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COVER: *When making important decisions during the clutter of diplomatic work, the Foreign Service officer has had little guidance in seeing right from wrong. Our story on doing "The Right Thing" begins on page 26.*

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LETTERS

Broken Silence

The article by Jim Anderson in your July/August issue, "Administration of Silence," ordinarily should not be dignified with a response. But because it savages the integrity of a dedicated staff of State Department press officers, I believe an exception must be made.

Mr. Anderson's accusation that the press office frequently fails to provide access to information is absurd. As he is aware, the press office is manned 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, and duty officers respond to every reporter's query in accordance with their instructions. While those responses may not fully satisfy a reporter's thirst for information, they do represent the informed judgments of U.S. policymakers as to the administration's official public posture on a particular issue.

Similarly, the daily press briefing at the State Department is primarily a forum for articulating and explaining U.S. foreign policy. After 18 months of verbal jousting with the press, I am aware of the temptation to go beyond the spokesman's brief. But a disciplined, coherent foreign policy, which Secretary Haig fought so hard to achieve, precluded impromptu policymaking by his official spokesman. Mr. Anderson's complaint about the press operation appears to reflect his own frustration that it in fact satisfied Secretary Haig's insistence on precision in the enunciation of the president's foreign policy.

I find Mr. Anderson's admission that he relies on "unhappy partisans who leak or fabricate information" an extraordinary self-indictment. To assert that Secretary Haig was inaccessible (the statement that "information aboard his plane became mundane or even nonexistent" is patently false) or that reporters were unable to conduct background interviews with other senior State Department officials is belied by a careful reading of such publications as the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the *Baltimore Sun*, the *Christian Science Monitor*, and the *Los Angeles Times*.

While Mr. Anderson is certainly entitled to his opinion, his failure to interview me or any other member of the press office staff in the preparation of his article raises questions in my mind about his objectivity.

DEAN E. FISCHER
Former Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Department Spokesman
Washington, D.C.

AP and UPI often do not see eye to eye, and it shouldn't come as much of a surprise that I dissent somewhat from UPI's Jim Anderson on his article, "Administration of Silence," in the July/August issue.

Jim got off on the wrong foot by making an unfair comparison between Dean Fischer and Nicholas Fenn, the gregarious British Foreign Office spokesman who wowed the American press during his visits to Washington during the Falkland Islands dispute.

Yes, Fenn was good but he had a big advantage. He was dealing with a readily identifiable enemy, Argentina, which, as Britain saw it, was engaged in unprovoked aggression against an integral part of British territory. His job was to be as unambiguous as possible in promoting the idea that Argentina was guilty of heinous aggression.

Jim, how do you think Fenn would act if he were in Fischer's shoes? In addressing, say, the West Beirut situation, do you think Fenn would be out there every day at noon giving chapter and verse on Phil Habib's dealings with the Lebanese and the Israelis? Not if he wanted to keep his job.

Jim also complains about the lid being on in this administration and its "lack of candor." Well, he has a short memory. The Carter administration, perceived by some as being "open," engaged in some of the most secretive diplomacy in American history. As an example, the United States and China negotiated for a full six months in 1978 on normalizing diplomatic relations without so much as a clue from the administration that the talks were even taking place. And the 1978 Camp David peace talks, which lasted more than two weeks, were held amidst a total news blackout.

I might add that the Camp David talks and the China negotiations are generally perceived as the two biggest foreign policy achievements of the Carter administration. The press doesn't like being cut out but sometimes there is no substitute for secrecy.

Jim is right in suggesting that the presence of TV cameras has had an inhibiting effect on State Department spokesmen. I, too, miss the days when the spokesman, for the sake of clarity, explained what was really happening on the condition that he

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not be quoted by name. Jim and I agree those days were better. The real fault, then, lies with the technological revolution, not with any particular "administration of silence."

And let's give this administration its due credit. I defy Jim to come up with a single instance of a prior department spokesman who publicly acknowledged a White House–State Department rift. Bob McCloskey never did. Nor did Charles Bray, George Vest, Bob Anderson, Bob Funseth, or Hodding Carter. I can imagine the reaction of those estimable gentlemen last fall when Dean Fischer, "Mr. Clampdown," admitted there were guerrillas in the White House who were out to get Al Haig. And let's give Haig himself his due credit. The whole city knew about Haig's lust for bureaucratic turf. All you had to do was ask him. (Remember his public battle with George Bush over control of the crisis management team?)

And I never found the information aboard Haig's plane "mundane or non-existent," as Jim alleges. Jim wonders why Haig took so long to get the Palestinian autonomy talks going. Haig spelled it all out on his next-to-last plane trip. I still have a transcript of his remarks. I'll even show it to you, Jim.

GEORGE GEDDA
State Department Correspondent
Associated Press
Washington, D.C.

Jim Anderson responds:

I find it touching, but symptomatic, when Dean Fischer says Alexander Haig represents "precision in the enunciation of the president's foreign policy." If Mr. Fischer really believes this—and I never doubted his sincerity or honesty—he is probably unique in the English-speaking world. As my article tried to point out, the basic problem was a lack of coherently stated foreign policy, a situation which left Spokesman Fischer mostly speechless and useless. The further point I tried to make—and will now restate for the benefit of him and his successors—is that an assistant secretary of state who is spokesman should be more than a mouthpiece. He should not make foreign policy (although he has a responsibility to tell the secretary of state which policies he believes are not salable to the American public). He should be an influential intramural missionary, spreading the gospel that a foreign policy, once decided, is not something to be concealed, as it frequently was during the Haig-Fischer regime at State. It should be explained and revealed, and if it runs into opposition or skepticism, well, that is one of the tests which will determine if it is a viable foreign policy.

I do "read carefully" the publications Dean Fischer mentions, almost every day. I also talk, almost daily, with the correspondents of those publications, one of whom is quoted by name in my article, among other people quoted and interviewed. That's one reason I came to the conclusions I did.

The correspondents of the publications he mentions came, as I did, to rely on outside sources more in the Haig-Fischer era than ever before. We all dutifully put in the telephone calls that were infrequently answered at the State Department because of the perception under Alexander Haig that such contacts with the press could harm a Foreign Service career.

Dean Fischer is wrong to draw any conclusions about my objectivity because I did not quote him as part of my observations about the state of information policy during the past 18 months. It is true I did not interview Dean specifically for my article. I did not need to. As he knows, we spoke several times a day for the past year and a half. My article is about the lack of information that resulted from those encounters. There is nothing in his letter to suggest that he understands what was wrong. Keeping the press office open 24 hours a day is a waste if nothing comes of it. He confuses access with information.

My article was not intended to criticize the people who worked for him, and there is evidence that they, at least, understood this point, since three members of Mr. Fischer's professional staff have come forward to express to me (at some risk to their careers) their agreement with the points made in the article. In my original manuscript, I ended by suggesting directly that Dean Fischer resign, an event which has since occurred. That suggestion was softened, by agreement with me, by the Editorial Board of the *Foreign Service Journal*. I think now that softening the criticism of Fischer was a mistake which confused the issue somewhat, so let me restate what I believe: the primary fault of the defective public information policy at the State Department during the last 18 months lay, first, with Alexander Haig's inability to articulate a foreign policy and, second, with Dean Fischer's failure to make that point with Haig.

As to Mr. Gedda's letter, I can only say: UPI covers the State Department exactly as closely as the AP. We are very competitive. If the AP is satisfied with what went on during the past 18 months—

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which I don't believe—then that says more about the difference between the AP and UPI than it does about the State Department.

I am not opposed to secret diplomacy. I never was. I am opposed to incoherence in foreign policy and that is what my article was about.

One of the problems that led to this lack of coherence was the unpredictability of Alexander Haig. One day he would call Jack Anderson to confirm that there was a "guerrilla" in the White House, and in the next breath, he would instruct his spokesman to say nothing further about it, ever.

Another day, as he did after his last meeting with Andrei Gromyko in New York, he disclosed to the press that the Soviets had launched a suspiciously warlike series of missile tests. He then ordered his spokesman to say nothing else. Astoundingly, Haig never thought to mention these missile launches to Gromyko, but he did reveal them publicly only minutes after the talks with Gromyko had finished. It was feast or famine with Alexander Haig, depending on his mood, but it lacked any sense of purpose or consistency.

I have spent more time during the past 13 years on the secretary's plane than Mr. Gedda and Mr. Fischer combined. I am aware of how valuable those encounters can be. And I remain convinced that Haig, compared to his early days and to his predecessors, became uninformative when talking to reporters aboard his plane.

Mr. Gedda may disagree with me about the past 18 months (we have spent about equal amounts of time at the State Department) but I believe that things were never worse in the 13 years that I have been around. Although we cannot turn the clock back, and some problems are probably built in to the Age of Communications, there are hopeful signs that the new regime at State appears to be doing better. I hope my article played a tiny part in that change.

Not Primarily for Spouses

In response to Patricia Bennett Hyde's letter in the July/August issue of the *Journal,* I would like to clarify some possible misconceptions regarding the position of community liaison office coordinator (formerly known at posts as family liaison office coordinator).

When these positions were begun at posts at the same time the Family Liaison Office opened in the department in 1978, the main purpose was to improve the quality of life of U.S. government personnel and dependents at our embassies and consulates. The person selected to fill the position of CLO coordinator was to be that person who was best qualified to achieve that purpose as delineated in the job description. Providing jobs for Foreign Service spouses was definitely *not* one of the primary, nor even secondary, aims when these positions were created.

The FLO has never advocated preferential hire with regard to positions at our missions abroad and has indeed worked to make all U.S. government non-career positions abroad open to dependents of any agencies. Thus, to insist that the CLO coordinator position only be made available to Foreign Service spouses would be inconsistent with the office's stance on dependent employment.

Finally, it should be noted that the FLO has consistently refrained from becoming involved in the local-post hiring of its coordinator because we believed that the post itself knows best what it needs and is in a position to select the person who best meets those needs. We developed guidelines for the selection of the coordinator but, having done that, we stepped aside to let the individual posts select their coordinators.

It might be interesting to note that presently we have the following agency representation among salaried CLO coordinators:

State	44
AID	16
USIA	8
DOD	8
DEA	3
PC	3
FAS	2

JANET W. LLOYD
First Director,
Family Liaison Office (1978–80)

A Query

I am compiling a list of those University of Virginia graduates who have served in the Foreign Service and Department of State, with current addresses of those still living. Would those readers who are graduates or know of such graduates kindly send their names and addresses to the undersigned? As this request is related to an upcoming event, it is a matter of urgency.

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BOOK REVIEWS

A Few Causes

THE PAST HAS ANOTHER PATTERN, *by George W. Ball. W.W. Norton, 1982. $19.95.*

Jean Monnet, one of George Ball's heroes, told him: "You shouldn't diffuse your energies, let so many things light up your imagination. You should find yourself a single theme, a single cause, and devote your life to it." It is evident from these memoirs that Ball, energetic and ambitious, was not content with a single theme or a single cause. He had several. But he did not diffuse his energies. He focused them—on Western European integration during the late 1940s and 1950s, on Vietnam during the 1960s, and more recently on the Arab-Israeli conflict.

After World War II, Ball, then in private law practice in Washington with an office in Paris, focused his energies with great intensity on efforts to achieve Western European union. He developed a close relationship with Jean Monnet, commuting to Paris almost monthly. His situation was unique. "I was a private American actively working on the Schuman plan for a participating government." Ball was deeply involved in the movement to unite Western Europe and became an adviser to the Coal and Steel Community, to Euratom, and to the European Economic Community. Ball, the hard-headed pragmatist, was a fully developed idealogue on the issue of Western European union.

On the Vietnam issue, Ball, under secretary of state from 1961 to 1966, was a non-conformist, the inside dissenter, unwavering in his fierce but well-reasoned opposition to U.S. military involvement. While President Johnson did not agree at the time, he did give Ball a careful and even respectful hearing, reviewing his arguments point by point. But Ball's views, at variance with those of his boss Dean Rusk, had little effect. On Vietnam, Ball believed in dissent but not in resignation. He did not resign because of Vietnam. He rationalizes this inaction with the argument that he would have had even less influence in stopping the war had he been outside the government. The "street people," whom Ball condemns, would disagree. And Walter Lippmann, a friend and neighbor on Woodley Road, did not agree and urged him to resign.

On the Arab-Israeli conflict, Ball thought the partial settlement of Camp David was a serious mistake. The United States should have used its bargaining power with Israel and gone all out for a comprehensive settlement—still the right course for American policy.

Ball's views on these "causes" were sharply defined, with little shading. He wanted solutions. He wanted the union of Western Europe, and he brought great pressure on the British—which the British resented—not to weaken the European Community. Ball was more interested in changing the world than in adapting to it. He wanted a settlement in the Mideast, not a half-way house. Accomplishments were bound to fall short of these goals.

For over thirty years, Ball has been active in the field of foreign policy. Yet until the final chapter of these memoirs, Ball has had little to say about policy concerning the Soviet Union, China, or nuclear weapons, even though these issues were changing the shape of the world. The reader is left to wonder: where was George Ball?

This somewhat over-written autobiography—at times the writing is studied and elaborate—is devoted mainly to Ball's public career, in and out of government, and includes, for example, the story of his friendship and association with Adlai Stevenson and his role in the two Stevenson presidential campaigns. The focus is on foreign policy and includes an account of Ball's active role as under secretary of state on such problems as Cyprus and Zaire. But Ball felt passionately about three issues—Western Europe, Vietnam, Israel—and his writing, on these subjects, exposing his creative and constructive views, makes the most interesting reading in the book. And the final chapter, piquantly entitled "Over and Out," suggests that Ball may have more to say in the future about our central security problem—relations with the Soviet Union and the threat of nuclear war.

—DAVID LINEBAUGH

Literary Diplomat

HAROLD NICOLSON, *1886–1929, by James Lees-Milne. Archon Books, 1982. $25.*

During its long history, Great Britain has produced many diplomats of skill and distinction. Harold Nicolson, the subject of James Lees-Milne's fascinating book, might well have been one of them if he had not elected in mid-career to turn his direction to full-time writing and politics. The

son of Arthur Nicolson, the distinguished diplomat who occupied the key position of permanent secretary of the British Foreign Office from 1910–16, the younger Nicolson entered the diplomatic service in 1909 after graduating from Oxford. Following assignments to various foreign posts including that of counselor to the legation in Teheran from 1925–27 and to the Berlin embassy from 1927–29, Nicolson resigned to become a columnist for Lord Beaverbrook's *Evening Standard*. From then until his death in 1963, he wrote numerous books, including a highly praised biography of his father and *Peacemaking, 1919*, in which he drew upon his experience as a member of the British delegation to relate the history of the Versailles peace conference. His political career was somewhat less successful than his literary but nonetheless included service as a member of Parliament for the National Labour Party from 1935–45 and as parliamentary secretary to the Ministry of Information in Winston Churchill's wartime coalition government.

This book covers only the period of Nicolson's life through his resignation from the diplomatic service. Additional volumes are planned by the author. Lees-Milne has wisely chosen to rely heavily upon Nicolson's letters and diaries, which were published posthumously by his son Nigel. Because Nicolson had already embarked upon a part-time literary career prior to his resignation from the diplomatic corps in 1929, and because his wife, Victoria Sackville-West, was a well-known author in her own right, many famous literary figures, from Virginia Woolf to Sinclair Lewis, are encountered on the pages of this book. The end result is a potpourri of events political, diplomatic, and literary rather than a purely diplomatic biography. Nonetheless, there are numerous sections of interest to the specialist in international relations. We see Nicolson joining the foreign service in 1910 to work primarily as a file clerk and typist—secretaries were in short supply and the novice diplomats were obliged to fill in for them, with no pay at all for the first two years of service. Subsequently, as chargé in Berlin in 1928, Nicolson displayed unusual perspicacity in warning the Foreign Office that Adolf Hitler and the Nazis constituted a potentially serious threat to Great Britain.

In sum, *Harold Nicolson* is recommended for those interested in diplomatic history as well as in British social and literary history of the 1920s and '30s. To judge from this first volume, the complete biography of Nicolson planned by Lees-Milne will be a significant contribution.

—Benson L. Grayson

Power Struggle

China: *A Political History, 1917–1980, by Richard C. Thornton. Westview Press, 1982. $32.50 (cloth), $15.00 (paper)*

As indicated in a prefatory note, this book is an updated and expanded version of the author's *China: The Struggle for Power, 1917–1972*. The original version, which makes up about three-quarters of this one, was more aptly titled. The present title leads one to assume that the book would say something about the Kuomintang and the Chinese government it dominated for two decades or more. But these important subjects are covered only in so far as they relate to the Kuomintang's fight against the Communists. This book is not so much a political history of China as it is a history of the Chinese Communist party's struggle to achieve national power and of the struggles of individuals and factions to achieve power within the party. On these subjects the book is very informative.

The book is also provocative, attacking much of the conventional wisdom in the West about how the Chinese Communists

came to power. For example, the author assigns decisive roles in the Communists' triumph to Soviet military aid to them and inadequate U.S. aid to the Nationalists. While conventional wisdom may err in underestimating the importance of such external factors, Thornton seems to err in the opposite direction by failing to give due weight to internal political and economic factors, which he hardly discusses at all.

The new part of the book covers the period since 1972. It presents a fairly detailed account of the struggle for power within the party between Mao and the so-called Gang of Four, on the one hand, and what eventually became Deng Xiaoping's faction, on the other. With the death of Mao in September 1976, and the consequent quick downfall of the Gang of Four, the power struggle shifted to one between Deng and Hua Guofeng, Mao's designated heir. For several years after Mao's death, Hua was both premier and party chairman, but not even Mao's endorsement could preserve him from Deng's superior political maneuvering, and he ultimately lost both positions. Now Deng and his faction dominate both party and government.

Thornton concludes his study with some rather pessimistic speculation about China's future. He believes that, despite the Deng leadership's commitment to modernization, "the inescapable development future, no matter what course any Chinese leadership adopts, is for continued slippage relative to the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States." On the other hand, the seeds of significant systemic change are perhaps being sown by the education of the new elite needed to carry out modernization.

—Edwin W. Martin

Foreign Ministries Compared

The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World, *edited by Zara Steiner. Times Books, Meckler Publishing, 1982. $87.50.*

Diplomacy reaches far back into the misty millenia of pre-history, but ministries of foreign affairs are of relatively recent vintage. Few are as old as the 16th and 17th centuries. Still, centuries being what they are, it is astonishing that we have had to wait until now for a first attempt at a comparative study of these government agencies concerned with the conduct of foreign relations.

This portly volume of over 600 pages, with bibliographies and organizational flow charts for each country, is a survey of the histories, experiences, and present composition and operations of the foreign affairs ministries of the superpowers, all European Community members, and such vital nerve centers as Tokyo, Beijing, and plucky Helsinki. Latin American countries have been omitted for lack of space. Steiner's choice of countries was necessarily influenced by the availability of experts with access to required material who were willing to produce concise chapters. The contributors represent different disciplines and backgrounds, some being historians, others archivists and librarians, and still others practicing or retired civil servants and diplomats. This variety, as well as the often fragmentary quality of documentary material, robs this first attempt at a comparative presentation of much of its comparative character. Nevertheless, it is an extremely valuable compendium of history and description.

Misery, of course, loves company and so it is with problems other ministries share with the State Department. Those of us who groan over the problems of lateral entry, for instance, will find comfort from what the French have had to go through—successive waves of lateral admissions from

the wartime government-in-exile, the resistance movement, and the old Ministry of France beyond the Seas, as well as from the civil administtations of Morocco and Tunisia. The Soviet Union's ministry, one is teminded, is dogged by the latetal entry of the secret police and petiodic flooding from the party appatatus when places have to be found for deserving opponents of the victorious party leader. The chapter on the Soviet Union, written by Professor Teddy J. Uldticks of the University of Notth Carolina (Asheville), is as illuminating as that sectetive society permits.

One wishes it could be said that the U.S. chapter is as illuminating as our open society permits, but it unhappily illustrates the fact that while out society is open, it is far from simple and its institutions harbor a myriad of complexities. The chaptet fails to mention the department's post-wat planning, which did much to counteract its decline in war-time effectiveness; the creation of the Foreign Service Auxiliaty, which offset the diminishment of the Service's war-time tesources; ot the labor attaché progtam, which generated a quiet, democratizing tevolution in both the Service and depattment. Not does it discuss the depattment's failute to educate and train those "China hands" born in China in the ways and disciplines of the Washington foreign affairs establishment which, along with weak-kneed colleagues and a China Lobby mentality in the depattment, made them excruciatingly vulnerable to McCarthyism and the Stanley Hornbecks; and the landmark introduction of machinery and procedures for the redress of grievances and exptession of dissent. The basic issue of education and training of foteign affaits officers is ignored. The authots accept the canard statted by Senator Henry Jackson and his staff of the ineffectiveness of the Eisenhowet innovations of a planning board and operations cootdinating boatd within the National Security Council system, which, in fact, cteated a magnificent opportunity for the depattment that it failed to see, much less to grasp. Nor is it illuminating to say that the depattment's politico-militaty office merely "replicates" the Defense Department's office of international security affaits. If the ptoblems of women and affirmative action genetally ate discussed, I missed it. Underlying much of this, is the failute to recognize the tutning point in the department's evolution which occurred at the end of the Spanish-Ametican War when Ptesident McKinley, after weighing his options, assigned the administtation of the newly acquited islands to the War Depattment tather than to State. This was a decisive factor in the department's outlook and development from that time on.

A quiet revolution is taking place in the study of intetnational politics and Zara Steinet, an American who is a fellow and the director of studies in modern history at New Hall, Cambtidge, has joined it with a notable conttibution. Evety professional is in het debt. It catties forwatd the compilations of principles and precepts by the fathers of international law into the field of operations by which governments seek to reconcile national with intetnational intetests. What we need now is to get started on compatative studies of diplomacy.

—Smith Simpson

Scholarly Synthesis

Peace Against War: *The Ecology of International Violence, by Francis A. Beer. W. H. Freeman and Co., 1981.*

Though ptobably written for the academic market, this book is an excellent review and synthesis of scholatly wotk in intetnational telations. Very well wtitten, it is a patticulatly good volume fot Foteign Setvice officers who wish to keep up to date with the useful aspects of academic output.

One other element commends this book to professional diplomats: Beer has gone beyond description, explanation, and synthesis and included predictive and prescriptive material. His concluding chapter, "Choice," seems almost designed for the statesman and diplomat who has much too little time for philosophizing in a too-rapidly changing world.

The author flags a number of problems coming down the road in the next five years—the likelihood of greater violence in the Third World, heightened terrorist threats arising from the logic of modern technology, and the increasing complexity of attempting to limit war. Readers may disagree with his solutions (he seems a bit too much of an optimist regarding man's capacity to control man), but they will have difficulty ignoring his warnings.

—JOHN D. STEMPEL

Biased Biography

RICKOVER, *by Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen. Simon and Schuster, 1982. $20.75.*

In the 744 pages of this biography of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, Polmar and Allen rely heavily upon the recollections of more than two hundred individuals. Yet, a review of those listed in the appendixes reveals few who are intimately familiar with Rickover's engineering work and even fewer who have been closely associated with him during the past fifteen to twenty years. Many anecdotes and unsubstantiated allegations, often from anonymous sources, are included even though the authors admit they cannot vouch for their accuracy. Frequently these stories are used to support opinions unfavorable to Rickover. Since the admiral and most of his family, friends, and close associates are not among those who contributed to the book, in many instances the reader is not presented with a balanced account. A few examples will suffice.

The authors' style presents overall an unfavorable image of Rickover. As a Congressional witness, he is described as "the slight, acid-tongued man in the baggy suit" with "oversized collar, nondescript tie." Such phrases reflect a bias and do not accurately picture the neat, businesslike appearance he maintained.

In a span of 85 pages early in the book, words referring to Jews such as Jew, Jewish, anti-Semitic, etc., appear almost one hundred times, some of them included in irrelevant material. For example, the authors describe the Jewish ghetto on Maxwell Street in Chicago at the turn of the century only to note later that the Rick-

overs did *not* live there. Further, much of the discussion of Rickover's years at the Naval Academy is not about him but about the unpleasant experiences of a Jewish classmate. This appears to be an attempt to portray Rickover as believing he was a victim of anti-Semitism, a supposition this reviewer has heard him reject many times.

The authors attempt to describe the key events in Rickover's life, but the book is flawed by many inaccurate and misleading statements which undermine its credibility. For example, they cite Rickover's congressional testimony of May 1, 1967, as causing "almost a decade" of delay in the navy's gas-turbine propulsion program "until, in the early 1970s, Admiral [Elmo] Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations pushed gas turbines for new classes of destroyers, frigates, and missile craft." However, study of the cited references makes clear, although the authors do not, that the issue in 1966 and 1967 was whether guided missile ships built to escort nuclear carriers should be nuclear powered—not whether development should continue on gas turbines for naval ships. Congress agreed with Rickover that the two missile ships proposed by the navy in 1967 should be nuclear powered and forced a major confrontation with the Pentagon—a confrontation that is not described in this book. Although the authors begin with a description of Secretary of the Navy Paul Nitze's attempt to fire Rickover in mid-1967 they do not indicate that Rickover's effort to gain congressional approval for nuclear propulsion in guided missile ships to accompany the nuclear carriers was behind this attempt. One major thesis of the book is that Rickover created a myth by claiming that he encountered opposition to nuclear power in the navy. Yet, he came close to being fired because of his fight for nuclear power over the objections of the secretary of the navy.

Meanwhile, contrary to the authors' allegations, development of gas turbines continued uninterrupted. The first gas-turbine powered ship sponsored by the navy put to sea less than eight months after Rickover's May 1, 1967, testimony. The first three ships of the gas-turbine powered *Spruance* class were in the budget submitted to Congress in January 1969. These events, not reported by the authors, occurred during Admiral Thomas H. Moorer's tour as CNO (August 1967 to July 1970), not during Admiral Zumwalt's subsequent tour.

Many of the statements in the book that are favorable to Rickover seem grudgingly made. However, the general reader has no way to identify which information can be relied upon as factual, whether favorable or unfavorable, nor will he or she gain a real appreciation of Rickover's actual accomplishments. As a biography it falls far short of the accepted standards of clarity, objectivity, and impartiality. The Rickover described in this book is not the Rickover this reviewer has known well for more than twenty-five years.

—David T. Leighton

Coordinating Arms Sales

The Global Politics of Arms Sales, *by Andrew J. Pierre. Council on Foreign Relations, Princeton University Press, 1982. $20.*

The dramatic escalation in the use of conventional arms sales as instruments of Western and Soviet foreign policies has by now become a familiar phenomenon to observers of international politics. Yet, too often advocacy or ideological posturing take the place of objective consideration of the concrete political, economic, and military factors that drive the continuing expansion of the arms trade.

Andrew Pierre's treatment of this subject, however, is neither a wholesale condemnation of arms sales that ignores geopolitical realities nor an *apologia* for the continued use of this policy instrument. Pierre rightly characterizes the problem as one of management: although arms sales have become entrenched as a critical instrument of global diplomacy, there is growing recognition of the risks the uncontrolled diffusion of modern arms may pose to the political and economic stability upon which the Western world depends. In the absence of institutional mechanisms to coordinate arms transfers so that they advance rather than impede the long-term interests of the West, competition among suppliers for arms markets weakens bonds among allies and undercuts prospects for a coherent multinational political strategy.

Pierre's insights into the potential risks for NATO diplomacy of uncoordinated arms sales gain special credence from recent events. A dramatic illustration was provided by the scenes of British troops battling Argentine forces equipped with French, American, and, most humiliatingly, British armaments in the Falkland Islands. Pierre's assertion that the West needs to develop "codes of conduct" to assure that arms sales are consistent with the foreign policy goals of the alliance—rather than with the short-term political or economic advantages of individual countries—is particularly prescient in this regard.

Although the most original and provocative aspects of Pierre's book are the

sections on options and incentives for multinational management of arms sales, his analysis of the dynamics of arms sales is sophisticated and comprehensive. Pierre's understanding of the bureaucratic and institutional factors surrounding arms transfer decisions, especially in Western Europe, should make these sections interesting to the policy community.

The section that will receive the most critical attention is likely to be that of Pierre's recommendations for multinational consultations and negotiations. Pierre does not ignore the East-West dimension but recognizes the threat posed by the continuing rise of Soviet arms exports. Nor does he overlook the problems posed by the escalating demand for arms among Third World countries. But he emphasizes, as the most urgent priority, the multilateral regulation of arms transfers by U.S. and Western European producers. To this end, one of the more interesting proposals (and one that is likely to be highly contentious) is for what in effect would be the cartelization of the arms market. Markets would be divided among Western suppliers according to principles of comparative advantage in weapons production or by geographical region. Pierre argues that this would permit export-dependent countries to have assured markets while reducing the duplication of production that imposes economic burdens on many governments, undermines military efficiency in NATO, and requires competitive exports that may exceed foreign policy interests. One cannot disagree with Pierre's fundamental premise that greater coordination among NATO allies in this and other areas is critically urgent. But the political feasibility of such an ambitious agreement, especially in light of the continuing difficulties of gaining alliance consensus on issues far less central to national sovereignty, is at least questionable.

—JANNE E. NOLAN

Gray's Bomb

STRATEGIC STUDIES: *A Critical Assessment, by Colin S. Gray. Greenwood Press. 1982. $27.50.*

It is always sad to see a bad book on a good subject. Colin Gray has set out to analyze the tradecraft of strategic studies, by which he means the analysis of nuclear war and nuclear weapons. Gray is a well-known and well-regarded strategist of hawkish bent. In this book he turns from expounding his policy views to analyzing the contribution that strategists such as himself make to peace and security. It is his attempt to answer those who would

have us believe that all would be well in the world if it were not for the distorted abstractions of nuclear strategists.

Gray poses and responds to no less than 19 "charges" against the intellectual and moral integrity, cultural objectivity, and practical success of strategic studies. To his credit, there are few straw men among the charges, and some, such as "strategists are fascinated by violence," are brutally direct. The problem is that Gray refuses to treat them seriously—to breathe real life and subtlety into them. He takes them on in the extreme form in which he poses them, pitching into a fruitless, tendentious duel with himself.

Most of Gray's charges can be distilled into two, which need to be restated in a reasonable form. The first is that strategists give too much attention—not always perhaps, but sometimes—to armed force as a solution to world problems. Thus occupied, they fail to explore alternatives to force. The second is that strategy and strategists—not always, just sometimes—affect peace and security in a way that is not positive or neutral, but downright negative. These two charges are old and hoary, but they could still provide fertile ground for a strategist's reflections. And, since these claims appear most often in writings by authors of the left, it would be refreshing to see a prominent conservative strategist have a go at them.

Instead, Gray dismisses the first with a trivial—one must really say irrelevant—discursus on the theme that "the world of international politics is a jungle wherein the strong and the ruthless devour the weak." As for the second charge, we learn early that it can be disposed of "peremptorily." Nuclear weapons exist, cannot be wished away, and must be dealt with; *ergo,* there's nothing wrong *in principle* with nuclear strategizing, though it is of course *in practice* that the question becomes interesting. If the issue is so thin that it can be dismissed peremptorily, why bring it up at all, much less write a book about it? Through page after page, Gray tilts at windmills in this rhetorical tone. One does not have to be a "radical critic" to feel cheated by arguments as wide of the mark as this:

> The radical critics of strategists really have nothing to say to policymakers that is at all pertinent to their [i.e., the policymakers'] problems as they perceive them. Officials in the Defense and State Departments . . . are working 12-hour days, by and large, coping, or attempting to cope, with problems as they arise. The burning issues in the eyes of the systemic, radical critic of strategic studies are likely never to be salient among the agenda of items the official has to contend with each day. . . . The strategic studies community, in its collective wisdom, deems such approaches to security problems irrelevant to the current international system.

Other passages are downright unfathomable: "This author believes that it would be scarcely more sensible for the United States to adhere to an incredible, and ultimately suicidal, strategic doctrine and posture than it would be to adhere strictly to a conventional military policy." What does this sentence mean?

It is difficult to see why anyone but a reviewer would finish this book once started. Whom can its author have meant it for? Its civics-text moralizing and debating-society tone are too thin for an audience of his peers. Sometimes he seems to be addressing the post-Vietnam undergraduate strategist trying to cope with peer pressure not to "sell out." Frequent references to "the author" suggest a professional *apologia.* Hard to tell. In any event, I cannot think of anyone who would profit from reading it, though I picked it up with high hopes.

—Ashton Carter

EDITORIAL AFSA

'A Truly Sterling Achievement'

Ambassador Philip Habib's latest triumph comes as no surprise to those of us who have followed his career over the years. The negotiated agreement leading to the evacuation of the Palestine Liberation Organization from Lebanon represents a towering tribute to his force of will in overcoming all obstacles. Once again he has brought credit not only to himself, but to the entire career Foreign Service.

For three long months Ambassador Habib contended with the passions and personalities of the Mideast — not to mention a travel schedule which left younger aides begging for mercy. A less determined man might have given up, a less experienced man might have made a catastrophic blunder, and a man who did not enjoy the complete confidence of his president might never have been given the authority to make the tough decisions. Fortunately for all, the right man was given the job.

Last January, AFSA organized an initiative to nominate Ambassador Habib, a former president of the Association, for the Nobel Prize for Peace. Chief Justice Warren Burger, Senators Howard Baker and Robert Byrd, and House Minority Leader Robert Michel served as sponsors of this effort. More recently, Senator Charles Percy has also nominated Ambassador Habib. We wholeheartly endorse these nominations and believe that rarely has there been a candidate so worthy of this honor. President Reagan's summation of Ambassador Habib's effort is right on target: this was "a truly sterling achievement." □

'A Truly Professional Performance'

The successful evacuation of Beirut resulted, in large part, from the extraordinary diplomatic efforts of Ambassador Philip Habib. However, without the strong support of numerous career members of the Foreign Service — many of whom have worked behind the scenes without recognition — Habib's efforts may not have succeeded. Special recognition is due in particular to Deputy Assistant Secretary Morris Draper, who has been Habib's right hand and chief of staff since early 1981.

Draper's extraordinary stamina, exceptional judgment, unparalleled area expertise, and meticulous attention to detail have complemented Habib's efforts at every stage in the delicate negotiations.

Also deserving of special recognition have been our career ambassadors in the field: Robert Dillon in Beirut, Samuel Lewis in Tel Aviv, Robert Paganelli in Damascus, and Richard Murphy in Jiddah. These ambassadors and their able staffs solved seemingly insurmountable problems on a daily basis. Our embassies in Nicosia, Athens, London, and our mission in Geneva also played key roles during the more delicate stages of the evacuation.

Finally, the men and women of the Foreign Service, both overseas and in Washington, whose numbers are too great to recognize here individually, performed in the highest tradition of Foreign Service excellence. □

Two to Tango

From Independence to the Falklands Crisis, Argentine and U.S. Foreign Policies Have Been Out of Step

By JOSEPH S. TULCHIN

Relations between the United States and Argentina are at a low ebb. Argentina's loss of the war with Britain over control of the Malvinas or Falkland Islands has left a residue of bitterness that will not easily dissipate. Whatever the intrinsic logic of U.S. policy in first offering to mediate between the two powers and then declaring unequivocal support for Britain while harshly criticizing Argentina, the *volte face* was seen in Buenos Aires as the cruelest betrayal. Argentine officials had believed the United States would support their efforts to reclaim the Malvinas. Only such support, they believed, would justify their willingness to send Argentine troops to serve U.S. interests in Central America.

During the Falklands incident, the U.S. and Argentine governments each misread the intentions of the other; each misread the signals they received; and each displayed remarkable insensitivity to the deep-seated traditions and principles guiding the foreign policy of the other. Ironically, this misunderstanding is the product of the Reagan administration's efforts to befriend the Argentine government and eliminate the tension that existed between the two countries during the Carter administration. What Reagan failed to realize was that tensions between the two countries did not begin with Carter and concerned much more than human rights. They go back deep into the historical memory of both countries and are part of an oft-repeated pattern of misunderstanding.

Part of that pattern is that U.S. policies have frequently served to undermine the groups in Argentina most sympathetic to the United States, thereby strengthening relatively hostile elements and leading ultimately to results counter to those intended. Similarly, Argentine policymakers in this century have been slow to appreciate domestic forces in the United States or the European orientation of U.S. foreign policy. More recently, the Argentine government has tended to misunderstand American bureaucratic politics and mistake as policy statements by individuals in the government.

Seeing Xenophobia

Most American studies of Argentine foreign policy have characterized Argentina's behavior as individualistic or isolationist. When describing Argentina's participation in hemispheric affairs, the terms are often more pejorative: idiosyncratic or obstructionist. Some authors have implied that Argentine governments deliberately and perversely block all efforts at hemispheric cooperation because of their jealous competition with the United States for leadership in Latin America or because of some more generalized xenophobia. This view, however, does not allow for the existence or expression of Argentine national interests apart from U.S. desires or objectives.

In this regard, and because U.S.-Argentine relations during the Carter administration hinged on issues of morality, especially the sanctity of human rights, it is instructive to note that Argentine conceptions of moral behavior by nation-states have been remarkably congruent with the codes of conduct followed by the United States since Woodrow Wilson's presidency. If the Argentines have applied the codes differently, it was because their perceptions of the world were not the same and their national interests often did not coincide with ours. For example, in 1918, an Argentine naval vessel stopped briefly at the port of Santo Domingo. U.S. marines were occupying the Dominican Republic at the time and the offices of the Dominican government were filled by U.S. military personnel. Yet the Argentine vessel saluted the Dominican flag, not the U.S. flag. In another episode, Argentine diplomats protested their exclusion from the Paris Peace Conference at the end of World War I. Like the other neutrals, Argentina had little part in the conference, but its diplomats made known their view that the League of Nations should provide all countries with an equal voice. At the first meeting of the League Assembly in Geneva in 1921, the Argentine representative proposed a motion to abolish the privileges of the big four and admit the vanquished nations. When the motion was tabled, the Argentine ambassador walked out. Were these gestures anti-American or quixotic?

Joseph S. Tulchin is professor of history at the University of North Carolina (Chapel Hill) and former editor of the Latin American Research Review.

Continuing the pattern of misunderstanding between U.S. and Argentine leaders, former president Leopoldo F. Galtieri (right) and other members of the ruling junta expected U.S. support during the Falkland Islands crisis and were stung when the United States backed Great Britain.

Furthermore, the view of Argentine policy as idiosyncratic or obstructionist ignores the possibility that basic principles of Argentine foreign policy are founded upon the national experience of the 19th century, when the United States was only a minor factor in Argentina's relations with the world. Following its war of independence from Spain (1810–16), Argentina suffered a prolonged period of internecine conflict. National consolidation was achieved after 1860, when a liberal elite seized control of the state and determined to remake their nation in a foreign image defined by the European idea of progress: European immigrants would populate the pampas and improve the creole race, European capital would pay for the infrastructure necessary to transfer the agricultural products from the fertile pampas to the consumers of Europe. The norms under which the Argentine economy was to function were those of liberal free trade; the political norms under which the society would be held together were those of Anglo-American democratic constitutionalism.

The liberal growth model worked; Argentina experienced an economic boom of unprecedented proportions. As more and more land was brought into production, Argentina became increasingly dependent upon European markets for the sale of its surplus staples and upon European capital to finance that trade. Great Britain was the paramount foreign power in Argentine affairs and, year by year, more and more of the Argentine national product was devoted to satisfying the needs of British investors and consumers.

It might be an exaggeration to say that Argentine policymakers sought to create the conditions of structural dependence upon Great Britain during this period of growth; yet it is true that the principal objective of the government was to facilitate the expansion of the country's exports. At that time, it was believed that the market mechanism would determine the pattern of relations among countries. Argentina would be friendly toward all, politically independent of all, and follow the links established by the international market. The Argentine leadership after 1880 believed that their country's interest required maximizing the export of its agricultural staples at the most advantageous price. All efforts in international relations were to be directed toward the achievement of that end. Argentina was to avoid restrictions on its freedom of action that might inhibit trade with Europe. In practice, this came to mean avoidance of formal international commitments.

Logical & Reasonable

Seen in this light, the Argentine caution in the first few Pan American meetings is both logical and reasonable. Anything that turned Argentine energies away from Europe was believed wasteful or harmful. Also, the obvious dominance of the United States in the Pan American movement was inimical to Argentines, for they expected, given the rate of Argentine economic growth, that their country soon would surpass the extraordinary levels of American material accomplishment, and do so while preserving the higher values of European civilization. But this reluctance to make commitments to the Pan American movement did not prevent Argentina from assuming an active role among the countries of the western hemisphere. The Argentine government made notable efforts to settle the War of the Pacific between Chile, Bolivia, and Peru and to fix its boundary with Chile, finally accomplished in 1902. And, it expressed its solidarity with Venezuelan efforts to settle a boundary dispute with Great Britain, although there was considerable debate among Argentine policymakers as to the proper attitude toward U.S. diplomatic intervention in that episode.

During the depression of the 1930s, only one foreign policy issue caught the attention of the Argentine public: the preservation of export markets. Other issues were allowed to become the personal playthings of the foreign minister or a particular elite. Seen in this light, Argentina's neutrality in the Second World War, like its behavior during the depression and its neutrality during World War I, was based on a definition of the national interest in terms of protecting export markets and on the conviction that neutrality, rather than choosing sides, would be most conducive to achieving national objectives. This is not to deny that there were groups or people in Argentina who rooted for the Axis; there were. But the pro-Axis forces within

Argentina did not dictate the policy of neutrality. That policy was the result of a fairly broad consensus within the society, including numerous groups that were pro-Ally in their sentiments. Neither Secretary of State Cordell Hull nor his immediate successors could accept that fact.

In the years just prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe, the international environment became unpleasant for Argentina. The informal imperial link with Great Britain no longer provided the support Argentina needed and the United States was persistently unwilling or unable to replace Britain in that role. Argentina's ability to secure military matériel was being jeopardized by the suppliers' reluctance to sell anything to any but the most vital potential allies—a category that Argentina was not likely to fit as much for its geographic isolation as for its political attitudes—while Brazil was enjoying remarkable success in winning promises for armaments and heavy machinery from both the Axis and the Allies. As a clincher, the harvests of 1938 and 1939 were either very poor or unsold, producing excruciating financial pressures on the Argentine government.

Declaring Non-belligerency

The administration of President Roberto Ortiz tried to reverse this adverse flow of events and project Argentina into a crucial position for the Allies by proposing in April 1940 that all American nations join in declaring their non-belligerency in the European war. Ortiz and his foreign minister, José María Cantilo, hoped to link Argentina with the United States in a way that would guarantee both defense supplies and markets for agricultural commodities, and, by so doing, undermine the anti-democratic forces in their own country. But the United States spurned the non-belligerency proposal and continued to drag its feet in meeting repeated Argentine requests for matériel and trade guarantees. Ortiz became ill and withdrew in favor of his vice president, Ramon S. Castillo. Cantilo fell and, after a brief interlude, was replaced by Enrique Ruiz Guinazú, a man noted for his admiration of "virile fascism." Given the configuration of domestic political forces in Argentina and of international military and economic forces, after 1940 Argentina really did not have a workable alternative to neutrality.

The non-belligerency proposal provides an excellent example of the American failure to understand adequately the domestic forces behind a particular Argentine foreign policy initiative and to appreciate the likely consequences among those contending forces of a negative or unsympathetic response. And, that failure was not the result of inadequate information nor of misunderstanding the signals put out by Argentine leaders. For example, in June 1940, Ambassador Norman Armour reported on a conversation with Raul Prebisch, then manager of the Central Bank, in which the Argentine tied together in no uncertain terms the economic, diplomatic, and political problems his country was facing. Help from the United States, Prebisch claimed,

> would give immediate relief and have a very beneficial psychological effect upon the Argentine people who are disturbed by intelligent Nazi-Fascist propaganda. Unfortunately, he added, there are serious political aspects of the present Argentine emergency but he went on to say . . . the Argentine government is now probably better disposed toward the United States and sees more nearly eye to eye with the United States with respect to the European situation than any other American republic; and he cannot conceive of a better opportunity than the present for exploratory conversations designed to evolve a lasting solution of existing political and financial and trade problems.

The next day a financial expert connected with the Argentine government told an American newspaperman that Argentina was in serious trouble and that if the United States did not soon provide help or open its markets to Argentine products, Argentina would have to go to Germany for trade and aid, thus falling into the Nazi camp like a spent trout.

This information was transmitted to Washington, but it did not move the Roosevelt administration. Aside from Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles, an old Latin American "hand," senior officials in the Department of State were put off by the public statements of Argentine officials attacking democracy and by the much-publicized activity of Nazi agents in Argentina. These officials did not support the Argentine cause in the councils of government and concurred with demands by officials in the Agriculture and Commerce departments that Argentine products must not be granted access to the U.S. market. A vicious circle was created: the United States refused to provide Argentina with aid or trade on the grounds that it was not sufficiently supportive of the Allied cause. The Argentine government split into three factions—one, pro-Ally; another, pro-Axis; and a third, committed to neutrality at all costs—and, with the growth of exports its primary concern, took the U.S. position as proof that the Argentines would suffer irreparable damage by throwing in their lot with the Allies. Such evidence weakened the hand of the pro-Ally faction in the government and emboldened the small pro-Axis group to make stronger public statements. These statements, in turn, convinced U.S. officials that they had been correct to deny aid and trade to Argentina and that Argentine leaders were hopelessly pro-Axis. Each episode only served to weaken those in each country who supported a constructive relationship between the two nations and strengthen those who were either hostile or apathetic toward close ties with the other country.

Destroying Relations

In contrast, one episode occurred during this period in which vigorous defense of the national interest by the relatively pro-U.S. elements within the Argentine government served to enhance that group's domestic political power. In 1937, Roosevelt offered seven old destroyers to Brazil as a means of improving relations with the South American country that U.S. military planners considered of greatest potential strategic significance. The Argentine foreign minister, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, complained bitterly of a gratuitous insult to Argentina and the perilous risk to the South American balance of power in the pro-

Association News

Quick AFSA Action Halts AID PERs Injustices

In mid-July, the prospects for a fair and equitable AID Performance Evaluation Report process this year were nil. As we go to press in early September, however, the situation has improved to the point where AFSA feels that selection panels should be convened. This dramatic shift occurred because of the perseverance and hard negotiating of the AID Standing Committee. A brief review of the events follows.

First, we must emphasize AFSA's longstanding commitment to an equitable method of differentiation among personnel, as well as candid assessment of an individual's strengths and weaknesses. We are on record as being prepared to meet with management at any time to negotiate a mechanism for effecting this goal.

Unfortunately, AID unilaterally attempted to revise dramatically the PER system in mid-cycle. In April, AID made a videotape for distribution to the field, exhorting raters to make a more conscientious effort to assess ratees accurately and honestly. The next step should have been for AID to negotiate with AFSA about a change in the instructions for writing PERs. Instead, AID acted to implement new "guidelines" — guidelines thar were never negotiated, never clearly spelled out, and which were subject to misinterpretation, misunderstanding, and overzealous application. AFSA polled its AID membership both in Washington and overseas and found that many posts did not receive the videotape before the PERs were completed, that some posts were applying "new standards" while others were not, and, worst of all, that some officials were attempting to coerce raters to downgrade PERs through threats of punishment. Quite understandably, this led to considerable confusion among raters and reviewers as to what was really desired — an honest PER or a general, indiscriminate downgrading of ratings? Were ratings to be objective and candid or were they to be distorted and contrived to fit expectations which had been arbitrarily created?

Obviously this was a situation which we could not accept. Further, we do not believe that what happened was what AID had in mind. At this point, AFSA and a newly concerned management began negotiating over how best to salvage this year's cycle. After five weeks of discussions and negotiations, agreement was reached. The agreement contains the following important features:

1. The AID administrator will reassert in a cable/notice that his intention was to have frank and candid assessments, *not* an indiscriminate downgrading or a bell shaped curve;

2. Any PER which was done under the erroneous assumption that an indiscriminate downgrading was sought is to be redone;

3. A retired AID officer will be brought back to provide an independent review in those cases where agreement can not be reached at the post/bureau level. This officer will have the PER in question, statements from the employee, and the ability to investigate further;

4. To allow time to accomplish this the due date for PERs will be delayed;

5. If this delay results in the postponement of any panel, management will not oppose AFSA's going to the Grievance Board to seek promotion dates retroactive to when promotions would normally have taken effect;

6. All pesonnel policy changes will be transmitted through established channels, i.e., by cable and notice;

7. "Rating tendencies" will not be given to this year's promotion panels;

8. AFSA will be allowed to provide a written statement to the promotion panels summarizing our observation on this year's evaluation process;

9. Any grievances which arise out of this year's PER cycle will be treated in an expeditious manner;

10. Management will meet with AFSA early on to negotiate fully next year's PER cycle.

AFSA's Newest Member—Secretary Shultz

Pat Guild

AFSA President Dennis K. Hays (right) presents an honorary certificate of membership in the Association to Secretary of State George P. Shultz. A dozen members of the AFSA Governing Board met with Shultz on August 23 to discuss professional concerns and labor-management issues.

MONEY

Calculating How Much Money You Will Need in The Future

"Money is of a prolific, generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more." —Benjamin Franklin, financial planner, in 1748.

Franklin would agree that money needs a great deal of intelligent, persevering care and handling in inflationary times if it is going to beget *enough* to take care of ever-expanding requirements. We live in a nervous climate of change, and this is especially true in the realm of money management.

Prudent management begins with accurate projections of inflation-adjusted costs for whatever needs loom on your particular horizon. Home purchase in three years? Three children to college in 8, 10, and 13 years? Enough capital to travel between your Washington and Cuernavaca residences after you retire?

To estimate capital needs, you must use a formula constructed of current cost, time, and a presumed rate of inflation. Example:

Tuition, room and board, 1982–83, Washington-area public college (out of state fee)	$3670
Years to college	10
Presumed rate of inflation	5%
Inflation adjusted cost	1.63 × 3670 = $5982
($1.00 compounded at 5% for 10 years = 1.63)	

Is it reasonable to assume that your earnings will increase at a rate comparable to the rate of inflation? If yes, you can simplify your estimates by using current figures for college costs. The technique is simple to master, however, and will help in the next exercise.

Presumably, another one of your objectives is to have enough income to live *with style* at the end of your peak earning years. How much is that likely to be? First, determine what that style would cost you today, on a monthly basis. $1000? $3000? Estimate years to retirement and adjust for presumed rate of inflation as in the following example:

Today's monthly cash required	$2500
Years to retirement	15
Presumed rate of inflation	6%
Inflation adjusted monthly requirement	2.40 × 2500 = $6000
($1.00 compounded at 6% for 15 years = 2.40)	

What will it take to produce an income of $6000 per month? Assume your investments can produce an annual yield of 10%. (They should do at least that well!) You will need assets of $720,000 to generate the required income (12 months divided by 10%, times $6000). When you apply this formula to your own situation, reduce your capital requirement by income from other sources: annuity, continuing employment, and eventually social security. Estimate your IRA-fund accumulation, if any, and see if there is a residual shortfall. Example:

Total monthly income required	$6000
Less income from annuity	2300
Less retainer from consulting job	250
Additional monthly income required	3450
Capital need (assets invested at 10%)	12 ÷ 10% × 3450 = 414,000
Marital IRA will have earned 12% for 20 years (no tax!)	181,572
Relatively liquid assets not including residence (assumed)	40,000
Remaining capital required	$192,428

With 15 years to get there, how much more must you invest to attain the required capital? You will reach your goal with a monthly investment of approximately $385, if you achieve a return of 12%. (The last two procedures call for a calculator which will compound periodic payments and will differentiate between beginning- and end-of-year deposits. That accounts for some of you coming up with $162,118 for the IRA accumulation calculation.)

The purpose of this exposition, clearly, is to disclose the value and necessity of planning, a critical component of prudent financial management. Next installment: How to plan strategies and choose investments to meet your objectives.

News update: Since my article on IRAs was published (June), Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia have amended tax regulations to allow the contributions to be deducted from gross income for determination of state taxes.

—Margaret Winkler

AFSA, Management Go to Impasse on Family Visitation

Management has chosen to go to the Foreign Service Impasse Disputes Panel over a proposed provision in the Family Visitation regulations. These regulations set forth conditions under which employees at posts where families are not authorized may visit them. Management first contended that "family" should be defined as "spouse and children," later proposing a broadening of the definition to include immediate family members who are more than 51% dependent upon the employee. The Association feels strongly that management's proposal discriminates against single employees. Employees should be able to visit a member of his or her family, related by blood, marriage, or adoption, who normally resides with that employee at post.

This regulation affects a very small number of people—as this is written there are only two posts where families are not permitted. As far as is known, there is at present no one at either post to whom this regulation would apply. Management has thus chosen to follow an expensive and time consuming procedure (remember how long Advance of Pay took?) to try to avoid a small benefit for single people which might possibly cost them a couple of thousand dollars a year.

So why are *we* holding tough on a regulation that affects so few? Because your family is your family—whether it be aunt, parent, sibling, or whatever, and whether or not the person is more than 51% dependent on you. And Congress, in the Foreign Service Act, does not say, "spouse and children"; it does not say, "51% dependent"; it says, in black and white "the family of the member" of the Service.

It's strange, isn't it, how management can get so worked up about a benefit like this, and spend so much time and effort on it, when they don't seem to have the time or resources to deal with subjects like Standby Pay, Special Incentive Differential, and some others we could mention.

Until the Impasse Disputes Panel rules, the existing regulations on Family Visitation will apply.

Congressman Paul Simon (D.-Ill.)

Simon Calls for More Cultural Exchange in 'Public Diplomacy' Luncheon Lecture

"It is so easy as we deal with those nations whose policies we dislike intensely to serve the national passion rather than the national interest," said Congressman Paul Simon (D.-Ill.) to a packed audience in the Foreign Service Club on April 26. In his speech, the fourth in a series of luncheon lectures on the theme of "Public Diplomacy in the 1980s" sponsored by AFSA's USIA Standing Committee, he urged the Foreign Service to speak out on behalf of educational and cultural exchange programs.

Simon said that these programs "ought to have a broader base. The political mileage is gone, yet the national interest is very clear." Never before in history has it been so important for nations to understand one another, he said, yet there has been a "dramatic and precipitous decline in international education over the past decade." The congressman observed that today the United States only spends as much on exchange programs with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe as it does to pave one-third of a mile of interstate highway.

Simon criticized the government for subsidizing and encouraging international studies programs in the United States at an "embarrassingly low level." While France and West Germany allocate one percent of their budgets to educational, cultural, and informational exchange with other countries, for example, the United States spends only one-tenth of one percent. To remedy this situation, he suggested building a broader resource base for the programs, attempting to reach a greater number of universities, and establishing more foreign language requirements.

The congressman cited some illuminating statistics in his discussion. Of the 488,000 military service personnel overseas, for instance, only 412 are linguistically competent in the country in which they are stationed. Pointing out the obvious security risks inherent in this situation, he also noted that only six of the 52 hostages at the American embassy in Teheran spoke Farsi.

"We are missing out on valuable opportunities," said Simon. In 1978, the U.S. government sponsored 181 scholarships to Latin America, while the Soviet Union sponsored 4650. In 1977, there were 1800 African students studying in the United States, while there were 24,000 studying in the Soviet Union.

Simon challenged the audience to imagine if forty years ago Leonid Brezhnev had been an exchange student in the United States and Ronald Reagan had studied in Moscow. "It takes real imagination in both cases, but we would live in a vastly different world had that occurred. We don't know who the Brezhnevs and the Reagans of the future are, but we shouldn't be missing the opportunity to expose them to cultural exchange."

—Linda J. Lavelle

More Changes in Retirement Annuities

Before adjourning for the Labor Day recess, Congress acted to modify the cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) payments to federal retirees as part of the budget reduction process. Other changes direct that retirement annuity payments henceforth will commence the first of the month following the date of retirement rather than immediately as at present, while all future retirement annuity payments will be rounded down to the nearest dollar.

Formerly COLAS became effective March 1, incorporating the rise in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) during the preceding calendar year. The change voted as part of the fiscal year 1983 budget reconciliation process extends the effective date of the COLA increase. For the next three years the COLAS will be scheduled 13 months apart: instead of March 1, 1983, the next COLA will be effective April 1, while the next two are scheduled for May 1, 1984, and June 1, 1985.

Disability retirees and survivors will continue to receive the full COLA amount. So will retirees over age 62. Retirees under age 62 will receive only one-half of the COLA unless the CPI rise exceeds the CPI estimates incorporated in the budget projection. Example: the estimated increases in the CPI for the next three annual adjustment periods are 6.6%, 7.2%, and 6.6%, respectively. If the next actual CPI should prove to be 7.6%, the COLA for the under-age-62 retirees would be calculated as follows: one-half of 6.6% (the CPI budget projection) or 3.3%, plus 1.0% (the amount by which the actual CPI exceeded the estimate) for a total COLA of 4.3%.

Meanwhile there is further talk on Capitol Hill about the possibility of a special session of Congress between Election Day and Christmas to address the funding problems of Social Security. If this happens, the lame duck Congress presumably would be less sensitive to the political risks of tampering with the present structure of Social Security benefits, which might well result in further changes in the federal retirement system.

AFSA Scholarship Programs 1983–84

WHO—For dependent children of Foreign Service families who are serving or have served abroad.

HOW—Apply to the AFSA Scholarship Programs Administrator, by letter or phone (202-338-4046) giving FS affiliation and type of scholarship—Merit, Financial Aid, or both.

WHERE—AFSA, 2101 E St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

WHEN—IMMEDIATELY! All applications must be completed and returned to the AFSA office by February 15, 1983. (Forms available October or November.)

Merit Awards are for graduating 1983 High School seniors or juniors, based solely on academic excellence.

Financial Aid Awards are for undergraduate students based solely on need.

Foreign Service personnel in the lower grades are especially encouraged to apply.

Emergency Visit Travel Agreement Has Major Changes

An agreement with management on new regulations on "Emergency Visitation Travel" was signed on August 31. The most significant change from current regs provides for funded emergency travel in case of death of a sibling. Further, if an employee or eligible dependent goes home at his or her own expense to visit an ill or injured sibling, and the sibling dies during that visit or within 45 days of the employee's leaving post for that visit, *either* the complete round-trip travel already undertaken may be reimbursed *or* a subsequent round-trip travel for the interment will be funded—but not both.

This is still less than we want—that siblings should be treated the same way as parents, spouses, and children—but it's a big step forward, particularly in these budget-conscious times.

Other major changes are:

- Clarification of language to authorize emergency travel of tandem couples in cases involving children, regardless of which parent lists the child as a dependent;
- The post may provide transportation by GTR *or cash payments;*
- Clarification of provision allowing round trip to place of interment for eligible dependents at post, in case of death of an employee;
- Time spent in the United States will now delay home leave eligibility only if the member has not accumulated 18 months of continuous service abroad;
- Exceptions may be made by principal officers and mission directors to prescribed waiting period of three months following return to post from EVT before departing or family visitation travel.

Authorization Act Eases SFS Pay-Level Changes

In addition to establishing funding levels, changing "USICA" to "USIA," establishing the Foreign Missions Act, and so on, the Department of State Authorization Act for fiscal years 1982 and 1983 corrected a shortcoming of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. The Foreign Service Act established the Senior Foreign Service with six pay levels, but only three grades. The result is that grade FE-OC has four pay levels. What the original language of the Foreign Service Act did not make clear was how officers would move from one of these pay levels to another within the FE-OC grade. A Department of Justice opinion stated that movement from one pay level to another within grade would have to be submitted to the Senate for confirmation, just as is promotion from one grade to another, under current legislation.

Legislative relief was sought and obtained in the form of language in the authorization act that authorizes the secretary of state to adjust the rate of pay of a member of the Senior Foreign Service not more than once a year.

It is not certain at this writing precisely what this will mean. The Department has not yet informed us of how it intends to implement this provision or what criteria will be used to determine which officers will be moved from one level to another. What does exist now is the legislative authority to move officers from one pay level to another as an administrative procedure that does not require congressional approval.

The Association will keep members informed as developments occur.

Bring the Kids to Family Night at Bookfair '82

Family Night of Bookfair '82 will take place on Friday, October 29, from 5–8:30 p.m. Among the many special attractions this year will be Marthew Largen, former State Department employee and member of Clowns of America, who will be on hand to construct balloon animals and perform various sleights. Cartoons starring Donald Duck and Dr. Seuss characters as well as a Laurel and Hardy short film will be shown in the Dean Acheson Auditorium.

The State Department Cafeteria will not only provide family food such as spaghetti, fried chicken, hamburgers, cookies, and punch, but this year will host a Children's Halloween Party featuring decorations and games for school-age children. Cafereria Manager Jean Garvey and her colleagues will join the kids in playing pin-the-rail-on-the-donkey, musical chairs, etc. The party begins at 3 p.m. and will continue rhroughout the afternoon.

Association of American Foreign Service Women

BOOKFAIR

Dinner will be served from 3–7 p.m. The cafeteria manager asks that families eat as early as possible to avoid long lines at the last minute. (The cafeteria must observe irs scheduled closing time.).

Association Renews Capitol Hill Squash Club Agreement

The Association has renewed its agreement with the Capitol Hill Squash Club to provide free squash memberships to all AFSA regular and associate members on presentation of valid proof of Association membership.

Although the squash memberships are free, the Association has agreed to the club's request that it be allowed ro charge an annual $10 processing fee to cover its costs incurred by the plan.

AFSA Announces Harriman, Herter, Rivkin Awards

AFSA's panels of judges have designated the winners of the Herter, Rivkin, and Harriman awards for 1982. These awards are given annually to, respectively, a senior, middle-grade, and junior officer who has demonstrated "extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage, and creative dissent." The Harriman Award carries a stipend of $2500 while the Rivkin and Herter awards are for $1000 each.

The 1982 winners are:

THE HERTER AWARD:
The Hon. Herman J. Cohen
Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Intelligence and Research

THE RIVKIN AWARD:
George Cosgrove
AID (on leave until December 1982)

THE HARRIMAN AWARD:
Hugo Carl Getringer
Political Officer, American Embassy, San Salvador

The time and place of the awards presentation ceremony will be announced as soon as final arrangements have been completed.

Secretary of State Cordell Hull repeatedly pressured the Argentine government to sever relations with the Axis powers, but his demands only antagonized Argentina and ultimately led to the downfall of a sympathetic regime and paved the way for the rise of Juan Perón.

posed transfer of armaments. Hull reconsidered and ultimately withdrew the offer, accepting a momentary embarrassment in U.S.-Brazilian relations to prevent any deterioration in relations with Argentina. The success of the Saavedra Lamas defense of the national interest enhanced the strength of the democratic and pro-Ally faction favored by incoming president Roberto Ortiz and ultimately led to the effort in 1940 by Foreign Minister Cantilo to tie Argentina more closely to the United States by means of the non-belligerency pact.

Argentine neutrality was a nationalistic policy. It and the concept of nationalism from which it was derived, the mechanism of state control over export and foreign exchange upon which it was based, and the technicians who carried it out were essentially the same under pro-Allied democrats, such as Ortiz and his foreign minister, Cantilo, or pro-Axis leaders with authoritarian proclivities, such as Castillo or Ruiz-Guinazú. It should not be cause for surprise, then, that the military leaders who took power by means of a coup in 1943 followed a nationalistic line in foreign policy. Their policy was not something alien to the Argentine spirit, invented by the military mind, as so many observers in the United States argued. Colonel Juan Domingo Perón, the emerging leader of the 1943 military junta, pursued a foreign policy which had been evolving throughout the 1930s. Thus, the strong Argentine nationalism that appeared during the years dominated by Perón was in many ways a response to the failure of Great Britain and the United States to strengthen their commercial links with Argentina during a period of economic crisis.

Hardly Cordial

After 1943, Argentina and the United States entered a period in which their relations were hardly cordial. The Argentine military was concerned that its country was falling farther and farther behind Brazil in strategic capability, and believed that, to make Argentina secure, a program of industrialization that would satisfy Argentina's need for strategic materials in times of international crisis must be imposed on the country. In the view of U.S. policymakers, not only had Argentina assumed a posture of neutrality—seen as a cover for supporting the Axis—but it had abandoned all pretense of democratic government and was ruled by military men suspected of being sympathetic to German or Italian forms of fascistic social organization. The United States persistently pressured the Argentine government, first, to cooperate more enthusiastically in the war effort and, after 1945, to conform more closely to the norms of democratic behavior desired by Washington. This pressure had the unintended but repeated effect of undermining that political faction most sympathetic to the United States and strengthening the more nationalistic, more anti-liberal, and less friendly faction.

The so-called "Storni affair" illustrates this point very well. The junta that ousted Castillo gave early indications that it would be more cooperative toward the Allies than its predecessor. In fact, a majority of the military leaders, despite the German sympathies of a certain sector, had serious complaints against the Castillo regime—against its weaknesses, corruption, and, above all, its incapacity to obtain arms from the United States at a time when Brazil was forging ahead of Argentina in this respect. A cabinet shuffle replaced several members having Axis sympathies with others who were notoriously pro-Ally, most notably Admiral Segundo N. Storni, as foreign minister. Upon assuming office, Storni declared:

> Bit by bit, the actions of the Argentine government will continue the policy of American solidarity. . . . Argentina will arrive where it must be in international relations. The foreign policy of Argentina will imply a meticulous fulfillment of her obligations with the American countries.

The U.S. ambassador had been privately informed by Storni that this would include severing relations with the Axis.

Instead of nurturing this sign of cooperation, Secretary of State Hull reacted with scorn, demanding some proof of the meticulous fulfillment to which Storni had referred. Hull wanted a quick decision by the Argentine government to break relations with the Axis and he wanted no strings attached. Such a clear-cut decision was politically impossible in Argentina.

The question of foreign policy had become the central issue in the struggle for power within the military. General Ramírez, the head of the junta, tried to place himself between the two extreme groups that were fighting among themselves, but he was gradually losing control of the situation just as the nationalists within the military were increasing their power. The initial commitment to break with the Axis was becoming more and more difficult to carry out without some tangible evidence that the step would benefit Argentina. This Hull refused to give.

Allies or Axis

Eventually, at Hull's insistence, Storni agreed to put in writing the Argentine commitment to rupture relations with the Axis. The text of the letter, which was the cause of considerable debate within the government, tried to explain why Argentina could not break relations at that time without cause. He denied that the Argentine regime sympathized with the Axis. He insisted that his government would spare no efforts to comply with the obligations assumed. But he could not do so without a cause that would justify it. To act otherwise would be to provide arguments for those who might think that he was operating under pressure or threat from foreign agents. And this would be tolerated neither by the people nor by the armed forces of the country. He concluded:

> I can affirm to you . . . that the Axis countries have nothing to hope for from our government and that public opinion is daily more unfavorable to them. But this evolution would be more rapid and effective for the American cause if President Roosevelt should make a gesture of genuine friendship toward our people; such a gesture might be the urgent provision of airplanes, spare parts and machinery to restore Argentina to the position of equilibrium to which it is entitled with respect to other South American countries.

Storni's letter closed with a plea for understanding and friendship on the part of the United States toward the Ramírez government during its difficult initial period.

Hull answered Storni's note in a most scathing manner. He went on at great length excoriating the Argentine government for its failure to carry out its obligations. He expressed surprise that fulfillment of contracted obligations could be a motive for considering such action to have been taken under the pressure of foreign agencies, especially when the obligations had all been freely subscribed to by the American republics and had been fulfilled by all except Argentina. He specifically rejected the appeal for arms and stated his belief that the questions of a South American equilibrium were inconsistent with the inter-American doctrine of peaceful solution of international disputes, a doctrine to which, he added, Argentine statesmen had made so many contributions.

The publication of the Hull letter in the Argentine newspapers inflamed nationalist sentiments across a broad political spectrum. The position of Storni was made unbearable, and he had to resign the following day. As the situation of the chief of state himself was also compromised, Storni sent him a letter assuming full responsibility for the document. On the same day, the president declared that the "historical tradition of a nation . . . cannot be weakened by the confidential expressions of a functionary." When Ramírez finally ruptured relations with the Axis a few months later, Hull, instead of supporting the move and thereby strengthening Ramírez's position, pushed for further concessions. This only precipitated the fall of the Ramírez government, paving the way for Perón to take power.

Perón was able to build a coalition of the military and organized labor and skillfully construct a nationalistic image for himself. But when he tried to legitimize his authority through popular elections in 1946 the United States again acted in a manner that harmed its own interests. Fifteen days before the election, the United States made known its disapproval of Perón through the publication of the famous "Blue Book" detailing the links between the Argentine government and the Axis during the war and singling out Perón as the principal collaborator. The result of this overt interference redounded to the benefit of Perón. The sole objective of Perón's strategy in the last days of the electoral campaign was to present himself as the champion of Argentine sovereignty. According to his propaganda, the Argentines would have to choose on election day between U.S. Ambassador Spruille Braden or Perón. They chose the candidate not favored by the United States.

After Perón was deposed in 1955, the first democratically elected president, Arturo Frondizi (1958–62), tried to stimulate economic growth by massive investments in infrastructure, much of it with foreign capital. His foreign policy emphasized hemispheric affairs in a manner that seemed a throwback to Ortiz and Cantilo prior to World War II. He cultivated the friendship of the United States; he was one of the strongest supporters of the Alliance for Progress; he made shrewd use of the personal ties between his foreign minister, Miguel Angel Cárcano, and the family of John F. Kennedy. At the same time, he tried to balance these overtures to the United States and demonstrate his independence by maintaining relations with Fidel Castro's Cuba. This displeased the U.S. government and upset the Argentine military, whose ideological propensities were hostile to the doctrines represented by Castro.

Doses of Rhetoric

Frondizi's domestic economic policy, known as "Developmentalism," sought to control the foreign investment entering the country in order to free Argentina from its dependence on foreign capital. This policy called for mild doses of nationalistic rhetoric, but Frondizi was a moderate in comparison to some of his nationalistic critics who opposed all foreign investment and who were skeptical of the virtues of democratic government. In April 1961, Frondizi signed a treaty of friendship and consultation with the president of Brazil, Janio Quadros, in the border city of Uruguayana. This rapprochement with Brazil was part of Frondizi's efforts to build a bloc of underdeveloped countries and use foreign policy to further economic development, as explained by his undersecretary for foreign relations:

Wide World

When Juan Perón tried to legitimize his authority through popular elections in 1946, U.S. publication of a book singling out Perón as the principal World War II collaborator with the Axis powers fueled Argentine nationalist feelings and aided in his success.

> Argentina is a Latin American country, that is to say, it is made up of a geographical area belonging to the underdeveloped continents of the world, but she has conditions of negotiations that are very inferior to those of the other areas by virtue of her lesser strategic significance. . . . Our present solidarity with Latin America rises not only from the obvious traditional sympathy by reason of blood and language, but also from the conscience that only action can call attention to our necessities, as was demonstrated, though in limited measure, by the partial success achieved with Operation Pan-America.

The key to Frondizi's hemispheric policy was to be his attempt to arbitrate the growing differences between Cuba and the United States. The role of mediator would demonstrate Argentina's independence of action and its influence in world affairs. This would calm nationalists within the military who were nervous about Castro's politics and calm those within the military, Frondizi's own party, and the Peronist labor movement who considered his efforts to attract U.S. investment a mark of subserviance. In rebuffing the Argentine initiative and increasing the pressure on Frondizi to break relations with Cuba, the United States did coerce a rupture in relations, but, as in World War II, achieved its narrow objective at the cost of playing into the hands of the more extreme nationalists contending for power in Argentina, in this case the anti-democratic military looking for an excuse to be rid of Frondizi.

The parallels with earlier events are striking. Frondizi publicized his efforts to mediate between Cuba and the United States, just as he publicized his support for the Alliance for Progress. Washington acknowledged only the first. In September 1961, the U.S. government made public a batch of documents purloined from the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires that purported to show the links between Cuban and Argentine officials. Frondizi reacted strongly, characterizing the documents as forgeries, denouncing a Cuban exile group for their interference in Argentine affairs, and complaining to the U.S. government about unfriendly pressure to influence normal relations with another sovereign nation. This firm defense of Argentine sovereignty helped Frondizi for a little while, but it did not win him any new permanent allies. The combination of pressure from the United States and from his own military forced him to break relations with Cuba in February 1962 and led, in the space of little more than a month, to his ouster.

Getting in Step

More recently, it appears that the blunt, public manner in which the Carter administration attempted to work its will with the Argentine government in the matter of human rights violations served to embarrass the junta led by General Jorge Videla and created a political debate within Argentina over how to deal with foreign interference in the country's internal affairs. When U.S. policy was presented in these terms, most Argentines supported their government and rejected the U.S. advice and pressure. In the context of the political struggle, the most anti-American groups consolidated their positions at the expense of those considered moderate.

This is not for a moment to suggest that the policy of defending human rights was wrong or even that such blunt, public pressure always has negative results. It is clear, for example, that the military government in Chile responded positively to such heavy-handed methods. However, in trying to defend human rights in Argentina, the Carter administration repeated the pattern that has become so depressingly familiar in U.S.-Argentine relations during the 20th century, a pattern in which policymakers in this country fail to take into account the domestic Argentine political context in which their policy will be considered. As a result, time and time again, our government has managed to alienate those elements within the Argentine government most sympathetic to our policies while strengthening the position of elements relatively hostile to our interests. Whether the pattern has been repeated yet again in the case of the war in the Malvinas or Falklands, it is too soon to tell. Certainly, the results of the conflict and the role played by the United States have emboldened junior officers who are hostile to the United States and to capitalism. Whether they can take advantage of the situation to increase their power remains to be seen. □

Lessons in Diplomacy

By MARTIN F. HERZ

Diplomacy is not a popularity contest. It is not the projection of our ideas and ideals to foreign people, although that is a small part of it. Essentially, diplomacy is the means by which countries communicate with each other. It is therefore a field in which certain skills are required and thus most often is best entrusted to trained professionals. This is what most countries do, and have been doing for generations. The United States is an exception to this, for we sometimes employ amateurs to do the work of professionals in foreign affairs.

The ability to make speeches with sounding cadences and orotund phrases, to cut a good figure at parades, receptions, and various ceremonial occasions, and even the facility of mixing freely with people—these things may make one popular but have little to do with being a good diplomat.

The real function of a diplomat entails such things as noticing what it is that the foreign minister did *not* say in his presentation of a particular case; attributing the right significance to something that was only hinted at—for which, of course, it is first necessary to notice that something was indeed hinted at; assessing the significance of what leaders of a foreign government have said to each other, because it may have bearing on what they might say to you but prefer to say in a roundabout manner; reading a lengthy and boring speech, or perhaps listening to it, and suddenly being stung because of a new formulation that was given to a problem that had usually been set forth with a different terminology in the past; knowing what plausible argument *not* to use in advancing one's government's case, because that argument could be misunderstood; reminding your interlocutor of a precedent from his own history that is helpful to something you wish to accomplish; or seizing the significance of an historical allusion made by the foreign minister or some other official. An experienced diplomat will do all these things, but he or she will have something else that is even more important—he will be someone to whom people will like to talk about affairs of state because he knows so much about the country of his assignment, including its problems, history, culture, and personalities, that talking with him is interesting for the leading figures of that country.

It is not the job of an ambassador to be popular in the country of accreditation; it is his or her job to get certain things done and to establish or maintain good two-way communications. Of course, negotiation is part of such communication. It is best to have people in diplomacy who have track records, which is another way of saying that they should be experienced. They should be good at intercultural communication and should be sophisticated and have a larger view of the world. They should also have a good knowledge of the countries to which they are sent as part of the first line of defense of the United States.

* * *

Some of the horrors that the world has experienced in my generation did not come from any lack of understanding or communication, nor from any unwillingness to sit down and talk on the part of reasonable people. They came from something whose existence must be frankly acknowledged—the problem of evil in the world. It is always good to understand the other side, and major efforts should be made in diplomacy to improve and maintain communications. But it would not have helped to understand Pol Pot better; and with respect to Stalin, it turned out that the evil of his personality was under- rather than over-estimated. It would not have helped to have a better dialogue with Idi Amin, nor would it have helped to assuage the alleged fears of Adolf Hitler. No, we must frankly acknowledge that both things are true: For the sake of the peace of the world we need better mutual understanding and communication, but we also need to recognize that some of the people and forces in the world are up to no good, not because they are misunder-

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Martin F. Herz is director of studies at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy and Oscar Iden professor of diplomacy at the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University. A former career Foreign Service officer, he served as ambassador to Bulgaria.

These selections are excerpted from the Fifth Oscar Iden Lecture, delivered in November 1981 at Georgetown University. A full text is available from the institute, c/o GU, Washington, D.C. 20057.

A Career FSO Reflects on the Role of the United States and its Diplomats in Today's World

stood but because of the age-old problem of humanity's capability for evil, of man's inhumanity to man. The beginning of good diplomacy is to recognize that while not everybody is good, some are significantly more evil and dangerous than others. And not every issue can be talked out, because some aggressors are unappeasable.

* * *

The longest periods of peace in recent memory have been periods when there existed an effective balance of power. Yet, balance of power has a distasteful ring to it because it sometimes requires alliances with uncongenial people for the sake of offsetting a power advantage of a potential or actual adversary. Thus Churchill had to swallow hard when Germany attacked the Soviet Union in 1941 and Great Britain suddenly found itself a comrade-in-arms of the brutal Soviet dictatorship. For the sake of the war, Churchill said at the time, if Hitler were to invade hell, he would at least make a favorable reference to the devil in Parliament.

Today, when we open up relations with China in an effort to offset military advantages which the Soviet Union gained over us, we are doing something very similar to Allied policy during the war. It is deplorable that under such circumstances there is a naive tendency to glamorize our new partners as if they were friends, or to picture clients as if they were allies, or to picture allies as if they were really close to us because they are congenial to us, rather than because they are necessary to us—and we are necessary to them. Fortunately, we have allies who are indeed democratic and congenial—but that is not the real reason they are allies. The real reason is that their security interests and ours coincide. When those interests no longer coincide, they will no longer be allies. No country will sacrifice itself for another country because it loves or admires or even shares ideals with that country.

* * *

There is a touching belief in some quarters that in foreign affairs a kind of rating system exists that indicates how well a particular country is doing, and that in some way the votes in the United Nations represent such a rating. Horror is expressed if the United States finds itself in a small minority on a particular issue, and great delight is voiced when, as in the case of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union finds itself in a minority.

The Soviet Union gives no evidence of being shamed or embarrassed if it finds itself in a small minority in the General Assembly, and if the United States shows an excessive concern then it is unbalancing the situation. While it is not necessarily true that nice guys finish last—to use Leo Durocher's immortal phrase—in the United Nations, it certainly is a fact that just being nice and accommodating usually gets you nothing whatsoever in the issues that concern us most.

There are certain countries, especially among the minority that are democratically governed and where public opinion is important, whose good opinion of us is worth cultivating and whose differing interests we must take into account. But the fact is that the vast majority of the members of the United Nations simply do not fit into that category, so that to seek their Good Housekeeping stamp of approval is often a futile activity divorced from the realities of the world.

* * *

The American government, whether it be served by professionals or amateurs in foreign affairs, whether it be served by diplomats or intelligence experts, has a surprisingly poor record in making predictions. This is an important point because it shows not only the limits of what can reasonably be expected from diplomacy, but also the reason good diplomats are so often pessimists.

Let us look at a partial list of the things that took us by surprise since World War II: The break between Tito and Stalin, the North Korean attack on South Korea, the 1956 Anglo-French attack on Egypt, the Khrushchev "De-Stalinization" speech, the Soviet launching of the first earth satellite in 1957, the building of the Berlin wall, the placement of Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba, the 1967 Six-Day War, the 1973 attack of Egypt on Israel, the arrival in power of the Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While diplomats must all try to work as hard and as successfully as possible, I think we should not expect our future record of prognostication to be better than that of the past. We must be prepared for the unexpected. □

The Right Thing

Ethics does not loom large in the theory and practice of international relations. But moral choices must be made by Foreign Service officers in the field.

By JAMES W. SPAIN

There were two schools of thought on international relations when I was a graduate student at University of Chicago just after World War II. One, clustering around Quincy Wright, sought a structure for relations among nations in international law and organization. The other, drawing its inspiration from another academic giant, Hans Morgenthau, focused on geopolitics. The "law" people looked to international agreements and the United Nations to dominate bilateral relations and bring peace in our time. The "geopoliticians," on the other hand, believed that a stable world order was possible by balancing national interests. The law people wanted to delineate what was licit and what was illicit. The geopoliticians wanted to study the "real" nature of nations.

As I became interested in diplomacy, I discovered that there was more to international relations than law and politics. The literature for the Foreign Service examination revealed all sorts of fascinating new arts and crafts: analysis, drafting, reporting, negotiation, protection, representation. But for my first twenty years after entering the Foreign Service in 1951, I found that academic theory and diplomatic practice seemed to fit together pretty well.

For instance, I watched Greece and Turkey, Egypt and Israel, Pakistan and India (and our embassies in these and other capitals) working at international problems in very much the way Professor Morgenthau's geopolitics suggested. The result was never peace—it even included on occasion a limited war—but nations were preserved and world wars avoided.

Professor Wright's law likewise had

James W. Spain, a career minister in the Foreign Service, is currently a resident associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C.

its achievements. For example, Trieste, an Italian-Yugoslav problem that in the late 1940s ranked with the Greek-Turkish, Arab-Israeli, and Pakistani-Indian quarrels, was settled by a treaty. The United Nations stopped an aggression and made peace in Korea. New nations came into being within frameworks mutually agreed between metropole and colony. More and more subjects were regulated by global or semi-global consent: the air, customs, and communications.

Meanwhile, in the State Department in Washington and at our missions abroad, I learned the nuts and bolts of diplomacy. I analyzed, drafted, negotiated, represented, protected, and planned. I learned that a well-written memorandum or airgram often triumphed over a poorly written one—regardless of substance—and that a colorful telegram got more attention than a staid one. Problem-solving was the name of the game, and compromise and trade-off were its standard equipment.

Defining Reality

"Reality" often turned out to be that the other fellow didn't really know what his interests were. If you were quick enough, you could define them for him. If he was quicker and you found yourself yielding, he usually acknowledged that he owed you something in return. As far as "law" was concerned, if you were being pushed toward something you didn't like by someone else's emphasis on Paragraph B of Section 4 of Chapter III of this or that treaty, public law, or regulation, you could hold your own by taking a stand on Paragraph D of Section 6 of Chapter VIII.

Between 1951 and 1970 I don't recall ever finding myself confronted with—or even aware of—choices between good and bad, right and wrong, just and unjust. If such distinctions were necessary at all, I assumed they were made by people named Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon or Dulles, Herter, Rusk, and Kissinger. My decisions were action or information, priority or routine, finished or pending. It was only later on that I discovered that many of these moral choices had to be made by Foreign Service officers themselves in their daily business.

Morality brushed me for the first time—albeit lightly—in 1970. I was in the department, stalling on a proposed assignment as consul general in Istanbul to see what else might be available. Suddenly, I was informed that Embassy Saigon had asked for me as minister for public affairs. In those days Embassy Saigon got what it wanted, and I was told I had three hours to decide whether or not I had accepted Istanbul the day before.

Considerations of rank, pay, and living conditions took fifteen minutes. The rest of the time was devoted to a matter of conscience. During long years in Near Eastern affairs I had never had to focus on Vietnam. I had not been involved in promoting a policy that, while only dimly aware of, I was not sure was right. In due course I confirmed that I had indeed accepted Istanbul the previous day.

Ironically, it was in Istanbul that I first found matters of ethics and morality intruding into my professional life. As a principal officer, I now had management responsibilities. I was dealing with people and principles as well as with interests and policy. My name went at the bottom of the telegrams. I made decisions (however limited) rather than recommendations (however brilliant).

A new question entered my day-to-day professional life: What is the right thing to do? The drafting, negotiating, and other skills I had acquired in the Foreign Service were not much help. The philosophical distinctions of my student days occasionally offered clues, but they were pretty far removed from the issues before me. Like an astronaut's having "the right stuff," a diplomat's doing "the right thing" seemed to be almost mystical. There were no established rules; Washington, usually so free with its guidance, was silent on this subject.

Confronting Choices

I had been in Istanbul only a few weeks when I was confronted by the resident U.S. narcotics agent with a proposal to wiretap, without clear cause or court order, the hotel room of a dubious tourist from Los Angeles. Like any Foreign Service officer, I knew that when it came to local law, the Constitution did not follow an American overseas. But as consul general, I had to conclude that it did travel when it came to relations between Americans. I vetoed the proposal.

Sixth Fleet port calls were a question of great moment in Istanbul in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Department of Defense and the Navy wanted opportunities for shore leave in the eastern Mediterranean. They felt that Turkey should provide the opportunity when needed: sworn NATO allies should act like sworn NATO allies. They could usually cite the Turkish navy as supporting this position. The State Department and USIA fretted, agreeing in principle but worrying about the potential for violence by student protesters and the adverse effect on bilateral relations. They suspected that their Turkish civilian equivalents were just as uneasy as they were. The outcome was almost always the same: bureaucratic agreement on ship visits but for half as many as the Navy wanted, and each subject to U.S. mission approval.

We had to face a flesh-and-blood dimension that went beyond planning

In difficult situations it was usually clear where U.S. interests lay. The requirements of human decency were often less easy to calculate.

and policy. The local U.S. Navy representative told us that statistics showed a sailor was killed or seriously injured daily in the large Sixth Fleet. For the three days of a ship visit there would be three casualties somewhere in the fleet anyway, and if they happened to be in Istanbul, it would be routine. A cooperative Turkish admiral added that his shore patrol would be proud to risk their lives defending their American brothers.

The last deaths in Istanbul during a Sixth Fleet visit, however, had been not military personnel but Turkish students. There had been a riot between leftist and rightist university groups supporting and opposing the visit. Thus, everyone knew that a port call at the wrong time could be a matter of death. Since no one could argue that a particular visit was essential to life, more often than not we waved the ships off, hoping for a better time that did in fact come some years later. How much naval readiness—certainly a U.S. interest—suffered as a result, I have never known.

The cold war was frigid during those years, and even the tolerant air of the Bosphorus did not inhibit dissenters on both sides from forcing choices on a reluctant consul general. Soviet defectors frequently showed up at the consulate from one of the many Russian ships that passed through the Bosphorus. Their purpose was always "to choose freedom." If the new arrival had ever worked in a defense plant, served in the armed forces, or had an uncle who was in the KGB, we had to make a choice between putting him in the hands of the Central Intelligence Agency for a quick trip to Western Europe and intensive interrogation followed by no-one-ever-seemed-to-be-sure-exactly-what, or passing him on to the local UNRRA office, which in collaboration with the Turkish authorities sent him to Rome for resettlement in a country of his choice. It was usually clear where U.S. interests lay. The requirements of human decency were often less easy to calculate.

Resident Americans, some in uniform, outraged by our Vietnam policy, were no more merciful than the Soviets when it came to demanding ethical choices. Just before I arrived, one group had insisted on a protest, including a flag-burning, on the street outside the consulate. The Turks feel very strongly about flags, including other countries', and the penalty for desecration is harsh. Apprised of this, the protesters demanded to be allowed to hold their meeting within the sanctuary of the consulate. My imaginative predecessor negotiated an agreement that provided for a protected space, a flag, and a fire, but with the stipulation that the latter two could not be brought together.

Determining Jurisdiction

When I moved to Ankara as deputy chief of mission in 1972, deciding the right thing became a little easier. There was an ambassador in the office next door to whom I could pass on the really hard ones. He did, however, leave a few all to me. One was a problem within the U.S. military stationed in Turkey. There had been numerous complaints from the troops of harrassment by the Air Force Office of Special Investigation, which was working against black-marketeering in collaboration with the Turkish police. The subjects of attention always seemed to be black and to be enlisted men.

The first question at issue was whether or not any of this was the embassy's business. The unhappy troops felt that it was. Most of the commanders were sure that it was not. They had military functions to carry out and discipline to maintain in Turkey. The services had their own grievance procedures, their inspectors general, legal

defense counsels, and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. But we concluded that the U.S. government could not wash its hands of the wishes and rights of U.S. citizens whether uniformed or not. Each case was different. Conceptually, determining policy and interests was easy—but justice and injustice wouldn't hold still. Decisions had to be made to intervene or not to intervene and the final determinant of "the right thing" was more often than not the conscience of the decision-maker.

On leaving Ankara in 1974, I found myself back in the United States waiting for a mission—but this time with a keener appreciation than ever before of what running one meant and of how seldom one found clear answers to the question of right and wrong in international affairs.

I spent a year as a diplomat-in-residence at Florida State University in Tallahassee. This gave a welcome opportunity to conceptualize these matters of just and unjust, good and bad, that seemed so essential and so elusive in my profession. There must be a structured way of deciding "the right thing." The moral and ethical equivalents of Wright's *Study of War* and Morgenthau's *Scientific Man and Power Politics* were, I hoped, waiting in the library stacks.

They were not. The volumes that I did find were mostly published in the 1950s, mostly softcover, mostly by religious groups. Their subjects were narrow: the virtues of the United Nations and the perils of nuclear weapons. Turning to a dozen or so standard works on diplomacy, I looked up "ethics" in their indexes. I located one listing only, four pages of exhortations not to sell visas and not to abuse duty-free-liquor privileges.

Departing for Dar es Salaam as ambassador to Tanzania late in 1975, I had little useful ethical doctrine or organized moral insight to carry along. The Foreign Service Institute taught me a little Kiswahili and briefed me on the organization of a U.S. mission. The Foreign Buildings Office showed my wife approved upholstery fabrics for the residence furniture.

This time I would have no backstop to field the really tough ethical questions. But when I asked to see the secretary of state to discuss what the United States wanted to do in Tanzania, I was told not to worry. The secretary was busy but someone had checked with him and I would be happy to know that he had nothing against me. When I inquired about a meeting with the president, they laughed. No one above the desk officer in the department had any comment to offer—or question to ask—on President Julius Nyerere's socialism, the southern African independence movement, the North-South economic question, or even specific U.S. objectives in Tanzania. Yet from the moment of my arrival, matters of this kind were the heart of most embassy decisions.

Weighing Factors

The modest AID program in Tanzania was one focus of argument. There was no question that its technical assistance was desperately needed. No one in Washington wanted to take responsibility for ending a program in one of the poorest countries in the world. On the other hand, neither was anyone willing to make a major effort to promote the success of a militantly socialist economy in a country that opposed U.S. Vietnam policy and promoted Puerto Rican independence.

In 1975 the AID program was on the brink because of Washington's insistence on enforcing a provision against aid to a country that had nationalized the assets of American citizens without timely efforts to provide reasonable compensation. The total at issue was just over $100,000. Two years later, the AID program came under an even greater threat because of a new Washington concern about human rights. Nyerere's government held some three dozen prisoners without trial. Most of them were leftover conspirators from an abortive coup on Zanzibar who, if released on the mainland, faced a speedy trial and certain hanging back on the island.

The determination of what was the "right" thing to do about the AID program did not jump out as something clear and unanimous. Adding it all up several times, I came to the conclusion—which we managed to make stick—that the assistance program should be continued and perhaps even expanded a little. The basis of this judgment was not a reading of the law or recognition of a congruity of short-term Tanzanian and U.S. interests. It was rather a belief that American and Tanzanian long-term objectives were honorable and compatible, and that as long as the United States was putting out $4 billion a year in foreign assistance, Tanzania deserved $20 million of it.

The campaigns for independence in Rhodesia and Namibia dominated southern African political affairs in the late 1970s. As chairman of the "front line states"—Tanzania, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia, and Angola—Nyerere was a key figure both in the international maneuvering and in the guerrilla fighting being carried on by Rhodesian black leaders like Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.

Nyerere's distrust of the United States was deep. He saw U.S. efforts to stay clear of the Rhodesian and Namibian questions as evidence of a neocolonial outlook and of a strategic commitment to South Africa in support of a global anti-communist cause. Yet, as I talked to him on these sub-

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jects, it became clear that the ideas which flowed constantly from his agile mind were pragmatic, flexible, and based more on an acute desire for the final decolonialization of Africa than on any radical social, economic, or global theories.

By frequent and comprehensive reporting of Nyerere's view, we set out to catch the attention of Washington. Whether because of our skill or by coincidence, the outcome was beyond our wildest dreams. "From the Secretary" telegrams began to pour in, and in 1976 Dar es Salaam played host to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on three occasions. Our emphasis was still on calculating U.S. interests, analyzing political vulnerabilities and economic implications, and devising an arrangement that would keep communist influence out of southern Africa. However, the embryonic elements of a Rhodesian settlement began to emerge.

Later, Kissinger was replaced as a frequent visitor by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and U.N. ambassadors Andrew Young and Donald McHenry. In this period the United States finally got over a difficult hurdle. Calculations continued on which Rhodesian guerrilla leader was going to emerge on top and what would be his attitude toward the United States. However, President Carter decided that independence and black majority rule under any popularly supported leader was "right" for Rhodesia and Namibia, a course long urged by most of our embassies in southern Africa. The United States soon found a basis for cooperation with the front line states, the United Kingdom, and the Rhodesian leaders themselves, and eventually an independent, majority-ruled Zimbabwe emerged—without the massive bloodbath that had been expected.

When I returned to Ankara early in 1980 as ambassador, Turkey was experiencing the most turbulent time of its existence: financial turmoil, representative government rendered impotent by factionalism, political murders at the rate of more than twenty a day. Yet, the relationship between Turkey and the United States was eminently harmonious and satisfactory. We provided substantial economic and security assistance and the Turks offered maximum cooperation for a number of important military facilities.

Nonetheless, in September 1980, the deteriorating domestic situation led to a military takeover. The generals' coup was bloodless. Popular reaction to it was favorable. The political killing stopped overnight. Established foreign policy was maintained. The business of government began to move again. However, the revolt *was* extra-constitutional; the leadership *was* a junta; large numbers of citizens *were* detained simply for having participated in the previous political system. The United States and other friendly foreign democracies suddenly faced major questions of reality versus law and principles versus interests. What now was the "right" course for dealing with Turkey?

Choosing Policies

Embassy Ankara's effort to chart that course centered on a short telegram sent to Washington the day of the coup. Having described the situation with reasonable accuracy and comprehensiveness (no great trick under the circumstances), we laid down two commandments. Like the original Ten, these were couched in the negative. First, the United States should do nothing which would threaten our important security interests in Turkey. Second, it should do nothing that might impede a return to democratic government. In sum, the "right" thing was not to do the "wrong" thing.

There was a philosophical basis for these judgments. The Turkish-American relationship was harmonious. It had been founded on mutual interests. There was every reason to believe that the generals shared this perception. Unlike some of our Western European allies, we judged on the basis of past history—military takeovers in 1960 and 1971—and of our own close knowledge of the generals that they would restore democratic government. The important thing was not to impede their doing what they intended. All of the returns are not yet in, but it looks as if we were right.

Common denominators in the jumble of experiences set forth above are not easy to find. To force the issues involved into the categories of either law or politics would be artificial. To resolve them exclusively in terms of promoting U.S. interests would be virtually impossible. But old-fashioned as the words "right" and "wrong" are, they seem the most appropriate to describe the kinds of decisions often faced by Foreign Service officers.

The question, of course, is how to determine right or wrong. A few writers have brought the subject further along than was the case a decade ago. If, for example, Stanley Hoffmann's concept of distributive justice in international affairs is accepted, the United States is not free to wash its hands of the Law of the Sea Conference and to go its own way as far as exploitation of deep seabed resources is concerned. If Father Robert Drinan's theses on nuclear war are correct, we do not have a choice on whether to participate in arms control negotiations.

By and large, however, we have yet to develop an American ethic to cover our activities abroad. Snatches of morality appear here and there in the Foreign Affairs Manual, but they are almost entirely concerned with not misusing the government's money. The Foreign Service Institute, which has courses on analysis, reporting, protection, etc., refrains from trying to teach "right and wrong." The otherwise comprehensive Foreign Service examination shows no interest in the candidate's views on morality.

American Morality

The letters to ambassadors written by all of our recent presidents set forth ambassadorial responsibility and authority in categorical terms. However, only the latest of them, President Reagan's letter of September 22, 1981, emphasizes broader objectives: "Carrying the American message of hope and freedom. . . .Impartial and equitable treatment of all United States government personnel. . . .The highest standards of professional and personal conduct." The Foreign Service Act of 1980, which gives congressional approval to ambassadorial primacy overseas, has little to say on the goals for which that primacy is to be used. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee occasionally probes an ambassadorial nominee on what he believes is right for the United States in El Salvador or on human rights, but a commitment to pursue that right is seldom a criterion for approval.

Indeed, right and wrong receive very little consideration in the U.S. foreign policy mechanism. The emphasis is on allocation of resources, on domestic political consequences, on hard-nosed determination of U.S. interests, and on getting what we want at the moment.

It is impossible to point to a body of doctrine for right decisions in international affairs, but it is easy to show who makes many of these decisions. Most moral or ethical acts by governments in international relations take place in the field. It is the ambassador and his or her subordinates who see the issues—and the human implications—close up. It is their consciences that are most directly violated by an individual injustice or an unethical policy. It is they who have to explain and defend their actions to their host governments and to their diplomatic colleagues. It is their rebuttals to Washington's decisions, the alternative approaches they may be able to offer, and *in extremis* their resignations which are most likely to turn a wrong U.S. policy into a right one.

To what extent do American diplomats abroad actually perform this function? The record is not easy to come by but the department's files are full of ambassadorial cables and memoranda blocking clandestine intelligence schemes to interfere in local politics, objecting to proposals to punish aid recipients who have voted against the United States in the General Assembly, and opposing development projects which would help wealthy contractors or repressive police forces more than impoverished citizens. There is also at least one helpful tradition firmly lodged in the career Foreign Service: The obligation to report objectively and to dissent when necessary from conventional wisdom has long been cherished and encouraged.

For now at least a substantial share of the burden of trying to determine right and wrong (whatever they may be) in the international activities of our country is likely to continue to fall upon Foreign Service officers. As was the case with Thomas Becket, who pledged to obey his king "in all save the honor of God," determining right and wrong is not the least burdensome of official responsibilities. A Foreign Service officer does not have to bear the burden all the time. However, it comes to him or her on occasion, and when it does, it is remarkable what a lonely time it is. □

The Bomb

FSO Fred Upson called the strikes for part of the largest air war in history—until he began to ask questions.

By JEROME DOOLITTLE

The embassy had put him up in the Laan Xang Hotel till his house was ready. The way from there to the embassy took him down Samsenthai Street, where the shops were just opening. Indian merchants stood on the sidewalk outside their stores, very polite, very humble. They all said, "Hello, sir," as Upson walked by. He turned off the business street and onto a smaller dirt road that led to a black, crumbling monument. The hotel clerk had given this to him as a landmark along the way—the *That Dam,* he had called it. The heat was already heavy. A dog lay in the dust near the monument, in the total limpness of death. As Upson walked past, the dog slowly opened an eye, examined him, and then let the eye fall shut again.

Just a few more yards down the road was the embassy, an unimpressive three-story structure painted white. The building was windowless, giving it a bunkerlike appearance. But there were no sandbags or sentries with machine guns, or any other sign that Laos was a country at war. An unarmed Indian guard in a blue-gray uniform said, "Hello, sir," just like the merchants downtown. Inside, a pretty Lao receptionist took his name and invited him to wait in the small room behind her. A bookcase against one wall was empty except for a set of volumes of the U.S. Code. The waiting room table held back copies of *Time, Newsweek,* the *Bangkok Post,* and the *Far Eastern Economic Review.* Upson had just begun to look the collection over when the receptionist said, "Mr. Brautigan will see you now."

The deputy chief of mission was a big man, with beefy freckled forearms. His sandy hair was tousled, as if he had just run his hand through it. His face was wide and open and pleasant, the face of an older brother you can always depend on. He smiled when he saw Upson—a smile that somehow made the younger man feel that the DCM wanted nothing more fervently than to welcome him aboard.

"Well, here you are," the DCM said. "Good to see you, Fred."

"Nice to meet you, Mr. Brautigan."

"Jerry. Things are pretty informal here. You'll see most of our people wearing sports shirts to work, with no tie. Here in our office we like to wear ties and slip on a jacket when we go out, the AID and military types, hell. As long as they don't frighten the horses. Well, Fred, it's wonderful to see you. We're counting on you to clear up a little problem area in the operation. Did they tell you anything about the job when you went through Washington?"

"Not very much. They said it would be coordinating with the Air Force, but they didn't go into detail."

"I'll start at the beginning, then. Since 1964, the United States, at the request of the Lao government, has been conducting reconnaissance flights over Laos. These planes are armed, and have the right to return fire if fired upon. For public consumption, that's all we say about our part in the biggest air war in history. Did you know that? Tonnage dropped, missions flown, by any measure you use, the air war in Indochina is bigger than World War II and Korea, put together."

"No, I didn't." Upson thought of the vast airborne armadas in the old World War II newsreels—the ranks of bombers filling the skies, the swarms of fighter planes.

"Anyway," Brautigan went on, "we try to keep a fig leaf on the air war the best way we can, so as not to officially admit to any violations of the Geneva Accords. Both sides have been violating the hell out of the accords since they were signed, but they're still the most viable structure to build a peace on when the time comes. Which, in my private opinion, will be in about two years. Once President Nixon is safely re-elected."

"I don't see the connection," Upson said.

"If he ends the war in his first term, the right wings of both parties will see to it he doesn't get a second term. So he's got to keep it going till he gets re-elected, and then we'll fold our tents and silently steal away."

"Interesting thesis," Upson said neutrally.

"Not that getting President Nixon re-elected matters to me one way or another," the DCM said. "The country of Laos does, though. Wonderful, gentle people, but hopelessly unable to take care of themselves. Thailand on one side and Vietnam on the other, and both of them in the habit of snatching off pieces of Laos whenever they get a chance. So what I'm working toward, Fred, is to see Laos come out of this mess with some kind of internationally guaranteed neutrality

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Jerome Doolittle served in USIA in Laos and Morocco. A former speechwriter for President Carter and director of public affairs for the Federal Aviation Administration, he has written for Atlantic, Esquire, *and other national magazines.*

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

Barbara Posey

Upson laid the prestrike and poststrike photos side by side.

and territorial integrity. As far as I'm concerned, that's the whole justification for what we're doing out here. Your job and mine. Everything."

"Um, I see." Upson had learned, from watching his father deal with parishioners of all political persuasions, to listen without offering his own opinion. Later, when he knew more of the political and military background, would be time enough to take sides.

"That's what justifies the agency presence, the military presence," Brautigan continued. "And that's why we need a dominant State Department presence, to keep the military and paramilitary sides of the mission under firm control and channel our overall effort toward diplomatic ends. As the Air Force liaison officer, you embody that diplomatic presence. The American effort in Laos is run by the ambassador. Not the station chief, not MACV in Saigon or MACTHAI in Bangkok, not some Seventh Air Force general sitting down in Udorn. The ambassador has the responsibility of approving or disapproving every single air strike carried out by U.S. forces in this country. And he exercises that responsibility through you, Fred."

"I see," Upson said, although he didn't yet see at all.

It could be day or night outside, sunny or stormy, but inside Upson's office the fluorescent lights gave off the same cold, flickering illumination and the humming air conditioner kept the temperature at the same 72 degrees. The only opening in the outer wall was the one filled by the air conditioner, which was chained, for security reasons, to bolts inside. The whole office was classified secret, because of the maps of Laos which covered the walls. Overlays showed which areas were unvalidated, partially validated, or fully validated under the rules of engagement. Unvalidated areas were those where there were temples, hospitals, POW camps, friendly troops, inhabited villages. In these, no bombing was allowed. In partially validated areas, the Air Force needed permission for some types of bombing but not for others. Fully validated areas, mostly along the Ho Chi Minh trail down south, were basically free-fire zones.

The tools of Upson's new trade were the huge Army Map Service topographic maps on the wall, grease pencils, compasses and protractors, files holding photographs and the documents which comprised the rules of engagement, and a large light-table on which to examine the reconnaissance photos. There were crank handles to move the film back and forth and a stereoscopic viewer to make the pictures three-dimensional. He had a small shredder, too, so that he could avoid being buried by the hundreds of classified messages that came to him every day. After-action reports on every strike listed the type of airplane used, the call signs, the time, the weather, ordnance dropped, what the Air Force believed the target to be, and results of the strike. Other reports gave the location of friendly troops and of teams behind enemy lines. Still others listed what the ground troops—Thai, Meo, Special Guerrilla Units, the Royal Lao Army—needed in the way of air support. Upson filed whatever he thought might be of later use, but most of the paperwork was stuff that would be out-of-date in days or even hours. It went through the shredder, to become billowing piles of paper vermicelli.

Upson had been waiting for the series of photographs on his light-table.

They showed several buildings, little more than huts, that he had refused to validate as a target a week before. The strike request had been accompanied by other photographs, showing an indistinct line from one of the structures to the forest nearby. The Air Force had insisted the line was communications wire, which suggested a military target. Upson thought the line might just as easily be a footpath.

When the air attaché appealed Upson's disapproval of the strike request, the matter came to the ambassador's attention. He directed the Air Force to take new reconnaissance photos, from a lower altitude—and he bet Colonel Mike Costikyan, the air attaché, twenty dollars that the new pictures would prove Upson was right. At first Upson took this as an uncomplicated expression of support for the home team. Later he wondered if it wasn't the ambassador's way of saying that all his trust was in Upson, and that Upson better, goddamnit, be right when he tangled with the Air Force.

Upson looked away from the stereoscopic viewer for a moment to rest his eyes, and then examined the photos again. What he saw relieved him enormously; the twenty-dollar bet had raised a minor difference of interpretation to policy level. Since he had good news to deliver, he walked the few steps to the ambassador's office instead of phoning. He found the ambassador where he often was—contemplating the pins and unit flags on the war map that covered one wall of his office. "I just got the photos we asked for last week, Mr. Ambassador," Upson said. "No doubt about it this time. Couldn't possibly be communications wire."

"That's my boy," the ambassador said. "Listen, Mike is coming over on something else in an hour. Have the secretary let you know when he comes, okay? And then you just wander in by accident with the photos. We'll teach him to fool with the Lone Ranger."

Playing a hunch, Upson went straight to the wall of his office where the big maps hung. He unlocked one of the panels and slid it aside to expose the section that included the Plain of Jars. Northeast of it, in what the contour lines showed to be a little flat-bottomed valley between two steep ridges, he found Xieng Dat. He noted the village's coordinates and went to his files for the photo he half remembered. The picture wasn't sharp; the pictures in his files seldom were. The papers wrote about satellite and U-2 photography so clear that you could make out a ball on a putting green, lenses of such incredible resolution that you could read newspaper headlines from miles in the air. But the Air Force's pictures from just a few thousand feet in the air were fuzzy. Could the papers be right? Upson wondered. Could anything really see that well from a satellite's altitude? Eagles? God?

The photo from his files showed a small village built along a stream which ran through the broad valley. He counted fourteen thatched roofs among the trees. Sticking out a little from under one of the houses was a row of indistinct objects. Upson's magnifying glass just brought up the grain in the photo, making the row even less distinct. He called Major Mulhouse, the man in the air attaché's office who had tutored him in photo interpretation months before.

"Remember the picture of a rocket-storage dump you showed me a couple of months ago?" Upson asked.

"Which one?" the major said.

"The one you said they use in the photo reconnaissance classes as a classic example of a rocket-storage site. A village called Xieng Dat, above and just east of the PDJ. Would the coordinates help?"

"No, I remember it. Didn't I give you a copy, though?"

"You did, but I was wondering if you had any after-strike pictures. Presumably there was a strike?"

"Presumably, but it was before my time. That photo goes back a few years. Hold on, let me see what we got. . . . Okay, sorry to be so long, but here it is. The rockets are blown all over the place. Want me to send it over?"

"I'll come by. Thanks Bill."

When Upson got back to his office again, he laid the prestrike and the poststrike photos side by side. The first showed dozens of bomb craters all around the village—old ones, because water was standing in them. Some were close to the little houses, but there were no direct hits. The second photo, taken after the attack on the rocket storage site, showed three lines of fresh craters, roughly parallel. Two of the crater lines missed the target hut by a good margin, but one of the bombs in the third string had hit right next to it. The rockets lay scattered like jackstraws around the smoking debris of the hut. He was able to get an idea of their size from a twisted bicycle that lay on its side not far from the ruins. He dialed the army attaché's office and got Major Leroy Dutton on the line.

"Leroy," Upson said, "what's the biggest rocket or missile the bad guys use in Laos?"

"In the Nam they use the JT-10, but it wouldn't be worth humping them to Laos for a little tiny war like this one."

"How long are they?"

"All set up to go, about eight feet."

"They couldn't be using another model or something in Laos, could they? About twelve feet long?"

"Negative. The JT-10 is already so big it usually knocks the little guys on their ass when it goes off. Why?"

"I've got some old photos of missiles or rockets, twelve feet long. From MR-II, up the road from the PDJ."

"Let me come by, okay?"

Dutton was there ten minutes later. He was a short, heavily built man, with stiff black hair like an Indian's. This was his third tour in Laos, a country he knew as well as any American ever had. The major glanced at the photograph for only a second, not bothering to use the magnifying glass.

"What kind of bull are they trying to hand you?" he said. "You know what those things are? Bundles of steel reinforcing rods."

"I know."

The next afternoon, Annie Cutler, Brautigan's secretary, brought a copy of the memo back to Upson. On the top, the deputy chief of mission had written, "Good memo. Ambassador concurs. Original sent to Costikyan for appropriate action." Upson wondered whether the DCM meant that the am-

bassador concurred with the memorandum's recommendation about the training photographs, or concurred that it was a good memo. He picked up the phone and called the air attaché.

"Fred Upson, Mike," he said to the colonel. "Was that memo Jerry sent along any use to you?"

"Damned straight it was. I sent it on down to Seventh Air Force, along with my implementation recommendation."

"Good enough. It just seemed to me like something that should be called to their attention."

After the colonel hung up, he muttered something his sergeant couldn't make out. "Beg your pardon, sir?" he said.

"Civilians, sergeant. Damn civilians."

"I know what you mean, sir."

"Did that memo on rocket-storage dumps go forward?"

"Yes, sir. A couple hours ago."

Colonel Costikyan figured Brautigan had only sent the memo along to keep his In basket clean. But against the slight chance that Brautigan or the ambassador really cared, the air attaché had forwarded the thing to Seventh Air Force with a handwritten covering note: "Bill: Recommend non-implementation. Photo evidence non-conclusive. Non-military utilization of steel reinforcing rods in MR-II highly unlikely anyway. Best to Midge and the kids, Mike." This would leave Costikyan free of any possible blame for inaction, since Bill Farley knew enough to toss out the personal covering note.

This goddamned Upson kid is getting almost as bad as his predecessor, Gus Thompson, Costikyan thought. Thompson, you never knew who he was working for, us or goddamned Ho Chi Minh. The ambassador had it together, but civilians like Thompson and Upson and even Brautigan sometimes were screwing up this war to a fare-thee-well. Not a one of them could get it through his head that if the commies were going to swim like fish in the ocean of the civilian population like Mao said, then what you had to do was dry up the ocean. Simple as that. Suppose Upson was right about those rockets, for example. What did he think the commies were going to use steel reinforcing rods for anyway, up there in the boonies? Either bunkers, or some kind of AID-type project to win the hearts and minds. What a bleeding heart like Upson could never understand was that dam or bunker, *either one* of them ought to be bombed. Did he think the commies were up there building dams because they're good guys, or because they want to get the peasants on their side, so they can win the war? Unlike us, for Christ's sake. What was the whole point of the rules of engagement, if not to make it impossible for the good guys to win?

"I feel like sweeping you off your feet," Upson said to Annie Cutler at noon the next day. "Let me take you to Giovanni's for lunch."

"I must have passed this place a hundred times without seeing it," she said when Upson showed her the Italian's tiny soup kitchen. "I wondered why I never saw you in the ACA snack bar."

"Takes too much time out of the day to go up there," Upson said.

"Your day is long enough as it is," Annie said. "You're getting to be like poor Gus Thompson. He used to work twelve- or thirteen-hour days, seven days a week. They did him a favor when they eased him out of here. His health was going."

"I'm going to have to start coming in weekends, too. Otherwise I can't keep up."

"The man who had the job before Gus worked nine to five, on the dot. He was promoted to FSO-4 and his next posting was to Rome."

"Don't think I'll get to Rome, do you?"

"I thought you would at first. But then something changed, didn't it? Not that it's any of my business."

"No one thing changed, Annie. Little things piled up. I guess maybe I'm not on the team anymore. As they say."

"Oh, you're still on it. But just barely."

"It's funny," he said. "In Morocco there was a guy who wasn't on the team. A USIS guy down in Marrakech who was always raising hell because he claimed the king was using PL 480 grain illegally to pay soldiers on the Algerian border instead of workers on

"If the missile had worked, she wouldn't have been hit," said the DCM.

Barbara Posey

irrigation projects. He was probably right, but I always thought he was kind of a jerk to make so much noise about it. I liked the ambassador there. I like the Foreign Service. I liked my teachers in school and college."

"Well, it's not too late," Annie said. "You're still on the team, and you can stay on it if you want to."

"And go to Rome?"

"And go to Rome."

"I think I'll have to start coming into the office on weekends instead, Annie."

"We all do what we have to do. Just watch out, though. Don't give them anything to work with."

"How do you mean?"

"Gus got two or three warning citations for security violations when the marine guards found classified material on his desk that he forgot to lock up overnight. It didn't make any real difference, since the whole suite of offices is a secure area. But they made sure it got in his file, and people kept bringing it up in a kind of a kidding way, only not really kidding. For the rest of his career, people will be saying, 'Gus Thompson, oh, yeah. Wasn't he that guy who got into some kind of security trouble, someplace or other?"

The bitterness in her voice suprised Upson. He wondered if there had been something between Annie Cutler and Gus Thompson. The bitterness made him feel safe in asking a question he would not otherwise have risked.

"It can't be intentional, can it, Annie?" Upson said. "You don't think they're conscious murderers, do you?"

"No, it's more dangerous than that. They're all children."

Walking Annie back across the parking lot toward the embassy, Upson was struck by something. Even a few weeks ago he wouldn't have said "they." He would have said "we." But wasn't the right word still "we"?

In an effort to calm down, Upson held his breath before he went into Brautigan's office, but it didn't work. "What's wrong, Fred?" the deputy chief of mission said on seeing Upson's expression. Upson handed him the Pathet Lao broadcast reporting on the bombing of Samneua ford. Brautigan took it in at a glance. "What a damned shame," he said.

"What a damned shame? That's it? What a shame?"

Brautigan came out from behind the barrier of his desk and put a hand, broad and heavy and reassuring, on Upson's shoulder. "Come on, Fred," he said. "Let's sit down." They sat at a low coffee table with rattan armchairs around it, the broadcast transcript on the table between them.

"We killed the woman Phailin right in this room," Upson said. "Admit it."

"Of course I admit it." Upson felt off balance, as if a door had unexpectedly swung wide open the instant he began to push it. "She died by accident," Brautigan went on, "but we sent the plane up there with the missile that went haywire. And either one of us could have stopped that plane from going up there, so we killed her right in this room, yes."

"What does that make you feel like, Jerry? It makes me feel like a murderer."

"I feel that it's a shame."

DOMESTIC POSTINGS

"Jesus Christ."

"Fred, listen me out. By the standards we're both applying right now, a lot of people have been killed in this room. And in other rooms all over the mission, both by accident and on purpose. And in other rooms in Hanoi, and Samneua, and in Moscow and Peking and Washington, too. It's what happens in a war. The end product is dead people."

"The woman Phailin."

"Dead civilians aren't the intended product, but they're an occasional by-product. If the missile had gone straight, she wouldn't have been hit. But there's waste, confusion, error, carelessness. Callousness, indifference, cruelty. Your job is specifically to cut down on those things. But you make mistakes, too."

"Just like the missile did?"

"Just like the missile. We both made a mistake this time, me more than you. And we'll make mistakes again."

"Not this mistake, I won't. I'll never sign off again on a request I know is wrong."

"One you know is wrong might be right," Brautigan said. "One you're sure is right might be wrong. Nobody can do any job perfectly. You just do it the best you can.

"If a job's worth doing, it's worth doing right. Is that it?"

"I suppose."

"And if a job isn't worth doing? What about that, Jerry?"

"Your job is worth doing."

"I mean the whole job. The air war."

The deputy chief of mission looked down at his freckled hands on the table for a moment, and then gazed at a point over Upson's shoulder. The fingers of his right hand drummed soundlessly on the table. "All right," he said at last. "I see what you're saying. I don't agree with you, but you've come to your conclusion for decent and honorable reasons. Could you bring yourself to stay on the job for just another couple of weeks, though? We've got a junior officer trainee coming on the twenty-fifth, fresh out of FSI. I was going to send him up to Sam Thong, but it was just to get his feet wet. They don't really need a man up there."

Upson looked at the DCM in surprise. He hadn't thought the thing through as far as asking for reassignment, but he wasn't disposed to protest.

"This new JOT should be able to handle the job," Brautigan said. "Don't you think so? Somebody with your amount of experience was wasted in it, anyway. The job's ninety percent clerical. In the military, they'd have an enlisted man doing it. I've had it in the back of my mind for a long time that you could do the mission a lot more good in the political section, but I didn't dare switch you. As long as you seemed satisfied here with us, I was afraid you might misread reassignment to mean we weren't satisfied with your work."

As Upson left the office, he didn't much care whether they were satisfied with his work or not. He was just grateful that the decision had been reached, even if inadvertently. It was the decision he would have had to come to anyway, eventually. At least he thought it was.

"Welcome to the turkey farm, Fred. It's not so bad over here. Sort of like one of those independent eating houses in college. We may not be in the fraternities, but we have each other. If you do good work for me, I'll take care of you as well as I can. Which is pretty well. When I do your OER in August, it'll be based on your performance in the political section, not on how you got along with the Little Field Marshal across the hall."

Upson knew that some of the junior officers called the ambassador that, but he was surprised to hear it from the chief of the political section. Goldman was a FSO-2, only one step from the top grade. Upson himself had been promoted up to FSO-5 during his tour in Morocco, and had hoped to make 4 during this tour. "Jerry already did an OER on me," he said. "I just got it yesterday. Apparently he had to do one covering the part of the rating year when I worked over there."

"How did you make out?"

"He said I lacked judgment."

"That's pretty rough. Like saying a running back can't run. Judgment's the only thing you've got to sell."

"How can I appeal it, though?" Upson asked. "It's like having a bad attitude in school. You can never prove you don't have one, because it's the teachers who decide what one is."

"Have you signed off on his evaluation yet, Fred?"

"Not yet."

"I'd go ask him, very politely, to explain what he means, so you can do better in the future. He can't make it any worse; he's already blown you out of the water for promotion for at least the next three years, even if your next bosses think you're Metternich. And maybe he'll soften it a little if you go in and see him. Jerry doesn't really like confrontation."

Neither did Upson, and he was uneasy later that afternoon while waiting by Annie Cutler's desk for Brautigan to be free. "Is it that damned OER?" she asked. "I typed it, is how I know about it. But nobody else has seen it."

"Yes, that's it."

"Well, his light's out now, so he's off the line. You can go on in. Good luck."

Brautigan nodded toward a chair and said, "Sit down, Fred. What can I do for you?" He didn't come out from behind his desk to sit in one of the other chairs, as he usually did.

"I just wanted to talk to you before I signed off on my OER, Jerry."

"You don't have any problems with it, do you? It's a damned good report."

"Well, most of it. I was just thinking about here under 'Work Performance,' where you say, 'This young officer occasionally displays poor judgment in the discharge of his duties.' I don't know just what you mean by that, so I don't know what I should be doing differently."

"Fair enough, Fred. First off, let me say that I wasn't kidding when I just said it's a damned good report. You ought to see one or two of the OERs *I* got when I was your age. If I had let myself get discouraged, I'd be selling life insurance for a living today."

He paused and smiled. Since it seemed to be expected of him, Upson smiled back. "The fact is," Brautigan went on, "you've got a long and successful career ahead of you in the Foreign Service, and you're making a mistake if you think this report is going to change that. It's a fine report."

"Except for that one part."

"I had to put that in, Fred. The whole system breaks down if you don't evaluate officers as honestly as you can."

"How did I display poor judgment, though? What are some examples? That's what I want to know."

The deputy chief of mission clasped his big hands together behind his neck and leaned back in his chair. "All right," he said, "let's take the business of the strike on the Samneua ford . . ."

"But I was right, Jerry. They missed the damned ford and blew up an innocent woman. My judgment wasn't poor. My judgment was vindicated."

"Your judgment on the strike request itself, sure. That's not in question. I shared that judgment myself, you'll recall. I'm talking about your judgment in the whole matter. Let me give you an example. When I was in the Army, every spring there would be a certain day when you changed into summer uniform. Up to that day, you wore your wool uniform even if it was hot; from that day on you wore khakis, even if it was cold. Now obviously on certain days and in certain places, that rule looked wrong and stupid. That's always the case when you apply general rules to particular cases. But you have to have general rules in any large organization, or it's no longer an organization. That means, though, that there's a certain amount of stupidity and injustice and even immorality built into all large organizations. Do you begin to see where I'm going?"

"Not really, no. I was *supposed* to judge particular cases. That's what my job was."

"That's true up to a point. But there has to be a certain amount of play in any large machine. If you engineer the tolerances so close that they approach perfection, you may have a beautiful machine. But it'll seize up when you try to run it. The important thing is the operation of the whole machine, Fred, not the theoretical perfection of one little part of it."

"You mean I showed poor judgment by doing my job too well?"

"Let me try again. The machine we have here is an unusually complicated one, with a lot of parts that normally wouldn't mesh too well. It's important that the ambassador maintain his control over those different parts—the CIA, AID, the military attachés, and so on. Otherwise, the Pentagon would pour a half-million troops into Laos and pave most of the country over for runways. But the ambassador can't *coerce* those different parts, or elements, of the mission. If the machine is to work, each of them has got to cooperate, and they can withhold that cooperation in a thousand little ways without ever disobeying a direct order. So if somebody wants to try out one of their little toys and there doesn't seem to be too great an objection to it, it's best in the long run to let them go ahead. As long as you say yes in such a way as to let them know you still exert final control. And I think we did that, you and I. Does that make sense to you?"

"I guess it does. A little." Upson smiled wanly as they rose to shake hands. Then he turned and left the room. □

FOREIGN SERVICE PEOPLE

Foreign Service Juniors Awarded AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships

The initial list of the 1982–83 American Foreign Service Association Scholarship Program Awards has been announced by the Hon. H.G. Torbert Jr., chairman of the Committee on Education. AFSA once again expresses appreciation to all those who have supported the scholarship programs with their generous contributions, and in particular the Association of American Foreign Service Women for their continued interest and efforts on behalf of Foreign Service Juniors with funds raised at their annual AAFSW Bookfair.

The names of the recipients, their scholarships, and colleges and universities follow:

Marit Anderson, Julius C. Holmes Memorial Scholarship, James Madison University.

Rolf R. Anderson, Harry A. Havens Memorial Scholarship/AFSPA, University of Virginia.

Alison V. Apel, Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, Bryn Mawr College.

Michael C. Apel, Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, Carleton College.

Mark E. Brogley, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Southern Florida.

Earl Roland Brown, Robert Woods Bliss Scholarship, University of Utah.

Aaron L. Brown, AAFSW Scholarship, Brigham Young University.

Peter H. Carwell, Avis Bohlen Memorial Scholarship/AAFSW, Wesleyan University.

Marina S. D'Angelo, Marcia Martin Moore Memorial Scholarship, University of Maryland/Baltimore.

Mauro G. D'Angelo, William Benton Scholarship, University of Maryland/Baltimore.

Deborah A. Drechnowicz, Adolph Dubs Memorial Scholarship, University of Rhode Island.

Michael E. Drechnowicz, Hope Rogers Bastek Memorial Scholarship, University of Rhode Island.

Philip DiTommaso, AAFSW Scholarship, New York University.

David D. Durham, Timberlake Scholarship, University of Maryland/Munich.

James R. Durham, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Maryland/Munich.

Christopher H. Floyd, AAFSW Scholarship, Delaware Technical and Community College.

Desiree D. Garza, Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, George Mason University.

Melissa J. Garza, Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, George Mason University.

Charles T. Goodnight, John Campbell White Memorial Scholarship, University of Maryland/College Park.

William L. Goodnight, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Maryland/College Park.

Catherine R. Grant, Edward T. Wales Scholarship, University of Tampa.

Christine L. Grant, Lowell C. Pinkerton Memorial Scholarship, University of Pittsburgh.

Estelle M. Grant, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Pittsburgh.

Regina A. Grant, Betty Carp Scholarship, University of Pittsburgh.

Deborah C. Hagen, AAFSW Scholarship, University of LaVerne.

Charles G. Hall, AAFSW Scholarship, Maine Maritime Academy.

Sara Jean Hewes-Manapol, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Rochester.

Kenneth F. Hewes-Manapol, Arthur B. Emmons Memorial Scholarship, Yale University.

Ivan A. Holsey, AAFSW Scholarship, Morehouse College.

Amy S. Hough, David W. Christenson Memorial Scholarship, St. Olaf College.

Paul R. Hubler, Theodore A. Xanthaky Memorial Scholarship, Pitzer College.

Stephen A. Hubler, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Southern California.

Barbara A. Lowe, Betty Carp Scholarship, Asbury College.

John B. Marston, Timberlake Scholarship, Marietta College.

Cynthia R. Matera, Norris S. Haselton Memorial Scholarship, College of William and Mary.

Anika Martin, Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, University of Tennessee.

Diana Martin, Jefferson Patterson Scholarship, University of Tennessee.

Cynthia A. McIntyre, AAFSW Scholarship, Millsaps College.

Deana F. McIntyre, Mark G. Mattran Memorial Scholarship, University of Southern Mississippi.

Tasaneeya McKeithen, Charles B. Hosmer Memorial Scholarship, San Francisco State University.

Molly McKeithen, Rob L. Berrett Memorial Scholarship, University of California/Berkeley.

Suchiraphon McKeithen, Edward T. Wailes Scholarship, San Francisco State University.

Rachael A. Nelson, C. Montagu and Frances M. Pigott Memorial Scholarship, McHenry County College.

Phalika C. Ngin, Robert E. and Florence L. Macaulay Memorial Scholarship, St. Petersburg Jr. College.

Deborah S. Nugent, AAFSW Scholarship, University of New Hampshire.

Jerald R. O'Brien, David K. E. Bruce Scholarship, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.

Jonathan G. O'Brien, John F. Simmons Jr. Memorial Scholarship, Brown University.

Vicki M. Penn, American Women's Group/Bonn, University of Maryland/College Park.

Anne E. Penney, AAFSW Scholarship, College of William and Mary.

Kathryn J. Penney, Timberlake Scholarship, College of William and Mary.

Dorothy M. Penney, Leslie A. Squires Memorial Scholarship, Carnegie Mellon University.

Jeanne-Marie Pogue, AAFSW Scholarship, University of Virginia.

John R. Pogue, Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, George Mason University.

Patricia A. Pogue, Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, Mary Washington College.

Caitlin J. Porter, Oliver Bishop Harriman Memorial Scholarship, College of William and Mary.

Leslie C. Sapp, AAFSW Scholarship, State University of New York/Purchase.

Michael P. Scanlon, American Consulate General Ladies' Club/Frankfurt, California Polytechnic State University.

Nora Sherwood, Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, University of Colorado.

Margaret A. Simpson, Vietnam Memorial Scholarship, University of California/Santa Cruz.

Daniel A. Webb, Edward T. Wailes Scholarship, Le Tourneau College.

James D. Welch Jr., AAFSW Scholarship, Pennsylvania State University.

Susan V. Westmoreland, John Foster Dulles Memorial Scholarship, Connecticut College.

Jennifer K. Wellde, Naomi Brown Honor Scholarship/AAFSW, University of Virginia.

Philip C. Wellde, Edward T. Wailes Scholarship, University of Richmond.

Matthew P. Wills, AAFSW Scholarship, Clark University.

The AFSA Committee on Education members are the Hon. H.G. Torbert, Jr., chairman; Robert L. Caffrey, State; David T. Jones, State; Sheila Mack, AAFSW; Susan Modi, USIA; James D. Singletary, AID. Clarke W. Slade is educational consultant to the committee, and Dawn H. Cuthell is the Scholarship Programs administrator.

Attention Foreign Service Juniors — Apply Now for 1983–84 Scholarships. All eligible dependent students of Foreign Service families, who have served or are currently serving abroad, are encouraged to apply to the Scholarship Program of the American Foreign Service Association immediately. In addition to the Financial Aid grants for undergraduate study, there are Merit Awards of $500 for High School students graduating in 1983, based on competitive academic excellence.

There is no limit to the number of dependent Foreign Service students who may apply from one family, if eligible. There is a limit, however, on the amount of money that can be awarded to a single student and also collectively to a family. Grants for individual students range from $200 to $2000 per year, according to need and limitations imposed by the school attended. The total amount awarded to a family cannot exceed $3000 per year, regardless of the number of college-attending members. All financial aid applications are evaluated by the College Scholarship Service in Princeton, N.J. (or Berkeley, Ca.). AFSA also uses this system to ensure equitable distribution of its scholarship funds.

Students may request application forms for either the Financial Aid or Merit Awards (or both, if qualified) by writing to Dawn Cuthell, Scholarship Programs Administrator, AFSA, 2101 E. St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20037, giving Foreign Service affiliation. Deadline—Feb. 15, 1983. AFSA membership is not an eligibility requirement, and Foreign Service personnel in the lower grades are encouraged to apply.

Deaths

WALWORTH BARBOUR, whose tour as ambassador to Israel, 1961–73, was one of the longest of any American diplomat in his rank at a foreign post, died of pneumonia July 21 in Gloucester, Massachusetts. He was 74.

A native of Cambridge, Massachusetts, and a graduate of Harvard University, Barbour joined the State Department in 1930. In addition to Washington, he served in Italy, Greece, Iraq, Bulgaria, and Egypt. In the early 1950s he was counselor of the embassy in Moscow. He was deputy assistant secretary of state for European affairs during the Eisenhower administration and was appointed deputy chief of mission of the London embassy in 1955. President Kennedy appointed him ambassador to Israel, and he retired from the Foreign Service when he left that post.

According to former associates, the esteem in which he was held by the Israeli government was the reason he remained as ambassador there for so long. When he retired, the *Jerusalem Post* described him as "a sagacious political intelligence who could continuously and precisely define for his own country and for his hosts the political aims of both, and more specifically the limits of tolerance of both." Survivors include a sister, Ellen, of Gloucester. Contributions in his memory may be made in his name to the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

LOUIS F. BLANCHARD, former counselor of the embassy in Managua, Nicaragua, died

of double pneumonia on May 17 in El Paso, Texas.

Blanchard, who was born in Las Vegas, New Mexico, had a long career in the Foreign Service. He served in Mexico City as assistant to Ambassador Walter Thurston on the Braceros Treaty and in intelligence work with Nelson Rockefeller, was on the monetary commission in Bolivia, was principal officer in Tijuana, Mexico, Mexican desk officer in Washington, and secretary of the International Boundary and Water Commission in El Paso, where he researched the lands disputed by Mexico and the United States, resulting in a settlement.

He is survived by his wife, Helen, a son, Louis F. Jr. of Jakarta, two daughters, Maggi Davidson of Rochester, Minnesota, and Barbara Hohenberg of Santa Barbara, California, and four grandchildren.

W. Beverly Carter Jr., a former newsman who served at three ambassadorial posts and was considered a hero for his role in negotiating the release of three Americans and a Dutch woman kidnapped in Tanzania while he was ambassador there, died May 9 at Suburban Hospital near Washington of a heart attack. He was 61.

After attending law school at Temple University, Carter became a journalist for 12 years in Philadelphia. He then joined the old USIA, serving in Kenya and Nigeria. He was named deputy assistant secretary of state for African affairs, following which he became ambassador to Tanzania in 1972. In 1975 he bargained for the release of four hostages held by rebels from Zaire. One of the men whose lives he saved wrote: "He strove against seemingly insurmountable challenges, the terrorists' repeated and certain threats against our lives, their 60-day deadline and primitive communications relying on dugout canoe and foot messenger. Those of us who came to know him through this period found a man of rare principle and integrity, a great humanitarian and a brilliant diplomat." Details of the negotiations were never made public, but Carter was withdrawn as ambassador and then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told reporters that "we are trying to maintain the policy that terrorists cannot negotiate with American officials." Former Washington Mayor Walter Washington said that "America should be proud to have produced a great man who cares about humanity, knows when to draw the line and makes decisions for the best." Speaking for the Congressional Black Caucus, Rep. Charles Rangel (D.-N.Y.) told the Foreign Relations Committee that the subsequent withdrawal of Carter's nomination as ambassador to Liberia was "astonishing and undeserved punishment for a man who had acted in the finest tradition of our nation's diplomatic service." He returned from Monrovia in 1979 and was named ambassador-at-large. At the time of his death he was a U.S. member of the U.N. commission on human rights.

In 1971 he was married to Carlyn Brown Pogue, who survives, as well as their son William Beverly III and two stepchildren, Dion Pogue and Ann V. Pogue.

John Cook, former administrative officer for AID and a retired lieutenant colonel in the Air Force, died in late June in Louisville, Kentucky. He was 65.

Cook joined the agency in 1961 and served in Chile, Honduras, Peru, Vietnam, Nepal, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. He retired from AID in 1978. He is survived by his wife, Betty Taylor Cook, who lives at 3610 Fallen Timber Dr., Brownsboro Farm, Louisville, Kentucky 40222.

Edward Poor Montgomery died last spring, according to A. J. Hulett of Cannes, France. Hulett did not report a date, cause, or place, but did say, "He died peacefully at home and with friends, as he would have wished."

Matilda W. Sinclair, who was chief of mission social secretary and protocol officer at the Rome embassy in the early 1960s, died in Italy on July 18. The cause of death and her age are not known.

In addition to Rome, she served in Bern and Vienna, starting in 1942. She was skilled in several languages, and was fluent in French, German, and Italian. Her interest in foreign languages caused her to leave a testamentary bequest to AFSA and the Department of State to be used "to reward superior achievement by career officers in the Foreign Service in the study of 'hard' languages." Details will be announced as soon as appropriate procedures for administering the awards have been completed.

Honors

Diego C. Asencio, assistant secretary of state for consular affairs and former ambassador to Colombia, was elected to a two-year term as national president of Delta Phi Epsilon, Professional Foreign Service Fraternity, Inc., on July 21. Ronald A. Davidson, special assistant to the U.S. coordinator or refugee affairs, was elected president of the Washington Alumni Association of Delta Phi Epsilon. Joseph O. Elban, retired Foreign Service officer and former consul general in Palermo, Italy, was elected national secretary for alumni associations of Delta Phi Epsilon. The fraternity was founded at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in 1920. It has 24 collegiate chapters and some 4000 members. It is directed toward those interested in careers in diplomacy and foreign trade. Asencio succeeds as president Kenneth W. Bleakley, deputy chief of mission at the embassy in El Salvador and a former president of AFSA 1979–81.

Richard J. Bloomfield, ambassador to Portugal since 1978 and a career diplomat who has served at various Latin American and European posts, including that of ambassador to Ecuador, was named director of the World Peace Foundation. He is 54 years old. The foundation, a private, nonprofit organization, is the oldest of its kind in the United States sponsoring research, writing, and public discussion of international issues. It was founded in 1910.

John H. Hurley, former Foreign Service officer, was ordained a Roman Catholic priest at St. Matthew's Cathedral, Washington, on May 29. Hurley entered the Foreign Service in 1964 and served in Cape Town, Hamburg, CORDS-Vietnam, and Bonn. He chaired the A-100 Basic Officer Course for 10 classes, served in the West European division of INR, and was desk officer for Austria, Switzerland, and Lichtenstein. He is now associate pastor of St. Francis de Sales Church, 2021 Rhode Island Ave. NE, Washington, D.C. 20018.

David D. Newsom, former U.S. ambassador and under secretary of state for political affairs, was named associate dean of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service on July 6. He will continue to serve as director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at the school, which he joined in 1981 after a career of 34 years in the diplomatic corps. Newsom's ambassadorial appointments were Libya, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

Birth

Ryan Bernard Nolan was born May 4 to Robert B. and Mary P. Nolan in Fairfax, Virginia. The father is budget officer for the personnel bureau in M/EX.

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