

Foreign Service Journal

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Foreign Policy in the 1980s by Donald Nuechterlein

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

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COVER: Beaulieu sur Mer, by Joyce MacCorquodale

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Letters

NO TIME FOR HEADS IN SAND

The recently published regulations covering employment conditions for Senior Foreign Service officers are the best that could be achieved under the new Act. I commend the AFSA Board for its complete support of a group of senior officers who formulated the negotiating objectives, most of which were achieved. The regulations, however, implement an Act which, in my view, changes the working environment for the Senior Foreign Service to the detriment of both our foreign policy process and individual career planning.

The bottom line is that senior officers had better organize themselves to become heavily involved in the political process within AFSA or we are likely to suffer further setbacks. AFSA is no longer the friendly professional club it used to be, but a focal point for all the conflicting career objectives of the various FS personnel categories. Senior officers —get your heads out of the sand.

HERMAN J. COHEN

Washington

CORRECTION

"The Visa," by John Bovey, which appeared in the April issue is from *Desirable Aliens*, published by the University of Illinois Press.

AN INQUIRY

I am writing a book about the 1954 American coup in Guatemala for Doubleday publishers in New York City. I have been trying to reach the wife of the now deceased former ambassador to the country of Guatemala in that year, John Peurifoy. I would like to write to her to find out if she would consent to be interviewed about her own and her husband's term of office in Guatemala.

I wonder whether the *Foreign Service Journal* might be willing to print a small notice requesting anyone knowing Mrs. Peurifoy's address to notify me so I might accomplish this objective.

Thank you very much for your help.

STEPHEN SCHLESINGER

53 West 71st Street, Apt. 3A
New York, New York 10023

LOVE LETTER FROM THE EDITOR

This is my love letter to the Foreign Service and I can't complain that it never wrote to me. I am sorry that I cannot write personally to all of those in the Service who helped me, guided me, extended the hand of friendship to me or offered the rare compliment that made this job worth doing.

The almost twenty years I have spent with the Association have been rich ones, with many changes. I have seen the Association change from a professional association to a combination employee-management group and professional association. The young Turks took over during that period and, as one said, "We have now become old Ottomans." Some of those I knew as junior officer members of the Governing Board and Editorial Board have become ambassadors and I have proudly attended their swearings-in.

There have been changes in the *Journal*, too. Members of the Editorial Boards I have worked with over the years and I are proud of them. It has been a pleasure to feature the work of our talented Foreign Service artists on the cover and inside the magazine. Early on, we decided on a professional layout firm to do justice to the magazine. From time to time, the *Journal* publishes fiction and poetry under its mandate to act as a showcase for the talents of members of the Foreign Service community.

It has been a challenge but it has also been very rewarding. The greatest reward has been getting to know the men and women of the Foreign Service and I carry my appreciation of them into retirement. I shall do as my good friend Bob Rinden has done in Iowa and try to spread the word in my home country, Vermont, about the Foreign Service and its practitioners. Perhaps I can help to build a constituency for you.

And remember, in Londonderry, Vermont, the welcome mat is always out. Skiing, anyone?

SHIRLEY R. NEWHALL

The JOURNAL *welcomes the expression of its readers' opinions in the form of letters to the editor. All letters are subject to condensation if necessary. Send to: Letters to the Editor, Foreign Service* JOURNAL, *2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.*

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

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John Moors Cabot

PETER F. KROGH

I met Ambassador Cabot twenty years ago—across the generations—when I was a graduate student at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and he was ambassador to Brazil. He was the first ambassador I met in person. How he conformed to my conception of what an ambassador should look like and be! I was impressed at once and in full measure by the quality and diversity of his diplomatic experience. I was attracted by the warmth, modesty and joviality that lay just beneath the surface of an imposing frame and an aristocratic demeanor. He was to me then and ever after an authentic diplomat—an exemplar of a now almost extinct class and generation that was born to the conduct of diplomacy, pursuing it with natural assurance, ease and effect.

Ambassador Cabot entered the Foreign Service 54 years ago. His career spanned four decades, three continents, fourteen countries—in five of which he served as chief of mission, in one of which he met his wife and lifelong diplomatic partner, Elizabeth, and in two of which three of his four children were born. The span of his national service was coincident with transitions in American foreign policy from neutrality, to war, to reconstruction, to cold war, to international development, to détente. His assignments converged with international developments of great consequence. His posts included: Counselor in Buenos Aires during the ascendance of Juan and Evita Peron; counselor in Belgrade during the emergency of Tito's ideological independence; consul general in Shanghai on the eve of Mao's control of China; assistant secretary of state and ambassador to Colombia and Brazil during the creative period leading to the Alliance for Progress; and ambassador to Poland (and in effect to China) at the peak of the cold war.

Fortunately for those who will seek instruction and draw inspiration from this remarkable career, Ambassador Cabot wrote two books, published by schools with which he was closely associated and in which he and Elizabeth placed so much of their hope for the future. These texts yield a substantial appreciation of the essence of Ambassador John Moors Cabot and what he represented abroad in the service of his country. To wit, and I quote:

"Liberty is not license. Liberty substitutes self-discipline for the discipline of a despot."

"I emphatically reject the idea of any government censorship of the press; but I think the press might spend more effort in opposing the irresponsibilities of a small minority of it."

"Protectionism substitutes normal exports with exports of resentment and despair."

This is the eulogy for John Moors Cabot, delivered by Peter F. Krogh, Dean, Georgetown School of Foreign Service, at St. John's Church, Lafayette Square, on February 27.

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And, as if presaging the criticism of the past administration and heralding the supply-side economics of the new administration, Ambassador Cabot wrote:

"Let me say that no policy is better than two policies."

"There is only one way that living standards can be raised and that is to produce more."

Finally, with reference to his own life's calling, Ambassador Cabot wrote:

"It is upon our representatives abroad that we must depend for our first line of defense. They must understand the country where they represent us. They must report without fear or favor. They must represent what we ourselves stand for with tact and with a desire for mutual comprehension."

These quotes speak the plain truth. And that is precisely what Ambassador Cabot, with the proud and unfailingly spirited assistance of his wife, Elizabeth, represented abroad. They knew themselves and their country and they were steadfastly true to both. That is why Ambassador Cabot brought such dignity to his profession, such success to his diplomatic service, and such credit to his country, his family and his friends.

All three mourn Ambassador Cabot's passing. But we thank him for his legacy of decency, humanity and integrity in the nation's service. We promise to do him the honor of keeping faith with that legacy, both personally and professionally, and thus to make it, as he and Elizabeth would wish, a living one.

A Diplomat's Viewpoint

The Foreign Service Secretary

JACK PERRY

Author's Note:

I wish to thank the editors for their hospitality in letting me have space in the Journal over the past year or so for my column, "A Diplomat's Viewpoint."

I have enjoyed writing the column and I have many other things I would like to say. The profession of diplomacy is rich in content and context, and I daresay one could write for many lifetimes without exhausting its resources. Still, I feel I would do well to stop writing the column for now, perhaps giving others a chance to get across their view.

In saying thank-you and goodbye, I wish the magazine and its readers well.

Let us say a word of thanks to American Foreign Service Secretaries. Without them, US diplomacy wouldn't work.

All of us who have spent a career in the Foreign Service are well aware of our enormous debt to our secretaries, even if we all too seldom put it into words of gratitude. And *acts* of gratitude—as I can hear some of my secretary

friends saying—are probably rarer still.

Our basic attitude toward secretaries was well summed up in a true story told me by a secretary friend. The deputy chief of mission at her post threw a match into his wastebasket without making sure that it was out, and the basketful of paper flared up. Not knowing how to put it out, he dashed out of his office with the flaming basket in his hands. He almost collided with the ambassador in the corridor. The DCM shouted, "What can I do with this fire?" The ambassador replied, "Quick, give it to your secretary!"

I have been handing fires to my secretaries for more than twenty years now. I couldn't exist for a day without them. The indispensability of competent secretaries, trained in diplomatic practice, will not be gainsaid by anyone who has served at a US mission. An embassy is like a ship sailing in foreign waters: the crew has little outside help and must rely on its own resources. The secretary is the chief petty officer who makes sure the voyage is successful. The most exquisitively drafted policy advice will not get to Washington unless the secretary is there to prepare it. More than likely, the bosses would not even have got the project completed if the secretary had not been there to help and push and goad them along.

Goodness knows the secretary's indispensability is challenged by frustrations. Years ago I isolated the "sundown syndrome" at American missions—the inability of diplomats to begin serious work until the sun was over the yardarm, thus guaranteeing the secretaries frustrating mornings and unwelcome active evenings. There are multitudinous other disadvantages to service abroad, ranging from poorly functioning telephone systems to linguistic disorders to local inefficiency viruses—none of which prevents Foreign Service officers from expecting perfection from secretaries.

This brings us to the uniquely American qualities of our secretaries, one of which is a stubborn "can do" attitude that almost always conquers the local obstacles. I would not for a moment disparage the secretaries of other nations' diplomatic services, but I maintain that our secretaries exhibit certain American characteristics which enable them to get jobs done others could not do. Most countries still tend to treat their secretaries in the diplomatic services as second-class citizens—wanted for typing and shorthand but not for thinking, certainly not for responsibility. Americans trust their secretaries, call on them for advice, give them more responsibility (although we could go much further in this direction). In short, we make them full members of the team. They respond by doing a full-member job.

The Foreign Service Secretary is often in a position to represent, unofficially, our country, in a full and exceptional sense, and is thus an extremely valuable envoy. The professionalism of our secretaries is crucial to diplomacy, because we diplomats bounce from country to country, embassy to embassy, language to language, but must be able to function impeccably, efficiently, from the day of our arrival in a new land. It must be especially difficult for a secretary to fit into a new way of life overnight while making sure the embassy is functioning as if he or she had been there for a lifetime. There is no breaking in period: the secretary is expected to hit the ground running—and does.

In addition to the problems of the professional gypsy life is the reluctance of some diplomats to share full responsi-

bility with their secretaries. (One secretary, I am sad to say, has posted "Don't Think!" above her typewriter. I like to believe that the objective is to get as much thinking, as much equal participation and responsibility from our secretaries as they are prepared to assume.)

Finally, let me say that the American Foreign Service secretary is seriously and systematically undercompensated. I do not mean merely in money, although that is of course a large part of it. (One of the really superb secretaries I know calculated that the new salary scale of the Foreign Service Act will net her twenty cents a day.) The hardships of life abroad are huge, and they are getting worse. To the decline of the dollar (Can secretaries afford to eat out in Geneva or Tokyo?) must be added the threat of terrorism, which can take a heavy psychological toll in a growing number of countries.

Despite my brave words about responsibility, many secretaries feel the service uses their abilities inadequately and also fails to recognize their contributions. The "second-class citizen" syndrome is not dead. Moreover, many secretaries perceive the increased emphasis on hiring wives as a threat to their profession. (I am enthusiastically in favor of helping find more jobs for Foreign Service wives, but I hope we can do so without any inroads on the integrity of our secretarial corps.)

These challenges to the status and well-being of the Foreign Service secretary mean that the institution as we know it may be in danger. We are finding it harder and harder to attract serious, dedicated professionals to this career—with all the troubles abroad, the Foreign Service secretarial game may increasingly not be worth the candle. And that would be a great pity. I, for one, cannot envision American diplomacy functioning well without these seasoned professionals. They give hugely of themselves to make the system work.

To the diplomat, the Foreign Service is not just a job, not just a career. It is a life. A life mostly spent abroad in all sorts of circumstances, where the only constant is change. It is a life with much wear, but with many rewards. That life would not be possible without the gifts given daily by Foreign Service secretaries. We are enormously in their debt.

(This column is dedicated to the memory of Foreign Service secretary Lorraine Sonne.)

THE SECRETARY AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE

Members of the Foreign Service found themselves uncomfortable bystanders in late March as the media placed the Secretary of State under the most intense public scrutiny. This is one aspect of public service at the highest levels the rest of us are happy to miss. Media noise about power struggles and personalities seems a distraction at a time when the foreign challenges to the United States are as real as they are today.

Yet the Foreign Service has learned the hard way that decisions on how to structure the consideration of foreign policy matters can shape the substance of foreign policy as well. We hope the president's decision to place the vice president in charge of crisis management, supported on foreign policy by the staff of the National Security Council, will not once again separate policy making from the professionals who implement it. As professionals, we are now required to honor the president's decision, and make his system work. At the same time, however, we wish to express our appreciation for Secretary Haig's efforts to have crisis management handled in the manner we manage the balance of foreign policy questions today—at the department level in working groups made up of professionals.

From the day he arrived at the State Department, when, at AFSA's initiative, he spoke to the Foreign Service and said he was the president's foreign policy vicar, the secretary has identified himself with strong professional involvement in making foreign policy. When he met with the AFSA board in early February, the secretary promised a vigorous effort to enhance the departmental role in managing foreign policy, and stated his effort would require strong support from the career service. The Interdepartmental Group (IG) structure went into full operation shortly afterwards, effectively bringing working-level professionals into foreign policy management.

- The secretary's identification with our concerns about professional management of foreign affairs means media treatment of his efforts affects us as well.
- Some of the late March stories surrounding foreign policy's top professional struck us as having all the characteristics of "a snake with legs."
- The issues involved in shaping foreign policy are complex and not given to ready simplification.
- The effort to improve US foreign policy toward over 160 nations will take time, and it will involve competition both abroad and at home.

This administration has barely begun. There will be countless opportunities in the months ahead for all of us to display our professional skills and build the reputation for effective foreign policy management that will bring increased reliance on our services. We believe that, in the end, America is best served when those most qualified to perform a specific task are able to perform it. What the Foreign Service increasingly realizes is that others will not take our qualifications for granted and that we must assert ourselves if the qualified are to be brought in line with their proper tasks.

We are making progress. During its successful effort to move an acceptable Foreign Service act into law, AFSA found that congressional respect for the Foreign Service is high among those who have met and worked with us. With the return of the hostages, who managed their moment on the world stage so very well, we found this respect spreading to the nation as a whole. Now, under a secretary who is himself a career government servant, we have a new oppportunity to expand the professional role in foreign policy management. The Foreign Service has come a long way from the low image improperly thrust upon it during the McCarthy era.

Of course much remains to be done. During the Carter administration, Peter Szanton at the Office of Management and Budget articulated and attempted to put into effect a design for foreign policy management that might be called the "domestication" of foreign policy. He argued that as companies form foreign divisions when they first go into international operations, then abolish the foreign divisions and reassign their tasks to the company's various domestic operational divisions as time goes by, so too should most of the US foreign policy functions go to domestic departments, with coordination handled at the White House level. Szanton then presided over a process that stripped the cultural and commercial function out of State, gave more trade policy functions to the Special Trade Representative and opened up the distance between ICA and State. He sought to do the same for the AID-State relationship with the creation of IDCA, and even tried to award the visa function to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Szanton is gone, along with Carter, but his divide-and-rule concept may remain.

AFSA strongly rejects the concept of foreign policy "domestication." What really happens with successful companies that begin with international divisions is they go multinational, establishing wholly owned subsidiaries staffed abroad entirely with Americans and foreigners who understand both the US business and the foreign culture. Managing such multinational operations is complex enough for a company; imagine how much more difficult it is for a government involved, as the United States is, in every part of the world. Rightfully, the task should employ thousands of skilled professionals who understand both their own business (agriculture, commerce, press relations, consular affairs, foreign assistance, communications) and the culture within which they work. It should also involve coordination between all the American professionals working within a given country, and someone to orchestrate the coordination. Abroad, that happens with the ambassador's country team. With the IG structure, the secretary has tried to reproduce the country team at home. This type of coordination is the answer to the Szanton approach, which leaves the professionals divided and isolated at the working level.

The secretary is helping with one other matter dear to the Foreign Service. We see ourselves as the nation's first line of defense, those who must solve foreign policy problems before they turn into war. Recently, we have repeatedly found how graphically true our front-line defense role has become, as increasing numbers of us face the danger of death or capture at the hands of hostile groups. It is time the country officially began treating us as part of the national security apparatus. With Secretary Haig's active support, we may yet succeed.

"In the wide arena of the world, failure and success are not accidents as we so frequently suppose, but the strictest justice."—Alexander Smith

LIVING WITH SUCCESS

WILLIAM P. BLAKE

Successful is not an adjective usually called upon to describe the current state of US foreign policy. That this is so is unfortunate in that it continues to focus public debate on the wrong set of issues, and is likely to lead to a further deterioration of US influence in world affairs. US policy objectives, articulated immediately after World War II and reaffirmed in broad terms ever since, have met with remarkable success; the failure has been in the inability or unwillingness of the US to accept the consequences of a world order it in large measure fashioned. Western Europe and Japan were nurtured and protected in order that they might rebuild viable and independent political and economic systems. Asian and African colonies succeeded in attaining their political independence, often with the support of the United States and in spite of the strain it imposed on relations with former European colonial powers. A measure of the hostility and paranoia that drove Soviet foreign and domestic policies abated to the extent that limited negotiation replaced an atmosphere of nervous and unremitting belligerency. Even more remarkable, China and the United States achieved a reconciliation that few would have believed possible only a decade ago.

To be sure, a great deal remains to be done, not the least of which is the redefinition of US foreign policy objectives in light of its achievements to date. Western Europe and Japan are seeking to reorder their dependent relationship with the United States in political as well as economic terms. The Third World is in search of political and economic viability and influence that transcends regional boundaries. The USSR now shares with the US the ability to destroy the world in an instantaneous act of irrationality at the very time that the hard-won ability to communicate is dissipating rapidly. China has the potential to upset the emerging multi-polar balance of power should it opt to cast its lot with either the East or the West to the exclusion of the other. Hunger and political repression remain all too prevalent; nuclear proliferation only enhances the risk of a worldwide cataclysm; and energy shortages threaten to bring chaos to the international economic order.

The emerging world order and the nature of the challenges it presents will not permit the United States to conduct its foreign policy as it has for the past thirty-five years, and probably will require it to relinquish its role as the unchallenged political and military leader of the noncommunist world. A deliberately weak central government and a tradition of insularity imposed by a physical separation from the Eurasian land mass provided little practical experience or discipline in the conduct of an activist foreign policy. The United States did not have the constant exposure to the political intrigues that preoccupied Eurasian states for all of their history, forcing them to deal with the world on pragmatic, non-ideological terms. The overwhelming physical strength of the United States, in much of the post-war period, enabled it to act out its idealism without fear of the consequences; the margin of error diminished almost imperceptibly during this period, masking the necessity to face the consequences of its often idiosyncratic policies.

The dominance enjoyed by the United States in the immediate post-war period foreclosed serious debate on whether it should return to a posture of isolation or consummate its new role as a world power. The internationalists won in a debate that never took place. They readily accepted the containment of communism as a fundamental objective, thereby gaining the support of normally isolationist, but doctrinaire anticommunist, political forces. The principle of democratic self-determination provided a second objective to justify an activist stance. When the two all too frequently conflicted, anticommunism prevailed over Wilsonian idealism. Thus, Western Europe and Japan prospered, divested themselves of their colonies, and contained Soviet expansion, financed and sheltered by the industrial might of the US economy. There was little need to indulge in subtleties or sensitivities in an imbalanced world order such as this. The United States managed to perpetuate this brand of internationalism on a reserve of good will long after the distribution of world power began to limit its power.

The last comprehensive statement of US foreign policy objectives was articulated by Henry Kissinger in what could be considered the twilight of the old order. It was predicated on the acceptance of a bipolar world in which the US and the USSR dominated their respective alliances; those areas that fell outside these two spheres were either inconsequential or subservient. The successes achieved, the rationalization of relations with the USSR and China and an end to the Vietnam War on acceptable terms, were in the nature of unfinished business. The US and the USSR reinforced one another's illusions of their own importance, and in their preoccupation with each other neglected to notice that other forces were at work that put the lie to these self-deceptions. Kissinger and his successors thus far have failed to take account

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The author recently completed a year of independent study as a Mid-Career Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University. Since returned to the Washington, D.C., to assume a position with the Intelligence Community Staff.

of the historical forces at work both within their respective alliances and in the world that had evolved outside their immediate spheres of influence.

It is perhaps time to engage in the domestic debate between the isolationists and the internationalists that never occurred, in an attempt to articulate a foreign policy that recognizes US limitations without shrinking from its responsibilities. Such a debate must recognize that there is no going back, either to the pre-World War I period in which the United States played a very limited international role or to the unnatural state of affairs that shaped US attitudes in the years since World War II. Undoubtedly, it will be a humbling experience, for the US will be forced to confront its reduced capacity to influence events; it might also serve as a source for revitalization to the extent that it focuses attention on domestic affairs as a necessary precondition.

The President, Congress and Political Parties: The first order of business in redefining foreign policy is to reestablish an organic relationship between the office of the president and Congress. For some time now, presidents and members of Congress have been elected to office independent of one another, and as a consequence, both have become prey to volatile public perceptions of domestic and foreign policy issues. The party system is in need of restoration for three reasons: to establish a relationship of shared perceptions and beliefs that will carry over from the campaign to the office; to provide support when events require unpopular decisions; and to formulate a consistent domestic and foreign policy. Elected party professionals must be given a central role in presidential nominations to ensure they are an integral component of a candidate's constituency, not a force outside the process as is presently the case. The parties would be well advised to finance permanent staffs, augmented by outside, independent advisers, to aid elected officials in articulating party policy on a continuing basis rather than every four years.

Policy Formulation: The process by which foreign policy is made within government is responding, slowly, to the growing complexities of world affairs, but it remains centered in the State Department. The dominance of State is inappropriate for two reasons: it is only one of a number of actors with legitimate claims to a role in policy formulation; and it suffers from institutional biases which ought not to dominate or be compromised. Policy formulation should be concentrated in the White House in the body of an expanded National Security Council, on the order of a foreign policy council. Its members should consist of relevant Cabinet secretaries, each with an opportunity to contribute to and influence foreign policy decisions when appropriate. It should be chaired by the president or his foreign policy adviser. The staff of the FPC could be drawn from the party's stable of advisers and career professionals, thereby reinforcing the link between the president, the party, and the established bureaucracy.

"Much as it might like to, the US cannot ignore the unremitting pace with which the Soviet Union has expanded its conventional military forces."

Domestic Economy: The external elements of a successful foreign policy must be grounded in a dynamic and confident domestic economy. The state of the economy not only will dictate the manner in which the United States will respond to the growing restiveness within the Euro-Japanese alliance, but will determine its ability to confront the challenge of an adventurous USSR and meet its responsibilities in the Third World. Key ingredients for the restoration of vitality to the economy are: a rejection of protectionism as a response to economic challenges; a restoration of a climate conducive to technological innovation and capital investment; and a program to promote greater energy self-sufficiency grounded in market dynamics. US foreign policy has been driven by the same political philosophy that gave rise to the welfare state at home, predicated not on the alleviation of distress or social injustice, but on an arrogant attempt to use the state to restructure the social order. The thread that dominates the fabric of domestic and foreign policy is the increasing involvement of the state under a constitutional system ill-suited to such a role. The same international developments that are forcing the US to alter its foreign policy also are demanding change in the approach to economic and social objectives at home.

Western Europe and Japan: Clearly, the most important set of international relations of concern to the United States are those existing between it and Western Europe and Japan, and yet it is here that the United States seems to have the most difficulty in coping with the consequences of success. US efforts in the post-war period to promote strong and independent states worked, yet whenever these characteristics are displayed, the United States has responded as an aggrieved party. Economic affairs dominate relations within the alliance, but they are now based on aggressive competition instead of US domination. Rather than seeking to return to a world order that permitted the US economy to expand unchecked in order to establish the basis of a stable international system, the United States must face the necessity of an alternative order based on its participation rather than dominance.

The United States also must realize that it can no longer presume to speak for the alliance on matters of international political consequences. A major cause of discord within the alliance has been US attempts to deny Western Europe and Japan a legitimate political role; the test of US maturity will be its ability to accept behavior by its natural allies which at times will run counter to its interests in order to exert influence over issues of fundamental concern. In this regard, the Europeans themselves have not been of much help, in that they have sought to avoid the necessity of articulating the nature of the relationship. This has been all too apparent in defining relations with the USSR where European objectives, though broadly similar, no longer strictly coincide with those of the United States. The United States might render the greatest service to the alliance by gradually relinquishing its leadership role in NATO while at the same time demonstrating its willingness to increase its military commitment. Sim-

ilarly, the United States might give to Europe and Japan the responsibility for defining the nature of commercial relations with the Soviet Union. In the past, the United States has refused to consider such retrenchment out of fear that the Europeans would be incapable of resisting the political and economic attraction of Soviet proximity. In addition to displaying a high degree of arrogance, such a policy betrays a large reservoir of self-doubt concerning the underlying solidarity of the alliance.

The time is long overdue for the United States to share its role as the guardian of global Western interests, and there is no better place to begin than in the Middle East, an area of potentially far greater importance to Western Europe and Japan than to the United States. At the moment, serious consideration is being given to the idea of increasing European commitments to NATO in exchange for an increased US military presence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. This is contrary to US interests for two reasons: it would be logistically difficult and costly for the United States to manage, given the prevailing political constraints, and it would exacerbate already inflamed anti-American sentiments in the region. There is also an element of European duplicity in its willingness to use the United States as the cutting edge, while remaining immune from the consequences. US interests would be far better served if it were made clear to the West Europeans and Japanese that, since they are far more dependent on the region for energy supplies, they should promote security and stability by whatever means they consider appropriate. In support of these efforts, the United States should offer to increase its military presence in Europe, where its true interests lie.

The USSR: Perhaps the most frustrating exercise in reordering foreign policy is that of defining the nature of US-Soviet relations, in large measure because Russia, the political core of the USSR, is like no other state in modern history in its perceptions of the world beyond its borders. The present regime has sought to create the impression that it is secure in its leadership of a world communist order that it is confident will triumph over US-dominated international capitalism. Soviet leaders accept at least some measure of this image. At its core, however, the Soviet hierarchy shares the same insecurity, sense of isolation and cultural inferiority that characterized czarist Russia, Solzhenitsyn notwithstanding. US perceptions of the Soviet Union have been complicated by the difficulty of coping with a state constantly undergoing an identity crisis. Some in the US are reassured to note that the Soviet leadership is not secure in its own legitimacy and doubtful of the loyalty of its closest allies in Eastern Europe, choosing to ignore that neither factor impinges on its ability to project its influence, with force if necessary. At the other extreme, there is a body of opinion in the United States that accepts the irresistible appeal of international communism with such conviction as to justify a crusade to save others from their own folly. Thus, it is all the more important that policy concerning the USSR be pursued with caution and a high degree of predictability. The need for close coordination between the president and Congress is all the more necessary.

The overriding policy objective with respect to the USSR is the regulation of the level and nature of their military competition, particularly strategic nuclear weapons; to be at all productive, the process must derive from a clear articulation of US strategic nuclear doctrine. The United States has no choice but to resume SALT negotiations with the Soviets on the assumption that they share an interest in stabilizing and eventually reducing the quantity of nuclear weapons directed at one another. This objective is of such fundamental concern that it must be pursued regardless of the tenor of relations between the two countries at any time. Progress undoubtedly will be slow, and there will be pressures in the United States either to postpone upgrading of nuclear forces or to seek some mythical measure of nuclear superiority. The former is dangerous, the latter impossible. Increasing weapon accuracies on both sides eventually will upset the comfortable, if appalling, world of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), to be replaced by shared counterforce capabilities. The United States can begin the process of defining its strategic objectives by declaring a no-first-use doctrine, an assumed principle but one that has not been stated explicitly. If the US nuclear arsenal is to remain a deterrent and serve as an incentive for meaningful negotiations, it must derive from a credible doctrine that complements well-defined foreign policy objectives.

Much as some might like to, the US cannot ignore the unremitting pace with which the Soviet Union has expanded its conventional military forces. The US response has been sporadic and inconsistent, in part because of an all too prevalent view that limiting nuclear weapons is inconsistent with enhancing conventional forces. It would appear that the US has pursued a policy of gauging its military efectiveness by the size of the defense budget. The weapons it has acquired have been limited in number, expensive, and over-complicated, while training and maintenance have been neglected. Furthermore, the payroll represents a disproportionately large share of the total military budget. Future weapons systems must incorporate such principles as low cost, ease of maintenance, greater reliability under combat conditions, and increased numbers. A larger portion of the military budget must be devoted to maintenance, larger inventories of weapons and ammunition, and increased training. In order to reduce costs and improve the quality of enlisted personnel, the draft must be reinstated, pay for two-year enlistees proportionately lowered, and a portion of the savings distributed to career personnel. The US experiment with an all-volunteer military was a worthy attempt to eliminate conscription and reduce its discriminatory consequences. The US taxpayer has not been willing to pay the premium for such a luxury, however, and as a result, the defense budget has been squeezed by personnel costs, something the West Europeans have avoided by retaining the draft and devoting a larger portion of their military budgets to equipment and training.

The terms of day-to-day relations between the United States and the USSR also must be defined. If insecurity is the driving force behind Soviet foreign policy rather than purely ideological ambitions, US responses must become less doctrinaire. This is not to say that the US can or should ignore the often tragic consequences of the historic paranoia that appears to be at the root of Soviet foreign policy. It can, howev-

er, resolve to deal with the USSR as a sovereign state, albeit with superpower ambitions, something it has not been willing to do even during periods of studied cordial relations. Trade and cultural relations should be reestablished and freed of the intrusive and often punitive objectives that have characterized them in the past, including repeal of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment and any other politically motivated restrictions on trade. There will continue to be occasions when the United States will feel compelled and justified in expressing its displeasure over Soviet behavior, such as the invasion of Afghanistan, but these responses cannot be predicated on a reversal of Soviet actions. The US boycott of the Moscow Olympics was an appropriate response to Afghanistan; it was an expression of displeasure that demanded no realistic response. The suspension of trade, on the other hand, was inappropriate; it requires a specific action on the part of the Soviets before relations can be normalized. More than likely the United States will relent without a Soviet *quid pro quo*.

A final policy objective is to define the terms of US relations with the rest of the world in light of the competition posed by the USSR. Such a policy must accept the inevitability and legitimacy of the Soviet challenge to US influence; no advantage will be gained by protesting Soviet efforts to assert its influence. The United States must base its competitive drive on the principles of respect for the sovereignty of nations, a tolerance of the consequences of self-determination, and a dedication to human rights, both political and economic. But the United States has more to offer than platitudes, sincere though they may be, and this is the ability of its economy to provide economic and technological benefits not available from the USSR. Too often, the loss of US influence to Soviet diplomatic initiatives in the Third World has been self-inflicted. An unavoidable element of the competition for influence is the ability to project military force; the emphasis here must be on the perceived state of readiness rather than military intervention. As long as military assistance continues to be expected of powerful nations, the United States would be wise to distance itself from the allocation process, with all its subjective pitfalls, perhaps by encouraging regional organizations to assume a role in certifying the legitimacy of arms requests made by their member states.

Eastern Europe: It is ironic that the United States probably is held in higher regard in Eastern Europe than anywhere else in the world, a condition owing as much to symbolism as to the evolution of policy that has recognized the sensitivities of the relationships involved. The mounting economic problems confronting the USSR are likely to result in increased independence in these countries, as they are forced to fend for themselves. While it is too much to expect that anything approaching self-determination will result, closer ties with the West will be unavoidable. While their political role in the world arena will continue to be dominated by the USSR, their special status should assure them of immunity from the behavioral tests so often imposed by Congress which have complicated other foreign relations. Such sensitivity to the aspirations and limitations of other nations could serve as a model for the full range of US relations abroad.

"Without this provision, the US will only encourage the creation of international welfare states, similar to the permanent welfare class its domestic policies have fostered."

Cuba: Castro's Cuba has been a thorn in the side of every US administration that has had to confront it, a role it has played with a certain degree of pleasure. US administrations of varying persuasions have responded to Castro's presence through a variety of policies ranging from intimidation, to subversion, and ultimately to isolation. For his part, Castro has been the perfect foil, given his record of intervention, deprivation of political rights, and economic mismanagement—behavior not dissimilar to other tyrants too often considered US allies. Although the present moment may not be the best, the time is long overdue for the United States to recognize the Castro government formally, and, if necessary, unilaterally. This can be justified on numerous grounds, not the least of which is to divorce the act of recognition from that of approval that has so often complicated US efforts to adapt to changing international relations. If Cuba is ever to be extricated from the exclusive influence of the USSR, it will not be through isolation but through conciliation and trade. The time to act is now, while Castro still is the official head of the nonaligned movement, and Afghanistan still is fresh in the minds of Castro and the other nonaligned leaders. At the same time, the United States must be prepared to demonstrate its determination to check attempts at subversion while reacting less stridently to instances of legitimate military and economic assistance.

China: The normalization of relations with China was remarkable as much for having occurred at all as for the ease with which it was accepted in both the United States and China. In the euphoria that has so often characterized US-China relations, China's economic backwardness and repressive political and social systems were all but ignored. The glow began to fade as the gaping differences between the two societies became more apparent. China's preoccupation with its own political and economic problems and its limited foreign policy objectives suggest few areas of potential conflict, provided that the United States nurtures the forces on Taiwan who would promote accommodation with the mainland.

Of greater significance to the United States is how its actions with respect to China will be perceived by the USSR. While a great deal of satisfaction might be derived from conducting relations with China independently of the USSR, or even in opposition to it, the United States must proceed on the assumption that the Soviet Union is factored into every move made by Peking. The United States is a beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet rivalry if it commits itself to neither. But the two countries have as great a stake in cooperating with one another as in cooperating with the United States. For instance, the USSR need make only minor accommodations to China—concessions over territory whose value is more symbolic than real and a disa-

vowal of hegemonic designs on Southeast Asia—to counter US attempts to isolate the Soviet Union. That the USSR has refused to initiate such a rapprochement with China should not suggest that it is incapable of a diplomatic breakthrough every bit as dramatic as the normalization of US-China relations.

The Middle East: Of the three principal areas of concern in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, the Arab-Israeli conflict, oil dependence, and increasing Soviet influence, the United States has the ability to resolve the first two and thus reduce the threat from the third.

Time and bloodshed have convinced the vast majority of Arab leaders to abandon any hope of eliminating Israel's presence, yet the more apparent this becomes, the more the influence of intransigent minorities in all the nations involved is asserted to prevent accommodation. The US has within its power the ability to coax Israel through the peacemaking process; its failure to do so has convinced the Arab states of its opposition to their aspirations for regional self-determination. A reduction in the US demand for the region's oil will reduce its economic vulnerability to the political pressures inherent in such a relationship, and reduce the temptation to meddle in the affairs of the area. The Soviet Union has no natural constituency among the nations of the region, lacking as it does the technology, foreign exchange, and investment opportunities available in the West, as well as possessing an atheistic ideology that is the antithesis of the Moslem state. If the US is to regain a degree of influence, it must first admit that its major political and economic interests lie with the Arab states, and that this does not necessarily contradict its equally valid moral commitment to Israel's security.

The first step toward a settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is for the United States to sign a defense treaty with Israel. The purpose would be to define sovereign Israeli territory, and thus clarify for both Israel and the Arab states just what it is that the United States is prepared to aid Israel in defending. Israel's boundaries should approximate the pre-June 1967 border with one exception, the internationalization of Jerusalem, a city of significance to a host of religions. The party most likely to object to a formal treaty is Israel, and the president and his party in Congress must be prepared to weather a period of intense criticism from Israel and its self-appointed spokesmen in the United States.

The second phase in the settlement process is to permit the Arab nations to sponsor a sovereign Palestinian state wherever they see fit, most probably on the West Bank. If the United States lacks the fortitude to assist in this task, it must be prepared to step aside and permit the West Europeans to play a role. The legalistic machinations that surround the issue of a Palestinian state are a smokescreen intended to deny or delay the inevitable. There is a historic force behind Palestinian autonomy as strong and uncompromising as the drive for black majority rule in sub-Sahara Africa. At the very least, the United States has it within its power to deliver Israel's cooperation.

The United States will be held hostage to Middle Eastern oil as long as it delays setting its economic house in order. The US energy program still lacks sufficient breadth to promote meaningful conservation on the one hand, and the development of alternate sources on the other. A factor in this failure had been the piecemeal and timid approach both the White House and Congress have taken when addressing domestic economic policy. Needed is an increase in the cost of energy, whether through market forces alone, or if insufficient, by enacting an energy tax coupled with an income tax reduction of the same magnitude. Overall private investment, not just energy-related investment, must be encouraged in an effort to promote the use of energy-efficient capital equipment. Investment should also increase productivity and reduce inflation, thereby depriving OPEC of one justification for price increases. Oil prices probably have not reached their peak in real terms and are likely to continue to rise until they bump against the cost of alternate energy sources. The sooner the market is permitted to determine these costs, the sooner moderating pressures will be brought to bear on OPEC.

The Third World: US foreign policy approaches to the countries crudely identified as the Third World defy characterization given the contradictions and inconsistencies so often displayed. Post-war policy has been idealistic and cynical, conciliatory and punitive, accommodating and demanding, often all at the same time. These characteristics have been permitted to coexist in large measure because the United States has had no clear idea of what its objectives are in these regions beyond the preservation of its influence and the denial of a Soviet presence. The means by which these broad objectives were to be realized have been uniformly intrusive in nature: aid, assistance, and the general tenor of relations have been more dependent on political litmus tests than on the national aspirations of the recipient states. The dismal performance of these countries with respect to political and economic progress and an all too pervasive disregard for even basic human rights only serve to justify the denial of meaningful economic assistance and a voice in determining the shape of the emerging world political and economic order.

If the United States is to implement its stated policy objectives with respect to Africa and Latin America in particular, it must reconcile itself to the inevitability of pluralistic approaches to self-determination, which at times will conflict with US interests, admit that it has a responsibility to provide more in the way of untied foreign aid, and demand more in terms of general performance. To accomplish these ends, the United States would be well-advised to strengthen its reliance on regional organizations and reduce the bilateral approach that so often has complicated relations. The OAU and the OAS, less the US, could serve as the institutions through which development aid is dispensed, thereby reducing the intrusive nature of US foreign aid programs. The United States should make a long-term commitment, ten to fifteen years, of a specific amount of aid in real terms to be granted to each of these organizations. It should be made clear that, except for a separate account earmarked for the relief of distress, there is a termination point beyond which the United States will revert back to a system of bilateral disbursements. Without a termination date, the United States will only encourage the creation of international welfare states, similar to the permanent welfare class its domestic

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Foreign Policy in the 1980s: In Search of the National Interest

DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN

Ronald Reagan, like every newly elected president, began his administration with a reassessment of US national interests and foreign policy priorities. Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy, Richard Nixon, and Jimmy Carter conducted thorough re-appraisals of existing policy and quickly established their own priorities. Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson and Gerald Ford, however, inherited the presidency and chose not to make significant changes in foreign policy during their first year in office.

In making this reassessment, the new foreign policy team, headed by Secretary of State Alexander Haig, must have a clear view of three key aspects of the political environment in which foreign policy is formulated.

1) a realistic appreciation of the external environment in which the United States conducts foreign relations; 2) a realistic understanding of the US domestic environment; and 3) a realistic appraisal of United States national interests, which takes account of both the values to be pursued and the costs and risks involved in achieving them. The last category is the subject of this inquiry.

Correctly defining US national interests in the 1980s is a crucial first step in establishing new foreign policy priorities. The task is more difficult than it was in the 1950s and 1960s because the United States no longer possesses a preponderance of the world's military and economic power nor desires to pursue a globalist foreign policy. It is also more difficult than it was in the 1970s because we now realize that the high expectations for détente with the Soviet Union were illusory: Moscow used détente to advance its power and influence on several continents while the United States was preoccupied with domestic affairs. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan finally shattered our illusions about détente.

Since détente has failed and the globalism of the 1960s is dead, what should US foreign policy priorities be in the 1980s? Must the United States be heavily involved throughout the world in order to protect its defense, economic and international security interests in the coming decade? As the costs of asserting America's power in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf grow and as the frustrations of leading a reluctant western alliance system increase, will the American public and Congress give the necessary support to the Reagan administration to redress the power balance with the Soviet Union?

The normal process of redefining US interests and establishing new policies involves assigning officials in the State and Defense Departments and CIA to look carefully at each geographical area of the world and identify the potentially serious problems. This approach fits neatly into the State Department's organizational structure and focuses attention on countries and regions rather than on broad international issues. A more productive way to address this task is from the viewpoint of US national interests worldwide, to determine which countries and regions are crucial to defending and enhancing those interests. That is the approach employed here.

The United States has four basic national interests which undergird all of its foreign policies. These are: defense of North America, US economic well-being, favorable world order (international security), and promotion of American values abroad (ideology).* The policy planner's task is to identify correctly which of these basic interests is at stake in any given international issue, assess the trade-offs among these four interests, and decide which issues are so important to the well-being of the United States that they must be considered "vital," i.e., that they may require the use of

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*See Donald Nuechterlein, "The Concept of National Interest: A Time For New Approaches," *Orbis*, Spring 1979, p.76.

economic and military force if other measures fail. It is useful to look at American foreign policy priorities in the 1980s from this perspective because it makes for sharper analysis of US interests and should lead to more realistic policy choices.

Defense of North America. This is a narrowly defined basic interest which many scholars (but not military planners) take for granted. It is primarily concerned with defense of the continental United States and with the strategic balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is also concerned with the security of Canada's territory and air space, as well as peace and stability in the Caribbean, Mexico, Central America and Panama. As the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 demonstrated, a direct Soviet military threat in North America quickly escalates into a nuclear confrontation. As the recent focus on El Salvador shows, leaders of both US political parties react with vigor when stability in this area is threatened. Renewed talks with Moscow on a strategic arms limitation agreement are also a crucial part of the US defense interest because of the Soviet Union's capability of inflicting serious damage on the United States. International terrorism targeted against Americans living abroad, including attacks on American embassies, is part of the defense interest, as is externally supported terrorism within the United States. The flow of millions of illegal laborers across the US border from Mexico is a defense interest if it poses a security threat within the United States.

Two key questions the Reagan administration must address under this category are: How much additional attention and resources should be given to political, economic and security problems of countries close to the US borders? To what extent will greater attention to these issues divert public attention and resources from crucial problems elsewhere in the world? In fact, one might ask: Has the United States neglected its own neighborhood over the past twenty years as it pursued a global role that sapped its human and material resources? The possible breakup of Canada, the potential for revolution in Mexico, the continuing drive of Cuba to subvert the Central American and Caribbean states, and the inability of the United States to protect its own borders against narcotics smuggling and illegal aliens point to the need for much greater attention to the problems of North America. This does not imply renewed American isolationism or a lessening of the need for allies in Europe and elsewhere; it does suggest a higher priority for US interests in North America than has prevailed since the 1940s. One of the ways the Reagan Administration could demonstrate a higher priority for this crucial area would be the creation in the State Department of a new post of assistant secretary for North American affairs. This would confirm a trend begun in the 1970s when a deputy assistant secretary for Canadian affairs was created by President Nixon, and a special coordinator for Mexican affairs was established by President Carter. Such a move would immediately enhance the importance of Canada, Mexico, Panama, Jamaica and Cuba in overall US foreign policy.

Economic well-being. This basic interest includes a wide range of international economic issues, such as: the value of the dollar, the American standard of living, the ability of American firms to trade and invest overseas, the impact of international cartels, multinational corporations and large international currency transfers, as well as the "dumping" of foreign products in the US market.

By any measure, the United States must improve its domestic economic performance in the 1980s if it intends to play a major international economic role. There are three foreign policy priorities which must be given serious attention by the Reagan administration if the US economy is to be strengthened: 1) a new policy toward OPEC countries that reduces the likelihood of ruinous oil price increases; 2) a tougher stance toward US trading partners who insist on increasing exports to the United States while limiting American imports and resisting pressure to participate more fully in the common defense; and 3) a search for alternative sources of certain strategic minerals which the United States imports from politically unstable sources.

The Reagan administration, like its predecessor, seeks to reduce US dependence on OPEC by stimulating the search for new oil, developing alternative sources of energy, and promoting conservation. But why should Washington not also take a tougher stand on selling arms and agricultural products to the OPEC countries which press for ever higher oil prices but then cut production when the international price softens? A policy review by the State Department should include the desirability of a firmer stand toward Japan and the European Economic Community regarding their efforts to limit US imports, particularly agricultural products. Similarly, Japan and some European allies should be penalized if they refuse to increase their defense contribution while expecting the United States to defend their oil supplies from the Persian Gulf. Japan, in particular, must be persuaded that it will no longer be given a "free ride" on its security needs. Limiting Japanese imports into the United States is one way to bring pressure on Tokyo to change its defense policy. Finally, the Reagan administration needs to find other sources of scarce strategic minerals so that the United States is not so dependent for such imports on such unstable countries as Zaire, Zimbabwe and South Africa. While it is not possible for the United States to escape vulnerability to foreign sources of key minerals, it is clearly in the US interest to reduce its dependence on single sources, particularly where the political situation is unstable.

The economic well-being interest is an excellent example of the policymaker's need to appreciate the trade-off between a liberal international economic policy, on the one hand, and the severe domestic dislocations which result from the flourishing of that policy. Clearly, the United States in 1981 is approaching the cross-over point where massive unemployment caused by growing imports—automobiles being the best example—threatens to curtail congressional support for free trade policies. Being mindful of the domestic environment in which foreign policy is formulated, State Department planners should adopt a realistic approach to meeting these danger signals rather than holding up free trade as the overriding objective of foreign economic policy.

Favorable World Order. This basic national interest encompasses US alliances, US security assistance agreements with countries outside

North America, Soviet support of national liberation forces, conflicts between non-communist countries, world hunger and population problems, threats to the ecological balance, and international terrorism. Emphasis on this category of interests has greatly expanded during the past 30 years and has caused considerable controversy within the United States. Heavy US involvement in the Vietnam War is the best example of the ambiguity involved in defining these interests and of the penalties of poor judgment.

Few persons doubt that Western Europe and Japan will remain vital world order interests of the United States in the 1980s because they contribute to international stability and because their political and economic power is essential in balancing the growth of Soviet world influence. A key issue is why many NATO countries do not share the US perception of world order interests and the need for tougher policies to protect them. In a word, to what extent are Europe's and Japan's national interests convergent with our own?

Clearly, there is divergence between Western Europe and the United States in perception of Soviet intentions in the Middle East, in Africa and in the Far East. The unwillingness of Europe, particularly West Germany, to abandon détente with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union will continue to trouble relationships with the United States. Similarly, Japan's reluctance to devote a significant share of its GNP to building up its naval and air defenses in Northeast Asia and to protecting its oil life-line through the Strait of Malacca causes serious questioning among Americans on whether the United States should defend Japan's economic interests while Japanese products inundate the US market. Another problem in defining US world order interests is the extent to which Washington should support the Peoples Republic of China as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union. There are dangers inherent in building up a powerful Chinese communist state so soon after the ouster of a previous anti-American leadership there.

The growing economic influence of the Arab oil-producing states and the increased importance of Egyptian territory to US strategic interests in the Middle East cause renewed questioning of Israel's intransigent policy on the Palestinian homeland issue, as well as its illegal annexation of East Jerusalem. If Israel persists in refusing to abide by international law and pursues an inflexible policy toward its neighbors, it risks losing American political support as the American public becomes more aware of the trade-off in US interests in the Middle East. To what extent should the Reagan administration press for resolution of the Palestinian issue, in order to gain support of the Arab countries for a US strategic buildup in the Middle East?

"It is therefore in the interest of the United States to reach an agreement with the USSR that satisfies the minimum defense interests of both countries."

Promotion of Values. This category includes all forms of humanitarian assistance and the emphasis on "human rights" in American foreign policy. It is the ideological component of US policy.

A central question is: To what extent should human rights be stressed in the Reagan administration? In Africa, the United States should continue to press the government of South Africa to alter its repressive racial policies; in Latin America, US policy should continue to encourage existing military regimes to hold elections and permit democratic parties to function. In Asia, the United States should press those countries with highly authoritarian governments (South Korea, Indonesia, and the Philippines, for example) to liberalize their rule at least to the extent that citizens are not imprisoned solely for holding unpopular political views. This effort is particularly necessary in the case of countries receiving large US military assistance because Congress may otherwise withhold such aid. There is also good reason, however, why US policy should not try to promote western-type democratic systems in Asia and African countries where there is neither a historical nor an economic basis for assuming that such a government could effectively function. Latin America's tradition is different, and here the liberalization process ought to be pressed. This effort should be made quietly and without engendering the deep resentment against the United States that occurred in Argentina and Brazil during the last few years.

With regard to the Soviet Union and other communist countries, the United States should insist on implementation of pledges made in the Helsinki Agreements to permit greater freedom for citizens in their societies. The United States should not be less vigorous in pressing its ideas of liberty on communist regimes than it is on rightist authoritarian ones.

The challenge for policy makers in the Reagan administration is to establish priorities among these four categories of national interest and decide which issues (threats) require major attention, often at the expense of other interests with high priority. This is the process of determining the "vital" interests of the United States—those which are so important that policy makers may recommend to the president that strong measures, including the use of force, should be used to bring about a favorable outcome of an international dispute.

Certain general conclusions about US national interests in the 1980s and the policies to support them are apparent.

First of all, greater attention will need to be paid to the US economy and the way it is affected by international pressures. Unless productivity in the United States is improved, the likelihood exists that economic and political pressures at home will severely limit Washington's ability to continue liberal international economic policies and may, indeed, cause a resurgence of nationalism in this country. To reduce this possibility, the United States should press its allies, and wealthy developing countries such as Saudi Arabia, to engage more fully in burden-sharing. In particular, Japan must be persuaded to take on major respon-

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Is the Foreign Service in Decline?

Can it meet the challenge of the third century—. . . to continue to attract and keep first rate people in the career Foreign Service?

LIBBIE S. MATHES

The Foreign Service of the United States enters its third century challenged by open criticism of a career once assumed to be among the country's most prestigious, rewarding and sought after. Even CBS got into the act with a New Year's week TV Special. Focused on eroded morale in our Bangkok embassy, it leaped to the conclusion of a general decline in the Foreign Service.

There is an issue, but it is not decline. It is change.

The traditional Foreign Service ideal of the officer, who took the oath knowing it was forever, going off with spouse and kids unquestioningly to worldwide availahility, suhjugating personal doubts, spouse needs and family prohlems in monolithic loyalty to the "good of the Service" is dead. That is prohably a healthy decline. Certainly it reflects the realities of our society, and that is honest. Today's new officer comes in with more sharply divided loyalties than his traditional predecessors. Child of Vietnam, witness to Watergate and product of the accompanying disillusion with national leadership, the new officer is more skeptical, less absolutely committed, and enters with his own personal list of priorities and goals, admittedly putting the Service on probation in his mind. The Service has attracted him. In order to keep him it must also serve him.

New Problems

The third century dawns with problems hardly imagined twenty years ago:

- Increased danger and thus psychological anxiety abroad: The Foreign Service has always been a risky business, but since Vietnam the type of risk has changed dramatically. Go to the diplomatic entrance of the State Department. Look at the marble plaques in the lobby, and study the honor role of those "Who have lost their lives under heroic or other inspirational circumstances while serving the government abroad in foreign affairs." There are 123 names. The first was lost at sea in 1780. From that year till 1965—nearly the entire first two centuries of the Service—there were 74 deaths, 48 from illness. The greatest risk was some kind of "fever." The cables list coast fever, yellow fever, tropical fever, African fever, violent fever, malarious fever and just "fever" along with fulminant cholera, cold and exposure, climate, epidemic and smallpox. Seven officers were killed in natural disasters—earthquake, volcanic eruption and hurricame. Six died trying to save others from drowning or fire. Seven were lost at sea. Only seven died by violence before 1965. One of those was "killed at his post by a mob of religious fanatics" in Tehran, Persia, 1924. Since 1965 all 49 names on the plaque fell victim to violence. Explanations are not given, but locations and dates tell all—Saigon 1965, Laos 1967, Vietnam 1968, Jordan 1970, Uruguay 1970, Cambodia 1971, Sudan 1973, Mexico 1974, Argentina 1975, Beirut 1976, Kabul 1979, Islamabad 1979.

The possibility of Foreign Service lives being abruptly thrown into chaos has sharply risen. In the last thirteen years 7,300 terrorist incidents have occurred worldwide. Some 2,700 of these were directed at US citizens with over 175 Americans killed and over 970 wounded. The US official community has been evacuated from 29 different countries since 1970. About 1,500 Foreign Service people have been pulled out of their posts since December 1978.

- Decrease in the value of the dollar and the quality of life the Foreign Service salary will buy in foreign cities and at home: No one ever planned to get rich quick in the Foreign Service, but twenty years ago incoming officers living on their earnings could reasonably expect to buy a house, pay college tuitions and live modest professional class lives. No longer can these assumptions be made. This is not a matter of the price of corn flakes in Bangkok. (The CBS Special trivialized legitimate FS financial concerns with excessive focus on one embassy wife's acute distress at the price of a box of cereal.
- Decline in US prestige abroad: Many find serving ahroad with less automatic personal status a disturbing come-down.
- Greater spouse demands for personal career fulfillment outside the Foreign Service family: The women's movement has legitimized and encouraged spouse individuality: economic necessity now requires two incomes in many Foreign Service families. Twenty years ago many spouses worked, but they usually volunteered. Today they must earn.

Libbie S. Mathes has been a Foreign Service spouse for 20 years and served in six overseas posts with ICA husband, Donald, and two sons. She is currently in Washington working as a free-lance writer.

This article, her third for the FSJ, *resulted from personal and telephone interviews with nearly 100 Foreign Service people in State, ICA, AID and Commerce. Senior personnel, training, recruiting and medical officers shared their philosophies and concerns; officers of AFSA, AFGE, September 17, AAFSW, the Family Liaison Office and the ICA Issues Group defined their positons; dozens of individuals volunteered their personal stories and views; and people in charge of the various data banks generously crunched their computers to produce the statistical basis for the analysis.*

- Reduced opportunities for advancement within the Service: Officers find promotions to the upper grades coming more slowly than anticipated as the number of senior positions is reduced. Staff corps possibilities for upward mobility diminish as severe personnel shortages in staff slots prevent excursion tours and training for new skills.
- Open dissatisfaction with the routine and quality of much Foreign Service work: It is often hard to see how stamping visas contributes to the formulation of foreign policy.
- Open and frequently angry articulation of all of the above problems.

Discipline has cracked, and esprit de corps has crumbled under the pressure of these problems. The facade of stoicism is gone, but I would like to put this "decline" into perspective, something CBS did not do. (I do not write in response to the TV Special. This article was nearly complete before the program was aired, but since a national audience saw a generally misleading piece with a lot of whining and some inaccurate statistics, some response is called for.)

I would like to look at the so-called decline of the Foreign Service by examining statistics in four areas: officers leaving the Service, spouse dissatisfaction, potential candidates for appointment as junior officers and the new breed of JOT.

Officer Attrition

Though members of the Foreign Service question, complain and use every avenue and forum available to confront management with demands for change and improvement, they are NOT leaving the Service in greater numbers nor in patterns significantly different from those of the last 17 years. (Collected attrition statistics for State and ICA are not available for the period before that, and since that puts us at about the time of Vietnam, we have a pretty good picture to date of what many consider the "new" Foreign Service.) Consider the situation in two agencies:

At the Department of State well over half—55 to 60 percent—of today's entering officers are projected to "go the distance," that is to complete at least 25-year careers. This figure has remained stable over the ten years that related data has been analyzed by the Officer of Manpower Statistics. Almost half of those who do quit realize their mistake early: each entering class loses about 15 percent in the first five to six years.

Attrition patterns at ICA show similar consistency. Worried that there might be an accelerating drain in Foreign Service ranks, that agency last summer analyzed officer attrition patterns for the 15 years from 1964 to 1978 and was happily surprised to find no significant change over the period. Greatest attrition over the 15 years occurred between the second and eighth years of service. By the end of eight years, one third of each class had resigned. Date of entry was not important, nor was age of officers or marital status. Time in service was the governing factor. (Women and minorities left at rates substantially above the overall figure.) At the end of 15 years approximately 53 percent of each class remained in service with attrition projected to be very low from then until retirement. This figure is almost identical to State's estimate that 55 to 60 percent of its current JOT class will stay at least 25 years.

The greatest fluctuations in attrition patterns occur at the class 3 level, and I feel that this is what most of the "Foreign Service in decline" noise is about. Mid-life and mid-career are much discussed stations of decision, and Foreign Service officers are not immune to the pressure of vital choices, especially in an era when few can make career commitments they know will be forever. "It used to be like the priesthood," an officer contemplating resignation told me, "but today even that isn't necessarily forever."

Periodically several factors combine to make departure more interesting than remaining to a large number of officers at the class 3 level. We are now clearly in such a period (and we speak here more of early retirement than resignation). The factors are salary economics, doubts about career potential, low morale resulting from these two and increasing family demands.

Results of an AFSA attitudinal survey released in August 1980 bear this out. Over 1,100 AFSA members answered a questionnaire mailed to them last spring. Most significant was that nearly 50 percent of all those responding answered "Yes" to the question, "Are you seriously considering leaving the Foreign Service?" CBS used this figure to say that half the entire Service was seriously considering leaving! It should be clear that the 1,100 who voluntarily responded cannot be considered a random sample of a Service more than ten times that size, many of whom did not reply to the AFSA questionnaire. Still the survey is valuable as a warning. Its greatest contribution is in the follow-up questions. In answer to why people were seriously considering leaving reasons one, two and three were inadequate pay, lack of promotion and morale. (Spouse employment was at the bottom of this list.)

In class 3 the officer has reached the pay cap. Annuities appreciate faster than today's salaries. The bottleneck opening to class 2 is congested. At ICA a bewilderingly small quantity of cream can burst through to the coveted senior ranks each year. (Only 3.4 percent of ICA eligible class 3 officers were promoted on the January '81 list. At State, where 19.2 percent of eligible class 3 FSOs were promoted in 1980, the problem is less exaggerated.)

Inject into the pay and promotion picture children's educational problems, spouse desires for career continuity, aging parents—there is a good chance that an impatient top officer with other options will move to a second, more lucrative career on his fiftieth birthday. Some I interviewed suggest that it is often the best who are lost this way, because they are the very ones with options. Those who feel locked in stay, nourish their bitterness, further aggravate the congestion and generally help poison morale.

One ICA officer summed up. "Look, I stand to lose 12 percent of my buying power each year. With two kids in college I can't keep this up—and the odds of getting past the three-to-two bottleneck are terrible. It's not a question of performance—a lot of truly superior people are struck. I really love this career, but it's become a crap-shoot—and my wife isn't hot to leave her work and go out again, so I'm looking while I'm young and marketable."

He's looking and talking about it, but he hasn't done it and may not if the pay cap comes off and/or he pops through with a promotion and/or his wife can continue her work at their next post. Endless public catharsis—what one woman called "the bitch factor"—leads to a lot of misunderstanding and the kind of over-

statement we heard in the CBS Special.

Spouse Dissatisfaction

The question of unhappy wives must also be put into perspective. The myth says that wives are increasingly not accompanying their husbands to post because they are fed up with the quality of life abroad and are reluctant to leave careers and well paying jobs. Perhaps. So concerned were State senior personnel people that this kind of revolution could break the Service that last spring they cabled all posts requesting information on exactly "Who is at post?" Results: 90 percent of all married personnel abroad had spouses in residence at post, far more than anyone had dared hope with all the rumor, talk and threats. The 10 percent not in residence included evacuees, spouses waiting for kids to finish a school term, those gone for medical reasons, in fact those away for all reasons. It is certainly true that some women have left careers and forfeited potentially high salaries to accompany husbands, but who ever said there would be no hard choices? Today's recruitment pamphlets and training sessions and Overseas Briefing Center courses make it clear that this kind of choice will have to be made. They frankly point out that an officer with a professional spouse in law, medicine, scientific research, architecture and a number of other fields requiring licensing or special credentials or continuity just might not be ideally suited to the Foreign Service. No one today comes in blind to these problems. The present crunch is mainly with women already in the Foreign Service for some years who have grown children and want to go back to careers or to begin careers they never had. These women are often wives of the class 3 officers with pay cap and promotion worries also.

The AFSA survey is revealing on the spouse-employment question. Of the approximately 500 people who said they were seriously considering leaving, only 26 mentioned spouse employment as the main reason. Of the entire 1,100 people responding only 13 considered spouse employment the most important problem facing the service. That makes sense. An employee would not be expected to consider his or her spouse's situation as number one on either of these lists, but note: the issue rated only thirteenth place in a list of "topics of concern" to the Foreign Service, far below morale, pay, danger and nearly everything else one can think of.

Even so, there is no danger that the spouse-employment subject will be dropped as a "bitch factor." Top personnel people at State, ICA, AID and Commerce all named the spouse question as the key to future personnel concerns. All assured me they were actively examining suggestions for wider employment, new career options and even more flexible separate maintenance possibilities. They invite any ideas that will help the Service accommodate a growing number of working and career spouses. The Family Liaison Office, working closely with personnel, has as one of its main goals the expansion of bilateral agreements with foreign governments which would allow spouses to work in the private sector abroad. (So far only Canada has signed such an agreement with us). Even the idea of recognizing the Foreign Service representational senior spouse with her own salary is a future possibility which has considerable support in personnel circles. Add to these options the tandem couple arrangement, local hire possibilities overseas and PIT (part-time, intermittent, temporary) positions, and it becomes clear that there is no single mold for the new Foreign Service spouse.

Potential Candidates

How does the Service look from the outside, from the place where it really counts—the vantage point of the hopeful, potential young officer? Reflecting on all the problems facing us today, a 23-year senior officer observed soberly, "If I were a young man out shopping today, I might just pass this window by." But they are not passing it by.

Outsiders still find the career attractive. The Board of Examiners reports that over 13,000 took the written exam on December 6, 1980. This falls short of the total in 1975, the last decade's peak, but it is up 15 percent over 1979. This is impressive when you consider that candidates know the progression from written exam to oral to security check to appointment will take at least one year. More significant than this year's total, perhaps, is the 1979 situation. Our hostages were seized between the registration date and the exam date that year. Even so the same percentage of those who had pre-registered actually appeared for the exam as is expected each year—about 60 percent. (This is seen by the board as probably due to the country's economic situation, specifically the difficulty getting jobs in a number of professions from which the Foreign Service traditionally draws.)

BEX officers express the belief that more honest and effective recruitment and the recent publicity given the Foreign Service have encouraged a valuable self-selection process and that we are now getting "a candidate more suitable to us."

The New Breed

Who is this new candidate? Who is the new junior officer? Generally he and she (women comprise about 30 percent of each new class at State and up to 40 percent at ICA) are older—average age is 30 to 31, better educated—more than half have graduate degrees, and they are more experienced than their counterparts just 10 years ago. More are married, more are parents, fewer have military experience, and a large portion have firsthand knowledge of living and working overseas. Interestingly, they also generally have less language ability. Many are beginning second careers, and with the age limit lifted, some are on career number three. Geographical distribution and racial make-up of classes are more representative of the US population. Never again will three eastern universities each provide 10 percent of entering Foreign Service classes year after year.

Training officers find the new people more mature with wider insights and less naivete than their predecessors. They are seen as less likely to enter into doomed psychological contracts with the Service in which they blindly and indiscriminately overwork year after year, ignoring other aspects of their lives in the unrealistic hope of one day receiving recognition and rewards the Service may not bestow. "You must work hard to rise," a still enthusiastic State senior officer says unequivocally, "but burning yourself out is no distinction. The intelligent officer understands that the key is to

(Continued on page 44)

Association News

State Standing Committee

STANDBY PAY—OTHER AFSA CONCERNS

A flood of angry cables on the subject of standby pay has poured in from the field. AFSA sympathizes with all those affected, but, as we've stated before, compensation for standby duty is severely restricted by federal law. AFSA will be working with Congress to have the law changed, or to have State exempted. In the meantime, there will be some available relief for "worst cases."

AFSA will soon begin negotiations with management over implementation of the new allowances provided in the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The talks had been delayed pending approval of the State budget, since it was not known what funds would be available.

Management will soon be sending AFSA the precepts for the 1981 promotion panels. Among other items, we will be looking at requirements concerning low-ranking statements for staff corps members. The precepts for senior boards will receive particular scrutiny.

AFSA is pleased to welcome Emmett O'Brien as a voting member of the State Standing Committee. Formerly liaison between the September 17 group and AFSA, Emmett has been one of our hardest-working members on issues of interest to communicators.

The members of AFSA's Extraordinary Dangers Committee met in March with State Department officers to review security at Central American posts. We were impressed with the level and amount of attention being given to the problem. AFSA will continue to monitor the situation.

State Standing has begun to look into regulations and practices of issuing security violations at posts, having received a number of complaints from members in the field. There seems to be a great diversity in these practices from one post to another, and even within the same post.

AID NEWS

The AFSA AID standing Committee and AID management reached agreement on the AID Senior Foreign Service conversion package on March 19.

As part of the negotiations on the package AFSA called for, inter alia, the introduction of career counseling and open assignments for AID's Foreign Service employees. After forcing management to face the issues, management provided the following to AFSA in a side letter to our negotiated agreement.

A. *Career Counseling for the Senior Foreign Service:* We agree with the need for a career counselor, able to devote the time required, who is a member of the SFS. We are now developing a plan which will spell out the resources required for Foreign Service career development, including counseling services. As a temporary measure we plan to assign this counseling responsibility to a senior Foreign Service officer, by the end of August 1981, who will counsel both members and prospective members of the SFS. By next fall the agency will be in a better position to determine its continuing needs.

B. *Foreign Service Assignment System.* We believe your suggestions on the assignment system for the SFS should be viewed in context of restructuring the entire assignment system as it relates to all members of the Foreign Service. But, because of its linkages to the career development program the requirements to be placed on the new assignment system must be dealt with contextually. The assignment system is currently under review and it will be redesigned to meet the spirit and intent of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. As a precept, we believe that all officers and members of the Foreign Service should be provided with timely and adequate information concerning all projected vacancies both in Washington and overseas. Based on this information, the respective officers and members should be given an opportunity to indicate to the agency their preferences for next assignment, in order of priority. We plan to have such an assignment system approved by February 1, 1982.

Membership Drive Continues

AID AFSA membership is now comfortably above 50 percent of entire AID Foreign Service. The standing Committee wishes to express appreciation for the extraordinary efforts made by chapter reps in achieving this goal. The Standing Committee urges all AFSA members to continue efforts to recruit new members so that our gains of past year can be solidified. In support of this goal, materials are being sent to chapter reps. While progress has been made, much remains to be done in the next year. A larger membership is essential to AFSA in continuing to accomplish its goals.

Tax Info

ESTABLISHING A DOMICILE

Once again, AFSA wishes to caution members to take care when establishing a domicile for tax purposes. In a recent case, a Foreign Service officer, who owned property in and lived in the District of Columbia, recently underwent an expensive legal battle to prove her domicile was in Florida, making her not liable for District income taxes.

Though the officer's parents live in Florida, she had neither voted, held a drivers' license, nor owned property in that state, some of the criteria usually used to determine domicile. Florida therefore had no record of her, and she lost the case and was assessed for back taxes—plus interest—in the District.

Because several states do not tax personal income (Florida, Texas, Wyoming, Washington, South Dakota, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Connecticut), many Foreign Service officers claim domiciles in those states. But to do so the officer must have clear proof of a domicile, and the state should have the officer listed as domiciled there.

PERSONAL PROPERTY LOSSES UNDER CLAIMS ACT

In December of 1980 the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act of 1946 was amended to authorize payment of no more than $40,000 (previously $15,000) to compensate USG employees for damage or loss of personal property in a foreign country due to evacuation, political unrest, hostile acts, mob violence and terrorist attacks directed against the USG or its employees. The amendment is retroactive to December 31, 1978.

This is definitely good news for many Foreign Service families who have or will experience damages or loss of household goods in these politically uncertain times. We are concerned, however, about two factors that reduce the potential benefit considerably, as one employee recently discovered:

- The department does not take replacement value or appreciation into account when adjudicating a claim. On the contrary, the depreciation requirement takes a big chunk out of the claim.
- Goods termed "non-essential" are broken into categories with specific maximum ceilings. These included hobbies, books, china, crystal, silverware, etc. The Claims Department maintains that it is not an insurance agency and that employees should insure their personal "non-essential" belongings with a private carrier. The concept of raising the ceiling was discussed but rejected by Congress during preliminary hearings, despite the fact that private carriers do not cover losses related to war or civil strife.

The claim processing or "adjudication" can have an important bearing on net compensation. We advise employees to familiarize themselves with the regulations (6 FAM 300; AID HB 23, App 10A) and to request a copy of their final adjudicated claims. The basis for assigning items to certain categories can be ambiguous. You might find a number of items you considered essential lumped under hobbies, such as, a portable camp stove that should be viewed as an essential item in certain countries due to frequent power failures. Where there is a choice between two limited categories, items may have been uniformly assigned to one of them. The result is that the maximum is quickly reached and all amounts above the ceiling are automatically excluded from compensation. If you are in disagreement with the processed claim, you may request reconsideration within six months.

RYAN ELECTED AAFSW PRESIDENT

Patricia Ryan, formerly the chairperson of the Forum Committee on Family Concerns and of the Legislative Liaison of the Association of American Foreign Service Women, was elected president of AAFSW by the membership at its general meeting on March 10. Her term will run till May 1982.

For the past two years, Ryan coordinated lobbying efforts for provisions affecting spouses and families in the Foreign Service Act of 1980. In the Forum Committee, the family advocacy branch of AAFSW, Ryan was concerned with problems relating to divorced Foreign Service spouses. In this regard, she testified in July 1979 before a Congressional hearing on the proposed Foreign Service Act. In addition, she established a support group for divorced and divorcing Foreign Service wives. As a result of its analysis of their situation, AAFSW pressed for passage of the Retirement Income Equity provisions in the act.

A graduate of Principia College, Ryan worked at the Art Institute of Chicago until her husband joined USIA, now ICA, when she accompanied him on assignments to Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Oslo, and an academic year at Harvard University.

Ryan says she will be concerned with the potential erosion of pensions and other benefits by government budget cutters. She hopes to have AAFSW help AFSA in its initiative to study Foreign Service insurance needs. She says AAFSW will continue to seek ways to expand spouse employment opportunities, including a study on a placement service for spouses.

Also elected to the Board of the AAFSW were Patricia Barbis, first vice president; Catherine Miller, second vice president; Adele Rosen, recording secretary; Mary Lucius, corresponding secretary; Gladys Baker, alternate corresponding secretary; Joan McGinley, treasurer; Marlen Neumann, alternate treasurer; Lilo Dugstad, AAFSW desk chairman; Irene Novak, legislative liaison; Muriel Hanson, community relations chairman; Patricia Mitchell, membership chairman; Lesley Dorman, program chairman and Sally Smyser, public relations chairman.

NEW JOURNAL EDITOR

STEPHEN R. DUJACK

Steve comes to the *Journal* after a year's work as a graphic artist in Alexandria. For four years previous to that he was associate editor of the *Princeton Alumni Weekly*, the nation's most frequently published alumni magazine. As second-in-command, he was responsible for about half of the magazine, managing several departments and writing the feature-news page. The magazine's principal feature writer, he drafted stories on varied topics, such as sports, law, medicine, politics, science, architecture, art—and humor. He served as the magazine's chief design consultant and produced most of its maps, charts, and other artwork. In addition, he took many photographs for the magazine. While in Princeton, Steve did free-lance writing for *Sports Illustrated* and *Omni* magazine and free-lance photography for a Doubleday and Co. bookcover, *Mystery* magazine, and several other publications. He is a graduate in philosophy of Princeton University, where he served on the managing boards of three undergraduate publications, helping to found two of them. Upon graduation, he received a journalism award from the *Daily Princetonian*.

In high school Steve was a sports and news stringer for six area newspapers and wrote a sports column and occasional news articles for two. He is 28 years old, single, lives in Arlington, likes to tell bad jokes and to cook, ski, run, and avoid traffic tickets.

MONEY MARKET FUNDS

While AFSA members who live in the Washington area are privy to all sorts of information on personal financial planning, from newspapers and the investment community our colleagues in the field are sometimes insulated from current developments in money management. AFSA therefore has decided to introduce a monthly column on personal financial planning as a service to its members stationed abroad. The column will be written by local financial planner, Howard Glick, who will also answer questions in this space on your own situation. Queries should be addressed to AFSA, Members' Interests Coordinator.

PERSONAL FINANCIAL PLANNING

To plan your family's financial situation well, you must treat it like a business, and no business can prosper without a plan based on accurate information. Obviously, you must first make a balance sheet listing all sources of income against expenses, for no business can operate without accurate information. Then you must consider emergency funds, health, disability and life insurance, and of course your income tax situation. A plan for an investment program should evolve from this analysis of your balance sheet, taxes, and your financial goals, which properly should include plans for retirement and children's education. Future articles will touch on many of the above subjects and accompanying problems, but to start I would like to talk about where to keep emergency funds providing a possible monthly cash flow—money market mutual funds.

You will not find a money market mutual fund (MMMF) at your local bank, savings and loan, or credit union. And the MMMF is not insured by the federal government, as is your regular savings account. It is a mutual fund, making you a shareholder, though you do not own the underlying investments of the fund. These underlying investments can consist of government-backed securities, certificates of deposit, corporate commercial paper, and other short-term investments. The MMMF is unique in that you are paid on the basis of an interest rate that changes every day. These funds are therefore of necessity short term, normally no more than 120 days.

The MMMFs have grown to more than $100 billion in value, supplied by many individuals, with small amounts of money, to large corporations with millions of dollars to invest short term.

The most important points to consider in an MMMF are safety, liquidity, and yield. The safest funds are those that invest strictly in government agency—backed securities. The most liquid funds are those, a majority, which allow check-writing privileges, with a standard minimum of $500. Yields vary, but they should exceeed the current passbook rates, the best argument for using these funds.

The minimum to open an account varies from $500 to $5000, with many requiring only $1000. Additional deposits may be made by checks for more than a prescribed minimum. Money may be withdrawn or deposited by electronic wire transfer from a bank.

Unless the underlying investments of the fund drop to the passbook rate—a highly unlikely situation, at which time you could transfer your funds—you will receive a higher return for your money. As of April 1, 1981, the average interest yield of the funds was in excess of 14 percent.

The opportunity to participate in a high-return investment opportunity without market risk to your capital is an inviting prospect in today's volatile interest enviroment. But, as good as MMMFs sound, remember they are subject to taxes on the interest, and the return after taxes is not likely to exceed inflation. The MMMF therefore is not a long-term investment but rather a sort of parking place for money until needed to meet current needs. The funds are sponsored by most major brokerage firms, many large insurance companies, and some independent firms.

AAFSW News

TAX DEDUCTIONS FOR '81

Here's how you can earn yourself a nice tax deduction, clean out those extra books in the attic, and support the Foreign Service scholarship program all at the same time!

AAFSW is seeking donations of books, records, stamps and art items for its 21st annual "Bookfair with an International Flair" which will take place October 17-24, 1981 at the State Department.

Almost any clean, undamaged books, including paperbacks, hardbacks, fiction, non-fiction, textbooks and books in foreign languages will be accepted. Especially wanted this year are children's books, rare collector's editions, and books on foreign affairs, government and political science. Maps, stamps, records, paintings, prints, posters, small art objects and exotica from around the world are welcome.

Donations can be left at various points within the State Department buildings or can, in most cases, by picked up by AAFSW volunteers. Bookbins are located in Main State at the D Street and the 21st Street entrances and by the basement elevators, and in the main lobbies of the State Department Annex, FSI, and 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue. For further information call 223-5796 between 10:00 and 3:00.

All donations are tax deductible and a receipt will be given. Since its inception in 1960, AAFSW has, through its annual Bookfair, provided over $400,000 to the Foreign Service Scholarship program and community projects. Open to children of all the foreign service agencies, the scholarships are awarded on the basis of need, and merit awards are given for exceptional scholastic achievement.

OUR COVER ARTIST

Joyce MacCorquodale has studied painting in Bogota, Santo Domingo and Washington, D.C. She had a one-man show in Santo Domingo in 1974. Mrs. MacCorquodale was born in Boston and graduated from Columbia Teachers College. She accompanied her husband, Don, on assignments to Guatemala, Colombia, the Philippines and the Dominican Republic.

FOR RETIREES: A DIET COLA?

Forces now in motion may eventually fix the March 1, 1981 retirement cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) as the last of the semi-annual COLA increases. Unless stalled by congressional floor action which seems highly unlikely, it apears that the law will be changed to provide a single annual COLA effective each March 1 which will reflect the rise in the price index during the preceding calendar year.

Before the election Candidate Reagan voiced unequivocal support for a continuation of the semi-annual COLA in a letter to the National Association of Retired Federal Employees which was widely publicized throughout the federal retiree community. Despite his pre-election assurances, President Reagan's budget reduction proposals to the Congress include halving federal retirees' COLA from two to one a year. At this writing his budget package has already been passed by the Senate with an overwhelming majority. Although hearings have not yet been scheduled on the necessary reconciliation legislation, given the present climate of fiscal austerity, the odds are heavily against any further continuation of the semi-annual COLA.

Senator Ted Stevens (R., Alaska) created a stir among both the federal employee and retiree ranks recently when he introduced a bill which was described as an alternative to an across-the-board reduction in the COLA. Senator Stevens's bill would limit retirees under 60 years of age to a single annual COLA equal to one-half the rise in the price index; it would give retirees aged 60 to 65 one full COLA annually; and it would continue with the semi-annual COLA for all retirees over 65.

Hearings on this bill were held April 1. Administration witnesses, federal employee and retiree organizations (including AFSA) and military associations were unanimous in their opposition to the proposal and present reports indicate that the bill has been shelved indefinitely, if not dropped altogether.

As has been pointed out in our earlier bulletins, the present 97th Congress seems destined to grapple with a number of basic issues affecting retirement and retirees, both public and private. A cut-back on the frequency of the COLA for military and civilian federal retirees now seems likely to be one more salvo in a continuing campaign to recast the present structure of the federal retirement system. As this process goes forward, AFSA will continue to put forth its best efforts to protect the interests of all foreign service people, both active and retired, in this area of vital importance to us all.

Outgoing AAFSW President Lesley Dorman (right) accepts gift from Sally Briggs at the March 10 meeting.

POST REPORTS

Available now—Post Reports from all countries having diplomatic relations with the United States. These were originally for use by embassy officials but are now on sale to the public through the Superintendent of Documents. Thirty post reports have been completed and the remaining reports will be ready by mid-1983. Post Reports are illustrated and contain brief descriptions of each country's:

climate
population
public transportation
arts
sciences
geography
education
communication
health
medicine

Also included is information more specific to the actual embassy. These reports also contain information that is useful and interesting to travelers or visitors such as:

housing and furnishings
food
clothing
supplies and services
educational facilities
social life
recreation

A bibliography of further reading on the country is also provided. Price list is available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Dept. 50, Washington, D.C. 20402.

QUOTE OF THE MONTH

"It is true that sometimes a lawyer diplomat has made a great sueeess of negotiation, especially in countries where the final responsibility for public policy lay with public assemblies which could be moved by adroit speech, but in general the training of a lawyer breeds habits and dispositions of mind which are not favorable to the practice of diplomacy. And though it be true that success in the law-courts depends largely upon a knowledge of human nature and an ability to exploit it—both of which are factors in diplomacy—it is none the less true that the occupation of the lawyer, which is to split hairs about nothing, is not a good preparation for the treatment of grave public affairs in the region of diplomacy."

—Francois de Callieres, *On the Manner of Negotiating With Princes* (originally published 1716; translation from English edition of 1963)

AFSA ELECTIONS COMMITTEE 1981
P.O. Box 57121, WEST END BRANCH,
WASHINGTON, D.C., 20037

The Elections Committee announces that in accordance with AFSA Bylaws, and pursuant to the terms of the 1981 AFSA Election Call, the following members have been duly nominated and have accepted their candidacies for the positions indicated below in the 1981 election of Officers and Constituency Representatives on the AFSA Governing Board.

These campaign statements are published in accordance with Article VI(4) of the AFSA Bylaws. In publishing them, AFSA and its Standing Committee on Elections are required by Executive Order 11636 and its implementing regulations, as interpreted by the Department of Labor, to do so without making any modification of their contents. AFSA therefore disclaims any responsibility for the content of any campaign statements made by the candidates. Content is solely the responsibility of the candidates.

PRESIDENT	**ORGANIZATION**
VICE PRESIDENT	
1. Anthea S. de Rouville (The Slate)	State
SECOND VICE PRESIDENT	
1. Ronald Witherell (The Slate)	AID NE/PD
SECRETARY	
1. Joseph N. McBride (The Slate)	State H
TREASURER	
1. Michael Speers (The Slate)	AID AFR/DR
STATE REPRESENTATIVES	
1. Robert Franks (The Slate)	State SY/PSI/I
2. Donald K. Holm (The Slate)	State ARA/ECP
3. Irving Williamson (The Slate)	USTR
AID REPRESENTATIVES	
1. Ralph Barnett	AID ASIA/PD/ENGR
2. William Schoux (The Slate)	AID PPC
ICA REPRESENTATIVES	
1. Stephen Chaplin (The Slate)	ICA PMG/GF
RETIRED REPRESENTATIVES	
1. Spencer King (The Slate)	
2. Charles Whitehouse (The Slate)	

It is each AFSA member's responsibility to see to it that his or her proper address and constituency (STATE, AID, USICA, or RETIRED) are on record with AFSA. Ballots will be mailed on or about May 15, 1981, and marked Ballots must be returned by 5:00 P.M. June 30, 1981. If you have not received your Ballot by June 8, 1981, notify the Chairman of the AFSA Elections Committee IMMEDIATELY in writing at P.O. Box 57121, West End Branch, Washington, D.C. 20037 or by "AFSA Channel" cable marked for delivery to AFSA Elections Committee.

Notice from the AFSA Elections Committee

An unusual situation has developed in the concurrent election campaign to elect a new Governing Board. On April 3, Mr. Kenneth Bleakley, present President of the Governing Board and sole candidate for that same position in the forthcoming election, officially informed the Election Committee that his unexpected assignment to an overseas post made it necessary for him to withdraw his candidacy.

The Elections Committee immediately informed the AFSA membership of this development by an announcement dated April 3 mailed to all AFSA members. That announcement also drew attention to the provisions of the AFSA Bylaws that permit members to "write" in on the official ballot the name(s) of any member(s) who fulfills the eligibility requirements as of June 30 of the election year." The announcement also set forth certain regulations that the Committee had adopted relating to possible write-in candidates for positions for which there are no regularly nominated candidates.

As this issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* goes to press two write-in candidates for the Presidency have informed the Committee of their candidacy and have submitted statements which are published in the pages which follow.

The next major event in the election process is a campaign meeting which will give AFSA members an opportunity to question candidates on their position on various AFSA issues. This meeting, which is being organized by the Elections Committee, is scheduled to take place in the East Auditorium of the State Department on Tuesday, May 12, between 12:30 and 1:30 P.M. AFSA members, and particularly those in the Washington metropolitan area, are urged to note this date and to be present.

STATEMENTS OF DECLARED WRITE-IN CANDIDATES FOR THE PRESIDENCY

CHARLES S. WHITEHOUSE

The present members of AFSA's Governing Board who are running unopposed for re-election were elected two years ago on a slate which promised to maintain the high standards, the commitment to duty and the service discipline which have traditionally characterized the Foreign Service of the United States. Under the able leadership of Ken Bleakley, the Board has represented the interests of the Association during the passage of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and during a period in which the plight of the hostages in Iran brought unusual attention to the Foreign Service. With Ken Bleakley's assignment as DCM in El Salvador, I have agreed to become an independent write-in candidate for the Presidency of AFSA. It will be my intention to pursue the goals and objectives for which we were originally elected. Of immediate concern is the need to work closely with the Department on the implementation of the provisions of the new Foreign Service Act to assure that benefits gained in that legislation are realized.

The role of AFSA in seeking improved compensation for stand-by, danger and hardships and professional recognition of all members of the Foreign Service, regardless of rank or category, received well-deserved emphasis over the past two years, and I pledge to you that the emphasis will continue undiminished in the years to come. In this regard, I am pleased that I shall have Thea de Rouville continuing as Vice President, as she brings invaluable experience and commitment.

I am grateful for the endorsement I have received from her and from former President Ken Bleakley.

In the past year, the Association has added 1,000 new members, which has permitted us to expand the professional staff handling grievances and members' interests. The new Foreign Service of the United States now includes Commerce and Agriculture. I intend to work closely with the new Treasurer to assure the most effective possible use of our resources and expanded organizational responsibilities.

I would appreciate your support in this election and pledge to work toward maintaining a Foreign Service which is dynamic, forward-looking and fully funded.

JEFFREY WHITE

Foreign Service personnel and their families are reexamining their commitment to worldwide service with increasing frequency. I feel this can be attributed to three recent developments. First, there is the threat in a growing number of areas of the world from terrorism, mob violence and street crime. Second, there are more and more spouses seeking serious, meaningful employment at overseas posts. And third, the inattention to inservice professional training is creating situations where personnel are being sent to jobs for which they are not adequately prepared. As President of AFSA, I would devote my time and energies to seeking substantial improvements in these areas. Specifically,

- We need, on the most urgent basis, a higher level of protection for our homes and families at many overseas posts. We also need implementation of many of the hardship incentive allowances, such as the Special Incentive Posts, lifting the cap on the Differential Allowance, and R&R to the United States, which the new Act provides for but for which Congress has withheld funding. I would give highest priority to ensuring that every effort is made to enhance personal security overseas, and to fully implement our new allowances.
- Not only do we need to expand language and functional training for spouses, and provide day-care facilities when necessary, we need to improve the prospects for overseas employment on the local economy through such mechanisms as reciprocity. A good deal of progress has been made in this area, but there is still a ways to go.
- Although a new professional training program of high merit has been assembled, it has yet to be funded. AFSA should exert its efforts where needed to implement this program. The basic issue of professionalism is at stake.

These are not the only issues, though. There is much of the new Foreign Service Act still to be implemented. Our recruitment policies need to be examined to ensure that we are getting the functional specialties and numbers we need without sacrificing either standards of quality or EEO and Affirmative Action goals. But regardless of the issue, as President of AFSA my efforts will go toward ensuring that we are doing the right things for all personnel of the Foreign Affairs agencies.

I have been a State Department Administrative Officer for eight years. I learned in Kiev what a hardship post is like. Although the unprecedented circumstances of this election have caused the candidates for President to run as write-in candidates, a number of members of the current Board have encouraged my action. As President, I feel I can serve with courage and conviction, and I ask for your vote in the election.

AID REPRESENTATIVE
RALPH BARNETT

I deem it unnecessary to repeat my credentials as stated in the April publication of the *Foreign Service Journal* but rather to state what my worthy opponent and I agree to be one of the shortcomings within AID. The subject matter is career counseling. I have always felt the Agency's lack of professional career counseling is a serious omission. A specific training program should be laid out for all Foreign Service personnel at time of hire that would be adhered to throughout his or her career. If mandated to one's supervisor, it would avoid any supervisor embarrassment and/or a guilt complex to the Foreign Service Officer for taking time off from one's regular duties to attend a prescribed training course.

This is but one of a number of delinquent matters that I would hope to pursue if I am elected AID representative.

STATEMENT OF THE SLATE

The Association is both a union and a professional association. The current Governing Board, headed by Ken Bleakley and Thea de Rouville, has tried to use each role to complement the other. It has worked. The Foreign Service Act, pay comparability, the successful effort to prevent Staff Corps downgrading, are only some of the successful results of this dual approach.

The slate we ask you to endorse is pledged to continue the pattern which has proved so successful during the past two eventful years—heavy emphasis on union concerns and matters of bread-and-butter importance to our members, and an equally heavy emphasis on advancing the interests of our profession by:

- reaching out to the Hill, the American public and the media;
- building a greater understanding of the role of the Foreign Service and its importance to national security;
- publicizing our achievements and creating a perception of our problems and their underlying causes.

A climate has been created and friends made for the Association through which further concrete gains can be made for all of our constituents. The budget crunch may slow us down—it must not be allowed to stop us.

We believe deeply that Foreign Service careers must be based on the following principles:

- the selection of the best qualified from all segments of American society;
- a predictable and equitable pattern of promotion and career development;
- a competitive service utilizing selection out based strictly on merit and due process;
- the utilization of career personnel before turning to outside hire;
- the protection of a retirement system which recognizes the unique demands of Foreign Service life.

Six members of the slate are on the present Board, six are new. The new candidates were chosen because they are broadly representative of the Foreign Service and from among those who have proved not only willing and effective workers committed to slate goals, but also experts in their fields.

After nominations for candidates closed, Ken Bleakley was asked to serve as DCM in El Salvador. He could not, as a management official, remain on the ballot as candidate for President and has therefore withdrawn. Since he was unopposed, there is now no candidate for President, and that office will be filled by write-in vote.

We are delighted that Charlie Whitehouse has agreed to run as a write in candidate for AFSA President, and heartily endorse his candidacy. Ambassador Whitehouse has been active on the present Governing Board and is pledged to continue its policies. He is widely respected in the Department, on the Hill, among retirees and his colleagues on the present Board. He is a fair and energetic proponent of the Foreign Service. He will bring balance to the predominantly activist, mid-level members on our slate, and his experience, public relations skills, and concern for the future of the Service will be invaluable. Together, we will continue to demonstrate to management that AFSA is the organization which actively represents the concerns of the Foreign Service and accordingly is a force to be reckoned with.

We ask you to write in Charles Whitehouse's name for President.

Among our slate's top priority future goals are:

- negotiate implementing regulations under the Foreign Service Act and monitor closely how they are carried out;
- push to obtain full funding for all the allowances and benefits in the Act;
- get realistic stand-by pay regulations;
- expand the quality and variety of services available to our membership;
- seek more participation by posts overseas, both on overall AFSA policy and on specific issues which affect particular posts, such as reciprocity on diplomatic privileges;
- emphasize broad analytical and managerial experience as a positive factor in selecting program directors for the Senior Foreign Service and promote mid-level assignment and Selection Board precepts that take this into account.

With regard to matters related specifically to AID, we will be working on the issues of special interest to AID membership. We want to see a more open assignment process in which more timely and accurate information on available positions is provided to all Foreign Service personnel. We will work to protect and expand promotion opportunities for the foreign service by challenging outside hires at the higher grades and by assuring the principles of the Obey amendment are maintained. We will continue to work toward commissioning for AID Foreign Service Officers and a practical career counseling system. With the problems of dual career couples increasingly an issue of concern for both the individuals and the Foreign Service, we will seek to expand the opportunities for spouses who wish to work and to facilitate tandem assignments for Foreign Service couprovince chief. How could five presidents and seven administrations,

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Why Are We Dismantling the (Senior) Foreign Service?

GEORGE B. LAMBRAKIS
HERMAN J. COHEN

EXPLANATORY PREFACE: Under the terms of the new Foreign Service Act, senior officers (current classes 2, 1, and CM) are being integrated—on pain of early retirement—into the Senior Foreign Service. Beginning in 1982-83 some 33 percent of those being reviewed per year will be retired—mandatorily, if they have not done so voluntarily. While all details have not been worked out, new promotees to the three senior classes—counselor, minister-counselor, and career minister—will "enjoy" minimum times in class of seven, five, or four years, respectively. Their careers might be extended for another three to four years at a time, though some extensions will be entirely at management's discretion. Thus a new Senior Foreign Service officer will have at most five to seven years of guaranteed tenure he can count on as opposed to the present 12 years in class 2 and 22 years in classes 1 and 2 combined. Tenure under this system will be reserved primarily for those in the three mid-career classes, who will continue to have tenure of 20 years combined. As all executive branch agencies, including State, implement substantial reductions in personnel ceilings, there will be an obvious temptation to lop off larger numbers of senior officers through discretionary refusals of limited career extensions.

There are undoubtedly a number of good things in the latest Foreign Service Act which took effect February 15. But its treatment of the Senior Foreign Service is certainly not one.

Various arguments are put forward as to what that section of the act is intended to do. Senior officers in the Foreign Service today have no doubts as to one thing it will do—cut into their numbers. It was defended on that ground by some high ranking FSOs themselves, and bought by the American Foreign Service Association, whose leadership is almost entirely mid-career these days.

This brings to mind AFSA less than ten years ago. Then the mid-career officers opted against a tight time-in-class system for themselves, a system which had cut substantially into their numbers for a few years. Instead they went for the present 20-year tenure for the three classes 0-5 through 0-3. It was argued then that building more competition into the system is harmful to creative foreign policy and upsets the lives of the officers involved. Tenure was more important than faster promotion. This was accepted by the department. Is being selected out for time-in-class ("retired" if you will) less upsetting at age 50 or 55 than at 30, 35, or 40? Mid-careerists of today ought to focus on that thought. It might even be pertinent to their own futures if the present act stays in force.

Of course senior officers would be abdicating their responsibility if they did not try to change this act over the next few years. It is just going to be that much harder since some of them testify so strongly for it.

Why oppose it?

First, officers aged 50 to 55 or even 60 are not so old in our American society today. Nor in most developed countries. They are not biologically unfit for high office. Ask Ronald Reagan or Averell Harriman.

Second, officers in their 50s are in many ways at the peak of their ability to perform. They are also in a position to apply wisdom and experience—on the assumption that wisdom and experience still have a certain value even in a world which is changing and requires innovation.

Third, men and women in their 50s often make better diplomats overseas than younger people. Most foreign societies place a positive value on age and experience and respect them more than we do at home.

Fourth, this is the reality in most walks of life, even in America. Except for certain specific areas such as advertising, the top positions in business are replete with people in their 50s. The top positions in government, politics, academe, also show a preponderance of elders alongside the "whiz kids." That is even more the case in Europe and Japan, and many other nations.

Fifth, there is an implicit contract between the Foreign Service and its senior officers, who entered decades ago under a system which promised them security until the age of 60. In a society which is talking of pushing the mandatory retirement age further back (and a Foreign Service Act which has recognized this by moving mandatory retirement from 60 to 65), it makes no sense to winnow out, say, 10-20 percent of the senior officers each year on the assumption that one can tell from their written records that their performance and potential have rendered them relatively unfit. The Foreign Service should gird itself for lawsuits which will claim unconstitutionality in this procedure. Indeed, who is to say what opprobrium will attach to an officer who "couldn't make it" be-

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The authors, FSO-2 and FSO-1, each with 26 years of Foreign Service experience, are approaching 50 years of age. Recent assignments include, for Lambrakis, minister-counselor and chargé d'affaires in Lebanon during that country's civil war and counselor for political affairs in Iran through that revolution; for Cohen, counselor for political affairs in Paris and ambassador to Senegal. They do not feel obsolete. Nor do they think their senior officer colleagues are. They feel it is time to express openly what many senior officers believe but have been reluctant to discuss due to the fashionable emphasis on "competitiveness" in recent years.

yond his basic term as a senior officer?

Sixth, there is something cannibalistic, and just plain dumb, in a process which honors an able FSO-3 by "selection" into senior ranks in one year only to begin considering whether he has become obsolete five years later.

Let us look at the issue from the point of view of the "system" too.

First, assignment becomes very complicated when personnel officers are dealing with a mix of candidates for a position. Those whose time-in-class is to run out while they are in that new assignment will obviously represent more of a gamble for the receiving office or overseas post (despite measures that might be constructed to stretch TIC in particular cases). Every personnel placement specialist will become a predictor of the future of a senior officer. In trying to sell an assignment, he will draw into this prediction process ambassadors, DCMs, and top bureau officials. Suppose they are wrong? Won't the officer have a grievance if he was disadvantaged in getting a job under our open assignments system? Won't he also have a grievance if he got the job by being thus "misled," sent abroad, and then was not retained by the board making the retention decisions? What additional havoc are we wreaking on an already exceedingly complicated personnel placement process?

Second, it is obvious that existence itself (as an FSO) will depend on one's assignment. At present, most FSOs have to put up with lower visibility assignments simply because the majority of senior jobs are of that kind. This puts some limit on cutthroat competition and leaves more room for personal dedication to doing a job even if it is not necessarily likely to lead to early promotion. Looking at a long-range career, officers are content to prepare themselves further, even accept a training assignment, though they know this breaks the pattern of their "good" job assignments and effectively removes them from competition for promotion for a year. Under the new system who will be content to serve in such low-visibility jobs or take a year of training? That will be a risky undertaking even for the newly promoted. All eyes will be riveted on upward mobility—constant motion. And the other jobs will suffer.

Some will argue that all this is not too high a price to pay because it will get faster promotion of younger people to the top (and out). But what is the great premium on youth in this work? And what are the trade-offs? Do we really want a Service in which "career" people are in-and-outers, similar to the non-career (since they will have to maintain their employability in other lines of work)?

The retiring board chairman of du Pont was only recently quoted in the Washington *Post* suggesting that the proven increased productivity of workers in firms such as his own, or in enterprises the Japanese set up in this country, may well be due to lifelong job security. Are we so sure we really know that more and more rapid promotion, with shorter tenure, will improve performance of everyone in our system? How about the average officer? Will he get promoted faster, or just be passed over more frequently? And will he feel and work better for this, knowing he will have to fend for himself in his mid-50s, when family responsibilities may be heavy and it is difficult to get another job?

What about team spirit—and all those exhortations to contribute to group achievement? Isn't that a dominant theme of the executive training seminars most Foreign Service officers are put through several times during their careers—at great cost to the budget? Is greater competition by each officer against all others the way to help develop such team work? We don't know of any training course that recommends it.

Finally, let us look at the bigger picture. What is the value of a career Foreign Service to the president, the Congress, and the American people? Much has been written about making the Service more *responsive* to presidents. It should be *enthusiastic* in carrying out the president's foreign policy.

From another point of view, as a learned mid-career officer with all his seven years of experience in the Foreign Service recently wrote in the *Journal*, the element apparently most missing in FSOs is aggressiveness, the "empire building" instinct.

Does the reader get the message? The quality apparently lacking by this account is activism and energy. Yet observers of the Foreign Service have frequently noted that energy and activism are often found in officers to a greater degree than in their counterparts from other walks of life—even if these are not so well rewarded. We have assumed that is the fault of the system. Could it be a function of the task to be done?

What is the function of the career professional? Is continuity not a great contribution he must make? Why should the taxpayer be saddled with a man or woman for 30 years if that person is not making more of a contribution than the neophyte? Why waste money on training officers and giving them a variety of experience if in the end the main qualities on which their performance depends are pliancy to the policy of the moment and aggressiveness in carrying that out?

Is there not a constructive dynamic in the interplay between the gifted (or just well-connected) non-career policymaker who takes office every two, four, or eight years and the experienced career veteran? If policymakers are occasionally frustrated because they cannot apply far-reaching changes in foreign policy overnight, could that be because the international environment will not accept those changes? Is there wisdom in having us work slowly at it? Is the senior career professional not doing what the American people have been paying him all those years to learn? After all, the president and his direct appointees hold a lot of aces, including, often, the support of Congress and a popular mandate. They can do a lot. But would the American people be better served if no senior career professionals asked the embarrassing questions, based on their greater experience in the field?

We submit that this innovative, impatient, ebullient country can afford to continue the employment of a number of senior officials who have been forced through experience abroad to take cognizance of the different attitudes among other governments and people. It is stupid to throw away such expertise just as it is making its greatest contribution simply because the arguments it puts forth are not always easily digestible by newcomers. American foreign policy lurches enough as it is. We do not need to deprive it of even these fairly minor constraints.

Why Not a Senior Foreign Service Based on Excellence?

LANNON WALKER
KEN BLEAKLEY

George Lambrakis and Herman Cohen provide stimulating positions in a debate on the Senior Foreign Service which should have been joined years ago—or at least during the Days of Decision of 1979-80 about the new Foreign Service Act. If their objective is to illuminate points of concern to many officers of all levels as we proceed with the delicate task of implementing the new act, we applaud their effort. If this is the first shot in an effort to roll back the "up or out features" of the new act in the same way that they were undermined and eventually eliminated in the old one, then this is the time for all who believe in a Foreign Service based on excellence to join the fray.

Getting the Facts Straight

First a word of caution—Foreign Affairs Manual Circulars 8 and 9 contain the definitive regulations on the new Senior Foreign Service negotiated between AFSA and the foreign affairs agencies with the full participation of any and all senior officers who expressed an interest. There are serious factual inaccuracies in the preceding article's portrayal of the new regulations and we would urge all concerned officers to study the regulations in making their own critical decisions about joining the Senior Foreign Service by June 14. We are particularly concerned about the following inaccuracies in the first paragraph of the article:

- It is not correct that "33 percent of those being reviewed per year will be retired mandatorily if they have not done so voluntarily." Senior officers will continue to be reviewed for promotion and selection out for substandard performance, as well as for limited career extensions during the last year of their time in class. Mandatory retirements with immediate annuity for excessive time in class are projected to affect less than five percent of Senior Foreign Service members' respective classes as determined by the selection boards.
- It is not correct that some extensions will be entirely at management's discretion. Section 601 (b) of the act specifically states that the three-year limited career extensions beyond expiration of time in class will be based on the determinations of the selection boards.
- It is misleading to postulate that "There will be an obvious temptation to lop off larger numbers of senior officers through discretionary refusals of limited career extensions." The act specifically mandates that decisions with regard to recruitment, promotion and retention in the service are to be based on systematic long-term projections and the Congress has established specific enforcement measures. (Sec. 601 (c) (2) and Sec. 2402.) The service has a legislated role in assuring that these strictures are carried out.

In sum, the underlying assumption that massive numbers of senior officers are arbitrarily going to receive mandatory separations simply is incorrect. The overwhelming majority of the members of the Senior Foreign Service will continue to leave voluntarily at a time of their own choosing.

We do not find endorsement of the revered principles of experience, rational assignments, enthusiasm and intellectual courage presented in the preceding article in any way inconsistent with a service characterized by regulated competition for promotion and retention at all levels, not excluding the top.

One Service with Shared Career Interests

With regard to the canard that restoration of competition for retention in the Foreign Service is a new feature unique to the senior service foisted upon it by ambitious middle level officers, we would point out the following:

- The Foreign Service Act of 1946 states "Any foreign service officer below the class of career minister who does not receive a promotion to a higher rank within a specified period or who fails to meet the standard of performance required of officers of his class shall be retired from the service. . ." Sec. 633(b). Indeed, meaningful time in class limitations and selection out were working prior to 1974.
- The junior threshold review and senior threshold will continue to result in much higher percentages of mandatory separation among junior and mid-career officer levels as significant as those which will now affect the senior service.
- All levels of the service share an interest in preserving the service we joined in which promotion and retention are based on merit—not longevity. Middle level officers are fully aware that they will be the first to feel the full weight of the restora-

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Book Essay

The Georgetown Revolution

by Smith Simpson

Over the years I have wondered why so much has to be written on foreign affairs, but when it comes to diplomacy itself, this has been scandalously neglected. In this area the professional journals and bookstores have been missing something meaningful, even revolutionary, in the last two years by declining to review or stock the slim publications of the Georgetown Institute for the Study of Diplomacy because their pages run from 11 to 75. Some booklets and pamphlets, they seem to forget, have been more innovative and done more to move the world than books. They should remember Tom Paine.

The Institute's publications, indeed, are not only proving highly innovative, being targeted at diplomacy, but, in the manner in which the mighty oceans were created, are contributing drop by drop to a revolutionary change in our approach to the diplomatic process. In the conduct of our foreign affairs we Americans have been singularly disdainful of a serious and systematic approach through analytical case studies and even argue over how important the human factor is. While I confess to having so chafed under our incomprehensible scorn of an approach to diplomacy comparable to that we make to sports I have been more interested in a critical analysis of diplomacy than in condemnation. This light-a-candle-rather-than-curse-the-darkness idea is what motivated the creation of the Georgetown Institute.

With even reputable scholars sharing in this avoidance of serious effort to come to grips with the ways and means by which governments seek to carry the ball from one part of the international field to another, the Hans Morgenthaus writing widely used textbooks on *Politics Among Nations* which relegated diplomacy to a single chapter, and a superficial one at that, instruction itself inevitably proved deficient. An assistant professor of international relations at one of our leading universities—the recipient of her doctorate from SAIS—once asked me: "What *do* diplomats do?" She was in earnest. She did not have the foggiest idea. I could only look at her in bewilderment and dismay. Where had SAIS—and all the other schools purporting to deal with international affairs—been all these years?

Wherever it was, the Georgetown School of Foreign Service decided it no longer wished to be there. Under the imaginative leadership of Dean Peter F. Krogh, it began to introduce courses on diplomacy as a political process and, in order to underpin and extend this effort, established an institute to generate materials for academic, professional and public distribution. These have ranged from the reproduction of contemporary diplomatic reports,—telegrams, dispatches and memoranda—to studies of the specific techniques, tactics and personal qualities brought to bear in the bilateral resolution of crises and in an international conference, on to symposia on problems vexing the performance of diplomatic responsibilities.

To the first category belong *David Bruce's "Long Telegram" of July 3, 1951* (24 pp., $1.50), Martin F. Herz's *A View from Tehran: A Diplomatist Looks at the Shah's Regime in June 1964* (11 pp., $1.50) and John K. Emmerson's *A View from Yenan* (15 pp., $1.50). The first sets forth a classic instance of how a diplomat posted abroad, several thousand miles and in a different political and cultural situation from his capital, can dissolve that geographic and psychological distance by factoring a lucid cable into the decision-making process on how to incorporate German troops into the Western defense system. Shrewdly beginning his cable with a review of the points on which he agreed with Washington, Bruce then moved on to their points of disagreement, developing his views with such a broad historical grasp, critical perception of the local (French) situation and impressive command of complex and technical detail in the politico-military area as to change his government's course of thinking. It was an impressive feat and points to the qualities which diplomats must possess if they hope to influence the policy-making process. People are constantly asking: what can diplomats do in an age of rapid communication and centralization of decision-making? The Bruce telegram, whose setting is ably provided by Martin Herz, gives us the answer: it depends upon the diplomat.

Herz's dispatch from Tehran, where he was serving as counselor for political affairs, is a brilliant analysis of the various factors working for and against the shah in 1964. Unlike Bruce's telegram, it contains no policy recommendation but, like Bruce's communication, it is well organized, insightful and felicitously written. Like all diplomatic reporting it raises the question of what kind of a Foreign Office received it. As wise and decisive as Bruce's? Or was it simply read with interest and filed? Was it filed in a way to be retrievable and useful later? Did it ever resurface to buttress any effort to curb the heavy-handed and disastrous Nixon-Kissinger policy of sinking the shah beneath a weight of armament which he was unwise enough to request? Did it have any part in the selection of US personnel for embassy and consular positions in Iran? As a result of it and similar reporting were any of our ambassadors picked with a view to gaining the shah's confidence sufficiently to offer wise counsel on his so-called reforms and requests for armament? In other words, how smart are we?

A View from Yenan reproduces a series of reports, analyses and policy recommendations of Emmerson when serving as a young political officer and given a specialized responsibility, thereby adding a realistic dimension to this category of the Institute's illumination of the diplomatic process, which is by no means limited to ambassadors, other generalists and embassies. Trained in the Japanese language, Emmerson was assigned the highly specialized task of analyzing the Japanese mentality on the basis of conversations with prisoners of war. With this as his springboard, he proceeded to predict the likely reactions of the Japanese people to defeat and the opportunities these might provide the United States to influence the postwar evolution of "a free, democratic, peace-loving Japan." As examples of diplomatic reporting these were outstanding.

It is in the second category of its publications—in the subtle intersection of private and public worlds—that the Institute is achieving one of its significant break-throughs. With the collaboration of Ellsworth Bunker, his papers as well as his recollections and insights have been made available to Georgetown graduate students who, under Herz's eagle

eye and exacting editorial standards, have produced *Resolution of the Dominican Crisis, 1965: A Study in Mediation* (v-xii, 52 pp., $3.50, by Audrey Bracey) and *Resolution of the Yemen Crisis, 1963: A Case Study in Mediation* (v-vii, 51 pp., $3.00, by Christopher J. McMullen). The Dominican crisis and the American role in it, as we know, fused to form a highly controversial subject and we are fortunate to have this brilliant light thrown upon the masterful diplomatic feat of Ambassador Bunker who was sent to the scene as a member of the three-man Ad Hoc Committee of the Organization of American States. It is no diminution of the contributions of the other members of the Committee to say that the leading and brilliant role in bringing the civil conflict to an end was played by the veteran and adept American diplomat. Thanks to him the whole business came out very much to the credit of the US.

The Yemen crisis was of a different order. Through no fault of Ambassador Bunker his mediation did not have the successful issue of the Dominican affair but his role, ably supplemented by ambassadors to Saudi Arabia (Parker T. Hart) and Egypt (John S. Badeau), show what resourcefulness, persistence, good judgment, adeptitude and teamplay can do to defuse a critical situation. A number of inaccuracies in the account of this crisis given by Edward Weintal and Charles Bartlett in *Facing the Brink: An Intimate Study of Crisis Diplomacy* are corrected.

To this same category belongs Ambassador Edwin McC. Martin's *Conference Diplomacy, A Case Study: The World Food Conference, Rome, 1974* (57 pp., $3.00). Taking charge of US preparations for one of the vaster international conferences held under the auspices of the United Nations, Martin subsequently served as a influential member of the American delegation. The conference being a gathering of some 140 governments, brought together just once, with only a few days to organize itself and produce in permanent, written form its collective judgment on a complex global problem had to be meticulously prepared and ingeniously run. How, indeed, can such a large, ad hoc assembly avoid chaos and endless wrangling and come up with constructive proposals which can provide on-going momentum? With what preparations, what advance negotiations and arrangements, what phrasing of the agenda, what kinds of delegates, what mobilization of resources, including embassies and missions to international organizations, what interplay of ideas, personalities, groups and interests, how much leeway in the instructions to delegates, what skills derived from experience? All of these questions are addressed in this lucid, well-organized, readable memoir. It is an exceedingly estimable contribution to the political science literature on conference diplomacy.

To the third category belong two symposia on *Contacts with the Opposition* (72 pp., $3.00) and *Diplomacy: The Role of the Wife* (75 pp., $3.00). The first is a well-selected collection of situational examples and comments by 19 distinguished diplomats, professors and journalists on the perennial diplomatic problem of how "to keep in with the outs." This is a question that arose in a particularly critical form in Iran and among the contributors are three former American ambassadors to that country, none of whom quite agrees with the other, which is a measure of the difficulties involved, including the qualities of the ambassadors themselves.

The symposium on the role of the diplomatic wife is the most illuminating presentation of the subject that has yet appeared, and I am not forgetting that of the Association of American Foreign Service Women four years ago. Since diplomacy is an international interaction with a considerable historical root system, no feature of it can be sensibly addressed through the experience and viewpoint of a single nationality, or in contemporary, personal terms. To attempt to do so is to invite ignominy wrapped up in ridicule inside a disaster. The State Department's emancipation proclamation—as so many a reform effort—has been a grievous deception for this very reason.

The Georgetown Institute wisely adopted a comparative approach in developing its symposium, inviting German, Italian, Japanese and Venezuelan wives of diplomats to set forth their experience and views along with Americans, and husbands along with wives. There is an old maxim, *si duo faciunt idem, non est idem* (if two people do the same thing, it is not the same thing) and if anything emerges from this compendium, it is that the role of the wife depends in no small part upon the wife: her education, up-bringing, culture, vision, qualities of mind and heart and character. But the role should not be permitted to rest exclusively on the wife and her perceptions. This is, after all, a professional task related to our national security and, as some European wives well point out, to international understanding and peace. It is clear that in abjuring all instruction of officers and spouses in the nature of diplomacy, the State Department and Foreign Service have let down all of us—officers, spouses, the nation itself. Where they have failed the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy may succeed. It cannot do so too quickly. This quiet revolution has long been needed.

Bookshelf

Prelude To The First World War

THE DECLINE OF BISMARCK'S EUROPEAN ORDER, *Franco-Russian Relations 1875-1890, by George F. Kennan. Princeton University Press, $25.*

This is not just an other book about Bismarck; it *is* the early history of the Franco-Russian alliance of 1894, "one of the major components out of which the fateful situation of 1914 was constructed." A cause of the first World War and of the Bolsheviks seizure of power in October/November 1917, the Franco-Russian alliance ushered in the present division of the world.

There is more. Professor Kennan suggests that "the mistakes and excesses of one generation of statesmanship [are] sometimes visited upon the generation that succeeds it . . . " : "if we could see *how* [our predecessors] went wrong, if we could identify the tendencies of mass psychology that led them thus astray, we might see where the dangers lay for ourselves . . ." This is the vision and the message of the book.

A title chosen, no doubt, for reasons peculiar to the art of publishing has misled the prospective reader and the critic; it has obscured the scope of the vision and the urgency of the message. For instance, the *Frankfurter Zeitung* has deplored an incomplete treatment of Bismarck and the London *Times* has bemoaned the effacement of Britain's role in this tale. Those notations are beside

the point. With due respect to the eminent author, praises for the elegance of his style, for the pace of his narrative and for the depth of his scholarship do not redeem the misunderstanding. The public must be disabused.

Whether he agrees or not with Kennan's theses, the professional diplomatist would be remiss should he fail to give them careful consideration. The theses do not lend themselves to abbreviated formulation, for they can be grasped only in the wealth of their detail. I shall simply signal the sequence that struck me the most and appears most relevant to the problems of our time: the respective role of reason and emotion in orienting policies, of cultural, military and economic factors in influencing them and of chance circumstances in derailing them from their course. In the effect, the obvious geopolitical justification of the alliance is less a determining factor than the situation created by the Frankfurt treaty of 1871, than the eagerness of the French Minister, the Duc Decazes, for a diplomatic victory, than the disappointments of Alexander III in the Bulgarian sideshow and than the illusions and the pressures of popular passions which statesmen sometimes used but never fully controlled. Unexpectedly, French and Russian military staffs "tended to slow down the process;" but Russian financial needs and the growth of protectionism precipitated it because they were not taken into account. Greatly as the French desired the alliance, endless delays emerged due to their tolerance of Russian political exiles, to the inadvertent recall of an ambassador and to repeated indiscretions of some of their public figures. And when at long last blind nationalism overcame those obstacles, the outcome was an alliance between an autocrat and a republic, the latter concerned with Germany, the former with Austria, an alliance so mismatched that the tragic sequel could have been safely predicted.

Thus, a telling account is given of the contrast between popular expectations and the result of decisions thus inspired. Professor Kennan's book is primarily a study of motivations: of those of peoples, of those of intellectuals and "media" and of those of the statesmen themselves. The study rests on fair characterizations of a wide range of actors: publicists, like Katkov; agitators, Déroulède and Boulanger; the main protagonists: Bismarck, of course, very much alive in the book, warts and all, the two Alexanders, shadowy French ministers, influential ambassadors, Appert, Laboulaye and Morenheim, the diligent Russian foreign minister, Giers, unjustly neglected heretofore; and a bevy of secondary figures hovering about the action: the ineffable Madame Adam, the physiologist-financier-double agent, Emile de Cyon, the "itinerant diplomat," Kumani, the bankers: Isaac Denfert-Rocherau and Emile Hoskier, the forger and spy, Foucault de Mondion, and many more. The book owes much of its charm to that entertaining company.

The entertainment afforded by such a cast should not make us forget, however, the dead seriousness of the lessons which it carries. "Today, in the face of the abundant weapons of mass destruction," writes Kennan, "there is no reason for denying them recognition." It is probably unusual to complete a review without mingling the praise with criticism: under the circumstances any critical remark would pale to insignificance.

CHARLES H. TAQUEY

A Crisis-Free Berlin?

THE FUTURE OF BERLIN. *edited by Martin J. Hillenbrand. Allanheld, Osmun Publishers, $24.*

Of the hundreds who write on the subject of Berlin, few, if any, seriously address the future. Few in any event are better qualified than former Ambassador Hillenbrand to sort out the intricacies of Berlin's situation as a starting point for future planning. Together with several other experts, he has put together here a composite picture of the city, past and present—starting from the realities shaping Four Powers rights and responsibilities, through Berlin's relationship to the Federal Republic and the East-West German complex, and going on from there into the city's demographic, economic, educational, and cultural prospects. Must reading for anyone contemplating a German assignment.

It is a cautiously upbeat picture which emerges. The essays document many effective adjustments, if not solutions, to the massive dislocations caused by the war and the "Wall." Losses of some industries have been made up by subsidizing others which better exploit the city's educated and skilled labor force; foreign (guest) workers are gradually being absorbed despite the sociological problems; turmoil in the universities has largely subsided; cultural life is once again of international renown; demographic trends are stabilizing and the economy adjusting to them fairly successfully.

What emerges most unexpectedly from the survey, however, is the fact that these successes stem in large measure from a surprising degree of bureaucratic imagination, foresight and determination in the Federal Republic and Berlin, as well as in allied capitals. That, plus the will of the Berliners to hold out, and a steady flow of federal monies.

Ambassador Hillenbrand's recipe for the future is essentially more-of-the-same. But his tentative optimism on that score rests on the implicit assumption that since the formula worked in the past, it will continue working indefinitely—or until "the Berlin Problem" is finally resolved in a larger context. He does not ask whether another generation familiar only with a crisis-free Berlin is prepared to appreciate the need for imagination, will and determination as much as did their elders. He merely lets 36 years of relatively successful crisis management argue the case for him.

—K F. MAUTNER

A CAO in India

A TUMULT OF YEARS, *by Robert R. R. Brooks, Ralph R. Renzi, Inc.*

The author of this autobiography, essentially a collection of short stories told in the first person, has had a fascinating career. At one time or another, he has been a student at Oxford, a professor of economics, a college dean, and cultural affairs officer in India. His style is decidedly low key. He dismisses a long interview with Edward R. Murrow with the observation that he still cherishes it.

His book is nonetheless laced with fine and at times irreverent humor. On one occasion he was suffering from food poisoning while bouncing about in a plane over Africa. He recorded that every time he retched, a flight attendant brought him a new bag, despite the fact that he "had nothing left to put in the collection plate."

I thought Mr. Brooks was at his best when he was describing his

experiences abroad, and I was deeply moved by his brief tribute to his wife, Mary, who died of cancer.

—DONALD MACCORQUODALE, M.D.

Tiger, Tiger, Burning Bright

SAVING THE TIGER, *by Guy Mountfort. Viking Press, $16.95.*

This book, lavishly illustrated with beautiful photographs, includes the recounting of the successful efforts of the author and the World Wildlife Fund to save the tiger from extinction. This multinational campaign (to which Switzerland, the US, Great Britain and the Netherlands were the largest contributors) enlisted the enthusiastic support of such world figures as Indira Gandhi, Mujibur Rahman and Prince Bernhard. It is an amazing example of the willingness of relatively poor Third World countries to protect their natural heritage.

The campaign, alas, began too late; of the eight races of tigers, two (Caspian and Balinese) are extinct and another (Javan) virtually so. Four races, however, have an excellent chance of long-term survival. But the *total* number of tigers in the world is estimated to be only 6,400!

The book is replete with fascinating facts about these handsome cats. Unlike lions, tigers are solitary, meeting only briefly for mating. Tigers are not necessarily kings of their jungles—they may be killed by bears, wild pigs, wild dogs, porcupines, elephants, rhinoceroses, crocodiles, the gaur bull, and their own kind. But such cases are rare, and man is the main threat; for example, the maharajah of Udaipur claims to have shot at least a thousand tigers. The Russian army exterminated the Caspian tiger in support of massive land reclamation programs.

The author concludes with a note for the budget-conscious: the entire cost of the campaign, taking everything into account, was less than the price of a modern bomber—or seven miles of six-lane highway.

Think about it!

—JAMES H. BAHTI

Two on Tito

TITO: THE STORY FROM INSIDE, *by Milovan Djilas. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, $9.95.*

TITO: A PICTORIAL BIOGRAPHY, *by Fitzroy Maclean. McGraw-Hill, $14.95; paper, $9.95.*

Tito's personality dominates Djilas's brief book, a revealing portrait of the man as Djilas saw him over a period of 17 years. There are positive and negative appraisals, but the latter predominate. Tito understood the importance of power, and in this he was more dedicated to himself than to Yugoslavia or communism. According to Djilas, Tito had no talent as a military leader, no original ideas, was a poor speaker, and his knowledge of Marxism was meager. But his dominance of the party is revealed in the manner that key political decisions were made.

A comparison with pre-communist Yugoslavia is interesting: Tito was a "more absolute monarch than King Alexander had been," presiding over "a failed and obviously unjust social order," and "law exacted more respect, and the courts more independence than they do today."

The book abounds with Tito's obsession with luxury, pomp, and a royal way of life. He had a predilection for palaces. He had the former

royal train remodeled because it was not comfortable enough. He paraded jewelry—a belt buckle of pure gold, a gold fountain pen, and medals. He "built himself up into something above and beyond the people and the movement."

Maclean's pictorial biography is interesting for the pictures, but the text is hardly distinguishable from Yugoslav ministry of propaganda handouts. There are half-truths and misrepresentations, e.g. reproducing only one-half of a German newspaper advertisement offering like rewards for the capture of Tito or Mihailovich. Turning to the present, Yugoslav citizens will not be comforted to read "how lucky" they have been to have had "a man of Tito's caliber," and that "after its own fashion, the Yugoslav economy does work."

—ALEX N. DRAGNICH

The Road To . . .

PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS: *The American Experience and Iran, by Barry Rubin. Oxford, $17.50.*

This is an aptly named book. It presents the most comprehensive and balanced account to date of how and why Iran slid downward into its current state of political chaos, and the curious American compulsion to involve itself in the debacle.

For two decades after World War II—the Mossadegh interlude in 1952-53 excepted—the US approach to Iran and its shah was characterized by considerable realism and sense of proportion. Although obviously of strategic importance by reason of its oil reserves and proximity to the Soviet Union, no sane policy-maker was under the delusion that this backward and corrupt relic of glorious antiquity could be transformed into a modern military power, let alone the protective guardian of the Arabian oil kingdoms. To the extent this traditional buffer zone was defensible—and Russia had been meddling in Iranian affairs for 200 years—the effective counter-pressures were deemed to lie elsewhere: in Europe, the nuclear deterrent, and the overall strategic advantage of the United States. The young shah himself was viewed as no more than the latest in two thousand years of oriental despots, albeit more glamorous and Europeanized than his predecessors.

With Lyndon Johnson and the growing realization of the limits of US power, the shah's pretensions to big-power status began to be taken more seriously. One reason was the end of British influence; another was the search for regional counterweights to Soviet influence. But it remained for Nixon and Kissinger to cast reality to the winds and project their geopolitical fantasies on to the flimsy and volatile social structure of a country already overheated with modernization. Instead of deflating the shah's megalomania, they fed his appetite for power with a vast array of complex and expensive armaments. They encouraged him to mortgage his oil revenues to the New York banks to pay for industrial imports and to go on a building spree. The idea was to modernize Iran as rapidly as possible for its role as US proxy in the Persian Gulf—and to bail out the US balance of payments in the process.

As Rubin demonstrates, this reckless course took no account of the internal dynamics of the moderniza-

tion process, not to mention its drastic collision with traditional Moslem tenets. It also took no account of the vanity, incapacity and weakness of the shah's character, especially his passivity and dependence on illusory professions of US support. Three successive administrations deluded themselves that this feeble reed could contain the unrest that this combination of extravagance and repression had provoked. As Rubin says about the inevitable explosion that followed: "The dislocation was not between a true image and irrational events but between a false image and a commensurate outcome."

The author's narrative goes well into the hostage crisis, though not its solution. As regards the embassy takeover and the Khomeini regime in general, it is as authoritative as any contemporary work can be, given the inaccessibility of both classified information and Iranian sources. In one respect, however this reviewer has minor reservations about an otherwise admirable work. The author too uncritically accepts the conventional wisdom about the CIA's role in the 1953 events that overthrew Mossadegh. He may not be aware of the respectable body of opinion, including ex-US ambassadors to Iran, that finds the chain of causation between the minimal activities of a few inexperienced CIA agents (in hiding, with no knowledge of the language) and the popular explosion that swept away Mossadegh too skimpy to be credible. Privately they contend that the efforts of Kermit Roosevelt and his handful of contacts fizzled, to be drowned out almost immediately by riots of wholly indigenous origin. If so, the United States has been getting a bum rap for 30 years—the product of a legend deliberately propagated in the '50s and '60s to magnify CIA success and justify ever larger demands for congressional appropriations.

—CHARLES MAECHLING, JR.

Kaunda's Creed

THE RIDDLE OF VIOLENCE *by Kenneth Kaunda, Harper & Row, $9.95*

To the surprise of no one who knows him, presumably, the president of Zambia is a complicated man, gnawed at by deep sociopolitical convictions and a sincere Christian faith. In Kenneth Kaunda's case, they have come close to being mutually exclusive.

This analysis in his own terms of what has struck him as a fundamental dichotomy between "fight for freedom" and "love thy neighbor" reveals how deeply he has struggled within himself to reconcile these precepts. It is by no means an original theme: more often than not, churchmen in various parts of the world have found themselves ministering to a flock of guerrillas, if not organized insurgents, and siding with them politically if not philosophically, to boot. Witness Latin America, for starters.

Naturally, President Kaunda's despair is focused on his brothers in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe moving in their own way toward majority rule. He deplores violence but, at this stage of the game, sees no other way out, given British attitudes. Despite his adulation of Gandhian principles of passive resistance, they appear an inadequate response to the malevolence of white supremacy. He finds

support in the World Council of Churches which, like himself, rationalizes its aid for the "freedom fighters" in terms of what is at stake. "Is there really anything new in Christians supporting the use of force for what they believe to be moral ends?" he asks.

To make it easier on himself, certainly in the political and (one should credit him with this) in the ethical sense as well, Kaunda reduces the dichotomy to a dilemma. Having done so, he admits that "on this issue of violence, Christ is putting a pistol to my head, or rather, pointing a Cross at my heart. As a political leader I cannot accept that Cross as a standard for my political life; as a penitent sinner, I cannot evade it. I know of no way out of that awful predicament.

"My enemy and I have many differences," he continues, "some of which have brought us to the point of conflict; the one thing we share is the need to be forgiven."

Riddle of Violence is not an exciting book, but it is worth reading, and owning, for what it reveals about a man of ethics trying . . . and in the main succeeding . . . to maintain some semblance of order, moderation, and stability in one part of a neighborhood torn, as he is himself, by conflict.

—JOHN M. ANSPACHER

A Welcome Coherence

AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR. *the United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 by George C. Herring. John Wiley & Sons, paper $6.95, cloth $12.95.*

Historians regarding that thin, dragon-shaped little country find it incredible that a great nation could have staked its reputation on so little. To find the reason why, Professor Herring goes back to the beginning, to US support for Ho during World War II, and to the basic sources, the presidential papers, the Pentagon Papers and State Department records, to the memoirs of Colby, Ridgeway, Hilsman, Johnson, Westmoreland, to the writings of Bernard Fall, Halberstam, Shaplen et al. It is a superb job of scholarship condensed into manageable size. It tells the whole story in a refreshingly dispassionate yet highly readable account documenting the ratchet effect at work, taking over from France, the commitment to Diem and the struggle to replace him, upping the ante in men and materiel, the Johnson decision to go-for-broke and the agonizing process of disengagement. For an older generation it is almost nostalgic; for a younger it will provide a welcome coherence to a fragmented and still disputatious experience. In the best tradition of historical writing, Herring refrains from personal fault finding or blame, sketching out the problems of decision-making in the context of Cold War and domestic politics. The failure, he states, lay, ultimately, in the uncritical application of a doctrinaire policy of containment to a "local struggle." "A policy so flawed in its premises," he concludes, "cannot help but fail."

It is as good an answer as any but questions still remain. How can we conclude anything about a conflict when we know little or nothing of the other side, of North Vietnam, the Soviets and Chinese? To the Vietnam adviser, the failure was clearly leadership, not American but Vietnamese, from the palace to the

three Democratic and four Republican, have persisted in the same misconceptions despite doubts and increasing opposition? It is incredible. Herring, wisely, is not himself doctrinaire. He opens his book, fittingly, with a quote from Shaplen that makes as good a closing: "Vietnam, Vietnam . . . There are no sure answers."

—ROBERT K. OLSON

After Mounting the Dragon

CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY: *The Maoist Era and its Aftermath, by Joseph Camilleri, Univ. of Washington Press, $25.*

The author concentrates on China's relations with America and Russia since China has perceived them, at different periods, to be the most formidable obstacles to the achievement of its objectives. China's dealings with the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are also discussed. In this comprehensive survey of China and the world, recent developments, especially since Mao's demise, are seen in historical perspective.

Since Chairman Mao "mounted the dragon" in September 1976, China's diplomacy has undergone a gradual reorientation. The too ambitious program of "Four Modernizations" (agriculture, industry, science and technology, defense) requires massive infusions of capital and technology, which are available only from capitalist nations, America, Japan and Western Europe. Another major force in China's changed diplomacy has been the attraction of Western armaments to help contain Soviet "hegemonism." China's new *welt-politik* has blurred the revolutionary vision, modified Mao's principles of self-reliance (Operation Bootstrap) and increased many fold contacts of all sorts with the capitalist world. A concomitant of China's long-standing hostility toward and fear of Russia has been a compelling desire for *rapprochement* (even a quasi-military alliance) with the United States.

The many virtues of this estimable work of scholarship make it absorbing and instructive. It is a valuable reference source for China's foreign policy 1949-1980.

—ROBERT W. RINDEN

STATEMENT OF THE SLATE

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ples. The issue of funding for the additional allowances and benefits authorized by the new Foreign Service Act, while not related only to AID, affects AID personnel more than those of the other foreign affairs agencies because of the nature of the posts where we are represented. We will continue to work hard on seeing that the budgetary support for these special hardship and security-related items is provided.

The membership in the last two years has increased dramatically. This development represents not only an endorsement of the path the Association is following, but also an increased realization throughout the Foreign Service of what can be accomplished with an activist and committed organization.

OK, if you like it, help us continue it. Give us a resounding mandate. Give Charlie Whitehouse a resounding mandate and write in his name for President.

FOREIGN POLICY IN THE 1980s

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sibility for defense and economic aid in Southeast Asia as well as Northeast Asia in the 1980s. The US economy should not be expected to carry the full burden of the non-communist world's security as it did in the 1950s and 1960s.

The United States will continue in the 1980s to have a major interest in upholding a favorable world order but, unlike in an earlier period, its interest requires partnership with allies rather than unilateral decision-making. Such partnership implies fuller consultation, and in many cases joint decision-making, on how international security needs can best be met. The West European view of détente with Eastern Europe is a case in point, and Washington will have to accommodate in part to the European view if it wishes to engage the NATO allies more fully in the security of the Middle East. In the Far East, Washington should encourage Japan and China to take greater military responsibility for containing Soviet power and keeping the peace in Korea and Southeast Asia while the United States shifts its attention and resources to the Indian Ocean.

The United States will need to pay greater attention to economic and political developments closer to home in the 1980s. The American people will demand it, and policy planners will ignore the challenge at their peril. Such issues as illegal Mexican laborers, Cuban-supported guerrilla forces, narcotics smuggling, natural gas supplies from Canada and Mexico, and the probability of renewed Soviet efforts to establish bases in North America—these challenges will get more attention in the US media and in Congress. The Reagan administration needs urgently to establish a NATO-type forum with the principal countries of North America, as well as Venezuela and Colombia, so that economic and security interests can be assessed jointly by their leaders.

Clearly, the United States has a vital interest in continuation of the SALT process with the Soviet Union. Soviet military advances during the past decade have made this country more vulnerable to Soviet missiles and deterrence may not be as effective as before. It is therefore in the interest of the United States to reach an agreement with the USSR that satisfies the minimum defense interests of both countries. This interest is so vital, in my view, that it should not be directly tied to Soviet behavior in the Middle East, Africa or even in Latin America. Moscow's support for "national liberation forces" should be countered with political, economic, and even conventional military means where necessary, but not to the point of holding US territory hostage to world order interests.

Defining the national interests of an open democratic society requires the best thinking and judgment of all its informed citizens, not only its government officials. That is why it is essential that the Reagan administration not only correctly define US interest for the 1980s but that it make a major effort to persuade the public of the wisdom of its view. Only in that way can we rebuild the consensus in foreign policy that has been lacking during the past decade.

LIVING WITH SUCCESS

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policies have fostered.

A regional approach such as this would eliminate much of the patronizing overtones of past aid programs. The regional organizations would be responsible for allocating these development funds among their member states; the funds would not be tied to purchases from the United States in any fashion. The United States would stand ready to sell military equipment to the member states on a cash basis thereby making explicit the guns versus butter alternatives available. At the same time, US trade policy should be freed of all restrictions on imports, thus making real its commitment to free trade. The United States has a moral obligation to assist the economic development of the Third World based —not on a colonial legacy—but on humanitarian grounds which its past policies too often have perverted.

It is conceivable that the United States would discover that a number of its enlightened policy objectives are shared by the regions, if not every member state, and that regional organizations are more attuned to the special needs of their member states. In addition, they are likely to be more demanding of their members. In the area of nuclear proliferation, for example, the United States must concede that it no longer has a monopoly in nuclear power technology. Its attempts to dictate the terms by which others will share this technology no longer work. At the same time, regional states have more to fear from the diversion of this technology to weapons production than does the United States, and thus could establish more effective monitoring agencies than one of US creation. Similarly, the promotion of political and economic human rights is of concern to all regional member states given the destabilizing potential of refugees. Like the parent of a child who has come of age, the United States can no longer protect the Third World from the consequences of its own actions; it was never very good at this in the first place.

Conclusion: We are a great nation by virtue of our richly endowed national boundaries secure from foreign invasion, our diverse and energetic population, and our constitutional system predicated on limited state authority; we achieved superpower status long before we began behaving like one. In the aftermath of World War II we chose to exercise the authority inherent in our overwhelming strength in order to rebuild a devastated world order, rather than reign over its devastation. Our objectives were remarkably enlightened and our commitment equally generous, given our limited experience in exercising world leadership, and it reflected the very best of a uniquely American approach. But something happened over time to distort these selfless ideals as we sought to model our behavior on the European pattern instead of trusting our own better instincts.

It is no coincidence that the increasing level of US foreign involvement has closely paralleled the concentration of power in the state that occurred at the same time, and it is not surprising that the process has continued uninterrupted regardless of the party in power. The

concentration of power, so dreaded by the authors of the Constitution, has been used, as those same authors knew it would be, to protect vested economic interests at home and abroad, and to promote preconceived notions of social order domestically and internationally.

To suggest a reduced level of international involvement does not mean that the United States must abandon its legitimate global responsibilities any more than a call to reexamine the nature of the welfare state assumes no state role in promoting social welfare. The response, however, must be uniquely our own, for we are a culture quite different from that of our predominantly European origins. The time is perhaps opportune to conduct that debate on the nature of US foreign policy for which we had so little time in the decades that followed World War II. I doubt very much, though, that we have the necessary fortitude to engage in such a debate in any meaningful way given the political, bureaucratic, and academic interests invested in the *status quo*. In any event, there are several steps we can take now that would prepare the way for a variety of foreign policy options in the future.

Our first order of business is to restore the vitality of and confidence in the domestic economy, the central ingredient in our claim to greatness. One element of this revitalization is the elimination of trade restrictions, an action that is wholly consistent with our foreign policy objectives. It is not my intention to promote specific remedies to our economic problems except to express my general optimism in its future, but only on condition that the role of the state is reduced greatly.

The second item on the agenda is to restore a sense of purpose and proficiency to our military forces, and concede that a strong military capability is not inconsistent with a democratic society whatever its foreign posture. This will require that we concentrate less on crude comparative rankings of our military forces, and focus instead on structuring the military to complement stated foreign policy objectives. However constituted, a creditable military will be expensive and will require personal commitments, including universal conscription. A well conceived and proficient military force is not incompatible with either peaceful intentions or the desire for universal arms reductions.

Finally and perhaps most importantly, the United States must learn to cope with a world order which no longer looks to it for its marching orders. We are no longer the Middle Kingdom, and the nations of the world are under no obligation to behave as if we were. Our post-war objectives, in large measure and often in spite of ourselves, have been realized, and we can no longer avoid confronting their consequences. Our freedom of action, once almost limitless, is now constrained on all sides by a world grown independent and assertive. What is now required of us is a greater tolerance of the uncontrollable, a growing detachment from international developments, and a more modest sense of our moral righteousness. This will be the most difficult task of all for, in only a few decades, we have become captives of the powerful state, and all of the mischief inherent therein.

IS THE FOREIGN SERVICE IN DECLINE?

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know when to say 'No' and pay no price."

The most striking characteristic of the new breed is attitude to the Service. New people are taking a look-see at the profession as a possible career for a time. While this disturbs some proponents of a career service, it is healthy. Those who stay will be motivated by job satisfaction. Those who see the fit is not good will have no false idealism to block them from resigning.

In general more in-out flexibility is probably on the horizon with more leaves of absence, more short careers, perhaps more use of outside specialists in certain positions and probably a reduced "core Service" of long-distance people. All are logical ways to use talent effectively in a society where the average adult changes his career/job every seven to ten years.

Conclusion and Challenge

The Foreign Service is not in decline, but it is under great stress.

I suggested to a ranking ambassador that in the face of destructive pressures it might be wise to arbitrarily end the era of personal diplomacy now and enter the age of electronic diplomacy. We could reduce our missions abroad to skeleton staffs and carry on through a sophisticated world-wide network of video communications. Expert task forces could be deployed to crisis areas as needed.

"Absolutely not!" In his model for the third century we will need the on-the-spot career foreign affairs specialist more than ever. He projects the United States as a relatively circumscribed power with reduced economic influence and significant limits on what we will be able to do. The ability of the Foreign Service to supply good, relevant, timely information will determine its role in formulating a "necessarily more nuanced" foreign policy. Developing quality professionals to serve abroad thus becomes more essential than at any other time in our history.

Well, to develop them you first have to keep them, and that is the real challenge. The Foreign Service is challenged to address the problems of safety and pay; it is challenged to create an environment where diverse family career life styles can all flourish; and it will always be challenged to provide interesting work, participation in the formulation and articulation of policy and the opportunity for personal growth.

I am optimistic: the Service will respond. Prospects for meeting the challenge are excellent, because individual members of the Foreign Service community care to participate actively in solving our problems. No longer are we disposed silently to await policy emanations from on high. A heartening number of responsible groups and individuals speaking from varied philosophical positions demand, cajole, prod and contribute constructive suggestions designed to reform and improve their chosen profession. With the new Foreign Servce Act of 1980 as the framework for a continuing discussion of imaginative and courageous ideas we should have little fear of decline.

WHY NOT A SENIOR FOREIGN SERVICE BASED ON EXCELLENCE

from page 32

tion of competition in the Senior Foreign Service five to seven years from now.

We Can't Go Back to the Last Decade

The authors of the preceding article are eloquent about what they oppose and silent about what they are for. Their intent seems to be to return to the system which prevailed prior to the Foreign Service Act of 1980—a system in which:

- No FSO-1 had been selected out for performance since 1974, unlike any other grade in the service.
- Time in class provisions had gradually been lengthened to include, ultimately, 22 years in classes one and two. No other executives enjoy such sinecures—not US congressmen nor presidents, not corporate executives nor generals, not university nor foundation senior executives and, after the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, not even members of the senior civil service.
- 25 percent of all senior officer positions were filled by non-senior officers despite repeated entreaties to the bureaus by the Director General to make greater use of the surplus of senior officers. Meanwhile, promotion rates (a major incentive to excellence) at some grades approached 0 percent.
- The only functioning mandatory attrition mechanism for the seniormost officers was the completely arbitrary one of forced retirement at age 60.

It is not surprising that this era coincided with the greatest erosion of Foreign Service responsibilities in our history, that our unique pension system came under increasing attack in the Congress, and that only a promise of major restructuring saved us from being swept into the Civil Service Reform Act. By late 1978 over 450 officers of all levels had joined together in calling on Secretary Vance to restore a standard of excellence to the Foreign Service. By the time the Foreign Service Act was ready for debate on the Hill in 1980, over half the officers of all levels who responded to a worldwide AFSA poll indicated they were seriously considering leaving the service.

Time for Us All to Move Ahead Together

Now we have a new charter. Unlike other reform efforts over the last thirty years, it is comprehensive, not piecemeal. The Service, through its association, had ample time to make its views known and the Congress and the administration listened. Implementing it in ways which balance the needs for a steady flow of recruitment and promotion through the ranks with the important requirements for experience, continuity and job security has been and will remain a major challenge for the Service. The new act provides important new ways in which the members of the Service can continue to make their inputs felt in shaping their own careers. We think the time has come for all the members of the Service, especially the most experienced ones, to join together in making the system work—not in tearing it apart again.

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Foreign Service People

Birth

Khan. A daughter, Ayesha Margaret, born to FSO Karen Longeteig and her husband, Hasan Khan, on December 29, in Jakarta where Mrs. Longeteig is second secretary in the commercial section.

Deaths

Byrne. James F. Byrne, FSO-retired, died on January 15 in Alexandria, Virginia. Mr. Byrne joined the State Department in 1945 and entered the Foreign Service in 1957. He served at Ankara, Karachi, Montreal and Kinshasa. From 1972 until his retirement in 1977, he served as liaison officer between ICA and the Department of State. Mr. Byrne is survived by his wife, Mary V., of 8421 Mt. Vernon Highway, Alexandria, Virginia, three sons, Robert, James and William, and a daughter, Ann Marie.

Spivack. Florence Caroline Spivack, wife of FSO-retired Herbert D. Spivack, died on March 27 in New York. Mrs. Spivack was the daughter of the World War II prime minister of Burma, Sir Paw Tun. She accompanied her husband on his assignments to Tehran, Rangoon, Paris, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, Dacca and Munich. Mr. Spivack resides at 211 East 70th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Tomlinson. John D. Tomlinson, FSO-retired, died on April 5 at George Washington University Hospital. Mr. Tomlinson joined the State Department in 1941 and the Foreign Service in 1944. He attended the Dumbarton Oaks conference and was an adviser at the San Francisco and London conferences establishing the UN. He served at Beirut and Port Elizabeth as a consul general in Casablanca before his retirement in 1963. He is survived by a daughter, Elizabeth Theiss of Ballwin, Mo. 63011, one sister and three grandchildren.

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FOREIGN SERVICE REUNION:

A mini-reunion of officers who entered the Foreign Service together more than thirty years ago took place recently at the Foreign Service Club. Guest of honor, and chief reason for the event, was ex-hostage Ambassador Bruce Laingen. Others attending were: William Helseth, Alan Dodds, Peter Brescia, Larry Connell, Kempton Jenkins, Pat Quinlan, Orme Wilson, Arv Kramish and Pratt Byrd. Other members of the group, which was established as a KRO training program in November, 1950 preliminary to an Atlantic crossing with the French line (those were the days) and assignments in Germany, are asked to make their welfare and whereabouts known to P. Byrd, S/FSG,SA-6, Room 430,Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. A reprise is planned —but we won't wait for another hostage.

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