FOREIGN SERVICE
JOURNAL
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September 1985

TRAGEDY OF ERRORS



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

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

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

4 international bands.
7-2990 **$172.**

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

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

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

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

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

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

Kitchen center food preparation appliance 4 in 1. (220v.)
980-98 **$184.30**

HUNTER CEILING FAN



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24531 **$169.00**

HUNTER CEILING FAN

52" brown motor w/pecan finish wood blades and white motor w/white wood blades (220v./50)
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AMILTON BEACH OFFEE MAKER



ctric drip coffee maker brews 2-12 cups in nutes. (220v.)
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HAMILTON BEACH FOOD PROCESSOR



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

luxe travel converter kit 50w & 1650w con- rters, 4 plugs.
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FRANZUS PORTABLE CLOTHES STEAMER

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

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Franzus **18/21** 1000w travel converter **$ 8.60**
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

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

This month marks the second anniversary of the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. Beginning on page 24, Thomas Maertens explains why allegations that 007 was a spy plane are not based in reality.

CONTENTS

"The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service"

The FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL is the magazine for professionals in foreign affairs, published monthly except August by the American Foreign Service Association, a private non-profit organization. Material appearing herein represents the opinions of the writers and does not necessarily represent the official views of the foreign affairs agencies, the U.S. government, or AFSA. The Editorial Board is responsible for general content, but statements concerning the policy and administration of AFSA as employee representative under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 in the ASSOCIATION NEWS and the ASSOCIATION VIEWS, and all communications relating to these, are the responsibility of the AFSA Governing Board.

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ASSOCIATION VIEWS

The Fight Continues

In this time of troubles for the Foreign Service, the new Governing Board that took office over the summer will continue the commitment of the past several boards to fight to preserve the significant national asset that the Service represents. This will not be an easy task, but we are fortunate in having the support of by far the largest membership base in the history of the Association, an enhanced dues structure, and record donations to our Legislative Action Fund.

The attacks on the Service have been coming both from within the country and overseas. Domestically, the foreign affairs agencies and their personnel—both active and retired—have been subject to budgetary squeezing that does not recognize the usefulness and eventual economy to the nation of a well-funded first line of defense. The agencies themselves have been lethargic and reluctant in implementing many of the key provisions of the Foreign Service Act, in force now for more than four years. At the same time, we have witnessed increasing politicization of the professional ranks, to ever more missions, ever more countries, and ever lower ranks.

Overseas, our people are continually the target of terrorists, making the Foreign Service a more dangerous profession in this decade than the military. To stop this, we will probably have to rebuild or move half of our missions, and retreat into embassies that are located in suburban areas far from foreign ministries and in buildings that increasingly resemble fortresses. This unwanted but unfortunately necessary development could significantly alter the very manner in which we do business, while giving an increasingly war-like cast to the profession of peacemaking.

AFSA needs to fight these threats. We need to maintain and enhance the Service, to preserve the quality of its people, the quality of its work, and the vitality of the profession itself. We need to take into account the evolving nature of the American family and make sure that the needs of spouses and children are met.

We do not pretend that these problems will be solved when the new board completes its term two years from now; indeed, new problems will undoubtedly arise. But we pledge our best effort in resolving them and ask for your support.

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LETTERS

Keeping Confidences

I feel sure that Foreign Service officers now, as in my day, recognize that confidentiality is essential to the conduct of the trade. Outside critics often thought of security primarily in terms of preserving defense secrets from potential adversaries, but in practice its main value is to preserve the identity of sources in the Foreign Office or elsewhere in the host country and to assure candor in our own internal discussions when policy recommendations are being debated. The public's "right to know" does not extend to the record of what the desk officers for India and Pakistan, or those for Greece and Turkey, said on a working group drafting a position paper.

It is just this sort of true security which, from my observation as an outsider, seems particularly threatened by the ultra rightists, those who are generally the first to denounce alleged security risks. Some of this fold complain that there has been a purge of "true believers" within the department. If there really had been a purge, I would have expected to see some evidence of it having been applied to those who, on losing some intramural argument or failing to get some Helms protégé appointed to a key policy spot, immediately blab to Evans and Novak.

ARMISTEAD LEE
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Arlington, Virginia

Pushing Costa Rica

I am still puzzling over what point Jorma Kaukonen was trying to convey in his letter [June] regarding former Ambassador to Costa Rica Curtin Winsor. The ambassador's letter encouraging Americans to visit Costa Rica addressed a very real problem: tourists, confusing peaceful Costa Rica with the more troubled areas of Central America, were staying away in distressing numbers. Given the fact that the U.S. government contributes about $200 million a year in various forms of economic assistance to support Costa Rica's balance of payments, correcting this misimpression was consistent with our broader objec-

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Water Pollution: A Worldwide Problem!



Water contamination is not limited to 3rd World nations. Industrialized nations including the U.S.A. face the threat to human health posed by pollution of public drinking water supplies. Public Water Treatment Facilities built years ago cannot protect you from today's pollutants. A Water Purifying System to be truly effective must be able to remove micro-organisms, bacteria, nitrates, sodium, toxic waste chemicals, sedimentation, sulfates, chlorinated hydrocarbons, lead and other heavy metals, and other harmful, often invisable contaminants. Now, you might think that boiling or filtering water can protect you. Unfortunately, filters cause bacteria to multiply and are ineffective against many contaminants disolved in water. Boiling concentrates inorganic contaminants, nitrates, and heavy metals.

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

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tives here. (No, I did not write the letter for Ambassador Winsor.) We have seen indications that his message has achieved the purpose of reversing the negative trend, although the industry is still not as vibrant as it might be.

"Unprofessional" the letter may have been, but there is no doubt in my mind that it was written because Ambassador Winsor cared deeply about the welfare of the country to which he was accredited. Whatever the reasons Washington concluded that he be replaced, I trust they were of greater importance than this demonstration of his keen desire that Americans not be deterred from enjoying the natural beauties of this fine country by the sensationalized images of Central America that cross the television screens in their living rooms. I, for one, share that basic wish.

BONNIE M. LINCOLN
Counselor for Economic Affairs
San Jose, Costa Rica

Nuclear Israel

Our government's diffident approach to Israel's illegal acquisition of U.S. nuclear triggering devices or krytrons is in sharp contrast to our professed strong support for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. According to the *New York Times* of May 16, our government fears it might be embarrassed if it pressed a vigorous investigation of Israel's use of these devices.

In 1975 we agreed to transfer to Israel several hundred short-range Lance missiles, missiles that were to be used by our own military forces as tactical nuclear weapons. Israel assured us that the Lance would be used only with a conventional warhead. But Israel has in the past disregarded our restrictions on weapons use (e.g., its use of cluster bombs in Lebanon) and it might do so again if it believed that its interests would be served by so doing. Israel may well be able to design and assemble a nuclear warhead for the Lance. Our indulgent attitude toward Israel's nuclear programs and lax enforcement of export controls are undermining the non-proliferation treaty.

W.A. CHAPIN
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Gore, Virginia

Labor Lamentations

"He wouldn't be able to handle the job; he's just a narrow-gauge labor officer." How many times have I and my colleagues in the Foreign Service with substantial labor experience heard that? It seems to be a constant theme of personnel officers looking for people to fill political, economic, or front-office slots. "He doesn't have it; all he has done is labor work."

Such an uneducated and unsophisticated attitude makes the bidding and assignment process even more traumatic for me and others in a system where re-assignment is already far too traumatic when changing posts every three to four years. Neither does it do anything to improve the productivity, efficiency, or effectiveness of our Foreign Service.

No potential supervisor or personnel wizard ever has been heard to say that anyone has been "only" a political officer, or "only" an economic officer. If he has been a good political officer it is automatically assumed that he will be a good manager, a good executive, a good DCM. Why? What has he managed? He has made contacts, he has reported, and maybe he has analyzed. In our system, who hasn't done these things?

What officer in any embassy crosses specialization lines from politics to economics and back again more than a labor officer? Who works with USIS on exchange programs, Amparts, target audiences, and so forth more than a labor officer? Who works with AID with greater frequency on tech-

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nical assistance, development projects, or training programs than a labor officer? What purely political officer ran a unit with an AID technician and a USIS officer under his supervision, as I did in one post? What purely economic officer supervised an $875,000 assistance program involving several dozen employees, as I did at another post? What segment of society is more important in the Third World than the trade union movement? What element of society in the developed world is a more major factor on political and economic decisions than the trade union movement? If you don't know the answer, ask Mr. Mitterand, Mr. Craxi, Mr. Kohl, Mr. Peres, or Mr. de la Madrid.

When will the system learn? Virtually the only resources the Foreign Service possesses are its human ones. If it doesn't use its talents to the maximum, it doesn't produce to the maximum. Maybe the time has come for it to take a closer look at its labor officers before coming up with a determination of who is broad-gauge and who is narrow-gauge in our country's Foreign Service.

IRWIN RUBENSTEIN
Counselor of Embassy for Labor Affairs
Mexico City, Mexico

Overland Again

The April article "Overland from China," recounting the tragic death of Vice Counsul Douglas Mackiernan on the Tibetan border brought back vivid memories of the 2400-mile overland trip I took with him in the spring of 1947 from Nanking to Urumchi. Mac had just joined the Foreign Service and was on his way to his first (and, unhappily, his last) post. Why overland? Because we had an Army 6'x6' truck, a one-ton trailer, a well-used jeep, and more than four tons of miscellaneous supplies to deliver to our consulate in Tihwa.

After barging our vehicles and supplies across the Yangtze River to Pukow, we loaded them onto a flat car and into a box car, which were our homes for the next ten days as they were coupled to various freight trains en route to Suchow, Kaifeng, Chengchow, Loyang, and finally Sian. But ten consecutive days and nights on Chinese freight trains was merely prologue. At Sian we began the nearly 1700-mile drive to Urumchi, through the Kansu

Martin (left) with Mackiernan in Sin Kiang.

corridor, climbing 8000-9000 foot passes, across the Kara Gobi, along the rim of the Turfan Depression, and over the Tien Shan. Mac drove the truck with trailer attached while I preceded him in the jeep to scout the road. As far as I know, we are the only Americans to have personally driven vehicles every foot of the way from Sian to Urumchi. Thanks to Mac's resourcefulness, we came through in good shape.

EDWIN W. MARTIN
Ambassador, retired
Washington, D.C.

Books

The Decline of State

By Sidney Sober

Secrets of State: *The State Department and the Struggle over U.S. Foreign Policy. By Barry Rubin. Oxford University Press, 1985. $25.00.*

Barry Rubin, a Washington scholar who has written prolifically on various aspects of foreign policy and the Middle East, has a good grasp of the fundamentals of the U.S. foreign policymaking process. His book, *Secrets of State,* stimulates fresh thinking on our present system's shortcomings and what might be done to improve it.

Sidney Sober is a retired Foreign Service officer who served in the State Department.

Rubin takes a dual approach. The basic thread is a thumb-nail review of how our foreign policy system has evolved in response to our emergence on the world scene and the preferences of our leaders. He jumps quickly from the first days of the Republic to the years of Franklin Roosevelt, then examines developments in increasingly greater detail through successive administrations up to the present. The second thread, interwoven with the first, relates to the State Department as an institution and actor in the foreign policy system. The dual concept is good, although the task is formidable both in scope and analytical challenge.

The account of how various presidents have dealt with foreign affairs, which takes up the larger part of the book, will be "old hat" to students of U.S. diplomatic history. The coverage through the Johnson period is based on secondary sources and tends to be fairly pedestrian. The narrative picks up steam when it reaches the Nixon years. The most useful sections pertain to the relations between presidents and the State Department and to the development of a foreign policy system moving away from State's pre-eminent role as policy formulator and presidential adviser. It is sobering to be reminded that even before the United States emerged from World War II as an activist leader in world affairs, two of our major presidents (Franklin Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson) had shunted aside their secretaries of state and used personal emissaries to deal with crucial foreign policy issues.

It is also instructive and only very mildly amusing to recall how a succession of administrations have viewed State's career people. Rubin notes that Roosevelt believed State contained rightists and isolationists bent on obstructing his foreign policy. John Foster Dulles distrusted the career staff as the product of 20 years of Democratic rule and warned them at his initial meeting that they owed "discipline and positive loyalty" to the Eisenhower administration. Kennedy never trusted the State professionals as being sympathetic to the new policies he was projecting. Nixon thought FSOs were loyal to past Democratic administrations and "an astonishing number of them have no obvious dedication to America and its service." Kissinger's contempt for Foreign Service careerists was not concealed, although in later years he said he had been converted to a highly favorable view as a result of his service as secretary of state. Carter was suspicious of the department and at the end of

his term blamed State for not having produced a "new idea in 20 years." Reaganites have seen the Foreign Service as a hotbed of liberalism and have increased the number of political appointments in the department as well as abroad.

Rubin also reminds us of the cliches that have been used over the years to describe the "typical" FSO, e.g., suave, unimaginative, aristocratic, and—perhaps most often—elitist. His own handling of this subject is reasonably balanced, if indecisive. He notes that patriotism and a strong dose of idealism are a common part of the FSO's character, and explains the tendency to conformity as a result of the discipline imposed by existing diplomatic and political constraints. He also refers to the efforts in recent years to broaden the recruitment base of the Foreign Service.

Referring to low morale among the FSO corps in recent years, Rubin quotes George Kennan as calling diplomacy a "thankless, disillusioning, and physically exhausting profession." There have been, and are, grounds for complaint about the workings of the career system, compounded by lack of recognition, if not suspicion, on the part of the political leadership and the general public. The spread of terrorist violence and the increasing number of spouses pursuing their own careers are also clear impediments to life in the Foreign Service. There is also undoubted need for various managerial improvements. Still, the large numbers of applicants for the exams in recent years suggest that the prospect of a satisfying career in the Foreign Service remains.

Rubin portrays three distinct periods in U.S. foreign policymaking: up to the 1940s, when State did mostly routine work, with decisions made informally by a very small group of people; from 1945–69, when State at first played a key role but then forfeited it because of "intrinsic problems, bad decisions, and the onslaught of McCarthyism"; and the current era, with the rise to power of the National Security Council staff. The most trenchant account deals with what the author calls "Kissinger's policymaking revolution," continuing on into his move to the department, in the course of which "Kissinger created more bitterness, even hatred, toward himself at State than any other secretary in U.S. history." This is probably true, but for historical balance it would have been appropriate to note Kissinger's achievement of superstar status as a diplomat as well. Rubin contends that the experience of the Carter and Reagan administrations, looking uncertainly to the NSC staff as an institutional alternative to State, was one of confused battles for control, threatening to make policymaking unmanageable.

For students and practitioners of foreign policy, as well as for the American public that has to live with the consequences, the decline of State raises numerous questions. Is this decline structurally inherent in the composition of the State Department? Is it an inevitable consequence of the broadening of our involvement in world affairs and the increasing stake of other U.S. agencies? Is it the natural result of modern presidents' desire to maintain a tight grasp within their own immediate domain? Is it a response to the relative decline of U.S. power and the emergence of seemingly intractable problems, and the need for an institutional scapegoat? Is State's decline irreversible? Is the United States better served by a system in which State plays a less than primary, if still important, role as the president's adviser on foreign affairs? Is the "system" all that important, anyway? Last, is concern with institutions distracting us from fuller attention to the issues in our foreign policy world?

Rubin touches on some of these questions, but by and large he avoids unequivocal answers, presumably because he

recognizes that the returns are not all in and that frequently "it depends." It depends, first of all, on the personal predilections of the president. It depends on the president's and the secretary of state's selections as their principal advisers. And it depends on the secretary's relationship with the president. Finally, State's role depends on the secretary's interest and skill in leading the bureaucratic pack.

Rubin misses a significant point in the three sentences he gives to a missed opportunity for State before its slide into near-irrelevance on the Nixon/Kissinger arrival in 1969. In 1966, egged on by some of his wiser subordinates, President Johnson issued a statement that recognized the secretary of state as responsible for the overall direction and coordination of government activities overseas and accorded executive leadership of interagency groups in Washington to the under secretary and various regional assistant secretaries of state. They were to "act presidential" and take hold of the management of foreign affairs in support of the president's constitutional responsibility. It might have worked, at least until shoved aside by Nixon and Kissinger, but Secretary Rusk never gave it the strong personal support and leadership that were needed to convince other agencies that State was really intent on taking hold.

It seems that State will rank on top of the bureaucratic heap when there is a strong president and he wishes to have, and then chooses and supports, a strong secretary of state. Failing those conditions, we may be fated to see re-runs of the Kissinger/Rogers, Brzezinski/Vance, and Clark/Haig shows, with State and the NSC vying for preeminence. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane's appearance on the cover of the Sunday *New York Times Magazine* in May, labeled "Taking Charge," was presumably noted with interest by Secretary Shultz.

It is fair to question whether the job of secretary of state is manageable among the welter of world problems (political, economic, terrorist, etc.) this country has to face. The position has evolved into a cluster of responsibilities including key policy adviser to the president, top full-time diplomat, recurring congressional witness, speechmaker, departmental manager, and presumed leader of the entire U.S. foreign affairs community. It is no wonder some presidents prefer to deal with a close-by adviser with a lean support staff free of administrative, diplomatic, or congressional duties. It is time to lighten the burdens of secretaries of state so they can devote more time to the most essential matters. This means delegating more au-

thority to strong associates, who can be seen as having not only the secretary's but also the president's confidence. For example, a subordinate "secretary of foreign affairs" could take on a good deal of the secretary of state's tasks.

Rubin has made the same mistake as numerous other commentators in lumping the department and the secretary of state together, making no distinction between the perceived failings of the two, when he attributes "fault" to the department in failing to question Kennedy's decision to go ahead with the Bay of Pigs operation. Though the connection between the department and the secretary makes some sense in theory, since the secretary has the responsibility, the fault in the Bay of Pigs decision-making could fairly be laid only on State's top political leadership. It is deceptive to employ such a special relationship as an analytical tool, given the special status of political appointees.

Secrets of State concludes with an excellent but brief chapter summing up the problems of the foreign policymaking system and offering a set of reasonable principles to explain why the problems have arisen. Rubin offers no nostrums or ideas for another "reorganization" of the State Department. This book has done its job without them.

The scholarship behind the book, reflected in 40 pages of end notes and an adequate bibliography, suffers from a number of minor factual errors presumably resulting from hasty research or inadequate editing. The supposedly current description of the State Department has the Bureau of Consular Affairs responsible for the department's internal security—a function it lost more than 20 years ago—and lists the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which has not existed since 1978. There are several other misidentifications as well, but these gaffes do not break the flow of the text. *Secrets of State,* though not the definitive book on the U.S. foreign policymaking system and State's role in it, is well worth reading for its review of controversial subjects that are destined to occupy our attention for some time into the future. □

Review

Techno-Bandits. *By Linda Melvern, Nick Anning, and David Heboitch. Houghton Mifflin, 1984.*

Advanced technology is the foundation upon which the United States' and NATO's most sophisticated weapons systems are built, so protection of our "cutting edge" technologies is a national security impera-

tive. As *Techno-Bandits* shows, however, the U.S. government has only recently awakened to the vast amount of this knowledge that is being exported to our adversaries.

The book covers the full range of technology transfer problems as dramatically as a spy novel, but unfortunately, it is real. It documents U.S. successes and failures in controlling illicit technology exports and presents case histories of some of the most interesting techno-bandits, those independent brokers, freight forwarders, and middlemen who are unconcerned with the final destination of the products they handle. It clearly outlines the national security implications of this continuing technological hemorrhage, as well as the bureaucratic turf fights that hamper efforts to stop it.

According to the book's authors, the Soviet effort to acquire our technology is massive, employing a wide range of eastern bloc intelligence, scientific, and governmental agencies. Many of our most sophisticated secrets have been acquired by both overt and covert means. By 1930, all important industrial processes in the U.S.S.R. were derived from such imports. Since then, acquisition of western military and dual-purpose technology (that with both military and civilian applications) has come to be a primary Soviet concern.

The Soviets seek western technology for a variety of reasons. First, pirating proven western technology has saved the Soviets vast amounts of money—perhaps billions of dollars—and years of research. Second, modernization of Soviet military equipment is hastened by building upon western breakthroughs. Finally, once the technology behind a weapon is understood, countermeasures can be developed.

The U.S. government has attempted to control this technology drain by establishing licensing procedures and export controls. These actions have had some success, but they also have created friction with our NATO allies and other friendly nations affected by them. Despite the creation of the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control—comprising the Western European countries, Canada, the United States, and Japan—the differences between western governments over what should be controlled remain unresolved.

Melvern, Anning, and Hebditch have produced an excellent piece of investigative reporting. Their documentation of this important issue is flawless and absorbing. Here, for the first time, is a realistic portrayal of the technology transfer problem. *Techno-Bandits* is must reading for all concerned about U.S. security.

—MAYER NUDELL

DIPLOMACY

Direction Finding

By JOHN BURKE

"It should be remembered that it is election of correct bearing and rejection of wrong which makes direction finding still an art and not a science."

It was during the Korean War—well toward its end, as I recall. The armistice talks at Panmunjom were still going on in their aimless way, and though the front lines had become static, there was still a good deal of hardware being exchanged back and forth and the noise level was still quite high. As a navy lieutenant, I was serving as officer-in-charge of a network of radio direction-finding stations. I don't know how direction finding has evolved since that time, though I suspect that it is now a good bit more sophisticated than it was then. Nevertheless, we did our best with the equipment at hand—it was probably "state of the art," though that phrase had yet to be coined—and were able to pinpoint with reasonable accuracy the location of enemy transmitters, and thereby the units that owned them. This was done by plotting simultaneous bearings taken by our several stations on the radio signals being put out by these various transmitters. If the bearings crossed at almost the same spot on the chart, we could be reasonably certain of an accurate fix.

There was, however, one particular transmitter that caused us a good deal of trouble. It broadcast at irregular times on odd frequencies and seemed to be located at a considerable distance behind the arc of transmitters the enemy normally employed. Thus, when more than one of our stations got directional bearings, the combined bearings when plotted were too close to parallel to give anything approaching a right-angle intersection, tending to trail off in the same general direction, and when they did cross, the angles were too shallow to be of any use in establishing an exact location. Finally, in an effort to nail down this elusive transmitter, we called on our British friends for assistance. They had fewer direction-finding units than we had in the area, but we felt that their bearings on the target might just provide the angle we needed to give us a proper fix. So together, over some weeks, we jointly stalked the mystery transmitter, exchanging bearings and attempting to locate precisely where this radio might be located.

Over time, my British opposite number and I became somewhat obsessed with this problem and we probably spent more time in search of a solution than the target deserved. I know we exchanged many cables back and forth, each side arguing in favor of different locations scores of miles apart, based on separate readings of the same sets of bearings. The final cable on the subject sent by my British colleague was a lengthy recapitulation of their analysis that ended

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with the Confucius-like quotation cited above. Though I still felt that our fix remained as valid as theirs, I let the matter drop: it was difficult to argue further with my opposite number because "DFing" in those days did indeed require a good deal of intuition and art on the part of the analysts.

I have had occasion in recent months to recall this incident from the dusty past. The trigget was an informal review my staff and I have been doing of the "information revolution" that has been sweeping through the Department of State in the form of word processors, mini-computers, and floppy discs, and its future impact on the department's archives. The vendors of these adult toys, like so many modern prophets, have been sketching out the wondrous world of tomorrow that is already dawning. They speak of mini-mainframes, local-area networks, electronic mail, the capability of conjuring up from the central files, with the slightest manipulation of a computer keyboard, every reference on any given subject. The intelligence analysts, they promise, will be able to sift and winnow through literally thousands of cables and documents in a twinkling and then produce fresh, up-to-the-minute analyses at lightning speed. Decision memoranda can be drafted with minimal delay setting forth every possible pro and con and every conceivable option, and these can be passed at lightning speed to the decision makers faced with a fast-breaking problem. The large embassies and consulates will become automated to the point where information can be exchanged with Washington, between drafting officer and desk, in seconds. Polished prose and the stylish phrase may be sacrificed on the altar of speed, but the technology provides the potential for the exchange of facts or instructions in moments rather than hours.

The advantages offered the diplomat in the brave new world of rapid word and data processing are obvious and staggering, but there is also the risk of inundation. Having more information on a given subject is not necessarily an advantage, especially when what is needed is a discrete or unique datum which will point the analyst and the decision-maker in the right direction toward the best solution or judgment. The intuition of the most gifted individual can be suffocated in a sea of detail.

There is another aspect of the problem which should not be lost sight of. In the business of diplomacy, the human element always bulks large. Foreign relations between nations, after all, are conducted by individuals—our people and theirs—and the level of technological sophistication within several of the governments with which we do business is considerably lower than ours, though their natural sophistication may be further advanced. And because the conduct of diplomacy is a "people-to-people" process in its present form, the personal idiosyncrasies on both sides will always have an important effect on the formulation of plans and policies, not infrequently in ways that defy the data. This, alas, will probably continue to be the case until we reach the point where their elected mainframe talks directly to ours without benefit of human intervention.

I do not mean to argue that we sit like so many Canutes with feet in the technological tide and command it not to advance into our untidy little realm. I merely wish to suggest that as the technological tide rises to engulf us we make certain to canalize and control it so that it is useful to the special and even peculiar needs of diplomacy. It is, after all, election of correct policies and rejection of wrong ones that makes diplomacy still an art and not a science. □

Diplomacy is a bimonthly column that explores the mechanics of policymaking and Foreign Service life as viewed from the perspective of Foreign Service professionals.

CONGRESS

'Not Since McCarthy'

By LARRY KNUTSON

It was a long struggle but, after successfully employing delaying tactics for several weeks, Senator Jesse Helms (R.-North Carolina) was persuaded to free the State Department 29. The last group of four nominees—Richard Burt as ambassador to East Germany; Rozanne Ridgway to succeed Burt as assistant secretary of state for European affairs; Edwin G. Corr as ambassador to El Salvador; and John Arthur Ferch as ambassador to Honduras—were confirmed on July 15.

But Helms did not let the moment pass without lecturing the Senate on the perceived evils of a nominating system he said is dominated by diplomatic professionals out of tune with President Reagan's conservative, anti-communist political philosophy. Declaring that Reagan must have nominated such people only because no president has the time to personally assess the political philosophies of each of the thousands of nominees to cross his desk, Helms said Reagan relies on his secretary of state, who in turn relies on "the foreign policy system." "And that is where the problem is," said Helms.

He went on to say he is convinced of "the absolute necessity of doing something about the functionaries in the State Department who are elected by no one, whose activities are not even monitored, and whose activities have so often led to distressing circumstances in various parts of the world." The senator's latest campaign against the Foreign Service apparently was sparked by his demands that Secretary Shultz find new positions for six conservatives at the State Department whom he said were being purged because of their political views.

Helms's delaying tactics in the confirmation of the 29 diplomatic officials was one more episode in the legislative guerrilla warfare the senator has waged with characteristic doggedness since the beginning of the Reagan administration and earlier. Senate liberals expressed outrage over his latest legislative hold on important appointments. Senator Alan Cranston (D.-California) told Burt the delays were caused by "a self-appointed band of ideological inquisitors" here in the Senate. "Not since the time of Joe McCarthy have we seen such attacks on the professional Foreign Service," Cranston said. "I respect the dedication of the president and Secretary Shultz to professionalism in our embassies and foreign missions. I deeply regret these actions by a handful of right-wing senators."

Helms was joined by Senator Barry Goldwater (R.-Arizona) in attacking Burt, whom Goldwater said became "the prime exponent within the councils of the administration of the doctrine that the United States should unilaterally observe the arms constraints of the SALT II treaty, even though the Soviets themselves have committed massive violations of the levels proposed in that treaty."

The North Carolina senator said he objected to the nomination of Ridgway to replace Burt as head of the European division because, while serving as ambassador to East Germany, she allegedly forced from the embassy a man who was seeking political asylum. He said he rejected her explanation that security officials had determined the man was a threat to embassy security because he said he was carrying surgical scissors and poisons and had threatened to kill his family and himself.

On the appointment of Corr, Helms said he had come to the judgment that Corr "is very much out of sympathy with the foreign policy philosophy of President Reagan, particularly regarding Central America....Mr. Corr is a candidate of the State Department, by the State Department, for the State Department," Helms said. Additionally, he said he suspected Corr of unspecified wrongdoing based on charges brought to Helms about the nominee by people Helms did not name. He said the allegations have been investigated by the inspector general of the State Department. But Helms said the investigation did not satisfy him because "the State Department's inspector general's office is the only such office in the government

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which is under the authority of the cabinet officer in charge of the department.

"Moreover, the head of the inspector general's office...is the former president of the Foreign Service Association, the State Department's union," Helms said. "So you see why I find suspect any benign report from this gentleman," he added. "In my judgment he is part of the problem that has existed for a quarter of a century." He noted that the Senate, while considering the State Department authorization bill earlier in the year, agreed to his amendment making the inspector generals of the State Department and USIA totally independent of those agencies.

The senator made clear his battle with State will continue and that he has no intention of backing down. "No senator, in my judgment, can escape the responsibility and duty to be as faithful as possible in examining all nominees, whether they be State Department or others, before rubber stamping them," Helms said. "I do not propose to do that. I never have and I never will because the Constitution confers upon each of us in the Senate the responsibility and the duty to advise and consent. And if we do not like a nominee, it is our responsibility and our duty to say so." But he acknowledged that his position is not universally held: "I stand in a virtually empty Senate chamber at 4:30 on Monday afternoon and my message is probably like a ship passing in the night."

Not Since 1981. Also in mid-July, the House of Representatives broke a four-year congressional log jam by passing a foreign aid authorization bill. The Senate had passed its own version of the bill earlier. The House action marked the first time since 1981 that both houses of Congress were on track at the same time on foreign aid.

The House bill, with its repeal of the so-called Clark amendment barring U.S. aid to insurgent forces inside Angola, as well as its authorization of aid to anti-communist rebels in Cambodia and Afghanistan, represented a distinct change of approach and one which drew the praise of House conservatives.

"I do not know when I started out disliking a bill as much as I did this one and ending up with an almost sentimental attachment to it," said Representative Henry Hyde (R.-Illinois). "This bill goes a long way toward accommodating a world view that I think is in touch with reality."

"This bill has made stronger statements against communism than any bill to come out of this house in a decade," said Representative Robert K. Dornan (R.-California). "The near-fatal fever of the Vietnam syndrome, which has plagued us for 10 years, was lowered at least 10 degrees through what we have accomplished in this bill this year, particularly the acceptance of my amendment to remove the infamous Clark amendment, which crushed the freedom fighters in Angola."

There was a different reaction, however, when Secretary Shultz told reporters there is no present plan to send military aid to anti-communist rebels in Cambodia, despite the House vote, in part because he considers Congress "a very changeable operation."

Representative Newt Gingrich (R.-Georgia) called that an effort at "slowing down, confusing, and disrupting the momentum of the anti-communist, pro-freedom forces in this Congress." Gingrich added, "While the secretary of state is the person in the headlines, it is not his fault. He is surrounded by, guided by, and advised by a professional bureaucracy which is weak and ineffective. The State Department has been weak under Shultz as it was weak under Haig as it was weak under Muskie as it was weak under Vance....The State Department view of legalism, of conflict avoidance, of negotiating to get a 'yes' at virtually any cost, that view is fundamentally wrong."

The foreign aid bill was amended to include a provision of interest to female members of the Foreign Service. The amendment, offered by Representative William H. Gray III (D.-Pennsylvania), directs agency heads to develop "to the extent practicable" an affirmative action program to increase the number of women and minority groups in the Foreign Service in that agency.

The amendment requires that particular emphasis be placed on achieving significant increases in women and minority group members in the mid-level and senior-level of the Foreign Service. It calls for annual reports to Congress on efforts to implement those affirmative action goals, including promotions. Gray told the House: "The Foreign Service needs to embody a balanced and realistic reflection of our nation's best minds. There are many minorities, many women, who are equipped to serve and pursue this country's best interests abroad but who, by dint of tradition and bias have been effectively locked out of the Service. There is no reason to delay correcting this imbalance." □

CONGRESS appears from time to time to record and explain significant events in the legislative branch that affect the foreign affairs agencies and the Foreign Service.

CLIPPINGS

Grinding at State

"Mr. Lichenstein [former ambassador and deputy chief of mission at the United Nations] said [at a Heritage Foundation-sponsored forum] the State Department's approach to foreign policy is geared to maintain the status quo, rather than to implement the foreign policy of the president.

" 'The system first, the system last, the system always—long live the system,' Mr. Lichenstein said in assessing what he said was the incorrect approach taken by career diplomats.

" 'They control the supply of both the carrot and the stick,' he said. 'They recruit people in their own image....These chickens have the advantage of running their own coop'....

"Mr. [Curtin] Winsor [Jr.], a former career officer, said the system 'grinds down' career diplomats, rewarding with good assignments those who play the game and relegating those who do not to tours of duty in insignificant areas."

Bill Outlaw in the Washington Times, July 3

Diplomacy as Craft

"An ambassador's complicated functions include, in addition to advocating U.S. policy, the capacity to report events in the host country. This presupposes arduous training in history, economics, culture, and language, coupled with experience. Also, diplomacy is a quiet, painstaking craft, and becoming a media celebrity usually limits effectiveness.

"We must be clear about what an ambassadorship is not—a dumping ground for the politically inconvenient; a place for ethnic Americans, who often speak their ancestral language poorly, to prove that they have made it in America; a job to provide social climbers an opportunity to hobnob with the local nobility; a stage for persons on the make at home to add a line to their resumes with ill-advised intervention in the domestic affairs of the host country.

"America and its presidents must come to accept that to carry out our worldwide mission we need a highly skilled professional Foreign Service and ambassadors. We must devise more effective techniques for recruiting, training and, especially, utilizing a first-class career diplomacy."

Robert F. Illing in the International Herald Tribune, June 4

Truth in Recruiting

"One element of the new [security] program is a 'truth-in-recruiting' policy, to let new Foreign Service applicants understand that they are pursuing a career that may be more hazardous than they expect. Following an [Advisory Panel on Overseas Security] recommendation, recruitment literature will try to give 'a more graphic description of the hazards of political violence to our personnel abroad.'

" 'What is being done is a response to a general recognition of the times we are living in,' [diplomatic security coordinator Robert E.] Lamb said. 'A few years ago we could identify certain "high-threat" countries to concentrate our efforts on, but now there are no frontiers to terrorism, and no place we can let our guard down.' "

Don Oberdorfer and Joanne Omang in the the Washington Post, July 3

Stopping Terrorism

"First, I am totally convinced that our failure to strike back [against terrorists] will encourage more and more attacks on us.

"Second, the U.S. owes its citizens—here or in any other part of the world—protection to the degree it can give it. Retaliation would make it clear to everybody that Americans traveling abroad are nobody's free targets.

"Third, we have an obligation to punish murder of American citizens in places where courts of law cannot reach."

Lawrence Eagleburger in U.S. News & World Report, June 25

Endurable Wick

" 'Charlie [Charles Z. Wick, director of USIA] has had some good ideas,' said Hodding Carter, a news commentator who served as the State Department spokesman in the Carter administration. He said that some of Mr. Wick's efforts suffered from a 'glitzy' and heavy-handed patriotism but that Mr. Wick deserved support for 'the core idea that the Voice [of America] and the agency needed considerable strengthening and that we have a right and an obligation to have a vigorous information policy around the world.'

"Mr. Wick...shows none of the uncertainty typical of political appointees who worry about retaining the president's support. Asked how long he would remain as head of the agency, he said he would be there until the day Mr. Reagan leaves office."

Neil A. Lewis in the New York Times, June 25

Compensating Hostages

"Dr. Katherine Keough, speaking for the families of hostages held for 444 days in Iran, accused the government Wednesday of 'bargaining away' their right to sue Iran for damages and then failing to fulfill its own promise by not compensating hostages. Keough—wife of released hostage William Keough—testified before a House panel considering legislation to provide compensation to federal employees who become victims of hostile action against the USA. A presidential panel has recommended hostages receive $12.50 a day, or about $4500. She suggested $192.50 a day, similar to what commission members were paid."

USA Today, June 13

Religious Test

"In the March 16 issue of the Jesuit magazine *America*...the Reverend Thomas J. Reese wrote: 'When over 100 other nations have diplomatic relations with the Holy See, it is clear that there are advantages to the United States in also having an ambassador at the Vatican....

" 'On the other hand, diplomatic relations are of no advantage to American Catholics, and in fact would be detrimental, if the American ambassador meddles in church affairs. Many Catholics would have preferred that a non-Catholic be appointed ambassador in the hopes that he or she would be less tempted to interfere in internal church administration....[Catholics] should demand that the State Department make clear that the internal affairs of the church, especially episcopal appointments, are not to be discussed by Vatican and American officials.'

"The Jesuits' concern about U.S.-Vatican ties is no doubt welcomed by the Americans United [for Separation of Church and State] coalition challenging the diplomatic relationship. Their solution—a non-Catholic U.S. ambassador—may not be, however. Article VI of the U.S. Constitution forbids any such religious test for public office."

Jim Buie in Church and State, June

CLIPPINGS records statements in the media on the conduct of U.S. diplomacy and the foreign affairs agencies. Readers are invited to submit contributions.

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, September 1975: "It seems to me endlessly frustrating to feel jealous of one's husband's job and to downgrade the often dull but very necessary jobs performed by the wife. The value of any job is usually in the eye of the doer and maybe we women are aping man in looking down on any work that doesn't have a price attached to it. I can't help wishing that these bright and able [spouses] would put their good minds to such problems as why the number of Foreign Service children needing psychiatric care seems to be growing and why more isn't done within the average embassy to make life more meaningful and interesting for all who are a part of it. I'm sure secretaries could tell embassy wives a thing or two about boredom and frustration."

Anne Penfield

Foreign Service Journal, September 1960: "I have had misgivings from the start about the soundness of certain features of the reform conducted some years ago in the recruitment and organization of the Foreign Service, and about our subsequent practices in this respect.

"First of all, I have the impression that the Service is overstaffed....

"Secondly, I think the Service should not include people who, while they may be technical experts in some specific field, lack the broader background of education and character necessary for Foreign Service work, generally.

"Thirdly, I question the adequacy of an entrance examination which, as I understand it, includes no question of prose composition and thus fails to test adequately the candidate's ability to express himself clearly and effectively in his own language."

George F. Kennan

Foreign Service Journal, September 1935: "A recent issue of amendments to the consular regulations, which was sent out to the field in the usual way, bore a little green cover entitled 'Pre-Natal Care.' In spite of explanations that it was all a mistake and that the cover was placed on the regulations only as a protective binder, the incident has caused some speculation and amusement."

News from the Department

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DESPATCH

Thrashing State

A "network" of anti-Reaganites in the State Department is undermining the president's stated foreign policy objectives in several critical regions, according to three former non-career ambassadors who spoke at a symposium sponsored by the Heritage Foundation in early July. The ambassadors painted a portrait of an influential cabal that has advanced "internationalist" ideology and avoided confronting adversaries in areas where Reagan has tried to contain communism or thwart Third World anti-Americanism. The three said that these were not the policies the American people had voted for last year and concluded by calling for the resignation of Secretary Shultz as the person responsible.

The ambassadors—David Funderburk, who served in Romania from 1981–85, Charles Lichenstein, alternate representative to the U.N. from 1981–84, and Curtin Winsor Jr., ambassador to Costa Rica from 1981–83—have been involved in controversies before. Funderburk, a scholar on the country to which he was accredited, had written a pamphlet during Jesse Helms's 1978 senatorial campaign charging State with "whitewashing" human-rights reports on Eastern Europe—an allegation he updated at the symposium from his ambassadorial experiences. During his confirmation hearings, however, Senator Paul Tsongas had forced the nominee to admit that the department instead may have been guilty only of omitting cases "because of a space requirement."

Winsor was alleged to have taken advantage of his diplomatic status by asking that a $1.25 million lawsuit against him be dismissed because notices of the legal action could not reach his residence in Costa Rica, the address of which was protected for security and privacy reasons. The ambassador denied at the time that he had used his position to avoid the suit, filed by National Bank of Washington because of the bankruptcy of a firm whose loans from the bank Winsor, along with four others, had guaranteed. And Lichenstein became a "folk hero," in his words, when he bade the United Nations to sail off into the sunset while he was Jeane Kirkpatrick's deputy there.

During the Heritage event, Funderburk charged that "U.S. policy toward Romania and Eastern Europe is laughed at by really knowledgeable people in Eastern Europe as well as by the Soviets, who know that it plays right into their hands." He said that U.S. diplomats' desires to encourage Romanian independence from the Eastern bloc concentrate on superficial actions such as that country's refusal to observe the boycott of the Los Angeles Olympics, while human-rights abuses and technology transfers to the U.S.S.R. continue under their deliberately averted eyes.

The reason this occurs, he said, is because policy is in the hands of careerists, who promote and assign like-minded officers into their stead. He said that officers who "dare to advocate a Reagan foreign policy or to buck the misconceived policy line of the elite network at State which controls appointments, advancement, promotions, rewards, assignments, and so forth" end up being ruined by the network.

The "network works frantically to denigrate the latest information from the field regarding human-rights violations and technology transfers," he said. Officers ignore international-terrorist activities as well as Soviet troop movements in Romania. He accused the network of being anti-Reagan and of embarrassing the president at every turn. The Service requires "liberal views,...antipathy toward conservatives and political appointees, pro-internationalism and detentism, and...activistic clientitis." Concluded Funderburk: "The State Department has not effectively implemented the president's stated foreign policy goals" of liberation for the peoples of Eastern Europe; rather, "it has undermined them at every turn."

State responded to Funderburk's charges, which were made elsewhere as well: "During his tenure in Romania, Ambassador Funderburk had every opportunity to contribute to the policy process regarding Romania. His views received full consideration throughout the government."

Lichenstein agreed that the Service adheres to "the system first, the system last, the system always." As an example, he said that, at the mission to the U.N., FSOs were ruined by the system for being close to the conservative Kirkpatrick.

He told a story of an anonymous officer—a Democrat, Lichenstein said—who had succeeded at the difficult task of multilateral diplomacy for four years under Kirkpatrick. The assistant secretary designate of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs "wanted this highly trained, highly skilled, and by this time highly experienced FSO to be his principal deputy here in Washington. The system decided, however, that he was urgently required in Nigeria." Lichenstein said that the officer had no African expertise and that others could have taken the post. He cited "the retribution factor"—"being a loyal, dedicated, and effective assistant to Jeane Kirkpatrick and all those other terrible right-wing ideologues"—as the reason for the officer's punishment.

Several sources in the Bureau of Personnel disputed Lichenstein's account. The officer in question, who was not requested for the IO position until *after* his assignment came up to Lagos, was "the most eligible senior economic officer up for reassignment in terms of prior hardship service," one of the sources said. Because State has difficulty filling positions in hardship posts, it identifies officers who have not served at one for 8-10 years. This officer had not served in a hardship post for nearly 20 years.

As further evidence of the Service's liberal leanings, Lichenstein said that President Carter had the highest percentage of political ambassadors in recent years, but that the careerists had not protested during the Carter administration, though they had under Reagan. When the JOURNAL challenged that assertion, he was unsure of the statistics but cited a report to Congress by the Bureau of Management. The report, however, says just the opposite: political appointees sunk to a post-war low under Carter, rising again under Reagan. In addition, career officers challenged several Carter appointments.

Lichenstein also blamed the State Department for protracting the ordeal of the TWA hostages because of a memo it had released several months before the terrorist hijacking that charged Israel with illegally detaining the Shiite prisoners. He implied that the memo was part of an ongoing attempt by the department to oppose Israel. He said that the memo was unnecessary and had been released without the White House's knowledge. He added that he could give "ten more illustrations" of similar actions by State "deleterious in their impact on the U.S. national interest."

Winsor's accusations were milder. He did, however, describe a timid bureaucracy that had produced "confusion" over U.S policies in Central America "sown by the Department of State, not by the president or the White House."

DESPATCH is a compendium of news about the Service. It is written by the editor and does not necessarily represent the views of the Association.

Approximate KAL Flight 007 flight path from Soviet tracking. Flight 007 was hit at 1826 GMT (Z) but took 12 more minutes to disappear from Soviet radar. As the estimated 1826 position for the airplane shows, air traffic controllers in Japan were expecting it to approach from the east and did not identify the aircraft emerging from Soviet airspace to the north with the Korean airliner, which was reporting itself on course.

TRAGEDY OF ERRORS

Media charges that KAL Flight 007 was a spy plane rely either on Soviet disinformation or misinterpretation of the facts

THOMAS MAERTENS

SEPTEMBER 1 marks two years since the Soviet Union shot down Korean Air Lines Flight 007. The circumstances suttounding the tragedy have continued to generate interest both in the United States and abtoad. The ptess has generally covered the incident well, using experienced reporters who understand civil aviation. A small handful, however, encouraged by Soviet charges and disinformation, have exploited the gaps in out knowledge of the event to portray the airliner as a spy plane. Much of this has been retracted or discredited, but one wonders how such charges gained credence in the first place, given their obvious conflict with well-known facts. Even now some analysts and their followers persist in the myth that Flight 007 was an espionage mission.

One such charge was by the pseudonymous P.Q. Mann. His article, appearing a year ago in the British publication *Defence Attache,* and since retracted, alleged that the intrusion by Flight 007 was coordinated with a "Fettet-D" spy satellite and was intended to stimulate Soviet radat emissions, which could then be intercepted and analyzed. This is essentially the same charge the Soviets put out—and one they used in a similar incident in 1978. Bhupendta Jasani of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, who has investigated the Soviet story, concluded, however, that because of errors and inconsistencies, the Soviet assertion "doesn't hold water."

For those seeking an explanation such as Mann's, it is possible to charge that practically any event was coordinated with a satellite. NASA's most recent Satellite Situation Report shows that the United States has more than 2700 military and civilian satellites in orbit, although not all are opetational. Some of them orbit the earth in as little as 90 minutes. During any given time period, at least a few ate likely to pass ovethead.

As to the ptovenance of his charges, Mann openly acknowledged that the map he used was based on a Soviet document. This taises an intetesting point—although the map identifies several U.S. aircraft by type, some said to be hundreds of miles off the coast, the Soviets maintain they did not realize that the intrudet was a highly recognizable 747 even though they followed it for mote than two hours.

Mann's story does have one original twist. He implies that the space shuttle had some role in 007's deviation off course. James Oberg, a Houston space flight engineer, writing in the January/February 1985 issue of *Defence Attache,* demonstrates that the shuttle could not have had any role in the events leading to the shootdown. It was always over the horizon and nevet in a position where it could have had tadio contact during the entire two and a half hours the Soviets tracked it. NASA officials have confirmed the accuracy of Oberg's article.

Missing from Mann's piece is any mention of the extensive two-part investigation into the shootdown by the International Civil Aviation Organization, a technical body of the United Nations. This resulted in a lengthy report by the otganization's secretary general to its council in December 1983, and a second report in February 1984 by the ICAO's Air Navigation Commission, which carried out a technical review of the secretary genetal's report. Among the ICAO's findings: "The Air Navigation Commission was unable to substantiate that the aircraft's diversion from its flight plan track was the result of a deliberate action by the flight crew." Not surprisingly, Mann's speculations created quite a splash until they were retracted as a result of a libel suit by Korean Airlines—eventually settled in KAL's favor. Lawyers for the publisher and editor announced in London High Court in November 1984 that "there is no foundation for any suggestion that either Korean Airlines or any of its staff on the aircraft concerned took part in a spy mission." As part of the court settlement, *Defence Attache* agreed to apologize, to set the record straight, and to pay substantial damages and legal costs. KAL has now instituted lawsuits against two other British news organizations that tepeated Mann's theories.

A more significant article on the Flight 007 tragedy that received wide publicity was published by *The Nation* in August 1984. Wtitten by David Pearson, a graduate student in sociology, it alleges that the United States either knew of the aitliner's deviation and tefused to warn it because of the intelligence bonanza to be gained, or it did not know of the incursion, in which case it suffered the "most serious failure in the history of U.S. early warning." This is an old trap: either the United States knew about some event in advance and did nothing to stop it, or else it suffered an intelligence failure; guilty on one count or

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the other. At the risk of contradicting his first allegation, Pearson also charges a carefully planned intrusion. "All the evidence points in that direction," he writes. An ICAO press statement in December 1983, in contrast, says its report "indicates there was no evidence of any deliberateness in the flight's off-course deviation."

SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY, a Democrat and member of the Senate Intelligence Committee, was quoted in *Time* last September as saying there was no intelligence bonanza to be reaped from an overflight by Flight 007. The United States has much better means for testing Soviet radar defenses, he said, adding that he had reviewed still-classified information on the downing and found nothing in it that would relieve the Soviets of their responsibility.

As for the "intelligence failure," Pearson attributes this to a possible breakdown of the Defense Department's World Wide Military Command and Control System. WWMCCS, he claims, "has failed to provide timely information to leaders during real crises," such as the Jonestown massacre. The system is not an automatic warning system, however, but a series of computers that transmit the Defense Department's message traffic. It had no warning role in the KAL tragedy, not to mention the Jonestown massacre. Furthermore, the U.S. early warning system is intended to provide notice of an *attack,* not that a foreign civilian airliner is off course somewhere, even over the Soviet Union. No government agency, military or civilian, has a mandate and the facilities to track and report on civilian air traffic outside of U.S. radar coverage. To do so would require additional radar facilities and communication circuits, warning procedures, charts of air routes, flight schedules, and so on. It is for this reason that no agency recognized that the airliner was off course until after it was shot down.

Furthermore, no matter what intelligence-related mission is claimed for Flight 007, a military aircraft, including an unmanned drone, could perform such a task better—and with little or no risk to life. Nor has any evidence ever been produced showing that Flight 007 had an intelligence mission. There is some evidence, though, that it could *not* have had such a mission. For example, the Air Navigation Commission report states that the manufacturer of the aircraft, Boeing, believed that any modification of the airplane for intelligence purposes would have required substantial time out from service, and records proved that this had not been the case. The ANC reported further that "the handling staff at New York and Anchorage had free access to all parts of the aircraft and none of these personnel reported any unusual equipment or structural changes." Further, "the flight schedules of the [airplane] showed that it did not adhere to any set pattern," as a plane modified for intelligence gathering might. The fact of the matter is that since the 1960 U-2 incident the U.S. government has never authorized or sent any aircraft to penetrate internationally recognized Soviet airspace.

In addition to these problems, Pearson's article contains literally dozens of factual errors and several dozen more erroneous assertions. The author, for instance, misuses a transcript of the Soviet interceptor pilots' conversations to show that they tried to signal the KAL plane. According to Pearson, at 1810:51 Greenwich mean time, the Soviet pilot who eventually shot the airliner down said: "Roger, [the] light is blinking." Pearson interprets this as indicating that the Soviet interceptor was in front of the airliner flashing its own lights as an interception signal. The problem is that the pilot did not say that. The U.S. translation of the statement is: "Roger, [the target's strobe] light is blinking," and the ICAO translation is: "Roger. Target is flying with strobe light, with strobe light." An unpublished manuscript by Marilyn J. Young and Michael K. Launer of Florida State University discusses the Russian on this point and leaves no doubt that the Soviet pilot was referring to the target's light.

Eight minutes later, the same interceptor pilot said, according to the ICAO translation: "The air navigation lights are burning. The strobe light is on." Pearson claims the Soviet pilot is again referring to his own lights. But the interceptor's next transmission, 28 seconds later, is: "I am closing on the target"—i.e., behind the target and increasing speed, not in front of it and slowing down. Pearson also fails to note that this pilot reported his own altitude as 8000 meters and the airliner's as 10,000 meters. In other words, the interceptor was not only behind the 747 but below it as well. How could he be signaling the KAL pilot with his own lights? The ANC report says the transcript "gives no clear indication that the intercepting aircraft had taken up a position within view of the intercepted aircraft." But Pearson persists. Two minutes later—at 1821, after the Soviet pilot's third direct reference to the airliner's lights—the KAL pilot, Pearson claims, realized he was being intercepted and turned on his lights. The ICAO reports directly refute this story. The secretary general's report says, "There was no indication that the [KAL] pilot was aware of being intercepted," and the ANC asserts that the transcript of air-to-ground communications from the intercepting aircraft "contains three references to the target's blinking or flashing strobe lights."

Pearson suggests that the Soviet pilot may have attempted to contact the KAL plane on the international emergency frequency. But the ANC report says, "There is no record or other information of any calls on 121.5 MHz having been heard by any civil or military ground unit or by other aircraft within [very high frequency] range of the intercepting aircraft, or any record of such transmissions having been received via the search and rescue satellite system." In contrast, such radio calls were overheard in the 1978 Soviet interception of a KAL flight, but the calls were from the airliner, not the interceptor.

Next, according to Pearson, the Soviet interceptor attempted to warn the airline pilot by firing shots "along the path of the intruding aircraft." It is unclear if the cannon shots were "along the path" as a warning, however, or at the plane in an attempt to shoot it down. Pearson himself noted that the Su-15 pilot said at 1821:24—some 35 seconds after firing his cannon—"I'm approaching the target, I'm going in clos-

er." Eleven seconds later: "I have already approached the target to a distance of about two kilometers." The logical conclusion from such statements is that the interceptor was *more* than two kilometers behind the airliner when the shots were fired, and apparently still below it. Therefore, he could not have been in the prescribed position, level with the airliner and in view of the pilot, for any warning procedure.

IF THE INTERCEPTOR had really passed in front of Flight 007 to signal it, he could not have failed to recognize it as a civilian airliner. The secretary general's report notes: "There was no evidence that complete visual identification procedures were employed." It concluded that "U.S.S.R. authorities *assumed* that KAL 007 was an 'intelligence aircraft' and, therefore, they did not make exhaustive efforts to identify the aircraft through in-flight visual observations" [emphasis added].

Pearson also believes that the KAL plane took "evasive action" by turning at 1802 and 1809. There is no evidence whatever for alleging a turn at 1802 except the Soviet claim that it did, and the one alleged at 1809 appears to be a mistaken report by the interceptor pilot, who was maneuvering himself at the time. Illustration 1 shows the track of Flight 007 displayed by Ambassador Kirkpatrick at the U.N. in September 1983. Derived from intercepted Soviet tracking data, it shows no such turns.

Pearson claims that the airliner did not really climb to 35,000 feet at 1823 but was making an evasive maneuver. The secretary general's report says, however, that "during the period of the interception, KAL 007 requested and received clearance from Tokyo Area Control Center to climb from 33,000 to 35,000 feet." Moreover, it had requested the altitude change, a fuel-saving measure, five minutes in advance of its ascent. Superimposing the transmissions of the Korean airliner and the Soviet interceptor on the same timeline (Illustration 2) shows that the Su-15 simply overshot when the airliner slowed during its climb. Fragmentary radar data released by the Japanese government shows the KAL aircraft at about 32,000 feet from 1812 to 1815, then at about 29,000 feet from 1815 to 1823, and finally, back at 32,000 feet from 1823 to 1829. The data show neither a descent nor a climb, however, but only disconnected segments of level flight. The reason for this is not clear but is probably related to the type of radar used and the general inaccuracy of height-finding radars, particularly at long ranges. The Japanese government placed the three radars involved at about 160, 220, and 270 nautical miles respectively from the aircraft at the time of detection. At ranges between 100–200 miles, similar U.S. radars could show variations in height up to about 6000 feet. The Soviet interceptor pilot reported no change of altitude for Flight 007 during this time, but he might not have detected a 2000-foot climb from below the airliner in the dark. If the Japanese data are taken literally, they would also show the KAL aircraft flying straight and level almost three minutes after it was hit.

Pearson's revised theory, put out in a "newsletter" on this subject, asserts that the Korean pilot deliberately misled air controllers on his altitude. To reach this conclusion, Pearson misstates the Japanese data on at least three points, ignores the statements by the Korean and Soviet pilots, and says nothing about radar accuracy. All this to prove that the aircraft was being flown manually at that particular time, when simply accepting the 2000-foot climb as reported would make the same point. In the absence of hard evidence, such as the flight recorders might have provided, the scenario shown in Illustration 2 is the most plausible.

One of Pearson's principal assertions is that the United States could have warned the KAL aircraft that it was off course. This would have been a more complex chain of events than Pearson implies. Such a process would require some means of detecting an aircraft along Flight 007's flight path, then some way of identifying this unknown radar "blip" and, finally, procedures and facilities for communicating with the 747.

With respect to detecting the aircraft, Pearson asserts that a number of civilian and military radars must have tracked Flight 007. "Radar screens must have been ablaze with the converging images of the four Soviet fighters, the RC-135 [that was operating over the northern Pacific that night], and KAL 007," writes Pearson. This is impossible. The RC-135 never came within a thousand miles of where the downing occurred. More important, as noted in the ANC report, once the airliner was out of Anchorage radar coverage there was no other radar available for monitoring the aircraft's flight until it approached Japan—except Soviet military radar. This meant that Flight 007 was out of radar coverage for approximately 2200 miles and flying solely on its own internal navigation systems.

Nor did any U.S. military radar operators track the 747. Their job is air defense, to identify incoming aircraft, not outgoing ones. Subsequent investigation showed that the unmanned Air Force radar at King Salmon had recorded the airliner's presence. The tape of that track (and all the other information collected by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Federal Aviation Administration) was turned over to ICAO investigators. It is the basis for the ICAO's conclusion that Flight 007 was 12 miles off course at Bethel, the point where it picked up route R20 across the Pacific. But the King Salmon data were not used by air controllers because the radar was not accurate enough to be certified for FAA use. Pearson asserts that another military radar at Cape Newenham, on the coast of Alaska, must have tracked the airliner as it continued further off course, but that information was not piped into the civil air traffic control center, only to the military operations center.

Having misstated the capabilities of all known radars in the area, Pearson tries the shotgun approach to the problem: some conventional radars in the area (not further specified) have been given over-the-horizon capabilities through a classified process of "bending" the radar signal. This assertion is not only false but physically impossible. Radio waves travel in straight lines; there is no known process, classified or unclassified, of bending them.

Pearson's next victims are two large phased-array

radars, Cobra Dane on Shemya Island and Cobra Judy onboard the USS *Observation Island*. It would have been "a scandal and a failure of a high order," Pearson charges, for the two radars not to have seen Flight 007's deviation. In fact, neither radar tracks aircraft at all, over the horizon or anywhere else.

If not one of the radars, then surely one of the many U.S. planes in the area must have seen the airliner deviate off course, Pearson claims. Only one U.S. aircraft came within 400 miles of the 747, however, a special type of RC-135 called Cobra Ball. According to Pearson, this aircraft has a high-resolution side-looking airborne radar that must have tracked the airliner. But Cobra Ball has no such radar and it never tracked Flight 007 at all. Like Cobra Dane and Cobra Judy, it is used for monitoring missile flights. Pearson strongly implies, based on what he claims is a "reconstruction" of the aircrafts' flight paths—essentially lifted from the Soviets' spy-plane story, and wrong—that the RC-135 and the airliner flew together. This is one of Moscow's charges and makes no sense whatsoever. If the KAL aircraft were part of a sophisticated, pre-planned spy mission, the presence of a U.S. aircraft would have been not only unnecessary but would have served only to arouse Soviet suspicions. In fact, the two aircraft never came closer than about 75 nautical miles. Moreover, contrary to allegations in Pearson's article, no RC-135 has ever violated Soviet airspace, accidently or otherwise. In fact, great care is taken to ensure that this does not happen, to the extreme of placing two navigators aboard the aircraft who use both inertial and celestial navigation. Moreover, an unarmed RC-135—basically a Boeing 707—would stand no chance against a Soviet interceptor.

Japanese military radars on Hokkaido eventually spotted an unidentified aircraft over Sakhalin island at 1812, some 14 minutes before the Su-15 shot it down. As Illustration 2 makes clear, however, detecting an aircraft and identifying it are not the same thing. Yet Pearson implies that any facility that detects a blip over Soviet airspace should know immediately that an aircraft is in danger and sound the alarm. In the real world, an analyst would assume that an unidentified aircraft in Soviet airspace was a Soviet aircraft. Moreover, Flight 007 was reporting itself on course the entire trip, so there was no reason to connect the unidentified blip with the 747.

BESIDES THE known radar stations, Pearson cites a laundry list of intelligence agencies and facilities and alleges that their information was being transmitted to various Washington agencies as it was gathered. The technique works like this: quote an unnamed Pentagon officer—"Nothing flies from, over, or near Sakhalin that we don't monitor"—and then modify it by assertion to suit your purposes—"This could be extended to include the Bering Sea, Kamchatka Peninsula, and the Sea of Okhotsk." Whatever the truth of the first statement, it provides no basis at all for the second, which refers to an area as much as 20 times larger.

What is important to understand here is that the first priority for U.S. intelligence is to provide early warning of attack on the country or its allies. For obvious reasons, this must be done in real time. To attempt to analyze most other types of intelligence as they are gathered would entail significantly increased expense for mostly marginal gains. For that reason, as Kirkpatrick noted at the United Nations shortly after the tragedy, much of our information about Flight 007 was collected on tape using voice-activated recorders—far more efficient than assigning human monitors to guard a multitude of radio frequencies around the clock.

Not knowing this, Pearson asserts that Washington knew where the airliner was at all times. But even the intelligence information that later became available doesn't support his story. For example, the intercepted conversations from the Soviet pilots never reveal what their target was, nor even that it was a civilian airliner. If the Soviets don't say what they are about to shoot down, how is someone else supposed to know from overhearing their conversations? Even if both the intercepted communications and the Soviet tracking data had been available as they were gathered, that wouldn't have changed an analyst's judgment. The interception still would have looked like a typical air defense drill, the kind that all air forces practice. Only with the knowledge that the KAL plane was missing did the information take on significance. An air defense exercise would account for Soviet air defense forces being on alert, too, something Pearson asserts should have been an indication that Flight 007 was in trouble.

Another of Pearson's contentions is that it is "probable that Soviet radar systems were jammed." Pearson's evidence for this? Some Soviet radars, he claims, have a range of up to 500 miles—his source for this assertion is not given—yet "none of these radar systems seems to have been able to locate the jetliner." But the Soviets had to have located it to shoot it down. Furthermore, according to administration officials quoted by Philip Taubman in the *New York Times* last October, dozens of planes would have been required to jam the Soviet air defense system along the path of the airliner. But there must have been jamming, Pearson continues, because one of the Soviet missiles missed the airliner. The missile that hit was heat-seeking, and the one that missed was radar-guided, he asserts. He gives no evidence for any of these assertions.

In contrast, the ICAO report says that Flight 007 was hit by *at least* one of two missiles the Soviet interceptor fired. It is possible that both hit: a Japanese fisherman reported seeing two flashes. There is no evidence, however, that the second missile was radar-guided; according to Jane's *All the World's Aircraft*, three of the four missiles normally carried by the Su-15 are heat-seeking. The Soviet practice from a tail-chase position, moreover, is to use heat-seekers, which are both more reliable and cheaper. Further evidence against the jamming theory comes from the fact that the interceptor reported on four separate occasions that his fire-control radar was locked on to the target. Finally, not even the Soviet Union has claimed (up to now, at least) that its radars were jammed—and jamming is apparent to radar operators.

PEARSON and *The Nation* contend that the issues raised in the article warrant a congressional investigation. In fact, the intelligence committees of both houses have looked into the incident. The Senate committee reported that "the intelligence community was not monitoring the KAL flight, and was not in a position to inform civil aviation authorities of its course. The committee concludes that there was no direct or indirect involvement by the U.S. intelligence community in the events leading to the KAL 007 disaster."

The House committee refuted Pearson's article in detail. Last October, Chairman Edward Boland stated that the committee had carefully investigated Pearson's charges and was convinced that "KAL 007 was not conducting a spy mission on behalf of or with any involvement of the United States." He further concluded that "U.S. intelligence agencies did not know that the aircraft was intruding into Soviet airspace or that it was being intercepted by Soviet aircraft." He observed that "the detailed account of the episode which emerged afterwards was put together with information recorded at various locations and pieced together to reconstruct the event." Boland added "that no 'conjunction' with KAL 007 occurred, nor was the RC-135 ever aware of the passage of KAL 007." Boland also said that no electronic countermeasures were used against Soviet radar. In conclusion, said Boland, "The committee believes its inquiry has been sufficient to establish that U.S. intelligence did not promote or even passively subscribe to an overflight and did not have timely information which could have prevented the overflight and Soviet attack." Yet, the conspiracy mongers have already decided that the House investigation was flawed because only U.S. officials were questioned, forgetting that they have asserted a U.S. role in the overflight of which only government officials would be aware.

Contributing to Pearson's article was John Keppel, a former State Department employee, retired since the 1960s, who says he doubted the government's version of events from the first. Keppel's essential contention has been that the airliner could not have gone off course by 300 miles accidentally. The pilot was too experienced and the navigation equipment too sophisticated. The odds against pilot error or equipment failure are astronomical—"a billion to one," he said.

This is akin to denying that accidents happen. Human error or equipment malfunctions account for essentially all of them, including car accidents. It is folly to assert that machines, however sophisticated, are not perverse, and that human beings, whatever their professional qualifications, don't make mistakes. As a *Washington Post* reporter, Douglas Feaver, put it from the vantage point of 10 years' experience covering civil aviation, "I know for a certainty that experienced, well-trained, highly qualified flight crews can commit incredible stupidities for unfathomable reasons." No one with any experience in aviation is likely to disagree with that. An analysis performed by the Air Line Pilots Association reached the conclusion that "technical [pilot] error, possibly combined with equipment malfunction, caused KAL 007 to stray off course." In the case of Flight 007, the human or mechanical failures that led the aircraft off course likely never would have come to the public's attention if it hadn't been shot down. Yet the public has little awareness of this.

Keppel's statistics are already faulty. A year after the KAL shootdown, an airliner went off course by an even greater distance than Flight 007, 500 miles, and approached within minutes of Soviet airspace before being warned off by Norwegian authorities. Following that incident, the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations stated that there had been 55 registered navigational errors in the past year *just over the North Atlantic*. In 1978, another Korean airliner went off course 1000 miles—and was also shot down over the Soviet Union. At about the same time, a 707 with the same triply redundant inertial navigation system as Flight 007 went 600–700 miles off course over the North Atlantic.

Another of Keppel's claims is that Flight 007 took on 9800 pounds of unneeded fuel—for sinister purposes, he implies. Here he is referring to the different fuel totals shown on the aircraft's Flight Release Sheet and its Weight and Balance Manifest, shown in the ICAO report. The former is a calculation of the *minimum* fuel required for the trip; the latter shows the amount actually loaded. Pilots frequently take on extra fuel for transoceanic flights, however—referred to as "grandmother fuel." Route R-20, over open ocean, would warrant such insurance, some four percent over the minimum requirement. Indeed, a flight over Soviet territory would have been more direct and required *less* fuel.

Keppel is aware that his story is contradicted by the ICAO reports. He attempts to discredit one by misquoting the other, contending that the ANC "threw out" the secretary general's report. What the ANC report actually says is that it was unable to validate or endorse the scenarios postulated in the ICAO report to explain why the plane was off course. This is not surprising, since the secretary general's report itself labeled these scenarios as hypotheses and said it did not have enough information to determine with any certainty why Flight 007 went off course. The ICAO says the ANC report does not contradict the secretary general's essential conclusions.

Walt Crowley, writing in the *Seattle Weekly*, comes up with the most Byzantine theory yet, sourced to one Richard Kunkle, who claims aerospace industry experience. Kunkle is said to believe that somebody aboard Flight 007 may have set off a self-destruct device to prevent the airliner and its cargo of espionage equipment from falling into Soviet hands. The secretary general's report concludes, however, that the airliner was "destroyed on its impact with the sea." Soviet tracking data of the aircraft's 12-minute descent confirm the ICAO's conclusion. In fact, a Japanese eye witness saw the airliner pass overhead, largely intact, and crash into the sea.

Conspiracy theories about the KAL incident are not unique to the English-speaking world. The West German magazine *Der Spiegel* printed a four-part series by Wilhelm Bittorf and Anthony Sampson last fall that rehashed the Mann, Pearson, and Keppel stories. Their article did add at least one new theory to the conspiracy lore, the charge that a telephone con-



Shootdown of KAL 007 reconstructed from the ICAO transcripts of the two aircrafts' transmissions. Note that the Soviet interceptor was firing cannon bursts after KAL-007 had started climbing.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT TRANSCRIPT ONLY, DECIPHERED AFTER ELECTRONIC ENHANCEMENT OF TAPE AND HUNDREDS OF REPLAYS.

PHASE 1

ference among Washington decision-makers, including Secretary Shultz, Under Secretary Lawrence Eagleburger, and Assistant Secretary Richard Burt, at five o'clock in the afternoon of August 31, Washington time, resulted in a decision to put out the story that the 747 plane was safe on Sakhalin. The alleged purpose of the story was to give the government time to develop a strategy for using the shootdown to undercut opposition to deploying cruise missiles and Pershing IIs in Europe.

This story appears to be fiction. First, Washington wasn't even informed that the plane was missing until more than two hours after the teleconference was said to have taken place. Moreover, State Department records show, and officials confirm, that the cause of the aircraft's disappearance did not become evident until later still. Only then, after 10 o'clock Washington time—almost eight hours after the fact—was Burt first informed of the tentative assessment that Flight 007 may have been shot down. (A more certain assessment was not possible until almost two the next morning.) Burt then telephoned Eagleburger, and Shultz was informed later still.

It wasn't until five hours after the plane had been shot down, according to the ICAO report, that the previously unidentified radar track obtained by the Japanese military was relayed to Japanese aviation officials, who connected it with the missing airliner. Moreover, media reports originating in Korea claimed that the plane was safe on Sakhalin. Repeated in various forms by the U.S. news media, they added further uncertainty to the analytical process. Furthermore, as noted previously, much of the information used to reconstruct the shootdown was recorded automatically and retrieved only after the fact.

Some final articles on Flight 007 don't really need to be refuted. There is the lengthy one by Conn Hallinan, associate editor of the publication *People's World*, which elaborates on the Mann, Pearson, and Keppel stories. Or the slick booklet by "Akio Takahashi" entitled *The President's Crime*. It was supposedly written first in Japanese and translated into Russian, but in any case is probably a direct fabrication by Soviet intelligence services; the Akio Takahashi described in the booklet apparently does not exist. And there is the article by Akeo Yamakawa published in *Gunji Minron* in June 1984. Yamakawa has been identified by a former Soviet disinformation specialist who later defected, KGB Major Stanislav Levchenko, as a paid Soviet agent whose real name is Akira Yamada.

The Nation will reportedly publish more of its "investigation" into the KAL tragedy soon, by a new reporter. In attempting to hire another "investigative reporter," they specified, according to a reliable source, that they would expect him to continue in the same vein as Pearson. If true, this would raise serious questions about ethics and journalistic standards. It also brings into question whether Pearson was hired using some similar standard, since he had no journalistic experience and, transparently, no knowledge of aviation or intelligence matters.

Why did the Korean airliner go off course? Aviation experts have offered several possible explanations, most of them centering around a malfunction or misprograming of the aircraft's inertial navigation system, a delicate and complex mechanism. The ICAO investigating team examined a number of such scenarios and, in conjunction with Boeing, Litton (manufacturer of the navigation equipment), the FAA, and others tested these hypotheses on Boeing's simulator,



allowing for actual conditions of the flight—wind, magnetic variation, and aircraft conditions. According to the secretary general's report, holding a constant magnetic heading (246 degrees) or inserting an undetected error of 10 degrees east in longitude for the "present position" into one of the three inertial navigation units could have produced a track similar to the one Flight 007 flew. In the second case, a single "typo" in entering more than 100 digits or letters into each of the three units could have resulted in the deviation, the ICAO says. It adds, however, that "each of those postulations assumed a considerable degree of lack of alertness and attentiveness on the part of the entire flight crew but not to a degree that is unknown in international civil aviation."

The Air Line Pilots Association attributes the deviation to pilot error, possibly combined with equipment malfunction, and postulates two scenarios that could fit the facts. When Flight 007 took off, ALPA notes, it was vectored south of its intended route. A common corrective procedure would be to fly north to intercept the intended route track using the inertial system in its "heading" mode, which simply holds the aircraft on a magnetic heading. Once the aircraft arrived there, it would then turn left to follow the original track and switch back to the normal mode. If the crew forgot to switch back, and overshot the intended track, the flight would have gone north of the proper route. ALPA also notes that there have been reports of malfunctions where the system remained in the heading mode even when switched back.

ALPA's second scenario concerns what is known as the "1–9 check." In brief, it involves the pilot's practice of double-checking the first and last check points of the route before takeoff to detect gross programming errors. If the pilot accidently pushed the button to enter the data rather than the "clear" button, the inertial system would be reprogrammed to take the aircraft directly from Anchorage to Seoul—and through the Soviet Union—rather than over Japan. As ALPA expressed it, "If you project a path from where...radar services were terminated and the flight was cleared as filed, the resulting route would closely follow the track the Russians claim they flew." ALPA noted that checkpoints would remain in the computer, and time/distance announcements would have been made as usual.

These explanations do not exhaust all the possibilities, nor do their authors claim to know what really happened. As the ICAO has pointed out, its investigation was hampered because it did not have the flight recorders and other instrumentation from the wreckage. In the absence of such vital evidence it is unlikely that we will ever know with any certainty why the aircraft went off course. These scenarios nonetheless demonstrate that there are real world explanations for the aircraft's being off course which do not rely on conspiracy theories and physical and technical impossibilities.

The Soviet Union has portrayed the shooting down of Flight 007 as the prevention of one more espionage attempt in the East-West struggle. The authors cited in this article have explained it as a failed conspiracy to gather intelligence that was covered up by an embarrassed U.S. government. But the only difference between KAL 007 and dozens of other airliners that go off course every year is that this one strayed over Soviet territory and got shot down. No effort to rewrite history or shift the blame elsewhere can change the facts. □

" 'KAL-007's climb from [33,000 to 35,000 feet] during the time of the last interception, a few minutes before its flight was terminated, was interpreted as being an evasive action thus further supporting the [Soviet's] presumption that it was an intelligence aircraft."
—ICAO Report

From Surfeit to Shortage

Changes looming on the horizon are likely to make first-rate officers scarce, turning the current senior surplus into a deficit

Andrew L. Steigman

When we read learned debates about the "senior surplus"—like those in recent issues of the JOURNAL—we may forget how long the phenomenon has been an issue for the Foreign Service. Twenty years ago, Henry Villard, writing in *Affairs of State,* noted with asperity that "in the State Department of today, the top-ranking officer is in danger of becoming a drug on the market; dispossessed career men roam the corridors looking for employment commensurate with their rank and experience."

Much of the recent discussion, especially in the pages of this magazine, has centered on the pros and cons of reducing the size of the Senior Foreign Service, the locus of today's senior surplus. Yet that discussion may already have become irrelevant—not only is the current surplus on its way out, it is likely to be the last of its kind. Ironic though it may seem from today's perspective, the Senior Foreign Service is more likely to suffer in the future from a shortage of personnel than a surfeit.

The current surplus, which has plagued the Service from the beginning of this decade, was born of a number of causes, including congressional action that raised the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 65, an increase in the number of non-career appointments both in Washington and overseas after the change of administration in 1981, the loss of several senior positions outside the department that had been filled by FSOs in the past, and an inordinate growth in the number of stretch assignments into senior slots. Early in the present administration, the State Department's senior management tried hard to pin the entire blame on stretch assignments (in which an individual is placed in a position ranked above his or her own rank). Fortunately, a more balanced judgment has since been allowed to prevail. The department also contributed to the problem by permitting relatively generous promotions into senior ranks even as it simultaneously allowed stretch assignments to grow in number—a sure recipe for senior unemployment.

Whatever the causes, the current problem is already on the way to resolution. Even though bringing stretch assignments "under control"—touted in some circles as the quickest fix—has produced little concrete result, more fundamental mechanisms are at work. The latest "high three" (based on higher salaries paid to senior officers since early 1983) will be achieved at the end of this year and is expected to trigger a substantial number of voluntary retirements. The firmness with which management has applied the limited career extension mechanism in its first two years of operation has provided an additional incentive for these departures. By denying extensions to between 30-40 percent of those eligible, management has made clear that the underemployed can no longer hope to hang on indefinitely, a message that will doubtless tip the balance for many officers who might otherwise be reluctant to retire from the Service voluntarily.

Even if a future management team balks at forcing retirements by such measures, the senior surplus problem in its historic form is unlikely ever to recur. Much of today's surplus (like those of the past) consists of officers who entered the Foreign Service in those prehistoric times before cones were invented and rose through its ranks as jack-of-all-trades generalists. When the cone system came into existence, most of these officers were unable to claim any legitimate association with the relatively specialized consular, administrative, and economic cones. They thus found themselves by default in the seemingly glamorous—but seriously overcrowded—political cone. Not surprisingly, the Service in recent years has frequently been short of talented senior officers in every cone but political, where there is an oversupply. Much of the recent senior surplus comprises precisely these one-time generalists lumped, for want of an alternative, into the political cone.

In contrast, the officers reaching the senior threshold and entering the senior ranks during the past few years have come increasingly—and now almost exclusively—from that newer breed who entered the Service with a cone label. More important, they have been promoted through the middle ranks largely in accordance with their in-cone abilities and in numbers determined by the need for their particular skills at the next higher grade. When they finally enter the Senior Foreign Service, many will be there because of a need for a given number of senior officers with their special skills. In consequence, the Service is unlikely ever again to find itself with a serious surplus of

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undifferentiated senior "political officers" who do not match the needs in the senior ranks. The so-called personnel pear will have become more like a slender core.

If the senior surplus is indeed about to become a thing of the past that will never again recur, it might comfortably be assumed that the Senior Foreign Service should have an assured future in something like its present shape. Yet, paradoxically, the internal causes of its distorted structure are about to be overcome just as today's senior Service may be facing radical change in the years to come as both political and societal pressures may force it to adopt to a dramatically new environment.

THE POLITICAL PRESSURES are the more clearly defined, and have been looming on the State Department's horizon for at least the four years since the Reagan administration came into office. Since 1981, the department, and the Foreign Service in particulat, has been the object of careful scrutiny by the Office of Personnel Management and, to a somewhat lesser extent, by the Office of Management and Budget. In essence, both have sought to make the Foreign Service more like the rest of government. Their initial assaults struck a sympathetic echo among senior managers in other foreign affairs agencies, but were blunted largely by two factors: the argument that Congtess had just spoken in the Foreign Service Act of 1980, which was and still is in the process of implementation; and, more important, the strong support given the Foreign Service by Secretary of State Shultz within administration councils.

Even with this defensive shield, however, a few stray rounds got through and demonstrated the strength of the opposition. For example, the Foreign Service was unable to gain exemption from OMB's directive to reduce the number of positions classified at the mid-levels; it did in fact drop the grade levels of a number of positions to comply with the order. The department has pledged to fight further compliance with the directive, under which even more positions should be reduced in grade in coming years, but a positive outcome is far from assured. More recently, the early months of Reagan's second term have brought a renewed assault on the entire federal work force. In this atmosphere, it seems probable that the Foreign Service will receive a share of this unwanted attention.

One form this scrutiny may well take is additional pressure for downgrading positions at all levels. It is all very well to argue that the Foreign Service is different from the Civil Service and the military, or that it has traditionally had about twenty percent of its officers at senior levels and therefore should be left alone to do its job. The department's senior management has wisely recognized that something more substantial than reference to the histotic record will be needed to justify the retention of anything like the current number of Senior Foreign Service positions. The current re-examination of positions now classified as seniot will doubtless turn up a number of slots inflated over the yeats, without much regard for their responsibilities, to attract ambitious mid-level officers into stretch assignments (in some cases to fill jobs at hardship posts). Those positions that have been unjustifiably upgraded will presumably fall by the wayside, but they will probably be too few in number to have a significant immediate impact on the shape of the Senior Foreign Service. Nonetheless, even limited evidence of overclassification will doubtless encourage outside critics to try again, and will also probably stimulate demands for an "independent" (read OPM) evaluation of senior positions.

At the same time that political pressures and management decisions seemingly point toward a slightly smaller senior corps, changes in our society suggest that even these reduced tanks may prove difficult to fill with first-rate officers. Up to now, candidates have joined the Service with the expectation of having a full career, moving steadily up their ladders to the senior ranks. As a result, there has never been a shortage of highly qualified contenders at the senior threshold nor a dearth of capable officers to fill senior-level positions.

This situation may be about to change, however. In a speech before the members of the Association last January [JOURNAL, March], Under Secretary for Management Ronald Spiers discussed a number of issues of concetn to the current management team at the State Department. In nearly every case, he was able to set forth both the problem and a proposed solution. But one problem, he admitted, "has so far stymied us"—and this is the one most likely to change the shape of today's Service. "How," Spiers asked, "do we maintain the kind of Foreign Service we have known in an era of societal change in which the two-income family is more and more the norm?" Indeed, he tentatively concluded that "perhaps there is no answer and no way the Foreign Service can preserve its traditional identity in the face of cultural sea changes."

There seems, in fact, little doubt that Spiers's gloomy conclusion is cotrect. We are in the early stages of a transition to a new and very different Foreign Service structure—one that will eventually face a serious problem in senior staffing. Some of the portents of change—the women's movement, for example, as well as the modified career assumptions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980—have been visible for several years; other elements, such as proposals for a more readily transferable retirement system, have only appeared more recently. Together, however, they point the way towatd a Foreign Service that may bear only superficial resemblance to the one we know today.

The kind of Service we are likely to see was suggested a couple of years ago by William Bacchus, a State Department personnel specialist, in his perceptive book *Staffing for Foreign Affairs*. [Excerpts from the book appeared in the December 1982 JOURNAL.] He hypothesized "that fewer individuals will be willing to serve full Foreign Service careers and that, instead, a larger number of individuals and family members will spend a part but not all of their working lives in the Service." Bacchus saw this phenomenon emerging primarily in response to pressure from spouses seeking career satisfaction that has not been available to them within the Foreign Service context.

The senior surplus problem in its historic form is unlikely ever to recur. Much of today's surplus consists of officers who entered the Service in those prehistoric times before cones

At some point, today's tough competition to cross the senior threshold may give way to a despairing feeling that many of the best officers have taken their annuities and gone elsewhere

Yet, this is by no means the only factor pushing the Foreign Service toward new career patterns. Another element is the seemingly greater willingness of those who have joined the Foreign Service over the past decade to switch careers if an initial choice does not measure up to expectations. They are part of a more mobile generation and appear to have less of a lifetime career commitment than was once the rule. Indeed, the average age of entering FSOs is about 30 and of Foreign Service secretaries about 35; in most cases, they have already tried another career path before joining the Service, and many have indicated a readiness to make yet another change if it proves incompatible with their own or their spouses' career aspirations.

EVEN AS EMPLOYEES have seemingly become less committed to staying with the Service for their working lifetimes, so the Service appears to be less committed to holding on to its people until normal retirement age. The 1980 act, by establishing the senior corps and relabeling the grade structure, has made it relatively easy to remodel Foreign Service careers along the lines of the armed services. Once the FSO-1 rank had been shifted downward to become equivalent to that of an army colonel or navy captain, rather than a general or flag officer, the stage was set for the development of a new pattern in which FSO retirements would occur at the same level at which most military officers end their careers. The State Department made this assumption explicit in 1983, when its new *Career Mobility Handbook* included the quiet statement that FSOs "usually will end their careers at the FSO-1 level and retire." This matter-of-fact statement has attracted little attention, and certainly does not appear to have affected the assumptions of most FSOs that "normal" careers still end in the senior ranks, but the handwriting clearly is on the wall.

Despite all these elements pointing toward radical restructuring of the Foreign Service, most careers would still be likely to span twenty years or more were it not for the wild card in the deck: the prospect of a portable retirement system. Currently, those individuals who are unhappy with the Service, whether for themselves or their spouses, face a Hobson's choice: either to hang on until age 50, when they become eligible for early retirement, or write off their annuities and start new careers with nothing but their accumulated contributions to the retirement system. Thus far, most members of the Service who find themselves in this unenviable position have opted to stay, accepting the strains on marriage, family, and emotional stability in exchange for an assured annuity.

In recent months, however, both OPM and key legislators, notably Senator Ted Stevens (R.-Alaska), have proposed to modify federal retirement systems in a way that, for the first time, would make them largely portable. All Foreign Service employees added to the rolls since January 1, 1984, are already covered by Social Security, an eminently transferable system. At the moment, the only source of supplementary benefits for these future retirees is the non-portable Foreign Service Retirement and Disability System. Congress, however, is currently working under a self-imposed deadline to produce a new structure of supplementary benefits for all federal employees, including the Foreign Service. Proposals floated by both the executive and legislative branches envision a system that would make individual annuities a major element of any supplementary plan—a system under which both employee and government contributions to a retirement account would be retained in the employee's name should he or she ever leave government service.

Clearly, if, as is currently proposed, the employee could retain two out of three elements of the retirement system in the event of a career change, the Hobson's choice will be substantially eliminated for those who wish to make such a change in their thirties or forties. While they would lose their benefits from the supplementary Foreign Service retirement system, they will be able to take their Social Security coverage and individual annuities with them, thus making the break far easier.

Once such a system is established (and the current best guess is that it will come about next year), we are indeed likely to see the kind of significant shift in career patterns predicted by Bacchus. The Foreign Service will become a place to spend a few years and gain experience. For many, it may well become the first career on which others are built, rather than, as today, the career to which candidates aspire after they have tried something else and found it to be wanting.

If all this happens, as seems likely, the problem for the Senior Foreign Service (and perhaps even for the FSO-1 level) will not be a surplus, but finding enough first-rate officers to staff established positions. It will undoubtedly take more than a decade for this problem to become acute, as substantial numbers of officers with the portable retirement coverage move through the middle grades. At some point, however, today's tough competition to cross the senior threshold may give way to a despairing feeling that many of the best officers have taken their annuities and gone elsewhere, leaving the Service to scramble to fill its posts with qualified officers. Under such circumstances, the Service would become even more vulnerable to pressures to staff senior positions with political appointees. It would also be harder to resist lateral entry at relatively senior levels by foreign affairs professionals from other government agencies.

Of course, such radical changes will not take place overnight—today's Service is still staffed largely by individuals who do not have the options that will be offered in the future by portable retirement systems. And, other unforeseen changes in the Service and the world could make full careers in the Foreign Service attractive enough so that relatively few take advantage of their new freedom to switch careers. Nonetheless, the time has clearly come when we would do well to shift our attention from the senior surplus and the "right" size for the Senior Foreign Service. Instead, we should already be planning to meet the problems that the Service is likely to face at the turn of the century, when it cannot find enough first-rate officers for its senior jobs. □

IMPROVING THE PUBLIC DEBATE

The foreign affairs agencies need to create a constructive dialogue with nongovernmental organizations to repair the badly fractured public consensus on foreign policy

DON W. CARLSON and GORDON FELLER

TODAY, PRIVATE AMERICAN citizens and nongovernmental organizations are more active than ever in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy. In the past, that involvement was restricted to voting in elections and reacting to foreign events. Now, however, the public works through Congress, the president, the media, and other channels to influence the course of policy. On a lengthening list of international issues—not only peace and security, but also economics, the environment, human rights, and other concerns—the private citizen is part of the daily making of foreign policy, both directly and through organizations representing particular interests. The State Department can either ignore this trend and so become isolated from public concerns, or it can respond to the public's involvement by opening channels of communication.

The department's Bureau of Public Affairs has, very occasionally, held events intended to improve relations between senior foreign policy officials and the citizen-leaders who create the consensus—or dissent—that determines whether it is possible to form a coherent policy. But if this dialogue is to be more than simply reciting views to each other—if it is to be constructive—the State Department will have to restructure its relations with the world of nongovernmental organizations. Clearly, there are many different kinds of NGOs, some far more representative of the public than others. Yet, the department should be able not only to discern the wheat from the chaff, but also to recognize that some "non-representative" organizations, like public policy institutes without memberships, deserve a role in the new public policy debate.

This dialogue should not be restricted to immediate policy questions. As the late Charles Frankel, formerly assistant secretary for educational and cultural affairs, once said: "The heart of the decision-making process... is not the finding of the best means to serve a national interest already perfectly known and understood. It is the determination of the interest itself: the reassessment of the nation's resources, needs, commitments, traditions, and political and cultural horizons—in short, its calendar of values." It is not enough to discuss such issues as U.S.-Soviet relations, human rights, or international economic reform, as one recent listing of priority topics from the Bureau's Office of Public Programs suggests. The primary concern is that even discussions among the attentive public are seldom conducted in ways that move us toward common ground. Indeed, the disagreement and incoherence that mark the policy arena reflect a basic disagreement and incoherence among opinion in the country as a whole. Recently, Senator Richard Lugar (R.-Indiana), chairman of the Foreign Relations committee, decried the absense of any bipartisan consensus on foreign policy.

In the early 1970s, the American public also seemed irreconcilably divided over the basic tenets of U.S. policy. In response, the State Department attempted to broaden its consultative framework and alter significantly both the substance and style of the department's relations with NGOs. Then, as now, PA served two roles: as the transmitter of information to both press and public and as the in-house advocate for outside opinion and analysis relevant to the policy-making process. In April 1974, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs Carol Laise wrote a memorandum to then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger proposing a new relationship between PA and its independent-sector constituencies. Laise reminded the secretary that PA was formed to help "precipitate a national discussion of the broad conceptual assumptions on which our foreign policies are based." Although efforts in this direction were pursued, especially during the Carter administration, they were allowed to die after the election of Ronald Reagan. Today, the argument over PA's proper role vis-a-vis the independent sector continues, but no significant step toward its resolution has been taken.

Over the past two decades, the general public has become much more attentive to the problems of U.S. foreign relations. There has also been a sharp rise in the number of Americans who want to influence public affairs—and feel they can. As a result, a growing number of NGOs have been established to inform, educate, and shape American opinion and government policy. On many issues, such as the nuclear freeze, NGOs have played a significant and potentially crucial role.

NGOs can also provide the impetus needed to move governments to act. In some situations, such as the International Airline Pilots Association's work on

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In the absence of a bipartisan consensus on foreign policy, the State Department should restructure its relations with the world of nongovernmental organizations, separating the wheat from the chaff

terrorism, or the World Psychiatric Congress's and the National Academy of Science's efforts in the human rights field, they can initiate and even enforce policy in ways a government cannot.

The NGOs are also very active within the United Nations. Their enthusiastic participation perhaps culminated at the two U.N. Special Sessions on Disarmament, during which they participated formally in the deliberations. The Soviet Union recognizes the contribution of the NGOs and continues to devote much energy to programs, publications, and organizations directed at these groups.

The State Department has made some efforts to address public concerns about policy; for example, the Office of Public Diplomacy was established in 1981. However, it has made only modest efforts to understand and perhaps influence the rather specialized world of the NGOs. Of course, most individuals in the Foreign Service do meet with NGO representatives occasionally in the course of their duties, but listening to a particular view on a particular issue is not a substitute for a coherent pattern of contact, one that allows the foreign affairs agencies and the NGOs to better understand the concerns and procedures of each other. Nor is Congress a substitute; although some may argue that the legislative branch was intended to serve as the voice of the people, the executive should not remain isolated from its citizens. If it does, the result will be policies that are not supported, either in Congress or among the public at large.

IF THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS agencies and the NGOs are ever to establish a mutually beneficial relationship, they must first develop a greater understanding of each other. For its part, the State Department can take several steps to improve its knowledge of the NGO community. First, it should develop an accurate map of the NGO universe. Our foreign policy leaders need to understand the organizational networks, the intellectual and ideological currents, the limitations and capabilities of different kinds of organizations. Knowing this information would make Foreign Service personnel more aware of this vast network and enable them to act as a switchboard connecting relevant sectors of the NGO world to appropriate governmental agencies.

Second, the department should identify some thousand organizations that would be invited to participate in a long-term project to improve relations between the NGOs and the foreign affairs agencies. It could then write and circulate questionnaires that might help the government and these private organizations identify problems already existing between them and to consider ideas that might improve their mutual understanding.

Third, since such a large group will undoubtedly prove awkward at times, the department should also develop a leadership advisory group of about a dozen organizations. They would be chosen without regard to their views on current policy, but because they share a concern about improving departmental relations with the independent sector. They would also be selected for their influence among the NGOs and to represent competing political perspectives. There are a few, albeit rare, precedents for the development of such an NGO advisory board. Several senior staff members of NGOs have served for more than a decade as informal advisers to the department, principally through PA.

Fourth, the department should hold an annual conference for NGO leaders. These meetings will not be useful, however, unless the conferences break out of the current pattern, in which the State Department functions only as an apologist for present policy and the NGOs attempt only to portray the administration as the enemy of peace. The department, as the national resource of diplomatic skills, must be willing to take the lead—like any good negotiator—in understanding the opposition's position and outlining possible areas of agreement. This kind of conference provides such an opportunity, but it should be used, not to address the pros and cons of particular policies, but to discuss what scholar James Rosenau describes as a fragmented public arena in which opposing, polarized views have become the norm, making a broad consensus on foreign policy almost impossible to achieve. The intent would be to promote sustained, purposeful exploration of the competing perspectives on such issues as U.S. goals in the world, the obstacles posed by totalitarian power, and strategies that would be both tactically effective and morally appropriate in overcoming those obstacles.

Fifth, Foreign Service training should include information about NGOs. Although Foreign Service people are instructed in the complexities of foreign affairs, they remain essentially ignorant of the interests and concerns of U.S. citizens. A number of the programs already available to Foreign Service personnel do make an effort to reacquaint them with domestic politics, but more still needs to be done, especially on the topic of NGOs. Every year, a limited number of Foreign Service members spend time out of the agencies either as foreign affairs fellows, diplomats-in-residence, or Pearson fellows. Usually, however, they are attached to local-government offices, academic institutions, or congressional offices; there is no program specifically designed to increase contacts between the Foreign Service and the NGOs.

It will be difficult, of course, to take more people away from the agencies to serve with NGOs, even temporarily, at a time when the secretary of state has been complaining about a shortage of analytical personnel. An alternative might be a "reverse" Pearson Act procedure, in which senior NGO staff members

would be brought into the agencies, especially PA, for a 6–12 month internship that would include specific program responsibilities. In this way, not only would the NGOs develop a corps of people who understand how government operates, their presence would also serve to educate their colleagues in the government about the concerns of the NGOs.

JUST AS THE State Department needs to enlarge its understanding of the independent sector, so does the independent sector need to improve its understanding of the government. Except to a few very sophisticated leaders, the State Department and the other foreign affairs agencies remain unknown, mysterious organizations. Too often, access by NGO leaders to the department is limited to a letter to the secretary. For this reason, State should prepare and distribute widely a publication explaining the department's structure and functions. Currently, the official description is buried in the *U.S. Government Manual,* an impenetrable document. The proposed guide could provide a set of scenarios demonstrating the various ways organizations interested in communicating and interacting with the department could gain access to the particular offices where such contact would be constructive. Such a guide should also include listings and descriptions for other agencies within the foreign affairs community, such as AID, ACDA, and USIA, and would describe those government periodicals and publications of interest to the private sector.

The department could create even more public understanding of its mission by issuing an annual overview that presents the basic assumptions, values, and goals of U.S. foreign policy, and describes how these have been applied in particular situations. This publication could be modeled on those issued under President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. From 1970–73, Nixon submitted a series of annual reports to the Congress on the state of the world and the American response. Published in February each year, *U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s* was a remarkable set of documents: clear and cogent, they presented an analysis of world affairs and a statement of U.S. goals and the policies designed to achieve them. Whether one agreed with those ideas or not, everyone benefited by having them openly presented. The essential ingredient for building a foreign policy consensus—a clear statement of the president's understanding of world problems—was available. Unfortunately, no report has been issued since.

It is not enough, however, simply to improve the foreign affairs agencies' knowledge about the NGOs or vice versa. It is also essential that a continuous and constructive dialogue be established between them. Currently, contact between the department and the private organizations is so weak that the cost is clearly visible: a perpetual adversarial climate; a breakdown in the public consensus essential to successful foreign and security policies; and official neglect of, and then inept responses to, public activities concerning foreign policies. One need only look at the surprise with which the department greeted the bishops' pastoral letter or its discovery in 1981 of the nuclear freeze campaign that had been in motion since the late 1970s.

One way of improving the dialogue would be for the department to appoint an ambassador to the NGOs. He or she would be an experienced senior official, responsible for overseeing the quality of interaction between the department and the independent sector. The appointment would require Senate confirmation. Such a move would not be unique; Sweden and France already have similar emissaries, and other Nordic governments are considering such a post.

This ambassador would not be just another addition to the many government offices already engaged in a variety of interactions with NGOs. He or she would serve as a coordinator for this complex set of relations among the government, the United Nations, and other international agencies and events. The office would have a multitude of functions. First, it would be an information center, knowledgeable about the independent sector and its points of interaction with government and the U.N. system. It would indentify appropriate publications and conferences, and work to make such materials available to both NGOs and government offices. Second, the ambassador's office would be a representational center that sponsored not only formal meetings but informal exchanges with NGOs. It would provide a channel through which the private sector could both learn about and communicate with the government. Third, it would serve as a critic—in the sense of an ombudsman—of the interaction between various elements in the government and the NGOs. Fourth, it would be a policy-planning center, identifying the issues that should be addressed and providing the needed scheduling, perspective, and follow-up services now so seldom encountered. Fifth, it would facilitate participation by U.S. NGOs in international conferences and other suitable forums. Finally, it would serve as a symbol of the government's recognition of the significant impact the independent sector is having in shaping the world's future.

Another personnel change that could strengthen the NGO-government dialogue would be to develop more continuity in the directorship of the Office of Public Programs, either by designating this as at least a two-year tour for an FSO, or opening the position up to a Civil Service employee. Because the directorship has traditionally been reserved for a member of the Foreign Service, it has suffered from rapid turnover. The resulting bureaucratic discontinuity has hindered the development of programming needed to pursue the dialogue with the NGOs constructively.

Another initiative would establish regional outposts of the department's public affairs office. Regional PA representatives would monitor, participate in, and report on programming held by the independent sector. Their primary function would be to implement at a local level the many programs suggested here and to report the responses both to Washington and the local NGO leadership. For example, the regional office could sponsor conferences to discuss the State Department overview reports proposed above.

Another way communication between the agencies

Although Public Affairs began to help 'precipitate a national discussion of the broad conceptual assumptions of our foreign policy' under Carter, the effort died after Reagan's election

and the independent sector could be improved is through regular meetings. These would not be public gatherings, but structured conferences with representatives from government and from business, labor, religious groups, the media, and voluntary organizations. This would constitute a wider audience than that at a typical Council on Foreign Relations or even a World Affairs Council gathering. It might include the local rabbi, the person designing the Episcopal church's international affairs programming, leaders of student exchange organizations, and individuals from more policy-oriented think tanks and learning centers.

Any conference must, at least at the outset, be designed to clarify disagreements. This is a crucial point: it is not intended to be a traditional State briefing, but an opportunity for the department to engage NGO leaders in an exploration of present disagreements. If possible, it should also consider ways of reconstituting a common consensus on which U.S. policy can be based.

On occasion, these meetings might be used to allow academic, labor, religious, and business organizations to comment in a structured manner on administration statements and decisions. One method might be to invite these groups to participate in "national reactor panels." They would be encouraged not only to indicate their responses, but to identify alternative policy options. The process by which these reactions would be recorded and reported should be a matter of public record, even though in some cases the deliberations of the panels themselves would be confidential.

These reactions might be collected by including a simple postcard ballot with every State Department publication mailed to this selected list of "reactors." It could include opportunities to respond both to particular policy decisions and to the more fundamental matters of values, beliefs, and attitudes. Responses, tabulated to indicate the range of regions and constituencies represented, would be brought to the attention of both the broader public and decision-makers within the department.

The government-NGO dialogue would also be strengthened if the discussion involved not only past and current policy, but future possibilities as well. Because it currently does not, the prevailing response in the independent sector is simply reactive. What is needed is a process whereby leaders in the independent sector may participate in identifying upcoming choices and in conceiving alternatives before the options are foreclosed. To this end, State should regularly issue a document, perhaps titled "Options for U.S. Foreign Policy," that would identify forthcoming policy decisions and present several possible responses and their likely consequences. The document could then provide the basis for a series of public programs to foster dialogue between the government and independent sector.

Consider how this could be applied to Kenneth Adelman's dilemma as director of ACDA. There is a real skepticism in the arms control community about his abilities and the agency's role. To ameliorate this dissatisfaction, the agency might, through regular mailings, engage NGO leaders in thinking about and reacting to its work. After all, the public perception of the agency's competence is based largely on the opinion of NGO experts. ACDA might also produce a document that sets forth the record on arms control and disarmament efforts by our government and explains the perspective in which ACDA works. It may be wise to include a section that would identify and respond to competing points of view. Former Director Fred Ikle's 1976 ACDA report is as good a model as any. These precedents are buried in reams of paper, but they are useful illustrations of the possibilities before us.

High technology offers another means of improving the dialogue between government and the independent sector. Computers—which are already present in many NGO and government offices—could greatly enhance the ease of daily communication. This is not just to satisfy a vague need for chit-chat between NGOs and government officials. In some cases, such as during the famine in Ethiopia, the creation of logistical hurdles by the local regime makes the exchange of information about local officials, corruption, and the like a practical necessity. Furthermore, if Oxfam, World Vision, Save the Children, CARE, and the dozens of other voluntary organizations involved in African famine relief had been able to pool their data on funds, staffs, targets, and other factors, it might have been much easier to focus U.S. attention on the situation and to identify areas of overlap and neglect, even as early as 1981. Unfortunately, this progress was not achieved until early 1985, well after several hundred thousand deaths in the year before.

Finally, if the dialogue between government and the public is to be improved, the public must have the necessary tools to understand and assimilate the complexities of global problems. Therefore, another primary concern should be the integration of an international perspective into school curricula. Both government policymakers and public sector leaders need to address the problem of decreased funding for those educational institutions that are shaping the international understanding of future State Department and NGO leaders.

In the late 1950s, the National Defense Education Act stimulated a considerable expansion in international affairs education in institutions of higher learning. This act, which was accompanied by heightened

interest on the part of several major foundations, led to the establishment of 97 university centers for international affairs and area studies. But the International Education Act of 1966, which was designed to expand such work, was never funded, even though authorization was renewed in 1973 for three more years.

Adam Yarmonlinsky's report *Philanthropic Activity in World Affairs* was prepared a decade ago for the Filer Commission. Its now outdated facts are the only currently available statistics—a statement of some import in itself. According to this study, $91.3 million in foundation money was given for furthering international studies in 1966, and only $45 million in 1971. There has also been a substantial drop in public funding under the National Defense Education Act, from $18 million in fiscal year 1969 to $12.7 million in fiscal 1974, and the indicators for future years are not promising. The decline in funds has been exacerbated by the impact of the 1969 income tax revisions. Most of the several million dollars given by the MacArthur, Carnegie, Rockefeller, Gund, Ford, and Rockefeller Brothers foundations have gone to support advanced research, not teaching at the undergraduate level—where the need is the greatest.

ONCE THE NGO–STATE DEPARTMENT dialogue has improved, it still needs to be brought to the attention of policymakers to be effective. The department must not only be attentive to the independent sector's view of current policy, it must report this response to the highest decision-making levels. This is not to say that the NGOs should dictate policy—only that the development of a framework that takes their views into account could produce wiser policy. It might also stem the climate of divisiveness that currently marks our foreign policymaking process and create a more constructive atmosphere for discussions between government and the private sector.

Ensuring that the views of the NGOs are brought to the attention of the high-level policymakers will not be an easy task, given the existing complexity of the decision-making system. It might be useful to have an "American desk" in each of the relevant bureaus. For example, in the Bureau of Human Rights, a desk officer could address what Assistant Secretary Elliott Abrams considered his greatest problem: channeling the conversation between his staff and the NGO community in a constructive direction.

There are some people who would be highly skeptical of any enlarged role for an American desk in the department. They fear government cooptation of the voluntary sector, government "management" of public opinion. The dangers inherent in any vigorous State Department entry into the public discussion of foreign policy are real. Its participation would have to be carefully planned and monitored to ensure continuation of an open political process.

But there are also dangers in the failure to take such initiatives. We are already witnessing the disintegration of a sense of political community because there is no agreement on its purposes. The climate between government and independent sector organizations has become so adversarial that the government's legitimate authority to act in world affairs has been threatened. One recent example was the organized public resistance to the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Yet, building the consensus needed as a basis for a successful U.S. global policy is unlikely to occur unless NGOs and the foreign affairs agencies focus on a dialogue that centers not on specific issues, but on the framework of policy. It should discuss principles and purposes and explore underlying values and attitudes.

Several years ago, one small network of NGOs began to develop the idea of a new kind of public forum in which government officials did not simply give presentations, but entered into a debate with leaders from the independent sector focused explicitly on choices among underlying values and long-term goals. At these meetings, State Department officials worked intensively with organization leaders and scholars to address these questions. Some of the events promoted a full-fledged examination of U.S. national security policy. The experience left most participants with a sense of commitment to repeating these kind of experiments, but no institutional mechanism existed to follow up. Unfortunately, such in-depth discussions between senior officials and critics of government policy remain rare.

American leadership toward world order must be based on truly national bipartisan unity, internal cohesion between left and right, and confidence in our values and our traditions. Few would offer that as a description of the United States today. Yet, the organizations working on peace, arms control, or foreign policy problems do not consider these more basic problems among their responsibilities.

From a confident, perhaps shallowly optimistic nation convinced that it could and should seek to shape a freer and more peaceful world, the United States seems at times to have lost faith not only in its global mission, but in itself. This period of self-doubt, which may have ended with Ronald Reagan's election, did produce in some circles a more realistic assessment of the United States' capabilities. It had, at times, provided an antidote to sentimentalized approaches to complex problems. But a United States crippled by its own self-image should be recognized for what it is: a new obstacle to progress on any number of global fronts.

Vigorous leadership is needed to right the balance, to regain an earlier sense of the United States' promise to all. The independent sector can play a significant role in providing that leadership. However one views the activities of academic, religious, or citizen peace and foreign policy organizations, it is clear that an attentive American public is rapidly emerging. The growing number and influence of these nongovernmental agencies are directly affecting foreign policy decisions. The NGOs are now a permanent part of the policymaking landscape; they offer an appropriate way for our government to enlarge its dialogue with the American people. Unfortunately, much of their interaction with government has been hostile. The many proposals presented in this article seek to alter this pattern, for the NGOs can contribute to that sense of common ground that is so badly needed in the present public climate. □

Training Future High-Level Political Appointees

An Interview with William B. Macomber

Many people—including you—have criticized the practice of appointing unqualified persons to serve abroad as U.S. ambassadors. Is there, however, a place for political appointees within the foreign affairs agencies in Washington?

In a *New York Times* piece last year, I addressed two concerns: first, the need for our political parties to develop stronger reserves of experienced foreign policy leadership talent than either now has; and, second, the necessity of ending the unconscionable practice, still followed by both, of peddling ambassadorships to unqualified appointees.

My point was that political parties, when in office, should seek to entice able supporters into diplomatic work but in the right way and following the right route. Political recruits should be brought into one area only; namely, the lower echelons of the State Department's upper layers of leadership as aides and special assistants in the immediate outer offices of the deputy assistant secretaries, assistant secretaries, under secretaries, the deputy secretary, and the secretary. A few of the best could, perhaps, start as deputy assistant secretaries. Here they would work alongside career officers who fill similar jobs. Those who did well could be moved on to increasing responsibilities at the deputy assistant secretary level. The very best would eventually go on to appointments as assistant secretaries and under secretaries, either then or in future administrations when their party returned to power. The most able of all would one day be in the running for deputy secretary and secretary. Through this process, each party would systematically develop a growing cadre of experienced foreign policy leaders, which would be an important resource for both the party and the nation.

Similarly, all but the most obviously qualified aspirants for non-career ambassadorships should be required first to pass through this same domestic training and screening experience with, again, only the most successful being eventually considered for chief-of-mission appointments. Thus, at least initially, they would not be directing more experienced career officials nor subject only to distant supervision. Rather they would begin working alongside Foreign Service officers and under close supervision. Such a requirement would, I believe, considerably upgrade the level of non-career ambassadorial appointments while significantly reducing their number. Those who moved through this process successfully, however, would add strength and depth to the cadre of which I have spoken. For too many years now, too few non-career appointees at the very top levels of department leadership have had firsthand experience with what being an ambassador is all about.

Thus, the answer to whether there is a place for non-career appointments in the foreign affairs agencies is yes, of course. The secretary of state, the administrator of AID, the head of USIA, and a portion of the senior officials immediately below them should be non-career people. Under our political system, it is these top officials who are primarily responsible for setting policy courses consistent with the president's wishes. It is this group, too, that should carry the major responsibility for explaining and defending these policies in the maelstroms of congressional and domestic politics. Professional diplomats have often been called upon to do this explaining and defending and have done so loyally, but it is not their natural role, and it sometimes diminishes their usefulness in subsequent administrations. It is, however, the professionals' responsibility, through candid advice and by drawing on their years of experience, to make those policies as professionally sound and wise as possible. And it is the professionals' responsibility to carry out policies, once they are determined.

There are already a number of assistant secretaries and office directors who are political appointees. How extensively should political appointees be placed in the Washington offices of the foreign affairs agencies?

There should be no political appointees at the office-director level or below. Those layers should be absolutely inviolate. Where there can and should be a number of political appointments is in the layers starting with the secretary and the deputy secretary and running down through the assistant secretaries, the deputy assistant secretaries, and special assistants working either in the immediate office of these officials or doing special projects directly for them. When I first worked in the State Department in the early 1950s, there were far fewer such positions than there are now, but they were affected by an informal—but admirable—tradition. Most assistant secretaries had only one deputy assistant secretary, and the formula often followed was that if one were a

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William B. Macomber, former ambassador to Jordan and to Turkey, served as deputy under secretary of state for management from 1969–73.

career person the other would be a political appointee. And if there were two special assistants in the front office, often one would be a career FSO and the other would be an outsider. In those days there was no deputy secretary, but there was one, and later two, under secretaries and always two deputy under secretaries. This group also tended to be balanced between career and non-career appointees.

In the years following World War II, that balance of outsiders and experienced professionals worked very well. It not only produced a very creditable U.S. foreign policy, it also spawned several future secretaries of state—Dean Acheson, John Foster Dulles, and Dean Rusk—and a number of other non-career figures who went on to fill increasingly high diplomatic posts at home and abroad with much distinction.

Unfortunately, in the years that followed, the 50/50 practice fell by the wayside, and until recently outside appointments were significantly less than half of those on the sixth and seventh floors. Recently the pendulum has swung too far the other way. What I want to see is the old 50/50 system restored.

Concern has already been voiced by many in the Foreign Service about the limited opportunities at the senior levels. Wouldn't these political appointees exacerbate the situation? What would be the effect on the Foreign Service personnel system?

There are numerically many more jobs within those layers to which I have just referred than there used to be. Approximately half the positions at the under secretary and assistant secretary level should go to career people. This would both strengthen professionalism at those levels and provide, over the years, quite a number of opportunities at the top for career Foreign Service people. It is important to remember that despite an excessive number of non-career ambassadorial appointees, there are still a great many top jobs abroad, not only at the ambassadorial level, but also as deputy chief of mission or consul general. If these positions are combined with half the top positions in Washington, there are more very senior positions available to career diplomats then there are proportionately in many other organizations. All organizational structures tend to narrow at the top like a pyramid. The State Department's pyramid is wider at the top than most. Few organizations I know in the private sector have a comparable number of positions that could be characterized as vice-presidential.

You have written in the *New York Times* that "certain layers" of the department could be used as a "training ground." Robert Hunter, formerly of the National Security Council, has written that policymaking positions should be filled with "the president's men and women" so that the president's views and initiatives will be adequately promoted. What would be the real purpose behind putting these political appointees in the State Department: to train them, or to safeguard presidential control of foreign policy, or both?

The real purposes of my proposal are to develop strengthened foreign policy leadership resources in each party, to protect embassies against unqualified leadership, and, at home, to protect all levels from office director down from non-career invasions.

As for safeguarding the president's control, that suggestion misunderstands the role of members of the career Foreign Service. They are the "president's men and women," whoever is president, and they are there to support him faithfully and effectively.

That does not mean that the State Department and its embassies have to become propaganda sub-offices of the Democratic or Republican national committees. It does mean that the president's ideas must be understood and explained abroad. More important, it involves a commitment on the part of all career officers to be as effective and professional as possible in putting U.S. foreign policy on the course the president and the secretary of state have chosen. It requires above all that career diplomats help craft for the president and the administration a highly professional diplomatic performance in a difficult and dangerous world.

Mr. Hunter's recommendation would start us back down the road to the type of government spoils system that so marred the last century with its chaotic loss of continuity and expertise. All civil servants must understand, however, that pressures to go in the direction Mr. Hunter is suggesting will mount if administrations lose confidence about career people being, in fact, the president's men and women.

Foreign Service employees have consistently expressed a readiness to serve any administration—Democratic or Republican. Could you elaborate further on what you think loyalty does and does not involve?

Loyalty means that a career diplomat should never



Political parties should seek to entice able supporters into diplomatic work, but in the right way and following the right route. Political recruits should be brought only into the lower echelons of the department's upper layers



All but the most obviously qualified aspirants for non-career ambassadorships should pass through this domestic training. Thus, they would not be directing more experienced career officials nor subject only to distant supervision

do anything of a public or private nature which undermines the leaders of the government he or she serves. But loyalty should never be confused with thought control. On the contrary, if a career diplomat disagrees with a policy, he or she not only has the right to speak up but the obligation to do so. Loyalty, if it requires anything, requires giving one's best judgment at all times. But it requires doing so in a private channel and not in a way that it will leak out to the press and public. The career diplomat must also recognize that no one can expect his or her views to be adopted all the time. And, once a decision is reached, the public servant is obligated to support it, unless it is one of those very rare situations where matters of great conscience are involved.

For most career diplomats graced with the humility to know they are not infallible, this last should not be a likely occurrence. It obviously can happen, however, and when it does, he or she must, sadly, resign. Only then can they publicly oppose what they are otherwise honorably required to support.

To return to the idea of high-level State Department jobs as training grounds: aren't these positions too valuable to be used as school rooms? What qualities would you seek in selecting these appointees?

Over the years, it has been my experience that administrations are generally more careful about the caliber of people they appoint to high levels in Washington departments than they are of those being sent off as non-career ambassadors for the first time. Certainly these departmental appointees are subsequently under much closer scrutiny. Secretaries and deputy secretaries generally do not put up very long with under secretaries and assistant secretaries who are not getting the job done. The same is true, of course, for assistant secretaries vis-a-vis deputy assistant secretaries and for all vis-a-vis their special assistants. In addition, they should all work side by side with career officers in the same ranks. Yes, there is a price for using these positions as training grounds, but there are also important benefits.

The qualities I would want to see in non-career people coming into the system for the first time include: character, brains, a capacity for objective analysis, an abiding interest in foreign policy, and stamina, in that order.

Do you think that political appointees in general have been qualified for the positions they have held in the foreign affairs agencies? Is there a large enough pool of qualified people for the political parties to draw on? Has there been an adequate number of people from which to choose a secretary of state?

They would have been better qualified if both parties had developed a better and deeper pool of experienced people. Five of the last six secretaries of state, in marked contrast to the era proceeding them, came to the job without significant in-house State Department experience. I respect them all very much, and each brought other important and impressive talents and backgrounds to the job. But each faced a shorter list of serious and experienced rivals for the job than is healthy or would have been produced by an effectively functioning training and screening program. We got five good ones; we were lucky. We will not always be so fortunate.

Recently it has been suggested that political appointees are changing in type. The generalists—who were usually in a profession other than foreign policy, such as law or banking—are being replaced by foreign policy specialists from think tanks, academe, and elsewhere. Has this affected the quality and role of political appointees? Is a research background sufficient qualification for holding a high-level position in a foreign affairs agency?

Some of the generalists were valuable additions, indeed. Especially valuable were those coming in the late 1940s, '50s, and '60s with earlier experience in wartime Washington agencies or in the Marshall Plan, which meant they came to the department with some experience in the way both our government and the world worked.

On the other hand, in earlier times I never thought that the department recruited enough from the academic and think-tank community or, during many periods, even had an adequate liaison with them. That community has much to offer in terms of knowledge, analysis, and ideas. So while we will also continue to want able generalists, I think the trend you mention is a good one and can add to the quality of the department's performance. But, on the other hand, a research background is not in itself sufficient qualification for holding high office. People with promising track records in think tanks and academe should be welcomed warmly but asked to follow the same screening and training route which we have been discussing. □

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Conditions for

In 1933, a popular uprising, led by Army Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, deposed Cuban President Gerardo Machado, replacing him with President Ramon Grau San Martin. Batista ruled through a series of presidents until becoming president himself in 1940.

PHILIP F. DUR

JEFFERSON CAFFERY arrived in Havana on December 18, 1933. The veteran U.S. diplomat came, not as ambassador, for that would have implied recognition of the leftist revolutionary president, Grau San Martin, but as special representative of President Roosevelt with the personal rank of ambassador. In fact, the president's parting instructions were "to get rid of Grau." But "remember," Roosevelt had admonished his envoy, "no marines."

On the day after his arrival, Caffery declared to the press, "My country's policy toward Cuba will remain the same." The message was plain: The revolutionary government of Cuba could not expect recognition from the United States as long as Grau was president. Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Sumner Welles, who had been Caffery's predecessor in Cuba, enjoyed full command of U.S. policy toward the island. Since Welles's opposition to Grau was implacable, and Roosevelt's determination not to intervene with force irreversible, it was left to Caffery to solve the dilemma of what U.S. policy toward Cuba should be.

Before his departure from Cuba, Welles had in effect invited Fulgencio Batista to depose Grau, telling him that "he himself was the only individual in Cuba today who represented authority." The tactic was ingenious, since the Cuban army would thereby carry out the assignment Roosevelt would not allow U.S. forces to undertake. But after starting on this course, Welles failed to pursue it and instead ignored and angered Batista in his attempts to unite Cuban politicians in a coalition against Grau. What Welles had described as his "anomalous relationship" with Batista deteriorated to the point where, by the end of his mission, the two men were no longer speaking.

Havana was in an uproar. During Caffery's first night there, he counted 100 explosions. "As I unfortunately remarked that they hadn't bothered me much, they exploded a gigantic one under my room at the hotel the next night, destroying what was left of [former Cuban President] Machado's statue." Aimless bombings and bursts of gunfire were nightly occurrences during the first month of his mission. Although he described the experience as "thrilling" in his memoirs, the populace was in a "state of nervous tension and terror," according to the embassy's reports. Soldiers and terrorists patrolled the streets and occasionally shot a student.

On the day after Caffery's arrival in Havana, riots broke out "all over town," according to the *New York Times* correspondent. On December 20, as 30,000 Cubans protested below, Caffery stood on the balcony of the U.S. embassy. "I was a little concerned about it before it began," he remembered, "but as soon as I showed myself, they cheered me." Cuban nationalism had not yet come of age, and the majority of the people still looked on the United States as both the cause and cure of most of their ills.

The United States, however, was doing nothing to stabilize the violent political situation. U.S. ships were stationed in Cuban waters, but their purpose was widely disputed. Welles had been afraid their presence might strengthen "the present government by assisting in preventing disturbances of the public order." The Mexican chargé in Washington, on the other hand, had protested to Caffery that the flotilla encouraged "opposition leaders" to overthrow the *de facto* government. For his part, Roosevelt insisted the ships had no other mission than to protect American lives "if this should be necessary." He teased the press by calling the ships "little bits of things." This show of force for political purposes was not entirely effective. "On one occasion," Caffery recalled, "the Cuban authorities asked me to have the ships removed to get out of the line of fire."

AMID THE AGITATION, Grau's government was drifting further to the left. On December 6, the Cuban Electric Company was ordered to reduce its rates by 45 percent. In his first contact with the revolutionary government, Caffery met privately with Grau's secretary of agriculture, Carlos Hevia, and complained of "communistic tendencies" revealed by such measures as the "confiscatory legislation" on electric light rates. Despite U.S. protests, the leftward trend continued.

Washington's refusal to recognize the provisional government had not only plunged Cuban politics into turmoil, it threatened to make a shambles of an economy largely dependent upon the United States. The Roosevelt administration had earlier been moving toward a rescheduling of payments on Cuba's foreign debt, a reduction of the tariff on its exports, and an increase in its share of the sugar quota imported into the United States. This process was reversed on Grau's accession to the presidency. As often happens, the economic penalties of non-recognition were hurting the people without chastening the government. Caffery came to Cuba at Christmas time determined to alter this. There was little time to spare; elections to a constituent assembly were to be held on April 22.

Grau had promised to resign when the assembly convened in May, but such promises are made to be broken. And if Grau's followers won the election, as Caffery thought they would, the U.S. government could hardly continue to deny their leader recognition on the grounds that he did not represent the will of the majority. Welles's policy of non-recognition was leading straight to an impasse from which the Roosevelt administration could not be extricated without serious embarrassment.

Three weeks after his arrival, Caffery

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Recognition

MAGDA FRENCH

submitted a comprehensive report on the political situation. "I agree with former Ambassador Welles as to the inefficiency, ineptitude, and unpopularity with all the better classes of the country of the *de facto* government," he declared, adding, "It is supported only by the army and ignorant masses who have been misled by utopian promises." This support, however, would be more than enough to ensure victory in the forthcoming election, Caffery implied, especially in view of the disarray of the opposition. Welles and Caffery both knew, as the latter stated in another telegram sent two months later, "that, in numbers, the ignorant masses of Cuba reach a very high figure." Caffery suspected the unschooled element of the population favored Grau over his opponents.

Less concerned than Welles with the form of legitimacy, and more alert to human sensibilities, Caffery solved Welles's problem by gaining Batista's confidence. His first step was to suspend his predecessor's game of coalition-building. "As the department is aware, it would be a hopeless task to get all the opposition groups to agree on a program." The new envoy's restraint was in itself reassuring to Batista. But Caffery had more to offer than discretion. Batista, who was now a colonel, was looking for acceptance, and Caffery was prepared to give it. "Colonel Batista is an interesting type: a self-made man in every sense of the word, with a keen native intelligence and a keen desire to learn; and also a first-rate politician," Caffery noted in his memoirs. Caffery offered his support to a new leader unreservedly, and Batista responded in kind. "Caffery and Batista became friends almost before Caffery had unpacked his bags," Batista's official biographer recorded. Their friendship became legendary. "The two men saw eye to eye as to conditions in Cuba. Both were pragmatists," wrote Philip Bonsal, the last U.S. ambassador there.

NOT ONLY WERE the two men pragmatists, they also had certain tastes in common. Like Batista, Caffery enjoyed horseback riding and cock fights. These were the pastimes of rural Louisiana, familiar to him from his boyhood. The Mexican chargé d'affairs, Octavio Reyes Spindola, who introduced Caffery to Batista, was also an accomplished horseman. Reyes Spindola had ingratiated himself with Batista while other diplomats stayed aloof, and he became the colonel's companion on his morning breakfast rides. A wealthy Cuban lent Caffery a horse, and Batista and Reyes Spindola soon invited him to join the exercise.

Within three weeks of Caffery's arrival, the Cuban imbroglio began to unravel. "I met Grau and Batista last night in a private house on invitation of Hevia," Caffery wired five days after landing. "I did not, repeat not, discuss recognition." That burning subject was not broached until January 10 at a dinner Reyes Spindola gave for Caffery, Grau, and Batista.

On the same day, Grau turned down the Uruguayan minister's second attempt at mediating an agreement to broaden the provisional government. Caught between the opposition domestically and in Washington, the revolutionary leaders turned to Caffery. "I am meeting Grau and Batista again on invitation tonight. I have been told they will make an offer of changes in government,'" Caffery informed the department.

At dinner in the Mexican embassy, Grau offered once more to resign the presidency or broaden the base of his government by including some of the opposition. Instead of taking the bait, Caffery refused even to discuss the subject. "I thought it best not to pursue this conversation further last night in order to give Grau time to think it over and also because I am not convinced of his sincerity or that he would be allowed to resign" by his followers, Caffery wired the department the following day.

Two days later, Caffery repeated to Washington the gist of his conversation with Batista on the same occasion. When the military leader of the revolution asked him what were the U.S. conditions for recognition, Caffery replied: "I will lay down no specific terms; the matter of your government is a Cuban matter and it is for you to decide what you will do about it." This answer has been appropriately termed a "gem of diplomatic savoir-faire." The entire conversation, in fact, displayed Caffery's flair for bargaining. By his reticence and laconic statements, he had conveyed two assurances: the United States would, under no circumstances, deal with Grau, and the choice of the next president would not be made by the U.S. embassy in consultation with the opposition. On receiving these assurances, Batista looked at Grau, Caffery recalled, and said simply, "You will have to go."

Colonel Carlos Mendieta was the obvious choice as a successor, for he had long been the preferred candidate of the opposition and of Ambassador Welles. The veteran liberal leader, however, proved to be a reluctant contender. At 3:00 a.m. on January 14, Caffery wired the State Department that Mendieta was "willing to assume the presidency (provisionally, of course) at once, but only if he knows in advance that the United States will recognize him." Caffery consequently requested immediate authorization to recognize Mendieta. "If this is not done, Batista will probably turn definitely to the left with definite disaster for all our interests here (or declare himself military dictator)," Caffery warned.

WHETHER MOTIVATED BY pique or principle, Welles could not readily accept from another the solution that had eluded him. The reply he sent Caffery was circumspect to the point of being negative. "We cannot be in a position of promising recognition to any individual or group in advance of the fulfillment of the conditions we have consistently set forth." Welles had taken the precaution of clearing his telegram with the president, and Caffery could only submit. "Of course the president's position is understood," he wired back.

As a consequence, the Cuban crisis had to go through one more convolution before a settlement could be reached. After a stormy meeting of students and politicians at his headquarters, Batista threw his support behind a dark horse—Hevia.

Late the next day, Grau finally turned over the office of provisional president to Hevia. Before leaving the presidential palace, however, he received a farewell visit from Caffery, who expressed regret for what had happened. The visit, but not the ambiguous apology, was reported to the department. They were the repayment Reyes Spindola had demanded for his assistance in bringing the envoy and Batista together. Surmounting his scruples and fears, Caffery had walked across the little park that lay between the embassy and the presidential palace to call on Grau who, as usual, was surrounded with a coterie of armed students—or "killers," according to Caffery's recollection. Shortly after Grau's departure from the palace, a mob that had gathered outside was dispersed by force, leaving one dead and 14 wounded. At some risk to himself, Caffery had reassured Grau that his opposition to Grau's presidency was not personal.

Hevia's presidency turned out to be a false start. Inaugurated at noon on January 16, he left office two days later, unable to deal with a rash of strikes. Mendieta finally accepted the presidency on January 18 without a promise of recognition from Washington, but with a whole-hearted commitment from Caffery to obtain it promptly. He intercepted Secretary of State Hull at Key West on the secretary's return from Montevideo and spoke to Roosevelt directly by telephone. The president's special representative was instructed on January 23 to "extend immediately to the government of Cuba on behalf of the United States a formal and cordial recognition." □

PEOPLE

AFSA/AAFSW Merit Award Winners for 1985

An interesting and diversified group of Foreign Service juniors competed in the 1985 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards for outstanding academic achievement and leadership qualities. This year, for the first time, there were more winners from schools overseas than those in the United States. Sixteen of the 25 winners graduated from high schools in the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Uruguay, Mexico, Ecuador, Pakistan, Egypt, Greece, India, and Indonesia. Winners in the United States attended schools in Washington, D.C., Virginia, Maryland, Colorado, Connecticut, and Florida. The awards this year are given in honor of Horace G. Torbert Jr., in recognition of his service as chairman of the AFSA Committee on Education from 1978–83. Biographies and pictures of the winners appear here.

Eligible students who will be graduating from high school in 1986, and who are qualified dependents of career Foreign Service personnel, are encouraged to write for applications now to Dawn Cuthell, scholarship programs administrator, 2101 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. Applications will be mailed for both the Merit and the Financial Aid programs in late October. Merit Awards are based solely on acedemic excellence; Financial aid grants for undergraduate students studying in the U.S. are based solely on need. The deadline for completion and return of all program materials to the AFSA office is February 15, 1986. Please apply early and be sure to state your qualifying Foreign Service agency.



Mitchell Baker, son of John Alexander and Katherine Gratwick Baker, State. Mitchell is a graduate of St. Alban's School in Washington. He has lived in Italy and Czechoslovakia. He won four piano competitions and the Bowles Music Prize. He was a National Merit finalist and was inducted into the Cum Laude Society. His interests include music, athletics, and journalism. He will enter Brown University this fall.

Alison L. Becker, daughter of John and Priscilla Becker, State. Alison was graduated from the American International School in Vienna. She has also lived in Germany, India, and Canada. A member of the National Honor Society, she was a National Merit Scholarship quarter-finalist. She also won the Williams College Book Award for 1984. She is interested in basketball, flute, and voice. This fall she will enter Brown University, where she will study physics and engineering.

Matthew Diamond, son of David H.H. and Molly G. Diamond, State. Matthew was graduated from the American School in London, where he was on the honor roll for four years. He was the winner of the English Department Writing Award in the 10th grade and was accepted for the International Honor Band and Choir Festival the next two years. He was also a National Merit Scholarship quarter-finalist. His interests include computers and playing the clarinet. This fall he will enter Carnegie-Mellon University, where he will study computer science.

Thomas V. Diamond, son of David H.H. and Molly G. Diamond, State. David is a graduate of the American School in London, where he was valedictorian of his class. He was the winner of a third-place prize in the Scholastic Writing Awards of 1984 and a runner-up in the 1984 American Legion Essay Contest. His interests include playing badminton and squash and reading science-fiction novels. He will enter Johns Hopkins University this fall, where he will study the natural sciences.

Claudia A. Edwards, daughter of Gary and Irene Edwards, USIA. Claudia is a graduate of the International School of Paris. She has also lived in Niger, Morocco, Britain, and Greece. She is a winner of the European Council of International Schools' Award for International Understanding and of Outstanding Achievement Awards in French and Social Science. She is interested in drama, creative writing, and journalism. This fall she will enter Yale University to study history.

Charles W. Henebry, son of the late Charles William Henebry and of Carla Wiebenson Henebry, State. Charles was graduated from Thomas Jefferson High School in Denver, Colorado. He was first in the state in physics and second in biology. He was also a semi-finalist in the National Chemistry Olympiad and the winner of an Eagle Scout Award. His interests include soccer, scouting, skiing, and backpacking. This fall he will enter Harvard University to study one of the sciences. He hopes to spend a summer with Jacques Cousteau.

Edward Tai Hoganson, son of Jerome L. and Barbara F. Hoganson, State. Edward is a graduate of the Uruguayan-American School in Montevideo. He is a member of the National Honor Society and received a National Merit commendation. He was an officer of his school's Student Council and the varsity soccer captain. He won a medal for swimming for the Uruguayan national team in the South American games. His interests include backpacking, backgammon, and playing the saxophone. This fall he will attend Yale University, where he plans to study economics and political science.

Charles Iceland, son of Harry and Joan Iceland, USIA. Charles was graduated from the American School Foundation in Mexico. He has also lived in Venezuela, Colombia, and Greece. He took first place in the science fairs in Thessaloniki in 1983 and Mexico City in 1985. He was also a winner of the Department Awards in science, social studies, and French. A member of the National Honor Society, he plans to enter Yale University this fall.

Sharman Ellen Jacoby, daughter of Peter H. and Ellen A. Jacoby, USIA. Sharman was graduated from the Uruguayan American School in Montevideo. She has also lived in the Netherlands, Paraguay, Austria, and West Germany. Sharman was president of the Student Council and vice president of the National Honor Society, as well as copy editor of her school's yearbook. She also won first prize in an essay competition. She is interested in reading, photography, and volleyball and played on the varsity volleyball team. She will enter Amherst College this fall, where she plans to study history and mathematics.

Lisa Langhaug, daughter of David B. and Anne E. Langhaug, State. Lisa is a graduate of the American International School in Quito, Ecuador. She has also lived in Pakistan, Thailand, France, and India. Lisa was president of the National Honor Society and the Outstanding High Schooler for ninth to eleventh grade. She received a high school biology award and a prize for being the overall student coordinator for the South Asia Schools' Cultural Convention. Her interests include genealogy, Indian art, and classical music. She plans to attend Brown University, where she will study biology and history. She intends to enter the Peace Corps following graduation.

James Walter LeBlanc, son of Robert Francis and Nancy Ann LeBlanc, USIA. James is a graduate of the Berlin American High School in West Berlin, where he was valedictorian of his class. He has also lived in Yugoslavia and Pakistan. He is the winner of a National Merit Scholarship commendation. His interests include international affairs, astronomy, and sports. He will attend the University of California this fall, where he will study astronomical sciences. He would like to work for NASA someday.

Maria Consuelo Maisto, daughter of John F. and Maria Maisto, State. Maria was graduated from Bishop Denis J. O'Connell High School in Arlington, Virginia. She has lived in Bolivia, Costa Rica, and the Philippines. She was inducted into the Quill and Scroll Honor Society for High School Journalism and was in the Latin Honor Society. She was also nominated for the NCTE writing award. She is interested in politics. This fall, she will enter Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service.



Christopher D. Marin, son of Rafael L. and Margaret Corinne Marin, State. Christopher was graduated from Cairine Wilson High School in Orleans, Ontario, Canada. He won a computer science award, a Spanish award, and was a diving champion. He was a member of the National Junior Honor Society. His interests include cycling, alpine skiing, and neurophysiology. This fall he will enter the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where he will study cognitive science.

Thomas S. Rackmales, son of Robert and Mary Kennedy Rackmales, State. Thomas is a graduate of the Notre Dame International School in Rome. He has also lived in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Nigeria. A member of the National Honor Society, he was a National Merit Finalist. He was nominated as a presidential scholar and participated in the National Council of Teachers-of-English Writing Contest. He was also editor of his school newspaper. This fall he will enter the University of Virginia as an Echols Scholar.

Nina V. Ragone, daughter of Louise and Vincent A. Ragone, State. Nina is a graduate of the International School of Islamabad. She has also lived in Madagascar, Italy, Liberia, and Saudi Arabia. A member of the National Honor Society, she won student awards in English, European history, biology, and geometry. She also won the Super Science Quiz and was on the winning team of the Regional Debate. She was president and treasurer of her Student Council. Interested in sports, Nina was captain of the girls' varsity volleyball and basketball teams and has won many athletic awards, including the Best Student Athlete Award. Last summer she worked for the AID Project Development and Monitoring Office in Islamabad. She will enter Brown University this fall.



Benjamin Francis Raley, son of Charles M. and Inja L. Raley, AID. Ben is a graduate of the Cairo American College. He has also lived in Turkey, Thailand, and Vietnam. He was the 1985 salutatorian of his school and the winner of its poetry contest. In 1984, he was on the All-Tournament Team in volleyball of the International Schools' Sport Tournament. He will enter the University of Virginia this fall.

Stephanie Schollaert, daughter of James and Elizabeth Schollaert, State. Stephanie is a graduate of Washington-Lee High School in Arlington, Virginia, where she was the valedictorian of her class. She has lived in Austria, Germany, and the U.S.S.R. She was selected to attend the 1984 Virginia Governor's School for the Gifted and was homecoming princess in 1981 and 1984. Stephanie was captain and coxswain of her high-school crew team for four years. This fall she will enter the Naval Academy, where she will study English or oceanography.

Peter DuBois Seymour, son of Jack Murray and Marshall Metcalf Seymour, State. Peter was graduated from the Kent School in Kent, Connecticut. He has lived in Poland, Yugoslavia, West Germany, and Belgium. He is the winner of a National Merit Scholarship and membership in the Cum Laude Society. He has won a Greek prize, a chemistry prize, an English prize, the National High School Mathematics Association award, and the *Reader's Digest* Scholarship. He was a member of the varsity swim team and captain of the junior varsity cross-country team. He will enter Stanford University this fall to study engineering.



David Foster Stearns, son of Monteagle and Antonia Riddleberger Stearns, State. David was graduated from the TASIS Hellenic International School in Athens, where he ranked first in his class. He has also lived in Britain, Laos, and the Ivory Coast. His interests include baseball and basketball, for which he won a school letter. This fall he will attend Amherst College.

Deborah Ida Sutter, daughter of Eleanor Bly Sutter, State, and Willis J. Sutter, USIA. Deborah is a graduate of St. Paul's Girls' School in London. In addition, she has lived in Thailand, the U.S.S.R., and Zaire. She was the recipient of the Telluride Association Summer Scholarship in 1984. Her interests include piano, dance, history, and community work. She will enter Yale University this fall to study history.

Claudia Maria Taylor, daughter of Everard S. and Lucia S.C. Taylor, State. Claudia was graduated from James Madison High School in Vienna, Virginia. She has lived in Indonesia, Portugal, Ethiopia, Denmark, and Canada. Claudia has won the Optimist Club Award for excellence in academics and the Daughters of the American Revolution History Award. She was a member of an English Team that tied for first in the county and of the 1984 All Virginia Chorus. She is also a member of the National Honor Society. In addition, she was secretary of the Thespian Honor Society, a member of the Madrigal singers, and co-captain of the Forensics team. She will attend Yale University this fall, where she will study international relations.

Mark Conrad Thormann, son of Peter H. and Mary S. Thormann, AID. Mark was graduated from the American Embassy School in New Delhi. He has also lived in Switzerland. He is a member of the National Honor Society and was a National Merit finalist. His interests include computer programming, reading, and camping. He will enter Carnegie-Mellon University in the fall, where he will study applied mathematics. He would like to have a career in computer science or business.

Johnna Boulds Tipton, daughter of John B. and Marian L. Tipton, State. Johnna was graduated from Walt Whitman High School in Bethesda, Maryland. She has lived in Guatemala, Chile, and Romania. She was a National Merit finalist and a Maryland Merit Scholar. She participated in the Program for Verbally Gifted Youth at Johns Hopkins University. She enjoys backpacking, skiing, silk-screening, and ceramics. She will attend the University of Colorado in the fall, where she will study environmental sciences. Upon graduation, she would like to enter the Peace Corps.

Bettina von den Steinen, daughter of Erwin and Annemarie von den Steinen, State. Bettina is a graduate of H.B. Woodlawn High School in Arlington, Virginia. She has lived in West Germany, Turkey, and Yugoslavia. She won an honorable mention in the Ambassador's Award, given by Ambassador Arthur Burns to American students who have shown an interest and participated in activities in their Germany communities. She is a member of Arlington County's Student School Board, and a co-founder of Concerned Students Against Censorship and the Committee on Democratic Action in South Africa. This fall she will attend the University of Virginia, where she plans to study international relations and journalism.

Sarah Manth Winder, daughter of Joseph A.B. and Pamela M. Winder, State. Sarah is a graduate of Winston Churchill High School in Potomac, Maryland. She has lived in Chile, West Germany, and Indonesia. A member of the National Honor Society, she also received a National Merit commendation. She was the recipient of a first-place prize in the trio competition at the Maryland piano festival. She volunteers at Sibley Hospital. This fall she will enter Wellesley College.

Bookfair '85

THE 25TH ANNUAL AAFSW BOOKFAIR will be open to the public in the Department of State October 19–26 (except Tuesday and Wednesday). Family night is October 18. The cafeteria will be open, and parents are urged to feed their children early to avoid crowds. Special features at this year's BOOKFAIR include a Shiva from India that dates to the turn of the century. Proceeds benefit many charitable organizations, including the AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards. Donations continue to be accepted. Call (202)-5796 for information.

Schedule

Family Night: Friday, October 18, 5:00–8 p.m.

Open to the General Public: 10:00 a.m.–4:00 p.m. on:

Saturday, October 19–Saturday, October 26

Closed Tuesday, October 22, and Wednesday, October 23

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GRIEVANCE COUNSELING: Retired Senior Foreign Service officer attorney who served on Grievance Board staff will assist grievance presentation. Richard Greene, 161 Laurel Rd., Princeton, NJ 08540. (609)924-3077.

VOLUNTEERS

STIMULATING VOLUNTEER OPPORTUNITIES AVAILABLE IN FALL '85. International high school exchange program needs volunteers to evaluate written applications from American high school students applying for scholarships in the Congress-Bundestag Youth Exchange Program. Volunteers must have some combination of the following: background in international relations; teaching or counseling experience; experience in hosting exchange students; or participation in other evaluation programs. A minimum of six hours per week from November to mid-January is required. All applications are read at International Headquarters in Washington, D.C. For more details on these or other openings, contact Doris Mattos, Youth for Understanding, 3501 Newark St., NW, Washington, D.C. 20016. (202)966-6808.

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ASSOCIATION NEWS

Association protests Galbraith's call for more political appointees

AFSA has protested a call by departing Ambassador to France Evan K. Galbraith for large reforms in the Foreign Service, including non-career ambassadors in all major posts in the State Department and overseas. He said that foreign policy should be formulated not by State but by the president, and that a conservative chief executive would find it difficult to find ambassadors with similar convictions in the Service.

"The facts are that most of the people in the Foreign Service vote Democrat [*sic*]. I can't verify it. It's just a feeling I have," Galbraith told the *Washington Post*. "The conservative Ronald Reagan took that office without a great deal of support or enthusiasm from the Foreign Service."

AFSA responded that "Ambassador Galbraith is entitled to his opinions about the Foreign Service, but the burden of proof is on him. In one case he is quoted as saying, 'I can't verify it.' If so, perhaps he shouldn't make the accusation."

The Association went on to say that "President Reagan would be surprised to learn that he has not been formulating U.S. foreign policy. The role of the State Department and the Foreign Service is to give the president foreign policy advice and to implement the policies he decides upon. Under the leadership of Secretary Shultz, they have been doing precisely that."

Galbraith's four-year career in France has been full of controversy. He has angered members of the French government, which reprimanded him four times, but won the acclaim of conservatives there for his vocal anti-communism. Last spring he was publicly rebuked by Shultz for his remarks that Foreign Service officers lack bureaucratic "guts"—"somebody ought to tie his tongue," the secretary said. Galbraith later expressed support for the career Service in a cable to Shultz.

"As to the style of diplomacy exemplified by Ambassador Galbraith's performance in Paris, of which he seems quite proud," AFSA said, "we believe most career ambassadors would be inclined to pursue a more conservative style, based on their long experience of the costs of recklessness in diplomacy."

Galbraith said he is writing a book about reforms in the diplomatic corps. "We look forward to reading his book," the Association responded.

AID employees meet with OMB, Hill staff

Members of AFSA's AID Standing Committee have held a series of meetings this year with the Office of Management and Budget and with key congressional staffers to establish a dialogue on the needs of agency employees, particularly on retirement matters. The committee's major theme was to articulate the unique qualities of the Foreign Service and of the agency's programs and personnel.

"These meetings have left us cautiously optimistic that congressional deliberations will ultimately have little, if any, negative impact on the existing retirement system," said committee chair Charlotte Cromer. She noted that a retirement system for new entrants would not be introduced till this summer.

In addition to Cromer, members of the committee are Bill Ackerman, Frank Young, Roy Harrell, Bernie Salvo, Paul Bisek, and Jean Durrette. Cromer emphasized that interested agency members are urged to join the committee at its meetings every Thursday at noon in Room 3644 of the Department of State.

Hays, his board retire to salutes

Outgoing AFSA President Dennis K. Hays (left, above) receives a certificate of appreciation from incoming President Robert V. Keeley at a party honoring both the old and new Governing Boards a few days before the transition on July 15. The certificate cited Hays "for significant contributions to the Foreign Service and for leading its Association during three years of unprecedented growth and achievement." At a party given by the AFSA staff (left), Hays was saluted by gifts of an automatic miniature American flag pole and a tie with a large cookie stitched on it.

Robert V. Keeley



Keeley elected Governing Board head

Robert Keeley, former ambassador to Zimbabwe and to Mauritius, was elected president of the Governing Board of the American Foreign Service Association, Elections Committee Chairperson Morris Weisz has announced. He will head a board composed entirely of members of his Unity Slate, voted into office by the membership at the same time. The term for the new board runs for two years.

Keeley received 2,566 of the 2,831 ballots cast. Also elected as officers of the board were Vice President Anthea S. de Rouville (2,524), Second Vice President Charlotte Cromer (2,519), Secretary Hartford Jennings (2,507), and Treasurer Warren Gardner (2,508).

Elected as State Constituency representatives were Sandra Dembsky (1,023), James Derrick (998), Gerald Lamberty (1,032), and James Williamson (1,012). Elected as AID representatives were William Ackerman (375) and Frank Young (370). Elected as USIA representative was Richard Arndt (84). Elected as retired representatives were William Calderhead (966), Roger Provencher (952), and John Thomas (972). There was a small amount of write-in votes in each category. There were no opposing candidates.

The next board election will take place in 1987.

Amendments will change board, allow non-American associates

Two new amendments to the AFSA bylaws will create constituency vice presidents and permit non-Americans to become associate members. The amendments were proposed by the board and were approved by a membership referendum in July.

The three constituency vice presidents will be elected at large but will be drawn from the State, AID, and USIA memberships. They will replace the current vice president and second vice president. Other constituencies that exceed 100 members will qualify for a vice president, except for the retired constituency. The change will assure officer representation for the qualifying groups.

The other amendment permits non-citizens to become associate members. This will allow persons with an interest in foreign affairs who are not Americans to receive the JOURNAL and to use the club. Foreign embassy personnel, in particular, have expressed interest in becoming associate members.

Pact reached on second consumables

After the filing of an unfair labor practice and months of mediation and negotiation efforts, AFSA, AFGE, and the foreign affairs agencies reached agreement to provide a second consumables allowance. The agreement provides that once a post is designated as a consumables post, an additional full allowance will be granted for a second tour at post, 50 percent for a one-year extension, and 25 percent for a six-month extension.

The intent of this allowance is to recognize the extreme conditions at specific posts and to provide employees with adequate consumables. In order for a post to be designated as a consumables post, the availability of consumables must be limited, with items being extremely difficult to obtain locally or from other sources of supply, or locally available goods must be of substandard quality.

The weight allowance for shipment of consumables has been established at 2,500 pounds, net, for each employee regardless of family status. The allowance is provided on the initial orders assigning the employee to a tour at a consumables post. The employee will have one year from arrival at post to use the allowance.

All consumables allowance posts are required to submit a new justification every two years. However, if circumstances change, a new justification may be submitted at any time. The initial renewal due date is September 30, 1986. An employee assigned to a consumables post is not affected if the post is deleted from the list of designated posts. When a post is added to that list, all employees with more than one year remaining in their tour of duty will qualify for a consumables allowance.

THE ASSOCIATION NEWS

The official newsletter of the American Foreign Service Association, the professional association for the Foreign Service and the legal representative of all Foreign Service employees in the Department of State and the Agency for International Development. Founded in 1924.

AFSA
2101 E St. NW
Washington, D.C. 20037
(202) 338-4045

Nominations sought for AFSA Awards

Each fall, the Association solicits nominations for five awards honoring Foreign Service people. These awards are among the most prestigious in the Foreign Service and are accompanied by cash prizes. They are presented at a ceremony in the spring. Vice President Bush was guest speaker at the ceremony last May.

The **Christian A. Herter Award, William R. Rivkin Award,** and **W. Averell Harriman Award** are for senior, mid-level, and junior officers, respectively. They are presented to individuals nominated by their colleagues for outstanding intellectual originality, courage, forthrightness, and creative dissent. The first two carry stipends of $1,000 each, the last $2,500.

The **Avis Bohlen Award** honors members of a Foreign Service family "whose relations with the American and foreign communities at a Foreign Service post have done the most to advance the interests of the United States in the tradition of the late Avis Bohlen." The award is worth $2,500.

Nominations should be sent to the AFSA Awards Committee, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. The deadline is January 15. The nominations should include two full sets of materials, unbound, with each page marked with the nominee's name. The recommended format is:

- Biographic data: birth date, grade, agency (only the last for the Bohlen Award);
- Association with the candidate (strictly limited to 250 words);
- Justification for nomination (500-750 words). Summary of specific reasons for the nomination. The narrative should discuss qualities of mind and spirit that qualify the nominee for the award and offer specific examples of the candidate's accomplishments.

The **Sinclair Language Awards** honor distinguished study of a hard language and its associated culture. Each carries a prize of $1,000. Nominees must be career officers or reserve officers in a junior officer program who are candidates for Foreign Service appointments. A nomination may be made by anyone with direct knowledge of the candidate's qualifications. A separate committee selects the winner of this award. It includes the dean of language study of the Foreign Service Institute. A nomination form may be obtained from AFSA or from FSI. Nominations for awards for study completed by August 1, 1985, are due January 15, 1986, at the AFSA offices.

Legislative Fund nears $90,000 from 1650 donors in five months

Almost one member in five has now contributed to the Legislative Action Fund, bringing total contributions to $87,498 five months into the campaign. Donations to the fund, which are tax deductible, should be sent to the address below. Donors' names will be published in this space unless they wish to remain anonymous.

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AID Standing meets with agency management on morale, RIFs

Reductions in force and the declining morale of agency Foreign Service employees were the topic in meetings between the members of AFSA's AID Standing Committee and agency management in June.

On June 11, AFSA Second Vice President Charlotte Cromer, AID Governing Board member Bill Ackerman, and AFSA President Dennis K. Hays met with Administrator M. Peter McPherson, telling him that the Association is concerned about present efforts to restructure the agency and eliminate nearly 300 positions. AFSA offered to use its contacts on Capitol Hill to inform Congress about the effects budget cuts would have on AID programs and employees. McPherson expressed appreciation for the Association's assistance in this area.

In addition, the committee expressed concern that the replacement of AID Counselor Jim Norris, a senior Foreign Service officer, with a GS employee would make more difficult the ability of Foreign Service employees to contribute to decisions affecting their careers and agency policies. The administrator was sympathetic and said that he had already decided that the executive secretary position would be filled by a Foreign Service employee.

During a meeting with Assistant Administrator for Management Tom Rollis, the committee discussed agency reorganization and projected reductions in personnel. Rollis repeated the administrator's earlier comments that management believes that the reductions can be made without any firings. If the attrition rate has not reached about half of the 292 positions by November, however, management may have to make some hard decisions.

Non-career SFS appointments in FCS derided

The Assocation has written members of the House Foreign Affairs Committee to express its objection to an amendment to the Foreign Service Act that would allow the Commerce Department to continue indefinitely to appoint non-career individuals to the Senior Foreign Service in excess of the act's five-percent maximum. Section 305 of the act had provided for a temporary easing of the five-percent restriction for the Foreign Commercial Service to allow the FCS to find experienced senior executives in its early years. The restriction was to expire on October 1.

The Association observed that the committee had strongly supported the idea of an SFS that is "a reward for excellence for those who have put in the time and effort to develop the talents and skills required in the Foreign Service," in the committee's words. The Association said that an adequate supply of experienced officers was available but that "Commerce continues to plead a shortage."

USIA membership grows; agency employees become activists

The steady growth of USIA membership in AFSA continues, with an increase of more than 50 percent over this time a year ago. The USIA Standing Committee's luncheons with newly entered officers and its monthly lecture series "Dialogs on Public Diplomacy" in particular have helped recruit new members.

USIA officers are playing important roles in AFSA's work in Washington. Caroline Osterling and Steve Telkins serve on the JOURNAL Editorial Board. Sam President worked on the Elections Committee. Sheila Austrian is USIA's representative on the Committee on Education, which awards scholarships. Mary Muller works on the Insurance Committee, and Dick Arndt and Al Perlman represent USIA at meetings of the Senior Foreign Service Association, which works in close conjunction with AFSA. Arndt is also our representative on the AFSA Governing Board. The lecture series has sponsored monthly dialogs that have featured Senator Charles Mathias (R.-Maryland), former USIA Director Leonard Marks, former Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Newsom, public diplomacy commission chairman Edwin Feulner, and panels on Officer Efficiency Reports and State involvement in public diplomacy [see report in this issue].

Scholarship panels meet

One of four volunteer panels meets to determine winners of the 1985 AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards. Patterned after selection boards, the scholarship panels review academic and extracurricular qualifications of nearly a hundred graduating high school seniors and annually award about two dozen scholarships of $500 each. The panelists are (from left): Angel Rabasa of State, John Champagne of AID, Julia M. Timberlake (retired), panel chairman James D. Singlefary of AID, Patience B. Spires of AAFSW. Panelist Sheila Austrian of USIA is not pictured.

Court ruling should clear SFS back pay

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recently ruled in *Squillacote* v. *U.S.* that the salaries of members of the Senior Executive Service were improperly capped in fiscal years 1980 and 1981. AFSA has received a number of inquiries as to whether the decision affects Senior Foreign Service members.

Since the Foreign Service Act mandates that the salary levels of SES and SFS members be equivalent, AFSA believes that SFS members are entitled to back pay. Accordingly, AFSA has written to the State Department and AID to determine their timetables for implementing the ruling. The department has said the SFS should indeed be covered. However, it will have to seek concurrence from several agencies, including the Justice Department and the General Accounting Office, before it will begin making payments. To date, AID has not responded. The court found that the federal pay cap in fiscal 1980 did not apply to members of the SES. As a result, SES members were subject to the permanent statutory pay limitation, Executive Schedule IV ($52,750), rather than the 1980 pay cap, Executive Schedule V ($50,112.50). Although the pay cap was legal in fiscal 1981, it was applied to the improperly capped 1980 level.

Even though the SFS did not exist until fiscal 1981, the salaries of employees eligible to join the SFS were affected by the improper 1980 pay cap. The act requires that SFS salaries may not be less than the basic pay for the SES, and that SFS salaries shall be adjusted at the same time and in the same manner as SES salaries.

Under the act, all individuals serving under appointments as Foreign Service officers or as Foreign Service reserve officers with limited or unlimited tenure at class 2 or higher were eligible to convert to the SFS. Effective October 17, 1980, such employees were treated for salary purposes as if they were members of the SFS.



Managing Your Money

The Risky Business of Real Estate

By MARK S. WALDMAN, *Ph.D., CFP, Investment Adviser*

These are trying times for the potential real estate investor. Real estate remains an extremely attractive area for investment, but the changing financial climate and potential tax reforms are forcing investors to be particularly wary. Let's see how our couple deals with the situation.

André and Dorice are a Foreign Service couple in their late 40s. They have an investment portfolio of $25,000, and Dorice has just inherited $25,000. They have already planned for their short-term financial goals and now want to increase their wealth for retirement. They know that real estate has been an excellent investment and want to diversify their portfolio into this area.

They could invest directly in real property. Current analyses of the real estate market suggest that multi-family and quality single-family dwellings are the best current investment. Real properties need management, though, and André and Dorice are concerned about living abroad and turning their investment over to a property manager. They're also concerned about having all their investable funds in one or two properties.

André and Dorice have alternatives. They could invest in real estate limited partnerships—RELPS. This would ensure professional management and a diversified group of properties. It would also shelter some of their current income from taxes. These investments are illiquid, however, and they couldn't expect to receive most of their gains for at least four or five years.

They might also put their money in real estate investment trusts—REITS. These are pools of properties and mortgages and are often traded publicly after their formation. They don't shelter income like a RELP, but they do require a lower initial investment. One new development is the formation of mutual funds that specialize in the stock of companies involved in real estate, or companies holding substantial amounts of real estate. These funds, although fairly speculative, might produce significant gains.

Another way to invest in real estate is through mortgages, Ginnie Mae's or Fannie Mae's. These are securities issued by independent government agencies, which then provide mortgage funding to the public. One major problem with these is the large minimums required, sometimes as much as $25,000. There are now various mutual funds and unit trusts that invest in these securities, and these spread the risk for the small investor and can provide more liquidity.

André and Dorice, after consulting with their financial adviser, decide to take a more advanced approach. They leave their $50,000 invested with their broker. They then borrow from the brokerage house, using the securities as collateral, at a lower-than-market rate. Mutual fund shares can be used as collateral, too. Let's say the rate is 10 percent, and they borrow a conservative $25,000. Because they have the collateral, and because there are no banks to deal with, they do this with a phone call. They will continue to receive the income from their investments while they serve as collateral for the loan.

They will pay $2,500 a year in interest, which will be deductible as an interest payment. If they are in a 40-percent marginal tax bracket, this makes their hard-dollar cost $1,500—what they really pay to borrow the $25,000. The investments could be in anything—mutual funds, real estate limited partnerships, or even in real property.

Let's assume they invest in real estate. They put $5,000 into each of five conservative, top-of-the-line, well-managed, publicly registered real estate limited partnerships. Let's further assume that they get an average 20 percent tax write-off this year from their investment. They've paid $1,500 to invest $25,000, and they're getting a $5,000 deduction (20 percent of $25,000). They've now received a 333-percent write-off on their $1,500. They've begun to use leverage—borrowed money—to increase their wealth. But what happens to their income in the mean time?

Their $5,000 deduction produces a $2,000 tax refund. They've paid $1,500 to borrow the money, so they have a net gain this year of $500. The government has, in effect, paid them $500 to increase their wealth. They still own their original $50,000 portfolio and are receiving the income from it. And this analysis has not yet included any income they receive from the new investments.

This is an advanced wealth-building technique, of course. André and Dorice had their financial adviser calculate the costs and benefits before they committed themselves to this course of action. They also could have invested the borrowed funds in real property, putting about $10,000 into each of two $100,000 properties. This would have increased their portfolio by 400 percent. Or they could have combined limited partnerships and real property—the mix depends on their goals and tolerance for risk.

André and Dorice are a little leery of real property as an investment because of the possibility of tax reform. Various proposals under discussion could severely limit some of the tax benefits of owning investment property. Their adviser has suggested, however, that any reform-generated decline in value would be short-term, and that real estate remains a good long-term investment.

In their discussions of these possibilities, André and Dorice realized that they should also consider borrowing out the considerable equity they've accumulated in their home. They can use these funds in much the same way as those in the example above. If tax reform then lowers the value of their home, they will have gotten their money out first. And even if it doesn't they stand to profit by it anyway.

Investing in real estate in the current environment should only be done with the assistance of a professional adviser. Tax and investment considerations must be woven together, and it's more important than ever to spread out your risk. This caveat shouldn't keep investors out of real estate, though. It can still be an immensely profitable area for the careful investor.

Mark S. Waldman is a former Foreign Service officer who is now an investment adviser and certified financial planner specializing in tax-advantaged investments. He is associated with Wealth Management Consultants, a registered investment advisory firm. He alternates this column with Margaret Winkler, a certified financial planner.

Time to apply for AFSA scholarships

Now is the time to apply for the two scholarship programs run by the AFSA Committee on Education. Students who are qualified dependents of career Foreign Service personnel are encouraged to apply for either the **AFSA Financial Aid Awards** or the **AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards.**

The aid program is open to undergraduates studying in the United States, and awards are based solely on need. The merit awards are for students who will be graduating from high school in 1986 and are based on academic excellence. Interested students must submit completed applications by February 15, 1986. They can obtain materials now by writing the scholarship administrator at 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. Be sure to state agency affiliation.

Feulner offers favorable assessment of USIA activities

Characterizing USIA's overseas posts as places "where the rubber meets the road," Edwin J. Feulner, chairman of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, offered his assessment of the agency and its "revitalized" role in making public diplomacy a central part of U.S. foreign policy. His remarks were made on May 17 at the seventh in the series "Dialogs on Public Diplomacy," sponsored by AFSA's USIA Standing Committee and held at the Capitol Hill Holiday Inn.

The president of the Heritage Foundation, Feulner has chaired the advisory commission since September 1982. In the informal gathering attended by more than 60 agency personnel, he described the purposes and activities of the commission, stressing its role in examining the effectiveness of public diplomacy programs and in "boosting USIA's case" in the country through public forums and on Capitol Hill.

Feulner elaborated on the commission's view that the purpose of public diplomacy is to both educate and advocate. Stating that the two functions are complementary and mutually reinforcing, he stressed that the impact of public diplomacy efforts is a cumulative one. Its effectiveness, he said, depends on recognition within the foreign affairs community of the importance of using USIA resources to enhance educational and cultural exchanges as well as to articulate U.S. foreign policy.

Visits of commission members to USIS posts are an integral part of its work, Feulner said, and often done at their own expense. He cited several examples of outstanding public diplomacy achievements of agency officers and Foreign Service Nationals and reiterated the commission's respect for and confidence in the professionalism of the Foreign Service. The commission's contacts with target audiences overseas, he said, have shown that foreign governments are increasingly appreciative of the agency's work and are beginning to realize the important role public diplomacy can play in the successful advocacy of their own foreign policy objectives.

On balance, the commission has favorably assessed USIA's public diplomacy efforts over the past year, Feulner stressed. He added that in the coming year it plans to focus on the following concerns:

- Modernization of the Voice of America;
- The initiation of a coordinated interagency research effort to assess foreign public opinion more effectively;
- An increase in representational funds for agency officers;
- An increase in the staffs of USIS offices;
- Additional training for ambassadors in effective media interviewing;
- Security vs. public accessibility to USIS centers;
- The future career enhancement prospects for mid-level USIA officers; and
- An increase in outreach services for non-U.S.-government-sponsored foreign students in the United States.

AFSA names new law clerk

Suzanne Rigby has been named AFSA's new law clerk, to work with General Counsel Susan Holik and Legal Assistant Gregory Lewis. She replaces Francine McNulty, who resigned to take another position.

Rigby is a student at the National Law Center of the George Washington University who expects to receive her juris doctor degree next May. A graduate of Utah State University, she majored in history and was ranked in the top 10 percent of her class. Last summer she worked in the U.S. Attorney's Office in Washington, where she concentrated in employment-discrimination and administrative law.

Life & Love in the Foreign Service

"Now we'll see if our new political officer really can walk on water."
Frank Cunningham, Washington

Honorable mention:
"This year's July 4th celebration attracted participation from every section of the American Embassy, Guinea-West. In the absence of any air and sea connections that month, the temporary chargé d'affaires (far right) departed post by the best alternative means."
George Lambrakis, Washington

Winners of the monthly LIFE & LOVE contest receive a certificate for a free lunch for two at the Foreign Service Club. Honorable mentions receive a free carafe of wine.

Mail entries to:
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Contest deadline is October 1.

Competition #24



RETIREMENT NEWS

Retirees found, manage new Foreign Service History Center

George Washington University has recently established a Foreign Service History Center at the suggestion of two retired Foreign Service officers. The center will tap the recollections of members of the Foreign Service and others in the public and private sectors on various issues related to the U.S. experience in the world since the end of World War II. The center will be creating collections of oral histories, articles, donated correspondence, papers, and photographs that will be available to diplomatic historians and specialists in international relations working on the post-1945 period.

The two retired officers, Charles Stuart Kennedy and Victor Wolf Jr., were troubled by the fact that the experiences and insights of members of the Foreign Service remain virtually untapped by those who write the history of U.S. foreign relations. With the exception of the memoirs of a very few career ambassadors, the perspectives of the working Foreign Service members, both those assigned in Washington and in the field, are not available to scholars. Kennedy and Wolf spent about a year exploring the different ways to bring the Foreign Service experience to the attention of those scholars. They noted, for example, that the Foreign Service does not have a historical society that could serve as a research center. The funding for starting such a society, unrelated to academic work in the fields of diplomatic history and international relations, was problematic.

The two retired FSOs were intrigued with the possibilities that the comparatively new technique of oral history offered. Scholars, communities, and institutions are using it increasingly to capture the memoirs of persons who participated in social movements, to gather folk histories, to develop institutional records, and to gather the recollections of major American figures before they leave the scene.

Retired FSO Victor Wolf, who will co-run Foreign Service History Center

In 1984, GWU's School of Public and International Affairs and its Department of History approached Kennedy and Wolf after those organizations heard about their investigations into the possibility of establishing a Foreign Service oral history program. During the annual meeting of the Society of Historians of American Foreign Relations, in August of last year, a roundtable discussion on such a program revealed widespread enthusiasm among professional historians. Finally, in December, GWU established the center.

It will be organized on an interdisciplinary basis, combining the talents of the SPIA, the history department, and the Gelman Library, where it will be housed. GWU is an excellent location for the center, being near the State Department and in easy striking distance of the Library of Congress and the National Archives. Further, many government agencies (but, sadly, not yet State) have ongoing oral history programs and have given encouragement to Kennedy and Wolf as they launch the center's programs.

The two retired FSOs currently serve as managing directors of the center on a voluntary basis and are now concentrating on organization, fund-raising, and program development. The program will emphasize oral history collections, the development of special archives of assembled material, the encouragement of contacts between the university and the active Foreign Service community and its retirees, and liaison between the university and the foreign affairs community.

The managing directors point out that the center provides present and former members of the Service with a unique opportunity to make their contributions and insights on foreign affairs better known to scholars, academicians, and ultimately the public. These Foreign Service people can now offer perspectives on foreign policy issues often different from those found in the official documentation after it is released through the freedom of information process.

Five of the six living former secretaries of state have endorsed the concept of the center. Further, members of Congress, former ambassadors, members of congressional staffs, distinguished academicians, and other prominent personalities have indicated their enthusiastic support for the idea.

As the center moves into high gear, volunteers from the Foreign Service community will be needed to help with office work, research, interviews, suggestions for fund-raising and projects, and the creation of the collections themselves. All are encouraged to contact Kennedy and Wolf at the Foreign Service History Center, Gelman Library, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. 20052. Phone (202) 676-6455.

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