FOREIGN SERVICE

JOURNAL

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February 1986

THE FOREIGN SERVICE ACT AT 5

If you have the AFSA Plan Personal Property Floater, you don't have to go through this red tape when you file a claim.

This is the red tape you have to go through if you file a claim under the Claims Act.

How to file claims relating to personal property

Claim—Any claim filed by an employee of the Department of State, the International Communication Agency or the Agency for International Development, for damage to, loss, destruction, capture, or abandonment of employee's personal property incident to service (6 FAM 310.3a).

FOR MANY Foreign Service personnel, it's time to change assignments, which means shipping personal property all over the world. Inevitably, some cases of damage do occur. All State, ICA or AID employees should use this article, in conjunction with 6 FAM 300, as a guide to filing a claim correctly.

Your claims assistance officer, usually in the post's administrative section, will be able to supply the claims form, DS–1620, and whatever information you need. When the form is submitted to the Office of Operations (A/OPR, ATTN: FMAS/CL) at the Department, all necessary documentation must be attached. This *always* includes a copy of your assignment orders. For items damaged in shipment, include all accompanying travel documents. For items destroyed or damaged beyond repair, include whatever documentation is available to show their cost. For repairable items, include estimates of repair costs (done by a professional, if one is available), in addition to information concerning the value of the damaged items. If the loss was incurred through theft, the post security officer's report and the local police report (if available) must be enclosed.

The minimum amount of loss necessary to file a claim is $50. The maximum allowable payment is $15,000. This maximum applies per incident. For example, if your automobile is destroyed in the embassy parking lot when hit by a runaway truck, and a fire at your quarters destroys your furniture, the maximum payment in each case could be $15,000. If, however, a fire in your garage destroyed your car and spread to the house and destroyed the furniture, a single $15,000 limit applies. The only exception to this limit are losses due to an evacuation, at which time the maximum payable claim rises to $40,000.

A claim must be presented in writing within two years after the date on which the loss occurred or the prospective claimant was officially notified of the loss (in cases where the loss did not occur where the claimant was located). This date is known as the claim accrual date. Since someone filing a claim usually wants to do it as soon as possible, this deadline rarely presents a problem. Occasionally, however, potential claimants decide to wait until returning to the Department at the end of their assignment abroad. If this is more than two years after the claim accrual date, the claim will be disallowed.

State, ICA and AID employees should also be aware that carrying insurance coverage on their belongings almost always is to their advantage. Through insurance, an individual can set the limits of coverage and, in nearly all cases, be assured of more rapid claim processing than is possible in the Department. If you do have insurance coverage, or a valid claim against another party, such as a moving company or ocean freight carrier, a claim must be made against and settled with that entity prior to filing a claim with the Department.

The importance of insurance coverage was made apparent to one employee when all his possessions were destroyed in a warehouse fire. His insurance had lapsed; the warehouse's settlement was by weight of the items stored, not their value; and the only other party to whom a claim could be made was the U.S. Government. The claim was completely documented at more than $90,000, with bills of sale, receipts or professional appraisals of the items destroyed. Due to the limit per incidence of loss, the Department could make reimbursement of only $15,000.

Even for claims of less than $15,000, claimants often find the amounts of reimbursement have lesser dollar amounts than those listed on their DS–1620s. Values of destroyed or damaged items are modified by two separate factors, one for inflation and one for depreciation. As an example, consider a claimant's sofa, destroyed when the embassy truck transporting it was involved in an accident. The sofa was purchased in 1975 for $300. That amount is multiplied by an inflation factor of 1.63, giving a replacement cost of $489. This is then depreciated at a rate of 5% per year for the seven years from 1975 to 1982, giving the claimant a payment of $317.85.

One final reminder: When filing a personal property loss claim, be sure to keep a copy of all the documents involved. In case any problems occur in adjudication of the claim, you will have all the information necessary to provide additional documentation or answer any questions which may arise. Any inquiries about claims should be sent to the attention of the Office of Operations, using TAGS of "ACLM". □

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No longer an infant but with some filling out still to go, the Foreign Service Act celebrates the fifth anniversary of its implementation this month. Starting on page 19, we present a discussion by two individuals who have had a role in shaping the present personnel system and who hold sharply divergent views on the effect the act has had on the Service during its first half decade. On page 25, AFSA President Gerald P. Lamberty gives the Association's view that the act may have had good intentions but management's implementation of it is hurting the Service.

Contents

"The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service"

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ASSOCIATION VIEWS

Truth or Consequences

Like all Americans, we at AFSA are concerned about protecting government secrets from spying. We believe, however, that the administration, in a well-intentioned effort to stem the recent spate of espionage, has placed the need to protect secrets ahead of the constitutional rights of its employees; has broken faith with those workers by reneging on promises not to implement several announced measures that abrogate those rights; and is ready to place unwarranted trust in an electronic countermeasure that has no scientific validity.

The president has now said in his January news conference that the plan for polygraph screening of State Department employees and other government workers has not been changed. The White House had promised in December, after Secretary Shultz threatened to resign rather than take a test, that the machine would only be used in investigations of espionage incidents, which had been the practice all along. When polygraph use last came up, in 1983, the administration also had promised not to implement its planned program.

Now we have been told that the administration has also gone against its promise made three years ago not to require pre-publication review of employees with high security clearances. The White House has been saying it is holding "in abeyance" the measure that requires employees to sign documents requiring life-time review of their writings that touch on security matters. Meanwhile, it has been passing around a nearly identical form that was created slightly earlier.

The problems with these measures are twofold. First, they infringe on the liberties to which government employees, like all Americans, are entitled under the Constitution. There are already laws that punish persons who reveal classified information without infringing on their right to speak freely without prior government approval. As for the polygraph, former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote recently that it is a tool proper only for totalitarian governments.

The second problem is that, as a bipartisan congressional study reported in 1983, there is no evidence that the polygraph is a reliable screening mechanism. There is abundant evidence, however, that its well-established error rate will place the careers of thousands of Foreign Service employees in jeopardy. Even the FBI, the lead counter-espionage agency in the government, has rules forbidding its use in a screening capacity. Meanwhile, there is also evidence that the Soviet Union trains its agents to penetrate polygraph screening.

AFSA believes strongly that the government must take action to protect its secrets. This need not be done, however, in a manner that infringes on our rights as citizens. This also need not be done with a device that can only serve as an electronic Maginot Line.

LETTERS

Bio Supplement

Whether by intention or simple carelessness, one detail in Thomas Maerten's September article ["Tragedy of Errors"] should be supplemented or revised. On page 29, Mr. Maertens describes John Keppel only as "a State Department employee retired since the 1960s." (One has the sense throughout of a general *ad hominem* handling of all persons who do not buy this administration's disposal of the KAL 007 affair.)

According to the bio data furnished to local colleges who hosted John Keppel here in Oregon last fall, John Keppel was an FSO for 22 years (1947–69), is fluent in Russian, and was working in the U.S. embassy in Moscow in 1960 during the cover-up of the U-2 flight.

If Mr. Maertens's own FSO pedigree were translated as "a present State Department employee" he might feel that such a meager description of his talents served to cast doubts on his own credibility. Why, come to think of it, he might get mad as hell and label it "disinformation."

DOROTHY M. WEAVER
USIA, retired
Portland, Oregon

Great Decisions

I would like to inform your readers about the non-profit Great Decisions program of the Foreign Policy Association. I have been pleased to hear from some Foreign Service retirees that they are involved in the program and to learn that the USIA library has increased the purchase of Great Decisions books, in part to meet overseas requests. The 96-page book would make a useful reference document in embassies and USIS libraries. It could also be used in discussion groups involving host country nationals who speak English. Peace Corps volunteers who want to keep up-to-date on international issues would find it valuable. Retirees and officers stationed in the United States can contribute to a better understanding of the setting in which the Foreign Service operates by participating in the Great Decisions activities around the country, which involved 250,000 people in 1985.

The Great Decisions topics for 1986 (the 32nd year of the program) are:

1. How Foreign Policy is Made: The Case of Central America
2. "Star Wars" and the Geneva Talks: What Future for Arms Control?
3. Democracy in Latin America: Focus on Argentina and Brazil
4. International Terrorism: In Search of a Response
5. European Community and the United States: Friction Among Friends
6. Third World Development: Old Problems, New Strategies?
7. Israel and the United States: Friendship and Discord
8. Religion in International Politics: Why

the Resurgence?

The Great Decisions book provides background information and the pro and con of the policy options available for dealing with each issue. Books can be ordered at seven dollars each plus one dollar postage and handling for single copies (discount available for quantity orders) from the Foreign Policy Association, 205 Lexington Ave., New York, New York 10016, (212)481-8450. In the United States, books can also be obtained from state and community coordinators of the program. I will be glad to provide additional information to anyone interested and books to those in the Washington area for six dollars each.

James L. Roush
Northern Virginia Coordinator
Great Decisions Program
P.O. Box 244
Arlington, VA 22210

Diplomatic Loyalty

I must say I was quite shocked by the letter [December] by Andrew John Kauffman II. He takes the position that a Foreign Service officer is bound only by his oath to support and defend the Constitution and that "he has no loyalty" to the president or secretary of state. His letter demonstrates either an inexcusable sophistry or an unacceptably low level of intellectual and moral integrity.

Of course an FSO is bound to defend the Constitution. But he is not appointed to be the official whistle-blower against what he may perceive as unconstitutional acts by the president. The Constitution entrusts that responsibility to the Congress, through the impeachment process. Mr. Kauffman makes such a play of the FSO's oath to defend the Constitution that he seems to make it extend to cover all cases in which an FSO thinks presidential policy is unwise as well as unconstitutional.

One would suppose that any schoolboy would understand without prompting that no organization can operate successfully if every subordinate member of it conceives it to be his right and duty to oppose or sabotage the directing head's policies. That is disloyalty.

If implementation of the policies of the president and the secretary of state becomes so intolerable to the FSO's sense of rightness, honor, or constitutionality, he has only one option: resignation. He has no option of sabotage or disobedience. I would hope, for the sake of our foreign policy and our system, that most FSOs understand that much more clearly and

coherently than Mr. Kauffman appears to.

PERRY LAUKHOFF
Foreign Service Officer, resigned
Amherst, Virginia

While one can sympathize with the considerations that gave rise to Andrew Kauffman's letter on diplomatic loyalty, I, for one, find it difficult to accept his conclusions as a guide for the behavior of Foreign Service officers confronted with specific issues. As he points out, we all took oaths of allegiance to the Constitution. So did the president who appointed us. The same article that prescribes this oath provides that he can be impeached for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors."

No one will dispute that an FSO should be loyal to the Constitution, but do we want the officer to hold up every instruction from Washington to the litmus test of constitutionality, let alone to "the demands of the American people"—however these are determined? That way lies anarchy.

One of my former chiefs, the respected Robert Murphy, put it very well. In essence, he said that every officer had the right to question instructions. If they were reaffirmed, the FSO should carry them out. If the officer believed, nevertheless, that to carry out the instructions would violate his moral principles, then the only honorable thing to do was resign. Secretary Shultz has, I believe, spoken in similar terms in more recent times.

I have always understood that the loyalty of an FSO is to the presidency as an institution established by the Constitution. If this is what Kauffman means, fine. We serve loyally whether the president be Republican or Democrat. This is often very difficult for a non-career appointee to understand. His loyalty is usually very definitely to the president who appointed him. Having served under 11 non-career chiefs-of-mission, I have more than once seen them puzzled as to how we could have served a preceding president of another political party as loyally as we were serving the current one. Perhaps it is to the non-career people that the Kauffman letter should be directed, not to the Foreign Service officers.

THOMAS J. DUNNIGAN
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Alexandria, Virginia

Cover Complaint

Why does the JOURNAL now use such ugly, caricature-type covers? In earlier years it had such attractive covers—often attrac-

tive scenes of overseas posts. I find the November cover of the belligerent hockey players particularly unpleasant and unsuitable for this publication.

ALTARIE B. STEWARD
AID, retired
Brevard, North Carolina

Foreign-Born Spouses

The Foreign-Born Spouses Network has been organized by members of AAFSW and works in cooperation with the Family Liaison Office and the Overseas Briefing Center. It has been set up to ease the process of adjustment to life in the United States for foreign-born spouses of foreign affairs employees.

The network helps the newly arrived foreign-born spouse with such practical aspects of life in the United States as housing, schools, shopping, employment, and emergency services, as well as with larger and more difficult questions such as cultural expectations and the American way of life. It maintains a current list of language schools for those spouses who do not have a sufficient command of English and attempts to put them in touch with someone who speaks their language and is familiar with life in the United States. The network also keeps track of the many excellent resources available at the foreign affairs agencies in order to direct those spouses who may need these services (but do not know they exist) to relevant resource offices.

In addition, the network provides a sympathetic ear and a starting point for those foreign-born spouses who wish to discuss the pros and cons of adopting U.S. citizenship. We also try to help those who have special problems by putting them in contact with those who can direct them to specialized legal services.

Finally, the Foreign-Born Spouses Network plans frequent social activities to help those individuals meet others who have adjusted to life in the United States and are willing to assist newcomers in doing so. These social gatherings can provide an instant pool of individuals from which the spouse can select friends or associates. Both American and foreign-born spouses are welcome to join the network—we always need more volunteers.

For further information please call Haida Roberts at 244-8919 or myself at 644-0417.

SHEILA SWITZER
Foreign-Born Spouse Committee
7101 Highland St.
Springfield, Virginia 22150

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

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Books

Reviews

No More Vietnams. *By Richard Nixon. Arbor House, 1985. $14.95.*

The United States won the war in Vietnam, but then proceeded to throw away the peace. A familiar refrain in U.S. history (witness both world wars), this is also the message Nixon imparts in *No More Vietnams*. "In the end," he writes, "Vietnam was lost on the political front in the United States, not on the battlefront in Southeast Asia." Many Americans will find this argument comforting. But Richard Nixon would better serve his country—and his ultimate reputation as a statesman—if he dispensed wisdom rather than comfort. Unfortunately, the former is in short supply in this volume.

"Rarely have so many people been so wrong about so much," Nixon says, commenting on public misunderstanding, past and present, about the torturous U.S. involvement in Indochina. The former president then focuses his considerable ire on what he sees as four of the most common misperceptions about the war: that it was immoral; that it was unwinnable; that diplomacy without force is the best answer to communist-backed insurgency; and that the United States was on the wrong side of history in Vietnam.

In attempting to refute these propositions, Nixon lays forth an appealingly simple thesis. By the time of the Paris peace accords in January 1973, the communists had been soundly routed on the battlefield. The extent of their military defeat can be gauged by their many significant concessions in the last stages of negotiation. Accordingly, the peace agreement offered the Thieu government in Saigon a splendid opportunity to consolidate its many strengths and build a viable, noncommunist, quasi-democratic state in South Vietnam. But then the U.S. Congress presumed to enter the realm of statesmanship and in short order undid all the good work of the Nixon years. By prohibiting the president from reintroducing U.S. airpower into combat and by refusing to appropriate the full amount of aid for Saigon requested by the Nixon and Ford administrations, the defeatists in Congress crippled the South Vietnamese military, undermined our ally's morale, encouraged the enemy, and made possible the sudden communist victory in April 1975. Congressional behavior in 1974 and 1975, Nixon observes, offers "an unprecedented example of American betrayal and failure."

All this calls to mind Vermont's redoubtable Senator George Aiken, who at the height of the war gained widespread notoriety by suggesting that the United States simply declare victory in Vietnam and come home. In truth, Nixon's 1973 peace accords did much the same thing. His fine words about the agreement allowing the South Vietnamese people to determine their own political future obscure the fact that battle-hardened enemy troops occupied a quarter of the south by the time the last U.S. forces left the country. Nor did the Paris accords stop the bloodshed; 6600 South Vietnamese soldiers died in combat in the first three months after the "peace agreement" was initialed, a casualty rate surpassed only in the worst months of the war. Americans on the spot concluded that both sides were responsible, in about equal proportions, for the continued fighting, but Nixon places the blame solely on the communists.

As for the notion that Congress sold the Thieu regime down the river, the facts suggest otherwise. As Arnold Isaacs has documented, in 1974, at a time when Saigon was bemoaning congressional cuts in U.S. assistance, South Vietnamese troops were still expending 56 tons of ammunition for every ton used by the enemy. Nor should U.S. legislators be castigated for blocking Nixon's desire to send U.S. bombers back into combat once the United States had withdrawn. Having secured the release of our POWs, how could Nixon have believed the American people would support operations that would inevitably result in new captives? Apparently he cannot bring himself to accept that the voters sent antiwar majorities to Congress precisely because they wanted an end to all U.S. involvement.

What has Vietnam taught us? Here, too, Nixon has decided opinions. "The willingness to use power to defend national interests," he writes, "is the foundation

of any effective foreign policy." Undoubtedly he is correct—up to a point. But what he does not seem to understand is that raw power, unless coupled with finesse, understanding, and public support, can never be the final arbiter; at best it can only delay the eventual working out of larger forces. This is precisely what happened in Vietnam between 1965 and 1972. U.S. power prevented the toppling of our Saigon ally, but it proved insufficient to stem the long-term forces that coalesced so dramatically in the spring of 1975. Sadly, those who depend upon this book for elucidation will never comprehend the reasons.

—ROBERT M. HATHAWAY

Africa: *The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent. By Sanford J. Ungar. Simon and Schuster, 1985. $19.95.*

The book jacket tells us what to expect. "Not since John Gunther's monumental best-seller *Inside Africa* has there been such a thorough, lively, and crucial primer on this awe-inspiring continent." Indeed, Sanford Ungar's *Africa* is very much in the Gunther mold—a journalistic overview of the African continent organized largely in country-by-country segments. He has attempted to tell us something about nearly every nation in sub-Saharan Africa. Some are mentioned only in passing (including, rather oddly, Ethiopia); most are covered in vignettes of from 2-10 pages each; and five—Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, and South Africa—get full chapters. The author sandwiches these country descriptions between an opening section on the history of U.S. involvement with the continent and a conclusion that incorporates both a gloomy prognosis ("the future of Africa's nations and people looks bleak") and some sensible suggestions for future U.S. policy.

As might be expected, Ungar's book has many of the same strengths and weaknesses of its 30-year-old model. When *Inside Africa* was published in 1955, there were only three African studies programs at U.S. universities. Yet even then, Orville Prescott noted in his review in the *New York Times* that those who had read other works on Africa would find much of Gunther's book "familiar and elementary."

The same cautionary comment applies to Ungar's work. For those who have neither studied nor visited Africa, however, it is a good place to start. Ungar's prose is as lively as promised, and he brings to life the Africa he observed as a journalist.

Despite its merits, however, no serious student—and certainly no member of the Foreign Service setting off for a tour anywhere on the continent—can afford to rely on this book alone. The reader will get a good sense of the problems of the five countries covered most thoroughly. But for those countries that get shorter shrift, Ungar inevitably skims both the historical background and the nuances in trying to include as much as possible in a book half the length of Gunther's. In addition, those sections that draw on secondary sources rather than on Ungar's own experience contain factual errors and questionable interpretations, making outside reading even more necessary for anyone seeking thorough and accurate coverage of any particular country.

No single volume can ever describe a continent as vast and as varied as Africa. Yet even with its limitations, Ungar's readable and sensible work offers as good an introduction to its subject as is currently available.

—ANDREW L. STEIGMAN

Nicaragua: *Revolution in the Family. By Shirley Christian. Random House, 1985. $19.95.*

An eye-witness to the Nicaraguan drama, Christian has written a vivid, balanced work of contemporary history that stands well above the level of most "inside Nicaragua" journalism. For those who still have illusions about the political orientation of the Sandinistas, this well-documented description of their Marxist-Leninist views will make instructive reading.

In addition to documenting the assistance and ideological support provided by Cuba and other Communist-bloc nations, the author states that "the leaders of the Sandinista Front intended to establish a Leninist system from the day they marched into Managua, whether they called it that or not." Her supporting evidence is irrefutable. Most of it comes from the mouths and pens of the *comandantes* themselves. Humberto Ortega declares "we are guided by the scientific doctrine of the revolution, by Marxism-Leninism." Bayardo Arce said a few months before the 1984 elections that the elections would do nothing to advance the Sandinista cause and were in fact a nuisance. Daniel Ortega's statement that the revolution is "an irreversible process" convinced many that the Sandinistas would not give up power even if they had lost the elections.

On the other hand, *Revolution in the Family* is by no means an uncritical defense of U.S. policy, past or present. In fact, much of the blame for the present crisis is attributed to the Carter administration's lack of resolve. The White House, in the

author's opinion, was unwilling either to force former Nicaraguan President Anastasio Somoza from office early enough for a moderate government to assume power or to resume backing him militarily or politically, which could have prevented the rise of the Sandinistas (Christian would have favored the first alternative).

The author has no ready solutions to the present impasse in U.S.-Nicaraguan relations. Her principal recommendation for U.S. policymakers is to defend democracy vigorously in future cases so that neither totalitarians from the right nor the left will be able to assume power. In any event, her book can be read with profit for its complete and unbiased account of Nicaragua under the Sandinistas and the lessons Americans can learn from it.

—JOHN J. CROWLEY JR.

The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy. *By Robert Jervis. Cornell University Press, 1984. $19.95.*

The Age of Vulnerability: *Threats to the Nuclear Stalemate. By Michael Nacht. The Brookings Institution, 1985. $26.95.*

Both of these books address nuclear strategy, but from very different perspectives. Robert Jervis is an iconoclast, Michael Nacht a chronicler of conventional wisdom.

Jervis argues that U.S. strategy quite unnecessarily emphasizes flexibility and counterforce. Following a line of thought first developed by Bernard Brodie, Jervis posits that the existence—"irrespective of policy"—of mutual assured destruction sets apart the nuclear age. This condition stems from the enormous power of nuclear weapons and the inability of either side to wipe out its adversary's arsenal through a first strike. In today's world, therefore, the fear of nuclear war must override all other considerations, and a flexible, diversified nuclear force proves unnecessary. Jervis writes elegantly, and his analysis yields useful insights. For instance, he trenchantly points out that present U.S. strategy apparently says little about how to control the escalation process or how to terminate a war.

Nevertheless, on several levels, his writing is flawed. For one thing, Jervis repeats his central argumentation with nearly hypnotizing redundancy. In addition, his analysis is not entirely consistent. For example, he criticizes at length senior U.S. policymakers' advocacy of limited nuclear options, but in his own conclusion, he states that "our limited nuclear options should be retained." He also occasionally engages in flights of fancy: "may we not need to abolish or alter national sovereignty?"

Illogic's most fundamental shortcoming, however, is Jervis's inability—by his own admission—to prescribe an alternative nuclear strategy, although his analysis seems to point toward retaining only a minimal nuclear deterrent. A quotation of Walter Lippmann cited at the opening of Michael Nacht's *The Age of Vulnerability* suggests the magnitude of Jervis's omission: "The hallmark of responsible comment is not to sit in judgment on events as an idle spectator....Responsibility consists in sharing the burden on men directing what is to be done or the burden of offering some other course of action in the mood of one who has realized what it would mean to undertake it."

Nacht, unlike Jervis, appears to find merit in current U.S. nuclear strategy, although he does not explicitly endorse it. He cites with approbation such basic principles of strategy as maneuverability, flexibility, and maintaining the initiative, arguing that they "are just as valid in the nuclear age as in any other." Moreover, Nacht suggests that the U.S. policy of flexible nuclear options satisfies several objectives, including enhancing deterrence by creating an ability to threaten a credible

response to a variety of possible actions; bolstering stability by reducing a potential adversary's incentives to strike first in a crisis; limiting damage in the event of a failure of deterrence; and reinforcing the confidence of allies in the U.S. nuclear guarantee. He also correctly notes that U.S. policies of flexible strategic options and "countervailing" forces, as articulated in the 1970s by Defense Secretaries James Schlesinger and Harold Brown, represented extensions of basic ideas long embedded in actual war plans.

The Age of Vulnerability also reviews the national character of Americans and Soviets, the characteristics of strategic forces, arms control, nuclear proliferation, and the role of U.S. allies. While competent and sensible, its consideration of these issues, like its review of nuclear strategy, contains little fresh thought. And the very breadth of Nacht's analysis reduces its focus. As a result, *The Age of Vulnerability* is best suited for use as a survey.

—David M. Adamson

The Eagle and the Small Birds: *Crisis in the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to Solidarity. By Michael Charlton. University of Chicago Press, 1985. $14.95.*

Between Russia and the West: *Hungary and the Illusions of Peacemaking, 1945–47. By Stephen D. Kertesz. University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.*

The recent 10th anniversary of the Helsinki accords, and the pointed exchange between Secretary of State Shultz and his Soviet counterpart, point out that the post–World War II division of Europe remains a current topic. *The Eagle and the Small Birds* and *Between Russia and the West*—both of which feature the testimony of participants in that split—are valuable primary sources in a field characterized by a surfeit of commentary but a relative shortage of first-hand accounts.

Charlton's book has broader appeal and will be much more useful to readers who have a general knowledge of Eastern European events but are not experts. A collection of accounts culled from interviews Charlton conducted in 1982 for a BBC radio documentary, it is not a thorough history of postwar Eastern Europe. It instead covers four main topics: Yalta; the establishment of Soviet control in Eastern Europe; the revolt of intellectuals like Djilas and Kolakowski; and prospects for change. Charlton obviously did his homework well. He elicits many telling and unexpected insights, from both the victims and the villains of Sovietization. The interviewer often prevails over the historian, but it is a role which Charlton plays eminently well.

The geographical coverage is unbalanced, unfortunately, emphasizing the northern tier countries—Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia—over the southern tier—Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, but Charlton makes clear that the inspiration for his effort was the rise and suppression of Solidarity in Poland. Despite such minor flaws, *The Eagle and the Small Birds* makes rewarding reading for anyone with a good basic grounding in East European affairs.

Between Russia and the West will interest a considerably smaller audience. The geographical and chronological focus is narrower than Charlton's, and the new information will be of interest primarily to area specialists. Kertesz describes at length the postwar conflicts over the fate of the substantial Hungarian population in Czechoslavakia, for example, and his own largely successful effort to press Hungary's case at the 1946 Paris Peace Conference. The story is fascinating but full appreciation of Kertesz's account requires background knowledge that relatively few people have.

Kertesz's book also suffers because it is part memoir, part monograph, and part general treatment of the postwar settle-

ment. The more general part and some of the monographic material cover fairly familiar ground, while one sometimes wishes the pieces of memoir were more discursive. This aside, however, Kertesz, a pioneer of Eastern European studies in the United States, is still giving students of the area the benefit of his considerable knowledge. —ERIC R. TERZUOLO

Underdevelopment is a State of Mind: *The Latin American Case. By Lawrence E. Harrison. University Press of America, 1985. $16.95.*

Following the tremendously successful Marshall Plan after World War II, the United States began to send aid to Third World countries. Yet despite intensifying efforts over the decades, and in comparison to the Marshall Plan, this program has been a failure. American development specialists are today more willing than ever before to admit that the projects they have sponsored in Third World countries have not worked very well. *Underdevelopment is a State of Mind* is therefore an important and timely work.

Harrison's book is aptly named, since he argues that the single most important factor in economic development is cultural values. He began to develop his ideas during his 20-year career with AID in Latin America, and he later backed up his practical experience with extensive research at Harvard University's Center for International Affairs. His thesis that values are an important factor in the development process is by no means new, but development experts have had a hard time dealing with those values that impede modernization and so have tended to ignore them when designing development strategies. Harrison's book makes it clear that these values are simply too important to ignore.

The heart of the book consists of a well-selected set of case studies. Costa Rica, for example, has long been an island of prosperity and political stability in Central America, and Harrison explains why the values in that country developed differently from those in Nicaragua. An even more interesting comparison is that between Barbados and Haiti. Barbados is one of the most prosperous and well-ordered countries in the Caribbean, while Haiti is one of the poorest and least civilized, yet both are populated by descendants of African slaves. Harrison goes into great detail about how their different historical development produced different values which, in turn, greatly influenced their level of economic development. His use of case studies, particularly in comparing Argentina and Australia, also enables him to challenge the credibility of dependency theory, a set of ideas Latin Americans often use to blame foreign countries for their lack of economic development.

By his own admission, the author does not offer a solution to frustrated western efforts to help modernize the Third World. Today there is a crying need for a developmental strategy that takes customs impeding modernization into account and shows how they can be changed. The value of Harrison's book is that he has opened the right door and pointed in the right direction. The book could not have appeared at a better time and is essential reading for anybody interested in the economic development of the Third World.
—JEFFREY W. BARRETT

European Peace Movements and the Future of the Western Alliance. *Edited by Walter Laqueur and Robert Hunter. Transaction Books for Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1985. $34.95.*

Peace and Survival: *West Germany, the Peace Movement and European Security. By David Gress. Hoover Institution Press, 1985. $15.95.*

These two books are representative of the dubious quality of recent literature on European peace movements. They both attempt to influence policy and events rather than analyze them. What policymakers need most, however, are studies based on dispassionate data collection and analysis.

European Peace Movements features the proceedings of a conference on that topic, but unfortunately it has only a very brief introduction and no conclusion. Thus the book lacks any major themes, except that the generally conservative authors are not very sympathetic to the peace movement. Indeed, in some essays there is a tendency to view the peace movements as "pinko," or even tools of Soviet propaganda. There is little effort to explore whatever common ground exists. Admittedly, such an exploration has not been made easier by the movements' self-righteousness, especially in Germany. This self-righteousness has become a sort of inverse nationalism that views a Green Germany as the unquestioned leader of a new Europe that has neither nuclear arms nor pollution and is ideologically superior to both the superpowers.

Some of the essays, however, are well worth reading. The best are written by "locals," such as political scientists Count Kielmansegg and Alting von Gesau. The

former provides an outstanding analysis of the rise of the German movement and the latter on the Netherlands. Both contributors deal with the important local issues, such as the lengthening of the Frankfurt airport runway, that have provided these movements with much support.

Peace and Survival, written by a senior research fellow at the Hoover Institution, is a disorganized tract that nonetheless has extensive footnotes and a useful bibliography. Gress denies legitimacy to any effort by Europeans to negotiate with the Eastern bloc and seeks to discredit the democratic left in West Germany. Moreover, this volume contains a number of unsubstantiated assertions such as the statement that "barbarism pervaded" German university classes in the 1960s and that a new Green *Zeitgeist* exists in Germany today. Such assertions demonstrate the lack of a systematic analytical framework that is most disturbing about these two books.

—Charles R. Foster

From the Think Tanks

The Cuban Revolution 25 Years Later. *Edited by Hugh S. Thomas, Georges A. Fauriol, and Juan Carlos Weiss. Significant Issues Series, Vol. 6, #11. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1984. 67pp. $12.95.* This report by the CSIS Cuba Project argues that, under Fidel Castro, Cuba's domestic revolution has stalled. While comparable and sometimes superior progress has been made in other Latin American countries without a concomitant loss of freedom, the Cuban regime's most notable accomplishments have been the militarization of society and the transformation of Cuba into a dependency of the Soviet Union.

The President, the Congress, and Foreign Policy. *Report of the Joint Working Group of the U.S. Association of Former Members of Congress and the Atlantic Council of the United States. Policy Papers, Atlantic Council, 1985. 34pp.* Tension between the executive and legislative branches on foreign policy is not so much due to inappropriate machinery as it to attitude, concludes this report. Along with increasing consultation, strategies for improving the relationship include reaffirming the role of the secretary of state as coordinator for foreign policy, strengthening the State Department, and arranging more exchanges between executive—including Foreign Service—and legislative personnel.

Foreign Service readers who have recently published books are invited to submit them for review.

CLIPPINGS

Protecting Diplomats

" 'When I first came into the Marine Corps, embassy security was glamorous duty. Embassy guards didn't have to go on training exercises or dodge bullets. They worked good hours, slept in nice houses, dealt with important people and had parties and social engagements. Now it's changed. They're dodging bombs and bullets, constantly having to stay on their toes.' "

Gunnery Sergeant Jim Coombs in "Can They Do the Job?" by Al Santoli, Parade Magazine, November 10

" 'It looks friendly, but it is built like a fortress,' says Washington architect George E. Hartman Jr., describing a recent project. 'It is a reinforced concrete pillbox, broken down in scale to resemble a house.' And it is a superb answer to a growing problem.

"Hartman is talking about his firm's design of the new U.S. embassy in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The building was cited for excellence last month by the Washington Chapter of the American Institute of Architects. The problem it solves: how to protect diplomats from terrorism while maintaining the architectural quality for which American embassy buildings have long been noted."

Washington Post, November 9

"The [U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy] 'recommends that legislation on diplomatic security take fully into account USIA's public diplomacy mission, the need for relatively free public access to USIA's libraries and cultural centers, and the desirability that USIA give visible evidence of the free and open society it represents.'

Other major commission recommendations are that:

- New security legislation require the State Department to consult with USIA on policies and programs, funding levels, and security standards;
- Congress authorize funds specifically dedicated to enhancing security for USIA's separate installations overseas;
- The State Department be bound by consensus or majority decisions of foreign affairs agencies affected by its security policies;
- Flexibility be the guiding principle in determining security standards for USIA;
- Each ambassador's country team have primary responsibility for determining the security threat, and appropriate countermeasures;
- The threat of terrorism not be allowed to deter the United States from conducting public diplomacy."

USIA press release, December 10

Death in Iran

"William Buckley, one of the six American hostages kidnaped by Shiite Moslem extremists, is dead.

"The State Department's official position is that 'we assume that he is alive and have been operating on that principle.' But the Central Intelligence Agency, for which Buckley worked, has highly sensitive intelligence information that leaves no doubt of Buckley's death.

"From our intelligence sources, we have pieced together the gruesome details of Buckley's captivity and death, and can disclose the nation responsible: Iran. In fact, he died in a Tehran hospital from a heart attack brought on by months of torture."

Jack Anderson, December 13

Harrassing FSNs

"There was a time when a job at the U.S. embassy in Managua was the envy of many Nicaraguans. The 200-odd nationals employed by the U.S. as guards, drivers, administrators, and accountants earn at least twice as much as most of their countrymen. Last week those jobs suddenly seemed less appealing. Since November 2, the leftist Sandinista government has summoned at least 17 embassy employees for interrogations at a nearby security compound. Some reported afterward that they were forcibly detained for up to 13 hours by security agents who subjected them to abusive and threatening treatment...."

"All were accused of being CIA plants and of being 'counterrevolutionaries' because they worked for the United States. Washington responded by lodging a sharp diplomatic protest."

Time, November 25

Spouse Employment

"The State Department has larger motives in seeking a jobs program for spouses, [Director of the Policy Staff of the Bureau of Personnel William] Bacchus said. 'Increasingly, women are going to want their own careers and if we can't do that...we're not going to be able to staff our posts,' he said.

"But try as they might, virtually no spouse can build a career overseas where employees switch posts every two or three years, officials said.

" 'Clearly if one wanted to be a law partner at age 29, you couldn't do it at all,' said [First Vice President of AAFSW Susan] Low."

Federal Times, November 25

Matter of Interpretation

"It is unfortunate that we have traditionally treated our interpreters as second-class members of a delegation. When they do their job well, interpreters hardly ever receive kudos, but if they make the slightest slip, they become scapegoats and laughingstock. They are underpaid and overworked, despite what may be the most stringent requirements of any profession."

William T. Shinn Jr. in the New York Times, December 6

Legislative Hold

"James Lucier, chief legislative assistant to Senator Jesse Helms [and] often called Helms's 'hatchet man,' told the *Sun*, "[Ambassador to Sri Lanka nominee James] Spain published a number of articles in various magazines and journals in which he strongly criticized the Foreign Relations Committee and the senators on the committee and made disparaging remarks about President Reagan's handling of foreign policy....

"He said that although Spain had published these articles while working for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace...'the point is that although he was working for the think tank, he was on the State Department payroll.'

"Lucier said that 'some of the persons are very upset with his answers [to senators' questions].' He acknowledged that the Spain controversy was 'part of a running dispute the senator is having with the State Department over appointing incompetent people who belong to the Foreign Service system.' "

Aziz Haniffa in the Colombo Sun, September 30

CLIPPINGS records statements in the press on foreign affairs and the Foreign Service. Readers are invited to send contributions from their local newspapers.

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, February 1976: "On the one hand, these [Foreign Service wives] are highly dependent people in their marital role, in the sense that if they wish to preserve their marital relationship they must accompany their husbands wherever they may be sent overseas or on a stateside assignment. On the other hand, while living in the United States they have been exposed to and influenced to some extent by society's changing definition of women's roles, and may have developed a need for a more independent, adult viability."

Katherine Gratwick Baker

Foreign Service Journal, February 1961: "Recently in its women's section the *Insider's Newsletter* published a startling tip-off for the girls.

"The State Department, it announced, under a headline 'The Dowdy American,' is now taking a dim view of wives who are too good looking or too well dressed. To quote the *Newsletter:* 'The State Department is sending circulars to diplomatic wives in Europe and other continents that it's time to change their style. Gist of the message is that glamour is out and the clothes unconscious, intellectual look is in....'

"The State Department flatly denied that there is any such thing as a circular to diplomatic wives, even though the *Newsletter* remarks that directives on diplomatic family teamwork are so stringent these days that newcomers to the Service complain that 'two people are being hired instead of one.' "

Foreign Service Journal, February 1936: "Foreign Service officers have a greater interest than ever before in America's capital. When visiting this beautiful and lively city, stay at the Mayflower, where international personages reside and great events occur. Rates are no higher than at less finely appointed hotels. Single rooms from $4, double rooms from $6. All with bath, of course." *Advertisement*

10-25-50 records excerpts from previous issues with an eye toward how things have changed for the Foreign Service—or how they have remained the same.

DESPATCH

To Tell the Truth

Old presidential directives never die, nor do they fade away. The White House had promised in December that it would not conduct polygraph screening outside the intelligence and defense agencies after Secretary Shultz's public threat to resign rather than take a test. Then President Reagan announced at a news conference in January that the order for the tests "was not changed nor did I change my mind." Three years before, the administration had announced that it was holding "in abeyance" a similar provision that would also have required that persons holding high security clearances sign lifetime pre-publication review contracts. Last month congressional staffers discovered that the government was using a nearly identical contract that had been created slightly earlier. Even the McCarthy-era security review boards established by a still-effective 1953 executive order were briefly revived in December before going back into hibernation under pressure from Congress.

The most recent measure, National Security Decision Directive 196, created national publicity late last fall when its provision calling for screening as many as 4000 State Department employees and other government officials elicited a threat by Shultz to resign rather than take a test. The White House quickly announced that polygraphs would not be used as a screening device but only as a tool in an espionage investigation—the policy before the directive. The president's statement in his news conference in early January seems to have put the original language back in effect. The ultimate shape of any government program that would affect the foreign affairs agencies awaits the findings of a special security task force set up by NSDD 196, plus presidential instructions that would result from its recommendations and implementing regulations drafted by the agencies themselves.

Opposition to the new polygraph provision has been coming from several quarters besides the secretary, including AFSA [see ASSOCIATION VIEWS]. Former U.N. ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick wrote in the *Washington Post* that the polygraph gives the government access to thoughts "over which only totalitarian governments claim jurisdiction. It requires, in other words, that government employees give up basic rights of American citizens as a condition of employment." Several members of Congress spoke out against the machine, but any action is unlikely.

At the same time, support for the measure came from CIA Director William Casey and Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger. After Shultz's December threat, both of them appeared on television pushing the polygraph as a means to safeguard secrets. The machine is used routinely in the CIA and in the National Security Agency. After the earlier polygraph order was stalled, Defense got permission from Congress for a pilot program involving about 3500 screening tests a year.

A recent Pentagon report entitled *Keeping the Nation's Secrets* advocates, among other measures, that the pilot program be expanded. "The counter-intelligence-scope polygraph is the primary technique currently available to the department which offers any realistic promise of detecting penetrations of its classified programs by hostile intelligence services." The report also said that the machine serves as a deterrent and called for "substantial, albeit gradual, expansion of the department's program." The author of the report, retired General Richard G. Stilwell, wrote in the *Post* that the NSA found the machine reliable 90-95 percent of the time.

The author of an earlier Pentagon report on polygraphs thinks otherwise. Dr. John F. Beary III, former health director at Defense, told the JOURNAL that resources are better spent on traditional methods of counter-espionage, such as background checks. "There is no physiological response unique to lying, and the professional spy will pass the test time after time," Beary said. Beary, now at Georgetown University Medical School, wrote Stilwell in 1983 that there was evidence of a KGB school to train spies to evade the machine.

There are other drawbacks. David T. Lykken, a professor of psychiatry and polygraph expert at University of Minnesota, told the JOURNAL that the machine screens out the very best employees. The polygraph actually detects indications of stress, and some persons are so upset that their loyalty can be doubted that they fail the exam. He agreed that spies can be trained to pass the test.

The polygraph is used for a variety of purposes. According to a 1983 report by the bipartisan Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, the available evidence does not establish its validity as a screening technique, as NSDD 196 mandates. The OTA found "no field studies on the validity of polygraph testing for preemployment screening or periodic screening." While there are studies that provide data on its use in another application—focused investigations of actual incidents—all "had substantial problems of research design." Beary agreed with OTA: "The polygraph cannot be used as a tool in making personnel decisions."

In addition, Beary said, the data the studies generate are misinterpreted and misused. The statistics scientists use to analyze such studies, for instance, do not generate a simple figure that can be labeled "accuracy." Instead they deal with the percentage of spies who are caught, and another percentage of innocents who are cleared.

Polygraph proponents tend to refer to the percentage of spies caught as "accuracy." This ignores the consequences of the other percentage. Stress will make a number of innocent persons produce results identical to that of a spy. Even if 99 percent of innocents were cleared—a figure in excess even of proponents' claims—a single screening of each of the 4000 State Department employees affected by the directive would produce 40 innocent persons cast as spies. Well-regarded polygraph studies say that only 57 percent of innocent persons will be cleared. That means more than 1700 officers will be branded as spies in a single polygraph screening. There is a problem with these figures: they assume the polygraph works as well in screening as it does in focused investigations. Actual results are therefore likely to be worse. So unreliable is the machine in screening that FBI rules forbid its use, as do laws in many states. Federal courts won't allow information gathered by the polygraph in any manner to be entered as evidence.

Proponents of the machine such as Stilwell often speak of "utility" rather than "accuracy" in screening. They point to NSA, which has unearthed countless felons who had passed its traditional background checks. These persons were not identified by the machine as deceptive, however. Rather, fear of the polygraph caused them to confess when asked if they had ever committed a crime. For them, unaware that the polygraph is unrealiable, it became an electronic scarecrow. The problem is that the actual spy will likely be trained in fooling the machine and will be unimpressed by it. Meanwhile, substantial numbers of innocent persons subject to the screening tests will have their loyalty placed in doubt and their careers placed in jeopardy.

DESPATCH is a compendium of news about the Service written by the editor. It does not necessarily represent the views of the Association.

FIVE YEARS AFTER THE ACT: THE FATE OF THE SERVICE

THIS MONTH MARKS the fifth anniversary of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, which became effective on February 15, 1981. Since then, feelings about the act and its effect have run high, especially as the Service has attempted to address such questions as promotion rates, the shape of the average career, and the effect of overseas service on families. Whether fairly or not, the act has been seen as central to these controversies. Early last year, Under Secretary for Management Ronald I. Spiers {JOURNAL, March 1985} began a discussion of such difficulties facing the personnel system by saying, "I have long had doubts about major aspects of the recent Foreign Service Act....However, it is the law of the land and so my responsibility is to implement it."

The JOURNAL recently asked two individuals with widely varying views to comment on the record of the act's implementation. Thomas D. Boyatt was president of AFSA when the Association won exclusive representation and was involved in establishing the existing employee-relations system. His Foreign Service career spanned 26 years, including service as chargé in Chile and ambassador to Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso) and Colombia. He is currently a vice president of Sears World Trade and a trustee of Princeton University, positions that have given him much exposure to non-governmental personnel and managerial issues. William I. Bacchus was closely involved in both developing and implementing the act. He is now director of the policy and coordination staff in the State Department's Bureau of Personnel. The views expressed by Mr. Bacchus are entirely his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Department of State or of individual management officials.

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 was intended to "promote the foreign policy of the United States by strengthening and improving the Foreign Service." Do you think that during the last five years the overall effect of the act has been in that direction?

BOYATT: During the past five years the Foreign Service has been weakened and its quality has deteriorated. The core function—the basic mission—of any diplomatic service is to analyze foreign environments, recommend and advocate policies to define and achieve national interests in these areas, and then to implement policy decisions, whether by influencing a foreign leader or managing a multi-million-dollar aid program. For several years we have been decimating in terms of numbers and rewards the very economic and political officers who perform these core functions. Other bureaucratic power centers have occupied the vacuums thus created. The Department of Commerce now promotes exports, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative handles trade policy, and the National Security Council satrap increasingly uses the CIA as *his* Foreign Service to substitute for the secretary of state and *the* Foreign Service. In structure, process, and result the foreign policy of the United States has been fragmented. The Foreign Service Act of 1980 is by no means the sole culprit. At the very minimum, however, the act has served to accelerate, if not initiate, these destructive trends.

BACCHUS: Although the full impact of the 1980 act has not yet been felt, I think it has begun to strengthen and improve the Foreign Service. It was especially important to limit membership in the Service, with the special benefits and responsibilities that this implies, to those who will actually "serve abroad for substantial portions of their careers," as is now expressly required by Section 504 of the act.

It was also valuable to renew the principle of the 1946 act that retention, promotion, and rewards should be based, to the maximum extent possible, on performance and not on seniority. This principle had atrophied over the years, but it seems to me that an elite service must actively work to retain its quality, if it is to survive with high status and effectiveness. The 1980 act also provided significantly better pay for the middle grades of the Service and improved benefits and allowances for all, both important if we are to provide equity and retain those who are most needed. Finally, the act broke new ground in recognizing the contributions of family members in their own right, rather than treating them as appendages of employees.

All of these steps will help, I am convinced, to make the Service stronger. It should be remembered, however, that the 1980 act covers diverse topics and is a mixture of new provisions and recodifications of old ones. Thus, it is difficult to evaluate as a whole.

Boyatt: "The foreign policy of the United States has been fragmented.... The act has served to accelerate, if not initiate, these trends"

What do you think has been the single most beneficial effect of the act, and why?

BOYATT: The single most beneficial effect of the act was to enshrine equitable benefits, the employee-management system, and the grievance process *in law*. Previously, such benefits were based on sufferance—that is, executive order or bureaucratic fiat. Now they cannot be withdrawn except by an act of Congress.

BACCHUS: While some would answer improvements in pay and benefits or the clear separation of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service, in the long term I think restoration of the up-or-out system and reinstitution of the requirement that all members of the Service serve rotational careers both at home and abroad will prove to be most important. Together, these two features largely define the essence of the Foreign Service.

What do you think has been the single most harmful effect of the act, and why?

BOYATT: The act has had many harmful effects. Most of these failings are in the area of opportunity costs—what could have been achieved and was not, such as a unified Foreign Service. Perhaps the single most pernicious direct result has been the establishment in law (Section 601) of the "throughput"—even the word is objectionable—syndrome. It is hard to argue against a "systematic long-term projection of personnel flows and needs designed to produce...a regular, predictable flow of talent upward through the ranks and into the Senior Foreign Service." However, to meet this goal the department has, I fear, abandoned to the number crunchers of the Bureau of Personnel not just the promotion system and the shape of the Service, but its very ability to perform. It should be obvious that a promotion system that relies upon vacancies by cone or function at the next highest level gives absolute power to those who define positions and then assign them to particular ranks and cones. Of particular importance, and especially subject to abuse, is the categorizing by rank and function of the many positions that are really multi-functional. Further, the variables that affect "throughput" are so great as to render the certitude of the department's personnel managers as an act of hubris. I would argue that this mechanistic approach to "needs" has contributed greatly to today's reality—a Foreign Service that is becoming a purveyor of consular services and a provider of administrative support to others who deal with foreign policy.

BACCHUS: The loss of some managerial flexibility, owing to pressures during consideration of the act will, in my view, cause us the most difficulty over time. To take one example, management can only extend an individual whose time-in-class (TIC) has expired for a maximum of one year, although the department argued unsuccessfully that there would be circumstances where it would be important to retain an individual with unique skills for a longer period of time. Some, including AFSA's leadership at that time, felt that such flexibility would present too much of a temptation to retain average officers at the expense of allowing more talented but more junior individuals to move up, and this view prevailed.

Other new restrictions were also imposed in the process of making labor-management relations provisions more closely identical to those prevailing throughout the government. The secretary of state could no longer use "promoting the efficiency of the Service" as a legitimate reason for rejecting decisions by the Grievance Board. Some also argued that dividing retirement annuities and survivor benefits between current and former spouses on a *pro rata* basis was unnecessarily arbitrary and that such decisions should have been left to the courts. Finally, management was not allowed sufficient discretion in the limited career extension (LCE) process to make it possible to match retentions and needs in a finely tuned way.

One of the major elements of the 1980 Act was that it placed Foreign Service personnel from the participating foreign affairs agencies on the same statutory basis, creating, at least in theory, a Service that would operate across agency lines. In your view, is this "unified" Service a desirable aim, or do the distinct goals of each agency require a different personnel system? Does such a unified Service exist?

BOYATT: A "unified" Foreign Service is most desirable in personnel *and* foreign policy terms. With respect to policy, public diplomacy and development diplomacy in fact are, and in practice ought to be, variable dimensions of a single foreign policy directed by the secretary of state. And, from the personnel and personal points of view, we all face the same environments and perform similar functions. For instance, how different is managing the human and financial resources of a USIS section versus managing these resources in a commercial section? How different is influencing the economic minister to support our position on economic development from influencing the foreign

BACCHUS: On balance, I think it is best to have individuals who serve our country abroad included, to the maximum extent possible, in a single personnel system which provides identical rewards, benefits, and rules covering everyone who serves in the same circumstances. Prior to 1980, State, USIA, AID, and the Peace Corps all used some version of the Foreign Service system, although each varied considerably from the others. The Foreign Commercial Service was just in the process of being created, and the Foreign Agricultural Service had been operating on a modified Civil Service model for the preceding quarter century. The 1980 act provided a uniform statutory authority for all of these

minister to support the United States on Central America? In any case, the act itself gives lip service to a unified Foreign Service but provides language ensuring that a unified Service will not happen. The first two sections ("Findings and Objectives" and "Definitions") fully protect the bureaucratic power of the administrator of AID and the director of USIA. The result is that we still have three Foreign Service personnel systems and, some would argue, three foreign policies.

systems and emphasized the principle of "maximum compatibility" among the agencies.

In fact, both AFSA and the department argued for even greater compatibility, approaching a true unification across agency lines for the Senior Foreign Service, but this was opposed by the other agencies and their employee unions on grounds that the department, as the largest agency employing the Foreign Service, would become unduly dominant and override the legitimate concerns of the others. We have thus been left in a situation where compatability can only be obtained through persuasion and cooperation. Although in my view the results have been generally positive, the process has been more cumbersome than is desirable.

There is a larger point. The U.S. presence and interests abroad today go far beyond traditional diplomatic representation. Those of us in State sometimes forget the significant contributions made by other parts of the government and their employees. If a multi-agency Foreign Service operating on identical principles helps to force a broadened focus, it will be worth some additional operational complexity.

Bacchus: "Retention, promotion, and rewards should be based, to the maximum extent possible, on performance and not seniority. That had atrophied over the years"

One of the intentions of the act, as identified by a 1984 GAO report, was to "restore the flow to the promotion and retention process in the Foreign Service personnel system." The report argued that the principle of up-or-out had become ineffective and the act was intended to correct that. Do you think there was a need to restore the up-or-out nature of the system, and how effective do you think the act has been in that regard?

BOYATT: The up-or-out principle had become ineffective by the late 1970s, and the act of 1980 indeed had the intention to "restore the flow to the promotion and retention process in the Foreign Service personnel system." The real questions, however, are: Who goes "up"? Who goes "out"? On the basis of what system? Why is the system fashioned that way? The current system of up-or-out—which is largely a matter of implementing the act—is flawed because it is based on a definition of needs that has been contrived to serve administrative imperatives, rather than designed to serve the struggle—and it is a struggle—to keep the foreign policy process in the Foreign Service.

BACCHUS: I do agree that there was a need to restore the up-or-out nature of the system, particularly at the Senior Foreign Service level. While time-in-class for mid-level FSOs had, by 1980, started to be effective again after a hiatus in the mid-'70s, there was no effective TIC at the senior levels after 1976. Officers were allowed up to 22 years in old classes 2 and 1 with a maximum of 10 years in class 2. In effect, this meant that anyone who reached class 1 would reach the old mandatory retirement age of 60 before his or her TIC expired. Career ministers were subject to no TIC requirements whatsoever. If one compares this state of affairs with the legislative history that accompanied the Foreign Service Act of 1946, it is obvious that the system through the years had become much less rigorous than originally intended. The Congress, the department, and AFSA leadership decided in 1980 that the Service would become more effective by going back to the principles articulated in the earlier act.

In principle, one could design a more static Foreign Service system which allowed individuals to reach the level for which their talents were suited and remain there until retirement. This would inevitably mean slower advancement rates and would increase the likelihood that many of the best individuals in more junior ranks would look for other occupations. At the same time, a choice to restore the up-or-out principle inevitably means that employees who could make further contributions will have to leave. There is no easy answer to this question, but the trade-offs must be faced, not ignored.

The full effect intended by the provisions of the 1980 act that restored "up-or-out" has not been felt. The mandatory retirement age was raised from 60 to 65

Boyatt: "AFSA should have made its support contingent upon implementation of the benefits section of the act. No benefits, no implementation of personnel risks. In a very real sense AFSA gave away something for nothing"

immediately upon passage of the act in October 1980, while the LCE mechanism did not come into effect until after the 1983 selection boards had met. Thus, there was a gap when neither approach—retention or departure based on performance, or departure upon reaching a given age—was operative. The problem was complicated by fewer voluntary retirements, since many senior officers chose to remain on active duty after a substantial lifting of the pay cap increased their "high three," and therefore their annuity, if they delayed their departures. The true test of the effectiveness of these mechanisms will come during the next few years, since the transition to the new system is now largely completed.

One specific step the act took in an attempt to restore up-or-out was to place stricter limits on time-in-class at the senior levels. Given that senior officers are now facing mandatory retirement for this reason, has this been an effective way to restore personnel flow-through? Has it been a fair way?

BOYATT: The strict limits on time-in-class (TIC) at the senior levels will restore the personnel flow-through but in limited degree and for a limited time. The process *has not been,* and *is not* fair. Consider the following: The Reagan administration has probably converted 20 senior departmental positions from the career to the political-appointee column. The historically high percentage of politicos appointed by this administration to ambassadorial ranks probably translates to another 20 senior positions. That represents *40* promotions to CM and MC that will not be made because the positions have been lost. The waterfall effect on promotions in the Senior Foreign Service is at least two-and-a-half fold (about 100 promotions lost each year) and seven-fold on the entire Service (about 280 promotions lost). Moreover, since political appointees want embassies and policy jobs, this hit is taken virtually exclusively by the substantive functions—the political and economic cones. Finally, even the least managerial among us will realize that, over time, lost positions and promotions will mean senior officers "walking the halls" and a much higher level of involuntary retirements.

BACCHUS: In 1980, there was probably even more agreement among AFSA and management about stricter limits on time-in-class for the Senior Foreign Service than there was for restoring the up-or-out system in general. With the choice of shorter, "renewable" times-in-class, that is, LCEs, the clear intention was that some senior officers would face mandatory retirement. Without these short TIC times and denial of LCEs, our flow-through would have been even more impeded than has been the case. We have to face the reality that retention at the top, as for the military, must be based on the need for an individual's continuing services, rather than being a reward for past contributions. Having said this, we must also recognize that in the military mandatory departure generally comes at an earlier age, when adjustment to a second career is easier. In the Foreign Service, many officers who might otherwise depart voluntarily are not in a position to do so because their financial needs remain high and their skills are not readily transferable to private-sector occupations.

Although some employees might have found such up-or-out provisions uncomfortable, has it been good for the Service as a whole? What are the implications for maintaining the pool of expertise that the Senior Foreign Service is supposed to constitute? What are the implications for the career prospects of good younger employees?

BOYATT: The up-or-out structure of the Service as it currently operates may appear to be bringing the numbers and ranks of people into line with the numbers and ranks of positions, but the base definitions are themselves flawed. As outlined above, the loss of 40 senior substantive positions to political appointees will mean that a harsh application of TIC will have to be applied to the Senior Foreign Service if the numbers are to balance. Moreover, the people lost will be a good chunk of the Service's repository of political, economic, and area skills. Were it not so destructive, it would be almost amusing. In 1988 a new administration will come in and argue that the 40 senior positions lost to the Reagan administration will have to again be filled by politicians because there won't be enough careerists

BACCHUS: I think the up-or-out system, appropriately administered, will be healthy and fair for the Service in the long run, despite some current difficulties. The great dilemma, of course, is that there is a direct relationship between retention at the top and advancement lower down. In a system oriented toward generalists, it is probably appropriate to place somewhat more emphasis on timely advancement for the most gifted junior and mid-level members than on retention of those at relatively senior levels who are unlikely to advance further. It is simply incorrect to say, as some occasionally do, that we can have it both ways—that the rank-in-person system will allow us to continue promoting people even if there are no vacancies at the top.

in the SFS to fill said positions! They will all have been retired by TIC to make the numbers balance in 1985, '86, and '87.

The implications for the career prospects for good (as opposed to "able to leap tall buildings at a single bound") junior employees should be obvious. About one in three will make it into the senior corps, and they won't be there very long.

There is no doubt that our new system is "tougher" than the old. Before 1980, we did not have to make some of the difficult choices that face us now, simply because everyone who stayed in the system retired mandatorily at age 60 and thus there was no stigma attached to departure. Furthermore, since the mandatory retirement age did not apply to those in the most critical jobs—that is, those serving in presidential appointments—retention after age 60 was based in effect on a rank-in-job concept that provided a clear means of indicating which officers the system most needed. But it is hard to argue that a member of the Service who may not be a presidential appointee but who continues to be highly effective should have to leave simply because he or she has reached age 60, while someone who is younger but not performing as well is able to stay.

Bacchus: "It is probably appropriate to place somewhat more emphasis on timely advancement for the most gifted junior and mid-level members than on retention of those at relatively senior levels who are unlikely to advance"

Senior management officials said at a recent AFSA open meeting that the Foreign Service Act came into effect at a time when the percentage of employees promoted every year was relatively high. Now, however, promotion rates have declined enough so that employees are more likely to reach the end of their allowed time-in-class before being promoted. To what degree is the Foreign Service Act responsible for these circumstances? Should the regulations intended to implement the act—or perhaps even the act itself—be altered to take this change of circumstance into account?

BOYATT: Promotion rates do not decline automatically or in response to long-term weather patterns. Promotions rates move up or down because administrative managers alter systems, fiddle numbers, or otherwise change the rules of the game. It is not simply that 40 senior positions are being taken by political appointees, thereby pushing about 100 senior officers into retirement for excess TIC and, in the long term, keeping another 100 officers in the mid-level grades out of the senior ranks. I understand that the department's managers are working to downgrade another 100 or so SFS positions because of the fanaticism of the "priests of the pyramid," or because the Foreign Service should look like the Navy, or whatever. Instead of worrying about how to lose people, the Service's leaders should be concerned with winning lost positions back. Current promotion rates should return to levels that will allow the SFS to survive. Changes in the hortatory language of the 1980 act would help, but the system could be improved enormously without amending the legislation.

BACCHUS: The statutory authority granted the secretary and other agency heads is, in my opinion, broad enough to allow modifications in up-or-out provisions, such as length of TICs, the senior threshhold window, and LCEs, when needed to accommodate new circumstances. Part of the current problem is due to the fact that a high rate of voluntary retirements made 1980 a high-water mark in promotion opportunities. This may have sent a false signal about future prospects, leading some to opt immediately for consideration for the Senior Foreign Service, when they might otherwise have chosen to defer. We are now seeing the impact of that, with an exceptionally large number of officers competing for a reduced number of opportunities.

In the longer view, I would not foreclose the possibility that changes in society, and the Service, may make some adjustment in the time periods allowed necessary. Of course, longer TIC times, which would lower departure rates, would slow advancement possibilities for the next generation. Obviously, what is needed is a balance between the two.

In a 1982 review of the act [JOURNAL, May], AFSA described it as a package "with new benefits balancing new risks and responsibilities," specifically the obligation for all members to serve overseas and lessened job security for those in the new Senior Foreign Service. The benefits included performance pay, special incentive differentials, and other allowances. Do you think this trade-off was a good one for the Service?

BOYATT: First of all, I think the trade-off of "new benefits balancing new risks and responsibilities" was tactically naive and told the AFSA leaders of the day why I held this view. In the real world, the new risks in the personnel system began immediately in 1980. The new benefits (except for the higher pay mid-level officers received because of linkage to the higher GS pay rate) were delayed for years. As predicted, the new

BACCHUS: I am uncomfortable with a formulation that makes a direct trade-off, almost in market terms, between benefits and risks. To me, the higher risk system is appropriate and the additional benefits are warranted. But one has to judge whether each element is right on its own terms. Either "up-or-out" is appropriate for the mission of the Foreign Service, or it is not. The benefits and allowances we provide are fair, or they

benefits fell victim to the "Ribbon Clerk Conspiracy" (a coalition of money managers in the Bureau of Management, Office of Management and Budget, and the General Accounting Office, who are dedicated to ensuring that benefits for Foreign Service people are kept to the absolute minimum), who took over and did their thing. Danger pay is a good example. As ambassador to Bogota from 1980-83, I can vouch that it was as dangerous then as the recent spate of terrorist activities has demonstrated. In spite of this, as of mid-1983, Washington bureaucrats—whose greatest risk is to commute to Silver Spring—had prevented me, and hundreds like me, from receiving the so-called new benefit of danger pay. In my judgment, AFSA should have made its support of the 1980 act contingent upon *implementation* of the benefits sections of the act. No benefits, no implementation of personnel risks. In a very real sense AFSA gave away something for nothing.

are not. The sole exception I would make to this is that the retirement benefits for those forced to leave the system involuntarily must be adequate. This is the case with respect to the existing retirement system, and we believe it will be true for the new system being developed for employees who joined the Service after January 1, 1984.

The primary intention of the Foreign Service Act was not to benefit the individual employees or even the Service itself, but the nation as a whole. Has it served the national interest, and how?

BOYATT: I am diffident about cosmic judgments on the Foreign Service Act of 1980. Has it benefited the nation as a whole? On balance, I would respond in the negative. The Foreign Service is weaker than it was before the act, the policy process is more fragmented, and the ambassadorial functions more diluted. I believe the United States benefits from having a professional Foreign Service, as does every other great power. To the extent we treat the institutions and processes of diplomacy in the same manner as do Togo and Honduras, the nation suffers. A stronger act would have made the Service, the process, and the ambassadorial function more professional. Perhaps a stronger act was politically impossible. In any case, much could be improved by implementing the law in a way that served fewer bureaucratic imperatives. Some encouraging steps (such as fighting OMB for more substantive positions) have already been taken. There is room for hope.

BACCHUS: Obviously, I think the 1980 act does serve the national interest. It does provide the tools needed to build and manage an effective Foreign Service. I would not be so presumptuous as to argue that all its provisions are right or that they have always been used in the most effective way, but I think the act can be employed to meet every likely need.

In light of the experience of the last five years, what would you recommend to improve the Foreign Service Act of 1980?

BOYATT: In 1974 or '75, I approached then-Director General Nathaniel Davis to propose on behalf of AFSA that we join the department to draft the Foreign Service Act of 1975. Our concept was to take advantage of AFSA's momentum and the power of Henry Kissinger in Washington to fashion a law that would unify the Foreign Service of State, AID, and USIA; put the secretary in charge of the development and public diplomacy functions; enshrine the employee-management and grievance systems in law; increase the number of career ambassadors and the power of all ambassadors; and rationalize the personnel system. Henry, busy writing (or perhaps rewriting) history, demurred. The Foreign Service Act of 1980, with the department in a leadership role and AFSA as the reluctant party, no doubt was intended to fulfill the same goals. A full redraft of the act is neither possible nor desirable today. What is necessary and feasible is a more determined defense of the career Service and a more flexible implementation of the act's provisions concerning the personnel system.

BACCHUS: From my point of view, the fundamental features of the 1980 act have proved to be largely correct. Therefore, most of the changes I would propose would be in the form of clarifications and refinements. The department currently has a package of proposed amendments to the act in the executive branch clearance process, after which it will be submitted to Congress. Most of those amendments are technical changes, although we have proposed some modest rationalization in allowances and benefits. The package does not, however, contain fundamental changes in the up-or-out mechanisms, in the basic structure of the Senior Foreign Service, in interagency compatibility features, or in the separation of the Foreign Service and the Civil Service. I think this is as it should be.


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Moving Overseas: the New Assignment Abroad Checklist
Reminders, suggestions and helpful hints for our Foreign Service clients to ensure that your next overseas move is the easiest and smoothest one yet.
Developed in collaboration with District Moving and Storage, Inc.'s Foreign Service Advisory Committee.
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☐ Soviet Union

Dear Foreign Service Families,

When we first issued The New Assignment Abroad Checklist in 1983 the response was terrific. Veterans of the Foreign Service used it as a reminder. Families relatively new to the Foreign Service used it as a step-by-step guide. All found it a valuable tool in making their move easier—and that is why we are reissuing it.

We are pleased that so many of you in the Foreign Service have honored us with your business over the years. We pride ourselves in giving personalized care to ensure that your household effects are packed carefully and safely and that the articles you entrust to our storage facilities are maintained well and securely.

We realize that you already have received official instructions and guidance on your move from the Department, and that you have consulted your Post Report, and such excellent publications as the Department of State's Foreign Service Assignment Notebook (Section III: Packing to Go).

We believe that if you add this handy checklist to your agenda of documents to read and follow, your move will be a happier, easier move. If you would like further information or advice on any subject relating to your move, please call us at (301)420-3300, a local call in the Washington area.

Sincerely,

John H. Bartko, Jr.
President

Members of District's Foreign Service Advisory Committee, from left to right, ***John A. Collins, Betty Coxson Dols*** *and* ***Andrew I. Kilgore*** *meet with District's President* ***John H. Bartko*** *and Vice President* ***Roland Kates*** *(standing) to finish work on District's* ***New Assignment Abroad Checklist.*** *Mr. Collins and former Ambassador Kilgore are retired from the Foreign Service. Mrs. Dols is a Foreign Service wife who has been stationed in five overseas posts.*

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Moving Overseas: the New Assignment Abroad Checklist

The District Moving and Storage New Assignment Abroad check-list will serve to highlight and remind you of some of the more critical elements of your move and presents practical, "hands on" suggestions derived from the wide and varied collective experiences of our own Foreign Service Advisory Committee members.

Overseas Move: Checklist

I. Before the Packers Arrive

- ☐ Confirm with Post Management Officer whether full or limited shipment is authorized. Determine applicable shipment and storage weight allowances.
- ☐ Prepare complete inventory of goods to be shipped and stored for your own record.
- ☐ Choose packing dates carefully. Try to set a moving date as many weeks in advance as possible. Make sure that date is convenient for you and free of conflict with other pre-departure obligations (e.g. medical exams, language tests, etc.)
- ☐ Schedule your departure to allow enough time after last packing day to arrange any necessary re-allocation between goods to be shipped and stored, should weight allowances be exceeded.
- ☐ Study and read Post Report carefully. Check also with Post Management Officer to determine any restrictions or proscriptions on goods to be shipped to new post.
- ☐ During pre-packing survey, make sure to bring to estimators attention all material to be shipped and stored. Don't forget articles in garage, cellar, attic or goods temporarily stored in homes of friends or relatives. Also include articles newly purchased but not yet delivered; for these latter items, mesh delivery dates with packer's schedule.
- ☐ Secure adequate insurance on all articles to be shipped and stored. The USG does not insure HHE, and the 1964 Claims Act has a number of limitations and has set maximum payable amounts.
- ☐ Arrange with utility companies (phone, gas, water, electric, etc.) to maintain service until date when all packing and moving is completed.
- ☐ Arrange for a friend or neighbor or relative to be with you during packing phase. Extra sets of legs, eyes and hands are extremely helpful to you and the packer during this period.

- ☐ Before the packer arrives, segregate and identify materials according to their ultimate disposition, i.e. (1) Unaccompanied Air Baggage ("air freight"), (2) HHE to be shipped to Post, (3) Effects and articles to be stored, and (4) Articles and items to accompany you in your own travel ("accompanied baggage"). District Moving and Storage will provide you, as a customer, with labels for separating and identifying materials.
- ☐ Separate articles and items of special or unique value (e.g. heirlooms) and other valuables not to be taken to post and not to be stored in regular storage facilities because of their special value. Arrange for safe-keeping in safe-deposit boxes or vault. You may wish to include in this category family photo albums or slide collections — especially if your post is one of potential unrest where evacuation may occur.
- ☐ Don't overbuy foodstuffs in period just prior to packing and moving. Arrange to give away to friends, neighbors or relatives — or a church or social service agency — those quantities of food and beverages which are left over.
- ☐ Take apart and disassemble those articles of furniture and equipment which cannot be moved in assembled condition, and which you have particular care or concern about. You know your own articles best (with all their quirks and peculiarities in handling); it's better then, for you to do it, rather than a packer who may not understand it's special characteristics.
- ☐ Disconnect washers and dryers in preparation for packing and moving. However, one caveat: allow enough time for that final wash of sheets, pillow cases and last minute laundry. Be sure to coordinate with packers on these matters.
- ☐ In allocating articles for air freight and accompanied luggage, don't assume that major HHE shipment will arrive in timely fashion. Similarly, don't assume that Air Freight will be waiting for you upon your arrival at post. Be generous in what you pack to accompany you, including transitional type clothing, should air freight shipment be unduly delayed. NOTE: See Sections III and IV of Check List for hints on packing Accompanied Baggage and Air Freight.

II. During Packing Phase

- ☐ Keep card or notebook with you during packing which lists key phone numbers of officials in the Department concerned with your move, e.g. post management officer, personnel in transportation office, etc. Call these officials as needed should questions arise during packing phase.
- ☐ Insure that UAB ("air freight") is weighed at your residence. Also, if weight of UAB is less than your allowance, the difference may be applied to HHE shipment. In this latter case, inform the Transportation Operations office (OPR/STP/T/TO) of the fact.
- ☐ Identify for packers all articles/items that require special care in handling and packing.
- ☐ Maintain your own notebook in which you identify contents of each carton that is packed, identifying it with number placed on it by packer. Inventory list of contents prepared by packer will be rather general (e.g. one carton kitchenware) and will not provide specificity you need in identifying unpacking priorities when you first arrive at new home.
- ☐ Do not have babies, small children, pets around your residence during packing if at all possible. Arrange for relatives, friends or neighbors to care for them. This will avoid significant distractions.
- ☐ Place numbered signs on bedroom doors and on other upstairs rooms (studies, etc.) for your ease in directing the packers, e.g. "pack articles in room #1 first, then #4; leave #3 to the last."
- ☐ During packing phase, do not leave important papers connected with your move on table or desk tops, or inside dresser or desk drawers, etc. There have been instances where passports, tickets, immunization certificates, school records, medical reports, etc. have been packed up and crated for shipment. Keep these documents and papers in your office, at a neighbors or in a locked closet or wall safe.
- ☐ Don't pack matches, lighter fluid, other flammable materials, ammunition, etc.
- ☐ When packers are preparing valuable articles for shipment and/or storage, e.g. silver service, be present and attentive. Note carefully the packer's inventory number placed on that carton.
- ☐ You may prefer to pack for yourself any small items of particular value, e.g. jewelry, watches, cameras, binoculars, etc., and include them as items for your accompanied baggage.

District customers are invited to call us for packing material if you decide you want to pack certain valuables yourself. (301) 420-3300.

- ☐ Clearly mark and label all keys for desk drawers, cabinets, chests, storage containers, etc., and assemble them on one key ring, or place them in one wallet, pouch, purse or case — which you should then carry with you to post in your accompanied baggage. Do not tape or attach keys to base of drawers or furniture; they can be easily dislodged, torn off, and lost.
- ☐ For electrical equipment with moving parts, place small label identifying their current "cycles," so you can judge if adjustments must be made at next or subsequent posts.
- ☐ Keep first-aid kit available and handy during packing. Accidents can occur and scratches. cuts and bruises are common.
- ☐ In identifying articles to be packed/shipped/stored, don't forget light fixtures, andirons, drapes, curtains, carpets and rugs. Remember, packers and movers do not take up wall to wall carpeting.
- ☐ Provide original cartons/boxes (if you have kept them) for packing of special items you have purchased during current tour in Department, e.g. stereo equipment, TVs, kitchen centers, exercise equipment, etc. Such custom-built cartons will provide better, safer and tighter fit than those of packers.
- ☐ Provide yourself with paper or plastic plates, cups, glasses, knives, forks, spoons, etc. for your meals/snacks during the packing day. Your own china and silverware will have been packed in most instances. Leave out an old pot you can spare in which you can boil water for coffee, tea, bouillion, etc. Leave out a small amount of cream and sugar for your beverages.
- ☐ It is a thoughtful (and welcomed) gesture to have cold, non-alcoholic beverages available to offer the packers during their work-day. Packers will be most appreciative.
- ☐ Arrange to borrow broom, mop, vacuum, etc. after movers leave so that you can tidy up the house or apartment before you leave. Remember to also provide yourself with cleanser, deodorizer, etc. and allow enough time to clean refrigerator.

III. Air Freight: Some Suggested Inclusions

- ☐ Adequate clothing for all family members, allowing for significant delay in receipt of major HHE shipment. Don't forget transitional clothing, when you move at change of season. Also, don't forget opposite season clothing (e.g. take plenty of winter clothing if you leave Washington in July and are headed for New Zealand). Don't skimp on clothing; err on the side generosity.
- ☐ Linens, toweling, shower curtains, dish cloths, placemats, napkins, table cloths.
- ☐ Tool kit
- ☐ Flash lights
- ☐ Silverware and basic cooking utensils
- ☐ Plastic bags; shopping bags
- ☐ Sponges, potholders, cookbooks, rubber gloves, flat sink stopper
- ☐ Extension cords; two and three-way plugs, and converter plugs
- ☐ Plastic ice cube trays; salt and pepper shakers
- ☐ Small electric appliances (coffee pot, toaster)
- ☐ Non-breakable dishes, cups, glasses, etc.
- ☐ Coat hangers, clothesline, clothes pins
- ☐ Toys, games, books, dolls, puzzles for children to tide them over until major HHE shipment arrives.

IV. Accompanied Baggage: Some Suggested Inclusions

- ☐ Flash light
- ☐ Screwdriver, pliers, small hammer
- ☐ Alarm clock
- ☐ Calling cards
- ☐ Extra, small B/W photos for ID cards, licenses, permits, etc.; useful upon first arrival at post
- ☐ International Drivers License
- ☐ Plastic shopping bags
- ☐ Plastic clothesline for hanging clothes over hotel bathtubs

District will provide you,
as a customer, labels reading "Air Freight," " Sea Freight," "Hold for Storage",
and "Do Not Move" for items to be left behind or for your accompanied baggage.
Just call District at (301) 420-3300 and we will send you labels promptly.

- ☐ Sewing materials (needles, thread, buttons, scissors, etc.)
- ☐ Bottle/can opener; safety pins
- ☐ Plastic cups, glasses
- ☐ Umbrellas
- ☐ Soap, washcloths and toilet paper
- ☐ Instant coffee, tea bags/packets of cocoa
- ☐ School and health records for children
- ☐ Small dictionary or Berlitz glossary for immediate use at new post or at intervening stops in journey
- ☐ Extra pair of eyeglasses; eyeglass prescriptions and other medical Rx
- ☐ Plastic knives, forks, spoons; small paring knife
- ☐ Keys for air freight trunks; notation of combinations for combination locks
- ☐ Limited amounts of foreign exchange for cabs, buses, phone calls, tips for use on arrival at post or at intervening stops

V. Miscellaneous Items

- ☐ Carry out final check-out procedures in the Department with officials concerned with your move.
- ☐ Advise Transportation Office in Department of your travel plans and phone numbers/addresses where you can be reached while in transit to post.
- ☐ Make sure that packer provides you with a complete and detailed inventory showing all items shipped and stored.
- ☐ Double check and insure that you have all your travel papers, travel orders, tickets, passports, visas, school records, medical records, etc. before packers make final departure.

We hope that this checklist has proven helpful to you. We thank you for your patronage and the opportunity to serve you as you proceed on your official mission. To schedule your move call District at (301) 420-3300.

VI. Notes/Phone Numbers/Last Minute Things to Do

To schedule your move call District at (301) 420-3300.

A visit to District Moving and Storage will show you just how we pack, store and forward your possessions—safely, securely and quickly.

If you were about to buy a new car, you'd certainly want to visit a dealer's showroom first. And if you plan to move or put your possessions in storage, you might want to visit the people who will be handling your valuable belongings.

You're welcome to make an appointment to visit District Moving and Storage any time, and you'll see for yourself why foreign service people choose us over all the others.

You'll see that we have more than 72,000 square feet of space in a new warehouse facility. You'll see how we pack even delicate or large materials for safe storage and shipping, and how our inventory location system means we can locate your possessions immediately. We believe you'll appreciate the way we protect your belongings with full security fencing, a central station burglar alarm system, and a dry sprinkler system. Our people know how to keep your possessions clean, safe and dry, and how to forward them to any place on earth.

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The View from AFSA

An Act of Suicide

Gerald P. Lamberty

The Foreign Service Act of 1980 has by itself neither strengthened nor improved the Foreign Service. But the manner in which it has been implemented has been far from positive. Rather, it has deemphasized substantive expertise, encouraged conformism, and moved the Foreign Service toward absorption into the Civil Service.

The act addressed many matters of concern to the Foreign Service, including unification across agency lines, compensation and benefits, and creation of the Senior Foreign Service. Five years later, however, one issue stands above the others in its potential impact on the Service: that of promotions and retention. Today, slow promotion rates and time-in-class limitations are forcing well-qualified employees to leave the Service, taking their experience with them. The act itself does not require that this happen. But the way in which the State Department management team has chosen to implement the act could have serious effects on both the employees involved and the Service itself.

Management has chosen to implement the act in this way because it has been preoccupied with what it sees as a surplus of senior officers. It came to this conclusion, despite a reduction of nearly 240 senior generalists since 1967, because it focused excessively on the large number of seniors underemployed in Washington. It failed to see that these individuals were in Washington because personnel policies made it advantageous for them to be there, even in over-complement status, rather than overseas, where fewer ticket-punching assignments that could ensure retention in the Service are available.

In the late 1960s, when the department's leaders began promoting management as the way to put the Foreign Service in charge of the international operations of all the U.S. agencies, it became difficult to get senior promotions unless an officer was in a so-called program-direction position, managing people and money. Now, seniors and O-1s not only don't get promotions, they are being forced out unless they already occupy such positions. Traditional diplomatic skills, area specialization, and substantive knowledge were no longer enough. The emphasis on management, which continues today, has not improved the department's control over other agencies' operations abroad, but it has heavily affected our own personnel system. To alleviate the supposed senior surplus, promotions into the senior ranks were reduced to 60 percent of their pre-act levels, rather than increased—as had been anticipated by Foreign Service supporters of the 1980 legislation and the department's promotion projections. Limited career extensions (LCEs) were denied 35 percent of those reaching the end of their time-in-class (now shortened by the act) even though most of those forced out the Service had been recommended for LCEs by the promotion boards. It is estimated that because of the 20-year TIC at the senior threshold and the LCE process, FSOs now have a 90 percent chance of being forced to retire involuntarily at about 50 years of age. Faced with this reality, FSOs at all levels are putting much pressure on the assignment process to secure the management-type positions that will help them be the lucky one-in-ten. This year's bidding exercise seems especially frantic.

In this struggle, seniors and O-1s perceive that they can no longer be "merely" substantive experts but must get jobs that demonstrate their managerial ability. Junior officers are already worried about the odds and are energetically seeking jobs that will give them maximum exposure. Japanese, Chinese, and other one-country experts are most clearly disadvantaged, since they have very few managerial positions, such as deputy chief of mission and ambassador, available to them.

Many jobs in non-geographic bureaus, and many even within the geographic bureaus, are being shunned by most officers. Soon these positions may have to be filled by GS employees or by contracted officers who have left the Service.

Today, about half of all senior and upper mid-level officers are within three years of finishing a TIC or LCE. Consequently, a single less-than-enthusiastic efficiency report will probably ensure their involuntary departure from the Service. Under these circumstances, it is not realistic to expect anyone to do very much to challenge the status quo or a superior. While this new docility will be more pleasing to incoming administrations, they will eventually regret that the Foreign Service did not challenge some of their early assumptions but rather required them to learn by costly experience.

To enforce its current policies, management is tightening up the linkage between personal rank and the ranking of specific positions. This is a direct assault on the flexible rank-in-officer concept which, together with worldwide availability, has been the main factor distinguishing the Foreign Service from the Civil Service. But because an officer's personal rank must now be the same as the grade of the position he or she occupies, we are eliminating our capacity to move our Pickerings, Bosworths, and Enders ahead as rapidly as we did when stretch assignments were readily available. The current system seems to operate on the principle that we have to move out hundreds of good officers prematurely so that the always rare "waterwalkers" can get the increased challenges they used to get automatically through stretch assignments.

Some in management have defended the current personnel policies as necessary to keep outsiders from damaging the Foreign Service's separate status. It seems more likely that as awareness of the great damage being done by our current personnel system becomes more widespread, we run a real risk of having Congress or an administration decide that the Foreign Service is incapable of running its own personnel system and has to be brought under the Civil Service umbrella.

In the 1980 act, Congress thought it was providing the tools that the Foreign Service said it needed to improve itself and preserve its distinctiveness. But the manner in which the act is now being administered certainly is not improving the Service and may well lead to its end as a separate corps. □

Gerald P. Lamberty is president of AFSA.

THE MARSHALL PLAN

A humorous account of some checkered doings by the striped-pants set

MARSHALL GREEN

DIPLOMACY is an ancient and much-maligned profession that commands about as much respect as the world's oldest. Indeed, both are being seriously undermined these days by ruinous competition from amateurs.

At least prostitution is an enterprise that can easily be defined. The best definition of diplomacy is the art of persuasion in international affairs. Persuasion is not always achieved by clever talking, however, but rather by attentive listening. The more attentively you listen to someone, the wiser that person deems you to be, for now he regards you as the beneficiary of his imparted wisdom.

Closely related to the importance of listening is the importance of letting the other fellow get the credit for anything that goes right—or at least of letting him save face. For example, back in 1948, I accompanied George Kennan on his only trip to Japan. Our objective was to persuade General Douglas MacArthur to shift the emphasis of the U.S. occupation of Japan from political reform to economic recovery. Kennan eventually reached agreements with MacArthur on all points save one. That related to ending the purge—the exclusion of Japan's most prominent business leaders from public office or top management positions because of their wartime associations. Kennan felt that tarring all leaders with the same brush smacked of totalitarianism.

Yet, because of the influence of certain members of his staff, MacArthur refused to end the purge. Things were deadlocked for months. Finally, Dean Rusk, at that time assistant secretary of state, asked me to draft a personal telegram from Secretary Marshall to MacArthur putting the case as persuasively as possible for ending the purge. This I did in a long telegram that I handed to Rusk for his approval. He read my handiwork, shook his head sadly, and suggested that I rewrite the whole message, cutting it down to one page and making it appear that ending the purge was what MacArthur had originally suggested should occur at this stage of the occupation, an idea which we had at first resisted but now recognized as wise, and we were now giving him the green light to carry out his idea. Well, I gulped hard because I realized MacArthur had never expressed such an idea, but I rewrote the message as Rusk suggested. Marshall approved, and it went out. Two days later MacArthur ended the purge.

Years later when I called on Rusk, who by then was secretary of state, I reminded him of this incident. "Heavens," he responded, "I hope you don't go around telling that story. It casts me in such a cynical light." "Perhaps so," I replied, "but you taught me a diplomatic lesson I'll never forget—the importance of letting the other fellow get the credit—especially if that fellow is Douglas MacArthur." For as one British newspaper phrased it during those days of MacArthur's occupation responsibilities, "Like an earlier and even more eminent creator, General MacArthur looked about him and saw that what he'd done was good."

Another form of persuasion is resort to sheer blarney. A good example of blarney in diplomacy occurred when I was ambassador to Indonesia and when George Meany, head of the AFL-CIO, wanted to set up a union office in the country. The Indonesian foreign minister, Adam Malik, however, told me in confidence that his government wished I could talk Meany out of the idea. They didn't think the time was propitious but did not want to offend Meany.

I tried to get Meany to drop his proposal, but I got nowhere. Finally it was arranged that Bob Murphy, a good friend of the labor leader as well as undersecretary of state, should call with me on Meany. So Bob Murphy and I went over to the big union headquarters on 16th Street. We shook hands with Meany, and for the next hour Murphy and Meany exchanged reminiscences about President Kennedy's trip to Ireland, where he was accompanied by Meany. It was a conversation between two Irishmen about an Irish-American president visiting Ireland. No mention was made during that whole hour of the purpose of our call, but, as we shook hands to say goodbye, Murphy said, "Oh, by the way, George, about that Indonesian problem...." He got no further—Meany just smiled and said, "Forget it." The problem never arose again.

In sum, there is nothing really exceptional about the arts of diplomacy. Basically they add up to common sense. They are closely akin to the arts involved in lasting marriages.

There is a widely held view that diplomats are supercautious fellows who devote their careers to preventing things from happening. To a large extent that is true. The greatest achievements in diplomacy, like

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Marshall Green, a Foreign Service officer for 34 years, served largely in East Asia. He was ambassador to Indonesia and to Australia and assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs. Retired since 1979, he is currently president of the Japan-America Society.

Kissinger's memoirs state that the president stormed up and down the guest house in his underwear, raging against a certain State Department official.

those in military defense, are the catastrophes that never happened. And because they never occur, they pass unnoticed.

Thus my greatest contribution to improving U.S.-Chinese relations was persuading President Nixon during his historic trip to China in 1972 to delete a single sentence from the Shanghai communique after he and Premier Chou En Lai had already initialed agreement on that document. At first the president was furious over my intervention. (Henry Kissinger's memoirs state that the president stormed up and down the guest house in his underwear, raging against a certain State Department official.) Later, however, he realized that I had spared him a major embarrassment.

I was less successful when it came to making puns, for I must confess to being a compulsive punster. When I was chargé d'affaires in Korea (the U.S. armed forces radio always referred to me as the "charge daffers"), I wrote a cable to Washington protesting the hypocritical criticism that the Republic of Korea (which we always called the ROK) received every year during the annual U.N. debate on the Korean item. Here was the spectacle of Poland, Bulgaria, the U.S.S.R., and other citadels of democracy criticizing the ROK for its lack of democracy. That was too much. "Let he who is without sin castigate the first ROK," I concluded my cable. (Unfortunately, the word "castigate" was corrupted in transmission, so I never again tried out my puns in messages to Washington.)

WHEN A Foreign Service officer is assigned to Washington, his role may change radically. In Washington, the successful FSO must learn how to fight bureaucratic, not diplomatic, battles. Suaveness and patience are no longer at a premium. Playing hardball is. To be successful in Washington, an FSO must be a real FSOB.

One of the most difficult tasks on the Washington diplomatic front is maintaining constructive and amicable relations between the State Department and the White House. Every elected president in recent memory has started his term by declaring that he is going to have a strong cabinet system and that he will look to the secretary of state to be his principal adviser in foreign affairs. Yet every one (except Ford, who wasn't elected) came to rely less and less on his cabinet and more and more on the White House staff. This has much to do with physical proximity and the fact that most of the White House staff are political supporters who stand or fall with the president, unlike that great mass of faceless bureaucrats who staff government departments and agencies for administrations of both parties.

When leaks of highly classified or sensitive information inevitably occur, especially leaks that are personally embarrassing to the president, he tries to find the leaker. But in seeking to do so, he discovers, to his amazement, that even the most sensitive messages, bearing the highest classifications, are routinely seen by dozens of people in State and the CIA and by scores

of people in the Pentagon—communicators, duty officers, secretaries, and so forth.

This often causes the president to minimize the danger by cutting out the bureaucracy on sensitive issues, communicating by personal emissaries or by back-channels. This in turn causes the various agencies to rely on their own independent channels—especially the overseas telephone—to the point where no one in the government can be certain that he or she is seeing the whole picture. It is in this atmosphere of suspicion—if not ignorance or paranoia—that some of our most delicate operations in foreign affairs have been conducted.

When I was assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, I was excluded from that small privileged circle around the president who were informed of Kissinger's secret trip to China in 1971 to arrange for the presidential visit to China the following year. I recall sitting in my office one morning with three members of my staff, one of whom mentioned that it had just been announced on the radio that Kissinger, who was in Pakistan, had contracted a case of intestinal flu and was motoring up from Islamabad to the Pakistan hill station of Murree for several days' rest in complete solitude. I commented to my staff that that was ridiculous—no one with what we used to call Delhi Belly would take off on a long motor trip. I then observed blandly that Henry was probably on a secret mission to China. As I said it, I suddenly realized that my speculation was probably true, and if it was, then my ruminations would find their way into the press and I would be responsible for one of the worst leaks ever perpetrated.

So I excused myself from the meeting, dashed up to the secretary's office, and told him what had happened. He paled visibly, for I had uncovered the truth. On his instructions, I rushed back to my office and swore all three members of my staff to secrecy. Such are the dangers of *not* telling officials of events occurring in their areas of responsibility.

ONE OF THE most important issues in the formation of foreign policy is how to bring matters to the president for his decision. Should they be brought forward as agreed recommendations from his advisers, or should the president be informed by his advisers of the pros and cons of various options, it being left to the president to decide which to pursue? President Eisenhower, with his military background, liked to have what he called completed staff work—that is, agreed recommendations from his advisers. This worked out very well under his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles. Not only did Dulles have the president's complete confidence but he was always careful to seek the president's approval on any issue of substance. Moreover, Dulles had in Gerard Smith, head of the policy planning staff, a kind of devil's advocate who argued against the emerging consensus. Smith played his role with such persuasive effect that it sometimes caused Dulles to explode in irritation over Smith's dogged opposition to the preferred course of action. But Gerry discharged his adversary role brilliantly and, in so doing, modified and improved the ultimate decision. And, by the way, no one left the conference room until Secretary Dulles had called up the president, informed him of our conclusions, and received Eisenhower's approval. We were then dismissed.

President Eisenhower was succeeded by a vigorous young president who looked for a more inspired way of formulating foreign policy—a way in which the White House, not the State Department, would be the playwright and leading actor. That marked the beginning of a major assault on the department's primacy in foreign policy. Never was this more pronounced than during the five years when Henry Kissinger was national security adviser under President Nixon and I was in charge of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, including, of course, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

I have particularly painful memories of crisis meetings in Kissinger's conference room in the basement of the White House where I sometimes represented the State Department on issues related to the wars in Indochina. Kissinger would usually arrive late at these meetings, preceded by a phalanx of subordinates who impressively laid out opened briefing books and the latest telegrams before Henry's place at the head of the table. Kissinger would open the meeting in a weary voice recounting the president's concern over the latest leaks, and he would darkly infer that someone at this meeting, or his subordinates, was responsible. In this atmosphere of mutual suspicion the meeting would proceed.

Kissinger would then explain his late arrival by disclosing that the president had called him to the Oval Office to discuss the very issue under consideration at this meeting, that the president had reached a decision (which Henry would then spell out), and that the purpose of this meeting was to consider an action plan for carrying out the presidential decision. This effectively prevented any discussion of the substance of the issue for which the meeting had been called.

Another favorite tactic of Henry's was the development of formal options with regard to just about every key issue in U.S. diplomacy. Developing options was a tedious, time-consuming, and often misleading process in which there were almost invariably three options to consider. Options A and C were artificial straw-men easily destroyed. Option B was the obvious course of action—that is to say, the one preferred by Henry. Hence we invariably ended up accepting Option B, although on one occasion Option A came so dangerously close to adoption that it created near panic in the White House.

From Henry's viewpoint, a further advantage of this approach to decision-making was to keep the bureaucracy busy, spinning wheels over options, suboptions, and variants of options, while Henry and the president did their high-wire act unimpeded by us bureaucratic roustabouts.

Although I joked a lot with Henry about these matters—for he had a self-deprecating, macabre sense of humor—I once carried things too far. I gave a talk at the National War College in which, to the delight of my audience, I described the option approach instituted by Henry, pointing out that every schoolboy and every schoolgirl in the United States could sleep peacefully at night knowing the United States was

At crisis meetings, Kissinger would usually arrive late, preceded by a phalanx of subordinates who impressively laid out opened briefing books and the latest telegrams before Henry's place.

pursuing Option B everywhere in the world. I went on to speculate that perhaps the reason why Henry had never remarried was to preserve his options, and that, judging from the photos in the social pages of the *Washington Post,* some of those options were remarkably well preserved.

Well, Henry did get remarried. More important, he became a good secretary of state, which meant that power returned solidly to the State Department during his reign under President Ford. But power began to flow back to the national security adviser during the Carter administration when the dynamic Zbig Brzezinski—I suppose people call him that because he sometimes got too zbig for his zbritches—cut into Cy Vance's turf. This eventually caused Vance to resign, and he was briefly succeeded by Edmund Muskie, who also publicly complained of being bypassed by the White House staff.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT lost further ground during President Reagan's first term in office, leading to Al Haig's resignation in strong protest over the excessive powers in foreign affairs of the Meese-Baker-Deaver trio. As Haig puts it in his revealing but curiously titled autobiography *Caveat,* "The White House was as mysterious as a ghost ship. You heard the creak of the rigging and groan of the timbers and sometimes even glimpsed the crew on deck. But who had the helm? Was it Meese? Was it Baker? Was it someone else? It was impossible to know for sure."

Today, Secretary Shultz seems to have the helm, even though he is hard-pressed by the appropriately named Senator Helms. But Shultz has at least the strong outward support of the president, and he had the wholehearted support of George Bush during all eight hours of his acting presidency.

Unfortunately, the secretary of state and the Foreign Service will always be vulnerable when anything goes wrong. Cheap shots can be made at their expense with impunity. They have no political constituency. The Navy has the backing of the Navy League and the veterans organizations as well as all those benefiting from billion dollar Navy contracts. But what is State's political constituency?

Looking back from the extremity of my many years in government, I would conclude that the system works best when the secretary of state is the president's main adviser on foreign affairs, and when the National Security Council *coordinates* but does not *conduct* U.S. foreign policy. Yet within this context, there is still a lot of room for improvement in formulating our foreign policy.

There should be a stronger adversary process within the administration to flush out, consider, and hone the most effective course of action. Resort to devil's advocates has merit. So does the war-gaming of crucial foreign policy issues—creating scenarios as close to reality as possible and engaging top-level policy advisers as participants in acting them out. This had been done on several occasions with illuminating results. The only trouble was that our leaders paid little attention to them.

Overall, we have relied too much on the skills of a poker player, and not enough on the skills of a chess player. Poker-playing diplomacy was fine in those early post-war years when we had almost all the top cards in our hand in terms of preponderant military and economic strength as well as a large responsive bloc of supporters in the United Nations. This is no longer the case. Today, we must count on effective diplomacy.

It is high time that presidents stopped naming incompetents as ambassadors just because of their politics. It is high time we turned our backs on those who would decimate the Foreign Service like Senator Joe McCarthy in the 1950s and Senator Jesse Helms in the 1980s. It is high time that the United States recognized that diplomacy is not only an honorable profession but that effective diplomacy could be the very margin of our nation's survival. □

Some of the thousands of women and men who came to Nairobi. Achieving a consensus from such a large and disparate group belied universal expectations of failure.

A Case of Consensus

The unexpected success of U.S. policy at the U.N. Women's Conference was based on smart execution of smart strategy

Gray Handley

As the International Women's Conference ended in Nairobi last summer, the universal agreement that had been achieved caused a spontaneous celebration. African delegates expressed their pleasure with choruses of traditional salutes, swaying and applauding in unison. Western delegates joined in the applause with broad smiles. Even the Soviets and their friends, though stone-faced, joined politely in the clapping. For all the participants, such an outpouring of positive emotion was extraordinary at a U.N. conference. For the U.S. delegation, the results were a considerable victory for our multilateral diplomacy. Because consensus was achieved despite a nearly universal anticipation of failure, U.S. efforts at this conference warrant some consideration.

The 1985 meeting had been expected to follow the pattern established by previous women's conferences in Mexico City in 1975 and in Copenhagen in 1980. These gatherings had caused major problems for the United States due to the adoption of highly objectionable language supported by the Soviet bloc and the Third World caucus known as the Group of 77. One of the troublesome provisions, for instance, had equated Zionism with racism—a direct criticism of Israel. It was widely reported that the Soviets viewed the Nairobi conference as another chance to pursue such unrelated political priorities and to isolate the United States from the majority of Group of 77 countries. The conference also offered an opportunity to embarrass the U.S. administration by forcing the delegation to oppose conference documentation, thereby appearing to take positions against women's rights. It appeared likely to all concerned that the Women's Conference would include many of the frustrating problems the United States confronts throughout the U.N. system, such as unacceptable politicization, isolation and criticism, Soviet posturing to curry favor from the Group of 77, and public embarassment. The fact that it did not makes it a good case study of the peculiar politics of multilateral diplomacy.

Faced with these familiar challenges in other multilateral settings, the United States has often focused on limiting damage. This is partly caused by the disheartening difficulty of achieving positive results in most U.N. forums, but it is also a reflection of the low priority generally assigned to multilateral affairs. In the case of the Women's Conference, however, the U.S. delegation decided to take an assertive, proactive approach tempered with conciliation. It also helped that the conference was considered a high-

Gray Handley is a foreign affairs officer in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. He attended the International Women's Conference as an adviser to the U.S. delegation.

priority multilateral activity that deserved considerable resources. These included a skilled delegation headed by Maureen Reagan, the president's daughter and a known advocate of women's equality.

While a number of factors in the delegation's success were beyond U.S. control, some specific elements of the U.S. approach did contribute significantly. The delegation started by establishing firm goals—and priorities among those goals—that extended far beyond the usual objective of damage limitation. To achieve these aims, it undertook an assertive strategy based on demonstrating U.S. leadership in women's affairs and developing a collective commitment to consensus.

The delegation adopted four main goals. It sought to focus discussions on technical issues affecting women rather than having the talks be sidetracked into other areas of global politics. It sought to foster consensus-building with moderate Group of 77 delegations as a basis for future collaboration. It sought to isolate disruptive Soviet and Arab influences. And finally, it sought to obtain the adoption of agreeable conference documentation by consensus, which required at least the removal of several references equating Zionism to racism.

The strategy the delegation employed had five principal elements. It firmly reasserted U.S. leadership in women's affairs. It negotiated aggressively with the Group of 77 to build consensus on issues of lesser priority and to generate an atmosphere that encouraged compromise on higher-priority issues. It gained general support and sympathy by building coalitions based on specific issues. It worked behind the scenes to orchestrate key western and Group of 77 delegations and the conference's officers and secretariat. Last, it brought to bear the full weight of American expertise and resources, including high-level influence.

None of these strategic elements is new or untried; most are used often in multilateral negotiations. What is unusual in this case is that these elements were used simultaneously in a concerted manner that enhanced the effectiveness of each element and increased their overall impact. It is also unusual, and perhaps even more important, that with the success of its aggressive, pro-active approach, the delegation demonstrated that the conventional wisdom about the United Nations is not necessarily correct. The delegation showed that the big voting blocs are not invulnerable. It showed that U.S. expertise and authority can make a critical difference when properly concentrated. And it showed that the Soviets and radical U.N. members can be isolated and neutralized even on issues of special importance to them.

Factors apart from the efforts of the U.S. delegation also contributed to the successful outcome of the conference. The U.S. pullout from UNESCO, for instance, showed that a U.S. threat to walk out of the meeting if participants refused to commit themselves to consensus should be taken seriously. At the same time, the Soviets were surprisingly ineffective in pushing their political agenda. Several African, Asian, and Latin American delegations became publicly committed to a successful conference, mostly due to the political sophistication of some developing-country delegates and their commitment to focusing on women's issues for which consensus could be achieved. This courageous commitment resulted in an extremely unusual display of public differences within the Group of 77 and remarkable pressure within the group to abandon its more radical positions. There was also excellent and sympathetic leadership from the chairpersons in the plenary committees and the negotiating working groups.

An example of this insightful leadership was the Philippine ambassador who chaired Committee II—the committee charged with negotiating "technical issues." Early in the discussions, she recognized that delegates to the committee fit into three categories, requiring different approaches from the chair. Those who were committed to women's issues but were inexperienced in international affairs, she guided through procedure, protected from manipulation, and encouraged in the articulation of opinion. Those who were well-versed in issues and procedure and wanted the conference to succeed through consensus, she supported privately in key ways while maintaining impeccable public impartiality. And those who knew issues and procedure and sought the divisive results that marred previous women's conferences, she encouraged to cooperate by drawing public attention to obstructive tactics and by generating productive peer pressure. This kind of sophisticated leadership from developing-country delegates is actually increasingly common in the U.N. system. The success of the Women's Conference shows that working in concert with such sympathetic individuals can greatly increase the effectiveness of U.S. efforts in the system as a whole.

As for the U.S. delegation's strategy, implementation began well in advance of the conference. The reassertion of U.S. leadership in women's issues started with the preparatory conference in February and was pursued at other relevant U.N. meetings during the year. The United States took an aggressive and visible role in insisting on an agenda of direct relevance to women and on conference decision-making by consensus. Through repeated high-level démarches, public statements, and private discussions, the conference was given a high profile within the administration, and the issues of special concern to women were proclaimed as a primary interest of the United States. This unusual degree and level of attentiveness convinced many western and Group of 77 nations of the genuineness of U.S. concern. This carried over to the conference itself. When the delegation arrived in Nairobi and delivered a strong but conciliatory plenary statement, U.S. assertiveness was accepted as a result of sincerity rather than expediency.

The plenary speech itself reinforced this perception because it was a stateswoman-like call for unity and, while clearly delineating issues of key importance to the United States, committed the U.S. to lead the way to consensus through compromise. Delivered at the beginning of the conference, this speech surprised many in the audience by defining the goal of the conference as unity and describing the boundaries

Maureen Reagan, delegation leader, with her entourage. Reagan gave the delegation high visibility and contributed to its ultimate success at the Nairobi conference.

within which the United States would negotiate. With the overall U.S. position thus established, the speech provided the U.S. delegation with an unusual degree of negotiating flexibility. The Group of 77 was further convinced of the U.S. commitment to consensus in the all-important negotiating committees and working groups. In these forums, the U.S. representatives quickly and aggressively led the way to consensus language, proving that the U.S. commitment had been made in good faith. Follow-up actions during the conference, such as the delegation's organization of a large number of special-issue conversation groups, also helped convince participants of the U.S. commitment to keep the focus on women.

Perhaps the most important key to the success of the U.S. strategy was the U.S. demand for a rule of procedure to require the adoption of conference documentation by consensus. Despite considerable resistance even from allies and an aggressive campaign by the Soviets to discredit this demand as a call for U.S. veto power, the delegation forced the issue to a positive conclusion prior to the opening gavel. While a formal rule was not accepted (thus limiting anyone's use of "veto power"), a public understanding was achieved that committed all parties to seek consensus. U.S. agreement to this procedure—not to mention its early success in motivating consensus—convinced the Group of 77 that the United States could be trusted not to obstruct reasonable accords. Of course, the cost of this strategy was U.S. acquiescence on some problematic language on lower-priority issues. But the remarkable effect of this commitment to consensus was to generate compromises that left the Soviets and Group of 77 radicals isolated in their efforts to force position-hardening votes. Once the first few consensuses were achieved, the momentum was established. Ultimately, only the most difficult issues (Zionism-as-racism and apartheid) remained unresolved. When only these issues blocked overall consensus at the meeting's end, the pressure on Group of 77 hardliners and the Soviets was irresistible, and they were forced to abandon some key positions.

The most innovative element of the U.S. strategy at the Women's Conference was the delegation's efforts to form issue-based coalitions with several countries. These efforts were carefully targeted to make use of the special technical or personal expertise of each of our representatives and to form individualized alliances with important delegations, regardless of "official" relationships. Significant alliances, trust, and reliable lines of communication were the result. To build these coalitions, the delegation used technical-information exchanges, formal programmed conversation groups, informal discussions, and social events. All these efforts had the virtue of appearing casual and therefore were not intimidating. They were carefully managed to build networks for both short-term and long-term use. In the execution of these responsibilities, the delegates performed in a conscientious, attentive fashion so that other delegates were further convinced of the U.S. commitment to a successful conference. While it is difficult to quantify the effect such building of relationships has on an international conference, in this case—where many of the delegates were not trained diplomats and where a shared concern for women often took precedence—the delegation's efforts appear to have had considerable impact.

THE DELEGATION, particularly its head and her deputy, made full use of all available tools to channel the direction of the conference. The most effective of these was the careful orchestration of key groups, always conducted behind the scenes. Within the western bloc, for instance, regular coordination meetings were held and aggressive techniques used to convince, cajole, or impel the necessary unity needed to encourage appropriate reactions from the Group of 77 and Soviet Union. Some western colleagues complained about the adamancy of U.S. positions and cynically suggested that our strategy of combining firmness on some issues with conciliation on others would be counterproductive. Others countries, like Canada, endorsed the U.S. positions and presented them independently, which increased their acceptability. The delegation

also held regular consultations with the elected conference coordinator, resulting, among other things, in a procedural move at the end of the conference that allowed, among other things, certain controversial draft resolutions to be tabled, but not considered or endorsed.

In the two plenary committees and the negotiating working groups, direct behind-the-scenes consultations with the chairpersons led to favorable rulings and diversionary tactics when the Soviets sought to break the consensus by having their surrogates call for votes. To diminish the voting bloc power of the Group of 77, the U.S. delegation discreetly formed issue-based alliances with influential group members such as Egypt, the Philippines, India, and Kenya. Key compromises resulted when these alliances could be orchestrated to ensure that the U.S. position was not isolated, to spotlight internal Group of 77 differences that blocked agreement, or to clarify gaps between Soviet and Group of 77 objectives.

One last element served to link all the other components of the U.S. strategy, providing the foundation needed to convey an aggressive policy. The administration firmly committed the personnel, technical, and support resources needed to achieve success. A special secretariat was established within the department; an interagency task force provided technical and policy support; private contributions and public funding supported the delegation's activities; several high-level démarches were made in all relevant capitals; discussions were held with the U.N. secretary general; and direct bilateral communications at the highest level were made when necessary. In addition, a talented, diverse delegation of individual experts was carefully trained and prepared. Experienced advisers were assigned to support them. Perhaps most important, the appointment of Maureen Reagan to head the delegation and her commitment to its efficient operation generated impressive domestic credibility. Her involvement was itself a key delegation resource. It also helped generate the other necessary support.

BECAUSE THE ACTIONS taken by the U.S. delegation to the Women's Conference overcame several of the preconceptions that often inhibit U.S. efforts in U.N. forums, and because this is relatively unusual, it may be useful to draw some conclusions from this experience. First, the experience in Nairobi suggests that the apparent invulnerability of current voting blocs can be eroded through negotiations that target specific countries and the issues of particular interest to them where agreement with the United States is possible. Divisions, particularly in the Group of 77, can and should be widened into clear differences of position even on issues of significance to segments of the group. Bilateral relationships, other shared concerns, and technical expertise can be used as tools to achieve compromises that divide large blocs. The often troublesome breadth of U.S. interests and expertise can be a strength if the United States can offer support on significant concerns of other countries in exchange for support on issues we consider important. Underlying this approach are two important requirements, however: clearly defined multilateral U.S. objectives, and the assignment of considerable flexibility to U.S. delegations to negotiate lesser issues on behalf of those objectives.

Second, the United States can increase its influence if it convinces other countries that it cares about the results of multilateral negotiations. The Women's Conference suggests that an evident commitment to the achievement of U.S. goals in multilateral settings must be backed-up by the assignment of adequate technical and personnel resources. Such resources, carefully coordinated and managed, can aggressively seize agendas and issues to make them more acceptable. U.S. efforts are also enhanced by the use of sophisticated technical capabilities in information management, individualized negotiations, and procedural orchestration. When the full strength of U.S. expertise and authority are brought to bear on a multilateral issue, progress becomes more probable.

Third, it is possible to isolate and neutralize the Soviets and radical anti-U.S. opposition in important U.N. forums, even on issues they have previously dominated. In Nairobi, the delegation accomplished this through public forums, through private discussions, and by aggressively managing our relationship with the conference secretariat. The delegation made it clear that it was negotiating from a position of clear moral authority on women's issues. And its success suggests that hypocritical positions on other issues can be effectively opposed in U.N. forums. For example, given the severe oppression and routine discrimination aimed against women in the Soviet Union, it was unnecessary and perhaps mistaken of the United States to identify the discussion of women's issues in the United Nations primarily as a Soviet tool for making trouble. Despite its history as a world leader on women's issues, before Nairobi the United States had been arguing from a defensive posture. By reclaiming women's issues through a demonstration of expertise and interest, we were able to exert significant influence.

The conference demonstrated that the radicalization of the U.N. can be combatted by holding individual countries accountable for unacceptable positions in multilateral forums, especially when those positions are more radical than usual for the country in question. In a few cases this may require the United States to reflect its displeasure over the multilateral positions of other governments in its bilateral relations with those countries. For most countries, pragmatism in multilateral forums probably will seem a reasonable exchange for cooperative bilateral relationships if the U.S. expresses serious concern about multilateral matters. In many less-politicized instances, references to bilateral affairs will be unnecessary. U.S. expertise and dispassionate rational arguments can be surprisingly convincing when potentially troublesome issues can be discussed in non-political terms, open to reasonable solutions and compromise. Overall, perhaps the most important lesson of the Women's Conference is that when the United States demonstrates that it takes multilateral discussions seriously, the effect can be remarkable and even encouraging. □

THE JOURNAL

Dosvedanya, Mr. Piggy

He was cute as a muppet, that cold bear of a consul general from our rival superpower

MARJORIE SMITH

AFTER THREE YEARS in a prominent job in a city like Sapporo, Japan, one knows throngs of people. It seemed I said farewell to all of them in the frenetic round of parties and courtesy calls that clogged my final weeks in the Foreign Service. But as the jumbo jet lifted me, bloated by rich food and drink and overcome by tears, I realized I hadn't said goodbye to two people who had given texture to my years in northern Japan: Mr. Piggy and his wife.

I first heard about the Soviet consul general during a round of courtesy calls the day I arrived in Sapporo. The city's mayor was still mildly outraged by the man's behavior two months earlier.

"What did he do?" I asked my predecessor.

"Mayor Itagaki tried to introduce Consul General Roudnev to a new Korean consul," Phil said. "Roudnev shouted, 'I do not speak to these people!' and stomped out of the party."

I pictured a hulking, rude bear of a man, a fitting representative of the threat from the north. In that autumn of 1980, 'the threat from the north' was a catch phrase the Liberal Democratic party brandished to justify strengthening Japan's defense posture. Once the Reagan administration was in place, U.S. diplomats were instructed to amplify their harping on the Soviet threat. I found good reason to play the game. Every time I could report evidence of a Soviet public relations triumph in Hokkaido, I buttressed my own small organizational niche and protected the jobs of the loyal and talented Japanese who staffed the Sapporo American Center.

Although it was January before I met the notorious Soviet, I met his wife that first weekend. She and I were delegates to a conference on "Women in Northern Regions" sponsored by the Northern Regions Center, an organization dedicated to the proposition that the countries of northern latitudes have special problems and Sapporo is the ideal place to discuss them.

Galina Roudneva was tall with dark hair, beautiful skin, and an aura of great intelligence. She looked like someone who would be interesting to know, but in that first year after the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, U.S. diplomats were under orders to treat Soviet diplomats with cold correctness, and I knew I couldn't cultivate a friendship.

Roudneva spoke slow, musical English and fluent Japanese and seemed to enjoy the conference a good deal more than her pudgy companion, wife of another Soviet diplomat, who spent the entire two days switching the knob on her sound system back and forth from English to Japanese, neither of which she understood. In the back row of observers, beyond the gleaming horseshoe-shaped conference table, a tall Caucasian man kept his gimlet eyes on the two Soviet women. During coffee breaks, friendly Japanese would try to engage the women in small talk but the presence of their looming escort seemed to abort conversation, and the three Russians spent the break periods standing silently at the 11th-floor windows, gazing out over Sapporo's explosion of autumn colors in the arboretum below and on the mountains that edged the city.

With the opening of a consulate general of the People's Republic of China that month, Sapporo had an intriguing mix of diplomats. The South Koreans always latched onto Americans at diplomatic soirees, since they didn't speak to either the Soviets or the Chinese. Caught up in the romance of a new diplomatic frontier, we brushed off the Koreans and sought out the Chinese to test our FSI Japanese against men raised in Manchuria who had been forced to learn it as children. Meanwhile, certainly aware of the directives on cold, correct behavior, the Soviets accosted us with warm greetings and watched us squirm. (At the prime minister's cherry blossom-viewing party in Tokyo the previous April, discreet scuffles had ensued as the Soviets threw their arms around U.S. diplomats in classic Russian bear hugs while accomplices stood by with cameras, and the Americans tried to wriggle away, coldly and correctly.)

At the mayor's reception to greet the Year of the Rooster on January 1, Galina Roudneva caught my eye as I carved my way through the crowd. She raised her glass of beer in a silent toast, and I reciprocated.

I FINALLY MET her husband a few days later. Aoki-san, who managed the American Center's relations with labor unions and artists, told me I must accompany him to the New Year's party of Sohyo, the General Council of Trade Unions. The ballroom atop a middle-class hotel was jam-packed, and Aoki-san seemed determined that I meet everyone. He whisked me from one table to another and I collected a canasta-deck of business cards from men juggling plates of food and glasses of whiskey and

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Marjorie Smith lives in Bozeman, Montana, where she does free-lance writing and directs plays for educational and amateur theater. She is also currently enrolled in a Russian language course.

water. Aoki-san beamed when people said that his new boss was a *bijin,* a beauty, which was a polite Japanese way of saying that they had noticed the Americans had stationed a woman in an important job.

I noticed two other foreigners across the room, a short, stout man with a bristling blondish-red crew cut, and a taller, dour-looking fellow. "Who are they?" I whispered to Aoki-san.

"Soviets," he said.

The short Soviet plowed through the crowd toward me, holding out his hand, a broad grin on his round pink face with its small, up-turned nose.

"Mrs. Smith," he said in English with a heavy Russian accent. "I haf been vanting to meet you. I am Roudnev. Soviet consul general."

I was startled. This chubby, clownlike figure was the obnoxious boor who had so insulted the mayor last August? This was the husband of the willowy, sophisticated Galina? I realized I had seen his companion before: It was Gimlet Eyes from the Northern Regions conference.

Consul General Roudnev would not release my hand from his moist, comradely grasp. "So. This is the famous American Center director," he said. "Every day you are in newspaper. I vanted to meet the most popular voman in Sapporo."

I tried to brush it off, saying the press

just didn't have anything else to write about, that I was a novelty as the first women diplomat in northern Japan. Roudnev seemed unsettled by my torrent of English, and Gimlet Eyes leaned forward to whisper a translation into his ear.

"I must apologize for my poor English," said Roudnev.

"I must apologize that my Russian is non-existent," I said.

"But your Japanese is very good, yes? They say in Japanese press."

Then, like rival dogs sniffing each other, we exchanged a few sentences in Japanese. His was about the same level as mine, although it seemed to have more consonants in it.

The next morning I told the U.S. consul about my encounter with the enemy. "I'll bet he thinks you're a spy," said Chuck. "Why else would the United States put a woman in a job that's always been held by a man, in Japan of all places! You must be a top CIA figure."

I knew Chuck was teasing but I rather liked the idea of being mistaken for a Mata Hari.

"He's a slimy little guy, isn't he?" Chuck said.

"I thought he was cute," I said. "Like a pet pig." And from then on, Yuri Ivanovich Roudnev, consul general of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was known in certain circles as Mr. Piggy.

A few days later, Chuck and his wife, Mary, and I were on our way to the Hokkaido governor's dinner for the diplomatic corps. The invitation had specified a party lasting only 90 minutes, and Mary had heard that the governor served the best food on the Sapporo social circuit, so she urged us to eat, not talk.

"If only we could figure out how to get rid of the other dips so we could have the food to ourselves," Chuck grinned.

"Well, as soon as they start the *kampais,* why don't you propose a toast to Kim Dae Jung," I suggested. "That will force the Koreans to leave." (The United States was exerting strong pressure on Korea that month to commute Kim Dae Jung's death sentence.) "Then Mary could propose a toast to Jiang Qing, Mao's widow? That should get rid of the Chinese." (The trial of the Gang of Four was underway in Beijing.)

"And what will you do?"

"I'll propose a toast to Lech Walesa and Solidarity so the Soviets will have to storm out. Then we can have the raw oysters to ourselves."

But Governor Dogakinai co-opted us, proposing the first toast to the inauguration of the new president of the United States and to the freeing of the hostages in Tehran. We modestly acknowledged the cheers of "*Kampai!*" and diplomatically fought for space at the groaning buffet table with our Korean, Chinese, and Soviet counterparts and a horde of Japanese dignitaries.

"Congratulations!" said a warm voice beside me as I gulped down an oyster.

"Thank you," I said to Galina Roudneva. It was probably not appropriate to accept congratulations from Soviets on the hostages' release since they had done nothing to help alleviate the crisis.

"Happy New Year," I said.

She lifted her glass. "To peace in 1981," she said.

"Peace," I agreed, raising my glass and catching Mr. Piggy's bright eyes over his wife's shoulder. He saluted me with a thimble of sake and grinned. Behind him, huge flakes of snow sifted down beyond the diamond-paned windows, turning the spacious garden behind the governor's mansion into a perfect winter postcard. I was probably not supposed to be drinking to peace with Soviets as long as they were in Afghanistan, but who wanted to spoil the governor's party?

THE SOVIETS APPEARED at certain events—art openings, concerts, selected parties on the social merry-go-round—but we never saw them on the street or in the supermarket. "They give me the creeps," said a friend who lived near their consulate. "They all live together in that one building and they don't hire any Japanese to work for them. They can't go outside Sapporo without permission from the foreign ministry in Tokyo. They must go stir crazy."

Mr. Piggy hinted that his life in Sapporo was indeed dull when we were seated next to each other at a banquet honoring contestants in the Prince Mikasa International Ski Competition. The dinner's organizers had reserved a table for diplomats near the head table. Chuck and Mary were on my right. To my left sat two gentlemen from the Korean consulate general, leaving a single space between us for Mr. Piggy when he came puffing in unfashionably late. The little Korean on his left moved almost into the lap of his colleague so as not to rub elbows with the Russian. For the entire evening he had to snag waiters to serve him as they passed by what looked like an unused place.

"So," said Mr. Piggy, crunching into his hard dinner roll and splattering crumbs and consonants across the table. "Did you go to view the northern territories with your consul?" Chuck had gone to Nemuro the week before to stare across three miles of ocean at the closest of the Soviet-occupied islands that keep the Japanese and Soviets from signing a treaty to formally end World War II.

"No, he didn't take me along," I said. "Have you gone?"

"Hah! Ven I go, it vill be from the Soviet Union, not from Japan!" He pronounced "Japan" with a curled lip, his pug nose quivering. Then he asked me if we had any movies at the American Center he could borrow. "Our vinter evenings are very long," he said. "You must haf some movies. Oh, nothing about vars and killings," he added, referring, I supposed, to the American penchant for such things. "Nice movies. About music and the arts?"

Ordinarily we in the public diplomacy business were thrilled if anyone volunteered to look at our products. But what was protocol here, with the enemy? "Actually, we don't keep movies in Sapporo," I said. "We have lots of videotapes."

He shook his head. "No, I haf projector. Sixteen millimeter. No video things."

"Well, we do have movies in Tokyo. I'll check and see what's available."

We chatted throughout the meal. I asked how Sapporo rated as a posting for a Soviet diplomat. Boring, he said. He would much rather be in Moscow with his children. No one at the Soviet consulate had their children with them, he said. They were all away in school.

Later in the evening he suggested I apply for an assignment in Moscow. "You vould enjoy," he said. "Every night you can go to the ballet, the opera. You can travel freely to Leningrad." I didn't have the heart to point out that, unlike him, I could travel freely anywhere in Japan.

On my right, Mary was whispering to Chuck. "My wife wants to know, Mr. Consul General," said Chuck, "if it is true that you are about to get a new boss?"

"Eh?" grunted Mr. Piggy.

"We heard that Mr. Gromyko will be replaced as foreign minister by Ambassador Dobrynin. Is that true?"

"Hah!" roared Mr. Piggy. "Hah! Hah! That is the same true as that tomorrow Soviet soldiers vill land in Hokkaido. Hah! The same true as that!" He barked in triumph at the aptness of his analogy.

"And when will Soviet troops land in

Hokkaido?" I inquired sweetly.

Mr. Piggy beamed at me and patted my hand. "Ah, my dear, ven that happens, you must come to us at the consulate. Ve vill protect you."

Later in the evening when the master of ceremonies introduced the team from "Soviet Russia," Mr. Piggy became irate. "Soviet Russia?" he muttered to me. "It makes no meaning. Is same to say American Chicago." As the dinner adjourned, he hurried up to lecture the emcee on proper Soviet terminology. The next day the bewildered Japanese told Chuck the Russian was insane.

I checked with my superior in Tokyo about lending movies to the folks at the Soviet consulate.

"Oh!" said my boss, his gulp of surprise coming across loud and clear on the long distance line. "You can tell them the movies are all booked for showings at the other centers."

"I can think up my own lies if the answer is no," I said, "but can't we lend them some films? After all, there are USIS officers in Moscow at this very moment trying to get Russians of Roudnev's rank to look at these same movies. Why not show them here?"

"Hmmm. I suppose you have a point. I'll check upstairs in the political section and get back to you." He never did, and I guess bureaucratic inertia and a desire not to embarrass him kept me from bringing up the subject again. From time to time, Mr. Piggy reminded me that he was waiting to borrow some nice American films. I told him I was looking into it.

MY 12-YEAR OLD DAUGHTER decided she wanted to meet a real live Russian. I told her she already had, that our friend from the Slavic Research Center at Hokkaido University had been born and raised in Moscow.

"I thought he was defective."

"A defector," I corrected, "but a real Russian."

"I want to meet Mr. Piggy. He sounds cute."

Her chance came at a party put on by Ikebana International, the ambitious group that seeks to solve problems of world misunderstanding through arranging flowers. Roudnev caught my daughter's small hand in both of his warm pink paws and held on for a long time. "So you see," he roared, "real live Russian is not bear, yes? I am not bear, am I?"

Kim giggled and shook her head. She finally extricated her hand and moved away, very pleased with herself. Later she confessed, "I wanted to say, 'No, you are cute little pig.' "

I tried to include some mention of Soviet activities in each of my monthly reports to Tokyo. The Reagan budget ax was bound to fall on USIS; heaven forbid the Sapporo American Center be abolished! Without it, how would the good guys know what the evil empire was up to here on the icy frontlines? If nothing else, I could always include a few words about my latest encounter with Mr. Piggy. From time to time, I had significant gossip to report. In January of 1982, for instance, thanks to Soviet coercion in the outlawing of Poland's Solidarity in December, the two Soviet diplomats who showed up at the Sohyo labor federation's New Year's party the next month were ostracized. The buoyant Mr. Piggy had the sense to stay away, sending Gimlet Eyes and another sour puss who spent the evening talking to each other.

Meanwhile, Aoki-san had orchestrated a friendship between me and Kazuko Ozawa, the leading proponent of modern dance in Sapporo. She had taken her troupe on tour in the United States a few years earlier and was now angling for an invitation from the Soviet Union. When she announced the premiere of a new ballet called "I Am a Victim" which portrayed the agonized death by fire from heaven of a rather improbable be-bop youth culture in Hiroshima in August of 1945, her invitation for a trip to Moscow followed quickly.

The Ozawa Dance Troupe were great perpetrators of parties: a party in honor of publication of a booklet recounting their triumphant U.S. tour, a party to celebrate the opening of "I Am a Victim," a bon voyage party before they left for the Soviet Union. Aoki-san and I were there each time, and the Soviets came to the parties in force.

The Soviet contingent and I would start out in opposite corners of the room. Eventually, Galina Roudneva would wander my way for some wary chitchat. I longed to ask this warm, intelligent woman about her life as a Soviet, or what kinds of books she enjoyed, or what her theories were about international issues. But I never strayed from the topic of the moment—the dance and how haunting it had been or what the weather would be like when the troupe was in Moscow.

At the Ozawa send-off party, the young dancers, still in their radioactive make-up and sweat-soaked leotards, surrounded the Soviets and sang two Russian folksongs. Ten massive foreigners stood there, surrounded by a sea of small, dark-haired Japanese, and a tidal wave of emotion seemed to flood the room. I thought it must be that obsessive love of Mother Russia we often forget when we consider the mysteries of the Soviet Union. When the songs were finished, there was not a dry eye in the Soviet contingent. Americans in Japan are constantly besieged by people wanting to speak English or sing "You Are My Sunshine" with us. But how often do Soviets hear a group of Japanese sing in careful Russian a song of their childhood?

In the end, there was a poetic irony to the Ozawa Troupe's Russian tour. They made the trip in November 1982. While they were there, Leonid Brezhnev died, and all but one of their performances were canceled. There seems a certain Chekhovian flavor to the story.

U.S. diplomats are certainly not the only ones who receive instructions regarding proper behavior toward third-country counterparts. Mr. Piggy was not so jovial and outgoing the times I saw him in the final year of my Sapporo sojourn. Sometimes I fantasized about refurbishing my image as a spy. I could ask my Russo-Japanese friends for a few secret lessons in Russian. Then just before I left Sapporo, I would greet Mr. Piggy and Galina in fluent Russian and leave them reeling, wondering what I had heard the past three years. But I thought better of it and wondered if I would have trouble getting a tourist visa to visit the Soviet Union in the future. Was I recorded in their data systems as a suspicious character? Did they really wonder what I had been doing in Sapporo? And what did they think about the story the Japanese press was making so much of, how I was resigning my Foreign Service position to go home to Montana and become a free-lance writer? Was that credible to citizens of a nation where it is illegal to be unemployed?

Early one morning in August of 1983, at the end of Sapporo's brief, intoxicating flirtation with summer, I was the sole U.S. representative at a convocation of local diplomats at the Mitsukoshi Department Store. We were there to open an exhibit sponsored by a Japanese doll-appreciation society. Mr. Piggy bounced into the VIP holding room with a small flock of Soviets, including several teenagers visiting Sapporo on their summer vacations. He proudly introduced his son, a sophomore at the University of Moscow, majoring in Chinese studies.

Tall and serious, young Roudnev exchanged solemn pleasantries in Mandarin with the Chinese consul general while the other Chinese applauded. Then he and the other teenagers tried out their polite English on me. Again I was embarrassed that I knew no Russian. I wished I could take his hand and say, "You see? We Americans are not demons!" I wished I could tell him how much I had enjoyed meeting his parents, sparring with them here on this island where our spheres of interest seemed to intersect. Instead, I chattered in Japanese with a Chinese vice consul while my mind raced with curiosity about these young Russians. What on earth did they make of Japan? How could they reconcile their education on the evils of capitalism with the consumer wonderland they had sailed through on eight escalators en route to the top floor of the Mitsukoshi Department Store?

After delaying the ceremony for 10 minutes in futile hope that the Koreans would arrive, the sponsors of the doll show led us out to the exhibition hall. An elaborate red ribbon spanned the entrance, and the Chinese consul general, Mr. Piggy, and I were each handed a pair of shiny scissors. On the whispered count of "*Ichi, ni, san!*" we snipped the ribbon and fragments floated to the floor. The small audience moved in to see the show.

It was dominated by a long central table bearing 57 dolls donated to the sponsors by Mr. Piggy. Proudly he led the Japanese dignitaries on a tour of the Soviet Union, pointing out that each doll represented a different Soviet ethnic group, from the Estonians in the west to the Kamchadal in the east. I roamed around the hall, puzzling out the Japanese labels, wondering if Mr. Piggy dreamed of a future in which the dolls of Poland and Hungary and Czechoslovakia would join those on his central table. I tried to ignore the pitiful collection that represented the United States. Someone had found a plastic hula dancer with a skirt of Easter-basket grass, a baby-doll in a cowboy outfit, and two or three skimpily-dressed Barbies. I lingered over the lovely Soviet dolls. Mr. Piggy had given the show 57 dolls; I would not have dared to ask for funds for one. Why should the United States buy dolls? Most Japanese who viewed this show would visit Hawaii and the rest of the United

States sometime in their lives. But those 57 dolls might be the most they would ever see about the Soviet Union.

A WEEK LATER, on September 1, a Soviet Mig fighter shot down KAL Flight 007, and it happened that in my last four months in Sapporo, I never again crossed verbal swords with Mr. Piggy. I saw him only once more, across the room at the October First National Day celebration at the Chinese consulate general.

I had always thought we should talk to the Soviets as much as possible. As long as they're talking to us, I said, they aren't pushing any buttons or starting any wars. But I didn't know what to say to this chubby, avuncular man whose nation shot innocent airline passengers out of the night sky. I didn't want to hear him lie or listen to him recite instances of U.S. spying in the Soviet Far East. But I didn't see how I could talk to him and not mention it, so I stayed on the far side of the room, beside the glass doors that overlooked a garden where an almost invisible woven wire fence fended off the thick forest on the hillside beyond. The trees were just beginning to kindle another glorious Sapporo autumn, one last time for me. I watched a while as Mr. Piggy and Galina approached people and tried to make small talk. The Japanese seemed to be avoiding the Roudnevs. Another tidbit for Tokyo, I supposed.

Ten weeks later, I left Sapporo. I knew I was doing the right thing for me, resigning from the Foreign Service. And yet there was a sense of regret, of incompleteness, of not having realized all the possibilities of my job in particular and diplomacy in general. Perhaps, in three years, I had contributed something to the relationship between the United States and Japan. But what of that ultimately crucial relationship between two superpowers poised to blast each other and the very face of the earth into oblivion? What had any of us in the diplomatic circus been able to do about that?

Sayonara, Galina. Perhaps there will be a day yet when we can have that talk about the books we love.

And *dosvedanya,* Mr. Piggy. May we live in a world some day where our children can sit down together and talk about what is in their hearts. □

EXCHANGE

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PEOPLE

Urgent: Apply Now For AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships

This is scholarship application time, when requests for scholarship assistance must be made *immediately* if you are to meet the deadline of February 15, 1986. On that date, all materials must be received in the office of the AFSA Scholarship Programs Administrator, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. To qualify for consideration in the AFSA/AAFSW Merit Award program, the dependent Foreign Service student must be graduating from high school in 1986. This competition is based solely on academic excellence, and students are required to submit their SAT scores, rank in class, grade point average, transcripts for four years (including the first semester of the 12th grade), a personal essay, a list of extracurricular activities, and one or two references. All completed applications received by February 15, 1986, will be reviewed by volunteer panels to determine approximately 22 winners who will receive $500 each. The announcement of the winners will be made on May 1.

The Financial Aid Scholarships are given for full-time undergraduate study in the United States to qualified dependent Foreign Service students, based solely on financial need. All applicants must file a financial aid form with the College Scholarship Service in Princeton or Berkeley, for which a fee is charged. Both the AFSA application and the CSS form are available from the AFSA Scholarship Programs Administrator at the above address. The same February 15 deadline applies. Qualified students should request these forms immediately.

Both the Merit Awards and the Financial Aid Scholarships are available only to qualified dependent children of Foreign Service personnel who are serving or have served abroad in agencies of the U.S. government operating under the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1980. It is not necessary to be a member of either AFSA or AAFSW. Personnel in the lower grades are encouraged to apply. Remember the deadline is *February 15*.

Deaths

EDWARD CASTLEMAN, a retired Foreign Service officer in AID, died November 6 at his home in Bethesda, Maryland, following a heart attack. He was 68.

Mr. Castleman was graduated from George Washington University. He served in the Army during World War II. He left the Army in the 1940s to join the Foreign Service as a technical assistance program officer in El Salvador. He later became an administrator of foreign assistance programs for the Department of the Interior and other government agencies until joining AID when the agency was formed. He served in Ecuador and Surinam and as director of AID training in Washington. He retired from Saigon in 1974.

Survivors include his wife, Mildred Ruth, of Bethesda; a daughter, Lynn McNair, of San Francisco; a son, Craig Castleman, of New York City; and three sisters, Evelyn Volkman, of Silver Spring, Maryland; Rene Ferber, of Chevy Chase, Maryland; and Betty Castleman, of New York City.

JOHN W. CLARE, a retired Foreign Service officer and Army major, died of emphysema November 23 at Montgomery General Hospital. He was 65.

Mr. Clare entered the Army in 1938 and received an infantry commission in 1942. He served in Iceland and the Pacific during World War II. He also served in South Korea during the conflict there and received a Purple Heart. In the early 1960s, he was assigned to Vietnam. In addition to the Purple Heart, he earned three Army Commendation Medals and the Combat Infantryman's Badge.

He retired from the Army in 1965 and joined the Foreign Service. He served in Chad, the Ivory Coast, Colombia, and Japan. He was an aide at international conferences to Secretaries of State William Rogers, Henry Kissinger, and Cyrus Vance. He was a recipient of the State Department's Superior Honor Award.

Mr. Clare was a member of the Disabled American Veterans, the Second Infantry Officers Association, and the Society of the Fifth Division.

Survivors include his wife, Barbara, of Silver Spring; a daughter, Nancy McNerney, of Rockville; a son, Jeffrey B., of Charlotte, North Carolina; a brother, Eldon R., of Detroit; and a grandchild.

WILLIAM F. KEOUGH, one of the Americans taken hostage at the U.S. embassy in Iran, died at his home in Washington November 27 from amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease. He was 44.

Mr. Keough was superintendent of the American International School in Islamabad and was visiting the embassy in Tehran when it was seized. More recently, he was director of overseas schools for the Department of Education.

WILLIAM L. SMYSER, a retired Foreign Service officer, died October 7 at Marin General Hospital in Sausalito, California. He was 84.

Mr. Smyser was a magna cum laude graduate of Harvard University. He worked for the Foreign Service for 18 years, serving in Vienna, Brussels, Berlin, Madrid, Prague, Bordeaux, and Bangkok. Following his retirement in 1951, he was on the staff of the Wharton School of Finance at the University of Pennsylvania. He also spoke before womens' clubs, educational associations, universities, colleges, business groups, and at public forums.

He wrote for the *National Geographic, The Century, This Week,* and *Reader's Digest*. He was a fellow of the Royal Geographic Society.

Survivors include his wife, Phyllis; two sons, Lair Smyser and Richard Smyser; and two daughters, Joy Olney and Helga Smyser.

Births

Jonathan Borden Reams was born to JOANNE and PETER REAMS on March 24, 1985, at St. Mary's Hospital in London. The father is a political officer serving in London and the son of Borden Reams, who was ambassador to the Republic of the Ivory Coast and to the Republics of Dahomy, Niger, and Upper Volta. The mother is a former editor of *Background Notes* in the Bureau of Public Affairs at the State Department.

Elizabeth Kate Tyston was born November 19 to SYDNEE LEE MCENERNEY TYSON, a former Foreign Service officer, and DONALD R. TYSON, consul general in Managua, Nicaragua.

Appointment

CLINT E. SMITH, a retired Foreign Service officer, has been named program officer at the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation in Menlo Park, California. He will be responsible for the foundation's grants in the area of education. Mr. Smith retired from the Foreign Service in 1981 to become a senior research associate and lecturer at Stanford University.

ASSOCIATION NEWS

Security won't wag State's tail, Lamb tells Association leaders

"There is a lot of concern that we have a security tail wagging a department dog," Coordinator for Diplomatic Security Robert Lamb told a combined meeting of the AFSA Governing Board and its standing committees for State, AID, and USIA in early December. "Our job is to complement and assist you in doing real program responsibilities."

While expressing support for the department's efforts to improve security for Foreign Service employees, several of those present at the meeting questioned the security coordinator on key aspects of the program.

Lamb said some believe that the need for separate standards for security officers would require that they not be included in the Association bargaining unit. He also expressed concern that the need to respond to security threats quickly could mean exceptions to open assignments. Several persons present observed that security officers are in the bargaining unit at present, and that law enforcement officials are almost universally covered by union rights that respect the special requirements entailed in their jobs. "Frankly, we've made no decision," Lamb told the meeting.

The issue of responsibility for control of security operations also caused problems. Lamb reported that the heads of AID and USIA at first wanted State to only set standards, not mandate programs. "This was not acceptable to us—we want one person in charge," the secretary of state, said Lamb. He indicated that two other agencies now agree that responsibility will rest with the secretary.

The persons at the meeting were also concerned with the personal accountability in all significant terrorist incidents called for by the Advisory Panel on Overseas Security, also known as the Inman panel. Lamb said that Congress wants accountability and that there will be a formal procedure established. AFSA will attempt to ensure that due process is followed in any accountability investigations, and that standards for accountability be established before a terrorist incident rather than attempt to find a scapegoat afterwards.

Lamb said that there will be some post closings because of security, but "security is not going to drive programs." In addition, he said, "We will not accept the idea that if a post is not politically important, we won't protect it." He observed that post closings had occurred throughout the department's history. Several persons questioned his statement that security would require that some missions be moved out of downtown areas. Objections in particular were raised that this would make access to foreign ministries difficult, as well as inconvenience foreign nationals who need to visit.



Lamb meets Lamberty: Security Coordinator Robert Lamb (left) and AFSA President Gerald K. Lamberty (next to him) confer at a recent meeting that brought together the head of the new Bureau of Security with top Association officials.

Lamb said that the new Bureau for Security had been formally established but that the Diplomatic Security Service within it was still not fully operational. He said that there would be four deputy assistant secretaries, one of whom would direct the DSS, one for resources, one for policy and counterterrorism, and one for operations. He said that the building program would cost $3.2 billion, and that great attention would also be paid to residential, personal, and technical security.

AID Standing gets overview but few details on personnel actions

An overview on recent and ongoing agency personnel actions was provided at a recent meeting AFSA's AID Standing Committee held with Assistant Administrator for Management R.T. Rollis, but details on conversions and new hires requested by the committee remained unclear.

Rollis noted a net reduction of 300 U.S. direct-hire positions since 1981, with the cuts coming primarily from Washington positions and among GS employees. The overseas presence has remained relatively stable, down 60 by next September, at which point there will be 1428 agency employees outside the country. As of October, 60 Civil Service employees were holding Foreign Service positions, and 71 Foreign Service employees (mostly secretaries) were in Civil Service positions.

The reduction for fiscal years 1985–86 requires a further cut of 250 employees, which management is attempting to meet through attrition and a hiring freeze. Some 187 agency employees retired in the first nine months of 1985, but 78 freeze exceptions were hired during the same period. Although Rollis noted that some new hires are in shortage categories, accountants and contract officers, for instance, he did not provide details on categories as requested by the committee. He also did not specify the numbers and categories of conversions from GS to FS positions during the same period.

If the rate of attrition continues and the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction bill does not require additional severe budget cuts for AID in this fiscal year and the next, management might consider a limited hiring program early this year. Some 67 current international development interns and 32 others on complement must be absorbed in staffing patterns this year; by this spring, all the IDIs will be absorbed. The standing committee believes that the hiring freeze may result in difficulties in staffing mission positions.

Current legislation in the Senate includes add-ons of $1.2 million for the IDI program and $2.5 million for overseas school activities. Also included are a budget earmarking of $6 million for inspector general activities, as well as a limit of 19 positions for the External Affairs Office, which currently has a staff of 27.

Rollis also reported on a recently established Position Stabilization Committee that will be asked to rule on requested position changes for a 90-day period during the open assignment bidding process. This is supposed to ensure better planning for personnel needs and decrease the number of arbitrary position deletions during the open assignment process.

Siracusa gift boosts AFSA Scholarships

A large donation to the AFSA Scholarship Fund from Ernest V. Siracusa of San Clemente, California, retired ambassador and long-time Association member, will establish two perpetual scholarships named for him and for his wife, Jacq Bachman Siracusa. This donation brings to 33 the number of named perpetual scholarships given as financial aid awards to full-time undergraduate students, based on need. In the current academic year, 98 financial aid grants and Merit Awards were made to eligible children of Foreign Service personnel through the fund.

Another substantial contribution was given to the Scholarship Fund from Neil Tardio Productions in New York City, to honor the courage and dedication of Foreign Service personnel.

Secretary hired in AFSA office

Sharon Y. "Shay" Morgan has been hired as executive secretary in AFSA's labor-management relations office in the State Department building, Director for Administration Sue B. Schumacher announced. She replaces Demetra Papastrat, who resigned to become a researcher at a health-benefits consulting firm.

Morgan comes to AFSA from a consulting firm, where she worked on site at a government facility. Previous to that she was a computer record technician. In addition to her work in the labor-management office, she serves as secretary to AFSA's Governing Board.

A primer on compensation available to victims of terrorism

Recent increases in acts of terrorism and kidnaping directed against Americans serve to remind Foreign Service employees of the dangers they face while posted abroad. Most recently, the hijacking episode in Malta and its tragic loss of life illustrate that Americans are often in danger of being singled out as victims by publicity-seeking terrorist organizations. Reality and prudence dictate that, although an uncomfortable subject, Foreign Service employees and their families should be aware of the benefits available to them should they become disabled, killed, or otherwise victims of terrorist acts.

Foreign Service personnel and their families who are disabled or killed by acts of terrorism are provided certain benefits under the Foreign Service Act and its implementing regulations. These include disability and survivor benefits; a special death-in-service gratuity equal to one year's salary; and health care treatment for injury or illness incurred while abroad, with coverage available to the employee and family members. Employees may also qualify for Workers Compensation and AFSA's Beirut Memorial Scholarship, established by AFSA in memory of the victims of the embassy bombing and awarded to dependents of terrorism victims. In addition, employees may buy Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (known as FEGLI) or AFSA accident insurance coverage. Finally, Congress is currently considering a bill that would specifically compensate victims of terrorism, retroactive to Iran. ***(Continued p. 45)***

Life & Love in the Foreign Service

"Since medical practitioners are scarce, dental care is provided by the regional medical staff using local facilities."—Post Report George Papoon, Washington

Winners of the monthly LIFE & LOVE contest receive a certificate for a free lunch for two at the Foreign Service Club. Honorable mentions receive a free carafe of wine with a meal.

Mail entries to:
LIFE & LOVE #29
AFSA
2101 E Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20037
Competition deadline is February 15

Competition #29

Under the Foreign Service Act, any employee who has at least five years of service credit toward retirement under the Foreign Service system and who becomes totally disabled or incapacitated for useful and efficient service by reason of disease, illness, or injury is eligible for disability retirement. The cause of the disability or incapacity cannot be "due to vicious habit, intemperance, or willful conduct" on the employees's part.

Disability retirement may be initiated either by the employee or by the foreign affairs agency. An "Application for Retirement" is submitted to the agency's personnel office, describing the disability and fully explaining how it affects performance of duties. Personnel, in turn, consults with the Office of Medical Services, schedules any medical examinations, and forwards the application to the agency's retirement section.

Any eligible employee who retires after 20 or more years of service due to a disability is entitled to an annuity equal to two percent of basic salary for the highest three consecutive years of service credit multiplied by the number of years of service credit, not to exceed 35 years. Employees with less than 20 years but at least five will be computed on the basis of 20 years. If at least one but less than five years of service have been completed, the employee receives his retirement contribution up to the separation date, plus interest of three percent.

If the employee dies in active service, a survivor annuity is payable to a surviving spouse, child, or designated beneficiary. The annuity for a surviving spouse of an employee with 3–20 years' service equals 55 percent of the retirement annuity computed by the above formula. A beneficiary of an employee with less than three years service receives an annuity computed on the basis of 55 percent of the average salary for the entire period. To qualify, the deceased needs 18 months' service credit toward retirement. Eligible children are entitled to an additional annuity.

Survivors will automatically continue coverage under Federal Employee Health Benefits health insurance, provided the employee and his or her family were enrolled at the time of death. Survivors may be eligible for FEGLI optional life insurance benefits, and employees covered under the AFSA group accident insurance plan are eligible to receive accidental death and dismemberment benefits. Coverage is available up to $300,000. Under the policy, terrorism is considered a warlike act, meaning that losses will be covered for one-half the principal sum amount. All AFSA members and spouses, including dependents up to age 25, are eligible for coverage under the plan. The applicants must be under 70 years old.

Finally, the survivors are entitled to any unpaid salary, allowances, and annual leave credit due to the employee at the time of death.

The Foreign Service retirement system is not the only financial benefit available in cases of disability and death. **Employees and survivors have the option of forgoing compensation under the Foreign Service system and electing to receive instead payment through the Department of Labor's Office of Worker Compensation Programs—BEC.** Persons eligible may choose either one system or the other, but not both. Payment is authorized for "disability or death resulting from personal injuries sustained in performance of duty, including disease, proximately caused by the employment." An exception is made for injury or death by willful misconduct, intention to bring injury or death to oneself or another, or when intoxication is a factor. Workers Compensation equals 50 percent of the employee's salary at the time of death, which is generally higher than the amount received through Foreign Service retirement. However, the paperwork required is more voluminous, normally resulting in longer periods of time before payments are made. Also, the burden of proving eligibility rests with the employee or claimant.

To establish eligibility for compensation benefits, the injured employee, or someone acting on his or her behalf, should notify the employee's official superior in writing within 48 hours of the injury. Claims for compensation are to be made to BEC within 60 days after the injury, but can be extended for up to one year if valid reasons exist; compensation claims for death as a result of on-the-job injury must be made within one year. Claim forms should be sent in duplicate by the supervisor or another appropriate official for transmission to BEC. If a favorable determination is reached, compensation would begin once pay status ends.

Claims filed for injuries or death due to acts of terrorism must be decided on a case by case basis, according to BEC, because too many potential factors can come into play, making generalizations about eligibility difficult. Much depends on where and when the terrorist act occurs. Though claims for injuries or death while performing official duties, either at post or on an outside work site, will usually be decided favorably, compensation for injuries at a personal residence, while in travel, or away from post but still overseas or in the host country are not as easily determined. All relevant factors must be considered to see if injuries in these situation are "sustained in performance of duty." Investigations can be quite lengthy and can result in further delays in granting compensation.

Survivors certified by BEC as eligible for Workers Compensation are also entitled to payment of a special death-in-service benefit from their employing agency. This death gratuity, equal to one year's salary at the time of death, is available to all survivors who qualify for Workers Compensation, "without regard to whether such survivor elects to waive [Workers Compensation]." In other words, the gratuity is a one-time gift additional to other benefits paid even if the survivor chooses an annuity under the Foreign Service system, as long as the survivor is determined as eligible to receive compensation through BEC. To receive the gratuity, a written request must be sent through the employing agency to BEC along with the Workers Compensation forms. Payment is first made to the surviving spouse; next, to a child or children in equal shares if no spouse survives; then to dependent parent or parents, if there is no spouse or child.

As the above discussion illustrates, the benefits due a disabled employee or his survivors can be a complex, detailed process. For further information, consult the retirement section of your agency.

The increase in acts of terrorism directed against Americans, and the growing awareness of the lack of specific coverage available to its victims, has prompted Congress to consider legislation designed to alleviate financial hardships. **The Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act, H.R. 2851, would provide benefits for government employees, including those in the Foreign Service, who are captured, kipnaped, or otherwise victims of hostile actions directed against the United States, whether the actions occur abroad or in this country.**

Introduced by Representative Patricia Schroeder (D.-Colorado), the act would authorize payment of educational, medical, disability, death, and other benefits to employees killed, injured, or taken hostage as a result of the hostile action and to their families. Payment would come from an interest-bearing trust fund, and compensation would be set at a per-diem rate to be determined later. Whether this amount will be in addition to any other benefit received or set off against those amounts has not yet been specified.

H.R. 2851 was recently reported out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and sent to the Appropriations Committee, where funding will be considered in the spring. From there it proceeds to the floor, where some opposition is expected, especially to the proposed per-diem rate. AFSA will monitor the bill's progress and inform members of any changes in its status or provisions. But unless or until Congress takes up this issue, Foreign Service personnel will be restricted to compensation through the two systems currently in place.

—GERRY KUNCIO

AFSA'S 1985 FOREIGN SERVICE TAX GUIDE

By SABINE SISK

AFSA'S 1985 FOREIGN SERVICE TAX GUIDE addresses provisions of special interest to Foreign Service employees in a general manner and does not presume to do more than that. For specific questions or assistance contact your accountant or AFSA's tax consultants, Robert N. Dussell and his associate Arthur Granberg, who operate Tax Matters at 3601 North Fairfax Drive, Arlington, Virginia 22201, (703) 841-0158. Mr. Dussell is a retired Foreign Service officer and an enrolled federal tax agent who is certified to act as legal representative in all tax matters. For many years now we have relied on his professional advice and expertise in preparing this guide.

Sabine Sisk, author of the tax article, is the director of AFSA's member services.

The tax return you will file for income earned in 1986 may be vastly different if tax reform becomes law. The Form 1040 you file this April 15, however, has just a few but nonetheless significant changes for the average Foreign Service family.

Some examples: non-itemizers may now deduct 50 percent of their charitable contributions. Alimony will qualify as earned income and may therefore be counted to qualify for an IRA. The car mileage allowance has gone up ½ of a cent to 21¢ a mile. Some provisions, such as the energy tax credit and the nontaxable utility dividend reinvestment provisions, are being phased out after 1985. The IRS has determined that billions of dollars of revenue are lost annually due to tax cheaters and has begun to institute a number of enforcement procedures, including mandatory auditing of tax shelters, rental-income schedules, and the reporting of capital gains and losses. Details on these changes and other questions of interest to the ever-mobile Foreign Service family at tax time are presented below.

Capital Gains

To encourage more investment by taxpayers, capital investments now qualify for long-term capital gains treatment at the lower tax rate after having been held for only six months instead of 12. Some specifics:

Tax Deferral and Exclusions. Under the Residence Replacement Rule (see Form 2119) you may *defer* the capital gains on the sale of your principal residence if you purchase a new home of equal or greater value within two years (four if overseas) prior to or after sale of the old residence. Rental property is considered investment property and does not qualify for the deferral. Foreign Service employees are affected by this caveat when their home is rented during overseas service. One Foreign Service member took this issue to tax court after the IRS denied the deferral provisions. In *Trisko* v. *Commissioner* (1972) the court disagreed with the IRS and held that the personal residence of a Foreign Service employee retains that status even if temporarily (six years in the *Trisko* case) rented prior to sale. In distinguishing personal residence from investment property, the court applied the following tests:

- Is the property the taxpayer's principal residence?
- Did the taxpayer reside in the property prior to being sent abroad?
- Did the taxpayer intend to return to the residence upon completion of overseas duty?

A copy of the *Trisko* decision may be requested from AFSA.

The deferral rule may be used repeatedly. In addition, taxpayers 55 years and older are granted a *one-time* tax *exclusion* (see Form 2119) of up to $125,000 of the profit realized after sale of the home. There is no requirement to purchase another home to qualify for the exclusion. However, the tax code provides that the taxpayer must have owned and lived in the residence for three of the five years prior to the sale. Foreign Service personnel often cannot meet this requirement due to their overseas service. Unlike the *Trisko* case, this issue has never been tested in court. We would like to hear from affected Foreign Service personnel who were denied the exclusion and who are considering court action.

The IRS will not give advance rulings on this issue. Representatives of its international division have told AFSA that exceptions may be possible and that Foreign Service members might receive favorable treatment if they reoccupy the residence for at least part of the three-year period. We would like to hear about the experience Foreign Service members have had in this area. An AFSA request two years ago for a ruling exempting Foreign Service personnel was not successful. The IRS maintains that an amendment to the code is required to provide relief for special employment categories that cannot meet the residency test.

Real Estate Investments. We receive numerous inquiries about how to calculate capital gains from sale of investment property. Here is an example:

Your capital gain, or profit, is the difference between the "adjusted cost basis" and "adjusted sales price." The adjusted cost basis is the price paid for the property plus major improvements during ownership, minus depreciation claimed on annual returns. The sales price is your gross sales price minus selling costs such as real estate commissions and closing costs.

If you purchased the property for $80,000, made $7,000 in capital improvements, and deducted $25,000 for depreciation, your adjusted cost basis would be $62,000. If you sold the property for $150,000 and sales costs were $11,000, your net or adjusted sales price would be $139,000. Subtract from that the $62,000 adjusted cost, and your long-term capital gain is $77,000. Only 40 percent of capital gains on investments held for more than six months are subject to a tax, or $30,800 in this example. The amount depends on the bracket you are in but cannot be more than 20 percent of the total gain (or one half of the 40-percent taxable portion). Therefore, the maximum tax would be $15,400. IRS Form 4797 may be used as a guide. The gain is shown on Schedule D and reported as income on Line 13 of the 1040.

In this example, however, the Alternate Minimum Tax would be triggered, since the 60 percent of $77,000 not taxed as a capital gain is a tax "preference" item of $46,200. (See Line 22 of Form 1040.) The Alternative Minimum Tax is discussed below.

By the way, if your capital gains increase your total tax liability for the year by more than 20 percent over withholding, the IRS can impose a penalty if you wait until April 15 or longer to file. It would be to your advantage to pay the capital gains tax by filing an estimated tax return immediately after the sale of the house.

Alternative Minimum Tax

The AMT applies to taxpayers with above-average preference income items, such as large itemized deductions, capital gains, depletion, accelerated depreciation, etc., in excess of $40,000 for joint returns or $30,000 for single. See Form 6251 for details. The excess is taxed at a flat 20-percent rate. The law also provides that estimated tax payments be made for the AMT.

Depreciation

The recovery period for writing off real estate investments through depreciation (Accelerated Cost Recovery System, or ACRS) is 18 years for property purchased after March 15, 1984. Property bought before that date but after December 31, 1980, may be depreciated over 15 years. If you sold property in 1985 through an installment sale, depreciation recapture is reportable as income in the year of sale, even if no proceeds were received in 1985. See Form 6252 for details.

Representation and OREs

Foreign Service personnel may deduct representation expenses in excess of allowances or reimbursement, provided that:

- Such expenses are required of the employee in accordance with his or her rank and grade, and these requirements are included in the job description;
- Such expenses would be reimbursable if the employing agency had sufficient funds for such payments;
- A certificate is obtained from an authorized officer attesting that such expenses were incurred for the benefit of the United States and that due to insufficient funds no reimbursements were possible. This certificate must be attached to the tax return. An itemized list showing the date and type of expenses, as well as their relationship to Foreign Service activities, should also be attached.

In 1984 the IRS issued an individual ruling for a Foreign Service member allowing him to deduct certain representation expenses incurred by his spouse and other family members. The favorable ruling is in part based on Section 905 of the Foreign Service Act, which provides for payment of representation expenses to family members. The ruling is directed only to the individual who had requested it and may not be used as precedent. Foreign Service members may contact AFSA for guidance and a copy of the ruling.

Under Revenue Ruling 84-86, Foreign Service officers subject to Official Residence Expenses may exclude from their gross income the five percent the government deducts from their salary to apply against OREs. The deduction is reported as an adjustment to income on Form 2106. Since the form has not been designed for this specific purpose, you will have to improvise somewhat. Delete the reference to "outside salesperson" and enter the salary contribution on that line with explanation, documentation, and reference to Revenue Ruling 84-86. In addition, submit a statement from a certifying officer to the effect that:

- You occupied a senior position and that the agency defrayed your OREs; and
- That five percent of your gross income was deducted from salary but was included on the W-2 form.

Amended returns may be filed on Form 1040X up to three years from the date of the original return. Copies of the ruling may be requested from AFSA.

Ordinary trade and business expenses of a Foreign Service employee in excess of any reimbursements are also deductible. These cover items such as AFSA dues, professional publications, business cards, and the like, as long as the records show them to be directly connected with the employee's profession. Remember, such expenses are only allowed when the taxpayer uses Schedule A, itemized deductions.

Medical Deductions

Medical deductions, including medical insurance paid by you, are limited to the excess over five percent of adjusted gross income. The cost of a diet or exercise program is also deductible if accompanied by a physician's statement that such treatment was recommended for a medical condition. Lodging expenses of a taxpayer who must travel away from home for specialized or otherwise unavailable medical treatment is deductible up to $50 a night. This also applies to a person accompanying a patient, such as a parent traveling with a sick child. No hospitalization is required to claim this deduction.

Working Couple Credit

Ten percent of the income of the lower-paid spouse, up to $3000, is allowed. The credit must be adjusted for any deductions claimed by the lower-paid spouse, such as an IRA, moving expenses, etc. Adjusted gross income is computed on Form 1040W. The deduction may be claimed even if you don't itemize.

Divorce and Alimony

Transfer of property between spouses as a result of divorce is no longer treated as a taxable loss or gain if not divided equally. Alimony income qualifies as earned income for purposes of qualifying for an IRA.

Charitable Deductions

As of 1985, non-cash contributions in excess of $500 must be supported with documentation from the charitable institution and reported on Form 8283 to be attached to your 1040. Taxpayers who do not

itemize may deduct 50 percent of their contributions. There is no maximum to the amount of contributions, but if over $5000, a certified appraisal of the donated items is mandatory as part of Form 8283.

Moving Expenses

Unreimbursed moving expenses may be deducted if the move was necessary to begin work in a new location. For Foreign Service personnel this would apply to costs for shipping household effects in excess of the weight allowance, storage expenses, shipment of pets and second automobiles, and travel expenses in excess of per diem or other travel and transfer allowances. It also includes costs incurred in the sale or purchase of a residence as the result of a change in job location. The same applies to costs incurred by leasing a home. Also deductible are broker commissions, lawyer fees, closing costs, other fees, and points—to the extent not claimed as interest or used to establish adjusted sales price when calculating capital gains. Foreign Service personnel should analyze their situation to see which method gives the best tax advantage.

The rules for foreign moves are more generous than for domestic transfers. However, a move from abroad to the United States does not qualify as a foreign move unless it is in connection with bona-fide retirement or the move of a spouse or dependent of a deceased person whose principal place of work was outside the United States at the time of death. There are limitations to the maximum amounts allowable. See instructions on Form 3903 for domestic and Form 3903F for foreign moves.

Job-Hunting Expenses

The following expenses in connection with the search for a new job in the same or similar trade or profession of previous employment may be deducted:

- The cost of resumes, stationery, printing, postage, etc.
- Job counseling, testing, or employment-agency fees.
- Long-distance calls to set up appointments, etc.
- Overnight expenses in connection with job interviews, as well as meals, lodging, and travel.

IRAs

The amount contributed to an IRA results in an immediate tax reduction, and interest accumulates tax free until withdrawal. For example, if you are in the 35-percent tax bracket, a $2000 contribution would lower your taxes by about $700. A non-working spouse may establish an IRA up to $250. The limitation to non-working spouses doesn't apply if alimony was received, since alimony qualifies as earned income for the purpose of making IRA contributions. IRA funds may not be withdrawn until age 59-½ without incurring a 10-percent penalty on the interest and/or the principal withdrawn, plus tax liability on the amount withdrawn, unless it is repaid into the same or another IRA or tax-deferred account within 60 days. 1985 contributions must be made by April 15, 1986, even if you have received an extension for filing.

Education and Training

While in salary status, expenses for meals, lodging, books, supplies, and other expenses required for training that are not reimbursed are shown on Schedule 2106 and are normally deductible. Expenses of family members are not deductible. A statement from the director of training or other appropriate official should be attached to the return to show the requirement for the training and its temporary nature, plus the amount of per diem, if any, paid by the agency. A sample statement may be requested from AFSA or the Foreign Service Institute.

Training expenses while on leave without pay taken to enhance professional background for greater responsibility in the Foreign Service are deductible only if a statement attached to your return shows that such full-time study was directly related to improvement of your ability to perform in the Service. The IRS will not permit deductions if they are in any way incurred to meet minimum requirements of your position or to qualify you for a new profession or for the *sole* purpose of obtaining a degree. Unreimbursed evening classes and correspondence courses you have enrolled in to improve your skills for the Foreign Service are also deductible.

Energy Credit

1985 is the last year that the energy credit is allowed, unless the final version of the 1986 Tax Simplification Act contains new provisions. A maximum credit of $300 (15 percent of $2000) is allowed. Any balance not used in previous years can be claimed up to the $300 maximum. See Form 5695 for details.

Political Contributions

A political donation credit of 50 percent of the first $200 in donations is allowed on joint returns. Single returns may get the credit at half the joint return amount. You need not itemize to gain this credit.

Interest and Dividends

Only dividend income of $100 ($200 joint) may be excluded. The net interest exclusion, which was scheduled to begin in 1985, was repealed before it ever took place.

Casualty and Theft Losses

The casualty and theft loss provisions have been tightened and include mandatory auditing. Only substantial losses have a chance of qualifying. A deduction is only allowed to the extent that the loss, after insurance reimbursements and minus $100 for each loss, exceeds 10 percent of adjusted gross income.

Foreign-Earned Income

Government employees are not eligible for the exclusion, nor are spouses who perform personal services for a government agency while overseas. As long as an agency has control or supervision over the operation and furnishes space and facilities, American employees are considered government employees subject to federal taxes, regardless of part-time or contract status. This includes American employees of commissary associations. The IRS continues to maintain that commissary associations are U.S. government instrumentalities, because of the government's control over their establishment and operation. Several tax court decisions appear to back this up. In *Morse* v. *United States* (1971) the taxpayer, who had been employed as general manager of a U.S.-employee association, argued that the commissary association was essentially a private organization subject only to very general guidance by the Department of State and the ambassador. The court, however, found that elements of control were retained by the government, including the authority to terminate the association's activities, exclusion of profit, and limitation of membership to government-connected personnel.

There are, however, certain jobs performed by dependents and spouses that qualify for the exclusion even though funds are ulti-

mately paid by the U.S. government. These include certain teaching jobs or performance as an independent contracting business or as a consultant. To be eligible under these circumstances, the individual must have been out of the United States for 330 days during any 12-month period.

Domicile vs. Residence

Domicile is that U.S. state or district that is the taxpayer's permanent place of residence, despite the ownership of property or temporary physical residence in another state or overseas. *Residence* refers to physical presence in a state for all or most of the tax year by a person who may or may not also be domiciled in that state. Courts have held that every U.S. citizen has the right to vote and must, therefore, have a domicile in the United States from which he or she can exercise it. Foreign Service employees abroad are absent only for a fixed period of time with an eventual return to the United States and must therefore have a domicile to return to. Foreign Service members must, therefore, continue to pay taxes to their state of domicile while absent from the state, including assignments abroad.

There are 10 states that do not have any income tax: Alaska, Florida, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, Wyoming, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Tennessee. The last three, however, do tax income from bonds and other investments. In addition, there are some states which, as far as we can tell, exempt income that domiciliaries receive while living outside the state (but not income received within the state). These include Maine, Missouri, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Vermont, and perhaps others. California specifically exempts Foreign Service personnel subject to Senate confirmation from tax if they are California domiciliaries living outside the state.

AFSA is currently updating its state income tax files and will report on state tax and filing requirements in a separate article once our research is complete.

When you move to the Washington area, and assuming you are domiciled in a state other than Virginia, Maryland, or the District of Columbia, you will have to pay the Maryland or Virginia income tax if you are in the state for at least 183 days of the tax year, even though you must also pay taxes to your state of domicile. However, there is a credit allowed by most states so that you would pay as a maximum the higher tax of either your domicile or your state of residence, even though you might be paying some to each state.

Foreign Service personnel residing in the District must pay income taxes, unless they are commissioned and confirmed by the Senate *and* maintain a domicile elsewhere in the United States. This includes commissioned AID officers. The IRS sends copies of 1040s to the state from which they were filed, and if you claimed the exclusion you may hear from the District to ascertain your tax exempt status. You will be asked to provide the legal authority for the exemption. It is 22 United States Code 3942.

Foreign Service personnel claiming the exclusion who own property in the District and also claim the "Homestead Exemption" may have their domicile questioned, since the D.C. government has determined that this exemption only applies to domiciliaries.

A number of Foreign Service employees who file their 1040 from abroad and use the Department of State's pouch address with D.C. zip code 20520 can expect to receive a notice from the District demanding income taxes for the year in question. This happens because, as noted above, the IRS sends copies to the state indicated as the address of the taxpayer on the 1040. The affected employees will then have to prove that they are domiciled elsewhere or do not reside in the District. To avoid having this happen, employees should give their home leave address if possible, or an APO/FPO address if applicable.

When you leave your temporary state of residence, be sure to inform that state's tax department of this fact to avoid later problems. Many states provide a form for this purpose.

If you have a domicile problem, you should carefully review the following factors which are normally considered when a challenging state looks into your status:

- The state where you vote, exercise civil rights, or where your will will be probated;
- The state of birth and schooling under parental control and from which the Foreign Service was entered;
- State of domicile after schooling and from which military service was entered and where veteran's benefits were obtained;
- The state where you or your dependents receive(d) secondary education at in-state tuition rates;
- The state where you maintain family ties, including burial plot and church or civic affiliations;
- The state where you maintain a bank account, own real property, or hold other business investments;
- The state where your car is titled and you hold a valid driver's license;
- The state where you take home leave or to which you intend to return after government service.

None of these factors alone will determine domicile, but each may contribute to a final determination. Even a slight alteration of a single factor, innocent as it may appear at the time, can lead to a change of domicile. For example, you should not vote in the state of temporary residence if it is different from your state of domicile.

For more details on state taxes, please ask the AFSA office for its "State and D.C. Income Taxes" guidelines.

The Audit

Your chance of being audited depends on several factors: Earnings over $50,000 per year about doubles the chance for an audit, as do disproportionate deductions. Then there is the computerized random-selection process.

The best strategy is to prepare your return as if it will be audited. Proper records must be maintained, particularly in areas that are often subject to challenge, such as home-leave deductions, type and number of tax shelters reported, unreported income that is verifiable through the W-2 or 1099, extensive exemptions and tax credits for which little or no supporting documents exist, home office and other business deductions without precise identification of the business purpose. Estimates do not stand up and required documentation should be organized and available. Hang on to those records, although this might be inconvenient for the ever mobile Foreign Service employee. The IRS has three years from the filing date (no time limit if fraud is suspected) to audit your return. If the area of contention was examined the previous two years without a change made in tax liability, request a cancellation of the audit.

Being chosen for an audit may merely mean that your name was drawn by random selection. If unreported income is the problem, however, the IRS may conduct a fraud investigation. In those instances, tax counsel is strongly recommended at once. One factor in the taxpayer's favor is that, unlike a regular audit, the burden of proof is on the IRS in a fraud case.

Audits are normally handled in some combination of three ways: correspondence, office visit, or field investigation. Most taxpayers overseas only face a correspondence audit, at least initially. If a reply is required, do it promptly and submit copies—never originals—of the requested documents. It is not good policy to volunteer added or unrelated information. If the auditor decides an added tax assessment is required—a fancy way of saying "pay up"—do not be pressured into accepting it. Take a few days to think it over and perhaps discuss it with your tax consultant before advising the auditor whether you accept or disagree with the determination.

If you disagree, you have three immediate courses open to you: an informal conference with the auditor's superior, an appellate hearing, and the tax court. As a last attempt, you can pay the tax first "under protest" and then sue for a refund through the courts.

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