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

INFORMATION IN THE POLICYMAKING MAZE

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

The policymaking process is like a maze. Information—intelligence, cables, studies—is fed in and policy somehow emerges from the other end. In this issue, we look at what happens in that labyrinth. On page 22, former CIA analyst John Horton shows how supposedly neutral intelligence assessments are sometimes affected by politics. And on page 26, journalist Kai Bird takes a look at the diminishing use of the dissent channel as a symptom of the foreign policy process's hostility to nonconformist thinking.

CONTENTS

"The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service"

The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the magazine for professionals in foreign affairs, published monthly except August by the American Foreign Service Association, a private non-profit organization. Marerial appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and does not necessarily represent the official views of the foreign affairs agencies, the U.S. government, or AFSA. The Editorial Board is responsible for general content, but statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in the ASSOCIATION NEWS and the ASSOCIATION VIEWS, and all communications relaring to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

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ASSOCIATION VIEWS

Professionalism

We frequently use the term "professionalism" to describe what we as Foreign Service career personnel set as our standard of excellence. We are frequently accused of "careerism," defined as blind support for a career Foreign Service without regard for standards of professionalism. AFSA stands for a career Foreign Service dedicated to professionalism, but does not promote careerism as an end in itself.

This semantic difference is important. We believe a career Foreign Service must exist to help the president and secretary of state formulate and implement our nation's foreign policy. Because we are dedicated to serving the incumbent administration—regardless of political party or persuasion—and have demonstrated this commitment over many years, the charges of partisanship and untrustworthiness which one hears frequently today sting deeply. Even more painful is the perception that some in the current administration intend to act on their mistaken impression of the Foreign Service by pushing for an even higher percentage of political appointments in the department than has existed ever before.

As the administration prepares to begin its second term, we wish to reaffirm the professionalism for which AFSA stands. It is based on:

—Loyalty to the policies of the president and secretary of state. The career Foreign Service is as dedicated as political appointees to successfully carrying out this administration's foreign policy;

—An obligation to tell our political leaders when we think a policy is wrong and should be changed, but to do so within channels;

—A system which recognizes excellence, be it from career or political ranks. Our nation's foreign policy is too important to make it the exclusive domain of either careerists or political appointees. By working together, we can do a better job.

Flooding the department with more political appointees, as suggested in a recent Heritage Foundation report, will not only make it more difficult to have the best qualified people advising the secretary, but it will also bring to the fore a basic dilemma one must face in any profession: What point is there in hiring the best and the brightest and making them go through an excruciating testing period only to deny them the opportunity to use all their background and training because there are no positions available to prove themselves? How many lawyers or doctors would endure the apprenticeship if they knew there was no way to become a partner or to practice after their residency? More importantly, would these professions—which demand a great deal of training and specialization like the Foreign Service—be better served if we entrusted them to amateurs?

Admittedly, the career Foreign Service is far from perfect. In an organization as large as ours, we have our leakers, squeaky wheels, and those who publicly disagree with established policy. These actions should not be tolerated. For example, the recent public statement—albeit taken somewhat out of context—of one of our most distinguished career ambassadors which disagreed with certain aspects of the president's Middle East policy and came only days before the election was wrong and unprofessional.

By the same token, political appointees to high-level positions in the State Department expect to be taken seriously and treated no differently than their Foreign Service counterparts. The 21 non-career ambassadors who publicly endorsed Senator Helms in his Senate campaign may have acted within legal guidelines, but they definitely violated the spirit of an understanding which has existed for decades that discourages partisan political activity on the part of all our ambassadors.

For every headline-grabbing story of an ill-advised public statement or leak which creates the impression that the Foreign Service is not to be trusted, there are thousands of career personnel who work quietly, year in and year out, to help support the president's foreign policies. There are many stories of political ambassadors who changed their negative perceptions about the career Service after they had the opportunity to work closely with career Foreign Service professionals. I believe they would agree that it is wrong to castigate the great majority of dedicated Foreign Service personnel who have served loyally for the transgressions of a few. This ethos of loyalty to the president remains as strong as ever among Foreign Service personnel.

TOM MILLER,
State Representative

LETTERS

Truth and Accuracy

I am surprised that such an experienced reporter as George Gedda should repeat the incorrect statement so frequently made by less knowledgeable supporters of Radio Marti that this is the first radio program designed to enable Cubans to learn the "truth" about their country in a quarter of a century ["Safety in the Center," October]. He, of all people, should have been well aware of Cita con Cuba, a Voice of America radio program, initiated under the Kennedy administration, specifically designed to maintain contact with the people of Cuba and to keep them informed about what was happening there and in the rest of the world despite the lack of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba.

Cita con Cuba lasted some 13 years under both Democratic and Republican administrations. It was abandoned in the mid-1970s because USIA felt that the program was not worth the money being spent on it and that the regular Voice of America programs beamed to Latin America could be just as effective as the special program. Whether one considers Radio Marti a good or bad idea, let the record at least stand corrected. Radio Marti is not a new idea; it is the revival of an old one.

DOROTHY DILLON
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Washington, D.C.

Kudos and Questions

Congratulations to Smith Simpson on his article "A Foreign Service Filament," which appeared in your 60th anniversary issue. This perceptive and entertaining review of all the JOURNALS—presumably 720 issues!—helps put various of our professional problems into historical perspective. And it shows us that we are not yet sufficiently clear about what the Foreign Service should be doing, and how it can best go about doing it.

Obviously, during most of its 60-year history, the JOURNAL was "getting in the way of the Service it is intended to serve," as Mr. Simpson puts it. It is therefore particularly encouraging that, during the last

decade, the JOURNAL has played an important "part in nurturing the spirit of analysis and criticism and freeing the mind of Foreign Service officers from the cliches which were once so pervasive." So congratulations as well to the JOURNAL.

BRANDON ROBINSON
Foreign Service Officer
Washington, D.C.

Congratulations on the 60th anniversary issue of the JOURNAL in November. It was excellent.

One thing bothered me. "How Can the Foreign Service Remain Effective for the Next 60 Years?" was the question posed to and answered by 37 people. Despite the thousands of words contributed by 36 men, the answer will be incomplete, if not erroneous, if it does not include a far greater contribution by women than the nine words from one woman suggest. Or are the next 60 years of the Foreign Service going to be like so many of the past with respect to women? I trust not.

ROBERT C. BREWSTER
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Washington, D.C.

The JOURNAL asked a representative sample of senior and retired diplomats, as well as legislators, academics, journalists, etc., to answer our question on the future of the Foreign Service. Unfortunately, only half of those asked responded. —ED.

Author Query

I am conducting research concerning the actual recovery of the original cables, messages, and related communications which reported anything about the mass murders, imprisonments, or disappearances during the now-little-known purges in the Soviet Union during the 1930s that came from U.S., British, and French embassies back to Washington, London, and Paris. The archives will be put together in dated sequence.

Anyone having useful insights or information should contact me as soon as possible, especially retired Foreign Service personnel who may have originated the reports or know of things first-hand that were not reported in writing, or who know of dates of events. Do any retired FSOs have any unique photos that would fit with the archives being compiled? Thank you for your help.

BERNIE WEBB
755 South 2nd St.
Carrington, North Dakota 58421

Fact: When you're going overseas, you have enough to worry about without worrying about your insurance, too.

Moving overseas can be a very traumatic time if you don't have the proper insurance. The fact is, the government will be responsible for only $15,000 worth of your belongings. If any of your personal valuables such as cameras, jewelry, furs and fine arts are destroyed, damaged or stolen, you would receive not the replacement cost of the goods, but only a portion of what you'd have to pay to replace them.

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A Correspondence Commendation

I have just received my copy of a circular to Foreign Service annuitants from Gertrude L. Wiechoski, chief of the Retirement Division.

The letter, which explains what to do about your pension check if you move, change your bank, or change your marital status, is clear, comprehensive, *and* polite. It ought to be used as a model for administrative correspondence, and Ms. Wiechoski should be commended.

HARRY I. ODELL
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Glen Echo, Maryland

The JOURNAL welcomes letters to the editor but reserves the right to edit for clarity and to shorten for considerations of space. All letters are reviewed by the Editorial Board. Letters received anonymously will not be printed.

BOOKS

Reviews

Soviet-East European Relations: *Consolidation and Conflict, 1968–1980. By Robert L. Hutchings. The University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.*

The Warsaw Pact: *Alliance in Transition? Edited by David Holloway and Jane M.O. Sharp. Cornell University Press, 1984. $29.95.*

These two books will be of particular interest to those specializing in Soviet and Eastern European affairs. They should be on the reading list of all persons assigned to U.S. missions in the U.S.S.R. or any of the other member states of the Warsaw Pact. As their titles indicate, these books are almost exclusively concerned with the post-Stalin period of Soviet and Eastern European history. They examine in depth the Kremlin's policies and actions toward the six Eastern European countries belonging to the Warsaw Treaty Organization and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.

Hutchings focuses on the period between the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the advent in August 1980 of organized workers' opposition to communist rule in Poland. During this eventful time, he argues, the Soviet leadership attempted "to create a system of interstate and inter-party links so pervasive" that recourse to the "ultimate unifying force" of the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe—the Red Army—would be unnecessary. To prove his point, Hutchings guides the reader through the maze of CMEA and WTO meetings, various party congresses, and other conferences. He rightly stresses the profound impact of the 1975 decision by the Soviet Union to tie its oil prices for CMEA countries to prevailing world market prices. The Eastern European members of CMEA soon found themselves, as Hutchings points out, in "a double bind, forced to divert trade eastward to compensate for increased Soviet oil prices and westward to repay growing hard currency debts to western creditors."

But Soviet efforts to further integrate the WTO countries did not solve other difficulties facing the pact. Hutchings concludes that, by the beginning of the

1980s, none of the various steps taken in the previous decade by the Soviet and Eastern European leaders had "offered any solution to the pressing challenges facing Eastern Europe in the late 1970s: severe economic deterioration, ideological erosion, and political malaise...thus the vision of a durable and viable Pax Sovietica remained in 1980 as elusive as ever."

In some respects, this reviewer found *The Warsaw Pact,* a collection of essays by 10 experts on the subject, to be the more interesting of the two volumes. Despite its title, it is by no means restricted to a mere consideration of the history, structure, and functions of the WTO. While these subjects are adequately covered, the book ranges much further both in terms of subject matter and coverage of recent developments in Eastern Europe. Unlike Hutchings's volume, which concentrates on the period 1968–80, several of the essays in *The Warsaw Pact* discuss the significant developments in Poland since mid-1980. Most important, J.F. Brown and Paul Marer tackle the challenging assignment of evaluating the future prospects confronting the Warsaw Pact states (and especially the U.S.S.R.) in the field of intra-bloc political and economic relations. The final chapter is a *tour de force* by Jonathan Dean (a retired FSO) covering a broad range of relevant issues under the title, "The Warsaw Pact in the International System."

It is worth noting that no significant differences exist between the conclusions reached by Hutchings and by the authors of *The Warsaw Pact.* All seem in agreement, for example, that the Eastern European members of the WTO have entered an era of greatly increased economic pressures arising from their own consumers' demands; from their trade situation with the U.S.S.R., whose energy and raw materials have become less readily available and much more expensive; and from western creditors, who are wary about advancing new loans. Nonetheless, Dean seems on target to this reviewer when he concludes that, however flawed the Pax Sovietica is now or is likely to become, the Soviet leadership will undoubtedly retain the will and the power to maintain its hold over the Warsaw Pact states for at least the next few decades. —CHARLES G. STEFAN

Weapons and Hope. *By Freeman Dyson. Harper and Row, 1984. $17.95.*

In *Weapons and Hope,* Freeman Dyson discusses the problem of nuclear weapons from a human rather than a technical point of view. He attempts to bridge the communications gap between such diverse groups as nuclear-freeze advocates and "star wars" supporters. His arguments are cogent, and he generally presents both sides of the arguments fairly. He makes his own bias toward non-nuclear resistance clear, but because he believes that a realizable policy must have public support, he advocates a compromise policy of "live and let live" with the Soviets.

Dyson rejects as unstable the concepts of mutual assured destruction, nuclear warfighting, and unlimited defense (outpacing the Soviet Union in the development of defensive capabilities). He also rejects unilateral disarmament and non-nuclear resistance as unsustainable, since neither is likely to gain the required political consensus in the face of a continuing risk that the Soviet Union may use nuclear weapons. He opts instead for a middle way that he calls "live and let live." The doctrine would be based on the principle that "in terms of strategic nuclear conflict...we should be able to do at least as badly unto

the Soviets as they had done or could do unto us." It would be implemented by maintaining strategic weapons while phasing out tactical weapons altogether. The Soviet reaction to such a proposal would be difficult to predict, but it would not require a substantial shift in Soviet behavior or doctrines. Disarmament negotiations could be conducted with great flexibility since only the aggregate number of warheads would be important.

Dyson's arguments are persuasive if one accepts his fundamental assumptions on human nature and political action. Even if one does not, however, his book makes one think, rather than simply follow the rut of old arguments and debates.

—Teresa Chin Jones

Understanding Austria. *By Martin F. Herz. Wolfgang Neugebauer Verlag, 1984. $52.*

Understanding Austria's 650 pages consist of 160 cables and inter-office memoranda written by the then third and second secretary of the U.S. legation, Martin Herz, from 1945–48. Although diligently reading all these cables and memos would be overwhelming, skimming the book is both rewarding and pleasant. Herz (who later became ambassador to Bulgaria) was born in New York in 1917, but his Austro-Jewish parents and attendance of both elementary and high school in Vienna (1922–36) gave him an unusual command of Viennese German and understanding of the Austrian psyche.

The cables in this book were selected by Herz just prior to his untimely death in October 1983. They come from a large group of dispatches authorized by him and unearthed by the department's historian. The inter-office memoranda, which are more candid and provide interesting glimpses into the U.S. bureaucracy, are from Herz's personal files (whose retention survived various informal instructions that they be shredded).

In his introduction, Herz notes that none of this material will induce historians to rewrite their accounts of postwar Austrian history. Nevertheless, it is worth perusing as an example of thorough and insightful political reporting, particularly for members of the Foreign Service. The art of in-depth political reporting (as well as semi-academic writing in general) has suffered a deplorable decline in recent years. Of special interest to FSOs ought to be Herz's 80-page "Compendium of Austrian Politics," which he wrote in 1948 at the end of his tour in Vienna. This voluminous memorandum provided a comprehensive guide to Austrian political life for his successor as well as for the desk in Washington. Writing such a political/economic post report ought to be required of all transferred FSOs in a Service that all too often posts officers long after their predecessors have departed. This practice would facilitate the re-establishment of contacts and speed the process of becoming familiar with the host country's political and economic milieu.

Both Austrophiles (those who maintain that Hitler was a German and Beethoven an Austrian) and Austrophobes (Hitler was an Austrian and Beethoven a German) will find some support for their views in this collection. This reviewer is left with two questions. First, did the Allied presence in Austria really make a difference to the political life of the land of Proporz and Kaiserschmorn? Second, how was Herz able to get the State Department to clear so many documents for publication when others are having difficulties?

—Charles R. Foster

The Dynamics of Development and Development Administration. *By Kempe Ronald Hope. Greenwood Press, 1984. $27.95.*

This book is in the tradition of more recent studies in development administration: brief and to the point. Gone are the interminable "collections" of 500 pages, and gone are the involved, often dreary, attempts to apply sophisticated measurement techniques to an unruly subject. The author, a professor from West Indies University in Kingston, attempts to reset the stage for development administration as seen from the perspective of the New International Economic Order.

The author attacks traditional theory on the grounds that economic development has for too long been equated with economic well-being, and growth in GNP with development success. This, he contends, is a throwback to the colonial mentality that is served by an old and discredited bureaucratism that passes for "public administration." What the Third World needs is a development administration linked to the four principles of the New International Economic Order: basic human needs, indigenous technology, individual and collective self-help, and redistribution of the world's resources. Without a development administration cast in this mold, he argues, there can be no lasting development in the Third World.

But the argument, for all its careful re-

search, single-minded brevity, and exhortation, is not convincing. Administration, by any prefix, is a means and not a value system; it is a mere handmaiden to policy. Were all four of the principles which Hope espouses desired by everyone, it would still take a political structure, not an administrative addition, to achieve them. By shifting his argument to the realm of development administration, Hope oversimplifies the problem and makes it seem as if exhortation, good will, and better management are the answers. Thus his frustration grows. The problem must first be solved in a political context so that any reform efforts will have the necessary leadership and consensus behind it. Only then can administration be called on to shoulder the burden.

In short, small may be beautiful, even desirable, but error is still possible in the thinnest of books. —WILLIAM SOMMERS

Iraq, Eastern Flank of the Arab World. *By Christine Moss Helms. The Brookings Institution, 1984. $28.95 (cloth), $9.95 (paper).*

Anyone seeking to better understand Iraq and its war with Iran would be hard put to find a better source of information than Christine Moss Helms's new book. The author, a research associate at the Brookings Institution's Foreign Policy Studies program, obtained much of her material through visits to Iraq and discussions there with senior officials, including four members of the governing Revolutionary Command Council. The book includes a surprising amount of useful information for its small size (215 pages), and, while concentrating on the war and developments leading up to it, does not omit discussion of Iraq's earlier history.

The role of the ruling Ba'ath Party is given considerable attention, and little of this information is easily available elsewhere. She notes that full party members number 25,000, or less than .2 percent of the population, compared to the 6.1 percent of the Soviet population who belong to the Communist Party. Similarly, the current dominance of Iraq's Sunni Moslems within the Ba'ath Party is made clear. They comprise less than half of the country's population but provide over 90 percent of the party leadership. By contrast, the majority Shiite Moslems, who made up over half of the party leadership in the 1950s, now hold only about five percent of the senior party positions.

No less interesting are the data Helms includes on the career of Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, including his participation in the attempted assassination of then Iraqi President Qasim in 1959. Wounded in the attempt, Hussein fled to Egypt, where he studied law at Cairo University before returning to Iraq in 1963.

In sum, this book deserves a place in the library of anyone interested in Iraq and the rest of the Middle East. Because of its easy reading style, it is also recommended to those seeking general works in the field of foreign affairs. —BENSON L. GRAYSON

The Making of America's Soviet Policy. *Edited by Joseph S. Nye Jr. Council on Foreign Relations, Yale University Press, 1984. $27.50*

This latest Council on Foreign Relations contribution to foreign affairs literature purports to focus on the making, rather than the substance, of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union. Still, it replows much familiar ground on the latter score. It nevertheless rates high for light shed on structuring a relationship with the U.S.S.R. and on why issues were handled (or mishandled) as they were. It also inadvertently sheds a bit of light on some of the people who write about this particular subject.

This book presents 12 essays by established names in the U.S.-Soviet field, most of whom have been writing voluminously on this subject for years. Their analyses are generally sound, and several are especially worthwhile. Richard Bett's wrap-up of the arms control picture is comprehensive and lucid, and political officers will find I.M. Destler's chapter on Congress's vital role in shaping our ties with Moscow very instructive.

One generalization about the group as a whole, however: the acerbity of criticism tends to vary inversely with the extent of the author's experience in government. Those who have been through the mill are more tolerant in explaining what went wrong. Then too, there is a surprising amount of ethnocentricity in some of the essays. If challenged, the authors presumably would acknowledge that the superpower rivalry is not exclusively bilateral, but played out in third areas as well. Yet only Dmitri Simes gives more than a passing nod to the importance of Europe, particularly Germany, in shaping U.S.-Soviet relations. One would have expected greater appreciation of Moscow's priorities from critics of U.S. policy formulation. One other quibble: Strobe Talbott has the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine backwards—he speaks of the U.S.S.R.'s organic relationship with Eastern Europe rather than its *lack* of one.

By and large, however, this is an informative survey of U.S. dealings with the Soviets and the problems encountered along the way. Nonetheless, it is the book's introduction and conclusion that offer most food for thought. Editor Nye zeros in on the crucial impact Washington's 18th-century approach to foreign affairs has had on our Soviet policy—not merely the checks and balances between executive and legislative, but the deliberate diffusion of power throughout the government, the inconsistency of democratic procedures generally, the moral concomitant to policy decisions, and, of course, the national sense of detachment from foreign affairs stemming from geographic isolation. No secretary of state will be startled by Nye's prescription. He recommends scaling down strategy to fit domestic capabilities, nurturing alliances, and engaging the Soviets through economics and dialogue while coping with them militarily. But the book he has pulled together at least offers policymakers some indirect consolation—for all their vaunted expertise (and criticism), the experts don't have any better answers either.

—MARTHA MAUTNER

The Non-aligned, the U.N., and the Superpowers. *By Richard L. Jackson. Praeger Publishers, 1983. $25.*

The author, a career Foreign Service officer, was a political adviser to the U.S. mission to the U.N. from 1980–83. He treats this complicated and controversial complex of foreign policy issues to a very scholarly analysis and suggests concrete new approaches for U.S. policy. The three parts of the book deal with the non-aligned movement as an institution, with the interaction of the movement and the United Nations, and relations between the non-aligned and the superpowers.

Block voting, anti-American rhetoric, and the United Nations' failure to act decisively during crises have increased the doubts of significant segments of American society as to the effectiveness of the world organization and its usefulness to U.S. foreign policy objectives. For this reason, political appointees with domestic constituencies and ties to the White House will probably be required as ambassadors to the United Nations for the immediate future, since they will be more effective in justifying U.S. participation. In the long run, however, the appointment of professional diplomats would be more consistent with reduced U.S. expectations, participation, and objectives.

The author opposes such drastic steps as

U.S. withdrawal from the U.N. system but suggests that the United States adopt a more pragmatic approach and redefine its objectives. The United States should carefully "pick and choose" those issues to be pursued in the world body and should channel those likely to be politicized by the majority into other directions. The United Nations also offers opportunities, among them easy access to the diplomats of developing countries, who usually are more open to dialogue and attention in New York than in their own capitals. Apart from multilateral diplomacy, the United Nations can be useful in bilateral efforts to build support for U.S. policies. It can also serve to increase the areas of shared interests between the non-aligned and the United States.

The non-aligned have fundamentally altered the structure and agenda of the United Nations. Thus, the author argues, historic U.S. patterns of behavior and perceptions of the organization have become irrelevant. A continuing dialogue on the U.N. process is now needed to change perceptions on both sides, and to "erode ideology with an appreciation of interrelated problems." —ROBERT A. BAUER

From the Think Tanks

Strategic Implications of the Continental-Maritime Debate. *By Keith A. Dunn and William O. Staudenmaier. Washington Papers #107, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984. 99pp. $7.95.* Dunn and Staudenmaier argue that both maritime and continental strategists have developed plans that are unacceptable because they heighten the risk of nuclear war, depend on unpredictable allied reactions, and lack the necessary flexibility. Only after the joint chiefs system has been reformed to constrain inter-service rivalry will it be possible to develop strategies that adequately reflect policy objectives.

An International Standard for Monetary Stabilization. *By Ronald I. McKinnon. Policy Analyses in International Economics #8, Institute for International Economics, 1984. 80pp. $6.* The national orientation of most monetary policies is insufficient in a world where markets for goods and capital have become increasingly international, says McKinnon. Central banks should de-emphasize national indicators (interest rates, etc.) and stress stabilizing the exchange rate against a hard currency trading partner; major monetary powers should also cooperate to dampen world cycles of boom and bust by controlling their aggregate money supply.

CLIPPINGS

A Month of Terror

"Four 60mm mortar grenades were fired at the U.S. embassy in Lisbon yesterday, slightly damaging three embassy vehicles, an embassy spokesman said. Lisbon police said they believed the grenades were fired from a passing vehicle. Three exploded inside the embassy grounds and the fourth on a sidewalk outside the perimeter wall."
Washington Times, November 26

"Italian police arrested seven Lebanese students last weekend whom they strongly suspect of planning to blow up the U.S. embassy in Rome in a truck-bomb suicide attack. The students are believed to be members of the Islamic Jihad movement."
Janet Stobart in the Christian Science Monitor, November 29

"Gunmen riding in a pick-up truck sprayed automatic weapons fire at the U.S. embassy [San Salvador] on Thursday, but no one was injured, an embassy security official said." *Chicago Tribune, December 1*

"International narcotics traffickers hired a professional killer and sent him to Bolivia to murder the U.S. ambassador, authorities reported yesterday. U.S. and Bolivian officials learned of the plot on the life of Ambassador Edwin Corr, who was safe and was taking security precautions, but the killer may still be in the country....Corr, 50, is known to be an active advocate of cooperative measures to reduce illegal narcotics production in Bolivia and its export to the United States."
Philadelphia Inquirer, December 8

"Squat, gray, and fortress-like, the 12-year-old U.S. embassy in Bogota is designed to withstand the most withering of terrorist bomb attacks. The building was put to the test last week: a white Fiat, packed with 33 pounds of dynamite, exploded just outside the employee parking lot. The blast killed a Colombian woman standing near by, knocked down several 50-year-old eucalyptus trees, and blew out windows in a 15-story office building a block away. But it did not crack a single pane of the shatterproof glass in the embassy or injure any of the 309 people inside. Said an embassy employee: 'They'd have to hit us with an atom bomb to shake this place.' "
Time magazine, December 10

"The harrowing hijack drama on a Teheran runway triggered nightmare flashbacks of what happened in Iran five years ago—terrorists taunting the U.S.—but this time American hostages [including two AID officials] died and a different president seemed equally unable to do anything about it."
U.S. News and World Report, December 17

"Israeli police early this month arrested several Palestinians from the occupied Gaza Strip who said they planned to attack the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv with a hand grenade."
Edward Walsh in the Washington Post, December 20

Dealing with Terror

"The least the Iranians can do is have these four people tried as murderers. I think the widows of these two men deserve an answer as to why their husbands were killed."
Charles Kapar in the New York Times, December 18

"With our embassies and military bases on constant alert to terrorist attack and our officials abroad aware that they may be kidnapped or killed, there are steps we must take to limit our exposure. We must continue to improve security at our embassies and military bases around the world. We must intensify intelligence-gathering techniques on known terrorist organizations. And we must work effectively with other countries to alienate—economically and politically—outlaw nations that harbor terrorists....

"Of all the nations of the world, our free, open society has the most to lose from a policy of counterterrorism that will only beget other rounds of terrorism from other fanatics. We must realize that although our power is substantial, there are limits to it. While others can blink at vengeance, we stand for justice."

USA Today, December 11

"One thing at least is certain. As with every other hijacking, this one would not have been carried out unless the terrorists had been reasonably confident of success. That means achieving not only their political aim—the release of 17 persons imprisoned in Kuwait for last year's bombings of the U.S. and French embassies there—but also success in finding a haven once that was done. The hijackers obviously had some final destination in mind for themselves and those whom they sought to free. As a practical matter they could expect to have found asylum only in Iran or, possibly, Libya. So long as this kind of expectation or prior understanding exists, airliner hijackings will remain a threat."

Los Angeles Times, December 11

"With two Americans dead and others in danger, one diplomat remarked, the arguments of Secretary of State George P. Shultz 'have become more respectable.' Mr. Shultz, more than anyone else in the administration, has argued that the United States must risk the lives of military personnel and of persons not involved, if necessary, to stem terrorism....

"If the group responsible for the current hijacking is identified 'with reasonable certainty' and its headquarters located, he said, 'then I think the mood for punitive action is growing. I certainly don't rule it out.' "

Henry Trewhitt in the Baltimore Sun, December 9

"I used to be in what has become one of the most dangerous of all professions: the business of representing the United States abroad. An ambassador, a Marine guard, a diplomatic courier may be in more physical peril than any contender for the heavyweight boxing championship."

Carl T. Rowan in the Washington Post, December 8

Cuts That Hurt

"U.S. Marines, Foreign Service officers, and civil servants are being terrorized and murdered in Iran and elsewhere around the world. And how does our president reward them for their sacrifices? By honor guards and caskets, and with the promise of pay cuts and COLA freezes!"

Bill Fraylich in the Federal Times, December 31

Non-Person Haig

"Alexander M. Haig Jr. served as secretary of state from January 1981 to June 1982—18 months during which he made hundreds of statements on U.S. foreign policy. One would not suspect that, however, when reading a recent 154-page State Department publication called *Realism, Strength, Negotiation: Key Foreign Policy Statements of the Reagan Administration*. Not once is the loquacious Haig referred to."

Lloyd Schearer in Parade magazine, December 18

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, February 1975: "Just as the foreign diplomats who tour the United States find inspiration and give inspiration, our Foreign Service could offer—and perhaps receive—a great boost in morale by renewing personal contact with our domestic scene as part-time ambassadors to our own people....

"When I served in the Congress, I often heard that our Foreign Service officers spend so many years overseas that they tend to get out of touch with the home country and with their hometowns in Kansas, or Texas, or Michigan. I am suspicious of all such generalizations. But I also believe it is essential for the men and women who represent us abroad to constantly renew their acquaintance with the constantly changing moods and ideas of 'Hometown, U.S.A.' " *President Gerald Ford*

Foreign Service Journal, February 1960: "A revolution is quietly taking place in the Foreign Service. It concerns the emergence of the functional and geographic specialist in a role equal to that of the generalist, a role which in the future may become the dominant one up to the level of deputy chief of mission."
James V. Martin Jr.

Foreign Service Journal, February 1935: "President Jackson, though a hard case in early life and to his death fond of cock fighting and horse racing, took the religion of his wife after she died, becoming a Presbyterian....One night he noticed a nobby-looking young man sitting in a pew near him, apparently paying close attention to the sermon....On going out he asked the young man what he thought of the discourse. 'It was the worst lot of stuff ever uttered in a pulpit,' replied the young dude, who, by the way, was a clerk in the State Department....

"A few days after this, the same young man wanted to go abroad as secretary of legation in one of the chief European courts. The minister...wanted him to go with him. Old Hickory, however, would not consent. 'The fellow,' he said, 'is a fool. He cannot appreciate a good sermon, and I will not appoint him.' The result was that the young man stayed home."
Frank G. Carpenter

THE QUESTIONABLE ALLIANCE

An assessment of the U.S.-Israeli relationship shows that its continuation may not be in the American national interest

CURTIS F. JONES

THE IMPORTANCE OF alliance with Israel is almost a given in U.S. political thinking. Middle East specialists still debate the pros and cons, but the major publications have been dominated by the arguments for alliance. More important, no recent administration from either political party has come close to adopting a position of strict neutrality in the Arab-Israeli conflict, despite ritual protestations of "even-handedness."

The U.S.-Israeli alliance has never been codified by treaty, but it has been articulated by every president, all of whom have reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to the survival of Israel. It has been consolidated by congressional approval of ever-increasing economic and military assistance. Washington's subsidies to Israel were recently calculated by George Ball to approximate $750 per year per Israeli. This figure approaches the $800 per capita that the federal government currently distributes to its own citizens under the Social Security program. The recent grant for Israeli production of the Lavi jet fighter exceeds any current subsidy to the U.S. defense industry for any competitive aircraft.

Given the tragic experience of the Jewish people during World War II, it is hardly surprising that attempts to evaluate the U.S.-Israeli association usually engender much controversy. U.S. actions and attitudes toward Israel are affected by both national security considerations and domestic political pressures, and in the murky world of policy formulation, it is often impossible to establish the relative weight of the two. This article will make no effort to deal with the sympathies of American citizens and their impact on policy. The objective here is to leave that domestic aspect aside and assess U.S.-Israeli alliance in the cold light of the U.S. national interest.

Israel's supporters in the United States have understandably sought to maintain and even strengthen the U.S.-Israeli alliance. Their statements and writings appear frequently in the media, reinforcing certain tenets about the close nature of the U.S.-Israeli relationship. A variety of individuals and publications have supported the notion that the U.S. commitment to Israel is essential because our interests are identical. For instance, a full-page ad appearing in a May 1968 edition of the *New York Times* and sponsored by "Foreign Policy Perspectives, Inc.," quoted former Deputy Under Secretary of State Eugene Rostow as saying, "Our interests and those of Israel are congruent." In May 1982, *Commentary* editor Norman Podhoretz wrote that an ideological attack on Israel "represents by extension a covert attack on the political culture of the United States." In a September 1979 editorial, the *Times* said that the United States "is bound, historically, morally, and politically, to ensure the survival of Israel."

A second recurrent theme is that Israel is the United States' only reliable ally in the Middle East: In December 1979, then Senator Richard Stone wrote in the *Washington Star* that the best places to establish U.S. naval and air facilities in the Middle East would be at the Israeli bases of Etzion and Ophira in Sinai. Columnist George Will wrote in an October 1981 issue of *Newsweek* that Israel is "the only nation in the region where we know we can land a plane tomorrow." In November 1983, Robert Strauss, the former Democratic Party chairman, said that "Israel is our oldest and most reliable ally and friend in the Middle East."

Supporters of Israel have also asserted that it plays a constructive role in the U.S.-Soviet rivalry by providing a firm anti-communist bulwark in the Middle East. Senator Lowell T. Weicker Jr. (R.-Connecticut) asserted in a November 1978 article in the *Washington Star* that President Carter, by pressing for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace plan, threatened to reduce "the value of U.S. and Israeli air and sea capabilities to interdict Soviet shipments" of materiel into the region. Theodore Mann, chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations, wrote in a letter to the *Times* in September 1979 that a West Bank state governed by the Palestine Liberation Organization would afford the Soviet Union a priceless base from which to threaten western access to Middle East oil. In May 1981, columnist William Safire attempted to justify Israeli actions against Soviet-made missiles deployed by Syria in Lebanon by arguing that their deployment was dictated by the Soviet Union to project its power into the area.

Unfortunately for both Americans and Israelis, these assumptions about the value of the U.S.-Israeli relationship are rarely examined in a comprehensive fashion. Too often they are simply accepted without being put in a context that reflects the realities of the Middle East situation. Yet, if U.S. policy is to be

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Reagan meets with then Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin (left) and current Prime Minister Shimon Peres. An invitation to the White House for the Israeli head of government is as much a given as is the United States' alliance with the Jewish state.

successful, it must take these realities into account, and our support for Israel must be evaluated in terms of overall national interest.

THE MOST ELEMENTAL fact about the Arab-Israeli conflict is its intractability. If Israel and the Arabs were to make peace, the implications of the U.S.-Israeli alliance would be fundamentally altered. This assessment, however, starts from the more plausible premise that Israel and few or all of its neighbors will continue to be at war for the foreseeable future, just as they have been in some form or other since 1948. With the collapse of the British and French colonial empires after World War II, the Middle East attained independence by default. Without established states or regional institutions, it lapsed into a chaotic free-for-all that has allowed foreign governments and groups extensive opportunities for involvement. The most traumatic case was the creation of the state of Israel. Since 1948, the Arab-Israeli controversy has flared into major hostilities five times without a hint of progress toward permanent resolution.

This intractability is in large part the consequence of two characteristics of the Israeli state: expansionism and communalism. It serves little purpose to argue whether Israel is expansionist because the Arabs are hostile, or the Arabs are hostile because Israel is expansionist. It is easy to understand embattled Israel's determination to hold on to the territory, water supplies, markets, religious sites, labor supplies, and defensible perimeter afforded by Gaza, the West Bank, and the Golan Heights—if not southern Lebanon. But the result has been that Israel now holds land long inhabited and still claimed by four Arab peoples—Palestinians, Jordanians, Syrians, and Lebanese. Whatever its boundaries, Israel is condemned to maintaining military power adequate to repel any possible combination of Arab forces, and that power is as much a threat to Israel's neighbors as is the retention of Arab territory. Israel's need for absolute security has become the cause of its neighbors' absolute insecurity.

Israel's communal nature has also contributed to the difficulties in finding a permanent solution. Created as the ultimate sanctuary for one discrete community of people, Israel cannot even assimilate the non-Jews that already live within its own borders. Even less could it accept non-Jewish individuals or factions from outside or co-opt them as dependable allies. Morally, Israel can take satisfaction in its contributions to the self-respect, fulfillment, and survival of the Jewish people. Geopolitically, it has condemned itself to permanent alienation from its non-Jewish neighbors.

Many Arabs believe that the only solution to the chaos in the Middle East would be the emergence of a central authority strong enough to pacify the area and secular enough to secure the loyalty of every ethnic and sectarian group. But such an authority would be fatal to the communal state of Israel, and Zionists would have an obligation to oppose it. Herein lies the insoluble core of the Arab-Israeli dispute.

The situation is complicated even further by the role of the superpowers in the region. The power struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States carries with it the constant threat of escalation to military confrontation. Many observers believe the greatest risk of such escalation lies in the Middle East—an area that is crucial to Europe and Japan because it contains half the world's oil, crucial to the United States because of the *de facto* security guarantee to Israel, and crucial to the U.S.-Soviet struggle because it lies at the geopolitical center between the two. It is generally recognized that, in this nuclear age, any attempt by either East or West to establish hegemony over the region would be irresponsible.

However, governments are prone to error, and the superpowers have failed to resist being sucked into the Middle East maelstrom. They are deeply involved: the United States by backing Israelis and "moderate" Arabs, and the U.S.S.R. by supporting "radical" Arabs. Soviet and American allies and clients are in perennial conflict. The superpowers have already intervened militarily in at least five known cases: U.S. landings in support of a rightist Lebanese government in 1958; clandestine U.S. air reconnaissance for Israel in 1967 (if Stephen Green's *Taking Sides* is accurate); Soviet air cover for Egypt in 1970; and Soviet and U.S. support for Syria and Maronite Lebanon, respectively, in 1982–83.

East and West share a compelling interest in promoting a regional power structure that is stable enough to stand on its own and strong enough to control the Middle East without outside help. Yet neither party has shown any sign of recognizing this truth. Both have pursued the tired old colonialist strategy of creating as many client states as possible—although the United States is handicapped by its commitment to Israel. It is only the weakness of the Arab states that has enabled the United States to pursue the contradictory objectives of Israeli and Arab friendship for this long.

GIVEN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, how valid is the faith of those quoted above in the value of the U.S.-Israeli alliance? There are profound benefits in the relationship for the state of Israel. Indeed, without U.S. support, Israel would neither have come into existence nor survived to the present day. U.S. financial aid has preserved an artificial prosperity in a country whose economy is running heavily into debt. U.S. arms supplies have made Israel the pre-eminent military power in the region. As for the benefits that accrue to the United States through this association, Israel, although embattled and encumbered with debt, is a dynamic, progressive state, at the forefront of cultural and scientific achievement. It has a formidable armaments industry and its military forces may well be the fourth strongest in the world. But how—and whether—those forces might be used to benefit the interests of the United States is uncertain.

In terms of U.S. regional interests, supporters of alliance with Israel note how the threat of Israeli air intervention led Syria to abandon its foray into Jordan in September 1970. The citation is valid, but the inference they draw is undermined by the fact that Israel uses its military power to serve its own interests, whether or not they coincide with ours.

The invasion of Lebanon, for example, did serious damage to the U.S. position in the Arab world—and demonstrated that Israel, for all its military might, is powerless to impose any political system contrary to the wishes of the local inhabitants. The late Moshe Dayan once made a public statement that hinted at the possibility that Israeli troops might be available if needed to ensure western access to Persian Gulf oil, but it is difficult to envisage any such intervention that would not cause more political and human damage than it would be worth.

Nor does Israel seem to have had any restraining influence on those Arabs who sought arms and training from the Soviet Union. The 1972 expulsion of Soviet personnel from Egypt was the independent action of Anwar Sadat. Today, Syria accepts Soviet aid without any visible concern for Israeli objections.

As for U.S. global interests, significant Israeli military assistance in a conflict against the U.S.S.R. is hard to visualize. If the United States and the Soviet Union ever go to war, the Israeli contribution will be a footnote. Proponents of alliance are left with Israel's intelligence contribution in time of U.S.-Soviet peace. Information in the public domain concerning

the Israeli capture of Soviet-made equipment suggests that the United States has been able to acquire valuable but not crucial data on specifications and performance.

The public statements of successive U.S. administrations have suggested a belief that Israel is more likely to be conciliatory when its security is assured by U.S. material aid or political guarantees. There is negligible evidence to support this theory. In 37 years of Arab-Israeli war, Israel has made only three substantial concessions to the Arab side, and all were the direct result of some form of coercion. In 1957, Israel relinquished control of Sinai and Gaza, reportedly under threat by Eisenhower to suspend U.S. aid. On September 17, 1978, Israel accepted the Camp David agreement, under which it gave Sinai back to Egypt for a second time in return for increased U.S. aid and, much more important, the Israeli government inferred that the accords had tacitly awarded Israel a free hand in Gaza and the West Bank. And, in August 1983, to reduce the continuing loss of money and lives in Lebanon, Israel began a process of disengagement which is still underway.

Noting Israel's demonstrated propensity for intervening in its neighbors affairs, its supporters have cast it in the role of regional policeman. Such interventions are not just a dubious advantage; they are in fact a major disadvantage for the United States. Indeed, the United States, as Israel's patron, has paid a price that is high by any standard and, in the opinion of this writer, prohibitive.

The most direct form of damage has been that done to U.S.-Arab relations. Every U.S. initiative for political, economic, or military cooperation with Arab states has been inhibited, if not crippled, by Arab disapproval of American support for Israel. Although the Palestinian problem is central to the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the PLO is generally recognized as the most representative Palestinian organization, Israel has prevailed on the United States not only to withhold recognition of the organization but even to forbid conversations with its officers. The Carter administration, whose soundness of analysis was periodically vitiated by cravenness of execution, dismissed Andrew Young, U.S. representative to the United Nations, in August 1979 because he violated Kissinger's promise to Israel not to deal directly with the PLO.

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon devastated a friendship between Americans and Lebanese Arabs that had endured ever since U.S. missionaries set up schools there in the late 1800s. In the judgment of *New York Times* columnist Anthony Lewis, the Israeli attempt to remake Lebanese politics by force was "a recipe for disaster." Both Israel and the United States have shared in the consequences of this disaster.

The closeness of the United States to Israel has also damaged its relations with the Western Europeans. Because the U.S. allies are more dependent on Arab oil and less wedded to Israel, they have distanced themselves from U.S. policy. The United States and Israel often vote alone in the United Nations. In a September 1979 issue, *Time* magazine observed that one effect of Israel's "scorched-earth" attacks against PLO installations in southern Lebanon was to drive the European countries closer to the Arab side and farther from the United States. Tom Wicker wrote in the *New York Times* in September 1982 that the Israeli invasion of Lebanon "was timed, purposely or not, to embarrass Mr. Reagan during his European tour."

THE UNITED STATES, by supporting Israel, has come to be seen—at least by some governments—as supporting Israeli policies which are at times in direct conflict with policies otherwise promoted by the United States. In recent years, for instance, Israel has secretly flown military supplies to the Khomeini regime in Iran as a means of weakening Iraq. This action is in conflict with the U.S. interest in reducing Iranian pressure on Iraq.

In another example, although the United States is committed to restricting the number of nuclear powers, most authorities agree that Israel has developed a nuclear weapon to use as a last resort against Arab encroachment. Israel began to build a secret nuclear fuel plant in 1957 with French help and, according to several press sources, colluded in the smuggling of U.S. government-owned uranium from Apollo, Pennsylvania, in 1963. Furthermore, the *Christian Science Monitor* of June 6, 1983, reported that there are strong grounds for suspecting Israeli collaboration with South Africa in the development of nuclear weapons. If this collaboration is in fact real, it would be an obvious violation of the 1977 U.S. arms embargo against South Africa.

The United States has also found it difficult to distance itself from the Israeli position on Middle East peace efforts, even though the two countries have quite different views. Washington has always pursued a settlement based on diplomacy and compromise, but Israel has pursued one based on its own military superiority. This strategy has on occasion required the use of weapons in violation of U.S. conditions, as when American-made cluster bombs were used in the invasion of Lebanon. It has also committed Israel to taking pre-emptive military action against any clear or even putative threat to that superiority. Even if one stipulates that the Israeli air attack on an Iraqi nuclear site in June 1981 was tactically sound and legally defensible, how can Israel or any other country survive on the tenuous premise of perpetual military predominance? Surely no state in the nuclear age can responsibly endorse the Israeli principle of "assertive disarmament."

To sustain its pro-Israeli policy, the United States has had to channel about a quarter of its foreign aid to Israel, and almost as much to Egypt, to keep it on the Camp David track. At the same time, increasing numbers of U.S. citizens have suffered injury and death in the Middle East. A few Americans of Palestinian origin have been sentenced by Israeli courts for membership in Palestinian organizations, even though such membership has not been illegal in the United States. Hundreds of Americans have been wounded or killed in terrorist operations carried out by Arab opponents of U.S. policy. During the June 1967 Israeli attack on the U.S.S. *Liberty*, 171 were wounded and 34 died. That action was probably motivated by Israeli determination to hide its war plans

from Washington. The implications of the attack on the *Liberty*, like those of the 1954 Israeli fire-bombing of USIA installations in Egypt, were muffled in the U.S. media in part because of dependency of U.S. policy on the alliance with Israel.

The close American association with Israel has also threatened a much more important relationship—that between the United States and the Soviet Union. Historians look back on World War I as a tragic case of the great powers' being dragged into war by inadvertence, as a consequence of injudicious alliances with smaller states. There is no reassuring evidence that the United States and the Soviet Union are keeping this lesson in mind when they deal with the Middle East. One is driven by its commitment to Israel, the other by its traditional paranoia against great-power activities along its borders. The risk of superpower confrontation is illustrated by a report by *New York Times* military correspondent, Drew Middleton, in April 1983 that the installation in Syria of SA-5 missile sites operated by the Soviet Air Defense Force and guarded by Soviet troops had given the U.S.S.R. the capability to engage aircraft of the Sixth Fleet should an Arab-Israeli war develop into a conflict involving the United States.

Reporter Don Kirk wrote in *USA Today* in May 1983 that, according to diplomatic sources in Washington, the United States and the U.S.S.R. were veering toward their worst confrontation since the Arab-Israeli war of 1973. Kirk reported that the Kremlin's need for power in the Middle East was driving it to attempt to torpedo the U.S.-sponsored Lebanese-Israeli withdrawal agreement of May 17. This article and contemporary statements by Reagan administration officials overlooked the fact that the agreement—since abandoned—accorded Israel privileges in Lebanon that were considered a derogation of Lebanese sovereignty by Syria and by significant elements in the Lebanese government.

THERE HAS BEEN a dangerous tendency in U.S. policy to equate unwelcome events with Soviet machinations. Those who adhere to the devil theory of Soviet behavior overlook elemental geography when decrying Soviet designs on the region: The Middle East is the U.S.S.R.'s Caribbean. Syrian and Soviet territory are 200 miles apart, not much more than the distance from Florida to Cuba. Jerusalem is only 750 miles away—the distance from Miami to Haiti. Even if the United States continues to deny the Soviets hegemony over any segment of the region, it must accept that they bear the same proprietary attitude toward the area as the United States assumes toward its own neighbors.

The Soviets undeniably seek in their ponderous way to exploit the Middle East's turmoil, but the root cause of the unrest is indigenous: social discord, economic underdevelopment, and the post-colonial power vacuum in which conflicts like that between the Arabs and Israel can fester. Military action by Israel or the United States against so-called Soviet clients, like the Lebanese Muslims shelled by the Sixth Fleet in 1983, is a futile and ludicrous effort to turn back historic tides. The only sensible policy is to work with the restive elements themselves toward redressing their profound and legitimate economic and political grievances. Warnings of Soviet treachery are misleading, perhaps dangerously so, for they avoid the central reality: In the nuclear age, the Americans and the Soviets must get along with each other whether they like it or not.

As pointed out earlier, Israel could not do much for the United States in case of a war against the U.S.S.R. It could, however, do a great deal to get us into such a war in the first place. Indeed, one could argue that Israel's interests are not served—at least in the short term—by cordial U.S.-Soviet relations. The U.S.S.R. gave diplomatic support to the founding of Israel, and Czech arms helped Israel win its war of independence. In more recent years, however, the Soviets have emerged as the major suppliers of military equipment and technology to Israel's adversaries and have placed heavy restraints on the emigration of Soviet Jews. These factors alone are sufficient to have prejudiced Israel against Moscow.

Apart from its own views of the Soviet Union, however, Israel has a more crucial interest in obstructing Soviet-U.S. detente by magnifying Soviet subversion of U.S. interests in the Middle East and the Israeli role in resisting that subversion. When the United States is preoccupied with the Soviets, it has less time to monitor Israeli activities and less political capital to expend on keeping them in line. Whether by coincidence or design, the tripartite invasion of the Suez Canal Zone came when U.S. attention was focused on the Hungarian crisis, and Israel's de facto annexation of Golan in December 1981 was overshadowed by the crisis in Poland.

Conversely, any progress toward U.S.-Soviet detente carries with it the possibility of an imposed settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute—a consummation devoutly opposed by Israel because, as the stronger party, it would presumably have the most to lose. Supporters of Israel have consistently resisted any suggestion of Soviet participation in Middle East peace efforts, and they reacted vehemently against the joint U.S.-Soviet communique of October 1977, which endorsed "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people." The communique was abandoned within days by the United States under pressure from Israel.

Ever since 1948, the United States has been torn between its strategic interest in building ties with the Arabs and its domestic political interest in supporting Israel. In general, the politicians have won out over the strategists, and the long-term result has been the expansion of Israeli territory, the decline of U.S.-Arab relations, and added tension in U.S.-Soviet relations. At this ultimate level, American and Israeli interests are in diametric collision.

For Israel, the alliance with the United States is a matter of survival. For the United States, it is an increasingly dangerous encumbrance. After 37 years, the United States is politically incapable of openly repudiating it. Whether it slowly erodes under the attrition of U.S. strategic imperatives, or precipitates a Soviet-U.S. confrontation, or Israel itself changes character over the years, these are contingencies beyond the human power of prophecy. □

The Real Intelligence Failure

Policymakers treat information in a variety of ways, not all of them respectful of its value or integrity

John Horton

When policymakers set out to plot a strategy or critique a policy, intelligence information is one of the tools they use. But the effect of intelligence on their decisions will depend on their willingness to defer to its implications—and interested parties will be pressing attractively argued alternatives. Other factors will also lead a decision-maker to give more or less weight to intelligence: whether the information is congenial or not; whether it is new and exciting or a humdrum repetition of tiresome views; whether the messenger bringing the news is liked or distrusted; and how the information is packaged. Appearances—which may be comparatively frivolous—may outshine the information itself and affect judgments on its value. Or, the policymaker may see past these images to the information and carefully examine its value to his decisions.

The intelligence community—the CIA, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, and others—exists, first, so that the president and the administration will not be surprised. Beyond that, intelligence has the finer role of enlightening policy. The most sophisticated use of what we know—or what we think we know—is to throw light on the future, to spot opportunities for the United States, to point out perils.

The late scholar Hans Morgenthau once warned us that "the first lesson which the student of international politics must learn and never forget is that the complexities of international affairs make simple solutions and trustworthy prophecies impossible. It is here that the scholar and the charlatan part company." Collecting and analyzing information—indeed, any link in the intelligence chain—provides many opportunities for charlatanship. Morgenthau was right in warning us against trusting easy assumptions about the future, but the attempt to define current reality must also be approached with modesty. The purveyor of intelligence must consciously work to present that reality in an intellectually limpid form, clear in expression and free from the impurities of emotion and ideology.

Of course, the intelligence community is not perfect. When the United States is taken by surprise or a policy is viewed as not working, an intelligence failure (not always further defined) is frequently cited as the cause. Some of these are genuine shortcomings of the process of information collection and analysis. Some of them are understandable, if not excusable, and some of them not.

Terrorist threats, for example, are difficult for anyone to predict. We know that diplomats and certain other individuals are especially vulnerable, and under certain circumstances—when dealing with a particular group or approaching a special date—we can gird ourselves for an attack. Even then, however, control of time and place, along with ruthlessness, gives the advantage to the terrorist. A professional intelligence officer may be dismayed by the failure to predict or to prevent an attack; there is a practical limit to what intelligence can do in this area. Even as we work to avoid this kind of failure, we must become inured to surprise.

There are other kinds of intelligence failures—failures in perception and judgment—and quite a few were apparent in the invasion of the Falkland Islands (Las Malvinas) by Argentina. These failures were shared by all: the British were surprised. The Argentines miscalculated the state of British pluck (not the first time that mistake had been made). The U.S. intelligence community had indications that the Argentines were talking about making this perennial irredentist fantasy become real, but we were surprised too. No one, we thought, could be so irrational, not even Argentine officers looking for an outlet for domestic discontent. The argument that something would be irrational will continue to confound level-headed people. It did so in 1962 when Soviet missiles were found in Cuba, and in 1973 when intelligence officers were surprised by the attack on Israel. Intelligence officers have a special responsibility to understand the volatility of passions, even though they do not share them; *especially* because they do not share them.

The Argentine failure to anticipate British reaction adequately (this seems evident from the generally poor quality of the Argentine troops put ashore in the Falklands) cannot be excused by a need for great haste, as may be the case in other even more impulsive expeditions. It was instead the result of plans being hatched in the narrow confines of a cabal within the government. Such plans are almost certain to suffer from a lack of expert advice and second opinions that

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might improve the scheme or lead to its abandonment. While the members of such a small, furtive group would not willfully draw up a poor design, they may fear that their intentions will be uncovered, or even suspect privately that there are holes in their reasoning and be ashamed should their hands be revealed. This is not just a peculiarity of the Argentines. The need for security in the U.S. government and the quite justified obsession with leaks may lead decision-makers to limit the people and agencies involved, thereby preventing good counsel and balanced assessments from being heard. This seems to have been the case in the decision to mine Nicaraguan harbors. In an article reviewing the first Reagan term [JOURNAL, October], reporter George Gedda writes, "The [Reagan] administration now looks with regret on the decision [to put mines in Nicaraguan waters]; the public reaction was almost uniformly negative and contributed to an erosion of support for overall administration policy toward Nicaragua."

SOMETIMES, HOWEVER, intelligence failures arise despite the constant attention paid to an issue. The U.S. government worried unflaggingly about Maurice Bishop, the prime minister of Grenada, because of his intimacy with the Cubans and the Soviet Union. That concern was further inflamed by the intemperate verbal attacks on the United States made by Bishop and others in his government. Nevertheless, the coup against him was a surprise. The lack of official U.S. representation on Grenada was one reason why we had no feel for the factional opposition rising against Bishop in the New Jewel Movement. A lesson to be drawn from this experience is that unless we have someone stationed in every one of these new island states, we must have a much better method of observing political developments than we had in Grenada. Our launching of an expensive expedition to Grenada in October 1983 demonstrates that we can hardly discount any one place as being of no interest. It makes arguments over which interests are vital and which are not absurdly beside the point.

Of some comfort was our realization that the Cubans had also failed to recognize how wide the rifts in the New Jewel Movement had become and so were unable to save the situation for their protege, Bishop. Of greater satisfaction was Castro's fuming suspicion that his Soviet ally was behind the coup and so contributed to Bishop's death and the invasion. Yet some hardliners in the Reagan administration—who prefer to hyphenate the Soviets and the Cubans, believing them to be a monolithic and crafty apparat—found this difficult to credit at first. They later came to accept it by comfortably shifting to the idea that "the Soviets planned the whole thing."

The U.S. experience on Grenada revealed some other intelligence problems, one being the Case of the Second Campus. We knew that the American medical students were housed in two different spots, one at True Blue, where they were liberated by our forces right away, and another at Grande Anse. These locations were marked on maps and photographs used at CIA briefings. But at a briefing on the flagship the night before the operation, the Grand Anse campus was not mentioned until a CIA officer rose to point out this omission. Despite this last-minute advice, the ground commanders later expressed surprise that there were students at Grand Anse. Once they learned this, of course, they speedily rescued them. We never could discover where the gap existed between what intelligence people knew and what troop commanders had been told. This form of mishap is commonly termed an intelligence failure but is actually a fault somewhere in the communications line, quite possibly a casualty of the haste with which the expedition was conceived and executed.

As soon as the fighting was over, another problem appeared, this time over the number of Cubans on the island. The Cuban construction workers captured by our forces gave conflicting and—some of us thought—exaggerated totals for the number of Cubans on the island. Quick counts of prisoners left the U.S. forces with the uneasy feeling that by no means all of the Cubans had been detained and that they were still a threat. We knew the size of the Grenadian armed forces and militia and realized that few of these had been captured. The Sunday after the invasion, members of the intelligence community found themselves sitting around a table in Washington, assigned with the task of arriving at a meaningful number. We counted Cubans and Grenadians, added and subtracted, and finally concluded that no one remained in the hills.

We found out later that we had been a bit off in our first pre-invasion estimates of Cuban strength, but not seriously so, and our long distance assessment turned out to be correct. The early exaggerations of Cuban troop numbers appear to have been based on those first interviews of prisoners, an overestimate by green troops of the opposition's size, folklore about Cubans in the Sierra Madre, Castro's vainglorious orders that his people should die fighting, and an understandable desire of the field commanders to be sure they had completed their assignment. For a while there were mutterings of another "intelligence failure," but that complaint was soon withdrawn. Eventually, Castro made public his inventory of Cubans in Grenada, plus killed, wounded, and missing. Even then, however, one diehard Cuba-basher in Washington would not accept our assessment: "Castro lies, you know," he commented.

When we distributed the assessment early Monday morning, it ran into some difficulties. I had thought the intelligence community had done a pretty good job, but clearly, in the view of at least some officials, it had a serious fault. That Monday a person with some responsibility in the community, although not himself an intelligence officer, asked to read the assessment. Later, I asked him what he thought of it. I was speechless when he said, "I think it stinks." Knowing him to be close to CIA Director William Casey, I went to see Casey as soon as I could. He was less abrupt, merely finding it "unimaginative." To this day, I cannot be sure why it met with such disapproval among these officials when others, then and later, found it acceptable. In fact, some weeks later a military intelligence officer who had been involved in the operation told us he had found the



Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, seen with Joint Chiefs Chairman John Vessey, points to map of Grenada during operation. Grande Anse campus is marked on the map, but mention of it was almost omitted during military briefing on flagship.

assessment especially useful—he had been saying exactly the same thing but had not been believed until the word came down from Washington.

I CAN ONLY SUPPOSE that the assessment was "unimaginative" because of what it did not say. For example, we could have said that the Cuban construction workers were actually combat troops in disguise, or that the arms found in Grenada were destined to be used to overthrow friendly governments elsewhere in the Caribbean, or that the airfield was not for tourism but for Soviet reconnaissance aircraft. I won't argue the merits of those points; clearly the Soviets and Cubans, either together or separately, would have made the New Jewel Movement a pawn for their adventures in the English-speaking Caribbean. But this instance does demonstrate the gap that currently exists between those who are already sure of what the world looks like and those charged with describing it in an accurate and neutral fashion.

In situations of the sort described above, we may so oversimplify the conflicts involved that we pillory those who disagree with us and exaggerate the virtues of our supporters. Zeal—that emotional investment in a point of view or in a particular strategy—can lead one to shut oneself off from other views, even to ignore obvious information. This probably happens to intelligence officers as much as to policymakers. In October 1984, El Salvador provided an example of passion leading people in our government to overlook an important development in a key area. To the apparent surprise of the U.S. government, President Jose Napoleon Duarte began peace talks with the guerrillas attempting to overthrow his government. The popular desire for peace in El Salvador is well known, as is the Christian Democrats' appreciation of this.

The peace talks had been preceded earlier the same month by an exchange of prisoners between the government and the rebels, which was arranged with the assistance of then Senator Paul Tsongas (D.-Massachusetts). Nevertheless, the Reagan administration seems to have been surprised by Duarte's initiative. According to the *Washington Post,* a congressional source said, "The White House...is so fanatically obsessed with Nicaragua, the Sandinistas, and maintaining the covert war there, they didn't even pay any attention to it." This leads one to believe that Duarte did not consult the administration beforehand but assumed that it would be distressed by his even talking to the guerrillas.

The administration deserves full credit for supporting Duarte and the Christian Democrats in El Salvador against those who would seize power by force and for opposing the Sandinistas' attempts to impose another shabby dictatorship on Nicaragua. Yet, at the same time, the drivers of policy have closed their minds—and have tried to close the minds of others—to alternative ways of reaching solutions in Central America. Even after Grenada, when Nicaragua seemed weak and fearful, when Castro himself had gone pale and stopped his blustering, diplomacy was seen merely as a clever form of pressure and was not used as a means of exploring possible solutions.

This administration considers agreements with Marxist-Leninists to be risky—as indeed they are—but it also finds them too distasteful and inconsistent with its own tough posturing to be a serious option. The administration did not simply fail to give sufficient hearing to a diplomatic strategy; it ideologically shackled its imagination and so was not free to use the informed pragmatism that enables a skilled diplomat to probe for solutions. This goes beyond a mere appreciation of intelligence, but involves the willingness to grasp opportunity and the sense of timing of inspired statemanship.

If an intelligence officer fears that a policymaker will bend assessments until they support policy, a different but also serious peril is that the intelligence officer will try to avoid this by climbing into an ivory tower and pulling his or her own preconceptions in afterwards. Rather, such officers must mix with the policymakers, understand their concerns, and go out into the world where policy is being carried out. Only then can the analyst be sure he or she knows what the problems are. For just this reason, estimates and assessments are shown in draft to the relevant ambassador and staff, to military commanders, and to other intelligence people for comments. This reduces the risk that the study will be irrelevant or address the wrong point. However, neither the ambassador nor the commander is permitted to change the judgments, either to protect themselves or their ambitions. There is a fine line here, and it is easy to drift across it without noticing that the intelligence process is being compromised.

For instance, one confidential study prepared by a military analyst last year contained a discussion of the Salvadoran armed forces' weaknesses. As the result of protests, the study was considerably rewritten. The objections came not from other qualified analysts, but from a senior Defense Department officer who was heavily involved in supporting the armed forces of El Salvador. Not an intelligence failure in itself, this action did erect a flimsy structure that can collapse in just such a flop. It is safer to let a controversial analysis be published and be sure that the vital questions are examined than to suppress discussion because someone is afraid that a pet program may be questioned.

Intelligence assessments should be written by those familiar with an area, and that expertise should not be suppressed. The advantage of familiarity is that one can peer beneath the superficial to find the essential. An example is provided again by the Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Many of our hemispheric neighbors spoke out against the United States for backing Britain instead of Argentina—even for referring to the islands as the Falklands instead of Las Malvinas, as the Argentines insist. Some elements in the U.S. administration wanted us to side with the Argentines, fearing that we would lose credit in the Americas by seeming to back British imperialism rather than an apparently American cause.

But the Argentines—especially the military government—were not as popular as the initial groundswell seemed to show. The outburst of support for them against the British was not universal in Latin

America, and many who formally backed the Argentines held their noses while doing so. Some of those who supported Argentina most solidly did so out of self-interest—the Americas are seething with old grudges over border problems, and many countries maintain irredentist ambitions. Even Honduras and El Salvador, who face similar Cuban-sponsored dissident movements, have found their cooperation hampered by disputes over pockets of border land.

Some Latin countries, however, agreed with our stand on the Falklands but did not say so publicly. This is part of a common but annoying pattern in Latin politics that is well understood by anyone who has dealt with the region. Americans who oppose a particular U.S. policy in Latin America will triumphantly point out that this or that government to the south has attacked the policy. But this is misleading, for not infrequently, the leader of that government has only recently assured Washington that he agrees entirely with what the United States is doing. At the same time, however, he cautions, "Of course, you understand I can't come right out and say so, you know." The maintenance of genteel relations with that government requires that Washington remain mum about those assurances.

ONE SHOULD DISTINGUISH between such superficial opposition to U.S. policies and actual disagreement. The analyst may sometimes find it helpful to fold some history into his assessment to make the point clear. The example of Mexican opposition to U.S. policy toward Nicaragua illustrates both this type of situation and the impatience with which administration hard-liners greet lessons from the history books. Mexico has consistently followed a policy of nonintervention in international affairs, coupled with a stand in favor of self-determination. As the reader has undoubtedly guessed, the principles stem from past experiences with the United States. A Mexican president who violates these principles in order to support the United States would find himself in an indefensible situation before the Mexican public. Mexico's past support of the Sandinistas and lack of backing for the Salvadoran government (it has lent some support to the guerrillas) rest on these two principles, particularly on opposition to U.S. intervention in Latin America.

In the face of this history, a reasonable U.S. reaction would be to accept Mexican policy for what it is and concentrate on those actions in the region that are most inimical to us. (In fact, Mexico, for its own reasons, has considerably modified its enthusiasm for the two factions we oppose.) Yet some officials in the U.S. government have been so annoyed at Mexico that they have brushed aside not only history lessons but those who would remind them of the complex and vitally important nature of relations with our southern neighbor.

Sober good judgment at the State Department, from the top right down through the ranks, has headed off any damage that might have resulted from active resentment and clumsy attempts to make Mexico change its policies—attempts that might actually harm that country's struggle for economic recovery, which is itself vital for U.S. interests.

It would be unfair and inaccurate to leave the impression that this administration is impervious to the contents of intelligence or that it habitually resists the advice of Foreign Service officers. Career people expect a new administration to have its own set of prejudices and biases, some of which they may share. This administration is trying to make up for what it believes has been past neglect of Soviet and Cuban influence in the Americas. While it asks East-West questions, another administration may ask North-South questions. The career officer can object only when the answers are required to fit the questioner's fancy.

Our intelligence is generally good enough. We know the problems each country faces: the difficulties caused by capital flows out of the region, for instance, or the threat of overpopulation. Our government can use more perceptive reports by curious-minded officers who, impatient with easy and trendy answers, can provide insights and speculations about the future, about individual countries and transnational movements, and about opportunities and perils.

In recent years, there has been a tendency for politicians to run against Washington and the federal government. This was done by both Presidents Carter and Reagan with astonishing success, considering that the government is supposed to be representative of the people. They also ran against the so-called establishment. The very word establishment causes indignation in some hearts. In these two campaigns it was intended as a slur on those who had gone before and now were presumably out of touch with the tides of history or had been willing to give away too much. To the extent that those who used these arguments came to believe them, the naivete in their attacks on the work of others revealed an ignorance about the severity of the world's problems. In their arrogance they overestimated their own talents.

One attempt to get informed advice on government policy was the establishment of the Kissinger commission to deliberate on Central America. A number of the commission's members, along with consultants and witnesses, were indeed among those who would be on anyone's list of the foreign affairs establishment. In appointing the group, the administration also hoped to get domestic support for what it would like to have accepted as its policy. It did not fully succeed in that, nor did it put all the advice of the commission into effect. But we should not decry either imperfect motives or imperfect results—good minds and serious people were brought together to consider a troublesome problem. The establishment proved itself useful.

If we cut ourselves off from the advice and help of those who have trod these same paths before, we will waste time wandering in well-mapped ideological thickets and falling into easy traps. Short on background, we will value zeal more than we do experience and cleverness more than wisdom. Rather than abhorring establishments, we should try to build them, not merely so they will endorse our actions or so we can achieve bipartisan agreements, but so our judgments will be enlightened by the counsel of weathered and disinterested minds. □



Smoke pours from stricken HMS Sheffield *after hit by Exocet missile off Falkland Islands. The Argentines underestimated British pluck, but the United States ignored indications that the junta would take what was thought to be an irrational action.*

The Decline of Dissent

Decreasing use of the dissent channel is symptomatic of an atmosphere in which noncomformist views are unwelcome and ignored

Kai Bird

When the assistant secretary of state for international organizations recently put into effect a new budgetary policy for U.S. contributions to the United Nations, he probably did not expect it to be challenged. Gregory Newell was acting in accord with President Reagan's legendary distrust of the world body when he decided that any proposal made by a U.N. agency for new expenditures should be opposed by the U.S. government. This policy, however, was not universally accepted, and some Foreign Service officers shared in the misgivings. One FSO posted in Geneva filed a cable through the dissent channel, protesting that the assistant secretary's rigid budgetary policy was often counterproductive. For instance, if a proposal came before a U.N. agency to study the status of human rights in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, the Geneva delegation would have no choice but to oppose the measure, even though the Reagan administration would not be adverse to embarrassing the Soviets with a critical U.N. report. The officer suggested that decisions on whether to vote for new expenditures should be made by the delegation at each of the agencies.

This was hardly a momentous issue, but the cable itself was significant for being one of the few sent through the dissent channel in recent years that received serious consideration in the secretary of state's office. Newell objected strenuously to the dissent, while Elliot Abrams, assistant secretary for humanitarian affairs, favored its message. The matter was referred to the under secretary for political affairs at the time, Lawrence Eagleburger, and the deputy secretary, Kenneth Dam. The issue was resolved with a compromise: Newell's ironclad prohibition against voting for any new budgetary items was upheld—with one exception. In the future, the ambassador to the United Nations will have the right to instruct a U.S. delegation to vote in favor of a budgetary item.

This cable was one of six formal dissents filed in 1984, and only five were filed the previous year. Since the special channel was established in 1971, there have been 123 dissents. A record 28 were filed in 1977 under the Carter administration, which everyone agrees encouraged—or at least did not discourage—use of the channel. Today, many officers flatly state that they fear using the dissent mechanism. Some, however, argue that the decline in the number of messages is not significant; it merely reflects the growing acceptance of Reagan administration policies. The figures bear this out, but the Carter administration numbers are so much higher overall that one can counter that the channel has been and can be used more frequently, given the right atmosphere.

Fourteen years after its establishment, the dissent channel seems to be dying. Yet it was started as—and in theory still remains—a means of ensuring that Foreign Service employees who disagree with the administration's views have an opportunity to present their analyses to the highest policymaking level in the State Department. The benefits of such a mechanism go beyond simply allowing employees to vent their concerns regarding official policies. The channel also provides an opportunity for decisionmakers to evaluate and perhaps revise their policy in light of new—or at least nonconformist—information and arguments. It lessens the risk that policy will be decided without the benefit of information that contradicts accepted doctrine or that comes from posts abroad. In reality, the dissent channel has rarely had any obvious impact on policy, but because of its mere existence, that possibility remains.

Some, of course, believe that this decline in the use of the dissent channel is a healthy sign. According to Alfred Atherton, who responded to written questions on this matter while director general of the Foreign Service, "It is possible that the decline in the use of the dissent channel you have cited represents the success of the system...rather than a deliberate effort to squelch differing views." He argues that alternative views are expressed in ways other than cables. "Policy option papers by and large are prepared in Washington, and many views are factored into both the documents themselves and the discussions that precede and follow the actual drafting. Viewing dissent channel cables as the sole measure of debate in the department...represents a misunderstanding of the system."

Others, however, are less sanguine about the situation. To many FSOs, especially those in the lower and middle ranks who have little other access to the State Department's seventh floor, the channel is one important symbol of their professionalism. In theory, if not in practice, it is the last-ditch repository of the Foreign Service officer's integrity. When senior officers are reluctant to forward the results of honest reporting

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because it contains politically unwelcome news or opinions with which they disagree, the dissent channel at least offers a means of reaching the decision-makers.

During 1984, a group of active and retired FSOs concerned about the channel came together under the auspices of the Open Forum chairman and formed the Sages' Group. They were especially worried about the fact that policy is rarely initiated or even affected by the knowledgeable diplomat well-versed in a particular country's political and cultural characteristics. What the officer in the field believes is very often simply not part of the policy debate in Washington. In such a system, the dissent channel should provide a means for the expert to advise the decision-makers when politically motivated policies formulated in Washington are inconsistent with the realities on the ground. The dissent channel might have done much to prevent some foreign policy misadventures that were primarily motivated by crude domestic politicking. But it never did have much impact, and its future right now looks grim.

Fourteen years after its establishment, the dissent channel seems to be dying. Yet it was started as—and in theory remains—a means of ensuring that alternative ideas reach the highest levels

SOON AFTER THE DISSENT CHANNEL was established in November 1971, the *New York Times* ran a story suggesting that its main purpose was to curb leaks to the press from within the department. Earlier disagreements within State had become public and caused the administration considerable embarrassment. Only a year before, on the eve of President Nixon's decision to invade Cambodia, 50 junior FSOs signed a letter protesting the imminent invasion and sent it to Secretary of State William Rogers. Copies of the letter reached the press, and, according to then Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Nixon furiously demanded that the officers involved be fired [JOURNAL, September]. (Johnson says he put the president off.)

Then, in the spring of 1971, as hundreds of thousands of East Pakistani (now Bangladeshi) civilians were being butchered by the Pakistani army, Archer Blood, the consul general in Dacca, wrote a blistering cable protesting what would become known as the Nixon-Kissinger "tilt" policy toward Pakistan. When the cable arrived in Washington, officers in the department began to add their names to the document. Blood was quickly removed from East Pakistan and given an inconsequential assignment in personnel—ironically, counseling other officers on their careers. A few months later someone leaked a massive batch of top secret documents on the policy of tilting toward Pakistan to columnist Jack Anderson. Dissent was clearly getting out of hand.

Once the new channel was established, however, it was initially used by very few officers—none in 1971 and only four in 1972. The first dissent cable was filed by Jack Perry, protesting the resumption of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in April 1972, on the eve of the Nixon-Brezhnev summit. Perry's arguments had no impact on Nixon and Kissinger's Vietnam policy.

The apparent ineffectiveness of Perry's dissent was to become a pattern for future dissents. Although the officers who write such cables undoubtedly hope that their arguments will influence or change policy, the history of the dissent channel shows that such a result is very uncommon. Indeed, Henry Kissinger, once he was secretary of state, seemed to confirm that the channel was intended primarily as a vehicle for allowing FSOs to blow off steam, not as a way of challenging policy. In remarks made in October 1973, he acknowledged the importance of dissenting views but stressed, "I expect that all officers in the Foreign Service and the department will keep dissenting views in the channels provided for. We cannot operate the government or the department if dissent is taken to the press." That the essential purpose of the dissent channel has in fact been to allow FSOs to voice their disagreement rather than to influence policy is demonstrated by the experience of those cables that, after dozens of interviews during the last six months, can be described.

After a fairly quiet beginning, the dissent channel became more active in 1974. Sometime during the upheavals that year in Nicosia, Cyprus, in which the CIA was involved in a coup, Thomas Boyatt filed a dissent cable protesting Kissinger's interventionist policy. Within days, Boyatt was removed from his position as director of the Office of Cypriot Affairs. His dissent cable was not answered for five months, and even then, the response was merely an acknowledgement of receipt. (The system nevertheless took care of Boyatt; after Kissinger left the department, he would make the ambassadorial grade.) During the same year, an FSO posted in Italy filed a dissent that argued against the ambassador's assessment that the Communist Party could not possibly register gains in the upcoming election. The Italian left scored a surprising upset and the young officer looked good.

In early 1975, one senior FSO in the United Arab Emirates was outraged to learn that Washington had decided to renew formal diplomatic relations with Sudan, where only three years before Ambassador Cleo Noel and his Deputy Chief of Mission, George

C. Moore, were assassinated. The officer, who had worked with Moore, quickly drafted a cable for regular channels and presented it to his ambassador, Michael Sterner, for his approval. Sterner, however, thought the message inappropriate for regular channels and suggested that he file it through the dissent channel. The cable was sent, but policy did not change, and the dissenting officer later received what Sterner calls a "typically mealy-mouthed response."

Other dissent cables filed over the years include:
—a provocative critique of the Camp David accords written by a Middle East specialist serving as a political officer in Cairo. One retired officer called it a "well-reasoned" cable which has stood up to events;
—a report in the late 1970s arguing that U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf was militarizing the region;
—a cable from Panama suggesting that the danger to American travelers on the Pan American highway was so serious that warning signs ought to be posted (they were);
—a warning from an officer in a consulate in Poland predicting that martial law was about to be imposed. (The cable never received an answer because shortly afterwards General Jaruzelski made his move. "What was the department going to do," says an officer familiar with the case, "pat the guy on the back and say, 'You were right'?");
—several cables from a political officer in the Bonn embassy criticizing Washington's handling of U.S.-German relations;
—a criticism of pending congressional legislation designed to bar aid to "unfriendly" developing countries, among them Vietnam. The officer pointed out that, if passed, the law would force the United States to renege on one of its formal treaty commitments;
—another cable from an officer stationed in Warsaw that was critical of the Reagan administration's handling of economic sanctions against Poland.

With the exception of the cable from Panama suggesting that the Pan American Highway be posted as dangerous, none of these dissents actually changed policy. One substantive dissent that came very close to doing so occurred during the Carter administration. Some junior officers in the U.S. mission to the United Nations drafted a cable that argued against the decision to vote for the seating of the Khmer Rouge delegation. Donald McHenry, who would become our ambassador to the the United Nations in the wake of Andrew Young's resignation, says he disagreed with the dissent but thought the drafters had a reasonable argument that was worthy of serious consideration. He advised them how to make their arguments more effective in a redraft of the message, which impressed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance enough to change his mind. "It took some real arguing," says one FSO, "to get the secretary back on track. The honchos in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs really had to put on the pressure before Vance came back on board. I personally thought the bureau was right. To unseat the Khmer Rouge, as awful as they are, would alienate our ASEAN friends and reward Vietnamese aggression." Another FSO, working at the time as an aide to Richard Holbrooke, the assistant secretary for East Asian affairs, says he supported the dissent. "I thought that in the long term we would be better off distancing ourselves from the Khmer Rouge. Holbrooke saw it differently."

PRECISELY BECAUSE FEW DISSENT CABLES have ever achieved the author's aim of influencing policy, use of the dissent channel is considered a desperate last resort. Most officers want to be known as team players and believe their careers will suffer if they become stigmatized as a "dissenter." In theory, of course, use of the channel should not have any affect on a career. The reality, however, can be quite different, as the case of Arthur W. Purcell demonstrates. In 1977, he filed perhaps a dozen dissent cables while labor officer in Melbourne, Australia. Eventually his case went before the Foreign Service Grievance Board, and its November 1978 report demonstrates just how vulnerable the lone dissenter can be.

In July 1976, Purcell was asked by his ambassador, James W. Hargrove, a political appointee, to address the country team on the labor situation in Australia. Eight months before, the Australian Labour Party had been unseated by the governor-general in a controversial move that has since elicited suggestions of external intervention. U.S. strategic interests were viewed as threatened by the party's hints that it might throw the United States out of its Pine Gap listening post in northern Australia. Purcell told the country team that, in his opinion, the "industrial relations performance of the government had been quite poor" since the Liberal Party had taken power, and that "the communist tail was not wagging the trade union dog in Australia." Purcell says his presentation was "frostily" received because his colleagues disputed his assessment, particularly on the issue of communist influence in the trade union movement.

In January 1977, Purcell submitted his annual labor report, but Hargrove delayed for more than a month before finally forwarding it to Washington. The ambassador also attached a cover note disavowing the analysis, calling it "tendentious and, in some instances, factually erroneous." The embassy also took the unheard of action of preparing its own annual labor report. When Purcell discovered that the embassy was not forwarding his report, he began filing his cables on the labor situation through the dissent channel. In response, Hargrove informed the State Department that Purcell had "expressed a reluctance to pursue the political objectives of the mission, [and] he certainly does not represent the mission's views of what is happening on the labor scene in Australia." The ambassador also tried to argue that Purcell's use of the dissent channel was improper.

That spring, Purcell received his first efficiency rating for his 14 months of service in Australia. Not surprisingly, it was the lowest he had ever been given. He filed another dissent cable, protesting that he was being penalized for his original use of the channel for transmittal of his labor reports. Later that year he sent a few more reports on the labor situation through the channel when the embassy refused to transmit them to Washington. He also filed a formal protest before the Grievance Board.

In the meantime, another political appointee, Philip H. Alston Jr., replaced Hargrove. After one meeting with Purcell, Alston cabled the director general of the Foreign Service and requested Purcell's transfer. Alston wrote, "I would hope that on reflection Mr. Purcell might forgo insistence on exhausting his rights under established grievance procedures."

Purcell left the Service at the end of 1977, having decided to take early retirement. But he continued to pursue his case before the Grievance Board. In late 1978, the board released its findings: it faulted Purcell for his "somewhat 'angular' personality" and said, "His qualities of independence and uncompromising integrity have been described by some supervisors as admirable and positive traits, but they have also been seen as demonstrating willful stubbornness and self-righteousness that have constituted an impediment to effective performance." Aside from this comment, however, the board upheld Purcell on all counts. It found "the grievant's use of the dissent channel entirely appropriate under the circumstances" and also concluded that Purcell had been "penalized for using the dissent channel." The board ruled that the poor efficiency ratings be expunged from his file because "the three examples given by the rating officer of the grievant's faulty judgment were considered...to reflect the rating officer's lack of understanding of the labor situation being described." Finally, the board deplored Alston's attempts to prevent Purcell from pursuing his grievance. Purcell had asked that formal letters of "reprimand" be placed in the files of the Canberra officers who had violated dissent channel regulations. On this point only, the Grievance Board balked, saying, "Neither ambassador is a career officer and neither has a performance folder in which to insert a letter of reprimand." (Though the State Department officially denied before the Grievance Board that Purcell was penalized for dissent, none of Purcell's superior officers bothered to testify.)

Without access to the classified cable traffic, it is difficult to judge whether Purcell was correct in his assessment of the Australian labor situation. The evidence of Purcell's fellow labor attaches, as recorded by the Grievance Board, seems to back up his reporting. But one can certainly conclude that regardless of the merits of his dissent, the system did not work for this officer.

PURCELL'S IS NOT an isolated case. There is the one of F. Allen "Tex" Harris, an FSO assigned to report on human rights in Argentina during 1977. Harris's reporting so antagonized his ambassador, a political appointee named Raul Castro, that he eventually had to use the dissent channel. Harris made a point of inviting the mothers of the "disappeared ones," those kidnapped and often murdered by military death squads, into his embassy office. He began writing up individual cases, and the resulting cables made Ambassador Castro's dealings with the military government all the more difficult. Like Purcell, Harris received extremely poor efficiency ratings and was not promoted again until after he was honored in 1984 with the William R. Rivkin Award, given by AFSA in recognition of his "bureaucratic courage to stand up for what was right." Further evidence that use of the dissent channel is sometimes harmful to a Foreign Service career appeared in the form of a notice sent to all employees in September 1979 by then Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher which said, "Two cases have come to my attention in which superiors actively discouraged personnel from using the dissent channel or penalized employees for having done so." Also, the Grievance Board in 1979–80 handled at least two cases involving interference with use of the channel.

None of this has encouraged officers to use the channel. "I don't know if the decline in use is a reflection of orthodoxy," says Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, "or fear of the consequences."

John Reinertson is one FSO who believes that fear of possible consequences is a major cause for the decline in use of the dissent channel. Until recently, he was the elected chairman of the State Department's Open Forum, which, among other things, is supposed to monitor the dissent channel. Open Forum was established back in 1967 as a voluntary member organization dedicated to encouraging in-house debate on foreign policy. It hosts a well-attended speaker's program and publishes a classified quarterly, *Open Forum Journal,* where alternative policy ideas are given a hearing.

Reinertson's one-year term as chairman, which ended last summer, was marked by an unprecedented bureaucratic turf fight. In a recent editorial of the *Open Forum Journal* Reinertson says that the dissent channel is "one important index of individual political integrity" within the Foreign Service. "By that index," writes Reinertson, "we are failing badly." In an interview, he said that under the Reagan administration "alternative ideas are less welcome," and "fear of expressing them is fairly pervasive."

Such outspoken views have not endeared him to everyone in the State Department. When a dissent cable arrived from Poland last year on the subject of economic sanctions, Reinertson, according to another FSO, thought the response, drafted by the then chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Stephen Bosworth, was inadequate. Open Forum operates out of the council, which is responsible for drafting the formal response to all dissent channel messages within 30 days.

Bosworth's special assistant at the time explains that, "Reinertson came in telling people his job was adversarial, that he was supposed to keep tabs on what we were doing....He then started commenting on substantive policy matters in memos directly to the secretary. The subject was the dissent cable from Poland. He had a different view of the matter and apparently did not think our reply was responsive enough. We didn't even find out about the memo he wrote to the secretary until it had already gone out....He had sent it directly to the secretary without showing it to Ambassador Bosworth, let alone clearing it with him." Reinertson says the regulations governing his duties as Open Forum chairman required him to ensure that dissent cables receive adequate replies—and that means direct access to the secretary, as well as other bureaus involved in the reply.

In theory, use of the dissent channel should not affect a career. The reality is quite different

This special assistant chalks up the dispute to "a personality clash" between Reinertson and Bosworth. Reinertson instead sees it as a fundamental difference of opinion on the role of the Open Forum in the dissent process.

The issue has not faded. The Sages' Group has drafted a set of 17 very specific proposals designed to increase the autonomy and power of the Open Forum chairman. The Sages want Open Forum taken out from under control of Policy Planning and placed directly in the secretary's office. They want a separate budget and a full-time chairman and vice-chairman with their own support staff. They believe the Open Forum chairman should have the right to sit in on the secretary's staff meetings and any other meetings throughout the department.

They have only harsh words for how the dissent channel operates currently: "One can sense a serious problem—a cynical, some would say 'realistic,' attitude that perceives the dissent channel as merely a management tool for letting the system vent bottled-up pressures...without affording these dissenting voices a real impact on policy." The Sages charge that currently neither the secretary nor the under secretary ever see dissent messages, and they want promises that these two officials will personally read and direct the replies to the messages. Finally, they want the dissent messages themselves to receive wider distribution, including publication in an abbreviated form in the *Open Forum Journal*.

When the Sages' preliminary proposals were brought before a general meeting of the Open Forum membership on June 26, Reinertson gave a speech criticizing the present system of handling dissent messages and declaring that the department has an obligation to handle dissent messages more seriously, only to be followed by the new chairman of Policy Planning, Peter Rodman, who talked of how splendidly the dissent channel was working. Significantly, Secretary Shultz, arriving late, gave a short speech echoing Kissinger's 1973 concern that dissents must not be leaked to the press.

When asked to comment on the Sages' recommendations, the then director general of the Foreign Service, Alfred Atherton, chose to respond only in writing. He said, "I think it would be premature for me to take a position on the specific recommendations at this time. In general, however, I am a strong supporter of the Open Forum, and would give sympathetic consideration to proposals which could be expected to make it more effective."

BUT OBVIOUSLY, whatever the effect of this issue on the Service, those who receive the dissent messages will be very reluctant to accept any reforms or changes that give the chairman of Open Forum, who is elected to his or her position, significant influence in the policymaking process. (Indeed, some would even question the quality of officers who choose to take a year off from their regular careers to be chairman of something as "artificial" to the policymaking game as Open Forum. The fact is, however, that quite a few past chairmen of Open Forum, including officers like William Luers and Sandra Vogelgesang, have gone on to significant achievements within the Service.) Nor, of course, will any secretary of state be inclined for institutional reasons to encourage the filing of more dissent messages.

Many officers, in fact, will argue that the Sages' efforts are misplaced, that there are other, more effective ways than the dissent channel of disseminating ideas that are not part of accepted policy. "The dissent channel is a crock," says one FSO working in the Far East bureau. "If you feel strongly enough about an issue, you go to your ambassador and you do what you must to get things changed."

Some officers argue that if you are bright and persistently argue the merits of an issue with the right facts, your reporting can over time change policy. "A single cable never makes a difference," says another officer. "But a pattern of cables can have an impact. Reggie Bartholomew's reporting from Lebanon did not get disregarded."

Yet another officer insists, "If my ambassador and his political counselor could not convince me that a cable I had drafted was off base, then it would go out. There's always a way to get your views back to Washington short of the dissent channel. Once I had a damn good cable which the political counselor decided shouldn't go out. I told him, okay, let's just send it to the ambassador as a memo for his information. I knew the ambassador would take one look at it and instruct that it be sent as a cable with his name on it. That's what happened."

Boyatt, whose 1974 dissent cable on Cyprus is well known for the trouble it caused him, nevertheless observes, "People know they'll have their inning sooner or later." In other words, if the dissent is proved out by later events, the officer will also be vindicated. Boyatt is one of the few ambassadors who routinely cleared cables containing views with which he did not necessarily agree. "More than one cable," says Boyatt, "went out saying, 'Our counsels are divided.' That's how I ran my embassy....If I didn't like a cable, I would merely add an ambassador's paragraph spelling out my differences."

Philip Kaplan, a ranking officer in Policy Planning, disagrees with this approach—and claims that his is clearly dominant in most embassies. "The ambassador's name goes on any assessment, so there can only be one view. It's not like a bunch of newspaper reporters; there are consequences to our reporting where there are none for a reporter....A good officer can iron out a position with his superiors in a way that his views do get reported. But ultimately, there can be only one assessment and I wouldn't have it any other way."

If ultimately there can be only one assessment, then it is easy to understand why there is so little dissent. Foreign Service officers have a reputation for timidity when it comes to advancing new ideas, which by the very fact of being new, risk being labeled "unsound." So it should be no surprise that those who use the dissent channel are often perceived as square pegs—abrasive and bad team-players.

Some officers, however, do not find the current system of cable traffic satisfactory, complaining that there is too much volume and too little influence. "When an officer gets busy," says one veteran country

desk officer, "these cables from the embassies just are not read. I do not read them...." In the past, there were other ways to circulate information outside of the regular cable traffic. Airgrams allowed an officer to reflect at length on an issue—and to sign his or her name to the report. These days it is cheaper to cable everything. Ten or twenty years ago, those stationed abroad would occasionally write personal letters, called "official-informals," to their desk officers. These too allowed for the expression of subtle or sometimes not so subtle differences of opinion from within an embassy, but they are rarely used today.

Henry Precht, desk officer for Iran during the 1978–79 revolution, resorted to writing a "Secret Eyes Only Official-Informal" to Ambassador William Sullivan in December 1978. The letter was later captured by the Iranian students who seized the embassy and published in Iran. It graphically illustrates the pressures placed on an officer who, like Precht, is critical of U.S. policy. Precht explains to Sullivan, "A quiet moment has come and I'll use it to bring you up to date on some very sensitive matters that I cannot commit to the phone or cable....There is real concern in this building about back-channel communications from the White House directly to the Iranians, notably the Brzezinski-Zahedi channel....I have probably confided more than I should to a piece of paper, but I doubt I have much of a future anyway....Whatever the risks, I believe it important to give you my frank assessment of how things are shaping up on the Iranian front these days." (Precht's career did survive—he is currently DCM in Cairo.)

THE PRESSURE IN THIS CASE came from the national security adviser, not Precht's superiors in the department. But this situation, in which State Department–White House differences entrap an FSO, is not an uncommon one. That the department did not stand up to Brzezinski's pressures and protect Precht is symptomatic of its discomfort with dissents from policy. If a senior officer such as Precht can be as fearful as he was about conveying his views, there's a real problem. Nevertheless, former Director General Atherton maintains that the system is working, that "the department as an institution encourages an atmosphere of debate, but if some few resist it, it is hard to imagine that an institutional fix can remedy the situation."

In the deepest sense, Atherton is probably right; there may be no easy institutional fix. But there are some obvious reforms that could encourage an atmosphere conducive to vigorous debate. It might, for instance, make an enormous difference if the department had publicly reprimanded the ambassadors who penalized Purcell, Harris, and others for using the dissent channel. It might also make a difference if officers serving in the field believed that their assessments were routinely included at the highest levels of the policymaking process. Our diplomats abroad, after all, are closest to the facts on the ground. True, they are not close to the other set of "facts" in Washington—Congress, public opinion, and the press. But ideally, policy ought to be a meld of the two. Unhappily, such a synthesis is rare. Except in the case of a crisis, when events are moving too quickly for Washington to know anything, the embassies rarely take the initiative in setting a policy line. Finally, it might be best to abandon the pretense that everything reported from the field must have the ambassador's imprimatur on it. The ambassador should take the credit—and blame—for only those cables which he or she has actually authored. In the case of routine reporting, many officers would prefer to work under an ambassador who lets "a hundred flowers bloom." Even if FSOs are not newspaper reporters, ambassadors should probably function a little more like tough editors and a little less like apparatchiks hewing the party line.

The Sages' Group's proposals represent an attempt to introduce a greater degree of accountability into the process:

> Dissent is the legitimate offspring of political integrity and independent professional judgment in the Foreign Service. Members of that Service...have a responsibility—not merely a right—to express reasoned, well-considered disagreement with policies or actions they find opposed to the national interest, ethically questionable, or morally repugnant. The means by which they express their disagreement or seek to change such policies, however, can be legitimate or illegitimate, and the difference is at present neither sufficiently defined nor commonly understood."

The Reagan administration hasn't helped matters any by its instinctive confusion of dissent with disobedience, as evidenced by the purging of those officers who disagreed with Reagan's policies in Central America. Similarly, in 1981–82, some China specialists who played a role during the Carter administration were transferred to posts outside their specialty because the new president feared they would not implement his more sympathetic policy toward Taiwan. In recent years there have been a few officers, very few, who found that merely dissenting on paper was not enough and chose to resign. One who left, Wayne Smith, who was head of the U.S. interest section in Havana, told the *Open Forum Journal,* "I left the Service precisely because I so strongly disagreed with the policies of the Reagan administration in Central America, with respect to Cuba, and with many of its policies elsewhere....The bottom line is that your analysis must be honest. You must call them as you see them. Having made your recommendations, either you implement the policy that is decided upon, or, if you can't do that in good conscience, then you leave or ask for a job unrelated to policy."

There are officers who have not felt it necessary to resign, but who are nevertheless alarmed by the decline in use of the dissent channel. They know that for every policy adopted regarding the Middle East, Central America, or the Soviet Union, there is an alternative—an equally coherent view that could be expressed but isn't. Instead, conformity is rewarded and all but the most aggressive officers are discouraged from thinking that they can influence policy with their reporting. The result has been that our foreign policy has suffered for lack of serious debate and knowledgeable challenge. For our own sake, as well as for the best interests of the Foreign Service, we deserve better. □

Those who use the dissent channel are often perceived as square pegs, abrasive, and bad team-players

THE JOURNAL

The Gray

In 1976, a coup in Argentina replaced the government of Isabel Peron with a military junta. One of the first priorities of the new government was to end what they saw as a rising tide of leftist terrorism. But, during the next seven years, the government crackdown turned into the infamous "dirty war," in which perhaps as many as 10,000 people disappeared. As more and more citizens lost family members, they began to gather each Thursday at the Plaza de Mayo and the Casa Rosada to mourn their losses and demonstrate silently for an accounting by the government.

In 1983, elections were held, and a new administration headed by Raul Alfonsin came to power. The government established a National Commission for the Disappearances of Persons to investigate the fate of these people. Many mass graves were uncovered and, as a result, the generals who led the junta were tried. But many bodies are still missing, and their families continue to gather, hoping for information about the disappeared.

CHRISTOPHER M. BONSTEEL

IT ALL STARTED very suddenly. I was unlocking the gate to leave for work, and outside was a gray Ford Falcon.

Three mustachioed men in the car watch impassively as I close the gate and walk quickly down the shady suburban street toward the train station. It is not unusual for a strange car to be parked on our stteet, so it doesn't really bother me.

When I arrive home late that night from downtown Buenos Aires, the same gray Falcon is still there. I go inside but don't mention the car to my wife. That night at dinner, I can hardly eat. I pick at my food and try to dismiss the Falcon and its occupants from my mind. They could, after all, be either guards for a new, important neighbor, or common, ordinary, down-to-earth thieves casing the area. But there are no moving vans around, and they are too visible to be robbers.

Christopher M. Bonsteel is a Foreign Service officer assigned to the Office of Communications. He was previously posted in Buenos Aires.

After a good night's sleep, I feel a lot better. I kiss my wife, Graciela, at the door, tousle the kids' hair, and stroll to the gate. But, as I cross the yard, a sudden dread seizes me. I struggle with the lock on the gate, trying to act nonchalant while, under my breath, I curse the rusted, decrepit thing. I wave at my family and, not daring to look up the street, hurry to the train station. A block and a half later, after I turn a corner, I glance back. There it is, as much a symbol of Argentina as our founding fathers on their copper mounts in the park: the Ford Falcon of the generals' regime. The license plate is jammed up under the front bumper so the numbers and letters can't be read. The conclusion is now inescapable; the occupants of the car are members of the security forces.

I shove my way onto the train more forcefully than usual, ignoring the indignant looks of the other riders. I stare without seeing as the train clicks past the houses and apartment buildings on its slow metallic way to the city. My mind races along the tracks. Panic ebbs and flows through my body. Once or twice when the train stops, I have a sudden urge to jump out and flee to somewhere, anywhere.

In my office, I throw myself into my work and labor feverishly all day. My fellow workers think my excess zeal means I'm taking Monday off. As I try to block out my growing dread, they get jealous, thinking I'm heading for a long weekend at the beach. I'm the only one who knows what is waiting for me.

On my way home, I decide not to let the Falcon worry me. In the first place, maybe they have left. And in the second place, why would they be watching me? They could be after anyone in the neighborhood. My first hope is smashed when I turn the corner on my street. The damned Falcon is still parked a few doors away from our house. I want to duck behind some trees, but I stop myself. If they are watching a neighbor, any suspicious actions on my part will make them look at me a little closer.

When I go inside, Graciela doesn't mention our visitors. She must not have left the yard all day, and since the street can't be seen from our yard, she probably doesn't even realize the car is there. I decide not to say anything. Before we go to bed, I peer out the children's window to see if the Ford is taking the night shift. It is. Maybe they'll take the weekend off like the rest of us. I can't fall asleep.

In the morning, Graciela is up early and takes the children out. While they are away, I wake up and creep to the window. Much to my surprise, and relief, the Falcon is nowhere to be seen. Over coffee and rolls, I consider the implications of its leaving. Maybe the security forces are just goofing off for a few days. After all, they never seem to have to answer to any higher authority. At least, the military government claims that it is never aware of their activities. Or maybe—and I pray this is true—they have already picked up one of the neighbors—they weren't after me at all.

The fall day now seems much warmer and brighter. I take the family out for a short drive in the afternoon. As I back the car out of the garage, I glance into the rear view mirror. In my alarm, I run the Renault straight across the street and into a tree. The three passengers in the gray Falcon are not impressed with my little accident. I quickly bundle the family into the car and speed off. As we cross the railroad tracks, I spot the Falcon hanging a block and a half behind.

WELL, THIS IS IT. They've got me. But it was so many years ago. Why me, why now? It must be from my days in the university. Damn, everybody was a subversive then, the students, the professors, the administration, the janitors, even my wife was a subversive. She dabbled in the Socialist Workers Party while attending the School of Architecture. It was the thing to do. Besides, if you weren't part of some group, you didn't receive your degree or, worse, some of the militants pounded you into the pavement. But only 10 percent at most were really militants or fanatics. The rest of us just went along for the ride. The course work at the university was easy; just be political.

Falcon

MAGDA FRENCH

Our degrees were political. So I was a subversive. I participated in wall painting, threw rocks at the police and army, stood up at demonstrations and called for the overthrow of the government and the ousting of the Yankee multinationals. Nothing too far out of line for those days. To be young was to be subversive back then.

But when General Peron grew tired and died, everything went downhill fast. His widow, Isabelita, couldn't run a washing machine, much less a nation. In the ensuing confusion, her advisers and cronies looted the treasury. Finally, much to the relief of everyone, the military stepped in. But after the political situation became more stabilized, things began to get nasty. The security forces were turned loose to bring in the troublemakers—anyone who wouldn't give the government carte blanche.

When security got rolling, people began to disappear. But the hard-core anarchists were not the victims—they were clever enough to have foreign money and connections. They slipped away to Europe and Mexico. The people that have vanished are the dreamers, the liberals, and many whose only crime was to believe in equality and human rights. If the security forces can't capture the real extremists, then they settle for those of the closest hue.

It's horrifying thinking of someone simply vanishing from the face of the earth. Of course, that's not what really happens—in reality, someone makes you vanish. I've heard of the midnight executions. People are brought in for questioning and then, to their astonishment, released from the police station or barracks in the middle of the night—an unusual hour for official business. But a Ford Falcon full of men ready to carry out their orders is waiting outside. In extreme cases, I've heard that very "dangerous" subversives are taken for long helicopter rides over the cold South Atlantic. As far as I know, no one has ever swum back to shore.

But why would they single me out? Rumor has it that if three suspects are picked up, and one of them mentions your name in any way, you will be the next to go. Eventually a web of friends, acquaintances, and business associates gets ensnared in the trap. But why now? I'm much older, more mature; I have a lovely wife, two good kids, a home, I pay my taxes. And it was so long ago.

WE HAD PLANNED on spending Sunday at one of the parks nearby, but I feign exhaustion and stay home. I watch the football matches on television and clean up the yard. Several times, I go to the street to dispose of leaves and trimmings. The gray Falcon sits there, and the three officers show absolutely no interest in me; their suspect.

I watch the River–Sante Fe match, halfheartedly thinking of making a break for it, but I know it's useless. As soon as my departure is discovered, the highways, ports, and airports will be closed. Besides, maybe they are just waiting for me to try to escape. Would that be proof of my guilt? How long can they wait? Well, I can tough it out for as long as they can. Their inaction has reinforced the faint hope that still lurks in the back of my mind—that it's all a mistake. They don't have anything on me, just a suspicion or two, maybe not even that. They'll come for me, but I'll be released shortly, sent on my way with their profuse apologies and best wishes.

If I'm right, it will be over soon, no use in involving my wife or family. Besides, I don't want to implicate them if my worst fears are confirmed. I will simply become one of the disappeared; picked up for questioning and never seen nor heard from again. The end will come quickly, God willing.

The next morning, the men are still there. I deliberately ignore them when I leave the house for work. At the office, it suddenly occurs to me to try a different tack: When I get home, I'll confront my acccusers, get it over with. The more I dwell on it, the better it sounds. Pretty soon, I begin to get angry. Those bastards, sitting in that damned ugly car, drawing salaries I'm helping pay, harassing me, and making my life miserable. If they want me, I'm going to find out why and tell them a thing or two in the process. Damn them.

On the train home, I brace myself for the upcoming battle. I practice snappy but firm answers to their questions and invent a few questions of my own. But a wet blanket is thrown on my fire when the Falcon is nowhere in sight. I should be happy and relieved, but I actually feel a bit let down. I scan the street to see if they have moved the car. They must have gone for an afternoon beer.

As I go inside, the phone is ringing. I answer it, and my mother is crying wildly about the breakup of my marriage. A gray Falcon dropped the kids off at her apartment in Belgrano less than an hour ago. Mother saw Graciela in the car with some strange men.

It doesn't matter to me what my boss or my fellow lawyers say, I join the vigil anyhow. I join the mothers, fathers, and relatives who gather every Thursday on the Plaza de Mayo to protest silently the disappearance of members of their families. Some of the disappeared were good, some bad; some innocent, some criminals. But all have disappeared forever from the face of the earth. □

PEOPLE

Deaths

CHARLES FLOYD HEGNA, a Foreign Service officer, was killed in Teheran last December in the terrorist hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner. He was 50.

Mr. Hegna served with the Navy from 1954–59. In 1963, he was graduated from the University of Wisconsin in Milwaukee with a degree in business administration.

After his graduation, Mr. Hegna worked for the Wisconsin Department of State, and later for the Northwestern National Insurance Group of Milwaukee. He joined AID in 1967 and was sent to Vietnam as an auditor. Other assignments included Ghana, Morocco, Thailand, Panama, and Washington. He was posted to Karachi, Pakistan, in October 1983, where he served until his death.

Survivors include his wife, the former Edwina Thibodeau; three sons, Steven, Craig, and Paul; and a daughter, Lynn.

WILLIAM LAURENCE STANFORD, a Foreign Service officer, was killed in Teheran last December in the terrorist hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner. He was 52.

Mr. Stanford was graduated from De Paul University in Chicago in 1953 with a bachelor's degree in accounting. He served in the Marine Corps Reserve from 1953–55. For the next two years, he was a credit manager with the Procter and Gamble Company. He went on to become an auditor with Vineyard and Vineyard from 1957–59, and with Arthur Young and Company from 1959–61. He joined AID in 1961. His assignments included Thailand, Panama, Greece, Turkey, Washington, and Pakistan, where he was serving at the time of his death.

Survivors include his wife, the former Lorraine Patrick; two daughters, Susan and Patricia; and two sons, Laurence and Paul.

EDWARD C. WOLTMAN JR., a Foreign Service officer, died December 6. He is survived by his wife, Karin, and two daughters, Rachel and Julia.

In lieu of flowers, contributions may be made to American Field Service International/Intercultural Program, The Bank of New York, 530 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10036, account number 00-5487.

THOMAS C.M. ROBINSON, a former Foreign Service officer, died December 6 in Houston of cancer. He was 72.

Mr. Robinson served as agricultural attache in Australia, economic counselor in Pakistan from 1958–61, and in the Commodities Division at the State Department. He retired in 1962.

Upon his retirement, Mr. Robinson joined the World Food Program as chief of the Program Operations Division. He went on to become executive director of the program and served in that capacity until his retirement in 1977. In early 1984, Mr. Robinson headed a United Nations team to evaluate emergency aid to Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

Survivors include his wife, Doris Loehr Robinson, of Harlingen, Texas, and a daughter, Jill Robinson Grubb, of Horspath, Oxford, Great Britain.

Appointment

PETER B. SWIERS, a Foreign Service officer, has been chosen by the Atlantic Council to be the first Alwyn V. Freeman Senior Fellow.

Birth

A daughter, TIFFANY HOPE O'NEILL, was born in Nairobi, Kenya, to Josephine G. and Joseph P. O'Neill. Mr. O'Neill is a Foreign Service officer assigned to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Marriages

HENRY LITO DEIMEL, retired Foreign Service officer, and Vivian Fisher Cunningham were wed May 26 in Washington, D.C.

MARY LOUISE PAGANELLI, daughter of Ambassador and Mrs. Robert P. Paganelli, was married June 16 to Jay Scott Mackler in Poughkeepsie, New York.

STEPHEN R. DUJACK was married to Regina I. Bacon at the Foreign Service Club on September 8. The bride is manager of the Equal Employment Opportunity Office for the headquarters and administrative support center of the Defense Logistics Agency. The groom is editor of the JOURNAL.

PEOPLE records births, deaths, and achievements of AFSA members on a space available basis. Announcements should be addressed to: PEOPLE, Foreign Service Journal, 2101 E St., NW, Washington, D.C.

DOMESTIC POSTINGS

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- NEWSLETTER
- FORUM
- Monthly Meetings
- Scholarships
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  Room 1248, Department of State, Tel. 632-3573

Foreign Service women, wives, or employees, active or retired, may join AAFSW. The annual dues are $15.00 which includes a subscription to the Newsletter. Send dues to Membership Chairman at address above.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

TAX RETURNS

TAX PREPARATION BY AN ATTORNEY who is also a Foreign Service officer and familiar with Foreign Service problems. M. Bruce Hirshorn, Esquire, 4501 Arlington Blvd. #125, Arlington, VA 22203. (703)525-9519.

CPA TAX PREPARATION, Single source for all tax problems; home leave and travel deductions. J.R. Funkey, CPA, 1700 N. Moore, Suite 720, Arlington, VA 22209. (703)524-6004.

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TAX COUNSELING & GUIDANCE, any problem. Never any charge to AFSA members for telephone advice. R.N. "Bob" Dussell (ex-FS), enrolled to tax practice before U.S. Treasury Dept. At tax work since February 1, 1938 and now staying at counsel mainly for aid to Foreign Service and their families. Located across from Virginia Square metro, 3601 N. Fairfax Dr., Arlington, VA 22201. (703)841-0158.

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PROPERTY CLAIMS

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Classified advertising in the FOREIGN EXCHANGE is open to any person who wishes to reach the professional diplomatic community. The rate is 50 cents per word per insertion. Telephone numbers count as one word and zip codes are free.

1985 Election of AFSA officers and constituency representatives

This Election Call, issued in accordance with Article VI(1) of the AFSA Bylaws, constitutes formal notice to all AFSA members of the opportunity to participate in nominations and election of a new Governing Board. All of the Officer and Representative positions listed below are for two-year terms beginning July 15, 1985.

A. Positions To Be Filled

1. The officer positions to be filled in this election are:

(a) President
(b) Vice President
(c) Second Vice President
(d) Secretary
(e) Treasurer

2. The Constituency Representative positions to be filled in this election are:

(a) State Department Representative (3 positions)
(b) AID Representative (2 positions)
(c) USIA Representative (1 position)
(d) Retired Member Representative (3 positions)

The number of representatives to which each constituency is entitled is determined by a formula prescribed in the AFSA Bylaws, Article IV (4), authorizing one representative for every one thousand members or fraction thereof. The number of positions to be filled in this election is based upon the membership rolls as of December 31, 1984.

B. Qualifications for Nominating and Being Nominated

1. Any AFSA member in good standing (i.e., a member whose dues are automatically deducted or who has paid dues through February 28, 1985) may submit names (including his/her own) in nomination for any or all of the above-mentioned positions.

2. In order to be nominated, a person must likewise be a member in good standing. (The Bylaws require that a "candidate" must be a member through June 30, 1985. If a member is nominated who is not on automatic dues deduction and has paid dues through February 28, 1985, but has not paid through June 30, 1985, that member will be contacted and advised that he or she must pay dues through June 30 in order to be a candidate.)

C. Nominations for Officer Positions

Any AFSA member in good standing may nominate any member in good standing, including himself/herself, for the position of President, Vice President, Second Vice President, Secretary, or Treasurer. No member may nominate more than one person for each position.

D. Nominations for Constituency Representative Positions

Any AFSA member in good standing may nominate any member(s) in good standing, including himself/herself, for the position(s) of Constituency Representative. No member may nominate more than three persons for State Department Representative, two persons for AID Representative, one person for USIA Representative, or three persons for Retired Member Representative.

E. All nominations must be submitted in writing or by cable. All written nominations must be addressed to First American Bank, 740 15th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, attn: Lockbox Department. To be valid, they must, without exception, be received at this address no later than 4:30 p.m., March 8, 1985. Members overseas can send "AFSA Channel" cables marked for delivery to AFSA Elections Committee. They must be received in the Department's Communication Center within the same time limits. Alternatively, nominations can be hand-delivered to a Committee member who will be in the AFSA office, Room 3646, Department of State, from 3:30 p.m. to 4:30 p.m. on March 8.

F. Nominations may be submitted individually or in slates. Slate designations will be accordingly shown on the ballot.

G. No member may appear on the ballot as a candidate for more than one position.

H. An authorized representative of the Elections Committee will communicate with each nominee (including members who nominate themselves) as quickly as possible after the receipt of each nomination to determine whether the nominee wishes to be a candidate. Any member who so accepts the nomination must confirm his/her acceptance in writing addressed to First American Bank, 740 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, attn: Lockbox Department, to be received no later than 12 noon, March 12, 1985. Alternatively, the written acceptance can be hand-delivered to a Committee member who will be in the AFSA office, Room 3646, Department of State, from 11 a.m. to 12 noon on March 12. Members overseas can send an "AFSA Channel" message accepting nomination which must be received by the Elections Committee by the same time. Any nominee whose written acceptance of nomination has not been received by the Elections Committee by 12 noon, March 12, 1985, will be considered to have declined candidacy.

I. In accordance with instructions which will be issued by the Elections Committee on or before March 1, 1985, and distributed as promptly as possible, all candidates nominated under the procedure outlined above will be given the opportunity to submit brief biographies of no more than 150 words for distribution to AFSA members in the April 1985 issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and/or ASSOCIATION NEWS as prescribed in the AFSA Bylaws, Article VI(4). All candidates will be given further opportunity to distribute campaign statements to the AFSA members in the May 1985 issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL and/or ASSOCIATION NEWS. These statements must be in the hands of the Committee by 12 noon on March 15 and April 5 respectively.

J. The AFSA Bylaws provide that should candidates wish to mail supplementary statements to the membership, the Association will make available to them on request, and at their expense, the membership mailing list or address labels. Further details on this and such other services that the Elections Committee may be in a position to provide candidates will be included in "Instructions to Candidates," to be issued by the Elections Committee not later than March 1, 1985.

K. Ballots

The ballot will be distributed on or about May 15, 1985, to each person who is a member on April 30, 1985. Each member may cast one vote for each Officer position and in addition one vote for each Representative position in the member's own constituency by voting for candidates listed on the official ballot, or by writing in the name(s) of member(s) eligible as of June 30, 1985, or by both. To be valid, a ballot must be received by the Elections Committee no later than 5:00 p.m., Tuesday, June 30, 1985, at the address indicated on the envelope accompanying the ballot. More detailed balloting instructions will accompany the ballots.

L. Tally of Ballots

On or about July 1, 1985, the Elections Committee will count the ballots and declare elected the candidate receiving the greatest number of votes for each position. Candidates or their representatives may be present at the counting and challenge the validity of any vote or the eligibility of any voter. The Committee will inform candidates individually of the election results by the swiftest possible means, and will publish the names of all elected candidates in the September issue of the FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL. The elected candidates will take office on July 15, 1985, as provided in the Bylaws.

M. Questions, Suggestions, or Complaints

At any time following publication of this Election Call through September 15, 1985, any member may file a written question, suggestion, or complaint concerning the conduct of the 1985 election. Such question, suggestion, or complaint would be addressed to First American Bank, 740 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005, attn: Lockbox Department.

ASSOCIATION NEWS

AFSA scores victory on open assignments

Using the threat of an unfair labor practice charge, the Association was able to persuade the State Department to adhere to a strict interpretation of an agreement made earlier on open assignments. The provision in question concerned employees' being "identified" for hardship posts. Under the accord finally reached, employees who have served in any differential post in the past eight years will not be identified at the beginning of the open assignment cycle—as the original agreement had specified.

The dispute began when the department began making identified assignments last November 16, despite the fact that the open assignment agreement mandates a starting date of December 1. This did not give bureaus sufficient time to undertake the careful review of positions and candidates called for in the agreement. At the same time, management decided that 10-percent differential posts would not count, despite the agreement's use of the inclusive term "hardship post."

When AFSA threatened suit, the department relented. The new agreement permits State to meet its assignment needs but also requires that career development and individual preferences be considered. Additionally, if an employee has not served at a hardship post but has bid on hardship positions, his or her bids will be given full consideration, while those who have not so bid may be identified.

"We are well aware that the strength and the uniqueness of the Foreign Service flow from our willingness—and the public perception—to carry out our duties under all circumstances," said AFSA President Dennis K. Hays. "Toward this end, we have repeatedly sought to develop new ways to encourage good employees to take difficult assignments." Hays said that service discipline can still accommodate a fair sharing of hardship assignments. He noted in addition that management might have more success in encouraging employees to volunteer for hardship posts if it worked to implement the special incentive differential passed in the Foreign Service Act five years ago.

JOURNAL's 60th observed by State



The 60th anniversary of the JOURNAL was commemorated in November by the State Department Library, which assembled an exhibition of articles and memorabilia showing the magazine's publishing achievements.

AFSA officers decry Iran tragedy

AFSA President Dennis K. Hays and Second Vice President Charlotte Cromer being interviewed for WJLA-TV News in Washington about the killing of AID officers William Stanford and Charles Hegna by terrorists in Teheran last December. "We go where we are told," said Cromer, an AID officer, but she stressed a need for protection.

Shipment of foreign-made, foreign-purchased vehicles

One of the least known Foreign Service allowances is the authority to ship a foreign-made, foreign-purchased, privately owned vehicle to the United States. Approximately half of the posts in the Foreign Service are on the list of those whose personnel are authorized to ship these vehicles at government expense. Personnel at all other posts would have to ship them at their own expense if they want to use them in the United States.

The procedure for getting on the approved list is simple. The chief of mission sends a cable to the State Department (OPR/STP) stating that it is difficult to maintain spare parts for American vehicles in the city concerned due to a shortage or a lack of trained mechanics. Full details are contained in 6 FAM 165.9. Earlier this year, AFSA pointed out to several overseas chapters that their posts were not on the list despite the situation there. At least five posts to date have been approved as a result of subsequent action by the chapters.

Many other posts may qualify by the above criteria. This is especially true in countries that drive on the left. The following is a representative sample of authorized and non-authorized posts:

If you believe your post qualifies, we urge you to discuss the matter with your administrative officer and ambassador. AFSA is ready to lend assistance.

	Authorized	Not Authorized
ARA	Sao Paulo	Asuncion
	Bridgetown	Belize
	Martinique	Grenada
EUR	Brussels	The Hague
	Oslo	Helsinki
	Paris	Rome
	London	Athens
EAP	Bangkok	Vientiane
	Jakarta	Wellington
	Hong Kong	Tokyo
NEA	Karachi	Damascus
	Rabat	Beirut
	Tunis	Alexandria
AF	Pretoria	Johannesburg
	Brazzaville	Kinshasa
	Maseru	Gaborone
	Nairobi	Victoria, Mahe

From the Director's Desk

Legislative Action: How You Can Help Fight Retirement Cuts

By LYNNE IGLITZIN, *AFSA Executive Director*

As we all know, when the new Congress convened in January, an open season began on the entire system of federal employee benefits as the result of the record deficits facing the nation. Talk of five-percent pay cuts and massive layoffs made headlines. Of course, none of this was really new—federal employees have been all too aware of threats to the system of personnel benefits for some time now.

In response, AFSA created a special congressional liaison position several years ago to help us monitor the entire system of Foreign Service benefits and allowances and to help AFSA do what it could to resist attacks on the system. AFSA decided on a two-pronged strategy: join with other federal employee unions to fight the broad measures being considered, and work to distinguish the unique needs of the Foreign Service that call for special consideration.

The AFSA strategy has met with some success despite the pressures to cut federal spending in this area. Robert Beers, AFSA's congressional liaison officer and a registered lobbyist, maintains continual contact with key legislators, committees, and staffers, thus making AFSA's positions known to the Congress and keeping the Association informed on latest developments. In the face of renewed attacks on the retirement system, with forces from both within and without the government lining up in alliance, a strong AFSA congressional presence is more vital than ever.

The costs of such an effort have been steadily increasing as the pressures on retirement and other benefits have been steadily mounting. AFSA has paid for this by supplementing our strained operations budget with members' contributions. The Legislative Action Fund, set up 18 months ago for this purpose, has received tax-deductible donations totaling $35,000 from nearly 700 members. That means about one in ten of you contributed—an impressive percentage. But that money is now exhausted. As the new round of attacks begins, we once again find it necessary to appeal for your assistance.

We need your support to help AFSA make your views known where they count most, in the Congress. We need your support to help AFSA cover special costs, such as dispatching action messages to our members in key congressional districts. And we need your support to help AFSA participate with the other unions that represent federal employees.

Need I point out that your contribution, in addition to being deductible, works to your benefit? You will be joining with hundreds of your colleagues in an effort to preserve the Foreign Service compensation system, which depends on an entire package of benefits that recognizes the unique and hazardous nature of your career. Won't you join them?

Contributions, which are tax deductible, should be made to the Legislative Action Fund and mailed to AFSA at 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. Unless you choose to remain anonymous, your name will be published in this section as a contributor to the LAF along with your colleagues.

Donations start to pour in as new LAF drive gets underway

Donations for the new Legislative Action Fund drive have already started to arrive, even before a letter from the president soliciting funds was mailed to the membership late last month. Donations to the fund are tax deductible and help support AFSA's lobbying efforts on Capitol Hill to fight proposed cuts in the Foreign Service system of benefits and allowances. For a further explanation of the fund, see "From the Director's Desk" elsewhere on this page.

Persons who donate to the fund are listed in this space, unless they wish to remain anonymous. Checks should be made payable to Legislative Action Fund and mailed to AFSA at 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

Below is a list of donations from December 1 to January 8.

Sara L. Andren
Joseph F. Aronhime
J.L. Bevis
Clark H. Billings
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Lyle R. Piepenburg
Mr. & Mrs. P.J. Walls
Julia Welch
Wendell W. Woodbury
Roderick M. Wright

Club banquets: an extra benefit for members

Most members have eaten lunch in the Dining Room or the prix-fixe buffet in the Bar & Lounge at the Foreign Service Club. Many probably don't realize, however, that they may hold events from intimate dinners for a few close friends to receptions, luncheons, seminars, and weddings or bar mitzvahs with 250 guests in the club's several newly refurbished banquet rooms.

Barbara Hughes, the club's banquet manager, recently showed us some of the mail she has been receiving from members who held events at the club. Here is a sampling:

"We held my son's bar mitzvah reception at the Foreign Service Club. From the moment it began to the moment it ended, it was an unadulterated delight. The service was warm, gracious, and efficient. The food was both well-presented and well-cooked. The entire staff seemed to know just how important this evening was to us and went out of their way to make the affair intimate, relaxed, and efficient. Several said that if this was the quality service one gets at a private club, it is not hard to see why people join."

"The feedback we have received from those who attended our reception has been enthusiastically positive; for many of them, the reception was a highlight of our meeting. The friendly manner and highly efficient service impressed us all. At a time when service is usually harried and abrupt, it was indeed a pleasure to find smiles and sincere warmth and care."

"Thank you for helping make our conference a success. The timing and room arrangements were perfect. Your cooperativeness with the extra details was greatly appreciated. I would certainly recommend the use of the Foreign Service Club."

Why not hold your next event at the club? Call Barbara Hughes at (202) 338-5730.

Toon says Foreign Service is loyal but must demonstrate it

"How do we stop this hemorrhaging of the lifeblood of the Service?" asked former Ambassador to Moscow Malcolm Toon, commenting on the increasing politicization of the Foreign Service and the Service's heightened inability to recruit the best people. Toon's remarks came before an audience of 60 at the Foreign Service Club on December 6 in the second of AFSA's new "Viewpoint" luncheon discussion series.

Many in government contend, said Toon, that the Service cannot be trusted, and this attitude has created an atmosphere of politicization and suspicion "much to the disadvantage of the country and the Service itself." The Heritage Foundation has counseled in its new report against the use of the Service in foreign policymaking, for instance, helping to lower morale and making it difficult to attract and keep good people. Toon cited as an example his observation that very few of the graduating class from the Fletcher School last year opted for the Foreign Service.

It is possible, Toon stated, for the Foreign Service to serve successive administrations loyally even when their views vary radically. It is up to the Service itself, however, to preserve the ideal of loyalty and trustworthiness. If career officers do not want to see themselves replaced by a legion of political appointees, the adherence of the Service to this ideal "should be promoted more vigorously and vocally" by senior officers, both active and retired. The dangers of the current course of politicization and distrust must be brought home to the public and the Congress. Although Toon acknowledged that the Service has no monopoly on wisdom and there is a need for talent from the outside, he emphasized that "we are arguing for competence."

Toon offered three suggestions on how to maintain a viable Service. AFSA, he said, should continue to speak out on the increasing politicization and impugning of the Service's integrity. Senior officers can help by fighting for their views as policy is being formulated, but then following it once it's made regardless of their opinion. Finally, officers who are unable to maintain this discipline in good conscience, or whose views on excessive politicization are ignored, should resign. If the issue is significant enough and they feel their views have not received a proper hearing, Toon added, these officers should "slam the door as they go out."



The American Academy of Diplomacy, of which Toon is a member, is working to resolve the issue of appointment for competence as opposed to political reasons. The academy has proposed creating a review panel for ambassadors that would provide a "crutch" for the president and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The committee, said Toon, has been "singularly lacking in guts as far back as I can remember." With such a panel, Toon said, a president could tell friends and backers that, although he would like to give them an ambassadorship, the review panel makes it impossible. The panel would ensure some degree of experience and continuity in diplomatic relations and help to avoid the "egregious mistakes that seem to be the hallmark of American diplomacy." Toon hopes that implementation of some of these suggestions might help to alleviate the deepseated and unwarranted bias against professionals by administrations who often do not even seek their views.

—Nancy Bartels

Silberman disparages Service's claims to representativeness

"You can't have it both ways." That was the diagnosis of former Ambassador to Yugoslavia Laurence Silberman, who said the most significant reason for the decline in influence and effectiveness of the Foreign Service in recent years is the desire of its members to play an active role in policy formulation while retaining the privileges of a neutral body. Silberman kicked off AFSA's "Viewpoint" discussion series, speaking to an audience of Foreign Service employees on November 15 at the Foreign Service Club.

A political appointee in the Ford administration, Silberman said that the formulation of foreign policy in the United States is no different than the making of domestic policy and therefore is the responsibility of elected officials and their agents. The Foreign Service, on the other hand, exists to advise on policy and then to execute it. The confusion in the Service between this subordinate role and that of policymaking, he said, has resulted in the overall ineffectiveness of the Service and the State Department.

"It is almost outrageous to suggest that the Foreign Service represents the nation as a whole in policymaking," Silberman continued. Because the Service has "no political legitimacy," its job should be only to argue its point at the time the policy is formulated and, once decided upon, to carry out that policy, regardless of any officer's own views. Unfortunately, many officers believe that the Service does have a special role in the formulation of foreign policy. For example, says Silberman, career ambassadors claim both to be neutral *and* to have political authority. "You pay your money and you take your choice," he said. It is damaging and counterproductive for the Service to suggest it has any representative authority. The Foreign Service does not have legitimacy in policymaking and by making claims of legitimacy, it destroys its neutrality.

Silberman said he cares very much about the morale of the Service and admitted that, in some areas, like language skills, career officers have the advantage over political appointees. But, in terms of loyalty to policy once it has been made, "my view is the Service has been very bad." This is proven by the distrust every president since Franklin Roosevelt has had for the Service. In fact, he said, this disloyalty and distrust have diminished both the public's view of the Service and the Service's effectiveness. If presidents viewed the Service as more loyal, they might be more willing to listen to its advice.

Perhaps, Silberman suggested, the Service could take a lesson from the Office of Management and Budget, which has proven itself highly disciplined and capable of shifting in a matter of days to a diametrically opposite policy when a new administration comes to power. The effect has been to make OMB more influential and powerful. "My idea would be to reduce the number of political appointees and have a very loyal Foreign Service," Silberman concluded.

That loyalty would be enhanced if career officers were to resign from the Service after taking high-level jobs gained as a result of closeness to the president or other top officials. If this were routine, the credibility of individual officers who must defend widely varying policies from one administration to the next would be preserved "absolutely...but only if you have a tradition of absolute neutrality and great discipline."

—Nancy Bartels

THE ASSOCIATION NEWS

The official newsletter of the American Foreign Service Association, the professional association for the Foreign Service and the legal representative of all Foreign Service employees in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. Founded in 1924.

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AID Standing Committee
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AFSA
2101 E St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 338-4045

Clarification on home leave eligibility

It recently came to our attention that the State Department is not correctly recalculating home leave eligibility dates in instances where service at an overseas post is delayed because of leave taken in the United States. Under the regulations, such leave periods—i.e., annual or sick leave—must be added to the eligibility date. Travel time outside the United States, however, is not added. For more details, members should review 3 FAM 452.2.

Problems are similar worldwide, Hays tells Canadian officers



AFSA President Dennis K. Hays addressing 250 members of Canada's Professional Association of Foreign Service Officers in Ottawa last year on issues of common concern. Terrorism in particular concerns diplomats of all nations, said Hays.

AFSA seeks new secretary/receptionist

AFSA is looking for a new secretary/receptionist for its offices in the headquarters building at 2101 E Street NW. The position will become vacant shortly, when secretary Supajee Lapcharoen leaves to return to Thailand.

The position involves a variety of duties in support of the Association's administrative functions, and the secretary reports directly to the executive director.

Essential skills include typing (65 wpm), a pleasant telephone manner, flexibility, and a familiarity with word processing.

Knowledge of the Foreign Service and the foreign affairs agencies is helpful. Salary will be in the mid-teens. For information and further details, phone Wanda Dykhuis at (202) 338-4045. AFSA is an equal opportunity employer.

Life & Love in the Foreign Service

COMPETITION # 19

Winners of the monthly LIFE & LOVE contest receive a certificate for a free lunch for two at the Foreign Service Club. Honorable mentions receive a free carafe of wine.

Mail entries to:

LIFE & LOVE #19
AFSA
2101 E Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20037

We're dreaming of the neat places
Just like the ones that used to be,
Where the water's pure and
Your daughter's cure is two asp'rin,
Maybe only three.
Still dreamin' of those nice places,
With every sewer that we smell!
Where the thugs don't have trop de zèle,
And where di-plo-ma-CEE is live and well!

—Bob Fouche, Washington

Managing Your Money

The Alternative Minimum Tax

Mark S. Waldman, *Investment Adviser*

The Alternative Minimum Tax is a 20-percent flat-rate levy on personal income. It's calculated at a lower rate than your regular tax but is applied to a larger base. If the AMT works out to be higher than your regular tax, you must pay the AMT. Obviously, this new tax brings with it a variety of problems and opportunities for investors. Let's look at some examples.

Peter and Elena, an FSO couple in their 50s, have a problem. Their combined salaries total $90,000, and their investment income is $25,000. They are in a high tax bracket, and because they are concerned with their tax burden, they've just sold a large block of stock and purchased some tax shelters. They took a large long-term capital gain on the stock but expect the tax savings from the shelters to offset any increase in their liability.

Peter and Elena chose their shelters carefully, sticking to publicly registered investments and general partners with many years of experience and strong track records. Each shelter they purchased is an excellent investment. They did not, however, take the AMT into account when they made these decisions.

The IRS designed the AMT to hit taxpayers who take too great an advantage of legal tax breaks. Peter and Elena didn't do it deliberately; all they wanted was to pay the minimum required by law. Nevertheless, they will be subjected to the AMT. The couple invested in a real estate limited partnership, an oil and gas drilling partnership, and an equipment leasing limited partnership. These investments provide investment tax credit (ITC), depreciation deductions, intangible drilling cost deductions, and depletion allowance. Peter and Elena have chosen good investments—they are high-quality shelters—but they've overdone it and generated too many "preference items," or items that might trigger the AMT. The diagram below and the discussion that follows will help explain their predicament.

Peter and Elena first calculate their AMT using Form 6251. They take their Adjusted Gross Income and add to it their preference items. These include the following: the excluded part (60 percent) of long term capital gains, depreciation taken on owned or leased real property in excess of straight line, exclusions of dividends or interest, depletion, intangible drilling costs in excess of net oil and gas income, incentive stock options, amortization of pollution control facilities, mining and exploration costs, circulation and research and experimental expenditures, and reserves for losses on bad debts of financial institutions.

From this total they subtract the following deductions: medical expenses in excess of 10 percent of adjusted gross income, qualified housing interest, charitable contributions, other interest to the extent of qualified net investment income, casualty losses in excess of 10 percent of adjusted gross, wagering losses, and deductions for estate taxes paid on a decedent's income. Then they exclude $40,000 as a married couple filing jointly ($20,000 each if filing separately, $30,000 if single). Their AMT is 20 percent of the remaining sum. Let's suppose it's $30,000 in Peter and Elena's case.

Now they calculate their tax the regular way, using Form 1040 and the tax tables. Let's suppose that their tax this way is $34,000. Since they must pay the larger of the two figures, the AMT does not seem to be a threat to them. But wait—they have investment tax credits from their investments, which total $8000. These lower their regular tax by that amount, to $26,000. Investment tax credits do not apply to the AMT. Now they have a problem, because the AMT is larger.

Here's what happens. Peter and Elena must pay their tax, figured the regular way, of $26,000. But they must also pay the difference between this figure and the AMT, or an extra $4000. The AMT has increased their tax obligation by 15 percent. But what about the part of the investment tax credit that was "consumed" by the AMT? Do Peter and Elena lose its benefit? No—they can file amended returns and carry it back to 1981, 1982, and 1983 and then, if unused, forward for up to 15 years. They will eventually get all the benefit of their credit.

Because the AMT has hit Peter and Elena with a 20-percent tax, it has reduced the value of their shelters. These investments are now sheltering 20 cents on the dollar rather than the 50 cents of their high initial marginal tax rate. This makes the shelters less attractive investments despite their high quality and expected good performance. It's a case of too much of a good thing. Once the AMT is triggered, all a shelter can do is further reduce the regular tax and add preference items.

What can our couple do? One thing is to try to shift income into this year, so it will be taxed at the low 20 percent flat rate. Another is to try to reduce some itemized deductions, like large state and local tax payments, by shifting them into the next year. The most important thing they can do, of course, is to plan each major investment decision with an eye on the AMT implications.

Each time they consider buying a tax-advantaged investment, they or their financial adviser should calculate the impact on the AMT. They should be particularly wary during any year in which they have a large long term capital gain. They should make sure their financial adviser or accountant understands the AMT and how it works.

A tax-advantaged investment can have a very positive impact on your tax liability and should be a good investment on economic grounds. Tax credits, depreciation allowances, intangible drilling cost deductions, and depletion allowances can significantly—and legally—reduce what you have to pay the government. But now, more than ever before, you must use these investments wisely. It's not enough to find a good investment. You must know when and to what extent you should invest.

Mark S. Waldman, Ph.D., is an ex-FSO and an investment adviser with Wealth Management Consultants, Ltd., a local registered investment advisory firm.



RETIREMENT NEWS

Jubilee Members announced

We now have confirmed the names of 47 Jubilee Members—those with 50 years or more standing. Some candidates have not yet responded to our inquiries, but we hope to have the roster complete in the near future. By vote of the Governing Board, Jubilee Members who are not already life members have been granted honorary life memberships. This step was taken in greatful recognition of their distinguished service and loyalty to the organization over the span of a half century.

Garret G. Ackerson Jr.
Jacob Beam
Willard L. Beaulac
William F. Busser
James G. Byington
Albert E. Clattenburg, Jr.
Montgomery H. Colladay
Donald C. Dunham
Howard Elting Jr.
Cyrus B. Follmer
Hugh S. Fullerton
Daniel Gaudin
Charles M. Gerrity
Claude H. Hall Jr.
Carl O. Hawthorne
Loy Henderson
Heyward G. Hill
U. Alexis Johnson
Gerald G. Jones
J. Wesley Jones
Reginald S. Kazanjian
George F. Kennan
David M. Key
Chester H. Kimrey
Foy Kohler
E. Allan Lightner
Cecil B. Lyon
Douglas MacArthur II
John H. Madonne
Thomas J. Maleady
Robert G. McGregor
Sheldon T. Mills
Boland More
William D. Moreland
John J. Muccio
Marselis C. Parsons
James K. Penfield
John C. Pool
R. Borden Reams
Arthur L. Richards
Albert W. Scott
John S. Service
Tyler Thompson
William C. Trimble
Henry S. Villard
Gerald Warner
T. Eliot Weil
Clifton R. Wharton
John R. Wood
Robert F. Woodward
Kenneth J. Yearns

Retiree Roush (left) in Africa.

For retiree James Roush, peace is a full-time job

James Roush is a Foreign Service retiree from AID who hasn't stopped working—for the agency as a consultant, and in foreign affairs educational activities with the Great Decisions Program as well as through his Foundation for P.E.A.C.E. The foundation, whose acronym stands for Peaceful Environment Among Communities Everywhere, was established in 1979 to promote community and international peace through improved communications and the use of conflict resolution.

Since his retirement in 1978, Roush has been called on several times by the agency to head high-level educational and assessment teams. In 1983, for instance, he led a five-person team contracted to evaluate the management of AID-financed disaster recovery activities in Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru that were meant to mitigate the El Nino–related disasters in those countries. Before that, he headed another five-person team that designed a primary education construction program in Equatorial Guinea as part of an AID-financed contract.

This is the first in a series of articles on Foreign Service retirees who are putting their expertise to use in second careers. Persons who have a story to tell—theirs or others'—should contact the JOURNAL editor.

Because of his consulting activity, Roush has had little time lately for the foundation, but he has still participated in the Great Decisions program, run by the Foreign Policy Association. Great Decisions sponsors grass roots discussion groups that review at least eight international issues each winter, collects ballots on the issues from the participants (more than 150,000 last year), and provides a summary of the results to the president, the secretary of state, and the Congress. Roush led discussions on "U.S. National Security and World Peace" before eight of the groups. "I was disturbed to find that there was little discussion of peace," he says. "Rather, the focus was on national security issues." Roush maintains that only peace will bring national security, not the opposite. He believes that "the focus on national security is leading to arms races and preventing people from seeing that there are possibilities for initiatives that could build a foundation for peace with security."

Roush's commitment to peace activities have led him to start a more ambitious project—the publication of a magazine. The first issue of *Peace in Action* should be out early this year. It is intended to serve as a forum for the exchange of ideas for peace initiatives and sharing of experiences in using conflict-resolution techniques to solve relationship problems at all levels of society. Roush believes that "people will be more willing to support peace initiatives when they see that conflict-resolution techiques are effective." Roush is seeking articles for the publication (he can be contacted at PO Box 244, Arlington, Virginia 22210).

Date changed on annuity checks

A number of AFSA's retired members have expressed alarm over a letter they received from the State Department late last November announcing that their December 1984 retirement annuity checks, incorporating the 3.5-percent cost-of-living adjustment, would be dated January 2, 1985 instead of a late-December date. Some interpreted this to mean that the government would be skipping one month's annuity payment, which would be forever lost to them.

Actually, the net effect of this action, mandated by the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, is not as bad as it first appears. It simply means that henceforth, monthly annuity payments will be received a few days later than in the past, and that retirees' W-2 tax withholding forms for calendar year 1984 will reflect only 11 payments instead of 12.

Congress's reason for having done this, of course, was to reduce fiscal year 1985 budget expenditures by the amount of one month's retirement payments, thereby making the overall expenditure figure that much smaller. AFSA assures its members that Foreign Service retires have *not* been done out of one month's retirement pay, and that the only noticeable effect of this change in the future is that the monthly retirement checks may arrive a few days later than before.

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