

Foreign Service Journal

JULY/AUGUST 1980 75 CENTS

Evacuation from N'Djamena
by Patricia B. Norland
Andy Young at the UN
by Seymour M. Finger
Truman's Secret Diary
with introduction by Barton J. Bernstein

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Foreign Service Journal

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Letters

OAS Intervention

I AGREE THOROUGHLY with John W. Ford's comments in the May *Journal* on my article, "Nicaragua," which appeared in the *Journal's* February number.

With reference to OAS action during the Cuban missile crisis, which Mr. Ford offers as an example of OAS usefulness, I say, in my forthcoming book, *The Shattered Continent: Latin America in Close-Up,* from which the article was taken:

> Meanwhile the Organization of American States itself continued to perform useful services. Its members had no Russian veto to contend with, as they had in the United Nations (OAS support of the United States during the Cuban missile crisis had been important to success).

Concerning the possible consequences of unilateral intervention by the United States, which Mr. Ford warns against, I am opposed to unilateral United States intervention, which did not occur in the recent Nicaragua case, and I am also opposed to the kind of intervention by Communist Cuba and a number of active members of the OAS that did occur in that case.

The OAS is understandably quick to oppose United States intervention. As I suggested in my article, however, it is not a corollary of nonintervention (on the part of the United States) that others should be permitted to intervene freely. The aspect of the recent Nicaragua case that has the most disturbing implications for collective security and hemispheric peace is that some OAS members violated their nonintervention pledge with little or no criticism by other OAS members or by the OAS as a whole.

WILLARD L. BEAULAC

Washington

Giving Credit

I WOULD LIKE to take exception to the article written by Mrs. Christine Wisner and published in your April edition. This article, coming from the wife of our ambassador at one post, fails to mention the hard work and excellent support other posts have received from OPR/STP, the US Despatch Agents and ELSO/Antwerp. Using the last ten incoming unaccompanied air baggage and household effect shipments and the last three POVs, I calculated it took an average of twelve days for air freight from airport to airport, twenty-four days for HHE/POV from port to port. The average of six days to clear air freight and ten days to clear household effects locally cannot be blamed on either OPR/STP nor on the Despatch Agent; these delays are for the Ivorian officials to process our customs clearance documents.

Nor does Mrs. Wisner's letter give OPR/STP credit for establishing the ELSO Despatch Agent in Antwerp to handle African transshipments, setting up the new two-man office at the Paris airport for our air freight transshipments, improving communications to posts with the design of the new cable format for advice on shipments and the host of other ideas coming out of that office.

Abidjan says the department and OPR/STP deserve our support and our thanks.

JOSEPH M. KEMPER

Abidjan

Ambassadorial Competence

I READ WITH interest the letter by Ambassador Attwood in the March issue, dealing with the "Case Study" of a politically appointed ambassador. Your "note" below needs, I believe, some further expansion.

With all due respect to Ambassador Attwood, the issue is not the perpetuation of what he calls the hoary myth that all chiefs of mission who are politically appointed are incompetent. The issue is whether any ambassador, either from the career service or from the "political" side should be competent or not. Many in the Foreign Service—both the good officers and the fools and blimps—have served with and worked for ambassadors like G. Mennen Williams and John Sherman Cooper as well as Richard Davies and Julius Holmes and felt privileged to do so, knowing that those men were ambassadors truly serving the national interest and American principles. However, many of us have also served with and worked for other ambassadors—both career and "political"—who could not be so characterized. We all have heard stories of incompetence, dangerous stubbornness, imprudence, and impropriety.

Many of us who have several decades of service in the department and at overseas posts sense a change in the character of the Foreign Service. And many of us are not too pleased by what we see. Change in the Foreign Service must keep pace with change in American society. However, the Service must debate and argue—just as American society does—the changes that must take place. The Service is not insulated from American society.

Articles like that by "Winston Smith" as well as letters like those written by Ambassador Attwood and the one by Ambassador Herz immediately following it are neither gratuitous nor irresponsible. They are merely parts of the debate on what constitutes quality and excellence in the profession of diplomacy. I for one want it to continue—and I hope that the arguments are hot, heavy, and constant.

VICTOR WOLF, JR.

Silver Spring

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A Diplomat's Viewpoint

Foreign Service Rewards

JACK PERRY

The rewards of a diplomatic career are many and large. We all know the perils and woes of the Foreign Service, but we do not always set down the rewards. Let me try.

If you are an American diplomat, you will have the gift of the lack of boredom. Variety is the rule, few days are alike, something different is usually around the bend. When I first entered the Foreign Service, I could not understand why people thought and talked so much about "next assignment." Now I see that this looking ahead to something new is at the heart of our profession. Change always lies ahead. There is always some possibility of you, of life, getting better. Next year you may see Samarkand, or tour Antarctica, or serve in Paris.

You will experience other cultures. I do not mean to visit, or be a tourist, which are lesser things; I mean live in, come to understand. This is an extraordinary gift because it means the multiplying of your awareness of life. If it is worth learning Italian to read Dante, it is surely worth becoming a diplomat in order to be able to think like an Italian. This is the next thing to seeing ourselves as others see us. I like to believe that in my career I have learned somewhat to look through Russian eyes, and French, and Czech and Swedish. What a rare privilege!

You will feel at home almost anywhere, and you may watch your children grow into the same feeling. While you may miss your roots, you will find cosmopolitanism a happy experience. To someone like me, who hardly left Georgia until graduation from college, it is a thrill to feel at home in London or Stockholm, to see my children treat Europe as a familiar neighborhood.

If things work out, you may create a family that can never be separated. Lacking a permanent home, the family itself, together or apart, becomes "home," and the planet is your residence. (This requires much luck, I acknowledge.)

You will see your country through new and enlightened eyes. How beautiful the United States is after that first tour in Moscow! As I read all the press commentary about America written by Americans who have never lived abroad, I realize how impossible it is to know your own culture unless you have experienced others as a basis for comparison. American diplomats learn their country's faults, but they generally become deeper patriots, because while living abroad they learn with conviction how to appreciate our country's great virtues.

In the words of that rare man and model diplomat, Chip Bohlen, you will be a "witness to history." As he showed in his illustrious career, the good diplomat can indeed live in history, become a part of his own time, meet and know some of the best and most interesting and most powerful men and women of the era. As a source of intellectual pleasure, this is a priceless gift.

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You will have some opportunity to live at a higher level, with access to beauty and to beautiful things, with openings to good talk, good food, good art, good taste. Only the high-born in past times could live in the world of good taste that a fortunate diplomat can sample today. I am not talking about luxury, or servants, or wealth, or high living, and goodness knows there are violent swings up and down. But I believe it true that most diplomats, during their careers, have access to the kind of cultivated living that enriches one's life immeasurably.

> "As a child in Atlanta I played on the same street as Martin Luther King, but never got to meet him—the poorer I. Imagine what it means to me now to transcend all barriers to feel kinship and friendship with any man and any woman, anywhere."

You will be challenged to use all your powers and talents to their greatest extent, for a worthwhile cause. Diplomats are paid to keep the peace, and to make relations among sovereign nations as harmonious as possible. They look after the national interest first, but there is opportunity to work both for one's own country and for the common interests of mankind. Idealism lies somewhere in every American diplomat's heart, even those who have become cynical. We are not in the profession for money (God knows), but for larger rewards. And professionalism does not conflict with a measure of idealism. So you can believe in what you are doing, be challenged to do your best and feel better because of what you do. Which is a large statement.

Finally, since life's best satisfactions finally come from people, and your relations with them, as a diplomat you can make friends across all boundaries, across all nations. Diplomats deal in power as the basic stuff of international politics, and are only too familiar with divisions and enmities of all kinds. But in your own personal life you can learn to cherish men and women as men and women, without putting them into categories. You can rise above categories, above tribes and divisions. When I was growing up in the south, there was a high barrier between races which, thank God, has since fallen: as a child in Atlanta I played on the same street as Martin Luther King, but never got to meet him—the poorer I. Imagine what it means to me now to transcend all barriers, to feel kinship and friendship with any man and any woman, anywhere. This is one of the greatest boons diplomacy can give you: you can not only feel at home anywhere in the world, you can feel yourself truly a citizen of the world. That is to be civilized in the highest sense of the word, and ours is a civilized profession.

Annual Meeting of the Association
Noon, July 16
Loy Henderson Conference Room

MIDTERM REPORT ON THE ASSOCIATION

The past year has been an extraordinarily eventful one for the Foreign Service and for your association. A formal report to the membership on association activities since the new Governing Board took office last July will be presented at the annual meeting and published in the next issue of the *Journal*. We are outlining below some of the primary areas of Governing Board attention during the past year to serve as a basis, along with the association's survey (to be tabulated in early July), for our priorities and focus during the second year of the current Board's term.

Hostages: Security for Foreign Service people overseas and related issues of evacuation and safehaven have become concerns of the highest priority requiring our constant attention. We have had the joy of welcoming home Ambassador Asencio, the survivors of attacks on our embassies in Islamabad and Tripoli and those who were released or escaped from Iran. We have had the sorrow of honoring those who died in Islamabad and the anguish of the continuing captivity of our colleagues in Iran. The association organized a nationwide letter-writing campaign, several rallies and individual events around the world in support of the hostages. We have supported the initiatives of the hostages' families. And yet, like other Americans we are frustrated that none of these efforts has succeeeded and that, as foreign affairs professionals, we cannot find a way of obtaining the release of our colleagues.

Foreign Service Act: The bill has now cleared the Rules Committee and is awaiting imminent action on the House floor and in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It is different in over 50 significant sections from the legislation presented by the administration one year ago. Members of the Foreign Service, acting through our association, have succeeded in shaping a charter for our institution which meets the objectives established during the Days of Decision last September. The act is not perfect; each of us is likely to find some elements where we would prefer something different or some changes; but all of us who have labored over it and worked to represent Foreign Service interests are convinced that it represents a comprehensive improvement to the Foreign Service, to Foreign Service life and to our professional effectiveness. Shepherding the act through the remaining congressional hurdles and the enormous task of negotiating implementing regulations are both going to require incredible amounts of time and volunteer effort.

Compensation: If the Foreign Service succeeds at long last in getting pay equity it will be due to the unprecedented efforts of the Foreign Service Association. For the last decade the association has pressed for an impartial study of pay and finally succeeded in the congressionally mandated Hay Associates Study. That study is the basis for the current provisions in the Foreign Service Act mandating $34 million dollars in additional compensation for the Service. At the same time, we have fought for an additional $11 million in other benefits to apply throughout the Service, including the senior ranks who are caught by the government-wide pay ceiling. We have won strong friends both in the foreign affairs agencies and on the Hill in our continuing effort to thwart OMB's attempt to deny equity with the rest of the US government's employees.

Image of the Foreign Service: Association officers recognized that, however unwelcome the cause, the attention given the Foreign Service due to the attacks on our members and posts could be used to enhance public awareness and gain support for our often-criticized and little-appreciated institution. Accordingly, the president and members of the board have taken every opportunity to appear on television, radio and in the press to present the case for the Foreign Service and improve our image. We have also responded promptly and strongly to reports of public attacks and calumnies on the service from a variety of sources, including Jody Powell, Robert Strauss and Ronald Reagan. In each case we have received clarifications—and impressed on many our unwillingness to let criticism go without rebuttal. We intend to continue this effort and urge members to use individual opportunities to get our message across to the American public.

Relations with Congress: We are too well aware that in the past the Foreign Service has not done enough to make its interests known on the Hill. Association officers are now expanding a network of direct contacts with key senators and congressmen. We are leading the effort of the Alliance for the Foreign Service, and our goal is to reach every member of Congress on the Foreign Service Act. We have been gratified, if a bit surprised, at the responsiveness our efforts have thus far engendered. No area of activity shows greater promise for the Service in the future than systematic development of our congressional relations network and we will continue to work at this.

Building the Association: The membership's overwhelming vote in favor of an adjusted dues structure took effect in March, without resulting in a drop in membership. Accordingly, for the first time in almost a decade the Governing Board is able to plan on a modest expansion of services. We have already hired a new attorney and a Members' Interests Coordinator.

(Continued on page 45)

"From hence, let fierce contending nations know
What dire effects from civil discord flow."—Joseph Addison

EVACUATION FROM N'DJAMENA

PATRICIA B. NORLAND

Early on the morning of Friday, March 21, 1980, sometime before 4 a.m., a sharp burst of rifle fire in the street before the American ambassador's residence in N'Djamena, Chad, woke the residents inside. At a distance, gunfire crackled in other sections of the sleeping town. The shots were more numerous than usual, and they persisted. As the sky began to lighten, Ambassador Donald Norland consulted by telephone with DCM James Bullington, at his residence next door in the DCM's compound. He also called the Prévôté, the force of local soldiers charged with maintaining security in N'Djamena. The Prévôté did not respond. Finally, the ambassador learned from the security officer at the French military base on the edge of town, that all French civilians, because of tension and firing in the street, were being urged to remain indoors until further notice. At this juncture, the DCM made contact with personnel of the American embassy advising them not to go to the embassy until the situation could be clarified. A further announcement was promised for 7 a.m. and then again at 8 in the morning. The DCM then slipped cautiously across the compound to join the ambassador at the embassy residence.

By 8 o'clock, the sound of continued firing indicated that, whatever the problems were, they had not yet been resolved. A number of Americans were reporting gunfire in their areas. The DCM—at the 8 a.m. and again at the 9 and 10 a.m. check-in—repeated the order to all Americans to "stand fast," finally promising that a decision on the opening of the embassy that day would be announced by noon. In this way began, for the American diplomatic mission in N'Djamena, the renewed outbreak of civil war in Chad.

As background for the events to follow, it should be noted that the country of Chad, in the heartland of the northern half of Africa, consists of 500,000 square miles (twice the size of Texas) of desert, bush and rain forest stretching 1,200 miles into the African continent due south of Libya. On the east is Sudan. A hundred miles across the Sudanese border is Egypt. Continuing clockwise around Chad's borders are the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger.

Chad has received some publicity in recent years for the severe drought and civil war within its boundaries; it is also distinguished by the fact that it is one of the poorest nations in the world. Little benefit has yet been realized from the considerable oil and uranium detected beneath its surface. Another feature—one in which Chad is not unique—is the country's serious division (geographic, ethnic and historical) into two quite different cultures. In the dunes and dramatic mountains of the sparse Saharan north, nomadic tribes tend their herds and caravans, able to march for days on a few cups of water and a handful of dates. In the south, Christian or animist farmers raise cotton, sugar and other crops in the wet agricultural band of the rain forest. History has aggravated the division. For centuries, Islamic northerners raided the south to supply the remunerative slave trade. As late as 1979, northerners living in the south were turned upon and massacred in the thousands by their southern countrymen.

During the European colonization of Africa, Chad became part of the French Empire but received its independence from that country in 1960 at the time of General de Gaulle's expansive, if not entirely spontaneous, gesture liberating most of the former French colonies. With greater resources and a willingness to adopt French culture and education, the south had bene-

Patricia Norland, a Foreign Service wife since 1952, is the mother of three, two sons and a daughter. Mrs. Norland graduated from Wellesley and has accompanied her husband on assignments to Morocco, the Ivory Coast, France, The Netherlands, Guinea and the BLS countries.

fited more than the north from French ministrations. In 1960, François Tombalbaye, a southerner, became president of the country at Fort Lamy, now N'Djamena, the capital of Chad.

As time passed, the Islamic north grew more than ever convinced that the new government favored the south. In the mid-'60s, a northern liberation movement developed, known as the Front for the National Liberation of Chad (FROLINAT) and gradually gathered strength under such leaders as Ibrahim Abatcha and Abba Siddick. Civil war broke out in 1965. In the late 1960s and early '70s, new leaders strengthened the movement—Goukouni Oueddai (son of the derdei, the spiritual leader of the Toubous of the north) and Hissene Habré, an energetic northerner educated in France who weaned his small army of ragged warriors on the stones and sand of the Sahara and is said to have financed them with the ransom paid for the French archeologist, Mme. Claustre.

In 1975, the Chadian armed forces mounted a coup in N'Djamena, overthrowing the unpopular Tombalbaye and eventually replacing him with General Felix Malloum, another southerner. Efforts to reach a reconciliation with the rebellious northerners were generally unsuccessful, but in 1978, Hissene Habré was persuaded to join the government and was soon maintaining an ambiguous military presence on the outskirts of the capital. The coalition did not endure. In February, 1979, two major northern factions—Goukouni's coming from the north and Habré's from the east—drove Malloum, the national army, and the southern inhabitants from N'Djamena with tragic loss of life and installed their two armies in separate sectors of the city. By November 11, 1979, a new interim government had been formed with Goukouni as president and Habré as minister of defense. To Goukouni's faction, the Forces Armées Populaires (FAP) and Habré's faction, the Forces Armées du Nord (FAN) were added nine other factions—a temporary government of eleven factions designed to serve in tandem until a permanent government could be elected at the end of eighteen months. Among the major factions and forces were those of Vice President Kamougué from the south and those of Foreign Minister Ahmat Acyl, considered to be sympathetic to Libya.

The provisional coalition governed (perhaps "existed" is the better word) uneasily from the time of its inception on November 11, 1979. In the background were 1100 French troops installed on a base they occupied near the airport. Long influential (with the ups and downs that come with influence) in the affairs of Chad, the French had learned to remain detached from any particular faction. Their role at this time was twofold: to provide security for French civilians (fewer than a thousand in all), and to help stabilize the situation and maintain peace during which the new government could begin to function. The more highly trained southerners having fled to the south, N'Djamena was now a northern city. Its inexperienced leaders faced enormous problems—with empty coffers. In seeking to provide stability in which the new government could take root, the French made available such services as official and unofficial air transportation around a country where road travel was almost impossible; they also helped to maintain electric power and water supplies, assured the operation of the ferry tying N'Djamena to Cameroon across the Chari River and kept communications functioning. It was France also which aided in re-opening the University of Chad and gave irreplaceable financial and other support to the struggling government. For the thirty or so Americans in Chad, all but a few of whom lived in N'Djamena, the French presence represented security in a political situation considered, at the very least, unstable. France also tried diplomatically to smooth the path of the untried nation. At the head of the French mission as of October, 1979, was a cool and courageous diplomat, Ambassador Marcel Beaux.

> "February fourth, the most recent demilitarization date set for all *combattants* to divest themselves of their arms, came and went. As far as anyone could ascertain, not a single weapon was laid down."

Benign as the French presence had become, it posed a very major problem. At Lagos in Nigeria, where the structure of the new Chad government was agreed upon in August 1979, fellow African countries had insisted that Africans themselves should guarantee Chad's security and stability. A basic tenet was that the French should leave Chad and be replaced by a military contingent under OAU auspices, drawn from Guinea, the Congo and Benin, to keep order until the government of Chad itself was strong enough to do so. Libya, in particular, was anxious to see French forces withdrawn. This same Libya, at one time or another, supported all eleven factions. But it also occupied the Aouzou strip, 40,000 square miles of Chadian territory adjacent to Libya, where uranium and other minerals are said to be plentiful. As a result, Libya was unpopular with most Chadians whose nationalistic instincts remained strong despite the civil war. Still Libya was not without considerable influence in the country and the area. Thus, the smoldering fires of civil war were fueled by the keen interest and influence of foreign powers.

N'Djamena, the capital of Chad and principal scene of the confusion, was originally a city of nearly 200,000 inhabitants. Its location on the banks of the Chari River in sub-Saharan Africa is almost midway between north and south. Travel by car had long been restricted by impassable roads, roadblocks and fighting in the countryside; the chief route of exit had become the ferry that carries vehicles and people across to neighboring Cameroon, and the airport. Thus, locked into place, the eleven factions of the new government settled into N'Djamena and the various armies began to make themselves at home. Looting had followed the fighting. The *combattants* (as the armed men in

their battle fatigues were called) found life in N'Djamena considerable more agreeable than in the spartan north. While most French and other European civilians withdrew from N'Djamena after the fighting of February 1979, some five hundred remained. They, together with a number of aid and diplomatic missions and foreign merchants, comprised the foreign element in the town and were in no sense a target of attack or animosity from the local population. A foreign flag on the garden gate conferred a miraculous immunity. However, houses which had been left empty were soon occupied by *combattants*, vehicles were stolen, Chadian civilians were held up for their purses and some were shot on the streets at night by armed men seeking motor bikes or cars. There was a singularly dangerous element loose in N'Djamena: almost all the *combattants* (some say as many as 8,000) carried arms—usually Russian Kalashnikovs slung across their backs or cradled in their arms. These and larger armaments and ammunition were supplied through Libya and gave the *combattants* a sense of security which the civilian population did not share. The streets of N'Djamena were empty at night. Of the few southerners who had remained in N'Djamena to work, most had moved their homes to Kousseri across the river in Cameroon, to which they returned by ferry or pirogue late each afternoon.

Bursts of gunfire were a daily and nightly occurrence. Sometimes they were in celebration of a marriage or a holiday, with tracer bullets providing fireworks in the night sky. Sometimes the shots were accidental; more often, they meant some *combattant* was settling a quarrel or obtaining money or a vehicle from a luckless civilian. Larger incidents arising from tensions between the armed factions continued to take place—a misunderstood gathering of military vehicles during a transfer of bank funds, fighting between FAN and FAC (Front d'Action Commune) at Abéché several hundred miles to the east, and later between members of FAN in a suburb of N'Djamena. Occasionally, fatalities resulted, but each time the tensions subsided and life seemed to return to normal.

Classes resumed at the university, to which students were eager to return, having already lost a full college year after the fighting in 1979. Huge trucks bearing oil, flour, and other essentials continued to cross over to N'Djamena on the ferry. Gasoline was sold by curbside vendors in bottles which glowed ruby-red when sunlight struck them. Cattle, raising clouds of dust, were driven down teeming streets to the river where they swam across to Cameroon. Each night the soft African dusk settled on mud and thatch homes in the Chadian *quartier*; the murmur of voices and the wood fires would fade as families went early to sleep. Jazzier sounds floated occasionally from the dusty gardens of one or two clubs where the new elite sometimes gathered. During the starry night, the silence was often broken by rifle shots or by nervous dogs whose barking in prolonged chorus would sweep across town. Every morning, just before sunrise, the voice of the mullah could be heard calling the faithful from the turret of the magnificent new mosque that Saudi Arabia had presented to the city of N'Djamena. The cooler season of the year gave way to the heat and dry wind of March. Occasional dust storms stole over the horizon and descended on the town like a dry and eerie fog.

Deprived of its trained staff of southerners and without food or supplies, the N'Djamena Central Hospital was barely functioning but managed somehow to treat the accident cases—chiefly gunshot wounds—that filled the corridors outside surgery each night. The Prévôté, the local military police force drawn rom the four major government factions, roamed the streets in jeeps, charged with maintaining order. Units of the OAU peacekeeping force from the Congo (Brazzaville) arrived in January 1980 and were installed in appropriate quarters but, incomplete without their Guinea and Benin counterparts, showed hesitation in asserting their presence. Meanwhile, the government struggled on in efforts to house its officials, provide desks, vehicles and salaries for its civil servants, and persuade its factions to act on the pressing problems of the disrupted and poverty-stricken country. February fourth, the most recent demilitarization date set for all *combattants* to divest themselves of their arms, came and went. As far as anyone could ascertain, not a single weapon was laid down. The theft of automobiles increased. Gradually, *combattants* began to knock on European as well as Chadian doors after dark, demanding keys to the owner's car, firing a shot into the ground for emphasis, and departing in the night with the car. Also for the first time, a French military vehicle was taken at gunpoint. A large theft of auto parts from the CARE-Chad organization convinced that agency it could no longer function under such conditions. On March 10, it closed its operations. Meanwhile, the Prévôté seemed to go out of business. The security force responded late when called, or not at all. As one western diplomat later remarked with regard to what was to follow, "You could see it coming for weeks, even months, but there was nothing God or man could do to stop it."

On March 14, at Bokoro, about 150 kilometers east of N'Djamena, serious fighting broke out between the forces of Defense Minister Habré and Interior Minister Abba Seid (of pro-Libyan reputation). On March 20, Minister Seid publicly urged President Goukouni to end the fighting in the countryside and accused the French of supporting the FAN force of Minister Habré. Seid also threatened to resign, indicating that the ruling coalition was undergoing major stress. Such were the events, briefly summarized, that preceded the outburst of shooting before dawn on March 21st.

Since the early hours of that Friday morning, the telephone at the American embassy residence had rung incessantly. As events proceeded, DCM Bullington, a skilled ham radio operator, came to spend much of his time on the second floor of the residence, communicating with Americans throughout the town and making contacts outside the country when possible. The ambassador was to be found for the most part on the phone at his desk in the downstairs library receiving and making calls, contacting diplomatic colleagues, journalists, French military officials, the imam (N'Djamena's respected Islamic re-

ligious leader), and government officials including, as time passed, President Goukouni and Hissene Habré.

Early in the day it was learned that one American, Lt. Colonel James Herrick, the defense attaché, had failed to receive word to remain at home that morning. Colonel Herrick, whose wife was in the United States with their family (since children were not permitted to accompany embassy personnel to Chad), made a practice of going to his office before 7 a.m. En route this morning to the embassy, he heard firing and saw a French soldier roll out of his jeep into a ditch while the jeep careened down the road ahead. Herrick hastily pulled off the road and lay on the floor of his car until the firing subsided. He then continued to the office, but not before having seen the French soldier scramble to his feet unharmed. Less fortunate was another French military noncom who, at about the same time on another road, was killed by a bullet as he returned to the French base with the morning supply of bread from the *Grands Moulins* bakery.

In mid-morning, the ambassador's driver, Younous Outman, a Chadian long employed at the embassy, arrived at the residence, and volunteered to investigate the situation in the streets near the chancery. He returned to report that only armed *combattants* were abroad and that road blocks prevented movement about town. The chancery, situated on the same road along the Chari River as the residence but a mile or so further toward town, stood opposite the Prévôté where a dispute between the president's forces and those of Defense Minister Habré seemed to have triggered hostilities. Nearby stood the house of the competent young correspondent for the *Agence France Presse* and his wife. Because of heavy shooting, they had already left their home. (Earlier, *combattants* moving through their yard had silenced a much-loved young dog with a rifle shot.) Road blocks had been set up at each end of this vulnerable area—in the center of which stood the American embassy chancery.

By noon it was evident that the embassy could not open for business and Americans in their different locations around town prepared to spend the rest of the day "standing fast." All morning, Colonel Herrick had been alone in the chancery—a location that was becoming less and less desirable. About one p.m. the driver Younous volunteered to try to bring him from the chancery to the embassy residence—which he did in the official car with American flag flying, using his Arabic to persuade the *combattants* to let him through the road blocks. The attaché's car was left behind, the only vehicle in front of an empty embassy.

Although the gunfire subsided from time to time, the fighting was by this time officially described as "generalized." Empty streets, road blocks, and the numbers and movements of armed *combattants* indicated a major confrontation was taking place between the followers of President Goukouni and those of Defense Minister Habré. It could no longer be denied that these two northerners, brothers in politics and arms, Goukouni, the unassuming politician, and Habré, the determined guerrilla leader, had now turned on one another—with all the ferocity, irony and tragedy of a classic civil war.

> "When a movement of the window curtain and a hissing sound indicated a nearby shot, the ambassador and his wife moved to a room on the other side of the house."

During the afternoon of March 21 strenuous efforts were made to establish a ceasefire. The leaders themselves were reported to have agreed to ask the OAU peacekeeping force to mediate. The Imam of N'Djamena, diplomatic representatives and others in the city, worked to halt hostilities—without success. By late afternoon, the French authorities recommended evacuation of the *gendarmerie* area because of shelling. Kathy and Phil Bauso, the American consul and his wife, decided to remain where they were. The director of CARE, Rudy Ramp, his wife and daughter, packed a few possessions and were escorted to the embassy residence. Their home later received a direct hit from a mortar round.

It was expected that, in the event of outbreak of hostilities, Americans and other foreigners would be evacuated to the air base occupied by the French military north of town. The journey from home to base would take place in convoys led by French military vehicles, a procedure which required (as in the February 1979 fighting) a temporary cessation of hostilities. At least a brief cease-fire was an essential ingredient of the plan which inmates of the city now began to contemplate with increasing interest.

As Friday afternoon, March 21, unfolded, it began to dawn on Arnie Squire, AID comptroller, at his home in the center of town that he was situated near an ammunition warehouse. After each burst of rifle fire or round of cannon shot, he could hear the footsteps of *combattants* running past his house to load up on ammunition before returning to their weapons. He decided to build a bunker by leaning mattresses against an inner closet. On top of the mattresses he placed box springs, then leaves of the dining room table and finally a coffee table. In other parts of town firing became less frequent as night fell and some Americans retired early, having been awakened before dawn that morning. In the area behind the "April 13 Camp," Larry Springer, acting administrative officer, was asleep when, about 11:30 pm., he was awakened by a mortar shell that sprayed his house with dirt. He wondered what he should do and how his neighbors were faring. The Wilsons, nearby, reported they were safe; Larry Jarrett, next door, advised that he was watching a football game on his VTR. Springer was counselled by the DCM and Acting ASO Nigel Whitehouse to make a shelter near an upright protecting wall. He decided, however, to remain under his bed where he could be nearer means of outside communication. Mortars continued firing in this area throughout the night.

Although the early part of the night passed in relative quiet, at about 2:30 a.m. on Saturday, March 22, heavy rifle and machine gun fire erupted in the street in

front of the ambassador's and DCM's residences and in the gardens of neighboring houses. Bullets and tracers crossed the garden on the river side, slapping through branches and leaves. When a movement of the window curtain and a hissing sound indicated a nearby shot, the ambassador and his wife moved to a room on the other side of the house. The ambassador returned shortly on all fours to be near the telephone and outside communication. The Ramp family at the residence had moved into one room and onto mattresses placed on the foor and were waiting for the barrage to subside.

Shortly after sunup the DCM and defense attache slipped over to the ambassador's residence. Here the DCM resumed communications to American and Canadian personnel and to posts abroad. The DCM's calm reports were said to be among the few, and by far the most informative, in the beleaguered town; they were a reassurance to others as well as to embassy personnel. Somewhat later, Kitty Allen, the ambassador's secretary, and George Granson (of AID) made their way to the residence from their houses in the compound. George reported heavy rifle fire in the street and bullets in his yard, as well as prolonged firing of machine guns—single salvos long enough to melt or bend most gun barrels. A large hole had been made in the metal shutter of the empty house next to his. Kitty Allen had spent an uneasy night alone in her home, having created a shelter for herself by leaning a mattress against her bed. Bullet holes pierced the roof and walls of her house and the sound of footsteps running across her roof led her to believe that *combattants* had been maneuvering inside her garden walls.

At about 8:30 a.m., the firing seemed to subside and the defense attaché stepped out on the second floor balcony of the residence from which he could see the sand flats along the Chari River and the green shore of Cameroon beyond. From here he could also see that, outside the residence garden on the river side of the grounds, a recoilless rifle was being brought into place by Hissene Habré's men to fire in the direction of President Goukouni's home and of the *gendarmerie* some two miles distant. The back blast of the explosions that followed threatened to break the many windows of the residence. When this gun was withdrawn, a so-called "Stalin organ" was put in its place, from which salvos of rockets were shot off with an eerie roar to seek hit-or-miss targets in the town. The guns were emplaced, fired, and removed by mobile teams of *combattants* who then raced to another part of town to fire a number of salvos before returning hourly or oftener to the residence. On the sand flats between the residence and the river, bursts of dust indicated that returning mortars were seeking these nearby rotating cannon.

By the middle of the morning, Arnie Squire, in the center of town, found that FAP forces had set up a machine gun point about fifty yards from his house, thus situating Arnie and his neighbors between two FAP camps, the other being the ammo warehouse of which he had become aware the day before. Mortar fire and heavy fighting continued in the street with bullets hitting walls and houses. Near the airport, embassy secretary Mary Stouma remained alone indoors. From her windows she could see occasional stray rounds strike the empty house next door. In the same general area, Phil and Kathy Bauso had stayed on friendly terms with the FAP forces in their neighborhood. They were not far from the *gendarmerie* from which small arms, recoilless rifles and mortars were firing. They reported that an area of about a hundred and fifty yards around the *gendarmerie* was receiving fire; based on timing of the blasts, it seemed to come from the big arms beside the ambassador's residence. Inside the *gendarmerie*, an ammunition depot went up in flames, and a heavy mortar shell hit the Ramps' house two doors away. The house resembled, the Bausos reported, an exploded popcorn skillet.

One of the most dangerous areas, it had become apparent, lay between Camp April 13 of Habré's FAN forces and the *gendarmerie* of FAP—a fiercely contested line of combat which wavered back and forth across the residences of David Wilson, AID director and his wife, Larry Jarrett and Larry Springer. The Wilsons by now were lying flat in an inner hall on mattresses with other mattresses balanced around and above them. The FAP *combattants* in the house next door remained friendly but found it necessary to use the Wilsons' back door area and patio from which to fire machine guns at their FAN foes. Every window in the Wilsons' house was hit, and bullets entered the house from all sides. One shot went through the refrigerator and its contents, producing a mixture of ketchup, maple syrup and beer when the door was opened. Mortar and some rockets fell nearby; straw mats serving as fences throughout the neighborhood in due time went up in flames, and bullets flattened the four tires of the Wilsons' car in their driveway. Close to the Wilsons' garden and across the street were the houses of Larry Jarrett, economic/political officer, and Larry Springer, acting admin officer. FAN *combattants*, had set up automatic rifles and mortars in their yards and about twenty soldiers were sheltered in the garage between the two houses. Some asked for water, beer and whiskey, but leaders among them restrained their fellow *combattants* from taking over the house. Fearing that the walls of his house might cave in, Larry Springer had hoped in vain throughout the day for evacuation. Unable to get into his kitchen during the day, he fixed himself a meal that night when the firing subsided and returned to the shelter in his bedroom.

Little was heard from the Americans in the area behind the chancery. Here, on the edge of the crowded Arab quarter, where humanity seemed to have been replaced by the hot and dusty March wind, Chadians took refuge in their labyrinths of stucco walls.

At the residence, the DCM, working in 110° heat on the second floor, continued to communicate with the American community and with contacts abroad. The task was rendered now more difficult by alternate blasts from the recoilless rifle and the Stalin organ at the edge of the garden—firing which shook the residence and rattled its many glass doors and windows. At his ground floor desk in the library, the ambassador sought (in vain) further indication that a cease-fire might still take place that day. Negotiations were even then—and

in fact, almost continuously—in progress, this time between the fighting factions and the French authorities. But gradually the firing lessened, shadows outside grew longer and cooled the stifling afternoon heat. Water and electricity in other parts of the town had begun to fail. In the residence, the dining-room table was moved to an inner supporting wall and shielded by mattresses—under which cushions were arranged for sleeping. At length, word was received that three major obstacles to a cease-fire remained: a buffer force was not yet agreed upon, a neutral zone was not yet defined, and above all, the *combattants* were ignoring orders for a temporary halt in the firing. It was clear that Americans in N'Djamena would spend another night on "stand fast."

After the heavy barrages of the day, Saturday night passed in relative quiet. But on the morning of Sunday, March 23rd, heavy firing again resumed in different parts of the city. Hopes that a cease-fire might be obtained possibly as early as 9 a.m. were dashed when the Stalin organ outside the residence began its firing a few minutes before that very hour. One of its shells made a direct hit on the town's main butchery, located behind the house of Arnie Squire and near the other Americans in the center of town. Everywhere but at the residence (where a generator had been installed), the supply of water and electricity had now failed. A rumor came by phone that President Goukouni was introducing into the fighting a number of heavy guns (although reportedly still at a distance from N'Djamena) to fire on Habré's forces in the city. The defense attaché's compound reported an attempt by FAN to take the airport, and Phil Bauso and several non-western ambassadors relayed the news that Vice-President Kamogué had arrived on the southern approaches of the city with an army of southern *combattants*.

Meanwhile the cease-fire on which all hopes were fixed remained elusive—postponed from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. and on into the afternoon hours. The ambassador again spoke with President Goukouni and with Defense Minister Habré, protesting the devastation of the capital and the danger to its inhabitants and urging that the cease-fire be observed. To the ambassador's protest, N'Djamena's religious leader, the imam, replied that he had been telling the two leaders the same things but "they won't listen to me."

By Sunday afternoon it had been two and a half days since word had gone out to Americans in N'Djamena to "stand fast," and the situation was not improving. The ambassador and his advisers at this time concluded that Americans must now try to reach the haven of the French-occupied airbase on the far side of the airport. Without a cease-fire, however, the necessary military escort could not enter the city. And the French wardens who were to round up the convoys were reluctant to do so in the absence of such armed protection. It was increasingly evident by early afternoon that Americans would have to get to the base as best they could—on their own or by joining a convoy that might happen to pass their home. Word was sent out to Americans to pack one bag each and to hang white flags made from sheets on sticks or poles to display on their car as they left their home. The best moment for departure was left to the judgment of each, and all were advised to join passing convoys if at all possible.

A cease-fire was never proclaimed. But toward the middle of Sunday afternoon, the unpopular Stalin organ fell silent and firing dropped to the lowest decibel level yet throughout the city. In the relative quiet, groups of French and Americans began to move toward the base.

Among the first of the Americans to leave were those whose location near President Goukouni's house made the French air base more accessible. Those in the airport area were also able to make their way to safety before the end of the afternoon. At about 4:30 p.m., the group of Americans in the center of the town managed to assemble at a central house and join a convoy of French cars headed in the direction of the base.

At the ambassador's residence, bed sheets now covered the interior glass doors and light fixtures to reduce the possibility of flying glass. The electric generator began to sputter, causing the ambassador to make several trips outside to restart it and raising questions about the possibility of further communication. As the firing fell off, the nine Americans in the residence assembled at a signal from the ambassador with their bags and white flags at the side entrance nearest the waiting cars. Suddenly, George Branson, who had crossed briefly to his home on the compound, returned in some agitation, gesturing everyone back inside the house. It appeared that firing was still going on and a bullet had just passed within inches of his head. After brief hesitation, however, the nine set out again for the cars in the compound where baggage was quickly stowed into trunks. On the official car, a hub cap had been whisked off by a bullet but the tire had providentially been spared.

The convoy consisted of five persons in the ambassador's car followed by the car of CARE Director Ramp with George Branson in the front seat beside him. Next came a French neighbor whose vehicle slipped into line as the convoy left the compound. Bringing up the rear was the car driven by the DCM accompanied by the defense attaché.

The cavalcade moved slowly down the empty street in the late afternoon light – past buildings riddled with bullet holes and smoldering tank trucks, their huge tires flattened and sitting in pools of oil. Tree branches hung from electric

"In front of the embassy the defense attaché's car still stood, its windshield shattered and its body pock-marked with gun shot. In the river port area, a FAN mortar crew was still firing an occasional round."

wires, and the convoy had to zigzag to avoid wires lying snake-like in the cluttered road. It continued on past the American embassy, the white building now blackened and spattered with bullet holes. Through a huge cavity in the wall next to the main entrance, rafters from the second floor were visible. In front of the embassy the defense attaché's car still stood, its windshield shattered and its body pock-marked with gun shot. In the river port area, a FAN mortar crew was still firing an occasional round. Further down the street, the wooden bleachers near the cathedral were aflame, strips of fire burning briskly alone in the afternoon. Some shooting could be heard in the distance, but the few *combattants* in the street were friendly. For the most part, however, nothing moved in the landscape until, passing the empty offices of CARE and rounding a bend, the convoy came upon a large assembly of French and other foreign civilians and their vehicles of various sorts gathered in front of the French embassy—a welcome sight that meant safety was within reach. Pausing only briefly to obtain a report about onward security, the convoy proceeded, covering the final mile and a half and rolling onto the tree-lined and soldier-protected roads of the French military camp.

Here, at the base, was a different world, one of order, cheerfulness and relief. French, Americans and other nationalities, bankers, diplomats and businessmen, milled about in the open areas between barracks where cars were parked in rows under the trees. Friends met, embraced and, with strained expressions, recounted their experiences. But in the background, distant explosions and firing could still be heard, and it was soon apparent that a number of embassy staff were still trapped in the city. Among these were Lynn and Nigel Whitehouse whose home was in a particularly dangerous position in the line of fire between FAP and FAN forces. Firing had severely damaged their living room, shots having even pierced some of the inner doors of the house. Conditions in their neighborhood made it dangerous to move but at the last moment, they were able to join a French convoy as it drove past their house. Along the way, the convoy was detained by *combattants* and only the intervention of President Goukouni himself cleared the way past the road block and onto the base. It was nearly dark when their pickup truck rolled into the parking area, draped with a large American flag (actually they are Canadian citizens) and bearing, in addition to the Whitehouses and their son, the embassy nurse, Mrs. Kessely, and a small puppy. Mr. and Mrs. Hodges, the missionaries, had earlier expressed the intention to remain in the city, and several others, possibly because they had Chadian families or for other reasons, had not made an effort to get to the base that day.

Meanwhile, among the Americans who wanted very much to leave the city and were unable to do so were the four persons on the firing line between FAN and FAP in the *chien mort* area—the Wilsons, Larry Jarrett and Larry Springer. The Wilsons' car stood in their driveway on four tires flattened by bullets. Earlier they had discussed trying to reach the home of the nearest French warden but the move was judged too risky. Now darkness was at hand, FAN forces were retreating before approaching FAP forces, and heavy firing from the field opposite the Wilsons' house made it dangerous for all to leave their homes.

At the base, at approximately 5:30 p.m., the ambassador held aloft keys to the official car and asked if anyone who knew the approach to the stranded group would volunteer to go back into the city to bring them out. Without hesitation, Tom Murray of AID, a man who had a close and good relationship with many Chadians in N'Djamena and who knew the area in question, volunteered to make the attempt. Someone suggested that "Hefty" Heffernan accompany him in case an Arabic speaker was needed to communicate with the *combattants*. Murray and Heffernan departed in the official embassy car; in fifteen minutes they were back. The *combattants* refused to let them pass without an official *laisser-passer* signed by the French. Tom, understandably agitated at the delay, went off in search of the appropriate French official. He returned twenty minutes later with the pass and together he and Heffernan set forth again. By this time, dusk had fallen.

In the town, the Wilsons, Jarrett and Springer, informed that a rescue party was on its way, crept with baggage in hand out of their homes and managed to join forces in the garage of an abandoned house. Murray and Heffernan, with white flags on the car and lights dimmed, approached the area where the four Americans were waiting by an indirect route, but could not find them. The car was on one street; the Wilsons, Jarrett and Springer were on another. In the dark it was impossible to make contact, FAN and FAP forces were still engaged, and heavy firing made it out of the question for the four to return to their homes. Precious minutes were lost in this groping in the dark when, by a stroke of luck, the car approached the garage where the four were huddled. Seeing the car lights, David Wilson ran out to meet it. Hastily, the four piled into the car which backed into a driveway where people, bags and three dogs were reloaded, and the car swung hurriedly back into the street. With lights on and white flags flying (though barely visible), they proceeded through the town, past three check points, meeting few troops and encountering fire only once. Minutes later, they reached the safety of the air base.

There, the night was filled with bustle and movements as the French military, in addition to its preoccupation with the stricken city, attempted to feed and bed down for the night the nearly four hundred civilians evacuated to its care. Rooms were assigned and meal passes handed out. Each evacuee was given the choice of the mode of his or her departure the next morning—by air in the big French Transall transport aircraft, or by car and then over the river by improvised ferry—to Cameroon. The embassy staff arrived at the officers' mess for a welcome dinner (including wine). Then all retired for a night's rest. The two single women of the staff found themselves sharing their room with 32 others—all men. Possibly the French billeting officer had confused the Ms. before their names with Mr. In any event, they fell onto their assigned beds in one of

(Continued on page 42)

"Ah! when shall all men's good
Be each man's rule, and universal peace
Lie like a shaft of light across the land?"—Alfred, Lord Tennyson

Andrew Young at the UN

SEYMOUR MAXWELL FINGER

Andrew Young's appointment as permanent representative to the United Nations shattered a number of traditions. He was the first ordained minister, the first black and the youngest man (44) ever named to the job.

This was not the only time Young broke a precedent. In 1972 he became the first black congressman elected from Georgia since Reconstruction a century earlier; a majority of his constituents were white.

Yet in another sense Young's appointment represented a return to a US tradition—naming a prominent political figure who has influence with the president. Such was the case, in varying degree, with Austin, Lodge, Stevenson, Goldberg and Scranton, who collectively accounted for about 80 percent of the time the United States has been in the UN. Young had played a vital role in helping Carter win 83 percent of the black vote in the 1976 election. He had also helped Carter by serving as a bridge to northern white liberals. Carter called him his "best friend in public life."

Young grew up in a New Orleans neighborhood that was predominantly lower-middle-class white. His father was a dentist and his father's father, whom Young describes as a "bayou entrepreneur," had also been prosperous.

He makes no bones about his sheltered youth in a black bourgeois environment. Young attended Howard University, the college of America's black elite, graduating at the age of 19. It was in his last year at Howard, where he had gone to prepare for either medical or dental school, that Young developed a serious social consciousness. He was impressed by the dedication of a young minister who had come to live in his parents' home. The minister was getting up to study and work at five a.m. when Young was just coming home from a night of fun. That presented a challenge to Young's lifestyle and values. Then, while driving home to New Orleans after his graduation, Young spent the night at a church conference in King's Mountain, North Carolina and had a white roommate who was on his way to Rhodesia as a missionary. The thought that a white man was sacrificing material comforts to go to help Africans evidently stirred Young's social consciousness; he decided on the ministry.

Young studied at Hartford Theological Seminary in Connecticut, was ordained as a Congregational minister in 1955 and served as pastor in several southern towns. In 1957 he and his wife, Jean, whom he had married in 1954, moved to New York City. He worked for the National Council of Churches and lived comfortably in Queens. But the news photos of blacks sitting in at lunch counters in the south moved him deeply, and he decided to go where the action was. The Youngs moved to Atlanta in 1961, where Andy soon became the top lieutenant to Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference—spearhead of the non-violent civil rights movement.

After King was murdered in 1968, Young decided that politics was the key to black progress in America. He lost a race for Congress in 1970, but was elected in 1972 and reelected in 1974. His backing for Carter in the Florida primary in 1976 may have been crucial in Carter's victory over George Wallace.

While many black leaders advised Young against taking the UN job, believing it would be better to have him in Washington working on behalf of American blacks, Young himself had had the UN in the back of his mind for a long time. This was mainly because of Ralph Bunche's outstanding role as undersecretary general of the UN; he was the first black man with whom Young had identified as a child. Thus, Young was ready when Carter, soon after the election, asked him to take the UN position.

Young talked of redeeming the United States at the United Nations and the United Nations in the United States, of putting the United States on "the right side of the moral issues of the world," a trend favored by the president and the secretary of state.

Although he had no diplomatic

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Ambassador Finger would like to acknowledge the help of Dr. Rosalie Reich in adapting the book chapter.

experience before he came to the UN, Young was not without international experience. He had traveled to thirty nations in most parts of the world and had many friends both in and out of their governments, particularly in Africa and the Caribbean. In the House of Representatives he was active on a number of foreign policy issies. More important, even though he flouted certain aspects of protocol, he has some important qualities of a diplomat. He is intelligent and personable, speaks well, and had influence with the president. These are the things that really count at the UN, not where the ambassador rides in his car. Moreover, UN diplomacy has always been more informal and less protocolar than traditional diplomacy, despite the many stilted public speeches. Also, foreign diplomats are used to dealing with non-career American permanent representatives, who have held the post for 32 of the 34 years since the UN was founded. Some, however, were upset by Young's indiscretions in dealing with the media and by his frequent absences.

Young considers himself a politician rather than a diplomat. Asked about the difference, he replied: "A diplomat, in the traditional sense, is instructed by his government to maintain the status quo. A politician is generating activity, hoping to produce change, trying to make things happen in a positive way for his country. I find that the State Department trains people not to take chances, to do the safe things for their careers." In truth, a good politician will use diplomacy to achieve his goals, as Young has. And there have been many career Foreign Service officers, of whom George Kennan is the best known, who have worked to change policy. But no career officer could have the influence with the president and the "star" quality with the public that Young had, and these are important assets in the job at the UN. Nor would he have had the unauthorized meeting with the PLO representative at the UN which ultimately led to Young's resignation.

Most important is the fact that Young represented and was part of an administration that has consciously chosen a more forthcoming approach to the UN and Africa. As noted earlier, US neglect of Africa had finally ended in 1975, in Kissinger's alarm over the installation of Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique. Ford, Kissinger and Scranton had begun a new policy of supporting the early attainment of self-determination and majority rule in Namibia and Rhodesia. Young threw himself wholeheartedly into this new American policy and was a major factor in moving it along in Washington, in Africa and at the United Nations. When Carter was welcomed in Nigeria in March 1978, in the first visit by an American president to Africa, it was clearly Young who had paved the way. At the UN conference on apartheid at Lagos in August 1977, Foreign Minister Joseph Garba of Nigeria said that the Carter administration had done more than any other to combat South African racial practices and hailed Young as the "symbol of a new and constructive United States policy toward Africa." Such praise is striking coming from a Nigerian leadership that long barred a visit by Secretary Kissinger. Young had described the African community's reception of him as "outstanding" and "exceptionally warm."

Young applies to African problems many of the principles learned in the civil rights campaign—in particular, non-violent struggle, patient negotiation and the belief that large corporations, if convinced that it is in their interest, can be a potent ally. Thus far, he has won few converts among either the militant black Africans or the die-hard white South Africans. Both sides tend to feel that his analogies with the US civil rights movement are too simplistic. But he has neither lost faith nor relented in his efforts.

Young has friends among radical, socialist and Marxist leaders in Africa, as well as the moderate ones, but is himself a firm believer in free enterprise. He emphasized his faith in the free market system in speaking to a group of South African businessmen, in Johannesburg, May 21, 1977, noting that in free market countries he saw more social change taking place along with more improvement in living conditions than in Marxist countries.

Young pointed out how banks and corporations in Atlanta and Birmingham had finally become



Andy Young, by John Perts

convinced that the civil rights movement was in their own interest, that it would avert violence, and that they had become more prosperous after the blacks, with increased opportunity, enlarged their markets. While persuasion had been used in both places, it took a massive non-violent protest and a six-month economic boycott in Birmingham to make the business community aware of its responsibility. Young acknowledged that South Africa was a vastly different problem, but still urged that South Africa avoid the human and economic repressions which would surely lead to widespread violence. Instead, it should seek racial justice and peace and thus open up to itself the vast economic potential of the African continent, just as Atlanta had become a city "too busy to hate," busy making money, "enjoying the prosperity of the market system."

Young's statement might be considered as tailored to his business audience, except that he has consistently used similar arguments with black African leaders, Marxist as well as non-Marxist, both in Africa and at the UN. For example, in his statement at the UN conference for Namibia and Zimbabwe, held May 19, 1977, at Maputo in Marxist Mozambique, Young argued for non-violent struggle and negotiation and for a constructive role that multinational corporations might play. Young also reminded his Maputo audience that the majority of the nations of Africa achieved independence through negotiated settlement and that those countries which had obtained independency by negotiation "moved much more

rapidly in their development." As he had done in Johannesburg, Young held forth the hope of mutual benefit for blacks and whites in Africa through cooperation in economic development, as had happened in Atlanta.

Young's work with the African countries in seeking peaceful solutions was widely appreciated, even by western ambassadors who sometimes found his unorthodox style irritating. Many of them felt that he was responsible for forging a link with the Third World countries; no mean accomplishment, and one that would stand the United States in good stead in the future. But some French-speaking African representatives, particularly those from smaller countries, felt that Young had neglected them.

On numerous occasions Young cautioned against full economic sanctions against South Africa, an attitude consistent with his overall belief that enlightened corporate policy could help to bring social justice in South Africa as it did in the American south.

Young also believes that American business should be much more active in black Africa, in both trade and investment. He notes that the United States now has a balance of payments deficit of $12 billion, owing primarily to oil purchases from Nigeria. He notes further that Peugeot and Mercedes have developed substantial markets in black Africa, whereas American manufacturers of cars and trucks have not exploited the market.

Young and Washington

An important factor in Young's influence, besides his special relationship with the president, was his rapport with Secretary of State Vance, lasting almost to the end of Young's tenure. Vance is a competent, solid, modest, indefatigable and unpretentious man with a great deal of experience and no yearning to compete for the spotlight. A liberal Democrat, Vance shares Young's general views on US policy goals in Africa and toward the Third World. Also, more than any other secretary of state in history, Vance has a deep interest in the UN. When Young had policy differences with William Schaufele, assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Schaufele was replaced by Richard Moose, then deputy undersecretary for management. Moose had traveled to Africa with Young in May 1977 and demonstrated that he could get along with Young, a key factor. Vance and Young also took pains to see that their own man, Charles W. (Bill) Maynes was installed as assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs (IO). Maynes had been in the State Department but was secretary of the Carnegie Endowment during the Nixon-Ford years. He is highly intelligent, able, energetic and a firm supporter of Young.

A further indication of the mutual trust between Young and Vance was the way Young's principal deputies were selected. Young did not really know either James Leonard or Donald McHenry when he appointed them. Vance did, and Young took his recommendation. According to McHenry, it was also Vance who suggested Melissa Wells for the post of US representative to the economic and social council. The result was an unusually close working relationship between Young's top staff at USUN and the key people in IO and the bureau of African affairs. Maynes, Moose, and McHenry had all known each other for many years, worked together in the Carnegie Endowment and shared similar outlooks toward the UN and southern Africa.

Vance fully supported Young's work at the United Nations, particularly with Africa and other parts of the Third World but certain key problems were reserved for the secretary, e.g., the Middle East and relations with Europe, Japan and the Soviets. Also, at crucial points, Vance has been the principal US negotiator on African problems, notably in dealing with the British foreign secretary on Rhodesia. This division of labor was generally satisfactory to both, until Young got involved in a meeting with the PLO representative in July, 1979, leading to his resignation shortly thereafter.

Young pushed for looking at Africa in African terms, not in terms of Soviet-American rivalry, and this has been much appreciated by Third World countries at the UN. Also appreciated is the fact that in April 1977 the United States for the first time accepted a UN visiting mission to one of its territories, the Virgin Islands.

Young's concern with combating the Cold War optic in viewing African problems may have led him into his off-the-cuff comment early in 1977 that the Cubans were a "stabilizing" factor in Angola. This was the first instance in which Vance publicly disagreed with him. Evidently embarrassed as Cuban military intervention continued in Angola and then spread to Ethiopia, Young later tried to clarify, explain and modify his position, stating that initially the Cubans were not engaged in fighting there but were giving technical assistance. But when they used military means, he then condemned that military role.

With respect to the nature of the Soviet threat in Africa, Young had some sharp differences of opinion with Zbigniew Brzezinski, special assistant to the president for national security affairs—the post Henry Kissinger held from 1969 to 1973, before becoming secretary of state. Brzezinski had expressed deep concern about Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. Young feared that the US might overreact to the Soviet-Cuban presence by becoming actively involved itself, thus bringing on Soviet-American confrontation in Africa and heating up the Cold War.

Despite the setbacks in Angola, Ethiopia, Iran and Afghanistan, Young believes it is the United States, not the Soviet Union, which is winning the competition in the Third World. He notes the Soviet failures in Guinea, Egypt and Somalia. He is convinced that Third World governments, even those with Marxist leaders, find that it is the West that can offer the trade, technology and capital they need, not the Soviet Union. In particular, he believes, on the basis of his contacts with Angolan representatives at the UN, that the current Marxist government of Angola would welcome improved relations with the United States, particularly economic. (Gulf Oil has had no problem in continuing operations there.) He also believes that US recognition of Angola's government would speed the departure of the Cubans now there.

"Open Diplomacy"

Young's outspoken style, which

he calls "open diplomacy," caused problems. In talking with reporters at various times, he called the British, Russians, and Swedes racist, along with former Presidents Nixon and Ford, bringing howls of protest. Young's definition of racism includes not only conscious acts but also subconscious attitudes of superiority, condescension and discrimination that result from insensitivity. He also attributes much of the criticism of the UN, with its majority of non-white states, to racist attitudes.

Two months after his appointment there were rumors that Young's penchant for off-the-cuff remarks was embarrassing Washington and that he would not remain long. Those who spread or believed the rumors did not know much about Jimmy Carter and Young's relationship with him. Young's influence with the president stemmed primarily from his role in the 1976 elections and his standing in the black community, but there is also a degree of personal affinity. Both are religious men as well as practical politicians. Both grew up in a racist, segregated South that was substantially desegregated in their lifetimes. Young was a major leader, as aide to Martin Luther King, in the civil rights struggle. Carter was not actively involved in the struggle but owes his presidency to its successful outcome, with the huge increase in black voters in the south.

By August 1977 Young's outspokenness had been reassessed. An editorial in the New York *Times* of August 8, 1977, entitled "Rediscovering Andrew Young," reflected the reassessment, and pointed to his assets: "Indeed, some of his colleagues from other governments now say he has become the most influential person at the United Nations, and that his presence at the head of the American delegation has swung more than a few votes, or has prevented issues from coming to a vote when the outcome would have been against the United States. And some say, with little irony or exaggeration, that Andy Young is currently the most influential person in Africa as well."

Eleven months later, in July 1978, Young was again in trouble because of indiscretion in talking to a reporter about "political prisoners" in the United States—an incident we shall discuss later. His lack of discretion with reporters undermined his standing not only among some segments of the American public but also with some foreign representatives at the UN.

Consistent with his belief in talking foreign policy with the American people, Young made an unprecedented number of public-speaking appearances. He also made an unusual number of trips abroad, on policy missions to Africa and the Caribbean and to attend UN conferences in Lagos (on apartheid), Guatemala City (economic commission for Latin America) and Geneva (economic and social council) all in his first year. Moreover, he was in Washington frequently for policy discussions and attended the Cabinet meetings there with conscientious regularity. As a result Young was at USUN only about half the time. When he was there he concentrated on the substance of major issues, particularly in southern Africa. He paid little attention to the specific wording of resolutions; for him, it is the "sense of feeling" that counts. Nor did he have much time for or interest in overseeing the operation of the mission; that was left to subordinates. In that sense, according to an experienced senior staff officer at USUN, there were two missions in New York—Andrew Young and the rest of USUN. Experienced western ambassadors at the UN expressed a similar view in my conversations with them. One of them referred to Young as an "absentee landlord" who was rarely around for western caucuses during the General Assembly.

In the effort to do his job conscientiously and still be the open, accessible man he has always been, Young tended to drive himself into periodic states of exhaustion. He would talk with visitors into the small hours of the morning, then be up at six o'clock to start a busy day. At the end of six weeks or so of this superhuman schedule, Young would become so exhausted that he sometimes disappeared for a few days to rest, incommunicado.

In an ideally constructed mission, Young's free-wheeling would be complemented by a highly-organized, experienced staff. Such was not Young's objective. He was determined to make a clean break with the past, to give USUN a new image, and to underscore that a new approach and a new policy were the order of the day. He replaced all four deputies at the ambassadorial level. Moreover, he brought in members of his congressional staff, filling slots that would otherwise have been available for career officers. Most of the new appointees were able; however, USUN was not the well-organized, highly professional mission it had been for most of its history. The drastic shakeup and new operating style upset some veteran western ambassadors, but did not hinder Young's popularity with Third World representatives; in fact, it was probably enhanced.

Young's deputy for the Security Council, Donald McHenry, has had many years of government experience. I remember McHenry, a black, as one of the most intelligent and effective State Department officials I had contact with in dealing with colonial issues at the UN. Conversations with experienced USUN officers and foreign diplomats at the UN indicate that he is highly respected for his integrity, thoroughness and rigorous analysis of issues. McHenry was blunt and direct in stating his views, to Europeans, to black Africans, to white South Africans, and even to his chief, Young.

Shortly after his arrival, Young made it clear that, in addition to several former associates, he intended to fill positions with people too long ignored by the system—women and members of the minority groups—so that the mission would have "ethnic diversity"; for obvious reasons his position was not appreciated by the existing staff.

Fortunately, Young made some exceptions. Among the senior staff holdovers from Scranton's period, the highest ranking and most influential was Ambassador Richard Petree, the senior adviser, an able Foreign Service officer with more than thirty years' experience. He had the principal responsibility for management of the political affairs staff. He also gave substantive backstopping to Young. The economic and social staff was run by Ambassador Wells; the legal staff consists of two veterans, Herbert Reis and Robert Rosenstock, who

have worked together for many years. Apparently no one was pulling it all together, as was done under most of Young's predecessors. Young himself preferred to concentrate on policy-making and communicating with the American people as well as foreign delegations, rather than the management of USUN.

Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia

We have already described Young's views on southern Africa and apartheid and his advocacy of negotiated, peaceful settlements. Now it might be well to look specifically in two areas where he was involved in negotiations looking toward independence under majority rule, Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and Namibia.

For five years after Ian Smith announced on November 11, 1965, that Rhodesia would henceforth be independent, the United States had a relatively comfortable position. It was based on emphasizing British responsibility for dealing with the white settler regime and supporting Britain at the United Nations. On October 29, two weeks before Smith's declaration, President Johnson had sent him a personal message stating that a unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) would be a tragic mistake and making it clear that the United States would support the British in opposing such an act. After Smith nonetheless declared independence unilaterally, the United States backed the British policy of "No Independence Before Majority Rule" (NIBMAR). When Britain urged selective UN Security Council sanctions against Smith in December 1966, the United States gave its full support. In May 1968 the United States again backed a British proposal, this time for comprehensive sanctions and the establishment of a committee to monitor compliance. At the same time the United States supported the British in their refusal to use military force against Smith. It was Britain, rather than the US, which took most of the heat at the United Nations. The Africans were occasionally irritated with the United States, but never so seriously as to lead them to jeopardize African-American relations. I served as US representative on the Rhodesian sanctions committee from 1968 through the summer of 1971 and was generally in the position of urging, on instructions, that sanctions enforcement be tightened. This position was popular with the Africans and the British but not with some of our western European allies, whose enforcement of the sanctions was half-hearted. Even when the United States government in November 1970 permitted Union Carbide to import 150,000 tons of Rhodesian chromite which it had allegedly paid for before mandatory sanctions became effective—a dubious case—the African reaction was relatively subdued. Evidently the earlier active American advocacy of strict enforcement of sanctions had left a temporary residue of good will.

> "Young's cultivation of good relations with the leaders of these African states during the preceding two and a half years had also helped significantly."

This residue was destroyed a year later when Congress adopted the (Harry) Byrd amendment. Attached to a military procurement bill as Section 503, the amendment read: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on and after January 1, 1972, the president may not prohibit or regulate the importation into the United States of any material determined to be strategic and critical pursuant to the provisions of this Act, if such material is the product of a country or area not listed as a Communist-dominated country or area in general headnote 3(d) of the Tariff Schedules of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202) for as long as the importation into the United States of material of the kind which is the product of such Communist-dominated countries or areas is not prohibited by any provision of law."

Although sponsors of the amendment stressed the alleged danger of becoming increasingly dependent on Soviet chrome, the language covered 71 other materials as well. Ironically, because of market factors, the percentage of US chrome imports of Soviet origin *increased* from 45 per cent in 1971, the year before the amendment became effective, to 60 per cent in 1972 and 54 per cent in 1973.

If the economic effects of the Byrd amendment were dubious, its political impact was disastrous. It put the United States in the company of South Africa, colonial Portugal and non-member Switzerland as the only acknowledged violators of the UN sanctions. It undercut the authority of the UN and gave heart to the Smith regime.

Unfortunately the Nixon administration showed little interest in either Africa or the United Nations. Although the administration's official position was against the Byrd amendment, neither Nixon nor Secretary Rogers was active in trying to persuade congressmen to oppose it. The White House was unwilling even to go on record against the amendment in the fall of 1971. When the showdown vote approached, Senator Gale McGee vainly appealed for five or six presidential telephone calls to "marginal" senators to get the Byrd amendment replaced, but to no avail.

Repeal finally came early in the Carter administration. Young, Vance and Carter gave the matter high priority. Testifying before a congressional committee hearing on February 24, 1977, Young stated: "I think we realize that had we repealed the Byrd Amendment on our first, or even second try, we probably could have avoided significant bloodshed and potential disruption to that entire area." Young noted that repeal was considered by both the black Africans and Ian Smith as a test of American sincerity and commitment to majority rule in southern Africa. He also observed that he would be president of the Security Council in March and would feel personally bolstered if Congress could act by then. In fact, it did. Thus Young's credibility with African leaders was given a substantial lift at a critical early period of his service at the United Nations.

Economic pressure against Rhodesia was increased on May 27, 1977 when the Security Council adopted a resolution expanding the scope of sanctions against the

Smith regime. The United States, having repealed the Byrd Amendment, rejoined the group of countries zealously working for strict enforcement of the sanctions and was a cosponsor of the May 27 resolution.

The Carter administration joined with the British government early in 1977 in working toward a plan for peaceful transition to majority rule. Key participants in the endeavor were Foreign Secretary David Owen and Ambassador Ivor Richard on the British side and Vance and Young on the American. The credibility Young established with the African states was a significant asset in getting their cooperation, usually tacit, but sometimes openly expressed. On September 1, 1977 the British permanent representative sent to the president of the UN Security Council "proposals for the restoration of legality in Rhodesia and the settlement of the Rhodesia problem" (Document S/12393). The proposals had been drawn up by the British government "with the full agreement of the government of the United States of America and after consulting all the parties concerned." The Anglo-American consultations had been held with leaders of all the nationalist factions, the neighboring ("Front Line") states and the Smith regime, both bilaterally and in groups.

The deteriorating situation in Rhodesia and the presentation of the Anglo-American proposals put further pressure on Ian Smith. On March 3, 1978, he announced an agreement with three African leaders in Rhodesia to bring about "majority rule on the basis of universal adult suffrage." The preamble to the agreement acknowledged the impact of sanctions and armed conflict and presented it as a means of leading to their termination. It represented certain significant concessions by Ian Smith; e.g., agreement to the principle of universal suffrage and to independence as of December 31, 1978, a sharing of power among the participating groups and a commitment that he would eventually step down. But, as Young declared in his statement to the Security Council on March 14, 1978, the Salisbury agreement was not adequate to bring about a peaceful solution. It left the real power in the hands of the white-dominated army, police and courts.

Despite Anglo-American and UN objections, Smith and his three black collaborators went ahead with the Salisbury agreement. Elections in March 1979 resulted in victory for Abel Muzorewa, who became prime minister, with Smith in the Cabinet as minister-without-portfolio. But white power remained entrenched and the fighting between the Muzorewa-Smith forces and the Mugabe and Nkomo groups continued, even intensified. No other government recognized the new regime of Zimbabwe Rhodesia and UN sanctions continued.

On August 6 the Commonwealth heads of government, meeting in Lusaka, Zambia, came to an accord aimed at "finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region." The accord "recognized . . . that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects"; accepted Britain's constitutional responsibility to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule; called for the adoption of "a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities" and for "free and fair elections properly supervised under British government authority, and with Commonwealth observers"; and set as a major objective the "cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement."

Earlier there had been hints that the new Conservative government, which came into office in the spring of 1979, might recognize the Muzorewa regime and move to end British sanctions. But concerned with possibly vehement reactions at the Commonwealth conference, which might even have led to its breakup, Prime Minister Thatcher moved cautiously. On the eve of the conference, Nigeria nationalized British shares in Nigerian oil production and marketing. Although Nigeria said the action was in protest of British oil sales to South Africa, it was also a clear warning to the Thatcher government not to lift sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

In September 1979 the British invited Muzorewa, Mugabe and Nkomo to a London meeting aimed at implementing the Commonwealth accord. Negotiations were extremely difficult, and often seemed on the brink of failure, but by December an agreement based on that accord was reached. The agreement was made possible in part by British skill and toughness; in part, by the strong desire of Muzorewa and the Rhodesian whites to see an end to the sanctions and fighting. (Young had contributed to this pressure by his energetic efforts to repeal the Byrd amendment in 1977 and his intercessions with Carter in the summer of 1979 urging the president not to yield to congressional pressure to remove the sanctions); and in part by the pressure on Nkomo and Mugabe by the neighboring African states, notably Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Botswana, whose economies were being severely damaged by the long civil war in Zimbabwe. Young's cultivation of good relations with the leaders of these African states during the preceding two and a half years had also helped significantly.

Elections in February 1980 brought a landslide victory for Mugabe, an apparent end to the civil war and the installation of an independent government in Zimbabwe based on majority rule.

Namibia

When the UN General Assembly declared in 1966 that South Africa's mandate over Southwest Africa (Namibia) had terminated, Arthur Goldberg played a leading role in negotiating the resolution, 2145 (XXI). In May 1967, however, the assembly adopted Resolution 2248 (S-IV), calling for measures to force South Africa out, and the United States became one of 30 abstainers. Goldberg argued that efforts must be made toward a peaceful solution through dialogue. Because of this and other differences of viewpoint, the United States stayed off the council for Namibia, as did France and Britain.

For almost a decade there was a standoff. South Africa refused to recognize the council and ignored the resolutions of the General Assembly. The 1974 revolution in Portugal, as a result of which an independent Angola emerged, brought a new situation to the northern border of Namibia. South Africa in-

(Continued on page 37)

Association News

TERRORISM AND FOREIGN SERVICE

The decade 1970-1979 was unprecedented for the level and ferocity of attacks on US personnel and installations overseas. Consider the following:

Murder: Fourteen US officials, including five ambassadors, were murdered in this decade—an average of one death every 260 days.
Kidnappings: Thirty-eight kidnappings for an average of one every 96 days.
Serious Injury: Thirty-two personnel wounded for an average of one serious injury every 114 days.
Terrorist events: Two hundred and eight attacks on either our people or our installations in forty-three countries for an average of one terrorist event every seventeen and one-half days.

In the diplomatic entrance of the State Department are two marble plaques maintained by the American Foreign Service Association in memory of those who have given their lives in Foreign Service. The first plaque begins in 1780 and was not filled until 1967. The second plaque which continued with 1967 is now two-thirds full. In just thirteen years we have lost almost as many people as in the first one hundred and eight years of our existence.

At this moment, 53 of our colleagues remain illegally imprisoned in Iran. Over the past twelve months more than three thousand five hundred of our dependents and employees have been evacuated from posts under emergency circumstances.

In this new decade of the '80s, we have already had two dead in Islamabad, ambassadors held hostage in Colombia and El Salvador and continuing pressure worldwide.

POST LANGUAGE TRAINING

Readers of the June issue (page 26) learned of AFSA/AID efforts to resume AID/W language training for spouses.

It has subsequently been announced by AID management that, in view of the restoration of additional training funds, AID/W language training for spouses and other dependent adults of direct-hire employees will be resumed. Our hearty congratulations to AID/PM and a resounding raspberry to whoever thought of cutting the post and AID/W language training program in the first place.

NEW TO EDBOARD

James L. Roush is an AID retiree ('78) who has continued his association with the agency through direct and indirect consulting. Jim served in USRO/Paris, Ethiopia, Cameroon, Vietnam, Guatemala (ROCAP) and Chile as well as AID/W (No. Africa, LAC, head of PBAR systems effort, evaluator with Operations Appraisal Staff). He is a graduate of the Army War College ('66) and the Federal Executive Institute ('71). Besides a continuing interest in development, he is seeking other ways to build a foundation for peace. He is a member of the board of the UN Association of the USA—Capital Division, Coordinator in No. Virginia for the Great Decisions program of the Foreign Policy Association, member of the Political Economy study group of The Churches Center for Theology and Public Policy, and founder and Executive Director of the Foundation for a Peaceful Environment Among Communities Everywhere. He has written for the *Journal* and is editor of an in-house organ in his condominium in Arlington.

PRECEPTS 1980

Following long negotiations with management, AFSA signed the precepts for this year's promotion boards on June 9. In what we believe is one of the most significant improvements over previous precepts, boards may now re-examine the files of employees not initially recommended for promotion should the number first recommended be lower than the number of opportunities available. As in 1979, boards will be informed of the number of promotion opportunities only after the first screening. AFSA is particularly concerned that there not be a repeat of the situation last year, when 158 Staff Corps promotions went unused.

There will also no longer be a set percentage identified for selection out. The bottom 10 percent of those eligible for promotion will still be low-ranked and so notified, but the boards must specifically designate individual employees for referral to the Performance Standards Board.

Among other major changes, the Zone Merit Promotion System for Class 4 and 5 officers will be abolished after this year's boards meet. Available statistical data suggest that zone merit has not had a major impact on promotion patterns, while it has exacerbated an already cumbersome review system. In another move to make Boards IV and V more manageable, each board will be divided into two independent panels—one to review political and administrative officers, and the other to review economic/commercial and consular officers. Competition will continue to be by functional category, although boards are being directed to give "due credit" to those employees who have expanded their career potential through multifunctional assignments. Similar weight is to be assigned to those who have served well at hardship posts. Language has also been added to the precepts which reflects the Department of Commerce's new export promotion responsibilities and notes the importance of continuing Foreign Service assignments in commercial work.

SURVEY RESPONSE

The AFSA survey is well underway and we are getting back questionnaires. For this first-ever, truly global survey of the Foreign Service we want a full range of opinions represented. If, by some chance, you haven't received a questionnaire please let us know. If you have, please fill it out if you haven't already done so.

KEN HILL TO ED BOARD

Ken Hill is currently assigned to the office of management operations in the department. He served previously in the bureaus of human rights and humanitarian affairs, and on the German desk in European affairs. His foreign service was at Jerusalem (1965-66), Frankfurt and Berlin as a consular officer (1966-70) and Belgrade as political officer (1973-76).

A Texan by birth, Ken was raised and educated in California. He has a BA and MA in history from Berkeley. He is also a dropout from a Baptist seminary for which he spent two years on the California desert in the Army.

Ken is married to the former Yvonne Trout, who is also from Richmond, California. The Hills have three children.

Ken is a member of the AFSA State Standing Committee and chairman of the Open Forum Working Group on Professional Concerns.

AND WASN'T ALI GREAT IN AFRICA?

Red Auerbach, *president and general manager, Boston Celtics, December 4, 1979:*

"Foreign service officers go to the Fletcher School, Georgetown, or some such place where they learn which fork to use, what to say, and how to kiss rear ends.

"I know what it's all about. Sports can change our image. I'm not so nearsighted as to believe it's everything. But if we'd flooded some of these countries with athletes instead of cocktail drinkers, it might have been a different ball game today."

—from the Spring/Summer 1980 Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University.

The joyful return of the six returnees who were harbored by the Canadians for three months, from left: Kathleen F. Stafford, Cora Amburn Lijek, Mark J. Lijek and Robert G. Anders. Joseph D. Stafford and Henry Lee Schatz not shown.

RETIREMENT: THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS

As this issue of the *Journal* goes to press, the future of the semi-annual Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) currently applied to retirement annuities is still up in the air. The reason for this is not so much a lack of agreement on the matter as it is a question of legislative procedures.

The budget committees of both the House and the Senate have agreed to cut $500 million in entitlement costs—meaning budget expenditures dictated by legislation presently on the books—of which the largest amount would be realized by limiting the COLA to one a year. The rub is that present retirement legislation calls for two COLAs annually, so this legislation would have to be amended if there is to be only one. Should a bill to accomplish this be reported out of the House Post Office and Civil Service Committee and be voted upon as a single issue, many federal employee and retirement organization representatives think that there would be a fair chance of defeating such a bill on the floor. But if the once-a-year COLA is included in a total "reconciliation package" bringing all legislative entitlements into line with the budget committees' reductions, the chance of retaining the semi-annual COLA would be much less favorable.

At this writing it is not possible to predict what will happen and when. If, however, the Congress does act to limit the COLA to one a year as is still likely, the next adjustment in retirement annuities would come in March 1981, and this adjustment would reflect the increase in the CPI(W) from December 31, 1979 to December 31, 1980.

As has been mentioned frequently in this space, AFSA is a member of the Fund for Assuring an Independent Retirement, a coalition of 23 federal employee and retiree groups organized to oppose mandatory coverage of all federal employees under Social Security. It is now apparent that Congress will not have the time this year to address this issue, even if legislation were introduced to accomplish this—which seems unlikely.

In May another retirement study group, the President's Commission on Pension Policy, issued a brief interim report. This commission was established "to examine the nation's retirement, survivor, and disability systems and develop recommendations for changes that will address current problems and meet identified goals." Its final report, scheduled to be released in February 1981, will be far reaching both in its scope and recommendations. In the interim report the commission expresses "strong sentiment to extending Social Security to all new workers who would otherwise not be covered." The commission would specifically exempt persons already retired and those eligible for immediate retirement from being affected by any changes, and it emphasizes that Social Security, if extended to all government employees, should not replace existing retirement systems but that existing systems should be modified to take Social Security benefits into account.

To sum up, with two political conventions and a national election on the agenda between now and the end of the year, it is highly unlikely that the 96th Congress will have time to consider any retirement issues other than the possible reduction in the COLA to one a year. But the betting is that it will be a different story when the 97th Congress convenes in January 1981. Demographic and fiscal pressures appear certain to make retirement, disability, and survivor income policies a high-priority national issue in the years immediately ahead. You can rely on being kept fully informed in this space as developments affecting the Foreign Service in this area begin to take form.

OFFICE OF SECURITY

AFSA has increasingly turned its attention to a part of our bargaining unit too long neglected—Security Officers. We have attempted to correct some of the administrative inequities for these underappreciated and frequently overlooked men and women, who too often seem to get zapped with the disadvantages of the Foreign Service while losing out on the plus side.

We have set up a communications system with the field offices which is just beginning to be used. We have successfully challenged SY's feudal system and unfair personnel practices that could seriously damage individual agents. We now have a security agent on the State Standing Committee. In fact, SY AFSA enthusiasts are among the most active, hard-working and responsive Foreign Service employees to work with.

We want the Security Officers to know that we are 100 percent behind them—and the troglodytes that brew up their rather unique operating rules without much reference to how the rest of the civilized world operates should take notice. SY is a real "challenge," as we say in the Foreign Service.

First Lady Rosalyn Carter greeting the six Americans sheltered by the Canadians and the families of the other hostages at the State Department.

An interview with David F. Trask, State Department historian

Foreign Service Memories and Diplomatic History

JOHN J. HARTER

The historical offices of the armed services have well-developed oral history programs, but not the Department of State, according to the State Department historian.

"An oral history program focused on career [Foreign Service] officers would be particularly useful," Dr. David F. Trask said in an interview. "This group has been neglected in all existing oral history projects, although it is just the group that may well have the most valuable historical information in their minds."

Prior to becoming the department's historian, Dr. Trask was chairman of the history department at New York State University. His published works include *The United States in the Supreme War Council* (1961), *General Tasker Howard Bliss and the "Sessions of the World," 1919* (1966), *Victory Without Peace* (1968), *World War I at Home* (1970), and *Captains and Cabinets* (1972). He also co-edited *A Bibliography of US-Latin American Relations Since 1810* (1968) and co-authored *Ordeal of World Power* (1975).

As historian he supervises a staff of 36, including 29 professional historians, who prepare and publish the American Foreign Relations Series and also undertake policy-related historical research on subjects of current interest to decision-making officials of the department.

Following are edited excerpts from the interview:

Q. To what degree do you think oral history—formal on-the-record interviews with surviving participants in diplomatic events—could and should be used to supplement the documentary record of diplomatic history?

A. There are problems with oral history, because it involves people's memories, often long after the events. Generally, the weaker and the more scattered the documentary record is, the more central oral history becomes as a supplement to other sources.

From the viewpoint of the State Department, I think an oral history program focused on career officers would be particularly useful. Cabinet level officials have been extensively interviewed by the presidential libraries and other oral history projects, such as the one at Columbia University.

But what is missing is the very extensive historical knowledge that country desk officers, ambassadors, DCMs, and political and economic counsellors acquire in the normal course of their work. This group has been neglected in all existing oral history projects, although it is just the group that may well have the most valuable historical information in their minds. They have knowledge about the actual course of negotiations, and the mood and tone of things, and the operational context in crisis situations, for example, that you normally can't get from the political appointees above them. That information would help anyone trying to get a full in-depth picture of what actually happened, and why it happened.

For example, I think future historians would find it very useful to have a record of the information and impressions the Iranian desk officer has acquired over the past two years. That might reveal more about important currents of history than would the recollections of the secretary of state about Iran.

Q. When and how would you like to see oral history interviews centering on the Foreign Service conducted?

A. I would like to see this linked to the transfer process. That is, a routine de-briefing could be arranged to mine historical information as an officer moves from one post to another. Alternatively, the department might mount a program

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to de-brief every retiring middle level or senior Foreign Service officer who wished to participate. Either way, I think this should be voluntary, and not compulsory.

Q. Do you think Foreign Service officers would like to participate in an official oral history project in the State Department?

A. Yes, I think many of them really do hope their contributions and observations will be recorded and remembered. They may be more concerned about their own role in the history of the country—and in its preservation—than any other group.

Q. Do you think the interviewees would be more candid if they could be assured that nobody would listen to the tape, at least for a few years—that it would be sealed and locked up meanwhile?

A. That might be true, within limits. My own opinion is that most of that material would be desensitized within six years. Most of the so-called "sensitive" material that is kept restricted for up to twenty years or more relates either to sources and methods of the intelligence community or to subjective comments or impressions of people who are still alive and historically active. To illustrate: we had a great deal of difficulty clearing our 1949 volume on China, which was held up a long time precisely because of "sensitive" material relating to Chairman Mao and Chou En-lai. When they died, it finally became possible to publish that volume.

Q. Would the Freedom of Information Act be a problem here? For example, if it should become publicly known that tapes of oral history interviews exist at the State Department—although intended to be confidential—could scholars seek their release under the Freedom of Information Act?

A. That could be a problem. Every official document, or any official information, can be requested, and, if requested, it should be reviewed. That doesn't mean everything will be released, but under present circumstances, the Freedom of Information Act

David F. Trask

can be applied to a document that was produced just ten minutes ago. It has not been legally clarified whether that applies to machine records.

Q. Aside from state, what other government agencies deal with post World War II diplomatic history?

A. There are several historical offices in the federal government, and altogether some 500 people do basically historical work in the Washington area. All of the armed services have very active historical offices, and they all have well-developed oral history programs. The CIA has a historical office, and so do the Department of Energy and some of the regulatory commissions.

Q. How about the economic side of foreign relations?

A. International economic issues have recently been at the very center of our preoccupation in my office, reflecting recent shifts in priorities, away from more traditional political-military aspects of foreign policy toward economic and social issues, particularly in connection with North/South relations.

For example, we are giving increased attention to the development of the foreign aid program, the changing structures that have administered external assistance, and our economic and political relationships with the Third World. Trade and the general unsettling of the international monetary system have also demanded more attention, particularly since the late 1960s and early 1970s, and, of course, energy since 1973. We are being asked to document these changes, as we move toward an integrated world economy, which some people see as the most fundamental revolution in the history of mankind.

Q. Could you give some other examples of the economic issues that you are working on?

A. I expect the setting up of the OECD, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and the forces that led to the Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations—which were major developments in international affairs in the early 1960s—will receive considerable coverage in the volumes of the Foreign Relations series documenting that period. Also, the interactions between North/South preoccupations on the one hand and East/West preoccupations on the other hand began to be obvious at that time, as reflected in such international crises as the Congo affair in 1959-61. The disparity in wealth and resources, as between the North and the South, has been a constant element in the dialogue since then.

Incidentally, I think President Kennedy's support for building the High Dam on the Volta River was an event of critical importance that hasn't yet been fully understood for what it represented. I think our series should correct and add to the record on such matters as this, which have proved to be of fundamental long-term significance. In fact, I would say that many economic developments that took place twenty-odd years ago are at the root of major policy problems that face us today.

Q. Has information relating to the CIA generally been available to you and your staff?

A. No. We think our Foreign Relations series should be the outlet for the over-all process of making and implementing US foreign policy. Insofar as the CIA and other intelligence agencies participate in that process, we think it should be documented in that series. The activities of the intelligence community—especially intelligence policies—appear to have been of great and growing importance in the foreign policy process over the past twenty years or so. It has therefore been increasingly difficult for historians to describe the over-all foreign policy process without covering intelligence questions.

We do get clearance on certain questions reflected in the Foreign Relations series, but we often encounter problems in obtaining favorable declassification decisions regarding some very significant materials. Also, we simply have no way of knowing about many developments that took place in this area. In fact, the US government simply doesn't have well thought-out and firmly established policies and procedures regarding how intelligence matters should be dealt with in official historical publications. I think there is an urgent need for the government to think this through, to ensure that our Foreign Relations series will be as comprehensive and useful to historians seeking to assess US foreign policy developments as possible.

Q. Is the CIA contribution reflected in State Department files?

A. Not all of it, by any means. The presidential libraries shed light on some of these developments.

Q. Some CIA materials are made available to government historians in other agencies to help them pinpoint their own researches—to army historians seeking to develop an authoritative history of the Vietnam War, for example—even when those materials cannot be attributed to the CIA or otherwise referred to in public documents. Does the CIA extend this kind of assistance to your office?

A. No, but we're constantly in search of CIA documentation, National Security Council documentation, and Defense Department documentation that relates to US foreign policy. We're actively exploring this whole range of questions with our colleagues at the CIA and other intelligence organizations. We believe that if we cover these matters responsibly and accurately in our series, we can limit the damage that would otherwise result from the publication of distorted accounts, unauthorized leaks, fabrications, and other sensational treatments. We believe, as the officially authorized outlet for government information relating to past foreign policy, our series is the appropriate outlet and context for this information to be publicly released.

"We found that even extremely intelligent individuals just don't remember key incidents or they don't recall them in the right order."

Obviously, we're not talking about releasing information about subjects that are still sensitive, such as specific intelligence operations in the field. The executive order covering declassification clearly precludes this, and there are explicit legal safeguards to protect particular sources and methods. We can accept and work with that. But I don't think these limitations should prevent the publication of desensitized material that is historically important and does not compromise sensitive sources and methods. I think it would help rather than threaten national security to cover this area more fully than we have to date.

Q. What do the presidential libraries do in the diplomatic area?

A. They seek to collect all the materials relating to what the president himself dealt with, in all areas, including foreign policy. We acquire important information regarding what other agencies have done that impinge on foreign policy through the presidential libraries. For example, we made a particular effort to exploit the resources of the Eisenhower Library in covering the 1953-61 period. We're just beginning to work out our strategy for exploiting the resources of the Kennedy Library for the 1961-63 period. This all began with the Truman Library, in Independence, although we had some recourse to the Roosevelt Library at Hyde Park.

In a nutshell, research in the presidential libraries is absolutely essential to our work, particularly since State Department files simply do not include all the materials that are relevant to the determination and implementation of US foreign policy.

Q. Do NSC files go to the presidential libraries?

A. Only to a degree. A lot of our information relating to NSC activity derives from our reseafch at the presidential libraries.

Q. Which of this information does not go to the presidential libraries?

A. Well, the NSC itself presumably has its own files, but the nature of these has never been made known. It's not at all clear what goes on there.

Q. How do you know about NSC files if you do not have access to them?

A. Well, through our examination of State Department documents—and materials that come to our attention from the presidential libraries and other sources—we become aware of certain NSC activities. But we haven't been able to gain direct access to NSC records or to elicit those specific documents that would trace the developments we're interested in. Given the obvious importance of the NSC in the foreign policy process, this is a serious gap in our work.

(Continued on page 44)

"The release of atomic energy constitutes a new force too revolutionary to consider in the framework of old ideas."
—Harry S. Truman.

TRUMAN AT POTSDAM: HIS SECRET DIARY

BARTON J. BERNSTEIN

On July 7, 1945, accompanied by advisers and armed with briefing papers, President Harry S. Truman departed on the *Augusta* for the Potsdam meeting with Premier Joseph Stalin and Prime Minister Winston Churchill. It was Truman's first trip abroad as president and, in fact, his first trip across the Atlantic since soldiering in World War I. "It was a wonderful crossing" on the *Augusta,* he later recalled, citing the fine band, the nightly movies, and the many ceremonies.

The conference was Truman's first meeting with Stalin and Churchill. It was an opportunity for him to assess them, to test himself, and to be tested by them. Only thirteen weeks in the presidency when the conference opened, he was anxious and uncertain. Neither his years as senator nor his months as vice-president had adequately prepared him to deal with foreign policy. Not until he became president in April, for example, had he even learned of the secret Yalta agreements or of the significance of the Manhattan Project, code name for the A-bomb project.

Despite Churchill's entreaties in the spring for an earlier meeting of the Big Three, Truman had delayed the conference, at least partly because he wanted to know the results of the A-bomb test. He arrived at Potsdam on the 15th, but not until the next evening did he receive the brief report that the test at Alamogordo had been successful. "Operated on this morning," was the message in code, "diagnosis not yet complete but results seem satisfactory and already exceed expectations." According to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, who carried the message to the president, he "kept it [and was] delighted with it."

Between July 17th and August 2, Truman, Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, General George C. Marshall, army chief of staff, and other American officials met with British and Soviet leaders to discuss the war with Japan and the shape of the peace. The meetings revealed the growing Soviet-American differences, and the issues of Eastern Europe caused grave problems. In fact, the powers could not reach any comfortable settlement on these issues. Stalin refused to accede to Truman's demand for the immediate reorganization of the Balkan governments, the inclusion of significant democratic elements, and free elections. Stalin pointed out that Russia was not meddling in Greece, a British sphere of influence, and indicated that he wanted a Soviet sphere in the Balkans. American efforts to secure free and democratic elections in Communist-dominated Poland were sidestepped with a loose agreement that elections would be held "as soon as possible."

Truman periodically insisted upon internationalization of European waterways and especially the Danube, which, he argued, would prevent future wars. Stalin, ever fearful of American penetration of Eastern Europe, retaliated by suggesting internationalization of the Suez Canal. The result, as so often

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during the conference, was to send the dispute to the newly created Council of Foreign Ministers.

The three powers reached a limited, uneasy agreement on German reparations and some other key issues. In a package deal proposed by Byrnes, the Soviets agreed to accept Italy in the UN after a peace treaty could be arranged; the United States and Great Britain agreed to set the temporary western border of Poland at the Oder-Neisse line; and the Soviets settled for less than the $10 billion in German reparations that Roosevelt had loosely promised at Yalta. The final agreement on reparations was so loose and so dependent upon undefined matters (the economic level necessary for the German peacetime economy) that it provoked bitter discord in the next year.

The American-Soviet discussions of Soviet entry into the Japanese war avoided sharp disagreements. The Soviet leaders emphasized that intervention awaited a settlement of Sino-Soviet negotiations, but entry seemed near. According to Truman, Stalin forecast entry by August 15, but a top Soviet general later told Marshall the "last half of August."

Truman's Diary

In 1978, after thirty-three years, Truman's handwritten secret diary for seven of his days at Potsdam—July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30—became available at the Truman library. It had been tucked away among the segment of his papers opened well after his death. That diary, unpublished until now, allows us to examine those critical days through a new lens.

There is an obvious but difficult set of questions: Why did he keep this brief diary? Was it for his own record, possibly to show to friends and relatives, or maybe for later publication? There is no clear answer for his Potsdam diary, nor for the few daily accounts he had made in the preceding weeks or for the more frequent but still scattered entries of later years. And there is the curious matter that the Potsdam diary contains entries for only seven days. Were there diary accounts for other days at Potsdam that got lost over the years? It is possible since Truman seems to have been relatively careless with his papers. His view of some of the other days can be pieced together from occasional letters to his mother and to associates in the United States.

At times, the diary is quite folksy in phrasing, as when he wrote about "soft soap" and "chigger bites," and his not having a "rose complexion." On a few occasions, perhaps in moments of awe, as for example when discussing a session with Stalin and Churchill on July 25, Truman referred to himself in the third person, in a very formal way, as "the U.S. President." Occasionally the diary is elliptical, as when he mentioned a conversation about Germany with General Dwight D. Eisenhower, supreme allied commander for Europe, but did not indicate the details. And frequently it revealed his thinking about key leaders (Churchill and Stalin) and about matters of central policy (especially the atomic bomb, Soviet entry into the Japanese war, and ending that war).

Not surprisingly, Truman's diary reveals a greater self-consciousness and uneasiness than his "ghosted" memoirs, published in 1955, acknowledge. Predictably, there are discrepancies, both major and minor, from the published recollections. Surprisingly, his diary discloses that he was a poor speller. Significantly, he ruminated on the ravages of war, Hitler, communism, the perils following Stalin's death, and the men around the Soviet leader. Most significantly, he emphasized the atomic bomb and it led him to new judgments about how and when the war with Japan would end.

Truman's early diary records his first meetings with Churchill and Stalin. These entries express optimism, some suspicion, and uneasy firmness. They also differ from the recollections later reported in his memoirs. In his memoirs, he claimed that he had found Churchill "very open and genuine" in their first meeting; but in his diary for the day, Truman expressed doubts, for he wrote that Churchill was delivering "hooey" and using "soft soap." In his memoirs, reporting his first assessment of Stalin, Truman wrote that he "looked me in the eye when he spoke and I felt hopeful that we could reach an agreement . . ." In his diary for July 17, after their first meeting, Truman was even more optimistic. "Stalin is honest," the president wrote.

A decidedly minor matter, though undoubtedly surprising in view of his memory for facts, is that Truman was a poor—indeed, a wretched—speller. Such words as lien, lye, cession, and situation became virtually unrecognizable in his versions. He also misspelled the names of James Forrestal, his secretary of the navy, General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the army service forces, and Lord Louis M. Mountbatten, supreme allied commander for Southeast Asia.

The first day of the diary is full of Truman's comments on war-ravaged Germany, the homeless people, the folly and evil of Hitler, the errors of the Germans, and, in summary, the devastation of war. Briefly he became philosophical, stating that "machines are ahead of morals" and "we are only termites on a planet. . . ."

In later days, he commented on the dangers of communism but noted that the "Nazis and Fascists were worse." What would happen, he mused, if Stalin suddenly died? A successor might wreck the peace. Who could succeed Stalin? the president wondered. The key men around Stalin, Truman concluded, were inadequate. Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Assistant Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky, as well as their associate, Assistant Foreign Minister Ivan Maisky, lacked sincerity or honesty.

The Atomic Bomb

Soviet entry into the war, ending that war, and, most of all, the A-bomb dominated diary. After his first meeting with Stalin, on the 17th, Truman recorded that the Soviets would enter the war on August 15. "Fini Japan," he wrote. By the next day, after meeting with Churchill, Truman shifted, "Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in."

What changed Truman's judgment in one day? Not Japan's peace feelers, but the atomic bomb. He already knew that Japan was sending out peace feelers asking the Soviets to serve as intermediaries in negotiations on rather undefined terms, so that informa-

tion did not come as a surprise when Churchill discussed it. Judging from the diary, as well as other sources, Truman concluded that the A-bomb might produce a speedy surrender. "I am sure they will [fold] when Manhattan [the A-bomb] appears over their homeland," he wrote on the 18th.

Earlier that day, Stimson had received a second, somewhat fuller report on the Alamogordo test, which he had taken promptly to the president: It indicated that the atomic explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for about 40 miles. The president "was highly delighted," Stimson noted in his own diary. "The president was evidently very greatly reinforced over the message from [Washington] and said he was very glad I had come to the meeting. . . ."

It is too much to conclude from this slender evidence that Truman conceived clearly of the A-bomb and Soviet entry as alternative ways of ending the war, but certainly the importance of Soviet entry diminished if the A-bomb might make the Japanese fold. Had he comfortably believed that *one* A-bomb would be sufficient to end the war before August 15, he would have urged his anti-inflation and reconversion agencies to step up preparations for peace and he would have spared his government the confusion of mid-August when peace unexpectedly came. He did not speed the preparations for peace at home. But he also did not push Stalin to enter the war earlier, and he took no later actions at Potsdam to hasten Soviet entry into the war. In fact, Truman seemed to follow tactics devised to delay Soviet entry into the war.

In his diary on the 18th, he said that he had "[d]ecided to tell Stalin about it [the A-bomb]." That was the earlier counsel of leading scientific advisers and of Stimson and of Byrnes, and Churchill acceded to it. But on July 24, Truman handled the matter in such an oblique way that he may have kept Stalin uninformed. After a meeting of the Big Three that day, Truman, as he later described it, "casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russia Premier showed no interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make 'good use of it against the Japanese.' " Truman had told him of a new weapon, *not* of the atomic bomb.

On July 21, Stimson received a very full, quite dramatic report on the power of the Alamogordo test. The weapon probaby exceeded the equivalent of 15,000-20,000 tons of TNT, created a crater with a diameter of 1200 feet, with a bowl 130 feet in diameter and six feet in depth, evaporated the 100-foot steel tower holding the device, knocked over a 70-foot steel tower in reinforced concrete a half mile away and "knocked flat" some scientific observers 10,000 yards from the explosion. According to Stimson, when he read this report to Byrnes and Truman on the 21st, "they were immensely pleased. The president was tremendously pepped up by it and spoke to me of it again and again when I saw him. He said it gave him an entirely new feeling of confidence. . . ."

"On the 25th, when discussing the targets in his diary, Truman implied that normal reasons had led him to agree with Stimson in exempting Kyoto."

Four days later, on the 25th, Truman summarized this Alamogordo report in his diary. In doing so, he made only minor errors—one slightly diminishing the power of the bomb and the other slightly exaggerating its power. The 100-foot tower became only 60-feet but the entire crater of 1200 feet in diameter became six feet deep.

Curiously, in view of his emphasis on the destructive power of this new man-made creation, he wrote of the A-bomb as something "discovered," not invented. His choice of words suggests a peculiar view of the Manhattan Project and America's scientific-technological achievement: it discovered the secret of nature and unlocked the atom. Such a phrasing minimized America's vast industrial apparatus devoted to the project, the efforts to devise techniques to guarantee a bomb explosion, and the actual building of the elaborate weapon. The gap between discovery and invention is, in short, the difference between learning how nature works and harnessing that knowledge in a device, in this case a bomb.

On the 25th in his diary, Truman also discussed the targeting of the bomb. Tokyo and Kyoto were unacceptable targets, he stressed. Some of Stimson's advisers had earlier proposed Tokyo, but by July they had dropped it and were recommending Kyoto, Hiroshima, Niigata, Kokura, and Nagasaki. Stimson, who had visited Kyoto nearly a quarter century before, opposed the bombing of this ancient shrine city and former capital. Earlier, when B-29s began the mass bombing of Japanese cities, he had removed Kyoto, an industrial and religious center, from the list of targets. In July, Stimson persisted, insisting that Kyoto not be on the A-bomb list. His reason was not to save lives but, rather, to preserve the shrines and thus prevent post-war Japanese enmity against the United States.

Stimson summarized his discussion with Truman on the 24th that Kyoto should be kept off the A-bomb list. According to Stimson's diary, Truman "again reiterated with the utmost emphasis his own concurring belief on that subject, and he was particularly emphatic in agreeing with my suggestion that if elimination was not done, the bitterness which would be caused by such a wanton act might make it impossible during the long post-war period to reconcile the Japanese to us in that area rather than to the Russians. It might thus, I pointed out, be the means of preventing what our policy demanded, namely a sympathetic Japan to the United States in case there should be any aggression by Russia in Manchuria."

On the 25th, when discussing the targets in his diary, Truman implied that normal reasons, not postwar diplomatic considerations, had led him to agree with Stimson in exempting Kyoto. The president also recorded that he had directed Stimson to use the bomb "on a purely military" target; "military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children."

How can we square these statements about "a purely military"

target with the choice of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the other cities for the bomb? Admittedly, the official presidential statement, drafted by others and released on August 6 after the first A-bombing, described Hiroshima as "an important Japanese army base." But it was also a large city, and the 70,000-120,000 deaths, and about the same number of injuries, were mostly among civilians. The very power of the A-bomb, about which Truman had marveled when he wrote about the disintegration of a steel tower and the knocking over of another tower a half-mile away, indicated that the weapon's impact could not be limited to a military base or even to industry.

Ever since the spring, American planners had intended to drop the A-bomb on a Japanese city, partly to kill civilians in order to intimidate the Japanese into surrender. That was a logical continuation of the mass conventional bombing of Japan, as the A-bomb Target Committee noted at its meeting of April 27: ". . . the 20th Air Force is operating primarily to laying waste all the main Japanese cities . . . with the prime purpose in mind of not leaving one stone lying on another."

When this committee, including General Leslie Groves and J. Robert Oppenheimer, met in mid-May, the members "agreed that psychological factors in target selection were of great importance. Two aspects of this are (1) obtaining the greatest psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized when publicity on it is released. In this respect Kyoto has the advantage of the people being more highly intelligent and hence better able to appreciate the significance of the weapon. Hiroshima has the advantage of such a size and with . . . nearby mountains that a large fraction of the city may be destroyed."

On May 28th the Target Committee agreed that the A-bomb should be dropped in the center of the city, when they were considering Kyoto, Hiroshima, and Niigata as targets. The industrial areas were too small and too dispersed to be suitable targets, the committee concluded.

On May 31, at the Interim Committee meeting, according to the minutes, Secretary Stimson "expressed the conclusion, on which there was general agreement that we . . . could not concentrate on a civilian area; but that we should seek to make a profound psychological impression on as many of the inhabitants as possible. At the suggestion of Dr. [James] Conant [scientific adviser and president of Harvard] the secretary agreed that the most desirable target would be a vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses." On June 21, the Interim Committee reaffirmed [this] position . . . that the weapon be used against Japan . . . on a dual target, namely, a military installation or war plant surrounded by or adjacent to homes or other buildings most susceptible to damage."

Between these two meetings of the Interim Committee, Secretary Stimson met with the president and explained that he was fearful that the air force "might have Japan so thoroughly bombed out that the new weapon would not have a fair background to show its strength." Stimson himself had been uneasy about the killing of civilians in mass conventional bombing, but under the pressures of felt exigency and the promises of new technology he had moved to endorse the use of atomic weapons against civilians.

Why then did Truman conclude that the A-bomb target was "purely military?" Had Stimson, so troubled by the carlier conventional bombing, misinformed the president when they talked of A-bomb targets? That is unlikely. Had Truman possibly *preferred* not to understand fully? That question cannot be definitely answered, but it may suggest why Truman, after the discussions with Stimson and the reports of the powerful Alamogordo test, still wrote in his diary of a "purely military" target. Possibly, in the ways that humans in crisis can accomplish, Truman had subtly deceived himself and thus avoided moral questions about the A-bomb. If so, because most other advisers had already comfortably accepted the mass bombing of civilians in warfare, no associate later challenged him on this matter.

The Edited Diary

Here is the entire transcribed diary, with occasional additions and corrections by the editor in brackets.

Berlin, July 16 [19]45

Today has been an historical one. Arrived last night from Antwerp via the President's C-54 and was driven to the movie colony district in Potsdam. The German Will Hays [America's movie czar] apparently had what is considered the best house. It was fixed up for me as President and called the Berlin White House. It is a dirty yellow and red. A ruined French chateau—architectural style ruined by German endeavor to cover up the French. They erected a couple of tombstone chimneys on each side of the porch facing the lake so they would cover up the beautiful chateau roof and tower. Make the place look like hell but purely German—just like the Kansas City Union Station.

We did not see but two German civilians on the several mile drive from the airport to the yellow "White House."

The house[,] as were all others[,] was stripped of everything by the Russians—not even a tin spoon left. The American commander[,] however being a man of ener[g]y[,] caught the Russian loot train and recovered enough furniture to make the place livable. Nothing matches. We have a two-ton German sideboard in the dining room and a French or Chippendale table and chair—maybe a mixture of both. There is a birdseye maple wardrobe and an oak chest matching the two-ton sideboard in my bedroom. It is comfortable enough all round but what a nightmare it would give an interior decorator.

To get down to today, Mr. Churchill called by phone last night and said he'd like to call—for me to set the hour. I did—for 11 A.M. this morning. He was on time to the dot. His daughter told Gen. [Harry] Vaughan [Truman's military aide] he hadn't been up so early in ten years! I'd been up for four and one half hours.

We had a most pleasant conversation. He is a most charming and a very clever person—meaning clever in the English not the Kentucky sense. He gave me a lot of

hooey about how great my country is and how he loved Roosevelt and how he intended to love me etc. etc. Well I gave him as cordial a reception as I could—being naturally (I hope) a polite and agreeable person.

I am sure we can get along if he doesn't try to give me too much soft soap. You know soft soap is made of ash hopper lie [lye] and it burns to beat hell when it gets into the eyes. It's fine for chigger bites but not so good for rose complexions. But I haven't a rose complexion.

We struck a "blow for liberty" when he left in Scotch—not the right brand for the purpose as the old V.P. Jack Garner can testify.

The photo men had a field day when he left. At 3:30 P.M. Mr. Sec [of State James F.] Byrnes, Adm. (five star) [William D.] Leahy and I left in an open car for Berlin, followed by my two aides and various and sundry secret service and military guards and preceded by a two star general in a closed car with a couple of plain-clothes men to fool em if they wanted to do any target practice of consequence on the Pres. They didn't.

We reviewed the Second Armoured Divison and tied a citation on the guidon of Co. E 17th Armoured Engr. Br[igade]. Gen Collier[,] who seemed to know his stuff[,] put us in a reconnaissance car built with side seats and no top just like a hoodlum wagon minus the top or a fire truck with seats and no hose and we drove slowly down a mile and a half of good soldiers and some millions of dollars of equipment which had amply paid its way to Berlin.

Then we went to Berlin and saw absolute ruin. Hitler's folly. He overreached himself by trying to take in too much territory. He had no morals and his people backed him up. Never did I see a more sorrowful sight, nor witness retribution to the nth degree.

The most sorrowful part of the situation is the deluded Hitlerian populace. Of course the Russians have kidnapped the able bodied and I suppose have made involuntary workmen of them. They have also looted every house left standing and have sent the loot to Russia. But Hitler did the same thing to them.

It is the Golden Rule in reverse—and it is not an uplifting sight. What a pity that the human animal is not able to put his moral thinking into practice!

We saw old men, old women, young women, children from tots to teens carrying packs [,] pushing carts, pulling carts, evidently ejected by the conquerors and carrying what they could of their belongings to nowhere in particular.

I thought of Carthage, Baalbec [Baalbek], Jerusalem, Rome, Atlanta, Peking, Babylon, Nineveh; —Scipio, Rameses II, Titus, Hermann, Sherman, Genghis Khan, Alexander, Darius the Great—but Hitler only destroyed Stalingrad—and Berlin. I hope for some sort of peace—but I fear that machines are ahead of morals by some centuries and when morals catch up perhaps there'll [be] no reason for any of it.

I hope not. but we are only termites on a planet and maybe when we bore too deeply into the planet there'll [be] a reckoning—who knows?

"I am sure they will when Manhattan appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at opportune time."

July 17 '45

Just spent a couple of hours with Stalin. Joe Davies [former American ambassador to Russia] called on [Ivan] Maisky [Assistant Foreign Minister] and made the date last night for noon today. Promptly a few minutes before twelve I looked up from the desk and there stood Stalin in the doorway. I got to my feet and advanced to meet him. He put out his hand and smiled. I did the same [and] we shook. I greeted Molotov and the interpreter and we sat down. After the usual polite remarks we got down to business. I told Stalin that I am no diplomat but usually said yes or no to questions after hearing all the argument. It pleased him. I asked him if he had the agenda for the meeting. He said he had and that he had some more questions to present. I told him to fire away. He did and it is dynamite—but I have some dynamite too which I am not exploding now. He wants to fire Franco [Spain's dictator], to which I wouldn't object and divide up the Italian colonies and other mandates, some no doubt that the British have. Then he got on the Chinese situation [and] told us what agreements had been reached and what was in abeyance. Most of the big points are settled. He'll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about. We had lunch[,] talked socially[,] put on a real show drinking toasts to everyone[,] then had pictures made in the backyard. I can deal with Stalin. He is honest—but smart as hell.

July 18 [19]45

Ate breakfast with nephew Harry, a sergeant in the Field Artillery. He is a good soldier and a nice boy. They took him off *Queen Elizabeth* at Glasco [Glasgow Harbor] and flew him here. Sending him home Friday. Went to lunch with P.M. [Prime Minister Churchill] at 1:30 [and] walked around to British Hqrs. Met at the gate by Mr. Churchill. Guard of honor drawn up. Fine body of men Scottish guards. Band played Star Spangled Banner. Inspected Guard and went in for lunch. P.M. & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan [A-bomb] (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor [actually from the Foreign Secretary] asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold before Russia comes in.

I am sure they will when Manhattan [A-bomb] appears over their homeland. I shall inform Stalin about it at opportune time. Stalin's luncheon was a most satisfactory meeting. I invited him to come to the U.S. Told him I'd send the Battleship *Missouri* for him if he'd come. He said he wanted to cooperate with the U.S. in peace as we had cooperated in war but it would be harder. Said he was grossly misunderstood in U.S. and I was misunderstood in Russia. I told him that we each could help to remedy that situation in our home countries and that I intended to try with all I

had to do my part at home. He gave me a most cordial smile and said he would do as much in Russia.

We then went to the conference and it was my job to present the Ministers proposed agenda. There were three proposals [on peace machinery, a Control Commission for Germany, and the Polish question] and I banged them through in short order, much to the surprise of Mr. Churchill. Stalin was very much pleased. Churchill was too after he had recovered. I'm not going to stay around this terrible place all summer just to listen to speeches. I'll go home to the Senate for that.

July 20 [19]45

Jim Blair now Lt. Col. came in for breakfast. Harry [Truman's nephew] left for Paris and N.Y. Sure hated to see him go. Discussed German situation with Jim. He had been in command of clean up detail which prepared for the American occupation, especially for our conference delegation. Said it was the filthiest place imaginable. No sanitary arrangements whatever. Toilets all full and all stopped up. Basements used as outdoor toilets. Said the sewer system evidently hadn't worked for months. Same all over town. Said Germans are sore and sullen. That we would not treat them rough enough. Russians treated 'em too rough and too kindly. Anyway it's a hell of a mess any way it's taken.

Saw Gen Omar Bradley about taking over the Vets. bureau [Veterans Administration]. Will take over Aug. 15th. Talked to Gen. [Dwight D.] Eisenhower about government of Germany along same lines as I'd talked to Gen. [Lucius D.] Clay [America's deputy military governor in Germany]. Got a concrete program to present.

Raised a flag over our area in Berlin. It is the flag raised in Rome, North Africa and Paris. Flag was on the White House when Pearl Harbor happened. Will be raised over Tokyo.

Uncle Joe [Stalin] looked drawn and tired today and the P.M. seemed lost. I told 'em U.S. had ceased to give away its assets without returns.

July 25 1945

We met at 11 A.M. today. That is Stalin, Churchill and the U.S. president. But I had a most important session with Lord [Louis M.] Mountbatten and General [George C.] Marshall [army chief of staff] before that. We have discovered the most terrible bomb [the A-bomb] in the history of the world. It may be the fire destruction prophesied in the Euphrates Valley Era, after Noah and his fabulous Ark.

Anyway we think we have found the way to cause a disintegration of the atom. An experiment in the New Mexican desert [at Alamogordo on July 16th] was startling—to put it mildly. Thirteen pounds of the explosive caused the complete disintegration of a steel tower 60 feet high, created a crater 6 feet deep and 1200 feet in diameter, knocked over a steel tower ½ mile away and knocked down men 10,000 yards away. The explosion was visible for more than 200 miles and audible for 40 miles and more.

The weapon is to be used against Japan between now and August 10th. I have told the Sec. of War Mr [Henry L.] Stimson to use it so that military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children. Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old Capital [Kyoto] or the new [Tokyo].

He & I are in accord. The target will be a purely military one and we will issue a warning statement [the Potsdam Declaration on the 26th] asking the Japs to surrender and save lives. I'm sure they will not do that, but we will have given them the chance. It is certainly a good thing for the world that Hitler's crowd or Stalin's did not discover this atomic bomb. It seems to be the most terrible thing ever discovered, but it can be made the most useful.

At 10:15 I had Gen. Marshall come in and discuss with me the tactical and political situation. He is a level-headed man—so is Mountbatten.

At the Conference Poland and the Bolsheviki land grab came up. Russia helped herself to a slice of Poland and gave Poland a nice slice of Germany taking also a good slice of East Prussia for herself. Poland has moved in up to the Oder and the west Neisse, taking Stettin and Silesia as a fact accomplished. My position is that according to commitments made at Yalta by my predecessor Germany was to be divided into four occupation zones, one each for Britain, Russia and France and the U.S. If Russia chooses to allow Poland to occupy a part of her zone I am agreeable but title to territory cannot and will not be settled here. For the fourth time I restated my position and explained that territorial cessions had to be made by treaty and ratified by the Senate.

We discussed preparations and movement of populations from East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Austria[,] Italy and elsewhere. Churchill said Maisky had so defined war booty as to includ[e] the German fleet and Merchant Marine. It was a bombshell and sort of paralyzed the Russkies, but it has a lot of merit.

July 26, 1945

Last night talked to Gen [Brehon B.] Somerville [Somervell, commanding general of the army service forces] on time for universal military training. Regular Army wants a straight year. I am very sure it cannot be put into effect. Talked to [Jefferson] McCaffery [American ambassador to France] about France. He is scared stiff of Communism, the Russian variety which isn't communism at all but just police, government pure and simple. A few top hands just take clubs, pistols and concentration camps and rule the people on the lower levels.

The Communist Party in Moscow is no different in its methods and actions toward the common man than were the Czar and the Russian Noblemen (so called: they were anything but noble.) Nazis and Fascists were worse. It seems that Sweden, Norway, Denmark and perhaps Switzerland have the only real peoples government on the Continent of Europe. But the rest are a bad lot from the standpoint of the people who do not believe in tyran[n]y.

July 30, 1945

Sent Capt. [James] Vardaman [naval aide] to ship at Portsmouth, Eng. to get ready for departure to US some day soon. Secretary of

(Continued on page 36)

Bookshelf

Memoir of a First-Class Diplomat

FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE: *Forty Years' Experiences of a Career Diplomat, by John Moors Cabot. School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, $8.95.*

Few American practitioners have shown Jack Cabot's intellectual girth and courage. He was a thorough, thoughtful, conscientious, dynamic officer who did not hesitate to express his views and to keep plugging away at what he considered right irrespective of the unpopularity of his convictions. He was one of the few Foreign Service officers who pressed for the defense of badgered China Hands during the McCarthy period. His Cabot and Harvard connections did not hurt him, but he did not hesitate to put his neck on the block and at least twice considered resigning.

He also displayed an imaginative grasp of modern diplomacy. Early perceiving the impact upon public opinion and intergovernmental relations of newspaper reporting in foreign affairs, he conceived the Maria Moors Cabot prizes which for more than forty years have been awarded to outstanding journalists of Latin America, the United States and Canada. Concluding that speeches are of minimal usefulness, he took to the expedient of conducting question-and-answer meetings in his embassies and elsewhere in host countries so as to achieve direct, no-holds-barred exchanges of views and information. These not only defused a lot of student, socialist, communist and other nonsense about the United States but gave Cabot and his embassies much information, clues to public opinion and perspectives which they could not otherwise have obtained. It was a happy technique which he got away with even in Warsaw.

The insights into diplomacy and diplomats which Cabot's memoirs provide are many and interesting. Among them are those concerning Spruille Braden, under whom he served in Argentina. Braden was a political appointee and skilled diplomatic operator who overreached himself, forgetting the admonition *pas trop de zèle*. As is the case of all politics, diplomacy is something in which the practitioner's reach should never exceed his grasp, no matter what's a heaven for.

Interesting also are Cabot's recollections of Robert Kennedy's visit to Warsaw, in which an American politician is shown at his publicity-craving, crowd-lusting worst. What wounds self-seeking and arrogant politicans can inflict upon their country!

Cabot rightly captions his memoirs *First Line of Defense.* Too many of us fail to conceptualize diplomacy in terms of national defense, including the all-knowing-but-still-woefully-benighted Office of Management and Budget and also, incredibly, the department's representatives who argue its appropriation needs before OMB and congressional committees. Secretary Cyrus Vance demonstrated he shared the general obliviousness of the national defense role of our diplomatic establishment when he got off on his ethnic representation binge. In diplomacy, as in athletics, who cares who the players are as long as there is no discrimination and the team wins? Isn't the best possible defense of our national interests our primary objective? Are the facts that Cabot is white and Anglo-Saxon, came from the Atlantic seaboard and graduated from one of the Ivy League universities anything other than tangential? Isn't the important fact that he had what modern diplomacy takes? In a word, isn't what we need Moors Cabots?

—SMITH SIMPSON

"He that runs may read"

A RUNNER'S GUIDE TO EUROPE, *by Aden Hayes and Jere Van Dyk. Penguin Books, $5.95.*

This is a welcome addition to the growing store of guides for runners trying out new places. However, the Foreign Service runner assigned east of the Oder-Neisse will lament the fact that the book deals only with western Europe. It would have been good, for example, to have at least a page on Prague, to include the up-and-down 5 km. course at the Sarka stream valley out toward the airport, and the Kunratice forest where Prague's biggest cross-country race (sometimes with FSO participation) takes place each November. In Western Europe the book covers 24 major cities; one could have wished for twice as many, and a terser style could have fitted them in in roughly the same number of pages. As regards the cities covered, though, the directions seem precise and the descriptions useful. One magnificent runningplace is missing from the section on Rome: Piazza Navona. True, it is good for running only at dawn, before the locals and the tourists flood the place, but what a grand place it is to run in at that time: Domitian's old stadium, built in fact for foot-races, two thousand years ago. Again, as regards Rome, one wonders why the authors did not include a description of running to the top of the Janiculum Hill, which offers a grand view of the city, instead of just describing the Villa Doria Pamphilii behind the Janiculum. One senses that the authors are flat-country runners and not hill-climbers. Otherwise they would have hardly counseled walking up the Spanish Steps, an easy slope for any runner. But these are minor points. This is all in all a very useful book for American runners visiting European cities. Incidentally, the American runner in Europe will be pleased to see that there, as here, he or she is taking part in an increasingly popular pastime.

—PETER BRIDGES

More Popular than Jeans

INFORMATION MOSCOW, *The Dime's Group, Inc., $11.95.*

At $11.95, *Information Moscow* may well be a more portable and more popular seller on the Moscow black market than a new pair of blue jeans. The relentless bureaucrats of the Soviet Union seem to keep telephone numbers a state secret, but this book blows the cover of Soviet government agencies, trade and tourist facilities, banks, transportation companies, and the diplomatic corps by revealing names, addresses, phone numbers, maps, and by giving thousands of tips from how to preserve your windshield wipers (remove them from the car whenever you leave it unattended) to antidotes for the overly enthusiastic vodka consumer.

This is the one to buy, if you'll be living, working, or doing business in Moscow.

—KAREN FOSTER

TRUMAN AT POSTDAM: HIS SECRET DIARY

from page 34

Navy Jas [James] For[r]estal came to breakfast with me and we discussed universal military service after the war and navy policy on officer training etc. Gen Eisenhower and son were also at breakfast with us. His boy is a nice fellow. Adm [Edward L.] Cochran[e] and several other naval officers were present.

Conference is delayed. Stalin and Molotov were to call on me yesterday to discuss Polish question and Reparations. Molotov came but no Stalin. Said he was sick. No big three meeting yesterday and none today as a result of Stalin's indisposition. Sent him a note expressing regret at his illness. Sent Churchill a note of consolation, telling him we regretted his failure to return [after the Labor Party victory] and wishing him a long and happy life.

If Stalin should suddenly cash in it would be the end of the original Big Three. First Roosevelt by death, then Churchill by political failure and then Stalin. I am wondering what would happen to Russia and central Europe if Joe suddenly passed out. If some demagogue on horseback gained control of the efficient Russian military machine, he could play havoc with European peace for a while. I also wonder if there is a man with the necessary strength and following to step into Stalin's place and maintain peace and solidarity at home. It isn't customary for dictators to train leaders to follow them in power. I've seen no one at this Conference in the Russian line up who can do the job. Molotov is not able to do it. He lacks sincerity. Vishinsky same thing and Maisky is short on honesty. Well we shall see what we shall see. Uncle Joe's pretty tough mentally and physically but there is an end to every man and we can't help but speculate.

We are at an impasse on Poland and its West Neisse to the Czechoslovakian border. Just a unilateral arrangement without so much as a by your leave. I don't like it. Roosevelt let Maisky mention twenty billions as reparations [from Germany]—half for Russia and half for everybody else. Experts say no such figure is available.

I've made it plain that the United States of America does not intend to pay reparations this time [as after World War I]. I want the German war industry machine completely dismantled and [as] far as U.S. is concerned the other allies can divide it up on any basis they choose. Food and other necessities we send into the restored countries and Germany must be first lein [lien] on export[s] before reparation[s]. If Russian[s] strip country and carry off population of course there'll be no reparations.

I have offered a waterway program [for Europe] and a suggestion for free intercourse between Central European nations [on the Danube] which will help keep future peace. Our only hope for good from the European War is restored prosperity to Europe and future trade with them. It is a sick situation at best.

ANDREW YOUNG
from page 22

tervened unsuccessfully in Angola on the side of Jonas Savimbi against the Soviet- and Cuban-supported forces of Agostinho Neto, which emerged triumphant. The Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), which had been waging a political and guerrilla campaign for control of Namibia, now had a friendly neighbor country as a base as well as the support of the OAU, the Council for Namibia and the General Assembly.

Faced with this new situation, South Africa finally began to take steps looking toward ending its mandate. In September 1975, talks were initiated with black leaders inside Namibia (but not with SWAPO) leading to a constitutional conference which then issued a statement fixing December 31, 1978, as the date for Namibia's independence. Two days later the UN Council for Namibia rejected the proposals in the statement as ambiguous, equivocal and totally lacking in legitimacy. SWAPO's leader, Sam Nujoma, denounced the constitutional talks in Namibia, which he charged were being carried out with "puppet chiefs," and declared that SWAPO would go on with its struggle for liberation.

In December 1976 the General Assembly adopted resolutions denouncing South Africa for its continued occupation of Namibia and for organizing the constitutional talks in Namibia. It accorded SWAPO observer status in the assembly and at all conferences convened under UN auspices.

Young made little effort to change US positions on General Assembly resolutions on Namibia at the 32nd session, his first, nor did he try to negotiate compromise language. Instead, he concentrated throughout 1977 on private discussions of the core issues involved in arriving at a peaceful transition to independence. Characteristically, he was more concerned with a sense of feeling than with words. He started, soon after his arrival at the United Nations, by inviting some key African and other non-aligned representatives to a series of early morning breakfasts. His first objective was to establish credibility. Then he asked them to think, not in terms of resolutions, but about a serious undertaking to bring genuine and early independence to Namibia.

The African representatives said in private what they could not state publicly—that it was necessary to enter into some kind of discussions with the South African government, but it must be done covertly.

After talking with Vance and Carter, Young asked the other four western members of the council—Britain, Canada, France and the Federal Republic of Germany—to form a contact group, which has come to be known informally around the UN as the "Gang of Five."

In January 1978 the first draft of a proposal was prepared, mainly by Donald McHenry of USUN and Gerald Helman of IO. The key elements in the proposal are the provisions for free elections for a constituent assembly for the whole of Namibia as one political entity,

with appropriate United Nations supervision and control. Balloting is to be secret and all adults will be eligible to vote, with provision for those who cannot read or write. Before the elections a UN special representative is to assure that all discriminatory laws and regulations are eliminated and political prisoners freed and that all refugees who wish to return have an opportunity to do so. There is also to be a cease-fire and a phased withdrawal from Namibia of all but 1500 South African troops within twelve weeks prior to the elections, as well as the demobilization of all "citizen forces, commandos and ethnic forces." The remaining South African forces would be restricted to one or two bases and would be withdrawn entirely after certification of the election. The UN special representative is to be assisted by a transition assistance group (UNTAG), consisting of a civilian team and a peacekeeping force.

This proposal was tentatively accepted by the government of South Africa on April 25, 1978. Speaking to the General Assembly three days later, SWAPO President Sam Nujoma expressed a conditional acceptance, depending on certain clarifications and additional conditions. The main problem, however, was his insistence that the Walvis Bay enclave, which had never been part of the mandate, was part of Namibia and essential to its territorial integrity. It is the only deepwater port accessible to Namibia.

The five western governments had omitted any mention of Walvis Bay because they saw no way of settling that difficult question in the context of the present negotiations but considered that this question would be subject to discussion between the South African government and the elected government of Namibia. After further meetings of the "Gang of Five" with Nujoma, SWAPO also accepted their proposals; these formed the basis of Security Council Resolution 431, adopted July 27, 1978. At the same meeting the council adopted Resolution 432 in which it declares that "the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia must be assured through the reintegration of Walvis Bay within its territory" and that the council "will remain seized of the matter until Walvis Bay is fully integrated into Namibia." The five western members of the council voted for both resolutions.

Secretary Vance, speaking for the United States, said that the west supported the second resolution, recognizing that there were geographical, political, social and administrative arguments favoring its being unified with Namibia. But he balanced this with an interpretation intended to mollify South Africa, saying that there was no prejudgment of legal issues, no intention to "coerce," and that in calling for steps toward "reintegration," direct negotiations between the parties were being suggested.

Yet, despite misgivings about the second resolution, the South Africans have since indicated that they would go along with UN procedures under resolution 431—essentially the western plan which they had accepted in April 1978. At the UN the agreement was consid-

ered to have justified the African policy of Vance, Young and McHenry and was a notable achievement made possible by skillful diplomacy rather than bluster. Unfortunately, implementation has been delayed by South Africa's stalling tactics.

A critical factor in gaining SWAPO's acquiescence to the western proposals was the attitude of Angola. Here Young and McHenry did a commendable job of building channels of communication to a government with which the US has no official diplomatic relations. One result was quiet Angolan work with SWAPO, persuading its leaders to go along with the western plan. Another was an assurance to McHenry that the Angolan government would try to prevent any recurrence of attacks on Zaire's Shaba province by rebels living in Angola, such as occurred in May 1978 and a year earlier. In fact, there have been repeated contacts with Angolans at the UN, including a meeting between Vance, Young and the Angolan foreign minister when Vance attended the UN disarmanent session in June 1978.

Open Mouth Diplomacy Again

Just as Young's work on African issues was bearing such important fruit, he caused a furor by another inept and inopportune statement to a reporter for *Le Matin* on July 12, 1978. The reporter brought up the trials of the Soviet dissidents. With feelings running very high in the United States, Young told the reporter that "there are hundreds, perhaps thousands of political prisoners in the United States," apparently alluding to poor blacks. He noted that there were "likely to be tens of thousands" of political prisoners in the USSR and that there is nobody in prison in the US for criticizing the government or "for writing a style of literature or for having a monitoring system of our human rights." Despite these nuances, the statement was a major blunder and an embarrassment to the president. Carter let it be known publicly that he had phoned Young and told him he was "very unhappy about his choice of words and several of the statements" made that week—the first public rebuke. Secretary Vance had already expressed his displeasure to Young. Young himself, a day after his gaffe, issued the following press statement (July 15, 1979). "Let me assure you that I am fully in accord with the strong statements condemning the persecution of Soviet dissidents issued by President Carter and Secretary Vance and have actively supported the movement for universal human rights and freedoms and especially the cause of Soviet Jewry from my earliest days in the US Congress.

"Nor have I ever equated the status of political freedom in the United States with that in the Soviet Union. I know of no instance in the United States where persons have received penalties for monitoring our government's position on civil or human rights."

Young's blunder also brought forth denunciations by congressmen, especially conservative whites, some of whom called for his impeachment. But this call was not taken seriously and President

Carter, even in rebuking Young, had made his confidence clear. When asked whether Young had offered to resign, White House Press Secretary Jody Powell said: "I can say with assurance that if there had been an offer, the president wouldn't have accepted it." Even so, Young appeared chastened for some time thereafter.

When I interviewed Young in July 1979 he defended his "political prisoners" remarks on the grounds that they were designed to help Shcharansky and other Soviet dissidents. He said he had been working through private channels to prevent or mitigate Shcharansky's sentencing. He believed that the Soviets were likely to ignore public criticism by the United States but might be influenced by leftist European criticism of the trial. By acknowledging that the US, too, had sometimes transgressed, he had hoped to win support for Shcharansky and other dissidents from European leftists who were also critical of the United States.

Seven months later Young slipped again. Interviewed on January 7, 1979, he said that the PLO's relationship to the UN "has made it possible for there to be some moderating influences present in the whole Palestinian equation. The people who are representing the PLO at the UN are very skilled politicians and very intelligent, decent human beings." In the 1960s I could have said the same about many South African delegates I met at the UN but I would have considered it insensitive toward the American black community to go public with such observations.

Young's comments alarmed Jewish organizations. The day after his interview appeared, the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations charged that his remarks appeared to condone the philosophy and tactics of the PLO, which is characterized as a terrorist organization. His remarks were especially unfortunate and ill-timed, coming at a moment when delicate peace negotiations were under way between Egypt and Israel—negotiations in which Young was not involved.

The dam finally broke in August 1979 when it was revealed that Young had on July 26 held an unauthorized, private meeting with the PLO representative at the United Nations. He did not report the meeting to Carter or Vance (or through official channels) and the revelation caused them serious embarrassment. Moreover, he first described the meeting as accidental but later conceded that it had been prearranged. His purpose, to arrange postponement of Security Council consideration of a resolution that the US would have vetoed, can hardly be faulted, but the meeting was in contradiction of US promises to Israel. Public revelation of it caused serious problems for US efforts to further Middle East peace negotiations. Carter, having changed two able Cabinet officers a month earlier because he wanted "team players," would have found it difficult to explain retention of Young. The Senate majority leader, many other prominent politicians and many public groups demanded his resignation. And Young himself, who believes

in communication as a way of tackling problems—he met with Ku Klux Klan leaders in the South during the civil rights struggle—was unwilling to go along with the policy of no PLO contacts to which his government was publicly committed. Thus, his resignation was inevitable.

Young's resignation aroused a furor among American black organizations. His importance as a symbol to the black community had been emphasized by Benjamin Hooks, executive director of the NAACP, who in 1978 observed: "No black person has ever had such a forum (especially with the backing of a sympathetic and supportive president) for advocating policies on Africa that challenge white minority rule and oppressive domination." After Young's resignation the leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference had lunch with the PLO representative at the UN, then issued a press statement endorsing human rights for the Palestinians, including the right of self-determination. Although neither Israel nor the leaders of American Jewish organizations pressed for Young's resignation—many, in fact, were his old comrades from the civil rights struggles of the '60s—the incident sparked latent hostilities between black and Jewish Americans.

Young's performance merits a mixed review. His habit of talking to reporters off the top of his head often embarrassed the administration and irritated friendly governments. His frequent public appearances all around the country helped to promote understanding of the United Nations, but they involved such prolonged absences that other western ambassadors at the UN felt he was too often not available for consultation and caucuses. Also, USUN was not as well organized as it had been under chiefs like Lodge, Goldberg and Scranton. He is a man of ideas rather than of organization, who appeared to be bored with the day-to-day slogging that characterizes so much of the UN's work.

Yet, all things considered, he served US interests well. His personal charm, quickness of mind, stamina and ability to communicate were important assets, as was his warm relationship with Carter and Vance, who shared and supported his views on African policy. He had outstandingly good relations with the Africans and other Third World representatives. While Scranton started the improvement of US relations with the Third World, after a decade of serious deterioration, Young succeeded in this regard as no representative had since Adlai Stevenson.

Young must also be given credit for his dedication to working for peaceful transition of power in Zimbabwe (Rhodesia) and Namibia. Fighting has ended in Zimbabwe. It is still far from certain that negotiations on Namibia will succeed. What is certain is that Young's efforts have improved such prospects from what might otherwise have been hopeless.

Given the new importance of the Third World to the United States politically, economically and strategically, these were no small achievements.

EVACUATION FROM N'DJAMENA

from page 16

the barracks, too exhausted to care.

Early on the morning of Monday, March 24th, the far-off sound of shooting could still be heard in N'Djamena. On the base, it was partially drowned out by a persistent French voice on a loud speaker urging evacuees to prepare for their departure by air or by road. At the same time, breakfast was being served in a nearby mess hall on long tables laden with fruit juice, butter, preserves, coffee and *pain de guerre*, heavy biscuits in lieu of the usual bread from the *Grands Moulins* which had cost a French soldier his life three days earlier. The instant coffee was made in round metal bowls into which hot water was ladled from a huge kettle in the center of the mess hall floor.

After breakfast, American embassy personnel gathered near their vehicles, having decided who would depart that day by air and who would join one of the French auto caravans departing hourly throughout the morning. The trip by car was made possible over a road behind the base, hastily constructed by the French military, which led to a protected crossing on the Chari River. Here a ferry waited to carry vehicles and passengers to the safety of Cameroon on the opposite shore. Those who decided to drive did so mostly to take baggage, animals or simply to avoid abandoning their vehicles. The cars were divided into groups, guided to the gas pumps where their tanks were "topped off" without charge, and directed in a convoy toward the ferry and freedom. In Cameroon, they would drive to the small town of Marua and eventually to Yaounde or Douala. The majority of Americans departed by this route, including the defense attaché who drove the official embassy car to Yaounde.

Those who left by air had minimum luggage with them and were interested in returning by the most direct route to the United States. Except for several helicopters which had been fired upon, no flights had taken place since the fighting began. President Goukouni, whose forces controlled the area of the airport, now agreed to withhold fire against flights scheduled to leave on Monday afternoon and later.

The ambassador and his wife, accompanied by the DCM and the administrative officer, departed for Douala at one o'clock that afternoon (March 24) on the first French military transport to leave. On the tarmac of the airstrip stood a French Transall. Beside it, a mountain of luggage gradually disappeared into the yawning tail section together with 85 refugee passengers, including two wounded French priests. Inside, canvas bucket seats lined each side of the cavernous body and a row of similar seats, back to back, ran through the middle section of the plane.

The passengers had covered the last mile from the camp to the plane on foot in the mid-day heat—over 100°. Once aboard, the military crew offered their guests an occasional bottle of water that was handed from passenger to passenger up and down the banks of seats. The DCM found himself sitting beside a woman with a Siamese cat which chose to share

his seat. A Dutchman broke out a can of Heineken's beer and offered a drink to others. A wounded priest, lying on an elevated litter, gestured weakly for something to drink. Faces empty of expression, people sat silently in their seats, covered with dust and sweat, still unconvinced of ultimate deliverance.

Since there were no side windows in the plane, it was not possible to tell when the aircraft left the ground. But once in the air, though a few moments of flight over Chad remained, a spirit of optimism swept through the aircraft. Cool air poured in through vents in the sides of the plane. A Frenchman wrapped his dachshund in his sweater. A woman surreptitiously removed an undergarment to warm her cat. A mother gave her baby a drink of fruit juice, and the bottles of water continued to circulate from mouth to mouth up and down the rows of seats.

There was, for Americans aboard the Transall, at last a moment to reflect on the events of the past three days. The most immediate emotion was of gratitude and admiration for the assistance rendered to Americans and other foreigners by the French. Ambassador Marcel Beaux, who remained in the French embassy with his staff and others (including Madame Beaux) had shown great courage, strength and sensitivity in an extremely difficult situation. The French military had been hospitable, competent and courteous in their evacuation of hundreds of civilians. In recognition of Americans present, some of the Fench officers had sung "It's a Long, Long Way to Tipperary" at dinner the previous evening. And when, upon leaving, the American ambassador telephoned to thank the French Embassy for all the assistance rendered, the French official on hand, ever courteous, replied simply and gravely: "Nous étions trés contents de pouvoir vous être utiles."

As the plane proceeded steadily on its course toward Douala, there was time also to reflect on the conduct of Americans during the days of conflict. Not one had failed to respond with courage, restraint, patience and, when the need arose, with exceptional bravery.

The dust and heat of N'Djamena were gone—the sharp sound of machine gun fire, the burst of mortars, the risk of direct hits, the fear of having to remain in the beleaguered town, of running out of water, electricity and food; for those on the plane such concerns now vanished.

But behind in the shattered city were tens of thousands of Chadians, kind and tolerant people whom foreigners who lived in Chad soon came to admire. Any jubilation that might have been felt on the departing plane was dimmed by the staggering tragedy just witnessed in N'Djamena. The Chadians in pursuit of their own vision of freedom, justice and a place in the world, had run afoul of conflicting powers, cultures and a ferocious civil war. For the people on the plane, the war was over; for the long-suffering people of Chad the battle had only begun. Three weeks later, when this account was written, N'Djamena lay in ruins, at least 80,000 Chadians had fled across the Chari River to Cameroon and fighting continued in the stricken city.

FOREIGN SERVICE MEMORIES AND DIPLOMATIC HISTORY
from page 28

Incidentally, we recently invited some prominent individuals who played important roles in the foreign policy process a few years ago to help us to fill in some of the gaps in our reconstruction of NSC operations. We found that even extremely intelligent individuals like Robert Bowie and Bromley Smith, who were centrally involved in these developments, just don't remember key incidents, or they don't recall them in the right order. They recognize that themselves. Still such talks help us, because when we hear of matters we were previously unaware of, we can check other sources to determine the accuracy of recollections. But how much better it would have been if we could have the record of a detailed de-briefing of Bromley Smith in 1961, say, or 1965 . . .

Q. If you solve the NSC problem, would you solve the CIA problem we discussed earlier?

A. Well, I'm not so sure of that, because when we talk about the NSC we talk about the highest levels of policy. The NSC records would certainly help to trace intelligence policy, and its influence on state policy—and vice versa. The involvement of the NSC in foreign policy varies from administration to administration, so it seems logical to presume that the NSC records would be more important for some administrations than for others. For example, they would probably reveal more for the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations than for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Q. This would appear to be an area in which the oral history approach might make a large contribution . . .

A. There's no doubt that personal recollections of key participants in these developments would be interesting to historians, especially given the constraints on the publication of documents. And we know that documentary evidence is likely to be thinner in this area than in any other area of public interest, for obvious reasons. But given present budgetary constraints, I don't believe we will be able to get the resources that would be required to mount the kind of program we have been discussing during the near future.

Interviewer's note: Vast resources are poured into oral history projects in the United States—big ones and small ones, exotic ones and arid, some conducted by professionally trained historians and others by amateurs with an ax to grind. Many communities across the country have attracted patrons who subsidize systematic programs to preserve extant memories of their local heroes. The military history of the Vietnam War is being documented through recorded interviews with those who were there—but not the parallel political and diplomatic chain of events.

Even in a period of austere budgets, it is difficult to understand why the State Department has not urged the Congress to authorize at least an experimental Oral History Program.

MIDTERM REPORT

from page 9

A new professional manager for the Foreign Service Club has been engaged—operating under firm instructions that the club must carry its own weight. We have become convinced that professional staff is the backbone of our organization for continuity and strength and we will be placing high priority on its development in the coming year.

Membership has held steady at 6000 or 40 per cent of those eligible. The association is delivering on a broad front for those we represent.

We will be pressing with increasing vigor to gain the support of those who are not contributing to the collective effort on their behalf. We want your help in convincing those who are taking a free ride to join up and start paying their fair share to support the association's efforts on behalf of the collective interests of the service.

Trade Reorganization: We failed to stop the congressional and executive branch momentum for trade reorganization. We have, however, had considerable success in mitigating its worst features and continue to be actively engaged with management both in State and Commerce as a systematic effort is made to build a foreign commercial service utilizing many of our people and the authorities and standards of the Foreign Service Act. We also have established regular liaison with Commercial Officers Overseas—the organization of concerned officers in Commerce.

Retired Interests: Elsewhere in the *Journal* we report on the latest association efforts with FAIR (Fund for Assuring an Independent Retirement) aimed at protection pension rights. Our retired representatives have fostered close collaboration with Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired and the association once again made a major effort to assure the success of Foreign Service Day. The association is especially proud of its role in bringing active and retired members together in continuing dialogue on how best to foster the improvement of an institution clearly able to advance US foreign policy.

Communications with Members: We have prepared more communications and held more meetings than ever before but this is still our greatest problem and weakest link. Messages, especially in Washington but also overseas, are frequently not distributed. While keypeople and AFSA Reps are very active in some areas, in others they are unknown to members. As additional resources become available the board is exploring both the purchase of additional reproduction equipment and the hiring of a full-time person to handle communications with members. If your bureau at post does not have a AFSA representative, please volunteer.

Grievances: A large amount of the limited time of our professional staff is spent representing individual grievants. As the association finds its services in increasing demand and its responsibilities growing we intend to move to much greater use of volunteers for this effort. We will begin a drive to recruit volunteer grievance counselors before September.

Equal Employment Opportunity: For a variety of reasons the Foreign Service has failed to attract representative numbers of minorities and women. Efforts by the foreign affairs agencies to correct these imbalances have stirred great controversy due, in part, to inept and disingenuous explanations by management about these efforts. In the year ahead the Foreign Service itself will need to take the lead in addressing these sensitive and important issues more forthrightly and openly than we have in the past. The Governing Board needs the help of all members, minority groups as well as the majority, to take part in active and productive collaboration within the service to produce a plan of action to which we can all point with pride.

Staff Corps: The association has made a real push on several fronts over the past year on Staff Corps issues. The most vital of these was to stop the proposed downgrading of Staff Corps linkages with the Civil Service. Thanks to a massive lobbying effort on the Hill, the pay option currently in the bill not only does not downgrade Staff, in most cases there is a very slight upgrading. Given the outcome of the Hay Study, and management's advocacy of downgrading, this is a real victory. However, it's only a preliminary skirmish in the battle for recognition of the contribution and professionalism of the Staff Corps.

In negotiating precepts for Selection Boards this year, the bottom line for the AFSA negotiating team was avoiding a repeat of last year's fiasco, when the board failed to use 158 of the available Staff Corps promotions. This year, the boards can reconsider their decision if, after being given the numbers, they find not all promotion opportunities have been used.

We are in the process of negotiating regulations for standby pay, something communicators, especially, should have had years ago. Progress has been much slower than we expected, mainly because we wouldn't accept the too narrow and restrictive proposals put forward by management. We are now making progress and hope to reach agreement soon.

We've only mentioned a very few of the issues we are working on, due to space limitations, and will provide further details in the annual report, but the Staff Corps is at the top of our list of priorities!

AID News: The AID Standing Committee expanded major efforts to assure that equitable and thorough implementation of the Obey Amendment occurred. We were consulted on the original position designation exercise and have closely monitored management's role in implementing the regulations. A spate of politically motivated high level appointments, language training, home leave travel, a foray at the promotion panel precepts and post evacuations were other major issues with which the committee was seized in the past year. We have also been integrally involved in the development of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.

ICA: The agency continues to wallow under the stewardship of an exclusive representative with an almost exclusively Civil Service orientation. But the FSIO corps has nonetheless benefited from AFSA efforts on its behalf on matters affecting the entire Foreign Service. This goes far beyond the immediate concerns of the provisions of the Foreign Service Act, and includes such essential matters as housing, R&R, and other joint regulations applying to USICA as well as other Foreign Service institutions.

In all of the above areas as well as others deserving our consideration the Governing Board will do its part, but we cannot and should not do it alone. We need *your* help—individually and collectively.

Special Services

In order to be of maximum assistance to AFSA members and **Journal** readers we are accepting these listings until the 15th of each month for publication in the issue dated the following month. The rate is 40¢ per word, less 2% for payment in advance, minimum 10 words. Mail copy for advertisement and check to: Classified Ads, **Foreign Service Journal**, 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

REAL ESTATE

CHOICE VERMONT REAL ESTATE. Free illustrated brochure. Retired foreign service officer on staff. Peter D. Watson Agency Inc., Greensboro, Vt. 05841. 802-533-2651.

FLORIDA—WATERFRONT, CONDOS—HOMES—INVESTMENTS—LAND. Helen Clark Realty, Realtor, 353 Tilden St., Dunedin, Fla. 33528. Tel. 813-734-0390 eve. 733-9428.

TAX RETURNS

TAX PROBLEMS, returns and representation. T. R. McCartney (ex-FS) and John Zysk (ex-IRS), Enrolled Agents. Business Data Corp., P.O. Box 57256, Washington, D.C. 20037. (703) 522-1040.

BOOKS

IF YOU ARE LOOKING for an out-of-print book, perhaps I can find it. Dean Chamberlin, FSIO-retired, Book Cellar, Freeport, Maine 04032.

CURRENT PAPERBACKS airmailed within 5 days at reasonable prices. Send for monthly list to Circle Enterprises, Box 1051, Severna Park, Maryland 21146

VACATION RENTALS

ADIRONDACK LODGES on Upper Saranac Lake. Available for two weeks or a month, July through September. Everything provided for comfortable living in the quiet woods. Please write Bartlett Carry Club, RD 1, Tupper Lake, NY.

HOME EXCHANGE

SABBATICAL? Rent/exchange housing worldwide. Loan-A-Home, 18F Darwood, Mt. Vernon, N.Y. 10563.

FOR RENT

D.C. APARTMENT (6-months—Oct. 15, 1980-Apr. 15, 1981). Fully furnished 2-bedrooms, 2-baths; spacious, convenient, near zoo. $900/month includes heat, light, gas, inside parking. J. E. Rosenthal, 2737 Devonshire Pl., Apt. 303, Washington, D.C. 20008 (202) 387-8914.

KITCHEN SUPPLIES

TUPPERWARE — Containers and kitchen aids — overseas or Stateside. Write or call for free Tupperware catalog. Order now. Will ship APO or pouch. Ellen Penndorf, 410 Plum Street, Vienna, Virginia 22180—(703) 938-7727.

Foreign Service People

Deaths

Ford. Richard Michael Ford, son of FSO-retired and Mrs. William J. Ford, died on May 7 in Dover, New Hampshire. Richard, 22, was scheduled to receive his BS in chemistry at the University of New Hampshire on May 18. He accompanied his parents on assignments to Seoul and London. In addition to his parents of 57 Carolan Ave., Hampton, N.H. 03842, he is survived by three brothers, William B., John T. and Robert D. and a sister, Maryka B. Barnard.

Henebry. Charles William Henebry, FSO-retired, died on April 16 in Santa Monica. He served as consul in Basra, Iraq in the 1930s. Mr. Henebry is survived by his mother, Mrs. M. Henebry, 3000 Leeward Ave., Los Angeles, California 90005.

Meyers. Elizabeth Hope Meyers, daughter of FSO-retired and Mrs. Howard Meyers, died following surgery on June 2, in Los Angeles. Ms. Meyers was born in Tokyo and educated in London and Brussels where her parents were posted. She received her B.S. from Bennington College and her M.A. from Brown University. Since 1972 she had been living and working in San Francisco and Los Angeles. In addition to her parents of 3321 P Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20007, she is survived by a brother Nicholas M. Meyers.

Tank. Martin M. Tank, FSR-retired, died on June 9 in Washington. Mr. Tank entered government service in 1942 and joined ECA in Paris in 1949. He served with MSA, FOA and ICA and as deputy director of USOM in London and Benghazi. On AID's formation, he was assigned to Bangkok and Saigon. From 1973 until his retirement in 1978, he was policy chief of the planning and review division in the State Department's office of international organization affairs. Mr. Tank is survived by his wife, Marelyn, a daughter, Holly, and a son, Jeffry, of 500 23rd St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Wollam. Constance Sturges Wollam, wife of FSO-retired Park F. Wollam, died on May 21, in Naples, Florida. She accompanied her husband on assignments to Cali, La Paz, Puerto la Cruz, Naples, Santiago de Cuba, Port of Spain, Vietnam (with safe-haven in Bangkok), and Belize City. She is survived by her husband of 3430 Gulf Shore Blvd., #2F, Naples, Florida 33940 and four children, Barbara Balch of Cleveland, Ohio; Anne Chevako of Nairobi, Kenya; Janet of Cambridge, Mass., and Park, Jr., of Shell Beach, California. The family has asked that expressions of sympathy be in the form of contributions to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

American Foreign Service Protective Association, Inc.

1750 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20006 Suite 1305 — Phone (202) 393-4220

Additional insurance available up to $30,000 for those who have or take the basic $17,500 policy.

Members of the Association under 60 years of age and on active service may subscribe for an additional $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000 Group Life and $10,000, $20,000 or $30,000 AD&D, effective March 1, 1978, at $85 a year per each $10,000 of additional insurance, provided that this additional coverage must terminate upon resignation or retirement or age 65 (whichever is first).

Officers who are now members of the Association may make application by using the amended form including information necessary to satisfy the Underwriter that they are in good health (see section of booklet entitled ENROLLMENT).

Officers joining the Association who wish the additional insurance should make their application therefore at the same time as the application for Group Life.

PREMIUM RATES

Regretfully inflation has forced some changes in our premium rates for the first time since 1929. The new rates for old or new members for the basic $17,500 Group Life plus $17,500 AD&D, plus up to $3,000 family coverage are:

To 41st birthday	$100 per year
To 51st birthday	$150 per year
To 65th birthday	$185 per year

Over 65 for those who qualify for reduced coverage, $37 per $1,000 per year.

Coverage After Age 65

There is a minor change in retirement coverage for old or new policies and the provision effective as of March 1, 1978 reads:

RETIREMENT. Members who retire on an immediate annuity may retain this policy unchanged until age 65. If at age 65 they have held this policy continuously for 20 years, they may continue to carry $5,000 plus reversionary if any, AD&D at $5,000 and Family Coverage (if they have been carrying $17,500) at $185 per year (lesser amounts at lower premiums if they have been carrying less than $17,500).

Members who transfer without a break in service from the Foreign Service to another civilian position with the United States Government may continue their policy unchanged as long as they continue such Federal employment and have the same privileges as noted above if they retire on an immediate annuity.

Application forms and Booklet available on request.