palace of Culture, because from there you can't see the Palace of Culture. Coincidentally, there were Eastern Europeans, Poles I believe, in one of the large courtyards, supervising the uncrating of imported bulldozers.

Our Thai colleagues were not particularly interested in the light and heavy industry exhibits: turbines, presses, lathes. I too had not expected or wanted to see in Shanghai a "high speed double lift automatic Jacquard loom." But there one sat, clacking away. In the vehicle section stood a 32 ton mine dump truck and assorted cars, trucks and forklifts. There were no prices listed for cars because there are none for sale to individuals. Plenty of consumer products on display—from thermos bottles (hot water for the ever-present tea), radios, watches, and bicycles. The bicycle, I should note, is China's main form of transportation—certainly the most numerous. Peking, with a population of eight million, is said to have two million bicycles and driving through the streets of Peking later in the tour we must have encountered half of them. Another traffic characteristic: Drivers are obsessed with horn blowing, whether another vehicle is approaching or not. The din is constant and nerve-racking.

Shanghai is no longer lurid and swinging (the Race Track is now Peoples Square), but compared to other Chinese metropolitan areas, this huge port city is more cosmopolitan, retaining traces and remnants of its colorful past. Today there is not a beggar to be seen on the streets, nor for that matter, a dog or a cat or a bird. The leaves from the sycamore trees, when they drop, are quickly swept up. The people, however, remain, millions of them—the debate continues whether there are one billion or a mere 900,000,000 in China. One's lasting impression is of people—and more people.

After lunch we boarded our train at the main Shanghai railway station. At 1:45 it began moving northward toward Changchow, Nanking and Peking. We settled in our white-covered seats and reached for our cups of tea.

BART N. STEPHENS

WHY WAIT?
Join DACOR *Now*

Diplomatic & Consular Officers, Retired—known as Dacor, Inc.—*also* welcomes active officers as well as retired FSOs, FSROs, FSIOs and FSSOs. Modest dues. Interesting Bulletin. Group insurance. Other beneficial features.

Members may stay at Dacor House while on leave or consultation. May apply for club membership in Dacor House. Excellent meals. Reasonable rates. Club rooms for entertaining.

For further details drop a line or phone
DACOR, INC.
1718 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006
(202) 298-7848

MOBILE UNITS
DELIVER HEALTH & EDUCATIONAL SERVICES TO THOSE WHO NEED THEM MOST.

One of many medical units delivered to over 94 countries in Medical Coaches' 25 years.

Custom built units include:
ambulances • audiovisual • medical • x-ray • dental • education • blood • military • labs • mobile hospitals • audiometric.



Mobile dental clinic reflecting the quality that has earned Medical Coaches the reputation as one of the world's finest specialized vehicle manufacturers.

MEDICAL COACHES INCORPORATED
MEDICOACH
HEMLOCK RD., ONEONTA, N.Y. 13820
TEL. AC 607-432-1333 • TWX 510-241-8294

RIVERSIDE TOWERS
Apartment-Hotel
Washington, D.C.

PROUDLY BEARING A TRADITION OF DISTINCTION IN SERVICE TO WORLD TRAVELERS

—EXQUISITE—
Seventy-two suites, studios and efficiencies, elegantly decorated, all apartment facilities, color television, maid service, fully air conditioned.

—CONVENIENT—
A superb location, directly opposite the State Department and amid the centers of business, culture and government.

—ECONOMICAL—
Less expensive than most conventional hotel rates offered for the same daily, weekly, and monthly rental plans.

A unique concept in furnished apartment-hotel accommodations designed to meet apartment requirements. Our congenial staff creates a warm, friendly atmosphere.

As a guest of Riverside Towers Apartment-Hotel, special privileges are extended to you at Wayside Inn Since 1797, Battlefield Crystal Caverns and the GAFIA Lodge Recreational Complex in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley.

For Reservations Contact:
RESIDENT MANAGER
RIVERSIDE TOWERS APARTMENT-HOTEL
2201 Virginia Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20037
Phone (202)452-4600 Cable: RIVERSIDE

UNRAVELING A MYSTERY

from page 19

A-bomb victims in Hiroshima. The document was undoubtedly given to American authorities, but both the archives and the Pentagon disclaim any knowledge of it. It is just one of many records on the A-bomb victims that American authorities lost or disposed of over the years.

For the Japanese, the effort at a cover-up of these atrocities partly failed. Other evidence allowed the International Military Tribunal of the Far East to convict and sentence 23 people connected with the experiments.

Shinichi Fukui, a 75-year-old farmer and a former army officer, was one of the two Japanese soldiers who recently revealed the attempted cover-up. He had served as an interrogator of American prisoners at Hiroshima. Immediately after the war, when a Swiss diplomat visited Hiroshima to investigate the American victims of the atomic bomb, Fukui was shunted to a different assignment, because, as he was later told, his superiors feared that he might give information that would undermine the cover-up of atrocities. Ironically, because the Americans seem conveniently to have lost or misplaced the list, it did not help the Japanese in their cover-up.

Conclusions

In summary, why didn't the War Department in 1945 or early 1946 publicly report the evidence that some American POWs had been victims of the first A-bomb? The evidence gathered by the Red Cross and the Sixth Army in September and October 1945, while incomplete, seemed firm enough. Was there simply bureaucratic error? Put simply, was this evidence lost or accidentally forgotten? That genial interpretation is difficult to accept. More likely, the military preferred to suppress the evidence and thus to protect the reputations of decision-makers and to block any moral doubts in America about the combat use of the atomic bomb. Such an interpretation, obviously, cannot be proved without documentation, and the problem is to explain the loss of many documents and the disregard of others. In such a case, analysis must rest ultimately upon a notion of reasonable inference: There was no incentive to reveal the evidence and considerable advantage in not revealing it.

On August 6, 1945, there were prisoners of war in Hiroshima, and at least 11 and maybe 23 Americans died from the first atomic bombing. Over the years, Hiroshima city officials have asked the American government for the names of the victims. One mayor promised to ask the Hiroshima municipal assembly "to take steps to enable us to enshrine them in the cenotaph in our Peace Park." In time, then, if the United States government officially provides the names of those POWs who were killed by the bomb, they may join the thousands of Japanese memorialized in the cenotaph, which offers these words:

Rest in Peace, The Mistake Shall Not Be Repeated

AUTHORIZED EXPORTER

Refrigerators • Freezers • Ranges
Washers • Dryers • Air Conditioners
Dishwashers • Radios • Phonos
Small Appliances
Available for All Electric Currents
Local Warehousing for Immediate Shipment

General Electronics, Inc.

SHOWROOM: 4513 Wisconsin Ave., Washington, D. C. 20016 EMerson 2-8300

WRITE FOR CATALOG. Our catalog is sent to administrative officers embassies and consulates throughout the world.

BUY
SELL
INVEST

Ed Joyce
Retired FSIO
LICENSED IN VIRGINIA, D.C., MARYLAND

MOUNT VERNON REALTY INC.

6257 Old Dominion Dr.
McLean, Va. 22101
Off: 821-8300
Res: 821-2109

ATTENTION:
State Department and Foreign Service Personnel

Riverside Liquors

Our 50th Year

2123 E Street, N.W. At Va. Ave.
(conveniently located across from the State Department on E Street, next to Peoples Drug Store)

5% off on regular low prices on liquor and wines; also ask about our case prices

Wide variety of Domestic and Imported BEERS ★ WINES ★ CHAMPAGNE Complete Selection of Whiskeys and liquor

338-4882

Liquor Discounts

Customer Parking at Gulf Station 22nd & Va. Ave.

JOHN FOSTER DULLES

from page 33

to replace Middle Eastern sources that were closed to them.

Thus, the US action was decisive in ending the short war. However, the United States gained little political credit to offset this severe blow to three important allies. Khrushchev reaped a great propaganda victory in Afro-Asian countries by threatening Britain, France, and Israel with rocket attacks unless they withdrew their forces—after they had already decided to do so.

The American Leadership Crisis

The Suez fiasco was symptomatic of America's weakening foreign policy leadership in the late 1950s. Stalin's ruthlessness had made him the ideal enemy against whom to mobilize the free world. Dulles found it extremely difficult to adapt to the more subtle challenges of Khrushchev.

In retrospect, the Eisenhower administration's most creative step in foreign affairs may have been its participation in the 1955 Geneva conference. This opened the way to further relaxation of cold war tensions. However, President Eisenhower suffered his first heart attack in September 1955; after he recovered, he was inclined to leave the conduct of foreign affairs even more to others.

Dulles served as the active manager of US foreign policy until shortly before he died from cancer in May 1959. (Dulles suffered his first attack of cancer, and was partially cured, shortly after the Suez crisis in 1956.) During these years, he exercised his gift for tactical maneuver, improvising a series of separate responses to crises but seldom seizing the initiative or setting in motion any long-range policies. More and more, his purpose seemed to be to maintain close relations with America's allies and client states that ringed the Sino-Soviet bloc. Dulles ignored the increasing groundswell of criticism, at home and abroad, of his hostile attitude toward China and Russia. In the eyes of a growing number of people, the onus for continuing cold war tensions lay mainly with the United States.

Dulles had two main strengths as a diplomat. He exercised close control over the whole range of US agencies engaged in foreign affairs, and he sometimes displayed great skill at hedging his commitments. After Dulles's death, no one asserted the same type of control over US foreign policy for about three years, until the Kennedy administration passed through the fires of the Cuban missile crisis.

Eisenhower and Dulles proved to be a remarkably effective team—even after ill health struck them both. Ike set the broad limits of continuity and change in US policy—sometimes but by no means always rejecting his secretary's judgment. Dulles knew how to extract the last ounce of cooperation from the "primitives" in Congress and from the growing ranks of US client states abroad. Yet in his final years, he was crippled not only by cancer but also by his inability to deal as effectively with our major allies, who had regained their prewar strength and self-confidence.

NOW FROM COLUMBIA PLAZA PHARMACY
516 23rd St., N.W. • Washington, D.C. 20037

Sensational SPECIAL-BY-MAIL SALE
Order Any Time and SAVE 20%
on All Merchandise

Send No Money
Pay only after receipt of your order

The only drug store your family will ever need
DEPEND ON US! *Fast Service!*
Telephone: 331-5800

D.C. Living — Intown Investments

For The Latest Statistical Data On
Which Areas Of D.C. Are Appreciating
The Fastest, Write:

CRANFORD & ASSOCIATES, INC.
530 8th Street, S.E. • Washington, D.C. 20003
(202) 547-9400

Specialists In D.C. Investment And Residential Property

Your Name ______
Address ______
______ Phone # ______

serving members in "money" ways . . .

WEST COAST
PARIS
LONDON
BONN
MOSCOW
NEW DELHI
TOKYO
across the nation . . .
around the world . . .
WASHINGTON
CAIRO
HONG KONG

YOU CAN COUNT ON US FOR MONEY ANSWERS!

STATE DEPARTMENT FEDERAL CREDIT UNION
2020 North 14th St.
Arlington,
Virginia 22201
(703) 558-8000

MOST POETIC NEGOTIATION

from page 29

more wit and distinction:

There was a smart lawyer named Rex
With a minuscule organ of sex.
When charged with exposure
He replied with composure,
"*De minimis non curat lex.*"

For those who have forgotten or were never subjected to Latin, the translation is: "The law is not concerned with trifles," an ancient legal doctrine that keeps $1.98 damage claims out of court.

The interplay of languages is always a source of high satisfaction for a limerick maker. So, when we were working out new compositions, I was happy to stumble on the inspiration to construct this one:

A timid young man from Versailles
Was told he should learn how to flailles.
But after five or six drhinx
And as stoned as the Sphinx,
He decided he didn't dare trailles.

Our joint efforts were soon directed at the treaty itself. Since its negotiation under the shadow of the Adenauer-Dulles deadline was not exactly a pleasure, we wrote:

We were told to *mach* very *schnell*:
To be late was to court bloody hell.
So we raced through the text
With not time to be vexed
That the words we put down didn't jell.

After finishing with the general ambience of the negotiations, we moved on to the individual parts of the Treaty. Here is our first shot:

We composed an Article One
In a carefree spirit of fun.
But when we reflected
On what was expected,
Our Article One was undone.

Later we put together this commentary on a convivial interlude:

There was an Article *Acht*
That we wrote in the dead of the *nacht*.
We saw the next morn
That our product was corn,
Distilled by two fellows half cracht.

Those verses and others like them were not too bad, considering the circumstances, but none of them had the mark of a candidate for the Limerick Hall of Fame. Up to the very end of the negotiations, we faced the challenge to produce a truly memorable five-liner. I, as the host, felt it most keenly. Could one of us, under pressure, create a limerick whose stature would measure up to the importance of the occasion? I cannot remember how many wastebaskets I filled before I said, "By George, I've got it!" (Some years later, Alan Jay Lerner stole that line for Rex Harrison.) And what I got, from what font of poesy one never knows, was this:

There was a young cook from LaGrange
Whose habits were nothing but strange.
Though most cooks desire
On a bed to retire,
This cook was at home on the range.

Yes, our two guests thought that one was worth coming to Washington for.

On the following day—October 29, 1954—the great men met, the pictures were taken, and the treaty was signed. It has lived happily ever after in the public prints. Until this writing, our cook from LaGrange has had to live quietly in a few memories. Now she belongs to posterity.

STUART & MAURY, Inc.
REALTORS
Specializing in Residential Sales and Rentals
Member Montgomery County and D.C. Multiple Listing
CHEVY CHASE, D.C. 20016
5010 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
(202) 244-1000
POTOMAC, MD. 20854
10220 River Road
(301) 983-0240

SHOP IN AN AMERICAN DRUG STORE BY MAIL!
An ice cream soda is one of the few items we cannot mail. Drugs, cosmetics, sundries mailed to every country in the world. We maintain permanent family prescription records. SEND NO MONEY—pay only after satisfactory receipt of order.



Western Pharmacy, Inc.
t/a Morgan Pharmacy
3001 P Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Graninger Realty Inc.
Main Office: 919 N. Kenmore Street (at Wilson Blvd.)
Arlington, VA. 22201 Phone: 703-528-5300
Offices in
Arlington, Woodbridge & Stafford Co., Va.
Large Enough to Serve You
Small Enough to Know You
Sales, Rentals & Property Management

NEED WHEELS IN WASHINGTON?
Let our diplomatic discount serve your weekly or monthly need for temporary transportation.
We rent all size cars, from subcompacts to station wagons. 15 passenger vans and trucks also available.
Write or call for advance information.
AMERICAN INTERNATIONAL RENT-A-CAR®
2804 Jefferson Davis Hwy.
Arlington, Va. 22202
Tel. (703) 684-4087
TLX 73-0715

We feature FORD and other fine cars.
In Europe and the Mediterranean look for

ESSENCE OF THE DEBATE
from page 16
the MIRV or multiple-warhead system for individual missiles, there seemed to be little strategic logic or necessity in going the route of the heavy missile. (It might be noted here that doubling the accuracy of a missile results in an eight-fold increase in the warhead's destructive power—reason enough for the United States in an earlier period to choose the course it did.) The Soviets on the other hand lagged behind in the relevant technological arts, and to compensate chose to emphasize heavy missile construction. Now it is true, in terms both of MIRV technology and increasing rates of accuracy, the Soviets have made considerable strides in recent years and this ought to be a matter of concern. The point, however, is—a treaty signed in 1979 could hardly be calculated to induce the Soviets to abandon or cut back significantly a crucial weapons program they felt compelled to adopt some years ago as a response to perceived American advantages.

To return to the initial focus of this article: explaining SALT II and its difficulties to foreign audiences. I discussed earlier some of the impressions I received from these sessions. One I haven't touched on is that almost every question I received about SALT expressed some bewilderment as to whether the United States government was actually capable of carrying on a coherent foreign policy in an area as important as arms control. There were expressions of amazement that the SALT negotiation process, which extends back to the last years of the Johnson administration and has involved the commitment of three other administrations since then, could now be short-circuited by a minority of thirty-four Senators. SALT II itself involved seven years of negotiation: the question is whether all this will prove simply to have been wasted effort. The broader foreign policy implications of a rejection of SALT II by the Senate, not just with respect to strategic arms but in terms of how American policy is formulated, ought in fact to be a matter for somber reflection, not just by our friends overseas but by Americans themselves. Now whether the two-thirds requirement for Senate ratification of treaties is in itself defensible, or perhaps ought to be altered, is a sticky issue. Certainly it does act as a potential safeguard against an administration which might be tempted to take risks with basic American interests. The history of treaty-making by the executive, however, seems to demonstrate this has hardly been the area in which their mistakes have been concentrated. It is and has been quite possible for an American president to involve the United States in a disastrous undertaking without reference to the treaty process (Vietnam once again stands as the best example). The point, however, is we seem to be at a critical crossroads as far as the president's ability to make foreign policy is concerned. The Constitution does assign him primary responsibility for that task. The fate of SALT II in the Senate may go a long way toward determining whether that power is reaffirmed or fundamentally eroded.

Service·Concern·Dependability

A. C. Houghton & Son, Inc.

REALTORS

IN THE FAMILY FOR 70 YEARS

Sales and Rentals in Northwest Washington, Chevy Chase, Bethesda, Potomac

4000 Albemarle St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016 — 686-5800
6400 Goldsboro Road, Bethesda, Md. 20034 — 320-5700

MOUNT VERNON REALTY INC.

Write for free information on taxes, schools, metro system, financing, and pictures of houses currently on the market. (Let me know your likes, dislikes, and price range.)

Also let me know if you need reservations for temporary housing.

ANNE GOMEZ
Someone who knows your needs.

Write: MOUNT VERNON REALTY INC.
Attn: Anne Gomez
8137 Leesburg Pike
Vienna, Virginia 22180
Tel: (703) 893-2510

Copenhaver

Fine Stationers and Engravers

Members of the Foreign Service of the United States of America can depend on *Copenhaver* for quality, service and correct counseling on questions of protocol for their calling cards, informals and invitations, etc.

Urgent requests filled promptly

ADams 2-1200
Connecticut Avenue Courtesy Parking

1625 CONNECTICUT AVE.
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20009

SALZBURG INTERNATIONAL PREPARATORY SCHOOL

A selective co-ed boarding school in Europe's most beautiful city.

* Grades 9 to 12. American curriculum & textbooks.
* High academic standards. Thorough preparation for entry into U.S. universities.
* College Boards & Advanced Placement Tests.
* Politically stable environment.
* Extensive travel, skiing and cultural programs.

For catalog please write: Admissions Department, S.I.P.S., Moosstrasse 106, A-5020 Salzburg, Austria

MR. BLACK GETS THE SACK

from page 28

Black and Company. The opening of the Suez Canal the year of her husband's death made the Galle harbor even more important, as the number of steamers entering the port rose from 58 in 1869 to 110 in 1871.

Displaying keen business acumen, Mrs. Black took full advantage of this increased shipping to develop her company into a highly successful coal supplier, ship chandlery and mercantile house. She was assisted by her son, John Reddie Black, who became a member of the Galle municipal council and married the daughter of Sir James Douglass, the well known engineer who designed the Eddystone Lighthouse. Completion of a new breakwater and harbor at Colombo in 1884 marked the end of Galle's position as the island's leading port but there was still enough mercantile business to ensure the Black firm's continued success.

John Black's widow outlived him by 36 years and when she died in

1905 at age 83, the oldest European resident in Galle, she was a wealthy woman, prominent landowner and benefactress of the All Saints Church and various charitable organizations. "Mrs. Black was possessed of remarkable business capacity," wrote the *Times of Ceylon*, "and the affairs of the firm were managed with the utmost skill up to the last. She was loved and respected by every European resident in the place and was held in the highest esteem by the Ceylonese community."



Mrs. Black was buried next to her husband in the Episcopal cemetery and today's visitors to the All Saints Church will find a large stained glass window dedicated by their children "To the glory of God and in memory of John Black and Isabel Swinburn Darling, his wife."



REAL ESTATE

Specialists in

TOWN HOUSES

CAPITOL HILL • GEORGETOWN
FOGGY BOTTOM • MT. PLEASANT

202-546-2676

RHEA RADIN, Inc.
REALTOR
220 SEVENTH ST., S.E.

COMING or GOING
You can count on
PERSONALIZED SERVICE
from
W. C. AND A. N. MILLER
DEVELOPMENT CO.
A Complete Real Estate Service Since 1912
NEW HOUSE SALES • BROKERAGE SALES
RENTALS
4701 Sangamore Road, Washington, D. C. 20016
Phone 229-4000 Phone 229-4016

ejf
EDMUND J. FLYNN COMPANY
Condominium and Cooperative Specialists Since 1920

- Carefree home ownership while you are here
- Expert rental service while you are overseas
- Competence and service in Washington for 59 years

Harold O. Wright, FSIO-Ret. — Sales Specialist
Rita Shutta — Rental Specialist

3408 WISCONSIN AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20016 ■ PHONE 202-537-1800

1980-1981 AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS AND OTHER SCHOLARSHIPS FOR F.S. JUNIORS

Applications will be available in November for the 1980 AFSA Merit Awards Program for 12th (and graduating 11th) grade high school and preparatory school students and for the 1980-1981 AFSA Financial Aid Program for college and university undergraduate study.

AFSA also has a very limited number of scholarships which may, under special circumstances, be awarded to secondary school students in need of financial aid.

For applications and information, write now to the AFSA Committee on Education, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, DC 20037. The deadline for completion of the application is February 15, 1980.

OTHER SCHOLARSHIPS AVAILABLE TO FOREIGN SERVICE CHILDREN

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to children of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information to the schools, colleges and universities indicated:

Castilleja School, Palo Alto, California. Scholarships are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas who are registered at Castilleja School for admission to grades 7 to 12, inclusive. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Castilleja School, 1310 Bryant St., Palo Alto, California 94301.

Dartmouth College: S. Pinkney Tuck Scholarship. For students at Dartmouth College who are the children or grandchildren of Foreign Service officers of the United States and who are in need of financial assistance. Address inquiry to the Director of Financial Aid, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

Middlesex School Scholarship: Offered on a competitive basis for Grades 9 through 12 to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service family. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Middlesex School, Concord, Massachusetts 01742.

The Hall School: For the daughters of Foreign Service Personnel, a $1,475 tuition reduction is available. Formerly known as Miss Hall's, the School enrolls 160 students from grades 9 through 12. This reduction is offered in recognition of higher travel costs and represents 25% of the total tuition cost for 1980/81. For further information, contact Mr. Diederik van Renesse, Director of Admissions, The Hall School, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201.

The New Hampton School: Offers a $1000 abatement on tuition to foreign service boys and girls. The school enrolls approximately 225 students in grades nine through postgraduate. For further information write to Mr. Austin C. Stern, Director of Admissions, The New Hampton School, New Hampton, New Hampshire 03256.

Northfield Mount Hermon School: A $1,000 reduction in tuition is offered all sons and daughters of US State Department personnel stationed overseas in grades 9 through 12. This reduction is afforded in recognition of the higher travel cost experienced by such personnel. Additional financial aid is available on the basis of need. At present students from 40 states and 40 countries are enrolled. For further information contact Adrienne Carr, Northfield Mount Hermon School, Northfield, Massachusetts 01360.

Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts. The Charles and Jane Stelle Memorial Scholarship awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service person. The award is based on financial need. For further information, and to apply for this scholarship, write to Mr. Joshua L. Miner, Director of Admissions/Mr. Richard Griggs, Director of Financial Aid, Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts 01810.

St. Andrew's School: Middletown, Delaware. The Norris S. Haselton Scholarships are awarded to sons and daughters of Foreign Service families where need is indicated. For complete information write John M. Niles, Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware 19709.

The Shipley School: Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania. In addition to the regular financial aid program, the Trustees of The Shipley School announce a $1,000 scholarship for daughters (entering grades 8-12 and a new postgraduate program) of officers of the American Foreign Service or of US Military & Government personnel serving overseas. Grants are based on need, as computed by the Educational Testing Service in Princeton, New Jersey. For further information, contact Mrs. Joseph N. Ewing, Jr., Director of Admissions, The Shipley School, Bryn Mawr, Pennsylvania 19010.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukens Memorial Scholarship is awarded at Vassar to children of Foreign Service personnel. Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the child of an American Foreign Service Officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the child of an employee of the Federal Government or of a State Government. Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Vermont Academy: An Edward R. Cheney Memorial Scholarship is being awarded at Vermont Academy to the son of a Foreign Service person. Those interested in applying should write to the Director of Admissions, Vermont Academy, Saxtons River, Vt. 05154. The Academy enrolls approximately 220 students in grades nine through postgraduate; girls, day students only.

Yale University Scholarship: A scholarship given by an anonymous donor is awarded each year to the son of an American Foreign Service Officer who demonstrates financial need. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the son of a member of the United States Military Services, or of an employee of the Federal Government. Complete information is obtainable from the Director of Financial Aid, Box 2170 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

Westover School: Middlebury, Connecticut: Generous financial aid and scholarship awards for grades 9 through 12 are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service Agencies or of US Military personnel serving overseas. Write Director of Admissions, Westover School, Middlebury, Connecticut 06762.

Dana Hall School is accepting applications from ninth grade girls who wish to compete for the Congdon Merit Scholarship, awarded on a competition basis to an entering sophomore resident student. In addition to the $1,000 prize, the winner is eligible for financial aid up to full tuition when warranted. Applications must be completed by February 1, 1980. Inquiries should be addressed to: The Congdon Prize Scholarship, Dana Hall School, Wellesley, Mass. 02181.

Foreign Service People

Births

Boyer. A daughter, Sabrina Nicole, born to *Journal* Editorial Board member Neil A. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer, on August 23, in Washington.

O'Neill. A son, Kevin Michael, born to FSO and Mrs. Joseph P. O'Neill on July 29, in Lisbon.

Deaths

Coleman. Aaron R. Coleman, FSO-retired, died on August 10, in Seattle. Mr. Coleman joined the Department of State in 1945 and entered on duty with the Foreign Service in 1954, serving at Hong Kong, Munich, Frankfurt, Bonn, Paris and Vancouver before his retirement in 1970. He is survived by his wife, Hope V. Coleman, 10041 Lake Shore Blvd., N.E., Seattle, Washington 98125, and four sons, Robert, William A., Thomas S. and Erin M.

Crawford. Barbara Gardner Crawford, wife of retired Ambassador William A. Crawford, died on September 12 in Bethesda. Mrs. Crawford accompanied her husband on assignments to Havana, Moscow, Prague, Paris and Bucharest. During this time she graduated from the Cordon Bleu Academy in Paris. She was an accredited laymember of the National Guild of Decoupeurs and a member of the Westmoreland Hills Garden Club. In addition to her husband of 4402 Boxwood Road, Overlook, Washington, D.C. 20016, she is survived by five children, Barbara C. Mulligan of Hanover, N.H., Pauline C. Blume of Louisville, Ky., William H. Crawford of Arlington, John K. Crawford of Chevy Chase and Elizabeth Crawford of Amherst, Mass., four grandchildren and a sister, Elizabeth DuBarry of Bryn Mawr. Memorial contributions may be made to the DACOR Educational and Welfare Fund, 1718 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006.

Denman. Vernita C. Denman, wife of FSO David C. Denman, died on September 8, in Washington. In addition to her husband, of 5300 Columbia Pike, Arlington, Va. 22204, she is survived by two daughters, Diane Carol and Vicki Mae, two sons, Mark Lee and Kevin Michael, and two brothers. Expressions of sympathy may take the form of contributions to the Washington Home Hospice Association, 3720 Upton Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Park. Nelson R. Park, FSO-retired, died on July 20, at the Winter Park Memorial Hospital. Mr. Park joined the Foreign Service after serving in the Army in World War I. He served in Bolivia and Guatemala before becoming one of the original Foreign Service officers in 1924 and then served in Honduras, Mexico, Colombia, Spain and Jamaica before retiring in 1950. He is survived by his wife, Grace Coleman Park, Apt. 832, 1111 South Lakemont Ave., Winter Park, Fla. 32792, a brother, a nephew and two nieces.

SECOND CAREERS

Hugh S. Fullerton, Career Minister retired, wrote the *Journal* a long and interesting letter about his second career as Executive Governor of the American Hospital in Paris. (He entered the Foreign Service in 1923 and retired in 1949.) During his 20 years at the hospital (1951-1971), he met a number of VIPs, the Prince de Polignac, Joseph Kennedy the elder, Maurice Chevalier, "so many others it would be tiresome to enumerate them," and the Duke of Windsor, of whom he writes, "The Duke as I knew him was a charming man with a talent for making friends and, above all, courageous. When his carefree years in Paris ended with the inoperable cancer of the throat which took its usual eventual toll he was outwardly imperturbable. The disease was as usual slowed down by cobalt treatments and, as I recollect, I accompanied him to some twenty of them in the basement of the hospital."

He also had enlivening experiences during his administration—midnight calls to separate hair-pulling nurses, disciplining interns who had so far forgotten themselves as to chuck a colonel in the medical corps under the chin and a knife attack by a crazed patient.

Special Services

HOME EXCHANGE

VACATION HOME EXCHANGES, rentals worldwide. INTERSERVICE, Box 87, Glen Echo, MD. 20768.

REAL ESTATE

Dunedin, Clearwater, Florida & surrounding areas. HOMES, INVESTMENTS, etc. HELEN CLARK REALTY-REALTOR, 353 Tilden St., Suite A, Dunedin, Fla. (813) 734-0390, evenings 733-9428.

TAX RETURNS

TAX PROBLEMS, returns and representation. T. R. McCartney (ex-FS) and John Zysk (ex-IRS), Enrolled Agents. Business Data Corp., P.O. Box 57256, Washington, D.C. 20037. (703) 522-1040.

SHOPPING SERVICES

PERSONALIZED SHOPPING SERVICE. For a small fee we will shop for you at Bloomingdale's, Garfinckel's, Woodward & Lothrop, Hecht's, Hechinger's, People's Drug Store, McLean Electronics and Camera or W. Bell and Co. Write: Phoenix Enterprises, P.O. Box 406, Vienna, Virginia 22180 for details.

Association of American Foreign Service Women

BOOKFAIR 79*

OCTOBER 13 — 20

Department of State
23rd Street Entrance

•SATURDAY, OCT. 13
10 AM — 4 PM
•SUNDAY, OCT. 14
2 — 5 PM
•MON.—SAT., OCT. 15-20
10 AM — 4 PM

FAMILY DAY FRIDAY
* OCT. 12—5:30-9

BOOKS
STAMPS
RECORDS
Art Etc.
·paintings·prints·
·posters and
·decorative things·

The Nineteenth Annual BOOKFAIR with an International Flair
BENEFIT AAFSW EDUCATION-SCHOLARSHIP FUND AND COMMUNITY PROJECTS IN D.C.

Feel at home with security...

AFSA Group Accident Insurance for Loss of Life, Limb or Sight.

"Make yourself at home."

How often is heard that warm invitation to share the comfort and security of a friend's home. And though the surroundings may be unfamiliar, they somehow seem **less foreign** and more secure because your host is there to help protect you.

Home is where the security is!

Similarly, AFSA Group Accident Insurance for loss of life, limb or eyesight provides that added security to make many of our members feel at home anywhere they happen to be.

This AFSA program provides financial protection against accidental loss of life, limb or eyesight 24 hours a day, the year round, anywhere in the world.

You and your family can be covered whether you're traveling by car, taxi, train, boat, bus, subway and even as passengers on most commercial, private and military planes you'd normally travel in.

Moreover, protection is provided during business, pleasure and just plain day-to-day activities at home and abroad.

ACT NOW! Get all the facts about benefits, rates and exceptions on AFSA Group Accident Protection for loss of life, limb or eyesight—direct by mail! No agent will call.

Just complete the coupon below and mail today. No obligation. So don't delay on a plan that can mean added security for you and your family!

UNDERWRITTEN BY

People you can count on...

MUTUAL OF OMAHA INSURANCE COMPANY
HOME OFFICE: OMAHA, NEBRASKA

AFSA INSURANCE PROGRAM
1666 Connecticut Ave. NW ■ Washington, D.C. 20009

☐ YES! Please rush full details on the Group Accident Insurance Plan available to me as a member of the American Foreign Service Association. I understand no agent will call.

Name ____________________

Address ____________________

City ____________ State ________ ZIP Code ________

FILL OUT AND MAIL TODAY!

CHRYSLER'S V.I.P. TREATMENT MAKES THE 80's EMINENTLY AFFORDABLE.

Now more than ever, foreign service members can get the most car for their money by buying direct from Chrysler.

If you're a member of the diplomatic corps, foreign service, or any qualified international organization, let Chrysler Corporation give you *Very Important Purchaser* treatment when buying that new car you want.

We'll provide highly personalized V.I.P. handling through our 1980 DIPLOMATIC PURCHASE PROGRAM. This exclusive opportunity lets you buy *direct* from Chrysler Corporation at *full diplomatic discount.* You can select from our special offering of unique Chrysler products that handsomely reflect your status. Built to your exact specifications, and backed by service, parts and limited warranty protection both in the U.S. and overseas. *All at preferential prices.*

Chrysler Corporation's Diplomatic Purchase Program. For complete information simply return the coupon below. Or call our toll free number—800-521-8900, and ask for Diplomatic Sales.

DIPLOMATIC SALES
CHRYSLER CORPORATION

560 Sylvan Avenue Englewood Cliffs, N.J. 07632 (212) 279-7350	or	1100 Connecticut Ave. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 862-5415

Send specifics on your Diplomatic Purchase Program and these products:

DODGE	CHRYSLER
☐ Omni	☐ LeBaron
☐ Aspen	☐ New Yorker
☐ Diplomat	
☐ Mirada	

Name______________________________

Address____________________________

City_______________________________

State and Zip________________Country________

CHRYSLER
CORPORATION

© C Corp. 1979