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
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A Lebanese Army soldier in a U.S.-made armored personnel carrier gazes over a capital divided by factional strife. Newsday diplomatic and military reporter Roy Gutman's story on the policy divisions in Washington begins on page 28. Photo by Chip Beck.

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JOURNAL subscriptions: One year (11 issues), \$10; two years, \$18. Overseas subscriptions (except Canada), add \$1 per year.

Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C.,

and at additional post office. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Microfilm copies: University Microfilm Library Services, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 (October 1967 to present).

The JOURNAL welcomes manuscripts of 1500-4000 words for consideration by the Editorial Board. Author queries are strongly urged, stamped envelope required for return. All authors are paid on publication.

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June 1984. Volume 61, number 6. ISSN 0015-7279.

ASSOCIATION VIEWS

A Situation We Will Not Tolerate

Slightly over a year ago I went to Andrews Air Force Base to pay my heartfelt respects to your fallen comrades, victims of the terrorist bombing of the American embassy in Beirut. As I talked with each family, I was touched by their grief, from the youngest child to the oldest grandparent. It was, as I said on that occasion, "the longest journey of my presidency."

That sad event brought home to me the great irony of your profession: as diplomats you abhor violence and pursue peace, and yet you often are the targets of terrorism and uncontrolled hate.

This past year we have witnessed a continuation of acts of terrorism against the representatives of our country and especially against members of the Foreign Service community. More than ever before, the satisfaction and the joys of serving your country abroad are burdened by the ever-present danger of irrational violence.

This is a situation we cannot and will not tolerate. Let me assure you that we will make every effort to defend our diplomats by strengthening security measures and enhancing our intelligence capabilities and, if necessary, by more active defensive measures. Terrorism must not be allowed to succeed. If it does, the victims will be not only diplomats or Americans, but the cause of freedom itself.

As you gather on the occasion of your 19th Foreign Service Day, I am very proud to express to you our nation's deepest appreciation for your sacrifice and service to our country.

All Americans who love this country and who take pride in our history are honored by the work of the American Foreign Service and especially by your selfless dedication to the cause of peace throughout the world.

—PRESIDENT REAGAN

The above message was delivered by Secretary Shultz on Foreign Service Day.



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LETTERS

Commission of error

John Wilhelm's revelations about the Carlucci commission [November] are very disturbing. If true, they paint a picture of a commission that has done little more than summarize and justify the foreign assistance policy stance espoused by foreign assistance's "iron triangle"—the foreign assistance bureaucracy, the Pentagon, and the present administration, whose natural preference is for tight control, i.e., the "carrot" approach. The list of 15 public commissioners and Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies reads less like a "wide-spectrum of non-government help" than a coalition of big business-labor protectionists and conservatives. Therefore, it's not surprising that the "new" name and concept for our next foreign assistance agency is adopted from the 1950s cold war era, when "stick and carrot" were the rule.

It is also not surprising that the commission had readily "found that foreign assistance is necessary for the proper conduct of U.S. foreign affairs," so that "its task now is to articulate the goals and objectives in a manner that will allow an expanded bipartisan coalition to develop." Mr. Wilhelm, defending what he later dubs as the "elite" point of view, implies that the public is misinformed and/or ignorant of the "need" for foreign assistance by claiming they elect foreign assistance supporters despite polls showing public opposition to foreign assistance. This traditional dichotomy, which has never been properly or objectively explored, is nothing new and has the traditional response that foreign assistance aids world security and trade—Mr. Wilhelm's argument for supporting a new agency. It is misdirected to look for support for a mutuality concept based on what is at best a weak inference and then to recommend a "nation-wide citizens network" that will inform, but not get approval for, aid directed by predetermined mutuality agreements guaranteed to benefit all.

To raise mutuality to the forefront is more understandable in light of (1) the administration's neo-cold war priorities, (2) the need to consolidate or unify all forms of assistance, even military, for bet-

ter control and influence-wielding, and (3) the seeming immunity, which Mr. Wilhelm notes, elected public officials have against anti-foreign assistance sentiment. The commission seems more concerned with the manner than the goals and objectives.

Another serious problem with the commission's work is its failure to address the Economic Support Fund vs. Development Assistance question, especially as it relates to the less-developed countries' debt, although we do get some insight from the recommendation that both accounts be more flexible. Whether ESF is lumped in with DA is not the real issue. Rather, it is the fact that, using Mr. Wilhelm's data, ESF has increased from 7 to 44 percent of total economic aid from 1968 to 1983. Besides "peace-keeping" objectives I suspect a growing chunk of this increase, along with PL 480 Title I, is going to debt relief, whether through commodity import programs or cash grants. Since trade issues are intimately linked with debt problems and are a principal consideration of any mutuality aspects of foreign assistance, the commission is committing, by its own standards, a grave oversight in ignoring trade issues, and in dismissing debt issues for the reasons Mr. Wilhelm provides.

The most serious flaw in Mr. Wilhelm's reasoning comes at the crux of any serious assessment/reevaluation of foreign assistance. If the commission's attitude toward evaluation, as expressed by its executive director, is that "success or failure is very much like beauty—it is in the eye of the beholder," I find it will be difficult to take any of its conclusions or recommendations seriously. Their credibility is further tainted by Mr. Wilhelm's contradictions. On the one hand, he admits project evaluation is possible and there have been successes at the project level and among target beneficiary groups, presumably in basic human needs among the poorest of the poor, i.e., present objectives which the commission supports. However, Mr. Wilhelm complains it is impossible to evaluate/measure overall foreign assistance. He claims there is currently "no systematic means of assessing the full impact of our programs and their relationships to one another in a given country," yet he makes no effort to discuss all the attempts that have been made or related measures actually used, such as the Country Development Strategy Statement, in evaluating in-country projects and programs.

As for mixing military and economic assistance, Mr. Wilhelm fails to distinguish between civil and external wars, and to mention how military assistance to such

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
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governments as Anastasio Somoza's may actually promote poverty and economic decline.

Finally, should overall economic growth and efficiency be a primary objective when U.S. assistance accounts for such a small part of economic assistance to the Third World? Why is there no mention of coordinating assistance?

Maybe Dr. Kissinger can be persuaded to "save" this commission.

STEVE WALWORTH

AID Foreign Service Officer, retired
Los Angeles, California

Author John Wilhelm replies:

The article in the November JOURNAL reported on the findings of the Carlucci commission. My views are aired elsewhere. Moreover, the term "elite," which Mr. Walworth uses with disdain, is the term used by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations. Their 1978 and 1982 polls distinguished between the casual observer of foreign affairs and the informed one. The casual observer is by definition more ignorant. That ignorance is not culpable, and, therefore, calling it what it is should not be regarded as pejorative.

The commission noted, however, that the constituencies for foreign cooperation (assistance) have become over time more fragmented and single-issue oriented, i.e., *only* humanitarian, *only* security, *only* trade and commerce, etc. These positions are inconsistent with the very nature of the aid transaction, which of necessity is political (it involves governments), economic (it involves money), security (it presumably strengthens the recipient), and humanitarian (it again presumably helps the needy). Very simply, if foreign assistance is to continue for whatever reason, enhanced public awareness, cooperation among constituencies, and support are essential.

Mr. Walworth complains about a foreign cooperation program which is based upon principles of mutual benefit. If it is not to be mutually beneficial, whom should it benefit? Mutuality of benefit is the only sound basis upon which political equals can meet over time with dignity. The accusation that mutuality of interest is the equivalent of "neo-cold war" policies is far-fetched at best.

Mr. Walworth is indignant about the commission's view that evaluations of our foreign cooperation programs are not adequate. The commission points out in its report that while we do perform technical evaluations, they deal only with one output of the program and ignore the remainder. In a comprehensive evaluation, values would have to be assigned to all of the

various objectives and the programs' degrees of effectiveness in meeting them. That is inescapably subjective and will entail honest differences of opinion. Effectiveness, then, has the quality of beauty and must in the final analysis rest in the eye of the beholder.

Mr. Walworth has one sound point. The commission overlooked the trade issue completely and that is a shortcoming. The reason was straightforward: The charter did not request it and time did not allow it. The trade issue is very important. It should be addressed. Mr. Walworth's ridiculous accusations against the commission's members should not.

Bargaining Chips

I would like to vent some spleen over the JOURNAL's publication of Jane Sharp's "Bargaining Chips" [March].

I have nothing against the occasional controversial article appearing in the JOURNAL and also enjoy seeing a little life in the magazine. Her article is thoroughly controversial, since it could have been written by the USA Institute in Moscow, where I heard all her arguments time and again. I have at one time or another been involved with several of her themes, chemical weapons and INF, for example, and do not see much point in refuting her preposterous statements. That ferocious militarist Helmut Schmidt appears to have missed the boat in late 1979, for example. Or, Brezhnev made a unilateral gesture withdrawing 1000 Soviet tanks and 20,000 Soviet troops from East Germany. Would that Ms. Sharp talk with one of the journalists called to East Berlin to occasion that historical event. But we withdrew 1000 "obsolete" American warheads. Etc. She writes pure Moscow-line, and the JOURNAL should have known better.

While I admit to wondering just what the Peace Studies Program at Cornell is engaged in, I also want to add that I am always stimulated when some thoughtful advocate of arms control and opponent of U.S. and NATO policies takes to print. Warnke, for example, or, further afield, Gerd Bastian in Germany. They, and many others, think for themselves.

More seriously, you might want to ask ACDA, RPM, or PM to do a risposte or ask someone in academe to contribute one. I would not like to see the last word in the JOURNAL going to someone who starts with Bernard Baruch and ends with Caspar Weinberger in criticizing just about everything that the U.S. has done in maintaining its security since the war save of course those two examples of unilateral measures: Kennedy's Limited Test Ban

Treaty and Nixon's Biological Weapons Convention.

PETER SEMLER
Foreign Service Officer
Rome, Italy

Author Jane M.O. Sharp responds:

Peter Semler's ad hominem attack speaks volumes about the state of his spleen, but, sadly, contributes nothing to the much-needed debate on U.S. arms control policy. In his fury, he ascribes to me statements I did not make and views I do not hold, yet seems to have missed the point of my article. This was not, as he implies, to denounce American security policy since 1945, but to ask whether the acquisition of "bargaining chips," or the exercise of restraint, constitutes the more effective arms control strategy for the United States to follow in its dealings with the Soviet Union.

Specifically, I examined claims that procuring new military programs brings recalcitrant adversaries to the negotiating table, softens their bargaining position, and can be cashed in for specific Soviet concessions in arms control agreements. My article reviewed several major arms control forums in the post war period, and suggested the opposite is true. The record shows that bargaining chips usually delayed the start of serious dialogue and toughened, rather than softened, the adversary's negotiating position. Moreover, constituencies developed to retain, rather than cash in, specific "chips," provoking countermeasures rather than concessions from the other side.

By contrast, U.S. restraints, whether directed by the White House or imposed by the Congress, have often revived stalled negotiations, facilitated arms control agreements, and enhanced western security.

Peter Semler offers no substantial rebuttal of these findings. If, however, he believes that bargaining chips contribute to U.S. and allied security and improve the chances of agreements limiting Soviet forces, let him present his evidence and argue his case in a civilized manner.

Correction

The man pictured with Environmental Protection Agency Administrator William Ruckelshaus on page 24 in the May JOURNAL was John Roberts, not Charles Caccia. Roberts was Caccia's immediate predecessor as Canada's minister for the environment.

The JOURNAL welcomes letters to the editor but reserves the right to edit for clarity and shorten for space considerations.

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BOOKS

America, Europe, and the Soviet Union. By Walter Laqueur. Transaction Books, 1983.

The Superpowers and Regional Tensions: *The U.S.S.R., The United States, and Europe*. By William E. Griffith. Lexington Books, 1982.

Griffith's book examines U.S.-Soviet relations in Europe over the last two decades. Two long chapters trace the interplay between the superpowers in security policy and arms control with an abundance of detail that makes them still useful, though now three years old and sometimes hard going for the non-specialist. A similarly detailed account of the Polish situation up to mid-1981 includes a perceptive discus-

sion of Soviet dilemmas. And, if Griffith doubted then that the Polish army would be the vehicle for partially restoring the situation he was not alone in that judgment.

The most useful chapters are those dealing with dissidence in Eastern Europe and Eurocommunism. Griffith wisely emphasizes the deep roots of Eastern European nationalist resistance to Soviet control and Russian nationalist determination to protect its power. He also sees clearly the challenge Eurocommunism offered to the Soviet model of leadership among Communist parties and the domestic legitimacy of the Soviet party. Although Eurocommunism has since faded, Griffith sensibly judges earlier U.S. concerns to have been exaggerated, but not baseless.

"The Crisis of the Western Alliance" is the least satisfying chapter because it addresses the issues of 1980-81—Afghanistan, the Mideast, intermediate-range missiles, European defense spending, East-West trade, stagflation—as if they added up not only to a crisis among the allies (the normal state of affairs) but to the most serious crisis ever. In 1984 the alliance is still in crisis, but it is also still in business, even though Griffith's proposed remedies have not been applied. His recommendations for avoiding or overcoming such crises—improved policy coordination among the major western allies and Japan and closer Western European unity—are familiar and apparently irrelevant to the adequate if continually troubled functioning of the alliance.

Walter Laqueur's book is a collection of articles published (with one exception) between 1979 and 1983, mainly in *Commentary*. Most date from the late Carter years and reflect the somber mood that Laqueur shared with many others at that time. But the Reagan administration does not please him much either. He finds that Carter's "weakness and inconsistency" have been replaced by "tough rhetoric and inconsistency." Reagan lacks a broad strategy and gives too much attention to domestic issues. "Meanwhile," Laqueur wrote in 1982, "time runs out."

Laqueur is at his best in analyzing the Soviet system and its policies (though he exaggerates the effectiveness of Soviet penetration of the Third World). But when it comes to policy prescriptions he shows a considerable amount of utopianism. Thus, he calls for a foreign policy consensus in the United States and between it and its allies; a global strategy supported by such a consensus; a sufficiently united Western Europe to support—psychologically and materially—the costs and burdens of such a strategy; and a sufficiently united West-

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ern alliance to deter or defeat every Soviet challenge, in and out of Europe.

Laqueur does not give much attention to specifics (except for urging enhanced information programs and, of course, rearmament) and even less to considering why the things he calls for have never been achieved to a degree he would think adequate. In essay after essay he is content to denounce the failure of the Western public, media, academics, and leaders to understand the Soviet threat and do what he considers necessary.

Laqueur is particularly bitter about Western Europe, which he finds to be weak, divided, dependent, pretentious, and foolish all at the same time. In one essay he sensibly criticizes another writer for being emotional about the destructive effects of nationalism which, he says, is "about as effective as to politicize against rain, storm, or hail." Yet he seems unable to forgive the Europeans for having disappointed his own hope that they would overcome their ancient nationalisms and achieve political unity to resist the Soviet Union better. The Europeans are now prey not only to Finlandization, but to a new illness called "Hollanditis" in dishonor of a small country that he believes did not stand up to Hitler. Europe is shirking its responsibilities and is morally decadent, yet has the presumption to lecture others.

But the evidence of recent years in Greece, Spain, and the Federal Republic suggests that the governments of Western Europe are not collapsing into neutralism. Perhaps Laqueur thinks that simply because sizable groups hold views to which he objects, those countries are disabled. But surely it is unreasonable to expect every citizen of these developed countries to support sensible public policies. We realists will be satisfied if governments based on adequate numbers do reasonable and sensible things at the most important occasions.

—James W. McPHERSON

Pieces of the Game: The Story of Americans Held Hostage in Iran, by Charles W. Scott. Peachtree Publishing, Ltd., 1984. \$14.95

The capture of the U.S. embassy in Iran in November 1979 by militant followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini still remains an impediment to any possible improvement in relations between the two countries. Even more traumatic, at least in terms of its effect on their personal lives and the nation's psyche, was the imprisonment suffered by the captives. To the growing list of narratives, Colonel Charles Scott has added an account that provides a useful

perspective on both the hostages and their captors. His assessment of the situation in Iran is aided by experience gained from his earlier tour of duty there and by his knowledge of the language and culture.

Scott was the second-ranking military officer in the embassy and in charge of the U.S. Defense Liaison office. The militants who seized the compound suspected him of being in the employ of the Central Intelligence Agency. As such, he was singled out for particularly harsh treatment.

Unlike other former hostages turned author, Scott intersperses between sections of his own story an account of one of his cap-

tors. Akbar was a former engineering student who was turned into a militant follower of Khomeini by his arrest and torture at the hands of the Shah's secret police. Although Akbar, as the author admits, would have executed any of the hostages if ordered to do so, he won Scott's gratitude for his humane treatment of the captives and his efforts to alleviate their hardships. In relating Akbar's story, Scott explains the reason for the fanaticism of the captors and their hatred for the United States, whom they regarded as the principal prop for the Shah's regime.

Unfortunately, because Scott uses a

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stream-of-consciousness style to describe his and Akbar's experiences, some readers may suspect him of including fictionalized material. Nevertheless, students of Iranian affairs will find Scott's detailed presentation of conditions in Iran useful, and general readers will enjoy its lively style.

—BENSON L. GRAYSON

The Banana Wars. By Lester D. Langely. University Press of Kentucky, 1983. \$26.

For those of us who forget why U.S. forays into the Caribbean—however well-intentioned—produce such outcries against “Gringo” policies, historian Langely of the University of Georgia has provided a reminder. This slim volume instructs us in the history of those interventionist years and has the additional merit of being entertaining.

The book spans the period between 1898–1934 and chronologically surveys U.S. “banana wars” in Cuba, Nicaragua, Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and finally Nicaragua again. The author details changes in U.S. policy, from gunboat diplomacy (in which an individual naval commander could decide to bombard a country or land troops to protect American personnel and property), through the “dollars for bullets” phase (used extensively in Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and finally to the actions of President Wilson to unseat President Huerta of Mexico, whom he considered immoral.

This book not only provides a pithy review of American intentions and heavy-handedness, it explains how a failed interventionist policy led to our propensity to back national dictators who promised to maintain order and respect for American lives and property. The United States did not fail because it suffered from indecisiveness or a lack of ardor, but because it could not effectively rule such conquered places.

—ROY F. SULLIVAN

The Soviet Union and the Middle East: Opportunities, Constraints, and Dilemmas. Edited by Mark V. Kauppi and R. Craig Nation. Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1983.

Take a dozen or so men and one woman, give them various pieces of the Mideast puzzle to contemplate, put them all together in one book, and you may have recreated the Tower of Babel. Or, as the introduction to this volume says, you will have some “fresh and sometimes controversial perspectives and interpretations.”

Most of the twelve chapters derive from a 1982 University of Southern California–U.S. Army Russian Institute symposium on the subject. Some are by familiar and reliable performers such as J.C. Hurewitz and Robert O. Freedman. Others are by less familiar authors, some from Europe and the Mideast itself.

Udo Steinbach, of the Deutsches Orient Institut of Hamburg, considers Islam and the points of convergence between it and communism, in a manner that is thought-provoking, but perhaps more out of fashion than fresh. He analyzes what he sees as the shared totalitarianism of Islam and communism and finds a dangerous parallelism in the utopian goals of the two “ideologies.” He foresees that well-intentioned Muslims, disillusioned with Islam's social performance, will turn to communism, where they will find “all the temporal blessings of Islam improved, refined, and embellished by technology and free from all metaphysical difficulties.” This “intrusion of communism into Islam,” he asserts, “is precisely what has been happening.”

Notable for His absence from Steinbach's equations is Allah. But if Steinbach undervalues the power of faith, Mamun Kurdi incorporates it into his insistence on the incompatibility of Islam and communism. He feels the West should welcome the strengthening of Islamic institutions, because the “Muslim countries on the southern border of the U.S.S.R. should be viewed as a potentially strong safety belt containing the spread of communism.” This is so, he goes on, “because Islam is a great unifier that can prevent the creation of the social divisions that are the breeding ground of communism.”

There is a good variety of stimulating and contradictory opinion in this book. An American reader should find refreshing the closing line of the final chapter: “Some recognition of both the meager rewards and great costs of involvement and with it, greater superpower caution, would be in the interests not only of the United States and the Soviet Union but of the indigenous countries as well.”

—DAVID NALLE

American Military Space Policy: Information Systems, Weapon Systems, and Arms Control. By Colin S. Gray. Abt Books, 1983. \$28.

Military space policy offers the greatest challenge to defense policymakers. Much of the relevant technology is immature and its potential for revolutionizing the relationship between strategic offense and defense can be only dimly seen.

But, with these caveats, this study concludes that the United States has no practical choice other than to be prepared to fight in space. Deterrence will probably not work. And even if it does, U.S. interest in denying the Soviet Union ocean surveillance and other reconnaissance capabilities probably outweighs any hypothetical benefits that might be obtained from an antisatellite arms regime. The analyses presented by Gray strongly suggest that, in the event of a general war, the superpowers will fight for the control of space as they will fight everywhere else.

If the book has a defect, it is the common failure of such policy-oriented studies to include technical models of the systems they discuss. The reader need not be a high-energy physicist to understand a technical description of a high energy laser system—*Scientific American* proves this monthly. A five-to-ten page appendix could give the reader a feel for the magnitude and tractability of the problems inherent in projecting a coherent pulsed energy beam over a 1000-mile distance. Policymakers don't talk the same language as particle physicists and don't have time to read books like this. But their advisers need to know what lies behind the author's flat statements on policy implications if they are to outline useful options for their principals. —FRANCIS X. CUNNINGHAM

From the Think Tanks

The Challenging and Elusive Arctic Region. By Louis Rey. *Significant Issues Series, Vol. 6, No. 5, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984. 27pp.* A report from CSIS's Arctic Resources project, this brief paper outlines the economic and strategic importance of the north and describes some of the ambiguities of the region (such as the question of Svalbard). But he cautions that the military preparations undertaken by both superpowers and their allies may be threatened by the growing opposition of the native peoples.

Nuclear Strategy and Strategic Planning. By Colin S. Gray. *Foreign Policy Research Institute, 1984. 130pp. \$5.95.* Gray outlines and discusses five major options for nuclear strategic policy and concludes that current U.S. policy is on the right track but that actual capabilities, especially in homeland defense, will lag behind doctrinal requirements for several years. He also thinks that a consensus has emerged, among both the right and the left, in support of deterrence backed up by a war-fighting capability.

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The United States and South Africa: Realities and Red Herrings. By Helen Kitchen and Michael Clough. *Significant Issues Series, Vol. 6, No. 6, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984. 48pp.* This study traces developments in U.S. policy and the South African political scene. The authors argue for a bipartisan consensus in the United States centered on a policy that neither sets unrealistic goals nor requires restricting contact with any particular group. Along the way they criticize many of the proposals of the "anti-apartheid dogmatists," including sanctions and disinvestment.

DIPLOMACY

Foreign Service Stew


By JAMES W. SPAIN

- 4 overseas posts
- 5 untenured years
- 1 tandem tour
- 3 Washington jobs
- 21 tenured ones
- 2 overcomplement times
- 1 Pearson position
- 2 limited career extensions
- 3 overworked ones
- 1 S/S line job
- 1 presidential award
- 2 big embassies
- 1 stretch assignment
- 1 AFSA membership
- 3 small consulates

Combine tenured and untenured years in large pot over slow fire. Blend in overseas posts and Washington jobs. Dilute mixture with overcomplement times, adding overworked ones as contents come to a boil. Grate in big embassies and small tandem assignment to taste. Pour contents of main pot into baking dish, stir and cook for twenty years at 250 degrees. Garnish with stretch assignment, presidential award, and AFSA membership. Bake at 600 degrees for another decade or until ingredients have all melted away. Serve at representation or retirement function.

Foreign Service life is like a stew. Once constructed, it is not easy to take apart. By the time the dish arrives on the table you may have forgotten the ingredients that went into it. Still, for those contemplating their own version of the above recipe, an inventory of ingredients can be useful. Some are as mutually exclusive as oil and water, others, like flour, add thickness to the mixture. You can never be sure until you try them—and all are prone to changing their original properties from time to time.

Let us begin with the most basic ingredients: the bare bones of a Foreign Service career that, when boiled, will provide the essential flavoring of a stew. Once, a diplomatic career required attendance at the proper university. The written examination was as broad as Harvard's catalogue, and in the oral, at least one aspirant had to respond to the question: "Why did you presume to come to this examination with a broken button on your right cuff?" Today, the stew bones contain more varied marrow. The exam, with sections on political, economic, consular, and administrative matters and the "in-basket experi-



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ence," now attempts to emphasize professional aptitude over social background.

The aging of these bones begins when the successful candidate is offered an "untenured" appointment. Within four years, another panel decides whether or not to offer a "tenured," i.e., permanent, appointment. If it does, the full-fledged Foreign Service officer has 20 years to rise through the ranks to FSO-1. If he or she fails to do so, involuntary retirement is upon them.

Above the level of FSO-1, another board controls access to the Senior Foreign Service. But even at these exalted heights, the senior FSO is still subject to selection-out for low-ranking in class. After seven years as counselor, five as minister-counselor, and four as career minister, he or she must retire unless offered a limited career extension of three years. And, the faster the stew boils during the junior and middle period, the harsher the pressure in the senior years.

There are some compensations to put fat on the bones. Each year, every member of the Senior Foreign Service is considered for bonus pay. According to a formula, derived from a 14th century alchemists' manual, this may range up to 20 percent of the fortunate one's base salary (not, however, in gold). The candidate may also (but not simultaneously) be awarded presidential "distinguished" or "meritorious" rank, which, calculated according to a formula from the same manual, may bring in either \$20,000 or \$10,000 additional. Finally, the Senior Foreign Service officer may accumulate annual leave without limit and receive payment for it upon retirement. If enough overworked periods are added to a particular stew, this can mean an extra 6-12 months' pay (which, if bet on a winning horse at the right odds, can produce a useful supplement to one's regular annuity).

Of course, a stew composed of only boiled bones would not be very tasty. It is the peculiar variety of spices that gives a Foreign Service career its particular aroma. All kinds of people—civil servants, temporary reserve officers, staff "mustangs," itinerant scholars, minority candidates, and political appointees—have been fitted laterally into the Foreign Service hierarchy through such exotic measures as the Rogers Act of 1946, the Wriston Plan of the 1960s, and the Foreign Service Act of 1980. These redesignings may have made the system difficult to understand and navigate, but few would deny that they have added flavor and substance to the stew.

But not only people add spice to the stew. Even more important in seasoning

are the places and experiences added to the mix, in short, the nature of Foreign Service work. According to a perceptive book by an expert on the subject—*Staffing for Foreign Affairs*, by William Bacchus—the single most important distinction to be made among all the various jobs in foreign affairs is that between those done overseas and those in Washington. Bacchus's ideal person for overseas toil is what might be called "the compleat diplomat": analyst, reporter, negotiator, entertainer, and area and language expert. His model for Washington is the "policy synthesizer": one who brings together all the various strains within the department, other foreign affairs agencies, the Congress, and the pub-

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


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
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lic, and crafts them into a viable point of view.

Our Foreign Service person, regardless of rank or experience, constantly faces the question of how much of what kind of work he or she wants to do both overseas and in the department. In many cases, this choice will have more impact on personal life than any made by a tenure, promotion, or pay board. Indeed, if one could somehow take all the factors that influence quality of life and run them into a computer for an ambassador, an assistant secretary of state, a vice consul in an embassy, and a desk officer in the department, the results would probably show that the ambassador and the vice consul have more in common than does either with the assistant secretary and the desk officer—and vice versa. Washington and the field are two different ways of life.

In Washington, the Foreign Service person works with one group of people and lives (in neighborhood, church, or bar) with another group. Overseas, the two groups, whether American or foreign, are apt to be the same. In Washington, a larger apartment to celebrate a pay raise or to accommodate a new baby is a matter of personal finance. In an embassy, it often turns on how effective the administrative officer of ten years earlier was in acquiring property and on the personality of the current housing czar.

In Washington, with an occasional exception for the president or the secretary, no decision, however well-synthesized, is ever final, and no implementation, however urgent, is immediate. In the field, when the consular officer says "ineligible" or the ambassador "I'm not going to ask the foreign minister about this nonsense again," that's usually that. Nevertheless, work in the field, however satisfying, has its disadvantages. There is the matter of promotion. Washington jobs seem to produce promotions faster and more regularly. There is also the question of the next post. However open the "open assignments" process, the assignment panel is down the hall in Washington, and chance encounters in the cafeteria are a regular possibility. Embassy Kathmandu is half a world away. And, in Washington, working spouses can ride bicycles almost anywhere. Overseas, the tandem trail is narrow and twisting.

When making a stew, a simple decision to use so much meat and so many potatoes is not the final one. What kind of meat and how to cut the potatoes are also important matters. Next to the Washington-overseas distinction, how each job is sliced can be the most important difference. Overseas, big embassies have their charm. They are

usually in big cities with big facilities. But you are less likely to find yourself doing anything beyond your own specific political, counselor, administrative, or economic chore. You may never have the pleasure of having the ambassador stop you in the hall to ask "Joe (or Jane), what do you think last night's vote in the parliament really means?" Indeed, you may never even have the satisfaction of knowing that he knows that you are Joe—or Jane.

In the smaller, more remote posts, you may find yourself more concerned with the relative side effects of different kinds of anti-malaria pills than with the quality of competing opera divas. And you may be forced to conclude that the department not only doesn't know that you are Joe—or Jane—but doesn't even know where Ouagadougou is. However, you will make more money (hardship, danger, education, etc., allowances). You will almost willy-nilly be a member of the country team. Whether you love or hate your principal officer, you will *know* him or her—and vice-versa. And, unless you are extraordinarily lowly and unlucky, you are likely to be addressed at least once as "Excellency" by some local citizen and get on a first-name basis with one or more visiting American senators, generals, or movie stars, to whom you play "escort officer." Most ego-satisfying of all, you may find yourself "flying the flag" on your house and car when the principal officer is away. (Not long ago, all these things happened to one brand new FSO in his first six weeks as vice consul on Zanzibar.)

The Washington portion of the stew is less savory and exotic, but the shape of the potatoes is still important. The opportunity for congressional testimony may give you a two-column-inch addition for your mother's scrapbook. (Spouses don't seem to keep these anymore.) Participation in the department's noon press briefing can bring its own brief immortality. An S/S line-officer job, or that of a sixth or seventh floor staff assistant, carries with it one of those periods of overwork that strains family relationships and alienates colleagues—but improves telephone techniques and establishes an image and contacts that pay off in the future. Still, in terms of job satisfaction, it is probably less flattering to be known as "that SS/NEA fink who made us rewrite the memo three times" or "the under secretary's favorite dog-robber" than it is to have a moment of history as "Joe, who turned down the defense minister's nephew for a visa for the third time."

Both overseas or in Washington, there is the "stretch assignment"—holding a job a rank or two above your grade. It is encouraging to know that in some in-

stances the perceptive eye of an assistant secretary can be as important as the measured judgment of a board and that you don't have to wait until you are a career minister to be an ambassador. Of course, if your "stretch" was a really early one, you may find yourself the only "Excellency" among the first secretaries at your next post. And, several years later, when the boards have moved in their glacial way (and you have even served on a couple of them) you may find that you now have the rank for the job but that there isn't a job—some bright young first secretary has been "stretched" to fill it. (Or some ageless political appointee has pre-empted it.)

Whether in Washington or elsewhere, there are also quiet times. It seems to be a fact of life that if you haven't been over-complement yet, your time is coming. Or, if you haven't been traded to another agency, given a Pearson position, or been told to "go write a book or at least read one" as a diplomat-in-residence or foreign affairs fellow, you can count on such an experience in the future. Much to your surprise, you may even find the experience a pleasant and profitable one.

At times you may wonder if it is a stew or a pot-luck in which you are spending your life. If you insist on being rational, you may want to climb out of the pot, either briefly or permanently. The world outside is now full of appetizing fare: there are one-time colleagues earning six-figure salaries as transnational executives and four-figure ones as adjunct assistant professors. There are bookbinders who can barely pay for their glue and coin collectors who are financing their grandchildren's college education. Still in the building is a whole stable of confirmed war-horses who classify and declassify, consult and comment, for as many hours a week as their annuities permit.

It is hard to find a proper simile for it all. But, perhaps, that of a stew is as good as any, and, for an essay about a stew, Kipling in the "Ballad of the King's Jest" has given us some fine words with which to end:

*The lid of the flesh-pot chattered high,
The knives were whetted and—then came I
To Mahbub Ali, the muleteer,
Patching his bridles and counting his gear,
Crammed with the gossip of half a year.
But Mahbub Ali the kindly said
"Better is speech when the belly is fed."
So we plunged the hand to the mid-wrist deep
In a cinnamon stew of the fat-tailed sheep,
And he who never bath tasted the food,
By Allah! he knoweth not bad from good.*

James Spain is a former ambassador to Turkey and a member of the AFSA Governing Board.

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
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CLIPPINGS

The Chief Diplomat

"Mr. Reagan is treated throughout [Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig's book *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy*] as an affable, not very involved president, who more often than not let Mr. Meese or somebody else speak for him. 'Simply put, Ronald Reagan is a nice guy,' Mr. Haig says, but not very interested in foreign affairs....Mr. Haig notes with irritation how White House aides treated foreign affairs as some annoying encumbrance that was only useful when it enhanced the president's political image."

Bernard Gwertzman in the New York Times, April 18

"Asked in an interview with the *Washington Post* what he had learned in the White House, the president said: "I think I was surprised at how much...percentage of your time and effort and thinking is devoted to the international situation."

Lou Cannon in the Washington Post, January 23

International Broadcasting

"In the last three years the content of [VOA's] English-language broadcasts has become so blatantly self-serving of Reagan administration policies that in Greece it is no more credible—and perhaps less so—than Radio Moscow. The major difference between the two is that Radio Moscow prefers symphonic music while the VOA promotes bubble-gum music."

Sally G. Greenway in the New York Times, March 19

"Congress is tampering with the Voice of America, which broadcasts news and commentaries in dozens of languages without any political bias. The U.S. doesn't need propaganda to promote its ideals. The VOA is a triumphant success because its independence is so well known...."

"[The proposed Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba are] propaganda [but] Congress insisted on incorporating Radio Marti into the VOA, unlike Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, which are kept separate....It's depressing that [Secretary of State George P.] Shultz and Congress can't tell

the difference between propaganda, for however worthy a cause, and journalism."

New York Daily News, January 20

"A Senate Democratic staff report says the managers of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have so weakened the controls over program content that commentators hostile to the United States are allowed to broadcast to Soviet bloc audiences."

Joel Brinkley in the New York Times, February 22

Media Conspiracy

"Rumsfeld Resumes Outside Work During Lull in Mideast Activity"

Headline, Washington Post, March 8

"New U.S. Strategy on Mideast Begun"

Headline, New York Times, March 8

Protecting Diplomats

"It is essential for the U.S. to take all the defensive measures that we can that are appropriate for our society and the mission of the places that we are worried about, such as our embassies," Shultz said. "But I do not think a purely defensive posture is adequate and we must think through, as a society, other aspects of this problem. We're in the process of doing that."

Bruce Dranke in the New York Daily News, April 19

"Pre-emptive action against 'state-supported terrorism,' as suggested by Secretary of State George P. Shultz, is more risky and less practical than foiling attacks when or before they occur, according to the shadowy world of terrorism specialists in Washington and New York...."

"Simulation training for officials not normally protected by the Secret Service—such as ambassadors or senior members of the National Security Council staff—is currently the 'in' thing, according to sources in the various organizations that specialize in combating what the specialists call unorthodox warfare."

Russell Warren Howe in the Washington Times, April 5

Political Ambassadors

"Mr. Reagan's appointments to most of the principal embassies have been a disgrace. There are some obvious exceptions. He appointed a couple of old hands like Arthur Burns to Bonn and Mike Mansfield to Tokyo, who have been very successful. He has also appointed one or two Foreign Service officers, such as Arthur Hartman to

Moscow. But on the whole, his diplomatic appointments have been disappointing, to say the least."

James Reston in the New York Times, March 21

"Mark Austad is a big, amiable bull of a man who carries around his own china shop. He is the American ambassador to Norway, a hero in unheroic times, hemmed in by the flummery of diplomatic protocol—a John Wayne in a post more suited to a Henry A. Kissinger. There is nothing suave or subtle about him; he has a genius for antagonizing the anti-American clique in Norway...."

"Austad isn't a diplomat of the striped-pants, lace-handkerchief set, to be sure. But a lot of people think he's one of our best."

Jack Anderson, April 21

"Q: Other than being a crony of Ronald Reagan, what qualifications does William A. Wilson have to become the first U.S. ambassador to the Vatican in 117 years?..."

"A: The Wilsons and the Reagans are old friends who have spent many vacations together, particularly in Mexico....No outstanding qualifications are needed for the position of U.S. ambassador to the Vatican."

Walter Scott in Parade, March 18

Etcetera

"Eavesdropping; blacklists; cover ups; the corruption of credibility. Our propaganda agency will sink in its own sleaze as long as its standards are set by The Man Who Never Lied."

William Safire in the New York Times, March 2

"Patriotism may not be 'the last refuge of a scoundrel,' as Dr. Johnson said it was in the 18th century. But militarism, often disguised as patriotism, is the first refuge of a bankrupt foreign policy, as Ronald Reagan is proving in the 20th."

"President Reagan's consistent elevation of militarism over diplomacy creates a clear and present danger to the internal and external security of the United States. Presidents have been impeached for less...."

"Internally, Mr. Reagan's militarism threatens America's economic stability and Americans' constitutional freedoms. Externally, it threatens our relations with our allies and the survival of the world."

John B. Oakes in the New York Times, January 9

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, June 1974:
 "The role and purposes of USIA have long been subjects of discussion and debate both within and outside the foreign affairs community. During the past 20 years, the agency and its programs have been weakened and its personnel frustrated by the lack of consensus over USIA's function, by an emphasis on tactical expedience in response to cold war and domestic political concerns as opposed to longer-range considerations, and by the need to be responsive to policies which were formed without consideration of public diplomacy implications in judging policy options. The cumulative effect of these factors has been to hinder development by USIA of an overall, continuing concept for its information and cultural programs which would have validity for—and be responsive to—the changing times." *AFSA Editorial*

Foreign Service Journal, June 1959:
 "Senator Stennis (D.-Mississippi): 'Foreign Service wives perform an important part of the functions required of their spouses; and many of their posts involve severe living conditions. With their ability and experience, with their dedication and poise, they make outstanding, constructive contributions to our nation.... After observing a number of these effective husband-wife teams as they work together in many countries abroad, I have a greater appreciation of their valuable service, and I realize the real bargain America has in obtaining the services of two—husband and wife—for the salary of one.' "

Gwen Barrows

Foreign Service Journal, June 1934:
 "Mr. Hull said that the freedom of the press is abridged almost universally today and that in a number of important countries the press is controlled by the governments, the military or political censors, manufacturers of war materials, or by foreign subsidies, but that it was a matter of congratulation that the United States has a free press." *August Ingram*

10-25-50 contains JOURNAL excerpts from previous issues with an eye toward how much things have changed for the Foreign Service, or how they have remained the same.

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
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Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, director general of UNESCO, addresses the U.N. General Assembly. The Reagan administration has criticized his management of the organization, but a 1979 U.S. General Accounting Office study said its management procedures were "unique and forward-looking."



UN/Miguel Jimenez

REFORM OR WITHDRAWAL

The United States does not need to withdraw from UNESCO but to use its influence more effectively to guide and monitor programs and personnel

SEYMOUR MAXWELL FINGER

LAST DECEMBER, the United States informed the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization of its intention to withdraw from that body at the end of 1984. The letter of notification, sent from Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Amadou-Mahtar M'Bow, its director general, stated that "we have been concerned that trends in the policy, ideological emphasis, budget, and management of UNESCO were detracting from the organization's effectiveness. We believe that these trends have led UNESCO away from the original principles of its constitution....For our part, we are convinced that we can develop other means of cooperation in education, science, culture, and communication which will more clearly embody the principle to

Seymour Maxwell Finger is professor of political science at the City University of New York and director of its Ralph Bunche Institute on the United Nations. A career diplomat from 1946-71, he served for 15 years at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, the last five as an ambassador, and has written extensively on the United Nations. Two graduate interns, Dolly Udemezie of the City University Graduate School and Marianne Woo of Columbia University, assisted in the research for this article.

which we subscribed in UNESCO many years ago."

The decision to serve notice on UNESCO followed a recommendation by Gregory Newell, assistant secretary of state for international organization affairs. It was endorsed by Jeane Kirkpatrick, U.S. permanent representative to the United Nations, Jean Gerard, representative to UNESCO, and Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary for human rights.

But this solid phalanx of support by top administration officials was not universally shared in the foreign affairs community. Many American diplomats and professional bodies, particularly the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, a quasi-governmental body that advises the State Department, voiced their vigorous opposition. A month before the withdrawal notice was issued, the commission affirmed in a letter to Newell that it was "convinced that the best means of serving U.S. interests in UNESCO is to press for reform from within...in concert with our friends and allies wherever possible." At a special meeting in June 1982, the commission's five working groups concluded unanimously that the United States should remain in UNESCO and the effectiveness of its participation should be improved; it also made specific recommendations for such improvements. When Newell re-

quested the commission's views in 1983, it consulted more than a dozen of its national associations and they recommended unanimously that the United States remain. In addressing some of the concerns that prompted consideration of withdrawal, Leonard Sussman, executive director of Freedom House and a delegate to the 1983 UNESCO general conference, concluded that the negotiations and resolutions "generally favored the western free press position." The World Press Freedom Committee wrote: "If anyone is looking at an assault on the media at this conference serious enough to justify a U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO, they won't find it."

There is no denying that UNESCO faces some serious problems, although the scope and impact of those difficulties may not be as severe as the Reagan administration believes. The Shultz letter could have some worthwhile effect; certainly it has demonstrated to UNESCO's director general the importance attached by the United States to reform of the organization. But the administration has acted precipitously and unilaterally, without adequate consultation with its friends and allies. The 23 other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development share U.S. concerns over budget, management, and voting practices but were not given an opportunity to consult on cooperative action before the U.S. announcement. The range of possibilities for encouraging positive change by cooperative participation in concert with our allies has not been exhausted.

John Fobes, a former chairman of the U.S. National Commission and deputy director general of UNESCO from 1971-77, states:

Threats of withdrawal are simply poor excuses, a coping out. What is needed is that we make known our purposes and our readiness and willingness to fulfill our responsibilities to the world (while protecting our interests); that we state more clearly what it is that we want changed and how that could be brought about (not simply by reducing a budget); and that we convince others that we are prepared to stick in, both for the battles and for the constructive projects that are crying for our full participation.

THE PROBLEMS CITED by Secretary Shultz in his letter to M'Bow are not new ones and are certainly not confined to UNESCO. Over the years since that organization's creation in 1946, several U.S. administrations, as well as other governments, have voiced their concern about both particular matters and general management practices. During the Carter administration, the State Department was deeply concerned about the introduction of extraneous political issues, such as the PLO and apartheid, into UNESCO proceedings and about rising budgets and faulty management—concerns shared by our western allies. The U.S. National Commission, at its 1982 session, also expressed concern over these problems and urged that U.S. participation be more effectively managed to deal with them. In 1977 an Arab-prodded Third World majority, backed by the Soviet bloc, voted to deny Israel participation in any geographic group. The United States thereupon withheld its financial contribution until 1980, when Israel was

admitted to the Western European and Other Group. And for some years, the western governments and media have been concerned by attempts to establish a New World Information and Communication Order. But on all of these issues the West has stayed in the arena and negotiated. Its success in holding down UNESCO's current biennial budget and negotiating reasonable resolutions at the 1983 general conference have been notable.

Furthermore, these problems exist to varying degrees in most U.N. agencies (and, of course, in almost any large bureaucracy). For more than a decade, cooperation within the entire U.N. system—not just UNESCO—has been hampered by the introduction of extraneous political issues into the discussions of specialized agencies and conferences. Apartheid in South Africa, the inequities of the current international economic order, and the fate of the Palestinians are important political issues that should be and are exhaustively discussed at the United Nations itself, especially in the General Assembly. But the specialized agencies and conferences are intended to address the specific matters, including health, food, agriculture, labor standards, human settlements, and the status of women. When controversial political and economic issues are pushed aggressively in these forums, the result is excessive and costly duplication of General Assembly discussions that limits the agencies' ability to achieve their particular goals. The supporters of international organizations once argued (along with the academic theorists of functional integration) that habits of cooperation developed in technical, scientific, economic, and humanitarian agencies would gradually carry over into the political realm. Instead, if the U.N. experience is any guide, the reverse has occurred.

The Reagan administration has also criticized the size of UNESCO's budget and its management practices. But this is another area where problems have not been limited to UNESCO—they exist throughout the United Nations and its specialized agencies. In the U.N. secretariat itself, political pressures by member states have resulted in the appointment of many unqualified persons to official positions, thereby undermining the concept of an international civil service based, as the U.N. Charter describes it, on "the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity." Moreover, during the 1960s and '70s, the budgets of many specialized agencies rose dramatically, as new programs were promoted by the majority even as old programs that had lost their *raison d'être* continued to be funded because of inertia. Poor management and inflation also worked to push the budgets upward. Such problems are not unique to international organizations; almost any Foreign Service officer can supply similar examples from U.S. agencies.

Yet there are certain factors that exacerbate these problems in international organizations. In particular, the abuse of majority rule has caused substantial difficulties. Decision-making is based on the one-country, one-vote principle, which equates 100,000 people in Grenada with countries with the size and resources of China or the United States (the U.S.S.R. has three votes). Contributions to the budget, howev-



Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi meets M'Bow (bottom) at the UNESCO headquarters building in Paris (top). As in other parts of the U.N. system, Third World countries through blocs such as the Non-Aligned Movement can control the organization's policies while contributing only a fraction of its budget.

er, are determined by a formula based on the member's ability to pay. Thus a majority can be obtained from countries that pay about one percent of the budget. The Non-Aligned Movement, which comprises more than 100 countries, can and does dominate the agenda and the debate. It is this group that must bear the main responsibility for UNESCO's current problems and other difficulties throughout the U.N. system.

AT THE UNITED NATIONS itself, however, the United States does have powerful defensive weapons, including veto power over any Security Council decision. The United States also holds an effective, if unwritten, veto on economic matters, for no major program can succeed without the cooperation of the major contributor. But the United States cannot control the anti-western rhetoric or the plethora of resolutions. This has been a matter of serious concern for Kirkpatrick, and she has attempted to deal with it through forthright speeches and rebuttals at the United Nations and by taking careful note of how individual representatives vote and speak. She says: "We operate as though there were no difference between our relations with supporters and opponents, with no penalties for opposing our views and values and no rewards for cooperating." We act "as though we had no coherent national purposes that link issue to issue." Under her guidance, the United States has more frequently objected to other governments regarding their representatives' antagonistic votes or speeches. Such tactics, if not used to excess, can be very helpful and should be employed on important matters. But there is a limit to the number of issues that can be usefully discussed between capital cities. Often an embassy representative, with only a superficial understanding of an issue, must talk with a foreign ministry official who understands even less. Moreover, such a step should only be taken after consultation with the U.N. representative; otherwise, one may needlessly antagonize him or her and require even more contacts between capitals,

going beyond the point of diminishing returns. In my own view, Kirkpatrick's tactics, like those of Moynihan before her, may be well intentioned, but they are counterproductive. They tend to widen the circle of enemies and narrow the circle of friends. Much more can be accomplished by patient negotiation than by exchanging rhetorical brickbats and brandishing the punishing rod.

Although these problems occur throughout the U.N. system, the Reagan administration appears to have singled out UNESCO because it has a reputation as one of the worst offenders, especially on budgetary matters. The Geneva Group of industrialized countries managed to hold UNESCO's budget for 1984-85 to \$374.4 million which represents a growth rate of only three percent over the previous biennium. Considering the rate of growth of the U.S. budget, this is certainly a respectable figure. But this modest growth comes on top of a figure already swelled by large budget hikes in the 1960s and 70s. For example, expenditures rose from \$175 million in the 1975-76 biennium to \$224 million in 1977-78 and \$303 million in 1979-80.

UNESCO has also long been regarded in the United States as one of the worst run and most-propagandized of the agencies. In 1981, an Ad Hoc Group on U.S. Policy Toward the United Nations, which included three former Democratic secretaries of state—Dean Rusk, Cyrus Vance, and Edmund Muskie—said:

Of all the specialized agencies, UNESCO presents perhaps the most troubling case of intrusion of retrogressive ideology and biased politics, with inevitable damage to its reputation and constructive programs. A conspicuous example has been the effort of the Soviet Union and some Third World governments to legitimize, under the rubric of a "New International Information Order," government controls over the collection, transmission, and publication of news by the press and other mass media. While calling for a "free and balanced flow of information and news" internationally, these governments maintain a discreet silence about its absence in their own countries, where news usually means government propaganda....

We believe the time has come to reassess the capacity of UNESCO, and certain other U.N. agencies, to function compatibly with their declared ideals and purposes. Where politicization, or gross inefficiency, has seriously impaired this capacity, and remedial efforts fail, the United States should consider alternative institutions or mechanisms to provide their intended services. Our preference is that the United States stay in UNESCO and aggressively affirm our own interests and ideals, and work to restore the agency to its proper role; but if these efforts fail, we should not exclude the possibility of withholding financial support or even withdrawing from the agency.

The Reagan administration entered office determined to change this situation one way or another. It fired its first salvo at UNESCO even before Inauguration Day. David Stockman, then director-designate of the Office of Management and Budget, argued in a position paper written during the transition that the United States should withdraw from UNESCO because of its "pro-PLO policies, and its support for measures limiting the free flow of information."

By 1983, the administration's patience was clearly wearing thin. Newell began a systematic review of the U.S. relationship with UNESCO and conducted a survey of U.S. missions overseas and scores of private groups involved in the organization's work. In October, Kirkpatrick spoke in congressional testimony of "our profound disapproval of UNESCO," which, she said, "has succumbed to politicization, ... creates obstacles to a free press instead of promoting free exchange of information, discriminates against Israel, and... is utterly indifferent to fiscal restraint." Clearly, the far right had singled out the organization as an easy target and was agitating for U.S. withdrawal.

A major reason for the administration's selection of UNESCO as the U.N. agency from which to withdraw seems to have been the effort in that body to promote the New World Information and Communication Order. This order, which was initially intended to address the dominant role of the West in the world press, has several provisions that would encourage government control of the media. Though strenuous western efforts have thus far forestalled its adoption, the western media understandably remain wary of UNESCO. Consequently, the administration could hope that its decision would not meet a storm of adverse reaction from the press. In fact, the *New York Times*, usually considered liberal and internationalist, produced an editorial in February that although generally supportive of the U.S. decision concluded:

Despite its meanderings, UNESCO has promoted some admirable programs in schools and laboratories, museums and libraries. Its thousands of publications in 70 languages do fulfill its mandate to maintain, increase, and diffuse knowledge.... If UNESCO shows a willingness to add to this body of work and to abandon the rest, it could again make Americans eager and generous participants.

The Reagan administration has demonstrated a more skeptical, even negative attitude toward the U.N. system than any of its predecessors. After 10 years of negotiations on a Law of the Sea Convention conducted during four administrations (one Democratic and three Republican), the United States was the sole major power to vote against the convention and to refuse participation in the Preparatory Committee. This administration has also shown a marked lack of enthusiasm for multilateral aid institutions. Its requests for U.S. contributions to the U.N. Development Program have been consistently low and, in a rare action, Congress has actually appropriated substantially more than the president requested. His request of \$750 million annually for the U.S. contribution to the International Development Association, which provides loans to the poorest countries, was 25 percent below the share recommended by A. W. Clausen, the American serving as president of the World Bank. It was also proportionately lower than the sums agreed to by the other major contributors. When it came to UNESCO, this administration seems to have wanted to shock the Third World countries and secretariat, to demonstrate that there were limits beyond which it would not be pushed. Thus, though other administrations had misgivings, this one was prepared, even eager, to act.

There has, of course, been a strong reaction. The secretary general of the United Nations, Javier Perez de Cuellar, quickly expressed his regrets and was assured by the United States that the UNESCO action did not portend a general U.S. withdrawal from the United Nations. Director General M'Bow wrote to Shultz in January expressing his regret over the U.S. decision and addressing some of its charges. On the matter of extraneous political issues, M'Bow argued that "a distinction should be drawn between the viewpoints expressed by UNESCO's individual member states and the activities of the organization itself." He stated that it would be impossible to "cite a single case" in which the activities of the director general or any UNESCO program activity were "contrary to the ideals enunciated in the constitution."

On budgetary and management questions, M'Bow cited a September 1979 study by the U.S. General Accounting Office that called UNESCO's management procedures "unique and forward-looking compared to other U.N. agencies examined" and said that planning and budgeting processes were "conceptually sound." The current assistant director general for administration, George F. Saddler, is an American with long experience in budget and management. Also, according to M'Bow's letter, Congress was assured in a State Department report of February 1983 that there was nothing in UNESCO's work program that would require a cutback in U.S. contributions. This 40-page report was made to the Congress pursuant to the Beard amendment of the 97th Congress, which stipulates that no funds can be contributed to UNESCO "if that organization implements any policy or procedure the effect of which is to license journalists or their publications, to censor or otherwise restrict the free flow of information within or among countries, or to impose mandatory codes of journalistic practice or ethics." As its conclusion, the report states: "UNESCO, to date, has debated but not implemented policies or procedures of an anti-free press nature."

The report also observed that "UNESCO programs for the most part contribute to broad U.S. foreign policy goals and particular U.S. educational, scientific, and cultural interests." That statement implies that some UNESCO programs are not consistent with U.S. policy goals. While this situation is cause for concern and increased attention, it is not surprising for an organization of almost 160 members with varying goals and interests. In fact, it suggests the need for more effective U.S. participation, rather than abandonment.

THOUGH UNESCO may have organizational strengths and weaknesses, it should also be noted that its field work, particularly the programs to reduce illiteracy and apply science and technology to the advancement of the less developed countries, has made a significant contribution and been generally free of extraneous politics. The same may be said for the various international scientific groups affiliated with UNESCO, which generally opposed the U.S. decision. International research on climate, oceanography, hydrology, chemistry, conservation, neurobiology, and human



Traditional-music class at Bangkok School of Dramatic Arts sponsored by UNESCO (top), and restoration project of Buddha in Sukotha region under the organization's supervision (bottom). Secretary Shultz has said other means can be developed for international cultural activities, but so far none has been initiated.

settlements brings important benefits to American scientists and their counterparts around the world. The U.S. National Commission for UNESCO surveyed over a dozen organizations familiar with the agency's work. It reported unanimous opposition to withdrawal from the respondents, a group that included the National Education Association, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and the National Wildlife Federation.

The strongest concern was expressed by those involved in the earth sciences. Warren Wooster, a University of Washington oceanographer, noted that oceans cover 71 percent of the earth's surface. "Their phenomena are grander in scale than any one country can study alone, and they demand mechanisms for intergovernmental cooperation." Wooster pointed out that through UNESCO's information networks and its joint programs, American scientists enjoy access to foreign research and countries that for political reasons could never be duplicated by government-to-government arrangements.

Shultz's letter of notification to M'Bow said that "we can develop other means of cooperation in education, science, culture and communication." But, to date, I am not aware that any such programs are being pursued. The development of such channels outside the United Nations would not be easy and would depend on the willingness of other countries to participate, particularly the 24 members of the OECD. Given the present state of U.S.-Soviet relations, one cannot be optimistic about cooperation from the Eastern bloc. Cooperation with the Third World outside UNESCO may also be difficult to achieve. The Islamic Summit Conference in Casablanca in January issued a declaration in strong support of M'Bow (who is a Senegalese Moslem) and urged the United States to reconsider its action. As a major faction of the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic group is certain to have substantial influence in determining that bloc's attitude on this issue.

The administration's announcement also provoked a protest among some congressmen. In one attempt to avoid withdrawal, Representative Jim Leach (R.-

Iowa) introduced legislation in March that would require specific authorization from Congress should the executive branch decide to take the final step of terminating membership. In remarks before a Science and Technology subcommittee, Leach characterized the administration's decision as "a unilateral expansion of executive prerogative, belying serious efforts to craft bipartisan, bi-institutional approaches to foreign policy."

Leach acknowledged that UNESCO had serious problems but argued that the United States should stay in and work for improvement. He emphasized that the U.S. government had successfully modified the organization's behavior in the past, notably in defending the right to a free press, protecting Israel's right of participation, and restraining budget growth. Furthermore, the administration had reported to Congress that "none of the programs included in the UNESCO organization plan pose any active, direct threat to a free press." He contended that 40 percent of last year's American contribution to UNESCO was returned to the United States via fellowships to Americans, payments by foreign students studying here, and the procurement of U.S. equipment.

Leach's amendment was introduced in the House Foreign Affairs Committee but was not formally considered. Instead, Chairman Dante Fascell (D.-Florida) proposed an amendment that called on the president to create a bipartisan commission to study U.S. differences with UNESCO. Once this was adopted by the committee it effectively precluded consideration of Leach's proposal, ending congressional attempts to forbid U.S. withdrawal. However, no such bipartisan committee has been appointed, nor is one anticipated.

It is possible that UNESCO will take some remedial action before 1985 that will allow the United States to remain in the organization. Indeed, the administration has suggested that withdrawal is not inevitable. In mid-February, Newell commented at a news conference in Paris that the Reagan administration would reconsider its decision if UNESCO started to change its ways, by, for example, improving management techniques, dropping "politically motivated anti-western programs," and concentrating instead on such technical tasks as promoting literacy, fostering scientific exchanges, and preserving artistic treasures. He announced that the administration would soon appoint an independent panel of educators, intellectuals, and artists to assess the organization's performance during the rest of this year. This group, known as the UNESCO monitoring panel, held its first meeting in early May.

At the same conference, however, Newell expressed his skepticism that sufficient changes would be made. His pessimism notwithstanding, it is possible that enough progress will be made toward meeting U.S. demands so that some accommodation can be worked out. In fact, the shock of the U.S. announcement may help trigger such reforms. Certainly the notification has attracted the attention of the director general. It has also put the Third World on notice as to the limits of U.S. tolerance for promoting projects without due consideration of their consequences, budgetary and otherwise.

THERE ARE ALREADY several efforts underway to identify and encourage the necessary changes. In an effort unrelated to that of Leach, Representative James H. Scheuer (D.-New York) conducted his own investigation of UNESCO. In an exchange of letters with M'Bow, he obtained the director general's agreement to cooperate fully with a review of the organization's activities by the U.S. General Accounting Office and to provide access to UNESCO's internal documents, financial reports, and budget records. At one time, M'Bow insisted that such an inquiry could only be conducted if it were formally requested by the Reagan administration and not simply by the Congress. Although the administration has apparently declined to make such an official request, a GAO team has been in Paris reviewing UNESCO papers and has encountered no resistance despite its lack of executive branch sponsorship.

Perhaps most important, in March the other 23 OECD countries joined the United States in submitting to the director general a working document that contained a list of complaints and suggestions for change. The paper reportedly states that it is of "highest importance" that the United States not withdraw, because losing the U.S. contribution and its technical expertise could be "fatal" to UNESCO. To avoid such an occurrence, the authors urge the organization to make several changes, including giving major contributors to the annual budget of about \$185 million more control over spending. The paper also calls for reforms designed to eliminate or minimize the intrusion of extraneous political issues in UNESCO operations. Despite the unofficial character of the report, the clout of this group could give their statement a significant impact.

In the past, such displays of muscle have succeeded in changing policies both at UNESCO and throughout the United Nations. When Israel was denied effective participation in UNESCO in 1977, the United States suspended its contributions to the budget, an action that stimulated the reaching of an agreement in 1980 that gave Israel membership in the Western European group. The United States then resumed its contributions. Also, in the last two sessions of the General Assembly, U.S. warnings that it would walk out and suspend contributions to the U.N. budget if Israel were denied participation in that body appear to have been a factor in forestalling such actions. For obvious reasons, Israel has expressed its concern over the possibility that the United States may soon actually leave UNESCO.

In 1977 the United States went through a similar episode with the International Labor Organization. The U.S. withdrawal from the ILO was attributed to "four matters of fundamental concern: (1) the erosion of tripartite representation, (2) selective concern for human rights, (3) disregard of due process, (4) the increasing politicization of the organization." Knowledgeable insiders, however, have confided that the real reason was to placate the late George Meany, then president of the AFL-CIO. Because the president was not prepared to accommodate Meany on the *in situ* picketing issue, he sought to make amends by getting tough with the ILO. Whatever the real motivation,

certain desirable changes did occur. The secretariat and other member states became more keenly aware that the United States could not be taken for granted. More attention was given to violations of trade union rights in Eastern Europe and to budgetary restraint. And, when the United States rejoined the ILO in February 1980, the secretariat and other delegations were notably more attentive to U.S. concerns. This time, however, it is to be hoped that the changes will be made *before* the United States makes good on its promise and actually withdraws.

When considering the nature of these changes and the likelihood of their implementation, one should avoid putting the entire burden for improvement on the director general and his staff or on the Third World countries. For some years, the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO has urged that the United States remain in the organization and work to increase the effectiveness of its participation. At its 1982 meeting, the commission concluded that the United States, because of its financial contribution, its human resources, and the appeal of its way of life, has more potential influence within UNESCO than the one-country, one-vote system might imply. To exercise that influence, the United States should participate more actively in planning and initiating programs. The report urged the United States to take on a greater role in monitoring UNESCO's performance and to devote more effort to finding and recruiting qualified Americans for staff positions. At last count the United States had filled only 90 of its allocation of 123 professional posts. Greater emphasis should also be placed on selecting a highly qualified staff for U.S. delegations to UNESCO and on ensuring the continuity of this representation. Similar efforts must be made by other OECD countries, with which there should be active and continuing consultations. These should involve more contact with professional and scientific groups in the OECD countries.

It is not enough for the United States to deal with UNESCO through negative, damage-control operations. If we want a UNESCO that measures up to its constitutional goals, we and the other OECD countries must devise constructive programs and then work with the organization's secretariat and cooperative Third World countries in making them effective. We have not done this at all well in the last decade and a half. It would have been far better for the U.S. to put its own house in order, as the U.S. National Commission has repeatedly urged, rather than to serve notice on withdrawal. Though the commission has made comprehensive, well-considered proposals for more effective U.S. participation, these have largely been ignored. Moreover, the United States did not engage in serious consultations with its allies before its withdrawal announcement.

The shock administered by the Reagan administration may yet do some good, but only if it results in corrective action by all parties concerned—the UNESCO secretariat, the Third World members, and the OECD countries. Withdrawal may have to be the end result, but it should be the last resort. If the United States does leave UNESCO, it will be a sad day both for us and for international educational, scientific, and cultural cooperation. □

WHAT HAPPENED TO U.N. ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS

JOHN J. HARTER

FROM 1944–74, Kathleen Bell was a specialist in U.N. economic and social operations at the Department of State. Here she recalls the formative years of the United Nations and several of its specialized agencies. The interview was conducted in Washington and Geneva in 1981 on developments she participated in and witnessed.

After the 1945 San Francisco conference, many people felt the United Nations would usher in a new era of peace and prosperity. Today few have such confidence in the U.N. What happened?

I think we oversold the United Nations in those days. We had a high-powered staff, riding the crest of a wave, going all over the country, holding hearings modeled after the old town meetings, trying to build grass roots support for the new U.N. Charter. We oversold collective security, international dispute settlement, and what the United Nations could do to maintain the peace. This created a concept of the U.N. in the public mind that the Washington political structure was not really committed to—that just by supporting the United Nations, we could save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

It's difficult today to recall the national confidence of the American people at that time. We felt that we, as Americans, could do anything—we had the brains, the know-how, the organizational savvy, and there wasn't anything we couldn't lick. There was true idealism, and a belief in rationality and sanity. We also had the welfare of the world at heart. You see, we had come through a bad time and a bad war—and we felt we had saved the whole world. We wanted to believe the war had achieved a purpose, and we honestly felt—and I still believe—that the U.N. Charter was a workable basis for an organization that would further that purpose.

But it soon became apparent that the United States was not prepared to use the U.N. for the purposes it was set up to serve. Those who had not been "present at the creation" were suspicious of it and either sought unilateral solutions to current international affairs or created new organizations to serve their purposes.

The U.N. gives a lot of attention these days to Third World development. Was that anticipated at San Francisco?

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Well, we were concerned with theoretical economic issues, but we didn't speak of "economic development" in those days. When the Dumbarton Oaks Conference hammered out a preliminary draft of the charter, we assumed that including economic and social matters would give the U.N. a better chance to survive. Remember, such international economic and social activities as existed before World War II—the Narcotics Commission and the International Labor Organization, for example—were limited and not directly under the authority of the League of Nations, which was mainly concerned with political questions. But State Department planners concerned with the post-war period focused mainly on political and organizational issues—as did their successors.

Who were the planners?

Midway through the war, President Roosevelt created a prestigious Post War Programs Committee, responsible to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. We called it the PWC, and its executive secretary was Leo Pasvolosky, then a special assistant to the secretary, who had absolute confidence in him. Pasvolosky was, incidentally, my first boss at the State Department, when I reported to duty in March 1944. The papers the secretariat prepared for the PWC outlined the U.N. Charter.

How much interaction was there between those who were preparing for Bretton Woods and the work of the PWC, while it was preparing for the San Francisco Conference?

There was little interaction between the PWC and those in the Treasury who had primary responsibility for preparing for Bretton Woods, in part because Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau had more influence with President Roosevelt than Secretary Hull did. Treasury officials didn't want the international financial institutions to be entrapped by U.N. political decisions—for example, with whether Spain or the Indochinese states should be in or out of anything. Also they were not enthusiastic about the poorer countries becoming members. But the State Department couldn't ignore those political questions, as it was considering the requirements of the post-war world—and especially the need for instruments of collective security. Clearly the Treasury didn't want State Department types to have any influence or say in the formation and development of international financial institutions.

Did the two different sets of attitudes reflect different visions of world peace and order?

Yes, I think so—and I think it's unfortunate that we never really aligned those two points of view better, that we didn't give more attention to the interactions and interrelationships in the international political and economic system. For example, while we were laying the foundations of the United Nations in 1945–46, nobody really thought of the economic problems that dozens of very small countries would face after they acquired political independence. The people concerned with the international economic side were preoccupied with the collapse of the world economy in the 1930s, which they perceived as having been the underlying cause of World War II. They felt the way to world peace was through a stable and growing world economy, which, they felt, would automatically bring the political side into line. By and large, they tended to think private enterprise could take care of the world's economic problems—that if you just turn business loose, it would do the job through investment and trade better than government. But this doesn't guarantee stability. Governments also have responsibilities—in curbing excesses, for example, and certainly in developing the infrastructure that is needed before significant private investment will take place.

There are a lot of complaints in the United States these days that the one-nation, one-vote formula through which General Assembly resolutions are passed does not realistically reflect contemporary world politics.

That resulted from our whole concept of democracy. This was not only built into the General Assembly and councils, but also into the conferences and assemblies of the specialized agencies of the U.N. system. As part of that, we pressed at San Francisco for the creation of a viable U.N. Trusteeship Council and a committee on non-self-governing territories to ensure that peoples formerly ruled by others would eventually obtain their national independence. But I don't think anyone at that time expected those bodies to succeed as completely and as quickly as they did. I certainly don't recall any discussion of how that would transform the whole political landscape of foreign affairs. But it did—and it brought into existence the many nation states now represented in the U.N.

How did the concept of the Economic and Social Council evolve?

U.S. economists wanted to create a U.N. economic council to discuss, research, and prepare studies on broad issues, like theories of full employment and how to increase production. Other countries advocated a separate social council attached to the U.N. to set up standards of social justice, for example, that countries might or might not adopt. In the end, at San Francisco, the two concepts were merged into ECOSOC.

Did ECOSOC evolve as you expected it to?

No, it didn't. We thought the secretariat would prepare academic studies that the council might just debate, along with annual reports of the specialized agencies—not necessarily in search of conclusions,

but perhaps with a view to formulating suggestions for all concerned. We never dreamed that ECOSOC would set up regional economic commissions, or get into economic development. But within a short time, it established economic commissions for Europe, Latin America, and Asia and the Far East. The Economic Commission for Africa came later. By the mid-1950s, ECOSOC was getting into the whole question of Third World development.

Is there no effective U.N. coordinating mechanism?

ECOSOC set up the Administrative Committee on Coordination for that purpose, back in 1945. It's composed of the directors general of all the specialized agencies, and it is chaired by the secretary general. Over the years the heads of other major U.N. programs have been added, as the programs were created. The ACC itself meets twice a year, and it has created subcommittees to take care of special problem areas. Dag Hammarskjöld was the most effective chairman the ACC ever had. He was trying to make it more effective in the late 1950s—and he was succeeding. Then he died in that plane crash in the Congo. In addition, the Ad Hoc Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions is a group of budget experts that is supposed to ask searching questions on proposed expenditures of the specialized agencies, as well as those of the U.N. itself. One U.S. representative, Bill Hall—who eventually became director general of the Foreign Service—was extremely effective in the 1960s. But the influence of the ACABQ is less than it should be, in part because as budgets have grown and become more complex, it has not had the time to undertake an adequate review of all the agencies.

What was the U.S. position at San Francisco on relationships between the specialized agencies and the United Nations?

President Roosevelt opposed the desire of some to ensure U.N. control over the specialized agencies. In November of 1944—before the conference—he decided to support their "independence." Ambassador Winant, as a former ILO director general, urged continued autonomy for the ILO, as did U.S. trade union leaders.

What was the result?

The consensus favored separate intergovernmental organizations related to the United Nations through negotiated agreements that would call upon them to receive U.N. policy guidance and U.N. budget review. This was written into the charter—but it has never been successfully or fully implemented, because there is a separate lobby within each government pressing for more resources and less central surveillance for each organization—with supporting echoes in the legislature and press of each country.

What were the origins of UNESCO?

An International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation had been set up in Paris after World War I, and the French wanted to establish a new and independent organization to replace it. They sponsored a resolution at San Francisco calling for such a body, but it



Kathleen Bell (left) confers with ECOSOC President George Michalowski of Poland, U.S. Ambassador Philip Klutznick, and United Kingdom Ambassador Dame Barbara Salt. "We never dreamed that ECOSOC would set up regional economic commissions, or get into economic development."

didn't win approval at that time. We—and others—opposed an esoteric, academic body, but we saw merit in an organization that would get into communications, science, and other tangible issues. It wasn't easy to merge these divergent concepts, and the compromise that became UNESCO was an ambiguous organization with educational, scientific, and cultural functions.

When did technical assistance first come into the United Nations?

Technical assistance was one of the functions financed by the regular budget of WHO from the time it first came into being, and when the other specialized agencies saw what the WHO was doing, they wanted to follow suit. But Hernan Santa Cruz of Chile first introduced the concept of technical assistance in the United Nations itself, at the third session of ECOSOC, in 1948. He proposed that the U.N. should provide technical assistance to countries that request it, with resources financed from the regular U.N. budget. We opposed that, because we were paying over a third of the U.N. budget. We mustered enough support to defeat his original proposal in ECOSOC, but he then re-introduced the same concept in the General Assembly, and it carried. In the beginning, this was peanuts, in terms of cost, and had little impact, but it was an important precedent. This was only advice, training, and fellowships, without any equipment to go with it: the United Nations would send out experts in public administration, for example, to offer advice to government agencies.

What do you recall about the origins of the U.N. Expanded Program of Technical Assistance?

This hit us as a bolt out the blue, with "Point Four" of President Truman's inaugural address in January 1949. The president suggested in that speech that the United States should funnel some technical assistance through the United Nations, in addition to that which would be administered bilaterally. I remember coming into the office the morning after that address to find everybody asking: "How are we going to do this through the United Nations? What does it mean? How will we introduce this?"

How did that get into Truman's speech?

I don't know. Walter Lippmann claimed he planted the essential idea of technical assistance there. Some say Francis Russell, who headed State Department Public Information, threw in the words "United Nations." He had been at the San Francisco conference, and he worked closely with those of us concerned with U.N. programs. But nobody had thought it through in advance. Eventually we decided that the technical assistance going to the U.N. should be channeled through the specialized agencies, and we set up a Technical Assistance Board composed of representatives of the specialized agencies, under the overall direction of ECOSOC, to oversee the program.

What did EPTA end up doing?

EPTA was designed to show people in developing countries through technical assistance how to increase their production, build their infrastructure, improve

their health, etc. Our original concept of technical assistance was fairly narrowly focused on know-how and again excluded equipment procurement. We thought that by building skills, you would create demand, which would automatically induce the supply and the capital to pay for it. Gradually, we learned that you can't teach a farmer to operate a plow unless he has a plow, and that once he grows a crop, he still has to get it to market. That kind of pressure ultimately translated into an urge for something like the Special Fund, which financed pre-investment studies, training institutes—and equipment. All that went beyond the advice, training, seminars, fellowships, and studies that EPTA provided. The Special Fund "pre-investment" studies were intended to convert a dream idea into a tangible project the World Bank or private enterprise might support—to develop an economic rationale for hydroelectric power, for instance. But the World Bank rarely relied much on these studies—it usually did its own.

What led to the United Nations Development Program?

EPTA was dying on the vine by 1961, as the Special Fund was growing rapidly, so it didn't make sense to keep them as separate operations. We decided they should complement each other. Merging them would bring administrative savings and make it easier to mesh their operations. We also felt it would be easier to get one appropriation through Congress than two—and meanwhile a proposal came out of Congress in 1961 to create a U.N. Development Authority. So we proposed in ECOSOC that an "Ad Hoc Committee of Eight"—involving experts from eight countries—should study all this. But again, the specialized agencies bitterly fought our merger proposal, fearing a strong central authority in the hands of the UNDP administrator would threaten their autonomy—and they succeeded in paring down our original proposals.

Has UNDP worked out as you hoped it would?

Well, I think we had unreal expectations: we thought we could control the specialized agencies through the purse strings and a strong UNDP executive. We also hoped a single U.N. resident representative in each host country could forge a cooperating team of the specialized agency representatives, so they would all pull together in developing a good and cohesive U.N. country program. We saw the resident representative as the supreme representative of the U.N., with representatives of the specialized agencies serving under him as a sort of cabinet. This worked sometimes, when there was a strong U.N. resident representative—and we found that up to half of them really were first class. But the rest were anywhere from mediocre to no good at all. And the specialized agencies all continued to push their own special programs, supported by their own constituencies within each government. Unfortunately, the World Bank representatives in particular normally refused to serve as real members of the U.N. team. UNDP did improve coordination in the U.N. system, but not as much as we hoped. Certainly the resident representative concept has been a good one. This has developed into a career system, through which individuals rise up the

ladder with frequent interactions between UNDP and the specialized agencies.

What impact has UNDP had on Third World development?

Oh, a lot more than it gets credit for. The world's a better place as a result of UNDP: more people are alive and in better health, there's more literacy, more labor productivity, improved agriculture, less malnutrition, better child care, and more effective bureaucracies. Some of the African countries in particular have benefited enormously, and they realize it. A lot of this can't be measured, but some of it can—we get more, dollar for dollar, by offering assistance through the United Nations than through bilateral aid programs, because the money we contribute to UNDP is more than matched by contributions from other countries, including developing countries, and also because it is more neutral politically. Recipient developing countries also pay more overhead costs for UNDP projects than they normally pay for bilateral projects.

How did UNCTAD—the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development—come about?

Through the late 1940s, it was generally assumed that an international trade organization would be established as a specialized agency to deal with international trade, but it proved impossible to bring it into being. We and other developed countries refused through the 1950s to discuss international trade in the United Nations—either in the General Assembly, or in ECOSOC—insisting that only the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was competent to consider trade matters. But GATT had limited membership that excluded many developing countries. Raul Prebisch, who then headed the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America, had pressed for some years for a special U.N. conference on trade and development. In the early 1960s we finally agreed that such a conference should be convened in 1964, intending that it would be a once-and-for-all escape valve, and still hoping to keep general discussion of trade matters out of the United Nations. Those of us who knew Prebisch and the strong feelings of many developing countries about these matters knew they would try to create a permanent institution. From the beginning, we made a lot of obvious mistakes in UNCTAD. I wrote papers before and during its first conference arguing that if the conference had to be a permanent body, it should be a specialized agency. If it were, it would be easier to control its budget and operations—and we needn't have joined it, or we could pull out of it, if we didn't like the way it was operating. But as long as UNCTAD is an integral part of the United Nations, its budget is part of the U.N. budget, and our assessed contribution to the U.N. automatically pays for it too. But it was impossible to get decision-makers to focus on these institutional issues. Incidentally, I have discovered over the years that people like to "create" institutions, but they don't really like to use institutions others have created.

Why is UNCTAD such a problem for us?

It's a 10-ring circus, with all kinds of things happening simultaneously. The Washington responsibil-

ity for UNCTAD is fragmented, with different offices concerned with different limited aspects of its work, and those nominally responsible overall for the conference normally don't know that much about its specific programs and activities. So as a consequence, the U.S. government rarely stops to think about UNCTAD as an institution. But as I see it, UNCTAD, having an incredibly broad range of responsibilities that overlap those of other elements of the U.N. system, really undermines ECOSOC.

Looking back, what have been our major achievements and failures in the economic and social side of the United Nations?

We established an international economic and social network that has the potential to do much good. We have the machinery, legislation, and precedents to do just about anything we want—but we no longer have the desire, the will, nor the experts to utilize the system in an imaginative way. We should also give a lot more attention to U.N. institutional issues at the higher levels of the State Department and the U.S. government as a whole. I think lack of U.S. policy coordination in the international economic and social area has been one of our greatest foreign policy failures.

If you could write a memorandum, with full assurance that the secretary of state and the president would consider your recommendations...

I would note first of all the need for a career corps of State Department experts on the United Nations, and especially on U.N. economic and social operations—officers who would get to know the agencies, their structures, functions, and cast of characters—things that are only familiar to those who work on these issues for some years. I would like to see a few junior officers work in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, then at U.S. missions to the U.N. in New York, Geneva, Paris, Bangkok, Santiago, or Addis Ababa, for example, later seconded to one of the international secretariats for a brief period, and then returned to supervisory positions in the department. And IO should protect and support their careers, as compared with those of area specialists based in the geographic bureaus. Most of those who specialized in this work in recent years did not prosper. We also need a special unit with more prestige than at present to ensure that our approaches in the meetings of the different specialized agencies are consistent and complementary, and not undercutting or overlapping each other.

Do you think those recommendations would be accepted in the foreseeable future?

Not in the immediate future, because just as we oversold the U.N. at the beginning, we now tend to undervalue it. But at some point I think—and I hope—we may rediscover the potential in the U.N. Charter, then the United States might once again take a positive and creative approach to the United Nations. I think this would be possible if we put our minds to it, and once we recognize the importance of working within the international community toward global economic development. □



Kathleen Bell at an early U.N. conference. "We opposed an esoteric, academic body but saw merit in an organization that would get into communications, science, and other tangible issues. The compromise that became UNESCO was an ambiguous organization with educational, scientific, and cultural functions."

BATTLE OVER LEBANON

*The cause of the American failure in Lebanon
can be found in the halls of Washington,
where impulse and rhetoric dominated policymaking*

ROY GUTMAN

SIX DAYS AFTER the Israeli army invaded Lebanon in June 1982, then Secretary of State Alexander Haig sent a cable to the U.S. special envoy in Jerusalem. Haig, smarting over attempts by White House aides to make policy without him, this time was making policy *without them*. The instructions to the envoy, Philip Habib, were to inform the Israeli cabinet of Haig's "strategic plan" that would "seize this great opportunity to make peace." It called for simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian, Israeli, and Palestinian forces from Lebanon, re-establishment of Lebanese sovereignty, and agreement on secure arrangements for Israel's northern border.

This incident, recounted in the former secretary of state's book *Caveat*, provides a good point of reference for those interested in uncovering the reasons behind the U.S. failure in Lebanon. Within the government, recriminations have turned into something of a round robin: White House officials blame the Pentagon; Pentagon officials blame the State Department; State officials blame Congress; and congressional leaders blame the president. There is good reason for many of these recriminations, but for the most part they are merely symptoms of a larger problem in the Reagan administration.

Haig's unauthorized instruction, full of optimism about a situation not exactly under American control, typified many of the decisions that were to follow. It had an unanticipated impact on three audiences. For the world at large, the move established a strategic goal for U.S. policy that the United States did not have the power to bring about, namely the expulsion of the Syrian presence from Lebanon. For the Israeli government, it provided a made-in-U.S.A. rationale for events that until then had been unfolding according to the whim of Defense Minister Ariel Sharon. And among the president's top aides in Washington, it affirmed a pattern of diffused responsibility on critical national security issues. Policy was not determined after a careful consideration of the issues and options; it emerged out of impulsive statements and uncoordinated actions. The first official who jumped into the policy gap with a proposal gained control of that issue. Recent accounts from Israel leave no doubt that Haig's statement was a "seat of the pants" initiative based on wishful thinking rather than on a careful reading of the situation on the ground or consider-

ation of the repercussions. He himself admits that he didn't know what Israel's war aims were at the time of his move. (He was in good company, for neither did most of the Israeli government.) Yet, despite the questionable basis of his policy, Haig succeeded in having it accepted. Reagan, Haig writes, was "displeased with me for the unauthorized dispatch" of the instructions to Habib but never disavowed them. In fact, Reagan later used Haig's three goals as a base on which to build U.S. policy.

In the absence of a rational decision-making process, personal rivalry came to be a major factor. It is characteristic that Haig says his impulsive action came "after the contretemps with Clark," referring to William Clark, then national security adviser. Haig cites three instances in the war's first week in which Clark went behind his back to get Reagan to toughen the U.S. policy against Israel. Haig thwarted him each time. After a succession of feuds with other players, which culminated in Haig's handing Reagan a list of "ineptitudes," the secretary himself fell victim to these squabbles in June.

In the months that followed, other players made equally bold contributions to policy. As the dominant role in policymaking shifted among the president's men, there was little continuity. Indeed, individual whims had so much impact that the phases of U.S. policy in Lebanon can be distinguished, if that is the right word, by which player had the most influence with Reagan at the time. When Haig left the scene, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger fought to limit the deployment of the Marines in a multinational peace-keeping force. But after the massacre of Palestinian refugees in the Sabra and Shatila camps, it was Reagan who acted impulsively by ordering the Marines back without thinking through the goals of their mission. George Shultz, who had by then replaced Haig as secretary of state, injected himself into the scene early in 1983 when, against the advice of experts in the region and in the Near Eastern Bureau, he warmed up relations with Israel and then concluded the stillborn Lebanon-Israel withdrawal agreement. After Shultz failed, the impulse came from Robert McFarlane, who had replaced Habib as special envoy. In September 1983, McFarlane won the authority to call in naval gunfire to support the beleaguered Lebanese government. The Marine barracks were destroyed in a terrorist attack on October 23, killing 241 servicemen. But Reagan, listening to Shultz and McFarlane rather than Weinberger, insisted they stay in

*Marine frees
American child
from barbed wire
during evacuation.*



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Beirut. In December, the impulse to change policy came from the joint chiefs of staff, who decided the force must be withdrawn. It retreated in haste and, by March, Syria once again was the dominant outside power in Lebanon.

Shultz and Weinberger are still battling over Lebanon, debating what went wrong in the guise of the question on when it is proper to use force. Weinberger fired the first salvo in December, when a commission of military experts he appointed charged that U.S. policy relied excessively on the use of force rather than diplomacy. Shultz replied in an April speech that the problem was not diplomacy but the reluctance to use military force. Since then, Shultz has one-upped Weinberger in bureaucratic terms by winning Reagan's approval of a policy of retaliation against terrorists. This was a rematch of last fall, when the administration, partly due to Weinberger's reservations, did not retaliate for the terrorist bombing.

TO STEP BACK a little from the fray, this round-by-round account describes how impulse and rivalry produced policy, but it does not explain why the president permitted this to happen. Debates that center on whether Shultz or Weinberger makes more sense on the use of force have been miscast. The lesson of Lebanon is that the foreign policy process is fundamentally flawed. And, this is so because, whatever the contribution of his top aides to the muddle, the real problem is Reagan himself.

Reagan's leadership in foreign policy has been inconsistent and largely rhetorical. Senior White House aides acknowledge that the president never could make up his mind on many key issues when his subordinates were divided. These include deciding how hard to come down on an admired ally when it acts contrary to U.S. wishes and when and how to retaliate for terrorist attacks. Just as his clear views on the Soviet Union have given a certain predictability to U.S. policies in that area, his failure to master Middle-eastern questions has led to ambiguous, shifting policies. Reagan's vigorous public statements were understood by his own aides and many in Congress mainly as rhetoric, not leadership. Abroad, Syria, Israel, and Lebanon could read what they wanted from these messages and pursue policies suiting their own narrow interests.

This lack of leadership has been compounded by Reagan's failure to establish a decision-making structure that would help him make up his mind. Instead, he set up a system designed to achieve harmony among rival aides. This Cabinet-style government may have worked well for him while governor of California, but it is unsuited for running Mideastern policy, senior National Security Council and State Department aides say. Because the system aims to achieve a consensus among subordinates through negotiated compromises, the president is spared the hard choices among conflicting goals. But it also means that his aides look for the middle ground within the Cabinet rather than within the real world. This middle ground can shift without respect for the merits or consistency of a particular policy. The failings of



this system have been compounded by Reagan's refusal to delegate authority so that someone can demand well-constructed and faithfully executed policies.

Furthermore, the president and many of his top aides have failed to demonstrate good judgment in assessing events in Lebanon. Ultimately the failure of U.S. policy in Lebanon cannot be extricated from the failure of Israeli policy, which the administration, as Haig makes clear in his book, sought to build on. But recent writings based on Israeli military sources show that when the army entered Lebanon, the Israeli government had not thought through what it hoped to accomplish or how. This was especially the case when Sharon, acting without prior cabinet approval, orchestrated his second-front war with Syria. When one understands that this lack of planning by the Israelis was never taken into account by Haig and that Reagan built his strategy on this foundation, it is easy to see why U.S. policy developed along contradictory lines, seeking both to minimize the damage to U.S. interests caused by Israel's invasion, while capitalizing on the gains Sharon said were within his grasp.

Haig's action also typified the administration's lack of judgment in attempting to exploit situations not completely under U.S. control by raising the stakes. Instead of focusing on the immediate problem—the Israeli invasion—Haig established a goal of removing *all* foreign forces, even though there was little reason to believe they would cooperate. In a similarly over-ambitious move, Reagan announced a major Mideast peace initiative in September. Israel, not consulted, rejected the Reagan plan outright. Sharon, citing the muddy roads during the Lebanon winter, said an Israeli pull-out would not be practical until spring. Reagan raised the stakes again in late September when he sent the Marines back into Beirut and announced they would not leave Lebanon until all foreign forces had been withdrawn. Next, it was Shultz who rested his and the United States' prestige on a signed withdrawal accord that he brokered between Israel and Lebanon. But Israel conditioned its withdrawal on an equivalent and simultaneous move by Syria. Today, Israeli and Syrian forces remain in Lebanon. But David Kimche, director general of the Israeli foreign ministry, asserts that as soon as some security arrangements covering the northern border can be made with Lebanon's new Syrian-dominated government, "we shall get the hell out of there." Whether or not Israel and Syria come to an agreement at this point, the

Smoke rises above the capital city. The real battle over Lebanon was not fought in Beirut but in the corridors of Washington.

standing and influence of the United States in the region has already been damaged by the Reagan administration's penchant for setting goals that are not within its power to achieve.

THE RESULT OF these failures of leadership, organization, and judgment has been a muddled definition of U.S. interests and aims that subordinates have been unable to clarify or implement. This is particularly so since they were not included in the decision-making process, even at the working level. Foreign Service professionals found their knowledge, analytical skills, and judgment largely bypassed when major decisions were made. Robert Dillon, the ambassador to Lebanon, has complained that the embassy was completely shut out of decisions during the period when McFarlane was special envoy. In the context of bureaucratic backbiting created by Reagan, diplomats rarely never had a chance.

When Haig made his June 1982 statement, responsibility for foreign policymaking was so diffused that he was able to attach the United States to a policy that was really understood by only one man—Ariel Sharon. Because Haig never really understood Sharon's intent or the situation on the ground in Lebanon, the goals he established for U.S. policy were totally unrealistic.

It appears that Haig, like many others, believed that Israel did not want a war with Syria, but only intended to clear Palestine Liberation Organization guerrillas out of a 25-mile zone. When the Israeli army turned against Syrian positions in the Bekaa valley, Haig was surprised. It is "still not clear," he writes in *Caveat*, "what prompted this sudden Israeli attack, which changed the whole character of the conflict." He concludes airily that "this dramatic widening of the war demonstrated once again the truism that political leaders tend to be carried away by the greatness of their responsibilities and the urgent nature of military advice once a conflict begins."

In fact, according to Richard Gabriel in his book *Operation Peace for Galilee*, Sharon provoked the war with Syria deliberately. He did this without telling his cabinet colleagues of his intent when he ordered Israeli forces to outflank Syrian troops in the Bekaa valley. This put the Syrian surface-to-air missiles within range of Israel artillery. When Damascus, faced with a rapidly deteriorating military situation, reinforced its SAMs, Sharon went to Begin and won his approval for a pre-emptive strike. Although this led to the the destruction of the SAMs and gave Israel control of the air, the war that ensued with Syria was not based on an agreed strategy relating aims and means, according to Israelis interviewed by Gabriel. Israel never had a clear idea of how to take advantage of its tactical gains because it had never decided on its strategic goals.

Haig, too, was unsure of Israel's objectives. But he was certain Israel had defeated the Syrians and the PLO, and that the moment had come to move all Syrian, Palestinian, and Israeli forces out of Lebanon. "I was convinced that such a moment might never come again if it was not seized." According to

Kimche, who was at the cabinet meeting when Habib presented his briefing, Haig developed the strategy that Israel not withdraw its forces unless Syria did as well. It was an American, not an Israeli, initiative, he says. Israel's adoption of that position later came to bedevil every U.S. effort to secure unilateral Israeli withdrawal and would tie down the Marines in Lebanon for 18 months. Kimche says this policy "came about by accident." "Of course there should be a simultaneous withdrawal," he recalls Habib as saying.

Did Haig, in trying to ride the tiger, actually spur it on? The day after Haig conveyed his plan, Sharon encircled Beirut without telling the cabinet of his scheme. Within the week he closed all exits, trapping Syria's 85th brigade and the 14,000 PLO guerrillas in the city. Haig's policy initiative certainly furnished Sharon with a convenient cover story. Since the U.S. secretary of state had linked the withdrawal of Israeli forces with that of the Syrians and Palestinians, Sharon was able to justify his army's presence. Although he never adopted Haig's statement as his primary goal, he did use it to further his own purposes. This leaves aside the whole question of whether Haig gave Sharon a green or yellow light to invade in the first place, which many in Israel and Washington are convinced was the case.

TO END SHARON'S siege of Beirut and get the PLO out, Habib called for a multinational force. Because the Soviets and Syrians opposed the use of U.N. forces it had to be American-organized and led. Habib's proposal, although it carefully specified the purpose and terms of the MNF, sparked a conflict in Washington that was resolved in a telling example of consensus decision-making. Throughout the crisis, the National Security Council produced "half-decisions, every one a mish-mash. Just like an Arab League meeting, the lowest common denominator prevailed," said a State Department official close to Lebanese policymaking.

This time it was Weinberger who dominated policymaking. He was vehemently opposed to a Marine deployment; indeed, at one stage senior State Department officials jokingly offered to call for several hundred volunteers from the Foreign Service. Habib and State wanted the Marines to stay for a minimum of 30 days and a maximum of 60. Weinberger's view, expressed in a recent interview, was that "Some of us had some doubts as to whether that was a very proper role for one of the major powers." Reagan settled the dispute in a Solomonic manner by splitting the difference. His decision, a compromise between two policies, was that the Marines would stay a maximum of 30 days. Following Weinberger's further intervention, they left after 17 days.

Weinberger also thwarted Habib and his deputy, Morris Draper, when they agreed with the French MNF contingent that some of the 800 Marines should be deployed along the Green line between East and West Beirut. Weinberger "insisted that they be only in the port, totally protected and that they not set one foot outside the fences," the State official said. "There was embarrassment," said a source close to the negoti-

The ambassador commutes home by helicopter under heavy guard.



ators. "As Americans we wanted to be able to say that we could take as much risk as the French."

The Marines left Beirut on September 10. Four days later, President-elect Bashir Gemayel was assassinated. Sharon sent the Israeli army into West Beirut, also bringing in Christian Phalange militiamen who proceeded to massacre more than 700 Palestinian civilians in refugee camps.

In Washington, the reaction—and subsequent decision-making—was heavily emotional and tinged with guilt. French officials charged that the massacre would not have occurred had the MNF stayed for the entire mandate period. Many U.S. officials believe that an MNF presence would have prevented Sharon's move. What followed, however, was an overreaction by the president. "Reagan virtually said: 'I don't want to hear any objections,' and he didn't," a State official said. Weinberger this time was silent. It was the quintessence of policy based on public relations gestures, not calculations of interests, purposes, and means. Fundamental steps were not taken. Clark failed to require the most basic preparations—position papers from around the government laying out the consequences of the move. Neither Weinberger nor the joint chiefs of staff demanded a statement of terms under which the MNF might depart, a normal prerequisite to deploying a peace-keeping force. In the months that followed, they would rue this oversight, for the deployment became purely political, with no military logic to it.

This lack of reflection on U.S. interests and goals was a sample of things to come. Even before the Marines landed again, Reagan vastly expanded their mission by implying they would not leave until all foreign forces departed. "Yes, because I think that's going to come rapidly," he told a press conference on September 28. Nor was this the only serious overstatement. In December, Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Dam described stability in Lebanon as "vital to our security."

Reagan had created expectations that could never be fulfilled. Building on Haig's impulsive initiative, Reagan had linked the removal of possibly 80,000 foreign troops—half of them Syrian—to the presence of 4000 U.S., French, and Italian troops. Reagan never disavowed his remarks nor did his aides; clearly no one thought them through. But the United States' friends in the Mideast would hold Reagan accountable for his failure to deliver what they took as a promise. Reagan's statement also gave Amin Gemayel, who succeeded his brother, an excuse to insist that Lebanon's top priority was removal of all foreign forces, not reconciliation among the factions whose civil war had led to the intervention.

The U.S. goal was nothing less than to remake the local balance of power, which had long been dominated by Syria. The means at hand was a peace-keeping force, some tall rhetoric, and whatever leverage could be derived from the presence of Israeli troops. Reagan had gained a good deal of credit in the Arab world with his September plan, but the timing created what proved to be another impossible linkage. The principal Arab actor waiting in the wings, Jordan's King Hussein, would not move until Israel began withdrawing from Lebanon. Sharon was not cooperating



and the Israel government backed him. The stalemate lasted for months.

Today, some NSC aides believe a far larger U.S. force would have been the answer. McFarlane presented an option to create a ring of troops at least 15 miles around Beirut to protect the city from outside artillery. The plan was favored by Gemayel, but Habib and Draper opposed such a force, and Shultz regarded the idea as "preposterously grandiose." A State Department expert on Lebanon says that "it just might have worked. But, knowing what I know about inter-agency fighting, I doubt it would be possible."

As Habib and Draper devoted months of effort to getting a withdrawal agreement with Israel, Syria regrouped its forces and recouped its losses. The negotiators unwittingly added to their woes when Draper accepted Gemayel's suggestion and agreed to the idea of a back channel to Sharon through a Lebanese businessman. Unbeknownst to them, Sharon used the envoy to negotiate what he later claimed was a draft formal agreement with Gemayel. Sharon announced the deal in December 1982, confounding Habib, who had brought along a U.S. plan for a quick, informal Israeli-Lebanese accord. But the Sharon-Gemayel deal fell through and it took more than a month to get the talks back on track.

BY THE FIRST quarter of 1983 administration policy was at a dead end and began to vacillate wildly. Late in January, White House officials warned that a "bruising showdown" was pending with Israel. But within a month, Shultz shifted to a policy of accommodation. "The word went out around the building: 'let no light come between us and the Israelis,'" a State Department aide said. Shultz had concluded by this time that an Israel full of self-doubt (the Kahane report had severely chastised the government for the Sabra and Shatila massacres) did not serve U.S. interests; furthermore, the United States alone could not fill the power vacuum in the region. But Shultz's wires crossed with Weinberger's and those of many officials in State's Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and on the negotiating team who felt that firmness was needed.

If there was still any doubt, the futility of administration attempts to build a Mideast initiative on U.S. policy in Lebanon became clear in April, when Hussein announced that he would not participate in the

The U.S. embassy after the terrorist bombing. The failure of the U.S. peace initiative in Lebanon was becoming clear at the same time that more than 60 persons were killed.

September plan. Eight days later, a massive car-bomb explosion devastated the U.S. embassy in Beirut. Sixty-three people, including 17 Americans, were killed. On April 20, in an article that drew rapt attention in Washington (and helped win a Pulitzer prize), Katen Elliot House of the *Wall Street Journal* said that Reagan's September initiative was dead and Shultz's failure to visit the Mideast raised doubts about the administration's commitment to its own policies. On April 22, Reagan announced Shultz would make his first visit to the region. He left two days later.

Habib urged Shultz not to come. NEA head Nicholas Veliotis warned that if he was coming out to conclude the Israeli-Lebanese peace accord, he should stay home because it would never fly with Syria. Most U.S. envoys in the region shared his view. Although many foreign diplomats and U.S. officials regarded the trip as an impulsive response to the *Journal* article, Shultz said he had already decided to go. "It was a question of timing," he said in an interview. "It was a decision that I felt was the right thing to do, just out of my own vibes in the situation."

Shultz got his deal, which called for joint withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian troops and provided for an Israeli security presence in southern Lebanon. But it was another example of trying to turn a situation not under U.S. control into diplomatic capital. The gains were short term; the cost was loss of the initiative. The accord was signed on May 17; had the deal been struck six months earlier, many diplomats think Syria might have acquiesced. Instead Syria rejected it and the dead letter became a symbol of Reagan's moribund policy in Lebanon and the Mideast. Habib felt that a major policy review should have been held and the accord dumped. But Israel opposed that course, and Shultz made sticking with the stillborn agreement the bottom line of U.S. policy.

Since Habib's role in negotiating the accord made him unwelcome in Damascus, Reagan named McFarlane as the new special envoy. McFarlane is described by all sides as a problem-solver by nature, and during his watch U.S. policy appears to have been a series of quick fixes. As a result, the United States became involved militarily, the rupture within the administration deepened, and dissatisfaction built within the public, Congress, and the military leadership.

McFarlane arrived in Lebanon on August 1. His first action was his first mistake: he promised Gemayel that direct U.S. contacts with Walid Jumblatt, the Druse leader, would cease. The decision was quickly reversed after diplomats mounted a major campaign, but it contrasts with what White House aides described as McFarlane's top priority: seeking national reconciliation.

Because Shultz had tied U.S. policy so firmly to the failed May accord, McFarlane now had little leverage in Jerusalem and none in Damascus. Meanwhile Syria, determined to thwart what remained of the agreement, was arming the opponents of Amin Gemayel and exploiting his failure to reach an accommodation with the Moslem majority. As Syria grew more militant, Israel lost its will to influence the military and political situation. All McFarlane could do was gain a few delays before Israel unilaterally withdrew its

forces from Beirut, creating a vacuum that invited an attempt by Syrian-backed rebels to change the situation on the ground.

As the Marines at Beirut airport began to take casualties, the moment quickly passed when they might have been removed without loss of face. But there was no decision until it was too late, apparently because the administration became gridlocked. McFarlane had endorsed a plan that originated with the Lebanese suggestion to move the force south along the coast. But the administration was afraid of prompting a congressional debate on the War Powers Act. Today Shultz cites a congressional restriction passed the previous April that blocked such a redeployment. White House officials say the military failed to come up with a good plan of its own. Military officials say they wanted to get the Marines on the ships or replace them with army units. But the White House wanted to have combat troops on the ground without implying a long-term commitment. Attempts to find a consensus thus led to indecision and heightened risk for the Marines.

At this time, Jumblatt launched a military challenge against Gemayel. In response, on September 11, the NSC authorized the calling in of naval gunfire support. Eight days later, over the vehement resistance of the Marines' ground commander, McFarlane successfully pushed for the first U.S. military intervention in response to reports that a column of tanks was heading toward Souk El Ghatb, a mountain village that is the gateway to the Lebanese presidential palace. At the time, the explanation for the firing was to protect Marines on the tarmac below. Officials acknowledge this really was a cover story mainly designed to avoid triggering the War Powers Act.

The naval gunfire was followed by a cease-fire which, in a now all-too-familiar pattern, prompted another bout of false confidence. That in turn was destroyed by the bombing of the Marine compound. Many officials now say the bombing destroyed U.S. policy in Lebanon—an observation that begs the question of whether there ever was a coherent U.S. policy there. But the illusion of U.S. control and determination was allowed to linger. In a powerful speech on October 27, the president himself declared Lebanon a vital interest.

In the same speech, Reagan also promised that "those who directed this atrocity must be dealt justice and they will be." But nothing happened. Again it was a case of internal gridlock. Reagan was reluctant to have U.S. forces risk the deaths of innocent civilians. "He is a pussycat in many ways. He wants no bloodshed unless it is for a specific purpose," said a high State Department official. A senior White House aide claimed that U.S. units were "tight down to the wire in a combined operation with the French" to retaliate against the bombing. But the French moved alone after Weinberger and the joint chiefs said they were not ready. This same official asserted that "the president was ready," but a senior State Department official said he was not. Today, eight months later, only Weinberger defends the failure to retaliate against Syria. "There was no public support at all for anything remotely resembling a war against the Syrians," he says.

Embassy dependents queue up during helicopter evacuation.



WHAT FINALLY BROKE the policy paralysis was rebellion, this time from a new quarter, the joint chiefs. Weinberger had long favored redeploying the Marines, but the chairman of the joint chiefs, General John Vessey, had remained a loyal backer of Reagan's policies. The incident that changed his mind was the downing of two Navy planes in December. A short time later, the Long Commission, named by Weinberger to investigate the Marine compound bombing, issued a report that questioned the entire basis and conduct of U.S. policy in Lebanon. Congress was in recess, but the two events produced a firestorm on Capitol Hill when it returned early in January.

With congressional support eroding fast, Reagan on January 26 approved a redeployment plan that exemplified his governing style of splitting the difference between diametrically opposed policy goals. Weinberger and the chiefs wanted the troops out. Shultz's goal was to stay. The compromise approved by Reagan was a phased withdrawal running until June. Although labeled a redeployment, the plan would require a greater U.S. military involvement, especially use of naval gunfire, to bolster the Lebanese army. To avert complaints that this would violate the War Powers Act, the announcement would state that the firing was to defend U.S. personnel in Beirut from outside shelling. But the joint chiefs resisted transmitting the orders authorizing naval gunfire. McFarlane, now national security adviser, heard of this and devised a novel maneuver. He went to the chiefs and insisted they put specific military instructions for firing on paper. He then took this paper to Reagan, who signed it, and the plan finally fell into place.

By February 7, however, the day of the big announcement, the Lebanese army had lost control of West Beirut. Shultz and Donald Rumsfeld, the new special envoy, urged McFarlane to cancel the announcement, but since Pentagon officials had already tipped off the television networks that an announcement was impending, they went ahead. The next day, by pre-arranged plan, U.S. ships unleashed an enormous barrage, including 300 16-inch rounds from the battleship *New Jersey*. To this date, the Navy has not revealed the results. The State Department also stuck to its pre-arranged redeployment plan, which by now made equally little sense. The premise of the plan, an orderly handover, disappeared when the Shiites took over West Beirut the previous weekend. Nevertheless Dam told House Republicans that the Marines would remain at the airport until June.

The end of the U.S. military presence in Lebanon came swiftly, and was as disorderly as the policy had been throughout. Day by day the redeployment plan was advanced, with Weinberger usually the first to disclose changes publicly. "Our position was we shouldn't depart in unseemly haste. The chiefs were desperate to get them out. I can't blame them," said a State Department official. Finally, Gemayel abrogated the treaty with Israel, the Marines boarded their ships by February 26, and a month later Reagan dissolved the MNF.

The experience in Lebanon should provide "no end of a lesson," to recall the famous study of the British



A good-bye hug as dependents leave Beirut. Shortly after, the Marines began their redeployment to ships offshore.

humiliation at Suez. But that evaluation may not happen. Unlike, Britain, where it is established practice whenever policy fails to hold inquests and publish the results, in this country most responsible officials—including those charged with oversight, that is Congress—want mainly to put the entire episode behind them. If Vietnam and Iran are any guideposts, the only postmortems on Lebanon will be in the press, which lacks the access to the cable traffic and internal documents needed to reach a fair and sound judgment. Therefore, any assertions on the lessons of Lebanon are necessarily tentative.

With that caveat in mind, one obvious lesson is that the practice of allowing rhetoric and impulse to dominate the decision-making process adds to the chances that policy will end in disaster or at least in the perception of disaster. To cite an example, stability in Lebanon is a highly desirable policy goal, but the fact that the republic has survived this setback proves Lebanon was never the vital interest it was declared to be.

Second, politicians should weigh the counsel of area specialists before making such decisions. By doing so, they might have avoided making the misjudgment of attempting to build a Mideast initiative on the shaky basis of U.S. Lebanon policy. They may also have realized the need to consult an ally—in this case Israel—when devising a plan that vitally affected it.

Third, there is no substitute for a deliberated strategy. The tragedy of Lebanon is that hundreds of American and other lives were sacrificed in an ill-considered attempt to shift the local strategic balance. If, before it had been decided upon, this aim had been debated within the administration, Congress, and the country, it would have become clear that the United States would not commit itself enough to achieve it.

Finally, and tying all these points together, the president should reconsider his attachment to Cabinet style decision-making with its emphasis on consensus. In the view of a senior White House official, "If there is a lesson to be learned from Lebanon, it is that Cabinet government is great for some things, but on vital issues, such as the Mideast...a stronger central authority might be more useful." Judging from the lack of thought and diffused responsibility still apparent in other foreign policy areas, this message has yet to get across. □

Simon McDougal

*How the American consul
made the acquaintance
of all the
prostitutes in town*

FRED GODSEY

SOMETHING IN THE BACK of my mind warned me not to open the envelope. But there were other considerations: Consul McLaughlin himself had placed it on my desk, and after all it was only my first post in the Foreign Service. Belem do Para, Brazil, was the post and, as my beautifully engraved visiting cards proclaimed, I was a vice consul of the United States of America. What this actually meant was that the buck stopped with me—on its way down.

The envelope was dirty and grease-stained. It had been left with the night watchman at the consulate. It was addressed, with pencil in an unsteady hand, to "Consul Sir, USA." On the back was written, "From Simon Bolivar McDougal—In Jail."

I opened it. The message therein, scrawled on a piece of brown paper bag, was brief and to the point. "Consul, Sir. I be American Citizen. I be in jail and not my fault. You please, sir, come remove me this place."

I checked the consular records and found nothing regarding McDougal. What to do? As with most things in life, there were at least two possibilities: I could throw the letter into the trash, thereby risking the wrath of some vote-hungry congressman should it later be found that the man was an American, or I could go down to the local jail and talk to Mr. McDougal. Bearing in mind what

Fred Godsey is a frequent chronicler of unusual but true occurrences for the magazine. "THE JOURNAL" is a special section for Foreign Service experiences and diplomatic history. All readers are invited to submit manuscripts of 1500 to 4000 words for consideration.

I had been told in Washington about congressmen in general, I opted for the latter.

It was 1943 and Brazil was preparing to send troops to fight with the allies in World War II. Consequently, I found the chief of police to be very pro-American. The chief told me that Mr. McDougal was a frequent inmate of his jail and that he had probably been in the Amazon for some fifteen or twenty years. His nationality was unknown. He had no personal documents but was presumed to be a native of Trinidad who had jumped ship in Belem. He was not really a criminal, the chief assured me, but was considerably addicted to *cachaca*, the local rum. It seems that, when in his cups, Mr. McDougal would position himself at the intersection of two of the busiest streets in town and begin preaching a sermon while standing on a wooden box. It was one of these sermons which had led to his latest incarceration.

"Of course you will appreciate," said the chief, "that we really can't permit such conduct, even though O Senhor McDougal usually gives a part of his sermon in English, which, naturally, the people on the street cannot understand. He also creates a traffic hazard."

A policeman took me to a corner cell for an interview with Mr. McDougal, who was reclining on a straw mattress, obviously recovering from a monumental binge. He was a lean, middle-aged black man, dressed only in a pair of patched trousers. He wore no shirt and no shoes, which was not unusual for laborers in the tropical heat of Belem. He was fluent in Portuguese and spoke the English of the West Indian islands, but understanding him in either of these languages was made difficult by the absence of his two upper front teeth.

McDougal, who saluted and insisted on standing at attention when he heard that I was from the consulate, confirmed that he had no personal documents and no proof of American citizenship. He said that his mother, before her death back in Trinidad, had told him that he was a U.S. citizen. He had never been to the United States; he didn't know where his parents were born and had no living

relations that he knew of and no family members in Brazil. He had never known his father. He worked sometimes, he said, on the docks in Belem unloading cargo from the river boats. As a child in Trinidad, he had worked as a house boy for a family of American missionaries. They had taught him to play the organ, and now he sometimes earned a few cruzeiros playing on Sundays at the Reverend Lunsford's small missionary church in Belem. He had also worked for a time as a sweeper in the bordello of Madame Ze Ze in the red light district, but he was fired when the madame caught him stealing the raw onions the girls kept behind their curtains to ward off disease.

"Consul, sah, you remove me this jail and get me USA passport, and I going to USA and get me fine job. Make lots money!"

After making it clear, or so I thought, to McDougal that I really couldn't help him unless we could document his claim to American citizenship, I slipped him a few cruzeiros, returned to the consulate, and wrote the State Department to check further into his citizenship claim.

ALTHOUGH I REALIZED that there was a very slim chance that he was an American citizen, his sorrowful plight and snaggle-toothed grin aroused my youthful sympathy. Since he said that he had worked for the Reverend Lunsford, I decided to visit the minister, whom I had previously met at the consulate, and make further inquiries.

The Reverend Lunsford, an elderly Protestant missionary, had been in the Amazon valley for about thirty years and had built with his own hands the small church on the outskirts of Belem. The tiny church seated about 25 people—quite ample for his regular Sunday service, which was usually given before some twelve or fifteen people. His flock included the family of the British manager of the local power plant, the family of the importer of a famous British gin, and a few American residents. On occasion, some members of the British and American consulates were present as

—In Jail



Magda French

well. I found Lunsford in his church making some repairs to his antiquated foot-bellows organ, which stood on a small platform in the corner behind his pulpit.

"Ah yes. Poor McDougal," the minister said, shaking his head sadly. "The best organist I ever had. Didn't read music, of course, but he knew all of the old hymns, and he was very good with the sound effects which I use in most of my sermons."

McDougal was especially effective on certain occasions when he had imbibed a bit too liberally from the bottle of *ca-chaca* which he kept hidden somewhere

in the innards of the organ. The reverend knew about the bottle, and McDougal was aware that he knew. But, according to the minister, it was a delicate subject which was never discussed between them, and McDougal was very careful never to be seen drinking or depositing a fresh bottle in the instrument. Lunsford, although thoroughly disapproving of strong drink, had, over the span of years, decided that in McDougal's case a few drops did perhaps improve the sound effects.

"But, alas," the reverend said, almost in tears and wringing his hands, "a most dreadful thing happened last Easter Sun-

day in the church, and I had to dismiss the poor chap. It almost broke my heart, since he had been with me for many years."

On that fateful holiday, every seat in the church was filled. "It was the best attendance we'd had all year, praise the Lord, and some of the town's greatest sinners were there," the reverend said. The sermon was to be longer than usual. The missionary was in good voice. The pedals were oiled, and McDougal was at his place behind the organ.

All went well through the initial hymn singing, and Reverend Lunsford launched into his sermon. He soon reached the passage which called for the sound effects. He raised his eyes heavenward and shouted in stentorian tones: "And I heard a voice from heaven, as the voice of a great thunder...." Here he raised both arms high into the air, which was McDougal's cue to work the organ bellows forcefully with both feet and to pounce on the bass pedals to rattle the church walls with thunder.

But from McDougal's corner came not a sound.

The reverend paused, arms still raised to the heavens, and peered anxiously over his shoulder at the organ. Still no sound. He repeated the passage, louder this time, and frantically pumped both arms in the air while glaring at the organ. There was a deathly silence. Then suddenly from behind the organ came a very loud belch, followed immediately by a fervent "Amen" from the same source.

"Naturally, I could not possibly keep the poor fellow in the job after such a humiliating performance," the reverend said.

TWO DAYS LATER, McDougal came to see me in the consulate. The police chief had, in deference to my visit, released him—I later learned that he had told the chief that I had promised him a job. He stood at attention before my desk and saluted. He was still dressed in his patched trousers, but this time he was wearing a pajama top and one shoe. He explained that according to the new decree issued by Governor Barata, no one could ride the local trolley cars without wearing a jacket and shoes. The pajama top qualified as a jacket, and since the decree failed to specify *how many* shoes, the shoe, which he had borrowed for the day from a friend, placed him safely within the limits of the law. The pajama top, he claimed, was his own.

"Consul, sah, you know I be Ameri-

can. You be American. So I think maybe you help me find good job until my passport, she come from America. Maybe, consul, sah, you also lend me ten dollah. I pay back soon I get good job."

Truth to tell, I didn't have ten dollars, but I gave him a few more cruzeiros and promised to speak with an exporter friend about a job. As it so happened, my friend, Jose Levy, did have work for him, and in a few days McDougal was unloading hides on the docks. I congratulated myself on a deed well done.

At the end of the month I went down to the docks to get some information for a report to the department regarding raw rubber shipments. It was nearing noon as

I was walking back to the consulate through the center of town, when I saw a small crowd gathered at the intersection of two of the busiest streets. As I neared the perimeter of the gathering, I suddenly heard a shout in English. "And the Lawd, he say, 'Adam? Adam,' he say, 'Sah!'" Two days later, I found another grimy envelope on my desk. On the back was written, "From Simon Bolivar McDougal—In Jail."

If the gods were not smiling on me that day, at least they were not frowning, because this time I did not have to visit the jail. The police chief telephoned me and offered to release McDougal if I would simply *try* to find him a job—

preferably as far away from Belem as possible. The chief tried to make the offer sound like a great favor on his part, but I heard a distinct sigh of supreme happiness when, like a fool, I agreed.

McDougal stood at rigid attention before my desk and saluted. "Consul, sah, that job on docks, she no good for me. You please speak to Reverend Lunsford that he take me back full time. I not take rum anymore. I learned me lesson now."

So it came to pass that McDougal, through my intervention, was again employed by the minister. He had promised on the grave of his dead mother to forgo the demon rum. He was not only to play

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the organ on Sundays in Belem but also to accompany the reverend on his missionary trips up the Amazon. The minister agreed that it would be un-Christian of him, praise the Lord, not to give the poor chap another chance. Besides, McDougal was the best organist in the area.

The department finally replied that McDougal was not a citizen and therefore not entitled to the protection of the U.S. government. I didn't bother to inform him of the bad news immediately. He had been back working for Lunsford

for two months, and I again congratulated myself that all was going well.

Shortly thereafter, on a Monday morning, I arrived at the consulate to begin my daily routine. I immediately noticed that I was greeted only by cold stares from the female clerks, and the male employees could barely contain their laughter as they said good morning. Finally, Mrs. Wilkins, a dignified American who was secretary to the consul, intercepted me in the hall. Drawing herself up to her full height, she looked at me as if I were some revolting insect.

"There are some *persons* waiting to see you in your office," she said, accenting the word with revulsion. "And when you've finished, the consul wants to talk with you."

All I can say is that I was completely unprepared for the scene awaiting me. There, seated around my desk, were four of the most well known madames from Belem's red light district. Moreover, they had asked for me by name and had refused to speak to anyone else. They were dressed in ankle-length red-and-blue silk dresses and wore heavy rouge.

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Realizing that my days in the Foreign Service were probably drawing to a close, I decided to make the best of the situation. I bowed from the waist, "Distinguished ladies! To what do I owe the honor of your visit?"

"O Senhor Consul," they all began at once. My office door was slightly ajar, and I detected an unusually large gathering of my male colleagues at the water cooler in the hall. "It is about the disgraceful actions of your employee," Madam Ondina said. "And the great damage he has caused to our houses," Madam Ze Ze added. "It happened last Saturday

night. Surely the police have already been in touch with you about it."

I was dumbfounded. "No, dear ladies, I have not heard from the police. Could you perhaps be a bit more specific?"

"Well," Madame Celestina continued, "around midnight your employee, O Senhor McDougal, who is also an American citizen, came into my house in a very drunken condition. Later, when asked to pay, he smashed the large mirror in my salon with a beer bottle...."

According to Madam Ze Ze, it was after the police were called that the real damages occurred. It seems that when a truck filled with policemen arrived to arrest McDougal, he managed to climb

through a small opening in a back room and got onto the roof, followed by five or six policemen. The houses in the district were built of sun-dried brick and stucco. They were set wall to wall and had slanting tile roofs composed of red clay tile, each connected to a neighboring one of the same fragile material. During the chase across the roof tops, parts of the roofs of four houses slid off onto the street.

McDougal was apprehended and taken away by the police. But the early light of dawn revealed a mass of broken tiles in the street along practically the entire length of one of the red light district's main thoroughfares.

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"It was not only my roof, O Senhor consul," lamented Madame Ondina through her tears, "but a piece of the roof fell upon my new record player and broke my best record. It was *La Paloma* by Miss Lily Pons—Miss Pons is American, no? It is very necessary for my business that I have another record by Miss Pons!"

McDougal had obviously spread the word throughout the district that not only was he an American citizen, but that he also was an employee of the American consulate and working directly under my supervision. Thus I was the man holding the purse for damage payments.

The madames were incredulous when I told them the facts about McDougal's claims, but they finally left the consulate only to be replaced in the afternoon by one O Senhor Osvaldo Fonseca and his lawyer. Fonseca averred, in a document drawn up by his attorney, that while in the act of relieving himself against the outside wall of the Waldorf Club in the district, that he had, suddenly and without prior warning, been struck on the head, neck, and other parts of the body from above by several pieces of falling tiles—thereby rendering him sick, sore, lame, and disordered. O Senhor Fonseca asked for one thousand dollars. He also left the consulate in a livid rage when confronted with the information that McDougal was neither American nor employee, and that we would not pay.

I NEVER SAW McDougal again, but his legacy remained to haunt me throughout my remaining days in Belem. It was a rare day when I was not greeted on the streets profusely, and by name, by one or more of Brazil's most notorious madames. Unfortunately, this sometimes happened when I was accompanied by some visiting dignitary. I fear my friends spake evil of me in the market place.

Then came the wonderful day when I received notice of my transfer. After over two and a half years in Belem, I was being sent to Budapest to help reopen the consulate there after World War II. As I was clearing out my office, prior to packing my bags, a messenger placed a soiled envelope on my desk. I immediately handed it to the secretary.

"Miss Mello, my replacement will be arriving from Washington in a few days. Will you please see that he gets this?"

On the back of the envelope was written, "From Simon Bolivar McDougal—In Jail." □

PEOPLE

25 students win 1984 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards

Twenty-five graduating high school students have been named recipients of AFSA/AAFSW Merit Award scholarships for 1984, AFSA Committee on Education Chairman Claude G. Ross has announced. This year the awards for academic excellence and outstanding leadership are given in memory of Clarke Winship Slade, educator and long-time friend and adviser to the scholarship programs for Foreign Service juniors. Funds for the awards are provided jointly from the AAFSW Bookfair and the AFSA Scholarship Fund.

The winners were chosen by four review panels consisting of 24 volunteers from State, AID, USIA, AAFSW, and the retired Foreign Service community. The award amount is \$500, and this year the number of recipients was raised from the previous total of 22.

The winners and honorable mentions are listed below. The September JOURNAL will include pictures and brief biographies of these talented students. Congratulations!

WINNERS

Douglas Chang
Robert S. Chase
Michael C. Friedman
Susanne A. Hauger
Maria M. Isaacs
Darell M. Kienzle
Jonathan D. Kulick
Liesl C. Leach
Indra A. Levy
Kimberly A. Linton
John F. Moran
Monique M. Morrissey
Claudia G. Nenko
Donald J. Planty Jr.
John H. Rogers
Julia L. Rogers
Michael C. Rubenstein
Amy C. Russell
Mary A. Sarros
Michael T. Schwartz
Stratton C. Strand
Alzada J. Tipton
Sarah L. Turrentine
Maria C. Williams
Alex B. Wright

HONORABLE MENTIONS

Linda E. Garufi
Neal D. Goldman
Brian J. Lubkeman
Brienne B. Merritt
Carolyn K. Montgomery
Monica R. Morse
Dane F. Smith III

Deaths

DENNIS W. KEOGH, a Foreign Service officer heading the U.S. mission to monitor the disengagement of armed forces along the Namibian-Angolan border, was killed April 15 when a bomb exploded at a service station where he had stopped to buy gasoline in Oshakati, Namibia. American military aide Kenneth Crabtree and a civilian were also killed. Keogh was 44.

The son of a career diplomat, Keogh attended high school in Iran. After graduating from Wheeling College in West Virginia, he served three years as an officer in the Marine Corps. An expert on southern Africa, Keogh had returned to Washington in September following several assignments in Africa. He returned to Africa in March on a 30-day assignment.

As evidenced by outpourings of sympathy at various memorial events, Keogh was an extremely popular Foreign Service officer. At the annual dedication ceremony on Foreign Service Day for the Memorial Plaque maintained by AFSA in the Diplomatic Lobby honoring Americans in diplomatic missions who die "under heroic or tragic circumstances," Secretary of State George Shultz presented the Secretary's Award posthumously to Keogh's daughter Molly. The award is given "in recognition of sacrifice of personal health—including loss of life—in performance of duty."

He is survived by his wife, the former Susan Garner; twin daughters, Molly and Kate; a son, Miles; and a brother, Hugh, all of Richmond, Virginia; a sister, Paulette Yonker of Gallup, New Mexico; and his parents, Mr. and Mrs. David J. Keogh, of Williamsburg, Virginia.

JOHN KENNETH EMMERSON, a retired Foreign Service officer and specialist on Japan and Northeast Asia, died March 24 at Stanford University Hospital following a stroke. He was 76.

Emmerson held degrees from the Sorbonne, Colorado College, and New York University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1935 and served in Japan before World War II. After the war he returned to Japan as an adviser to General Douglas MacArthur. During the Kennedy administration

he was appointed deputy to the ambassador to Japan and ran the embassy for several months in 1964 while the ambassador was incapacitated.

He left his last Foreign Service post as deputy chief of mission in Tokyo in 1966. He then became diplomat in residence at Stanford University until his retirement in 1968. From his retirement until the time of his death he was a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution.

He is survived by his wife, Dorothy; a daughter, Dorothy Louise Emmerson of New York City; a son, Donald Kenneth Emmerson of Madison, Wisconsin; a sister, Theodora E. Sinden of Aurora, Illinois; and two grandchildren.

EVAN MORRIS WILSON, a retired Foreign Service officer, died of cancer at his home

in Washington on March 13. He was 74 years old.

Wilson graduated from Haverford College and Oxford University. He also studied at the Geneva School of International Studies in Switzerland. He joined the Foreign Service in 1937 and his assignments included Cairo, Teheran, Calcutta, Beirut, Jerusalem, Mexico, and London.

As consul general and minister to Jerusalem, Wilson received the Superior Honor Award for his service and reporting during the 1967 Six-Day War. He was the author of the book *Jerusalem, Key to Peace*, which deals with his experiences there, and another book entitled *Decision on Palestine*.

Wilson was a member of DACOR and of the Board of Governors of the Middle East Institute.

Survivors include his wife, Leila; two daughters, Mrs. Frederick S. Brown of Brunswick, Maine, and Martha Leroy Wilson of Washington; and two grandchildren.

BARBARA A. HUTCHISON, a Foreign Service officer in USIA, died of cancer in Tequesta, Florida, on March 22. She was 57.

A graduate of Vassar College, Hutchison joined USIA in 1953. She served at posts in Chile, Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Guyana, and the Dominican Republic. During her assignment as public affairs officer in the last post, she was kidnaped and held for ransom by a guerrilla group but was later released unharmed. She received the State Department's Medal of Honor for heroism in 1974 as a result of the ordeal. In the two years prior to her death, she was

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FOREIGN

director of the USIA reception center for international visitors in Honolulu.

Survivors include two brothers, J. Ross Hutchison of Crystal River, Florida, and James A. Hutchison Jr. of Newark, Delaware, and two sisters, Isabel Fulling of Tequesta, Georgia, and Louise Whitaker of Athens, Georgia.

JOSEPH G. TSINGER, a retired Foreign Service officer, died of cardiac arrest March 23 at Fairfax Hospital. He was 63.

A graduate of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Tsinger served in the Army during World War II and was a civilian employe of the old War Department. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served at posts in Peru, Paraguay, and Chile before his retirement in 1970.

Survivors include his wife, Mary Doyle Tsinger of Washington; two daughters, Gail Schrantz of Martinsburg, West Virginia, and Christine Garbett of Prattville, Alabama; two sons, Andrew C. of Fairfax, Virginia, and Stephen J. of Herndon, Virginia; and his mother, Margaret E. Tsinger of Washington.

NANCY LOUISE NOACK, wife of David Noack, died on March 26 of cancer at Fairfax Hospital. She is survived by her husband, and also by her mother, Mary Jurgens; three sons, Fred, Alan, and Andy Clay Whiddon; two daughters, Susan Gaile Noack and Karen Diane Noack; and two grandchildren.

In lieu of flowers, donations in her memory may be sent to the American Cancer Society.

Appointments

WAYNE P. COOPER has been named a member of the Advisory Council to the Friendship Force of North Carolina.

The Friendship force was created in the late 1970s to promote international goodwill between the people of the United States and the world. It supports a cultural exchange program in order to foster better business, industrial, and cultural relations.

Cooper joins 16 other civic, business, and community leaders as a member of the advisory board. He is president of Arcon Manufacturing Inc. in Charlotte, North Carolina. Arcon is active in Central and South America, northern Africa, the Midwest, the Far East, Mexico, and Asia. Cooper is also Honorary Mexican Consul for the State of North Carolina.

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
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Association News

Foreign Service Day: four names added to memorial

Four new names of Americans attached to diplomatic missions who were killed under "heroic or tragic circumstances" in the last year were unveiled at the dedication of AFSA's Memorial Plaque on Foreign Service Day, May 7. AFSA President Dennis K. Hays and Secretary Shultz spoke at the brief ceremony, during which Shultz read a message from President Reagan pledging "every effort to defend our diplomats by strengthening security measures and enhancing our intelligence capabilities and, if necessary, by more active defensive measures."

"This past year we have witnessed a continuation of acts of terrorism against the representatives of our country and especially against members of the Foreign Service community," said Reagan. Shultz added that "this department will spare no effort for the safety of Foreign Service employees. Our Office of Security is working all-out on enhancing the security of our facilities around the world, and we are cooperating closely with friendly governments to track down and combat terrorism." Hays noted that, "For the Foreign Service, terrorism is not something abstract but something real, very personal—and never is it more real than on an occasion such as this, where we mark the loss of friends and loved ones."



Added to the plaque this year were Captain George K. Tsantes, who was killed in Athens in 1983; Foreign Service Officer Leamon R. Hunt, who was assassinated in Rome earlier this year; and Foreign Service Officer Dennis W. Keogh and Colonel Kenneth Crabtree, who were killed by a bomb in Namibia in April. Keogh's family were the guests of the Association at the ceremony, where Secretary Shultz gave the Secretary's Award posthumously to Keogh, presenting it to his daughter Molly.

"The irony of the deaths of all these tireless workers for peace is a sad and terrible commentary on the irrational forces with which peacemakers must contend today," concluded Shultz.

AID Standing accuses agency on languages

AID is "willfully backing away from the letter and intent" of Section 700 of the Foreign Service Act, which provides for sharply increased emphasis on foreign language capability, AFSA's AID Standing Committee has charged. "AID recently promulgated regulations to water down the Language Proficiency Standard required for renewing," the committee said. "Also eliminated was the requirement that beginning last February, certified proficiency in a foreign language will be required for consideration for the Senior Foreign Service."

Originally, management had proposed these changes to AFSA along with a sharp curtailment of the language incentive package, in particular step increases for proficiency, but AID Standing got the existing financial incentives package retained until the whole range of language incentive compensation could be reviewed. At the same time the committee won agreement to expand the list of "AID Useful" languages.

At that point the agency declared language-level items non-negotiable and implemented the proposals anyway. "This manifests a clear agency decision to de-emphasize foreign language training," the committee charged.

USIA junior officers meet AFSA at lunch



For the first time, members of USIA's junior officer class came by the Foreign Service Club earlier this spring to meet AFSA board members and staff and to learn about the Association's professional activities on their behalf.

Changes in retirees' COLA computation

In April the Senate finally passed the 1984 budget reconciliation bill that was enacted by the House last October. This legislation postpones the cost-of-living adjustment for federal retirees from May 1 to December 1, as reflected in annuity checks issued on the first of the following months. The budgetary savings are estimated to approximate \$1.1 billion.

Henceforth, COLAs will become effective December 1 of each year, payable January 1, and they will be based upon the difference in the Consumer Price Index from the third quarter of the preceding year compared with the third quarter of the year in which the COLA becomes effective. Thus, the next COLA, payable January 1, 1985, will be calculated using the rise in the CPI from the third quarter of 1983 to the third quarter of 1984.

In making this calculation, the average of the CPIs for the three months in each quarter will be used. Example: the actual CPIs for July, August, and September 1983 were 298.2, 299.5, and 300.8. Adding these together and dividing by three, we arrive at the average for the quarter of 299.5. This is the new base figure against which the average CPI for July, August, and September of this year will be compared.

This postponement and change in the COLA results in a loss in the inflation adjustment for the period from December 1982, when the CPI was 292.0, and the new base of 299.5. This constitutes a rise of 7.5 points in the CPI, or a 2.6-percent increase. This loss is a one-time event but it will have the permanent effect of reducing the base figure against which future COLAs will be applied.

To calculate the COLA adjustment now scheduled for payment in January 1985, we must wait until we can compute the average of the CPI readings for July through September of this year. Let's assume that this figure turns out to be 310.0. The previous base figure is the actual CPI average for the corresponding quarter of 1983, which we have just noted was 299.5. Under our assumption of an average CPI for the third quarter of 1984 of 310.0, the CPI would have increased by 10.5 points, or 3.5 percent. This increase would then be reflected in the January 1985 annuity checks.

At this writing only one more legisla-

tive issue affecting federal retirees awaits resolution during the 98th Congress. This has to do with the present provisions for a reduced COLA for retirees who have not reached age 62. This matter is being addressed in the budget reconciliation process for fiscal year 1985. The House passed its version of a reconciliation bill in mid-April, providing that non-disability federal civilian and military retirees who have not yet attained age 62 by the effective dates of the COLAs in fiscal year 1986 and 1987—i.e., by December 1, 1985, or the following De-

cember 1—will receive only one-half the COLA applicable to older retirees, survivors, and disability annuitants.

While the Senate has not yet acted on its version of the 1985 budget reconciliation, the draft bill does not incorporate this provision. The hope is that the final Senate bill will not include this limitation and that the House may agree to drop the measure when the differences between the chambers are resolved in conference.

—ROBERT M. BEERS,
Congressional Liaison

Judge rules on sale of personal property

An administrative law judge appointed by the Foreign Service Labor Relations Board has issued a ruling affirming the authority of ambassadors to limit conversion of local currency obtained from the sale of personal property by employees serving overseas.

The administrative proceeding resulted from an unfair labor practice charge filed by AFSA against the Department of State. AFSA charged that the department's April 15, 1983, cable to all diplomatic and consular posts directing ambassadors to impose limits on amounts of local currency converted into U.S. dollars at embassy facilities constituted a unilateral change in conditions of employment. The cable had been distributed two days before a negotiated agreement on the sale of personal property was

to take effect. The agreement constituted a liberalization of past policy, allowing employees to realize profits on the sale of personal property as long as the property had been imported for the employee's bona fide personal use.

The case was argued on AFSA's behalf by the general counsel of the FSLRB, which had issued the charge. The judge ruled that the authority of ambassadors to limit conversion of currency at embassy facilities predated both the agreement and the cable. The department was not obligated to consult with AFSA because the cable did not represent a change in practice. The judge ruled that the cable "merely alluded to existing ambassadorial discretion to control embassy conversion of local currency into U.S. dollars and suggested that ambassadors exercise their discretion as appropriate in countries with parallel rates."

The general counsel of the FSLRB is planning to appeal this decision on AFSA's behalf. We will let you know the results in a future issue.

AFSA cites Eagleburger for service



AFSA State Constituency Representative Thomas Miller (right) presents a certificate of appreciation to retiring Undersecretary for Political Affairs Lawrence J. Eagleburger at ceremonies on the eighth floor in April. AFSA cited Eagleburger for "sustained excellence in the performance of your many and varied duties."



From the Director's Desk

Enhancing Membership Communication

By LYNNE IGLITZIN, AFSA Executive Director

With this issue of the ASSOCIATION NEWS, I am pleased to initiate a regular column to communicate directly with the diverse membership of our Association. I plan to keep you informed of some of AFSA's activities you may not otherwise be aware of and to solicit your comments and ideas about things we are—and are not—doing. Please view this column as one way to encourage a dialogue about what your Association is up to.

We are trying to pay increased attention to the needs of our many retired members. Accordingly, beginning with the next issue we will be instituting another regular feature, this one devoted to items by, about, and of interest to AFSA retirees. We are pleased to announce that Spencer King—who is stepping down after years as a retired-constituency re-

presentative on the Governing Board—will serve as coordinator of this column.

Ambassador King, himself retired, hopes that the column will serve many functions: as a clearing-house for items submitted by the many retirees around the country; as a suggestion box for ways in which AFSA individuals and local groups might work in their communities, for instance with school or civic groups that are interested in foreign affairs; and as a forum for raising interests and questions that might be of interest to the rest of the AFSA community. Such a column will only be as successful as you make it. For it to work, we will need to hear from you. Please send any ideas, suggestions, and items for the column directly to Spencer King, c/o AFSA, 2101 E Street N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

We have exciting plans to continue to expand the AFSA 60th Anniversary Lecture Series, a monthly talk on foreign affairs by a distinguished speaker during a luncheon at the Foreign Service Club. Even though we realize this will primarily be of interest to members in the metropolitan Washington area, we are looking forward to a broader scope of professional events to be held at the club. If you have ideas for a good speaker whom you would be willing to contact personally, please let us know.

We are exploring ways to enhance our services to our members generally, and to our retired members in particular. This column is just a beginning. Do write directly to me with any suggestions as to other things AFSA might do to broaden the scope of member benefits. I shall do my best to respond personally.

Life and Love in the Foreign Service



WINNER:

"That's right. As your career counselor, I hold, the assignments officer kicks, and you keep still."

BOB FOUCHE, Washington

HONORABLE MENTION:

"An early version of the Triad."

CHUCK WOOTON, Pittsburgh

Winners of the monthly LIFE AND LOVE contest receive a certificate for a free lunch for two at the Foreign Service Club, honorable mentions receive a certificate for a free carafe of wine. Send entries to:

LIFE AND LOVE #12
AFSA
2101 E Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20037

*Contest deadline
is July 31*

Competition #12



Fact ■ Overseas insurance either replaces your household effects at today's prices or it doesn't.



Actual Cash Value

Most overseas insurance policies cover your household effects for their replacement cost less depreciation. This means that your \$500 stereo system purchased 5 years ago may have an actual cash value of only \$250 today. That's what most overseas insurance policies (or the Claims Act) would pay if it were lost or destroyed—hardly enough to replace the entire system at today's prices.



Current Replacement Cost

The American Foreign Service Association is sponsoring a Package Insurance Program for AFSA members only. The AFSA program covers you for the replacement cost of household furniture and personal effects that are lost or destroyed.

This means that your \$500 stereo system would be replaced with a similar system at today's prices even though they may be higher than \$500, subject only to the policy deductible of \$50.00.

Under the AFSA plan you can also add coverage for valuables or worldwide personal liability for you and your family. All with the assurance that you'll get fast, fair claims service.

And the rates are low. Basic property insurance costs only 75¢ per \$100 of coverage.

Give yourself some peace of mind before you move overseas. Send for our free brochure to help you determine how much insurance you need and how much it will cost. Or call your AFSA insurance specialist at:



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