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AFGHANISTAN '79

# Foreign Service Journal

JANUARY 1980 75 CENTS

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by Martin F. Herz

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Political Appointee—A Case Study  
by Winston Smith



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


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## Letters

### A Warm Thank-You

WE WANT to bring to the attention of all Foreign Service families and friends the wonderful treatment we received from the Department of State during our recent sudden evacuation from Pakistan. The entire operation was handled efficiently and with special concern for those for whom the evacuation was most difficult: the bereaved, the injured, those suffering from emotional shock and the many families with small children.

One of the most impressive aspects of the evacuation was the cooperation among the evacuees themselves. Everyone pitched in to walk or comfort crying babies, to reassure anxious teens, or just to listen to someone who needed to talk. This growing mutual support system continued at the hotel.

In addition to helping each other, we received fine support from the professionals and volunteers at State, ICA and AID. We were met at the airport and whisked to the Sheraton-National Hotel where our registration and the sorting of luggage was handled with a minimum of fuss. It always seemed as if someone was asking, "What can we do to help?" The Department of State provided 24-hour-a-day medical services at the hotel until the need diminished, as well as a control room that was manned around the clock. On Saturday, offices were opened by the various agencies to explain our rights, answer our questions, issue orders and hand out an advance in funds to those who were short.

We are especially grateful for the support of the Family Liaison Office (FLO) and the Association of American Foreign Service Women and its Housing Office. They cheerfully put in extra volunteer hours and willingly helped with numerous requests for information. With the help of the FLO we have now set up a Pakistan Evacuee Office which is publishing a weekly newsletter, forwarding mail and passing on information to all evacuees, both in the Washington area and around the country. (Tel. 632-9624)

The general public too, showed generosity by offering housing to share, sending clothes and games,

and even offering to teach if we established a school for our children.

Finally, we would like to thank all the old Pakistan hands—our former friends and neighbors—who turned up at Dulles Airport to make our arrival such an emotional and memorable experience.

EMILY F. THURBER

FRAN M. CATERINI

*On behalf of the Pakistan Evacuation Group*

### The Discipline of the Service

BEFORE Mr. Lenderking went public with his rather stinging criticism of VOA (in his article "USICA and the Triumph of Bureaucratic Style"—November 1979), I believe that he owed it to his colleagues and his organization to call their attention directly to his perception of VOA's shortcomings and thereby to try to bring about improvement or reform. To the best of my knowledge he has not once during the last three years told us that VOA news announcers "take turns mispronouncing names," that our news broadcasts "contain embarrassing slips," that VOA feature and interview programs "continue to speak condescendingly to foreign audiences." (I take it, although he does not specify, that he is talking about VOA English rather than Thai or any of the 36 other languages in which VOA broadcasts.)

If these criticisms are justified—and they may very well be—I believe that the discipline of the Service and the responsibility of his profession would require Mr. Lenderking in the first instance to seek correction of mistakes and improvement in performance from within. Otherwise he cannot, in my view, escape the suspicion that he is grandstanding.

HANS N. TUCH

*Acting Director, VOA*

*Washington*

**Author's Note:** If Tom Tuch had read his cable traffic during the past year more thoroughly, he would have discovered many examples of the "embarrassing slips" cited in my article. We (ICA Bangkok) brought them to the attention of VOA not to pick nits, but because they cast doubt on VOA's reputation for care and accuracy. I hasten to add that none of the errors cited were caused by VOA correspondents in the field, who continue to do a superb job.

As for my obligation to inform ICA of my criticisms, I thoroughly agree, and sent a copy of my article to ICA at the same time that I submitted it to the *Journal* in August.

Finally, I am sorry that Tom feels my article violates "service discipline" and "responsibility to profession." I would think that the same considerations would have led him to check his cable traffic before making groundless accusations.

WILLIAM R. LENDERKING JR.

### Those Travel Vouchers

THE AVERAGE employee seems to view a travel voucher like his/her income tax return: how much money do I have to pay/get back at this time? The bottom line of total out-of-pocket cost is ignored.

This failure to pay attention is costing employees thousands of dollars a year. Part of the loss is because proper costs are not claimed, and unreimbursed expenses are not claimed as business expenses for tax purposes. But a (probably) larger loss comes about because the personnel in General Claims make mistakes. Most vouchers are not reviewed after processing. Thus if the employee does not carefully review the results, the error is never detected.

The largest individual cases seem to involve food shipments to additional consumable posts. I have seen numerous instances where the employee was charged for an excessive household goods shipment when in fact the entire shipment was quite proper.

Lesser amounts are involved in simpler errors, such as miscalculating what the government should have paid for the tickets and thus overstating the penalty imposed for use of foreign flag airline.


Unfortunately, the detection of an error by an employee does not routinely result in a correction in General Claims. Overseas at a post with a budget and fiscal unit the employee can go there and discuss the matter. If an error was really made, it can be corrected either on the spot or within a few days—or at least that was the way I ran my units.

In the department, another voucher must be submitted. (The process of simply preparing that form is enough to keep many people from pursuing the matter.) Then if

*(Continued on page 45)*

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## A Diplomat's Viewpoint

JACK PERRY

After nearly twenty years in the Foreign Service, I finally spent one year on the Seventh Floor, that is, in the neighborhood of the secretary of state and his chief assistants.

Throughout my career I had heard, "Everybody should spend some time on the Seventh Floor." I do not know if this is good advice or not—I see many good reasons for, but also a number against.

In any event, since many of my colleagues have not yet served their time, if that is the right phrase, on the Seventh Floor, I thought I might attempt to list some of the characteristics of the Seventh Floor Outlook. Bear in mind, however, that I was a short-time sojourner only, that my sympathies remained largely with those on the sixth floor and below, and in

the field, and that my impressions are subject to question. Note also that I do not seek to describe how any particular secretary of state thinks, but how the collectivity around him in any administration seems to think. With those excuses, I offer the following characteristics of the Seventh Floor Outlook as I perceive it:

1. The insistence is on results—excuses are neither sought nor accepted, judgments are severe.

Ted Eliot told me he thought the great thing about Secretariat service for young officers was that it taught high, uncompromising standards. "They learn you have to get it right the first time." He was right. Work for the secretary of state is expected to be of the highest quality, to call forth the best

from very good men and women.

2. There is a preoccupation with people, with careers, with movement on and up. The assumption is that everybody is ambitious—ambitious for his or her own advancement—and humility or selflessness are not reckoned very practical or very present virtues. The high-ranking officer who shows signs of humility or self-effacement is often taken to lack self-confidence, and tends to get stepped on (although, thank goodness, there are exceptions). Self-seeking and zealous pursuit of policy goals are assumed to go hand in hand.

3. Cynicism abounds. Outsiders note swings from *Machtpolitik* to human rights—real enough changes—but Seventh Floor folk see the enduring demands of carrying out national policy and they stay aware of often painful continuities. Domestic politics always obtrudes, in appointments, in shading policies, in coping with Congress, and old-timers find their idealism rubbed thin.

4. Seventh Floor officers work ex-

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tremely hard and expect the same of others. Dedication is taken for granted, it earns no points. Private life is a luxury, people serving overseas are thought to be leading mostly soft lives. Foreign Service people are on duty twenty-four hours a day: those are the assumptions. Dissenters from this ethic of total, unrelenting toil are not to be taken seriously.

5. Action is what counts, although good writing, good speaking and even good thinking are valued at times if they contribute to successful action. (Some Seventh Floor denizens tend to value "forceful action" as much as, or more than, "successful action.") Since most Seventh Floor officers are either present or past staff aides, they see "good" career people generally as staff aides. It is characteristic that they are not respecters of rank or age or experience, but look for the man who can, simply, get the job done. Thus there is a natural opposition to "the bureaucracy," to "the bureaus," as well as dependency on them. And the posts abroad are often

rather out of it, with a handful of exceptions.

6. There is expectation of lively policy debate within the building, but little toleration of dissent. There is a fierce loyalty to the president, the secretary and "the administration," and a tendency to see others (press, Congress, bureaucracy) as undermining sound policy. The good side of this fundamental loyalty to our political masters is that the department—among those who know, and despite persistent press comment to the contrary—is recognized as firmly behind the president in carrying out his foreign policy. The less happy side of this is that in our non-parliamentary system, where every four years brings a massive swing of the policy pendulum, the enduring national interests have few to speak up for them.

Well, this list is only a beginning. Perhaps I could attempt to sum up my view by saying the generality of Seventh Floor people is awfully good, and they expect the Foreign Service to meet their high standards. And that's a compliment.

## COMMUNICATION RE: KIDNAPPING & DIPLOMACY

*As I was going up the stair  
I met a man who wasn't there.  
He wasn't there again today.  
I wish, I wish he'd stay away.*

—Hughes Mearns

### JOHN D. STEMPEL

By December 2, when this was written, 50-plus American diplomatic personnel remain into their fifth week of captivity incarcerated in the American Embassy because of gross and flagrant violations of diplomatic immunity for both personnel and property. Iran's revolutionary authorities (who constitute themselves a government only at times and places of their own choosing) have said that they will release the hostages when the deposed shah of Iran has been returned to Iran for trial. Presumably this is to be done by the American government, in violation of international conventions on asylum for political refugees as well as its own deeply entrenched historic values.

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Virtually no one expected the crisis to drag on as long as it has. Policymakers have consistently underestimated Ayatollah Khomeini's stubbornness. Unless events move more quickly than they have, many feel the present scenario could drag on for months. Whether it is resolved tomorrow or next year, however, the whole episode raises some very fundamental problems. Reams of paper have been and will be devoted to this crisis. Many aspects deserve attention; the following comments deal with some of the longer term professional, moral and substantive implications of Iran's hostage-gathering. If not providing many answers, at least the questions will be raised—questions likely to provoke both heartburn and controversy among all segments of the American public closely involved in foreign affairs—politicians, policymakers, scholars, journalists, and above all Foreign Service officers.

Revolutionary Iran's act of holding US embassy personnel hostage is the first instance of terrorism

aimed at diplomats supported and encouraged by the government of the host country. It runs contrary to the most fundamental rules of the international system—rules established over three to four hundred years with antecedents going back to two thousand years—setting forth the policy for immunity of diplomats and their missions. This immunity has been disregarded in the past; such violations have never been condoned by governments. The spectre of the principal mode of communication among nations becoming the subject of attack has troubling implications for those who make policy as well as for those individuals who represent their countries abroad. If we are to reduce the chance of nuclear war, dare the world's nations allow diplomatic processes to be impeded in such a traumatic way? Are there likely to be other incidents?

Holding diplomatic hostages for blackmail and trying to brainwash them changes the fundamental rules of the game in very nasty ways. Counter-terrorism is difficult

enough when governments are not active instigators. US policy, which has put the safety of the hostages above all else, has concentrated upon obtaining release of the hostages through diplomatic means. The president eschewed even the mention of force until the end of the second week of the crisis. Should we have been so forbearing? How does one discuss a matter with people who will not talk? Diplomats by nature reject the concept of a country that will "stone wall" matters until it has its way. Are there times and cases where undue concern for hostages' lives actually weakens the prospects for their eventual well-being? Might not torture be seen as a way

*John Stempel entered the Foreign Service in 1965 and served at embassies in Conakry and Bujumbura. He then had a four-year stint in Washington in the Operations Center as staff aide to Elliot Richardson and then as Ghana desk officer. After that he was assigned to Zambia as political officer from 1972-74, then to Persian language training and service in Tehran from July of 1975 to June of 1979, as deputy chief of the political section. John is currently the State Department's diplomat-in-residence at the United States Naval Academy.*

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
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to pressure the victim government? Would the United States be better off to attempt a military rescue in hopes of getting most hostages back, though some would certainly die? Has all our past talk about counter-terrorist preparation been just that—do we in fact have a capability that could even be brought to bear with any chance of success? What is “success”—one death? Ten?

Troubling questions, these, especially for Foreign Service officers and their families. There are no easy answers, as the president, the secretary of state, and even AFSA are discovering. Moreover, the idea of diplomats condoning violence runs against the grain. About 14 years ago, the Argyris study of Foreign Service officers showed that FSOs were much more likely to be those who muted their own hostility, pushing for arranged solutions—in other words they behave as diplomats, not special forces officers. If we are to deal with nations who reject diplomacy, or subordinate it to other ends, do the same fundamentals apply? Is military action irrational when others do not accept the basic rules of the system? Is the Foreign Service flexible enough and wise enough to distinguish between temporarily tough situations and ones where rules disappear?

The State Department has apparently not been involved in considering the “wider range” of alternatives. Should it be? If war is too important to be left to the generals, shouldn't counter-terrorism have a State Department input on all options?

The implications of the present crisis for American foreign policy and international behavior generally over the next few years are even more troubling: American foreign policy has been almost entirely focused on the Iranian problem since November 4 to the exclusion of SALT, energy, and a host of other international issues. Despite maximum support to date for the US, will time work in favor of the Ayatollah's stubbornness? Will the Iranian people, voting in theocratic government, not be the ultimate losers as Iran's westernized economy is dismantled or destroyed? What are the longterm energy implications of either an Iranian oil

(Continued on page 38)

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## THE FOREIGN SERVICE UNDER ATTACK

### Abroad

The Foreign Service has always been a risky calling, but recent events in Iran, Pakistan, and Libya have brought home the message as never before. Throughout the world, the men, women and children of the Foreign Service are reviewing their own security situations and recalling past brushes with violence or terrorism that have claimed the lives of 46 of our colleagues since 1965. We are dismayed by the sacking of our unprotected embassies in Tehran, Islamabad and Tripoli. Our deepest sympathies go to the families of Marine Corporal Steven Crowley and Army Chief Warrant Officer Bryan Ellis who were killed in the Islamabad attack.

Above all, the Foreign Service is united in concern for the safety of our hostages still being held in Tehran. On behalf of the Service, the Association applauds President Carter's vow of December 7 to the families of the remaining hostages:

The one issue is the early and safe release of the American hostages from their captors in Tehran. . . I am not going to take any military action that would cause bloodshed or arouse the unstable captors of our hostages to attack them or punish them. I am going to be very moderate, very cautious.

The Middle East, where colleagues in Lebanon and Afghanistan have been killed during recent years, requires special attention. But the security situation is little better in other regions such as East Asia, Southern Europe, Latin America and Africa where terrorists have also struck down our colleagues. The dangers we of the Foreign Service face are widespread and apparently growing.

As the Airline Pilots Association worked with governments to prevent skyjacking, the American Foreign Service Association will work vigorously to put an end to embassy seizures and the related taking of lives. We strongly support measures to reduce the physical and political vulnerability of US missions and personnel to mob or terrorist attack. Additional physical security measures now under consideration should be rapidly implemented. The United States should avoid assigning large numbers of personnel and/or their families to volatile posts simply to signify confidence in the stability of shaky regimes. In situations where chaos impends, the United States should act with prudence to draw down staffing levels to the essential minimum before the crisis becomes so critical that the act of withdrawal becomes itself a blow to confidence in the government.

AFSA supports measures to underscore universal international demands for effective protection of diplomatic missions by host governments as a *sine qua non* for acceptance in the community of civilized nations. Those nations which will not make a good faith effort to observe this universal canon of diplomatic practice should be shunned until they mend their ways. In this context, we approve of the administration's recent reduction in the level of our diplomatic activity in Libya. Countries which passively condone violence against our missions and per-

sonnel should be publicly required to pay a price for doing so. Otherwise, such activity will spread.

The Foreign Service has a proud tradition of going in harm's way for the national interest. The plaque in the Diplomatic Lobby bears mute evidence of the mounting price the personnel of the Service have paid for devotion to duty. While AFSA honors this tradition, it is the only organization whose primary reason for existence is the protection and welfare of Foreign Service personnel. In this context, AFSA has been deeply and actively involved since the earliest days in matters concerning Iran, Pakistan and the region at large. AFSA is working to ensure that those who have to make broader judgments on the totality of US interests are fully sensitive to our concerns and aware of our determination to discharge our duty responsibly, but vigorously.

The Association fully endorses the main outlines of the prudent approach which policymakers in the department and the administration have been pursuing since this crisis began six weeks ago.

### At home

While attention is riveted on the Middle East, challenges and threats to the Foreign Service in Washington remain serious. After a vigorous effort culminating in an unprecedented telephone "blitz" to the Congress, we lost the foredoomed battle to keep the commercial function in State. But, we made the case that: the erosion should go no further; we must maintain an integrated focus to our economic policy; the careers of the officers involved must be protected; and the concept of a "Foreign Service of the United States" should extend to the new Foreign Commercial Service.

The time for decision by the president on pay parity for the Foreign Service has come. The Association has made the case for full parity—in line with the Hay Associates findings—to the Board of the Foreign Service, the secretary and our friends in Congress. They have assured us of their support. We will accept nothing less. Unfortunately, OMB and OPM seem determined to deny us equal pay for equal work as guaranteed under the law. Disregarding the findings of the Hay Associates study, they have recommended the president provide us virtually no pay increase whatsoever.

The Association is scheduled to meet soon with key Senators and testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the proposed new Foreign Service Act. We intend to reaffirm our stand that the Foreign Service will only accept a new act which: preserves and enhances the role of the Foreign Service of the United States; assures our people a strong voice in vital decisions affecting their careers; and guarantees that we will be compensated on a par with our peers throughout the US government.

The challenges abroad have underlined the need for justice at home.



# Contacts with the Opposition

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MARTIN F. HERZ

At first glance, there is no problem. If our government is to be properly informed about events and trends in a foreign country, if it is to be able to anticipate what is going to happen, then our embassies naturally have to have contacts not only with the governments but also with the opposition. Who could disagree with such a simple statement?

Nobody disagrees. But there is considerable disagreement about how it is to be done, what price one pays, and how—and even whether—one can get around the difficulties that are involved in certain

political societies that are very different from our own. No foreign ambassador has trouble establishing and maintaining contacts with the opposition on Capitol Hill. But what if the opposition took the form of the Weathermen?

The symposium, "Contacts with the Opposition," undertaken by Georgetown University's Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, brings out a number of interesting views on this subject. Nineteen professionals, retired Foreign Service officers, two newspapermen and one distinguished professor of political science, articulate their views, some of which clash with each other.

Iran provides one focus because among the essays is not only a vigorous attack against what the author (former professor and ambassador Robert G. Neumann) believes to have been our policy toward the shah, but there are essays also by three former ambassadors to Iran—Armin H. Meyer, Richard

Helms, and William Sullivan. Let us see at first what is said about contacts with the opposition in Iran.

Neumann minces no words. He assumes that the American embassy in Tehran was under some restrictions, imposed by the shah, on its contacts with the religious opposition. He thinks it was a grievous mistake because we could have faced the shah down. "Surely we wanted the shah in our corner," he writes. "But the shah needed us at least as much, and we not only submitted to his whims but even anticipated them. Thus we accepted, unbelievably, to receive political intelligence only from Savak and not from our own agents while Savak observed no similar restraint in this country. I do not fault Savak agents for doing their job as they understood it; I fault our government for not directing or even allowing our people to do theirs."

Richard Helms, who had not read Neumann's essay before writing his own, answers these points only obliquely, but it is clear that he believes Neumann's premises to be mistaken. He writes, in one key passage:

During this period in Iran, as was the case for many years, the United States was obliged to balance many competing interests. Let us take one important asset which has been recently much publicized. The United States operated two listening posts in Iran which acquired valuable intelligence information from Soviet missile launching sites. These posts were under the protection of the shah and flew the Iranian flag. Was it not in the interest of the United States to cooperate in those matters where the shah felt he had legitimate requirements? He never demanded a *quid pro quo*. The embassy had no understandings nor made any agreements with him on how it would conduct itself. In short, there were no "deals." American policy was conducted in what we conceived to be its self-interest. The shah did the same with Iranian policy. It is true that we were very prudent. We had good reasons to be. We did the best we could in collecting intelligence about the opposition, while being careful not to encourage it or to be too visible in maintaining those contacts.

Ambassador Helms is frank in recognizing that the contacts of embassy Tehran were weak when it came to bazaar and religious opposition elements, but the implication

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of his essay is that this was a mistake—that the importance of these elements had not been properly understood in time, and not only by the Americans—rather than the result of policy or of any specific restrictions put on the embassy either by the shah or by himself. But there is another point.

As the editor of the symposium [myself] points out in his introduction, there is perhaps a tendency to be too facile about the significance of the lack of contacts in situations of this kind: Where one eschews contacts for the purpose of not offending the local government, the price can be quite high—

but we must be careful not to indulge in fallacious *post hoc, ergo propter hoc* reasoning: The fact that a group or faction that appears dangerous to our interests comes to power after insufficient contacts with the United States government, does not prove that if such contacts had been cultivated more assiduously, the policies of that new government would have been more to our liking.

Helms is quite vigorous in rebutting the notion that we could have told the shah that we were going to do what we thought best regardless of his feelings. "Among the gross over-simplifications one hears recently," he writes, "... is that he was an 'American puppet.' Although this was and continues to be a firmly held belief of the ayatollah and many of his followers, it is a myth; and its endless repetition does not make it true."

It is equally simplistic to say that the shah "needed the United States more than the United States needed him." He had things that we needed and couldn't get elsewhere, and we had very few things that he couldn't get elsewhere, as he did not mind demonstrating to us. To say, therefore, that the United States should have laid down the law to the shah, ignores the realities of the situation. It is the typical oversimplification that comes from lack of familiarity with the actual bargaining situation, and is part of the "myth of American omnipotence" which has harmed the United States in its relations with many other countries.

A prize example of where the United States knuckled under consistently to a foreign government that had the power to withhold from us something we wanted and needed very much—strategic facilities—is furnished in an essay of Wells Stabler, a former ambassador to Spain, who describes the

abortive moves that were made, during the dying days of the Franco regime, to open up some overt contacts with the democratic opposition in that country. Here we have the story of an American ambassador preparing the prime minister of a friendly country for the fact that the president of the United States, about to visit the country on a state visit, intended to see certain exponents of the moderate opposition—and seeing that effort completely frustrated by the tantrum thrown by the foreign government.

Subsequent to my meeting, the prime minister got in touch with the foreign minister in Paris who in turn sought an urgent meeting with Secretary Kissinger who was in Paris. He obviously made a strong protest, and this in turn, sadly, led to instructions to me to drop the whole matter. Although I still think we could have had our way by threatening to call off the visit, the decision had been made and the meeting did not take place. When I sat next to the prime minister at a lunch the president gave for him, he commented that he really had no objection to the people on the list, but rather to the impropriety of such a meeting during a state visit. The real reason was, of course, that Franco would have been furious over such recognition of the "opposition."

Perhaps if the president of the United States, on a state visit to an authoritarian country, saw exponents of the opposition, that might have conveyed some degree of "recognition" of them; but this clearly does not apply where contacts on a lower level than the ambassador are involved. This, at least, is the view expressed by a number of participants in our symposium. A countervailing view was expressed, however, by the sole theoretician in the group, Professor Hans J. Morgenthau.

Morgenthau attacks the hard cases—"authoritarian governments, such as military dictatorships, where the opposition is generally underground and leadership is frequently dispersed among many small groups." He does not for a moment believe that contact with such groups carries no implication of support. In fact, he argues that "diplomatic support or lack of it are forms of foreign intervention which, according to circumstances, may be an important factor in determining the outcome."

Thus, what appeared at first glance as nothing more than a technical problem of social and political intercourse re-

veals itself, on closer examination, as part and parcel of that intricate bundle of issues that goes by the name of intervention. The ultimate question to which all the technical questions have to be subsumed is the question of the utility and modalities of intervention. More particularly, a great power, in its relations with one of the second and third rank, intervenes, by dint of its power, regardless of whether it acts or refrains from action, by omission as well as commission. The question before us can therefore not be answered on its own narrow technical merits...

How important, from the point of view of securing information about the stability of a polity and about the aims and tactics of an opposition, is contact with its exponents? Surprisingly, there are some contributors to the symposium who find, on the basis of their experience, that the ability of an embassy to make assessments of this kind doesn't really depend very much on its maintenance of contact with opposition leaders (and even, in some cases, with opposition followers).

Upon reflection, the question dissolves itself into one of sources of information. Herbert D. Spivack, who as consul general in Dacca, then East Pakistan, was under rigorous restrictions that prevented him from taking up contacts with the Mukti Bahini, recalls that "even without such contacts ... dispatches to Washington from Dacca, as well as analyses by knowledgeable desk officers in the Department of State, warned that reconciliation was unlikely, that indefinite suppression by West Pakistani force of East Bengal's national aspirations was a practical impossibility, and that Pakistan's post-1947 configuration, 'a bird with two wings and no body,' was inherently non-viable."

If there was a failure of American policy in the case of East Pakistan [Spivack continues], it was not for lack of information, which might have been obtained by contact with the Bangladeshi nationalists, or faulty assessment of available information. The failure, if it was such, grew out of a judgment at the highest levels that it was more important to maintain a firm posture of solidarity with our SEATO partner Pakistan than to sympathize officially with the oppressed and rebellious Bangladeshis, the merits of whose cause were widely recognized by most Americans. An important factor in that judgment, only later revealed, was the assistance being provided by the Pakis-



tan government in our secret negotiations with Communist China which led to the celebrated Nixon visit to Peking and, eventually, to the recent normalization.

The reader's attention is drawn to the words "sympathize officially" in the above paragraph, which implies that *any official contact* with Bangladeshi (East Bengal) nationalists would have been interpreted by the authorities in Karachi or Islamabad as interference in Pakistani affairs. In fact, Spivack recalls that "efforts by the Dacca consulate . . . to make contact with the Mukhti Bahini resistance movement after the May, 1971 crackdown would have risked actual physical danger from the Pakistani security forces (as well as the stern displeasure of the Department of State)."

But Spivack goes further, drawing on his experience in Iran and extrapolating from it, and from his experiences in Bangladesh, about the problem we confronted in Tehran. The claim that the United States would not have been unprepared for the victory of Khomeini if it had had better contacts with the anti-shah opposition, he writes, "has the virtue of simplicity; but it does not provide answers to all the questions that need to be asked, even aside from the obvious one: is it actually a fact that embassy personnel, including the CIA element, were forbidden to talk to the opposition?"

Among other questions, he notes, are: Was the entire United States intelligence community, with access to many sources of information outside Iran (notably in France, where the Ayatollah Khomeini had his base), so crippled by strictures on the Tehran embassy that it had no way of knowing what was going on? Would the various opposition elements have welcomed contact with American officials, open or covert, given their conviction that the United States was unshakably committed to the shah? And, even convinced or strongly suspecting that the shah's regime was doomed, could the American government, in the post-Vietnam, post-China normalization period, have afforded to provide its remaining allies with yet another example of facile abandonment of a longterm friend? These questions are raised, says

Spivack, "not to justify or explain what happened, but merely to provide possible alternatives to the theory that the shah's downfall took us by surprise because our diplomats had not been able or allowed to exchange views with his opponents." [It might be added that even where US diplomats do not themselves have contact with the opposition, the diplomats of friendly embassies maintain such contacts and share the information derived from them.]

Still, all contributors to the symposium agree that contacts with the opposition, on a routine basis, are

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**"In Chile, we got the  
worst of all worlds—the  
CIA rigorously  
abstained from contact  
with the military, in  
order that the United  
States should not be  
blamed for the coup  
against Allende."**

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not only desirable but imperative. Those who have not encountered the problem in authoritarian or totalitarian countries are understandably less willing or able to dwell on the difficulties, but there are valuable case studies of the "routinizing" of such contacts so that the authorities, even if they were inclined to object, find it much more difficult to do so. Perhaps the most unexpected advocate of such contacts, in an essay written by Ambassador William H. Sullivan, turns out to be the shah himself:

But most of all, I remember how the shah of Iran, whom I had informed in some detail of a meeting which we had arranged with the Ayatollah Khomeini in Paris a few days before the shah went into exile, reacted with stunned incredulity when I told him that Washington had reversed itself and cancelled all the arrangements. "How," he asked, "can you expect to have any influence with these people if you won't meet with them?"

In my own experience in friendly

authoritarian countries (which I state in the introduction to the symposium), the problem often is not how to make contact with the opposition but "how to keep a sense of proportion under the avalanche of derogatory information about the regime received from opposition contacts, and how to preserve a sense of proportion about the importance (or rather, the relative lack of it) of those opposition elements. In South Vietnam, where I served as minister-counselor (1968-70) the opposition was always readily accessible, much more so than exponents of the government who were busy conducting its business during a war; so that a sense of proportion was especially difficult to achieve for junior officers of the embassy—and junior members of the press—who found information from government sources scarce and relatively hard to come by, whereas copious information of a derogatory kind and facile explanations of anything that happened were readily available from those who had little else to do but criticize."

Another thing that I experienced—and which is not mentioned in the symposium because the question wasn't asked of the contributors—is that opposition in *any* country is generally possessed of the purest motives, selfless, in its devotion to the public weal, incorruptible, devoted to policies that would solve all the ills of the country concerned, and outraged by the dishonesty, incompetence, and general wrongheadedness of the government in power. The young and inexperienced officer is likely to take at least some of this at face value. Only when he has experienced a change in government, when the previous opposition is accused of dishonesty, incompetence and worse, does it dawn on the younger diplomat that for people who are out of power it is much easier to be possessed of the purest motives, to be selfless in their devotion to the public weal, incorruptible, and devoted to policies that seem to promise instant solution to the country's problems.

The first journalists to ask for copies of our symposium were Greek, having heard that there is included not only a strong attack on Ambassador Henry J. Tasca but also, written shortly before his



death, his "apologia" for his stewardship in Athens. The attack, straightforward enough, is by Washington *Post* correspondent Dusko Doder who recalls that "not only did Mr. Tasca avoid the opposition politicians, he also failed to intercede vigorously in their behalf when they were arrested or harassed by the ruling junta. The sight of the American ambassador photographed with the colonels, and the presence of United States Navy ships in the Piraeus harbor, came to symbolize in Greek minds Washington's policy toward Greece. There was so much personal animus toward Mr. Tasca that it seemed to preclude the possibility of contact with the opposition. 'I will never set foot in that house as long as Tasca is there,' [Giorgios] Mavros told me, explaining his refusal to attend a 4th of July party at the US residence."

There are three interesting elements in this paragraph, which is only part of a lengthy indictment: The ambassador is faulted for not having interceded on behalf of the opposition. That is much more than having "contacts." The presence of the United States Navy in Piraeus harbor—one of the reasons why the US felt it had to pay a political price for the cooperation of the colonels—is treated as a liability, although to the US Navy (and the entire US defense posture in the Eastern Mediterranean) it was an asset; and the claim that Mr. Mavros refused to meet with the American ambassador because he thought him too much identified with the opposition. I understand, with respect to the latter argument, that Mr. Mavros did in fact meet with Mr. Tasca. What politicians tell American newspapermen is not necessarily identical with what they find they have to do under certain circumstances; but the sentiments expressed about the American ambassador were certainly authentic.

Tasca, of course, had no knowledge of the tenor of Doder's attack when he wrote his essay, but it is interesting that he says both at the beginning and the end that the problem that troubled him most was that he would have been unable to offer the opposition any encouragement in so far as US actions in the internal Greek situation were concerned. "Even if it were

in our interest to interfere so deeply in the political life of other countries," he writes, "it is doubtful whether we are able to bring democracy to them when they have lost it for purely internal reasons."

In so far as policy is concerned, Tasca claims that he advocated that General Ioannides be pressured to allow a return to democracy, and that he was overruled by Secretary Kissinger whose instructions "were that we should inform Ioannides that he had full US support and 'appreciation.' Thus the ambassador's recommendations, the latest in a series covering the years since 1970, that our security interests were in deep jeopardy because we were losing the people, that we should encourage the return to democracy immediately—and, in particular, the return of Caramanlis—were rejected."

Tasca is furious at the liberal press for having failed to display the "investigative journalism" for which it was so famous in other issues, which might have brought out what he himself was unable to tell the press, that he had himself argued against support of the colonels' regime. This, of course, involves a political argument about policy toward Greece and not the general questions of contacts with the opposition. There are two points, however, implicit in Tasca's essay, points that he does not make explicitly, which I believe are worth bringing out: First, that the US is frequently blamed for "support" of a particular regime when it is merely doing business with it; and second, that the problem in the case of countries like Greece wasn't the ignorance of the American embassy—which was in no doubt about the unpopularity of the colonels and of the even greater unpopularity of the Ioannides regime—the problem, or rather the issue, was US policy itself.

Let me make this point clearer still. I believe, on the basis of the nineteen essays in our symposium, that is fairly clear to everyone that it is desirable to have contacts with the opposition wherever possible—but that American embassies, where they lacked such contacts, were not materially worse informed than embassies of other countries which did maintain those contacts. In Spain, where we can be faulted for craven compliance

with the wishes of a dictatorial regime; in Iran, where we failed to predict the importance of the religious opposition; in Greece, where we were accused of being "in bed with the colonels," what was criticized was not really any failure of intelligence but the policy of doing business with the incumbent government. It is not failure to have cultivated Khomeini that the opponents of the shah fault the US government for, but "support for the shah"; and the same, *mutatis mutandis*, applies in other countries governed in an authoritarian mode, where the United States has strategic interests that make it reluctant to tangle with the local government. That problem transcends the problem of contact with the opposition.

The wisdom of Professor Morgenthau's dictum that both contacts with the opposition and failure to have such contacts constitute interference, is nowhere brought out more clearly than in the essay by Richard L. Sneider, ambassador to South Korea when that country was governed by Park Chung-hee. We did, there, maintain contacts with the opposition, despite the suspicions of the regime. But we had constant problems because of the eagerness of that opposition to picture the contacts as implying support for them. The Korean government [writes Sneider] feared that overtly sympathetic contact with the opposition would only encourage broader dissidence and demonstrations which might be misinterpreted by the North Koreans as a signal for a combined internal and external attack against South Korea. A special problem . . . [was] the strong pressures being exerted by the human rights advocates in Congress and the American press against the government of President Park. Korea was in the spotlight and its human rights record, which was often overstated in the press, was a prime issue for those advocating a stronger American stance against authoritarian government. There were virtually no actions the embassy could take that would satisfy the demands of these human rights advocates short of pressing for the overturn of the Park government.

The opposition, knowing this, tried to exploit all contacts by giving them a political significance. "My efforts in Korea to meet quietly with opposition leaders," writes Sneider, "were constantly

(Continued on page 41)





*A scene on the Moskva River, with the Kremlin in the background.*

# ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

DONALD R. KELLEY

As have virtually all advanced nations, the Soviet Union has come to face serious environmental problems as a consequence of her emergence as a major industrial power. At first ignored during the

drive for rapid industrialization, and then only dimly perceived and grudgingly acknowledged during the 1950s and early 1960s, the problems grew in scope and intensity by the 1970s to a point which compelled Soviet authorities to take corrective action and allocate adequate resources for large-scale abatement programs in selected, high priority areas.

Soviet officials now admit that widespread deterioration of air quality in the major industrial centers began with the first five-year plan from 1929 to 1934. In Moscow, scientists first noted the decreased growth rate of local trees in the

1930s and attributed it to city-wide air pollution. Izmailov Park, in the city's rapidly industrializing northeast sector, rapidly became a microcosm of environmental deterioration. By the 1940s, extensive damage had been wrought by air pollution and acid rain, and the muted protests of local naturalists were unheeded.

By the 1960s, the average urbanite did not need a scientist or naturalist to tell him that the air was increasingly fouled by pollution. The withering of trees was commonplace in industrial areas, and in the Urals, officials admitted that tree kills for a ten-kilometer

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*Photos courtesy of Jack Grover*



radius around some factories were the norm. Muscovites noted the absence of birds from local parks, and the residents of other major industrial centers increasingly complained of pollution-related health problems.

Water pollution grew to even more frightening dimensions by the 1960s. The uncontrolled dumping of industrial and municipal wastes reduced most major waterways to lifeless sewers. Chemical discharges occasionally forced Volga steamers to post signs warning passengers not to throw lighted cigarettes overboard because of the danger of fires on the river, and across the nation, recreational facilities felt the deleterious impact of water pollution. More sobering to Soviet officials were the gradually recognized public health and economic consequences of water pollution. By the 1960s, widespread epidemics linked to impure water supplies were already common, and increasingly frequent massive fish kills were taking their toll on the national food supply. Industrial enterprises and the major urban areas—themselves the sources of most water pollution—were finally becoming the victims of their own outcast wastes; both faced the dilemma that increasing demands for fresh water supplies for industry and human consumption could not be met without ex-

tensive programs to reduce emissions, recycle water, and divert north-flowing Siberian and north-western rivers to the populated regions. One Soviet economist estimated in the 1960s that direct economic losses to industry due to water pollution totaled six billion rubles per year, to say nothing of the less tangible costs exacted in terms of public health, recreation, and the perceptible decline of the quality of life.

Recognition of environmental problems was delayed for nearly three decades by an anthropocentric view of nature and by political and institutional restraints which made it virtually impossible for concerned scientists and naturalists to raise their voices above the clamor for continued economic growth. Despite Marx's prediction of the ultimate "accomplished union of man with nature" under socialism, the operational worldview of early Bolsheviks stressed instead man's dominance over the forces of nature; the voluntarist orientation of Leninism that willful action could reshape society easily translated into the notion that man should dominate and manipulate nature, preparing the stage not only for the conscious disregard of the environmental consequences of industrialization but also for grandiose schemes to "remake nature." The embattled history of a regime

that had faced civil war and an exaggerated threat of foreign intervention further strengthened the tendency to relegate environmental concerns to the background. With the advent of Stalin's "socialism in one country" and the rapid industrialization of the 1930s came even greater emphasis on maximum economic growth and industrial gigantism. In the minds of central planners in Moscow and factory directors in the provinces, the message was simple: growth for the sake of growth, and soon planners and operatives at all levels found themselves enmeshed in a network of incentives and performance criteria which stressed gross output and relegated environmental protection measures to the status of "non-productive" endeavors.

When meaningful environmental awareness finally came in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it arrived not as the result of dramatic oil spills or other environmental disasters—although the Soviet Union unquestionably experienced such catalytic events—but was a consequence of growing awareness and sophistication in the scientific community and of the increasing perception on the part of Soviet leaders that continued environmental deterioration would exact unacceptable economic and health-related costs. What did not occur is equally significant; no environmental protest movement emerged as the focal point for growing public concern. Only one environmentally important cause celebre emerged in the mid- and late-1960s in connection with the campaign to protect Lake Baikal, and it involved a relatively small handful of concerned scientists, writers, and other members of the elite. For the most part, however, environmental awareness grew slowly, spreading gradually from the scientific community to at first skeptical economic and political leaders and eventually trickling down to the man in the street.

Any realistic assessment of this new-found awareness must take into account both the prevailing Soviet philosophy about the interrelationship of man and nature and the legal and institutional setting within which decisions are made which affect the environment. In their separate ways, each prescribes the limits of effective abatement programs and sets the



*Bridge and fireworks over the Moskva River, at night.*



tone for a highly selective approach to environmental protection.

In philosophical terms, the current Soviet view closely resembles the American "multiple use" concept; that is, the environment is both to be utilized by mankind for its material needs and to be shielded from excessive exploitation or irremediable damage. But within these parameters, a virtually endless set of balances may be struck between the needs of man and the maintenance of the ecosystem. The environmental threats of uncontrolled population growth, the development of increasingly harmful technologies, and the depletion of non-renewable natural resources so widely discussed among Western analysts evoke little concern among Soviet environmentalists. Population growth is regarded as self-limiting within acceptable limits of economic and environmental impact; the Malthusian prediction of the teeming masses driving the standard of living to the poverty level or the more contemporary image of a growing population gradually straining world food supplies and choking in its own wastes are rejected out of hand, although some demographers have now cautiously admitted that such problems may arise in the third world. Current Soviet policy encourages higher birth rates and provides limited material subsidies because of impending labor shortages and the declining number of ethnic Russians in the nation as a whole.

Soviet thinking also discounts the limits-to-growth argument popularized in the West by the Club of Rome. Such dire predictions are interpreted in political terms as overt attempts to deny the legitimacy of continued growth in the socialist and third worlds and in conceptual terms as short-sighted denials of the ability of modern technology to produce substitute resources. While Soviet theorists have used the debate initiated by the Club of Rome to urge the restoration of a more equitable balance of priorities within the multiple-use framework, they have carefully avoided the suggestion that unalterable limits eventually will be reached.

The increasingly potent environmental threat of modern technology has concerned Soviet environmentalists far less than Western



*Red Square in Moscow.*

commentators. Informally the argument that modern technology and industrial processes are potentially more harmful is accepted without much debate; the environmental consequences of the development of new technologies such as petrochemicals over the last two decades are clear even to the least sympathetic viewer, as is the impact of the growing number of private autos. But unlike Western critics, Soviet environmentalists never extend the argument to suggest that technology *per se* is at fault. Rather they accept without question the "technology fix" position that improved abatement techniques can counter the increasing threat and express an eagerness to draw upon more advanced Western technology in the field.

The true commitment to effective environmental protection is best measured by the gradual tightening of legislative controls and the strengthening of enforcement agencies from the early 1970s onward. While pollution control laws had been on the books for some time—wide-ranging but essentially ineffective legislation governing virtually all aspects of environmental protection was enacted in the late 1950s and early 1960s, and specific conservation or abatement regulations had been present even before—they were honored largely

in the breach, in part because they offered only vaguely worded mandates but more importantly because the monitoring and enforcement agencies were simply not given sufficient resources to implement programs. But in the late 1960s, a trend began to strengthen the legislative mandate: the 1968 law governing land use contained stronger environmental regulations, the 1969 public health law reflected an enhanced awareness of the medical impact of pollution and strengthened the hand of the health inspectors, and the 1970 water use law intensified pollution controls. Equally significant was the growing tendency to focus on specific problems such as the deterioration of the Volga-Urals watershed water quality in a few major cities, and the preservation of Lake Baikal. Special enactments were offered in each case, underlining the highly selective commitment of Soviet leaders to a particular area and sorting out the administrative and budgetary problems that had made effective measures difficult in other instances.

In 1972, heretofore scattered enforcement powers concerning water pollution were largely centralized in the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources, which operates principally through water basin inspectorates. Since



this consolidation there has been a notable increase in the effectiveness of pollution abatement measures; basin inspectors have grown more aggressive in imposing fines, canceling bonuses, and closing offending enterprises, although their impact has been reduced both by their limited numbers and by the resistance of factory and ministerial officials who have successfully defended more important industries. The problem is compounded by the dual responsibilities of the ministry in the area of land reclamation, which is its principal mission, and the secondary priority of protecting water resources. With the per capita amount of arable land decreasing at an alarming rate, it is understandable that top-level ministry officials have placed greater emphasis on land reclamation activities even in an era of greater environmental awareness. Adding to the problem is the unwritten agenda which seemingly informs the ministry's choice of environmental priorities; the vast bulk of its activities deal with a few key cities such as Moscow and Leningrad and the eleven major river basins of the European and southern parts of the country in which environmental deterioration has had the most serious health and economic consequences.

Two other institutional changes also signal greater attention to environmental protection. In 1973, the chief administration of Hydrometeorological Service was given a broadened mandate to monitor pollution and propose abatement measures. For the first time, the new mandate established the Hydrometeorological Service as the lead agency for air pollution problems, which have always been considered less significant by Soviet authorities. In 1978 the service was given additional responsibilities and upgraded to the level of a state committee, entitling it to representation on the Council of Ministers. Now titled the State Committee for Hydrometeorology and the Protection of Nature, it has retained its lead agency status concerning air pollution and seemingly acquired further responsibilities for coordinating both domestic and international programs. Its director, Yu. A. Izrael, reportedly deals directly with Premier Kosygin on environmental matters, and the State

Committee itself shows all the signs of seeking to capitalize on recent attention to the environment to enhance its own admittedly low standing in the bureaucratic pecking order.

The second major institutional change was the creation in 1974 of a Division for the Protection of Nature within the State Planning Agency (GOSPLAN). Ostensibly the formation of this unit was to ensure that an analysis of the environmental impact of projected economic activities would be incorporated directly in the planning process itself. The water basin inspectorates of the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources take the lead in formulating a draft

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**"Also adding to the problem are the growing numbers of private and fleet autos which have already emerged as a major source of pollution in urban areas."**

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water quality plan and submit it to GOSPLAN through its environmental division. Simultaneously the industrial ministries and other water users submit their own drafts concerning water consumption and protection measures. The balance is then struck within GOSPLAN itself, with the division for the protection of nature acting as a spokesman for environmental concerns but usually operating at a severe disadvantage because of its non-operational status in contrast to the more deeply entrenched branch divisions.

Budget increases also tell an important part of the tale. In 1973, investments in water pollution abatement jumped dramatically from 300 to 1500 million rubles. A few years later, the 1976-1980 five-year plan promised an 11 billion rubles program for investment, mostly on water pollution abatement programs, and Soviet environmentalists have recently told their American counterparts that they expect a similar increase in the

1981-1985 plan.

Despite this flurry of legislative and administrative activity, it remains clear that the Soviet commitment to improving environmental quality remains highly selective. Certain environmental threats such as water pollution have been the targets of reasonably effective programs, especially in high priority areas. The once-dead Moscow River has been brought back to life through the efforts of the Moscow-Oka basin inspectorate; over the last decade local industries and municipalities have received a disproportionate share of purification facilities, and especially offensive (and usually technologically obsolete) factories have been closed or moved to lower priority areas. Much the same success can be noted in the high priority water basins of the European and southern parts of the country. They too have received special treatment in terms of budget allocations and access to better quality equipment. In these areas, there has been a marked improvement in water quality, although abatement programs still lag years behind the original, overly optimistic, timetables because of the footdragging of local industries and construction delays. For lower priority areas, on the other hand, the results are predictably less impressive. The local water basin inspectorates are even more understaffed and lack influence over local industrial and municipal officials, and because of the low priority of their region, they are unable to look to central authorities to strengthen their hand.

The situation concerning air pollution is more complex. Although the State Committee on Hydrometeorology and Protection of Nature has emerged as the lead agency, it does not exercise the same sort of centralized authority as does the Ministry of Land Reclamation and Water Resources. Moreover, because lower priority has generally been attached to air pollution problems, no sweeping national mandate has yet been offered as a counterpart to recent water quality legislation. According to Soviet environmentalists, nationwide legislation establishing ambient air standards and creating more effective monitoring and en-

*(Continued on page 43)*



"On the night of March 25th, the West Pakistani troops were let loose on Dacca."

# GEOPOLITICS AND EAST BENGAL

GRANT PARR

In his New York Times review of *White House Years*, the first volume of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, John Leonard says Dean Acheson "would not have sniffed at the style and would probably have agreed with the geopolitics."

If several prominent foreign affairs specialists, including some who knew Acheson personally, don't take serious issue with this assessment, I for one will be surprised.

When Dr. Kissinger deals with subjects of which I have no personal knowledge, he often seems convincing; but his comments on events which I lived through, the Pakistani, Indian, Bengali confrontations of 1971, appall me. There are so many obfuscations and evasions that space limits rebuttal.

The whole structure reminds me of a moth-eaten sweater. At first glance it seems repairable, but when touched it disintegrates.

Citing little but subjective opinion, Dr. Kissinger attempts to justify one of the worst foreign policy gaffes in our recent history—the tilt to Pakistan while Pakistani troops were running amok in East Bengal, killing, raping, burning, and pillaging. Buzz words gloss over the flight into India of some ten million refugees and a death toll that reached a million.

I saw this horror unfold. I

*Grant Parr, FSIO-retired, now lives with wife Penny in Cadaques, Spain. Before joining the State Department (later USIA) in 1948, he was a foreign correspondent in the Middle East and Europe for NBC and the New York Times. With USIA he was assigned in Damascus, Bonn, Hamburg, New Delhi and Dacca.*

worked and lived in Dacca from late 1968 to November 24, 1971. Like most other Americans who shared the experience, I will never forget it.

The Kissinger thesis is that India and the Soviet Union, without significant provocation, plotted to embarrass China and establish India's "pre-eminence on the sub-continent." Continuing with the supposition that the Indian invasion of East Pakistan was an unprovoked attack, Pakistan is termed an ally "to which we had made several explicit promises concerning precisely this contingency."

Too much of this thesis lacks a basis in reality. For perspective, let's look at what really happened in East Pakistan.



*Pakistani troops on the streets of Dacca, March 27, 1971.*

## Sheikh Mujib Was Elected

Pakistan President Agha Mohammed Yahya Khan, a bluff, often drunken, army officer without any notable political following, did hold in December 1970 one of the few free and fair elections in the history of Pakistan. The votes in West Pakistan were divided between several candidates with Zulfikar Ali Bhutto the front runner; but the Bengalis of East Pakistan gave almost unanimous support to their idol, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Shortly before the election the sheikh had been released after several years in a Pakistan prison on the unproven charge of conniving with India to effect the independence of East Pakistan.

Both in public statements and in talks with Americans, Sheikh Mujib said he wanted only increased autonomy, particularly the retention of more of the foreign exchange earned by the export of East Pakistan's jute and tea.

There were more voters in East Pakistan than in the West and they were not split. With a good majority, Mujibur Rahman's Awami League won a majority of the seats in the National Assembly and he would have been prime minister in the new government.

There was no legal reason for barring the sheikh from office, but Bhutto, using wiles and possibly threats on a none too nimble Yahya, persuaded him that Mujib should be prime minister only of East Pakistan while he, Bhutto, would be prime minister in Islamabad.

Sheikh Mujib was a man of

character, moderate, friendly to the United States. He was somewhat impractical, and at times too trusting; but this was hardly an election issue.

The first and most basic cause of the troubles in East Pakistan was not a demand for independence or even autonomy. It was the refusal to seat a duly elected prime minister because he was a Bengali.

Not surprisingly Sheikh Mujib refused to share power with Bhutto and, in this context, refused also to water down his proposals for East Pakistan autonomy.

Yahya Khan came to Dacca and there were several days of what the sheikh and American observers thought to be bona fide negotiations. Then, without prior warning, Yahya returned to Islamabad and in a brief radio denunciation issued the Bengalis an ultimatum demanding complete capitulation.

During the talks, the planes of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) were flying almost around the clock to bring in reinforcements for the army. On the night of March 25th, the West Pakistani troops were let loose on Dacca. They would soon kill at random but at first they followed careful instructions.

All Bengali army units and the police were ordered to turn in their weapons. Those who refused and even some who complied were gunned down. Then, resisted only by a few student barricades, the troops moved on Dacca University. From there they went on to Hindu enclaves. Dwellings were set afire and inhabitants machine-gunned when they attempted to escape the blaze.

Foreign newsmen, including several Americans, were seized at gunpoint in their hotel rooms and driven to the airport before they could learn much about the shooting and burning. Foreign reporters were barred from the province until late July.

My family and I were restricted to our home by a general curfew. Late in the night bullets whined down our street and ricocheted from the road outside our gate. Neighbors, an American consular officer and his wife, heard the bullets even closer. They lay on the floor behind their bed.

Sheikh Mujibur Rahman lived about 150 yards down the street

from us. The firing occurred when West Pakistanis raided his home, killed supporters, and arrested him. For days his fate was not known. We later learned that he had been flown to West Pakistan and imprisoned.

For two days we heard the almost constant rattle of machine guns and the bop-bop of tank cannon. By night we saw towering flames and by day huge pillars of smoke.

On the 27th the curfew was lifted during the day and I was able to drive around the city. It looked as if bombed.

There were burned-out bazaars, half-destroyed buildings, debris everywhere. There were so many dead bodies that after a while one's eyes instinctively passed over them in self-protection.

This initial two-day attack cost at least 3,000 lives including some 500 students and eleven University faculty members.

#### Death at the University

A Texas Ph.D., brought to Dacca by AID to promote science education wrote this about Dacca University:

We stopped at Jagannath hall, the dormitory occupied by Hindu students... Two tanks had broken through the wall, parked, and shot the place up. Then, from the evidence inside, soldiers had gone through the



*Jagannath Hall, the residence of Hindu students at Dacca University, showing signs of shelling and burning by the Pakistani army on March 25, 1971. Some 500 students were killed on that night.*

building and burned each room. There was an area about 30 feet wide and 100 feet long of fresh-turned dirt just outside the building.

There were several holes where the cannon had punched through the wall... There was a decomposed body on the first floor, or rather half a body. Every room had been burned, with furniture overturned, bedding and books burned.

The story told was one of a terrible night. The living students had been made to drag the bodies of the dead and wounded and throw them into a ditch dug by a tractor. Then the living were machine-gunned and their bodies thrown into the ditch. Gasoline was poured on the bodies and after burning dirt was pushed over the whole mess. From one pile of dirt a hand and about four inches of wrist was sticking up... I could take no more...

Everywhere Hindus had been the first target. The Hindu community of squatters living in a village in the middle of the race course was completely wiped out. Days after the first conflict the bodies were still where they had fallen.

People, both Hindus and Muslims, were often shot for trying to reclaim the bodies of dead relatives. The sky was black with crows and buzzards. The stench was overpowering.

For all the ensuing months such scenes of horror invaded my mind. I wanted them not to be true; but they were true. While I remained in East Pakistan there was no escape.

Apparently in the chessboard world of geopolitics this sort of thing can be ignored or covered over by a bit of meaningless tut-tutting.

Henry Kissinger recalls that he gave a press briefing, "In which I emphasized that we had not condoned the Pakistani repression in East Bengal in March 1971." (The time is unclear but it appears to have been in late November.) He told the newsmen that military aid had been cut off and major efforts made to promote political accommodation between the Pakistani government and Bangladesh officials in Calcutta.

Was it sufficient to not condone the days of terror months after the event? Why were they not forthrightly condemned in March? Why was nothing done until events seemed likely to upset the geopolitical chess game?

A few Bengali soldiers, some police, some students, and a few





What was left of "Ittefaq" building—then a leading Bengali newspaper in Dacca, shelled by the army on March 26 or late March 25.

others escaped from the two-day crackdown in Dacca. A weak but brave guerrilla movement took shape—the Mukti Bahini. Nevertheless, neither guerrilla activities nor guerrilla clashes with troops accounted for much of what went on for eight months until December.

The policy of the Pakistan military was indiscriminate slaughter. The only thing that seemed organized was the kidnapping and forced prostitution of Bengali women.

Nowhere in the memoirs is there any clear reference to this unceasing killing which eventually took the lives of a million Bengalis. It never ended until the Indian army entered East Pakistan on December third.

This is the Kissinger cover-up: "To be sure, Pakistani repression *had* (underlining mine) been brutal and shortsighted; and millions of refugees had imposed enormous strain on the Indian economy."

There is no indication that the killing and the exodus of refugees never stopped. The context is an allegation of Indian belligerence.

It is an affront to both human memory and credulity to recall this situation now and still leave out most of the salient facts.

Dr. Kissinger does admit that the State Department had information at variance with that of the president and himself but he does not say where they got their own re-

ports. He says:

"It was nearly impossible to implement this (the Nixon-Kissinger strategy because our departments (state and defense) operated on different premises. They were afraid of antagonizing India; they saw Pakistan was unpopular in the Congress and the media. If there was a 'tilt' in the US government at this stage, it was on the side of India."

If he refers to the US consulate general in Dacca or the embassy in New Delhi, Dr. Kissinger is correct. He is correct, that is, if it is a "tilt" to recognize what is happening all around you.

#### The Missing Tilt

If the United States did anything else that could have been construed as pro-Bengali or pro-Indian, the Americans who lived through all or part of the troubles were unaware of it. However, in claiming there was such a tilt, Dr. Kissinger at least confirms that the cables from Dacca and Delhi were being read.

In East Bengal we felt that our government was not only tilting toward Pakistan but by its silence encouraging Yahya Khan in his butchery.

The first reports from the Dacca congen began while the city was still burning: "With this mindless, knee-jerk reaction, Yahya has ended forever the chances of a truly united Pakistan." This was the key point in a long and careful

message on the two-day crackdown.

Full and accurate reports were sent regularly until the crisis ended in December with the Indian intervention. New Delhi did an excellent job reporting reactions and developments in India.

However, the embassy in Islamabad was isolated, almost a continent away. Its principal sources were West Pakistani officials and a heavily censored West Pakistan press. In view of this handicap it might be said that the embassy reported too much, not too little.

During the spring and early summer several American and other news correspondents crossed into East Pakistan from India and made their way to Dacca on foot or by bicycle-ricksha and boat. In doing this they showed great courage. Imprisonment or death were very real risks. Even after July when foreign newsmen were grudgingly allowed to return, there was danger, not from the Bengali resistance but from the Pakistani troops and their Bihari\* auxiliaries (Razakars) who were all too ready to kill.

We of the consulate, including AID and USIS, briefed newsmen as thoroughly and accurately as we could. The correspondents zealously followed every lead. Their stories were detailed and true; but what they reported was so fantastic that the American public seemed unable to grasp what was going on.

Among the unsung heroes of those sad days were several young AID officers who used their knowledge of Bengali and of the rural areas to travel about and gather information for the congen's report and for briefing newsmen.

Archer K. Blood, Dacca consul general when the troubles began, well deserved the Christian A. Herter award which he received later for "constructive dissent in the best traditions of the Foreign Service." Credit should go also to Robert J. Carle who for a time was consul in charge and to Herbert D. Spivack who succeeded Blood. It took real courage and integrity to report honestly things that powerful men did not want to know.

\*A non-Bengali, Urdu-speaking Muslim minority group that had fled from Eastern India to East Pakistan at the time of partition in 1947.



Sometimes we Americans in East Pakistan wished for a place to hide, not for personal safety, but to escape the continuing torture of the tragedy all around us.

"Can my family sleep on your floor? We are afraid for our fifteen-year-old son. All young men are being taken away."

"The body of my brother-in-law was tossed out of an army jeep. I don't know if they killed him or the Biharis who took his house [did it]. I have my sister and eight children to look after. Eight little children!"

"My brother was the chief police officer in an important district, Rajshahi. Two months ago the military took him into the cantonment. I have heard nothing since."

"He was a Dacca University student. I knew him slightly. I watched him die for two hours and could do nothing about it. He had been there all day, without water, tied to a post in the middle of an empty square. It was burning hot. All around him was a fire-zone. Anyone who entered it would be shot. Finally the troops became impatient. They killed him with a bullet in the head."

Don Weaver, the regional Voice of America correspondent, was one of the foreign newsmen expelled during the night of March 25. Though VOA's Bengali stringer reported regularly to me, he felt open attribution would endanger his life. So as information officer I filed a daily backgrounder for the VOA newsdesk in Washington. Once this was known, I became a center for reports by staffers and other contacts. There were many.

September 20 was no particular day, but it was typical:

From my file of that date: "Mukti Bahini activity and retaliatory burnings among villages about 20 miles north of Dacca. Guerrillas killed six troops guarding bridge. Staffer personally saw troops burning predominantly Christian village of Mousaid. Military fired on burning houses and on country boat carrying villagers to a service at a Catholic mission, two wounded. Fifteen villages burned by troops over nine day period, estimated 250 families homeless. Troops looted a village market. Troops invaded home of village official, killed uncle and three younger brothers. At a colony of hereditary musicians man locked in

house while in another four soldiers raped his wife. Razakars selling corrugated-iron roofing from burned houses. Derailed diesel locomotive observed a few miles from burned villages, possibly a cause of army retaliation."

The embassy in Islamabad soon ordered me to classify these reports thus greatly limiting their usefulness.

### Silencing the Americans

It would be tedious to detail all the attempts—apparently on orders from a very high level—to silence the Americans who had seen too much, both those who remained in Bengal and those who were evacuated in April. I will include a few examples.

The evacuees were not allowed to fly to Bangkok on United States Air Force transports. Instead the United States paid full fare to PIA to fly out American evacuees to Karachi and then Tehran. PIA used returning planes after bringing troop reinforcements to Dacca!

The evacuees were warned against talking with newsmen. In Tehran they were isolated. Meanwhile, we in Dacca saw the Soviet Union scoring one propaganda victory after another. Finally State, AID and USIS officers signed a petition to the secretary of state urging him to condemn the atrocities of the Pakistan military.

The evacuees also proved that Americans are not easy to suppress.

As soon as they could get back to the United States, Dr. John Rohde and Dr. Lincoln Chen, who had been in Dacca with the Pakistan-SEATO cholera laboratories, talked to anyone who would listen. Dr. Rohde appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

While still in Tehran several people wrote to a senator or congressman, some using a model letter worked out jointly by several evacuees:

Dear Senator (Congressman)

... it may have been difficult for you to obtain first hand information about the civil war which is raging in East Pakistan. My own experience verifies the brutal tactics being used by the Pakistani army. American weapons are being used by the military against unarmed civilians, students, professors, and political leaders.

Fully realizing the inadvisability of the United States actively intervening in a civil war, I urge you to seek and support a condemnation by Congress and the president of the inhumane treatment being accorded to the people of East Pakistan.

No political or strategic consideration should outweigh the importance of a humanitarian stand reiterating the American belief in the value of individual lives and a democratic process of government.

I urge you to speak out now. . .

It seems amazing that after eight years with every possible research facility available to him, Dr. Kissinger has still managed not to know what happened in East Bengal. He insists on fixing the date of Indian intervention as November 22, a small matter perhaps but all too typical of the obfuscations and unsupported assumptions that pepper the entire account.

The Indian army moved into East Pakistan on December 3. Prior to this there was firing across the border by both sides, but nothing that could be construed as an all-out offensive against East Pakistan (a phrase from a Pakistani radio broadcast quoted by Dr. Kissinger). It seems amazing, particularly after eight years, that any serious scholar could use the Pakistani radio for reference!

### The Slaughter Was Continuing

In Dacca we felt that India acted reluctantly, almost tardily. Despite some foreign, including US aid, the millions of refugees had become an almost intolerable economic burden. Refugees were still flooding in, and in East Bengal the daily slaughter of thousands, including a virtual genocide for Hindus, was continuing.

At the end of what he calls his sham fact-finding mission and before slipping into China, that is, in July 1971, Dr. Kissinger was in Islamabad. He had made several stops, but he could not find time to go to Bengal.

Several senators found the time. Their personal reports undoubtedly helped inspire the congressional dissent to the Nixon-Kissinger policies.

Dr. Kissinger provides no valid reason for a US obligation to defend Pakistan. The concept of obligation seems particularly pointless since we had done nothing to halt

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# Association News

## AID'S IMPLEMENTATION OF OBEY AMENDMENT

AFSA President Ken Bleakley has sent a detailed letter to Congressman Obey conveying AFSA's initial analysis of how AID Management has designated AID/W jobs FS and GS. The November 30 letter notes AFSA's concern that the purpose of the Obey legislation—to appoint more Foreign Service personnel to policy-making and project implementation positions in AID/W—is being circumvented by management's desire to retain a disproportionately high number of GS and AD staff in such positions.

The process through which AFSA believes this is being done is threefold: by failing to reclassify a large number of AID/W positions as FS even when the Obey criteria would seem to be applicable; by seeking to expand the ten percent exemption applicable to FS-designated positions in the Obey legislation, i.e., allowing 10% of FS positions to be encumbered by non-FS personnel; and by seeking to place administratively-determined appointees (ADs) in FS-designated positions. A fourth technique, which has been ventilated at least within the Africa Bureau, would be to upgrade GS-designated positions so as to enhance promotion prospects.

Glaring deficiencies are noted in the detailed analysis: IDCA—AID's new parent agency—is charged with setting over-all development policy for the United States government and yet has been excluded altogether from the designation exercise. ISTC has similarly been excluded. AFSA believes that the rationale underlying the Obey Amendment should apply with equal vigor to these two major policy-making agencies.

Serious deficiencies were noted in specific offices and bureaus; only two of the 19 positions within the Office of Legislative Affairs and only three out of 27 positions in the Office of Public Affairs have been designated as Foreign Service. There are no FS-designated positions in BIFAD; only two in the Office of Equal Opportunity Programs; and only five in the Of-

fice of General Counsel. Only 36 FS positions were identified in the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination. Whereas some 30 out of 64 positions were initially designated FS in the Office of Intra-Governmental and International Affairs this number was later reduced to seven without adequate explanation. The four regional bureaus fared best in terms of FS-designated positions, although a disproportionate number of key deputy director positions remain GS-designated.

We are also concerned because of the high proportion of senior level positions which will remain GS. According to AFSA's analysis 62% of all GS-13 level positions will be classified as Foreign Service. That percentage drops as the grade level rises: 58% of all GS-14 positions; 42% of the GS-15 jobs; 39% of GS-16 jobs and 33% of GS-17s!!

The letter also draws Congressman Obey's attention to the poor treatment accorded to AID's some 200 Foreign Service Staff (FSS), for whom no (repeat No) AID-W positions have been designated. Experienced FSS personnel serving a rotation tour in AID/W will probably continue to be placed haphazardly in vacant positions, generally inferior to those justified by their rank, experience and capability. AFSA contends that management's narrow interpretation of its legislated mandate is in conflict with the thrust of the Obey legislation, which is to make better use of personnel with overseas experience so that AID can perform more effectively.

Bleakley cites management's recourse to administratively-determined appointments in filling FS-designated posts as "adding insult to injury in relation to the concept of a professional Career Service Corps." AFSA continues to maintain that ADs should only be permitted within the ten percent exemption authorized within the Obey legislation. Furthermore, AFSA questions the rationale for making AD appointments at this point in time, and recommends that Congress re-examine this anach-

ronistic authority at its next session, with a view to eliminating it entirely.

Representatives of AID's Office of Personnel Management have had frequent consultations with AFSA to discuss these issues. It was regretted that the AID Administrator, who had the responsibility to resolve all classification disputes which may arise between OPM and the various AID Bureaus, was unable to meet with AFSA on this vital matter.

The full text of the Bleakley letter will be distributed as an AFSA "Red Top," and readers are assured that AFSA will continue to monitor implementation of the new job designation plan and seek to consult with Congressman Obey's staff as the situation will undoubtedly require.

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## A TRIBUTE

During the recent tragic events in Islamabad when unruly mobs attacked our embassy, four members of the embassy staff lost their lives:

**Marine Corporal Steven Crowley**  
**Army Chief Warrant Officer Bryan Ellis**  
**Nazir Husein**  
**Sharafat Ali**

These four persons were killed when carrying out their duties and responsibilities. Their supreme sacrifice has earned the respect of everyone. On behalf of AFSA and all Foreign Service employees, AFSA President Ken Bleakley has extended sincerest condolences to their families.

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## OVERPAYMENTS

A recent ruling by the Comptroller General reminds all employees of their obligation to make inquiries regarding any significant unexplained increase in pay or allowances. According to the ruling, employees have a responsibility to review records in their possession which might indicate an overpayment and to take corrective action in case of error.



## HOUSING POLICY STATEMENT

In April of this year, the Department sent to all posts an airgram (A-1093) announcing a new Housing Policy and Standards for Foreign Service members to be followed by overseas missions. AFSA has consistently maintained that the subject of overseas housing falls within the scope of matters under Executive Order 11636 calling for consultation between management and AFSA. Prior to the issuance of this airgram, AFSA reiterated this position and proposed several changes to the Standards and Policies in an effort to lessen the potentially adverse effect those policies and standards would have on employees stationed overseas. Since A-1093 did not reflect those changes, we proposed to replace it with a new airgram jointly drafted by AFSA and management. Agreement has now been reached whereby the department will soon send a follow-up airgram which will contain the clarifications and modification requested by AFSA.

Although still premature to conclude what the effect of these airgrams will have on housing assignments (and living quarters allowances) overseas, we would like to describe some of its major provisions to assist each employee in dealing with individual housing situations.

From the outset, it should be noted that the diversity of conditions found in posts overseas requires that any housing standards be viewed as general guidelines and not as fixed norms. "Finished space" varies according to the locality and the employee's representational responsibilities. The definition of finished space is being revised to exclude certain areas in a residence which are not usable. In the follow-up airgram, it will also be made clear that it is up to the post interagency housing board to reconcile the needs of the employee with the intent of the regulations. Criteria other than family size which boards must consider include location in relation to place of work, schools and public transportation, as well as the availability and adequacy of housing and prevailing security conditions. Any employee may appeal the decision by the Post Housing

Board to the Washington Inter-Agency Housing Board.

The department has accepted AFSA's suggested changes in the "bedroom criteria" which *inter alia* will entitle each employee and dependent over ten years of age to a separate bedroom. Also, no child (regardless of age) should be required to share a bedroom with an infant (under two years old). For the purpose of determining bedroom entitlement, a spouse is considered a dependent. In most cases, this means that a family will be entitled to one bedroom for each member of the family living at post.

A number of AFSA chapters and employees overseas have communicated their concerns over the impact of these new policies and standards. Since local interpretation of the relevant airgram differs among posts, AFSA Washington would appreciate receiving any input from overseas, especially concerning problems or hardships resulting from the new guidelines. AFSA stands ready to intervene with management to insure that employee housing needs are adequately and fairly met.

## USE OF BRANIFF AIRWAYS

AFSA has sent a cable to all ARA posts asking them to report to AFSA any examples of inadequate plane service. Our cable was sparked by a telegram from embassy Santiago citing yet another example of an airline over-booking. If we can get enough such examples we will ask the department to waive the requirement that USG employees use Braniff Airways in flights to Latin America. We believe that there is a very good chance that we could get the department to agree to this waiver if we can get enough recent examples. We have also asked these posts for suggestions of alternative air carriers and alternative routes to Latin America.

## SECOND CAREER

Leonard J. Saccio, retired ambassador, writes of his election as First Selectman of the town of Woodbury, Connecticut. He says, "The town, population 7500, continues under the Town Meeting form of government since colonial times; first purchase from the Indians 1659."

## COMPLAINT AGAINST AFSA DISMISSED

On November 27, Administrative Law Judge Rhea M. Burrow of the Federal Labor Relations Authority handed down the Recommended Order and Decision on the complaints of John J. Harter and John D. Hemenway against the American Foreign Service Association. The complaints were for alleged violations of 29 C.F.R. 204.2, bill of rights of members of labor organizations.

The decision read, in part: "It therefore must be concluded that: (1) the respondent, AFSA did not violate complainant Hemenway's right to communicate with the membership of the Association and make public statements which the Governing Board did not agree with because it was Hemenway who was attempting to subvert and sabotage AFSA's constitution and by-laws and AFSA's managing Governing Board to his own advantage and against the established policies of the organization he was

elected to espouse; (2) the evidence does not establish that Hemenway's right to bring suit against members of the Governing Board have been in any way limited or impaired; (3) neither Hemenway nor Harter under the circumstances of this case have cognizable rights under 29 CFR 204.2(a)(1) and (2) and the Standards of Conduct Provisions of Executive Order 11636 which have been violated by AFSA; and, (4) complainants' right of protection to sue has not been impaired and there is no violation of this right established by the evidence of record."

The Recommendation of the Administrative Law Judge was as follows: "It having been found that the Respondent did not violate Executive Order 11636 or the Bill of Rights sections of 29 CFR 204(a)(2) and (4) of said Order incorporating the CFR regulations, I recommend that the complaint herein be dismissed in its entirety."



**MEMO FROM: Robert M. Beers, Executive Director**  
**SUBJECT: Membership**

The start of a new year is traditionally an occasion for reflection and appraisal, a time for measuring next year's prospects against the yardstick of last year's experience. This process takes on a special significance when the start of a new year also marks the beginning of new decade. As AFSA approaches its 70th birthday, one cannot help but speculate on what the 1980s have in store.

Whatever AFSA's stand on this or that issue, whatever its boxscore of successes and defeats, these considerations are all subordinate to a more mundane and less glamorous statistic: the size of AFSA's membership. Any evaluation of AFSA's prospects for the 1980s has to begin with a look at the extent to which AFSA is supported by those it serves, the active and retired members of the Foreign Service community. Membership is the Big Casino, the *sine qua non*, or in today's lexicon, "the bottom line."

As the Association embarks on a new decade, more than one out of three active Foreign Service people are AFSA members. While this may be a higher percentage of participation than that registered by other federal employee organizations, it still is not nearly good enough in view of the many disquieting uncertainties now confronting us. For better or worse, AFSA is the voice of the Foreign Service. If we care about the service, if we are concerned about its future and ours, if we believe that its separate identity and its superior quality should be preserved, then AFSA is the means to those ends we seek to achieve.

The decade of the '70s brought more than the usual run-of-the-mill type of problems. The process of accommodating to new responsibilities in the area of labor management relations and of coping with a divisive and widely publicized conflict within the Governing Board were among those factors which inevitably left their mark on AFSA's level of membership. More old members left than new members joined. 1969 marked an all-time high in AFSA membership. Today, with yesterday's problems receding into

history and with AFSA again moving in the direction of constructive achievement, one would like to think that the 1980s would see AFSA's membership climb to new heights.

Not that conflicting viewpoints within the Association no longer exist. Indeed, each mail brings comments and criticisms from members which cover the full spectrum. AFSA's performance has been labeled both "outstanding" and "extremely poor"; it has been accused of favoring the interests of one group of members at the expense of others; it has been criticized for making "too much noise about how to protect our rights at the expense of quality," and branded as being "reactionary" in its attitude towards minorities; it has been condemned for supporting the policy of mandatory retirement while being castigated for not being more aggressive in pressing for wider career opportunities. Yet, throughout the Foreign Service community the areas of mutual concern outweigh by far those of narrow self-interest. AFSA's efforts and resources are directed toward furthering the collective and individual interests of its constituency—occasionally with a surprising result.

Recently a telegram was despatched to all posts transmitting a statement issued by AFSA's president on the American hostages in Iran. In response came a letter carrying the salutation, "Dear Gentlemen," directing that the writer's membership be canceled. The reason: a "sexist" reference in AFSA's telegram to "the safe return of our countrymen," and the observation that this implied that AFSA favored leaving our "countrywomen" behind in Tehran.

This surely has to qualify as one of the more frivolous reasons for dropping one's membership.

With our colleagues coming under actual physical attack overseas and the very concept of a separate Foreign Service being questioned in certain high quarters at home, now is the time at the start of the new decade to elevate and accelerate AFSA's growth. As we face an uncertain future, this has to be a priority concern for us all.

**AFSA WRITES ICA DIRECTOR**

AFSA called on the International Communication Agency to reevaluate its policies on assignment of non-essential personnel to areas where they could face extreme personal danger.

In a November 19 letter to ICA Director John E. Reinhardt, Fred Shaver, chairman of ICA Standing Committee, noted that, within days before the attack on the Tehran embassy, and after the Binational Center in Isfahan had been taken over by Iranian students, the agency was planning to commit more resources to its cultural and information program.

"There will be situations where a USICA officer performs a vital function in a crisis situation, as evidenced most recently by events in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Afghanistan," Shaver wrote. "The question of personnel policy arises in regard to assignment of our people to non-essential functions in the midst of extreme personal danger."

He asked that personnel guidelines for crisis situations be made available to AFSA and offered AFSA's assistance in a review of the agency's policy and actions in Iran and elsewhere.

In his reply of November 29, Director Reinhardt did not go into details but did give assurances that the "safety of our people has been and shall continue to be a major factor as we plan our activities," and noted the recent withdrawal of ICA personnel from certain Islamic countries.

We are disturbed that neither the management of ICA nor AFGE as exclusive representative for ICA Foreign Service employees has apparently taken any substantive action toward ensuring better protection of Foreign Service employees in the face of the recent attacks by terrorists.

**SY REPRESENTATION**

Acting on Security Officers' concerns that the Office of Security had undermined their right to representation by setting up a closed "office union," AFSA obtained from management a commitment to revoke this system. AFSA is still negotiating on comp time, night differential, pay while in travel status, and other issues. SY officers are encouraged to keep AFSA informed of their views and concerns.



## IT'S AN OUTRAGE

A post recently submitted a request to the department that a new AID Mission Director be given the diplomatic title of counselor which had been accorded to his predecessor. The department denied the request stating that to grant the title would violate the AFSA-State agreement on diplomatic titles. The same excuse has been used before under similar circumstances.

Blaming the AFSA/State Agreement of 1974 for that refusal is an outrage. The agreement was designed to develop a uniform criteria for granting of diplomatic titles. Its operative sections read as follows: The parties, desiring to ensure that Foreign Service personnel are accorded diplomatic titles commensurate with their responsibilities and with international practice, have agreed to the following revision in the correlation between title and rank for officers of the Foreign Service:

*Minister-Counselor*—The rank of Minister Counselor, heretofore granted to Deputy Chiefs of Mission at Class I Missions, will be accorded to Deputy Chiefs of Mission at Class II Missions as well.

*Counselor*—The rank of Counselor has heretofore been granted to Deputy Chiefs of Mission at other than Class I Missions and to heads of section of Class I and II Missions, if the position is classified 0-2 or above and the rank

of officers is 0-3 or above. The rank of Counselor will now be given to Deputy Chiefs of Mission at Class III and to heads of section at Class I, II and III Missions, regardless of position level, if the rank of the officer is 0-3 or above.

The implementing regulations are contained in Volume III of the Foreign Affairs Manual Section 610. Responding to AFSA's insistence when those regulations were issued, these regulations include a saving clause to meet unusual circumstances (Section 617.1). That subsection provides that "there may be extraordinary circumstances or overriding considerations which require on an exceptional basis the officer's use of a specific title or diplomatic listing, or denial thereof, in particular cases. In such case, the department will issue appropriate instructions consistent with law to the post concerned." AFSA knows that the provisions of this escape clause have been used and, we expect, will continue to be used on a case basis. If the department decides not to grant an exception, it should accept responsibility for making that decision and not pretend that AFSA or the Agreement is to blame.

## EXTRAORDINARY DANGERS COMMITTEE

Since the seizure of the hostages in Tehran, the AFSA Board has met several times a week to review the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East and to recommend to management precautionary steps better to protect Foreign Service employees and their families worldwide.

In order to strengthen AFSA's ability to respond to this crisis and similar problems which may arise in the future, the Governing Board voted to reestablish the Extraordinary Dangers Committee. Ronald L. Nicholson has been named chairman of the committee. It is charged with monitoring all developments which threaten the safety of Foreign Service personnel and their families. The committee will work with management to ensure that highest priority is given to safeguarding the lives and well-being of personnel.

The Extraordinary Dangers Committee, working in close coop-

eration with the Board and the Members Interests Committee, will have broad authority to carry out its responsibilities. Persons having information of interest to the Committee are encouraged to communicate with the committee by letter or, if urgency dictates, by AFSA Channel cable.

## APPEAL FOR RELEASE

AFSA's Governing Board, on December 11, voted unanimously to give all possible support to a grass roots effort to bring pressure for the release of the hostages of Iran. The families of the 50 hostages have asked that postcards and petitions be sent to the embassy of Iran directed to the Iranian people and bearing the message, "The American people ask that the hostages be freed immediately." A group of AFSA members established an office in the AFSA building and appealed for volunteers.

## NEW ED BOARD MEMBER

David Alan Cohen was born in 1944 in the state of New Jersey. Having survived his youth, he entered Rutgers University where, after four years, he was awarded a Bachelor of Arts degree in Latin American Civilization. Shortly thereafter, he attended New York University and earned a Master of Arts degree in Brazilian Affairs and Economic Development. While enrolled in NYU, Mr. Cohen conducted research on the development of small and medium-sized industry in the interior region of the Northeast Brazilian State of Ceará.



In 1968, Mr. Cohen was married to Rita Ferreira, a nice person. At about the same time, he became an International Credit Analyst for the Irving Trust Company, a Wall Street banking firm. In 1969, Mr. Cohen was employed by the United States Agency for International Development, and was assigned to the AID Mission in Brazil, where he served for five years as an economic analyst and assistant program officer. In 1974, Mr. Cohen was reassigned as program officer in the AID Mission to the Dominican Republic, a position he occupied through mid-1977. While on Agency-sponsored academic training, he earned a Masters degree from Cornell University in International Development Planning. Mr. Cohen is now serving as Assistant Director for Planning of AID's Office of Southern African Affairs.

## REUNION

Calling all Americans who have served in Afghanistan! A reunion is planned for March 8 at Fort McNair. If you don't receive an announcement by February 1 it's because we don't have your address. Call or write Betty Hubbell, 303 N. Lee St., Falls Church, Va. 22046. Tel. (703) 532-7337.



"I have measured out my life with coffee spoons."—T. S. Eliot

# On Measuring Out Our Lives in Coffee Spoons

LIBBIE S. MATHES

When my husband joined USIA 19 years ago he and I promised each other that we'd accept foreign assignments and frequent post changes only until we had children old enough to be affected adversely by so much moving. Didn't everyone? Our future children would not become the psychological and intellectual casualties of our wanderings. The suffering we observed in many of the mission children in Ceylon and India where we spent our early FS years stunned and disturbed us. Since we were not yet parents, it was easy to be judgmental and superior.

Our test came; and stubbornness, ambition, who knows what, made us blind for several years to the signals warning us to slow down. Today we are paying for excessive globetrotting with a too long undetected learning disability in one child. His eager use of a handful of foreign languages so delighted us that we didn't focus properly on the difficulties he had reading his own. The discovery shocked us into taking a critical

look at our boys and subsequently taking two concrete steps toward some necessary stability for them. First was a request for an extension in São Paulo one year beyond the four year limit at one post. Request granted. Result: the tour has been our richest experience. The second step was to apply only for jobs in Washington even though there were some very tempting positions opening up abroad. The world will have to wait a few years. Now our boys simply must go "home" where we've spent only one three year tour since 1960.

Our situation is not unique or even unusual. All FS families eventually face educational and developmental crises.

Certainly one does meet FS children who display no scars, only the benefits of all the moving, but experience and intuition tell me they are in the minority. Even the most committed FS families recognize displacement scars as the major drawback of this life. It's time for personnel to address this problem with a flexible and constructive assignments policy designed to reduce the chances that the scars will be permanent.

## The Proposal

The precedent for assignment flexibility exists. Women officers

are seen as cases requiring special personnel attention; minority officers are special cases; married officer couples are special cases. The Service has responded well to the current social revolution.

Traditionally organized families, the backbone of the Service, also require special assignment consideration.

Specifically I propose two things, both heretical by today's guidelines:

- Waive the four year limit on tours at a given post so that families can opt for more continuity in schools and friends and routine when necessary, and
- Encourage interested officers to develop expertise in a country or an area and to return to it over an extended period while their children are growing. These officers should be considered a special resource, not traitors to their Foreign Service oaths. Surely the result would be fewer of the traditional FS family ills, certainly less of the FS schizophrenia that comes from spreading ourselves too thin.

An unreconstructed advocate of area specialties, I believe the oft-denounced "area clubs" should not be broken up but made more productive.

Families would benefit. So would the Service. Government goals would be served by an enlightened personnel policy that met seasoned officers' family needs. Longer tours and more profound area expertise in middle and senior grade officers (the ones likely to have school-age children) would mean more continuity in programing, the chance to develop more substantive long range communication with foreign leaders and institutions and more informed reporting.

Budgetary savings from less moving, less language training and less orientation time at new posts would be impressive, but they are much less important than the potential savings in teen-age-transfer-trauma and the potentially better use of officer talent.

## Turf Defending

As I review this I am handed Alan Carter's "Reflections and Episodes" (March *USICA-World*). The article expresses a mistrust of area expertise in the belief that

(Continued on page 42)

*Mrs. Mathes, a free-lance journalist, has just returned from five years overseas with her branch PAO spouse. "The Girl from Ipanema" which appeared in the February, 1979 issue was written while she was in São Paulo and drew much comment.*



"Why not the best?"

# Political Appointee: A Case Study

WINSTON SMITH

*We were at an evening social function. The ambassador and I were standing in a corner of the terrace, talking to a senior official of the host government who was anxious to tell us about his just-concluded visit to the United States. He had been asked by a neighboring government to sound out American officials on a delicate subject during the visit, and he began to describe to us the outcome of his inquiries. The ambassador, a political appointee, couldn't follow the conversation. At the first opportunity, he broke in to ask genially, "Did you get in any golf while you were in the States?"*

Rewarding a political supporter by naming him ambassador to a salubrious foreign capital is a practice as old as the Republic. Although a uniquely American product, it has not been one of our more felicitous political traditions. Mention of political appointees is apt to invoke memories: the envoy to Sri Lanka who gained fleeting fame by admitting that he did not know the name of his host country's prime minister; the ambassador to a Latin American country who adamantly refused to let the embassy staff operate out of his undamaged residence after the chancery had been demolished in an earthquake; the businessman-turned-diplomat who solemnly explained that for-

mer Dominican dictator Trujillo was really a fine man led astray by evil companions and advisers. These, of course, are all images from the past. What about the present?

A recent assignment has induced me to take a new look at this hoary institution and how it has been faring under the present administration. The experience was far from unique but it did provide the occasion for a good deal of reflection on the problem of the political appointee, some of which I would like to share with you.

Although there has been a tendency on the part of career officers to see the term "political appointee" as synonymous with "non-career appointee," an important distinction can be made between them. From the very beginning, US administrations have routinely reached outside the ranks of government to appoint private citizens of demonstrated ability and often distinguished records to ambassadorial positions. Indeed, until World War II most of our chiefs of mission came from this source. Among contemporary examples of such appointments one can cite Ambassador Mansfield in Tokyo, Ambassador Goheen in New Delhi and Ambassador Wriggins in Colombo, persons whose selection as chiefs of mission even the most career-minded of foreign service professionals can hardly criticize. All appointments of this nature

may not have been equally worthy, but they have rarely been a valid source of discontent to the professionals.

This type of non-career appointment is not, of course, made solely on the basis of the individual's qualifications, however impeccable they may be. A political motive is almost invariably present, even if it is no more than the hope that the appointee will add a touch of lustre to the appointing administration. Living in a political society, we can hardly criticize an otherwise suitable appointment on the sole grounds that it has a political motivation.

But appointments of this sort are not really what we mean when we talk about "political appointees." If one sets aside the university presidents, scholars, retired legislators and civic-minded philanthropists whose appointments—although motivated in good part by the political considerations—can be seen as at least reasonably appropriate to the job, we are left with a residue of other non-career appointees. These are the ones who have no visible qualifications for the position and nothing in their backgrounds to suggest any particular affinity for foreign affairs. They are the true political appointees, those who have obviously been selected for reasons that have nothing to do with the conduct of foreign policy.

It is primarily from this group

*Winston Smith is the pseudonym of a Foreign Service officer who wears a thirty-year button and has had assignments in four continents under a total of fourteen ambassadors.*



that the diplomatic horror stories of the past have come. This is not to suggest that some of the seemingly well-qualified non-career appointees (and for that matter, even some of our own career officer appointees) have not proved, in the event, to be pretty dreadful chiefs of mission. But in the great majority of cases, the truly abysmal performers of recent decades have been those individuals who can be labeled, in the strict sense, political appointees.

Most political appointees, interestingly, have not themselves been politicians. The largest number has been drawn from the ranks of business, with executives from the large corporations less often represented than individual entrepreneurs who have made a pile and seen fit to donate some of it to the coffers of the successful presidential candidate. There have been some politicians among them, however, usually those who have just lost an election and customarily a product of state politics rather than the national level. A third source has consisted of personal or professional friends of the president, or of his associates and political allies, including, in several unforgettable cases, society hostesses, who have opened doors for them.

To be fair, it must be acknowledged that many of these people have been able in their own fields and that some of the seemingly least qualified of them have actually turned out to be reasonably competent chiefs of mission. (I have heard a Sri Lankan official comment that the hapless gentlemen who initially didn't know the prime minister's name eventually proved a pretty good envoy.) By the late 1970s, however, it has become distressingly evident to any thoughtful person that the process of utilizing ambassadorships to flatter friends or reward political favors is an anachronism.

Although there has been much talk of the declining role of ambassadors as a result of the revolution in communications technology, this is not an accurate picture. True, an ambassador no longer has the freedom of action that he may have enjoyed in the days when instructions from Washington reached him by square-rigged ship. Countering this, however, is the enormously

more complex international world that has evolved in the past few decades. With roughly 150 separate governments interacting around the globe, the jobs of our chiefs of mission in most cases have become even more demanding and call for even more expertise on their part.

The basic trouble with most political appointees in the embassies of today has been their inability, often through no fault of their own, to meet these demands. They simply don't *know* enough about the international environment—especially in the developing countries—to do their jobs effectively. They become, in the majority of cases, an added burden to the professionals on their staff and to the country desk in Washington. Rather than leading and guiding the

puzzle is that, knowing this, presidents who would not dream of entrusting non-professionals with their Chevrolets or their frontal lobes will award highly sensitive diplomatic posts to complete amateurs: cronies, campaign contributors and personal friends. Yet for years no one has seemed able to do much of anything about it.

Thus foreign service professionals reacted with real, although guarded, enthusiasm in 1976 to Candidate Jimmy Carter's ringing denunciation of the practice and his promise to do away with it once and for all if elected. "Quality" would henceforth be the sole criterion for ambassadorial appointments, he declared, and not "political inter-relationships."

The professionals were further

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**"While the administration has not reached the level of certain of its predecessors in truly egregious appointments, it has appointed ambassadors of obvious—and in at least one case, stunning—unsuitability for the job."**

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mission's activities, they must be carried, shielded, protected and—when possible—educated by the staff. The magnitude of the burden often depends on the extent which the appointee recognizes his limitations and, in essence, keeps his fingers out of the machinery. The worst situations, as we all know, frequently are those in which he does not realize his own inadequacies but insists on firmly grasping the wheel.

None of this should be surprising if one accepts the fact that diplomacy and the implementation of foreign policy in today's complex world have become, in every sense of the word, a profession. In every modern profession from automobile repairing to brain surgery, the contemporary demand has been for ever higher levels of expertise and professionalism. (I can remember once disassembling the carburetor in my 1937 Pontiac, cleaning it and putting it back together. The car ran beautifully after the operation. Have you ever tried doing that to a modern car?) The

cheered when, after President Carter's inauguration, he announced in February, 1977, the formation of a special advisory board headed by former Florida governor Reubin Askew to pass on the suitability of ambassadorial appointments. Although not yet ready to proclaim the millennium, career officers welcomed the Askew Committee as a step in the right direction—an acknowledgment that a fat purse or a political favor does not itself equip a person to head the American government's diplomatic mission in a foreign capital.

Just how well has this worked out in practice? Has the Carter administration really observed President Carter's campaign pledge to appoint no more campaign contributors or jobless political friends as ambassadors? In particular, has the Askew Committee actually scrutinized the qualifications of non-career nominees whose names have come from the White House or has it merely rubber-stamped White House choices?

Over all, my impression is that



the Carter administration's record in naming ambassadors has been quite good, an impression confirmed by the AFSA Governing Board's latest annual report. The percentage of appointees from career ranks has been kept above the seventy percent mark. Moreover, a goodly number of its non-career appointees have been from the category of reasonably well qualified persons rather than straight-out political appointees.

The professionals were right, however, not to proclaim the millennium. Among the college presidents, professors and lay statesmen appointed by the present administration have been a number of undeniable political or personal payoffs. While the administration has not reached the level of certain of its predecessors in truly egregious appointments, it has appointed ambassadors of obvious—and in at least one case, stunning—unsuitability for the job. Most distressing, they seem to have been given the seal of approval by the Askew Committee without a whimper.

I have just been exposed to a rather dramatic example of the latter category, having spent a surrealistic eight months as deputy to one of the administration's political appointees. I would like to describe this experience in some detail, not as an exercise in vindictiveness or self-justification, but as a real-life case study of what can still happen to a post as a result of the political appointment process. The locale was a small, friendly, far from critical but not unimportant country, in which we had previously been represented solely by career officers.

In describing this experience, my hope (admittedly a fleeting one) is that the tale may encourage some one in the administration to take a new look at its politically motivated ambassadorial appointments and what they may be doing to its image abroad. At the same time, I have no particular wish to embarrass the individual concerned, a decent man whose only real fault is that he is a fish out of water and who can be criticized only for voluntarily leaping out of the pond. I have therefore asked that my real name be withheld from this article and I will use a pseudonym for him. Let us simply call him "Ambassador X." Here is his story.

None of the embassy staff had

ever laid eyes on Ambassador X when we assembled at the airport to meet him on his arrival at the post. Our initial impressions were favorable. During our first few minutes of conversation he seemed friendly, unassuming, alert, crisp and not overly taken with his own importance. My first misgivings arose when we rode together into the city from the airport. Although he had never before been in that part of the world and the route passed through some especially interesting parts of the city, I noticed that he did not once glance out the window at his new surroundings. Nor did he ask any questions about the country. He spent the time talking about the important people he had met in Washington and at a stop-over en route.

Ambassador X's first days in office were unexceptional, devoted largely to meeting the staff, leafing through the briefing material we had prepared for him, listening to a series of oral briefings, and familiarizing himself with the office layout. At the same time, he began reading the incoming cable traffic. The first sign of anything unusual came about a week after his arrival, when one of the secretaries emerged wide-eyed from his office, rushed over to me and said, "He just asked me where Canberra was!"

This was the modest beginning of our progressive exposure to Ambassador X's fund of information. In short order senior staff members were presented with, among many others, the following questions:

"What is this 'gang of four' that everyone is talking about?"

"You mean there has been a war between India and Pakistan? What was that all about?"

"Did you say there are two separate Korean governments? How come?"

Among people he had never heard of, we found, were Gandhi, Nehru, Sukarno, former British Prime Minister Callahan (then still in office), Chancellor Schmidt and Chiang Kai-shek, to say nothing of such nonentities as Deng Xiaoping and President Giscard d'Estaing. Even more startling was a conversation with several fellow chiefs of mission in a neighboring capital some months later. The discussion turned to the resurgence of Islam and its possible impact on the re-

gion; at that point, Ambassador X asked, "What's Islam?"

This mind-boggling lack of information was by no means confined to the foreign policy field. At one unforgettable staff meeting, Ambassador X opened the proceedings by complaining of his lingering cold and wondering aloud whether he should send someone out to buy him "some antibiotics." He acted surprised when a staff member observed that a doctor's prescription would be necessary, and showed incomprehension when another suggested that an antihistamine ("a *what?*") would be more effective. He became animated when a third staff member extolled the virtues of Vitamin B and offered to give him a supply. "It's not habit-forming, is it?" he asked nervously.

Strangest of all was an episode during an early evening reception aboard a visiting third-country naval vessel. A number of us, gathered around Ambassador X, were perplexed at his odd use of the word "hull" in chatting about the ship we were on. Seeing our confusion, he said, "you know, hull! Isn't that what you call the front of a boat?"

Assured by his startled audience that the more customary word was "bow," he observed testily that he had been the owner of several boats even though he may not know the names of their various parts.

None of the foregoing is in any way exaggerated. In citing these examples I am not trying to poke fun at Ambassador X. His truly thunderous lack of knowledge was not entirely his fault, nor was he noticeably sensitive about it. He had no hesitation in asking questions to fill the gap, although it was a bit like trying to fill in the Atlantic. We soon began to wonder, however, just how deeply the White House and the Askew Committee had probed this man before sending him abroad as the president's personal representative.

Meanwhile, as the depth of his information gap was being plumbed, other traits were emerging. One concerned his personal work habits. During his first weeks in office, we attributed to delayed jet lag his failure to return to the office after going home for an early



lunch. We later found, however, that this was simply his style. Out of curiosity I once checked the Marine Guard logbook that recorded all his comings and goings; over a three-month period he had averaged slightly less than 21 hours a week in the office.

Ambassador X also did not write—at first almost literally. While we routinely drafted his official correspondence for him (including his “first person” cables to Washington), he soon faced the problem of a stack of congratulatory personal notes from hometown friends and acquaintances. Summoning a junior officer, he handed him a pile of them with instructions to prepare replies for the ambassadorial signature. Delighted with the results, he gave the officer a

introduce him into the active intellectual/representational life of the capital. Shortly after he arrived, we persuaded him to host a large two-part reception at the residence for senior host country officials, the diplomatic corps and leading local citizens. With that successfully behind us, I suggested a few weeks later that we sit down and work out a representational program for him. Absolutely not. He and his wife heartily disliked entertaining, he said emphatically. One of the reasons they had taken an ambassadorship rather than a Washington appointment, he declared, was their fear of the heavy social schedule that the latter might entail!

And that was that. For the next six months not a single host coun-

sion's time. His sense of propriety was not very well developed, however, and he really didn't listen to our earnest lectures on local social customs, so odd incidents occurred. His seat of honor would be glaringly empty after the intermission at a concert, and he once innocently walked out of a ceremony minutes before the deputy prime minister rose to officiate, leaving both the DPM and the diplomatic corps openmouthed.

I recall most vividly one occasion when he was called upon to escort a party of senior officials, including the brigadier commanding a third-country military installation on a tour of a visiting American warship. Halfway through the tour he abandoned them so that he could join his own household, which had just arrived at the ship for a separate tour. I still puzzle over just what happened next, but I remember well the vignette in the admiral's cabin a half hour later when the rest of the party had finished the tour and was waiting for the ambassador. Standing around a table were a permanent secretary, several senior host country military officers, the brigadier, myself, and one other host country citizen whom I knew only too well, acting as impromptu host to the permanent secretary. The brigadier turned to me and whispered, “Who is the gentleman talking to the permanent secretary?”

Taking a deep breath, I replied, “Oh, that's the ambassador's houseboy.”

Ambassador X had dispatched the houseboy as a stand-in until he himself was able to rejoin the party. The brigadier did not say a word but I will not forget the look of frozen horror on his face!

There were a host of other oddities. Personal friends from home would visit Ambassador X at the residence, sometimes settling in for weeks on end. He would drop everything to entertain them, never an easy task for him since he had not identified, let alone visited, any of the capital's main tourist attractions. To pass the time, he would bring them to his office to sit, often for hours, while he conducted the nation's business in front of them. One day I found to my alarm that one of them was actually sitting in on a rather highly classified country team meeting. Ambassador X

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“To pass the time, he would bring them to his office to sit. . . One day I found to my alarm that one of them was actually sitting in on a rather highly classified country team meeting.”

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second batch, then a third. As I recall, a reply to a personal letter from his insurance company was then assigned. The officer's supervisor came to me. With the officer working full time on the ambassador's non-official correspondence, the section's regular reporting was suffering. Couldn't I do something about it? I told him to keep the officer at work on the correspondence and hope that the flood of personal letters would subside. Happily, within a month or so, it did.

To be fair to Ambassador X, he eventually did make an effort to draft a few messages. The first products were wholly embarrassing, but I thought I could detect signs of progressive improvement. He would never be a drafting officer, but he did show promise of becoming able to express himself coherently once the reader got past his stylistic quirks. I fancied that I was helping him in the process.

A more serious problem arose in our efforts to develop local contacts for Ambassador X and to in-

try official, prominent citizen or third country diplomat crossed the threshold of the residence. The local American community was scarcely more favored. The close personal and social contact that his predecessor maintained with local Americans was allowed to dwindle to rather grudging agreement to hold occasional—and mutually uncomfortable—early evening briefing sessions at the residence for members of the local American businessmen's organization. (Noting my observation that the absence of non-American guests raised a question over the use of representation funds for these gatherings, he asked why the organization itself shouldn't pay for the refreshments consumed. The word was passed to the rather surprised organization, which quickly agreed.)

After initially balking, Ambassador X did dutifully attend most of the endless round of national day celebrations, receptions, dinner parties, and similar events that consume so much of a chief of mis-



did not take kindly to my subsequent suggestion that this was not a good idea (it brought forth his first accusation of "disloyalty") but he did get the message.

Ambassador X is the stuff from which Foreign Service legends are made, and I could go on in this vein almost indefinitely. My purpose in this article, however, is not to entertain the reader or to ridicule Ambassador X. He is, to repeat, a decent man, although entirely unqualified for the job he holds. That such a person has been appointed ambassador, as we all know, is by no means a rarity. There have been far worse ambassadorial appointments in the past few decades, although I doubt that any have arrived at their posts bearing as little knowledge of the outside world as he. What bothered me most about Ambassador X was that this administration was supposed to be different. We had the president's campaign promise, we had the Askew Committee—I suppose it was naive to feel a bit cheated.

My own involvement with Ambassador X ended abruptly after eight months, when he determined to replace me as DCM. We had both made a sincere effort to work together, but the strain proved too much for him. He found his new position increasingly frustrating as the divergence between his particular talents and the requirements of the job became ever more apparent to him. The frustration inevitably focused on his DCM, the one person always present at his humiliations and the one with the unwelcome but unavoidable task of constantly explaining to him why he could not do something he wanted to do and vice versa. I thought for a while that we had worked out a satisfactory *modus vivendi*, but I was mistaken.

As with most of his activities, Ambassador X's method of relieving me was unorthodox. Rather than telling me to my face that he was replacing me, he thrust a letter into my hand one morning, grabbed his expensive briefcase and strode rapidly out of the office, not to return until the following day.

The letter was a long one, explaining in painful detail why he considered the step necessary. The language was stiff and archaic, but it made his points graphically. Having no inkling that the letter was

coming, my immediate reaction was one of surprise. Beneath the surprise, however, was an odd, niggling feeling of accomplishment. It was by far the best thing he had ever written!

Reflecting on the experience, I think it fair to say that Ambassador X has not been, as have some early political appointees, a foreign policy disaster. He is not an arrogant nor an abusive man, and he has not created significant difficulties in our relations with the host country. Senior host country officials (the handful who see him with any regularity) simply don't take him seriously. Pragmatic, urbane and without any special cultural sensitivities, they find Ambassador X more amusing than annoying. The most we have lost in this particular case is a certain amount of national dignity and, perhaps, more important, regular access to the thoughts and views of the host country leadership. But despite the limited damage, anyone familiar with the situation can only conclude that Ambassador X's appointment was an unmitigated mistake.

Can similar mistakes be avoided in the future? It seems quite clear that the present administration, despite the brave words of 1976, is no more ready than its predecessors to take the vow and swear off the use of ambassadorships for political patronage and reward. The White House has shown sensitivity to the past excesses of the appointment process, however, and might conceivably be induced to take steps that would insure at least minimal competence in its political appointees—enough, one would hope, to guard against the recurrence of such embarrassments as Ambassador X.

One useful measure would be to substitute for the Askew Committee a mechanism that would actually examine, even if superficially, the capabilities of potential nominees before a decision is made. In the case of Ambassador X, a five minute conversation with anyone versed in foreign affairs would have revealed his unsuitability for the job. If it were of a mind to do so, the White House might quietly line up an informal roster of persons with actual foreign policy expertise whom it trusts—retired career chiefs of mission, for example, or foreign corre-

spondents emeritus—one of whom could be asked to meet personally with a potential ambassadorial candidate to determine in advance whether he or she meets the minimal level of competence that would avoid embarrassment to the government. This obviously would not resolve the problem of political appointees (and I hope that AFSA will be even more assiduous in opposing those not fully qualified) but it would at least weed out the most glaring misfits before the situation becomes irreversible. The real problem here, I suspect, is in getting the White House to recognize that there is a problem.

At a more immediate level, is there a more active role for the department in seeking to minimize the harm done by the seriously unsuitable political appointee? I am not qualified to address the question of how far the department's senior leadership has been able and willing to go in attempting to dissuade the White House from making such appointments. A possible difficulty is that the department may not know that it has a particular problem until the guy shows up to be sworn in. Once saddled with a clearly unqualified ambassador-designate, however, it seems to me that there are additional steps the department could take to contain the damage.

The department now provides orientation programs for all newly appointed ambassadors, one element of which is a brief course on the functions of a chief of mission. The course is offered equally to career and non-career appointees. The bulk of career officers apparently bypass the course, while roughly half the non-career appointees take it. One could suggest a bit more pressure on the latter—and perhaps even the former—to take the course. This argument, unfortunately, is somewhat vitiated by the fact that Ambassador X was among those who, according to the department's records, *did* take the course. A hard look at its substance might be in order.

Apart from this course and a few other standard items such as the terrorism course, the orientation program for ambassadors-designate consists largely of a schedule of appointments and briefings, tailored to the individual and

(Continued on page 39)



## Book Essay

### Vietnam: How Could the System Work?

THE IRONY OF VIETNAM: THE SYSTEM WORKED, by Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts. Brookings Institution, \$14.95.

The authors admit that, "the title of this book must strike any intelligent reader, at first glance, as ridiculous. America's war in Vietnam was obviously a failure."

They then go on to argue for 387 excellently-documented pages that, while the foreign policy of the United States failed, "the domestic decision-making system worked." To some readers, this may seem like the old medical line about the operation being a success, although the patient died.

However, one has to applaud the research that went into this book—as well the conclusions drawn from that investigative effort, flawed as they may be. *The Irony of Vietnam* is certainly one of the best inquiries yet written on how the United States got itself involved in Vietnam, and why it stayed there as long as it did. Leslie Gelb, until recently director of politico-military affairs in the State Department, brought to the task his own experience in directing the Pentagon Papers project for the Defense Department—which he and Brookings research associate Richard Betts quote from extensively. They also draw from previously unpublished White House files.

Their book is a must for anyone seriously interested in the fascinating history of America's long involvement in Indochina. Having said all that, I must add that their basic premise does not hold up. The system plainly did *not* work, because it was not permitted to.

The authors skirt the fringes of this issue without ever really coming to terms with it. They note, for instance, that "the CIA had to prove, especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, that it could handle covert action and covert paramilitary operations lest it chance having its operational missions in general questioned."

They go on to reveal some of the

details of the highly-classified OPLAN 34-A, a covert action scenario developed in Saigon by CIA and the US military, and approved by President Lyndon Johnson in February 1964. According to the authors, "OPLAN 34-A envisioned a two-phase program of intelligence collection, psychological operations, and sub-rosa escalating 'destructive undertakings' against North Vietnam." These latter included MAROPS, Pentagonese for maritime operations mounted by CIA against the North Vietnamese coastline.

The Pentagon Papers abound with references to MAROPS and OPLAN 34-A, several of which are cited by Gelb and Betts. Further details can be found in Anthony Austin's excellent work on this period, entitled *The President's War* (Lippincott, 1971). But the full story of the maritime operations carried out by CIA during the 1960s has yet to be fully pulled together. Some of it appears in the Pentagon Papers, some of it in Austin's book, some of it came out in the various congressional investigations into CIA, and some of it even surfaced in the Watergate trial of the White House "plumbers." The rest will have to await the memoirs of some of the key figures involved—or possibly an interested journalist's skillful implementation of the Freedom of Information Act.

What *can* be pieced together at this point is that—over a period of years—CIA developed an occasionally effective maritime striking force, using armed, high-speed patrol boats (Swifties, as they came to be called by the US Navy), often backed up by night-time air support. Cuba was the first target, with Florida as the home base. Techniques were worked out involving larger, mother-type vessels which would tow the patrol boats into striking position, and then stand by to provide radar and artillery support. Eventually, the system was even deployed against Congolese rebels in November 1965, when a combined CIA-South African mercenary force staged a moderately successful amphibious landing at Fizi-Baraka on Lake Tanganyika.

Ironically, this mother-ship technique has since become popular with dope-runners working their way up the Florida coast from

Latin America. Conceivably, some of the same individuals may be involved. CIA's Dade County Cubans turned up in the Congo during the 1960s. They later participated in the Watergate break-in, as well as the attempt to burglarize the offices of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist in Beverly Hills. In the latter case, they thought that they were still working for CIA—or so they testified at the White House "plumbers" trial.

To get back to Vietnam, OPLAN 34-A was doing its work against shore installations in North Vietnam during June-July-August 1964. On August 2, the North Vietnamese struck back. Possibly thinking they were hitting the CIA mother-ship involved, they attacked the US destroyer *Maddox* in the Gulf of Tonkin. Two days later, they may have struck a second destroyer, the *Turner Joy*. It is not clear from the confusion that followed.

However, as Gelb and Betts acknowledge, "What was really significant about the August crisis was not what happened in the Tonkin Gulf, but what was going on in Washington."

On August 7, claiming it needed broader powers in Vietnam, the Johnson administration pushed through the Congress a resolution which Gelb and Betts say "was written and apparently discussed in the National Security Council at least as early as almost two months before the crisis in the gulf." (Emphasis added). They then cite other White House documents as revealing that a "scenario for engineering a general or permissive resolution was considered."

In the hysteria that followed the *Maddox* and *Turner Joy* incidents, the Tonkin Gulf Resolution passed both houses of Congress with only two votes recorded against it. The resolution, according to Gelb and Betts, "authorized the president to take vigorous measures to protect American forces, and came to be regarded by the administration as the functional equivalent of a declaration of war."

They go on to cite the following exchange between Senator J. W. Fulbright, who would subsequently change his mind about the war, and Republican Senator John Sherman Cooper:

Cooper: In other words, we are now



giving the president advance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary?

**Fulbright:** I think that is correct.

**Cooper:** Then, looking ahead, if the president decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?

**Fulbright:** That is the way I would interpret it.

At this point of course, OPLAN 34-A was known only to the innermost councils of the Johnson administration. It was certainly *not* revealed to the Congress. Gelb and Betts make this point clear: "What Congress did not know when it passed the (Tonkin Gulf) resolution was that 34-A operations were going on in the vicinity when the North Vietnamese attacked the *Maddox*."

And they add: "It is not clear, despite the (Johnson) administration's contention, that the North Vietnamese did not consider the *Maddox* a part of the covert naval contingent that was bombarding parts of the North Vietnamese coast. Only (Senator) Wayne Morse got inklings of the dimensions of what was going on in the gulf, through an anonymous Navy informant who urged him to get the logs of the *Maddox* (he was unable to do so)."

To recapitulate: in mid-1965, President Johnson was looking for ways to get congressional backing for an expansion of the US presence in Vietnam. CIA, at the same time, was trying to prove to the executive branch—if not to the Congress—that it could carry out its covert mandate without getting caught on the beaches. OPLAN 34-A's maritime operations finally provoked a North Vietnamese naval response in August, and LBJ turned to the Congress for the support he felt he needed. He got it several times over in the Tonkin Gulf Resolution.

If this is what Gelb and Betts mean by "the domestic decision-making system" having worked on Vietnam, they would have to admit an important element of that system was deliberately bypassed. Congress did not have the full details of what was taking place in the Tonkin Gulf.

We do not know—yet—whether OPLAN 34-A was a calculated White House effort to provoke North Vietnam into taking action

against US forces, thus deliberately creating the climate for positive congressional action. Gelb and Betts suggest that this may have been the case. But we do know that the results were the same.

Under the circumstances, how *could* the system have worked?

—SEAN KELLY

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## Bookshelf

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### No Quislings in Poland

*BITTER GLORY: Poland and Its Fate 1918-1939*, by Richard M. Watt. Simon and Schuster, \$16.95.

Mr. Watt has written a fascinating, panoramic political history of Poland during the inter-war period—from its establishment at Versailles after centuries of partition, through its desperate efforts to maintain national independence against its powerful and traditional enemies, and, finally, to the ignominious fourth partition in the wake of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. After reading this book, one cannot but admire this stubborn, long-suffering people; one can also understand why the Nazis were unable to find a Pole willing to serve as a Quisling, why successive communist leaderships are despised as being anti-Polish, and why speculation of a German-Russian/Soviet rapprochement sends fear and suspicion through virtually all Poles, whether communist or anti-communist.

Although well aware of the special position which the Catholic Church occupied during the inter-war period and of the intense devotion of the Polish population, the author almost glosses over the role of the Church and its impact on internal and external developments. Perhaps the Church was then so much an integral part of the Polish scene that it commanded little attention among those writing history—as contrasted with the present, when the role of the Church as a symbol of nationalism and human rights cannot be ignored. Failure to devote more attention to the role of the Church is, in this reviewer's opinion, a significant omission in an otherwise commendable book.

—P.C.

### Collision of Cultures

*ARABIA: JOURNEY THROUGH THE LABYRINTH*, by Jonathan Raban. Simon & Schuster, \$11.95.

This is a travel book out of another age, in the *genre* of Peter Fleming and Patrick Leigh-Fermor. The author, a cultivated young British intellectual, drifts in an aimless and negligent way through modern Arabia—Bahrain, the Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Jordan—revealing the ethos of the natives and the devastating impact of oil revenues and Western materialism on their societies.

Bringing the reader into souks, seedy bars, luxury hotels and the dismal offices of local bureaucrats, the author presents the world of both rich and poor—he also treats us to a landscape rapidly turning into a junkyard of abandoned cars and appliances populated by a discontented proletariat of Paki and East Asian laborers ruled over by an army of over-educated Palestinian clerks. Perhaps the most startling revelation is the omnipresence of British salesmen peddling cosmetics and other wonders of the West to the new class of Arab city dwellers caught half-way between the stark life of the desert and the wasteland of suburbia.

*Arabia* is a book about the collision of cultures, written with taste, perspicacity and humor, in a historically crucial time for relations between Islam and the West.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

### Naipaul's Work of Art

*A BEND IN THE RIVER*, by V. S. Naipaul. Alfred A. Knopf, \$8.95

When I pick up a book by Naipaul a feeling comes over me that I associate with reading Joyce Cary, George Orwell, Joseph Conrad, or E. M. Forster. Two qualities place him in this company: his faultless ear for English and his cross-cultural background. Naipaul is of Indian extraction, born in Trinidad and educated in London.

Salim, *Bend's* anti-hero, is a second-generation African, his Muslim Indian grandfather having immigrated as a trader from Gujarat. In a town which seems to be Mombasa his family carries on Indian traditions and it is assumed that he will one day marry Nazrudin's fair and well-educated daughter.



ter, Kareisha. But Africa is changing. Nazruddin improves his situation by buying and operating a general store in another African country to the west, and Indar, Salim's school friend, goes off to a university in England. Salim breaks away from his futureless family life when the chance comes to buy Nazrudin's store.

The new country is independent. A bloody and destructive coup has been survived. Salim hopes for a period of quiet and growth of trade. Another revolution changes nothing except to fill the town with Youth Guards and ever-larger pictures of the Big Man. Zabeth, a witch and village trader who comes to Salim for wholesale merchandise, leaves her son Ferdinand with him as apprentice, and Metty, a hereditary slave of Salim's family, is sent to him.

Indar surprisingly reappears as a lecturer at the Big Man's "Domain," a modern conference center with living quarters and airconditioners. Here Indar introduces Salim to Raymond, the Big Man's white man, who spends most of his time in his study perhaps writing for the Big Man, but surely paying little attention to his captivating wife, Yvette. A Belgian student of Africa, Raymond is so well known in academic circles in Europe and America that it has been useful to the Big Man to seat Raymond and Yvette on the platform with him and refer to him as "my revered professor."

In search of a future like Indar's, Salim visits London but returns disillusioned to try to continue as before at the bend in the river. But the Big Man's picture has swollen to occupy whole sides of houses, and the gimcrack "Domain" has lost its status to become just another housing area. Raymond and Yvette have disappeared, their usefulness to the Big Man ended.

The reality of Salim is so engrossing that the cameos of his Hindu friends, of Zabeth, of Raymond and Yvette, of Father Huisman (who collects masks), of Ferdinand and Indar, and the sketches of tropical weather, of dugouts and steamers on the river, the refuse in the slums, the rotting colonial mansions, the water-hyacinths lurching by on the current, all take on startling life.

This is a work of art; but beyond that it is an opportunity to get inside the minds and the skins of a mixed bag of human beings striving for solvency and self-respect in developing Africa.

—ALBERT B. FRANKLIN

### Confronting Conflict

BARGAINING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS, by Charles Lockhart. Columbia Univ. Press, \$12.50

Studies of international conflict bargaining have progressively recognized its distinctively complex character. Now we have an updating of the salient features of such negotiations, which identifies and discusses the stages and tactics involved in major disputes.

Starting from generalized theories and bargaining models in economic, administrative and psychological areas, the writer moves into what he terms the three processes used within a government confronted by international bargaining needs: information interpretation, decision making, and a search for a strategy. Interpretations are naturally affected by personal preconceptions, roles and ideologies. Decisions are shaped by

varying constraints, such as compromises needed by the group nature of decisions in major conflicts, and by the pulls of domestic as much as foreign objectives. In searching for a strategy, the author maintains, a serious conflict requires a supportive internal coalition to weather the crisis. Hence, changing a policy (i.e., Vietnam) could mean changing the supporting coalition.

National power can be deceptive in assessing bargaining courses. Conflict locale, other states influence, can bring supports for the seemingly weaker party. Statesmen confronting conflict search for options from among adaptive, accommodating and coercive strategies. Then, stemming from their own resourcefulness they may use tactics such as blocking, detouring, and various forms of force.

The work is filled with pertinent examples derived from the research on Vietnam, Cuba, and crises in European diplomatic history. In fact, throughout it is a close interweave of practical example and empirically derived theory. At his conclusion and within his preset compass the author has attained a satisfying objective.

—ROY MELBOURNE



"Now remember—this is background, not for attribution, off the record and I don't want to be quoted!"



## GEOPOLITICS AND EAST BENGAL

from page 22

the very real provocations that finally forced India to act.

Dr. Kissinger admits that "the State Department was eloquent in arguing that no binding obligation existed."

Indeed none did. All our agreements with Pakistan were strictly defensive. The United States and Pakistan were among the members of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) formed in the mid-1950s as much to contain Communist China as the Soviet Union. Under bilateral arrangements, the United States had furnished Pakistan a considerable amount of armaments, particularly tanks and warplanes. However, part of the military aid agreement was that these arms would not be used against India. Pakistan violated this agreement when it attacked India in 1965 using both American tanks and planes.

Some other interesting suppositions:

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"We would have no choice but to assist China in some manner against the probable opposition of much of the (US) government, the media, and Congress." (Who is fighting who here?) And later: "We had to be ready to back up the Chinese if they came in."

"Pakistan was our only channel to China, we had no other means of communicating with Peking."

This was seriously questioned at the time. Many Far East experts felt that our Asian relations would have benefited far more if we had made our approach through Japan.

Since Dr. Kissinger was in touch with China's ambassador to the UN and since China clearly wanted to establish a dialogue with Washington, it seems remarkable that no other way could be found.

However, even if Pakistan did hold the only open door to Peking, we did not owe its leaders anything like what we paid.

According to the memoirs, "We strove to preserve West Pakistan as an independent state since we judged India's real aim was to encompass its disintegration."

Nothing is provided to support such a judgment, made counter to the evaluation of the State Department and the reports published and voiced by the "media," though both were based on firsthand observations in the subcontinent.

One of the more frightening accounts in Dr. Kissinger's book concerns the decision of President Nixon to "risk war" with the Soviet Union. The sequence as reported attributes this decision to an erroneous supposition.

It was known that Huang Hua, China's ambassador to the United Nations, wanted to see Dr. Kissinger. It was assumed that Huang Hua wanted to say that China planned to intervene militarily on the side of Pakistan. It was also assumed that the Soviet Union would then "use force" against China. A third assumption, already noted, was that the United States would have no choice but to assist China.

Assuming, but not knowing, what the Chinese ambassador intended to say, the decision was made to risk war, and a US Navy carrier task force was ordered to enter the Bay of Bengal—a decision shattering to America's public image, both in South Asia and the world at large.

After all this it was discovered that Huang Hua merely wanted to tell Dr. Kissinger that China would support the US call for a cease fire resolution in the UN. It had no intention whatever of getting involved militarily in Pakistan's troubles.

The Kissinger text should give considerable satisfaction to the Departments of State and Defense.

### Without State or Defense

"It was symptomatic of the internal relationships of the Nixon administration that neither the secretary of state nor of defense nor any representative of their departments attended this crucial meeting where, as it turned out, the first decision to risk war in the triangular Soviet-Chinese-American relationship was taken." The triangle concept is interesting. Apparently East Bengal, Pakistan, and even India were really just pawns in the geopolitical chess game.

Given a knowledge of the situation in East Bengal, one cannot agree with Dr. Kissinger that, since Bengali independence would have been achieved anyway, there was no justification for India's military action.

The military death toll in the two-week conflict with the Pakistani army was well under 20,000, but for purposes of comparison this is a usable figure. It is less than the number of Bengalis killed by Pakistani soldiers during each and every two-week period between March 25 and December 3. The Bengali guerrillas, the Mukti Bahini, were woefully outnumbered and outgunned. Even if we accept the Kissinger thesis that they would have won independence eventually without Indian help, we cannot skip over the resulting loss, for every month of delay, of more than 100,000 civilian lives.

Contrary to the assertions in the memoirs, the United States failed to obtain any meaningful concessions from Yahya Khan. He issued several amnesty notices urging the refugees to return; but the killing did not stop and many of the refugees who did return lost their lives.

A civilian government was established, but with Sheikh Mujib still in a West Pakistani jail and his Awami League barred from participation no one took it seriously,



including the Pakistan military. The killing continued.

Perhaps the saddest line of all is Dr. Kissinger's worried abhorrence of "a demonstration of US irrelevance." It is sad because irrelevance is exactly what the US did demonstrate.

Before India signed the treaty of friendship with the Soviets, the United States had had four months to condemn the Pakistani slaughter or make an effective move to stop it. By doing nothing we handed to the Russians the very position in the subcontinent they had striven so long to achieve.

Somehow the Nixon-Kissinger team convinced themselves that Pakistan was more important to the United States than India. Yet, in assuming that India could have dismembered Pakistan if there had been no cease fire, India is hardly regarded as an unimportant country, the kind to be rebuffed, and pushed into the camp of one's opponents.

If the United States had established any position for itself, it could have been our advice to the

Indians, not that of the Soviets, that won credit for stopping the war.

In recalling the famous leak to Jack Anderson about a tilt toward Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger shows the most skewed perspective of all. He says that the installation at the end of December of a civilian government—this is confusing since an ineffectual civilian government had been installed earlier with Pakistani endorsement—"would surely have led to the independence of East Pakistan—probably without the excesses of brutality, including public bayoneting, that followed."

This seems to mean that "excesses of brutality" followed the establishment of an independent state—Bangladesh. Nothing could be more ridiculous. Despite the terrible atrocities that had been going on for months, the Bangladesh government deplored violence from the start. When Sheikh Mujib was released and took control he stopped it completely.

The bloodbath of revenge, so often predicted, never took place.

There were some public executions in the first days of victory and here and there in the villages some men must have repaid the killing of a relative or the rape of a wife or daughter. But it is also true that the number of Pakistanis and their Bihari supporters killed by Bengalis after independence never approached the 500 students killed by Pakistani troops on that first terrible night.

The creation of Bangladesh did not bring the millennium so many Bengalis had hoped to see. On the other hand the nation has not become the "international basket case" its detractors had foreseen. Amid the tea plantations of the hills and the jute fields of the alluvial plains, the mighty rivers and the lily-clogged streams, a patient and hardworking people struggle for survival.

In recent years, particularly in Latin America, the United States has learned that it often pays to be ethical rather than Machiavellian. What a pity we did not discover this in 1971.




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## KIDNAPPING & DIPLOMACY

from page 9

cutoff or the destruction of Iranian production as the country continues to descend into chaos?

Journalists have written that the present hostage-taking is an international turning point, similar to the 1968 Tet offensive and the 1973 mideast war, in its impact on American opinion. The eternal question of the proper use of force in American foreign policy, as yet not definitively resolved after 203 years, has reemerged with a new wrinkle. Some decry US "weakness" in the face of Iran's challenge, others applaud the administration for restraint. There should be no doubt in anyone's mind that Ayatollah Khomeini's reinterpretation of diplomacy has created new problems for all diplomats and for others. The attacks on our embassies elsewhere in the Islamic world and withdrawal of dependents and other personnel from 11 Islamic countries underlines the forces unleashed, at least partly as a result of Iran's actions.

Just as the ultimate tragedy of an unsuccessful outcome will be borne by the diplomats concerned and their families, the most troubling problems and choices fall to the foreign affairs establishment, from the president on down. President Carter has reportedly said that America's honor comes first; at

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**"Can the international system risk the complete destruction of our position in the Middle East, if that were the price?"**

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other times he has emphasized the hostages' well being. What sacrifice would be expected of the hostages? Does the POW code of conduct apply? What price should the US pay for a safe return of our people? Can the international sys-

tem risk the complete destruction of our position in the Middle East, if that were the price? Intellectually and emotionally, we resist the conclusion that Khomeini's government and Khomeini himself aim first of all at our destruction, even if it encompasses their own. Many don't believe this; some call it madness; others see it as a question of fundamentally opposing values. To what extent should Khomeini's desire to make martyrs (and perhaps be one) open the way for consideration of alternatives we might reject under virtually all other conditions?

These are neither idle nor heartless questions. Honest, correct answers may not be palatable to rational men. To talk of "sabre rattlers" or "appeasers" obscures the hard but necessary choices. There are real questions here which need real answers capable of being understood by all. Otherwise, Iran's extension of "public diplomacy" to extreme and dangerous lengths may bear serious and tragic consequences for us all—if not now, next time.



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## POLITICAL APPOINTEE

from page 32

arranged in most cases by the country desk. They consist typically of thirty- to forty-minute sessions at which the head of an agency, bureau or office exchanges pleasantries with the ambassador-designate and gives him a thumbnail sketch of his agency's interests in the country in question. The agency's own country desk officer usually is present to provide the expertise. Scheduling tends to be heavy—four to six or more appointments a day—to avoid wasting the new man's time and to get him to his post (and, incidentally, out of the desk officer's hair) as soon as possible. Through this process he is supposed to gain an overall picture ranging from the host country's stance on nuclear proliferation to the problem of the upstairs bathroom at the residence. Obviously not enough to make him an instant expert in the affairs of the post, the program is supposed to be sufficient to keep him from being too surprised upon arrival at

his new post and to provide a basic framework of pertinent data on which he can build. Some appointees do benefit from this shotgun approach. Ambassador X gained almost nothing from it.

The department, it seems to me, could ease to some extent the problem of the uninformed political appointee by a more prolonged, systematic effort to educate him before he leaves for his post. When a person is about to assume a position as the president's personal representative in a totally unfamiliar field, a few days of formal instruction (which he is free to skip if he wishes) plus a week or two of largely unstructured appointments cannot be called adequate preparation. A three-month course of full-time instruction would hardly be excessive. Career officer appointees, as well as those non-career appointees with backgrounds in foreign affairs, normally would have little need for such exposure. Judged by their performance, many political appointees obviously do.

At least as important to the neophyte ambassador-designate as

instruction in the politics and economics of the host country, the structure of the federal government and the department, and the operations of the various sections of a diplomatic mission would be instruction in how to run a mission. Quite apart from the inadequate substantive training available to them, my impression is that they are given virtually nothing in the way of guidance on the handling of their new job beyond frequent reference to the president's letter, reminders that they are in sole charge of the mission, and a recitation of the powers and perks that they will command. Scarcely any effort is made to explain to them *how* a mission should be run or to warn them of the more common pitfalls. When the absence of guidance is coupled with their pleased discovery of the deference with which a person bearing the title of ambassador is treated in the department, it is not surprising that certain of them—and this eminently includes Ambassador X—arrive at their posts with a great deal of regard for their own authority but virtually no idea

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how to exercise it.

Little written material on how to run a mission seems to be available to the ambassador-designate. One rather detailed compilation of ideas, techniques and procedures, entitled *This Worked for Me . . .*, does offer a number of useful suggestions, and another shorter paper entitled *A Primer for New US Ambassadors* should also be helpful. The impact of these papers is vitiated, however, by the fact that the first of them has not been revised since it was published more than fifteen years ago, while the second was put out not by the department as such but by the Open Forum, an entity most political appointees have never heard of. Beyond this, the cupboard seems bare.

Even more important than more adequate written material would be a more systematic effort on the part of the senior department leadership to educate the political appointee in coping with the more common problems he is likely to meet at his new post. As an illustrative example (one admittedly close to my heart), some informal words of ad-

vice from a senior department official such as the director general on the perennial problem of relations with his DCM might help rectify what has become an all-too-frequent pattern. The ambassador-designate should be warned that he will inevitably find himself uncomfortably dependent on his DCM, that he will probably find the fact frustrating, that he may well focus his resentment unconsciously on the DCM, and that he may be tempted to replace the officer as soon as he thinks he is able to fly on his own. Rather than giving him the impression that the department exists only to do his bidding in matters such as this, he should be counseled to recognize them as occupational hazards common to inexperienced political appointees and told that the department wants him to cope with them at minimum disruption to the staff.

A case could be made that the actual responsibilities and powers customarily accorded ambassadors should be tacitly downgraded in the case of inexperienced political appointees. Desirable as this would

be, I doubt that it is a practical one. An unspoken distinction of this nature does exist to some extent, especially at the Department of State working level. To expand it into a visible tool of management, I am afraid, would take more leverage than the department is willing to expend on this problem. Unable to rope the political appointee in, it appears that our only present recourse is to try to educate him.

The nation, the taxpayer and the foreign affairs community would all benefit if the administration and its successors were to give up once and for all the habit of using ambassadorships as domestic political currency. Realistically, there is little likelihood that this day will soon dawn. Since the prospect is that we will be faced into the indefinite future with appointees along the line of Ambassador X, I would hope that the department could take a new and more searching look at the problem and how to cope with it. If it does, Ambassador X could be credited with a small but real contribution to American foreign policy.



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## CONTACTS WITH THE OPPOSITION

from page 14

foiled by their proclivities to advertise these contacts to the point of inviting photographers to so-called private dinners. In particular, contact with the opposition should not lead to expectations of political support, which will be disappointed. Too many opposition forces saw the human rights advocacy of President Carter as an invitation to seek American support for an effort to overthrow the existing regimes and came away disappointed . . ."

One tactical problem that is faced head-on in the symposium is that of the appropriateness or desirability, in certain situations, of having the contacts carried forward by the CIA. William E. Colby addresses the problem with illustrations taken from our relations with Cambodia, Chile, and Angola. In Cambodia, the United States tried to "maintain contact" with the potential opponent of Prince Sihanouk, only to find that it was blamed for supporting him when

Sihanouk descended upon him, killed him, and revealed the American communications equipment "and an impressive quantity of gold provided by South Vietnam." Contact of a surreptitious kind had been taken as proof of complicity. In Angola, the contact was so tentative that it gave us the unfavorable publicity without the advantages of actual influence on the ground. In Chile, we got the worst of all worlds—the CIA rigorously abstained from contact with the military, in order that the United States should not be blamed for the coup against Allende, "but, since the CIA had approached the military in 1970, some three years before, the impression was given around the world—and prompted by unfriendly services—that the Chilean coup had been mounted by the CIA. Objective research [writes Colby] is now showing the contrary, but the problem would have been magnified if the agency had established the kind of contact with the Chilean military that it had had with the opposition to Sihanouk in Cambodia in 1959."

Colby's conclusion is not that the CIA has no role to play in contacts with the opposition, but that that role is much more limited than the layman may assume—and that as much contact as possible should be carried on overtly by political personnel of American embassies. He also believes, and explains in detail, that when clandestine contact is necessary with an opposition group, rigorous safeguards must be instituted against the opposition misinterpreting such contact—which, to him, means following all the rules of clandestinity "so that only a few individuals within the supported group are aware of the American contact."



[Copies of the publication "Contacts with the Opposition" may be obtained by writing the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 20057. The publication has 72 pages and costs \$3 postpaid. Contributions cover experiences in Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Cambodia, Chile, Cyprus, Egypt, France, Greece, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Korea, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, USSR, Vietnam and Yemen.]



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## ON MEASURING OUT OUR LIVES IN COFFEE SPOONS

from page 27

such knowledge probably makes an officer into a turf defender. Not necessarily. I see no logic in assuming that the officer who develops profound knowledge of a geographic area is prone to a distorted view of US policy goals any more than is the specialist in communications, labor, energy or economics.

Both geographic and functional expertise are essential to conducting our foreign relations. The point is balance. No conscientious officer lets his specialized knowledge cloud his clear vision of US policy objectives. Enthusiasm for a geographic area should encourage more imaginative work toward those objectives, not professorial myopia.

My argument here, however, is not philosophical. It is to state the hard personnel reality that today's best young people will not accept fragmentation of their families' lives into two-to-four year unrelated bits after they assess the odds

for so much change causing serious damage.

### Dangers and Sins

Ancient FS wisdom warns that long tours are beset with dangers. Most to be feared is that time will seduce an officer to commit the twin cardinal sins of **identification** and **loss of objectivity**. This need not happen. A sensitive professional can become engaged in a culture without forgetting why he is overseas and whom he represents. I see identification less as a result of time in place than as a function of personality and age. Youthful, "do good" zeal and falling in love with a first post are common forgivable examples.

Other dangers lurk. Long tours are reputed to dull an officer's edge and to be bad for career advancement. As for the first, I suggest that officers who easily lose their edge are likely to be the ones who never had it in the first place. Finally, wisdom sometimes lies in knowing when to stay put—risks to career advancement well noted.

Short tours make sense at the

beginning of a career. They continue to be logical if the goal of the Service is to develop a corps of interchangeable officers willing to serve "anywhere" with equal enthusiasm, "measuring out your lives in coffee spoons," as my mother so often reminds me with her caustic paraphrasing of T. S. Eliot. She is unconvinced of the wisdom of creating a worldwide service of what she calls professional transients. That goal even expressed in positive terms begins to have a negative ring after mid career: "Worldwide availability" hints of a superficial life in a series of randomly chosen cultures. "Foreign Service generalist" suggests a dilettante.\* The game is structured so that we are nothing so much as food, wine and travel professionals. If this is no sin, it is at least a waste.



*\*I criticize abuses of the "World Wide Availability" concept. This should not be misinterpreted as support of officers who remain nominally in the FS and spend most of their career in Washington. I am writing of those who are committed to overseas service but need some continuity.*

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
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## ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE SOVIET UNION

from page 18

forcement mechanisms is now on the drafting board, but no timetable for implementation has been offered. At present, the existing guidelines concerning emission standards or the siting of potentially offensive factories are honored spottily, with fairly close adherence to clean air standards in the major cities—Moscow is again a showcase—giving way to less vigorous concern in the provinces. Paradoxically the greatest improvement in air quality, especially in the major cities, came in the late 1950s and 1960s as a consequence of converting important industries and coal-powered generating stations to oil and gas and of enlarging the network of public and residential buildings served by more efficient central heating plants. Recent concern with an impending energy crisis of their own has led Soviet authorities to urge the reconversion back to local, low-grade coal in the energy-poor European sector.

While the extent of such conversions will be severely limited both by technical considerations and by the enormous investment required, any movement in this direction will have a highly unfavorable impact on air quality. Also adding to the problem are the growing numbers of private and fleet autos, which, despite promises concerning limited emissions, unleaded gasoline, and better service facilities, have already emerged as a major source of pollution in urban areas.

No small part of the problem of improving air and water quality stems from the low technological level of Soviet purification devices and the inadequacy of the construction organizations that specialize in abatement facilities. On the whole, Soviet abatement technology is regarded as roughly a decade behind that of the West, although important efforts have been made in recent years to catch up or to purchase advanced equipment from abroad. Clearly the high priority regions receive the best available equipment, although its effectiveness is severely limited by frequent

breakdowns in the hands of inexperienced and poorly trained personnel. Construction problems also beset even the most earnest programs; the few construction organizations that specialize in the area are always overloaded with assignments and requests for assistance and far behind schedule on even the most high-priority projects. In desperation, local construction organizations attempt to construct purification facilities on their own—usually with amateurish results—or connive with local industrialists and growth-oriented party and state leaders to secure permission for a factory to begin operations before treatment facilities are completed.

What of an overall assessment—have the Soviets seriously recognized environmental imperatives, or is the commitment limited to the minimum necessary programs needed to sustain public health and continued economic growth? No definitive answer can be offered at this point, of course; the next generation of leaders after Brezhnev will place their particular

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stamp on national policy just as have all their predecessors. But two facts are clear: First, the legal and institutional structures have been altered to provide a voice for environmental interests higher than ever before within leadership circles. But to say that the battle has been joined is not to say that it has been won; Soviet leaders have tempered their desire for more rationally administered environmental programs with an unwillingness to establish a single and presumably more powerful environmental protection agency, despite repeated pleas from environmentalists.

Second, the average person is now far more aware of the need for environmental protection. Real concern has finally trickled down to the population as a whole, which is constantly reminded of the issue in the mass media. In the public commentary on the draft of the new 1977 constitution, requests to improve environmental protection were among the most frequently voiced concerns from the average citizen. But on the other side of the

equation, the average person has not yet come to perceive adequate environmental protection and continued economic growth in trade-off terms. For the man in the street, who for years has been lectured on the need for a build-now, consume-later economy, the realization that such a relationship exists may well have sobering consequences. Given what may be presented as a choice between an improving standard of living and the continued growth of the national economy on the one hand and the protection of the environment on the other, the average citizen and the present leadership are likely to agree on a course of action favoring economic over environmental priorities. For the nation as a whole, increasingly severe trade-off choices will undoubtedly continue to be handled by maintaining or even strengthening abatement programs in selected geographic areas or in those instances in which pollution has exacted an unacceptable economic or health-related costs while permitting even further deterioration of air and water qual-

ity in less important regions. The limits of such a course are two-fold: With increasing frequency, the solution of even "limited" problems entails massive investment and the development of new abatement or production technologies, steps which demand both politically difficult decisions on regional and industrial priorities and sustained commitments to programs with long lead times. Even more problematic is the assumption that pollution can continue to be tightly compartmentalized and dealt with effectively on a limited, regional basis. Especially in the heavily industrialized European sector, such selective compartmentalization already grows increasingly difficult; air and water pollution spill over traditional administrative boundaries, and their impact is felt far beyond the narrow limits of economic and health-related issues now recognized as legitimate by Soviet authorities. As a truly national environmental problem grows, as inevitably it will, Soviet leaders will be deprived of the luxury of selective commitment. 

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In what I hope is an extreme example, my travel voucher from a 1975 transfer is still not finalized. It was originally submitted in February, 1976. When I received it back from General Claims in April, 1976, I found that the processing clerk had overstated the cost of the tickets by \$602.76, and was asking me to refund \$54.12 of that. (The actual cost of the tickets is shown on the voucher which paid for the GTR, but that was not referred to when the voucher was processed—or so I was informed by the supervisor of General Claims.) I wrote to the post and obtained proof of the actual cost of the tickets to the government, with which I submitted a reclaim voucher. Since that time I have also written/talked to every supervisor up to the deputy assistant secretary (now comptroller) level, and the matter has been referred to both the GAO and the Grievance people. None of the responses (totalling 10 in writing alone at this time) has addressed the issue of the cost of the tickets.

As the system obviously is not trying to protect employees, you can only hope to minimize your travel losses (and you cannot hope to make money in a post transfer) by:

- including all costs on your vouchers;
- carefully reviewing the certified vouchers; and
- never giving up on efforts to have errors corrected.

DANIEL C. GAMBER

Washington

### New Game, New Rules

IN REGARD to the article by Jeanette L'Heureux in the November issue, the AAFSW testimony on the proposed Foreign Service Act did not say, as Judy Mann's article suggested, that "we do not want to play by the old rules any more." Rather AAFSW was saying that the old game has been

swept away by forces which neither we nor the State Department have created. Whether or not we like the new game, we need a new set of rules.

Mrs. L'Heureux may not realize that, since 1965, the government automatically gives old age pensions to divorced women who were married for ten years to a covered worker. However, the Foreign Service is not covered by Social Security, so wives are denied even this inadequate recognition of the housewife and mother whose contributions to the economic partnership of marriage are widely disregarded by state property laws and by the divorce courts. AAFSW would like to help make it possible for wives who wish to devote themselves to their homes, families and communities without working at a paid job to be able to do so.

As chairman of the Forum Committee on Women in Transition, I have interviewed dozens of divorced Foreign Service wives. Not surprisingly, they feel quite differently than Mrs. L'Heureux about beautiful memories for twilight years.

AAFSW feels that it is especially inequitable that Foreign Service wives who have shared the hardships, sacrificed the opportunity to provide for their own economic survival and often made contributions of the sort that Mrs. L'Heureux so graphically describes should be denied any government protection for their old age.

PATRICIA RYAN

Forum Committee, AAFSW

### Bella Italia

AS SOMEONE who is reasonably well acquainted with Italian history, society and politics, I feel obliged to respond to the article "Italian Sense and Nonsense" by E. J. Mann in the November 1979 issue of the *Foreign Service Journal*.

Mann begins by declaring that "Italy never did make much sense as a political entity" and concludes with the prediction that Italy will "muddle through." I will dispute the former and tend to agree with the latter statement. His introduction and conclusion, however, have virtually nothing to do with the body of his article. He devotes over

half of his space to what tourists can expect to find in Rome, tacking on almost as an afterthought a melange of sweeping statements about the Vatican, Italian youth, the higher education system and the present state of the Italian Communist Party.

Mann's article is almost entirely anecdotal, but what little analysis he attempts is faulted from the outset. Thus, only someone who knows nothing of the long history and present strength of Italian national consciousness could pen such simplistic pronouncements as "Italy never did make sense as a political entity."

In reality, the sense of Italy as a single country stretching from the Alps to Sicily has existed since Roman times. Long before unification, Italians shared a common historical-cultural patrimony and literary language—*despite* the legacy of foreign rule, political fragmentation, uneven economic development, and the plethora of local dialects. The leaders of the *Risorgimento* in the 18th and 19th centuries considered themselves Italian no matter what part of the country they came from. Therefore they *were* Italian and could work together for the common goal of political unification.

It is ridiculous to claim, as Mann does, that "since unification Italy's economic and political situation has changed little." The statement is untrue in its economic as well as political context. A century ago Italy was an overwhelmingly agricultural country. Now it is the world's seventh largest industrial power.

By the same token, the idea that some sort of quasi-ethnic frontier stretches across central Italy, dividing "hard-working northerners" from "easy-going southerners" is a hackneyed and long discredited myth. Anyone who has traveled extensively in southern Italy should know, for example, that farmers there must work as hard as any agriculturalists on earth.

I could go on and cite other inconsistencies and outright errors in the article. I will content myself, however, with simply saying that I believe the *Journal* deviated from its usual high standard in selecting Mann's piece for publication.

NICHOLAS A. STIGLIANI

Willimantic, Conn.



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## Foreign Service People

### Deaths

**Braddock.** Daniel McCoy Braddock, FSO-retired, died on November 24 at his home in Silver Spring. Mr. Braddock entered the Foreign Service in 1929 and served at Medan, Barcelona, Caracas, Porto Alegre, Bahia, Madrid, Manila, Rangoon, Habana, Sao Paulo and Bombay before his retirement in 1971. He was the last diplomat to leave Cuba in 1961 after this country broke off diplomatic relations. He also served as chief of the division of Brazilian affairs and adviser on American Republics for the department, as liaison with the Latin American missions at the UN and as a senior Foreign Service Inspector. He is survived by his wife, Virginia L., 3206 Gleneagles Dr., Silver Spring, Maryland 20906, five children, Daniel M., Jr. of Austin, Tex., John L. of Arlington, Carolyn Palma of Lima, Peru, Edward S. of Newport News, Va., and Richard S. of Savannah, Ga. and eight grandchildren.

**Byrne.** James MacGregor Byrne, FSO-retired, died on November 30 at his home. Mr. Byrne entered the Foreign Service in 1941 as special assistant to the ambassador to Argentina. He then served at Bern, Madrid, Addis Ababa and Tunis before his retirement in 1964. For the next four years he was deputy chairman of the Foreign Students Service Council before retiring again in 1969. He is survived by his wife, June, of 5904 Cedar Parkway, Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015, a son James Jr., of Washington, three daughters, Moyra, of Austin, Texas, Jill, of Quebec, and Jaid, of Boulder, Colorado, and a sister, Phyllis Cox of Cambridge, Mass.

**Hunter.** Grace May Hunter, FSS-retired, died on November 11 in Murray, Utah. Mrs. Hunter served with the State Department for 28 years before her retirement. She is survived by her husband, Robert S., 4500 West Skye Drive, South Jordan, Utah 84065, two daughters, Bettye Toledano dos Santos, Rio de Janeiro, Kathleen Callaghan, Sao Paulo, two grandchildren, two sisters, and two brothers.

**Lynch.** Anne E. Lynch, Foreign Service secretary, died on October 2 in Wiesbaden. Ms. Lynch worked for the Navy Department and the International Cooperation Administration before joining the Foreign Service in 1961. She served at Saigon, Martinique, Vienna, Rio de Janeiro, Nassau and as secretary to Ambassador Ronald I. Spiers in Ankara. Ms. Lynch is survived by her father, Cdr. F. Leo Lynch, USN-ret., Park Lane East, 250 Beverly Blvd., Upper Darby, Pennsylvania 19082, two sisters and four brothers.

**Mann.** Helen M. Mann, Foreign Service secretary, died on September 27 in Washington. Ms. Mann joined the Foreign Service in 1962 and served at Tokyo, Rabat, Ibadan, Kobe-Osaka, La Paz, The Hague, Manila and in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. She is survived by her mother, F. Lena Mann, 237 East New St., Lancaster, Pennsylvania 17602.

**Newsom.** Howard F. Newsom, FSO-retired, died on November 29 in Silver Spring. He entered the Foreign Service in 1950 and served in Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Lahore, Paris, Wellington and Seoul. He retired from the Foreign Service in 1975 after serving as deputy county director for Korea in the department. He is survived by his wife, Duece Spencer Newsom, 200 Woodmoor Dr., Silver Spring, Maryland 20901, a son, Kevin, of Chicago, and two daughters, Heather Newsom Anthony of Berlin and Nyna Newsom of Silver Spring. Expressions of sympathy may take the form of contributions to the Church Organ Fund of Christ Congregational Church, 9525 Colesville Road, Silver Spring, Md. 20901.

**Rimestad.** Ann Rimestad, wife of retired Ambassador Idar Rimestad, died on September 30 in Scottsdale, Arizona. Mrs. Rimestad accompanied her husband on assignments in Germany, the Soviet Union, France and Switzerland. She is survived by her husband, 1650 Jacklyn Dr., Fountain Hills, Arizona 85268, two daughters, a sister and a brother.




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