Decision on Palestine by Evan Wilson
USICA and the Triumph of Bureaucratic Style
by William R. Lenderking, Jr.

FSJ

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL
NOVEMBER 1979 75 CENTS



MOUNT VERNON REALTY INC.

★ ★ ★ IN ASSOCIATION WITH ★ ★ ★

GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES REAL ESTATE

INTRODUCES THE MOST EXCITING CONCEPT IN REAL ESTATE SINCE THE VA LOAN

Lifetime Benefits and Special Rates when Buying or Selling Real Estate
Valid in Every State of the Nation

FOR ACTIVE & RETIRED MILITARY AND GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
VETERANS, SCHOOL TEACHERS, POLICE OFFICERS, AND MANY OTHERS - YOU MAY QUALIFY!



Ed Joyce
Retired FSIO

GERE
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
REAL ESTATE



Al Herzog
Retired USAF

BE AMONG THE FIRST
IN THE WASHINGTON - METROPOLITAN AREA
TO RECEIVE YOUR GERE LIFE-MEMBER CARD ENTITLING
YOU TO GUARANTEED BENEFITS & SPECIAL RATES ON REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS

NATIONWIDE

EACH & EVERY TIME YOU SELL OR BUY A HOME!

SEND FOR LIFE MEMBERSHIP CARD

YES! I'M ENTITLED TO LIFETIME BENEFITS!

HERE'S $3.00 FOR MY GERE MEMB. CARD. MY SOC. SEC. NO. _____

NAME _____ PHONE _____

ADDRESS _____

TRAVELING FROM _____ TRAVELING TO _____

DEPARTURE DATE _____ ARRIVAL DATE _____

NUMBER IN FAMILY _____ PRICE RANGE _____

☐ I AM NOT MOVING WITHIN THE NEXT SIX MONTHS BUT WOULD LIKE A MEMBERSHIP CARD

MAIL TO: MOUNT VERNON REALTY INC.

GERE OFFICES — 6000 Stevenson Avenue, Alexandria, Va. 22304

OUT OF TOWN READERS
CALL US TOLL FREE 800-336-0276

LOCAL READERS
CALL: 370-4600

Foreign Service Journal

NOVEMBER 1979: Volume 56, No. 11
ISSN 0015-7279

Cover: Santorini, by Felicity O. Yost

The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the journal of professionals in foreign affairs, published twelve times a year by the American Foreign Service Association, a non-profit organization.

Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and is not intended to indicate the offical views of the Department of State, the International Communication Agency, the Agency for International Development or the United States Government as a whole.

While the Editorial Board of the JOURNAL is responsible for its general content, statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under Executive Order 11636 on the editorial page and in the AFSA News, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

Membership in the American Foreign Service Association is open to the professionals in foreign affairs overseas or in Washington, as well as to persons having an active interest in, or close association with foreign affairs.

Membership dues are: Active Members—Dues range from $39 to $65 annually. Retired Active Members—Dues are $35 annually for members with incomes over $15,000; $20 annually for less than $15,000. Associate Members—Dues are $20 annually. All dues payments include $6.50 allocation for the Journal and AFSA News, per AFSA Bylaws.

For subscription to the JOURNAL, one year (12 issues): $7.50; two years, $12.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually for overseas postage.

Microfilm copies of current as well as of back issues of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL are available through the University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 under a contract signed October 30, 1967.

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional post office.

Letters

On the Other Hand . . .

JOE MONTVILLE has written an interesting article on the Congress and pressure groups (*Foreign Service Journal*, September 1979), but accepts quite uncritically some currently fashionable left wing notions:

He writes that "there is a growing trend toward right wing single-issue PACs—the anti-abortionist, the gun lobby, right-to-work groups." Right-wing single-issue groups certainly have grown, particularly since the election law reform of 1971, but this hardly proves that the latter is the cause of the former. (*Post hoc ergo propter hoc*?) The absence of the 1971 law did not rule out the growth of *left*-wing single issue groups in the years and decades before, including the roles of labor unions with *their* political action committees in the 1940s and '50s, the civil rights movement, and the anti-war movement. One could argue that these issues are broader than "single issues" such as anti-abortion, or right-to-work, but that is a value judgment for the electorate to make, not political commentators.

Mr. Montville makes another unfortunate liberal assumption in addressing the problem of black teenager unemployment. He associates this with "badly skewed income distribution," ignoring the propositions that the *higher* are legal minimum wages and the greater are *un*employment benefits, the *greater* will be unemployment among marginal groups. To suggest that there is "no honorable place" in American society for black teenagers—or at least the 40 percent of them unemployed—is to suggest that the problem is rooted in unworthy social attitudes. Indeed, it hints darkly at a persistence of racial discrimination. Some, who do not make the assumption that more and more government involvement can solve any problem, would argue however that high black teenager unemployment is a direct and measurable consequence of inept "leftist" social legislation over the years of the New Deal, the Fair Deal, the New Frontier, and the Great Society.

Mr. Montville quotes with approval former Senator McIntyre in accusing rightist groups of increasing success in using "the scare technique." This is a particularly unfair charge to level against the right, which has no monopoly on ungentlemanly political tactics in this country. Perhaps the most brilliant and successful use of "the scare technique" in recent American politics was that used by candidate Lyndon Johnson against rightist Barry Goldwater in 1964. For more current examples, see any Herblock cartoon dealing with arms questions.

PAUL D. MOLINEAUX
Washington

Mr. Montville replies: It is always gratifying to have one's thoughts provoke reaction. Paul Molineaux's letter is therefore welcome. Since the letter speaks resoundingly for itself, I will not comment on it overall, but there is a point worth making in the context of liberal/conservative definitions. The most important element of "Congress and the Issues Extortionists" is its venture into political economy. Its theme is that if there were more genuine free enterprise in the American economy—that is, less success by corporations, professions, trade unions and associations in manipulating Congress to insulate themselves from the free play of market forces so that "the invisible hand" was allowed to flex its fingers, there would be more integrity in the production of goods and services and a higher rate of productivity. There is thus a distinct flavor of classicial liberalism in the article rather than of modern perpetual deficit liberalism. Senator Gary Hart uses the term "radical conservatism" to characterize this school of thought. It is apt, I think.

The Future of the Service

THE ARTICLE by Smith Simpson which was published in the September 1979 issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* is far and away one of the best that you have published in recent years and goes directly to the essence of many of the State Department's problems.

No major nation gives such slipshod and cursory training to its diplomats. Either the requirements for entrance into the diplomatic service are such that only persons with adequate backgrounds in international law, history, international economics, and the techniques of negotiation are admitted, or the government supplies this training in an academy or similar facility before its diplomats ever go abroad. Third world countries devote more care and attention to the training of their diplomats (Peru, for example, has a three-year diplomatic academy) than does the United States.

The average American education in no way prepares a student to deal with the complexities of modern diplomacy nor to have any understanding of the historical, legal, or economic base upon which modern diplomatic problems stand. A few Foreign Service officers do enter the department with this background, and others acquire it over the years, but all American diplomats should have some basic level of competence in their profession. To put the American Foreign Service officer in a position where he will not be embarrassingly inferior to his colleagues from around the world in these areas requires remedial attention by the Department. Whether this is done through the institution of an intensive program similar to the one which was employed some years ago to educate economic officers or through the long discussed establishment of a diplomatic academy is a question for debate, but it is indisputable that a fundamental grasp of the intellectual tools of diplomacy is essential.

Once again, I applaud both the *Journal* and Smith Simpson for raising a key question for the future of the American Foreign Service.

CURTIS C. CUTTER
Washington

Effect Without Cause

IT ISN'T OFTEN that one comes upon an editorial in the *Journal* as interesting as the one entitled "Ambassador Thomas Watson" in the September issue. I assume that the Board of Directors had good reasons for endorsing the appointment of Mr. Watson as ambassador to the Soviet Union. But they aren't stated. Instead, the editorial goes through a series of contortions that would be comic if they didn't involve an important matter of principle. The editorial says, first, that

"While it is the policy of the Association to support to the fullest extent possible the assignment of career officers of the Foreign Service to ambassadorial positions,

Continued on page 46

FORD PRESENTS A SPECIAL

DIPLOMATIC SERVICE

BUY A 1980 LINCOLN CONTINENTAL OR MARK VI AND RECEIVE A DIPLOMATIC DISCOUNT.

THE CONTINENTAL MARK VI FOR 1980. In both 2- and 4-door versions, the Mark remains unmistakably luxurious with custom features, including automatic overdrive, electronic fuel injection, and optional electronic instrument cluster. The Mark VI for 1980, it's unmistakable.

THE LINCOLN CONTINENTAL FOR 1980. Traditional luxury. Sophisticated engineering.



The new elegance of Lincoln Continental for 1980 takes special advantage of outstanding engineering while enhancing traditional luxury and prestige.

Lincoln Continental... 4-door excellence that's almost irresistible.

Please send me full information on using my diplomatic discount to purchase a new_____.

WRITE TO:
DIPLOMATIC SALES: FORD MOTOR COMPANY

815 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006/Tel: (202) 785-6047

NAME _____

ADDRESS _____

CITY _____ STATE _____

COUNTRY _____ ZIP _____

Ford FORD EXPORT DIVISION

Communication Re:

What is there in it for me?

JEANNETTE B. L'HEUREUX

If that is your question, do not marry a Foreign Service officer. The answer will be the second word in his title: Service. Sacrifice and selflessness will be the order of your life. You will sign a commitment, not only to marriage, but also to a career.

I write from the experience of thirty years and eighteen days spent in that service, and from more than twenty-two years of retrospective viewing of those years. At the time of our marriage in 1927 my husband had been a member of the Foreign Service for six months. In 1957, at the height of his career, "our" service was terminated by cancer, on the twelfth floor of the United States Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland.

The following excerpts from an article by Judy Mann in the Washington *Post* of this past July 27 are incredible, and have aroused in me a need to explain and defend the devotion of the many Foreign Service wives I have known who served willingly and endured silently over the past years, with no thought of monetary compensation for their efforts.

These quotes are from "Foreign Service Wives: What Price Service?"

Jeannette B. L'Heureux, widow of FSO Hervé J. L'Heureux who was one of the founding members of the Association, is the mother of three, grandmother of sixteen and great grandmother of eleven. One son, David, is on active duty in the Foreign Service. For the past fifteen years she has been a volunteer teacher of literature and other subjects in the high school at St. Ann's Infant and Maternity Home.

A taste children prefer.

Sure, fluoride is important in fighting cavities—but so is proper brushing. And that's why we made Aim.®

According to the mail we get, children by the score brush longer, more thoroughly and *willingly* when they switch to Aim fluoride toothpaste.

We can't *guarantee* this will happen in your home, but isn't it worth a try? Especially since dentists blame so many cavities on bad brushing habits.

Aim's fluoride is stannous fluoride.

Aim has stannous fluoride—the exact amount considered effective against cavities.

But Aim has something the leading fluorides don't. A taste children prefer. In fact, in tests with more than 1300 children against *both* leading fluoride brands, children preferred Aim by almost 2 to 1.

A gel that's low in abrasion.

Because Aim is a gel, it has an unusually fast "dispersal rate." This

means, when your child brushes with Aim, it spreads the good taste *faster* in the normal brushing time.

Aim is also low in abrasion.

All of this makes Aim a true advance.

If you have a child in the cavity-prone years, ask your dentist about Aim.

Like any dentifrice, Aim should be used as part of a program of good dental care. So see the dentist regularly, brush often, and take Aim against cavities.

Take Aim against cavities!

There were four women on the panel, three of them still married to foreign service officers, one of them divorced from a former ambassador, and they appeared Wednesday before a congressional subcommitee to say that spouses of American foreign service officers don't want to play by the old rules any more.

The purpose of the panel was to bring out the heavy toll created by prevalent divorces of Foreign Service wives who "are left after long years of unpaid government service abroad with no employment record, no modern skills, no Social Security, no shared annuity, no survivor benefits and exorbitantly expensive medical insurance."

The State Department was urged to compensate the "highly involved diplomatic spouse who devotes untold volunteer hours to the work of the US missions and community projects abroad, and without whose contributions of time and talent the quality of our presence abroad would be vastly diminished."

I am in accord with some of the above, and am sure that isolated cases should be considered, but I heartily disagree with the idea of rating the work of a Foreign Service wife and paying her according to the amount of entertaining and volunteer work she may have done.

The article continues: "Ryan and others said the American government exploits foreign service wives, and they have a point. For years, until 1972, the foreign service wife was expected to help her husband in his diplomatic work by entertaining at their home and doing no end of charitable work in the host country."

My meager experiences in the Foreign Service are but a drop in the stream of numberless women who, through generations, have followed their husbands to hardship posts, made homes under mind-boggling difficulties and created good will with their tireless entertaining and volunteer activities.

Our thirty years in the Foreign Service were not easy ones. They were alternately exciting and depressing, glamorous and frustrating, but they were fulfilling and never dull or boring. Previous to 1927 my life had been

> "What has happened to the pioneer spirit and selfless efforts of women, in a nation that could not have been conceived, or 'long endure' without all that they did?"

spent in educational pursuits, interesting work and no preparation for being a "household drudge." We began our life together on a salary less than the amount I had squandered when single. Half of it went for rent. At that time there were no extra allowances for anything. We paid for the birth of our first child (a son who recently completed thirty years in the Foreign Service) from proceeds of a book which I had spent many months translating.

One evening, during our first year, while I was resentfully stringing beans for a dinner I did not feel like preparing, and trying to read at the same time, a phrase in the

Fact: Recognizing the limits of the Claims Act, the government recommends private insurance too.

Claims Act

1. The government will be responsible for only $15,000 of proven property loss.
2. Loss recovery limitations exist on most categories of possessions such as jewelry, furs, cameras, fine arts, antiques.
3. Claims process requires government investigation and documentation.
4. Loss must be incident to service.
5. Comprehensive Personal Liability insurance is not available.
6. Loss evaluation is complicated and includes depreciation.
7. Theft loss requires proof that due care was exercised to prevent the occurrence.

AFSA Plan

1. You may purchase as much insurance as you need.
2. Valuable articles can be scheduled without limitation on a "valued at" basis.
3. Swift claims settlement begins with a simple telephone call or letter.
4. Coverage is worldwide whether on business or pleasure.
5. Comprehensive Personal Liability insurance is available.
6. Loss settlement on unscheduled items is based on replacement cost *with no depreciation.* Settlement on scheduled articles is based on the agreed amount.
7. No such requirement.

These are only a few of the differences.
Please refer to Foreign Affairs Manual (6 FAM 300).

AFSA Desk, The Hirshorn Company 1179
14 East Highland Avenue
Philadelphia, Pa. 19118 (215) CH2-8200.*

Send me your free brochure (with built-in application form) that answers my questions about overseas insurance.

Name _____

Address _____

City/State/Zip _____

**If calling from the Washington, D.C. area: (202) 457-0250*

Note: The insurance policies, not this advertisement, will form the contract between the insured and the insurance company. The policies contain limits, exclusions and limitations not listed here.

book fairly jumped at me: "If I cannot be a sword, then I shall be the whetstone to sharpen one." I ceased attacking the beans. A glow of pride came over me. That was the answer. That would be *my* career. I would send forth a shining, sharp sword to face the world. Through trial and error the whetstone became my talisman.

Many trials came during the ensuing years: a three-year assignment in Nazi Germany; outbreak of World War II while there; transfer to Belgium shortly before the German invasion; flight out of Antwerp to the coast, and a five day trek with streams of refugees to the Spanish border. My husband, of course, had to remain at his post. Our three children and I were forced to leave La Panne, where we had gone for refuge the day of the bombing of the Low Countries.

In mid-June the children and I boarded the SS *Washington* outside Bordeaux. We ardently desired to return to Antwerp, but the situation had become untenable, and there was no place to go but back home to the United States. Off the coast of Spain, at dawn, we were stopped by a German submarine, with a threat to sink us. Then ensued a mad dash through choppy seas, suspended over the side of the ship in a lifeboat, until we had escaped the sub. After a thirteen-day voyage through mine fields to Galway, Ireland, we arrived in New York, and thence to Washington.

Five years passed in an overcrowded city where we were forced to move five times. During that time my husband got home twice. He remained in Belgium a year, served at Lisbon seven months before his first "visit" to us. After an assignment of some months in the department, he received orders to proceed to Algiers, returning home after more than a year, ill with jaundice and facing a gall bladder operation. Barely recovered from that ordeal he was assigned to Marseille to serve as the first consul general at that post since the fall of France. Southern France had been liberated in 1944. We were not permitted to be with him on any of those wartime assignments. Yet, I always felt that it was still "our" career. My part as the whetstone was to keep him free from worry about me and the children.

In June 1945, on the first ship to carry families across, we joined my husband in Marseille, once again a complete family. At that post there was no time for thoughts of self, no time to ask "What is there in this for me?" The need surrounding us was overwhelming. Local shortages of almost every commodity and material were appalling. Due to arrivals of American ships, the teeming presence of US Army, Navy and Seabees in that staging area, and their commissaries, we had plenty and to spare. American colonels with an excess of supplies of every sort were wined, dined and cajoled into letting me have commodities that would otherwise have deteriorated or been abandoned. With the aid of the charming, charismatic wife of the prefect of the region these goods were dispensed to orphanages, homes for the aged and other institutions, as well as to destitute individuals. A vibrant aliveness to work and help was born of their need. The delight on the faces of people, long starved for even the bare necessities, when they were given as little as a bar of soap, or a bit of chocolate was reward far above the labor and time entailed. No thought of monetary recompense

could begin to compete with the pleasure afforded us.

Later posts provided less urgent opportunities for service, but there was ever-present need for our joint efforts in many fields.

Financially we were always a step ahead of debt, but we felt affluent. We were not thinking that we were "performing hours of unpaid service for the government." We believed that we were furthering international relations and goodwill, and carrying out the Divine command to be good neighbors to whomever might be in need, wherever he might be.

As for entertaining, even "pushing canapes" is self-rewarding if the effort involved brings the people of our country and another into close contact, with resultant mutual exchange of ideas and ideals. Being hostess in a Foreign Service home abroad should be job enough for any woman.

The *Post* article describes "the alienation of culture shock, the isolation of language inadequacy, etc." as a dark side of Foreign Service life. Learning to know the people of a country, studying their culture and customs, acquiring their language, while sharing our knowledge, show that we are a caring people. They are not handicaps, but bonuses.

The Foreign Service in which we began was a small organization. There were no rent allowances, no furnished homes, cars and chauffeurs, entertainment allowances or other fringe benefits of today's service. There were no American schools for our children. We did not have the privilege of choosing or rejecting assignments. Each year we were permitted to send in post preferences, but our choices were usually ignored. My husband's second language was French, mine Spanish. Our first European assignment was to Germany, where we did not know a word of the language.

My sincere sympathy goes out to destitute Foreign Service widows and divorcees. Frugality is no stranger to me. My husband died before the present generous salaries and consequent high annuities were granted. The Foreign Service has no corner on women in similar situations. There are aggregations in all walks of life in the same category. They receive no help from the government. I contend that a Foreign Service wife's "enforced entertaining and volunteer services" are not entirely for the United States government. As with all other wives, they are a part of their marriage vows. In the natural order a wife is a partner and a helpmate. Is it not also to her advantage to further her husband's advancement, even if that entails entertaining and good works? She is hardly conferring a favor, but fulfilling her role.

It is devastating to see the youth of this country steeped in the belief that to do, or not to do, something it is only necessary to want, or not to want, to do it. What example is being given to them by their elders who express belief that every extra hour spent in charitable pursuits or self-sacrifice should be counted and paid for.

What has happened to the pioneer spirit and selfless efforts of women, in a nation that could not have been conceived, or "long endure" without all that they did?

Perhaps loyalty to, and love of, God, country and family are become passé, but their observance makes beautiful memories for twilight years.

An Address to the Foreign Affairs Community by Ken Bleakley, President, American Foreign Service Association, in the Dean Acheson Auditorium on September 18, 1979. This speech is in lieu of an editorial.

The Future of the Foreign Service

Ladies and Gentlemen of the Foreign Service of the United States and all those who are concerned about the future of the Service:

I would like to discuss with you today a crisis which has been developing in the United States Foreign Service and which if not addressed and solved could result ultimately in the collapse of one of the vital institutions of our government. The Foreign Service of our country today is called upon to produce women and men who will serve throughout the world in circumstances of increasing personal danger and family hardship, to face problems of bewildering and growing international complexity. At the same time they are asked to accept continually eroding benefits and perquisites while serving overseas—to labor under pay scales dwarfed by counterparts in the Civil Service and private industry—to languish interminably without realistic promotion possibilities in a system frozen in the ice of bureaucratic unenlightenment—and finally to face a gloomy and uncertain career outlook continually wrenched and changed by succeeding administrations.

As we look toward the 1980s and beyond I would advance four propositions:

First, there will be a growing need for the best Foreign Service that the United States can muster. Some suggest we can rely increasingly on occasional tours abroad by domestic civil servants to protect our national interests. These minions of OMB and OPM are wrong!

Second, the Foreign Service is in disarray.

Third, reaffirmation of the role of the Foreign Service, strengthening of its professional influence, and provision of adequate compensation for its members are urgent national requirements.

Fourth, we, the Foreign Service of the United States, can influence our own destinies and the nation's.

The United States will face with increasing urgency over the next decade the challenge of defending its interests and maintaining its world position under military, economic, and energy conditions in which we no longer enjoy unquestioned dominance. We will need to rely on the vast human resources our nation possesses to secure the benefits the United States has enjoyed throughout much of this century.

A few trends in foreign affairs may provide an indication of the kinds of people that the nation will require overseas in the 1980s and beyond:

- The linkage of economic issues to strategic issues is increasing. Issues which cannot be contained within the economic sphere are causing political and strategic shifts.

Massive migrations of people as a result of political, strategic and economic factors challenge our traditional processes for immigration. This requires international solutions. Simultaneously, the protection of American life and property abroad continues to grow more difficult as a result of changing life styles, internationalization of corporations and the shifting strength of the dollar.

(Continued on page 40)

Decision on Palestine

EVAN M. WILSON

THE OLD STATE DEPARTMENT

Dean Acheson remarks in his book *Present at the Creation* that the State Department of the early 1940s was closer to the State Department of the nineteenth century than to the department that he was to head shortly after the Second World War. It therefore seems logical to begin with a few words of description of the setting in which the officers of the department carried out their duties. The ornate building at the corner of Pennsylvania Avenue and 17th Street, dating from the 1870s, with its high ceilings, white-painted swinging doors, and long corridors paved with alternating black and white marble squares, was reminiscent of some exclusive club. The total personnel was so small that everyone knew everyone else. A good deal of attention was paid to tradition and to doing things in the department's customary style. Critics of the department sometimes said that its policies and way of life were as Victorian as the building itself.

In 1947 the department moved into a new building that had been designed for the War Department and that now forms the nucleus of the State Department complex in Foggy Bottom. It was hoped that this move might result in a streamlining of departmental procedures, but whether this has come about is debatable.

At the head of the department we knew was Cordell Hull, a veteran of the Spanish-American War and a distinguished-looking man who had had a distinguished record in Congress before becoming secretary of state in 1933. Hull approached every problem with deliberation and caution, whether in his office or on the croquet lawn where he found his favorite relaxation. It was commonly known in Washington that he and the under secretary, Sumner Welles, were not on good terms and Hull resented Welles's inside track to the White House. Hull, in fact, was never one of President Roosevelt's intimates: for example, the president never even showed the minutes of the 1943 Tehran Conference to his secretary of state.

Welles was a patrician who had been a schoolmate of Roosevelt's at Groton. In the extensive correspondence between the two men preserved at the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, he addresses the president as "Franklin." Also at the library are copies of letters addressed to Hitler, Mussolini, and a number of other leaders at the time of Welles's 1940 mission to Europe, in which Roosevelt refers to him as a "boyhood friend."

Welles had pronounced Zionist sympathies, more so perhaps than we realized at the time. This emerges from the correspondence of the Zionist leadership to be found at the Zionist archives in New York and Jerusalem. He was the principal high-level contact of the Zionist leaders, and in early 1943, for example, it was he who took Dr. Chaim Weizmann, president of the World Zionist Organization and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, to call on Roosevelt.

In the summer of 1943, matters came to a head and Hull asked the president to remove Welles. As under secretary, Roosevelt selected Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., then serving as administrator of Lend-Lease. Stettinius, a former steel executive, had the reputation of being a capable administrator, but Roosevelt clearly expected that in matters of policy Stettinius would follow his lead.

The next year (1944) Hull, in failing health, submitted his resignation, and Stettinius moved up to the secretaryship. Joseph C. Grew, a veteran career diplomat who had been ambassador to Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor, became under secretary.

Stettinius's administrative good sense resulted in a far-reaching and much needed reform of the department's organization, but with Roosevelt in charge he made relatively little impact on foreign policy. In 1945 he presided over the San Francisco Conference, at which the United Nations Organization was set up, and thereafter devoted much time and attention to the world body.

Shortly after assuming office in April 1945 on the death of Roosevelt, President Truman replaced Stettinius with James F.

Evan M. Wilson, who served in the Foreign Service from 1937 to 1967 and whose work had to do primarily with the Arab-Israel dispute (ending up in Jerusalem at the time of the Six Day War in 1967) has written a book on President Truman's Palestine policy which is shortly to be published by the Hoover Institution at Stanford, California, with the title ***Decision on Palestine: How the U.S. Came to Recognize Israel.*** *Wilson was serving on the Palestine desk in the old Near Eastern division of the department during most of the period (1942-1948) covered by his book. He has spent six years in research in this country and abroad and in interviewing key participants of the events which he describes. He has of course also drawn on his own recollections. The following is an extract from his introductory chapter "The Setting and the Cast of Characters" which seeks to convey the atmosphere of the old State Department and the Near East division of the 1940s. It is reprinted here by permission of the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford University.*

Byrnes. In doing so he yielded to widespread criticism that Stettinius, who under the law then in effect would succeed to the presidency, lacked wide governmental experience and indeed had never held elective office. Byrnes was a prominent member of the Democratic party who had served as Senator, as Justice of the Supreme Court, and in the executive office

"Lovett argued that American foreign policy interests would be ill served by a hasty recognition of the new state of Israel."

of the president. Simultaneously, Dean Acheson, formerly assistant secretary of state, was appointed under secretary.

Not long after Byrnes took over the department, I attended a meeting in his office to discuss the Palestine question. Byrnes, who had the courtly manner of an old-fashioned Southern politician, sat at his desk, rocking back and forth in his big chair, his feet in their high-button shoes barely touching the floor. From time to time, as the meeting progressed, he took shorthand notes—he had been trained as a court reporter and the accounts of several conversations he had with the British ambassador regarding Palestine appear in the *Foreign Relations* in the form of dialogue, just as he recorded them.

Byrnes's time was largely taken up with attendance at interminable meetings of the Council of Foreign Ministers and he devoted little attention to Palestine. In fact, he rather pointedly washed his hands of the problem and repeatedly stated that he was leaving it to the president to handle. Thus it was Acheson with whom we usually dealt on such matters as required top-level consideration in the department.

In taking on this assignment Acheson managed to overcome a certain reluctance which he felt at becoming involved in Palestine affairs because of his close friendship with Justice Felix Frankfurter, who was a prominent Zionist supporter (their daily walk downtown from their Georgetown homes was a familiar sight to the celebrity-watchers of the period).

Acheson, who later was to serve as Truman's fourth secretary of state, was an impressive figure who looked the perfect diplomat. He had a keen mind and an incisive wit and our frequent contacts with him were always enjoyable as well as educational. With his very considerable skill in drafting he imposed on us the same high standards that he set for himself.

Truman soon became dissatisfied with Byrnes and his free-wheeling tactics. In January 1947 he availed himself of Byrnes's resignation, which had been in the president's desk drawer in the Oval Office for a year, and appointed General George C. Marshall as secretary. Marshall, the wartime Army Chief of Staff and one of the most respected figures in the country, had recently been serving in China on a special mission for the president.

Like his predecessor, Marshall resisted getting involved in Palestine, preferring to focus on the problems of European recovery and East-West relations. In mid-1947, Robert A. Lovett, a New York lawyer and member of the Wall Street firm of Brown Brothers, Harriman, succeeded Acheson as under secretary. This was of importance to the department's work on Palestine, as Marshall delegated almost all of it to his under secretary. With a lawyer's perspective, Lovett attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, to redress the balance between the White House's and the State Department's handling of the problem. In May 1948, Lovett argued that American foreign policy interests would be ill served by a hasty recognition of the new state of Israel. It was Clark Clifford's advice, however, that domestic political considerations argued for immediate recognition which won the day.

The Division of Near Eastern Affairs, under which Palestine came, was headed in the early 1940s by the redoubtable Wallace S. Murray, whose previous Near Eastern experience had been in Iran. He had been with the division since 1925 and chief since 1929. To be precise, Murray had the title "Adviser on Political Relations," while his deputy, Paul H. Alling, was the nominal chief of the division, but since the two of them worked very closely together as a team, the titles made no real difference. Immediate supervision over the work relating to Palestine came under Gordon P. Merriam, assistant chief of the division and one of the earliest crop of Arabist Foreign Service officers.

In 1944, as a result of the Stettinius reorganization, an Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs was created with Murray as director and Alling as deputy director. This office was the forerunner of the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of today. The Division of Near Eastern Affairs, with Merriam as chief, then became one of the component elements of the office. In early 1945, Murray was appointed ambassador to Iran while Alling went to Morocco as diplomatic agent and consul general. Murray's successor was Loy W. Henderson, then serving in Baghdad. First George V. Allen, then Henry S. Villard, and later Joseph C. Satterthwaite held the position of deputy director; all three were career Foreign Service officers with area experience.

THE OLD NEAR EAST DIVISION

A 1937 article on the department made the comment that the Near East division "is not often marked with excitement . . . our relations with these peoples are not important." A similar attitude of condescension prevailed in other offices of the department, to the extent that when I was assigned to Cairo in 1938, a friend in the European division commiserated with me by saying: "The Near East! Nothing ever happens there."

That the problems of the Near East were indeed not of primary importance in the department of prewar days is revealed in a passage from Hull's *Memoirs* in which he lists the pressing matters which were on his desk when he became secretary of state. Although he mentions over a dozen problems, not one of them relates to the Near East.

The division was still rather quiet when I entered it in 1943. The entire division numbered only fourteen officers: by way of comparison, today's bureau has a staff of

over 150. As an indication of the workload, Palestine was handled by a desk officer along with Egypt and Iraq. The Palestine work, however, was soon to register a dramatic increase, as is shown by the number of pages devoted to it in the *Foreign Relations* volumes: 1942, 21 pages; 1943, 82; 1944, 97; 1945, 166; 1946, 167; 1947, 330; and 1948, one entire volume.

We were housed in a few offices along the west side of the third floor of the old department. Two other desk officers (dealing with Turkey and Saudi Arabia), a secretary, and I were crowded into a room (No. 345) which had accommodated a single officer up to the outbreak of the war. Merriam was squeezed into an adjoining cubbyhole. Working conditions were chaotic most of the time. In the long Washington summers the heat became almost unbearable as the afternoon sun beat down. There was of course no air conditioning and though it was customary in those days to dismiss the government employees when the thermometer touched the mid-90s, the urgent nature of our work and the small size of our staff did not generally make it possible for us to leave early. With the aid of the salt tablets which we kept handy we managed to put in a full six-day week, rarely leaving before six or seven in the evening.

Even under normal conditions our room would have been full enough, and we often were crowded beyond capacity when officers arriving from the field or awaiting transportation to a post abroad—and there were always delays under the aircraft priority system—made the division their headquarters. As soon as the doors of the department opened in the morning these individuals would rush to preempt the chairs standing by our desks. We called them the "kibitzers." This invasion caused problems when any of us had visitors, as frequently happened.

The visitors to the office gave us plenty of problems in any event. Once, when the Saudi desk officer and the Turkish desk officer both had a number of callers grouped around their desks, the Saudi desk officer asked a question and one of the Turkish visitors replied. Fortunately there were not too many instances of this sort, but things could get rather touchy when the Saudi desk officer, for example, was receiving an Arab visitor and I was receiving a Jewish one. Simultaneously the Turkish desk officer, who had a wide acquaintance among the members of the press covering the department, was apt to be entertaining some correspondent who might not be above taking advantage of the opportunity to overhear what the rest of us were saying.

> "It also led to allegations that some of the officers in question were anti-Semitic, a charge repeated, I am sorry to say, by Truman in his *Memoirs*."

On top of this general *va et vient,* the phones kept ringing incessantly and our lone secretary kept pounding away at her typewriter: incidentally she was the only person in the room who was allowed to have one, as all typewriters had been taken away from the officers when the war began. It was this same secretary, Marilyn Woods, who unwittingly provided me with an anecdote which I often used afterward when she remarked one day in bewilderment: "Mr. Wilson, I don't understand why you let yourself get so bothered about Palestine when everyone knows it says in the Bible that the Jews are going back there some day!" Miss Woods, in the end, literally got herself to a nunnery, and gave up the department in favor of a convent.

In the field, the division had supervision over some thirty-nine Foreign Service posts, including one embassy (Turkey), ten legations, and twenty-eight consular or other offices. Beginning in 1944 there was also an officer attached to the embassy in London (Raymond A. Hare) who followed Near Eastern developments from that vantage point.

Within the department, the officers concerned with Palestine had frequent contact with two scholars who had been brought in from academic life to work on postwar planning in the Division of Territorial Studies—Dr. Philip W. Ireland and Professor William Yale, who with several members of our division made up the so-called Interdivisional Area Committee on Arab Countries. One of their colleagues was Ralph Bunche, who although not working directly on Palestine at this time was to be intimately associated with the problem later on as the second United Nations Mediator for Palestine and for many years thereafter as Under Secretary-General of the UN. In the early 1940s, Bunche was one of the few blacks holding positions at the officer level in the department. Washington was a very different place in those days. I recall that when any of us wanted to go out to lunch with him there were only two places where we could go—Union Station and the YWCA.

Then there was Lieutenant Colonel Harold B. Hoskins, who had been born in Beirut and was sent out to the Near East on special missions in 1942 and 1943. Though not a member of the division, Hoskins participated in many of the important discussions of the Palestine question and his name appears frequently in the official documents for the period. Because of his background and his contacts in the White House and the Pentagon, Hoskins sometimes played a key role, as for example in the case of the resolutions introduced into Congress in early 1944 respecting Palestine. Although the published documents do not reveal it, he was largely responsible for the shelving of the resolutions at that time. He was a cousin of Colonel William A. Eddy, also born in Beirut and Arabic-speaking, who interpreted for FDR and Ibn Saud.

The Foreign Service posts under the supervision of the Near East division, like the division itself, were staffed largely by officers who had had experience in the area. This was natural enough from the administrative standpoint, but there was also a sound reason why it should be so. As one authority on the department and the Foreign

Service pointed out at the time, the Near East division, like its counterpart the old Far Eastern division, dealt with "questions that often have little or no resemblance to the problems of Western nations." Not only were there profound cultural differences between the peoples of the Near East and ourselves, but the work of the division was set apart by special problems stemming from capitulary rights (still in force in certain countries as late as the mid-1940s) and the presence in the area of important American educational, medical, missionary, and archaeological institutions. In other words, the division handled many problems outside the range of ordinary diplomatic and consular work. It had thus become a *sine qua non* that its personnel should have experience in the area. Indeed, it should be noted that shortly after the Near East division was established in the year 1909, it was made a departmental requirement that the division be staffed by officers who had served in the Near East. This policy was still being generally followed when I joined the division in 1943.

There was nothing sinister in this, but it gave rise to accusations that the officers dealing with the Palestine problem tended to side with the Arabs against the Jews. This led to repeated requests by the Zionists that jurisdiction over Palestine be taken out of the division and placed in a special office dealing with Jewish affairs. It also led to allegations that some of the officers in question were anti-Semitic, a charge repeated, I am sorry to say, by Truman in his *Memoirs*.

In point of fact, we in the Near East division and in our posts overseas were simply trying to further United States interests. A corollary of this happened to be that most of us considered that the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would be detrimental to our other interests in the Near East. The published diplomatic correspondence for these years contains many warnings to this effect, but this is not the same as promoting the Arab point of view in the dispute. Some of these officials may have been slow to recognize the significance of the American Jewish interest in Palestine but the accusation of anti-Semitism (in the loose sense of anti-Jewish) is wholly unwarranted. We could take little comfort from the fact that we were often thought by the Arabs to be pro-Zionist because our work brought us into contact with Jews. This was just another consequence of the dilemma inherent in our Palestine policy.

The personality of Wallace Murray dominated the old Near East division. Murray had a quick mind, a formidable knowledge of Near Eastern affairs, and a lively appreciation of the importance of the area to the United States. At the same time, he did not suffer fools gladly and he tended to show a proprietary attitude toward everything that he considered to be within his bailiwick. At this period the division chiefs were constantly feuding with one another and Murray was a past master at defending his prerogatives. Toward the Palestine question, he held very firm views, based on long exposure to that vexing problem. His manner toward the Zionists sometimes implied that he regarded them as intruders on an otherwise placid, or comparatively placid, Near Eastern scene. As a consequence, his meetings with the Zionist leadership, which were infrequent, were marked by a certain coolness on both sides and he was often a target of criticism on the part of the Zionists and their supporters in Congress.

Certainly, the record contains a number of instances in which Murray expressed opinions that could not be regarded as sympathetic to the Zionist point of view. Among other things he warned President Roosevelt against the harmful effects of Zionist agitation on the war effort, and he recommended against approaching the British to keep Palestine open to Jewish immigration. Small wonder that when word spread in 1945 that he was to go out to the field, the Zionist leaders called on Acting Secretary of State Grew and urged Murray's replacement by someone who, as they put it, "understood the whole broad problem of the Jews and Palestine."

In all fairness to Wallace Murray it should be pointed out that though he frequently gave voice to his deep-seated suspicion of Zionist motivations, and though he was never one to remain silent when the occasion called for forthrightness, he was a devoted public servant whose overriding concern was to do what he thought was right for the American interest. His reports to his superiors were notable for the prescience which they displayed and for accurately forecasting, at this comparatively early date, the effect that the adoption of a pro-Zionist policy would have on the standing of the United States in the Near Eastern region.

So formidable was Murray's reputation that our opposite numbers in the British Foreign Office regarded him with some trepidation. The British record of his 1944 visit to London, in the Foreign Office Palestine files at the Public Record Office, London, contains a number of comments expressing surprise that he turned out to be, unexpectedly, quite affable in his dealings with British officials.

Murray's deputy, Alling, had likewise served in the area and had been in the division for many years, but he was the antithesis of Murray in personality. He had a genial, kindly manner and was universally popular. He succeeded in calming down many a visitor who found Murray's acerbic approach a bit hard to take. Like his chief, he had a wide-ranging knowledge of Near Eastern matters, particularly those pertaining to Syria and Lebanon, where he had seen service.

Merriam, too, was experienced and knowledgeable. His approach to the explosive Palestine issue was marked by a calm, businesslike manner. His drafting ability was a tremendous asset in dealing with the subtleties and nuances of the problem.

Henderson, Murray's successor, was a very different type. His Foreign Service background, prior to going to Iraq, had been in Eastern European affairs and his approach to the problems of the Near East showed a broader perspective than that of many who had concentrated on that one area. He was objective and fair in his attitude toward the Palestine question, and sincerely interested in finding a solution. In view of this it is ironic, though perhaps inevitable, that he should later have been so fiercely attacked by the Zionists. Henderson encouraged those of us who were concerned with Palestine to have Jewish as well as Arab con-

tacts, and departmental meetings with the Zionists became less stiff and formal than in the past. A revealing comment on the contrasting styles of Murray and Henderson is to be found in Lord Trevelyan's little book on diplomacy. Trevelyan, who served in Washington during the war as a representative of the government of India, writes: "We had first to deal with Mr. Wallace Murray, whom we found difficult and openly hostile to the British in India. He left and was succeeded by Mr. Loy Henderson. The whole situation was transformed by his friendly and helpful approach." Even so consistent a critic of the department and its Palestine policy as the chairman of the Political committee of the extremist United Zionists-Revisionists of America, Dr. Joseph B. Schechtman, found Henderson to be sincere, not an anti-Semite, and seeking what he conceived (mistakenly, Schechtman thought) to be the American interest.

In considering the way in which the Palestine question was handled by the Near East division, it must be borne in mind that the division was responsible for our relations with over a score of countries, of which Palestine was only one. Essentially our task was to carry out United States policy toward the countries of the arca and to protect and promote US interests. Sometimes the latter were in conflict, as in the case of Palestine. In such an event, we did not consider that it was incumbent on us to pursue any single interest at the expense of another, but rather to attempt to reconcile the conflicts to the extent that seemed to be possible within the context of overall policy objectives. It follows that the criticism sometimes made by Zionists to the effect that we were remiss in not promoting the Jewish National Home morc assiduously was wide of the mark. Not only was this not our principal task, but also (and this is the essential point) we never received instructions from the secretary of state or the president that it should be so. Conversely (and this is equally important), we never were instructed to favor the Arab side in the dispute. It goes without saying that to carry out our duties in the light of the dilemma imposed by our conflicting commitments required a high degree of detachment and objectivity. We were specifically charged with making recommendations to the secretary with regard to the area of our jurisdiction, including Palestine. There thus can be no basis for alleging, as has sometimes been done in Zionist circles, that we were interfering in our government's Palestine policy: this was our duty.

With two exceptions the day-to-day operations of the Near East Division were generally similar to those of the other geographical or political divisions of the Department. Because of problems peculiar to the Palestine issue, there were two important respects in which the work of the division differed from that of the other divisions. In the first place, a very considerable portion of the paperwork relating to the Palestine problem had to receive the personal attention of the president—which brought the desk officer into much closer touch with the White House than was the case elsewhere in the department. Secondly, the special way in which matters pertaining to Palestine were handled by the US government gave rise to a whole range of problems that were unique as well as frustrating in the extreme. Frequently we were kept in the dark about important developments that took place at higher levels. We were dependent on the press for learning which Zionist leaders had been received at thc White House, and what the president had said to them, or, in some cases, allowed them to make public in his name. Perhaps the worst example of this occurred in August 1945, when President Truman wrote Prime Minister Clement Attlee of Great Britain urging the immediate entry into Palestine of 100,000 displaced Jews. A month later, the division was still seeking confirmation of press reports that Truman had approached Attlee on the subject. Ironically enough, through a bureaucratic mix-up, the White House sent us Attlee's reply for action.

"We were dependent on the press for learning which Zionist leaders had been received at the White House, and what the president had said to them, or in some cases, allowed them to make public in his name."

There were many other examples of this sort of thing, especially when the Palestine question was before the United Nations in 1947 and 1948. Indeed, an examination of the material available today in the Roosevelt and Truman libraries, as well as in the Zionist archives, has provided me with a number of surprises in the way of things of which I had not been aware during the time I was on the Palestine desk.

A fact of life to which we had to resign ourselves was that we were generally unable to find out what US policy toward Palestine was. As early as 1942, Murray proposed that President Roosevelt should be asked to define our policy, but no answer was forthcoming. Later on, in spite of many attempts, the department never obtained from President Truman any clear set of instructions as to the line to take. Thus we were forced to operate more or less in a vacuum.

One thing, however, was certain: whenever a presidential statement favorable to the Jewish side gave rise to Arab protests, as was frequently the case, it was the Near East division that was called on to smooth things over and prepare a reply. After we had exercised our ingenuity in an effort to provide some plausible explanation, a grateful president would initial our draft and the reply would go out. We became quite accustomed to this syndrome: presidential statement, Arab protest, reply prepared by NE, presidential approval.

It is not surprising that with these frustrations some of us developed ulcers and that at times wc despaired of ever being able to carry out duties assigned to us. In retrospect the wonder is that a handful of officers, working mostly under difficult wartime conditions, should have been able to achieve so large an output of important policy papers and still to have kept up with our other daily tasks.

USICA and the Triumph of Bureaucratic Style

WILLIAM R. LENDERKING, JR.

For many years, employees of the International Communication Agency and its predecessors have debated whether they were propagandists, communicators, cultural missionaries, information disseminators, or some hybrid combination. Since elements of all these roles survive in the new agency, the ambiguity has never been completely resolved. But in today's USICA, uncertainty over identity seems almost irrelevant. What now occupies center stage is the emergence of bureaucratic style.

The triumph of bureaucratic style is a phenomenon increasingly reflective of American society at large, so the new agency is at once in the mainstream of bureaucratic evolution and, in a small way, symptomatic of a culture which shows many of the rigidities of advancing middle age.[1]

Students of bureaucratic behavior do not claim to have discovered all its mysteries. But they have identified many characteristics of modern bureaucracies which help to illuminate the factors which are shaping USICA.[2]

When the new agency came into being in April 1978, a great deal of effort was spent in correcting the defects of the old USIA. These defects included excessive reliance on self-assertive propaganda; unfocused and often unrelated activities based on personal whim or past practice; and often fuzzy and wishful thinking about our ability to persuade people to think good thoughts about America.

This commendable effort to impose more discipline on our far-flung efforts marked a definitive break with the USIA of the '50s and early '60s, and those who remember some of the bumptiousness of those years might well say good riddance. But gone too are the spirited improvisation and enthusiasm that can come with the feeling of working full blast in a good cause, and which typified the early Peace Corps and even USIA in its early years.

One need not lament the feckless but exuberant past, however, in order to question the new conventional wisdom or resist the seemingly inevitable future. The bureaucratic structure now in place supposedly provides a rational link between objectives and the limited resources available to achieve them. But what it actually provides is a rigid apparatus more attuned to the centralized use of bureaucratic power than it is to efficient allocation of resources. In operating this structure, *how* we do things has become more important than what we do or why, and in fact determines them.

The emergent structure itself, proclaimed with all the solemnity of the Second Coming, can then be called a "program design system," although it neither designs programs nor is a system. But it is a powerful mechanism which enables a few plentifully staffed offices in Washington to assert control over much of USICA's operations.

Since mechanisms must be governed by procedures, these increasingly dictate the essence of what we do, rather than the reverse. Communications may be a process, as USICA never tires of proclaiming, but a more accurate motto for what we are up to these days would be "procedure determines substance."

The New Bureaucratic Babylon

There are several key indicators of the modern bureaucratic style, and USICA seems to have embraced all of them. So, indeed, have many large corporations, state governments, hospitals and other institutions. Taken together, these characteristics reflect not rationality but waste; not creativity but mechanistic inflexibility; not innovative management but bureaucratic manipulation and control.

1. *Fragmentation.* The most basic characteristic of developed bureaucracies is the progressive fragmentation of jobs and functions, in which employees are given only parts of tasks to do and cannot see the results of their efforts. In such a situation, employees become interchangeable, like parts of a machine, and it is virtually impossible for promotion panels and personnel managers to distinguish between one employee and the next. This characteristic, which has been evident for years, does not mean that everyone in USICA has achieved an advanced state of competence, but that most work has been trivialized to the extent that almost everyone can perform a given job as well as anyone else.

Bureaucracies develop in this manner because such an arrangment guarantees continuity, and therefore survival. It guards against unwanted change, and insures a steady, if uninspired, level of efficiency and productivity. It enables a centralized office to declare itself the promulgator of universal values, disregarding obvious special circumstances unique to each country and geographical area.

Outside of industrial production lines, the military is of course the most extreme practitioner of fragmentation. One can understand why an organization that must be prepared to wage war needs to

1. *See Christopher Lasch,* The Culture of Narcissism, *Norton, 1978.*
2. *See, for example, Ralph P Hummel,* The Bureaucratic Experience, *St. Martin's Press, 1977.*

William Lenderking is a Foreign Service Information Officer who has served in Italy, Cuba, Bolivia, Japan and Vietnam. A frequent contributor to the Journal *and former Board member, Bill is now in his fourth year af an assignment in Bangkok.*

structure jobs so that people performing them are interchangeable. But there is less apparent reason for a civilian agency, which is supposed to devise better ways for nations and peoples to communicate with and understand one another, and whose "output" is concepts and ideas rather than material products, to develop in the same direction. One reason that it is doing so is that employees are increasingly less involved in the substance of their work and more and more obliged to function as packagers of products. They have become purveyors more than communicators.

Fragmentation may insure continuity and an elementary level of efficiency, but there is a price. Employees who are only a small part of a process are deprived of seeing their work whole. As sociologist Karl Mannheim noted, as rationalization of an organization increases, the ability of an employee to know the purpose of what he does decreases. As a result, employees are easier to manipulate, but there is also a stultifying effect on innovation and creativity. It is therefore puzzling when some bureaucratic managers decry the decline of creativity at the same time that they are erecting an apparatus that effectively stifles it.

If there is blame for this phenomenon, it must be shared by employees as well as managment. If fragmentation and excessive diffusion of responsibility have deprived employees of the wholeness of vision and sense of participation that foster creativity, employees themselves have willingly acquiesced in their own emasculation, seduced perhaps by relatively high salaries and benefits, the ease of evading responsibility and the opportunity to relinquish difficult analysis and decision-making to an apparatus that claims to be rational but in actuality only asserts control.

2. *The debasement of language.* Another key indicator of advancing bureaucratic senescence is the manner in which a bureaucracy develops its own specialized jargon and language. This does not improve efficiency, but it does increase the power of those who invent the language. In other words, if you want to play the game, you have to learn the lingo. Thus, we now use "PPP," "MRP," and "DRS" when we mean plans, projects, and distribution. It is ludicrous to hear adults talk earnestly of "PPPs" and other terms in the current lexicon, especially in an organization whose purpose is better communication.

Apparently, to use clear and straightforward English would be to risk the possibility that people would more quickly realize the barrenness of some of the ideas being discussed. For example, a recent

"With USICA, part of this impulse to invent new frameworks springs from the understandable need to stake out a piece of turf independent of the State Department and other agencies with foreign affairs responsibilities."

"MRP" (multi-regional project) is designed "to help build professional media skills directed towards the engagement of public and official attention to problems and opportunities with society." What on earth does this mean? Does it represent the "sharper focus" we are supposed to be seeking, or is it a noble attempt to "discover the pictures in people's heads," which is another cliché currently in vogue at USICA?

3. *Conceptual Confusion.* Perhaps more serious than the expanded use of jargon is the growing conceptual confusion that accompanies it. Examples abound: an "ASEAN" symposium that has nothing to do with ASEAN; a recent "program design" which lists three articles in "Problems of Communism" on China's internal modernization as "support" for a project on American policies in East Asia.

The originators of these meaningless or misleading notions seem neither to understand what they are trying to communicate nor care what words they choose, since one word seems to serve as conveniently as the next. As sociologist Christopher Lasch notes, "the contagion of unintelligibility spreads through all levels of government."

An apparatus that permits such barbarisms to go unchecked cannot be called a system. It does, however, permit the quantification of projects and allocation of resources. This gives the illusion of rationalized management while the substance of history, politics and culture is treated with the superficiality and distortion that must inevitably result when we submit to the discredited McLuhanesque notion that how we say things is more important than what we say, and why.

Another example of conceptual confusion is the current stress on "communications tensions," an innovation that came in with the new agency. As the crux of their activities, posts are now directed to identify and reduce these "tensions" overseas. But effective explanation and advocacy of US foreign policy, which forms only one part of the USICA mandate, could in many situations increase "tensions." There could also be a need for an extensive USICA role where no serious "tensions" exist. For example, the United States has relations with many countries where "communications tensions" are minor, but where nurturing a healthy relationship by means of a whole range of traditional USICA activities is of basic importance.

A senior official says, "we're paying PAOs overseas $47.500 a year to think their way through these problems." Very well, but if relating activities to "communications tensions" does not cover our mandate, is the concept valid or not? Should we be trying to ease "communications tension," "discovering the pictures in people's heads," "sharpening our focus," or all three simultaneously? USICA policy statements urge us to do all of these, but is it too harsh to suggest that there is conceptual confusion here?

What we have, then, is not a methodological breakthrough, but another illustration of the tendency of bureaucracies to try to define the world in ways which are often distorted or irrelevant, but which are convenient to the bureaucracy. It is much easier to invent pseudo-

Continued on page 38

"Hell hath no fury like a nine-year-old denied his favorite spread"

"Peanut butter, por favor"

JAMES S. PACY

As we drove south from Biarritz on the road to San Sebastian, we were issued our first warning: the peanut butter supply was low. Such a warning is bad enough when issued on the way to a shopping center back home in the US, but the admonition takes on ominous tones when delivered by a nine-year-old American boy to his parents while all three are motoring on a European highway.

Nevertheless, we frolicked on the beach at San Sebastian for a few days and then departed for Pamplona.

Again, the warning was issued. The peanut butter reserve was now "dangerously" low. This latest notice was not lost upon us even though the delights associated with the running of the bulls in Pamplona can easily cause one to forget peanut butter. We had speculated that with the vast concourse of American youth in Pamplona, someone might have a lead as to availability, or wildly—might even have a jar, or part of a jar, for sale. No leads, no peanut butter.

It became a familial challenge. Somewhere in Spain we would find peanut butter! On to Madrid.

Driving to the Spanish capital all sorts of thoughts played havoc with our imaginations—for example—that around the next bend, by some miracle, we would find a broken-down tractor-trailer truck labeled "SKIPPY." Wishful thinking produces many near-hits, for around one bend there *was* a broken-down tractor-trailer truck, but it was labeled "BIMBO." Unfortunately, hope as we might, Bimbo made cup cakes, not peanut butter.

We arrived in Madrid, checked into our hotel, refreshed, and then went out to dine. At dinner we struck up a conversation with a winebibbing Briton who told us the same Abe Lincoln joke three times, but who also offered the most fantastic intelligence since Kim Philby defected: a nearby health food store carried peanut butter! Quickly finishing the umpteenth *flan*, we headed to the address provided. It was too late! Not only was it closed, it would be closed for the entire weekend!! Just to make sure, our son, Ben, tugged at the door, twice. Enraged, I did too. No question about it, the store was closed.

We went back to the hotel and threw ourselves on the mercy of the concierge. A little startled, he asked us to repeat our query to the lady at the desk. The lady and *El Conserje* now looked at each other, I am sure, not unlike that German general and his interpreter in World War II when our General McAuliffe replied to their surrender demand with the word "Nuts!" At any rate, the advice from the desk was to forget about health food establishments because she doubted that they carried any such "things," and if we did find any it would probably be of a decidedly un-American sort, but how about the Sears store?

Sears? Sears and Roebuck—in Madrid?

Si, senor, corner of Serrano and Diego de Leon.

Shazam!

The morning found us in Sears. Sears in Madrid is most accommodating. They even accept your stateside charge card, but peanut butter? *No pasaran*!

Now, I did have a professional mission in Madrid. After all I was on sabbatical leave. There were some ex-Hungarian diplomats for me to interview. Insane as it may seem in retrospect, the thought did cross my mind—could I broach the subject to *them*? Realism triumphed. In a Magyar language discussion about World War II, Admiral Horthy, János Kádár, the crown of St. Stephen, the Hungarian foreign service, and Americans who served at the legation in Budapest during the interwar years—Wright, Roosevelt, Montgomery, Matthews, Tuck, Schoenfeld, Ackerson, Travers, etc.—peanut butter is best left to someone less nervy, say, Mike Wallace and/or Oriana Fallaci.

The next morning, as I was making telephone calls regarding the day's appointments, I was apprised of the calamity which I knew had to come: the jar was absolutely and positively empty. The situation had become desperate.

"Why don't you call the embassy?" my wife inquired.

"The embassy! To whom at the embassy do I direct my inquiry re peanut butter? Who or what does one ask for?"

I glanced at my *Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts* guide, but where to begin? AMB? DCM? ECO/COM? COM? POL? LAB? CON? ADM? RSO? AGR? (Maybe?) SCI? PAO? (Perhaps.) No, I decided we simply could not involve the United States embassy in our dilemma. I allowed that, quite probably, some Marine guard or young Foreign Service family could be in a position to offer some suggestions—even the actual product—but no, I just couldn't. Oddly enough, Madrid was the only European capital where we had no contact at the embassy or at any other American institution.

Then I remembered that before we left home, a Canadian diplomat friend had given me the name of his Candian diplomat friend stationed in Madrid. Trusting in friendship, I phoned, only to learn to my horror what my friend had never told me. His friend was the ambassador! I have always felt that the coins I had left earlier that day at the Church of Santa Maria la Mayor in Alcala de Henares precluded his being in. My

James S. Pacy is with the department of political science of the University of Vermont where he teaches a course on the craft of diplomacy. When he is not at work trying to persuade Congress to authorize a peanut butter allotment for all US missions abroad, he is busily engaged bombarding State with his ideas on how every FSO-1 can have his or her own embassy.

perceptive wife argued that, anyway, Canadians go for marmalade.

I still had the Madrid phone directory in hand and took a moment to obtain the number of one of my interviewees. As I was flipping through the "S" listing, my eye caught the unexpected name: Skorzeny, Otto.

"Otto Skorzeny!"

As I shrieked his name I bewildered the family, and my wife agitatedly inquired, "Who's that?"

"Well," I began, "at one point during World War II Skorzeny swept in from the air and rescued Benito Mussolini for Hitler."

"With peanut butter?" my son asked incredulously.

No, I explained that this guy had a certain evil genius and—Ruth now interrupted and insisted that I be serious.

But, under the circumstances, how could I? For a brief moment I enjoyed the lunacy of it all—the idea of an ex-Nazi turning up peanut butter for the son of an American political scientist in Madrid. Sort of the last rescue, *nicht wahr*? The mind boggled at phoning Skorzeny in my halting German about peanut butter. I recall being utterly delighted at the thought that he would hang up on me in disgust and would then ponder the call for days, nay, for the rest of his life; he would have gone to his grave wondering if it had been a message from Martin Bormann, or better yet, from Argentina.

As one who teaches a course on diplomacy, our predicament did cause me to wonder as to the relationship, if any, between peanut butter and American diplomacy. Was it the most American of foods? Was there any food item more suggestive of the American national character? We talk of apple pie, of ketchup, of hamburgers, but isn't peanut butter the foremost binder helping to maintain the fabric of American society? Is this reflected in our Foreign Service? More seriously, is there any tie between peanut butter and American diplomatic efficacy? Now, here was something that Charles Thayer, William Macomber, Ellis Briggs, or even Smith Simpson, had never thought of.

I was amused by the potential of a scholarly article on the subject. I could envisage questionnaires, tabulations, statistics, graphs, etc., the results being published in *The American Political Science Review* and then picked up by the Washington *Post*:

> The article also disclosed that FSO-4s ate more peanut butter than any other class. DCMs in class II embassies ate the least peanut butter. At hardship posts, Ivy League male FSOs married to state university graduates ate 6.7 percent less peanut butter than all other FSOs. The political appointee vs. career chiefs of missions peanut butter percentages were being withheld for later announcement by Hodding Carter III, but, it was learned, would not exceed a 5 percent i.q. (indulgence quotient) for the former.

So, peanut-butterless, we moved on to Toledo where we were soon immersed in the great tourist attraction, the Alcazar, and the story of the siege it had withstood during the Spanish Civil War. When the guide spoke of the deprivation and hunger of the defenders under siege, Ben nodded all too understandingly. When the guide played the recording of the famous telephone conversation relating the refusal of the Alcazar commander to surrender even though the enemy held his son, Ben gazed straight at me. As the father was heard saying to the siege commander, "Shoot my son. The Alcazar will never surrender," I felt that it was I who was under siege and that Ben was role-playing young Luis Moscardo to the hilt. After all, wasn't it I who had brought him to this awful purgatory involving the worst agony of man: a father's inability to secure peanut butter for his only son! Unlike Colonel Ituarte Moscardo, I surrendered. It was time for a very serious effort.

I had spied on my map the southern coastal city of Rota. Rota was a United States nuclear sub base. Surely, no self-respecting American naval installation would be without that paste of the Yanquis, peanut butter. Since we were heading south anyway, we would go to Rota.

Being denied the opiate of American youth, it was fascinating to witness Ben's withdrawal pains diminishing as we drove on to Cordoba, to Seville, to Cadiz and eventually to Rota. Intriguingly, withdrawal was the child of anticipation.

I must confess, I had never given much thought to the navy. I had been air force myself. Oh, sure, like everyone else, I knew about such things as Annapolis, Midway, Pearl Harbor, San Diego, Tijuana, etc., but I was now hoping that somewhere in that great drydock in the sky a benevolent sea lord with a peanut butter *weltanschauung*, maybe even the great Alfred Thayer Mahan, was looking down on us and as a result, there would be a bevy of nuclear sub admirals simply crazy about American peanut butter worshippers on a pilgrimage to Rota. My mind evoked the imponderability of whether Hyman Rickover liked peanut butter. Of course, I assume that under present circumstances, many US admirals would quite readily admit to liking anything made with peanuts.

At long last, Rota! As I suspected, there was a gate and there was a guard. We pulled off to the side, outside the gate. I walked to the gatehouse. A young marine lifted my spirits when he greeted me cordially, "Hi, Man, how's the world?" A quick chat revealed that we had both been in Vietnam "together," and established that my name had somehow become "Man!" I was charmed.

Now, one does not walk up to a US nuclear sub base in Spain and say, "I am an American and I want peanut butter." What *does* one say? Well, I said I was an American university professor on sabbatical leave and part of my interest centered on the college courses offered by various American universities at military and naval installations around the world. Could I be allowed to visit the American academics who offered courses on this base? "Hey, Man," that would necessitate some telephoning. Much telephoning as it turned out. I handed over my passport and my university identification card, giving name, rank and parking lot number. These were carefully studied and then the telephoning began.

While standing about waiting, I became conscious of being scrutinized by the Spanish marine on duty. It was discomforting. Did he understand English? What did he think of my story? I told myself I should look scholarly.This is difficult to accomplish. Try it sometime. What is looking scholarly? It brought to mind my doctoral diss-

ertation on King Alexander of Yugoslavia. When Alexander was assassinated in 1934, a magazine reported that Alexander looked like a small-town dentist. A dentist from Kearney, Nebraska wrote to the magazine and asked just what did a small-town dentist look like? The editor replied: like King Alexander of Yugoslavia.

The Spanish marine's optical inquisition vanished from my thoughts as the US marine put down the phone and said I could proceed onto the base and to the building housing the education offices. I thanked him profusely, collected my papers and then, suddenly, remembered my family in the car. With great trepidation, I pointed and asked, "Could they . . .?"

"Hey, Man," he'd have to make another call.

He did.

"Do they have proper ID?"

Indeed.

"Let's see it."

It was all okay. All systems were go.

Few humans have ever driven through any gate with more exuberance, such exhilaration, so much expectation, we were veritable conquistadores!

As we drove along, we kept looking for nuclear subs. We never saw one. What we did see from time to time, however, were Spanish officers in full-dress whites, with sabers. What kind of base is this, we wondered? Why the full-dress whites? Sabers, yet. Ours not to reason why because we had arrived at our destination, the education building.

A very pleasant American greeted us. She explained the college program. I paid scant attention to her commentary inasmuch as I was concentrating on when and how to drop the peanut butter bomb. Finally, an opportunity presented itself. She had just said something about the instructors all being off base that day. Immediately, I offered how terribly sorry we were to hear that, hence, we would not tarry. Before running off, however, could we impose upon her goodness to repair to the nearest commissary and purchase for a rather malcontent country man of hers, the one in the green and yellow sneakers, a large jar of peanut butter?

It took her but a brief moment to regain her composure, utter the most positive words, and reach down for her purse. Our faces shone like new Poseidon missiles. Then, horror of horrors. She tossed her purse back down and declared, "I'm sorry, I can't."

"You can't," I cried, "why not?"

"Because today is a Spanish holiday, the commissary workers are Spaniards, and the commissary is closed!"

Ugh! Like a saber through the heart!

No doubt recognizing that here was a family with a serious, if not crackbrained, problem, our gracious hostess tried to save the day. She took us over to a window and pointed. "See those bungalows over there? Well, navy personnel, many with children, live there. You can knock on any door and probably find . . ." At which point I thought to myself, yes, knowing our luck, we would probably find someone who would surmise that he was confronted by a trio of nut-crazed weirdos and who would soon be dialing base security. I politely declined the house-to-house canvass.

"El Dorado, in the form of two large jars of Skippy brought over by Ben's grandparents, awaited us in Budapest. But there we had a new problem. Ruth was dying for a real American manhattan!"

Well then, what about the officer's club, or, what about the cafeteria in the air terminal building, they serve peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. Right on! We decided on the latter and, expressing a thousand thanks, headed there. We arrived, parked and entered.

Never before had we so easily followed our noses. Those indisputably 100 percent American aromas were instantly recognizable even though we had been away from the golden arches and such for months. As we stepped into the cafeteria, our olfactory senses were joined by the sight variety in surveying those evocative symbols of the plenitude of capitalist democracy, hamburgers, cheeseburgers, french fries, baked beans, onion rings, milk shakes, chocolate cake, and dearest, merciful Admiral Mahan or whoever: peanut butter and jelly sandwiches!

We loaded three trays with enough food for one of the smaller villages on the *Costa de la Luz* and proceeded to the cashier.

Oh—oh, I knew it was too good to be true. The cashier proclaimed, "United States dollars only." We had no United States dollars. Spanish pesetas, yes. Travelers checks, yes. United States dollars, no. The cashier summoned the assistant manager. He appeared to be the kind who would understand the torment of peanut butter withdrawal. He did. He would accept a traveler's check.

Oh—oh, again! For complex reasons beyond need of enumeration here, I had only British pound sterling traveler's checks. Could he take a personal check on a Vermont bank? They use dollars in Vermont. "Check? Are you kidding? Hey, Mister, this isn't a hotel, or a bank or a tourist service." That last one hurt. Meanwhile, back in Ruth's bag, her right hand was frantically digging around until it found a slightly crumpled traveler's check wallet. As she withdrew it, one could not help but note its very malnourished condition.

There, spread before us was, literally, our meal ticket: one traveler's check for twenty (20) United States dollars. It was perused and declared okay. Ruth signed it. At last, peanut butter!

Karl Malden would have loved it.

El Dorado, in the form of two large jars of Skippy brought over by Ben's grandparents, awaited us in Budapest. But there we had a new problem. Ruth was dying for a real American manhattan!

A contact at the United States embassy killed that crisis in a matter of minutes, ably supplemented during our Budapest stay by a bartender at a posh hostelry overlooking the Danube.

Talleyrand was wrong. Above all, *much* zeal!

Association News

KEN BLEAKLEY TESTIFIES ON THE HILL

AFSA President Bleakley testified before the House Subcommittees on International Operations and Civil Service on September 27. Bleakley's testimony called for the preservation and enhancement of the role and integrity of the Service; the assurance of a strong voice for career employees in the evolution of the Service; and compensation on a par with the Civil Service, along with appropriate incentives for a lifetime of service abroad.

In enlarging on these requirements, Bleakley called for 1) a Foreign Service which advises and assists the President and Secretary of State in the formulation of foreign policy, and 2) conducts the full range of US government civilian affairs overseas on behalf of the principal foreign affairs agencies and those with major foreign affairs concerns. This would require maximum uniformity of personnel management, especially of the SFS, and the Association advocates the concept of Foreign Service officers serving each of the agencies without artificial labels. He also called for predictable and controlled career development from recruitment through retirement, as well as for consideration of the problems of overseas families.

Bleakley went on to outline the need for a strong and effective employee organization to guard against possible political abuses in the future. Such an organization should be broadly based, he said, exclusions from the bargaining unit should be minimized and the scope of bargaining should be as broad as that accorded the Civil Service.

Finally, the Association's testimony as delivered by its President, called for pay comparability throughout the Service, for the Staff Corps, for officers through the ten class system, for an end to exclusion from hardship pay for ambassadors.

Bleakley concluded by recommending that the Foreign Service undertake its own affirmative action program—with the assurance that all new entrants to the Service would receive the training and support needed to launch their careers and to compete as equals for promotion. He said "As I reminded over 500 colleagues in our address last week [printed elsewhere in the *Journal*], the Foreign Service is too small and too valuable to allow ourselves to emphasize differences arising out of artificial specialization categories, agencies, sexes, races, staff corps versus officers or union versus management. We in the Service are now hard at work tearing down those barriers. We ask your support in reporting out a bill which provides an enduring structure for those efforts."

PAY COMPARABILITY

State Management testified recently before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee and before the Board of the Foreign Service to outline four options for revising the Foreign Service pay schedule to reflect the recommendations of the Hay Associates study. AFSA commented on these four options pointing out that only two of them are actually in line with Hay's recommendations; the other two would merely mitigate the worst effects of the present system of pay discrimination against the Foreign Service.

AFSA DUES INCREASE

The secret ballot referendum on the proposal of the AFSA Governing Board to increase AFSA dues was brought to a conclusion on October 1, 1979 by the tallying of the ballots received by the Elections Committee by the announced deadline of noon of that day.

The Board's proposal was approved by majority vote, 1374 for and 1243 against.

AFSA Elections Committee

AFSA President Bleakley is sending a letter to all AFSA members providing additional information and further details concerning the increase in AFSA dues, now scheduled to become effective on March 1, 1980.

STATUS OF TRADE REORGANIZATION

On September 25, the president submitted the administration's Trade Reorganization Proposal to Congress. The 60-calendar-day clock has begun ticking: if one House of Congress does not vote the proposal down under the 60-day time limit, it will go into effect. On September 26, Senator Ribicoff and Representative Brooks introduced identical *pro forma* Resolutions to bring the issue to vote to ensure that Congress does act upon this proposal. However, this does not mean that there is a good possibility that the proposal will be voted down. AFSA was told recently by a Congressional staffer on Brooks'Committee (Government Operations) that it would pass with a ten to one majority. There will be further hearings on October 16 and 17 before the Congress; AFSA will testify again against the proposal but it is unlikely that these hearings will have any effect on the eventual success of the proposal.

Meanwhile, Ben Read and the new undersecretary of commerce, Luther Hodges Jr., signed an agreement as to how the two departments would handle the transfer of the 162 positions. This memorandum states that FSOs who transfer will carry all their present rights and prerogatives with them. Secondly, it provides for a certain number of FSO assignments to commerce which would be scaled down gradually over four years. However, there are unanswered questions about which AFSA has begun to consult with management to ensure that FSOs are protected. We will keep you informed as these talks proceed.

OUR COVER ARTIST

Felicity O. Yost is the daughter of Ambassador and Mrs. Charles Yost and works in oil, watercolor and pen and ink. She is employed by the United Nations.

NEGOTIATIONS ON THE NEW ACT

The Association's Governing Board met with Secretary Vance prior to the delivery of President Bleakley's speech on the Future of the Service. At that meeting the Secretary expressed his full concurrence in the principles outlined in the speech which appears elsewhere in this issue and his confidence that specific differences could be narrowed in negotiations between the team headed by Under Secretary Reed and the Association's team led by the AFSA President included representatives from all elements of the Service.

In a series of marathon sessions over weekends and extending though the night the negotiators succeeded in making considerable progress prior to the Association's testimony September 27 before the combined House subcommittees debating the legislation. As a result of that progress and sympathetic interest expressed by the Subcommittees in securing legislation favored by the Foreign Service, President Bleakley was able to announce to the congressional hearing that we shared the confidence expressed by the secretary. He stated that we were prepared to support a bill which secured the principles that the Association outlined after lengthy consultations with our members. The Association presented 88 specific changes to the legislation support those principles.

Management has agreed to accept roughly half of these desired changes and undertook to support them in committee mark-up in October and November. Critical areas in which agreement was reached included:

- providing clear limits on the influx of non-career officers in senior levels,
- strengthening the legislative requirement that personnel flows be based on a systematic model explicitly taking into account the requirement for regular, predictable promotions into the ranks;
- extending career officer status to AID officer parallel to that enjoyed by FSOs and FSIOs;
- protecting staff corps who would become subject to selection out by substandard performance by doubling the grandfather period to ten years or eligibility for immediate annuity, whichever comes first;
- insuring that present FSRU communicators would not be disadvantaged compared to their FSS counterparts in the possible application of the Time-In-Class (TIC) and;
- further reducing the number of employees to be excluded from the bargaining unit particularly in SY.

Critical areas in which management has not yet been able to fully satisfy AFSA's position include:

- Authorization of stand-by pay;
- Reimbursement for local customs/taxes for non-diplomatic list personnel and;
- Specification that the application of critical authorities affecting promotion and selection out (e.g., adjusting TIC rules) should be explicitly negotiable. However, we have reason to believe that AFSA's position on many of these and other outstanding issues will receive favorable consideration in the committee mark-up.

STERN NEW STATE REP

On the resignation of Charlie Hill, due to a new assignment overseas, the Governing Board unanimously selected Bob Stern to fill the vacancy as a State Representative. Bob was a member of the previous Governing Board and his commitment to the Association and its concerns extends over a long period. He hopes to strengthen the bridges from AFSA to all the other interested groups within the Service so that the Association can more effectively represent the entire Service.

JOIN AFSA
(OR ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO JOIN)

ROLE OF AFSA REPS AND AFSA KEYPERSONS

Copies of the AFSA Chapter and Keyperson Manual have been circulated in Washington to all Keypersons and overseas to all posts for the attention of the AFSA Rep. This helpful manual provides guidance on the duties and responsibilities of the Keypersons and AFSA Reps and also includes information which can be helpful to all Foreign Service employees.

In addition to outlining the overall organization of AFSA and the various methods by which AFSA members at posts abroad can cooperate in advancing their common interests, the manual includes as appendices copies of several important documents: the AFSA Bylaws, Executive Order 11636 which governs collective bargaining in the Foreign Affairs agencies, guidelines on how to file a grievance, texts of AFSA agreements concerning the use of the department's telecommunication and pouch system.

If anyone is unable to locate a copy of this manual either with the Bureau keyperson in Washington or with the AFSA Rep at a post abroad, please notify AFSA Headquarters.

EILTS RECEIVES AWARD

Hermann F. Eilts, ambassador to Egypt from 1973-79 and ambassador to Saudi Arabia from 1965-70, received the Joseph C. Wilson Award for achievement in international affairs on October 22. A $10,000 honorarium accompanied the award. Ambassador Eilts recently joined the faculty of Boston University as professor of international relations and research professor of history and political science.

SECOND CAREER

Edward William Mulcahy, former ambassador to Chad and Tunisia, has been named to the board of directors of The People-to-People Health Foundation, Inc. The foundation has as its major activity, Project HOPE, with numerous medical teaching programs in a dozen sites worldwide.

USE OF POUCH FACILITIES

AFSA's Members Interests Committee has just completed an agreement with management covering the use of pouch facilities for mailing of consumables. The pertinent regulations will be applicable to foreign service employees in State, AID and ICA. Formerly, employees had no right to use the pouch for this purpose. Under this new agreement twenty-five pounds of foodstuffs (excluding breakables, etc.) can be received by each employee and family member per year at post via pouch facilities. This agreement does not affect the employee's rights to receive clothing, medicines, etc., via the pouch. (AFSA negotiator Bill Burke.)

SPECIAL ALLOWANCE

Management and AFSA will soon begin consultations for a new agreement covering regulations on the Special Allowance. This allowance is authorized for FSOs and FSIOs who are required to work many hours of regular scheduled overtime and are not otherwise eligible to receive any form of overtime compensation. In brief, we will ask that arbitrary restrictions on positions authorized to receive the Special Allowance be removed, that the criteria employed to designate such positions take account of seasonal and crisis situations, and that the amount of the allowance be increased to 25 percent.

COMBINED FEDERAL CAMPAIGN

The Association has been told that the Secretary of State has set the period of September 24 through November 26 as the official campaign period for the 1980 Combined Federal Campaign. The goal is $340,000 and the American Foreign Service Association wishes to encourage Foreign Service employees to participate in the CFC. The Combined Federal Campaign includes 173 voluntary health and social service agencies in the United Way of the National Capital Area, 12 national health agencies and seven international service agencies. Payroll deduction may be used for contributions to the CFC and charities of the donor's choice may be designated.

AFSA/AAFSW SCHOLARSHIPS for dependent children of American Foreign Service Personnel

Materials for the 1980-1981 AFSA Merit Awards and Financial Aid programs will be ready for mailing in November, 1979. All students graduating from high school in 1980 interested in entering the merit awards program and 1980-1981 undergraduate students interested in applying for a financial aid grant from the AFSA Scholarship Fund should write to:

AFSA Scholarship Programs
2101 E Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037.

The deadline for completion of the materials is **February 15, 1980.**

These programs are made possible by funds from the AFSA Scholarship Fund and funds raised by the AAFSW Book Fair. This annual event needs support throughout the year.

In addition to the scholarship recipients announced in the September *Journal*,

TAMARA E. BROWN was awarded an AAFSW Scholarship (Trinity College);

CHRISTINE ANN CURLEY, the Charles C. and Jane K. Stelle Memorial Scholarship (Andover/Phillips Academy);

CAROL E. FARRAND, the Hope Rogers Bastek Memorial Scholarship (Mount St. Mary's College);

JONATHAN A. FISCHER, the Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship (Regis College);

MATTHEW J. HOLMES, an American Women's Group of Bonn Scholarship (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University);

PHILIPPE J. HOLSEY, an American Women's Group of Bonn Scholarship (Morehouse College);

MICHAEL A. PAULIN, an AAFSW Scholarship (University of Massachusetts);

THOMAS M. SCANLON, an AAFSW Scholarship (Monterey Peninsula College).

CONE SYSTEM REVIEW

Management has recently proposed to AFSA modification of the FSO cone system. While the proposal is still under review, AFSA is pleased to see management tackle this long-standing problem. Joe McBride and Matt Daley are chairing AFSA's task force to study and respond to the proposal. Officers' comments are, of course, welcome.

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS AGO

James B. Stewart, writing the "Twenty-five Years Ago" column in the July, 1954 *Journal*, reports as follows: "The Secretary's very heavy daily schedule reminds Cornelia Bassel of former days in the Department and the difference in the amount of work which falls to the lot of a Secretary of State. For instance when Philander C. Knox held that office (1909-13) he never went back to the Department after lunch. And yet no one could accuse the initiator of 'dollar diplomacy' of being lazy. There simply was not enough work at 17th and the Avenue to occupy the Secretary's entire day. Incidentally, Miss Bassel remembers her father telling her that a very young Philander, when a student at the University of West Virginia, was expelled for going to see 'East Lynne.' "

"News to the Field" in that same issue contained a quote from the statement on foreign policy drawn up by the CIO Executive Committee, which read: "One of the pet targets of the neo-isolationists and their hate-mongering fellow travelers has been the Foreign Service of the United States.

"The Foreign Service is made up of men and women who have done the yeoman work of American diplomacy—unheralded and often at tremendous personal sacrifice. Yet in recent years, they have been subjected to vilification and abuse, their patriotism questioned, and their role as the Nation's observers abroad placed in jeopardy.

"Eminent persons in public life, including former high officials of the Foreign Service, have testified that these attacks have shattered morale and resulted in a tendency toward conformity in reporting more suitable to a totalitarian civil service than to that of a democratic state.

"The Administration must realize that the success of American foreign policy depends in large part upon the people who are asked to conduct it.

"The Foreign Service should be actively protected against these vicious attacks if it is to remain a strong instrumentality of the national interest abroad."

Special Services

The rate for these listings is 40¢ per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail copy for advertisement and check to: Classified Ads, **Foreign Service Journal**, 2101 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20037.

HOME EXCHANGE

VACATION HOME EXCHANGES, rentals worldwide. INTERSERVICE, Box 87, Glen Echo, MD. 20768.

REAL ESTATE

Dunedin, Clearwater, Florida & surrounding areas. HOMES, INVESTMENTS, etc. HELEN CLARK REALTY-REALTOR, 353 Tilden St., Suite A, Dunedin, Fla. (813) 734-0390, evenings 733-9428.

NORTHERN PALM BEACH COUNTY, TEQUESTA and vicinity. Homes, condominiums, land, commercial. ALBERT W. POLLARD (FSR Ret) REALTOR ASSOCIATE, WILCOX GALLERY OF HOMES, 361 Tequesta Dr., Tequesta, Fla. 33458. (305) 746-8385; eve. 747-0457.

TAX RETURNS

TAX PROBLEMS, returns and representation. T. R. McCartney (ex-FS) and John Zysk (ex-IRS), Enrolled Agents. Business Data Corp., P.O. Box 57256, Washington, D.C. 20037. (703) 522-1040.

WASHINGTON UPOATE

THE WASHINGTON OVERSEAS NEWSLETTER invites you to write for a free introductory copy of our monthly newsletter. It has the news—real estate prices, food prices, restaurants, special shopping, etc.—that you need to keep up-to-date with changing Washington. Write to: Phoenix Enterprises, Box 406, Vienna, VA 22180.

BOOKS

ASIA, CHINA, ARAB MID-EAST, PERSIA. Old and rare books bought and sold. Write for catalogue or send us your offers. ASIAN RARE BOOKS INC., 507 Fifth Ave., (307), N.Y., N.Y. 10017.

SCHOOLS ANO CAMPS

PARENTS. FREE ADVISORY SERVICE. Independent schools, private camps visited and evaluated since 1936. Some European programs. For free referrals and 283-page EDUCATIONAL REGISTER, give child's age, grade, interests, needs, geographical preference and proposed entrance date. Include $.00 for Air Mail and handling: VINCENT/CURTIS, Room 219, 224 Clarendon St., Boston, MA 02116.

FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS

WORLDWIDE ENGLISH NEWSPAPERS, 65 countries! Sampler: Five countries, $2.98. FREE BROCHURE. MULTINEWSPAPERS, Box DE-J, Dana Point, CA 92629.

Foreign Service People

Birth

Belding. A daughter, Juliana Victoria, born to Susan Brand Belding and David Belding, on August 4, in South Woodstock, Vermont, granddaughter of FSO and Mrs. Robert A. Brand.

Deaths

Brennan. Edward Thomas Brennan, FSO, died on September 25 at the National Institutes of Health clinical center. Mr. Brennan entered on duty with the State Department in 1941 with the courier service and joined the Foreign Service in 1953. He served at Paris, Frankfurt, Bonn, Manila, Tunis, Bangui and as consul general in Thessaloniki. He received the USAF exceptional civilian service award in 1970 and the superior honor award in 1971. In 1975 he was named counselor for refugee and migration affairs for the US Mission to the UN in Switzerland. Mr. Brennan is survived by his wife, Denise M., two sons, Edward T., Jr., and Peter M., and a daughter Nizette, all of 9104 Kirkdale Rd., Bethesda, Md. 20034., and another son, Kevin C., with the US Embassy in Prague, and two grandchildren.

Harrison. Randolph Harrison, FSO-retired, died on August 20, in Charlottesville, Virginia. Mr. Harrison entered the Foreign Service in 1928 and served at Habana, Paris, Tegucigalpa, Rome, Rio de Janeiro, The Hague, Ankara and Damascus before an automobile accident forced his retirement in 1950. He is survived by two sisters, Mrs. Philip H. Ryan, 12 Ednam Village, Charlottesville, Va. 22901 and Mrs. James W. Watts, 4611 Hawthorne Lane, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016, a niece and two nephews.

Reade. W. Wolf Reade, FSIO-retired, died on September 4, in Boulder, Colorado. Before his retirement in 1970, he had served as cultural affairs officer in both Singapore and Hong Kong. Mr. Reade joined USIA in 1955, after serving with the Air Force in World War II and as assistant manager of the National Symphony Orchestra. He is survived by his wife, Mildred, 1927 Senda Rocosa, Boulder, Colorado, 80303, a daughter, Louise Burton of Vienna, Virginia and a son, Jon Alex Reade, Longmont, Colorado. A Wolf Reade Memorial Fund has been established at the Southern Hills United Church of Christ, 2650 Table Mesa Dr., Boulder, Colorado 80303.

Vogel. Frederick H. Vogel, FSR-retired, died on September 8, at Naples, Florida, at the age of 69. Mr. Vogel taught at several universities before entering government service, first with the Forest Service and then with AID in 1951. With AID, he served at Tegucigalpa, Asuncion, Kathmandu, Istanbul, Ankara, Kabul and Saigon before his retirement in 1970. He is survived by his wife, Helen, of Bordeaux Club #300, 4051 Gulf Shore Blvd., N., Naples, Florida 33940, two daughters, Mrs. Suzanne Dorr, Kuala Lumpur, and Dr. Kathleen McNally, Williamstown, Mass., and a sister, Mrs. Linsley Dorman, Monterey, Calif.

Williams. Ruth Finney Williams, wife of FSO-retired Jack S. Williams, died on September 16, in Vero Beach, Florida. In addition to her husband, of 18 Vista Palm Lane, Vero Beach, Fla. 32960, Mrs. Williams is survived by three daughters.

FS JUNIOR CONDUCTS NSO

Hugh Wolff, son of FSO-retired and Mrs. Hugh W. Wolff, has been selected for the staff conductor position at the National Symphony. Mr. Wolff, a 1975 graduate of Harvard with a master's degree in piano and conducting from Peabody Conservatory, was selected from a field of 14 would-be conductors by a vote of the orchestra members and NSO director Mstislav Rostropovich. Wolff's appointment is for one year during which he will conduct the majority of the NSO's educational concerts.

Chiang Kai-shek's wartime irresolution

THE JAPANESE AS A DISEASE OF THE SKIN

JOHN HUNTER BOYLE

The catalog of frustration and disillusion that grew out of the Sino-American partnership during the war with Japan belied the friendship and harmony of purpose that were projected by government press releases, Hollywood celluloid, and journalistic boosters like Henry Luce. The broken careers of "Old China Hands" like Stilwell, Davies, Service, Ludden, Emerson and others testify to the strained relations and the recriminations that lasted long after the war's end. Not the least nettling aspect of American relations with Chiang Kai-shek was the difficulty of ascertaining just how resolute was his commitment to fight the Japanese. For public consumption, both at home and abroad, the generalissimo released ringing statements which pledged resistance to the last man and defense of every last inch of Chinese territory. Japan and those who collaborated with her were vilified as contemptible beyond measure. "We maintain," he declared in 1939, "that resistance and national reconstruction have no time limit. If we do not succeed in five years, we shall go on for ten years, or even a hundred years." To all outward appearances, the line drawn between the Nationalists and their enemies was clear and firm. Rhetoric such as the following (on the occasion of the ninth anniversary of the "9-18" or "Manchurian" incident) might subtly point an accusatory finger at the United States for its economic appeasement of Japan but one finds no hint of a weakened will to resist:

> We bid the enemy to go on squandering his aerial strength in the blind and indiscriminate dropping of costly projectiles. His menaces and his destructiveness fall flat and we are content to await the time when he has used up all his American oil, engines, and parts. The real measure of his strength is a matter of common knowledge; no one is any longer intimidated by his threats.

In private, however, the generalissimo (usually through intermediaries such as Madame Chiang, T. V. Soong and H. H. Kung) constantly set before the eyes of the American (and other Western) governments the specter of a Nationalist accommodation with Japan—a "separate peace" it could be called after December 1941. America was repeatedly warned that if Japan prevailed in the struggle for China it would mean the end of the open door and the whole complex of special rights and privileges that the West had built in China for a century. And beyond that, a Japanese victory in China would surely embolden her to press her advantage by moving to Southeast Asia, a warning that needed little emphasis after German victories and the signing of the Axis Pact in 1940. Western governments were reminded that Japan was a formidable enemy and without foreign assistance for China the outcome of the war was in doubt.

The United States and Britain were pressed hard on this issue after the fall of Hankow and Canton in October 1938. In a "strictly confidential" telegram to the State Department, dated November 16, 1938, Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson reported that the British ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, had conferred with the generelissimo shortly after the loss of those cities and just one day after Premier Konoye made his "New Order in East Asia" announcement. While the generalissimo "had not talked threateningly," he had declared that the "time had now arrived when he had to give a specific statement of Britain's intentions as well as tangible evidence to the people of China at the forthcoming plenary session of the Kuomintang." Chiang suggested a loan "as an initial move on Britain's part." Naval Attaché James M. McHugh, something of a palace intimate, reported that it was his impression that the generalissimo "had presented an ultimatum to London." Soon after, McHugh himself talked with the generalissimo, who told him there was reason to believe Japan would offer China "very easy peace terms in return for an about-face towards the British." McHugh responded by asking Chiang how he would sell anti-British sentiments to the Chinese people. Before he could answer, Madame Chiang interrupted to say that "the people would accept peace with Japan if the generalissimo told them it was the best thing for China." At almost the same time, Ambassador Joseph Grew, in Tokyo, was advising Washington that his British colleague there, Sir Robert Craigie, believed that "some further concrete step in support of Chiang Kai-shek will soon have to be taken by Great Britain if they wish to avoid his being driven into the Japanese camp." An accommodation with the Japanese, for all its political hazards, would permit the Nationalists to devote their full resources to annihilating their erstwhile united front allies, the Communists, and to terminating the century-old Western domination of China through the unequal treaty system. It is arguable whether or not these goals deserved such a high priority but there is no doubt that the generalissimo felt that they did, and it is also certain that the generalissimo and the Japanese saw eye-to-eye concerning these goals.

If these threats were "mostly bluff," as many American and British observers believed, they were nonetheless credited in the right places from Chungking's point of view. They provided ammunition for Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and State Department adviser Stanley K. Hornbeck in their efforts to persuade Franklin D. Roosevelt to crusade against the neutrality legislation imposed on him by isolationist Congresses since 1935. The vision of a Nationalist collapse

---

John H. Boyle, professor of history at California State University, Chico, teaches Asian history and has written rather extensively on modern Asia. His book, China and Japan at War. 1937-45: The Politics of Collaboration, *was published by Stanford University Press in 1972. This is an expanded version of a paper he read at the Conference on the US and the Three Chinas, 1931-49 at Rutgers University, last May.*

was at least part of the explanation for the first major American grant of credit to China which was announced on December 16, 1938. I have found no evidence that Washington anticipated the defection of Chiang Kai-shek's rival, the pro-Japanese statesman Wang Ching-wei, from Chungking, which occurred just one day later. Nevertheless, as Willys Peck, chargé at the American Embassy in Chungking, commented, the announcement of the $25 million credit was "construed by the Chinese as indicating the commencement of action . . . to prevent Japan from achieving its aims in the Far East, and it now seems clear that this conviction was immensely stimulated and stiffened the will for prolonged resistance."

For the next six years, indeed almost until the last gun was fired, Chiang was to hound Great Britain and the United States with innuendo and veiled threats. But his meaning was quite clear. Without greater and greater support from the Western powers, he might find the continued struggle too burdensome for his war-weary nation. He might yield to his own anti-Western biases and to the counsel he was receiving from various quarters that he cooperate with Japan in achieving an "Asia for the Asians." In November 1940, the "Chungking crisis mill" (Michael Schaller's apt phrase) geared up to persuade the United States of the need for a much-increased level of commitment. The crisis at hand was the impending formal recognition by Tokyo of the Nanking collaboration regime established by Wang Ching-wei earlier in the year. The official ceremonies had been delayed several times while various Japanese negotiators explored last-minute possibilities of an understanding with Chiang Kai-shek, considered by many Japanese to be the indispensable partner in any lasting resolution of Sino-Japanese problems. The failure of these initiatives could be interpreted as signalling a new and harder Japanese line. Ambassador Johnson who, only weeks earlier, had glowingly reported on the high morale in Chungking, was now (November 21) writing in a totally different vein. The generalissimo had told him that if America did not counter the expected Axis recognition of the Wang regime by "showing a positive attitude," his war of resistance would be "gravely imperiled." On November 27, Johnson cabled Washington again, reporting that Chiang appeared to him a "man who has lost confidence in his ability to contend longer with the domestic situation [and] feels he has now virtually exhausted the strength of his nation in resisting aggression, in an effort as much in the interests of Great Britain and the United States as of China . . ." Moreover, Roosevelt was convinced—by somebody, rumors abounded—that "something [was] going on between Wang [Ching-wei] and Chiang" and, accordingly directed his secretary of treasury to make a "stabilization loan" to China immediately. T. V. Soong was in Washington at the time and he persuaded authorities that the timing of the loan was urgent enough to bypass congressional approval.

The crisis tactics worked. Without consulting Congress, FDR announced the most massive China aid program yet, just hours before Wang Ching-wei signed a basic treaty of cooperation with Japanese Ambassador Abe in Nanking. The United States would put $100 million at Chiang's disposal; fifty modern pursuit planes were to be sent immediately, and more were promised; and steps would be taken to allow American citizens to serve in China as aviators or aviation instructors.

It is well known that, one year later in November 1941, it was the risk of a Chinese collapse which more than any other single factor impelled Washington to deliver to Japan the harsh November 26 ultimatum. "What about Chiang Kai-shek? Is he not having a very thin diet?" asked the "former naval person," Winston Churchill, in a telegram delivered to FDR one day before the ultimatum was presented to Nomura. After a meeting with Madame Chiang in July 1942, Stilwell scribbled in his journal an account of yet another of her efforts to "throw a scare into us": the flat statement, "China can not go on without help." The pro-Japanese activity was very strong, Madame Chiang warned him, and without more help the Chinese would be forced to "make other arrangements." Two years later, in 1944, it was the turn of H. H. Kung to raise the specter of a separate peace. At issue was an ultimatum from the generalissimo calling for a billion dollar loan without which China would face inevitable economic and military collapse. Kung, whose task it was to persuade Ambassador Clarence Gauss of the need for the loan and who regarded himself as adept at dealing with Americans, hinted darkly that the Japanese had been making "some very good offers" lately. Gauss was not easily stampeded, however, By this time, the separate peace ploy no longer produced the flesh-creeping results it had in earlier years. Repeated use had served to undermine its credibility and, moreover, the grand strategy of the war had shifted American gaze from the China mainland to islands in the Pacific. Gauss forwarded Kung's remarks with his own comment that "we do not consider [them] a matter of concern."

Well-informed foreigners in China were aware that Chungking was always interested in the "peace movements" initiated by Japan, many of which filtered through high-level defectors who passed Japan's bargaining points on to Chungking for consideration. Some of these individuals abandoned collaboration after becoming exasperated with Japanese demands. Kao Tsung-wu and T'ao Hsi-sheng did so in January 1940 and were well rewarded: Kao with a comfortable life abroad and T'ao with an appointment to the generalissimo's personal staff and the honor of becoming ghost writer of *China's Destiny*. Both men had paved the way for the defection from Chungking of arch-collaborator Wang Ching-wei. The details behind Wang's departure from Chunking—he left via a routine air flight for Kunming and then on to Hanoi—will perhaps never be known, but it was widely believed that he could not have slipped through Tai Li's secret police apparatus unless the generalissimo had given his approval. For the record, Wang had announced only that he was flying to Chengtu—the opposite direction—to keep a speaking engagement, a device which would grant the generalissimo what, in Watergate jargon, became known as "plausible deniability." Chiang

had little to lose by the departure from Chungking of his old rival. If by some chance Wang were to succeed in softening the Japanese, the Japanese would eventually settle with Chungking; both before and after Wang's defection, Tokyo made it clear that, in spite of public pronouncements to the contrary, it preferred the generalissimo as an ally. And if Wang failed to extract favorable terms from the Japanese, he could be denounced as a traitor.

In any case, in the service of Wang's regime there would be opportunists (or peacemakers—the verdict of history remains clouded) who could be counted on to keep in touch. It may well be that Chou Fo-hai, who had once been a trusted aide-de-camp to the generalissimo, never severed contacts with Chungking after his defection in 1938; it is certain, at any rate, that by early 1942, at the same time that Chou served as Wang's closest adviser, he was in smooth, almost daily communication, with Chungking agents. In addition to a squad of couriers who filtered through the Japanese lines carrying messages back and forth, Chou maintained contact with Chungking via two secret radio stations, one of which was beamed towards the headquarters of his old friend, General Tai Li.

It was in fact this porous state of the front lines that most puzzled and infuriated American observers. Maps showing occupied China in black and "Free China" in white concealed the true color of much of China—gray. Mail, travelers, precious metals, agricultural and industrial commodities flowed from one zone to the other hampered by little more than peacetime levels of red tape. Technically, the goods moving inland from the coastal factories to the swollen populations of the interior were contraband; the trade was smuggling. The Kuomintang taxed the smuggled goods, to be sure, but it made no effort to stop the trade, claiming that the commerce was in fact a wholesome contribution to the economy of Free China. American officials disagreed: they noted the high percentage of luxury items and the bankruptcy of local industry caused by the inflow of products from occupied China. Worse still was the effect of the outflowing goods — principally rice — lured eastward by the high prices offered by the Japanese. Graham Peck, an Office of War Information agent, describes the seizure of rice from already starving peasants by KMT government and army officials in unoccupied Kwangtung in the drought years of 1943-44. The sale of the rice to the enemy, he writes, served to "finish off what was left of morale in unoccupied Kwangtung." Indeed, he speculates, that may have been the purpose of the Japanese in offering the high prices.

Furthermore, the smuggling trade weakened the frontiers to Japanese spying and infiltration. By 1943, Chinese security was like a sieve. At the Quebec Conference held in that year, the Combined Chiefs refused to allow Chinese representatives to sit for fear that Allied secret plans would be in the hands of the Japanese before they could be executed. As Barbara Tuchman notes, General George Marshall revealed a portion of those plans to T. V. Soong only after insisting that Soong literally raise his right hand and swear not to send any secrets to Chungking by radio.

"They had little stomach for engaging the usually superior Japanese armies on the battlefield. Nothing in their backgrounds prepared them for guerrilla-style campaigns in league with impoverished peasants in the countryside."

It was more, however, than rice and military secrets which drifted from Free to occupied China. So many Nationalist soldiers deserted and joined the ranks of "puppet" armies that embarrassed KMT information officers took to describing them as "Manchurians" or "Koreans." Or, later on when their true numbers and nationality could not be concealed, it was argued that the Chinese had surrendered because Mao's bandits had attacked them from the rear. Some of the puppet armies in the occupied areas were, of course, recruited there but the defection of division and even army-sized units was commonplace by 1943. The result was that the strength of puppet armies reached the half-million mark by late 1943; by the end of the war, the figure had reached nearly one million. The Communists published a list of 58 Central Government commanders of general rank who had not only surrendered to the Japanese but had been placed in command of puppet armies (usually assigned to garrison duty or to guarding communication lines).

In a report dated November 3, 1943, Foreign Service expert Jack Service stated that the defection of most of these generals was admitted and well known. These commanders commonly had maintained contacts—trade or otherwise—with the Japanese or with Chinese puppets under them. "When a satisfactory arrangement—probably backed up by a threat of military annihilation—is reached, the change in allegiance is made." Many of these generals, Service explained, were remnants of the old provincial, warlord armies who had been placed in undesirable front-line positions by the generalissimo, who was intent upon preserving his own armies. The front-line troops, therefore, might wear uniforms of the Nationalist Army but they were poorly paid, fed and equipped by Chungking, and they bore only the lightest sense of allegiance to the Central Government; many, in fact, had long careers of actively fighting against the Kuomintang. They had little stomach for engaging the usually superior Japanese armies on the battlefield. Nothing in their backgrounds prepared them for guerrilla-style campaigns in league with impoverished peasants in the countryside. They were therefore easy targets for offers from the Japanese or from Wang Ching-wei to resume what Service described as the "largely sedentary life of garrisoning towns and living off the people" that had been their style.

The Communists, however, saw these wholesale defections as directed—certainly permitted—by the generalissimo as part of his plan

Continued on page 45

Italian Sense and Nonsense

E. J. MANN

Unified in 1870 after years of foreign occupation and rule, Italy never did make much sense as a political entity. Hard-working northerners and easy-going southerners have in common only their occupancy of "the boot," a rocky peninsula jutting into the Mediterranean Sea, *Mare Nostrum* to ancient Romans. In the more than a century since unification, Italy's economic and political situation has changed little. By accepted modern standards of self-determination for all, Italy should not exist. But it does.

As a starter, let's look at the capital city of Rome. Despite almost daily tales of terror, crimes, and bombing, the outward appearance there is one of business as usual. Autos race madly about; buses are jammed. Multitudinous little shops are abustle with housewives; businessmen linger over heavy lunches.

Since women give color to an age or era, what is happening on the Roman fashion scene? Women are wearing below calf-length skirts, embellished with flounces, usually no bras. No split skirts. Young girls wear white denim jeans. Prostitutes and tourists wear blue jeans. Roman women dress conservatively whereas foreign females parade through city streets and across St. Peter's square in short shorts and sunback dresses. Guards stop underdressed women from entering and profaning Christendom's largest cathedral. A new sight within the past two years is the number of women walking along the streets puffing away vigorously and trailing cigarette smoke.

Prostitutes on the lower Via Veneto have upped their fees by 100 percent. On the outskirts of Rome near the "Mussolini bridge," lining the roadway, stand the hard-core ladies of the evening. After dark, they light bonfires to make their presence visible as well as to ward off the chill of the evening. Appropriately, Americans have dubbed these women "Campfire Girls," poles apart from our own estimable youth organization.

Among males, the macho symbol for the young and not so young, is a shirt open to the navel with a gold chain dangling against a hirsute chest.

Lacking tourists, the fragile Italian economy would fall apart. Fifteen million tourists visited Italy in 1978, equivalent to more than one-fourth of the Italian population. Present day Italians owe a vast debt to their ancestors who produced artistic geniuses and to those profligate princes and popes who financed their churches, villas, paintings, and sculpture. Rome boasts a staggering 450 churches, many of them architectural gems which would merit a special visit if located anywhere except in the Eternal City. Masses in these beautiful churches are attended only by a scattering of old people as an elderly priest intones his litany.

Reflecting their prosperity from sales of Toyotas and cameras, Japanese tourists swarm over Rome. Under the leadership of a guide who directs them like a kamikaze pilot, they troop through churches and museums before proceeding to expensive shops. Groups of young Japanese girls stay at the posh Excelsior hotel. An occasional honeymooning couple is doing the Grand Tour. Romans may deplore the Oriental invasion, but Gucci's is enjoying undreamed of prosperity as wealthy Japanese snatch up alligator handbags and armsful of expensive leather goods.

Let the visitor beware of Rome's petty criminals who have raised thievery to high art form, improving on the outdated technique when a man on a motor scooter would swoop up onto the sidewalk past a cafe and snatch a woman's handbag from the table. One day in late August, no less than 23 Americans called at the Rome consulate to obtain new passports, replacing those stolen the previous day and night. Each told a different tale of woe.

One American male, rubbernecking on a poorly traveled side street, had a camera bag slung over his shoulder. A car swerved close to the sidewalk. As he jumped out of the way, the bag was plucked neatly from his shoulder. An American woman, carrying a shoulder bag with no clasp, was jostled while getting off a bus. A few minutes later, she looked in vain for her and her husband's passports and train tickets. Another American woman, resident of Rome, was sitting in a cafe when an Italian woman approached, asking directions to the Piazza del Populo. Obligingly, the American rose from her chair and pointed the way. Yes, handbag containing money and jewels had disappeared by the time she resumed her seat.

While driving through southern Naples, an American motorist stopped for a red light and two blocks later found himself bumping along on a flat tire. Three "helpful" Italians drove up and helped him change the tire which presumably they had slashed. Missing after the tire change were the American's jacket and his wife's handbag. Moral: Ladies should clasp handbags to their bosoms with a lover's fervent embrace.

Although by no means cheap, Italy is one of Europe's less expensive countries. While nosediving against currencies of northern European countries, the dollar has remained relatively stable against the *lira*. Italian inflation of

E. J. Mann is a retired Foreign Service Reserve officer, who "un-retired" in August to spend a year in Germany teaching accounting and related subjects to military personnel. He writes, "This job falls under the program established by the University of Maryland 30 years ago for instructing GIs in arts other than killing."

12 percent a year has upped prices, but a good dinner for two, including a rough table wine, goes for about twelve dollars. One caveat: avoid the restaurants of central Rome where "English is spoken." Fluent English adds 50 percent to the tab. Trattorias and osterias, establishments not rated on a par with restaurants, will often purvey just as good food although the waiter will not be dressed in white tie and tails. Wherever you eat, you will have a 50-50 chance of dining on imported food.

A traveler should be prepared to shine his own shoes. Romans abandoned this profession years ago. Nor should he expect much politeness from shopkeepers who are rather a surly lot. As in any provincial town, Roman merchants bang down iron shutters over their windows and hurry home for pasta and siesta. Depending on the proprietor's need for relaxation, the shops will reopen at four or thereabouts. The siesta, dating back to bicycle days, is not going to be altered for any tourist who may find himself wondering how to occupy himself during those "sacred hours" of closure.

Defensive driving? Who needs it? Highways and boulevards are scenes of daily mayhem and crack-ups. But for the Italian's driving skill, the death toll would be astronomical. When crossing streets under the supposed protection of white stripes, the tourist must learn to keep steel nerves and never break stride despite the cars bearing down on him. Only if he hesitates is he likely to be in danger, for the wild man behind the wheel of the onrushing vehicle has calculated to miss the pedestrian by a narrow margin. Miraculously, he will swerve past the pedestrian, rounding a corner on two wheels amid a crescendo of wailing rubber as he races to the next red light. Above all, one must tread carefully, for the sidewalks are strewn with offal from what must be ten million dogs.

Ten gallons of gasoline costs about $24, but this price does not deter drivers of big Mercedes, as well as those in tiny Fiats, from roaring down the autostrada at 75 miles an hour. There are no speed limits in Italy. If there were, they would be ignored, so it makes no difference.

Although Italy is 99 percent Catholic, moral and ethical pronouncements emanating from the Vatican carry little weight. In 1974, divorce became legal; in 1977, abortion upon demand was made free to any woman eighteen years old. Many physicians are reluctant to perform abortions for fear of reprisal by anti-abortion fanatics, even as in the United States.

Educated young people, unable to find jobs, are constantly mounting demonstrations against "The Establishment." The founder of the Red Brigades' urban terror gang, alleged murderers of former president Moro, was a university graduate, unemployed after graduation in 1969.

Of the 150,000 students enrolled at the University of Rome, perhaps 30,000 attend classes. Professors likewise are indifferent to their duties. During the few times they show up at the university, they skulk around in fear of physical attack by some disgruntled student. Only in Italy could this lunatic situation be equated with education.

However futilely, the government is trying to improve the lot of 1.5 million of the unemployed. It has poured vast sums into the *mezzo-giorno*, the economically depressed countryside south of Rome, with few apparent results. In order to sustain present employment, the government has supported bankrupt industries. One consequence of this support is that there are no rewards for efficiency. Capitalists are unwilling to invest any of their own money in plant modernization, often asking the government to underwrite such costs. Italian production has perforce fallen behind that of the rest of western Europe.

Between 1948 and 1979, the star of the Communist party was rising steadily. In the 1979 elections, the party suffered a modest setback, losing about four percent of the vote it had gathered in the elections of 1976. After the Moro murder and the "kneecapping" of several industrialists, plus numerous bombing incidents, moderate voters turned against the Communists. After all, who might be next on the hit list if they gained control? A tiny new Radical Party, composed of ecologists and civil libertarians, has come into being, attracting many younger voters disillusioned with the Communists.

Modern Italy seems cemented together by clever politicians, descended perhaps from Machiavelli, the supreme *litterateur* of this arcane art. Enrico Berlinguer, the Communist party leader, coined the Machiavellian word, Eurocommunism, to distinguish the Western version from the repressive Soviet brand of communism. In pushing Eurocommunism—renouncing revolution and accepting a democratic parliamentary system—Berlinguer managed to alienate many of his old time colleagues, the pro-Moscow Communists. Berlinguer has been pushing the dominant Christian Democrats toward what he terms a "historic compromise," that is, a joining together to rule the nation. Christian Democrats, however, are wary of any rapprochement.

Yet it is debatable whether the Communists really desire an equal voice in government. It is far easier to stand aside as a critic rather than to shoulder responsibility for unpopular decisions. More importantly, the Communists fear the economic, not the spiritual, power of the Vatican which has wealth estimated as high as $12 billion. Vatican money might be withdrawn from a Communist controlled state, as would loans from Germany, the United States, and other foreign lenders. Should the economy then collapse, near revolution or a military takeover might ensue. Military men are traditionally rightists who would not stand casually by and watch a leftist takeover.

Older Italians speak with some respect of Mussolini who, however hapless in war, did bring order and security to pre-war Italy. While avoiding Mussolini's repressive regime, post war Italian democracy has not been able to match his other feats.

Naive Americans are firmly convinced that any regime that is not "democratic" should be censured, condemned, or even overthrown. In what image Italy will be remolded—Communist, Fascist, or democratic, only time will reveal. In the past Italy has survived invasions, foreign rule, autocracy, and conquest. As was said of nineteenth century Britain, Italy will "muddle through."

Book Essay

Early Relations between Malta and the United States

L. BRUCE LAINGEN

Malta? Where's that?" the nurse in the medical unit said to me when she glanced at my papers as I took my medical exam en route to Malta. "isn't that the place they used to call Ceylon?"

Well, it isn't. Nor is it the place, as some also have been heard to say, where Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill had one of their trysts during World War II. That was Yalta. (Roosevelt did *transit* Malta on the way to Yalta—and a handsome marble plaque on the walls of the Palace of the Grand Masters of the Order of the Knights of St. John in Valletta records the eloquent words he spoke then about the heroism of the Maltese in the face of some of that war's heaviest and most sustained bombing attacks.)

Such examples of mistaken or non-identity are frequent for Malta. Not all bad, perhaps, for those of us who rather like our Shangri-Las to remain that way. Inevitable, perhaps, given the fact that the Sixth Fleet—by policy of the Maltese government—long since stopped calling here. And that so few American tourists yet find reason to visit Malta, which—if you still don't know—is a country in the middle of the Mediterranean made up of not one but three inhabited islands of both scenic and historic charm.

All of which makes the more interesting a book recently published in Malta by a Maltese physician* (who incidentally has never been to the United States) recounting a surprising degree of contact between us as a newly independent state and the Maltese—who were then, as they are now, a remarkable example of a people and culture that have absorbed and survived the impact of centuries—indeed millennia—of political penetration and change from outside these small islands.

That contact, as described by the book's author, Dr. Paul Cassar, included the presence in the American colonies in the years preceding our independence of "a native of the isle of Malta" by name of John Pass (a corruption of the Maltese family name Pace). That Maltese fellow had set himself up as an ironmonger in Philadelphia in the mid-eighteenth century and his name is to be found today on the Liberty Bell as one of the artisans who helped recast that bell after it cracked the first time and before it cracked a second time in 1835.

Another early contact described by Dr. Cassar was a product of an effort by the Knights of Malta in the seventeenth century to establish colonies of Maltese settlers in the Western Hemisphere. In 1653 the island of St. Croix in the present-day Virgin Islands and several other islands were acquired by the Knights—and for a brief period, before their subsequent resale, these islands became known as the Maltese Antilles.

In the early 1790s the Knights of Malta—then in their last decade of sovereign rule in Malta—in communications from their diplomatic representatives in Europe to their American counterparts, pressed the idea of a treaty of union and alliance between the United States and the Grand Master. As the Maltese chargé in Paris wrote to his American diplomatic colleague there, Minister James Monroe, Malta's position in the Mediterranean provided "an asylum, provisions and succour of every kind . . . and even protection against the Algerine pirates." He proposed the acquisition by the Knights of territory in the United States in exchange for the use of Maltese harbors and the protection of American shipping by the Order's navy against the corsairs of Algiers. Monroe apparently saw enough merit in this idea to pass it on to Washington—but nothing came of it, among other reasons because of the demise of the Knights' sovereignty in Malta (to France first and then to Britain) less than a decade later.

Yet only a few years thereafter, the Grand Harbor in Malta provided exactly that kind of protection—and indeed a base of sorts—for American naval vessels engaged in action against the Barbary pirates. In the early 1800s, such American warships as the *Constellation,* the *Constitution,* the *Chesapeake* and the *Philadelphia* operated occasionally out of Malta—the *Philadelphia* eventually captured by Barbary pirates when it went aground off Tripoli but later boarded and burned in a celebrated action by a party of American seamen dressed, as Dr. Cassar's book notes, as Maltese sailors and led by a man who became famous in American naval history—Stephen Decatur.

Subsequently the nineteenth century in Grand Harbor saw frequent visits by American ships with names famous in American naval history—including the *North Carolina* (a ship said to have had a library of 4000 volumes) whose visit in 1827 caused an eyewitness to write of its triple tiers of guns, its bands, marines and flags, as "a spectacle of inimitable grace." And in 1837, the frigate *Constitution*—then the flagship of the American Mediterranean squadron—celebrated Washington's birthday in Grand Harbor by dressing its flags and firing a "feu de joie" of 26 guns—one for each state—an event recorded in a colorful painting that hangs in the museum of the Naval Academy at Annapolis.

But for those of us in the Foreign Service, perhaps the most interesting part of Dr. Cassar's book is that describing the problems of early American consuls in distant Malta. A consular presence began in Malta as early as 1796, when a British citizen named William England was designated consul. It was not until 1834, however, that the first American citizen became consul in Malta—a gentleman with the distinguished name of W. Winthrop Andrews, from Boston, of course. He was destined to serve in Malta until his death in 1869 and his body lies today in a handsome tomb in a cemetery just outside the entrance to Valletta.

Mr. Andrews's tour was long and frequently eventful but—more often than not—ignored by a distant and parsimonious Department of State. Dr. Cassar records the following example that suggests how much times have changed—and perhaps how much they haven't: "Mr. Andrews felt frustrated by official parsimony . . . as the following incident shows. On the 30th November 1838, Her Majesty Queen Adelaide, dowager queen of England, landed at Malta. The Mal-

**Early Relations Between Malta and the United States of America,* by Paul Cassar. Midsea Books Ltd., Valletta, 1976

tese government invited the inhabitants of Valletta to illuminate their houses for the occasion. This appeal met with the desired response on the part of the people and of all the foreign consuls including Mr. Andrews. The expense incurred by the American consulate to illuminate the building with twelve pounds of candles amounted to twelve dollars and ninety-six cents. When the bill was passed on to Washington the Department of State declined to meet this expenditure.

"Mr. Andrews was understandably upset. 'I did it,' he wrote in a despatch on the 25th July, 'not in accordance with my own wishes but as an American holding the office of consul in an English colony. How, sir, I could have acted otherwise I am at a loss to determine. With the consulate of the United States situated in one of the best streets of Valletta with many of the houses around me tenanted by English officers, who are employed in the civil, military and naval service of Great Britain, with a general illumination and the streets crowded with people, I had no alternative but to act as I did. Had I done otherwise, had I remained with a solitary lamp glimmering in my office or in darkness, I should very probably have had my windows broken with unknown hands and myself insulted. Had such been the case, sir, may I be permitted to enquire if the department would have supported my conduct? Her Majesty has expressed her determination to visit Malta again. Should such be the case, during the time I may remain as consul, may I request instructions how I should act?' "

Dr. Cassar notes that the archives fail to record whether, if ever, the department responded to this appeal. One suspects it didn't.

Mr. Andrews's income from his consular duties at Malta was at no level to cover even this minor expense. In September 1842 he plaintively pointed out to the secretary of state that "my situation in Malta is a peculiar one. Both the consuls nearest to me on the coast of Africa have two thousand dollars a year, while nothing is allowed to me, and my fees for the last two months have amounted to only four dollars. I am not engaged in commerce and, therefore, having no clerks, would ask, if I am appointed a despatch agent that a sufficient sum may be allowed me to cover my expenses."

A year later he appealed again, noting that the fees deriving from his office of consul amounted to only two dollars a month. While Washington ignored or deliberated over his appeals, Consul Andrews's financial situation did occasionally improve—witness the effect of the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854 when so many US ships (carrying French troops to the Crimea or coal to Malta from Britain) transited Malta that his consular fees rose to $714.59 in the third quarter of that year—a sum dutifully reported to the department, together with the observation that it was a larger sum than he had received in any one year since coming to Malta in 1834.

But this was only temporary relief. In 1860—after 25 long years in the Service—he noted that during this time there had not been "a single year when the fees of office could support a family in a respectable manner." He had not been to the United States in 14 years, while during the previous ten years he had absented himself from the consulate for only 22 days.

So it went, until at last his financial worries were relieved in 1861 with news that legislation had been enacted according him "an annual compensation of fifteen hundred dollars" which, however, was to cease "with the restoration of internal peace within the United States." Why that should be, Dr. Cassar does not explain, but he notes that Andrews's badgering of the department finally bore fruit with the official news in 1866 that Malta had at long last been put on the paid list of consulates.

There it remained, until Maltese independence from Britain in 1964 and its transformation into an embassy. Only briefly, for a few years beginning in 1942, when the consulate was closed because of war conditions until its reopening in 1949, was there any interruption in the long period of American consular and diplomatic representation in these historic islands.

L. Bruce Laingen served as ambassador to Malta from 1977-79 and is now assigned as a senior inspector in the Inspection Corps. A native of Minnesota, he has been a member of the Foreign Service since 1949.

Bookshelf

A Great Reference Book

THE TIMES ATLAS OF WORLD HISTORY, *Geoffrey Barraclough, editor. Hammond Incorporated (USA) or Times Books Limited (Great Britain), $60.00.*

This book is far more than a collection of maps. Think of it as an historical encyclopedia, with special attention to the geographic impact of historical change, which is very well illustrated.

The main part of the book consists of about 270 pages of maps, grouped under seven historical eras ("The World of Early Man," "The First Civilizations," "The Age of European Dominance," etc.). Within each category, maps, each accompanied by very helpful essays of from a few hundred to perhaps a thousand words, deal with various themes: "The Rise of the United States to World Power, 1867-1917"; "Africa Before Partition by the European Powers, 1800 to 1880"; or "From Hunting to Farming: the Origins of Agriculture," to name a few. The essays are tightly written and aimed at the informed adult reader, but good high school students would probably not find them too difficult. The choice of map scales and projections is varied and avoids the monotony of map-after-map which sometimes afflicts atlases. On a few occasions the editor was unable to resist squeezing in one more category of fact, the result being perhaps more detail than necessary, but this is not a major problem.

There is good coverage of Europe, but it is not Euro-centric. The Far East, the Indian subcontinent, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere all get their due. Added to this is a good world chronology of important events, a 37-page glossary of short paragraphs on people, places, events, and so on, and a useful index. The paper is good and the binding is strong.

This is the kind of reference book Foreign Service families would want to have in their homes, especially overseas where local reference resources may be limited. Embassy libraries should buy it too.

—CHARLES O. CECIL

Book Essay

Iran Then and Now: The Mystique of Foreign Power

EDWARD H. THOMAS

Battered from many sides, the CIA no longer inspires the awe it once did. But a paradox from its heyday remains unexplained: How could an intelligence agency be so often unintelligent in its judgments and at the same time so effective in its operations?

Reexamination of a classic early CIA "success," the overthrow of Iranian Prime Minister Mossaddegh and the restoration of the shah to his throne in 1953, helps explain the puzzling duality of the agency's reputation. That the CIA was involved in the operation has long been known, of course. Indeed, the director of the time, Allen Dulles, and others soon afterward began boasting about the case openly, even in print. But it is only now, in a forthcoming book by the "field commander" of the exercise*, of which excerpts have appeared in the press, that at least some of the details are becoming known to the public.

On the one hand, Kermit Roosevelt's account demonstrates lack of understanding of the Iranian scene so clearly that one is astonished he would want to publish his story now, when the benefits of hindsight are available. It is not merely that he knows no Persian, the national language, and was thus virtually unable to communicate with such a key actor in the drama as General Fazlollah Zahedi (father of the former Iranian ambassador in Washington), the man chosen to replace Mossaddegh. More than that, the flippancy pervading the excerpts reveals shocking insensitivity to Iranian values. For example, Roosevelt at one point tries to amuse the shah by telling him some of the nicknames assigned by the CIA to actors in the scenario: "Boy Scout" for the monarch himself, "smart ass" for the army chief of staff, and "the old bugger" for Dr. Mossaddegh—a man revered by many Iranians as a national hero.

Yet somehow, as Kermit Roosevelt and his CIA colleagues wander like creatures from another planet about a Tehran whose inhabitants they are unequipped and unmotivated to comprehend, conferring with "Laughing Boy" and "The Mad Musician," pausing for a vodka-lime or to listen to the record of their theme song, "Luck Be a Lady Tonight," somehow the thing comes off—Mossaddegh is toppled and arrested, Zahedi becomes prime minister, and the shah returns from his self-imposed exile in Baghdad and Rome. What magic did these real-life James Bonds work?

Roosevelt's account, at least in the excerpted version so far published, leads to a surprising conclusion: that all the essential steps in the operation were carried out by Iranians! It was the shah, after all, who appointed Zahedi to replace Mossaddegh, it was an Iranian officer who led a task force of Iranian soldiers to deliver the shah's directives, and it was Iranian organizers who assembled a mob of Iranians to demonstrate in favor of the shah and Zahedi.

Then why was the CIA needed at all? Obviously not simply as a conduit for American financing, for the whole operation, according to Roosevelt, required less than $100,000 worth of rials.

No, there was another reason—one that points up the difference between the world America dominated in the early '50s and the far less tractable world we face in the late '70s. In 1953 the shah and his Iranian backers had all the capabilities they needed to overthrow Mossaddegh—but they would not do the job without us because they *assumed* that such jobs could only be pulled off by those who really ran the world, or at least that part of it rather inaccurately labeled the "Free World." Therefore they would not exercise their capabilities unless we so directed them. Their belief in their own impotence helped make it true, and at the same time inflated our own confidence in our capacity to control events far from our shores.

A world view that sees happenings everywhere fitting into a Master Plan elaborated in London, Washington and Moscow is perhaps not unique to Iranians, but they have more excuse than most others for holding that attitude, given their historic role as a buffer between the expanding British and Russian empires and more recently as a frontier in the Cold War. Since in this theory the Great Powers control matters like changes of government in lesser countries, it would be futile to act without them. Within each Power, moreover, regardless of the formal institutions that ostensibly insure public participation, it is assumed that all important decisions are actually made behind closed doors by a handful of powerful men who really pull the strings that count.

Given the currency of this outlook among Iranians, the CIA role in the summer of 1953 makes perfect sense. The 33-year-old king of a poor and backward country, lacking the self-confidence he later developed and beleaguered by a charismatic prime minister, appears at a midnight tryst to meet someone he has been told represents the men who run the world of those days—Churchill, Eden, Eisenhower and the Dulles brothers, John Foster and Allen. Reading now the account of the agent he encountered, one can imagine the reassurance the shah must feel when, peering through the darkness, he recognizes a familiar face and extends a warm greeting: "Good evening, Mr. Roosevelt. I cannot say that I expected to see you, but this is a pleasure."

For, of course, it was natural that Roosevelts would be among the master planners of world destiny, the powerful men who had evidently decided now to favor this young monarch. Who could be more appropriate than a grandson of the president whose "big stick" made the United States a Great Power? Kermit Roosevelt's very manner with the Persian king of kings, for whom he outlined the operation as though to a pupil, reinforces the master control theory. The cleverest touch is a phrase the CIA field commander composes himself but gratuitously attributes to President Eisenhower: "If the Pahlavis and the Roosevelts working together cannot solve this little problem, then there is no hope anywhere." To a ruler whose vanity only became fully apparent in later years, this admission to the board of directors managing the world must have meant a great deal.

*COUNTER-COUP, *by Kermit Roosevelt. McGraw-Hill, $12.95*

A quarter of a century later, as the troubles that grew into a revolution began to develop, many Iranians at first assumed that those events, like all others, were deliberately staged as part of some master plan. The most common theory held that it was all somehow connected with foreign oil interests. As time passed this theory became more difficult to maintain—though even today there are those who believe that Ayatollah Khomeini himself was brought to power by the world's puppet masters and who confidently await the further unfolding of a diabolically clever scheme. Perhaps the shah imagined, as his plane took off from Tehran last January, that his temporary departure was but a ploy in the master plan of the world directorate to end the troubles in his realm so that he could reclaim not only his throne but also his seat on the board of world directors.

But whatever illusions may have been or still be held, in fact the rules had changed. In 1978 and 1979 the shah needed no help in dismissing or appointing prime ministers, but even doing so three times could not alter the course of events. By this time he had one of the best equipped armed forces in the world, trained and advised by American military personnel, but even martial law could not hold the lid on. He also had his own intelligence service, one that had been launched with CIA guidance but had gone on to develop certain capabilities far beyond those of its mentors. SAVAK could and did organize pro-shah demonstrations, but these only provoked the shah's burgeoning opposition to enlarge their own manifestations.

Nor was the difference due to lack of Great Power backing in the more recent instance. On the contrary, the United States went out of its way time and again in 1978 to voice support for the shah—far more than it had done in 1953. Other major countries did the same, in varying degrees, with none backing the opposition.

In 1953 a little essentially moral support for the shah from the United States and Britain, conveyed by Kermit Roosevelt and his CIA colleagues, was sufficient to induce all concerned—*including most of the opposition to the shah*—to play the roles assigned to them. Our action was roughly the equivalent of the classic Great Power maneuver of sending a warship close to a small country to stress the Power's interest regarding an internal matter. By 1978 the royal side in Iran was infinitely stronger and more confident, at least at the outset, but the opposition refused to play dead simply because those who had been managing things for so long wanted it so. And of course that was the meaning of the revolution, that was what made it a revolution rather than a *coup d'état* like the operation of 1953.

In 1953 Iranians themselves believed, and thereby encouraged us to believe, that we could determine their political fate. And if we could "win" Iran then, our present leaders must be to blame for losing Iran now. In truth Iran was not ours to win or lose, but we were undeniably on the losing side in 1979—a direct consequence of being so intimately identified with the side for whose victory we took credit in 1953.

Edward H. Thomas entered the Foreign Service in 1954. He served as vice consul in Tabriz, consul in Mashhad, assistant Iran desk officer and as Peace Corps director in Iran. In the private sector he directed an English language training program in Isfahan and helped form and direct a joint Iranian-American manpower development company. *(Editor's Note: See additional review on page 36.)*



Bookshelf

Reaping the Whirlwind

COUNTER-COUP: THE STRUGGLE FOR THE CONTROL OF IRAN, *by Kermit Roosevelt, Harper and Row, $10.95.*

This book is a firsthand account by Kermit Roosevelt of how he and a tiny group of CIA agents and native conspirators engineered the coup that in the summer of 1953 ousted Prime Minister Mohammed Mossaddegh of Iran and restored the shah to control of his country.

Widely heralded as the event that saved Iran for the West, a close reading of Mr. Roosevelt's book cannot help but raise troublesome questions about the wisdom of this gratuitous act of covert intervention. Was it really justified? Was there really a Soviet threat? Would the shah be playing tennis on his palace grounds today if we had allowed the Mossaddegh "revolution" to run its predestined course?

Mr. Roosevelt's book, well-written and informative though it may be, answers none of these questions. The uninitiated reader, particularly of the younger generation, will be puzzled by the author's account of why the Dulles brothers, with only the flimsiest justification, concluded that the advent to power of an elderly eccentric of palpably nationalist leanings presented Iran with the threat of an imminent Soviet takeover. Or, since at that time oil was not an issue, how nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company constituted a threat to US "national security." The same reader will be even more baffled when he finds Dr. Mossaddegh described as a *right-wing* politician, regarded with indulgent amusement by President Truman and Secretary of State Acheson, while the total number of Soviet agents in Iran, apart from the small, local Communist party, is estimated at no more (and probably fewer) than the half-dozen agents fielded by the United States itself.

After reading this book, the temptation becomes overwhelming to view the cold-warriors of the '50s as living in a fantasy world in which amateurs were allowed to tinker with political dynamite. In the case of Iran, we are now reaping the whirlwind sowed by their ill-considered meddling of a quarter century ago.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

A Great Anbassador

THE PAPERS OF ADLAI E. STEVENSON: *Ambassador to the United Nations. 1961-1965. Volume 8, Walter Johnson, ed. Little, Brown, $25.*

No one thinks of the ambassadorship to the United Nations as an easy post. It is one of the most exacting in our profession. The occupant must stand up before the representatives of every other country in the world and explain, defend and win as much support as he can for our policies and diplomacy on a multitude of issues relating to every area of the world. He must also be an adept negotiator. Since our policies and diplomacy cannot possibly please everyone and each one of them demands a nice balancing of national and world interests, the position requires a man of great erudition, political sophistication and experience, patience and both forensic and negotiating skill.

To succeed, the ambassador must also win respect for himself, as an individual. A diplomat admired for what he himself is places some restraint upon criticism of his government. Personal qualities and character count for a lot in all forms of diplomacy and the parliamentary type practiced at the UN is no exception.

This difficult role Adlai Stevenson played with grace. This does not mean he did not have his differences with his government and his frustrations. He had plenty. For four and a half years he represented a government whose presidents pulled terrible boners (one lying to him in a way to humiliate him publicly) and put youngsters of little political experience and know-how in White House and State Department positions who felt they could tell the UN ambassador how to present his arguments and maneuver in the General Assembly and Security Council. What saved him were his forebears who bequeathed him a character, culture, sense of duty, patience and intellect which enabled him to bear all things, hope all things, endure all things. He was what the French call "a friend of the heart" for, great-hearted as he was, he saw through to the hearts of others. Perhaps he was not representative of America, as so many are trying to make our diplomatic service, but he represented our best and that is the true mission of politics and diplomacy.

So this final volume of *The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson,* edited by Professor Johnson, is a rewarding one for all of us in the profession, containing many heart-warming letters and truly great addresses of a learned and cultured man. Would we had a larger reservoir of his ilk on which to draw for our political and diplomatic responsibilities.

—SMITH SIMPSON

Eyewitness in Shanghai

CHINA: *An Uncensored Look, by Julian Schuman. Second Chance Press, Sagaponack, NY. 11962. Hardcover $12.50; Paper $5.95.*

During WWII the author studied Chinese at Harvard under the rigorous auspices of the Army Specialized Training Program. But, he never got to China—only as far as Japan. The war won, he resumed Chinese studies at Yale. Upon completing them, he sailed for China, arriving at Shanghai on December 8, 1947.

For the next six years he reported on events in China (the downfall of Chiang and the Kuomintang and the rise to power of Mao and the Communist Party) for ABC broadcasting, Denver *Post,* Chicago *Sun-Times* and other media in the US and elsewhere. A *rara avis* among foreign correspondents in Shanghai, he was specially qualified for his assignments by his facility in spoken and written Chinese and his intense interest in China and the Chinese. That he remained in China three years longer than any other American newsman makes his eyewitness account of unique value. Anecdotes and conversations, as well as astute analyses of turbulent conditions, make this memoir of absorbing interest.

First brought out in 1956 by an obscure publisher (*Whittier*), who braved McCarthyism, the book didn't sell. In rejecting the manuscript, one leading publisher said: "The subject of Red China has to be handled with asbestos gloves." And it was.

It is appropriate, timely, and fortunate for those who wish to know

how it was in China during the momentous years from 1948 through 1953 that the Second Chance Press reprinted this book. Its time has come.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

The Spanish in Russia

HITLER'S SPANISH LEGION, *The Blue Division in Russia, by Gerald R. Kleinfeld and Lewis A. Tambs. Southern Illinois University Press, $25.00*

It must be a sign of generational change; this history of *Hitler's Spanish Legion* is a relatively sympathetic account of Generalissimo Franco's wartime collaboration with the Nazis in Russia.

It is not good literature, however, and as history, the scholarship is benumbing—a staggering amount of documentary material and survivor interviews went into this vacuum cleaner. Furthermore, the organization is chaotic, often switching from chancelleries to headquarters to foxholes and back without logical transition. Even some otherwise vivid combat sketches end up in total confusion.

But the book has its merits, in addition to containing more than you ever knew about the remarkable Spanish role in the Leningrad campaign. There are some highly diverting confrontations between German and Spanish military mentalities, particularly where Spanish concepts of discipline clashed head on with the Prussian. But there is also the reluctant German respect for an ally's fighting qualities and ferocity in holding untenable positions and some unusual vignettes of contact between individual Russians and their enemies on the front.

Most significantly, Kleinfeld and Tambs manage, despite their shortcomings, to recreate the political atmosphere of Spain of the early '40s: a fiercely nationalistic, almost medievally religious country just emerging from devastating civil war; its new leaders traumatized by the Soviet intervention on the Loyalist side; obsessed with the British presence in Gibraltar; anticipating a Bolshevik flood over Europe in the event of a German defeat.

And they paint an equally revealing portrait of Franco, initially carried along by Hitler's early triumphs, but nonetheless determined to keep the Germans out of Spain, and Spain out of the war, no matter how much Berlin pressed. Their evidence shows Franco dispatching the Blue Division to keep his foot in the German door without irrevocably committing Spain to the Nazi cause. At the same time, he is shown using it to remove from Madrid his own Falangist hotheads who wanted Spain more deeply involved in what they considered an anti-Bolshevik crusade. They, like many other similarly motivated Europeans, volunteered to fight the USSR.

Just as dispassionately, Franco then scuttled the whole venture once the outcome of the war was clear. He had achieved his objective at comparatively low cost, all considered. (The price the Blue Division itself paid was something else: 4,500 of its 47,000 men died in the effort, 17,000 were seriously wounded or ill, and 300 captured in the three years around Leningrad.)

The authors intended *Hitler's Spanish Legion* to be a tribute to the Spaniards who fought in Russia. They end up paying tribute to the political shrewdness of Dictator Franco.

—KARL F. MAUTNER

JFK Earning His Salary

THE BRINK: CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS, 1962, *by David Detzer, Thomas Y. Crowell, $11.95.*

David Detzer made full use of the extensive source material in this absorbing and dramatic account of the inner workings of the American government during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Bobby Kennedy, of course, emerges as one of the heroes of that perilous episode, counseling restraint and skillfully conducting the negotiations with the newly arrived Ambassador Dobrynin. Detzer provides a vivid picture of JFK's impressive group of advisers which included Rusk, McNamara, Ball, McCone, Acheson, and Dillon. An outsider, Columbia University professor Zbigniew Brzezinski, counseled forceful action in a telegram to the White House: "Any further delay in bombing missile sites fails to exploit Soviet uncertainty." His advice was not taken.

Detzer believes Khrushchev was motivated in part by the desire to deter an American invasion of Cuba (the Bay of Pigs was fresh in everybody's memory). If so, Khrushchev badly miscalculated because the deployment of the missiles nearly brought on what they were designed to prevent.

At the height of the crisis, Detzer says there may have been as many as 40,000 Russian troops and 350 Russian tanks in Cuba. The American ultimatum to the Russians called for the removal of missiles but most of the troops and tanks were withdrawn as well. A handful remained but the crisis had passed, at least for the next seventeen years.

Detzer's narration of JFK "earning his salary," as he put it to Dean Acheson, is first class. And Detzer introduces the day-to-day events of October with a useful though somewhat sketchy analysis of the backgound: Soviet purposes, Batista's Cuba and Castro's Cuba, and the sorry state of US-Cuban relations.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

A Valuable Guide

ROAMING 'ROUND HOLLAND, *by Patricia G. Erickson. E. T. Heron, Ltd.*

Not only was the original title of this book, *Roaming 'Round Rotterdam,* more alliterative, it was more accurate. More accurate still, though infinitely more awkward, would be *Living in or near Rotterdam or Staying There for an Extended Visit with Children.*

It is full of commonsense information expanded from that which is found in ordinary guidebooks and aimed specifically toward families with children. The sections on schools, churches, health care, camps, and sports would be invaluable for those planning to live in Holland.

In spite of the unforgivable omission of the Royal Tropical Museum (good for ages 6 and up, attractive snack bar), the book is a must for Holland-bound families.

—KAREN FOSTER

Book News

Just issued last month, too late for review in this issue, *Our Neighbors Upstairs: The Canadians*, by the late William Redman Duggan, from Nelson-Hall Publishers, $16.95 cloth, $8.95 paper. "Red" Duggan was a Foreign Service officer for 30 years.

USICA AND THE TRIUMPH OF BUREAUCRATIC STYLE

from page 19

frameworks such as "communications tensions" than to relate to the real world with all its ambiguity and complexity. With USICA, part of this impulse to invent new frameworks springs from the understandable need to stake out a piece of turf independent of the State Department and other agencies with foreign affairs responsibilites. In this way, the need to justify the continuation of USICA as a separate agency then becomes a bulwark of the institution. Never mind that as a concept the "communications tensions" formulation brings a distorting prism to what should be an attempt to probe more deeply into the causes of misperception in international politics. Staking out the turf may be necessary to bureaucratic survival, but it is unfortunate if our search for uniqueness leads us to divorce ourselves from other aspects of international relations.

4. *The Mystique of Quantification.* More than ten years after the mistakes caused by our tendency to quantify became apparent in Vietnam, perhaps fifteen years after many scholars first protested the limiting of political science scholarship to that which could be measured, USICA seems to be fully embarked on the road to quantification. We now count numbers of contacts as a measure of effectiveness, and formulate "program designs" which are fulfilled by a given number of contributions regardless of content or relevance—three articles, two VTRs, four speakers, and so forth. We now have a communications assembly line that assures quantity, but we have left out the quality control.

5. *The Decline of Professionalism.* The inevitable result of the ascendancy of these bureaucratic characteristics is a decline of professionalism. This has already happened. VOA news announcers take turns mispronouncing names, and news broadcasts contain embarrassing slips, such as confusing ASEAN with SEATO. Feature and interview programs continue to speak condescendingly to foreign audiences and suffuse the whole with dullness. With the exception of jazz and popular music programs, the excitement, controversy and ferment of contemporary America are not to be found on the programs of VOA, nor with rare exceptions, anywhere else in USICA for that matter. New satellite radio transmissions bring startling improvements in reception clarity, but if content is tired, unimaginative, and full of errors that caring editors would catch, where is the improvement? VOA remains by far the most professional part of USICA, but it too has not been immune to the ascendancy of style over substance.

These are only a few examples which are offered not as a gripe list, but as illustrations of where we have come from and where we are headed.

Feeding an artificial and mechanistic apparatus with indigestible reports and quantifiable trivia now probably takes more employee time than the contacts, discussions, and substantive activities that are supposedly the jus-

tification for our existence. Responding to the demands of the bureaucratic system is now more important than the acts which comprise cross-cultural communication. And erecting an over-arching administrative structure is causing us to lose yet another opportunity to respond to the signs of revitalization and dynamism in contemporary American culture.

None of this bureaucratic effort has resulted in better programs, improved communications, or wiser use of resources. The increasing difficulty in seeing one's job whole translates directly to the employee disgruntlement and indifference reflected in some of the above examples. The overall effect of these current manifestations has been a diminution of quality.

Retooling–Is it Possible?

USICA's development as a bureaucratic entity is hardly a unique phenomenon, because it both parallels and reflects that of American society as a whole. But for those who do not long for the good old days but are appalled by the present, a fundamental question is whether anything can be done about things all of us should care about deeply.

There are no easy answers. In *The Bureaucratic Experience* Ralph Hummel suggests such things as greater politicization of organization, the encouragement of "countervailing bureaucracies," greater employee-management co-determination, and the creation of more open systems and greater feedback for employees. But he also recognizes that such things are hard to create and can themselves quickly become part of a management control structure. He concludes rather weakly that employees and managers must ceaselessly "adopt new methods, then discard them in a few years," so as to "never allow the cycle of growth toward over-rationalization to fully develop."

The best Hummel can come up with is the need to constantly assert one's humanity and sense of community, in response to the dehumanization and fragmentation brought about by large modern bureaucracies. For the economy, he advocates incentives for the individual entrepreneur as opposed to the large corporation. But for public organizations, he can only call for flexible institutions with a decentralized focus in order to counter the "stultifying control mechanism" of public bureaucracies.

This does not take us very far. But there is no law, natural or man-made, that decrees that progressive fragmentation and the triumph of style over substance are inevitable, irreversible, or even rational. There are potential solutions to these and other problems of modern bureaucracy, although some of them are untested and would be difficult to put into practice.

For USICA, perhaps it is time to recognize that our brave plunge into rationalization has brought with it new diseases. As the saying goes, "the operation was successful but the patient died."

In any case it is no crime to experiment and fail. But it would be unforgivable to fail to learn from the experience.

THE FUTURE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE

from page 12

• The growth of US government personnel abroad which took place in a period of affluence must diminish in a period of austerity. As the need for the activities these people perform continues to grow, consolidation among foreign affairs agencies overseas under managers who understand the wide range of US programs abroad becomes essential.

We cannot avoid the conclusion that the United States will be operating on a finer edge in the decade ahead than ever before. This will require an unprecedented integration of foreign affairs skills. It means that somewhere within the US government there must be a repository of: accumulated diplomatic wisdom, international management talent, area knowledge, functional expertise, and understanding of both the American and foreign systems. Those possessing these requirements must be ready to be sent wherever their country needs them whenever they are called. If the Foreign Service of the United States did not already exist, the creation of one would have to become a national priority.

But the Foreign Service is in disarray.

(1) Its role has suffered steadily accelerating erosion. Our leadership has failed to get us sufficiently involved in new areas of international importance. Traditional functions, like trade policy and promotion involving over 160 Foreign Service positions, are being offered to domestic agencies.

(2) The administration has failed to ask for and the Congress to provide sufficient staff and budget to perform our mission overseas. The Foreign Service has been compelled to neglect its central political and economic duties in order to concentrate limited resources on administration for other agencies and the fulfillment of expanding statutory requirements.

(3) Executive reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies has fragmented the leadership and personnel of State, the Agency for International Development, and the International Communications Agency. ICA's role as overseas spokesman for US foreign policy has been limited and the morale of its Foreign Service people drained by an increasingly domestic oriented bureaucracy. AID has taken its personnel reductions from the Foreign Service while maintaining its domestic staff. Its new parent agency contains not a single position for the Foreign Service.

(4) The Foreign Service has failed to attract sufficient numbers of women and minorities.

(5) Our Staff Corps, without which we cannot function overseas, has been victimized and ignored to the point of rebellion.

(6) Our system for assuring a steady flow of just and honorable retirements has collapsed under the neglect of successive administrators. As a result the people who must supply the foreign affairs leadership for the '80s find their careers blocked and opportunities for career development limited. Some of the best are opting out. Many find their motivation toward excellence being sapped away.

Our profession is not well understood in the United States. National policies in support of freer trade, expanded admission of refugees, assistance to the underdeveloped world, compromise with our adversaries in the cause of peace and telling the truth about how we are viewed abroad are not always popular acts at home. We serve the policies determined by our political masters, whether the policies are popular or not. In turn we rely on that leadership to protect us. Sometimes they fail us and the nation suffers. We, the Foreign Service of the United States, owe it to our country not to let that happen now.

Unfortunately, the very factors which contributed to the erosion of the role of the Foreign Service hurt our ability to unite, compromise our particular interests and speak with a common voice. We have over-emphasized our differences—specialty cones, agency, sex, race, family status, employee versus management and staff versus officers. This leaves us vulnerable to attack from outside the service. It destroys our case for an integrated approach to foreign affairs. It sets interest group against interest group in a dangerous cycle in which we are all the losers. Time and again it causes us to be eloquent on what we are against and silent on what we are for. We need to start telling the administration and Congress what has to be done to make the Foreign Service whole again.

The process starts with our charter—The Foreign Service Act of 1946. Though this document has been amended frequently through the years to adjust to changing times, its emphasis on excellence in pursuit of our nation's objectives remains fundamental to our profession. More than 30 years after our Act's passage, the Civil Service Act of 1978 sought to capture the same concept in the establishment of a highly competitive Senior Civil Service.

Many of the problems facing the Foreign Service today could be cured by returning to the principles and procedures of the 1946 Act from which successive administrations have strayed. We would have preferred this administration to have moved vigorously two years ago to halt the erosion I just outlined by using the ample tools available under the Act.

They argued instead that the need for fundamental reaffirmation of a separate Foreign Service in the light of the Civil Service Act was great; and that the amendments needed in the light of legal challenges to our system were extensive. State's leadership chose to propose a new Act whose initial formulation was so flawed as to be almost universally unacceptable throughout the Foreign Service.

The Foreign Service responded with detailed, well-reasoned criticism of the proposal, and the Secretary of State listened. The bill submitted by the administration to the Congress in June, while still seriously deficient, is a substantial improvement over the earlier draft and closely parallels the 1946 Act. It contains many positive features.

Now, the arena for change has shifted from this building to Capitol Hill. The congressional committees directly responsible for the bill have made clear their intent to listen to what we have to say about it. A strong, unified Foreign Service has an opportunity to shape its own des-

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN FOREIGN SERVICE WOMEN
Box 8068, Washington, D. C. 20024

- Housing Assistance and Orientation Room 1248, Department of State, Tel. 632-3573
- Educational Counseling Center
- Language and Writer's Groups
- Monthly Meetings ■ Newsletter
- Book Fair ■ Welcome Home
- Scholarships ■ Teenage Activities
- Community Service ■ Career Workshops

Women serving in the Foreign Service as FSOs, FSIOs, FSRs, FSSOs and FSSs and Foreign Service wives whose husbands are serving in these classifications are eligible for membership in the AAFSW. The annual dues are $12.50 which includes a subscription to the Newsletter. Send dues to Membership Chairman at address above.

tiny. Erosion of the Foreign Service of the United States stops here! The elected Governing Board of the American Foreign Service Association has voted unanimously to present its own legislative proposals to forge the kind of bill necessary to provide a mandate for the Foreign Service for the remainder of this century. In arriving at this position we have had resources unavailable elsewhere in the US government:

- Hundreds of individual analyses from most of our overseas posts;
- Extensive formulations from a series of open meetings and Association task forces in Washington;
- Cogent comments from the Secretary's Open Forum Working Group on Professional Concerns;
- And testimony from individuals, employee interest groups and the Association of American Foreign Service Women on the Hill.

Some of these analyses were contradictory. All contained three essential principles for which we will fight and we will win:

First, the role and integrity of the Foreign Service must be preserved and enhanced. The threatened loss of the commercial function is but the latest in a series of events which highlight the need to reaffirm the role of the career Foreign Service as an institution for which there is no credible substitute within our government.

- Both in the general provisions of the proposed act and in its legislative history, the Congress should reiterate and the administration support a Foreign Service of the United States which: (1) advises and assists the President and Secretary of State in the formulation of foreign policy; (2) conducts the full range of US government civilian affairs overseas on behalf of the principal foreign affairs agencies and those with major foreign affairs concerns.
- This will require that there be maximum uniformity of personnel management, particularly of the Senior Foreign Service, among the individual agencies operating abroad.
- The ranges for our system of intake into the service, career development through the middle grades, and intake into the senior ranks, as well as just, honorable and secure retirement must be predictable and controlled. Only in this manner can we end the vagaries of successive managers, commissions and boards.
- The Staff Corps' indispensable contribution must be recognized and ample opportunities for the professional development of its members assured.
- The changing roles and aspirations of families of our overseas employees must be an integral part of a comprehensive improvement of the quality of foreign service life for all.
- Ultimately, the preservation and enhancement of the role of the service can only be accomplished if the administration attaches a much higher priority to persuading Congress to provide the financial and personnel resources necessary for us to accomplish our mission. We can no longer survive by alternately shifting resources from one important activity to another, whether it be reducing political reporting to provide administrative service or limiting Staff Corps training while providing it to families. The United States cannot continue to main-

tain a strong international diplomatic position in the complex world of the '80s by deploying less money and fewer people than it did in the '50s.

Second, career employees must be assured a strong voice in the evolution of the Foreign Service. The proposed act will give foreign affairs management broad new authorities for administering the Foreign Service. While we know where we stand under existing legislation and Executive Orders, the authors of the Foreign Service Act of 1979 have not provided a concrete plan as to how these new authorities would be implemented. We also need to guard against possible political abuses in the future. Therefore, the safeguards of an effective employee organization are essential if there is to be a new Foreign Service Act.

- In order to play a creative, responsible and influential role, our employee organization must be as broadly based as possible. This means: (1) We see no need for exclusions beyond management officials and confidential employees as defined in the current Executive Order; (2) The proposals for additional exclusions of inspectors, security and other personnel identified as "Confidential Employees" must be minimized in legislative history and in practice; (3) Further erosion along the lines of Title VII of the Civil Service act would be intolerable.
- We cannot accept limits on the scope of bargaining beyond that accorded the Civil Service. Indeed our unique and essential rank-in-person system and the special demands of career service abroad require the broadest possible negotiating mandate. We must be able to negotiate in advance the implementation of such provisions of the bill as: (1) precepts for tenure, promotion and selection out; (2) definition of concepts such as "worldwide availability" and "the needs of the service"; and (3) ranges affecting essential conditions of employment such as lateral entry, time-in-class and promotion rates.
- We cannot accept the imposed monopoly on grievance representation unless we are provided additional resources and are totally protected from congressional efforts to reduce further the size of the proposed bargaining unit in the name of preventing conflict of interest.

Finally, the Foreign Service must be compensated on a par with the Civil Service and must receive appropriate incentives for a lifetime of service abroad. If we are to attract, develop and retain the talent we need from all segments of our society, they must be able to make reasonable predictions about their futures in the service. They must also receive tangible benefits for pursuing a career which takes them away from home for much of their lives, exposes them to hardships and dangers and frequently thrusts incredible responsiblities on them.

- For the Staff Corps this means: (1) compensation built into the salary structure for the "overseas factor" and a renewed assessment of the extra responsibilities they assume abroad; (2) authorization for reimbursement for local duties and taxes overseas for employees excluded from the diplomatic lists; (3) authorization for our secretaries and communicators to be compensated for the long hours they are regularly on standby duty.
- For officers it means full implementation, as established by law, of the professional Hay Associates Study

which demonstrated the chasm between Civil Service and Foreign Service pay. We stand for establishment in law of the ten class system below the senior ranks linked to the GS scale at the points outlined in the Hay Study. The legislative history should prescribe that the new class will be at the level of tenured FSO-6.

- For the Senior Service it means: (1) an end to exclusion from hardship pay for ambassadors whose lives are on the line abroad, and (2) compensation ranges on a level with the Senior Civil Service.
- The service is divided on the question of "performance pay." Since it is the only means now available for providing equitable compensation for our senior ranks, we will not oppose its enactment. It is essential that there be guaranties of its protection from political abuse and impartial distribution through the Selection Boards. We must emphasize, however, that it is not financial incentives but the standard of excellence which has provided our real motivation for superior service since the days of Jefferson, Adams and Franklin.

The Foreign Service Association has specific proposals for achieving each of the above. In my testimony before the House Subcommittees September 27 and as legislative consideration proceeds, we will continue, with your help, to press for an outcome which guarantees all three of these essential conditions.

If we are satisfied that all three conditions have been met, the Association will support the bill.

Ladies and gentlemen, the days of decision about our futures and indeed about America's ability to conduct an effective, professionally executed foreign policy are upon us. Each of us can help to shape our own and our nation's destiny. You have already taken the first step by demonstrating through your presence here today that the Foreign Service does care.

- If you are not already a member of the Association, please join us. We are pushing our resources to the limit and need your help.
- If you want to get more directly involved, all our committees and meetings are open to anyone who wishes to participate. There is no limit to the amount of work yet to be done.
- All of us, in and out of the service, need to get the message to Congress that they must act now to preserve the Foreign Service of the United States.
- Though the Association stands alone, we have not given up the fight to keep trade policy and promotion where it belongs, in the Foreign Service. You can help by contacting the Congress directly or through business and other colleagues.
- We can all reach out to broaden the base of our service by individual recruitment efforts, particularly of outstanding minority and women candidates for the career service.

Together, we can shape a service dedicated to excellence, representative of the best of our diverse society and capable of advancing United States interests around the world for the remainder of this century and into the next.

THE JAPANESE *from page 29*

to regain control after the war in the Communist-dominated guerrilla areas. Many Americans agreed although some, like Service, held that the eventual use of the puppet forces "is probably more of a fortuitous development, as far as the Kuomintang is concerned, than a deep-laid Kuomintang plot with Japanese connivance." Nonetheless, Service's colleague, John P. Davies, viewing the situation in December 1944, summarized Chiang's critical position vis-à-vis the Communists and certain regional overlords who were challenging his authority:

> Chiang's greatest hope for domestic reascendency lies in . . . collaboration with the puppets, who may be expected to attempt interregnum control between the Japanese and Chiang. The generalissimo has therefore looked with complacency if not approval upon the "surrender" to the enemy by some of his generals and their subsequent incorporation in the puppet armies. At the same time he has maintained through Tai Li's and other secret services constant contact with the puppets. Through these channels he is able to receive and reply to Japanese peace feelers and other propositions.

Moreover, by 1945, as evidence of an eventual Allied victory mounted, the Japanese themselves found the links between the KMT and their puppets ("Whose puppets?" one might almost ask, by this time) more and more acceptable. Defeat for Japan did not mean that she would be without influence in determining who would fill the power vacuum created by her withdrawal. And the Japanese much preferred to see Chiang Kai-shek at the helm rather than rivals (like Marshal Li Chi-shen or General Hsueh Yueh). Least of all would Japan stand by and watch the Communists take advantage of the end-of-the-war confusion to seize power. Neither, of course, would the United States—for all our frustration with the generalissimo.

And thus the United States was ensnared in Herbert Feis's *China Tangle* and we have the picture—which shall stand for a conclusion to this essay—of United States Marines standing shoulder-to-shoulder with puppet forces and with the Imperial Japanese Army at war's end, holding points and lines in North China against the Communists until such time as Nationalist troops, held in reserve for many years until just this moment, could be ferried into place. The reasons for the generalissimo's wartime behavior—especially the irresolution that had so frustrated "old China hands" like General Stilwell—come into sharper focus and the inconsistencies of the "China tangle" begin to dissolve when we recall the remark attributed to the Chinese leader by Theodore White: "The Japanese are a disease of the skin but the Communists are a disease of the heart." Few of the China specialists in American government service would have endorsed Chiang's diagnosis of his country's ailments in the midst of the war with Japan. And even as Japanese strength faded in 1945, farsighted American observers saw the Communists as less of a malady than a symptom, a symptom of internal corruption, malaise, and lost opportunities.

LETTERS *from page 4*

the present Board of the Association believes that Mr. Watson's experience as an innovator in a worldwide high technology corporation and his distinguished contribution in public service and education qualify him for this very important diplomatic [position]."

This is double-talk. *Why* does the present Board believe that Mr. Watson's position as head of the International Business Machines Corporation qualifies him to deal with the rulers of the Soviet Union in a more effective manner than a senior Foreign Service officer steeped in experience of such dealings? Because his business is "high-technology?" If it were low-technology, then, would he be less qualified?

I hope it is understood that it is the logic of the position, and of the editorial, that escapes me. Perhaps Mr. Watson is a worthy successor to Governor Harriman who, I understand, warmly recommended him. Mr. Harriman, when he was appointed by Roosevelt to become ambassador to the Soviet Union, was mainly known as a polo-playing scion of a railroad tycoon's family. His appointment turned out to be a felicitous one.

On the other hand, we have had a number of successful, innovative businessmen who in senior positions in the government turned out to be very disappointing. One thinks of "Engine Charlie" Wilson, who had been a smashing success in General Motors but turned out to be a dud as Secretary of Defense. General Patrick Hurley, probably one of America's most disastrous ambassadors, was sent by President Roosevelt to China on the basis of a "distinguished" record in non-diplomatic fields. And we have had another Ambassador Watson, in Paris, about whom it is better not to say too much, except that one must hope that his soul rests in peace.

The puzzling thing about the editorial is that our Board of Directors, after quoting the Foreign Service Act, which clearly stipulates the qualifications that should be sought from chiefs of mission "to the maximum practicable extent," blithely goes on to both *endorse* those requirements and then to state that they need not apply in this instance—while giving no explanation except that Mr. Watson is "distinguished" and "innovative" in his corporation. Why should this make him a good ambassador?

One cannot help wondering if the decision to endorse didn't come first, and the scratching around for some rationale, not very successful, came afterwards. But if this working hypothesis has anything to it, then it would be all the more interesting to *Journal* readers to learn what *were* the *real* reasons for the Board's endorsement.

As a matter of fact, one is more than puzzled. One is dumfounded. Our Board concludes its editorial with a description of the desirable characteristics of an ambassador to the Soviet Union—"*that. . .[he] be an expert, capable of analyzing Soviet politics and society and experienced in dealing and negotiating with Soviet officials*"—only to conclude that "in the present instance" those characteristics seem to be unnecessary.

There must be a rattling good story behind that editorial. Let's bring it out. Clearly, we have been given only the effect but not the cause. A little openness in this instance will clear the air.

MARTIN F. HERZ
Washington

Regenerating Esprit

SMITH SIMPSON's excellent article in your September issue cogently demonstrates weakness in State's capacity to make good decisions promptly at the working level. I agree with him that the selection and training of Foreign Service officers could be improved. However, I don't think, as he implies, that improved selection and training will rectify the problem, except as factors in improving discipline and morale.

I think that State's problem has two root causes: centralization of all major decision-making at the very top level of government, and lack of the close-knit, disciplined organization that must accompany centralization. The first problem has plagued State for years, but it has been immensely complicated by bureaucratization and the Kissinger style, which, once in place, is hard to change.

Organizational discipline in State has suffered from shifts in the social environment. People are no longer content to serve long apprenticeships in gofer and support roles: they want to be decision-makers. Lacking the authority, support, and information actually to make decisions, they are easily frustrated and turned off; they naturally become indifferent to challenges, especially those which might require effort and overtime.

Either the Foreign Service must be given a significant role in the foreign policy picture at the working level, or the whole foreign policy organization of the United States government needs to be changed, so that authority and organization are more nearly congruent. Once this basic problem is solved, then selection, training, assignment, and promotion procedures can and should be tailored to match requirements—including the regeneration of esprit de corps.

DONALD S. MACDONALD
Professor
East Stroudsburg, Pa.

A Note of Thanks

JUST A NOTE to thank you and your associates for the editorial endorsing me for my coming post in Moscow. As has been pointed out, I am scarcely an expert in State Department diplomacy, but did manage to survive in business for a long time, and hope that the lessons in diplomacy learned there will be helpful. Anyway, you can be sure I will do my best, and I am heartened by your endorsement.

THOMAS J. WATSON, JR.

This Is a Choice?

A QUESTION of Numbers" by William C. Dawson, Jr. in the October *Journal* was worth reading twice. He has accurately expressed the sentiment of Congress and the American taxpayer. Perhaps the next reduction—unlike BALPA and OPRED—will be more seriously aimed at more than 10 percent of the communicators and secretaries. Speculating further, imagine the prospect should taxpayers choose between no Saturday postal service or a streamlined Foreign Service. . . .

JOHN N. KENNEDY
AFSA member
Centreville, Va.

• STOLEN LUGGAGE • FIRE DAMAGE • BODILY INJURY LIABILITY • BREAKING AND ENTERING • SHIPPING LOSSES OF ALL KINDS • PET LIABILITY • LIGHTNING DAMAGE • TRANSIT/WAR RISKS • PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY •



...with travel-pak

Here—there—everywhere! From the moment your household and personal possessions leave the U.S.A.—until they return . . . TRAVEL-PAK protects against financial loss caused by fire, theft, pilferage and a host of other risks.

On the way—while there (including storage if requested)—and back again—TRAVEL-PAK is the choice of people who will be living abroad for awhile.

Let us send you details—return the coupon below—or better still call us.

When you return to the Washington area—call us—we'll be happy to help you set up a sound economical insurance program covering your home, auto and life.

travel-pak

WHEN YOU'RE GOING TO LIVE ABROAD!

James W. Barrett Company, Inc.

REED SHAW STENHOUSE INC.
OF WASHINGTON, D.C.

Insurance Brokers

1140 Connecticut Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Telephone: 202-296-6440

A REED SHAW STENHOUSE COMPANY

SEND FOR DETAILS—TODAY

24A

Tell me about **TRAVEL-PAK.**

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ Zip _____

CHRYSLER'S V. I. P. TREATMENT MAKES THE 80's EMINENTLY AFFORDABLE.

Now more than ever, foreign service members can get the most car for their money by buying direct from Chrysler.

If you're a member of the diplomatic corps, foreign service, or any qualified international organization, let Chrysler Corporation give you *Very Important Purchaser* treatment when buying that new car you want.

We'll provide highly personalized V.I.P. handling through our 1980 DIPLOMATIC PURCHASE PROGRAM. This exclusive opportunity lets you buy *direct* from Chrysler Corporation at *full diplomatic discount.* You can select from our special offering of unique Chrysler products that handsomely reflect your status. Built to your exact specifications, and backed by service, parts and limited warranty protection both in the U.S. and overseas. *All at preferential prices.*

Chrysler Corporation's Diplomatic Purchase Program. For complete information simply return the coupon below. Or call our toll free number—800-521-8900, and ask for Diplomatic Sales.

DIPLOMATIC SALES
CHRYSLER CORPORATION

560 Sylvan Avenue
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.
07632
(212) 279-7350

or

1100 Connecticut Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 862-5415

Send specifics on your Diplomatic Purchase Program and these products:

DODGE
- ☐ Omni
- ☐ Aspen
- ☐ Diplomat
- ☐ Mirada

CHRYSLER
- ☐ LeBaron
- ☐ New Yorker

Name_____

Address_____

City_____

State and Zip_____ Country_____

CHRYSLER CORPORATION