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

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FSJ

The Beirut embassy bombing is a lasting memory in the minds of millions of Americans. But many probably do not realize that 17 Lebanese who were members of our Foreign Service died there. Beginning on page 26, John O. Grimes explores other ways in which Foreign Service Nationals are overlooked—in labor-management relations particularly—and argues that this essential group deserves better recognition.

Contents

"The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service"

The Foreign Service Journal is the magazine for professionals in foreign affairs, published monthly except August by the American Foreign Service Association, a private non-profit organization. Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and does not necessarily represent the official views of the foreign affairs agencies, the U.S. government, or AFSA. The Editorial Board is responsible for general content, but statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in the Association News and the Association Views, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

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ASSOCIATION VIEWS

Votes of Confidence

These are tough times for all federal employees, and Foreign Service personnel in particular. AFSA has to meet severe challenges on several fronts. But, thanks to you, our members, our resources to combat these diverse threats to the vitality, if not the very existence, of the Foreign Service have been greatly augmented in recent months.

●You have joined the Association in record numbers, and we are now stronger—by far—than at any other time in our history. AFSA's membership has risen 46 percent since June 1980 to a record 8600. One thousand of those members have joined in the last year alone. This membership strength is absolutely essential to meet the challenges we face. Whether new or old, our members obviously have recognized that there are budgetary proposals, appointment practices, and personnel-management problems that threaten the viability of the Foreign Service as a profession on the domestic front, and a world-wide plague of terrorism that threatens us overseas. As both a union and a professional association, we believe that a strong Foreign Service is an important national resource, and you, our members, obviously think so too.

●You have given us a vote of confidence by passing—overwhelmingly—our recent request for a dues increase. In fact, for every nay vote, seven members gave a resounding aye to our new dues structure. This will give us the added resources we need to meet these challenges, as well as to help provide the many services and benefits on which our mobile lifestyle depends. Almost half the membership participated in the referendum, an unprecedented turnout.

●You have donated more than $72,000 to our Legislative Action Fund to fight the recent attacks on the Foreign Service retirement system. This amount was more than double the total donated in our drive two years ago—and it was collected in one-quarter of the time! This will enable us to conduct an aggressive lobbying campaign on Capitol Hill and elsewhere to preserve the retirement system you joined when you entered the Foreign Service—and have counted on throughout your career.

You have our thanks for these three votes of confidence. We will use the resources and support you have provided us to preserve and improve the Foreign Service as a career.

THE AFSA GOVERNING BOARD

LETTERS

Gus's Gumption

While reading your January 1985 article on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, I was struck by the inaccuracy of your thumbnail sketch of my colleague, Gus Yatron. It is simply untrue that Representative Yatron "avoids political fights and rarely challenges the administration." Had the JOURNAL bothered to check its facts more carefully, it would have learned that Gus has been one of the most outspoken leaders in the Congress in the annual debate with the administration concerning appropriate foreign aid levels for Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

Furthermore, Gus's Subcommittee on Human Rights and International Organizations has done an excellent job of focusing attention on human rights abuses around the world at a time when the administration is all too willing to ignore them.

STEPHEN J. SOLARZ
U.S. Representative (D.-New York)
Washington, D.C.

Patricia Cohen replies:
A wide range of Democratic and Republican legislators and staffers were interviewed for the article, and all facts were carefully checked.

Cutting Up

I was proud to see that someone, namely Gerry Lamberty, has finally taken a positive and responsible position [LETTERS, January] on the question of political appointments and the "plum book."

We should also try to be more positive and altruistic with regard to the administration's commendable efforts to balance the federal budget by cutting back on the career-specific pension benefits which some members of the Foreign Service may naively have thought they were contracting for when they first signed on the ship of the State Department and as they have paid their contributions into the pension fund over the years.

Indeed, the positive budgetary impact is likely to be even greater than predicted if all of the Office of Management and

Budget's wise reform proposals are implemented, since many Foreign Service personnel would then probably be unable to afford retirement, but would remain in the traces until they drop (whether from natural causes or from a terrorist's bomb or bullet, tropical disease, workaholic delirium tremens, or some other occupational hazard). Thus they would have no occasion to claim even the proposed pension pittance. In that case the administration might be able to cut taxes even further. Such cuts would be particularly welcomed by those in the private sector whose improvidence in not accepting restraints on periodic cost-of-living wage adjustments (as we government employees have wisely done) has driven them into ever-higher tax brackets so that they now badly need further tax relief.

We should therefore commend the administration's drive for fiscal responsibility and urge them on to even greater efforts. Once they have squeezed the last drop of blood out of the retirement fund, we should encourage them to turn their attention to sick leave, through which millions of man- and woman-hours of work are unnecessarily lost every year.

JOHN B. THOMPSON
Foreign Service Officer
Brussels, Belgium

Intelligence Analysis

John Horton suggests thought-provoking lessons to be drawn from our experiences in Grenada. I was intimately involved in the events leading up to the Grenada mission, the operation itself, and afterward as senior U.S. representative on Grenada. Mr. Horton's account reminds me of dilemmas we faced in assessing fragmentary, contradictory information throughout the period. It is too early to reach conclusions about many instances Mr. Horton discusses. The final story on Grenada will be a long time in the writing.

I do, however, have one clarification to make. Discussing "The Case of the Second Campus," Mr. Horton describes the moment when "a CIA officer rose to point out [the] omission" of the Grande Anse campus of the medical school from the task force's maps. In fact, credit for discovering and correcting the omission goes to E. Ashley Wills, a USIA officer detailed as the task force commander's political adviser, and Larry Rossin of the State Department, then on the flagship after his attempt to reach the governor general had been thwarted by enemy anti-aircraft fire. Both officers had covered Grenada from our Bridgetown, Barbados, embassy dur-

ing tours of duty there and were well-acquainted with the medical school's layout. Though the error was discovered only after operations were underway, our military moved quickly and skillfully to fix it with a daring and totally successful rescue. U.S. achievements in Grenada flowed from cooperation between the military and all foreign affairs agencies, and we can all be proud of the result.

CHARLES A. GILLESPIE
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs
Washington, D.C.

I have great respect for John Horton as an intelligence professional. However, he makes two serious errors in his article in the February JOURNAL ["The Real Intelligence Failure"] which, based on my personal participation in these events, I feel should be brought to your readers' attention.

Mr. Horton should know that the record does show that the United States had advance information of President Duarte's October 1984 peace initiative, as I have noted in public previously. Such information was conveyed in a very restricted channel only to avoid press leaks which might have pre-empted El Salvador's full freedom of decision on this matter—a decision which we fully support.

The article also refers to an intelligence analysis of the "Salvadoran armed forces weaknesses." I reviewed early drafts of the study at the request of the preparers and found it out of date, in some areas factually incorrect, and badly in need of rewriting. While I strongly support the view that controversial analysis should be published, I object to dissemination of an intelligence analysis which is outdated and factually incorrect and hence badly out of balance under any circumstances.

THOMAS R. PICKERING
Ambassador
San Salvador, El Salvador

John Horton replies:

If one must make mistakes, the pain of discovery is slightly relieved if they are found by such respected persons as Ambassador Pickering and Deputy Assistant Secretary Gillespie. Concerning the warning about the second campus that night on the flagship, evidently my memory was wrong and I am glad Mr. Gillespie has given credit to Mr. Wills and Mr. Rossin, who deserve it.

Ambassador Pickering corrects my belief that "Duarte did not consult the administration beforehand," saying the

United States did indeed have advance information about President Duarte's peace initiative. Since it illustrates the difficulty of commenting on current events when one is not in the so-called loop, a weakness I have scorned in the writings of others, it is particularly galling to have fallen down those stairs in the dark. The example was a bad one, but the trouble the administration often has in accepting disagreeable information and opinions is not alleviated by my error.

In regard to the analysis of the weakness of the armed forces of El Salvador, I am sure enough the ambassador and I are thinking of the same study but we are not talking about the same point. Certainly if information in a study is outdated or factually incorrect, it should not go out without correction. Someone I trust told me the person I described as a Defense Department officer also found factual errors in the study. But the officer also objected to some judgments in the study, not because they were in error but because they might somehow be used to oppose budget items for help to El Salvador. He made it plain, according to my source, that if he could not quash the study forever he would hold it up until the money had been obtained from Congress. It would be comforting if this example were also mistaken but the matter was reported to me as I tell it now. The person who told me was not personally committed to the findings of the study but was disturbed rather by the motives of the officer who objected.

It has been suggested that, in the lobby of the CIA building, across from the passage where Allen Dulles had chiseled from John 8:32, "And the truth shall make you free," Oliver Cromwell's adjuration should appear, "My brethren, by the bowels of Christ I beseech you, bethink that you may be mistaken." It is now pasted to my word processor.

Dissenting Views

Kai Bird's article ["The Decline of Dissent," February] provides a useful history of the dissent channel. His review of some of the specific issues addressed in the channel over the years, and how they were received and handled in the State Department, is especially interesting.

I question, however, Mr. Bird's conclusion that statistics indicate the dissent channel is dying. In my view, the channel succeeds when it does not need to be used. It has always been and should remain a last resort, used only after employees have exhausted all other available and legitimate means to affect policy or communicate their views to decision-makers. The sys-

tem's openness to the expression of divergent views, unfortunately, cannot be quantified as readily as the volume of dissent messages. Furthermore, the quality and impact, rather than number, of dissent messages is also hard to measure.

Like any expression of political views in the Foreign Service, use of the dissent channel carries some risk, no matter how many protective regulations and precepts are created or how strictly these are enforced. It would be naive to expect otherwise. The Open Forum is working to minimize those risks, just as the Sages' Group worked to further strengthen the department's openness policy.

Undoubtedly, there will always be officers who disagree with current policies. I have suggested to several, who I knew objected to a particular policy, that they express their views in the channel or the Open Forum's journal. Mr. Bird mentioned most of the reasons for their not doing so: too busy, nothing will change, don't feel that strongly about it. However, *no one* has ever told me, as they apparently told Mr. Bird, that they *feared* using the dissent mechanism. If they had, I would have suggested that they let me or the Open Forum chairman submit their views anonymously on their behalf.

Perhaps the future of dissent in the Foreign Service is "grim," as Mr. Bird believes. If so, let us not pin the blame on this administration, which has given no indication that it will close the dissent channel. Instead, let us accept that our own lack of creativity, initiative, or guts is to blame.

MARK L. WIZNITZER
Vice Chairman,
The Secretary's Open Forum
Washington, D.C.

Kai Bird replies:

As an outsider, I could only report what I was told by Foreign Service officers. As Mr. Wiznitzer writes, it would be naive to believe there is no risk in filing a dissent cable. And naturally, if an officer fears using the channel, he or she is not likely to tell the people who monitor the channel of his fears.

My own fear is that Mr. Wiznitzer may be closer to the truth when he suggests that it is the Service's lack of initiative that is to blame. I agree that a mere statistical decline in the number of dissent messages is not necessarily a measure of the value of the dissent channel itself. But given the range of controversial issues on our foreign policy agenda in recent years, whether it be in dealing with the Arab-Israeli problem, Nicaragua, or arms control with the Soviets, I was shocked that there had not been literally dozens of vigorous dissents on substantive policy questions. We all know that there are a large number of FSOs who could easily mount a well-reasoned critique of this administration's policies. But after making their arguments and losing the policy debate, very few of these officers choose to extend the debate to the dissent channel. That's a sad commentary on the intellectual vigor of today's Foreign Service.

"The Decline of Dissent" by Kai Bird was an honest appraisal of the dissent channel. One point the author brought out, which may pass unnoticed by many, is worthy of emphasis. Bird says, "...it might be best to abandon the pretense that everything reported from the field must have the ambassador's imprimatur on it."

As long as the United States continues to give political appointees and barely knowledgeable Foreign Service officers an ambassadorship as a reward for faithful service, it is imperative that our policymakers continue to receive reliable—and factual—reporting from the field. This can only be accomplished by listening to the professionals. Others are only interested in proclaiming that "all is well, the situation is under control, I'm in charge," often down to the final hour when all hell breaks loose. Team playing is great, but I'll opt for honesty every time. I pray the secretary and the president will also.

ALTON P. GORBETT
Communications Program Officer
N'Djamena, Chad

Uneasy Alliance

How refreshing. An assessment of U.S.-Israeli relations free of the emotions of the World War II holocaust or the feeling of guilt at even questioning our commitment to Israel ["The Questionable Alliance," February]. For years we have known that our allies (who are more dependent on the resources of the Middle East than we are) question the strategic value of the area. They were happy to have us take the dominant role there for "western interests."

We seldom hear the side put forth by our own strategists who contemplate the burden it would be to defend Israel in an all-out confrontation with the Soviets, or the magnitude of U.S. resources it would take to do so.

JOSEPH W. KOVACH
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Locust Grove, Virginia

LETTERS are published on a space-available basis.

BOOKS

Books

Panama Odyssey. *By William J. Jorden. University of Texas Press, 1984, $24.50*

U.S.-Panama Relations 1903–1978, A Study in Linkage Politics. *By David N. Farnsworth and James W. McKenney. Westview Press, 1983. $23.*

According to *Webster's,* an odyssey is "any long series of wanderings, especially when filled with notable experiences and hardships." *Panama Odyssey,* an engrossing history of the 14-year effort to negotiate new Panama Canal treaties, has more than enough thrills to fit the definition. The author—first as a member of the National Security Council staff and later as ambassador to Panama—was intimately involved in the many ups and downs of the process. Although largely autobiographical, the account is a complete and faithful rendering for the historical record. The hefty (800 pages) book records the surprises, false starts, disappointments, and tenacious opposition in both camps that had to be overcome before success could be achieved.

Despite its formidable length, *Panama Odyssey* grips the reader's attention throughout. The many powerful personalities on both sides emerge as characters in a real-life drama. What might have been dry and legalistic is made vital and fascinating. The book's concluding message is well-argued: If the United States and Panama had not been able to reach agreement, the late General Omar Torrijos might very well have carried out his vow to sabotage canal operations through violence. It is sobering to consider how much more difficult and complicated the present crisis in Central America would be under such circumstances even if, through the use of superior force, the United States could keep the canal open.

Farnsworth and McKenney, who are academic observers, cover much of the same ground as Jorden. *U.S.-Panama Relations* also traces the earlier history that set the stage for the canal negotiations. They include a social science analysis of the problem in terms of linkage politics (which they define as recurring patterns of behavior originating in one system that are

reacted to in another). These linkages are between foreign and domestic policy systems in the United States and Panama and between the domestic political systems of both countries. Other linkages involve the Organization of American States and world opinion in regard to the canal issue. They conclude that the internationalization of the issue, masterminded by Torrijos, was instrumental in bolstering the Panamanian position vis-a-vis the U.S. The authors end their interesting and insightful analysis with a question. Since the economic advantages of the new treaty arrangements have not brought about Panama's rapid economic development, as some had hoped, will that country be content to wait another 15 years before gaining control of the canal in the year 2000? If not, the United States may face a new crisis before the end of the century.

Both books reprint the full treaty texts, and Jorden gives the complete statement of the late John Wayne who—some readers may be surprised to learn—was a staunch supporter of the treaties and took his former acting colleague, Ronald Reagan, to task for opposing them. Jorden also pays warm tribute to his staff, in contrast to the brickbats sometimes cast at the Foreign Service by non-career ambassadors. "I have been part of or have observed closely countless groups of people in many places over the years. I have known no group who collectively surpassed the men and women of the Foreign Service in intelligence, ability, dedication, or sense of national purpose." While both books are interesting and insightful, *Panama Odyssey* is likely to remain the most authoritative version of the negotiations, at least from the U.S. perspective, for the foreseeable future. —JOHN J. CROWLEY

The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation. *By Stephen M. Meyer. The University of Chicago Press, 1984.*

The "actual cause of proliferation decisions is politico-military motivation," says author Stephen M. Meyer. "Technology is not a cause of nuclear proliferation, it is an aid." Meyer arrives at this conclusion after an exhaustive empirical analysis covering the countries known to have developed nuclear weapons, as well as those that may have decided to follow that course or that have advanced nuclear technology but are believed not to have made a proliferation decision.

This is a good primer on the process of nuclear weapons proliferation. A social science dissertation revised for publication, it suffers from faults characteristic of that genre. Still, the analytical rigor and comprehensiveness of this work more than compensate for its shortcomings in style.

Although it is not directed at influencing policy, *Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation* has obvious policy implications. While the author recognizes the ability of technical controls to "buy time" by retarding the pace of nuclear spread, he also argues—plausibly—that "trying to prevent the emergence of new nuclear-weapons countries solely through the control of technical means amounts to treating the symptoms while ignoring the disease." The author detects many distinct motivations underlying proliferation but finds that having a nuclear ally has the greatest dissuasive effect on a possible entrant into the nuclear club. This should be a sobering conclusion for those who would have the United States reduce or restrict its alliance commitments: While reducing our immediate exposure, the ultimate effect could well be to produce an even more dangerous world, with significantly more states having nuclear weapons.

This book has other strengths besides its systematic rigor. In the course of the analysis, for example, a number of misconceptions (e.g., that there is a technical need for prospective nuclear-weapons states to test a nuclear explosive device) are set to

rest. The volume includes useful appendixes, notably on the technical side of building the bomb.

—David M. Adamson

Bangladesh: *Biography of a Muslim Nation. By Charles P. O'Donnell. Westview Press, 1984. $40.*

Bangladesh: *A New Nation in an Old Setting. By Craig Baxter. Westview Press, 1984. $16.50.*

These books by retired Foreign Service officers who served in Dhaka—one as consul general in the early 1960s and the other as political counselor in the late 1970s—were published simultaneously. Although they cover much the same ground, each provides a useful and illuminating account of Bangladesh's recent history and its situation in the early 1980s.

Although unified Pakistan's eastern section contained about half the country's population, the national leadership consistently sought to maintain the west's predominance—in the distribution of development funds, recruitment of the armed forces, allocation of political power, and the fateful language question. As both books show, the westerners' handling of the Bengalis was of such monumental ineptness as to make one wonder if there was some suicidal urge in the Pakistani psyche. Perhaps a geographically divided Pakistan was misbegotten from the start. Only in its foreign service did Bengalis do well, and their capabilities have proved to be one of Bangladesh's few strengths in the post-independence period.

Bangladesh's own brief but troubled history is evidence that even a country with a homogeneous population can have too much politics—if not too much democracy. *Biography of a Muslim Nation* speaks of "the strenuous personal politics so dear to the Bengalis," which independence hasn't lessened. It is Bangladesh's misfortune that politics *per se* is so much more interesting to the urban population than economic development.

Both O'Donnell's *Biography* and Baxter's *A New Nation in an Old Setting* are more sympathetic to Bangladesh's Major General Zia Rahman, former chief martial law administrator and president, than to its first prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (known as "Mujib"), whose initial doctrinaire socialism proved an economic disaster. In fact, little favorable seems to have been written or said about Mujib since his demise, whereas Zia appears to be genuinely missed. His eventual successor, General Ershad, seems bogged down in the political quagmire, reimposing martial law in March and canceling the parliamentary elections. Both authors are guarded in their hopes for the future of Bangladesh.

O'Donnell covers the trials and tribulations of U.S. policy in 1971 but adds nothing to the record. He makes some reference to the Foreign Service officers whose careers were in varying degrees shipwrecked by the veering of U.S. policy. Baxter's book, which is part of the Westview Profile series, is shorter and stylistically superior. —Alf E. Bergesen

The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel. *By Lily Gardner Feldman. Allen and Unwin, Inc., 1984. $35.*

As the jacket on this book notes, "It is difficult to imagine a less likely bilateral relationship of friendship and mutual support after World War II than one between Germans and Jews. Yet in their simultaneous efforts to establish legitimacy in the family of nations, the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel turned to each other." Aside from a chronological accounting beginning with the Luxembourg reparations agreement, *The Special Relationship Between West Germany and Israel* contains thoughtful chapters on the psychology and history of relations between the two states from 1952–82.

Unfortunately, Feldman, who teaches political science at Tufts University, muddles the account with a lengthy scientific analysis of the "special relationship" between the two and attempts to "provide a framework in the context of a general theory of bilateral ties between states." Under her definition, however, the Federal Republic also enjoys a special relationship with the German Democratic Republic, as well as one with the United States and France. Instead, the author should have devoted more space to an analysis of West German public opinion and to the economic aspects of the relationship.

Despite the tone of morality in the joint communiques and statements, economic and political factors were important in the development of the relationship. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer gave priority to the relationship with Israel and to Nahum Goldman's 1952 World Jewish Claims Conference because they could provide a basis for Germany's rehabilitation into the family of nations, and, at the same time, German economic, military, and technological aid were important for Israel's survival. Not until 1954 did the German government begin the process of indemni-

fying the 10,000 Jews who returned to participate in the postwar reconstruction. Only recently have West Germans begun to distinguish between their national obligation to acknowledge through continuing educational efforts the brutal immorality of the Third Reich and their international political role, which may require criticizing the policies of Israel.

West German-Israeli relations are a difficult topic for scholars who must cut through much prejudice and rationalization. Despite its weaknesses, Feldman's book is a *sine qua non* for policymakers and other students of Germany.

—CHARLES R. FOSTER

Soviet Policy toward Western Europe: *Implications for the Atlantic Alliance. Edited by Herbert J. Ellison. University of Washington Press, 1983. $30 cloth, $14.95 paper.*

Soviet Strategy toward Western Europe. *Edited by Edwin Moreton and Gerald Segal. George Allen & Unwin, 1984.*

These two comprehensive collections cover the same ground but quite differently. *Soviet Policy* consists mostly of detailed, often pedestrian, and sometimes rambling accounts by American authors of Soviet political, economic, and military policies toward Western Europe. *Soviet Strategy*, on the other hand, is an easy read, even for the general public. It comprises eight nicely delineated, often provocative, and always sophisticated analyses of Soviet policies and the determinants of Soviet military, economic, and arms control strategies. The contributors challenge standard assumptions about Soviet policy, questioning, for example, whether splitting Western Europe from the United States and getting U.S. troops out of Germany is a high priority for the U.S.S.R. Americans seeking detachment about this country's policies can profit enormously from reading what these British authors have to say about the arms control process and U.S. and Soviet policies in Europe.

Some nuggets do turn up in the Ellison volume. Joan Urban describes the complexities and frustrations the Kremlin experiences in dealing with cheeky European communist parties. Trond Gilberg presents a concise summary of Moscow's prickly dealings with Socialists and Social Democrats. Michael Sodaro plows new ground with his analysis of Soviet writings on the western alliance. And the two old warhorses, William Griffith and Pierre Hassner, paint the big picture of Soviet-European and U.S.-European relations with their customary virtuosity and verve.

The Moreton and Segal volume deals with issues that are seldom addressed by Americans, including the ability of Soviet military power to be translated into political influence, the elements of compatibility and conflict among Soviet aims in Europe, and even the commonality of Soviet and U.S. interests in keeping the continent divided. Its chapter by Lawrence Freedman on U.S. policies is brilliant. Karen Dawisha's on Soviet ideology and Hannes Adomeit's on Soviet decision-making offer exciting perspectives. Jane Sharp displays a keen sense of the important aspects of the neglected Soviet-U.S. negotiations on troop reductions.

Both books reveal many nice ironies: It is hard to judge, for instance, whether the Americans or the Soviets have been more upset about the obstreperous Italian Communist Party. But both also fail to take account of the European states' tendency to put their common interests first (*Soviet Strategy* is less at fault here). The United States and U.S.S.R. must now recognize, as Hassner puts it, "that the existence of the two alliances and the pan-European dimension are not two mutually exclusive alternatives." The question is not whether there will be a Finlandization, but who will do it to whom.

—ROBERT GERALD LIVINGSTON

The Arabian Peninsula: *Zone of Ferment. Edited by Robert W. Stookey. Hoover Institution Press, 1984. $22.95(cloth), $10.95 (paper).*

Gulf Security into the 1980s: *Perceptual and Strategic Dimensions. Edited by Robert G. Darius, John W. Amos II, and Ralph H. Magnua. Hoover Institution Press, 1984. $21.95(cloth), $10.95(paper).*

Anyone writing about current developments in the Middle East faces the problem of getting the book to the reader before it is hopelessly outdated by constantly changing events. These two works, published by the prestigious Hoover Institution, are well-written and well-researched, but have not overcome this problem.

Each book contains about a half-dozen separate, self-contained articles similar to those one would find in *Foreign Affairs* magazine. The most useful segments are those containing relatively permanent background data, such as that by Calvin H. Allen Jr. in *The Arabian Peninsula* on "Oman and American Security Interests," which discusses the position of various members of the ruling family and reminds the reader that Sultan Qabus has no designated successor. Conversely, John W.

Amos's chapter in *Gulf Security in the 1980s* on the Iran-Iraq war, although packed with useful background information, suffers from being somewhat outdated—its latest material was obtained in 1982. In sum, these volumes are highly recommended as background reading on the subject, but are of less value to the general reader. Those seeking more recent information are advised to consult their daily newspaper; those looking for a full analysis must await works yet to be written.

—Benson L. Grayson

Representing America: *Experiences of U.S. Diplomats at the United Nations. By Linda M. Fasulo. Praeger, 1984. $27.95.*

The author of *Representing America,* a fellow at the Institute for Research in History, interviewed 32 Americans who served as ambassadors and delegates to the United Nations over the last four decades. Chronologically organized into five parts—Truman-Eisenhower, Kennedy-Johnson, Nixon-Ford, Carter, and the Reagan years to publication—it contains the views and insights of both liberals and conservatives, Democrats and Republicans.

A few quotes illustrate the major conclusions reached by some of the interviewees on the importance of the United Nations in maintaining international order and fostering economic development. According to Arthur Goldberg, "The U.N. is not what its founders expected. But the founders expected too much." Dean Acheson expressed the same opinion in 1945. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, known for handling his duties as ambassador aggressively, says, "It's a very important place." George Bush states that he was originally very critical of the world organization, which he thought fell short of its goals, but "after I served there, my views changed." Jeane Kirkpatrick believes that U.S. influence has been frittered away and "that it reflects U.S. incompetence in multilateral politics." And Andrew Young states that the United Nations "in fact only works when the United States gives leadership."

After a foreword by Elliot L. Richardson, the author introduces each period with a concise overview and offers interesting portraits of the persons involved. She also points out that public opinion polls show that a great majority of Americans believe that the United States should remain in the United Nations, and the world body should stay here. She suggests that we reassess the role we expect the United Nations to play in today's world, both now and in the long-term.

If we want to use the world organization more effectively, she says, we must decide how it relates to U.S. policy and alter our behavior. We will have to give U.N. affairs a higher priority in the government, especially in the State Department. We should provide continuity in staff to our mission there and bring it closer into decision-making. We should pay more attention to multilateral diplomacy in the training of our diplomats. Last, according to Fasulo, there must be greater input from the public. We need a national debate "of the sort that has developed over the issue of nuclear weapons." The debate would be designed partly to provide information. For instance, although it is frequently charged that U.N. votes go against the United States, this has only sometimes been true, and as some interviewees noted, for many years it was the United States that enjoyed an automatic majority. Policymakers, political scientists, historians, and leaders of civic organizations who could stimulate a nationwide debate of these complex and important issues should read this useful volume.

—ROBERT A. BAUER

From the Think Tanks

Jamaica: *Managing Political and Economic Change. By John D. Forbes. Special Analyses, American Enterprise Institute, 1985. 48pp.* The author, a Foreign Service officer, traces Jamaica's economic and political history since independence and suggests that if that country is to recover from its recent difficulties, a way must be found to restore consensus politics and improve confidence in the economy and the political system. He also points out the importance to a successful recovery of Jamaica's maintaining good relations with the United States and warns that an anti-American element that remains in Jamaican politics could create problems if the left regains its influence on the Caribbean island.

The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and the New International Economic Order. *By Christopher Coker. Washington Papers #111, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984. 109pp.* During the last two decades, Soviet trade with the developing world has been guided increasingly by economic, not political factors. And, according to this monograph, Eastern Europe's growing reliance on imports of fuel and minerals from the Third World has contributed to a distinct lack of sympathy by the Eastern bloc for any far-reaching reforms in international trade relations such as the New International Economic Order.

China's Foreign Policy toward the Third World. *By Lillian Craig Harris. Washington Papers #112, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1984. 111pp.* This study examines China's attempts to expand its authority within the developing world. Although its limited resources, historical isolation, and lack of practical support for many Third World goals is likely to be a hindrance, China's status as a nuclear power and part of the great power triangle will allow it to play an increasingly important role in Third World politics.

Managing East-West Conflict: *A Framework for Sustained Engagement. The Aspen Institute International Group, 1984. 28pp.* In this statement, a number of eminent Europeans and Americans—including Helmut Schmidt, Robert McNamara, Elliot Richardson, and Pierre Trudeau—argue that the destructive power of nuclear weapons makes it imperative that the East-West relationship be one of "sustained engagement based on strength and flexibility." They then outline several recommendations concerning arms control, security, trade, cultural exchange, and crisis management, all designed to increase contact and communication.

Soviet-American Cultural Exchanges: *Rip-off or Pay-off? By Yale Richmond. Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1984. 77pp.* This report argues that if U.S.-Soviet exchanges are to be effective in improving understanding between the two countries, they need to be insulated from the bilateral political relationship. This can be done by reducing the government role (at least that of the U.S. government) to that of maintaining a general agreement, while allowing the details of each exchange—the content, participants, and agenda—to be worked out between the relevant organizations on both sides.

Trade in Services: *A Case for Open Markets. By Jonathan David Aronson and Peter F. Cowhey. Competing in a Changing World Economy Project, American Enterprise Institute, 1984. 39pp.* Trade in services has become, deservedly so, an important issue in both U.S. foreign policy and multilateral negotiations. The existing structure of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade does provide an adequate mechanism for working toward free trade in service, although the new rules should provide a limited safety net for countries as they accept less regulation in the international service economy.

DIPLOMACY

The Price of Terror

By U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

Not the least unhappy consequence of the wave of terrorism sweeping so much of the world has been the damage it has done to the Foreign Service's ability to maintain constructive relations with the citizens of the countries where it serves. It is a sad commentary on the collapse of international morality that although there was not a single case of a U.S. diplomatic or consular representative abroad being murdered for political reasons during the first 175 years of our history, in the last 20 years, 70 (including six ambassadors) have been killed and many others wounded, abducted, or held hostage. The price exacted by this terrorism and the measures taken to prevent it have now reached the point of interfering with the basic duties of the Foreign Service.

The United States, while maintaining that the primary responsibility for protecting diplomatic and consular establishments and their personnel rests with the host country, has properly sought to improve the security of its own people abroad by a wide range of physical and other measures. When terrorist acts were directed primarily against individuals, particularly ambassadors, it was relatively easy to put into place measures such as bodyguards and armored cars that would give better protection to such officials. As these measures became effective, terrorists began launching massive attacks against whole structures, with heavy loads of explosives carried in automobiles or trucks, often driven by suicidal fanatics. This phenomenon has added the word "car bomb" to our diplomatic vocabulary. (In March 1965, when I was in charge of our embassy in Saigon, we were the victims of the first attempt to use this tactic against an embassy. While only five American and local employees were killed, three police guards and 15 bystanders died, and 190 employees and bystanders were wounded.)

The only effective defense against such attacks has been to erect usually unsightly physical barriers at vulnerable points outside our buildings. In some high-risk areas, entirely new structures are being designed and constructed at a speed hitherto unknown in our building program. The need for such protection is not, of course, unique to the Foreign Service. In Washington, it has been applied not only to the Department of State, but to many other government buildings, including the Capitol, the White House, and the Supreme Court. Other governments have also felt obliged to carry out similar building programs.

Another defense against terrorism would be to acquire prior information on planned or imminent attacks so measures could be taken to forestall them. This usually requires a close liaison with the local authorities and their unstinting cooperation, as well as the exchange of information with other posts and agencies. Happily, in an increasing number of cases, we have succeeded in obtaining such information and using it to prevent or deter attacks.

All these efforts require money and personnel. Fortunately, with Secretary Shultz in the forefront, the department has been able to obtain substantial increases in funds and staff for this mission. Thus, the department has not, as was so often the case in the past, been required to meet this increased need from already strained resources.

There is no denying, however, that one result of all these security measures is to restrict the life blood of our representation overseas—the knowledge and judgment that come from a continuing and intimate association with the people and officials of the host country. Formidable appearing barriers and guards intimidate visitors and inhibit that free and easy access in which we Americans have long taken pride. Unfortunately, in some cases this is further exacerbated by a tendency in the name of administrative efficiency and economy to house all Americans in hideously unsuitable architectural ghettos. This has further discouraged easy interchange with the people of the country, while at the same time providing a high-density American target for terrorists.

Thus, no matter how courteous and considerate our Marines and local guards may be, and how well the physical barriers and defenses may be camouflaged, there is an inherent and inescapable dilemma between the demands of increased security and the concomitant demands on the posts for increased knowledge and better judgments about the local scene. The degree to

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U. Alexis Johnson, a retired career Foreign Service officer, served as ambassador at numerous posts and as under secretary of state for political affairs.

which this dilemma can be resolved—if at all—will vary with each country and region. There is no escaping the fact that there must be some compromise between the conflicting requirements of absolute security and of uninhibited relations with the residents of the country and visiting Americans. Inherent tension between the two requirements demands a high degree of understanding and respect for each others' responsibilities.

This is not a conflict we are likely to resolve. Even as we are making it more difficult for others—even friends—to enter our embassies and consulates, it is becoming no easier for American diplomats to leave their compounds and mix securely with others. Car bombs may capture the biggest headlines now, but the assassinations and abductions from the street corner that first prompted today's massive security drive are still there. In some regions, the restraints on the Foreign Service are such that it can no longer maintain the wide range of contacts and information needed to make an adequate assessment of that country's situation. We may no longer have the knowledge required to make judgments about something as vital and fundamental as a government's stability. Because we cannot entirely solve this conflict between the needs of security and of knowledge, we must learn to cope with it and look for new and novel ways of gathering information.

I have no concern that average Foreign Service employees are going to give too much emphasis to security. If they have erred, it has usually been in the opposite direction. The record shows that the Service is staffed by people with great personal courage. Rather, I would be concerned at possible overreaction by the news media and the public to the inevitable casualties that will continue as long as the present species of terrorism exists. All of us must understand that there can be no absolute security without surrendering to the objectives of the terrorists—that is, the withdrawal of all of our people back to a "Fortress America." This, I am sure, no American, and certainly no member of the Foreign Service, wants to do. We are engaged in a test of will, and when those who support and are engaged in terrorism see that our will is not going to flag, they may abandon this tactic. Until then the United States must do all it can to discourage terrorists from the belief that they can succeed. □

Diplomacy is a bimonthly column that explores the mechanics of policymaking and Foreign Service life as viewed from the perspective of Foreign Service professionals.

CLIPPINGS

Diplomatic Security

"The State Department has already installed state-of-the-art security barriers to protect its underground garages from car bombs. The department has already received congressional approval to spend more than $110 million on new security programs. But an additional request for about $240 million will go to Capitol Hill in a few weeks.

"Some of the money is being used to train 82 new security officers at a federal law enforcement training center in Georgia, and to hire 30 new security engineers to design and install barriers and other security devices around the world.

"Among the new additions will be bullet-proof glass for the State Department's cavernous diplomatic lobby and shatter-resistant plastic film for the rest of the department's windows. Other improvements will include more metal detectors, an emergency alarm system, and new locks for State Department doors. Better barriers will be installed outside the department as well.

"But most of the money will be spent on improving security at American embassies abroad to prevent recurrences of the bombings which have killed hundreds in the Middle East and injured people elsewhere. ...Much of the money goes to relocating embassies to safer, less accessible locations."

Ralph Begleiter on CNN News, January 26

"The Reagan administration withdrew an undisclosed number of American embassy personnel from Lebanon because of the 'unsettled situation' there....

"Referring to the official American presence in the war-torn land, [a] U.S. official said, 'It's down about as low as you can go and still keep functioning as an embassy.' "

Wall Street Journal, March 15

"There may be some who think it unbecoming for the United States to pull its embassy personnel out of Beirut in the face of terrorist threats, but we're not among them. We are glad that all but a few were taken to safety in Cyprus last week, and we wouldn't be embarrassed if the remaining token presence were removed until the immediate danger is past....Administration officials have said they want to keep some official presence in Beirut no matter what, because they don't want the United States to appear weak and ineffectual. That desire is understandable, but fails the simple logical test of comparison with the alternative: If the embassy in Beirut is bombed, then the country will still look weak and ineffectual—and our representatives there will look dead."

Atlanta Journal, March 18

"The United States' antiterrorist program is disorganized and probably unable to respond quickly to attacks on U.S. embassies, members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee said yesterday. Members of the panel's subcommittees on arms control and international operations expressed alarm on hearing a report by Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, director of the State Department's counterterrorism and emergency planning office.

"Oakley said a reported reduction in terrorist incidents in the United States last year was partly a result of the work of his office, but he acknowledged that his organization is suffering from 'internal confusion' and that 'we haven't been able to get our act together.'

"Soon afterward, the ambassador angered panel members when he said that before an antiterrorist plan can be implemented, his office must consult with other State Department agencies, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the White House.

" 'Who in heaven's name is in charge here?' shouted Representative Lawrence J. Smith (D-Florida), a member of the international operations subcommittee....'It seems like everyone's in charge but no one's responsible in your office,' [Representative Daniel A. Mica (D.-Florida)] said. 'Maybe we have to go back to the drawing board and look at the idea of whether we need this office or it should be streamlined.' "

Associated Press, March 6

"The State Department has undertaken what is likely to be the biggest embassy-building program in the history of the United States after learning that more than half of the 262 U.S. embassies and other diplomatic posts do not meet minimum security standards established after last September's terrorist bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in Beirut.

"A high-level advisory panel headed by retired admiral Bobby R. Inman, former director of the National Security Agency, reported to Secretary of State George P. Shultz last month that 139 of the overseas posts must be replaced or 'significantly overhauled' to meet the new standards.

"According to initial State Department estimates, it will cost $3.3 billion to bring these embassies and consulates up to the new standard....About two-thirds of the funds would be needed in the volatile Middle East."

Don Oberdorfer in the Washington Post, March 2

The Bear's Ears

"The bugging of about a dozen IBM Selectric typewriters in the U.S. embassy in Moscow was a severe embarrassment for Washington. Security officials were told about the bugs several months ago. They are still not certain how long the electronic penetration lasted—most think the devices were operational for more than a year—or how clearly the Soviets were able to receive the signals given off by their planted transmitting devices. After a briefing from administration officials last week, a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee said, 'The loss was substantial.'

"The Soviets apparently placed sensors of some sort inside the workings of certain typewriters....The most damaging discovery was that at least some of the compromised typewriters were situated in the embassy's political section."

Time, April 8

The World's Ears

"The balance of radio power between the United States and the Soviet Union is much more favorable to Moscow than the balance of military power. But the Voice of America and its partners, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, still do fairly well. ...But...technology changes the balance, and money makes a difference....

"On Capitol Hill, where lawmakers are trying to cut the federal budget deficit and are even rejecting President Reagan's military budget, getting appropriations for his other propaganda star war won't be easy. But fortunately it's the main war we have these days, and deserves more attention from Congress than it's getting."

James Reston in the New York Times, March 20

CLIPPINGS records statements in the media on the conduct of U.S. diplomacy and the foreign affairs agencies. Readers are invited to submit contributions from their local newspapers for consideration.

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, May 1975: "When my husband came into the Foreign Service in the early '60s, we both accepted without question the traditional role established for Foreign Service women: I was to be a gracious hostess for his representational entertaining; to rear a family in trying circumstances (compensated for by having servants and intercultural children); to learn as much as I could about the cultures and languages of our various host countries (with area and language training at FSI on a 'space available' basis and *if* I could find and afford a baby sitter); to participate in mission functions including newcomers' teas and embassy wives' meetings; to support my husband in all his professional endeavors. My reward was to be mentioned once a year in an efficiency report in a sentence which read something like, 'Mrs. Williams is a charming and gracious hostess and a great help to her husband in the performance of his duties.'

"Well, it won't wash anymore."

Carman C. Williams

Foreign Service Journal, May 1960: "At the luncheon of the Foreign Service wives last month, the Nominating Committee for the new Foreign Service Women's Association was introduced. Officers will be voted for and installed this month and further information on the new association will appear in an early issue of the JOURNAL. In this picture, Mrs. James Penfield and Mrs. Charles Bohlen discuss spring hats." *Service Glimpses*

Foreign Service Journal, May 1935: "The secretary of state on March 23 delivered an address over the National Broadcasting Company network concerning the vital concern to every individual among us of the international exchange of goods, pointing out that the trade stimulated productivity at both ends of the transaction....He said that we are seeking, by the trade agreements program, to persuade other countries to join us in breaking down excessive barriers to trade so that its movements may be less hampered and its volume increased." *News from the Department*

10-25-50 records JOURNAL *excerpts from previous issues.*

FOREIGN SERVICE
DESPATCH

Judging Ambassadors

An experiment is underway to establish a non-governmental procedure to screen ambassadorial appointees for competence. Six members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which rules on ambassadorial nominations, have declared their interest in receiving evaluations of prospective chiefs of mission from a private group called the American Academy of Diplomacy, much as the Judiciary Committee uses a screening process run by the American Bar Association. Besides the six senators—Republicans Charles Mathias, Nancy Kassebaum, and Daniel Evans and Democrats Claiborne Pell, Christopher Dodd, and Alan Cranston—the idea has the support of AFSA, several prominent newspapers, and every living former secretary of state (all of whom are in the academy). At present, however, the committee as a whole has not accepted the plan, and it is firmly opposed by Secretary Shultz.

The academy was founded early in 1984 by John J. McCloy and former ambassadors U. Alexis Johnson and the late Ellsworth Bunker. The idea of a review panel had been around for several years, and one based in the White House was tried with little success in the Carter administration. When the percentage of political appointees to ambassadorial posts began to rise sharply in the first years of the Reagan administration, the idea surfaced again. Proposals evolved for a panel created by the Foreign Relations Committee or by the executive branch. It was also suggested that AFSA create such a board, but the Association rejected that idea in a 1982 editorial, declaring it was "flattered" but that it was not really comparable to the ABA, with its large nationwide membership.

At Elliot Richardson's suggestion, a group was formed on the model of European academies, with as many as 75 members, all of whom are elected for life. Most of the members are former ambassadors, and most of them have served in at least two posts as chief of mission or equivalent. They are divided almost equally between career and non-career diplomats, "not by design but by circumstances," said David Newsom, the academy's president. In addition to the ambassadors, there are the former secretaries of state—Dean Rusk, William P. Rogers, Henry Kissinger, Edmund Muskie, Cyrus Vance, and Alexander Haig—and several others selected for their expertise in politico-military affairs or policy planning.

Ultimately, the academy plans to engage in projects designed to "increase public understanding and appreciation" of diplomacy and to conduct studies on the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and improving diplomatic representation. At present, it is trying to get its review procedure established. The screening process, which got underway in early April and at first will be limited to appointees—both career and non-career—who have never headed a mission, will be conducted by former Assistant Secretary William E. Shaufele, who will draw from the academy membership as needed. His panels will conduct interviews and review biographical data. Final assessments will be forwarded to the six senators over the signatures of a non-career appointee of a Democratic administration, one of a Republican administration, and a career ambassador. Those persons are the academy's chief officers, Chairman Sol M. Linowitz, Vice President Shirley Temple Black, and Newsom. Unlike the ABA, no grading system will be used.

The academy hopes that this screening will augment the search for demonstrated competence in ambassadorial appointees and aid the Senate in carrying out its constitutional role of providing advice and consent in appointments. While some nominations have been withdrawn before they have reached a vote, Foreign Relations has rarely rejected an ambassadorial appointee—"a casual and indulgent attitude" permitting "the confirmation of candidates provided their qualifications are somewhat better than Caligula's horse," AFSA said in the 1982 editorial.

A similar problem plagued the judicial system following World War II, leading the ABA to establish its Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary in 1948. Initially, it met with resistance, but every president since Truman has used the committee and cooperated by providing needed information. The academy proposal too is meeting initial resistance. While the Foreign Relations staff is to provide names of appointees "on a timely basis," most of the committee's members, including Chairman Richard Lugar, have not accepted the plan. Linowitz began the campaign to achieve acceptance in the legislature by contacting Mathias, the Maryland Republican known for his frequent but unsuccessful bills to limit non-career appointments. Mathias in turn was able to recruit five of his colleagues. "It didn't take much persuasion," an aide to the senator told the JOURNAL. "It was a good idea."

"We don't think it's a good idea," was the State Department's response. "Secretary Shultz is opposed to the initiative." While State will not forbid nominees from undergoing the screening, "it would be against the department's policy." The reason? "The constitutional and traditional Senate confirmation process is clear, and we will continue to abide by it fully." The same view was expressed by Lugar's spokesman, Mark Helmke: "The senator is opposed to that idea," he told the JOURNAL. The Constitution and Senate rules give authority on ambassadorial appointees to the committee, he said, "and that's where it should stay." Under the Constitution, the process for appointing and confirming ambassadors and Supreme Court justices is the same.

"Naturally we would have very much preferred the support of the department," Newsom told the JOURNAL. There are practical as well as political reasons for that. Though Justice has furnished extensive information to the ABA panel for years, State has refused to provide "personal information" other than that in the public domain or released through the Freedom of Information Act, claiming to do so would be a violation of the Privacy Act. That makes the academy's job more difficult. Newsom is pleased with the acceptance the idea has received to date, however, saying, "This is not a confrontational exercise; it is designed to fit a need many have long held for additional professional advice by those who do not have the immediate responsibility and concerns of office." He is quick to point out that the academy model is not an exact parallel of the ABA panel. "There is broader agreement on what makes a good judge than on what makes a good ambassador."

Mathias and Pell, a former Foreign Service officer, released a joint statement that the new process "will not diminish the president's prerogative in nominating ambassadors. It will not reduce the Senate's responsibility in confirming ambassadors. What it will do is assure that there is a more thoughtful and thorough consideration of the qualifications of particular candidates for specific posts." The hoped-for result: "Better qualified ambassadors and greater success in executing foreign policy."

FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH is a compendium of news about the Service. It is written by the editor and does not necessarily represent the views of the Association.

DIPLOMAT, HEAL THYSELF

The Foreign Service should stop blaming others for its problems and instead turn its efforts toward needed internal reforms

R.T. CURRAN

THE DEBATE OVER the relative effectiveness of the Foreign Service has intensified during the past 15 years, and recently there has been a tendency to blame *outside* influences alone for the Service's problems. Although each successive administration has in fact applied more and more pressure, the roots of many problems can be found *inside* the Service itself.

It is clearly wrong for an administration to attempt to exploit the diplomatic corps merely to satisfy political obligations. The Foreign Service could, however, reduce its vulnerability by correcting its internal problems. Furthermore, if the Service—with some help from Congress—does not address these problems soon, responsibility for the formulation and management of foreign policy will continue to drift to other power centers in Washington, and the State Department may become peripheral to policymaking and implementation.

The sources of the Service's current difficulties are not to be found in the quality of the highest-ranking officials or in the nature of ideas produced by Foreign Service officers. The individuals working in the grueling and thankless upper levels of the State Department are generally superior people, certainly vastly better than other countries' diplomats. Instead, the decline is due to weaknesses in the Foreign Service system. These are producing mid-level cadres who frequently negate the best, sometimes brilliant, efforts of their superiors to serve the president and the country.

These weaknesses include:

- a personnel evaluation system which is extremely weak either as a basis for assignment or administration;
- an erosion of Foreign Service discipline;
- a view among many officers in the political cone (the fast track to the top of the Service) that management is something for someone else to worry about; and
- a lack of role models: outstanding careerists whose dedication to service younger officers could emulate.

None of these will be news to anyone trying to manage foreign affairs. But it has thus far been difficult to actually do anything about them. Now that the second Reagan term has begun, perhaps a working group could be organized to develop a plan for the rapid internal reform needed to restore the Service to full strength. The plan—*not* another study—should be designed and implemented by a small group reporting to the secretary of state and consisting of representatives of the foreign affairs agencies, the National Security Council, both major party leaders in Congress, and a few distinguished individuals from the private sector.

The first step, however, in reinvigorating the Service should be a restoration of the bipartisan oversight and direction that characterized earlier periods in U.S. foreign relations. Here one should make a distinction between policy, in which there is broad public interest that is rightfully shared by many on Capitol Hill, and the management of foreign affairs, which is rather overendowed with congressional attention and is also under the purview of the Office of Management and Budget and the General Accounting Office. Obviously, having the interest of senators and representatives is not a problem—some of the most satisfying moments of my Foreign Service career involved interchanges with members of Congress and their staffs concerned with foreign affairs. What needs some moderation is the *number* of individuals who take an active role in the *management* of the foreign affairs agencies. The needs of the country and the Foreign Service will be best served by tough, exacting congressional oversight, which should be limited to a relatively small group of senators and representatives who have the confidence of their peers. Perhaps the present oversight mechanism for the intelligence agencies could serve as a model.

Once this bipartisan congressional oversight is reestablished, it will be possible to launch the internal reforms that are needed to make the Service an effective, disciplined body. Chief among these should be improving the personnel system. In particular, a meaningful evaluation system should be established. As almost all Foreign Service officers are aware, the present rating system is a shambles. In particular, employee evaluation reports are too fuzzy to permit the kind of disciplined personnel management the secretary of state needs. There is no excuse for continuing with a personnel rating system that blurs the

R.T. "Ted" Curran retired from the Foreign Service in 1984 after serving in the State Department's Executive Secretariat, as deputy chief of mission in Kabul and Rabat, as an area director in USIA, and as a management liaison officer during the consolidation of USIA and State's Bureau of Cultural Affairs. He is now a management consultant working in Germany.

The sources of the Service's current difficulties are not to be found in the quality of the highest-ranking officials or in the nature of ideas produced by FSOs; instead, the decline is due to weaknesses in the Foreign Service system itself

rated employee's qualifications and does not hold the rating officer accountable for judging too many as excellent.

A COMPLETELY NEW evaluation system is urgently needed, one that allows more precise ratings, more accountability of rating officers, and more acceptance among employees of the need for accurate ratings. Many large international firms require their rating officers to apportion their grades either among the people rated or compared with at least ten other employees in the same job category: 10 percent at the top, 20 percent as "excellent," 50 percent as "satisfactory,"and 20 percent at the bottom. There is no reason why this cannot be done in the State Department. The argument is sometimes made that an elite group such as the Foreign Servce should not have 20 percent of its members identified as "needing improvement." Yet, to remain an elite service, the corps must accept a competitive system that identifies quality on a relative scale and rewards those who can succeed. One might ask if it is fairer to continue selecting for promotion and retirement under the present system, in which boards must rely on guesswork and corridor reputations rather than an equitable grading system. Without a new evaluation system, employees' records will continue to be bland, and administration of the Foreign Service officer corps will be weak. Eventually, this might cause the Service to lose the distinction and special dedication to worldwide availability that has characterized it. There would then be only a thin line separating the Foreign Service from the Civil Service. Once the Foreign Service has the same status as the Civil Service, more top jobs than ever may be set aside for political appointees.

Another essential element in revitalizing the personnel system is rebuilding Service discipline. In previous years, this discipline allowed the secretary and the director general of the Foreign Service to assign employees where they were needed. Today, too many individuals are granted exceptions from the obligation to serve worldwide, an obligation once accepted with the privilege of a Foreign Service commission. Control over the assignments process should be returned to the secretary and the director general. The modern Foreign Service needs officers and families willing and able to serve in the difficult, demanding, and often dangerous assignments overseas. Once such people are identified they should be far more sensitively handled and much better rewarded.

Rebuilding discipline also means stemming the flow of leaks from the State Department. During my Foreign Service career, I was regularly bemused by the amount of confidential and sensitive material that leaked from State's ship (although these were not nearly as serious as leaks from the National Security Council). This issue is undeniably difficult, since some very fundamental rights and freedoms are at stake. Still, the Foreign Service, under the aegis of Open Forum or AFSA, might do well to examine the issues of discretion, confidentiality, and sensitivity and draw up guidelines. This lack of discipline has caused many top foreign affairs executives—appointed both from inside and outside the Service—to believe that they cannot count on the discretion of their support staffs.

Another weakness of the personnel system is its failure to provide senior officials with sufficient management experience. Successful FSOs, those who are named as ambassadors, tend to be political officers who have served as desk officers and office directors in Washington and political officers and counselors overseas. Many of these individuals arrive in senior ranks with little or no background in resource or personnel management. The result is that management overseas is frequently delegated to the administrative staff, where decisions on space, national employee pay, housing, equipment replacement, and budget allocations are made without the benefit of the front office's overall perspective. In Washington, management gets more attention because under secretaries are involved, but few political officers are required to serve as bureau executive officers, for example, where they would have a chance to become acquainted with budgets and their implications.

This difficulty could be easily overcome once the importance of having senior officers trained in management is accepted. More employees from the administrative cone and from program agencies such as USIA and AID could be assigned as DCMs and ambassadors. Furthermore, those persons recommended for the Senior Foreign Service should be required to serve in at least one assignment as an administrative counselor or executive officer. The subject of management experience for senior people is an old one, but more high-level attention might ensure that some reforms are actually instituted.

The failures of the personnel system are reflected in the issue of ambassadorial appointments. Certainly anyone would agree with the need for political appointees to be qualified, but the problem also applies to career officers. Because the rating system is so abysmal, even when career officers' names are submitted for ambassadorships it may be too difficult to determine whether they are qualified or not. Further-

more, not nearly enough study has been done on what makes an ambassador successful. In my own experience, a number of career officers have been given ambassadorships without adequate training in administration, public affairs, or even as DCMs. By reviewing the career of each geographic bureau's best 10 career ambassadors, one might discover the reasons behind those individuals' success. If a correlation exists between certain career experiences and successful ambassadors, those younger officers identified as potential chiefs of mission could be guided to the requisite positions.

ADMINISTRATIONS MUST ALSO do a more thorough job of examining the management and policy records of political appointees so that the foreign affairs agencies can make better use of outside talent. Setting quotas of "insiders" versus "outsiders" is important to prevent exploitation of any career service for raw political purposes, and recent game-playing at USIA with second- and third-level political appointments (those not subject to congressional review) ought to be stopped cold. But we should not disregard the issue of quality when arguing the merits of career versus political appointees.

The answer to this question of quality is, in part, better preparation for high-level appointees, both from inside and outside the Service. Another, equally important part of the answer is that the Foreign Service should make better use of all appointees. Too often, bureaucratic obstacles are placed in the way of presidential appointees—whether Foreign Service or outsiders—trying to implement White House policy. This lack of discipline and discretion is seriously disruptive to the secretary's and the department's ability to perform effectively. During my service as DCM in Morocco from 1982–84, I was struck by the resistance with which the Foreign Service in Washington treated President Reagan's choice for ambassador. He defended himself for nearly two years against a whispering (sometimes shouting) campaign from some of his backstoppers at State, a campaign that could have caused U.S. policy in North Africa considerable damage. Admittedly, the ambassador to Morocco's dramatic and highly visible operating style did make him an easy target. But if he had been given better predeparture briefings and a clearer definition of his mandate, together with more disciplined support by the State Department (support that was generally received from the ambassador's field officers), U.S. representation would have been less stressful in Morocco. Nor was this ambassador alone: numerous non-career charter members of the recently formed American Academy of Diplomacy—many of our most distinguished diplomats—have had to fend off various kinds of whispering campaigns directed against them by career officers.

Political appointees are not the only ones to suffer. When I served as DCM in Afghanistan, the ambassador, a respected career officer, occasionally had to deal with undisciplined free-wheeling by State Department desk officers. During a consultation in 1976, one of the country directors told me, "Your ambassador should leave policy matters to us." Too often Embassy Kabul's warnings about inadequate attention to resource flow problems were tabled by support officers who "knew better." When ambassadors are not well supported, they are less effective. They also lose confidence in the State Department and begin to operate via their own informal channels, thus compounding the problems.

The needs of the country and the Service will be best served by tough, exacting congressional oversight of foreign policy, which should be limited to a relatively small group of senators and representatives who have the confidence of their peers

One unfortunate effect of this decline in the quality and discipline of the Foreign Service has been the disappearance of those giants, such as U. Alexis Johnson, Charles Bohlen, or Raymond Hare, who served as role models for their colleagues. Twenty years ago, one could immediately name 10 or 15 officers on active duty who were well known for their influence, integrity, and dedication to serving the nation and the interests of the Service. Although the current leadership is undoubtedly dedicated and certainly works cruelly long hours, they do not stand out as did the leaders of 10 years ago. Nevertheless, role models are important, for they provide inspiration and continuity across the generations. We should consider why the Foreign Service is no longer producing such luminous examples of upright behavior: Is it a general trend in society or something peculiar to the Foreign Service system? Is State's position in foreign affairs weaker and thus not attracting commanding individuals? How can this situation be reversed?

The Foreign Service is in poor health right now, but with some effort it can return to full effectiveness. To start, Foreign Service employees should stop looking to outsiders as the source of their problems and instead focus on needed internal reforms. Undeniably, some outside factors—including terrorism, budgetary constraints, and bureaucratic disputes—have adversely affected the Service, but efforts to overcome these difficulties will come to naught unless we first tend to our own failings. When we have corrected the faults of the personnel system so that it once more produces well-trained and disciplined individuals worthy of the role models of the past, perhaps we will be well on the way to recovery. □

Members with a Difference

Foreign Service Nationals perform necessary services and deserve the same rights accorded to American employees

John O. Grimes

One consequence of press reports of the terrorism threatening our diplomatic missions abroad is a heightened public awareness of the personnel who staff them. Unfortunately, too often the thousands of Foreign Service National employees who serve side-by-side with their American colleagues are ignored by the media. Yet, in recent years, FSNs too have been killed in great numbers.

The Foreign Service Act, which recognizes FSNs as full members of the Service but characterizes them as "clerical, administrative, technical, and support personnel," does not adequately convey the quality of their contribution. Given the foreign affairs agencies' policy of frequent rotation of their American employees, FSNs provide the continuity and institutional memory at any diplomatic post. And their tasks are frequently far from menial: the political assistant whose analysis of a complicated system of proportional representation gives meaning to a cable; the embassy driver whose knowledge of the city's back lanes enables him to save a diplomatic courier from a hostile mob; the economic assistant whose contacts in the host government's statistical office provide unpublished information of great value.

There are other examples: the assistant who arranges for a newly arrived labor attache to establish contact with a labor leader forced underground by an authoritarian regime; the embassy driver who courageously aids the deputy chief of mission during an assassination attempt; and the commercial assistant who provides crucial guidance in contract negotiations. The day-to-day functions of FSNs often go well beyond mere support services—they make a significant contribution to the substantive work of the mission.

As a group, FSNs are very much like their American counterparts—good, bad, and indifferent in their performance. Probably the characteristic that most distinguishes them is their loyalty to the United States, even in circumstances that are often stressful or dangerous. Approximately half the Service is composed of FSNs, yet as the 1980 act is currently applied, they are members with a difference.

Unlike U.S. government employees generally, FSNs have not benefited from the reform of labor-management relations in federal employment. The Foreign Service Act may have defined one of its purposes as the establishment of "a statutory basis for participation by the members of the Foreign Service, through their elected representatives, in the formulation of personnel policies and procedures which affect their conditions of employment" and declared that "labor organizations and collective bargaining in the Service are in the public interest and are consistent with the requirement of an effective and efficient government," but Section 1002(8)(A) effectively restricts collective bargaining under Chapter 10 of the act to unions composed of U.S. citizen employees of the Service. In fact, FSNs are perhaps the only group of civilian executive branch employees in non-sensitive positions who have no representative voice in determining their conditions of employment.

What is the practical effect of this exclusion? Do FSNs have a real need for a representative voice? The short answer is: yes. A few examples will illustrate that need. At one of our major embassies in Western Europe (which employs some 400 FSNs) three successive job classification teams played havoc with an FSN's career. The first determined that his position was over-rated by two grades and ordered it reduced accordingly. Several years later a second team found that the position was under-rated and ordered an upward adjustment. Finally, three years later, a third team found the position still under-rated and ordered it returned to the grade assigned prior to the first team's visit. While grateful for the final outcome, the incumbent, whose pay and promotion prospects had meanwhile been adversely affected, was puzzled—particularly in view of the fact that the duties and responsibilities of the position had remained unchanged throughout the time. Without questioning the honesty or good will of the three teams, the incumbent felt—understandably—that all three could not have been correct. He had not had a representative input into these assessments. For him, the choice was simple—accept the contradictory findings or resign.

Section 408 of the act states that, to the extent consistent with the public interest, compensation plans for FSNs are to be based upon prevailing wage rates and compensation practices in the country of employment. But, in practice, local law and custom are frequently ignored where the consequence would be increased cost. For example, one major European post refuses to accord cost-of-living adjustments with the same frequency as is common on the local job market. That same post also declines to recognize the

Photographs furnished by State *magazine.*

John O. Grimes is a retired Foreign Service officer. His last post was as labor counselor in Paris.

Foreign Service Nationals at the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam (left) help to compile the budget while a defense attache consults with a Hungarian employee (above). FSNs provide the continuity and institutional memory at any diplomatic post.

peculiar status of certain FSN positions which, in local usage, would be regarded as a category apart, with all the attendant benefits and privileges. This kind of selective application of the local-practice guideline is the source of a good deal of dissatisfaction among FSNs. But, once again, there is no recourse.

Another post decided to convert FSNs from the Civil Service retirement system to the local social security plan. Newly hired personnel would be automatically enrolled, and incumbents would have the option of retaining their coverage or converting. As it turned out, the local plan offered a number of substantial benefits. Tempting though it was for most FSNs to convert, there was a problem. Those opting for the local plan would lose the contributions made by the U.S. government. Since a great many of the FSNs concerned were quite senior and had accrued sizeable government contributions toward their retirement, they were not in a position simply to forfeit these very substantial amounts. Thus in a very real sense they had no choice but to remain under the Civil Service system. As a consequence, the embassy now operates two distinct compensation plans, and an FSN covered by the Civil Service plan earns significantly less in total compensation. The employee can either accept this situation or resign.

BUT, EVEN WHERE consistently applied, local labor law and practice is not always a sure guide to fair and equitable treatment for FSNs. As even-handed as it may appear in the abstract, the wage policy stated in Section 408 of the act can result in shockingly shabby treatment for some FSNs. Listen to the remarks of one officer who served in Africa in the mid-1970s:

> There is a built-in inequity in the FSN system of pay. FSN pay is based on a system of comparability with wages paid in the host country. This seems a sound enough principle, designed to enable Foreign Service posts to compete for the best available manpower, while remaining roughly in line with prevailing wage rates. In all this there is, of course, the unspoken assumption that the economies in question are open and free. But, in the case of this post, restraints on wages have been imposed by an authoritarian regime, while prices have been allowed to rise. We have seen the real wages of our FSN staff decline by approximately 50 percent. Some FSNs are forced to forgo their mid-day meal. When this was pointed out to the personnel officer his reply was that a recent survey had indicated that they were paid on the local market "as prescribed by regulation." Never mind if our people were going hungry; he was covered by the regulations. Hoping to work around this blinkered view, I tried to interest senior officers, including the ambassador, in the problem—but to no avail. If Americans generally knew what is being done in their name in this regard, there would be some changes made.

The act guarantees members of the Foreign Service due process in the settlement of grievances, but Chapter 11 provides a due process procedure only for American members. Do FSNs require similar protection, or can they safely count on the even-handedness of post administrative officials, many of whom have deliberately declined the "nuisance" of establishing a formal local grievance procedure? With the magnanimous observation that their door is always open, they prefer to deal with FSN grievances in their own way, i.e., as both accused and judge. In the absence of an impartial, reprisal-proof procedure, few FSNs have the temerity to take their grievances through the "open door." Consider a few examples: an embassy driver who, after two minor automobile accidents (only one of which was due to his error), was told that, whether his fault or not, a third accident would result in his immediate dismissal. A third accident (not his

At the embassy in Kinshasa, Foreign Service Nationals' duties are as varied as working in personnel (right) to taking inventory of an automotive spare parts warehouse (above). Regulations prohibit posts from bargaining with unions of FSNs.

fault) did occur, and he was dismissed. Convinced of the futility of challenging the action, he left in disgust after eight years of service with the embassy. Or consider the case of the general services assistant, a respected senior employee with supervisory responsibilities and some 15 years' service who, without warning, was demoted and transferred to a non-supervisory job in a warehouse. He was told that the reason for his demotion was unsatisfactory performance, despite the fact that the same supervisor had only recently rated his performances as very good and, subsequently, had expressed no dissatisfaction with his work. After some hesitation, the employee decided to test the "open door." The upshot was that, while he was allowed to retain his former level of pay, he was informed that he could expect no further periodic wage increases or promotions and would have to take up his newly assigned tasks in the warehouse. The administrative officer's decision was, of course, final.

Though FSNs urgently need a procedure to ensure due process, at present no regulations require posts to establish a grievance process for them. At the same time, those regulations prohibit posts from recognizing and bargaining with unions of Foreign Service national employees.

Having seen FSNs' need for a representative voice in their working conditions and an assurance of due process, we can turn to the question of why Congress included them as "members of the Foreign Service" but subsequently contradicted that purpose by specifying that Chapters 10 and 11 of the act would apply only to American members. To interpret this as deliberate would be to insult the intelligence of the legislators. The point to note is that, while the benefits as described in Chapters 10 and 11 are prescribed only for U.S. citizen members, this in no way prohibits a separate formulation, by regulation, of these same rights for non-American members who, after all, are a majority of the total membership as defined by the act. Nowhere in the act is it stated that these fundamental rights are to be denied FSNs.

While the act itself does not formulate these rights for non-citizen members, Section 303 does delegate to the secretary of state the authority to appoint FSNs "in accordance with this act." And Section 408(b) empowers any U.S. government agency or establishment functioning abroad to administer employment programs for its foreign national employees "in accordance with the applicable provisions of this act." The Department of State operates its FSN program under the authority of Section 303. The Department of Defense, however, employs a vastly greater number of foreign nationals at its overseas establishments under the authority of Section 408(b). The secretary of state's regulations proscribe recognition of FSN unions and do not require posts to establish procedures for the resolution of their grievances. Defense, on the other hand, routinely recognizes and bargains collectively with the trade unions that represent its 1.1 million foreign national employees. Typically the agreements concluded with these unions include a grievance procedure. Thus, often in the same country—Belgium, for example—foreign national employees working at U.S. military bases enjoy the two basic rights in question while those employed at the embassy do not. Yet, both agencies operate under the authority of the same Foreign Service Act. Is such a situation tolerable?

IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SENSE, FSNs are invisible, indeed almost non-existent. Isolated from one another by distance, language, and custom, they appear nowhere as a group. They have no coordinated voice, no constituency. Consequently, they are ignored. One can look in vain through the



A commercial specialist and a consular specialist in Maracaibo compare notes (above) as do embassy drivers in Riyadh (left). Foreign Service Nationals have been consistently loyal to the United States even in stressful or dangerous circumstances.

legislative history of the act for a single reference to Foreign Service national employees. Nor does the poet laureate of the Foreign Service personnel system, William I. Bacchus, director of the Policy and Coordination Staff in the Bureau of Personnel, make any significant mention of this numerically preponderant but shamefully undervalued personnel asset in his book *Staffing for Foreign Affairs: Personnel Systems for the 1980s and 1990s*.

Currently, the FSN personnel program is administered (mainly in a budgetary sense) by a minuscule office of a dozen or so professionals many of whom are ordinary civil servants with little or no overseas service. Day-to-day personnel management of FSNs occurs at the post level. Ambassadors and other ranking officers as a rule refuse to concern themselves with the problems of FSNs, delegating that responsibility to administrative and personnel officers. Many of these attempt to deal fairly and humanely with their FSNs—to the extent allowed by the regulations. Others, harassed perhaps by a multitude of urgent problems, have little patience for their demands and grievances. With virtually absolute power over FSNs, they too often have swift recourse to their bottom line: "If you don't like it, you are free to resign." The kind of bullying and petty tyranny often practiced toward FSNs must be seen to be believed. Unfortunately, there is no effective institutional check on this behavior.

There are a number of reasons why the secretary of state should exert himself, through his regulatory power, to correct this situation. The United States is extremely fortunate to have in its employ FSNs who contribute so substantially to our representation abroad. FSNs have suffered imprisonment and, on occasion, death by reason of their employment. Statistics furnished by the State Department indicate that, of the 42 regular Foreign Service personnel killed by terrorists between 1979 and 1984, 22 were FSNs. Their sacrifice and the continued loyalty and dedication of FSNs in the face of persistent terrorist threats have earned for them the right to an officially recognized voice in their conditions of employment and the right to a fair and impartial hearing of their grievances.

The Reagan administration's four-square stance in favor of free trade unionism in the case of the Polish Solidarity movement has won popular support in the United States and abroad. The administration also won congressional approval for $18.5 million for the promotion of democracy abroad—including the promotion of free trade unions. Given this praiseworthy national posture, the secretary of state should blush at the denial to his own FSNs of the two basic employee rights discussed here.

But if due recognition for loyal service and a decent respect for consistency were not motive enough to spark a reform, consider another aspect. Following the most recent terrorist strike at our embassy in Beirut (where four FSNs lost their lives and 11 others were wounded), Congress appropriated several hundred million dollars to strengthen the security of our overseas posts. But has the secretary considered that, while the outer walls are being strengthened, his personnel policies are fostering alienation and disaffection within? One wonders if he is comfortable with this.

Reform of labor-management practices with respect to FSNs is long overdue. While it would appear that the required changes could be undertaken under the regulatory authority of the secretary, the department should propose appropriate changes in the Foreign Service Act if legal obstacles do in fact exist. Foreign Service Nationals have served silently and well. It is time now that they receive the recognition and respect they deserve. □

Movement in Metamorphosis

The apparent dormancy of the nuclear peace movement is misleading, for it is moving from the streets to Capitol Hill

Jo Ann Hardee Collinge

On the surface, the so-called nuclear peace movement has lost the vitality it had only two years ago. Even the movement's activist supporters agree that the excitement of the early 1980s has ebbed, the pace has slowed, and the future is uncertain. The idea of a nuclear freeze has not been accepted as a tenet of U.S. policy and some national leaders of that campaign now acknowledge that its value as an arms control proposal is nearly at an end.

Moreover, the rate at which new activists are emerging has slowed markedly. For example, in 1982 Physicians for Social Responsibility was recruiting medical professionals at the rate of 500 per week; in 1983 the weekly average dropped to 130; today it is between 80 and 90. At the grass-roots level, some groups that had earlier attracted fairly large local followings have disappeared altogether.

But this apparent dormancy is misleading. Even if the movement is less vigorous than it was at the height of the nuclear freeze campaign, it is still active at the grass roots and in Congress. And its impact has been substantial—not a few observers credit the movement with making arms control the central issue it was during last year's presidential campaign, and some even take credit for getting the administration back to negotiations with the Soviet Union. For policymakers and those who must explain the administration's arms control policies at home and abroad, the nuclear peace movement is still a force to be reckoned with.

Opinion polls indicate that some of the movement's basic principles are now widely accepted among the general public. A 1984 Public Agenda Foundation compilation of data showed 66 percent of Americans now believe that both the United States and Soviet Union would be totally destroyed in a nuclear confrontation (in early 1982 only 46 percent believed this); 77 percent believe their chances of survival are poor (60 percent thought this in 1981); 83 percent feel that a nuclear war cannot remain limited; 68 percent think that nuclear war is inevitable if both sides continue to build missiles instead of negotiating to get rid of them; and 92 percent agree that "the arms race can never be won, for if we did have a bigger nuclear arsenal than the Soviets, they would simply keep building until they caught up."

However, the data also reveal an ambivalence that has existed within the public for many years: a strong desire for negotiations is mixed with a deep distrust of the Soviets. As a result, 74 percent consider stringent verification measures, including on-site inspection, essential to the signing of any treaty. The public and those in the peace movement both recognize the threat posed by nuclear weapons, but they part company when considering ways of dealing with it. In simple terms, the public fears the Soviets more than the weapons, while the peace activists fear the weapons more than the Soviets.

The movement can be viewed, and is by some, as an adversarial force that limits the policymaker's freedom of action in a complex policy arena. No doubt it seems reminiscent of citizen opposition during the Carter administration that made implementation of policy more difficult in the case of the Panama Canal treaties and helped to derail it altogether when it came to SALT II and deployment of the neutron bomb.

Last June, Max Kampelman, then ambassador to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, was asked to assess whether the movement had helped advance arms control. The response from the man who now heads our negotiating team in Geneva recalls the frustration of those who faced the Vietnamese at the bargaining table while anti-war demonstrators filled U.S. streets. He replied that he could think of "a number of instances where it has hindered" U.S. policy by tempting the Soviets into thinking that they could achieve their objectives without serious negotiation. Public or congressional pressure, the Soviets hoped, would effectively restrain administration behavior without a quid pro quo. Indeed, this argument was recently used successfully by the Reagan administration in getting the House and Senate to authorize production of additional MX missiles.

Whether it be groups like the Committee on the Present Danger, which Kampelman helped to found to defeat SALT II, or the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), which conducts door-to-door campaigns against nuclear weapons, citizens questioning arms policy is a fact of democratic life with which those in the foreign policy community must contend. Moreover, many mainstream citizens joined the nuclear peace movement at the beginning of the decade because they believed relations with the Soviet Union were deteriorating dangerously and that the arms race

Jo Ann Hardee Collinge is a Foreign Service officer currently on a Una Chapman Cox sabbatical studying the peace movement at its grass roots in the Puget Sound area. Her last assignment was in the Bureau of Public Affairs.

was accelerating. If they could be convinced that both parties were bargaining in good faith, they could become a reservoir of potential public support for an arms reduction policy.

The peace movement is composed of many diverse and sometimes contending groups—to describe it as a "movement" is to simplify a complex socio-political phenomenon and imply more unity of action than exists. Among those organizations that do have national headquarters and professional staffs, coordination is attempted from time to time with varying degrees of success.

UNLIKE THE YOUTHFUL counterculture protestors of the Vietnam era, today's peace activists—especially those who first became acquainted with nuclear issues in the 1980s—tend to be middle-aged and middle class. Few are holdovers from the antiwar demonstrators of the 1960s and '70s. Many are professionals attracted to groups like Physicians for Social Responsibility and its counterparts among lawyers, educators, scientists, and those in high-technology fields. The movement even has its own military experts, like retired Admirals Eugene Carroll, a former deputy chief of naval operations now with the Center for Defense Information, and Noel Gaylor, a former commander of Pacific forces and head of the National Security Agency now with the American Committee on East-West Accord. They bring impeccable military credentials to their message that nuclear weapons make Americans less secure and that deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet arsenals are urgently needed.

In the Pacific Northwest, conservation has long been a popular issue, and many have come to a stand against nuclear weapons from environmental activism. Peace groups, such as SANE, were prominent last year in the unsuccessful congressional bid of Brock Evans, who lobbied on behalf of the Sierra Club and National Audubon Society for 10 years. Greenpeace devotes itself with equal fervor to "saving the whales" and "saving the planet" from nuclear war. And throughout the region, but especially in Oregon, opponents of nuclear power have turned their attention to its byproduct—nuclear weapons.

In the Puget Sound area as elsewhere, mainstream churches are a linchpin of the movement. They provide its moral impetus and shape its generally moderate tactics. In 1982, Seattle Roman Catholic Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen was among the protestors when the first Trident submarine arrived at its new base in Bangor, Washington. He has decried that facility as the "Auschwitz of Puget Sound" and withheld a portion of his federal income tax in protest against the defense budget until the IRS attached his salary early this year. At the other end of the train line that brings nuclear weapons to the Trident base from a Pantex factory in Amarillo, Texas, Bishop Leroy Mattisen is also an outspoken critic of his city's leading industry. And between Washington and Texas, protestors gather every time a weapons train runs; 131 were arrested along the route in February, while hundreds more observed vigils off the tracks. Another major force in local protests is the Church Council of Seattle, comprising 20 Christian denominations and 300 individual churches and parishes.

For all its middle-class support, however, the movement has failed to attract a broader segment of the public. Despite the campaign at Brown University last year to have school authorities provide students with cyanide capsules so they would not have to survive nuclear war, youth is little in evidence. Even campus peace groups tend to be composed of lecturers and professors rather than students. The less affluent, labor unions, minorities, and the business community have, as one of the movement's national leaders put it, "stayed away in droves."

But if the nuclear peace movement has a somewhat elitist cast, that is one source of its credibility with legislators, community leaders, and the media. Liberal Seattle Democratic Representative Mike Lowry particularly praises the physicians, scientists, educators, and church people for posing "intelligent arguments that force politicians" to respond to their concerns. "These aren't left-wing kooks." From the other side of the aisle, Republican Joel Pritchard, who retired this year, agrees. The movement, he believes, "had an important role in making members of Congress—making all the people in this country—put the arms issue at the top of the agenda. We in Congress had to do our homework and we became less willing to accept at face value the views of 'experts' whether it was [Assistant Secretary of Defense] Richard Perle or [PSR Founder] Dr. Helen Caldicott."

But despite its influence, both observers and activists frequently use the past tense when discussing the accomplishments of a movement which appears to have reached its zenith in 1982–83. Those were, indeed, heady years. In 1982, millions nationwide participated in marches and rallies, including at least 500,000 in New York City. Resolutions calling for a freeze on testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons were introduced in both houses of Congress. "Peace Sabbath" was observed in hundreds of churches across the country. Nine states and 227 cities endorsed the nuclear freeze in what supporters described as a "national referendum." Even advice columnist Ann Landers joined the bandwagon.

The following year, Roman Catholic bishops issued a pastoral letter questioning the morality of even possessing nuclear weapons. Respected non-partisan organizations like the League of Women Voters came out in support of the nuclear freeze, as did the U.S. House of Representatives, although in an amended form that displeased many peace activists. A record television audience watched "The Day After," which purported to depict the effects of nuclear war. At the same time, astrophysicist Carl Sagan predicted that even if only part of the U.S. and Soviet arsenals were used, it would create a nuclear winter, destroying all life on the planet. This theory has since received partial support from a National Academy of Sciences panel and a Pentagon study.

Not since the Ban the Bomb movement of the late 1950s and early '60s had so many Americans expressed fears about nuclear weapons. At that time, some national organizations were started that are still active in the movement. Since 1962, the Council for a Livable World has been raising modest sums to sup-

The movement can be viewed as an adversarial force that limits the policymaker's freedom of action; it seems reminiscent of citizen opposition to the Panama Canal treaties, SALT II, and the neutron bomb

Citizens joined the movement because they believed the arms race was accelerating; if they could be convinced that both parties were bargaining in good faith, they could become a reservoir of support

port Senate candidates who favor arms control. Last year they also began making donations to congressional candidates. Physicians for Social Responsibility was founded in 1961 in response to the strontium 90 threat posed by atmospheric testing. After the partial test ban was adopted, PSR dwindled to "a mailing list and most of that at Harvard Medical School" until its revival in 1979. In the last few years it has re-emerged as a vocal opponent of nuclear weapons with 30,000 members. Creative Initiatives, a California-based group, was founded in response to the Cuban missile crisis, but then drifted into concern with the ecology and the energy crunch. In 1982 it rediscovered nuclear weapons and adopted the name Beyond War.

SOME CRITICS HAVE PLACED a "made in Moscow" label on both the American nuclear freeze movement and the European protests against the cruise and Pershing missile deployments that helped motivate the American activists. *Reader's Digest* senior editor John Barron, writing in the October 1982 issue, said:

> It has spread like a raging fever throughout the world. From Bonn to Istanbul, Lima to New York, millions upon millions of people have joined in the nuclear freeze movement. It is...largely made up of patriotic, sensible people who earnestly believe that they are doing what they must to prevent nuclear war. But it is also...penetrated, manipulated, and distorted to an amazing degree by people who have but one aim—to promote communist tyranny by weakening the United States.

Activists, however, counter that the fuel for their fears was closer to home. Although President Carter in a 1977 speech at Notre Dame called for a nuclear freeze, including a ban on the capability to attack space satellites, it was during his administration that the peace movement began gathering force. Presidential Directive 59 gave the impression that the United States believed a limited nuclear war was feasible. Discussions about the MX basing mode and the deployment of the neutron bomb continued throughout the administration's tenure. Most alarming, relations with the U.S.S.R. began to deteriorate, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put the final nail in the coffin of SALT II.

But it was the rhetoric of the early Reagan administration, combined with its commitment to a nuclear arms buildup, that most activists credit with bringing hordes of new recruits to the movement. Harsh rhetoric about the Soviets and official pronouncements about nuclear "warning shots" made people who had ignored nuclear weapons since they hid under desks during air raid drills in the 1950s again think the unthinkable. The re-emergence of civil defense planning as a government priority enhanced fears instead of calming them, and produced that most devastating form of protest, ridicule. On the day the city council of Seattle voted to reject a Federal Emergency Management Agency evacuation plan, as many other municipalities did, it also adopted a nuclear freeze resolution.

The arrival of so many mainstream Americans in the peace movement may well have been responsible for the changes in style and tactics that appeared even as the movement swelled. For example, the leaders seemed to take the advice they frequently gave the president on dealing with the Soviets: "Cool the rhetoric." Efforts to alert Americans to the danger of nuclear weapons first centered on what activists call "the bomb run"—a graphic description of the consequences of nuclear war unaccompanied by any prescription for its avoidance. But the bomb run soon yielded to proposals for a freeze, and the rhetoric of hope replaced the rhetoric of fear.

Although peace activists claim to have lost none of the sense of urgency that has fueled public debate, some have settled into long-term programs—a definite change from the perception of imminent danger that marked earlier efforts. Beyond War, for instance, which has sent unpaid "missionaries" to 17 states, attempts to convince Americans that "war is now obsolete." This is surely a broader and longer range program than calling for a nuclear freeze or opposing specific weapons systems. Other groups have widened their agendas to include non-nuclear issues. For instance, the national freeze campaign joined in a recent Washington, D.C., demonstration that not only protested the arms race, but also opposed U.S. intervention in Central America, apartheid in South Africa, and domestic spending cuts for human services. And, within PSR, there is pressure from some members to add at least Central America to its agenda of issues.

This shift of attention toward Central American issues—and more recently, to South Africa—is particularly evident in church organizations. Many church leaders from the nuclear peace movement have been very vocal in their criticism of administration policy toward Nicaragua, and the churches have also been at the center of the sanctuary movement, providing illegal havens for those fleeing El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Church leaders have also participated in the recent protests against apartheid, especially those held outside the South African embassy in Washington and consulates across the country.

This widening of the agenda has great implications for the future of the nuclear peace movement. Academics who have followed the course of peace activism through U.S. history believe that the intense Vietnam protests diverted attention and support from efforts in the 1960s to halt the nuclear weapons race. Many activists agree and believe the current shift to concentration on Central American and South African issues has the same potential for distraction.

The primary issue of concern is not the only aspect of the peace movement that is changing. Recently there has been greater acceptance of more confrontational activities. For the first time, the national freeze campaign has adopted a policy of "condoning and supporting" members who engage in illegal activities, such as a proposed trespass at a Nevada test site in August. A member of the Freeze National Committee concedes that embracing non-nuclear issues and more strident tactics "might return the peace movement to the radical fringe rather than keeping it in the mainstream." But, activists argue, they must be concerned about "the entire fabric of foreign policy, not isolated pieces."

If the peace movement is now less of a mass appeal, single-issue group, its use of traditional ways of influencing policy may give it staying power over the long term. In particular, more attention is being paid to electoral politics, even though the movement has yet to score major victories. During last year's election campaign, the Council for a Livable World raised a record $1.5 million for Senate and House candidates who favored arms control; an impressive total even though it was spread thinly over 71 campaigns. SANE and Freeze Voter '84 were also highly visible in selected campaigns. Yet, results were minimal: only two Senate seats were gained by candidates endorsed by the peace movement and the House of Representatives was left virtually unchanged.

Electoral politics is, however, relatively new territory for most activists who, in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, shunned campaigns until 1982 and did not become involved in substantial numbers until last November. The Council for a Livable World, SANE, and the freeze campaign all hope to achieve more in 1986, when 22 Republican senators are up for re-election, as is the entire House. And in 1988, peace activists will undoubtedly work toward the nomination of a Democratic presidential candidate who can create more enthusiasm among the rank and file than did Walter Mondale, for whom their support was tepid.

Between elections, the movement will pursue its lobbying efforts. In meetings late last year, executives of the leading national organizations established their legislative priorities. If this latest effort at coordination is successful, about two dozen groups will join forces on Capitol Hill to oppose the president's Strategic Defense Initiative and put in effect a comprehensive test ban by blocking funds for underground weapons testing and missile flight trials. And, although they lost in their attempt to block 21 additional MX missiles in March, they have greater hopes of success later this year when Congress will vote on 48 more. The movement will not attempt to influence policymakers solely through the use of paid lobbyists. SANE, for instance, has developed a nationwide Rapid Response Network of 37,000 persons who can be mobilized to contact their representatives and senators before a key vote. The Professionals' Coalition for Nuclear Arms Control, founded last year, is pulling together a similar roster composed of doctors, lawyers, scientists, and others to lobby their representatives.

Despite this entrance into partisan political activity, the overall thrust of the movement remains education. PSR, for example, will spend only 20 percent of its budget on lobbying and to date has not, as a group, endorsed a political candidate. Educators for Social Responsibility, which neither lobbies nor takes partisan positions, will continue to concentrate on getting a "peace curriculum" into the schools. Recently, the MacArthur Foundation, known for its no-strings-attached grants to artists and scientists, established a $25 million fund for scholarly research into the prevention of nuclear war.

While recognizing changes in their own attitudes and activities, most antinuclear activists do give credit to the Reagan administration for softening its rhetoric about the "evil empire" and taking a more flexible approach toward arms negotiations. They welcome the president's statements that "nuclear war can never be won and must never be fought" and his assurances that deep reductions and the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons are his goals. Nevertheless, they view the resumption of U.S.-Soviet arms talks with as much skepticism as hope. Indeed, many activists see the current negotiations as a mere cover for a continued arms buildup. As a Common Cause spokeswoman says: "The administration is using the negotiations as a weapon against Congress" to get MX and Strategic Defense Initiative funding. Within the movement, a strong belief persists that too many advisers, within and outside government, still desire no real accords with the Soviets, a belief fueled by Strobe Talbott's recent book *Deadly Gambits*. Previous U.S. arms control proposals, activists argue, were so clearly unacceptable to the U.S.S.R. that their rejection could have been easily predicted.

Critics find this preoccupation with Soviet sensitivities appalling. World Without War founder Robert Pickus has criticized others in the movement for "conform[ing] to the current Soviet propaganda agenda rather than confronting it." The subjects of such charges retort that they are well aware of the failures of Soviet society and the threat the U.S.S.R. poses, but cannot influence its policies as they can those of their own government.

Some outside observers believe the nuclear peace movement is now in disarray. They view it as unable to pull its disparate elements together into a potent public force and lacking the stamina needed to pursue long-term goals. And it is true that as one church leader says: "Many people new to activism had a naive view of just how much could really be accomplished in a limited period of time. Some gave up the dream, became disheartened, disillusioned, bored, or went on to other things."

Those who remain in the movement, however, say they have a "lifetime commitment" to nuclear arms control. They will continue to operate in the political arena, both through partisan politics and lobbying efforts; promote tax resistance and non-violent demonstrations like those against nuclear arms shipments; and conduct education campaigns, people-to-people exchanges with Soviets through visits to the U.S.S.R., and symbolic projects like encircling the Pentagon with a "peace ribbon" sewn by women throughout the country. National media attention may focus on the movement from time to time, especially during such occasions as the 40th anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima this August, when major demonstrations are planned. As long as there is any hope of success at the current arms control negotiations, the movement will probably be less visible nationally than it once was. Yet, it is likely to remain just as active at the grass-roots level from which it sprang. Perhaps most important for the policymaker, the movement, with its recent emphasis on political activity, is likely to continue as an influence on Capitol Hill. The peace movement, most activists say, is far from being in decline; it is just hunkering down for the long haul. □

Perhaps most important for the policymaker, the peace movement, with its recent emphasis on political activity, is likely to continue as an influence on Capitol Hill

Learning to Lead

A political appointee discovers an ambassador's job is demanding yet stimulating

Geri Joseph

MY GIRLHOOD ASPIRATIONS never included being an ambassador. But in December 1977, when Vice President Mondale called to ask me to consider it, I was intrigued and said I would. I felt, however, it was highly unlikely that I would get the appointment. I'd been in politics long enough to know that such plums usually go to big campaign contributors. President Carter had gotten only $2000 from us.

So, when Mondale called again about three weeks later and greeted me with "Congratulations, Madame Ambassador," I thought he was teasing. I was ironing in the basement, and no ambassador worth her salt would be caught doing that. I suddenly wanted to reconsider. If Mondale noticed my unenthusiastic response, he didn't comment. He told me what I was to do next, I thanked him and promptly, half in panic, called my husband. He believed in the appointment from the beginning. "It fits with a lot of things you've been doing up to now," he said, "And besides, haven't you been telling me women have to take advantage of new opportunities, that they can't hang back?"

Despite my husband's advice, I was agonizingly ambivalent. For weeks I would wake up in a cold sweat wondering how my family would manage without me. Not one of my three grown children would be accompanying me nor could my husband. I had traveled throughout the United States a great deal on assignments for *The Minneapolis Tribune*, as National Democratic Party officer during Hubert Humphrey's presidential campaigns, and as a volunteer in a number of national organizations. But there was something about that intervening ocean that gave me a feeling of total inaccessibility—really breaking ties. I worried, too, about being female in a job historically held by males.

I was equally concerned about my non-career status. How would I be received by the people with whom I had to work—Dutch, Americans, and all those other diplomats whose governments didn't believe in political appointees. And like many women who take a step up the career ladder, I was haunted by the idea of failure and uncertain about my ability to do the job. After gritting my teeth for months, my strong belief that women have to take risks and pursue success in their careers, instead of anticipating failure, finally prevailed.

After weeks of laboring over forms and a month of briefings but no language training, I left for the Netherlands. Because the United States requires its employees to "fly America," I had to go the long route—Minneapolis to Detroit, Detroit to London, London to Amsterdam—arriving at my destination at 7:15 a.m. A group of Dutch reporters welcomed me with the usual range of questions, which my own journalism background helped me through. The Dutch chief of protocol, a rotund little man with very formal manners, was also there to greet me. Finally several members of the embassy staff, observing my drooping eyelids, whisked me off to the residence in the Hague.

I suddenly became aware of the dimensions of my new job when I walked into the huge, 10-bedroom house. The public rooms were badly in need of redecorating—just the kind of chore I detest. There was a household staff consisting of a Yugoslav, a Ghanaian, an Egyptian, and a Filipino. I realized I would have to be my own wife, managing a household at the same time as I was learning my ambassadorial duties.

There was no doubt in my mind which had to come first. I had been warned by two former ambassadors that it was essential to establish my credentials in short order. My first day in the office we held an afternoon reception at which I introduced myself to the staff of 125 Americans and 114 Dutch. I said I would be visiting each of them individually, that my door would always be open, and that I wanted to work with them to make our embassy the most effective in the Hague. It was a teamwork speech and I really meant it. In those early days, I would need them more than they needed me.

It took about a month before I felt that I was a team member in good standing. During that period, I discovered that many of my past activities had given me knowledge and skills I could depend on in this new assignment. My years as a journalist, a political activist, a volunteer, and a director of business boards had taught me more than I realized. I knew how to ask questions, listen, and rely on intuition. I also knew a lot about self-discipline and organizing my work. And I knew how to work with people, all kinds of people. I had always been a compulsive reader—especially about politics and international affairs—and it pleased me that my staff considered me a quick study.

I was very lucky to have a good collection of people making up that staff. I was permitted to choose the

This article was adapted from a graduation speech presented by Geri Joseph on June 11 at the University of Minnesota for its midcareer program on leadership.

"A group of Dutch reporters welcomed me with the usual range of questions, which my journalism background helped me through."

individuals for two jobs, deputy chief of mission and my personal secretary. For the DCM's job, I interviewed 10 men, most of whom came highly recommended. It was not an easy decision; I knew my relationship with the person I chose would be critical not only to the ambiance of the embassy but to my performance as well. I finally chose a man who, in addition to his experience and personal qualities, had a lovely sense of humor. My personal secretary was chosen from a group of four women, and the choice, largely intuitive, turned out to be one of the best decisions I've ever made. She knew how to unravel red tape, and to her the State Department bureaucracy was as familiar a structure as my home was to me.

AS AN AMBASSADOR, I was responsible for a number of constituencies. Each one added to the pressure, chaos, and fatigue of the job, but also to its interest. For starters, every ambassador has an all-important constituency of one—the occupant of the White House—to whom he or she is directly responsible. Then there was the State Department, with almost daily inquiries for information or urgent demands that the host government be told this or asked that or persuaded to do something they usually preferred not to do. There was the staff of the embassy and two consulates, with all the personnel problems and management requirements you would find in any office of about 250 people, plus a few more that go with the foreign territory. Complicating the staff picture was the fact that the State Department contingent was a tiny minority, outnumbered by the representatives of other government agencies: CIA, Commerce, Drug Enforcement, Agriculture, Defense, and so on.

Then there were the many Americans living abroad, some 15,000 of them in the Netherlands. There were business executives who had a problem or just wanted the ambassador to know they were there. There were numerous social clubs looking for a speaker, and American schools and sports clubs. I talked to parent-teacher associations, threw out first baseballs, and went to scores of monthly meetings. And there were my diplomatic colleagues—about 70 ambassadors in the Hague. When you arrive, protocol demands that you pay a courtesy call on each. Doing your job requires that you routinely keep in touch with those who represent countries particularly close to the United States or in which we have a special interest. Add to all of the above: Dutch business people with investments in the United States, the cultural community, Dutch educators, and of course, visiting congressmen and other U.S. government officials. And one of the most important constituencies of all is Dutch government officials and political party leaders.

Within the embassy, the ambassador is everybody's boss and is to be consulted and informed on all key matters; the ambassador's decision should prevail. For example, the CIA section of the embassy made two requests. First, they wanted to increase the number of their agents. Second, they asked to "hide" several of their people in other divisions. This is not an uncommon practice nor is it a particularly secret one. Both requests were approved in Washington but, as ambassador, I had the final word and it was "no." The CIA staff was already fairly large for its mission and for the size of the country. Further, I could not see the value—and I *could* see the harm—in attempting to "hide" agents from a government as open and friendly as that of the Netherlands.

In several other matters, large and small, I followed my own instincts against staff advice. I insisted upon two hours twice a week for Dutch lessons, and I visited programs and projects in fields where I had longtime concerns. My staff was quite unsettled when I visited places such as a new women's prison in Am-

"While we were strongly urging the Dutch government to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, some 500 demonstrators protested our immigration policies in front of our embassy one afternoon."

sterdam, a facility for the elderly mentally ill, or a program for juvenile delinquents. But they came to see that we all benefited from these visits because we learned much about Dutch attitudes and the horrendous cost of their welfare state. In turn, the Dutch interpreted my visits and language lessons as reflecting a genuine interest in their country and welcomed me in a most heartwarming way.

My job, of course, was more than making visits, throwing out baseballs, or making the rounds of social functions. There were two situations that made it particularly difficult. During my years in the Hague, NATO's decision to deploy nuclear weapons in five Western European countries, including the Netherlands, created deep controversy. The coalition government, clinging to a slim and unpredictable margin of support, kept hoping the opposition would just go away, even as the peace movement grew stronger. It was impossible to persuade government officials to discuss the subject openly and present their position in a constructive way. While the prime minister assured me of the government's support, he and other officials kept silent and wanted us to do the same.

It was my job to inform them that they were asking the impossible and that we intended to hold forums and interviews and generally speak out on the subject. We found a number of Dutch leaders outside of government who joined us. The issue was profoundly emotional, making it difficult to discuss with opponents, but we tried with members of parliament and various representatives of the peace movement. It was a hard test for my patience as well as for the remnants of my high school debating skills. If we didn't change many minds, at least we earned their respect.

We also did not create a rift between the Dutch and U.S. governments because there was no name-calling, no finger-pointing, and no accusations. We openly recognized the Dutch political dilemma and expressed our appreciation for the influence they already had exercised in NATO councils. They had been key participants in the decision to hold arms control negotiations simultaneously with preparations to deploy. If the negotiations were successful, the deployment would stop.

The controversy brought to the fore more anti-Americanism than I realized existed in the country. For the most part, it was a generational problem; those under 45, who had little or no memory of World War II or its aftermath, considered the United States and the Soviet Union nearly equal menaces, powerful giants trying to gain dominance at great risk to the "peace-loving" world. What bothered me—and I did not hestitate to express my objection—was that the criticism directed at these two giants was decidedly lopsided against the United States. In fact, we were frequently attacked for our human rights behavior.

For example, at the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—a human rights violation of gigantic proportions—a story appeared in a Dutch newspaper about our immigration policy toward homosexuals. While we were strongly urging the Dutch government to condemn the Soviet action, 132 of the 150 members of parliament debated our policy and signed a petition condemning it. Some 500 demonstrators paraded in front of our embassy one afternoon. We received scores of bomb threats. Our Amsterdam consulate was picketed and had windows broken and paint thrown on the building. Several weeks later, when the Dutch government finally responded to the Soviet invasion, the demonstration before the Soviet residence was a pale, unemotional affair compared with the spectacular one we had merited.

Several party leaders asked to meet with me at the time, but I was so angry I put the appointment off for a few weeks. When they finally came to the office, they were appropriately uncomfortable. It's rare that I lose my temper, but even after two weeks' wait, I felt

they deserved a tongue lashing. I reminded them the law is rarely enforced and there are ways for homosexuals to ensure they will not be turned back from entry ports. I also mentioned that the United States has large and active organizations working for gay rights and that homosexuals hold public office and are an influential pressure group. "How could you possibly give us priority criticism over the Soviet Union?" I demanded. They didn't have an answer and, several days later, they told my political attache that I was right to have been so angry. Sometimes losing your temper at the right time can be useful, but it ought not to become habit-forming.

THERE WAS ONE other situation that certainly put me to the test. It is one that increasingly confronts Foreign Service officers, a number of whom have been killed or wounded by terrorists. One doesn't usually associate terrorism with the Netherlands. I had been briefed, of course, and both the residence and the embassy had locks, alarms, barriers, and an occasional big police van parked at the curb. But for most of my time at the Hague, I was casual about security. I walked the two miles to the embassy when time and weather permitted. On free Sunday mornings, I rode my bicycle through the dunes or along the marvelous bike paths. Sometimes I drove my car to the tennis courts, about a 20-minute ride from the residence.

Everything changed about two months before I was scheduled to return home. Dutch security officers informed us that a group opposed to U.S. actions in El Salvador had voted to kidnap the U.S. ambassador. The officers were very concerned. Dutch security agents are permissive in the extreme toward protest behavior so, if they said there was a problem, there was a problem. From that moment on, I was always accompanied by three guards carrying machine guns. My every departure and arrival at the embassy was recorded. I was urged to be unpredictable, to follow no set schedule. You never know what a creature of habit you are until you must change your ways, driving to the office by varying routes, leaving for work at different times.

My first reaction was fear. The thought of being kidnapped interfered with my sleep and my digestive system. After a few days, a kind of icy calm took over. It was dehumanizing and intimidating to be regarded as a symbol and not as a person. I fought off those feelings by doing my job with determination. Not an appointment was canceled nor function unattended. I felt strongly that, political appointee though I was, my behavior must not disgrace my Foreign Service colleagues or myself. I do not look back on that time with pleasure, however, and for months after I came home, I was suspicious of any car that pulled up alongside mine.

At its core, leadership is lonely and stressful. Even though I strongly believed in consultation and consensus and practiced them both, in the end many decisions were mine alone, and the issues were rarely easy. But there is compensation for that loneliness. If you find it exciting to test yourself against a challenge, if you enjoy power but are sensitive to using it responsibly, then leadership, particularly on behalf of your country's interests, can bring great satisfaction.

When I arrived in the Netherlands, a journalist welcomed me with a particularly nasty column about my inexperience in diplomacy and my non-career status. The column irritated me because I was more journalist than ambassador, and I felt she had been journalistically unfair. She knew nothing about me, had made no effort to find anything out, and had chosen to write from ignorance and bias. When I left, she wrote another column. I occasionally glance at its complimentary phrases to remind myself that leadership is worth the effort. □

"After a terrorist threat, I was always accompanied by three guards carrying machine guns. My every departure and arrival at the embassy was recorded. I was urged to be unpredictable, to follow no set schedule."

THE JOURNAL

Quest for a

At the turn of the century, when consulships were given as presidential favors and politicians sometimes had literary axes to grind, and when the elite complained of the United States' lack of culture, George Horton, ex-consul, sought re-entry into the consular service. The methods used to re-instate him seem colorful and novel when compared with today's procedures.

NANCY HORTON

GEORGE HORTON, a scholar of Greek and Latin and renowned translater of Sappho, satisfied a lifelong yearning to be on classic soil when he obtained the post of consul to Athens in 1893. After a change of administration forced him out of office, he returned to his home in Chicago a contented man and resumed his career as a successful journalist and novelist. A member of that literary movement known as the "Chicago Renaissance," he was referred to as the best reviewer of the West. Edgar Lee Masters and Theodore Dreiser both acknowledged his support of their early work; Horton had pushed Dreiser's *Sister Carrie* despite the controversy it was arousing.

In 1903, a tragedy in his personal life impelled Horton to leave Chicago and seek re-entry into the Service. The man of letters lamented that, at the turn of the century, consulates were often purely political prey. "Saloon keepers, broken-down preachers whose congregations were tired of them, and political henchmen were apt to be appointed," he wrote. He recalled that a consulate on the Syrian coast was presided over by a former saloon keeper who opened an American bar just across the street from the consulate; his usual greeting was "Well, gentlemen, what'll it be, an invoice or a cocktail?"

President Theodore Roosevelt was getting ready for an intensive tour of the West when Horton's case was brought to his attention. George Lodge, a poet and son of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who also acted as his father's secretary, approached the president about re-appointing Horton. Although the senator was also interested in Horton's case, it was quite fitting for his poet son to make the appeal for the appointment on the strength of Horton's literary achievements. Roosevelt had made a point of acknowledging writers and often invited them to the White House. Ironically, Horton later found out the State Department considered it a sign of inefficiency at the time if one of its members wrote books. In any case, Roosevelt told Lodge that it would assist him in his decision to have letters of recommendation concerning Horton, which he could study on his return.

George Lodge obtained the letters of recommendation, with the help of Mitchell Carroll, professor of classical philology at Columbian University (now George Washington University). The letters were mostly from university presidents and professors of Greek. Simultaneously, Francis Fisher Brown, publisher of Horton's book *In Argolis*, was sending copies to senators and heads of university classics departments. In today's context, it seems remarkable that a book such as this was cited as a compelling reason to place a man back in public office. It was an account of Horton's experiences on a Greek island village, where he traced the customs, ballads, and folklore back to their classic sources wherever possible. It was praised for its lack of statistics and paucity of economic detail and for telling, instead, of "wanderings through lemon orchards and green lanes, with the sea in the hearing and the nightingales forgetting it is a day."

In a full-page review in *Harper's Weekly*, William Dean Howells called *In Argolis* a classic. Howells shared the popularly held view that a work of literary merit strongly qualified a man for foreign service. He commented, "I thought from my friendship with his poems that he was a singularly fit man to send as consul to Athens, and I felt when he was removed that it was one of those prodigious official errors to which the tradition of our system lends itself."

Many endorsements were flowing in, in response to Lodge's request. One professor wrote that he heartily supported Horton because the consulship at Athens ought to be reserved for someone who could assist scholars at the American School for Classical Studies there. "The commercial duties of the consul will naturally be performed by the vice-consul at Piraeus," he concluded, displaying great naivete about the position in question, for the consular duties in Athens involved an extensive amount of commercial work, from statistics on pig iron to research on Greek cheeses. Some newspapermen, learning of Horton's desire to re-enter the Service, wrote on their own initiative. For example, B.D. Butler, editor and publisher of the *Omaha Daily News*, addressed himself directly to President Roosevelt:

> I am advised that Mr. Horton, the well-known author, is desirous of a consulate appointment....He is, of course, well-known to you as an author, and his successful work when consul at Athens is a matter of record in the department. I believe that such an appointment as Mr. Horton's would not only please his friends, but reflect credit upon the Service. Let us have more such men, and less professional office-seekers....

When Roosevelt returned from the West, George Lodge sent him the letters by registered mail. Although he called them "a most remarkable endorsement," a new matter emerged that threatened to negate the positive influence of the letters and *In Argolis*. It is first mentioned in a letter from William Loomis, assistant secretary of state, to William Loeb, Roosevelt's secretary. Referring to Horton's proposed re-appointment, and acknowledging that his official record was satisfactory, he added:

> But while there [in Athens] Mr. Horton took occasion to attack Secretary Hay's daughter because of some of her writings and has made himself very obnoxious to the secretary on that account...while, he

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Nancy Horton, the daughter of George Horton, is a former president of the Federal Poets. This account is taken from a biography in progress. Contributions of letters, photographs, or anecdotes concerning George Horton would be greatly appreciated and may be addressed to 3314 Dent Place, NW, Washington, DC 20007.

Consulship

> [Hay] would not say a word in this matter, and has not mentioned it to me, he would personally very seriously regret it if Mr. Horton were to be put back in the Service at this time.

Despite his disclaimer, Loomis seemed to be acting as Hay's agent when he implied that the president should weigh the secretary's displeasure against the favorable statements elicited on Horton's behalf.

George Lodge did some checking. Three days later, he explained to the president that when Horton's review appeared in 1900, Horton was not consul at Athens. He was then literary editor of the *Chicago Record Herald,* and as such was responsible for reviewing new books. Horton then tracked down the review, and he could not see how it might have caused offense. He refers to Hay as a "rising poetess" and says, "Children are likely to clamor so loudly for her verse that hereafter she may not have time for more serious efforts." In regard to her second book of verse, called *Beasts and Birds,* he wrote, "Its frequent puns betray the fact that it was intended for older readers. For instance:

'The turtle doesn't have much fun,
All fast companions he must shun.'

"I fear it is a horrid pun," Horton added. Perhaps it was this comment that would decide his fate. That such a mild chastisement should be interpreted as a personal attack on the daughter of the secretary of state, and that Horton was wrongly believed to have been his subordinate at the time of this critique and was wrongly placed in Athens when in Chicago, demonstrates the awesome power of bureaucracy to damage a career. One would think that, given the paucity of telephones and the relatively small number of people involved, communication would have been less subject to error and misinterpretation than it is today.

HAY'S BIOGRAPHER, Tyler Dennet, theorizes that the secretary, himself a distinguished poet, received vicarious satisfaction in seeing his daughter succeed as a poet and thus was excessively sensitive to criticism. According to Dennett, "Hay was trying to hand down the torch which, in his own hand, had already grown dim." Horton may also have become an unwitting pawn in the power struggle between Hay and Lodge. Hay felt that the Senate was seeking to belittle his office and to encroach upon its proper functions. He remarked that the senators thought the State Department had no other duties but to provide their friends with offices. In his diary, Hay wrote, "How winter looms before me! Every senator has promised his dozens of consulates, and Cabot is already there, yelping for loot like a Christian in China!"—a fitting simile for the man who authored the Open Door policy.

Horton's anxiety would have been abated had he realized that Roosevelt's mind was already made up when he wrote George Lodge:

> No additional letters were necessary as to Horton, for what you have said was quite enough as far as I was concerned. Besides, I liked him personally from what I had seen of him. I haven't the slightest idea what the article is to which exception seems to have been taken, and so can say nothing about justification for the feelings which seem to exist.

The president, accordingly, signed the following petition:

> We, the undersigned, respectfully present the following memorial on behalf of Mr. George Horton, former United States consul in Athens. Mr. Horton, in addition to being a most efficient consul, and, according to the testimony of all who visited Athens during his tenure, a most acceptable representative of the government, has performed literary work which evinces extraordinary attainments in the modern Greek language, and has attracted the favorable attention of scholars and the leading reviews, both of this country and of Europe. He also has on hand unfinished tasks which it is very desirable in the interests of literature and philology, that he be given the opportunity to finish. We believe that in the Consular Service only would it be possible for him to go on with this work, and his efficiency as consul is such that he would carry on the duties of his office with great credit, and at the same time find occasion to continue his literary pursuits. We therefore respectfully beg that at the first opportunity Mr. Horton be restored to the Consular Service.

The idyllic wish expressed by so many American academics that Horton "pursue unfinished literary tasks" was not fully realized, for most of his energy would go into promoting his country's commercial interests. He also found it necessary to carry out extensive relief and rescue work for the victims of wars and upheavals that would soon erupt in the Balkans and the Near East. It was for these activities that he received the recognition which has outlived him, and made him a legendary figure in that part of the world. □

PEOPLE

1985 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards to Honor Horace G. Torbert Jr.

The 1985 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards will honor Horace G. Torbert Jr. who, during his five years of service as chairman of the AFSA Committee on Education from 1978–83, made an outstanding contribution to the development and implementation of the AFSA/AAFSW scholarship programs benefiting the dependent children of Foreign Service personnel. The awards are given to 22 graduating high school students for academic excellence and superior leadership qualities.

Torbert entered the Foreign Service in 1947 following service in the Army in World War II from which he emerged as a lieutenant colonel. He held posts in Europe and in the Bureau of European Affairs before becoming charge d'affaires in Budapest in 1961. He was subsequently named ambassador to Somalia, acting assistant secretary for congressional relations, and ambassador to Bulgaria. He retired in 1973. Since 1983, Torbert has been the president of DACOR. He is also a member of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council.

The $500 Merit Awards result from the deliberation of four panels consisting of volunteer representatives from State, AID, USIA, AAFSW, and the retired Foreign Service community who review all applications and make numerical evaluations in six categories. The 32 semi-finalists are then reviewed again and 22 winners are chosen. Honorable Mention runners-up receive commendation certificates. Pictures and biographical data on the winners will be published in the September issue of the JOURNAL.

Deaths

LOUISA HALL LA RUE, widow of G. Wallace La Rue, a former Foreign Service officer, died of cancer at her home in Washington, D.C., on March 12. She was 75.

In 1942, Ms. La Rue (then Costa Francke) married Carlos Hall, a Foreign Service officer. She accompanied him to posts including La Paz, Bolivia; Quito, Ecuador; Panama City, Panama; Santiago, Chile; Caracas, Venezuela; Havana, Cuba; and Ankara, Turkey. Mr. Hall died in 1968.

Ms. La Rue remarried in 1969. Her second husband was a retired Foreign Service officer. He died in 1981 following a long illness.

Ms. La Rue was a member of the Annunciation Catholic Church and was an active associate member of DACOR.

Survivors include two brothers, Jose Costa Francke and Carlos Costa Francke, both of whom reside in Chile.

MICHAEL D. MARCONI, a Foreign Service officer, died of cancer on February 12 at Fairfax Hospital, Falls Church, Virginia. He was 36.

Mr. Marconi studied economics at the University of Chicago and served in the Army from 1970–73. After joining the Foreign Service, he served as a communications electronics officer at assignments including the Sinai Field Mission, the Soviet Union, Kenya, and the Grenada Task Force.

Survivors include his wife, Donna; a son, Matthew Dante; a daughter, Morgan Ayn; two sisters, Catherine Born, of Kansas City, Missouri, and Patricia Marconi, of Elmwood Park, Illinois.

FOREIGN EXCHANGE

TAX RETURNS

TAX PREPARATION BY AN ATTORNEY who is also a Foreign Service officer and familiar with Foreign Service problems. M. Bruce Hirshorn, Esquire, 4501 Arlington Blvd., #125, Arlington, VA 22203. (703)525-9519.

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TAX PROBLEMS, returns and representation. T.R. McCartney (ex-FS) Enrolled Agent, and staff. Returns now completely computerized. Business Data Corp., P.O. Box 57256, Washington, DC 20037-0256. (703)671-1040. INVESTMENT GUIDANCE.

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FINANCIAL/ESTATE-RETIREMENT PLANNING, ASSET MANAGEMENT: E.F. HUTTON & CO., INC. G. Claude Villarreal, Financial Management Adviser, 1825 Eye Street NW, Suite 1000, Washington, DC 20006. (202)331-2528.

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EXCHANGE RATES

Classified advertising in the FOREIGN EXCHANGE is open to any person who wishes to reach the professional diplomatic community. The rate is 50 cents per word per insertion. Telephone numbers count as one word and zip codes are free. To place a classified ad or to receive our rate card for regular display advertising, write or call the Foreign Service Journal, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20037, (202)338-4045. Checks should accompany all classified insertion orders. The deadline for FOREIGN EXCHANGE ads is approximately 5 weeks before the publication date.

1985 AFSA ELECTION SECTION

In accordance with AFSA Bylaws, and pursuant to the terms of the 1985 Election Call, the following members have been duly nominated and have accepted their candidacies for the positions indicated below in the 1985 election of officers and State, AID, USIA, and Retired constituency representatives of the AFSA Governing Board. All members vote for officers and for representatives of their constituency.

OFFICERS

President: Robert Keeley (Unity Slate)
Vice President: Anthea S. de Rouville (Unity Slate)
Second Vice President: Charlotte Cromer (Unity Slate)
Secretary: Hartford Jennings (Unity Slate)
Treasurer: Warren Gardner (Unity Slate)

STATE CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATIVES (Choose four)

1. Sandra A. Dembsky (Unity Slate)
2. James Derrick (Unity Slate)
3. Gerald Lamberty (Unity Slate)
4. James Williamson (Unity Slate)

AID CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATIVES (Choose two)

1. William Ackerman (Unity Slate)
2. Frank Young (Unity Slate)

USIA CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATIVE (Choose one)

1. Richard Arndt (Unity Slate)

RETIRED CONSTITUENCY REPRESENTATIVES (Choose three)

1. William Calderhead (Unity Slate)
2. Roger Provencher (Unity Slate)
3. John Thomas (Unity Slate)

Ballots will be mailed on or about May 15, 1985, and marked ballots must be returned by 5 p.m., July 2, 1985. If you have not received your ballot by June 7, 1985, notify the chairman of the AFSA Elections Committee *immediately* in writing at 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037, or by "AFSA Channel" cable marked for delivery to AFSA Elections Committee.

It is each AFSA member's responsibility to see to it that his or her proper address and constituency are on record with AFSA.

The statement and biographies that follow are published in accordance with Article IV(4) of the AFSA Bylaws. In publishing them, AFSA and its Standing Committee on Elections are required by Chapter 10 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, as interpreted by the Department of Labor, to do so without making any modification of their contents. AFSA therefore disclaims any responsibility for the content of any campaign statements made by the candidates. Content is solely the responsibility of the candidates.

AFSA ELECTIONS COMMITTEE, 2101 E St. NW, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037

CAMPAIGN STATEMENT OF THE UNITY SLATE

We believe that the Foreign Service is a significant national asset. Its members and their skills are a valuable resource. Our guiding principle as the AFSA Board will be to champion any measures which will facilitate the development of Foreign Service members and permit them to better serve their Service and their country. Conversely, we will oppose measures which injure our members or limit their development—even if these measures are misrepresented as responding to the needs of the Service. The Service needs the best people and needs to allow them to develop to their fullest.

The Unity Slate represents continuity, in that most of its candidates are the officers, board and standing committee members who have guided the Association during the past four years, when so much has been accomplished to strengthen our organization and to use it to advance the interests of the Foreign Service as a whole. We continue to adhere to the goal of carrying out effectively AFSA's dual roles of labor union and professional association, and to representing equitably and fairly all of AFSA's constituencies—secretaries, communicators, specialists, retirees, minorities, women, junior, mid-grade and senior officers, members of all the cones and backstops, employees of all of the foreign affairs agencies.

Our aim will be to articulate and represent the interests of all our members and clients. At times the career interests of one group may appear to conflict with those of other groups. In such cases we will try to harmonize these interests in ways that benefit the Foreign Service as a whole.

At a time of budgetary stringencies throughout the Federal Government it will not be easy to obtain even the minimum resources required to fund a vital and effective Foreign Service. These difficulties make it that much more important to devote our talents and energies toward that end. A major aspect of this problem is the proposal to revamp our retirement system.

We believe the Foreign Service should be considered a full lifetime career, with honorable retirement at an appropriate age, and so understood for new entrants as well. It should be possible to so structure and administer the Service that normal attrition through voluntary and routine retirements at appropriate retirement ages will provide the needed openings at predictable and satisfactory rates. The option of taking early retirement at age 50 with 20 years of service must be preserved for those choosing to exercise this option, and there should be no pension penalty for so doing.

Our retirement system is also under attack for our retirees. The arbitrary reduction or elimination of COLAS constitutes a pension cut, because of the effect of inflation on fixed incomes. Our retirees served in a career service with a retirement system protected against inflation. That bargain must be kept. The same principle applies to pay cuts or freezes for salaried employees.

There has also been talk of restructuring the Service in ways which we believe would be deleterious to it and to the country. For example a major reduction in the size of the Senior Foreign Service would decimate the corps of our most experienced and able managers and would at the same time drastically reduce the opportunities for mid-grade officers to reach the senior ranks. More than that it would seriously damage the Foreign Service's ability to carry out its responsibilities. We believe that there is no excess of senior FSO positions, though there is a senior officer surplus caused by maladministration and politicization.

We intend to resist the politicization of the Foreign Service, the excessive displacement of career officers by political appointees, and the appointment of unqualified people as ambassadors. These appointees demoralize the Foreign Service people who have to work for them, embarrass the image of the United States abroad, and damage our foreign policy interests. We believe the proportion of political appointees in the Ambassadorial and other senior ranks is currently much too high.

Certain provisions of the 1980 Foreign Service Act have not yet been implemented by management. The Special Incentive Differential is an outstanding example, as is the benefit of sabbaticals for SFS members. These are long overdue. We intend to push for early implementation without further delay. Other provisions have just been negotiated—R&R to the U.S., compensatory time for FSO's—and we must now monitor the implementation.

Over the past year, labor/management relations have become more adversarial. A high priority of the Unity Slate will be to put an end to the current situation where even after agreements are negotiated, there is a fight to get them implemented. Management delaying tactics such as asking for another opinion from the Legal Office or a GAO decision on authority to pay after agreement has been reached, do not inspire confidence. Payment of new storage limits (effective May 1, 1984 but just being implemented for those with effects in storage on that date) is a case in point. Sabbaticals for SFS is another, a benefit given in the Foreign Service Act of 1980 and still unresolved, due to "legal difficulties."

Now that we have been operating under the new Act for four years we believe it is time to re-examine some of its provisions and how they have been implemented to see how they have worked out in practice and whether they are achieving their intended objectives. For example, the shortened time-in-class limitations for the Senior Foreign Service have resulted in a large number of involuntary retirements of officers who feel their departure is premature and arbitrary, as well as damaging to the interests of their country. The "six year window" (seven years for AID) for Class 1 officers will soon force the premature departure of large numbers of officers at that level who will have much shorter careers than they expected, and who will leave at what should be the beginning of their prime years.

The increasingly hazardous conditions of Foreign Service work make it vital that we strive to improve working conditions and benefits even within an environment of shrinking budgets. This is particularly true for AID employees, who almost always serve in moderate to severe hardship posts. Relatively modest changes in AID's open assignments system, reducing the uncertainty of the EER process, and funding already-approved R&R travel to the U.S. from all posts would go a long way toward mollifying the physical and emotional strains of hardship assignments. Beyond this, we must retain the incentive for attracting qualified people to take these jobs by protecting retirement benefits and the tax exempt status of service allowances and benefits.

In USIA, AFSA continues to play a crucial role as an organization dedicated to professionalism in public diplomacy, limited at present only by the fact that AFGE represents the Agency bargaining unit. Our pledge to the profession will be carried out, this year as last, in three areas: (1) continual monitoring of all appointments and assignments, to assure fair process and quality in selection and thus to foster the maximum potential for excellence, for career growth and development, and for sound human resource management; (2) close and ongoing legislative liaison, aimed both at resisting actions that adversely affect career personnel and at advancing initiatives designed to help all of us do our job better; and (3) an active program, through the pages of the JOURNAL and in our series of "Dialogs on Public Diplomacy," to build a stronger conceptual basis for the work we do in USIA. An increase in membership of over 50% compared to last year at this time strengthens our belief that AFSA is persuasively addressing the interests and concerns of all professionals in the practice of public diplomacy.

Support staff face special problems and changing conditions—increased automation, recruitment of employees with

years of experience for entry level positions, more single parents and more tandem couples. Protection of benefits and prevention of downgrading are essential. Positive goals are restoration of FS-3 for secretaries, payment of differential for regional employees, attainable career ladders within specialties as well as career mobility, and better counseling and recruitment.

We believe strongly in the importance of developing the foreign language skills of all Foreign Service personnel and their spouses. We will oppose measures to reduce spending on language training, to lower language requirements for advancement or assignment, or to lessen special incentives to encourage acquisition of language skills.

Physical and personal security is becoming an increasingly important issue facing the Service. The past several years have seen embassies blown up in Beirut and Kuwait, two employees on TDY hijacked in an aircraft and killed at the airport in Tehran, and one of our employees assigned to Beirut has been kidnapped and is still being held. Other examples can be cited by all of us. We will continue to work to publicize hazards we face, and to assure that we are provided sufficient personnel and monetary resources to upgrade our security.

In conducting AFSA the professional organization the Unity Slate acknowledges the continuing challenge of improving member services while at the same time trying to keep cost increases to an acceptable minimum. In recent years AFSA has been faced with escalating costs from general inflation and modest operating cost increases as expansion in certain member service areas became unavoidable. The recent favorable referendum on a dues increase certainly indicates preponderant member support for AFSA's current level of activities as well as those areas where anticipated changes are being set in motion.

Recent improvements in AFSA services include more staff time dedicated to employee grievances, stronger emphasis placed on legal interpretations of AFSA and employee actions, expanded availability and utilization of automatic word processing among office staff, stronger financial oversight, and improved accounting records and practices. Even more can and will be accomplished as the Unity Slate continues with its program to prioritize necessary changes and implement them as time, money, and staff availability may allow.

Enhancement of AFSA member services takes a variety of activities into account. Of great importance at the present time and as previously mentioned, more staff time and expense is being brought to bear in the campaign to protect employee retirement benefits. Improved performance from the AFSA scholarship fund investment portfolio is expected to provide additional income and hence more money for students. Impending changes to the Foreign Service Club include faster customer service and improved food quality while keeping prices at a practicable and affordable level. These are but a representative few of the member service improvements that the Unity Slate expects to enact in the coming year.

The Unity Slate is committed to the maintenance of an environment in which the members of the Foreign Service can develop their abilities to the fullest. We support that goal for all members of the Service regardless of sex, race, religion, or national origin. We believe the composition of our slate is one evidence of that commitment.

Charlotte Cromer
Second Vice President
Unity Slate

Charlotte Cromer, an assistant population officer in AID, joined AID in 1964. Served in Ankara, Bangkok, Paris, Manila, and AID/Washington. Charlotte served previously on the AFSA board as AID representative and as second vice president in 1974–77. She was also on the AID Standing Committee in 1978. She was the AFSA representative in Manila. She has served on the AFSA board as second vice president since October 1984.

Frank J. Young
AID Representative
Unity Slate

Frank J. Young joined AID in 1977 after working on Capitol Hill for four years. He has served in Manila and New Delhi and was AFSA representative in Manila from 1979–80. He currently is program and budget coordinator for Asia and Security Assistance in the Bureau for Program Policy Coordination.

Gerald Lamberty
State Representative
Unity Slate

A career FSO, Mr. Lamberty is Director of the Office of Development Finance in the Department. He entered the Service in 1956 and has served in Havana, Guatemala, Lima, Santo Domingo, Warsaw, as well as many years in various Washington assignments. His last foreign assignment was as DCM in Lima from 1980–83.

Sandra Dembski
State Representative
Unity Slate

A career Foreign Service officer, Ms. Dembski is an economic officer in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs. She began work in Soviet Affairs in May, 1984.

Ms. Dembski entered the Foreign Service in 1976 and served in the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru from 1977 to 1979. Following this assignment, she worked in the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs on a variety of trade issues, including U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty laws and U.S. agricultural trade relations.

Ms. Dembski received a B.A. from Swarthmore College in International Relations in 1973 and a J.D. from Yale Law School in 1976.

ASSOCIATION NEWS

Seven to get first language awards

Seven Foreign Service officers have been named the first recipients of the Matilda W. Sinclaire Language Awards, given annually for distinguished study of a hard language. The awards program is administered by AFSA's Awards Committee, and the stipend is $1000 for each award.

The winners are Joseph G. Sullivan, Roger Hart, Franklin Pierce Huddle, Laurie A. Johnston, Douglas Roberts, Michael Sellers, and John C. Stepanchuk, the Awards Committee announced.

The awards were established by a bequest in the estate of Matilda W. Sinclaire, a Foreign Service officer.

For instructions on applying for the awards, contact the AFSA office in Washington.

AFSA prevails in dispute over storage of household effects

The General Accounting Office has backed AFSA in its dispute with the State Department over weight allowances for stored household effects. The GAO decision resolves a dispute over a provision in the May 1984 weight allowance agreement concerning effects placed in storage prior to the implementation of the agreement. According to the decision, the increased weight limits that became effective on May 1, 1984, can be applied to all effects, even those that were already in storage.

The department requested a GAO review in September 1984, more than three months after the agreement was signed and without informing AFSA. Acting on behalf of the other foreign affairs agencies, State argued that it was precluded from retroactively amending travel orders and therefore could not apply the new limits to effects placed in storage under the old limits. In response, AFSA filed an institutional grievance against the department [ASSOCIATION NEWS, November 1984] and subsequently filed an appeal with the Foreign Service Grievance Board.

The decision does not affect the basis of the institutional grievance, since the department was charged with violating the agreement. AFSA thus will persist with the grievance in order to obtain a Grievance Board decision ordering the department to comply and to reimburse employees who have continued to pay expenses as a result of its noncompliance. In addition, the Association will continue to push for expeditious implementation of the agreement. Employees are advised, however, to continue paying the overweight charges until it is certain that the agencies are complying.

Record turnout supports dues increase by 7-to-1 margin

A record 3822 valid ballots were cast by members on the recent referendum to increase dues, and 87 percent supported the hike, the AFSA Elections Committee has reported [see the photograph, above]. Some 3342 ballots were cast in favor of the dues increase, and 480 were opposed.

In all, 3925 ballots were received. Of these, 99 were declared ineligible by the committee for rules violations and 4 were abstentions.

"This overwhelmingly favorable vote represents a mandate to us," said AFSA President Dennis K. Hays. "We have to take heart at such an expression of support, and we pledge to continue what we are doing. At the same time, we will have to do even more to preserve the Foreign Service as a career from attacks both in this country and abroad. You, our members, have now given us the resources to do so."

The dues increase went into effect the first pay period in April, but members on the allotment system may not see the change for a month or so.

State cancels contract with Fidelity Storage

Complaints about shipping-and-storage companies are legion, and they range from the heart-breaking to the ludicrous. Lately, our offices have been swamped with complaints about Fidelity Moving and Storage Company.

Advised of rumors about the financial health of Fidelity and stories about a possible physical "catastrophe" there, we brought our concerns to management and conducted our own investigation. Management has told us that there has been no calamity but "some" physical damage to containers and liftvans. Our investigation, meanwhile, revealed that Fidelity has not renewed its lease on one of its warehouses, resulting in consolidation of household effects stored there and possible difficulties in locating them. We polled the field for examples of misplaced or damaged effects and brought them to management's attention.

Management terminated its contract with Fidelity, finding it "was not performing nor providing the quality services we expect." This does not, however, release the company from its responsibility with respect to effects still in storage or transit. The State Department has assigned inspectors to each warehouse to conduct an inventory. Fidelity has been told to repair any damage and to honor all contracts. The Association is working to ensure that stronger controls on the handling of household effects will be put into place. We will keep members advised of any developments.

Where were we when you needed us?

That's the question many members ask after they move. Their JOURNALS have not been reaching them, and they fear they are being ignored.

In most cases, the reason is the member has not informed us of his or her change of address. The foreign affairs agencies do not notify AFSA when personnel are transferred or retire, nor does the post office. So please keep us informed when you transfer, retire, or change your name due to marriage. We will reciprocate by making sure you don't miss any issues or other services we have to offer.

A change of address form is included in many issues, or simply write AFSA.

Legislative Alert

The Supplemental Retirement Plan

It appears at this writing that the administration is on the point of introducing its version of a new federal retirement system to supplement the Social Security coverage mandated for all federal workers employed after 1983. The new program will be called the Federal Employees' Retirement System.

Essentially, the new system would be a "defined contribution plan," financed entirely by the government. A defined contribution plan provides for a certain amount of money to be set aside each year toward an individual's retirement. In this system, the government would contribute an amount equal to 11.6 percent of each employee's salary into an individual account. (Employees would not be required to contribute to this plan.) An employee's retirement benefit would then be determined by the amount of money accumulated, including interest. This new system would supplement the Social Security coverage required of all new employees, into which employees themselves pay 7 percent of salary up to a predetermined limit. Social Security is a "defined benefit plan"—benefits do not relate primarily to how much the employee has paid into the system but are computed by a formula incorporating years of covered employment and salary history.

In addition, the administration's plan would provide for an optional third element, the Federal Employees' Savings Plan. This would be comparable to an individual retirement account. An employee could deposit up to $5000 a year from pre-tax income into a sheltered account that would be taxed upon withdrawal.

Vesting under the new system would take place after one year of service, but the earliest age at which most employees could retire on an annuity would be 59½ years. There would be no length-of-service requirement other than the one year required for vesting.

Of particular reassurance to the Foreign Service however, is the intention to incorporate special arrangements for certain categories of federal employees, such as Foreign Service personnel, law enforcement officers, firefighters, air traffic controllers, etc., so they may continue to be eligible to retire as early as age 50 and receive retirement payments immediately, either in a lump sum or in an annuity. In addition, provision would be made for these employees to receive a special benefit: a payment covering their estimated Social Security income until they attain age 62, when they would become eligible for regular monthly Social Security payments. The plan also includes new disability benefit provisions as well as special benefits for survivors of employees who die in service.

While many details remain to be filled in, the new plan obviously marks a radical departure from the old. Under the old system, most employees are vested in the retirement system after five years of civilian service. They can retire on an immediate annuity provided they meet certain age and length-of-service requirements. (In the Foreign Service these are 20 years' service and age 50.) The annuity is calculated as a percentage of "high-three" salary multiplied by the years of service, so the amount of the annuity can always be computed as a "defined benefit" figure.

Under the new system, an employee would be vested after only one year. An individual could leave the government any time after that period and still be eligible for a lump-sum payment or an annuity at age 59½ (except for the special employee categories mentioned above). The amount of one's benefit would depend upon the balance in the individual's retirement account and also whether the person elected a lump payment or chose one of a series of available annuity options.

The individual's retirement account balance would consist of the government's contribution of 11.6 percent of salary, all amounts deposited by the employee in the savings plan, plus the income generated on these monies. Additionally, at age 62 the employee would become eligible for monthly Social Security payments. Social Security, of course, provides a defined benefit. As with any retirement system that does not provide a defined benefit feature, however, a long-term employee's retirement income from the Federal Employees' Retirement System will depend upon the investment results.

The administration's plan would permit pre-1984 employees to shift over to the new system through the transfer of previously earned retirement credits if they chose to do so. Also, to ensure the solvency of the present retirement trust funds, the government would pay off the unfunded liability of these funds in equal installments over a 40-year period.

1200 members contribute over $72,000 to legislative fund

Contributions to the Legislative Action Fund topped $72,000 at the end of March—nearly twice the amount collected two years ago, when administration plans to overhaul the federal-employee retirement system were first proposed. Donations came from 1200 members, or nearly one in seven.

The money is being used to conduct an aggressive campaign on Capitol Hill to protect the interests of the Foreign Service in the face of forthcoming changes in the federal retirement system.

Donations to the fund are tax deductible. Contributions are acknowledged in this space unless the donor wishes to remain anonymous.

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