FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL

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COPING WITH THE NON-ALIGNED

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JOURNAL

COPING WITH THE NON-ALIGNED

With 101 members, the Non-Aligned Movement encompasses a significant portion of the world's governments, people, and resources. Yet, more often than not, the United States finds itself at odds with this group. The last few years have been especially tense, since Fidel Castro used his position as head of the movement to lobby on behalf of the Soviet Union. Some observers had hoped that the term of Indira Gandhi as chairperson would bring a more balanced attitude to the movement, but they were disappointed by the New Delhi summit, where the United States was frequently criticized by name and many Soviet transgressions went unnoted. In "Coping with the Non-Aligned" (see page 20), Richard Jackson discusses the politics of the NAM and argues that it shares more interests with the United States than with the Soviet Union. It is time for both the United States and the non-aligned countries to rethink their approaches toward each other.

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ASSOCIATION VIEWS

The Role of the JOURNAL

The Editorial Board of the JOURNAL is pleased that the magazine has become a lively forum for serious discussion of professional issues and foreign policy, as our readers may have noted from many recent articles and letters on controversial topics. The debate of these issues is our purpose as the magazine for professionals in foreign affairs. We take seriously our mandate from the AFSA Governing Board to maintain the editorial independence of the publication. The Editorial Board is responsible for all material appearing in the magazine's pages, with the exception of the ASSOCIATION NEWS and the ASSOCIATION VIEWS, which the Governing Board has graciously offered to us this month.

In recognition of the important role the JOURNAL plays in Foreign Service professionalism and in observance of its 60th anniversary year, the Governing Board recently approved an expansion of the publication and the adoption of the slogan "The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service." The Editorial Board welcomes this acknowledgement of its role and, as our bylaws state, "within the watchwords of fairness and accuracy, the JOURNAL encourages its writers to take a firm stance on the issues they address." Sometimes, however, we are not sure that all our readers understand that, while we review manuscripts carefully to ensure that they are indeed fair and accurate, we also want our writers to express their views. Neither the Governing Board nor the Editorial Board nor the Association as a whole will necessarily agree with everything our authors say. An explicit statement to that effect appears on the CONTENTS page of every issue.

Both boards agree that it is important that this kind of forum be provided the Foreign Service, especially given professional constraints on speaking out elsewhere. We hope our readers understand this and feel free to agree or disagree with the opinions expressed in these pages, by submitting either letters or articles of their own, without feeling that they must take on all the world's burdens. We welcome your interest and participation and thank you for your support. Fire when ready!

JOHN STEMPEL
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LETTERS

Recognizing Needs

Hear, hear for Brandon Robinson's article on "Information and Development" and Dante Fascell's on whether USIA will be a future "Dynamo or Dinosaur" in the January issue. In regard to the former, many scholars and professionals in the foreign affairs agencies have long recognized the need for the development of research, statistical, and analytical capabilities in Third World countries, since it was clear that they needed this type of information in order to make informed policy and programming decisions. However, as Mr. Robinson noted, agencies were so preoccupied with trying to obligate funds for projects that decisions were made in a vacuum without the requisite information.

Many of us involved in Latin America can well remember in the heyday of the Alliance for Progress in the early 1960s that the least-developed countries of that area could not even fill out the complicated forms required to describe projects for which funding was being requested. U.S. officials constantly told Latin American counterparts that "We stand ready to assist" without realizing that the officials to whom they were addressing these words lacked the elementary information needed to ask for the assistance in the first place!

The type of technical assistance suggested by Mr. Robinson would indeed be an essential form of technological transfer which would not only help Third World countries develop the information needed for intelligent development decisions but would probably assist in coordinating the varied activites of the bilateral and multilateral agencies involved in funding development. It would certainly enable all concerned to make more efficient use of the limited resources available and might even avoid significant rises in development budgets in the future, a happy thought in these days of billion dollar deficits.

To turn to Representative Fascell's article on USIA, he highlights many of the issues which have been debated within the agency since its founding in 1953. The question of audience, for example—whether our target audience should be the elite or the masses, whether agency programs should concentrate on students at the university level or should include students at the elementary or secondary school levels—has preoccupied agency officers over the years, with decisions fluctuating one way or the other depending largely on the funds available. In Latin America in the 1960s, when both the information and cultural programs of USIA and the State Department were well financed when compared to today, agency programs and the educational exchange programs then in State reached out to much larger audiences than was possible in the 1970s and '80s, when a seemingly larger budget buys less in terms of programs.

Representative Fascell has been one of USIA's strongest supporters in the Congress since the formation of the agency. As he well knows, however, not all his colleagues share his enthusiasm for the work of the agency and hence have worked to restrain efforts of many directors to bring information and cultural programming on a par with the state of the art. When one has to make program decisions within the constraints of tight budgets, one cannot do everything that one would like to. Under such circumstances the tendency is to reduce the quantity to preserve the quality. I think that that is the correct way to go, but I used to wish that when I had to make such decisions that I could have enjoyed the luxury of having both.

DOROTHY DILLON
USIA Assistant Director for Latin America, 1973–76
Washington

Clarke Slade

The loss of Clarke Slade is so sad [EDITORIAL, December]. He was of tremendous help to many, many Foreign Service families. He was also a friend and keen supporter of the Association over a period of years. We all will miss Clarke's warmth, vitality, and friendship.

JOHN A. PATTERSON
Lusaka, Zambia

Author's Query

As a graduate student in history at San Jose State University, I am writing my master's thesis on U.S. intelligence in Portugal during World War II. I am trying to locate any former State Department personnel who served in Portugal during this time. If any JOURNAL reader can help, I would appreciate hearing from them.

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Books

The Right People

Staffing for Foreign Affairs: *Personnel Systems for the 1980s and 1990s. By William I. Bacchus. Princeton University Press, 1983. $25.*

In a lucid, compact little book, William I. Bacchus invites our thoughtful attention to some of the personnel issues and problems that beset foreign affairs agencies and affect their performance. We have not had such a searching and stimulating study since the Murphy Commission, whose report and supplemental studies and essays ran into volumes. Bacchus reduces the issues he analyzes to a slim, 235-page book. It is a masterpiece of condensation. It is also, unfortunately, over-priced.

Some of our Foreign Service colleagues view diplomacy as a self-delighting, self-gratifying occupation and disdainfully reject personnel issues as "administrative" and thus irrelevant to their lofty substantive duties, ranking only a cut above the concerns of the curator of the diplomatic reception rooms in the State Department. Others recognize them as being at the heart of effective performance in the development and execution of our foreign policy.

The military operates on the principle that there is no use trying to fight battles unless the right people and right supplies in the right quantity are in the right place at the right time. Bacchus is one of our Civil Service associates who holds a similar view of the conduct of foreign affairs. For him, having the right people in the right numbers in the right place at the right time is not a "nuts and bolts" matter but a dynamic factor that helps determine the quality and success of performance. He sees it as integral to the overall performance of our foreign affairs responsibilities. He goes at this, to change terms of comparison, as the late Bear Bryant used to go at competition on the football field. Asked on one occasion how he explained his astonishing record of victories, Coach Bryant replied it was simple: he paid attention to the "teensy weensy, itsy bitsy" things that most coaches overlooked. In his concise little volume, Bacchus directs our attention to what too many of us view as teensy weensy and the province of "administrative types," as we concentrate on substantive matters and the assignments and promotions that will advance our careers. Bacchus implicitly suggests that if we want to win in the highly competitive arena of international politics, we must apply concentrated and continuous study to personnel issues and make a far more vigorous effort to resolve them.

One result of our unwillingness to do this is a chronic morale affliction, and the public, frankly, is tired of hearing about it. Some people, like former Senator Eugene J. McCarthy, have begun to treat it facetiously, even sarcastically. "Each day," Bacchus quotes McCarthy as acidly suggesting, "following the weather report, the baseball scores, and the Dow Jones average, Walter Cronkite, just before he says, 'That's the way it is,' could give us the morale index for the State Department. We might sleep better, knowing that despite the headlines and stories about a troubled world and failures in American foreign policy, morale at the State Department is stable, high, or rising." In no small part, we have brought this ridicule

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

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

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upon ourselves. Furthermore, it renders somewhat absurd all those lofty thoughts of improving the public's understanding of the department and Service so as to gain more respect and support for our diplomatic establishment. If the public got to know us and our self-centered, organizationally ramshackle ways better, it might have even less respect for us.

Bacchus comes to the task of analyzing our efforts to staff foreign affairs agencies with good, if limited, credentials. He has a doctorate in political science from Princeton and is familiar with a certain range of public administration literature. He served on the staff of the Murphy Commission, whence he transited to the department's Bureau of Personnel. There he became one of the architects of the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and is now director of the Policy Coordination Staff. But his exposure to foreign affairs has been limited: it includes neither service abroad nor extensive familiarity with the slowly expanding literature on diplomacy. He sees personnel issues almost exclusively from the Washington end, as he did in his earlier study of the department's country director system, *Foreign Policy and the Bureaucratic Process*. As is evident in the title of both books, he emphasizes foreign policy to the exclusion of diplomacy.

This leads him to draw much too sharp a contrast between the activities of foreign affairs officers abroad and their duties in what he considers the bruising bureaucratic environment of Washington. Service abroad can be bruising too, including some pretty rough relationships with the department itself. Moreover, by viewing diplomacy in the constricted terms of Harold Nicolson (as negotiation) and the archaic terms of old timers in the Foreign Service (as representation, reporting, and negotiation) he misses some staffing issues and qualities and competences—such as political acumen—and treats education and training far too casually. By placing the stress he does on the Washington function of integrating "a diverse range of interests, bureaucratic considerations, political pressures and goals in such a way as to provide coherent and pertinent policy recommendations to political leaders" (to which I would add recommendations on tactics and timing), he might be overlooking the fact that this is a function that senior and some mid-career officers are obliged to perform abroad, as they present policy recommendations to foreign governments and deal with the host society's bureaucracy, media, educational institutions, employers' organizations, labor unions, youth and peace groups, and the like. Officers like William Sullivan, Deane Hinton, and Thomas Pickering can testify that although they must operate with suavity and tact, this should not disguise the fact that overseas operations can be just as bruising as anything one encounters in Washington.

Even so, the author clearly sees and lucidly discusses, with eminent good sense, many of the basic personnel issues all governments face in their conduct of foreign affairs. He pulls no punches in stating his concern that "the United States—like other modern nations—is faced with a growing crisis in finding and keeping the caliber of people needed to conduct its foreign relations" and that the State Department is far from where it should be. He goes on to discuss the need for designing "a personnel system which produces individuals able and willing to range from participation in the paramount policy processes of government on the one hand, to the provision of routine services on the other."

He considers the issue of providing a wider "range and depth of technical and specialized competence than heretofore, deployed primarily in Washington but to some degree also available for assignment abroad." Related to this is the unresolved issue of "the degree to which this kind of talent should be concentrated in the Department of State, in addition to being located in the more functionally oriented departments and agencies." This also touches on the issue of representativeness. If a diplomatic establishment is to be representative of the overall population it serves and of high quality—as it can be if enough thought and effort are given to the problem—how should the issue of "technical and specialized competences" be applied to the cases of minorities and women?

Bacchus discusses the old issue of generalists vs. specialists very intelligently. Generalists are preferred in our recruiting efforts. We emphasize general experience and skills in our examining procedures, our orientation course, and early years of service. Yet many mid-career positions must be filled with officers of specialized knowledge and experience. Unfortunately, Bacchus does not consider the option of recruiting specialists and rounding them out through general orientation, education, and service. The experience of the labor-attache program shows this can be done successfully.

The author also refers to the difficulties involved in reconciling the benefits of a rotating cadre of officers with the need for continuity and consistency in the development and execution of foreign policy. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 attempted to resolve this issue by retreating to the peri-

od before 1946, when the Wriston committee so seriously reduced the Civil Service component of the State Department as virtually to destroy the permanent personnel hub around which the migratory Foreign Service revolved. The solution then, as now, is to educate and train officers of both systems, not to periodically demolish and then reconstruct the hub.

The growing interconnection between domestic and international affairs presents another acute staffing issue. Foreign affairs agencies must demand that their personnel serving lengthy periods overseas acquire greater knowledge of the domestic environment and at the same time sensitize their largely stationary personnel at home to the foreign implications of what they do and the importance of seeking out the views of those posted abroad.

Bacchus dismisses the issue of competence in bilateral and multilateral diplomacy with the comment that "support can be found for the proposition that it will be necessary to develop a new cadre of diplomats who spend virtually all their careers working in the multilateral area and for the contrary argument that since bilateral and multilateral diplomacy will depend increasingly on each other, diplomats should serve in both contexts to the extent possible." No doubt the lack of diplomatic experience inhibits the author from any analysis or elaboration of argument on this issue, but, once again, it may be that appropriate education and training could go far to resolving the problem.

Without an adequate supply of officers with the specialized knowledge and experience which the agenda of international relations requires, the department, Bacchus insists, cannot hope to "play the comprehensive role of policy and diplomatic integration" so vital to our national security. We have temporized with this issue and Bacchus suggests that time is fast running out. Further temporization will only "risk increasing the FSO's irrelevance in Washington"—and abroad. To emphasize the point, he analyzes several areas—the politico-military, economic, and scientific and technological—in which he claims the department lacks the functional competence "to play anything resembling an integrative, policy development role." And, he says, "there is little current indication that significant improvement is likely." He questions the department's and Service's assumption that the new economics course at the Foreign Service Institute is meeting their requirements and that it is enough for the diplomatic establishment to be better than the Commerce Department in international economics, just as it is questionable whether it suffices for our

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Service simply to be better than other countries'. The real quesrion is: have we, in the department and Service, enough officers good enough to cope with our foreign affairs needs?

Running like a tiebeam through all these issues is rhe question of education and training. Yet, it is not an issue that Bacchus really tackles. Except through exacting professional education how can we acquire individuals of a wider "range and depth of technical and specialized competence" who are nevertheless familiar with the broad context of foreign affairs in which these special interests and skills must fit? How else does one fuse a rotating corps with a stable hub of civil servants, keeping officers abroad attuned to the domestic environmenr and srationary civil servants attuned to the world communiry? This is a central issue deserving hard analysis and rhis reviewer finds it astonishing that someone suitably equipped does not zero in on it and perhaps even give some thought to the issue of establishing a Foreign Affairs Academy to educate and stimulare, to broaden the horizons and deepen the perceptions, and to develop among both Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel an *esprit de corps*. Bur then, even secretaries of state with the strong educational orientation of Dean Rusk and Henry Kissinger, equally astonishingly, ignored this issue. It rook a military careerist, Alexander Haig, to put his shoulder to the wheel and see to it that a mid-career officers' course was re-instituted at FSI.

The writing of this book, Bacchus tells us, began "almost as a diatribe against the Deparrment of State and its apparent unwillingness to confront mounring personnel problems." Many of us have experienced that frustration. Bur he wisely produced a thoughtful, constructive, and persuasive analysis. This is not a strident or didactic book—in many ways, it is a gentle, reproving, almost parental book. But the message, however gently conveyed, comes through loud and clear: the State Department and Foreign Service are not good enough and time is running out. Neither department nor Service have nearly enough officers with the expertise and skill needed, nor do they have the vision or personnel systems that can produce such persons. These are sad facts, difficult for most of us ro accept. Harder still is mustering the will to devote ourselves to the hard study and sustained action that can produce the needed reforms. Most of us are too absorbed wirh our own careers and AFSA with bread and butter issues and the resolution of transient grievances to do more than thread our way through the corridors of the existing system. Jack Perry recently wrote in the *Washington Post* that the likelihood of any important change is not great. And Bacchus suggests that here lie the ingredients not only of continuing morale problems and organizational ineptitude, but a tragedy for the nation.

—SMITH SIMPSON.

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Red Carpet. *By Joseph Finder. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983. $16.95.*

Finder sketches the personal relationships of five prominent American capitalists—Armand Hammer, Cyrus Eaton, Averell Harriman, David Rockefeller, and Donald Kendall—with the Kremlin leadership. The tenuous initial links go back to the 1920s, when Lenin and Trotsky courted Americans sympathetic to the U.S.S.R. with the hope they would exploit concessions in Russia and generate needed foreign exchange. Such relationships peaked in the detente of the early 1970s, as symbolized by the milestone agreement to market Pepsi in the Soviet Union.

Finder did extensive research and conducted over 100 personal interviews, which is laid out in some thirty pages of notes. His effort to handle five personages, who enter and exit at intervals throughout the book, leaves the reader at times disjointed and frustrated. He would have done better to focus on perhaps the two most important of the five: the enigmatic Cyrus Eaton (fellow traveler or idealist?) and Armand Hammer, who comes across as an egotistical, conniving self-promoter and ironically is the only one to maintain close personal links with the present Kremlin leadership.

This book provides an interesting account of the important contribution made by American business to the brief phase of detente, a contribution characterized by the currently unfashionable notion that trade builds bridges and promotes peace. He also details the high-level infighting and lobbying over the decision to link the emigration of Soviet Jews to U.S. trade liberalization and the granting of most-favored-nation status. While emphasizing the role of corporate leaders as catalysts in shaping the East-West climate, Finder concludes lamentably that American businessmen have often been beguiled by the Kremlin leaders, that their capacity for criticism has frequently been muted by the understandable fear of alienating their hosts. —DAVID S. WILSON

Working for the Sovereign: *Employee Relations in the Federal Government. By Sar A. Levitan and Alexandra B. Noden. Johns Hopkins University Press. 1983.*

This book considers whether private sector principles of personnel management can be applied to the Civil Service and attempts to draw some conclusions about the current administration's policies in this area. Many of the changes being proposed may affect the Foreign Service.

Clearly, there are distinct aspects of federal employment, but the differences from employment in the private sector are often exaggerated. For example, the fact that the pay structure for federal employees is in disarray because successive administrations and Congresses have refused to bargain over wages or to peg federal pay to private-sector remuneration has led to an exodus of top federal managers—just as would be expected in the private sector. This has endangered the efficient performance and delivery of federal services.

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There are, however, some areas where it is important to maintain the distinction between private and public-sector employment. The authors do feel that a departure from private practice with regard to hiring and firing of federal employees is essential. Because political leaders try to manipulate the Civil Service for political ends, management discretion in this area must be much narrower than it is in the private sector. Management appeals for greater flexibility must be greeted with caution.

The authors' examination of the current administration is illuminating. On the question of workers' rights and compensation—where distinctions between the public and private sectors are not convincing and often counterproductive—administration officials have repeatedly refused to adopt collective bargaining procedures based on private sector models. On issues of hiring and firing, however, private sector experiences have been evoked to demonstrate that broader discretion for political appointees is necessary to ensure greater flexibility and efficiency. The disturbing conclusion is that private sector analogies are being used in a manner nearly opposite to that which logic would dictate.

—FRANCIS X. CUNNINGHAM

Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace. *By Leon Wieseltier. Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1983. $2.95.*

Facing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons. *By Sidney D. Drell. University of Washington Press, 1983. $4.95.*

Nuclear Hostages. *By Bernard J. O'Keefe. Houghton Mifflin, 1983. $14.95.*

Mimicking Sisyphus: *America's Countervailing Strategy. By Louis Rene Beres. Lexington Books, 1983.*

Given the complexity and paradox associated with nuclear weaponry and nuclear strategy, it comes as no surprise that the vast literature on these topics is uneven in quality and divergent in theme. Thus Leon Wieseltier's brilliant primer is particularly useful—as well as timely. He takes aim both at what he terms the "party of peace" and at what he characterizes as the "party of war." Brushing aside antagonism to the deployment of U.S. intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe, he argues that "deterrence is the real reason for the installation of the intermediate-range missiles by NATO—deterrence, to be precise, at all levels." He sharply challenges proponents of a doctrine of no-first-use of nuclear weapons, who in his view imply that in a nuclear world we are facing a choice between peace and (conventional) war, rather than between peace and extinction. Wieseltier is no more tolerant of the "party of war"—those who think the United States can fight and win a nuclear war. While granting that operational thinking about nuclear weapons is unavoidable, Wieseltier decries a creeping "Sovietization" of U.S. strategy that is "creating the military and psychological conditions for the greatest tragedy in history." But he does not evade the problem of a possible failure of deterrence. Wieseltier argues cogently that if nuclear war breaks out, the aim must be to end it as quickly as possible while minimizing damage to *both* sides.

Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace has few shortcomings. Wieseltier is, however, occasionally unfair to those he judges to be of a different cast of mind than his own. More significantly, his standard for setting the size and style of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is ill-advised. Although his discussion of this issue lacks the clarity characteristic of most of his book, Wieseltier appears to favor an American "minimal deterrent force" of nuclear weapons—the number of which would be absolute, not relative to Soviet force levels. This position seems incongruous with his views on INF and no-first-use. What is more, it overlooks three car-

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

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

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dinal facts. First, the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence (notably in Europe)—already called into question by Soviet-American nuclear parity—would hardly be credible if backed by only a minimal deterrent. Second, the international political and psychological ramifications of clear Soviet nuclear superiority would undercut the U.S. global position. Third, the Soviets would lose an incentive for negotiating substantial cuts in arsenals if the United States unilaterally decided not to keep pace. A minimal deterrent, then, while seemingly adequate for a France or Britain, will not suffice for the West's leading power.

Like *Nuclear War, Nuclear Peace,* Drell's *Facing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons* is compact, elegantly written, and persuasively pro-deterrence. For Drell, "the first and overriding goal of arms control...should be: to enhance strategic stability based on a balance of highly survivable and secure deterrent forces." He adds a second goal for arms control: "To initiate significant, timely, and verifiable reductions in the nuclear forces and destructive potential of both nations." But while Wieseltier displays little patience with the nuclear freeze movement, Drell supports it—not so much as literal policy, but rather as reflecting a public constituency for arms control. Implausibly, Drell argues for an eventual "policy of no use—first, second, or third, or at any level." Notwithstanding the evidence to the contrary—ably marshaled by O'Keefe in his book—Drell suggests that the hydrogen bomb "genie" could have been kept in the bottle.

Drell's essay is nicely balanced by the incorporation in the same volume of Andrei Sakharov's previously published open letter on thermonuclear war. A stirring call for the West to maintain the nuclear balance, Sakharov's letter makes for sober reading—coming as it does from the father of the Soviet hydrogen bomb and one who knows the Soviet system all too well.

In contrast to Wieseltier and Drell's terse and highly analytical essays, O'Keefe's *Nuclear Hostages* is a vivid, discursive memoir by an engineer intimately involved in the United States' wartime effort to develop the atomic bomb and in its subsequent nuclear weapons programs. The book is anti-revisionist in thrust, for example, defending along familiar and convincing lines the atomic attacks against Hiroshima and Nagasaki. On the whole, *Nuclear Hostages* represents a useful addition to the literature on the history of America's nuclear weaponry. It nevertheless is marred by a breezy style and lapses in judgment. Such lapses are illustrated by O'Keefe's bizarre conclusion that U.S.-So-

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

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viet reconciliation hinges on the Unired States' "selling" its economic-political-cultural system to the Soviets, which "will not be as difficult as ir seems if we go about it the right way."

Beres's *Mimicking Sisyphus* is by far the weakest of these four books. In style it is disjointed, repetitive, and excessively reliant on quotation. In substance the book amounts to a tirade against "the American search for a countervailing strategy," which Beres alleges "will inevitably increase the likelihood of nuclear war with the U.S.S.R." Beres does not effectively document what he claims to be the evolution of U.S. strategy, nor does he adequately come to grips with the problems associated with basing (in Kissinger's words) "all our plans on the assumption that war, if it comes, will inevitably be all-out." And he gives scarcely any attention to *Soviet* nuclear strategy.

The author's prescriptions suggest that his underlying quarrel is not so much with U.S. strategy but, more fundamentally, with the nature of the world as we know it: "For those that lock their definitions of national interest into the dying forms of *realpolitik*, there can only be disaster-....states must begin to fashion their foreign policies on a new set of premises, one that defines national interest in terms of what is best for the world system as a whole." Beres enthusiastically supports a nuclear freeze. However, his main recommendation is for the emergence of what Richard Falk has called a "Third System," essentially a popular movement to "demilitarize" the world. How such a movement could possibly gain influence in the Soviet Union is one of the many questions Beres leaves unanswered (indeed, it is symptomatic of his double standard vis-a-vis the U.S.S.R. that he does not even pose the question). In sum, *Mimicking Sisyphus* would seem to represent the irresponsible idealism so scorned by Wieseltier, whose chapter on the "party of war" is a far more sophisticated analysis of the body of thought Beres evidently seeks to criticize.

—David Adamson

Buying the Night Flight: *The Autobiography of a Woman Correspondent. By Georgie Anne Geyer. Delacorte Press/Seymour Lawrence, 1983. $16.95.*

The paths of foreign correspondents are always crossing with those of diplomats, and though they each have different missions, they have a lot in common. Correspondents not infrequently find themselves at odds with official representatives of the U.S. government, but generally their work, difficult and challenging by irs nature, is expedited by tapping the resources of their diplomatic colleagues.

Because Georgie Anne Geyer's path in particular, as illuminated in this latest book, has crossed and criss-crossed the globe so many times in the past 20 years, and because it brings back memories of situations involving such newsmakers as Allende, Che Guevara, Khomeini, Sadat, and many others, and such historic times and places as Santo Domingo in 1965, Israel in 1969, or Poland in 1980, this volume should be of interest to Foreign Service professionals. Her experiences and observations of the Mideast and Central America, for example, remain highly relevant today.

The author's anecdores and musings on the many world leaders she has interviewed, her description of the difficulties and challenges faced by both male and female correspondents, and her vivid accounts of her adventures in seeking out leaders of coups, elusive guerrillas, and sometimes even more elusive foreign government officials, is what this book is about. But it is also about what she calls

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

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"one of the great epic changes of our times"—the freedom the current generation of American women enjoys relative to earlier days, a freedom which is not without its price for what she describes as "my often tormented generation." Geyer's first book, *The New Latins*, published in the 1960s, remains a classic even today for anyone wishing to understand Latin American psychology. Her autobiography is equally interesting and instructive.

—Allen C. Hansen

Saudia Arabia: *The Making of a Financial Giant. By Arthur N. Young. New York University Press, 1983. $20.*

Arab-Latin American Relations. *Edited by Fehmy Saddy. Transaction Books, 1983. $29.95.*

One of the most important developments of the past fifty years has been the transformation of Saudi Arabia and the neighboring oil-producing states from one of the most remote, backward, and poor areas of the world into a region of vital economic and financial importance. The history of this development has been only sketchily told, so these two books are useful.

Young, whose *Saudi Arabia: The Making of a Financial Giant* is based on his service as head of the U.S. financial mission sent to Saudi Arabia in 1951 at the request of the late King Adb al-Aziz, describes his role in the creation of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency and its evolution into one of the most important financial institutions of the world, with assets today of over $100 billion. In contrast, before the discovery of oil in 1938, the Saudi finance minister reportedly could keep the entire national treasury "in a box under his bed," and the total revenues of the country did not exceed $7 million annually.

Arab-Latin American Relations, for its part, is a collection of articles on economic, financial, and political cooperation between the two regions. Most of the authors are from Mideastern countries. Saddy, a former professor of political science at Kuwait University and now a businessman in Saudi Arabia, sums up the objective of the book by describing how the Arab and Latin American countries could join together to advance their mutual interests and that of the Third World in general to escape from what he regards as the "traps of colonialism."

Regrettably, neither volume is the definitive work in its subject. Young's association with the Saudi Monetary Agency was limited to less than two years, and his description of its operations is brief, so much more of its story remains to be told. Again, both books are written from a position of sympathy for the aspirations of the Arab nations, which some readers may find less than objective. Still, they do provide a plethora of useful information.

—Benson L. Grayson

The U.S. and Free China: *How the U.S. Sold Out its Ally. By James C. H. Shen. Acropolis. $14.95.*

Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy. *Edited by Hung-Mao Tien. Oelgeschlager, Gann, and Hain. $16.95.*

The shift of U.S. diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China in 1979 ended a debate that lasted for thirty years. Ever since the Communist government was established and the defeated Nationalists fled to Taiwan, the question of who represented China was at the foundation of U.S. policy. But it did not solve the issue of what our policy towards Taiwan or the PRC

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should be. Taiwan, though unrecognized, does exist and even flourishes. Just as it is evident that the PRC *is* the government of China, it is evident that the Taiwan government has endowed its citizens with economic success and political freedoms which far exceed anything the Communist government offers its citizens. Further, the Nationalists consistently support U.S. foreign policy, while the PRC consistently opposes us.

As the last ambassador from the ROC to the United States (1971–78), Shen's book offers the Nationalist view of Sino-American relations. Not surprisingly, he is consistently critical of the United States and our moves towards the PRC. Shen presents himself as the hero: a hard-working, honest, unassuming patriot, constantly undone by a clumsy, ineffective, or malevolent Department of State. His premise—that it was the United States which "sold out" China—exemplify the errors in the book. It would be more accurate to argue that the group that sold out China was the Nationalists themselves, for it was their incompetence, corruption, and bungled economics that allowed the Communists to win. All the United States did was to recognize that fact thirty years later.

Shen's accounts flow in simple chronological order. After the obligatory retired diplomat's my-life-in-the-foreign-service chapter (which actually is rather interesting), he proceeds to give a blow-by-blow account. Although he discusses every step of the U.S.-PRC rapprochement and the U.S.-ROC rupture from his partisan viewpoint, he does discuss every step. The expulsion from the United Nations, Japan's derecognition, the trips of Kissinger, Nixon, Ford, Brzezinski, and Carter, and the final act of derecognition are all here, as is a discussion of the Taiwan Relations Act and Sino-American relations in the Reagan administration. Thus *The U.S. and Free China* is a handy guide to both the decade-long process of derecognition and to Taiwan's arguments and positions at each step in the process.

Tien's work is quite different in scope. It deals with a wide range of PRC-Taiwan-U.S. issues, and rather than stressing the past decade, it looks at what lies ahead. *Mainland China, Taiwan, and U.S. Policy* is a compendium of papers presented at the Wingspread Conference in Wisconsin in August 1981 and the resulting discussions and so reads differently from Shen's book. The disadvantage is that the topics are not dealt with comprehensively and are rather eclectic ("Modern Taiwan Fiction"), and the organization is not as coherent. The advantage of this format is that many points of view are represented.

Particularly enjoyable is Chen Jo-Hsi's presentation on "The Democratic Movement and Popular Journals in the PRC," which provides insight into the generally unpublicized dissident movement. Also valuable were papers on "U.S. Policy toward the PRC and Taiwan" and "Political Change and Economic Development in the PRC." Although the arguments are well laid out, there is not much in this book which has not been said before. What makes this book worth purchasing is the comprehensive appendix of 16 documents.

—FRANKLIN L. LAVIN

Jamaica: *Struggle in the Periphery. By Michael Manley. Third World Media Limited. 1982. $7.95.*

After winning by wide margins in 1972 and 1976, Michael Manley and his People's National Party suffered a stunning defeat in the 1980 elections, when 58 percent of Jamaica's voters preferred his opponent, Edward Seaga, and the more conservative Jamaica Labor Party. Manley's explanation of why this happened is contained in *Jamaica*, his apologia for his years in office.

Manley admits that his government was unable to curb inflation, to reduce unemployment, or to achieve economic advances. He acknowledges that efforts to control rampant street crime, or to make many PNP social-engineering projects popular, were less than successful. Moreover, he and his government did not effectively refute charges that they were moving toward greater radicalism at home and abroad. Thus, there were many issues ripe for exploitation by his opponents. Manley goes on to claim, however, that one of the greatest obstacles he faced in trying to create a prosperous, egalitarian, and democratic socialist state was a deliberate campaign of destabilization by the U.S. government. As evidence, he lists numerous events that disrupted Jamaican economic and political life from 1976–80 and attributes these to machinations by the Colossus of the North.

Manley is an eloquent writer, and his praiseworthy ambition to better the lot of the Jamaican poor permeates the book. He is probably right that many of his statements and actions, especially in foreign policy, did not win him many friends in Washington. On the other hand, although he argues that there was a calculated destabilization campaign by the U.S. government and that it was a major factor in bringing about his electoral downfall, he does not offer convincing evidence.

—JOHN J. CROWLEY JR.

PERIODICALS

"America Looks at Europe: Change and Continuity in the 1980s." *By Catherine McArdle Kelleher. Washington Quarterly, Vol. 7. No. 1. Winter 1984.*

The changes in American attitudes toward Western Europe since World War II are particularly notable among two groups: those young enough to have been initiated politically during the Vietnam war and those who challenge the dominance of an East Coast–based elite. Because of a series of policy disputes, especially in the security area, an increased focus on economic competition, and a growing perception of Europeans as "changing," the commitment of American elites to Atlantic incorporation has begun to erode. A declining number of the elite could be classified as traditional Atlanticists (and most of these are 50 or older). The remainder are more willing to view the U.S.-European alliance as no more than an impermanent arrangement of mutual convenience. Kelleher cautions that although an image of cooperation still outweighs one of conflict, these new images of Europe imply an "inevitable Atlantic disengagement and portray eventual American autarky." Furthermore, they may well be symptomatic of a change in attitude toward the U.S. role in the world.

"Misperception and the Causes of War." *By Jack S. Levy. World Politics. Vol. 36, No. 1. October 1983.*

Diplomatic historians who investigate the causes of war generally settle on a rational approach—one that assumes the actors accurately perceive threats and opportunities and base their decisions on a logical cost-benefit analysis. However, claims Levy, this kind of analysis is contrary to recent studies of decision-making and crisis behavior that have demonstrated the influence of such irrational factors as misperception. He gives numerous brief examples in which misperception appears to have been an influential and perhaps determining factor in states' behavior. But, Levy cautions, one should distinguish between miscalculation and bad luck—risks taken with reasonable recognition of the uncertainties should not be classified as misperceptions if they go astray for extraneous reasons.

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"The Military Reform Movement: A Critical Assessment." *By John J. Mearsheimer. Orbis, Vol. 27. No. 2. Summer 1983.*

Mearsheimer criticizes the views of those in the military reform movement, such as Edward Luttwak, who argue that the U.S. military requires a "manuever" strategy, less reliance on technologically complex weapons, and a less bureaucratic system. The author dismisses those views as romantic. He points out that the military does not operate in a vacuum but is inevitably influenced by the nature of modern society and industrial democracy. The strategy advocated by the reformers, he claims, is both unclear and inappropriate. The United States, because of its geographical location, must devote substantial resources to logistical planning (and therefore to bureaucracy). Further, the German experience has shown that a general staff is not necessarily counterproductive. He criticizes the reformers for their apparent prejudice for simple weapons, arguing that more advanced weapons are not only more effective but essential in opposing the adversary's advanced systems.

"After the Fall: U.S. Policy toward Radical Regimes." *By Richard E. Feinberg and Kenneth A. Oye. World Policy Journal. Vol. 1. No. 1. Fall 1983.*

Feinberg and Oye view the security and prosperity of the United States as endangered not so much by the policies of post-revolutionary radical regimes but by U.S. attitudes and actions toward those countries. A U.S. response of automatic blind hostility, especially apparent during the Reagan administration, may well increase the dependency of such regimes on the Soviet Union. Radical governments do not seek isolation from the industrial west, as the trading patterns of Algeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Libya, and Nicaragua attest. Many of these countries are eager to participate in the world economy. The Soviet Union has, of course, been able to take advantage of unsettled conditions in many post-revolutionary countries. The United States should strive to prevent the creation of strong ties between radical regimes and the U.S.S.R., especially in the security and military fields. However, current U.S. policy has frequently had the opposite effect. U.S. sponsorship of subversion can be particularly damaging: not only is it usually unsuccessful, it may lead the regime to turn to the U.S.S.R. for support. The United States should exploit the inevitable conflicts between the Soviet Union and the Third World. The U.S.S.R. may make some short-term gains, but time, conclude the authors, is on our side.

"Dateline Washington: The Rules of the Game." *By Stanley J. Heginbotham. Foreign Policy, No. 55. Winter 1983-84.*

The author argues that differing political cultures in executive and congressional branches are the source of much misunderstanding. Policymakers on the executive side see Congress as being parochial and prone to grandstanding, and congressional personnel in turn consider executive branch staff—including FSOs—to be obsessed with diplomatic minutiae and overly concerned with the interests of foreign countries. Because the rules of the two political cultures are often contradictory, conflict almost always results when participants from the two arenas try to reach decisions jointly, no matter how completely they agree on substance. Case studies of congressional-executive disagreements reveal that executive branch attempts to refuse to bargain or consult with Congress provided a focal point around which opposition to the executive branch's policy could coalesce. Heginbotham notes that this opposition was a response to insensitive treatment, not to specific policies, even though it was manifested as the latter. This conflict can be ameliorated by developing players who are sensitive to the needs and requirements of both sets of rules.

"The Reagan-Kirkpatrick Policies and the United Nations." *By Seymour Maxwell Finger. Foreign Affairs. Vol. 62. No. 2. Winter 1983-84.*

In this profile of Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, focusing on her activities at the United Nations and ideological beliefs as outlined in her writings, Finger describes her as a foreign policy conservative, ideologically close to the president, who believes the United Nations has strayed from the intent of its charter and become an arena where conflicts are exacerbated rather than resolved. Although the United Nations does have some good points, she believes that on political and security matters, in particular, it has become a negative influence. Finger, a former FSO who served at USUN, notes the diplomatic inexperience of the staff—the few senior FSOs have been frozen out of the inner circle, he claims—and questions the usefulness of her confrontational attitude toward the nonaligned majority. Several times Finger mentions the critical attitude of other representatives toward Kirkpatrick. He concludes that "the experience of the Moynihan and Kirkpatrick incumbencies appears to suggest that the strategy of confrontation serves the interests neither of the United States nor the United Nations."

Clippings

"Those of use who have spent at least a part of our lives in conducting relations with other nations share, I believe, a concern over the national attitude toward diplomacy....We believe that those of us who have had substantial experience as diplomats can make a contribution by looking at the future requirements of our diplomacy, at the kind of persons who should assume the reponsibility for those requirements, and at the process by which they are chosen. These are the purposes that lie behind the creation of the American Academy of Diplomacy...."

Ellsworth Bunker in the Washington Post January 31

"In this unruly world, where terrorism is all too prevalent, the security of our embassy personnel throughout the world warrants more attention that it has received....In my own diplomatic experience, both at the United Nations and as ambassador-at-large in Belgrade, I found that security measures for our embassies and residencies of our ambassadors are woefully inadequate.

"Because of my concern, shared by many Foreign Service officers, that our foreign personnel abroad are not being adequately protected, on May 5, 1982, I addressed a communication to General Haig, then secretary of state, relating to this subject....General Haig stated that, under the Vienna Convention on the Conduct of Diplomatic Relations, the host government is charged with the responsibility for the protection of accredited diplomats and diplomatic property. How this convention would protect our embassies and our Foreign Service officers in revolutionary situations, such as in Iran or, in chaotic ones as in Lebanon, against terrorist attacks, is not addressed.

"General Haig added that, notwithstanding the convention and its requirements that host countries must secure foreign embassies, chiefs of mission now have authority to utilize marines as a small deterrent force to repel any assault upon embassy property and personnel.

"These security provisions are grossly inadequate....The French are more realistic. When a mob of Syrian-inspired Lebanese recently attempted to storm the French

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embassy in Beirut, they were repelled by armed French paratroopers who had been brought in specifically to ensure the security of the French embassy....

"The time is overdue for a complete and impartial investigation of the security of our diplomatic personnel. I cannot prejudge the results of the investigation, which I recommend. It should, however, not be in-house but conducted by distinguished Americans. An investigation of this character is imperative and long overdue."

Arthur Goldberg in the Christian Science Monitor January 23

"The leader of the abortive U.S. raid to free American hostages held in Iran says a tour to check security at U.S. embassies, including the one in Teheran, was canceled before the takeover there because the State Department couldn't come up with money to pay for the trip.

"In the months preceding the takeover, embassy security had a low priority, according to Charlie Beckwith, a retired Army colonel.

"Ironically, another canceled survey was mentioned after the car bombing this month of the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, in which six persons were killed. The State Department acknowledged two weeks ago that a request from the embassy there for security improvements was held up for three months, in large part for budgetary reasons."

Vernon A. Guidry Jr. in the Baltimore Sun December 28

"We recently attended press conferences held in Washington by National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and START negotiator Edward Rowny. Big deal? Yup: We were in Brussels at the time. This electronic magic is part of a new U.S. shot at getting its policies better understood abroad. The USIA has gone high-tech to allow European journalists to reach out and touch U.S. officials....We're not so naive as to think that better communications will always bring greater harmony. But we'd argue that discord within NATO is sometimes due to remarkable lapses in European understanding....Euronet has already proved that there's no reason Europeans should be harnessed to the U.S. media in order to get news about America. It looks as if the USIA is up to some good, and putting American officials directly before European questioners and audiences is bound to increase the understanding of all concerned."

Editorial in the Wall Street Journal December 27

"Ambassador to Mexico John Gavin says he will leave his post after next year whether or not his friend Ronald Reagan is reelected. When President Reagan took office, many Mexican officials were hoping that he would move to strengthen ties by picking a top diplomat or prominent politician to be ambassador; they were disappointed by the selection of Gavin, a former actor who was appearing in ads for Bacardi rum on Mexican television when named to the post. But Gavin's knowledge of Mexico's problems—and his access to Reagan—eventually won over most skeptics."

Newsweek, January 2

"More than curiosity prompted Senator John Tower's fact-finding mission to the Mideast. The retiring Texas Republican felt his chances of becoming the next secretary of state would be improved by a fresh look at the world's hottest trouble spot."

U.S. News & World Report, January 16

"Considering what he might have done with his power to appoint the best servants of the nation, from even within his own party, let alone the 'partnership' he is always talking about with the Democrats, [President Reagan's] record is a disappointment.

"His ambassadorial appointments at a time of critical foreign puzzles, with a few exceptions, are socially acceptable but professionally ineffective and often an embarrassment."

James Reston in the New York Times January 8

"In Washington 'foreign aid' often means a multinational pork barrel—a shipload of weapons or a slug of cash meant to enrich an overseas government, placate a pleading ally, or assuage the guilt of affluent Americans. But aid to the developing nations need not be a billion-dollar boondoggle..."

Jerry Knight in the Washington Post January 30

"Behind Henry Kissinger's hard labors to calm the turmoil in Central America: Kissinger told intimates he was trying to 'pay my dues' for neglecting that part of the world in favor of Vietnam and other pressing matters while he was secretary of state in the Nixon and Ford years."

U.S. News & World Report, January 23

"Minor Memos:[Former Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger, discussing his Central America report, complains, 'One of the clear violations of human rights we found was the lunches at the State Department.'"

Wall Street Journal, January 13

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, March 1974: "One of the most important and difficult tasks which this Associaton must undertake is defending the integrity and reputation of Foreign Service personnel, and thus of the Service itself.... What brings this all to a head is a recent series of accusations in the press that American embassy personnel in Santiago failed to give adequate protection to American citizens during and immediately following the coup. The accusations are a typical 'bum rap' of the sort the Service has faced too often, which reflects adversely on highly dedicated personnel, particularly consular officers. The other side of the story, the scores of lives saved, the risks taken, the hundreds of personnel assisted under the most trying circumstances, was never mentioned in the press.... If the Foreign Service's side of the story is to be understood, it must be told with force and conviction."

AFSA Editorial

Foreign Service Journal, March 1959: "The 86th Congress has shown a renewed and vivid interest in the training of Foreign Service personnel. As we go to press nine bills have already made their appearance this session asking that a Foreign Service academy be established. Their contents vary from proposals that it be a four-year college, similar to the Air Force Academy and West Point, to a post-graduate training center."

Gwen Barrows

Foreign Service Journal, March 1933: "There is no getting around the fact that something must be done and done quickly to relieve the dire financial stress in which members of our Foreign Service find themselves today.... Salaries of our men abroad have been reduced by some 40 percent because of the appreciation of foreign exchange.... These salaries in addition have been subject to the 15-percent cut in all government salaries... the moderate rental allowances granted to Foreign Service officers have been reduced by 60 percent... in the past two years no promotions have been permitted.... [This] presents a picture too obvious in its detrimental effect to require further argument."

Cordell Hull

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

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Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Cuban President Fidel Castro, and Secretary General Shri Natwar Singh (left to right), and other delegates listen to the Indian national anthem at the seventh summit of the Non-Aligned Movement. The summit, held in New Delhi last March, broke no new ground.

COPING WITH THE NON-ALIGNED

The United States and the Non-Aligned Movement share some basic principles and interests; they should reassess their attitudes toward one another

RICHARD JACKSON

AT THE NEW DELHI summit of the Non-Aligned Movement last March, the deputy prime minister of Vanuatu—the 101st and newest member—said that, "For us, being a non-aligned country means being able to say what you believe without fearing that it could result in undesirable relations with one or the other bloc." His definition captures the ambiguity of a movement perceived both as a fraternal order that is not accountable for its proceedings and, at the same time, as a serious grouping of sovereign states. For two decades, the non-aligned, as would-be mediator between East and West and representative of the South against the North, have directed declarations and appeals to the developed world. But to be taken seriously, the non-aligned must put forward realistic proposals and act to put their own house in order. The conflicts between Iran and Iraq, Libya and Chad, and Ethiopia and Somalia, along with some thirty other simmering wars or internecine conflicts, should no longer be ignored and neglected. But if the non-aligned must make some changes, so must the United States.

As the NAM evolved into the major Third World lobby, U.S. and Soviet approaches to it diverged, with the result that today Moscow is regarded, if not as a natural ally, as at least sympathetic, while the United States is seen as an obstacle to non-aligned aspirations. Largely by posturing, the Soviet Union has taken full advantage of the movement's anti-Western drift over the past decade. The United States, which more clearly shares the non-aligned aim of a pluralistic environment of nationalistic and independent states, has alternated between periods of rapprochement and confrontation. That in 1983 the

Richard Jackson is a Foreign Service officer whose book The Non-Aligned, the U.N. and the Superpowers, *published by Praeger last November, was written on a Chapman Cox Sabbatical year. His views do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State.*

movement continues to hold largely anti-imperialist and anti-Western views can only be seen as a serious failure of U.S. diplomacy over two decades.

The New Delhi summit occurred at an important juncture for the world economy. Although the recession in the West showed signs of abating, the developing countries still suffered from low commodity prices, high interest rates, an overall slowdown in world trade, and, in some areas, negative economic growth. Also, many of the non-aligned found themselves burdened with large debts—much of it due in the near future. Faced with a new round of trade negotiations with the West and disarray within the ranks over whether to stick with a strategy based on the U.N.-sponsored Global Negotiations, the non-aligned looked to India for the kind of leadership Algeria had exerted from 1973–76.

Yet, Indira Gandhi inherited the leadership of a movement badly fractured by three years of Cuban leadership. The overheated rhetoric of the 1979 Havana summit and its aftermath brought unsuspected contradictions to the surface for the movement's 101 members, who span all political persuasions. Castro, by interpreting the chairman's role as chief lobbyist rather than honest broker, forfeited the ability to speak for the non-aligned between East and West and antagonized the movement's moderates. His bid to link the NAM to Moscow as a "natural ally" placed in sharp relief the issue of the movement's proper relationship to the superpowers.

Both members and outsiders alike speculated that after more than three years of Cuban leadership, the New Delhi summit would bring a swing of the pendulum toward balance and a fresh approach to the standardized NAM agenda. But New Delhi broke no new ground—whether on economics, disarmament, the Mideast, or southern Africa—and criticized the United States 23 times by name.

Even before the summit, there were signs that there would not be many changes. A January meeting of the Coordinating Bureau in the closed environment of Managua was little more than a bid by Cuba to preempt the summit by adopting extremist positions on Latin America. Unable to gain endorsement for the "natural ally" thesis during its own tenure in the chair, Cuba won at least tacit acceptance of its complementary form, the United States as "natural enemy." Managua and other preparatory meetings tended to entrench existing positions, establishing limits within which issues were considered at New Delhi. Intense consultations also fueled rivalries that spilled over into acrimony and several pamphlet wars in India. Singapore, for example, labeled the Havana summit as "the lowest point of degradation" in non-aligned history and was, in turn, reviled by Cuba as a "U.S. spokesman with a Chinese accent."

SUMMIT MEETINGS of the NAM since Colombo in 1976 have struggled to reconcile essentially irreconcilable points of view, using a loose consensus as a fig leaf to preserve a semblance of non-aligned unity. New Delhi was no different, even though India put forward a relatively balanced document and intervened to defend it in only a few cases of direct national interest. From the outset it was clear that well-organized minorities within the regional groups would re-write portions of the text, although some observers might have been unprepared for the wholesale changes that finally emerged. The African, Arab, and Latin groups proved once again to be the strongest. Their decisions, reached in closed caucus, were passed along for routine approval, defying efforts to give balance or consistency to the overall package. Anti-imperialism, which Jawahar Nehru compared at the first NAM summit in 1961 to "flogging a dead horse," also remained central to the movement. The New Delhi declaration again defined the "quintessence" of nonalignment in Fidel Castro's terms as the: "...struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, *apartheid*. racism including Zionism, and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference, or hegemony as well as against great power and bloc policies tending to perpetuate the division of the world into blocs." Only issues from areas like Asia, for which no regional group exists within the NAM, received close attention by the plenary. On these, it was agreed to disagree on Kampuchea by leaving its seat vacant, to postpone decisions on the next summit still coveted by Iraq, and to make minor revisions in language on the Indian Ocean. On economic matters, the Global Negotiations were neither scrapped nor fully endorsed but downgraded to a long-term objective. An "Action Program for Economic Cooperation" contained 21 calls for separate follow-up conferences or meetings.

In the end, the New Delhi summit—which was the largest gathering of heads of state and government in world history—contained something for everyone. Indira Gandhi, having approached it more as a process than for substance, realized India's basic objectives, avoided harm to relations with either superpower, and emerged with new stature as an international leader. Moderates took comfort from the contrast with the preceding period of heavy-handed Cuban pressures. Radicals, often represented at a higher level than moderates, ensured the movement's continued anti-Western bias with harsh language on the Mideast, Central America, and southern Africa. Yet the seventh summit, the first since the Soviet occupation of non-aligned Afghanistan, failed to protest this glaring violation of non-aligned principle, failed to agree on cohesive proposals at a critical moment between North and South, and failed to unearth new ideas for the Mideast or Namibia.

It is too soon to assess fully the impact of New Delhi, and the ambiguity of its various proposals, in fact, leaves considerable flexibility for the new chair. Procedural gains, like expansion of the Coordinating Bureau to 74 members, may also have a long-term influence in freeing the movement from the radical minority that manipulated its procedures under Cuba. The demonstrated ability of regional groups to translate their own narrow objectives into those of the overall movement, nevertheless, remains a threat to the larger vision of the original founders. The very concept of a common, non-aligned foreign policy is, in the words of M.S. Rajan, "Subversive of freedom and equality among the members of the group, which is the essential foundation of non-alignment."

Summit declarations, while the most visible product of the NAM, are nevertheless probably less significant than the chair's ability to mobilize the movement into a cohesive Third World lobby. Such leverage is focused at the United Nations, where 98 non-aligned members have largely succeeded in determining the agenda and have restructured that body to suit its Third World majority. By the time the next General Assembly begins, the positions of the non-aligned will be fixed and it will be simply too late for outsiders to influence the outcome. The losers are clearly those, like the United States, who find themselves outside the transmission belt carrying resolutions from regional groups to the non-aligned plenary and on to the General Assembly. The process of consensus also telescopes responsibility back to smaller and smaller groups or even to individual countries or liberation movements. The Palestine Liberation Organization, for example, usually predominates within the Arab group, overcoming decreasing resistance from moderates at each stage.

By last year, the NAM had become, in the words of former Yugoslav Permanent Representative Miljan Komatina, "the basic influential component" at the United Nations. Simply to conduct business in New York, U.S. and Soviet officials are forced to recognize and refer regularly to the movement. The degree of U.S. concern was apparent in Jeane Kirkpatrick's letter of October 1981 to 64 members of the NAM. In the General Assembly the non-aligned vote together with a consistency of about 95 percent, whether measured against the standard of India or the poles of Cuba and Singapore. By comparison, in 1982 NATO states voted with the United States an average of 64 percent of the time, and the Warsaw Pact supported Moscow by a margin of 98.4 percent.

Nor is the Security Council immune to NAM influence. There the veto power of permanent members has been largely offset by an absolute non-aligned majority required for passage of any resolution. In 1979, non-aligned members of the council organized into a sub-group that has been increasingly effective in introducing resolutions, frustrating actions opposed by the NAM, and occasionally forcing vetoes to isolate the United States and other Western members. If India realizes its ambition of obtaining a fifth term on the council beginning in 1984, the relationship between the group of eight and the NAM chair and Coordinating Bureau will probably be more direct.

Non-aligned activism in the General Assembly and Security Council is part of an underlying struggle for institutional control. The basic incompatability between "universality"—the principle of equal participation by all sovereign states—and the concept of "special responsibility" by major world powers ensures that there will be conflict over U.N. reform, staffing, and the budget. A Charter Review Committee, established at non-aligned insistence and singled out for special support at New Delhi, is committed to limiting the veto power and role of the Security Council's permanent members. In the General Assembly, the power of the non-aligned majority to pass budgets and set assessment levels has led to massive deficits and program growth geared to the Third World. The United States and nine other developed countries, responsible for 75 percent of the budget, have voted against this trend but have been forced by charter obligations to pay anyway. By 1982, the United States was engaged in an across-the-board struggle for zero-growth budgeting to combat, in effect, a regimen for international taxation without representation.

The degree of NAM influence on the U.N. agenda and procedures was apparent in the non-aligned initiative to transform the 38th General Assembly into a special meeting of heads of state to address "problems facing the world," particularly development and disarmament. In late March, Indira Gandhi urged U.N. members to attend the 1983 UNGA at the summit level as a "collective manifestation of political will." While response from the major powers and the non-aligned themselves was less than overwhelming, the initiative demonstrates a non-aligned effort to define U.N. priorities and then determine how, when, and at what level they should be taken up by the larger body. It was also intended to renew the movement's role as mediator between East and West by promoting a first meeting between President Reagan and Secretary Andropov under NAM auspices.

The Soviet Union has encouraged and benefited from this antagonism between the non-aligned and the West, even though it shares the U.S. concern over growing budgets and assaults on the veto. Trends within the NAM, at least since the 1973 summit, have been largely inimical to the West, offering the Soviets a virtual free ride. Nonaligned attacks on Western policies toward the Mideast and southern Africa have kept the West on the defensive and diverted attention from Soviet expansionism in the Third World. Furthermore, the United States has often seemed to be complaining or cajoling on specific issues, leaving an impression of opposition or indifference, if not outright hostility, toward the NAM. At the same time, the Soviet posture of encouragement for non-aligned positions has fostered a positive image of Moscow, even though the U.S.S.R. provides less aid and trade than does the United States.

At first suspicious of states differing from its model, the Soviet Union soon realized that the anti-colonial focus of the non-aligned could be beneficial. By 1973, the Kremlin realized the movement could be used both to isolate the United States and to gain acceptance for Soviet global policy, and so attempted to sharpen further the movement's anti-colonial and anti-imperialist thrust. Soviet messages to summits of the NAM became increasingly fulsome and, at the United Nations, Moscow deliberately courted the non-aligned majority. Only ten days after his appointment, Yuri Andropov hastened to highlight Soviet support for the non-aligned in his first foreign policy speech.

Moscow's embrace of the NAM coincided with a new Soviet approach to individual members. At first, the largest and most powerful states were singled out for special attention. Countries like Egypt, India, Indonesia, and Algeria received large-scale military and economic assistance. None, however, was pre-

Gandhi, the new chairperson of the NAM, confers with Castro, the outgoing head of the movement. Many have speculated that Gandhi's leadership would bring more balance to the movement, which was badly fractured by Castro's efforts to have the Soviet Union declared the "natural ally" of the non-aligned.

pared to be used as a proxy, and so Moscow was denied a direct voice in the movement. Algeria's strong leadership from 1973–76 served Soviet interests by setting the movement on a more radical anti-Western course, but the causes lay in Algeria's liberation struggle and nationalism, not in Kremlin influence.

Cuba, however, did present an opportunity, even though during the 1960s it remained on the NAM periphery. Acute economic problems and hostility to the United States made it vulnerable to Soviet influence, and by 1982 Havana depended on the Soviets for about $4 billion a year in aid. With Cuba as its chosen instrument, Moscow broadened its efforts to include other hardcore radicals in the movement, promoting behind-the-scenes the admission in 1976 of Vietnam, North Korea, Angola, and the PLO. These efforts succeeded in widening the circle of radical members, as did the installation of "revolutionary" regimes in Ethiopia and Afghanistan. At present, the core of NAM members clustered around Cuba and dependent on Soviet aid contains about a dozen states, who can be counted on to oppose U.N. resolutions calling for troop withdrawals from Afghanistan. Not a few are directly linked to Moscow by "treaties of friendship," even though such accords are contrary to membership in the non-aligned movement.

ONCE IT HAD a reliable client state within the movement, Moscow moved to gain acceptance of an identity between Soviet and non-aligned interests. The vehicle for this was the "natural ally" thesis, first put forward by Cuba at the 1970 Lusaka summit. At Algiers three years later, Castro echoed Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev's message to the summit that the "socialist states and the Soviet Union" should be recognized as the "natural and most reliable allies" of the non-aligned. Even though this formula was never endorsed by the overall movement, Cuba's chairmanship of the NAM from 1979–83 offered Moscow an unparalleled opportunity to reinforce non-aligned positions that served its interests and downplay others.

Nevertheless, this period of maximum Soviet leverage revealed clear limits to the power of proxies. The presence of client states prepared to block consensus on issues damaging to Moscow was a major tactical advantage, but it did not provide the Soviets with broad acceptance for their positions or prevent fallout from Afghanistan and Kampuchea. Moscow's foothold in the NAM, and through it the United Nations, led some to portray the anti-American tenor of these institutions as being the result of Soviet diplomatic skill. Yet Soviet influence remains narrowly based and dependent on the loyalty of a small core of states. They have been somewhat effective in mobilizing the more passive larger group but remain outside the mainstream.

The impact of Soviet clients in non-aligned decision-making is, furthermore, likely to diminish over the three years of India's chairmanship. As if reflecting uneasiness with the prospect of change, the Kremlin conducted intense consultations with its clients before and after New Delhi. The Soviet media openly attacked India's draft declaration and railed against "the blind alley of equidistance." Moscow probably will retain a propaganda advantage over the United States as long as issues of the Mideast and southern Africa dominate the non-aligned agenda. Yet Soviet posturing among the non-aligned is little more than a low-cost strategy to compensate for the lack of resources and diplomatic leverage needed to develop broad bilateral relations with the Third World.

The U.S. approach, in contrast with the consistent Soviet one, has fluctuated between neglect, attempted rapprochement, and active confrontation. Underlying these shifts has been the same ambivalence some members exhibit toward the NAM: whether it is merely a gathering place where Third World leaders can exchange ideas without responsibility for what is said or a body of sovereign states whose declarations reflect national positions and are generally binding. If the former, U.S. policy should probably reflect a range from indifference to indulgent interest. If the latter, however, the United States should adopt a response of stricter accountability, linking performance in the NAM to relations with the United States.

The non-aligned movement has changed considerably since the initial meeting two decades ago in Belgrade, but the wide swings in U.S. policy have not necessarily been related to these changes. Some, like the Carter administration's attempted rapprochement at a moment of maximum Cuban and Soviet influence in the NAM, were poorly synchronized and stemmed from pressures within the U.S. government rather than any external reality. Policy has also been shaped by an element of perhaps unfounded optimism that

the United States as a superpower can and should play an active role in the major Third World political grouping. An erratic U.S. response is also encouraged by the NAM's pattern of holding summits every three years with relatively quiet lulls in between. If there has been a change of U.S. administration between summits, awareness of the movement tends to be diminished even further and swings of the policy pendulum greater. Faced with an impending summit of the NAM, whether in Havana, Baghdad, or New Delhi, and near certain condemnation of the United States, the usual bureaucratic response is to design a package approach intended to limit the damage and cover all contingencies. Such patchwork demarches, however, create resentment by making it appear that the United States is lecturing NAM members on what position to take.

THE U.S. POLICY toward the NAM was initially shaped by John Foster Dulles's dictum that non-alignment was "an immoral and shortsighted conception." President Kennedy sent greetings to the first summit, but its failure to take a stand on the construction of the Berlin Wall or Soviet violation of the 1958 test ban was disappointing. And, following the Bay of Pigs and Cuban missile crisis, there was only limited enthusiasm for dealing with a movement which had Cuba as a founding member. Some, no doubt, believed that the NAM would be no more than a passing phenomenon. Western neglect of the NAM ended, however, after the Algiers summit of 1973, when the developed countries were faced with concerted demands for the New International Economic Order, backed by quadrupled oil prices. The next year, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger announced that "the United States recognizes non-alignment" and that "our relations with the non-aligned countries are another pillar of our foreign policy."

So began a decade during which the United States attempted to construct an effective policy toward the non-aligned. In the first phase, Washington adopted the tactic of rebutting charges against the United States forcefully and in full. Particularly evident during the 1975–76 term of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as ambassador to the United Nations, it led to heated rhetoric and increased acrimony on both sides. In the post-Vietnam and post-Watergate period, such confrontation struck a responsive chord among some Americans, who saw it as standing up for U.S. interests against a hostile Third World majority. It failed, however, to alter the positions of the non-aligned or to bring about the movement's demise. By mid-1976, confrontation had given way to a more restrained approach based on quiet diplomacy and persuasion.

Under the Carter administration, rapprochement with the non-aligned was part of a larger effort to improve relations with the developing world and encourage awareness of human rights. Unfortunately, this effort occurred at the moment of maximum Cuban and Soviet influence. The atmosphere of the Havana summit offered no scope for the United States to affect the proceedings or moderate strident criticism of itself. In fact, increased U.S. attention to the NAM lent plausibility to Castro's adept exploitation of the Soviet brigade episode as a U.S. effort to sabotage the summit. Later in 1979, the Iranian hostage crisis and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further undermined rapprochement, leaving a foreign policy based on improved relations with the Third World vulnerable to charges of weakness and irrelevance.

In the Reagan administration, contact with the non-aligned has been largely centered at the United Nations. Initially, administration officials tried not to deal directly with or even refer to the NAM so as not to further enhance and legitimize its status. Yet after finding that the United States needed to deal with the non-aligned as a group to conduct routine U.N. business, Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick took issue with a NAM ministerial communique of September 1981 and called on 64 members to disassociate themselves from its "base lies and malicious attacks on the good name of the United States." As a one-time warning, the Kirkpatrick letter helped to persuade some members that NAM positions should be considered in a wider context, including relations with the United States, and demonstrated that Washington views NAM positions as the considered product of sovereign states.

Since that time, however, the movement has been dominated by intense jockeying for power, as the leadership has gone from Cuba to Iraq and then, by default, to India. U.S. efforts to inject moderation through regular consultations with the non-aligned have been largely extraneous to these power rivalries. Washington clearly hoped that the New Delhi meeting would herald a reassertion of centrist leadership and that, if the United States were attacked by name, Moscow would also be cited for the occupation of Afghanistan and other violations of non-aligned principle. With this expectation, President Reagan revived the practice of sending a warm message to the incoming chairman. During the summit, however, few members with whom the United States had consulted spoke up in any regional group, and the results, from a U.S. point of view, were unbalanced and unfair. Washington was again in the position of expressing disappointment with the outcome.

Neither policies of rapprochement nor confrontation appear to have had the intended effect on non-aligned behavior or attitudes. Although Washington has only a limited ability to affect NAM positions, its actions have often intensified the movement's anti-Western course and strengthened the hand of Soviet clients. Abrupt, and to outsiders arbitrary, shifts in U.S. policy have been perceived by many members as threatening and confusing and have fueled an image of the United States as Goliath.

A new U.S. approach to the non-aligned should begin by accepting that the movement is here to stay and avoid creating any pretexts for preserving its current anti-Western character. The consistency and tone of any new U.S. approach will be as important as agendas and the contents of proposals. It should stress not the divisions, but instead points of convergence between the United States and the non-aligned. Both are committed to survival of independent states in a pluralistic environment, a perspective fundamentally inconsistent with the Soviet world view. At an earlier

time, the United States went through a comparable period when survival seemed dependent on avoiding "entangling alliances." The central concept of non-alignment, articulated by Nehru as "avoiding foreign entanglements by not joining one bloc or the other," is strikingly similar. Another goal shared by revolutionary America and the non-aligned is that of avoiding economic or other forms of dependency on foreign powers.

FOR THE UNITED STATES, today the world's banker, the non-aligned preoccupation with dependence is a major challenge. A new international economic climate is beginning to develop, however, that the United States should explore, ever mindful of any convergent interests. The worldwide recession has begun to erode the consensus behind the NIEO and Global Negotiations. Economic Cooperation among Developing Countries, a program discussed at several non-aligned meetings, has the potential to reduce political instability and opportunities for outside penetration by stressing cooperation among the non-aligned in trade, technology, and other economic fields as a means of achieving development. It is no coincidence that Soviet gains have been in economically-backward Ethiopia, Cuba, and Vietnam, while self-sustaining economies in the developing world have usually been capitalist. ECDC also tends to exclude the Soviet Union even further because it has few trade links with the developing countries. The Soviet share of Third World trade reached 2 percent in 1981, compared with an estimated 19 percent for the United States. Washington, as it resumes economic dialogue with the South, should encourage those who would replace demands for unilateral transfers of resources with a sense of shared responsibility and recognition of indigenous as well as external causes for economic failure.

The United States has of course been isolated from the non-aligned over issues where interests may not be so congruent—the Mideast, Namibia, and reducing the $600–800 billion spent annually on arms while basic human needs remain unfulfilled. Nonetheless, the United States should endorse rather than cut short the airing of differences, encouraging the non-aligned to grapple with basic problems that cannot be solved without cost and sacrifice. Solutions to these problems are vital to the United States and have been pursued by both Republican and Democratic administrations. In some cases, the United States has assumed a position of global responsibility for situations, like those in the Mideast and southern Africa, where it cannot control the course of events. This responsibility both limits Washington's ability to posture for non-aligned support and entails opprobrium when intractable problems do not yield to quick solutions. Nevertheless, for the United States to challenge agendas or terms of reference before substantive issues are fully aired permits critics to take refuge in rhetoric, criticism, and bloc positions. By failing to engage in debate, the United States also concedes a monopoly for discussion of all world problems to those convinced of Western guilt.

The United States should seek broader communication with the non-aligned, rather than depending on cultivating individual countries within the movement. In the past, rapprochement has been based on the assumption that moderate members, friendly to the United States, would take an active role in defending U.S. interests. Washington, however, could not achieve and has not sought the tight control exercised by Moscow over its clients. After New Delhi, some commented that the United States should have "arranged" for countries to speak in its defense, but such arrangements are easier when the relationship is authoritarian. Furthermore, they are profoundly subversive of the NAM. To be sure, Cuba and the Soviet Union have branded states like Singapore, Pakistan, Egypt, Zaire, or Morocco as proxies of the United States, but their performances do not support this charge. In the U.N. General Assembly their positions coincided with those of the United States less than 30 percent of the time during 1982, while Vietnam voted with Moscow 98.2 percent of the time, Laos 97.7 percent, Afghanistan 95.3 percent, and Cuba 93.5 percent.

The issue for U.S. policymakers is not creation of Soviet-style assets, but a longer term approach aimed at ameliorating anti-colonial attitudes by reducing unnecessary areas of conflict and strengthening the movement's tendency toward genuine non-alignment. India will provide reassurance and continuity for members who had begun under Cuba to question the basic premises of the movement, but to remain relevant to its diverse membership, the NAM will need to re-examine its mandate in a multipolar world, one quite different from the cold war setting in which non-alignment evolved. It is in the U.S. interest that it do so, escaping in the process the present corrosive time-warp of anti-colonialism. The United States will also need to seek closer relations with leading non-aligned states, like India or Algeria, which shape the movement's course. In both the NAM and the United Nations, alert diplomacy with individual countries or regional groups can help set the larger course. In both institutions, process itself remains important and can still change perceptions on both sides, eroding ideology with a sense of the world's infinite complexity. □

Gandhi addresses the New Delhi summit. U.S. and non-aligned interests in the world economy seem to be converging and may provide a suitable basis for creating better understanding between ourselves and the NAM.

A Sense of Institution

Esprit de corps requires a corps, but the Foreign Service lacks a strong central identity

JACK PERRY

I AM PROUD to have been a Foreign Service officer. I am glad I spent 24 years in the Service before retiring recently. As a way of life, the Foreign Service is incomparable. It provided me and my wife and our children with access to the world, making us witnesses to history, granting us the privilege of participation in our time.

Unfortunately, though, even after all these years I am not fully sure just what the Foreign Service is, or where it stands, or how I can express my gratitude and loyalty. I remember the embassies where I served as tangible, identifiable things; I remember Foggy Bottom clearly enough; but grasping the Foreign Service, explaining what it is, understanding what makes it work—this is hard. As a way of life, the Foreign Service is admirable; as an institution, it is hard to pin down.

During my career, which began in 1959, I saw the cohesiveness and the identity of the Foreign Service dereriorate. The line between the State Department and Foreign Service became harder to draw as departmental needs devoured Service needs. When I came in, it was possible to say, "I'm not 'State Department,' I'm a 'Foreign Service officer of the United States.' " It has become much harder to make that assertion. Also, other, non–State Department Foreign Services grew up while the original dwindled in numbers and in power. Indeed, today we have a unified Foreign Service under law, one composed not just of people from the Department of State, but personnel from AID, USIA, Commerce, and Agriculture as well.

What has not changed is the high quality of the people who make up the Service. Now that I am retired—albeit somewhat biased still—perhaps I can utter publicly my belief that our diplomats are unbeatable. The privilege of working alongside such people is the best thing the Service gives us. Let me adduce the testimony of two knowledgeable men who approach the Service from totally different angles. In the Spring 1979 issue of *Foreign Affairs,* Laurence H. Silberman, a former political ambassador and frequent critic of the Service, said: "The Foreign Service does attract, on the whole, the ablest men and women who enter government." And Cyrus Vance said in his book *Hard Choices,* "Although it is small in number of personnel and budget, the State Department contains probably the most able and dedicated professional group in the federal government." Such high appraisals are confirmed by the fantastically high ratio of those applying for the Foreign Service to those who actually get in—on the order of a hundred to one—and by the generally high esteem in which individual FSOs are held throughout government.

The problem lies in translating this high quality of people into an institution of equal quality. FSOs for many years have heard the popular cliche "They're great separately but put them all together and something doesn't work." As an organization, as an institution, we are found lacking. Yet, why is the Foreign Service, so strong in good people, so apparently feeble as an institution?

First, fundamental reality attaches to the State Department, not to the Foreign Service. The secretary of state heads the Department of State, not the Foreign Service. In terms of administration, budget, and political power, things are organized through the department, while the Service is often thought of as an amorphous appendage occupied with staffing missions abroad. State is not alone in this of course; AID and USIA share many of the same characteristics, and the Foreign Service in these agencies is similarly amorphous. If I seem to concentrate on the State Department it is because that is the environment with which I am most familiar.

Most secretaries of state and other senior officials, should they ponder the question, would probably wonder why any importance is attached to the distinction between the State Department and the Foreign Service. By way of reply, I might point to the somewhat analogous existence of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy, and suggest asking any Marine whether it is important to distinguish between the two. Institutional identity and loyalty do matter. If we are going to be Foreign Service people, we need a strong *institution*—"the Foreign Service"—to which we can belong. If it is seen as fictitious, or lacking solidity, those belonging to it lose in respect and in self-respect. The distinction *does* matter.

Second, I fear there is little serious and sustained interest at the top of the State Department and other foreign affairs agencies in the welfare of the Foreign Service as an institution. The frantic pace and unbelievable pressure endured by secretaries of state and

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their top assistants make merely keeping abreast of foreign policy from crisis to crisis a major achievement, and make creation of long-range policies—much less attention to the organizational underpinning of them—a luxury if not a fantasy. Secretaries of state *care* about the Service in the abstract, but they are far too busy to give much time to developing and srrengthening the Service itself, except of course for an occasional ceremonial pat. The secretary of defense, like the secretary of state, is frantically keeping up with policy needs as events break, as congressional testimony gobbles up the hours, as crises loom. But he can leave matters like morale and manpower and institutional care to the individual armed services secretaries and the chiefs of staff. The secretary of state cannot do this. His one service, even if minuscule by comparison, is integrated into his department and has no separate identity or genuinely distinct adminisrration.

THERE IS OF COURSE the director-general of the Foreign Service. In principle this should be the institution-building and institution-upholding post. But in practice, he or she has been mainly occupied with personnel direction, leaving all too little time for the task of *leading* the Service. Directors-general care immensely about the institution, but they seem to have been too boxed in by day-to-day management demands to have been able to devote much energy to improving the institution.

The truly vital administrative post in State is, of course, under secretary for management. During my career every incumbent seemed to work as hard as possible for the secretary and his immediate needs, with only secondary or tertiary attention to the needs of the Service. We were perpetually short-changed, as a simple matter of priorities. But perhaps this will change, for the news that two career officers, Roy Atherton and Ronald Spiers, are the new director-general and new undersecretary for management is cheering. Hope springs up that attention to the institutional needs of the Service will intensify.

Third, in diplomacy the spoils system is still in effect. If the president appointed a number of non-military men as commanders of regiments or as aircraft carrier captains, there would be an outcry, but Americans are so accustomed to seeing diplomatic assignments go to non-professionals that they hardly raise an eyebrow. FSOs raise eyebrows, of course. They recognize that the heart of the career system is stolen when over a third of the ambassadorial appointments, and most of the key departmental assignments, go to non-career people. Whether we can create a self-respecting institution as long as this relic from the past remains our national habit is indeed doubtful.

Fourth, men and women who become diplomats tend to be individualists, not team-players; skeptics, not true believers. The kind of loyalty and obedience the Marine Corps inculcates is neither desirable nor attainable in the diplomatic service. In *Hard Choices,* Cyrus Vance wrote that FSOs have "a strong sense of corporate identity." As much as I dislike disagreeing with a former boss whom I admire greatly, I would argue that FSOs actually have a strong sense of identity as *individuals,* bur a weak and weakening sense of belonging to a strong institution. There is some truth to the old accusation that Service people have strong loyalty upwards but little or no loyalty downwards. Being politically savvy, FSOs identify with the policy goals of each administration; lacking attachment to the Service as a continuing body, they downplay the importance of caring for the group as a whole. When key jobs come open, for example, FSOs at the top may push for the appointment of an outsider to satisfy domestic political needs, even if a well-qualified FSO is available. It does not occur to them that their lack of institutional loyalty harms the collectivity that should represent foreign policy professionalism. In this sense, many Foreign Service officers have sophisticated rhemselves right out of the defense of their own profession.

Fifth, there is little evidence of a Foreign Service lobby. No doubt it is unfair to compare us with the military (and the retired military), who have such numbers and such clout, both with Congress and with those in current command. But aside from fewness, FSOs evidence a curious reluctance to stand up and fight for their common interests. Most FSOs do not even attempt to build any ties to Congress, either as individuals or as a collective—this is a serious mistake.

In fact the Service has something to offer Congress and the country—expertness in foreign affairs—and this is an enormously saleable and usable commodity, if FSOs worked at selling it. There is, true enough, an idealistic streak in many FSOs which makes self-promotion, or even Service-promotion, hateful. I respect the idealism, but in the American system, those who do not protect their interests are quickly forgotten. With the press, with the public, with Congress, we need to make our interests better known and defend them more energetically.

We often take the welfare of the Service as an institution for granted. Yet it requires more attention and more active support than that. We must think long and hard about the kind of instirution we want the Foreign Service to be and to become.

SOME WOULD SAY that the American Foreign Service Association is already safeguarding rhe Foreign Service as an institution, and of course, what AFSA does is crucial. But deciding exactly what AFSA should try to do, now and in the future, is not easy.

When I joined in 1959, AFSA was dedicated to furthering diplomatic professionalism. It was something of an old-boy network with a certain amount of prestige, and it tried to rub some of that prestige off on the Service it represented. AFSA lunches at the Shoreham, for example, were notable affairs—for a new FSO-8 like me, hearing President Kennedy and Dean Acheson and Walter Lippmann was a heady experience.

If, however, we ask the hard question of how successful the old AFSA was in furthering Service interests and prestige, I for one would have to answer

UNFORTUNATELY, I AM NOT FULLY SURE JUST WHAT THE FOREIGN SERVICE IS, OR WHERE IT STANDS, OR HOW I CAN SHOW MY GRATITUDE AND LOYALTY. GRASPING THE FOREIGN SERVICE, EXPLAINING WHAT IT IS, UNDERSTANDING WHAT MAKES IT WORK—THIS IS HARD.

THOSE WHO BECOME DIPLOMATS ARE INDIVIDUALISTS, NOT REAL TEAM-PLAYERS; SKEPTICS, NOT TRUE BELIEVERS. FSOs LACK ATTACHMENT TO THE SERVICE AS A CONTINUING BODY. THEY ARE RELUCTANT TO STAND UP AND FIGHT FOR THEIR COMMON INTERESTS.

candidly, "Not too much." Somehow AFSA lost some of its relevance to the hard decisions being made by State Department administrators. What is more, Service needs, as perceived by the majority of its members, were changing: the members wanted more defense of their interests, more help in battling the octopus of what came to be called "Management." Old-fashioned folk called this new trend "trade unionism," but it seemed to be what many members wanted. (As one who was helped greatly by AFSA in successfully carrying out a grievance case when the department tried to do me out of a large sum of money, I cannot in all conscience knock AFSA's "trade unionism," even though my old-fashioned views predispose me towards the professional association approach.)

If the Foreign Service is to regain its old prestige, however, and win new respect by government and by the public, it requires more than a labor union; it requires an organization to hold up its professional standards and make the diplomatic profession known and respected and, yes, used. Today, a shift in emphasis toward professional advocacy is needed; a move away from defense of individual interests to promotion of overall Service welfare and reputation. I, for one, would like to see AFSA renew and expand itself, following a larger vision of what the Foreign Service can mean to the country.

The Foreign Service—and that means all of us (and not just AFSA)—should not only be equal to any demands the country may place upon it and capable of carrying heavy professional and personal burdens, it must also have pride and self-confidence in its mission. Only then will it be able to convey that pride and self-confidence to the president and to the country. Members of the Foreign Service would not be ashamed to defend their organization as important to U.S. national interests, and therefore worth defending against bureaucratic rivals and the onslaughts of domestic politics. Foreign Service people would expect the Congress and the public to recognize their profession as arduous, hazardous, and demanding of self-sacrifice. In return for these sacrifices, they would ask that the integrity of the diplomatic service be respected. Members of the Foreign Service would look on their institution not as a mere section of a foreign affairs agency, or as a way-station on the way from one job to another, or as a dispensable adjunct to certain policy functions; they would look on it as a distinct body, a professional group with a unique purpose and outlook, a way of life with peculiar demands and satisfactions. It would be composed of men and women proud of their distinction from those in domestic policy positions, dedicated to serving both at home and abroad, as needed. The institution we must work toward would embody and make worthwhile the dignified old term "a diplomatic career."

This institution would be recognized by the president, the Congress, the press, and most importantly the public as the organization charged with carrying out the nation's foreign policy on a continuing basis. Able and eager to carry out any president's policies, it would identify constant national interests and present them to our leaders in such a way that U.S. foreign policy might gain some needed steadfastness.

It would be an institution dedicated to professionalism, to the art of managing relations among states by negotiation, with the background and experience necessary to understand the viewpoint of the foreigner across the table. If the Foreign Service could fulfill the function of helping the president and other policymakers, even at times the public, see world problems through eyes other than our own, it would be rendering one of its greatest services. As such it would go beyond the immediate to the long-term national interest and would foster a broader view of international affairs.

That, no doubt in idealistic terms, is the kind of Foreign Service institution we should seek to have. To do the job the Foreign Service of the future should do, the kind of dedication more usually associated with the Marine Corps will be needed. But is this realistic? Can the Foreign Service as an institution be revived? As one who loves the institution, I hope so, even as I recognize that the process will not be easy. Let me offer a few suggestions from my limited personal perspective and express the hope that others interested in the welfare of the Service will come forward with other and better ideas.

OUR FIRST TASK IS to admit that there is a problem and that we could be doing better than we are at fostering the Foreign Service. We FSOs have been penetrating enough with our criticism in private—Why so many incompetent political ambassadors? Why no high-level defense of Foreign Service interests? Why no more concern for the troops?—but in public we have been rather mealy-mouthed, pretending that everything was working out. When I was an FSO-8 and on the editorial board of the JOURNAL, I wrote a strong editorial saying that the creation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was a mistake—it had just been proposed by President Kennedy—because it would separate an essential diplomatic function and damage the coherence and integrity of the Foreign Service. The board chairman curtly dismissed my draft, saying one did not question the president on such a matter, and he may have been right. But I think my instinct for defending the Service was not misguided, and I would like to see more of that instinct in myself and in others today. Secretary Vance earnestly fought the shabby political dealings that resulted in the tearing away of commercial functions, but I do not recall that the Foreign Service was very vocal or effective in defending its own interests. So the first thing we must do is holler louder and fight harder for our own interests.

As a means of recognizing the problems that exist, and making a start toward attacking them, it might be well to name a commission. The technique has perhaps been overdone and abused in foreign policy lately, but it can work splendidly. While serving in Stockholm, I was enormously impressed at how ably the Swedes used the commission as a way of focusing public attention on a problem and advocating solutions. Publicizing the problems of the Foreign Service, including the crying need for de-politicization, could be done in a valuable manner by a prestigious

commission. (The recently-announced Academy for American Diplomacy may well be a suitable instrument.) Such a commission should probably include both public and private members, both present and former diplomats, as well as non-diplomats. It should have a broad mandate: to examine the state of the Foreign Service as an institution, to identify problem areas, to suggest avenues toward solutions. It should not necessarily propose legislation—I am jaundiced enough to think that new legislation usually hurts more than it helps, and that our needs lie deeper than new legal measures—but it should be ready to wound sacred cows when necessary.

Second, nothing is more important than having the top administrators interested in promoting the Foreign Service. Fortunately, the present leadership constellation is auspicious. We should attempt to liberate the director-general so he or she can function as the genuine head of the Foreign Service. This would mean ruthlessly freeing the post from some other duties. Despite valiant efforts by recent directors-general, all of whom I have admired, we seem to have gone backwards in developing a stronger institution, partly because that position was too consumed by details unconnected with the primary task of leading the Service. Having a director-general who could symbolize the identity of the Service might help turn this around, but it would necessitate a change in the department's administrative lineup. If such a change proved infeasible, perhaps we should create a new, additional position of head of the Service. This person would give full-time attention to institutional—as opposed to individual personnel—needs. But it would be best to free the director-general to function as the title implies.

Third, could retired FSOs be organized into an effective lobbying body, similar to the retired military? I am too newly retired to know much about current organization and activities, but my impression from inside the Service has been that neither active nor retired FSOs have been grouped into a body capable of doing effective lobbying on the Service's behalf. FSOs would have to support such an effort with time and money—which, considering our individualism, may be a lot to expect. But it needs doing. Very recently the alumni of the Executive Seminar in National and International Affairs (the old senior seminar) formed an alumni organization, which may have considerable potential as a group for promoting Service interests. More activity in that direction is needed.

Fourth, why cannot the Foreign Service have a building to call its own? The State Department, even including the Foreign Service Lounge, does not suffice. If a building could be erected in Foggy Bottom, to include the Lounge and serve as a center for Foreign Service activities and ceremonies, it would be a focal point for building up the institution. Including money for such a building in State's budget would prove our administrators' interest in the Service, and give our congressional representatives a chance to show they care about a professional service.

When one visits the Pentagon, one is struck by the paintings and photographs lining the corridors, celebrating the contribution our armed forces have made to the history of our country. At State, we have portraits of former secretaries of state on the seventh floor and splendid public rooms on the eighth, but nothing celebrating the Service at all, unless one counts the list in the lobby of those who died in service. Few of the illustrious American diplomats of the past and little of the contribution made by the Service to our country's history is recognized. The department's inner exhibit area near the cafeteria is a beginning, but the exhibitions have been oriented toward the department, not the Service. Perhaps we should institute a Foreign Service Hall of Honor. Such a place of history and of recognition, in either a new Foreign Service building or the State Department, would help make Service traditions meaningful.

FINALLY, DIPLOMACY has traditionally recognized the value of symbols and ceremonies. Yet the Foreign Service has done little. Perhaps there should be a Foreign Service flag or an insignia that would identify members of the Service? Ambassadors and former ambassadors would probably appreciate having some small symbol, such as a lapel pin or rosette, in recognition of their contribution. As small as these suggestions may sound, a more imaginative use of symbols might help create the sense of belonging to a lasting institution.

Similarly, more attention to ceremonies might be helpful. Some things are done well, such as the swearing-in of new ambassadors, but we could take a leaf from the military and do considerably more. Most other diplomatic services do a lot with ceremony (often, unfortunately, in lieu of pay), and this is not without importance. Retirement, which is made much of in the military, is treated as a non-event in the Foreign Service. Yet it could be an opportunity to consolidate the FSO's sense of attachment for life. A letter from the secretary or director-general might be appropriate and may well serve this purpose. Ceremony could be used in various ways to underline the importance of diplomacy as a career.

The above ideas are only a beginning. Most FSOs could contribute better ones if they were asked, and they should be. All of us need to to work to convince the president, the Congress, the press, and the public of the importance of this outfit called the Foreign Service. A great deal of fresh respect was shown to the Service after the Teheran hostage ordeal. As I speak to audiences, I find a great amount of interest in the Service—and admiration for work done under trying circumstances, especially in light of today's terrorism. We should build on this interest and respect and launch a campaign to demonstrate what the Foreign Service means to the country.

In leaving the Foreign Service—to the extent one can leave what has become a way of life—I feel an increased sense of loyalty, and a desire to see it grow stronger. *Esprit de corps* requires a corps, and the Foreign Service, in the sense of feeling institutional pride and loyalty, does not have enough of one. Considering all the Service has given to those of us privileged to serve in it, perhaps collectively we can think of ways to repay our debt and help build the stronger Foreign Service of the future. □

IDEALLY, THE INSTITUTION WOULD BE SEEN NOT AS A MERE SECTION OF A FOREIGN AFFAIRS AGENCY, OR AS A DISPENSABLE ADJUNCT TO CERTAIN POLICY FUNCTIONS. THE INSTITUTION WOULD EMBODY AND MAKE WORTHWHILE THE DIGNIFIED OLD TERM 'A DIPLOMATIC CAREER.'

Bargaining Chips

Their only use is to bluff Congress and our allies in the arms control poker game

Jane M. O. Sharp

In early February, with all arms control talks between the superpowers suspended, it was somewhat ironic to hear Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger justifying the more controversial items in his $305 billion budget request in terms of their usefulness as bargaining chips in negotiations with the Soviet Union. Ironic, but predictable, since the promise of future arms agreements has long been the rationale of last resort for military programs that could not otherwise gain congressional authorization and funding.

Thus, Weinberger has been saying that nuclear modernization efforts are linked firmly to our arms control objectives. The provocatively accurate but highly vulnerable MX missile was justified as "essential...to encourage the Soviet Union to negotiate arms reductions." A new generation of anti-satellite weapons—which threatens the ability of both the United States and the Soviet Union to monitor each other's compliance with existing treaties and further undermines an already fragile arms control regime—is linked to a hypothetical anti-satellite weapon agreement. Binary nerve gas munitions, which most legislators find morally repugnant, are rationalized as providing "inducement for [the Soviets] to join us and the rest of the world in a comprehensive, verifiable, chemical weapons ban."

If past experience is any guide, the bargaining-chip rationale will be persuasive with many legislators, largely because so few trouble to check the record abour how effective all this extra bargaining strength has been in negotiating arms agreemenrs with the Soviet Union. The record shows that bargaining chips have seldom if ever been cashed in, and demonstrations of restraint rather than threats to play high cards have had more success in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table.

In the past, bargaining chips have appeared in several variants. Most often the case is made in general terms of the need to bargain from strength and to increase U.S. leverage on the Soviets, either to initiate negotiations or to encourage more serious bargaining once talks are underway. Occasionally, however, the claim is more concrete, that a certain system is required to exact specific concessions from the other side, or even as a contingency that will be needed if negotiations fail.

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From 1969 through 1971, for instance, the bargaining rationale was the crucial factor in persuading the Senate to approve the Safeguard anti-ballistic-missile system. Roundly condemned as ineffective by the technical community, and as dangerously destabilizing by arms control proponents, the ABM was nevertheless authorized and funded, albeit at minimum levels, because the Nixon administration insisted on deployment as a bargaining chip for SALT I. Missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles had a similar potential to destabilize mutual deterrence, yet these systems also were eased through the budget process by the bargaining rationale. In requesting funds for the MIRV testing program in 1968, Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford argued that an "ongoing MIRV test series would provide added leverage for these [impending] SALT talks." The following year, John Foster, director of defense research and engineering, suggested that testing was necessary because the prospect of a MIRV test ban would encourage the U.S.S.R. to accept limits on its primitive ABM systems around Moscow and Leningrad.

Given this logic, once Soviet ABMs were limited by SALT I, the United States should have been prepared to renounce MIRV, but by then the commitment to deploy had too much inertia. The supposed bargaining chip instead ended up as part of the permanent U.S. arsenal. Even before actual deployment, once it had been tested MIRV lost its trade-away potential because the U.S.S.R. then sought technological parity before accepting limits on analogous systems of its own. Multiple warheads thus became parr of the Soviets' arsenal too. Even former members of the Nixon administration now admit that MIRV was a bargaining chip that backfired, since Soviet MIRVs now may threaten our land-based forces.

Often the bargaining chip argument is little more than a figleaf for a weapon system that the administration has already promised the military, sometimes in exchange for the service chiefs' support for limits elsewhere. This appears to have been the case with the Trident missile in the early 1970s. This sysrem was essentially the price of Admiral Thomas Moorer's acquiescence to unequal limits for U.S. and Soviet strategic launchers in SALT I, yet was presented to Congress as a potential trade-off in SALT II. Perhaps the most outrageous counrerfeir bargaining chip of all is the MX missile. Promised to the Joint Chiefs by the Carter administration for their support of SALT II, the

early, race-track version of MX was denounced by outraged citizens and government alike in the proposed deployment areas of Utah and Nevada. Repackaged by the Reagan administration as the Dense Pack, MX was defeated by the House of Representatives in 1982. MX got a third chance when it was resurrected as the "Peacekeeper" and justified as a bargaining chip for START by the Scowcroft commission, whose mandate was to restructure MX in a form acceptable to the Congress. The last U.S. negotiating position before the talks were suspended, however, seemed designed to retain rather than trade MX.

A similar bargaining rationale was invoked to make the case for deploying long-range ground-launched cruise missiles and intermediate-range Pershing II missiles in Europe. The implication here was that the new missiles might never need to be deployed but were necessary bargaining leverage to persuade the U.S.S.R. to limit its SS-20 missiles targeted on Western Europe. It was clear from the outset, however, that the NATO defense officials who cooked up the "double-track decision" in 1979 never had any intention of relinquishing the deployment track.

The MX missile provides perhaps the best example of a counterfeit bargaining chip. Justified as a negotiating tool, it has gone through three incarnations: as a race-track system, Dense Pack, and, currently, as "Peacekeeper."

NOTHING IN THE HISTORY of East-West arms control efforts since World War II, nor at the naval disarmament conferences of the 1920s and 1930s, suggests that weapons acquired to beef up negotiating strength are in fact effective bargaining chips. They will not bring recalcitrant adversaries to the negotiating table more quickly, soften their bargaining positions, be canceled in exchange for the other side's cashing in weapon systems, or facilitate the conclusion of agreements not otherwise negotiable. On the contrary, coercive bargaining tactics will more often delay the start of serious bargaining by the adversary, toughen the other side's negotiating position, remain part and parcel of the permanent arsenal, and ensure that any agreement concluded will be at higher force levels than would otherwise have been possible.

When pressed for evidence of bargaining chips that have worked, proponents always point to the Safeguard ABM. Without congressional funding for the ABM, so the argument goes, the Soviets would not have been willing to sign the ABM Treaty in 1972, or accept limits on the SS-9 ICBMs in the interim agreement on offensive missiles. The evidence, however, is far from conclusive. What is indisputable is that the SALT I negotiations provided the diplomatic rationale for a system that the technical community had condemned. Several senators testified to Gerard Smith's powers of persuasion on that point, and Smith himself, in his history of SALT I, acknowledges feeling squeamish about his role in the 1970 Safeguard vote. Alton Frye, who was an aide to Senator Edward Brooke during the ABM debates of the late 1960s and early 1970s, saw Safeguard as a stumbling block hindering SALT rather than as a helpful bargaining chip. Frye and others have argued that we might have had an ABM treaty earlier and an agreement limiting offensive missiles at much lower levels if the Nixon administration had not insisted on a minimum ABM deployment.

It seems just as plausible, therefore, to argue that Soviet interest in an ABM treaty lay in the technical inadequacies of their own systems and because widespread American opposition to Safeguard since early 1969 provided reassurance that ABM was not likely to be a category of weapons in which the Soviets would have to struggle to maintain parity. Indeed, the significance, for the Soviet Union, of the 1970 congressional vote on Safeguard may have been the denial of the full 12-site system rather than approval of the two sites in the northern Midwest.

To suggest that evidence of American restraint is more likely to facilitate agreements with the Soviets than a show of resolve goes against the conventional wisdom but is consistent with two other important cases. It was President Kennedy's announcement of a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing in 1963 that broke the impasse in the test ban negotiations and led to the Limited Test Ban Treaty. And it was President Nixon's unilateral renunciation of both the possession and the development of biological weapons in 1969—

the most comprehensive disarmament measure yet undertaken by any U.S. administration—that laid the groundwork for the multilateral Biological Weapons Convention concluded in 1972.

As DEBATE ON THE BUDGET for fiscal year 1985 proceeds, legislators would do well to review the impact of our weapons acquisition process on Soviet arms control and defense planning. Two recent cases—the authorization of intermediate-range missiles for Europe and the denial of funding for binary nerve gas, also destined for Europe—illustrate both the perils of the coercive bargaining approach and the benefits of American restraint.

NATO's 1979 double-track decision—to deploy and at the same time try to limit U.S. medium-range missiles in western Europe—was rationalized on two grounds: to reassure the allies, particularly the West Germans, of the American security guarantee under conditions of U.S.-Soviet strategic parity, and to provide some incentive for the U.S.S.R. to negotiate limits on its SS-20s, which were replacing the obsolete medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted on Western Europe.

The domestic polarization in the five European countries whose leaders agreed to accept the new missiles, as well as the new lows to which confidence in American leadership and allegiance to NATO have fallen, shows the fallacy of the first argument. But what effect did the double-track decision have on Soviet willingness to negotiate, and on the U.S.S.R.'s bargaining tactics? It should be recalled that during the SALT II negotiations both sides agreed to deal with limits on medium-range systems—cruise missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft on the American side, the SS-20 and the Backfire and other medium-range bombers on the Soviet side—in the SALT III negotiations expected to follow immediately after the conclusion of SALT II. After Helmut Schmidt expressed concern that Soviet and American eagerness to limit long-range missile threats to each other had left the Soviet medium-range threat to Europe unconstrained, President Leonid Brezhnev traveled to Bonn in 1978 to assure the West German chancellor that SS-20 limits would be on the SALT III agenda.

As NATO debated possible hardware responses to the SS-20 through 1978 and 1979, Soviet and Eastern European leaders grew visibly alarmed. In an obvious effort to preempt a NATO deployment decision, Brezhnev offered late in 1979 to reduce the level of Soviet medium-range missiles and begin negotiations immediately on this category of weapons—on condition no new medium-range NATO systems were deployed. At the time, there were 81 SS-20s and approximately 250 older SS-4 and SS-5 missiles targeted on Western Europe. Brezhnev then sweetened the offer with a unilateral gesture, withdrawing 1000 Soviet tanks and 20,000 Soviet troops from East Germany.

NATO could have cashed in the cruise and Pershing II then, in exchange for a freeze or even reductions on the SS-20, but instead alliance leaders formalized their double-track decision two months later. Even those who earlier had opposed the new missiles as militarily unnecessary now argued that a deployment decision was necessary to maintain alliance cohesion. The NATO deployment package was tempered with an offer to include the new systems in SALT III and a promise to remove one old warhead for each new cruise and Pershing II warhead deployed. In addition, Brezhnev's unilateral gesture was matched by the withdrawal of 1000 obsolete American warheads from the NATO stockpile of 7000 in Western Europe.

Nevertheless, the Soviets denounced the double-track decision, claiming the basis for their earlier offer had been undermined by such coercive tactics. Schmidt eventually persuaded Brezhnev to change his mind, and bilateral talks were begun in late 1980 but were suspended for a year after President Carter lost his bid for reelection. The result of the double-track decision, therefore, was a two-year hiatus in serious talks during which the U.S.S.R. tripled the SS-20 threat to Western Europe (eventually imposing a unilateral moratorium at 243 missiles in March 1982) and also built up a force of approximately 100 SS-20s targeted on Asia.

At the INF talks, the Soviets first offered to reduce their three-warhead SS-20s targeted on Western Europe to no more than the number of NATO missiles targeted on the Soviet Union—i.e., from 243 to 162, the existing component of British and French medium-range strategic missiles. Last October, the U.S.S.R. offered to reduce SS-20s west of 80 degrees longitude to about 140 based on a British and French *warhead* count of 434. Soviet negotiator Yuri Kvitsinsky's final, if unofficial, offer in November suggested reductions to 120. Thus, the last Soviet offer before their negotiators walked out on the various arms talks in response to the actual deployment in Europe of the cruise and Pershing II—and the best offer since the double-track decision—was not as good a bargain as might have been had when the U.S.S.R. offered to negotiate in 1979.

Last July, a congressional amendment to defer deployment of the cruise and Pershing II by one year to give the negotiations more time was defeated by more than three to one, largely on the grounds that a delay would undermine the U.S. negotiating position. Deployment of cruise and Pershing II to Britain, Italy, and West Germany began on schedule last December and—as promised—the Soviets walked out of both INF and START, lifted their 20-month-old moratorium on new SS-20 missiles targeted on Western Europe, deployed new nuclear-capable systems in East Germany and Czechoslovakia, and increased the deployment of sea-based nuclear missiles within a 10-minute flight time of the United States.

Thus, in stark contrast to the claims made in 1979 that the double-track decision would be an effective bargaining chip, production of the cruise and Pershing II missiles delayed the start of serious INF negotiations by more than two years and toughened the Soviet negotiating position at the talks. Once deployed, the new NATO missiles led to a breakdown of both INF and START negotiations and unleashed Soviet countermeasures which put not only both halves of Europe but also the continental United States at greater risk.

THROUGH THE 1950s and 1960s, the United States maintained four nerve gas production facilities and produced tens of thousands of tons of lethal agents, including millions of gas munitions. When President Nixon renounced biological weapons in 1969, however, he also imposed a unilateral moratorium on the production of new chemical weapons. As noted earlier a multilateral Biological Weapons Convention was signed in 1972, and at the 1974 Moscow summit, Nixon and Brezhnev also agreed to open bilateral negotiations aimed at a ban on chemical weapons. This commitment was reaffirmed when President Ford met with Brezhnev in Vladivostock the following November, and technical consultations were first held in 1976. More formal bilateral negotiations began under the Carter administration in 1977 and continued through 1980.

At the same time, however, the Army's Chemical Corps had been promoting binary nerve gas munitions on the grounds that they would be safer to store than currently deployed chemical munitions. These munitions have two relatively harmless agents designed to mix into a lethal compound when a shell is fused or a bomb armed. Though a federal facility in Pine Bluffs, Arkansas, was set aside for binary gas production in 1973, to date Congress has denied production funds, and in 1975 it prohibited the production of any lethal chemical agents without presidential certification that such production was essential to the national interest. Neither Ford nor Carter made such a determination, and both regularly deleted the Army's request for funds for the Pine Bluffs facility.

The case against resuming production of nerve gas—on military, moral, political, and economic grounds—is overwhelming. These are weapons which kill horribly and indiscriminately. They would likely kill many civilians for every military casualty, since soldiers in combat would probably be wearing protective clothing. The artillery shells and Bigeye bombs for which the binaries are destined are essentially untested munitions. Most Western Europeans are opposed to chemical weapons, and the West German government will not even permit its troops to participate in training exercises. Just as with the neutron bomb, if binaries are produced they would most likely not be permitted in Europe but would remain in storage in the United States. Finally, production of new chemical weapons would abrogate what appears to have been a 15-year tacit Soviet-American moratorium on the production of new chemical weapons, undermine the considerable progress in recent chemical weapons talks, and could also generate a new round of production in the Soviet Union.

The Reagan administration did not resume bilateral chemical talks on taking office in 1981, nor since, though chemical arms control talks continue as the principal agenda item at the multilateral Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, in which both superpowers participate. In addition, in 1982 at the second U.N. Special Session on Disarmament, the Soviets presented a chemical weapons treaty that embodied the progress achieved at bilateral talks with the Carter administration, including, for example, provisions for on-site inspection.

The Pershing II, it was argued, would provide the bargaining leverage needed to persuade the Soviets to limit its SS-20 missiles. However, NATO officials seem to have intended to deploy whether or not the bargaining strategy succeeded.

Despite this manifest Soviet interest in a chemical weapons treaty, the Reagan administration has claimed in its last three budget reports that funds for binary nerve gas production are necessary to persuade the U.S.S.R. to negotiate seriously. Secretary of State Shultz, for example, in a letter inserted into the *Congressional Record* by John Tower, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, claimed: "As long as the Soviets are assured that the United States will do nothing to improve or even maintain its chemical weapon deterrent capability, they will have little incentive to conclude a verifiable ban. An effective deterrent capability should help convince the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously."

THE UNITED STATES does of course maintain a huge chemical weapons deterrent in its existing stockpiles which, according to the Army's Field Attillery School manual, are considered 33 percent more effective and credible than the proposed binary munitions. In Congress, the fight against the binary program has been led by Senator David Pryor and Representative Ed Bethune, both from Arkansas—a significant reversal of legislators' normal instinct to attract defense funds to their home states. Given the weakness of the case for the new binaries, the Reagan administration has had to press the U.S. delegate to the Committee on Disarmament, Louis Fields, into service to lobby for nerve gas production. Pryor was particularly incensed by Fields's lobbying activity in the Senate cloakroom last July. He chastised the negotiatot from the Senate floor: "I find it ironic that [Fields] would be here today lobbying the members of the Senate on this issue. As our man who wants to disarm and our man who wants to conttol armaments and our man who wants to lessen armaments, here he is today asking us for more armaments....I wish he were utilizing his strengths and his resources in Geneva talking with the Russians rather than coming today to the United States Senate to convince waivering senators to defeat this particular amendment."

Pryor's indignation notwithstanding, the lobbying tactic was effective. Some 49 members of the Senate and Vice President Bush broke a tie vote to defeat the amendment, thereby authorizing production funds. In November the vote to cut the appropriations for binaries was 46-46, and again Bush provided the tie breaker. The House of Representatives, meanwhile, overwhelmingly rejected binaries in both its authorization and appropriation votes, and the funds wete removed from the FY 1984 budget when congressional conferees reconciled the House and Senate versions of the defense appropriations latet that same month.

If the administration's bargaining rationale is valid, this repeated denial of congressional authorization fot binary munitions should by now have eroded Soviet intetest in a chemical weapons ban. On the contrary, however, the U.S.S.R. continues to negotiate seriously in Geneva and—in contrast to its suspension of INF, START, and MBFR—actually proposed new NATO-Warsaw Pact negotiations on chemical weapons early this yeat.

Contrary to the conventional wisdom, there is no evidence that acquiring extra bargaining strength will increase, nor that exercising restraint will decrease, an adversary's incentive to negotiate arms limitations. Earlier experience as well as very recent history all suggests that precisely the opposite is more likely: namely, that demonstrations of restraint may be the necessary catalyst for serious negotiations, while extra strength on one side reduces the other side's interest in any kind of controls until it has had time to achieve parity, or at least get back to the status quo ante. Only then can we expect a return to serious bargaining. This was certainly how the Soviets responded to MIRV in the 1970s and to the recent attempt to use the cruise and Pershing II as bargaining chips in the INF talks. This pattern promises to repeat itself with a particularly dangerous competition in anti-satellite weaponry unless Congress can impose restraints on testing in the coming year.

Legislators looking for responsible ways to cut the 1985 military budget request should seek to restrain particularly destabilizing systems, of which the ASAT program is a prime example, but it will take bold and imaginative congressional action to cash this chip in early enough to make a real contribution to arms control.

In the United States, research and development of anti-satellite systems began in earnest after the Sputnik scare in 1957. The first successful ASAT test was conducted in 1959, when a missile launched from a B-47 aircraft intercepted an Explorer VI satellite over Cape Canaveral. Both sides tested ASAT systems in the 1960s but were relatively quiescent through the first half of the 1970s. The U.S.S.R. broke what appeared to be a tacit ASAT test moratorium in 1976 by launching its F-LV rocket (modeled after the SS-9 ICBM). Meanwhile, the Fotd administration had increased ASAT funding and Carter began full-scale development of the Prototype Miniature Air Launched System in 1977. Apart from a new homing device, PMAL uses existing technology in a rocket fired from an F-15 that intercepts an orbiting satellite much as an air-to-air missile shoots down an aircraft. It was therefore somewhat disingenuous for Weinberger to argue in congressional testimony that we cannot expect the Soviets to negotiate seriously "if they have one and we don't."

The present genetation of ASATs on both sides still only threatens systems in relatively low orbits, primarily weather and reconnaissance satellites. Though the U.S. Transit Navigational Satellite is at risk, most American early warning and communication satellites are in higher orbit out of range of current Soviet ASATs. Each side already threatens the ability of the other to monitor arms control agreements through spy satellites, however, and while the window of opportunity for ASAT arms control is still open, it will close rapidly if both superpowers continue to test and place more of each other's satellites at risk.

The Carter administration refrained from testing PMALs while engaged in bilateral ASAT negotiations with the Soviet Union. The Reagan administration, by contrast, not only declined to resume bilateral talks—on the grounds that an ASAT ban might not be verifiable—but also accelerated the anti-satellite pro-

gram as a bargaining chip for future talks. The Soviets meanwhile were clearly interested in pre-empting a costly ASAT competition. After bilateral negotiations broke down they submitted a draft treaty to the United Nations in 1981 and a version revised to meet western criticisms in 1983, at which time General Secretary Yuri Andropov announced that Soviet ASAT tests would resume only if the United States tested first.

Late last year, in an effort to restrain the momentum of the anti-satellite weapons program and give arms control a chance, Congress banned all testing "against objects in space" until the president could report on arms control objectives in the field of ASAT systems. In contravention of the spirit, if not the letter, of that legislation, the Reagan administration tested the first two stages of PMAL in January. More tests are scheduled for later in the year.

While the bargaining rationale has often been effective in persuading Congress and our allies in Europe to acquire weapons systems of dubious merit, the impact on the Soviet Union has been almost totally counterproductive. Indeed, ever since Bernard Baruch distorted the cooperative Acheson-Lilienthal approach to controlling nuclear weapons in 1946, American arms control diplomacy toward the U.S.S.R. has been a blunt instrument: a thinly veiled attempt to maintain a technological edge through coercive bargaining from strength.

But the reciprocal urge to get up to parity means that extra systems acquired as bargaining chips are never likely to be cashed in. While it is theoretically possible to conceive a bargaining strategy whereby systems were acquired and subsequently exchanged for specific concessions on the other side, it would require a far more sophisticated team directing arms control and defense planning than has yet been assembled either in Washington or Moscow. One lesson we still have not grasped, for example, is that weapon programs rarely have negotiating leverage after the testing phase. Several American systems in development have generated interesting Soviet proposals for limitation agreements designed to preclude yet another expensive round of technological competition. But these arms control opportunities are then regularly squandered by our reluctance to relinquish testing and production of sexy new weapons—dangerous and destablizing though they may be—in exchange for a ban on analogous Soviet systems. New technologies seem to promise enhanced security for a brief spell but inevitably turn into nasty threats when the other side develops them some five years later. The failures to control MIRV and cruise missile technologies are instructive examples from the past; the opportunities to restrain ASAT remain to be grasped.

That the executive branch—including diplomats—and the armed services should regularly resort to the bargaining rationale for programs of dubious merit is perhaps not surprising. What is, however, is that legislators, elected to serve the public interest, are so consistently gullible to arguments which have repeatedly proved to be groundless. □

The deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe, along with the Pershing IIs, did not lead to a reduction or limitation on Soviet missiles. Instead, it led to the breakdown of the INF and START talks and to further Soviet deployments.

The Prime

International protocol forces a showdown at the USIS Corral

MARJORIE SMITH

I SUPPOSE SOME PEOPLE join USIA expecting to play a role in affairs of state and policy, hoping to have an influence on the course of international relations. Of course, they immediately get bogged down in the logistics of finding an audience for the latest speaker or videotape sent out from Washington, or find themselves handling an international-visitor grantee who wants to bring his wife and secretary along and spend most of his 30 days in Las Vegas, or they are overwhelmed by the demands of simple bureaucratic survival in the cold war between the various floors of the embassy. Dreams of having an impact fade, replaced by frustration or bemusement.

Then there are others, like me, who without plan or prior intention one day find themselves members of the Foreign Service. We too often end up unsnarling red tape rather than international conflicts, but once in a while even the most mundane of episodes has its impact on relations between states.

My moment came in Thailand a few years ago. At that time the USIA exhibits staff in Washington had created a show on the American frontier which was being circulated to posts around the world. International exhibits are complicated enterprises. After the show has been organized with items borrowed from museums and individual collections, there are the costs of packing and shipping between each post on the circuit, questions of insurance and supervision and security and how to repair the inevitable damage in transit. Then there is the problem of where to hold the exhibit. Some fit into an American Center, but others must be wedged into the crowded schedule of a local museum. Inevitably, of course, there are other problems, some of which beyond all expectation overshadow even the logistics of moving the Golden Gate Bridge to the Sahara. That year in Bangkok there was the problem of the prime minister's hat size.

Deciding on the site for the Frontier Exhibit in Bangkok was relatively simple. City of 4.5 million people it may have been, but there were really only three choices: the exhibition hall in the center of Lumpini Park, the fledgling Bhirasri Museum of Modern Art, or the American University Alumni Association Center, otherwise known as AUA, a binational center run jointly by USIS and a Thai organization of graduates of American colleges and universities. Since the Frontier Exhibit consisted of artifacts of the Wild West—Buffalo Bill's rifle, the stuffed head of a noble American bison, a half-scale teepee, saddles, gold pans, and models of stage coaches—rather than fine arts, the art musuem was out. That left AUA.

The Stetson Company, maker of the classic western hat (I grew up in Montana thinking "hat" and "Stetson" were interchangeable), had offered to provide one of their products for the dignitary who opened the exhibit in each country. The post would submit the person's hat size and then an elegant hat, with name and date embossed in gold on the inner band, would be shipped from the factory. The Thai are a remarkably genial and tolerant people with only a few cultural taboos: You must never point your foot at the Emerald Buddha or at any person you don't intend to insult; no disrespect of the King is permitted; and you must never touch the head of anyone over 12 years old. This last taboo figured prominently in our deliberations over whom to invite to open the exhibit.

It was beyond imagination that the king could come to AUA and open our Frontier Exhibit. His daughters, Princesses Sirindhorn and Chulabhorn, had appeared at the National Theatre the previous summer, but there were two princesses and only one hat and, besides, in a country where the lowliest cooly's head was sacrosanct, how could one present anything as intimate as a hat to a daughter of the monarch? The prime minister, on the other hand, was a commoner. Could we get him to open our exhibit and then surprise him with the hat? General Kriangsak Chomanan was a down-to-earth fellow whose interest in good international press had recently led him to deliver an address in English to the Foreign Correspondents Club. Perhaps he could be approached.

THE AMERICAN OFFICERS consulted the Thai staff, particularly the two experts on royal and political protocol who worked in the cultural section. Khun Poonsang, the lower-ranking of the two, nonetheless was the great-great-granddaughter of King Rama III and her great aunt, still living in the Palace, had been the last and youngest wife of King Chulalongkorn, the great modernizer of Thailand who was the young crown prince in that book of heated Bangkok controversy *Anna and the King of Siam.* Poonsang's father, the retired head of the Royal Household Agency, still wielded impressive power and from time to time Poonsang, laboring daily in our midst as a program specialist organizing seminars and lectures and overseeing the office of student counseling, would suddenly be plucked away by a call from the Palace and be seen floating off in traditional Thai silks and gold jewelry to some official function. Best of all, there was probably not a segment of official Bangkok where Poonsang did not have a personal contact, or one she could develop with a carefully selected phone call.

Of course she had a friend in the prime minister's office. A short consultation with him confirmed that yes, if the ambassador were to ask General Kriangsak to open the exhibit, he would be happy to accept. The General had a large cattle spread himself up in the northeast near Korat, and his favorite form of relaxation was said to be a weekend away from Bangkok riding the range.

Marjorie Smith joined USIA in 1975 and served in Bangkok and Sapporo. She retired from the Foreign Service last year to take up a career in writing.

Minister's Stetson



The prime minister's hat size was another problem. The complimentary Stetson had forced us to accomplish this groundwork earlier than the vicissitudes of Thai politics would generally indicate because the Stetson Company required the name and hat size several months in advance. We wondered what we would do with a hat made especially for General Kriangsak if he were in political exile in Taipei or Peking when the exhibit opened, but most prognosticators gave him several more coup-free months. So we plunged ahead to the next step: learning his hat size.

Because I was the assistant cultural affairs officer and Poonsang worked under my theoretical supervision (actually I worked under her advice and gentle direction), or because I was the most-junior officer at post, I was designated Hat Officer. Poonsang and I brainstormed on the possible ways of learning a person's hat size if one wanted to surprise him with a hat. Sneaking into his room and measuring his head while he slept was not practical. Surreptitiously glancing at his hat after he had hung it on the rack might work in some countries, but the fact of life in Bangkok is that men, unless engaged in coolie labor, almost never wear hats. It would do no good to bring the prime minister's wife in on the surprise and ask her what his size was. Why would she know?

"Well," Poonsang said at last, "I will call my friend. Perhaps he knows if Khun Krinagsak has ever bought a hat, and where."

After some hours negotiating the troubled waters of the Bangkok phone sysrem from one side of the city to the other, she came into my office, eyes sparkling. "We forgot!" she said. "He's a general. Generals wear hats in parades! They get their uniforms tailor-made. And my friend has found out the name and address of General Kriangsak's tailor."

And so the next afternoon our lovely royal lady got into a taxi with another USIS employee, a calm and gentle man who also had connections beyond the ken of occidenral minds, and off they wenr ro explore rhe rangled web of Bangkok's Chinarown in search of a tiny tailor shop rhat the general had parronized throughout his career. Using her sweetest charm, Poonsang extracted the information from a dazzled old man and was back quickly, not only wirh rhe strategic secret of the head-size of the strongman but with a magic formula for transforming Chinese tailors' measurements into American hat sizes.

"This was the most bizarre thing I've done yet, in the ten years I have worked for you Americans," said Poonsang, pretending not to be intrigued with this expansion of her horizons. "I felt like Mata Hari asking the most personal question about the most powerful man in Thailand! What if I had some evil scheme?"

"Assassination by tight hat?" I suggested.

THE SECRET STATISTIC was sent off to Washington and then to Texas, and we in the cultural section relaxed for a time while the exhibits section labored over design and construction of the portable plywood partitions that would transform the AUA lobby into an exhibit gallery. But our turn came round again when it was time to plan the ribbon-cutting ceremony and the opening reception.

The first problem was the guest list. The exhibit site was barely big enough to accommodate the exhibit. A reception held around its fringes was going to be crowded. Since the invitations would state that the prime minister would be cutting the ribbon, we could assume that almost everyone invited would attend. Careful calculations were made as to exactly how many human bodies would fit into the space available. A painful decision was made that although every American USIS officer and many of the Thai staff members would be required to attend to keep things moving smoothly, their spouses would not be invited. Neither would the spouses of the handful of embassy officers who had to be invited.

For the first time we tried to use our new computerized audience record system. Theoretically we could tell the computer the type of people we wanted to invite—high-level officials and those with a special interest in American history and culture—and it would give us a list of names. We gave the computer its instructions. It spat forth the names of everyone in our registered audience. The long printouts were passed from office to office and we each tried to designate the "must invite" people. Lists of suggested invitees came over from the embassy. Debate arose over whether all members of the AUA Association must be invited or only the board. The press office tried to estimate the number of slots that must be reserved for photographers and television crews. After all, the whole point of the ribbon-cutting ceremony was to get publicity for the exhibit. The challenge of collating all the lists and negotiating with individual officers as to which of their must invites would be dropped was, of course, excellent experience for the junior officer.

The wording of the invitation was the next problem. This naturally came to the cultural section. The invitation would be printed in English on one side, in Thai on the reverse. What would it say?

"The first decision," said Khunying Puckpring, our other expert on Thai protocol and officialdom, "is what the dress is to be."

True. Invitations in Bangkok always specify dress: black tie, business suit, sport shirt. Women are free to dress themselves to complement. Starting times for parties were set with the reality of Bangkok traffic in mind. The only way people would come to anything was if they could come right after work. The most convenient dress, therefore, would be sport shirt since that was what everyone wore to work. But of course, since they would be coming to rub elbows with the prime minister, surely no one would object to bringing along a suit for this special occasion.

"What do you suppose the prime minister would like to wear?" I asked.

"Just what I was thinking," said Poonsang. So off she went to phone her co-conspirator in the prime minister's office.

The word was that the general was anxious to downplay his military image, eager for an opportunity to appear in the press as a likeable, informal man of the people. Given the Wild West theme, sport shirt sounded perfect to him, Poonsang reported.

The English side of the invitation was thus completed. When I reported to the public affairs officer that the reception would be sport shirt, he frowned. "For the prime minister?"

"That's the way he wants it," I assured him.

Wording the Thai side of the invitation required extensive consultations between Khunying Puckpring, Khun Poonsang, and various other specialists in language and culture. "Sport shirt" was never translated directly into Thai. There were various ways of indicating that informal dress was expected or permissable. The problem lay in how the various combinations of words might be taken. Khunying Puckpring asserted that it was important not to give people the impression that a party at which the prime minister would appear was something casual. The idea must be that people could dress as was their usual wont at that time of day at that time of year. It took two days for the Thai experts to agree on the wording so that the invitations could be sent off to the printer.

MEANWHILE, a cable arrived from Washington exhorting us to be sure the Stetson was presented properly. The Stetson Company had complained that in all the press clippings passed on to them the world leaders donning their product had put it on backwards. The PAO briefed the ambassador on the anatomy of Stetson hats.

The invitations were hand-addressed and sent off to the chosen. The receptionists and secretaries fielded phone calls for days, collecting the RSVPs and regretfully informing people that they could not bring their spouses or children. The construction team finished the plywood partitions. The exhibit arrived and was safely unpacked. At almost the last minute, a huge box arrived from Texas with the beautiful Stetson reposing on purple satin. The prime minister's name, correctly spelled, gleamed in gold on the soft leather inner band.

On the day of the opening, Poonsang suddenly screamed, "The scissors! Who's in charge of the scissors?" A quick survey revealed that no one was, but clearly the junior officer should be. A staff member from the executive office was quickly dispatched to buy the most elegant scissors she could find, since the office scissors tended to be gummy with tape and rubber cement. Another staff member brought out yards of red ribbon and experimented with artful bows to decorate the scissors. In sudden panic, I telephoned my own co-conspirator, the activities chief at AUA, to be sure someone had thought to arrange for a ribbon to be tied across the doorway so there would be something to cut. Yes, his staff was out there fussing with it right now, but who was in charge of the scissors?

"The silver tray!" Poonsang shrieked. "If we're in charge of the scissors, we must be in charge of the silver tray." It would be unthinkable to simply hand the scissors to the prime minister. In Thailand, things are presented on a tray. Poonsang's home was well over an hour away through the Bangkok traffic but she called her maid and instructed her to find a certain silver tray and bring it to USIS immediately by taxi. The maid showed up in the nick of time with a taxi loaded with what must have represented the greatest part of Poonsang's wedding gifts—at least a dozen silver trays of every size and shape.

"Maybe we could use one for the hat, too?" I wondered. Poonsang selected a small scissors-sized tray and a large ten-gallon tray and with the scissors in hand, she and I grabbed a cab to hurry over to the AUA, leaving her maid to go home with the rest of the family silver.

Everyone at AUA seemed calm and ready. The exhibit looked marvelous in its plywood room. The bison head and teepee flanked a doorway barred with an elaborate arrangement of ribbons which trembled in the breeze in anticipation of

the bite of the elegant scissors. Back in the far corner of the lobby, behind the exhibit room, the bar was ready with crystal punch bowls awaiting blocks of ice which would be rushed in at the last possible moment lest it melt away completely in the April heat. Several pretty Thai girls, members of the activity chief's drama club, were dressed in denim skirts and wore bright bandanas at their throats and held baskets filled with star-shaped sheriff's badges which they would pin on the guests as they arrived.

"Everything looks great," I told the activities chief.

"If only the prime minister comes on time," said Poonsang, who has a special talent for worrying.

But she had reason to worry a few minutes later when the other American officers began to arrive. The PAO got out of his car wearing a business suit! "Why is he wearing a suit?" said Poonsang in a strangled voice. I hurried over to the deputy PAO, usually a reliable ally in times of conflict between the cultural section and the front office. "Why is he wearing a suit?" I demanded.

The DPAO shrugged in his Madras sport shirt. "Beats the hell out of me," he said and I guessed that he and the PAO must have had one of their periodic disagreements about how to best run the post. I took a deep breath and hurried over the the PAO. "Why are you wearing a suit?" I said shrilly. No time for niceties of rank and respect for my elders. "This is supposed to be sport shirt."

The PAO drew himself up to his full medium height. "Marjorie, I consulted with Phra Panij and he said that when an invitation says... well, whatever it said in Thai, you can wear a suit or sport shirt as you choose."

Exactly the impression Khunying Puckpring had meant to convey, in Thai. "But the prime minister is going to wear a sport shirt! I'm sure I told you that!"

The man was no doubt nervous about his first meeting with General Kriangsak and weary of the constant disrespect for diplomatic tradition he detected in his most junior officer. His voice was cutting. "Marjorie, when I need sartorial advice I will go to the distinguished president of the American University Alumni Association and not to the know-it-alls on the second floor of USIS." Thus I was dismissed and he turned to greet the AUA director, resplendent in tie and sport jacket, and the 75-year-old founder of the AUA, Phra Panij, who managed to occupy approximately half of the space in his antique business suit.

I felt Poonsang's icy hand on my arm. "Won't he listen to us? What will happen? How will the prime minister feel?"

"Well," I said grimly, "there's still the ambassador. Maybe he can read."

AS IF ON CUE, the ambassador's car pulled up and out he stepped, a Hollywood casting director's dream of an ambassador, tall and slim, with wavy silver hair, elegant bearing, classic Ivy League accent, exuding charm and intelligence, and at this moment dressed in a beautifully tailored business suit.

I heard a moan beside me. "It's no use," said Poonsang. "I'll have to leave the country on the next plane."

The PAO presented the ambassador with his sheriff's star.

I grabbed the DPAO's arm. "You've got to explain to them," I said. "Can you imagine how mortified the prime minister will be, showing up in a sport shirt and greeted by the ambassador looking like *that?*" The DPAO just shook his head. His eyes were glassy and he was wearing the strange, pasted-on grin he sometimes had at times of extreme stress or when he was contemplating the demise of some enemy. "It won't be my ass that'll be in a sling," he said.

The press attache, my best friend in the USIS hierarchy, arrived from the embassy, harried and late, wearing a tie and a spiffy blue and white sport jacket.

"What are you doing in that jacket?" I said harshly, physically tearing it from his back. "Take off that tie!" I ordered. I jabbed him with the pin of a sheriff's badge.

"Good grief, ouch!" he said. "Don't tell me I've screwed up on that today, too! But what about the ambassador? I saw him getting into his car outside my office window and he was wearing..."

"I know, I know," I interrupted. "And somehow we've got to get it off him. Can you imagine how this is going to look to the prime minister? The American ambassador asks him to open the exhibit, consults with his staff about what he prefers to wear, lures him here in casual dress and humiliates him in front of the televison cameras and newspapers by wearing his most dignified suit."

The press attache whistled. "Wow! What are you going to do?"

What *am* I going to do? I thought wildly. And how come this is *my* problem? Poonsang! Where is Poonsang? She always rescues me, she always knows what to do. Maybe she could get through to the PAO. Fling herself on her knees in front of him or something.

"Where's Poonsang?" I asked another Thai staff member.

"In the bathroom. Crying."

Our immediate boss, the cultural affairs officer, rushed in. He was a charming gentleman who was without doubt the snappiest dresser in the American mission. Well aware of the debates over the invitation wording he had forsaken his spectacular collection of elegant tropical sport jackets and obediently appeared in a crisp yellow sport shirt, open at the throat. While one of the girls pinned a star on him, he glanced into the exhibit room where the PAO and the AUA director were escorting the ambassador and Phra Panij around to see the artifacts. He grabbed me by the elbow. "Marjorie! What's going on? I thought this was supposed to be sport shirt."

I grasped at this slim, dapper straw. "It is! Somehow the PAO talked to Phra Panij about it and he told him either sport shirt or coat was okay, and apparently instead of reading the invitation the ambassador asked the PAO what he should wear, and now General Kriangsak is going to get out of his car at any moment wearing short sleeves and Thailand's honor will be publicly humiliated. Can't you do something?"

The CAO frowned as though in pain. "There's no way I can have my wife bring me a jacket," he mused. "She's still livid about not being invited."

"No, no," I moaned. "You don't need a jacket. We've got to get the ambassador *out* of his."

Poonsang emerged from the restroom. She was pale and her eyes were suspiciously pink, but as usual, she had decided to see things through. "I suppose I

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might not have to leave the country," she said sadly. "But I'll certainly never be of any use to USIS again. My father will probably have to keep me away from the Palace for a few years." She took a deep breath and practiced her most heart-shattering smile on the deputy chief of mission, who was just getting out of his car. He glanced into the exhibit room and then strode over to grab the CAO's arm. "What is this? *My* invitation clearly said sport shirt. What's going on?" He was a rumpled, youngish man, clearly recorded in bureaucratic heaven as "brilliant, destined to rise to the top ranks at great speed" but he was nervous and unsure in social situations, especially when deprived of his wife. His yellow sport shirt was damp with perspiration and his round face dark with anger. He was my last chance. I dived toward him.

"It *is* supposed to be sport shirt," I said, "and my staff and I have been double crossed by the PAO. We consulted directly with General Kriangsak as to what he would prefer to wear. He said sport shirt. But now the PAO has gotten the idea that it's optional, jacket or not, and I don't know what will happen when the prime minister gets here and thinks he's been tricked into looking like a hick or something."

As I babbled I could see the CAO's face over the DCM's shoulder. He was staring at me in astonished horror. Imagine airing USIS family frictions in front of the DCM! But the DCM considered the problem for roughly three seconds and then hurried into the exhibit room, dragging the girl trying to fasten his sheriff's star right along with him.

"Marjorie, that was hardly——" began the CAO. But just then the PAO hurried out of the exhibit room, his face

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red with annoyance, carrying a dark suit coat and trying to shrug out of his own. He didn't speak as he hurried past.

I hardly dared to ask. "Was that the ambassador's coat?" I whispered. The audio visual officer peeked into the exhibit room and turned around to grin broadly and give me an okay sign. "And here comes Phra Panij's," he whispered. A chagrined-looking AUA director emerged bearing the antique coat and wriggling frantically out of his own tie and sport coat.

Beside me, Poonsang heaved a huge sigh of relief and grew several inches taller. Her smile was radiant. "Now I can stay. My life is saved!"

Someone shouted, "Here he comes!" and there was a stately stampede toward the driveway. I felt Poonsang stiffen beside me and glanced at her to find her eyes tightly shut. She was murmuring, in English, "Oh, let him be wearing a sport shirt!" I had a sudden image of the prime minister getting a report from some secret operative: "Now they've all taken their jackets off!" and then quickly putting on his own tailored suit. "Kind of like waiting for the gunfight at the OK Corral, isn't it," muttered the press attache behind me.

An aide sprang forward to open the rear door of the limousine. Prime Minister General Kriangsak Chomanan stepped out. He was wearing the gaudiest Hawaiian shirt I had ever seen, an intense purple-and-white pattern of huge orchids. He grinned at the ambassador who, with unbuttoned cuffs, sleeves pulled up his forearms, star on his chest, and dress bow tie looking remarkably like a bolo, seemed the image of Marshal Dillon. The ambassador introduced the DCM and the PAO. The AUA director stumbled forward, pushing tiny Phra Panij before him. With great geniality, the ambassador pinned a sheriff's star on the prime minister's shirt, where it instantly dissolved into the throbbing orchids. The PAO led the way to the beribboned entrance to the exhibit room. The ambassador said what an honor it was to have the prime minister of the ancient Kingdom of Thailand come to see this small example of America's short but colorful history, and to have him officially open it. Poonsang sidled gracefully forward with the silver tray and knelt humbly before the prime minister. He took the scissors, pronounced a few pleasantries in Thai and English, and snipped the ribbon. Loud applause.

"And now," said the ambassador, "be-

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fore we take a look at this exhibit, we have a small token of remembrance for you." He turned slightly to his right. There, beside a small table bearing a large, empty silver tray stood the AUA director, his damp hands nervously bending the brim back and forth on the beautiful Stetson.

"Oh, er, uh," said the director, handing the hat directly to the ambassador, the silver tray forgotten.

The ambassador glanced inside the hat to determine where the back was and gracefully put it over the prime minister's head. In a movement so smooth it seemed rehearsed, the prime minister took the hat just before it touched his head and settled it comfortably, a Southeast Asian Napoleon crowning himself. He grinned. "Fits perfect!" he said.

There was an admiring sigh from the audience. The hat's on frontwards! I thought as the flashbulbs popped. The prime minister looked like a character in an authentic Hollywood western—perhaps a Mexican bandit.

"You give me cowboy hat," the general said to the ambassador. "I have present too for you." He whispered in rapid Thai to one of his aides, who hurried back to the limousine and returned in a moment with a somewhat worn but very authentic-looking western hat. "Here," said the strongman of Thailand, "this hat I wear at my ranch. It's old, but I like it. You have it." And he stretched up toward that fine silver head and the ambassador smiled and accepted the hat. It was just a little too big and settled down comfortably on the back of his head. Another delighted sigh from the audience. A face from an old Hollywood movie, I mused. Sure! He looks just like Ronald Reagan.

The cameras whirled and flashbulbs detonated and I sagged with relief. Someone shoved glasses of punch into my hand and Poonsang's and we giggled a little as we watched the ambassador lead the prime minister into the exhibit room to point out the large coins good for 30 minutes in a Carson City brothel and other souvenirs of America's romantic heritage.

"I feel like Gary Cooper in *High Noon*," I said.

"I feel like you should ride into the sunset now, and I will shout 'Shane, come back!' " said Poonsang.

"I think you'd both better finish your punch and come out with us for some spicy food and raucous laughter," said the press attache.

And Thai-American relations went smoothly on, drifting along like tumbleweeds. □

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People

Deaths

M. Lorraine Hynes, a public affairs officer in the State Department, died at her home in McLean, Virginia, on January 14 of cancer. She was 47.

Hynes, who held her post since 1981, previously had been public affairs officer with the SALT working group at State during the Carter administration. She was a member of AAFSW and had edited its newsletter. She was a winner of the department's superior honor award.

Survivors include her husand, Richard J. of McLean, daughters Jennifer of Malibu, California, and Jessica of McLean, mother Jane Harvey of Oregon, and brothers David and Donald Latrobe, both of California.

Eleanor Hovey Patterson Lester, wife of retired Foreign Service Officer Allen H. Lester, died of cancer October 30 in Scituate, Massachusetts. She was 78.

The former Eleanor Patterson met her husband when they were classmates at Tufts University in the 1920s. After they were wed, she accompanied him to posts in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Guayaquil, Santo Domingo, Guatemala City, and Barcelona until retirement in 1965. In Washington she worked with Margaret Sanger, served during World War II as an administrative assistant at the American Red Cross National Chapter, and was a member of the National Women's Party. In the field she was on the boards of directors of the American Women's Clubs in Rio, Santo Domingo, and Barcelona and on the boards of theater groups in Santo Domingo and Guatemala City, where she starred as the lead in *The Solid Gold Cadillac*. She was on the boards of Willoughby Settlement House in Brooklyn Heights and the Chapin Home for the Aged on Long Island and was president of the Hanover Garden Club and of the Women's Alliance, First Parish, of Norwell.

Survivors include her husband, of 281 Old Oaken Bucket Road, Scituate, and several cousins. The family requests that expressions of sympathy take the form of contributions to the Women's Alliance, First Parish, Norwell, or to the American Cancer Society.

Robert Henry McBride, a retired career minister in the Foreign Service, died of a heart attack on December 26 in Fairfax, Virginia. He was 65.

McBride, who graduated from Princeton in 1940, joined the Foreign Service the next year. His assignments included Algiers, Naples, Rome, Madrid, and Paris. From 1958–61 he served as director of the office of West European affairs in the State Department. He became ambassador to the Congo in 1967 and was ambassador to Mexico from 1969 until he retired.

Upon retirement, McBride became diplomat-in-residence at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. In 1977 he became a lecturer on Latin America at Dartmouth College.

Survivors included his wife, Jacqueline, of Hanover, New Hampshire; two sons, Alexander C., of Annandale, Virginia, and R. Charles, of Arlington, Virginia; a daughter, Ruth McBride Powers, of Chevy Chase, Maryland; and two grandchildren.

Robert Hale Shields, a specialist on Latin America known as "Papa Brazil" by his colleagues, died in Upland, California, on December 30. He was 73.

Shields did historical research in Argentina and Brazil before joining the Forign Service in 1947. He served as a Foreign Service officer in Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia for 10 years and in Asuncion, Paraguay, for two years. He wrote numerous analytical studies and policy papers on both countries, gaining him a reputation in the Service as an expert on the region. He retired from the Service in 1970, his last post being first secretary and consul. He received a certificate of commendation for outstanding service, loyalty, and devotion from Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

He is survived by his wife, Gloria C., sons Jaime of Upland and Stephen of Laverne, California, daughter Pamela of Upland, and a brother, Randle.

Woodruff Wallner, a retired Foreign Service officer who had specialized in French affairs, died December 26 following surgery at a hospital in Caen, France. He was 74.

Wallner joined the Foreign Service in 1935. His first post was Naples, and he served in Valencia during the Spanish Civil War. He went to Paris in 1939 and, when the Germans invaded, he accompanied the French government to Bordeaux. Later, he was accredited to the Vichy government. Ever in a war zone, he was interned by the Germans in 1942 when the U.S. invaded North Africa. In 1944 he returned to Washington as associate chief for Western European affairs. He was instrumental in the exchange of messages through the Swiss embassy that led to Japan's surrender in 1945.

After the war he went back to Paris as a political officer and minister-counselor. He later went to Belgrade, then back to Paris as deputy commandent of the NATO Defense College. From 1959–61, he was deputy assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. He also served as minister-counselor in Rio de Janeiro and as a senior Foreign Service inspector, when he retired.

Survivors include his wife, formerly Monica Pickering, whom he met during his internment, children Nicholas of Concord, New Hampshire, and Ann Calhoun of Garland, Texas, sister Mimi Bloom of New Haven, Connecticut, and five grandchildren.

Robert B. Whitinghill, a retired Foreign Service officer, died on September 2 in Alexandria, New Hampshire, after a sudden illness. He was 66.

Whittinghill was educated at Cambridge and Columbia Universities. He served in the Army in World War II and saw action overseas with the Office of Strategic Services.

During his Foreign Service career, Whittinghill served at posts in Syria, Morocco, Sudan, Zaire, Ivory Coast, France, Italy, and Vietnam. His career spanned three decades. Upon retirement he became an international consultant specializing in African affairs.

He is survived by his wife, Helen Whittinghill, his son, George Randolph Whittinghill, of Houston, Texas; his brother, George David Whittinghill, of Nice, France; and his sister, Diana Kent, of Westport, Connecticut.

Birth

Nichola Jane Hays was born to Dennis and Katherine Hays on December 28. The father is president of AFSA.

Honor

Joseph John Jova, former ambassador to Honduras, the Organization of American States, and Mexico, was elected to the Inter-American Committee on Culture, a body of the OAS. Proposed by the United States, Jova was elected on the first ballot at the annual meeting of the OAS Council on Education, Science and Culture in Jamaica. The committee serves the OAS as its advisory group on western hemisphere cultural projects. Its goal is the safeguarding of the common cultural heritage of the American countries.

Association News

AFSA Geared to Fight New Attack on Compensation

The Association is prepared to fight the administration's renewed attack on the compensation package for federal employees contained in the fiscal year 1985 budget package. AFSA will use the same strategy that proved so successful last year: opposing the proposals in conjunction with other federal employee unions and at the same time attempting to exempt the Foreign Service.

The FY 1985 proposals are "unwarranted and vindictive," said AFSA President Dennis K. Hays. "The purpose of this reintroduction is to soften up opposition with a view toward implementing them next year. If any weaknesses appear in our defense, rest assured that the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget will take advantage of them." *Washington Post* columnist Mike Causey quoted an administration official as saying, "We're going to push for the whole reform package this year, but realistically we think that this year will be a period of educating Congress and the public and laying the groundwork for next year."

One proposal would limit the next white collar pay raise to 3.5 percent and delay it until January 1985. "This violates the entire concept of 'comparability' pay adjustments and means that federal employees will continue to be paid more than 20 percent less than their colleagues in the private sector," said Hays. "The administration intends to present again its package of pay and benefit cutbacks and delays, increased costs and employee contributions, etc., all designed to penalize the federal employee for having chosen a career of service to his or her country."

Independent of this but simultaneously, a movement led by Senator Jesse Helms (R.-North Carolina) of the Foreign Relations Committee will look at the Foreign Service personnel system and allowances. Helms has charged that the Foreign Service has too many employees in high grades [ASSOCIATION NEWS, January]. "The issue of what kind of federal service we will have is not going to go away," said Hays. "The support of the membership both in Washington and overseas was invaluable last year. We must be prepared for a long fight."

3 Rms., Va. Ave. Vw. Need Names—and Benefactors

The Foreign Service Club's three newly refurbished banquet rooms on the second floor—overlooking Virginia Avenue and the Department of State—need names. AFSA has announced it is proposing to name the rooms in perpetuity for a person or persons who donate needed furnishings in keeping with a club atmosphere—leather sofas and chairs, or lamps, bookcases, tables, etc.

The Governing Board will honor a suitable response to this appeal by naming rooms for a donor or donors, or another person whom a donor may designate.

20/20 Asks AFSA for Views on Terrorism

AFSA President Dennis K. Hays being interviewed by ABC-TV reporter Sylvia Chase for its investigative program 20/20. Concerted international action is needed to stop terrorism, said Hays.

AFSA Charges State with Penalizing for Union Activity

AFSA has filed an institutional grievance with the State Department alleging that the department unjustly denied a promotion to one of its employees because of his involvement with the Association. AFSA has charged State with violating its 1983 promotion precepts and a negotiated agreement guaranteeing the right of employees to join or assist the Association.

The agreement between State and AFSA on labor-management relations guarantees the right of every employee to "form, join, or assist any labor organization...freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal." The 1983 promotion precepts further preclude selection board members from seeking or receiving information other than that properly included in the employee's performance file.

The employee in question had been involved in negotiations with management on behalf of the Association concerning proposed changes in the personnel system. On several occasions he was informed by department officials and other employees that his involvement with AFSA had angered his supervisors as well as others in the department. During the meeting of the 1983 Selection Boards, the employee was also personally chastised by the board chairman for his involvement in the negotiations with management. The employee was subsequently denied a promotion.

The Association contends that the denial of promotion was in retaliation for the employee's union-related activities, in violation of the negotiated agreement. The denial of the promotion itself was also a violation of the Selection Board precepts, which require impartiality.

As a remedy for the department's actions, AFSA is seeking a retroactive promotion for the employee. The greater danger, however, is the chilling effect that the reprisal has had on other employees. Therefore, the Association is also seeking the department's reassurance that in the future it will refrain from retaliating against any employee who is involved in labor activities.

Retirement, Health Benefits, and the President's Budget

Last year, the retirement "reforms" proposed in the president's budget for fiscal year 1984 touched off an epidemic of heartburn throughout the entire federal workforce. Employees retiring before age 65 would incur substantial reductions in their annuities, employee retirement contributions would be increased by more than half, the annuity benefit structure would be drastically curtailed, and further cutbacks in the cost-of-living adjustment would be imposed.

Since none of these changes cleared the first session of the 98th Congress, the administration is now back again with a modified and scaled-down version of them, this time presented as part of the FY 1985 budget. To counter any notion that last year's retirement-reduction package may have been scrapped, however, the 1985 budget document states specifically that "...the administration continues its strong support of the Civil Service reform proposals advanced in last year's budget." Possibly in recognition of the fact that 1984 is an election year, the administration says that this time around it will "focus its legislative effort on (only) three of those proposals, in modified form: COLA reform, a high-five-year salary average for the benefit formula, and increased employee and agency retirement contributions."

On retirement, under these proposals the next COLA would be postponed from June 1984 to January 1985, with a consequent adjustment to the consumer price index period. (Legislation to accomplish this has already passed in the House.) Beginning in 1985, the full COLA would apply only to the first $10,000 of a retirement annuity; any excess would be subject only to 55 percent of the regular COLA. (The $10,000 base "would be adjusted for inflation in future years," to quote the language in the budget.)

Beginning in 1986, the COLA would be limited to the rise in the CPI or the increase in federal white collar pay, whichever is smaller. Should this be put into effect, essentially it would give the president discretionary control over the annual COLA amounts, since he now has the authority to recommend annual percentage increases in federal pay.

An interesting ambiguity pertains to the question of COLAs for retirees under age 62. The Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 limited persons in this age category to one-half the "assumed increase in the price index" for fiscal years 1983, '84, and '85. The assumed increase for 1985 was 6.6 percent, which would have entitled younger retirees to a COLA of at least 3.3 percent. The budget simply proposes to eliminate this provision without stating whether retirees under age 62 would be limited to one-half the actual COLA or whether they would receive the full COLA like all other retirees.

In addition, retirement annuities would be calculated on the basis of the average high-five salary years rather than the average high-three, as at present. Any employee eligible for retirement, or within three years of eligibility, would not be affected.

Finally, employee retirement contributions would increase to eight percent in 1985 and nine percent in 1986, and agency contributions would increase by equal amounts.

On the health benefits front, the 1985 budget incorporates estimated savings resulting from a proposed reform of the federal employees' health benefits program—FEHB. Though the word voucher is not mentioned, the idea is to give each employee and retiree a fixed contribution toward the cost of their health insurance. Anyone selecting a health plan whose cost exceeds the government contribution would pay the excess; anyone selecting a cheaper plan could pocket the difference.

Concerning health insurance premiums in general, including those payable under the FEHB program, the administration proposes that the employer's contribution be treated as income and as such be subject both to income and social security taxes. Subject to tax would be employer-paid amounts above $2100 annually for family coverage and $840 for a single plan. Stay tuned for a report on subsequent legislative developments.

—ROBERT M. BEERS,
Congressional Liaison

House Bill Would Kill Polygraph, Censorship Plan

A bill introduced by Representative Jack Brooks (D.-Texas), chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, would make permanent a congressional ban on an administration order invoking lifetime censorship of government officials and the use of lie detectors to stop leaks. AFSA has been a leader in the battle to stop the president's National Security Directive of last March mandating the measures.

The bill would prohibit agencies from violating first amendment rights of the 127,000 government employees who handle information on intelligence sources and methods by requiring them to submit to lifetime pre-publication review of their writings. It would also ensure that some 2.5 million federal employees will be protected from indiscriminate use of polygraphs in leak investigations. Lie detectors could be used solely in actual investigations of illegal activities and only voluntarily.

"The Federal Polygraph Limitation and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984 would legislatively prevent the administration from implementing unsound lie detector and censorship policies which place a premium on intimidation," said Brooks.

Performance Pay, Presidential Awards Stalled by AID

The issue of presidential awards and performance pay—which got bogged down in joint agency negotiations last year because of USIA management's refusal to negotiate—has again come to a dead end in joint negotiations, this time because of AID. Alone among the foreign affairs agencies, AID is insisting on counting the prior Senior Executive Service tenure of recent lateral entrants into the Senior Foreign Service. This would put them on an even footing in competing for the awards with officers who have been in the SFS for its entire three years of existence.

"What AID wants to be able to do is have eleventh-hour entrants into the SFS from either the SES or the Administratively Determined ranks be eligible to walk away with SFS performance pay," said Douglas Broome, chairman of AFSA's AID Standing Committee. "This would leave less available fot officers who have spent at least three years in the SFS."

The other foreign affairs agencies seem to be willing to go along with the three-year-in-the-SFS position taken by the Association, said Broome.

Six percent of the SFS is eligible for presidential awards of up to $10,000.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service

WINNER:
"Naturally the Ambassador got the lead in the embassy talent show. After all, he used to be a movie actor."

—MARY NELL HANKS, *Tegucigalpa*

HONORABLE MENTION:
"Are you sure this is the way everyone approaches the King's throne to present their credentials?"

—JUDY CHIDESTER, *Washington*

We are currently receiving more than three dozen replies to each installment of LIFE AND LOVE, from which an ad hoc committee of AFSA staffers and board members selects each month's winner and honorable mentions. The former receives a certificate for a free lunch for two at the Foreign Service Club, the latter a voucher good for a free carafe of wine with lunch. Send entries for Competition #9 to:

LIFE AND LOVE #9
AFSA
2101 E Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

Contest deadline is April 15

Competition #9

60th Anniversary Expansion of Journal Approved

The Governing Board voted in November to approve an expansion of the number of pages in the JOURNAL, as well as other changes suggested by the Editorial Board, in recognition of the important role the magazine plays as the publication for professionals in foreign affairs and in AFSA labor-management communications. The changes started to be phased in with January's issue, the first in the magazine's 60th anniversary year.

The board approved the Editorial Board's requests for four to eight additional pages a month to handle an extra feature article and several new columns of benefit to Foreign Service employees; a half-time assistant to handle the extra editorial workload; a new graphic look; establishment of a permanent Governing Board editorial called ASSOCIATION VIEWS to appear opposite the CONTENTS page; adoption of the slogan "The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service" to emphasize the publication's purpose; and creation of a Communications Committee to manage the ASSOCIATION NEWS and ASSOCIATION VIEWS sections, which are under the editorial administration of the Governing Board.

To help compensate for the added costs of the proposal, the Editorial Board suggested changing the paperstock, having covers prepared by a less-expensive firm, and telecommunicating all copy to the printer to save on typesetting. All these changes are in effect in this issue and all have yielded the savings envisioned.

In accordance with the plan, the JOURNAL has hired Nancy L. Bartels as editorial assistant on a half-time basis. Bartels has a bachelor's degree in international affairs from George Washington University, where she specialized in the role of communications in the conduct of foreign policy.

AID Officers' Commissioning en Route to Senate

The documentation supporting AID Foreign Service officers for commissioning is on the way to the Senate for ratification, according to the chairman of AFSA's AID Standing Committee, but it must first clear the State Department and the White House. The Foreign Service Act calls for the commissioning of all agency Foreign Service officers ranked from FS-3 to FS-1, a provision won by AFSA during the legislative process.

"Many AID employees have been wondering whatever happened to their requests to become commissioned FSOs," said Douglas Broome. "Members should be assured that the wheels are turning, so not to worry." The interesting statistic, he added, is that only 46 percent of those eligible to apply for commissioning did in fact do so by last September. "There will be future chances to apply, but at this time we can't say how long this opportunity will continue."



Managing Your Money

Planning for College Expenses

By Mark Waldman, *Investment Adviser*

Will you have to choose between maintaining your standard of living and providing your children with the college education they need? College costs are high and increasing at about eight percent per year. A school costing $10,000 now will cost about $22,000 in just ten years. Families with more than one child are thus facing staggering education bills.

If you plan comprehensively, however, you can afford it. You wouldn't take a trip without planning it first, so why not apply the same principle to education expenses? The earlier you start, the easier it is. The following case study illustrates the principles and techniques involved.

Peter and Martha are an FSO couple aged 40 and 35, respectively. They have two children: Steve, 14, and Elise, 7. They are in the 40-percent marginal tax bracket. Elise thinks she wants to attend a school that now costs $12,000 a year. His little sister's interest in education perks up Steve, who suddenly decides that he too wants to go to a top-flight college.

Let's start with Elise, who has made up her mind early. First, the bad news. By the time Elise is ready to start school, the annual cost will be $28,000—or $112,000 for four years. The good news is that the family has 11 years to get ready. And because they're starting now, they won't have to impoverish themselves to generate the money.

First, they assume that Elise will work while in school and earn about $2000 per year. They further assume that financial aid—scholarships, loans, etc.—will total another $10,000 per year. This leaves Peter and Martha with the task of generating $16,000 per college year, or $64,000 total.

They begin by putting $4000 into an IRA. That saves them about $1500 per year in income tax. They then place the $1500 in a growth-oriented mutual fund in Elise's name (more about giving money later), earning an after-tax yield of 20 percent. In 11 years, when Elise is ready to begin school, they will have $48,000 in this fund. And, assuming they put their IRA contributions in the same fund, they have at the same time built up $128,000 for their retirement years. But they're still $16,000 short. They can generate this sum if they place an additional $34 per month into the mutual fund. The earlier you start, the easier it is.

Steve, on the other hand, will start school in just three years. Peter and Martha know they can't afford a school that will cost $15,000 per year by the time he gets there. So they sit down with Steve now and explain things to him. One option is to start researching schools in their home state with lower costs. Some may even better suit Steve's interests and abilities. Another is to look into whatever low-interest loans may be offered by the school, the state, or lending institutions that are paid back by the student over a long term after graduation. Finally, they should look at financial aid from the institutions themselves and from other organizations. In particular, AFSA's Scholarship Program gives dependents of Foreign Service personnel awards based on need of up to $2000 per student and awards based on merit of $500. Contact AFSA for details. By including Steve in their planning, they avoid misunderstanding and animosity. Better planning at an earlier stage, however, may have avoided some Hobson's choices.

In both children's cases, Peter and Martha wisely transfer income-earning assets to their names so the income can be taxed at a lower rate. But care must be taken here. Money given to minors may, once they reach age 18, be used by them for any purpose whatever, unless the donors have structured the arrangement otherwise. Using an experienced attorney to set up the trust fund and being aware of this potential problem can avoid a great deal of trouble later.

Because there isn't much time before Steve starts school, Peter and Martha will have to reposition some of their existing financial assets to generate additional income. The family, having found a school that will cost $10,000 a year when he turns 18, assumes Steve will work, earning $2000 per year, and will receive $4000 per year in financial aid. They will need to generate another $4000 per year, part of which may come from loans. (Kenneth and Irene Kohl's book *Financing College Education*, published by McGraw-Hill, is the best source of information on financial aid.)

Peter and Martha can, if they own a house or other property with substantial equity in it, get a second trust and use the proceeds for Steve's education. If this is not possible, or if the funds are insufficient, they can begin repositioning what they already have. They begin this, of course, with an in-depth analysis of their overall financial situation.

Their basic strategy will be to use tax-advantaged investments to generate more after-tax income from their existing portfolio. Then they will roll over the savings into further investments for more shelter and income. They can use real estate limited partnerships, equipment leasing arrangements, and oil-and-gas income programs. And when the investments lose their sheltering capacity and begin to generate income, they can transfer them to Elise's fund if that is appropriate at the time.

Combining comprehensive planning and the use of tax-advantaged investments allows them to fund their children's education without impoverishing themselves and without taking unnecessary financial risks. They will not get caught simply trying to make as much out of their investable funds as possible. They can avoid some of the risks and most of the oversight involved with investing in individual stocks and bonds, for example, and use mutual funds that provide diversification and professional management.

By thinking through this case study you can begin to generate some strategies to apply to your own situation. Each family is different, and so what works for one might not be right for another. But the same principles apply. Why not start using them now?

Mark S. Waldman, Ph.D., is a former Foreign Service officer who is now an investment adviser and economist. He is associated with Wealth Management Consultants, a registered investment advisory firm.

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