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COVER: *An artist's conception of an F-15 fighter launching a missile capable of knocking out Soviet satellites. Our story on war and space begins on page 28. Illustration courtesy U.S. Air Force.*

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Subscription to the *Journal*: one year (11 issues), $10.00; two years, $18.00. For subscriptions going abroad, except Canada, add $1.00 annually.

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C. and at additional post office.

2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037. Telephone (202) 338-4045. Offices in State Dept.: 632-8160/2548

Novembet 1982. Volume 59, No. 10. ISSN 0015-7279.

LETTERS

Doing Justice

I was pleased to see the letter by Curtis F. Jones in the September *Journal;* it gives what I consider a fair and constructive evaluation of the United Nations.

On one point, however, Mr. Jones is wrong. He says, "Ambassadors Goldberg and Moynihan were often critical of the decisions of the institution to which they were accredited." He is right in classifying Moynihan and Kirkpatrick as being anti-U.N. in their approach, but he is completely wrong about Justice Goldberg. Goldberg criticized certain actions of the U.N. majority when he felt they were wrong, but his overall approach was respectful and supportive of the U.N. as an institution. He had excellent relations with U Thant, the secretary general, and with Ralph Bunche. Those interested in a complete account of the work of Goldberg and Moynihan are invited to read my book, *Your Man at the U.N.*, which assesses the work of the 14 permanent representatives who preceded Ambassador Kirkpatrick.

SEYMOUR MAXWELL FINGER
Director, Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations,
City University of New York
New York, New York

Word from Fashoda

As a retired Foreign Service officer of Sudan, and having had the opportunity of serving both in the Soviet Union and the United States, and above all, as a Sudanese from Fashoda itself, I really enjoyed reading the article by Robert K. Olson, "The Fashoda Syndrome," in the April issue.

It may be unfortunate, however, that Mr. Olson wrote his article before the emergence of the latest developments that seem to militate more than ever against NATO cohesion.

As the dominant topic of the article is the widening gap between the United States and its European allies in regard to the conduct of international relations, I am afraid to say that the Reagan administration, voluntarily or otherwise, seems intent upon widening the already yawning gap between the members of the Atlantic community by its determination to forbid American companies and their subsidiaries in Western Europe from supplying already-contracted equipment for the Soviet gas pipeline to Europe. Irrespective of whether a person—American or non-American—agrees or disagrees, we all understand the president's reasons for such a move. Yet "when the U.S. sneezes, the whole world trembles," or perhaps falls apart.

Last, but not least, is the other point of disagreement between the United States and Europe—the issue of what you Americans term "European dumping of their subsidized steel exports" in American markets.

GIDEON J. NYMMBE
Dewan, Khartomm-Sudan

Correction

In the comparison of defense spending by the Soviet Union, the United States, and European NATO members in David Adamson's article "A 'No' to No-First-Use" (September), the $68 billion spent by the last in 1978 was inadvertently changed during editing to represent "total alliance defense spending."

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BOOK REVIEWS

Everyday Negotiating

THE PRACTICAL NEGOTIATOR. *By I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman, Yale University Press, 1982.*

Despite all the modern changes in the functions and duties performed by foreign services the world over, a diplomat's central job remains negotiation—seeking non-military solutions or managing conflicts of interest. Many U.S. Foreign Service officers participate in formal negotiations. But the work of most of their colleagues—desk officers dealing with foreign embassies or other departments of their own governments, diplomats in the field at bilateral and multilateral posts—can also be fruitfully considered as negotiation, for these jobs involve explaining the views of one's own department on specific issues, countering objections, and seeking mutually acceptable formulas.

Negotiation is exciting work. It challenges the capabilities of the individual officer, his or her knowledge of the situation, empathy, and creative imagination. But, although their whole careers may in effect be composed of a series of negotiating sequences, many diplomats do not have a great deal of formal training in negotiation, while those with more negotiating experience sometimes have a tendency to believe that their personal experience is valid for all negotiation. Both groups can use the help they can get from academic studies of negotiation.

Zartman and Berman's *Practical Negotiator* is a good short book by two well-qualified social scientists combining recent academic analysis of international negotiation with the views of experienced negotiators. The book draws on some thirty case studies of negotiation in the period after World War II, some of them as contemporary as Law of the Sea and SALT II; on social science studies on negotiation (more than a thousand have been published since 1960); on a series of interviews with senior negotiators who participated in the negotiations reviewed; and on a "control" questionnaire addressed to fifty U.N. ambassadors and members of the U.N. Secretariat. This material is well integrated into a series of general maximums or precepts, like the useful admonition to "Remember that the problem, not the opponent, is the 'enemy' to be overcome." These are followed by interpretation and historical examples. The book is organized around four main themes: first, the characteristics of the good negotiator—the authors observe correctly that one is made, not born; second, bringing about negotiations when interests conflict; third, defining potential solutions; and fourth, the tactics of detailed negotiations.

Most writing about negotiation suffers from a problem of focus, which is often broader or narrower than the reader may wish or need. The Zartman and Berman book does not escape it, for the authors' idea of what the "practical negotiator" needs to know is wider than the book's title would indicate.

The book contains a good deal of valuable advice, for example, its emphasis on creative thinking and imagination; on the need to concentrate on the home front with its diverse coalition of interested authorities; and on the need for a continued, painstaking analysis of the position of the other negotiating parties. Yet these useful insights are scattered throughout the text—the most valuable nuggets are sometimes found in an offhand quote from an experienced negotiator. And, one major theme, consideration of the circumstances in which countries decide to negotiate, goes considerably beyond the stated subject matter. Nonetheless, the effort to gather these insights—among them the challenging finding that cultural differences play only a secondary role in negotiating style—is a rewarding one.

—JONATHAN DEAN

America in Africa

FROM THE CONGO TO SOWETO. *By Henry F. Jackson, Morrow, 1982.*

THE CONGO CABLES. *By Madeleine G. Kalb, MacMillan, 1982.*

The cold war in Africa is the focus of these two studies of U.S. foreign policy. *From the Congo to Soweto* is a general survey of U.S. policy toward the continent since 1960; *The Congo Cables* is a detailed examination of East-West competition in the Third World. Both authors view U.S. intervention in Africa from a critical perspective.

From the Congo to Soweto is ambitious in its scope. Henry F. Jackson covers two decades of U.S. involvement in Africa and includes Egypt in his survey, making for a somewhat abbreviated treatment of most issues. The author states at the outset that he writes from the standpoint of an Ameri-

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can policymaker and seeks to assess concrete U.S. interests in Africa. It would be more accurate to say that he has written a critique of American globalism; Jackson argues that U.S. policymakers have viewed developments in Africa primarily through the prism of East-West antagonism. He underscores the shortsightedness of this perspective, showing how it has led to identification of the United States with racist South Africa in the eyes of black Africans.

The chapter on black Americans and their influence on U.S. Africa policy presents a subject neglected by most foreign policy analysts. Jackson predicts a growing interest in policy and influence on the U.S. government, but acknowledges that a full fledged pressure group has been slow to develop because black Americans have been more immediately concerned with a domestic agenda full of political, economic, and social problems.

Madeleine G. Kalb makes extensive use of declassified State Department cables in her chronicle of events in the Congo. She examines very closely the evidence, already in the public domain, of CIA involvement in the demise of Patrice Lumumba and the triumph of Joseph Mobutu. Kalb credits U.S. policy as a success in preventing a Soviet takeover of this Central African state and points out that two concurrent foreign policy problems in the Third World—Castro's Cuba and Indochina—were much less responsive to American efforts.

This book is carefully researched, including Soviet sources, and is written in a light style that makes it highly readable. It should be of interest to the specialist and generalist alike. Kalb concludes with a few comments on the current state of relations between the United States and Mobutu's Zaire and argues that the kind of American dominance illustrated by the Congo crisis is no longer available to policymakers.

—Nicholas Spiliotes

Wartime Allies

Allies: *Pearl Harbor to D-Day. By John S. D. Eisenhower, Doubleday & Company, 1982. $24.95.*

A special relationship with Britain has been a vital pillar of 20th century U.S. foreign policy. How different would be our world if the two most powerful English-speaking nations had not overcome the ill feeling, indeed bloodshed, that plagued their early dealings! Fortunately, since the great rapprochement of 1897–1902, Anglo-American relations have alternated between formal and informal alliance. In his second book, John S. D. Eisenhower, ex-ambassador, retired general, and son of the late president, describes how the two allies argued, persuaded, and compromised their way through one of the alliance's more trying episodes, the war against Hitler.

How best to defeat the Nazis? The Americans favored the direct approach: cross the Channel and head for Berlin. (Roosevelt even impetuously promised Stalin a second front in 1942, but soon recanted.) Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and other military leaders believed that a cross-Channel invasion could be made in 1943 if the Allies devoted themselves to assembling a huge landing force of troops, equipment, and ships in the United Kingdom. The British took a different view: although they realized that a cross-Channel attack was ultimately needed, they first wanted to weaken Germany by peripheral operations and leave the big thrust for 1945 or later. British leaders remembered the horrifying losses of World War I offensives, and many top Britons, Churchill in particular, wished to conduct military operations so as to preserve the empire and enhance Britain's postwar position.

These divergent views had to be reconciled. And so they were, in a host of oftentesty conferences that produced compromise after compromise. At first, the Americans bent the most. The battle-tested British persuaded the green Americans, so eager to attack *someplace* in 1942, to participate in joint landings in North Africa late that year. Triumph in Africa led in 1943 to a swift conquest of Sicily and the invasion of Italy. The Americans became better bargainers, however, as they gained combat experience and as the United States provided an increasing share of the war effort. In mid-1943, even before the Sicilian and Italian campaigns, the United States extracted a half-hearted British promise to cross the Channel in May of the following year. Although Churchill tried to weasel out of this pledge, the Americans dug in their heels. At Teheran in November 1943 the British, realizing that the invasion ingredients were now available, agreed to fix a date for the attack. As nearly everyone in Western civilization must know, the Normandy invasion was executed with great success in June 1944. Eisenhower concludes that all the compromises worked out for the best: D-Day could not have succeeded much earlier in the war, nor should it have been further delayed.

There are no revelations in Eisenhower's overview of military and diplomatic decision making. After all, the story has been

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well told many times before. But *Allies* has much to commend it. Using an unpublished manuscript by his father, Eisenhower provides new insights into the interplay of personalities. Dwight D. Eisenhower's role correctly appears as more important than usually admitted. The biographical sketches and anecdotes are marvelous. And for once a book of this type has enough maps and photos to complement the text. Above all, the book reads like a novel, thanks to Eisenhower's beautiful prose. Highly recommended, particularly as an introduction to the subject.

—William Michael Morgan

Strategic Crossroads

U.S. Strategy at the Crossroads: Two Views. *J. Record and R. Hanks, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982. $7.50 (paper).*

Sea Power and Strategy in the Indian Ocean. *A. Cottrell and Associates, Sage Publications, 1981. $17.50.*

The Horn of Africa: A Map of Political-Strategic Conflict. *J. Dougherty, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1982. $7.50 (paper).*

In the continuing re-examination of America's strategic situation, it is often argued that the linchpin of strategic power is military and that the United States lacks the conventional arms required to meet its broad commitments. While a U.S. build-up is beginning, it will be difficult to surpass a Soviet Union intent upon maintaining and exploiting that lead.

Another recurring theme is that the United States can no longer afford to put all its strategic eggs in the one NATO basket. The Soviet challenge makes this unwise. Western Europe has never pulled its weight in the alliance, and so the disproportionate U.S. effort should be reduced. Nor is Japan doing enough to protect its own and U.S. East Asian security interests, even though it is overwhelmingly dependent on sea lanes for its resource imports.

In considering alternatives to NATO and Japan, some studies examine the Caribbean, but more generally they focus on Southwest Asia and the Horn of Africa. The three monographs cited above are representative of this type of study and seem particularly cogent.

In the first, Record and Hanks argue that the lesser risk of a direct Soviet military assault upon Western Europe makes that area's role as the vortex of America's resources undeserved. They decry the ear-

marking for Europe of two thirds of the Army's divisions and 80,000 Air Force personnel, as well as half of the Navy's combat and amphibious ships in the Atlantic and Mediterranean. They call for withdrawal of U.S. army units and the retention of existing U.S. tactical air and theatre nuclear forces. Europe should provide the ground troops and assume more convoy responsibilities. To NATO and Japan they would apply an updated Nixon doctrine: support for those seriously helping themselves.

Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf issues are examined by Cottrell and his associates, who believe that the United States, as a geographic island, requires a maritime, not land, strategy. The burgeoning Soviet reach makes uncertain any prearranged U.S. land presence in Southwest Asia and dictates the development of a self-contained, off-shore presence, capable of air and amphibious assaults designed to protect the oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz. This will mean reductions in expensive armored land forces and beefing up a variety of naval craft.

Closely interwoven with the Arabian peninsula and Indian Ocean is the Horn of Africa. In recent years we have witnessed a remarkable change of partners—Ethiopia is now in the Soviet camp and Somalia is in the American. Dougherty provides a most useful survey of the factors affecting this rivalry. The author also provides a realistic assessment of future developments in Afghanistan, Iran, and the Gulf war. He concludes there are no certainties upon which the United States can depend when selecting potential sites for bases.

Studies such as these lead one to conclude that the United States requires a drastically revised military arsenal to handle late–twentieth century maritime needs. We must seek allies who will pull their full weight, or island America, facing a formidable global challenge, may be forced to adopt the "splendid isolation" of nineteenth century Britain.

—ROY M. MELBOURNE

The Role of the State

MANAGING DEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD. *By Coralie Bryant and Louise G. White, Westview Press, 1982. $30.*

One of the essential features distinguishing the present-day context of development from that of pre-industrial Europe is the dominant role that the state is capable of playing. According to the dictates of development policy and the nature of government intervention, the state can influence the process of economic growth with the result of either economic inhibition or acceleration. The state is now in the business of outlining comprehensive plans, sometimes precatory, often imperative.

Thus, Coralie Bryant and Louise G. White provide a timely exposition of the development administrator's repertoir of management and policy skills. Significantly, the authors do not lose the reader in decision trees laden with nodes and other trendy decorations purporting to advance analysis. Rather, this is a work with staying power. The authors succeed in treating administration contextually, providing insights into the relationship between underdevelopment and incapable administration. The authors do not neglect the political center of gravity in coming to terms with competing loci of authority and control. This is a work both students and practitioners of development will find well worth perusing.

—NOEL V. LATEEF

Congress's Foreign Policy

THE HOUSE AND FOREIGN POLICY: *The Irony of Congressional Reform. By Charles W. Whalen Jr., University of North Carolina Press, 1982.*

CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY. *By Robert A. Pastor, University of California Press, 1982.*

Studies on Congress's supposedly destructive involvement in foreign policy–making are not unusual. But a thorough and thoughtful analysis that welcomes increased congressional participation merits a second look. Robert Pastor's *Congress and*

the Politics of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy deserves such notice. Pastor assumes that a non-protectionist, development-oriented economic policy is desirable. And, he concludes that Congress has not only protected the public interest, but has even formulated a coherent, internationalist policy.

Pastor aims to construct the conceptual framework for this policy, but his purpose is also practical. By systematically examining the policy's development, he hopes to understand its processes in order to correct its deficiencies. Yet the book could also be read as a text on how other attempts to explain the history and mechanisms of economic policy have failed. Pastor discusses the merits of, for example, interest group and bureaucratic theory, but he subscribes to the interbranch politics model, with its emphasis on presidential leadership, congressional cohesion, and a responsive relationship between the two. This model provides for him the most complete and convincing explanation of what has historically been our non-protectionist economic system. Pastor's argument is not simplistic; he uses the executive-congressional relationship to explain why deviations from the generally internationalist pattern occurred (e.g., Congress was more concerned with its prerogative than with policy), and how they can be mitigated.

Yet the interbranch politics model is troubling in that it posits the Executive and Congress as "coherent, unitary actors." One who can attest to Congress's fragmented nature is Charles Whalen. As a former House representative for 12 years and member of the Foreign Affairs committee, Whalen gives a detailed and critical evaluation of how Sam Rayburn's credo—"to get along, go along"— gave way to the reforms of the 1970s.

He points out that the increases in staff and the reformed selection process for committee chairmen were not ends in themselves, but rather means of "turning the Democratic platform into legislative action." Unfortunately, greater procedural democracy did not lead to better policy. In Whalen's eyes, legislative inefficiency and, more importantly, an incoherent foreign policy are the legacies of the much-vaunted reforms. Ironically, the means were achieved but the ends were not.

The move to record representatives' votes serves as a prime example. The intent of this reform was to make members more responsive to their constituents and particular foreign policy issues. But in practice, it made congressmen unduly vulnerable to interest groups and opportunistic opponents. Whalen would amend the reforms so that the balance between public accountability and effective foreign policy would be more equitable. While his recommendations (for example, to increase the number of members who must request a recorded vote) seem sensible, Whalen could have devoted more space to detailing his proposals and less on listing examples of unfair election campaigns.

Because of the detailed, explanatory footnotes, *The House and Foreign Policy* can give the interested reader an inside look into House procedure and representatives' motivation (namely, getting re-elected). Pastor's book serves a different purpose. As a rigorous and scholarly study of U.S. foreign economic policy, it provides an essential framework for understanding this important cornerstone of our foreign policy.

—PATRICIA COHEN

Allies Adrift

REBEL EUROPE. *By James Oliver Goldsborough, MacMillan, 1982. $12.95.*

Many will be unhappy with what this book says about the United States and its fall from grace in European eyes. Nevertheless, it is an important assessment of U.S.-European relations, especially as disputes over steel exports and the Soviet pipeline have been making headlines since the book was written. Even those who will regard the book as merely an apologia for Europe's failure to support wholeheartedly U.S. policies are advised to read it, for Goldsborough (backed by quotes and statistics) has done an excellent job of sketching one prevalent European view of the United States.

In the past twenty years, Goldsborough argues, the United States has shown itself to be vacillating and narcistic; has lost the ability to maintain a consensus on foreign policy; and has persistently viewed the world through a simplistic, bipolar lens. Europe, which the United States considered permanently weakened and divided, has become a viable political entity in its own right, demonstrating renewed confidence and an ability to deal with the world's complexities. Two important points emerge from Goldsborough's description of the European recovery from the ashes of World War II. First, Western Europe had, and still has, a large stake in economic and political cooperation with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Second, Western European cooperation extends into all policy areas except defense. And, because France remains outside, NATO hinders rather than encourages the development of that cooperative defense effort. Only such cooperation, coupled with a reduced U.S. role, Goldsborough argues, will encourage the Europeans to

shoulder more of the burden of their own defense.

This is a wide-ranging book and at times that is a weakness. Goldsborough's brief discussion of the increase in crime and egocentrism in the United States is provocative but only impressionistic. However, when keeping strictly to the topic of U.S.-European relations, his portrait of two allied continents drifting further apart is both convincing and alarming.

—F.G.B.

Successful Germany

GERMANY TRANSFORMED: *Political Culture and New Politics. By Kendall Baker, Russell Dalton, and Kai Hildebrandt, Harvard Press, 1982. $32.*

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WEST GERMANY. *Edited by Andrei Markovits, Praeger Publishers, 1982. $24.95.*

The intricacies of international affairs frequently have their roots in the intricacies of domestic politics. Therefore, it is important to understand the reasons behind an apparent growing indifference on the part of West Germans—particularly the younger generation—toward the United States. This indifference may exist because Germans no longer need an outside model for establishing and maintaining democratic institutions. Also, their success at democratization has been equaled by an economic growth that far exceeds that of the United States.

Germany Transformed, the more scholarly of these two books, focuses on the changed and changing values and priorities in Germany. Based on extensive use of public opinion polls taken over an extended period of time, this book is indispensable for scholars in the German field. It documents the continuing interest of Germans in non-material issues such as nuclear power and war, ecology, etc., in the face of the most serious economic difficulties since the early 1950s.

The second work, *The Political Economy of West Germany,* is a set of essays written largely by liberal technocratic members of the younger generation of scholars. It is heavily based on an analysis of institutional arrangements and their relationship to economic policy, with some chapters focusing on established institutional mechanisms designed to foster consensus and compromise among crucial constituencies. In a concluding chapter, Markovits extends this institutional analysis (which uncritically favors corporatist arrangements) to foreign policy. He claims that for West Germany's economy to be successful, its foreign policy must enjoy a greater degree of autonomy from the United States and the Atlantic alliance. While this reviewer is also opposed to the Reagan administration's attempts at pressuring the Germans into following the dictates of short-term alliance strategic interests, the book fails to make a case that economic prosperity in Germany is tied to political autonomy. While it is true that political autonomy and democracy are related, the relationship is far more complex than Markovits—as a result of a bias towards the Social Democratic party—indicates in this book. Nevertheless, despite the inevitable unevenness and duplication that one is apt to find in this type of a collection of essays, the book raises—and sometimes answers—important questions about Germany.

Issues of continuity and change in institutions and values, given German history, are relevant to both scholars and policymakers. I recommend these books to them.

—CHARLES R. FOSTER

U.S. Hegemony

UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD ORDER. *By James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, Little, Brown and Company, 1981.*

On the gray Friday afternoon of February 21, 1947, H.M. Sichel, first secretary of the British embassy, delivered two notes to Loy Henderson at the State Department informing the United States that Great Britain could no longer provide the financial and military support needed by Greece and Turkey. Within that hour, wrote Joseph M. Jones, "Great Britain . . . handed the job of world leadership, with all its burdens and all its glory, to the United States." This book is an interpretation of how the United States handled that burden and that glory.

What the authors mean by "world order," then, is the American postwar system of political and economic hegemony and the "overarching" policy of containment. There is little or nothing on the creation and maintenance of the complex of multilateral agencies—the U.N. family, the OECD, the Common Market and other European agencies, and Third World associations—which are generally considered to be the permanent structure of the international system. There is nothing on the great diplomatic chapters of Western relations, of decolonization, or the North-South dialogue. What this study gives us is a mildly revisionist,

stripped-down history of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Nathan and Oliver place much of the blame for Soviet postwar hostility on the West's unilateral decisions regarding the reconstruction of Europe. The "culmination of Western unilateralism" occurred at the Westerners-only London Conference of January 1948, which brought West Germany into European reconstruction planning as a full partner but distressed Stalin so much that he retaliated with the Berlin blockade. Not mentioned are Western reactions of the time which viewed the situation quite differently. To many in the West the moment of truth was the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers during the devastating winter of 1947, when Europe lay prostrate and Stalin refused to agree to a plan for cooperative action. The Allies went home filled with a sense of profound mistrust, frustration, and urgency which produced the Marshall Plan and everything that followed, including the London Conference.

Thus began the long, unfortunate history of reciprocating misperceptions. While the authors have no illusions about the Soviets, the villain of the cold war, in their view, is not the Soviet Union but the American, chiefly Republican, right wing that forced the United States into a posture of rigid global confrontation and militarized its world role. It forced President Truman into Korea and pushed each succeeding president in turn to take a tough, anticommunist stand. It forced Kennedy into confrontation over Cuba, Johnson into Vietnam, and the United States into eventual defeat and humiliation. Even Carter ended his days rattling sabers over the Persian Gulf, desperately trying to build up his image as a tough decision-maker.

Nevertheless, the authors close on the positive note with which one wishes they had begun: The ultimate mistake lay in the displacement of diplomacy by violence. Despite the decline of American economic and political hegemony, the United States still has considerable influence. It could still revert to "some of the traditions of mediation and arbitration. . . ." Real security would be enhanced by a "retreat from the sense of American mission" and a return to "some diplomatic formalism, tolerance, and patience."

Anyone writing an interpretation of the cold war years runs a serious risk. Most of the records are still locked up, the Soviet records will never be released, and Freedom of Information releases render earlier accounts obsolete (and much of this book, e.g. Suez, is out of date). Moreover, the subject is too vast, too majestic for a short work. It will be years, maybe generations, before anything equal to this ambitious title, something generous, Churchillian perhaps, is finally produced. Nevertheless, this study provides one of the few coherent treatments of the entire cold war affair, from World War II to Afghanistan. And it is eminently readable (no small virtue in this field), catching something of the color and drama of the times without losing control of the subject.

—Robert K. Olson

Report from Warsaw

The Polish August. *By Neal Ascherson, The Viking Press, 1982. $14.95.*

Events in Poland over the past two years have occurred so rapidly that it would be difficult for any book to compete with the daily newspapers in reporting and analyzing developments in that country. In *The Polish August,* however, Neal Ascherson has done an admirable job in attempting the impossible: completing an up-to-date work that also includes a postscript describing General Wojciech Jaruzelski's crushing of Solidarity and the imposition of military rule over Poland in December 1981. But the book most outdistances the press coverage in its analysis. Ascherson, a

Scottish-born journalist who has been covering Eastern Europe for more than twenty years, has drawn upon his detailed knowledge of the area to explain the differences between the growth of popular opposition to the Communist regime of Polish party leader Edward Gierek in 1979–80 and similar trends which led to revolts in Hungary and Poland in 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and in Poland in 1970.

The author tends to support a cyclical interpretation of Polish history, in which each new government obtains power during a period of popular unrest by promising political liberalization and economic reform, only to grow increasingly isolated from the population, becoming authoritarian and corrupt, and eventually falling victim to a renewed period of popular unrest leading to the installation of a reformist regime. Ascherson suggests this was the pattern followed when Wladyslaw Gomulka replaced Boleslaw Bierut as party secretary in October 1956, and when Gierek in turn replaced Gomulka after widespread strikes in December 1970.

There are no heroes in the book. For example, the author portrays Solidarity leader Lech Walesa as weak and vacillating and Polish primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszynski as ineptly stating in August 1980 that both the striking Solidarity workers and the Communist government were in part to blame for the crisis which was threatening the nation.

Unfortunately, the book is marred, at least for this reviewer, by several observations which are in the revisionist school of history. Ascherson asserts that the Marshall Plan was designed by the United States to be unacceptable to the Soviet Union and that the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in February 1948 was a relatively "genuine" accession of power. These flaws notwithstanding, *The Polish August* is a well-written, informative description of events in Poland and is recommended to both the general reader and the specialist on Polish affairs.

—Benson L. Grayson

Books in Brief . . .

Saudi-American Relations. *By Benson Lee Grayson, University Press of America, 1982. $19.75 (cloth), $9.25 (paper).* A general review of U.S.-Saudi relations from Saudi independence to the present by a Foreign Service officer.

China, the Soviet Union, and the West: *Strategic and Political Dimensions in the 1980s. Edited by Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, Westview Press, 1982. $30 (cloth), $13.95 (paper).* This anthology, based on the 1980 Garmisch conference on Sino-Soviet relations, contains selections on domestic, regional, and military factors in relations between the two major Communist powers.

The Sino-Soviet Conflict: *A Global Perspective. Edited by Herbert J. Ellison, University of Washington Press, 1982. $35 (cloth), $14.95 (paper).* Eighteen contributors from academia, government, and the private sector consider different aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute: the influence of Chinese and Soviet domestic factors; important developments within the international Communist movement; the impact of international and regional events; and projections for the 1980s.

Spy/Counterspy: *An Encyclopedia of Espionage. By Vincent and Nan Buranelli, McGraw Hill, 1982. $24.95.* A comprehensive reference guide that includes articles on individual spies, particular incidents, organizations, and espionage techniques.

Issues in International Bilingual Education: *The Role of the Vernacular. Edited by Beverly Hartford, Albert Valdman, and Charles R. Foster, Plenum Press, 1982. $42.50.* A study of the impact of the ver-

nacular in bilingual societies, with several international case studies.

DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES IN SEMI-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMIES. *By Bela Belassa, World Bank Research Publication, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. $32.50.* An analysis of development strategies in countries that have already established an industrial base, with studies of Argentina, Colombia, Israel, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan.

THE ROAD TO BELLAPAIS. *By Pierre Oberling, Social Science Monographs, Columbia University Press, 1982.* A recounting of events in Cyprus during the 1960s and '70s which argues that the division of the island into separate Turkish and Greek entities was achieved not by the Turkish intervention of 1974, but by the Greek Cypriots in an earlier campaign of aggression.

CYPRUS. *By Paschalis M. Kitromilides & Marios L. Evriviades, World Bibliographical Series, Clio Press, 1982. $31.* An annotated bibliography of works about Cyprus.

KENYA. *By Robert L. Collison, World Bibliographical Series, Clio Press, 1982. $25.25.* An annotated bibliography of books and articles.

OMAN. *By Frank A. Clements, World Bibliographical Series, Clio Press, 1982. $32.50.* An annotated bibliographical guide.

SOUTH YEMEN: *A Marxist Republic in Arabia. By Robert W. Stookey, Westview Press, 1982. $16.50.* A profile of this strategically located revolutionary state by a former Arabic specialist in the Foreign Service.

THE PHILIPPINES: *A Singular and a Plural Place. By David Joel Steinberg, Westview Press, 1982. $18.50.* A basic account focusing on the Philippines' pluralistic society, divided between uplander and lowlander, rich and poor, and a variety of ethnic groups.

HUNGARY: *A Nation of Contradictions. By Ivan Volgyes, Westview Press, 1982. $16.50.* This brief volume traces Hungary's fortunes since the Communist revolution.

THE SEYCHELLES: *Unquiet Islands. By Marcus Franda, Westview Press, 1982. $18.* This is a profile of some small islands that were suddenly opened to outside influences with the construction of a U.S. satellite tracking station in the 1960s.

EDITORIAL

AFSA

Honoring Foreign Service Professionalism

The Foreign Service is generally thought of as a low-profile service. This is to a large degree accurate — diplomacy can be most effective when it is discreet, the foreign policy process runs smoothest when it is unobtrusive. Regrettably, though, this low profile sometimes contributes to misperceptions: the cookie pusher image is a difficult one to live down.

It is therefore useful from time to time to honor colleagues who, through service in difficult and often dangerous circumstances, remind us how inaccurate this caricature is. This year, the Association presented five awards at its annual ceremony to individuals who, through their contributions, brought credit not only to themselves but to the entire Foreign Service community.

The first three awards — the Christian A. Herter Award, the William R. Rivkin Award, and the W. Averell Harriman Award — were presented for extraordinary accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage, and creative dissent. In honoring this year's winners, respectively, Ambassador Herman J. Cohen, Mr. George T. Cosgrove, and Mr. Carl Gettinger, we were also mindful of a greater purpose — that is, to reaffirm the responsibility of the Foreign Service to provide frank commentary and honest and realistic policy options to decisionmakers.

We were also pleased this year to present the first annual Avis Bohlen Award. The importance and the contributions of the family overseas have long been known but until now have never been formally recognized. Mrs. Anne Cook Murphy, the first recipient, exemplifies the many talents which the late Avis Bohlen brought to the Foreign Service. AFSA is grateful to Mrs. Pamela Harriman for establishing this award.

Lastly, the Governing Board of the Association voted unanimously to present a special award to Ambassador Morris Draper. AFSA gave Ambassador Draper a certificate of appreciation which cited his "outstanding role in the negotiations leading to the successful evacuation of the PLO from Beirut in furtherance of the President's continued efforts to bring peace to the Mideast." This was not an established award nor was it meant to become one — it was meant to be a special tribute in recognition of a special performance.

The level of competition for each of the four established awards was extremely high this year. It is our hope that the selection committees will have to make even more difficult choices next year. □

(A complete report on the AFSA Awards Ceremony, at which President Dennis K. Hays read the remarks adapted above, will appear in the next issue.)

The European Question

By ROBERT K. OLSON

In the introduction to his book *The Struggle for Mastery in Europe,* British historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote:

> But the First World War had none of the traditional outcomes. The balance was not restored; a single Great Power did not dominate the Continent; there was not even a universal revolution. The intervention of the United States overthrew all rational calculations. Henceforward, what had been the center of the world became merely "the European Question."

But what a question; unresolved then and still unresolved. The question of Europe's future, and the struggle for control of that future, has left the world in political turmoil for almost seventy years and will undoubtedly continue to do so for many years to come. Europe remains the biggest stake between the superpowers and a time bomb which could destroy civilization.

From the perspective of the United States, the problem of Europe has produced a diplomatic revolution. It has so dominated American attention as to cast the United States in the role of a European power rather than a North American one. And, incredibly, we seem to have accepted the status quo as if it were merely one more adjustment among many in the international scene.

That the status quo of a shattered continent is beginning to seem entire-

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Robert K. Olson is a retired Foreign Service officer and the author of U.S. Foreign Policy and the New International Economic Order.

"The status quo of a shattered continent is beginning to seem entirely normal to Americans. But there are profound and powerful currents of change that will make the present situation stagnant and necessitate further adjustments."

ly normal to Americans, if not to Europeans, says much about our historical perspective. There are, in fact, profound and powerful currents of change that will make the present situation stagnant and necessitate further adjustments. As evidence, there is the endless and tiresome litany of complaints, now by Europeans, now by Americans, over defense, economic policy, Third World relations, the Mideast, and détente. These are conventionally glossed over as the inevitable and harmless product of any alliance. But they are more than that; they are symptomatic of a pervasive and growing disenchantment and a rising resentment on both sides of the Atlantic.

Alliance Resentment

On the one hand, Americans are weary of European criticism and carping while the United States bears the largest burden of European defense. Europe, with a population equal to that of the Soviet Union and a gross national product equal to that of the United States, should be able to look after itself. On the other hand, Western Europeans are more than ever restive over the American presence, less than ever enchanted with the alliance and American ideological sermons on East vs. West. To Europeans, the increasingly lethal concentration of theater nuclear weapons seems more likely to destroy than defend Europe. The European status quo preserves an inherently unnatural and unstable situation which time, history, and sentiment is bound to resist. The fundamental reality is that there is still no satisfactory political settlement in Europe and, incredibly, no apparent interest in achieving one.

The status quo has preserved Western Europe for thirty-five years and should not be lightly dismissed. But it is producing diminishing returns. What faith can we have in disarmament talks when the political questions which have kept the conflict alive for all those years remain unsettled? It was the status quo which produced those questions and weapons in the first place. From the point of view of the United States, NATO, and the Atlantic community, the status quo could become counterproductive, and with a vengeance. Therefore, the United States should reconsider its commitment to this status quo and reexamine the possibility of a long-range political settlement. The advantages to Europe are obvious, and indeed, Europe is already headed in that direction. But there are equally great, although unappreciated, reasons why that is also the only realistic option for the United States.

Americans should realize that there will be no relief from our current disenchantment with Europe and its problems under the status quo. Yet, to disengage from our interests, involvement, and responsibilities would be to throw away an investment of thirty-five years and billions of dollars and to place the United States itself in jeopardy. The United States has twice been drawn into European conflicts from positions of isolation. We cannot now realistically expect to be able to disencumber ourselves from our present position of interdependence and involvement. We cannot, that is, before reaching some sort of political settlement.

The basic reason for this, however, goes beyond mere interdependence and relates to the United States' role as a world rather than a regional power. History has shown that the world role of a North Atlantic power can only be carried out effectively when its security in Europe has been assured. This fact of life has been learned, usually the hard way, by every European state with world-power pretensions from the days of Portugal and Spain, through the careers of Holland, France, Britain, and Germany, on to our own time. But it is the British experience that is particularly illuminating because it reveals many parallels to our present situation.

Balancing Power

Since the Elizabethan age, Britain had been a world rather than a regional power, more concerned with maintaining control over seas and the empire. Its traditional policy toward Europe was standoffish, its principal interest being to prevent the domination of the continent by any hostile power. The means toward this end was the balance of power: Britain intervened when this balance was threatened but never involved itself in European affairs more than absolutely necessary. After the Franco-German war of 1870–71, Britain deliberately stayed aloof from Europe in "splendid isolation," according to Lord Salisbury, who believed that any European alliance would merely upset that balance by enhancing the ally's power

and, worse, involving it in the affairs of the empire. Nevertheless, within fifteen years after the death of Victoria, Britain had fatally stumbled over the rock of Europe. There is no good explanation as to why the greatest empire in modern history allowed this to happen. A similar challenge from Napoleon Bonaparte strained Britain sorely but confirmed its might and position. Perhaps splendid isolation was an early episode of appeasing an increasingly powerful Germany, and Britain merely intervened too late. In any case, a second European war twenty years later finished Britain off as a world power.

Stepping into Shoes

After World War II, the United States stepped directly into Britain's shoes. As Joseph M. Jones has written, when the British notified the State Department in February 1947 that they could no longer hold the line in Greece and Turkey, "Great Britain had within the hour handed the job of world leadership, with all its burdens and all its glory, to the United States." Within a few dramatic months, the United States, like Britain before, became the mainstay of the established world order. And, also like Britain, the United States, for better or worse, was saddled with the European Question. Until that time, U.S. policy had been to leave Europe to Britain, entering the conflict only at the eleventh hour. But henceforth, those old British chestnuts that the United States was always pulling out of the fire belonged to us.

Since then, the United States has not only assumed a global role but has also become the guarantor of the new balance of power in Europe. Indeed, having long since abandoned its own version of splendid isolation, the United States has been involved in Europe more deeply than Britain ever was, and for longer and in greater force. Roosevelt's dream was to consider the United Nations to be the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, but it has long since been displaced by NATO and the Atlantic community. The United States has waxed hot and cold in Latin America, relinquished the Panama Canal, accepted a Soviet presence in Cuba, in Africa, in Afghanistan, lost a ten-year campaign in Southeast Asia, dumped Taiwan, and threatened to pull out of Korea. NATO remains. This bedrock commitment, the almost obsessive tenacity with which the United States defends it while allowing its influence elsewhere to dwindle, validates the British parallel. Indeed, to turn Taylor's phrase around, in the American experience, Europe, far from being a "mere" question has become the center of the world.

The obvious question arises: Will the strains and conflicts of Europe eventually destroy the United States as a world power as they did Britain? It may sound far-fetched to our ears but we are in the same position, more so than we think. Further, one can only speculate on America's role and reputation in the Third World had it not been forced by loyalty to its European allies to moderate its historic stand on self-determination. The price of U.S. support for the British in the Falkland Islands—however justified by the norms of international behavior—is only the latest case in point.

This orientation toward Europe is an obvious distortion of the traditional U.S. worldview and yet has been held for so long almost without question, and is replete with such consequences, that its validity should be re-examined along with its implications. Such a re-examination could not be more timely, for the underlying mood on both sides of the Atlantic favors a readjustment of the relationship. The NATO system, if not actually counterproductive, seems to be producing diminishing returns as far as Western solidarity is concerned. The debate on theater nuclear weapons has exposed the illogic of a position in which Europe's defense or destruction will depend upon a few minutes. Arms limitation agreements may lower the cost of the present stalemate but may also prolong it. The only real alternative is a political and diplomatic adjustment that will break the deadlock and provide a rationale under which disarmament can realistically proceed. But this requires a fresh look at the European Question itself, to determine what it really is and what, if anything, can be done about it.

The question of mastery over Europe and its future is one based on a mercurial and everchanging situation. It is enticing but dangerous and has been both the plaything and the nemesis of dictators, monarchs, and prime ministers. U.S. presidents and secretaries of state should, therefore, resist the temptation to conclude that the European Question has finally come to rest.

The current, conventional view of the question is that Western Europe must be defended against the Soviet Union, which has already gobbled up Eastern Europe and divided the continent. Were it but for the United States, this view has it, Western Europe would have been reconstructed as a Soviet glacis, weak, communized, and hostile to the United States. Or, worse, Western Europe would have utterly destroyed itself in repression and revolution. This view is supported by the belief that the Soviet Union is committed to world domination, that for it Europe would be not only a source of wealth and pride but a strategic forward zone. From Western Europe the U.S.S.R. could dominate the eastern Atlantic, the Mediterranean, North Africa, the Mideast, and, hence, the world. But the domination of Europe by Russia is hardly a new possibility. Over the centuries it has been faced by the Poles, Swedes, and Finns, by the Germans, Austrians, and Turks, by Britain, Napoleon, and Hitler. The United States, by opposing the Soviets in Europe, has assumed a legacy as old as modern Europe and followed in the footsteps of some strange companions. Yet, this is too simplistic and too partial a view for our times, for the contemporary Russian problem should be seen principally as an outgrowth of the question of Germany's fate.

The German Problem

For seventy-five years, until the defeat of the Nazis, the European Question *was* the German problem. When the war was over, the question of Germany was settled, *faut de mieux,* by dividing that country in two, integrating West Germany into the larger framework of NATO and the European Community, and East Germany into the Soviet bloc. But the problem of Germany continues to haunt the

"The problem of Germany continues to haunt the streets and chanceries of Europe, introducing an element of mistrust whenever it is raised. Any appearance of the reunification question is so controversial as to be stillborn."

streets and chanceries of Europe, East and West, introducing an element of mistrust whenever it is raised. Any appearance of the reunification question is so controversial as to be stillborn. Even the Germans, East and West, are cautious courtiers of each other. It was French fear of the revival of German militarism that wrecked the European Defense Community and condemned the United States to keep a permanent military force in West Germany. Nothing would destroy what remains of détente more quickly nor more surely than reunification. Nor is it unthinkable that a German resurgence would destroy the EC and drive France back to its traditional alliance with the Russians.

Germany is not the only state to have sought to exercise some form of hegemony over Europe. Throughout history, various powers have tried to break the balance and achieve some sort of unity—a secular restoration of Christendom, a modern version of the Holy Roman Empire. The Spanish Hapsburgs were succeeded by the Bourbons, who were succeeded by Napoleon, who was succeeded by Bismarck, the Kaiser, and Adolph Hitler, who were succeeded by the Soviets.

In the past this drive toward hegemony and a more or less unified Europe was countered by one country—Britain—that sought to maintain the balance of power. Since any country that dominated the continent automatically presented a threat, British policy, reduced to its essentials, has been to keep Europe divided and, hence, weak. To this end Britain intervened periodically in continental affairs and shifted alliances many times. Britain joined the Austrians against Louis XIV, the Germans and Russians against Bonaparte, the French and Austrians against Russia, the French and Russians twice against Germany. No friends, only interests.

British and European politics were in fundamental opposition for hundreds of years. Britain has never sought empire in Europe nor hegemony; Europe has dreamt of nothing else since Charlemagne. But since World War II, the gradual unification of Western Europe has been a bright spot in a troubled world, and this time that movement toward unity has been joined by the British and supported by the United States. The only complaint has been that Western European unity has not gone far enough or fast enough. Indeed, the dream of a truly unified Europe, East and West, still lives, and constitutes the most creative and promising element in European political thinking today.

Superpower Domination

Here the protean nature of the European Question again shows itself. The view that the debate surrounding the fate of Europe should be focused on the possibility of Soviet domination is slowly and tentatively being displaced by one that emphasizes the question of a Europe freed from superpower domination, or perhaps even a genuinely unified Europe. Such ideas have been around for years, most prominently in de Gaulle's vision of a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" (dominated by France), but with little impact on the status quo. While still wary of the Soviets, Europe today, glimpses—through the mists of détente, East-West trade, and familial and social exchanges—the shadowy outlines of a pacified continent, once again in charge of itself. As former British Prime Minister James Callahan stated in a recent interview, "Even though the hand of the Soviet Union lies heavy on Warsaw, Prague, and Leipzig, the historic feeling that regards Europe as a whole lives on. . . ."

From the perspective of these new "Europeans," the greatest obstacle to the realization of their dream is continued U.S.-Soviet hostility, with Europe at its center. The obvious manifestation of that hostility is the increasing nuclearization of both Eastern and Western Europe. Indeed, it may be said that the recognition of this nuclear threat to the very existence of Europe is the primary force driving Europe toward a greater sense of itself, from which will inevitably come a drive for greater unity and independence. And, because Western Europeans despair that their own great protector fails to understand Europe, the ultimate obstacle to the restoration of Europe seems to be not the Soviets, but the United States.

The European Question, in its generic sense, is what Taylor suggests in his title, the struggle for mastery, not in but *of* Europe, and ceaseless resistance to that effort. This struggle is now between three actors, the United States, the U.S.S.R., and Europe itself. There are four possible answers to the question: continued division and confrontation between East and West, domination by the U.S.S.R., domina-

tion by the United States, or mastery of Europe by Europe itself. It is that last option that is now becoming the focus of the European Question and presents the only realistic basis upon which a European settlement can be based. The constant carping now going on between the United States and Western Europe, therefore, is due, not primarily to different responses to the Soviet threat—U.S. "saber rattling" as opposed to European "neutralism"—but to fundamentally differing definitions of the basic question. While the United States continues to focus on the possibility of Soviet domination, the Europeans are more concerned with recapturing control over Europe for themselves.

Stability & Status Quo

The implications of this change in the form of the European Question are enormous and no one can guess the eventual outcome. But at least two consequences are already apparent. First, it brings the problem of Germany back to center stage by raising the question of the intra-European balance, which is now submerged in the East-West order. The second is the problem of disrupting the status quo. All three parties—the United States, U.S.S.R., and Europe— have a vested interest in the status quo. Most important, the status quo guarantees stability and order, however unsatisfactory they might be; and in a tumultuous world, stability is no small virtue. Among Europeans in particular the violent instabilities of the past are still well-remembered and the future is too uncertain. Therefore, the appearance not only of popular appeals for change but of reasoned declarations from responsible statesmen that the status quo must be changed indicates the depths of anxiety and the vision of a greater good. They betray an answer, already evident in the rising tide of anti-Americanism, street demonstrations, and diplomatic complaints, to the question, Where is the status quo leading us?

The implications for U.S. policy are correspondingly enormous. It means, at the least, that the old postwar policy and the business-as-usual attitude is out of date. It means a difficult choice between two different definitions of the European Question, and between two American roles, the global and the European. Does the United States really want a truly united Europe which could become neutralist, could become a serious rival, or even reach accommodation with the Soviets? Or does it really prefer what it has now, a permanently divided Europe, both halves safely subordinate, difficult to live with but no threat to the United States? It does not, of course, think directly in these terms; NATO is an alliance among friendly powers. But neither can it forget the historic reality of European division and weakness that led to U.S. involvement even before the Soviets became a threat.

The latter, however phrased, is the apparent choice of the Reagan administration, which is preoccupied with the Russian problem and rooted in the past. The administration pressured its allies at Versailles to add economic pressures to military and diplomatic ones in dealing with the Soviets, arguing that it will strengthen Western Europe and weaken the Soviets or, at least, enhance the power balance in favor of the West.

Ironically, this policy of U.S. support for Western Europe against the Soviets has become the surest guarantee that Western Europe will remain weak and Europe divided. This suggests that U.S. encouragement of Western European unity (never unalloyed) has been primarily, and still is, a function of deterrence rather than encouragement for its own sake. Indeed, it would appear that the United States is finally assuming the historic role maintained for so long by Britain: preventing the establishment in Europe of an independent and dominating power. Is it significant that there was no mention of European unification in Reagan's Westminster speech on democracy, no state visit to Brussels? To carry the British parallel one step further, despite the Soviet menace, Europe is showing increasing resentment toward the United States as in former times it did toward Britain.

The future interest of the United States lies in leaving Europe more to its own devices, allowing Europe to become its own master and accepting that this could mean greater accommodation between Eastern and Western Europe. To do so would not necessarily mean creating a European superpower but, more likely, lowering the level of East-West confrontation. It could, as some suggest, provide the Soviets with the opportunity to assume a civilized role in the comity of Western nations. Determination not to be ignored by Europe, not to be treated as a merely Asiatic power, has always been a deep motive in Russian policy. Furthermore, in the words of former U.S. Ambassador to the European Community J. Robert Schaetzel, "The most effective deterrent to Soviet ambition will be a Western Europe determined to pursue the process of unification." A policy of fostering European self-reliance, rather than weakening the alliance, could save it from deteriorating into mutual resentment. The United States, by detaching itself somewhat, could save the relationship.

Binding Spirit

The historian Macaulay once wrote, "It is not the machinery but the spirit we are of that binds us together." If the United States would take seriously its oft-declared trust in the common heritage of values and interests shared with Europe, it would have no need to dominate in order to preserve those values, nor to fear that Europe's further growth, even if more accommodating to the Soviets, would be inimical to U.S. interests. Indeed, the more likely consequence of gradually relinquishing its dominant position in Europe would be to foster the further growth of European leadership and unity upon which the real security of Europe depends. This would break the status quo which is leading at best toward sterility and disenchantment, at worst toward the unthinkable.

The first order of business for the United States is to recognize that the focus of the European Question has shifted and to spur Western Europe to take the initiative toward stronger unification. The United States cannot act for Europe but it can stay out of the way, revive the political character of the alliance, and encourage the Europeans themselves. The last will be difficult and painful. Europe is now at the

"Does the United States really want a truly united Europe which could become neutralist or a serious rival? Or does it really prefer what it has now, a permanently divided Europe, both halves safely subordinate?"

stage frequently found in individuals, wanting autonomy but fearful of responsibility, alternating painfully between dependence and rebellion, demanding leadership but complaining when it comes. The obvious leverage would be gradual military disengagement from the continent while Europe takes up the slack. This would probably concentrate the European mind and spur it to renew the drive toward real, not bogus, unity. At any rate, it is high time, as the French politician Jacques Chirac has said, for the countries of Western Europe to provide for their own defense "so as to continue to be a center of power and decision."

Europe Emergent

Assuming, therefore, a more farsighted U.S. administration, and a few Western Europeans with the vision of a Jean Monnet and the guts of a Konrad Adenauer and a Robert Schuman, the next step would be a clear and unambiguous demand—by Europe itself—that Europe become, once again, master in its own house. Western Europeans could then pursue several aims: greater Western European unification and self-defense, closer ties with Eastern Europe, and a settlement with the United States and the Soviet Union. But the ultimate objective would be to achieve a political settlement in Europe. This would be no easy undertaking: Changing institutionalized attitudes toward the status quo will be an enormous task; the problem of Germany remains unresolved; Europeans are fearful and psychologically and morally dependent; Soviet conditions for cooperation would be stiff. It would take time and patience. Above all, it would take what seems to be in such short supply: courage and vision.

On the other hand, this process has already gone far enough to have produced substantial changes in Europe. It first began in the liberal atmosphere of Western Europe with formation of the various agencies of the European Community. It is evolving further through increased economic and cultural relations between East and West, through the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, détente, Ostpolitik, and numerous private and familial relations. Europeans, East and West, are moving toward each other through their common fear of the increased nuclearization of Europe. A further inducement to the East would be the achievement of an even greater degree of autonomy and unity in Western Europe. This is the most crucial element; without it nothing can be achieved. The EC is clearly bogging down in pettifogging committee work, losing momentum, unsure what to do next, engaged in what Schaetzel calls "a form of dangerous make believe . . . a device for avoiding the hard questions and answers." But Western Europe could be revived by giving it a renewed sense of purpose and determination, a sense of leadership it has long since abandoned but is searching for again.

Above all, greater West European unity could break the present deadlock between East and West. It could change the present zero-sum equation in which a gain for the Soviets is a loss for the United States and Western Europe, and vice versa. A new diplomatic initiative toward unity would start with the wholly new premise that there would be something in it for everyone, not just losses all around.

The advantages for the United States are not difficult to perceive. It could be the path to nuclear sanity in Europe and a measurable reduction in the level of U.S.-Soviet hostility. It could save the EC and foster a new, more symbiotic relationship with Europe. It would enhance U.S. security and reduce the hundred billion dollars per year burden of European defense. Not least, it would mean the liberation of the United States from its overwhelming preoccupation with the balance of power in Europe, restoring an Americentric rather than Eurocentric worldview and responsibilities.

Clearly, it is as important for the United States to maintain its own worldview, its own interests, and its own identity as much as possible. Like the frontier ethos and the egalitarian way of life, the world-wide perspective based on North America is essential. In the United States there is a growing erosion of the emotional postwar commitment to Europe. Symptomatically, there is no successor generation to replace the thinning ranks of the old Atlanticists. The traditional and instinctive urge for an Americentric worldview after thirty-five years as a para-European power is coming back to life. This should not be mistaken for isolationism. No one seriously believes any longer that the United States can or wants to withdraw from the world. Rather, this is a healthy instinct for identity, autonomy, and for a return to

(Continued on page 38.)

Wanted: An Honest Recruitment Policy

By EDWINA S. CAMPBELL

I have been an ex-Foreign Service officer for three years. It doesn't seem that long, so I suspect that even when my five years in the Foreign Service have become a very small part of my working life, I will still think of myself as an FSO. The Service does that to you.

I don't have to worry these days about Washington *per diem* or "Fly American" or crossing the threshold. Lacking these preoccupations, however, I've had some time to reflect on the Service's inability to engage good officers. "Engage," in the French sense: not only to attract and to hold people for a life's work, but to make them glad that they chose a Foreign Service career. It is not pleasant to watch friends "doing time" until retirement. It should be of no small concern to the country that this is true of so many FSOs.

Aside from those officers who resign for purely personal reasons—a death in the family, an illness which will not permit residence abroad—the Service must ask itself why it cannot hold the "best and the brightest" it initially attracts. There are problems of assignment and promotion, to be sure. There is, to a far greater extent than is generally admitted, the feeling that what one does doesn't really matter, a frustration often camouflaged by a frenzy of activity and rather too much griping about allowances and leave policies. But most important, there is a massive failure in recruitment, an inability on the part of the State Department and of individual FSOs to convey to prospective officers a picture of what they can realistically expect from the Service. It is this failure which poses the greatest threat to State's ability to build and to keep a corps of career officers.

A Lack of Perspective

Part of my last assignment was meeting with high school and college students interested in becoming FSOs. Some were quite young, but others had already passed the written portion of the Foreign Service examination and were looking for information on how to pass—and what to expect if they did pass—the oral exam. Almost without exception, they shared a lack of perspective, combined with misinformation and false impressions, that was often amusing but was also alarming. There were three areas in which these students were sadly deficient: their concept of the proper role of a diplomatic service; their awareness of the realities of daily life as a diplomat abroad; and their lack of concern with the personal qualities—as opposed to the professional qualifications—that diplomatic life requires.

Foreign Service recruitment does very little to correct the distorted images with which new officers initially accept appointment. In fact, it often encourages such images, ostensibly to attract the best available candidates. We are far too reticent in describing to candidates the proper role of a diplomatic service. For many young people, their interest in arms control, in development strategies, in management of global resources translates into a vision of the world as a community in which the Foreign Service is a 1980s Peace Corps. These expectations do nothing to prepare FSO candidates for the hard realities of government-to-government relations.

Students who have never traveled are not alone in this myopia. If anything, the opposite is true: those who have been favorably exposed to another country as exchange students are filled with stories of the wonderful people of that country. An interest in "doing something" for those people is often the origin of their interest in a Foreign Service career. But the business of American diplomats is to represent the United States.

If they eventually enter the Service, such students discover that the United States has interests which may not be identical to those of that country; that the host government often has a greater concern with staying in power than with the welfare of its people; and that social reform is not the business of diplomatic establishments. The resulting cynicism is not hard to imagine.

Could not someone have said clearly at the outset that American diplomats are abroad because there is international political business to be done? Being posted to a country that shares our commitment to common values and future cooperation is a fringe benefit; much diplomacy is conducted in a dis-

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tinctly less agreeable environment.

While dreaming dreams of an American-instigated New Deal for the world, prospective officers are also often dreaming (somewhat contradictorily) dreams of their own life abroad. Any FSO who has talked to friends and family on home leave has a pretty good idea of this distorted picture. The more candid officer may admit to having shared similar false expectations before joining the ranks. Is it necessary to describe this "Congress of Vienna" syndrome? Overseas, we ride in limousines, play a good deal of tennis, have long lunches, read a few dispatches (quill pens come to mind), and spend the evenings with invariably charming foreign colleagues and their invariably beautiful wives at intimate dinners or elegant cocktail parties catered, of course, by easily obtainable local staff, and held on the terrace of the "residence," from which we watch the sunset over the bay and think wistfully of the folks back home.

Kipling and Maugham knew better, but they helped create these images for us. Such novels, motion pictures, and the highly entertaining memoirs of retired Foreign Service officers have all been culprits. These memoirs normally exhibit two characteristics: the author was fairly prominent, with service in some exotic and critical posts—has there ever been a memoir by someone who spent twenty years doing the dullest jobs in the dullest bureaus?—and the author manages to gloss over both the truly bad and the truly dull.

Consequently, the loneliness, the physical and mental strain, the health hazards, the pressures on family life are reduced to amusing anecdotes or are not mentioned at all. This misinformation, unintentional though it may be, combined with the lack of opportunity for most young people to get to know FSOs or to see what their daily work is really like, creates a sharply distorted picture. It is precisely this picture on which many students base their decision to enter the Foreign Service.

Moreover, they make this decision without a great deal of reflection on the personal qualities that they will need to bring to the job. By choosing such a career, they also choose to deny themselves many of the things the majority of Americans take for granted: mobility, privacy, the right to make the major choices in one's life.

Few other jobs, even those with the largest corporations, require the flexibility to move every two to four years to places one has never seen before. Few jobs, because of budgetary and other formal and informal restrictions, determine where one's children will live and study. Few require, *de facto,* that one's spouse surrender the career prospects to be had at home, probably forever. How many jobs determine one's private, as well as professional, social life, if for no other reason than the small number of people at a given post? How many other Americans must rely on a teacher, merchant, or doctor they would not normally choose because there is only one available?

A Lack of Control

Many officers and their families find these to be small annoyances for which the Service more than compensates. Others long ago stopped admitting even to themselves that these aspects of life abroad are, for them, more than petty problems. Most people are not cut out to face a life of constant change, in which friends and colleagues are chosen by circumstances beyond one's control.

While these problems are inherent in a diplomatic service, the superficial shrinking and Americanization of the globe over the last thirty years have dulled our recognition of them. Life seems as if it will be similar enough to home that the necessary psychological awareness of the magnitude of change to be expected, and of the personal resources necessary to cope, is increasingly lacking.

The Service is all too familiar with the results of this process: the drug and alcohol abuse, the aborted professional careers of Foreign Service spouses, the glut of officers wishing to remain in Washington. The danger posed by international terrorism is only an additional burden on officers under increasing personal strain. Few of these rumblings, however, reach the ears of students considering a career in the Foreign Service. The department deludes itself if it believes that this veil of silence is to its advantage.

While it expects to find only a small number of people with the necessary educational and professional background, State fails to recognize that the number of applicants with the necessary personal qualities will be even smaller. In its zeal not to discourage those who are professionally qualified, and especially to attract women and minorities, the Service tries to avoid overly candid descriptions of the frustrations of life as an FSO. They become obvious to a junior officer soon enough, but by then many crucial personal and professional decisions have already been made.

Bright, young, single graduate students are usually not thinking about what will be important to them in twenty years, particularly not when tantalized by the "glamour" of the Foreign Service. The department has, at the very least, a responsibility to call to their attention the questions of working spouses, children's education, lack of freedom to choose housing, living conditions, friends, and workplace.

The Service owes itself and the country a recruitment policy which can attract and keep officers able to find personal and professional satisfaction as career diplomats. When faced with questions about the daily realities of Foreign Service life, the department has a responsibility not to dodge the issues. Taking cover behind official pronouncements on job opportunities for spouses and the availability of American schools cannot change the fact that diplomatic life will require that officers and their families make rather drastic compromises in their private lives.

A few will do so gladly and successfully. Many, unless recruitment becomes far more honest than it is today, will pay a high personal price. The department would do well to present a more candid picture of itself. Perhaps State would face the prospect of fewer applicants by being honest about the way of life it has to offer. But only such honesty will enable it in the long run to "engage" those men and women realistic enough to face both the rigors and the rewards of a life in the Foreign Service. □

War and the

AIR FORCE

Space flight has both benefited and worked against arms control. Humankind must choose which course will be followed in the future.

By DANIEL DEUDNEY

The first launch of the space shuttle marked the triumphant return of the United States to leadership in space. During *Columbia*'s latest mission, however, something was different. With the first military cargo aboard a manned NASA spacecraft, secrecy had replaced openness, and the Air Force was on the way to replacing the civilian space agency as the main actor in space. Now that the era of Apollo and Skylab is over, the shuttle program has become part of an increasingly expensive—and dangerous—superpower race for control of the high frontier.

Opportunities exist to head-off this new arms race and instead use space technology to help the cause of peace. Banning anti-satellite weapons, forming an international satellite monitoring agency, and engaging in joint manned missions with the Soviets, for instance, are important yet overlooked steps that could enhance national security far more than an unrestrained race to militarize space. During the last quarter century, space has been used both to advance and restrain the growth of weaponry. Which course humanity will follow in the future depends very much on decisions that will

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High Frontier

be taken in the next few years by those countries that have—or soon will have—space flight capability.

Since their almost simultaneous creation during World War II, the technologies of atomic weapons and rocket propulsion have been closely linked. For the last thirty years, the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union has centered on the inventories of nuclear-tipped missiles. Perhaps the most telling—but least discussed—indication of the motivation behind acquiring space-launch capability is the almost perfect correspondence between the "nuclear club" and the "space club." Of the six countries that have built space launchers, only Japan does not also possess nuclear explosives. The two most recent entrants into the space club, India and China, are also the last two countries to explode nuclear weapons. All indications are that Pakistan could be next in line to both explode a bomb and build its own space launcher. And it is surely no accident that Libya's well-known quest for atomic weapons was paralleled by a less well-publicized effort to lure German missile scientists to that country.

Military Purposes

Space has been and continues to be used predominantly for military purposes. The Congressional Research Service recently estimated that the Soviet Union has successfully launched 858 military and 392 civilian missions, while the United States has sent up 420 military and 327 civilian payloads. (The Soviet lead in number of missions is not a reflection of a menacing "space gap" but of the longer lives of U.S. satellites.) The U.S. space budget for defense surpassed the civilian in the late 1970s, and the military's share is still on the rise because of diminished spending for NASA programs and the breakdown of détente. Counting the share of the shuttle's cost assignable to military missions, the Pentagon accounts for close to 75 percent of U.S. space spending. Similar budgetary trends—less visible because of the organizational unity of the Soviet program—are occurring in the U.S.S.R. The Department of Defense estimates that 70 percent of Soviet space spending is directly military in nature, with a further 15 percent for combined civilian and military purposes.

The rising emphasis on military missions in space has been partially obscured by the dual character of many civilian activities. The most recent centerpieces of the civilian Soviet and American space programs—the space shuttle and the Salyut stations—serve important military functions and would probably not have been funded had it not been for their military value. Cosmonauts carry out both photo reconnaissance and surveillance in the Salyut stations. The shuttle was redesigned to meet military needs, was funded due to the Air Force's political clout, and is likely to serve the Pentagon more than any other user.

Not all military space missions contribute to the arms race. For instance, one of the earliest and still most extensive military space activities—reconnaissance and surveillance—has added greatly to the security of both countries. Since the early 1960s the United States and the Soviet Union have used camera-laden satellites to observe in detail military activities deep within each other's territory. Because the Soviet Union is able to keep its defense activities secret, this technology is of greatest benefit to the United States. In 1961 satellite photographs of Soviet missile and bomber facilities exploded the idea of a "missile gap" and averted an expensive crash catch-up program. After viewing satellite photos, one leading Senate advocate of the "missile gap" theory admitted he had been almost completely inaccurate. Several years later, President Lyndon Johnson said that the $34–40 billion spent on the space program had saved ten times as much by reducing arms expenditures. For the first time since the atomic age began, an advance in technology helped to constrain the rapid spiral of destructive capability.

Peacekeeping Benefits

During the 1970s, the value of space reconnaissance and surveillance to peacekeeping grew even more. Abandoning its early claim that observation satellites were "spies" committing "espionage," the Soviet Union began to build systems similar to those of the United States. Eventually, the superpowers felt secure enough to sign treaties limiting the numbers of strategic weapons. Without satellites to verify compliance, neither country would have entered into these pacts. In fact, the SALT treaty shows the importance of reconnaissance and surveillance satellites by explicitly outlawing interference with "national technical means of verification."

Satellites have further enhanced global political stability by enabling leaders to monitor crises, watch for nuclear tests, and communicate with each other quickly. To monitor compliance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1970 and Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the United States has placed observation satellites in high, large-vista orbits to scan the earth continuously as well as near space for nuclear detonations. In 1977, a Soviet satellite spotted a nuclear-test facility under construction in a remote area of South Africa. After intense diplomatic pressure, Pretoria dismantled the site. This early warning of an impending test is credited with averting a destabilizing addition to the nuclear club. Reconnaissance satellites have been wide-

ly used to monitor regional conflicts that could draw the superpowers into direct military confrontation. Intense reconnaissance satellite activity was reported during the 1971 Indian-Pakistani war, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars, and the 1980 turmoil in Iran. Linked by the satellite-based "hot line," U.S. and Soviet leaders can be in contact in a matter of minutes—which may someday prevent an ambiguous situation from turning into war. By reducing mistrust based on misinformation and by allowing leaders to communicate as rapidly as they can retaliate, these satellites have added a much needed element of stability to international politics.

The exact capabilities of U.S. and Soviet reconnaissance and surveillance satellites are, of course, tightly guarded secrets. Yet from a variety of anecdotal evidence and from the steps the Air Force took to design MX shelters that could deceive Soviet satellites, it is clear that the observational power of these systems is awesome. The oft-reported claim that satellite cameras can read a license plate is probably not far from the truth. Since the early 1970s the United States has been using the Air Force's "Big Bird," a 10-ton satellite 50 feet long and 10 feet in diameter, and the CIA's "key-hole" as its spies in the sky. In low orbits, these satellites go over every spot on earth in daylight every other day, sending a constant stream of television images and periodically dropping canisters of high-resolution film into the atmosphere, where they are recovered by specially designed aircraft as they parachute to the ground.

Monitoring Crises

To broaden the use and availability of surveillance satellites for peacekeeping and treaty monitoring, Howard Kurtz, the founder of War Control Planners, Inc., has promoted for a decade the idea of establishing a satellite-based "global information co-operative" run by the United Nations. A modest version of this idea gained official support in 1978 when France proposed an International Satellite Monitoring Agency. As outlined by then President Giscard d'Éstaing before the U.N. General Assembly, ISMA would extend the benefits of surveillance satellites to countries without space capability, would permit the Security Council to monitor crises and border disputes, and would lay the groundwork for monitoring compliance with the treaties banning chemical and biological warfare and environmental modification.

Depending on whether or not ISMA obtained technology from the superpowers, a basic monitoring system would cost between $1 billion and $2 billion a year—more than the entire U.N. budget. The United States and the Soviet Union have opposed such a system, arguing that sensitive issues of data interpretation could be politicized during crises. Support for ISMA has been strongest among the many countries that are not likely to soon have their own observational satellites, and superpower opposition may be overtaken by events. China, France, Japan, and India are each increasingly capable of building their own reconnaissance satellites. Thus, whether the superpowers like it or not, the facilities for an embryo system—dubbed PEACESAT by writer Arthur C. Clarke—will soon be available. Rather than resist the inevitable, the Soviet Union and the United States would be wise to exploit it by becoming leaders in setting up international satellite monitoring.

Of course, the benefits of a PEACESAT system operated by an international agency would be compromised if it failed to operate in an evenhanded manner. ISMA would probably work best as an independent agency in the U.N. system, somewhat like the International Monetary Fund. Since warring nations could want access to the information, carefully drawn policies governing the release of data should be written into its charter. Although ISMA's opponents protest its cost, the agency could pay for itself many times over in reduced arms expenditures if it is half as successful in regional arms control as satellite verification has been for the superpowers.

Creating Windows

Despite the positive contributions of space reconnaissance and surveillance to peacekeeping, the military communication, navigation, and scientific satellites have begun to shake the balance between the superpowers, undercutting many of the security accomplishments of SALT. For example, satellite data have been used to calibrate ballistic-missile trajectories. The so-called window of vulnerability cited by the Reagan administration to justify a U.S. arms buildup would not have occurred without geodetic satellites that precisely measure anomalies in the earth's gravitational field. With flight paths adjusted to compensate for these imperfections, which previously would have drawn them off course, Soviet and American missiles are so accurate that they can blow up concrete silos reinforced with hardened steel. This improved accuracy has given an edge to the side that strikes first, resulting in programs to adopt quick-reaction command systems to ensure that land-based missiles are not lost in a sudden attack—a hair trigger on nuclear war. Sadly, satellite calibration raises the chance of an accidental nuclear war.

Another unfortunate result of superpower satellites is their key role in the emergence of cruise missiles as an important strategic weapon. Unlike their predecessors, the buzz bombs of



AIR FORCE

NAVSTAR satellites will fix U.S. submarine locations to enhance their missiles' accuracy.

World War II, the new cruise missiles soon to join the U.S. strategic inventory are highly accurate because of the ability of high-resolution satellites to generate very detailed maps of the entire Soviet Union. The microelectronic memory bank of each cruise missile stores a satellite-derived digital map of the terrain over which the missile must fly to its target. By matching the image of the landscape before it with the map in its electronic brain, the Terrain Contour Mapping guidance system steers the missile at treetop level to objects as small as a building.

Other systems on the drawing board or just becoming operational could erode security further, tempt pre-emptive first strikes, and undercut arms control agreements. In a move yet unmatched by the United States, the Soviet Union has a series of satellites that scan the oceans with high-power radar impulses to locate surface ships. Linked to air- and sea-based missiles, these satellites could give Soviet commanders the information they need to launch a surprise attack on U.S. naval forces. The new U.S. NAVSTAR global positioning network of 18 satellites, to be fully operational in 1988, will give submarine commanders precise fixes on their own location, enabling the missiles they carry to knock out hardened silos. Such war-making capabilities could open up new windows of vulnerability. Another U.S. system in the works will record detonations of U.S. nuclear warheads, allowing commanders to use fewer weapons to be sure of destroying a given target. M.I.T. physicist Richard Garwin estimates that this will multiply the effectiveness of U.S. missiles by 40 percent, enabling the existing Minuteman IIIs to destroy as much as the proposed MX.

By multiplying the effectiveness of remaining weapons, all these new systems undercut arms control accomplishments and in fact encourage the belief that a surprise nuclear attack could really work. Moreover, they have little deterrence value because they probably would not work well for very long after the outbreak of a nuclear war, due to the aftereffects of the bomb blasts. Controlling these qualitative improvements through arms control agreements is difficult—information about such things as gravitational anomalies is hard to ban once acquired. And many of these force multipliers, such as communications and navigational satellites, are inseparable from increasingly useful civilian space systems.

The importance of space-based force-multipliers has spawned both Soviet and U.S. anti-satellite weapons. Whereas the military space programs of the 1960s and the '70s provided surveillance information and communication channels, the new generation of satellite killers involves for the first time the launching of destructive systems into space. This new arena of the superpower arms competition is particularly disturbing because the weapons will threaten the nerve centers of the strategic nuclear arsenals—the early warning, communication, and national-command links that alone can ensure that an accident or miscalculation does not slip into global holocaust.

The first anti-satellite system, employing nuclear warheads, was built by the United States during the 1960s, extensively tested, and then dismantled. The United States gave up this approach when it became clear that a nuclear blast in space would not only obliterate its target but send out pulses of electromagnetic radiation so strong that all satellites—including the United States'—not shielded by the earth at the time of the blast would also be destroyed. The ability of a few large nuclear blasts in near space to clear the skies of operating satellites is always within easy reach of both the super-

powers, enabling either to even the score from an unfavorable encounter in space.

Between 1968 and 1972 and then again beginning in 1978, the Soviet Union tested a non-nuclear anti-satellite system that is more discriminating in its destructiveness. In about two dozen tests thus far, a satellite launched by a heavy ICBM orbits near the intended victim and then explodes, showering the target satellite with shrapnel. With orbital maneuvering so common and the presence of an explosive device so difficult to detect, an agreement outlawing this technology could be verified only through close examination of every object put into orbit. Still, a ban on further tests would block the evolution of this system into a more comprehensive and threatening weapon and over time reduce confidence in its reliability. Last June the Soviet Union tested this satellite killer for the first time in conjunction with large-scale ballistic missile test launches from land and sea. This coordinated action feeds fears in the United States that the Soviets are preparing a first strike. The tests, however, are indistinguishable from Soviet preparations to shoot down American targeting satellites in the event of a U.S. first strike.

Killing Satellites

The U.S. military has designed and will soon begin testing a direct-ascent air-based satellite killer. The U.S. system uses a small homing missile that collides with the intended target at high speed after being launched from a high-flying fighter. Because it is air launched, the U.S. system bridges an important fire-break between space and aerial warfare, creating another whole inventory of ambiguous weapons to bedevil negotiators.

From the standpoint of arms control and crisis management, the U.S. system will be far more destabilizing. The Soviet orbital-rendevous missile could be tracked as it is launched and as it closes on its target, but the U.S. direct-ascent rocket could strike without warning from fighters located anywhere in the world. For the Soviet system to sweep U.S. satellites from the skies, highly visible launchings of many large missiles over several days would be required. But a globally coordinated U.S. strike could probably destroy most operable Soviet satellites within a day.

During the late 1970s sporadic negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States to control anti-satellite weapons were broken off by the United States to protest the invasion of Afghanistan. During the talks one stumbling block had been the Soviets' insistence that the U.S. space shuttle be defined as an anti-satellite system. The U.S.S.R. claims that the shuttle's ability to maneuver in orbit and to bring objects back to earth means the United States can destroy or hijack Soviet satellites. In response, the United States claims the shuttles are too expensive ($1 billion apiece), too scarce (only four will be built), and too fragile to use as space fighters, especially since the Soviets could quite easily mine their satellites. Although the shuttle is itself not a very plausible anti-satellite weapon its versatility does give the United States an important ability to fight in space. The Air Force's strong interest in the shuttle adds to these Soviet fears, stimulating retaliatory tests that could threaten U.S. space assets.

Time is running out to control these new weapons. From the standpoint of verifiable arms control, the testing—not the deployment—of satellite killers is the realistic point of no return. Once thoroughly tested, these systems will be a verification nightmare, since many orbiting Soviet vehicles or U.S. fighters could harbor satellite killers. The recent decision by the United States to accelerate testing of the direct-ascent homing missile but to delay anti-satellite negotiations has been justified as a "bargaining chip" strategy, to develop a weapon to be negotiated away at some future date. But unilateral U.S. restraint and an immediate resumption of negotiations would do more to enhance the security of both countries than would further tests.

Destroying Missiles

Beyond these simple adaptations of routine technologies to destroy satellites, Soviet and American military scientists are enthusiastically working to build space-based energy-ray weapons. No longer just the stuff of science fiction, laser and particle-beam systems are being developed with hundreds of millions of dollars in research funds. Prototypes already exist. In various tests, lasers placed on mountaintops, on ships, and in airplanes have shot down incoming missiles. Because these weapons cannot penetrate fog, smoke, dust, or rain, their most promising use is in the airless voids of outerspace.

As envisioned by military planners, powerful lasers in orbit would shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles as they arc briefly into space. A space ray system that could destroy the existing arsenal of Soviet ICBMs would cost—conservatively—between a phenomenal $500 billion and $1 trillion, and would call for more than 300 satellites larger than any yet built. An effective space-based ballistic-missile-defense system has one very appealing quality—it could eliminate the possibility of nuclear attack against population centers. Proponents argue that such a weapon would be inherently defensive in character, thus ending rather than fueling the arms race.



AIR FORCE

Shuttle-launched Teal Ruby infrared satellite would track enemy warplanes.

The ultimate defensive weapon—the dream of military planners from the time of the Great Wall to the Maginot Line—is not, however, any more likely to be realized in space than on earth. Exotic space weapons would merely extend into yet another realm the same stalemate of forces present on earth—at exorbitant cost. Using space-based lasers as a ballistic-missile defense suffers from the same problems—in spades—that led the United States and Soviet Union to agree to abandon anti-ballistic missiles a decade ago. The central problem of all anti-ballistic-missile systems is the ease with which the highly sensitive radars that track oncoming missiles can be utterly blinded. The massive aftershock of electronic radiation from a single nuclear explosion in space or in the upper atmosphere would disable sensitive circuits, radar screens, and computers and make it impossible to locate warheads moving faster than bullets. The systems' other fatal flaws include their ability to be countered by decoys, mirrored surfaces, spinning warheads, and burn-resistant materials. Even with optimistic cost figures it is clear that a dollar of defense expenditure could be effectively countered for a dime.

It is difficult to assess whether the benefits to arms control of surveillance and reconnaissance satellites that aid treaty verification outweigh the force-multiplying effects of calibration and targeting satellites, but the superpowers are at a point where positive steps to demilitarize space, halt anti-satellite weapons tests, and promote peaceful space activities are critical. By and large, the space technologies developed up till now can serve either peaceful or military purposes. A rocket can carry a communications satellite as easily as an atomic bomb. A satellite can photograph natural resources and monitor treaty compliance—or provide up-to-date targeting information. Just as an early unlimited test ban treaty would probably have prevented the deployment of multiple warheads and cruise missiles—two of the most destabilizing additions to the arms race—a quick ban on testing of anti-satellite systems and space-based laser anti-missile systems could prevent further destabilization. The superpowers are passing this threshhold by small steps, while never asking if the militarization of space will leave them more secure—or less.

Beyond the control of anti-satellite weapons and the establishment of a PEACESAT system, the United States and the Soviet Union can undercut much of the mutual suspicion of each other's space activities by engaging in joint manned space missions. It will be difficult for the arms race to move into the complex arena of laser weapons without human workers in space, and what better way to ensure mutual restraint than to have cosmonauts and astronauts keeping an eye on each other while they perform valuable scientific experiments?

If the military case for joint space flights is strong, the technological case for cooperation is even stronger. The high point of U.S.-Soviet space cooperation was the Apollo-Soyuz link-up in 1975. These two spacecraft were parallel systems with little to offer each other, but the centerpieces of the superpower space programs today are perfect complements. The Soviets have permanent space stations and the United States has a reusable space transport system. This unmatched opportunity to link productively the manned space programs of the feuding superpowers should not be allowed to slip past.

Unilateral restraint, bilateral cooperation, and international agencies will not, of course, by themselves ensure peace on earth. But a PEACESAT system and joint manned missions will put a literal ceiling on the arms race and provide a powerful opening wedge for global understanding and cooperation. □

THE JOURNAL

A Question

In the days after World War II, the Communists killed a U.S. economic officer's girlfriend, and now they were after his housekeeper. But he had a plan. . .

By FRED GODSEY

I couldn't say precisely when I made up my mind to kill Rajnal. It could have been on the day when I learned that Magda had been murdered, or it may have been when Wilhelmina told me that the political police wanted her to bring them a floor plan of my apartment and to let them know, by telephoning a certain number, the next time I would be away overnight. Rajnal is dead, and so is Wilhelmina now, so my reference to her part in the affair can bring her no harm.

Wilhelmina, an elderly peasant woman, fat and jolly, was my cook and housekeeper in that wretched Communist country. Magda, in her early twenties, brunette and beautiful, had been my girlfriend for almost a year when she was killed there by the political police. When I arrived there to take up my duties as an economic officer in the American Legation, it was practically impossible to find an apartment. The bombs during World War II had taken a heavy toll in central Europe. A few houses were available, but they were reserved by the legation for the married officers, so I had the very difficult task of finding an alternative to a cramped hotel room. It was almost two months before I learned through a friend at the British Consulate that a local textile engineer had been granted an immigration visa for England. He was leaving behind a completely furnished apartment in a better part of the city.

It was only when I hurried to see the engineer that I found out just how completely furnished the apartment really was. He adamantly refused to rent to me unless I would agree to keep Wilhelmina, his housekeeper for many years, and Magda, his girlfriend. He had decided not to marry Magda, but she had no family and he didn't want to put her out on the street. I rented the apartment. It was on the ground floor of a three-story building and had five rooms, a terrace, a large garden, and three entrances, including one through the basement.

Real Estate Transaction

I suppose that, technically, one could say that I acquired both Wilhelmina and Magda as part of a real estate transaction, but this would be misleading. It would suggest that I heartlessly considered them to be mere chattel, when, in fact, I loved them both dearly, and they both had fully agreed to the arrangement.

Shortly after I moved into the apartment, Magda returned one evening from the small photography shop where she worked and told me that she had been called to the office of the political police which, as in all Communist lands, is required to stamp out any anti-Communist sentiments among the local population and to monitor the activities of all foreigners in the country. She was brought to a dingy room in the police building. She was questioned at length by a young man in civilian dress, speaking the local language and some English with a strong Russian accent. He said that his name was Rajnal—obviously a code name—and that Magda would be required to meet with him every two weeks to give him information about my activities. He wanted to know where I went, what social engagements I had, and, especially, the names and addresses of any local people with whom I had contact. He would be very interested in any letters which I received or wrote and would, later, provide her with a small camera to photograph any letters and other documents I might bring home from my office. He also warned her not to let me find out about her assignment.

Magda said that Rajnal had reddish brown hair, chain smoked Russian cigarettes, and carried a small pistol in a shoulder holster under his jacket. She faithfully told me all that transpired at the meeting, and we both fully realized the danger she faced should her interrogator learn that she had confided in me.

Since my work at the legation consisted of routine economic and commercial reporting—nothing secret or even confidential—I told Magda to cooperate with Rajnal. She should give him any information that he wanted. I had nothing to hide.

For about six months, all went well. Magda would make her regular reports to Rajnal and then inform me of the details of the meetings. Then one day she failed to return from the police building. The next morning, I telephoned her employer at the photography shop, and Wilhelmina went to see several of Magda's girlfriends. All our inquiries were in vain; Magda had disappeared. I, of course, notified the regular police that she "had failed to return to the apartment from her place of work," knowing full well that they would do nothing.

I learned of Magda's death a few

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# of Murder


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"Rajnal warned Magda not to let me find out about her assignment."

weeks later from a receptionist at the French Consulate. The receptionist was a local woman who had been arrested by the political police and spent several days in the prison where Magda was held. She told me that one morning she had seen the police remove Magda's bruised body through a rear door.

Both Wilhelmina and I were stricken with grief. Wilhelmina looked upon Magda as a daughter, and it took her some time to realize that Magda was never coming back. I could only surmise that Magda, who was never one to pay too much attention to detail, had failed to report some trivial item in our daily program, and that Rajnal had found out about it. I could not, however, understand how he could have found out. Magda and I had always discussed such things outside the apartment—which I always assumed contained hidden microphones—and we never told Wilhelmina of her relations with the political police. Perhaps Rajnal had suspected that Magda was reporting to me about their meetings. Such suspicions in Communist countries are quite sufficient to bring about summary executions.

I was not surprised when Wilhelmina told me several weeks later that she had been called to the office of the political police. She had met with Rajnal and received instructions similar to those which he had given to Magda. I decided then and there that, as soon as possible, I would dismiss Wilhelmina and look for other quarters. The risks for her were too great. In the meantime, I asked her to be extremely careful to give Rajnal all of the information that he required—to withhold nothing, and never to say or do anything which would let him know that I was aware of their meetings. She agreed but, simple soul that she was, I could never be certain that she understood the danger.

Garden of Tears

One summer morning Wilhelmina was serving me breakfast in the garden when she suddenly burst into tears.

"What is it, Wilhelmina, are you ill?" We spoke German, which was her native tongue, and which we both spoke better than the local language.

"No, Herr Konsul, but something terrible happened yesterday when I met with that horrible man, Rajnal!"

She told me that she was required to draw a floor plan of the apartment, showing exactly where each piece of furniture was located, and to deliver the drawing to him the following week. He had mentioned a clothes closet in my bedroom, and I recalled that Magda had once reported to him that I sometimes kept my briefcase there. She didn't know that the only things in the briefcase were my pipe, tobacco, and a newspaper.

"Don't be upset. Simply sit down and draw the plan. I'll get pencil and paper for you after coffee."

"But, Herr Konsul." She was crying. "I can't draw. I could never even draw a straight line!"

Then she told me that Rajnal wanted her to telephone him anytime she knew that I would be away from the apartment overnight.

I spent most of that Sunday drawing the layout of the apartment and, as I worked, a plan began to take shape in

my mind—a plan to kill Rajnal. Obviously, someone wanted to enter the apartment while I was away, and my guess was that it would be Rajnal himself. The locks could be easily picked, or perhaps he had a key. I finished the drawing and instructed Wilhelmina to put iodine on her right hand and to bandage it thoroughly shortly before her next meeting with Rajnal. I did not want her to do further art work in his office. She would tell him that she had burned her hand in the kitchen and couldn't hold a pencil.

Wilhelmina's rendezvous with Rajnal went as expected. He even complimented her on the drawing. I took the first step of my plan by borrowing a Colt .45 Army service pistol and a full clip of ammunition from a sergeant in the legation guard. I explained that I wanted to do some target practice in the country. My next step was to tell Wilhelmina on Wednesday that I would be taking a trip with a friend on the coming Friday to a town in the southern part of the country. I told her that I would leave in the late afternoon, spending Friday night in the town and returning on Saturday. She was delighted because she could spend Friday night with friends in a nearby village and bring back some fresh eggs the next morning. I reminded her to inform Rajnal of my absence.

Late Friday afternoon, I drove in a legation car to the apartment and made a big show of picking up a suitcase and a thermos of coffee. Wilhelmina was still at the apartment and would leave a few hours later. I drove in a roundabout way back to the legation garage. The sergeant on duty was surprised when I told him that I was through with the car, and that I would pick up my suitcase the next day. I took the coffee with me.

The Stakeout Begins

Daylight was gone when I let myself into the apartment by the basement door, having walked back through side streets to make sure that I was not followed. A street lamp shining through a window enabled me to move around without a light. I checked the papers on my desk, as well as my briefcase in the clothes closet. Nothing had been disturbed. I took the pistol and the thermos into the bedroom and settled comfortably in an easy chair. The bedroom door was open, giving me a clear view of the living room. I was certain that the intruder would come straight to the closet and my briefcase. My chair was placed so he could not see me—until it was too late.

As I jacked a bullet into the chamber of the .45 and clicked the safety off, my thoughts wandered. I recalled my law school days, where I had made my best grades in criminal law. In America, if all of the facts were known to a judge and jury, what I was about to do would be first degree murder. All the elements were there—motive, premeditation, the planning and the act. But this was not America, and all of the facts would never be known. I would be dealing with a common, armed housebreaker. It would be self-defense. Oh, I was sure that Rajnal would bring along his little pistol in the shoulder holster. It was probably a 7.65 mm Walther or Beretta, the equivalent of an American .32 caliber, deadly at close range but not very accurate: guns worn in shoulder holsters usually have short barrels. I hoped my diplomatic passport, though no defense to a murder charge, would be of help when I pleaded self-defense against an armed intruder.

It was ten p.m. I placed the pistol within easy reach and walked around the bedroom to stretch my legs. I didn't expect Rajnal before midnight, but I was prepared. My thoughts went back to my childhood in Texas. I remembered Tom Polk, an old-time Texas lawman who was a close friend of my family. He had taught me to shoot when I was fifteen years old. Mr. Tom didn't waste time and ammunition by shooting tin cans. He had me begin with his .38 Special and a life-sized cardboard dummy at thirty yards. I remembered Mr. Tom's advice to shoot for the heart. That is what I planned to do. If possible, I would first tell Rajnal that I was going to kill him to avenge Magda's death. Magda would have liked that.

Eleven p.m. I took out the slip of paper on which I had written the telephone number of the American legation. As soon as I was certain that Rajnal was dead, I would telephone the legation and have the duty officer and another American colleague from the consulate come to the apartment before I called the regular police to report the death of an armed burglar. The neighborhood was quiet; I wished I could turn on the radio. My left foot developed a cramp. I sipped some coffee from the thermos lid and tried to relax.

Communist Efficiency

Midnight. Somewhere in the old part of the city, a clock struck six times. I looked at my watch. Typical Communist efficiency—not even the public clocks work. I was considering slipping into the kitchen to look for a piece of bread when I heard several soft taps on the terrace—like cushioned footsteps. I gripped the pistol and waited. Then I heard the "meow" and realized that it was the neighbor's cat. The nerves at the back of my neck were taut. I massaged them for a while. I took off my shoes and wriggled my toes to improve the circulation.

One a.m. It was so quiet in the apartment and on the street that, despite the coffee, it was becoming difficult to keep awake. I was almost dozing when the telephone rang! It was on the table beside me but, of course, I didn't pick up the receiver. So, I thought, it's Rajnal calling to make sure that no one is in. It rang for a few seconds and then stopped. Now I could expect a visitor soon. I walked around the bedroom again and checked the safety before resuming my vigil. My thoughts began again. I would probably resign from the Foreign Service, return to Texas and go into private business—or maybe open a law office. I was still young, but I was beginning to doubt that I could spend the rest of my working life outside my own country. Anyway, after this was over, I would probably be kicked out of the Service.

Two a.m. I drank the last of the coffee and thought about food, but I dared not go to the kitchen. My thoughts turned to Wilhelmina. Just yesterday she had told me that one day soon the Americans would start bombing Communist Europe. I suppose she believed this because all the local papers and newscasts were filled with anti-American venom, charging the

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"I jacked a bullet into the chamber of the .45 and clicked the safety off."

United States with planning war. She had lived through the bombings of World War II and probably thought it only natural that the holocaust should start again.

"But, Herr Konsul," she had said, "you will know before the bombing planes come, and I would be very thankful to you if you would notify the bombers to watch out, when they get over this place, for a large 'W' made from white bedsheets spread on the ground. Tell them please not to drop any bombs where Wilhelmina will be!" I solemnly promised to relay her wishes to the Air Force. I again had to massage the back of my neck. All was quiet.

Three a.m. I could hardly keep my eyes open. I went into the bathroom and was about to wash my face, when I realized that the running water would make too much noise. Regardless of what happened, I would dismiss Wilhelmina as soon as possible and move back into a hotel room until a transfer came through or until I resigned—or until I was fired. I could no longer take the chance that she would meet the same fate as Magda. I went back to the chair and waited, pistol in hand.

Four a.m. For the first time I began to wonder if Rajnal would come. Then I began to think that perhaps he had learned somehow that Wilhelmina had kept me informed. I cursed myself for not having dismissed her earlier. I should have let her go immediately after Magda's death, but it was too late to worry about that now. I peered through the bedroom window. Nothing was moving on the street. The clock in the old town again struck six.

Five a.m. It would soon be daylight. A horse-drawn cart with wooden wheels clattered down the street. There was the clang of a milk can. Somewhere in the building, an alarm clock rang. I put on my shoes but decided to wait another hour.

Six a.m. This time the clock in the old town was correct, but a few minutes late. There was already some movement on the street. A door slammed in the apartment upstairs. I put the pistol aside and went into the kitchen to make my breakfast.

Rajnal had not come.

The following week, I dismissed Wilhelmina, who returned to her village to work for a German farm family. I never saw her again. I moved into a hotel, and lived there for the remainder of my assignment. The hotel personnel were professionals at reporting to the political police: they never told me about it, and I was delighted.

I didn't kill Rajnal, but his Russian cigarettes did the job for me. A few years later, while serving at another post in South America, I learned that Rajnal had died in a hospital while undergoing an operation for lung cancer.

Had Rajnal showed up in my apartment, would I have pulled the trigger? It's a question I would really prefer not to answer. I would probably lie. □

The European Question

(Continued from page 25.)

its historic role, and a precondition for fulfilling its real role of world leadership. Indeed, it is the way the world sees the United States and the way we ought to see ourselves.

This is not the same as the popular concept of a free-handed, nationalist United States using its power and influence to attain only its own narrow advantage. Rather, the United States would assume the leadership of a wider community of the democracies, Pacific and American as well as European. The United States is the center and the driving force behind this worldwide community of democracies, and the community will grow and strengthen to the extent that the United States gives priority to the entire system, not only to its most problematic part. Therefore, the liberation of the United States from its European preoccupation is a matter of interest and importance for all members of the democratic community.

Finally, such a step would better assure survival than any arms reduction negotiations or demonstrations of resolve against the Soviet Union. Britain's failure to resolve or master the European Question finally destroyed that country as a world power, and it could do the same for the United States. In the interest of its own security, the United States should examine every possible avenue toward the problem of Europe in order to restore it to its proper proportion as "merely the European Question." □

DOMESTIC POSTINGS

FOREIGN SERVICE PEOPLE

1983–84 AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships for Foreign Service Students

Applications are now available for dependent students of Foreign Service personnel, who have been or are currently stationed abroad, for the American Foreign Service Association Scholarship Programs. The AFSA/AAFSW MERIT AWARDS are for graduating high school students only, and are based on academic excellence. These awards are $500 to each winner, usually 22 per year. The FINANCIAL AID SCHOLARSHIPS are for undergraduate educational study and are based solely on need as established by the College Scholarship Service, Princeton/Berkeley. Grants range from $200 to $2000 for individuals, with a $3000 limit for families. Write for applications and information now from the Scholarship Programs Administrator, AFSA, 2101 E St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. The deadline for completion of applications is February 15, 1983.

Other Scholarships Available to Foreign Service Students

The Association has been informed that the following scholarships are available to dependent students of Foreign Service personnel. Applicants should write for complete information directly to the schools, colleges, and universities indicated.

Secondary Schools

Castilleja School, Palo Alto, California: Scholarships are available to daughters of personnel in the Foreign Service agencies or of U.S. military personnel serving overseas who are registered at Castilleja School for admission to grades 7 to 12 inclusive. For complete information write to the Headmaster, Castilleja School, 1310 Bryant St., Palo Alto, California 94301.

Dana Hall School: Accepting applications from ninth grade girls who wish to compete for the Congdon Merit Scholarship, awarded on a competitive basis to an entering sophomore resident student. In addition to the $1000 prize, the winner is eligible for financial aid up to full tuition when warranted. Applications must be completed by February 1, 1983. Inquiries should be addressed to: The Congdon Prize Scholarship, Dana Hall School, Wellesley, Massachusetts 02181.

Grier School: A $1000 reduction in tuition is available to the daughters of Foreign Service personnel. Additionally, girls may compete for scholarship support on the basis of demonstrated financial need and all-around abilities. For information please contact: Admissions Director, The Grier School, Tyrone, Pennsylvania 16686.

Miss Hall's School: For the daughters of Foreign Service personnel, a $2140 tuition reduction is available. Miss Hall's enrolls 200 students from grades 9 through 12. This reduction is offered in recognition of higher travel costs and represents 25 percent of the total tuition cost for 1983–84. For further information, contact Mr. Diederik van Renesse, Director of Admissions, Miss Hall's School, Pittsfield, Massachusetts 01201.

Middlesex School: Scholarship offered on the basis of proven financial need for grades 9 through 12 to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service family. For complete information write to the Director of Admissions, Middlesex School, Concord, Massachusetts 01742.

The New Hampton School: A $1000 abatement on tuition to Foreign Service boys and girls. The school enrolls approximately 300 students in grades 9 through postgraduate. For further information write to Admissions Office, The New Hampton School, New Hampton, N.H. 03256.

Northfield–Mount Hermon School: A $1000 reduction in tuition is offered all sons and daughters of State Department personnel stationed overseas, grades 9 through 12. This reduction is afforded in recognition of the higher travel cost experienced by such personnel. Additional financial aid is available on the basis of need. At present students from 38 states and 55 countries are enrolled. For further information contact Adrienne Carr, Northfield–Mount Hermon School, Northfield, Massachusetts 01360.

Phillips Academy, Andover, Massachusetts: The Charles and Jane Stelle Memorial Scholarship is awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service person. The award is based on financial need. For further information, and to apply for this scholarship, write to Joshua L. Miner, Dean of Admissions/Mr. John McClement, Director of Financial Aid, Phillips Academy, Andover, Mass. 01810.

St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware: The Norris S. Haselton Scholarships are awarded to sons and daughters of Foreign Service families where need is indicated. For complete information write John M. Niles, Director of Admissions, St. Andrew's School, Middletown, Delaware 19709.

Vermont Academy: An Edward R. Cheney Memorial Scholarship is being awarded to the son or daughter of a Foreign Service person. Those interested in applying should write to the Director of Admissions, Vermont Academy, Saxtons River, Vermont 05154. The academy enrolls approximately 220 students in grades nine through postgraduate; coed since 1981.

Colleges

Dartmouth College: S. Pinkey Tuck Scholarship. For students at Dartmouth College who are the children or grandchildren of Foreign Service officers of the United States and who are in need of financial assistance. Address inquiry to the Director of Financial Aid, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire 03755.

Vassar College: The Polly Richardson Lukens Memorial Scholarship is awarded at Vassar to children of Foreign Service personnel. Another scholarship, awarded by an anonymous donor, is granted at Vassar to the child of an American Foreign Service officer. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the child of an employee of the federal government or of a state government. Both awards are based on financial need. Apply to Director of Financial Aid, Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, New York 12601.

Yale University: Scholarship given by an anonymous donor is awarded each year to the son or daughter of an American For-

eign Service officer who demonstrates financial need. If no such applicant qualifies, the scholarship may be awarded to the son of a member of the United States military services, or of an employee of the federal government. Complete information is obtainable from the Director of Financial Aid, Box 2170 Yale Station, New Haven, Connecticut 06520.

1982 Merit Award Prize Essay

As one of the many requirements in the competition to receive AFSA/AAFSW Merit Award scholarships—the 1982 winners of which were announced in the September Journal*—candidates are required to write a personal essay. Along with the rest of their applications, the essays are reviewed by volunteer panels composed of representatives of all the foreign affairs agencies. In a process patterned on the Foreign Service selection boards', Merit Award winners are chosen and the panel chairmen recommend a group of essays for dissemination. We take pride in presenting one of the best below.*

Teenagers come to Paris with mixed feelings. Depending on their attitudes, they will thrive, survive, or suffer. I classify these individuals into three categories based on Voltaire's *Candide*. First there is Martin, the pessimist. This teenager's attitude is immediate dislike of anything foreign. Arriving in Paris, he is sure that he will hate every minute of his stay, and he usually does. The second type is Pangloss, the eternal optimist. Paris is everyone's dream city to this teenager. Before he arrives he prepares himself for "paradise on earth." But he is quickly disillusioned and Paris becomes a big let down. Finally the Candide figure emerges. His philosophy is, *"Il faut cultiver notre jardin,"* meaning one must do the best with what one has. This teenager realizes that adjusting to Paris will be difficult but is necessary for enjoyment.

Four years ago, when my father announced that his next assignment would be Paris, I first played the Pangloss role. I was excited about going to a great capital. However, when I arrived, I recognized that visiting Paris is different from living there. There are four difficulties to overcome: a different language, culture, environment, and school. I could have easily become the pessimistic Martin, but I was determined to make the best of the situation.

Immediately I dealt with the language problem. I had had two years of French, but *"Comment allez-vous?"* with an American drawl didn't go far. So I enrolled at the Alliance Française, where foreigners at equal French levels are brought together in a class where only French is spoken. At the American School I continued to study French for four more years.

The second barrier to surmount was familiarizing myself with an urban environment. Previously I had enjoyed suburban life. First I became acquainted with the Metro; with one ticket and a map I could go anywhere. Shortly, I adjusted to the franc, worth about a quarter. After making a few conversions, I decided that French fashion was beyond my means. The final problem of city living was the apartment, a quaint building where the toilet is sepatate from the tub, the kitchen is unequipped, every room has a fireplace, and daylight is a dim reflection off the top stories. Fortunately, I learned to get out often.

Entering a new school is always difficult. One has to make new friends and adjust to a new set of academic standards. I found friends through school activities, such as yearbook and track. Through track I was enrolled in a French athletic club, the Stade Français, where I finally broke the culture barrier because I participated with the French as well as the Americans.

Through my experiences and my observations of my friends, I have come to believe that the only way to enjoy a place is to take full advantage of what it offers. In general, I would say that no matter where one lives one should follow Candide's philosophy: *"Il faut cultiver notre jardin."*

—Susan Lee Duncan

Susan Lee Duncan, writer of the 1982 Merit Award Prize Essay presented on this page, is the daughter of Robert Bruce and Faith Snedeker Duncan of the State Department. She has lived in Algeria, Ethiopia, and Morocco in addition to France, the subject of her essay. A runner who has won the women's division of the Parisian 20-kilometer run, she is now in her freshman year at Princeton University, where she hopes to major in economics.

Deaths

Vinton Chapin, ambassador to Luxembourg from 1957–60, died September 15 at a hospital in Woburn, Massachusetts, after a prolonged illness. He was 82 years old.

Chapin was the first career Foreign Service officer to be appointed ambassador to the traditionally political post in Luxembourg. He earned that rank through three decades of service in 10 countries, beginning his career as a vice-consul in Prague, Czechoslovakia, in 1929. After Luxembourg he was named ambassador to the Dominican Republic in 1960.

Before his ambassadorial appointments, Chapin had distinguished himself as a competent and professional counselor and deputy chief of mission at embassies in Dublin, Manila, and Havana. Among his other diplomatic assignments were his participation in the London Naval Conference of 1930, his membership on the faculty of the National War College in Washington, D.C., from 1951–52, and his designation as deputy assistant secretary general for political affairs for NATO in Paris from 1952–57. He also served in Haiti, Brazil, and the Netherlands. After his retirement in 1961, Chapin made his home in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Born in Paris, France, in 1900, Chapin served in the Marine Corps during World War I, attended St. Mark's School, and graduated from Harvard University in 1923. He was a member of the Chevy Chase Club, the Metropolitan Club, and the University Club in Washington, D.C., and a life member of the Harvard Club of Boston.

He is survived by his wife, the former Lilian Aldrich Winchester of Dublin, New Hampshire; two sons from a previous martiage, Richard Chapin of Cambridge and Aldus Chapin of Washington; two stepsons, Charles Winchester of New York City and Gordon Winchester of Oakland, California; and seven grandchildren.

A. Guy Hope, a retired Foreign Service officer, died of cancer on September 14 in a North Carolina hospital. He was 68.

Hope joined the Foreign Service in 1945. He was consul general in Istanbul, and held posts in China, Belgium, Israel, and the Ivory Coast, before retiring from the government in 1964. A lawyer on Cap-

itol Hill before his government service, he became a political science professor at several colleges following his Foreign Service career.

He was born in Norfolk, Virginia, and educated at the University of Virginia, receiving a bachelor's and law degree. He earned a master's degree at George Washington University and a political science doctorate at Syracuse University.

Survivors include his wife, Myda Weaver Hope of Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina; daughters Anne Hamrick and Jean Nye; a stepdaughter, Mildred Price Kaufmann; two brothers; a sister; and six grandchildren.

JOSEPH S. SAGONA, former chief of the Diplomatic Pouch and Courier Operations Divisions from 1968 until his retirement in 1973, died on May 13 at the age of 64.

Born in Buffalo, New York, Sagona was a graduate of Hurst Business College. He began his career as a clerk at the State Department in 1939 and became chief of the Payroll and Certification Examination Section, Division of Budget and Finance, in 1945. After working as a conference administrative officer, 1950–59, he transfered to the Foreign Service. His assignments as administrative officer included Montevideo, Lima, and Rio de Janeiro. He also served as an adviser to the U.S. representative to the Organization of American States.

Sagona is survived by his wife, Frances, a daughter, two sons, a brother, and five grandchildren.

Honor

ROBERT M. KLEIN, a former career officer with the Agency for International Development, has been appointed to the post of international program director of the New York–based International Human Assistance Programs.

Klein's duties within AID included tours as a program director with responsibility for Korea, Vietnam, and Georgetown, Guyana. He has also served as a development adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations from 1973–76, mission director to Mauritania, and most recently office director for several Central African countries. He received the Medal for Civilian Service in Vietnam, among other distinctions.

Klein began his work with the International Human Assistance Programs on September 13 and soon will be making a tour throughout Asia, Africa, and the Pacific to meet with AID mission directors and IHAP field staff.

Association News

SFS Pay Changes Now Possible Without Senate OK

As reported in the October issue of the *Association News*. Congress recently amended the Foreign Service Act of 1980 to allow movement within Senior Foreign Service classes from one Executive Schedule pay level to another without Senate reconfirmation, as had been required under a Department of Justice interpretation of the act. AFSA strongly supported the amendment within the State Department and on Capitol Hill. The Association did so to solve two important problems.

First, there was no upward mobility within an individual's SFS class, which resulted in a situation where the base pay of an old FSO-2 who was converted under the act at the ES-1 or ES-2 level could not be raised except by promotion to minister counselor. Similarly, an old FSO-1 who was converted to the ES-4 level would never get another pay raise unless he or she was one of the very few who are eventually selected for career minister.

As soon as the amendment was enacted, AFSA formally proposed that the Department and AID include as a function of the selection boards the recommendation of increases in SFS basic rate of pay. Management responded that negotiations would be conducted on a five-agency basis, necessitating a wait for a five-agency management proposal.

Second, the Department's regulations created an anomaly such that remuneration for certain officers in SFS levels 1 and 2 was less than it would have been had these officers not been promoted to the SFS but simply moved to the higher steps of FO-01. An officer promoted in subsequent years would be given an appointment in the SFS at a higher level than an officer promoted several years earlier.

The anomaly will continue to affect employees promoted into the SFS in the future. To remedy this, AFSA proposed the following regulatory language: "In no circumstances will an employee be financially penalized by promotion, taking into account the salary he would have received had he remained in grade."

Management devised a system for pay adjustment to guarantee that no member of the SFS will receive less pay after promotion to the SFS than he or she would be receiving had he or she not been promoted. However, management has only made the adjustment retroactive to September 5, 1982. Further, it made clear that this is a one-time adjustment, leaving future SFS members to be paid less than colleagues who remain in Class 1.

AFSA will continue to press for equity on this issue and will push management on negotiating precepts for movement within SFS classes.

New Manager, Menu, Decor at FS Club

In compliance with the membership's mandate — narrow as it was — received in the last election, the Governing Board has instituted several changes to improve the Foreign Service Club.

New Manager. The Club welcomes Alberto Gracia (pictured) as manager. Gracia has 18 years of experience in restaurant management, and in his first weeks has already redone the menu, reorganized the staff, and increased business.

New Menu. The menu of the Club has been redesigned to improve its competitive position with other restaurants in the area. The menu will include both quick, inexpensive items in the $3.75-$4.50 range and the traditional "full service" entrees.

New Look. Our primary interest has been with the food and service, but the general appearance of the building itself will be improved, i.e., a new door, new awning, interior painting, etc.

Expanded use of facilities. In addition to the usual lunchtime service, the Club will be used increasingly for group luncheons, speakers' luncheons, and after-hours events.

The board decided to effect "in flight" repairs but intends to have a grand reopening in early December. The board remains committed to its pledge to make the Club self-supporting within one year.

Association members are encouraged to visit the Club and give us your comments.

Foreign Missions Act: Is Reciprocity at Last in Sight?

The new Foreign Missions Act, passed by Congress in August, transfers the authority to regulate foreign missions in the United States from local city and state governments to the secretary of state. To do so, the act establishes an Office of Foreign Missions in the Department.

The act declares the policy of the United States to be to assist in obtaining appropriate benefits, privileges, and immunities for foreign missions and to require the observance of corresponding obligations by the countries they represent. The act further sets forth that the treatment to be accorded to a foreign mission in the United States shall be determined after consideration of the benefits, privileges, and immunities provided to the U.S. mission in that country. To that end, Congress empowered the secretary to regulate the operation of foreign missions, including the permissible scope of their activities and the location and size of their facilities.

AFSA actively supported this legislation on the Hill. Starting in April, the Association urged Congress to pass the act, noting that the United States was severely restrained in its ability to redress imbalances in treatment accorded Foreign Service personnel abroad and that accorded foreign diplomats here.

The Association maintained that providing the federal government with the ability to take effective countermeasures against countries discriminating against our overseas missions and personnel is essential to an effective policy of diplomatic reciprocity.

MONEY

Strategic Investment Planning: Reading the Menu of Financial Options

When you cut through financial writers' jargon, the simple fact is that there are only two basic ways to deal with money—aside from spending it. You can store, lend, or deposit it, for a fixed and predictable return. Or you can invest or venture with it, for an equity or participatory return that will vary according to the fortunes of the market or selected enterprise.

Neither route avoids risk. Investors who are fixated on the words "safe" and "guaranteed" are confusing money with little green pieces of paper. The cardinal rule of asset management is to preserve and augment value, or purchasing power. Money stored against a fixed return is ravaged during periods of inflation; it is a victim of inflation risk. Its value is as depleted as that of capital lost in an unsound venture.

There is a menu of financial opportunity with ingredients to satisfy virtually every investor's requirements. But since everyone's needs and objectives are his or hers alone, it is impossible to prescribe a single monetary meal to satisfy all palates. Nevertheless, discrete criteria can be applied to every financial vehicle to help with the decision of which ones to choose, and at what stage. These criteria include:

Liquidity. Must you have access to your funds immediately? In two years? Ten years? Solutions range from totally liquid deposits in money market funds to much less liquid investments in limited partnerships (specified dollars at work for a period of 5–12 or more years.) Stock market investments are liquid in five days from date of sale; you can have cash from mutual fund redemptions within a few weeks.

Safety. Foundation dollars—those at the bottom of the investment pyramid—should have certain guarantees. Those "savings" dollars could be in tax-deferred annuities, some now yielding more than 13 percent. They should probably not be in passbook savings accounts unless new banking regulations allow substantial rate increases.

Diversification. Survey the marketplace and take advantage of several options. The first 5000 stock market dollars probably belong in a diversified mutual fund, not in one or two selected "hot" stocks. After you have purchased your residence, consider for additional real estate a partnership which buys a pool of professionally managed, diverse and multi-use properties. The objectives of these partnerships are to produce capital growth and to convert ordinary income to long-term capital gain. The best of them have done just that, some with annual gains of more than 25 percent after tax.

Growth potential and ability to outpace inflation. Deposit vehicles—money market funds, Treasury and bank certificates of deposit, and bonds are only for money in search of income. A money market fund is ideal for emergency reserves but should be thought of as a parking lot rather than as an investment. Bond principal can fluctuate with interest rates, as does the yield for all deposits.

Tax consequence. No point in working all out for the tax collector. Tax considerations play an important role in investment decisions for anyone in the 30-percent or higher marginal tax bracket (taxable income of around $30,000 or more on a joint return.) Know your tax bracket! It is a valuable decision-making tool, helping you to assess the degree of speculation and risk you might be able to tolerate. You can reduce current tax liability by:

—making an investment through an IRA;

—taking on debt via home ownership;

—shifting income through certain trusts to lower-tax-bracket family members;

—investing in tax shelters with write-offs from interest payments or drilling or research/development outlays;

—plus various other methods.

You can produce tax-free, deferred, or sheltered income by investing in municipal bonds, annuities, or using certain stock and bond strategies:

—purchasing utility stocks for tax-free dividends;

—taking gains long term and losses short term;

—purchasing bonds at deep discount timed to mature when college tuition will be due;

—selecting growth rather than income funds or stocks.

Decisions? If an analysis of your potential capital need (see my October article) revealed accumulated funds sufficient to provide for anticipated needs, you will clearly wish to go mostly into a preservation mode with on-going investments. This is the time for intermediate-term (up to 15 years) high-yielding bonds, or bond trusts, preferably tax exempt. If, on the other hand, the analysis projected a shortfall, you have little choice but to aim, with at least some of your funds, for capital growth. Only a select few common stock mutual funds have produced excellent records over the years, in both good and bad markets. They are an excellent choice for growth dollars. In a down, or bear, market they keep most of their investments in short-term financial instruments, similar to the transactions of the money market funds. This internal market timing practice compares favorably with the tendency of most funds to stay fully invested, riding the market down as well as up.

I cannot stress strongly enough that strategic planning requires you to focus most of your attention on the windshield instead of the rear view mirror. The spectacular gains in single-family real estate during the 1970s may never be repeated. The fever caused disproportionate concentration for many in one investment area. The 1980s call for a more balanced mix.

—Margaret Winkler

Margaret Winkler is a certified financial planner and investment broker with Legg Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 1747 Pennsylvania Ave. NW, Washington, D.C. 20006.

Heads Sought for AFSA Elections, Awards Committees

The Association is seeking Washington-area members who are interested in chairing AFSA's Awards Committee and Elections Committee. The former administers the Harriman, Herter, Bohlen, and Rivkin awards as well as the memorial tablets in the Diplomatic Lobby of the State Department. The latter runs the Association's annual elections for Governing Board officer positions and constituency representatives as well as membership referenda. Interested persons should contact Patricia Guild at (202) 632-8160 or write her c/o AFSA, 2101 E St. NW, Washington, DC 20037.

Association Honors Walter Stoessel at Retirement Fete

AFSA President Dennis K. Hays (right) presents a certificate of appreciation to retiring Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel.

AFSA presented former Deputy Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel with a certificate of appreciation during 8th-floor retirement ceremonies on September 23 at which President Reagan praised the extraordinary record of the highest ranking career diplomat in American history. Secretary of State George P. Shultz, incoming Deputy Secretary Kenneth W. Dam, Under Secretary Lawrence W. Eagleburger, and Director General Joan Clark also honored the retiring diplomat in their remarks. Stoessel received the Wilber J. Carr Award, the Distinguished Honor Award, and flags commemorating his tenure as deputy secretary, under secretary, and ambassador.

AFSA President Dennis K. Hays (pictured) presented the certificate of appreciation to the long-time Association member to honor his 41 years of government service. The certificate cited Stoessel, "In recognition of your many accomplishments and in appreciation for your long-standing efforts on behalf of the career Foreign Service."

State Standing Calls for Establishment of CDC File Guidelines

AFSA's State Standing Committee has proposed to the Department that a set of guidelines be established regarding access to and the contents of employees' Career Development Counseling files. The Association is concerned that all employees are aware of the files' existence, that they are not secret and may be reviewed at any time, and that they be purged permanently of inappropriate materials. Management has taken the position that an employee must make an appointment to see his or her CDC file to allow time to remove temporarily documents relating to other employees or that are classified or administratively controlled. AFSA believes these documents should not be in the files in the first place and that a policy of temporarily cleansing them brings into question just what the career counselor is removing.

In response to an article in the June *Association News* that advised employees to review their files when in Washington, Arthur T. Tienken, director of the Career Development and Assignment office, wrote AFSA that "employees may review and photocopy documents in their [CDC] file at any time" but that notice must be given to allow the office to cleanse the file. The State Standing Committee then met with Tienken to discuss their differences. After the meeting the committee proposed to management that the Department inform career candidates during orientation of the files' existence, purpose, and employees' right of review; that career counselors be furnished guidelines on contents; that the Privacy Act be observed by removing documents relating to other employees; and that all file documents be accessible to the employee and not be subject to temporary removal. "We believe implementation of the proposals would go a long way toward ensuring confidence in a fair and equitable career development and counseling program," the standing committee said.

Tax Update: Strategies Before Year's End

November is here and it is none too early to start thinking about taxes or, rather, how to use the time remaining in the year to ease your tax burden. Certain tax-cutting measures require more sophisticated analysis and strategy and thus are best left to a professional. However, some measures can be handled simply.

Medical expenses. Starting in 1983, a deduction will be allowed for medical expenses only in excess of 5 percent of adjusted gross income, up from the present 3 percent. If you were thinking of elective surgery and your bill won't be fully covered by your insurance carrier, try to fit your operation into 1982 and pay for it this year, so that a larger portion of medical expenses will be deductible. The same goes for physical exams, eye check-ups, dental and orthodontal care, etc.

Monthly payments. The most widely used year-end speeding up of deductions is in the areas of mortgage payments, credit card debts, and the fourth-quarter payment of state income taxes. Making January payments in December allows you to deduct the interest payments a year earlier.

Major purchases. If you are considering buying a car, boat, fur coat, or other major item within the near future, you might consider doing so before the year is over. The sales tax on these items is deductible and may be combined with other sales tax deductions, whether you add up your own or take the standard deduction.

Casualty losses. Up to now taxpayers have been able to deduct each uncovered loss from theft or casualty as long as it exceeded $100 and the insurance reimbursement, if any. Starting next year such losses will be deductible only if they exceed $100 plus 10 percent of your adjusted gross income. On a $20,000 adjusted gross income, for example, you only qualify for the deduction if the loss exceeds $2,100 after insurance. Therefore, if you have sustained such a loss but have not got around to completing the documentation necessary to establish the loss and dollar value, you should act quickly.

Contributions to charity. Giving money to a church, college, or other charity in December rather than early next year will allow you to reap the tax benefit a year ahead.

In the December issue we will discuss how the recent tax increase bill, "The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982," will affect you next year. Also, please take note that our annual tax section will appear in January instead of February.

Fact: Overseas insurance either replaces your household effects at today's prices or it doesn't.

Actual Cash Value

Most overseas insurance policies cover your household effects for their replacement cost less depreciation. This means that your $500 stereo system purchased 5 years ago may have an actual cash value of only $250 today. That's what most overseas insurance policies (or the Claims Act) would pay if it were lost or destroyed—hardly enough to replace the entire system at today's prices.

Current Replacement Cost

The American Foreign Service Association is sponsoring a Package Insurance Program for AFSA members only. The AFSA program covers you for the replacement cost of household furniture and personal effects that are lost or destroyed.

This means that your $500 stereo system would be replaced with a similar system at today's prices even though they may be higher than $500, subject only to the policy deductible of $50.00.

Under the AFSA plan you can also add coverage for valuables or worldwide personal liability for you and your family. All with the assurance that you'll get fast, fair claims service.

And the rates are low. Basic property insurance costs only 75¢ per $100 of coverage.

Give yourself some peace of mind before you move overseas. Send for our free brochure to help you determine how much insurance you need and how much it will cost. Or call your AFSA insurance specialist at:

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