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

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

Cover: *No one was selling tee-shirts with George Shultz's picture on it, but for many observers the most dramatic moment at the congressional Iran-contra committees' hearings was the performance of an outraged secretary of state putting diplomacy back on a moral plane. Shultz emerged from the hearings with his opponents in disarray and a new mandate to lead the administration's foreign policy. Our story on a secretary standing at the crossroads of history, along with excerpts from his testimony, starts on page 32.*

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"The Independent Voice of the Foreign Service"

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ASSOCIATION VIEWS

Questions about Immunity

DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY serves the same function for the Foreign Service employee as does the policeman's bullet-proof vest: it allows a vital public service to be performed in areas of great risk. Without it the United States would be foolish to send representatives to the places where it most needs them. Thus we are greatly troubled by recent proposals to radically change this valuable and proven system.

The most recent of these has been put forth by Senator Jesse Helms. Responding to criticism of the current immunity arrangements agreed to in the Vienna Convention of 1961, the senator would remove protection from family and staff members of foreign diplomats posted here who are charged with drug trafficking, violent crimes, or reckless driving. We do not argue that these people should be free to break our laws and get away with it by hiding behind immunity, but that another way should be found to deal with the problem that does not weaken the protection of immunity for our people abroad—as would surely occur as reciprocity is invoked around the world.

Senator Helms's proposal would not affect the immunity of consular and diplomatic officials themselves, but our communicators and secretaries, not to mention our spouses and children, would be subject to legal and political systems that are often sharply at variance with ours or are controlled by states that could use them to harass and intimidate us. Without immunity, what is to prevent an unfriendly country from arresting and imprisoning the spouse of an official who delivers a diplomatic rebuke? Must we return to the days when the messenger who brought unpleasant news had his head sent back home on a plate?

Under the convention, the United States may not take judicial action against a diplomat. But that does not mean that he or she must go unpunished or that justice must be denied the victim. The State Department can declare the perpetrator persona non grata, urge the embassy to waive his or her immunity, or ask the sending state to compensate the victim. In addition, U.S. law has been updated so that foreign missions are now required to insure their drivers for liability, and the State Department can revoke their licenses. A new bill would go even further by creating a system in which victims could be compensated through a special fund when other procedures fail.

We understand the anguish of those who have been unfortunate victims of criminal acts perpetrated by foreign representatives in our country. Diplomatic immunity certainly should not be used as a shield to permit criminal actions. But neither should the remedy be worse than the illness. AFSA is presenting its own proposals to address these concerns while opposing Senator Helms's approach, which will surely limit our ability to do our jobs and put us at risk.

Perry Shankle, President

LETTERS

In Defense of Displays

In a period of declining budgetary resources, USIA must indeed examine its program priorities, as Yale Richmond pointed out [LETTERS, June]. An important conclusion, however, of that examination is that academic exchanges *and* exhibits (as well as publications, performing arts groups, and radio broadcasts) all have distinct and necessary roles in USIA's public diplomacy mission in the Soviet Union. Academic exchanges aim at an elite audience and project long-term effects; exhibits, by contrast, aim at a mass audience, but this does not necessarily mean that visitors are uneducated or unsophisticated.

Few Foreign Service professionals would question the value of academic exchanges as a tool of international programming. The Fulbright exchanges have been effective for 40 years. That's why Congress appropriated $121 million for these programs in the current fiscal year. Exhibits, too, have been effective communicators for over 30 years, and with a worldwide budget of only $16 million, the Exhibits Service is one of USIA's most cost-effective programs.

"Information USA" has had thousands of Soviet visitors waiting in line for up to four hours to see this interactive exhibit on computer technology and the computer revolution in America. During its nine-city, 18-month tour in the Soviet Union, more than two million Soviet visitors will carry away useful information and impressions about American life and values. Our companion publications, the 64-page brochure for visitors and several hundred thousand copies of *America Illustrated*—each to be read by 10 or more people based on our past experience—will be given out. For the cost of $16 million we believe the exhibit accomplishes a great deal. This kind of broad exposure is as important in its own right as the more limited, albeit intense, exposure of participants in the exchange program. After showing in the USSR, "Information USA" may be refurbished or adapted for presentation elsewhere, adding to its utility.

That the exhibit has been more successful in whetting the Soviet appetite for unbiased information about the United States is attested to by Soviet press criticism that the U.S. exhibit was aimed at the average citizen, not the politically acceptable elites; that the guides were not scientists, but Russian-speaking Americans who could talk with visitors on any subject; and that the equipment displayed was not only state-of-the-art innovations, but also average models freely available here, though scarce in the Soviet Union.

As a promotion of national image and achievement, exhibits have few equals in USIA's repertory. We certainly need to exert all effort to make them better, more sharply focused, and more cost effective, but the agency can ill afford to neglect one of its foremost tools of communication. That could be the most objectionable budget priority of all.

WILLIAM K. JONES
Director, USIA Exhibits Service
Washington, D.C.

Apathy

I recently attended AFSA's annual awards ceremony in the Loy Henderson Conference Room. I was embarrassed.

Why? Assuredly not by the awardees—all of whom, I have no doubt, richly deserve this recognition of dedicated professionalism—recipients of the Rivkin, Harriman, Bohlen, and the Sinclaire language awards. No, the recipients of these awards speak for the best of the Foreign Service—class acts, each and every one of them.

I was embarrassed instead by the fact that no more than 75 people were present to applaud them in that large hall, and perhaps a third of that small number from outside State. Embarrassed for those who were present who provide the funds to make these annual awards possible. Embarrassed for Senator Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who came and made a gracious little speech. Embarrassed, too, to hear AFSA President Frank Young announce from the podium that no Herter Award was given this year because only one nomination had been received. But above all, embarrassed for those who did receive awards this year, seeing around them so few of their colleagues in the Service.

Don't we care about distinguished service? These awards are one of the best ways we have of saying to ourselves and to outsiders that the Foreign Service stands for the highest standards of professionalism and integrity, and is proud to say so. Too busy to attend? Surely a poor excuse; the kind of skill these awardees represent is, after all, what gives the Service whatever standards of efficiency and productiveness we claim. Declining morale generally? If so, this is no way to do something about it.

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bols, meant to reach beyond the awardees themselves, to the kind of public service that we profess and want to be. We demean all of that if we don't make it publicly clear that we care.

L. BRUCE LAINGEN
Foreign Service Officer, retired
Washington, D.C.

Included with member copies this month, for the first time, is an application form for the Rivkin, Harriman, Herter, and Bohlen awards. In addition, the AFSA Governing Board is examining ways of improving communications with the Washington members, including announcements of events such as the awards ceremony.—ED.

Den of Naiveté

I refer to the article "Dinner and Opium" in the July/August issue by Mary Sanford, wife of our cultural attaché to Thailand. In both her and her husband it revealed an incredible naiveté, if not stupidity.

So opium is legal in Thailand, so their host is "highly respected," so, as he explained to them, "an opium den is a peaceful, relaxing place, pleasant after a week hard at work," so we in the West really didn't understand; anyone trying the stuff and getting sick needed "guidance" and better-quality opium, etc., ad nauseum. *Observing* an opium den in Bangkok is one thing—I did this myself when I was posted there over 30 years ago—but partaking of the stuff and swallowing the line they were being handed is something else. This inquisitive couple might well have visited, as I did, a detention center for opium where I went with Macao's chief of police years ago. They came in looking like human skeletons. Or, perhaps, when the Sanfords return to the United States from the Golden Triangle, they might investigate their own culture a little deeper and learn more about both the ravages of drugs, including opium, and our efforts to combat this menace at home and abroad.

Really, and exactly what is the JOURNAL trying to prove, running a piece of garbage like this?

EARL J. WILSON
Foreign Service
Information Officer, retired
Potomac, Maryland

Despite the writer's contention, Ms. Sanford describes in detail the deleterious effects of the drug: "Many [of the men in the den] were strikingly emaciated." And: "Detailed and graphic as they [newspaper articles about opium withdrawal] were, they were less appalling than the account...of an American friend's Chinese cook's...excruciating withdrawal as he lay vomiting, sweating, screaming, convulsed, and writhing on his cot." Incidentally, the Sanfords left post in Bangkok many years before the story was written.—ED.

HOME LEAVE: A Survival Plan

Life in the Foreign Service, though often challenging, has some benefits. One of these benefits is "HOME LEAVE", a chance to remain current with socio-political changes back home and let your family rediscover their own nationality. But this golden opportunity is not without its logistical problems. Where to establish "home base" for the two to three months in the U.S.?

You may own a house in the Washington area, but it's probably rented. Staying with family and friends for long periods has very large drawbacks. (Guests are like fish; after a couple of days they begin to smell.) Hotels are prohibitively expensive.

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am-bas-sa-dor

Surely the Foreign Service can use a little bit of irreverence from time to time as an antidote to such ponderous questions as "What is the role of the American ambassador in the modern world of rapid communications, global responsibilities, and an increasing interdependence?" I offer the following contribution for my colleagues' consideration, quoted from *A Concise Etymological Dictionary of the English Language*, by the Reverend (Irreverend?) Walter W. Skeat, Litt.D., D.C.L., Ph.D.:

"Ambassador, Embassador. L. *ambactus*, a servant, emissary. The Latin word is borrowed from an old Gaulish (Celtic) word (*ambactus*?) a slave, lit. one driven about... c.f. Old Irish *immagim*, I drive about, send about..."

Now, you can take this many ways. I take it to mean that the role of the American ambassador in the modern world of (drivel) is to be driven about by a chauffeur in a large limousine with flags on the fenders. But what about the "slave" bit? And, what is the immediate significance of *ambactus* and *immagim* for young upwardly mobile FSOs (YUMMIES)? Readers are invited to comment.

PETER C. WALKER
FSO, en retraite
Washington, D.C.

Hail and Farewell

The AFSA membership has spoken, and new leadership is at the helm.

In that regard, we would like to take this occasion to note that Thea de Rouville, whether over the bargaining table involving innumerable issues, or informal consultations and contracts, was totally dedicated and professional in representing Foreign Service employees. She was a formidable negotiator who did her homework, mastered the most minute details of the issues and asked the tough—often embarrassing—questions. At the same time, she was never unreasonable, and quite often, as the flow of negotiations pointed inexorably toward impasse, Thea was instrumental in achieving results that, on the negative side we could both live with, and, on the positive, would meet the major concerns of management and the AFSA membership.

It is our firm impression that Thea always manifested a dedication and desire—and worked hard—to achieve the best possible outcome for AFSA and the employees it represents.

BOB SHERMAN
Chief Labor-Management Negotiator
Washington, D.C.

BOB FOUCHÉ
Former Chief,
Labor-Management Relations
Washington, D.C.



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Books

Reviews

Shadows and Whispers: Power Politics Inside the Kremlin From Brezhnev to Gorbachev. *By Dusko Doder. Random House, 1986. $19.95.*

The Waking Giant: Gorbachev's Russia. *By Martin Walker. Pantheon, 1986. $17.95.*

Since the great success of books by Hedrick Smith and Robert Kaiser in the mid-1970s, few western journalists in Moscow have been able to resist the temptation to write an account of their tour. These two books are the latest entries on the growing list of pop Sovietology.

Doder focuses on high Kremlin politics. He has produced a study of the succession crisis that brought Mikhail Gorbachev to power in March 1985. While the author has worked his Soviet sources hard, he has added only a few mildly interesting details to an outline that is already widely known. His book thus is mainly of interest as a commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of journalistic methods in Moscow. Doder's métier was tips and rumors. Tips from his Soviet contacts were crucial in gaining his major scoop—the story of Yuri Andropov's demise. As for rumors, the common currency of both reporters and diplomats in Moscow, there is no indication that they were subjected to any kind of evidentiary tests. Doder admits that he was loath to correct a story after it had appeared, even if subsequent evidence had proven him wrong.

The danger of journalist dependence on tips and rumors in a totalitarian society is obvious—self-censorship. Doder provides a marvelous example of this in recounting how he obtained his second big scoop—an interview with Konstantin Chernenko. He notes that while he was pursuing a meeting with the general secretary, the *New York Times* was also seeking an interview. Surmising that the *Times* would ask questions about Soviet Jewry and emigration that would not be congenial to the Soviets, Doder calculatedly drew up a list of written questions on arms control that he believed would be more welcome. It will come as no surprise that the Soviets granted the exclusive to Doder.

Martin Walker of the *Manchester Guardian* prefers a more sociological approach. Walker sees Gorbachev as the representative of a rising new middle class of intellectuals, scientists, managers, and bureaucrats. Much of his book is derived from previously published work but, nonetheless, some of the material he presents about Soviet lifestyles is of interest. Unfortunately, the book is marred by overoptimistic assumptions about how much has actually changed in the Soviet Union. Walker also compulsively blames the United States for almost all of the current problems in East-West relations. This, unfortunately, appears to reflect the conventional wisdom among some European journalists.

These books, in sum, must be read with caution. David Satter's recent article in *Encounter* on the foibles of western journalists in Moscow would serve as a useful corrective and companion piece.

—Eric S. Edelman

The Closest of Enemies: A Personal and Diplomatic History of the Castro Years. *By Wayne S. Smith. W.W. Norton, 1987.*

Wayne Smith's Foreign Service career, which ended in 1982, was devoted in large measure to Cuba. His book is a critique of the policies followed by the United States toward the island from the final months of the Batista regime to the present. What emerges is a view of successive administrations—particularly the last two—squandering numerous opportunities for a less hostile relationship with Cuba.

About two-thirds of the book is devoted to the 1977–82 period, when Smith worked on Cuban affairs at the State Department and later at the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. On many important issues, Smith confides, he was in conflict with the administration position. He states flatly that a "significant improvement" in U.S. relations with Cuba has been possible for some time, contending that Castro's revolutionary fervor has diminished over the years and that the Cuban leader was willing to seek a *modus vivendi* with Washington. Critics will find that analysis to be unrealistic. It is difficult to understand, for example, how the United States could expend so much energy opposing communism in Central America, on the one hand, while casually seeking an accommodation with Cuba on the other. American steadfastness might be open to question by anti-communist forces if we engaged in an open-ended dialogue with Castro, as Smith recommends. And any interest by the dictator in talks with the United States might well be for the very purpose of demoralizing pro-democratic

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forces in Central America. The administration obviously thinks this, but Smith believes that, at a minimum, Castro should be sounded out. The affection Smith has for Cubans is a recurring theme of this book, and his disappointment over the inability of the two sides to get together is deeply frustrating to him, but affinity for the country to which a diplomat is assigned can be dangerous. Detachment is an important trait for any envoy, and Smith probably would have been better off serving elsewhere.

The book is a useful contribution to the annals of U.S.-Cuban relations, written by a man who cares deeply and who, in the best American tradition, is exercising his right to speak out. He is fortunate to live in a country where dissidents, such as himself, get published and not jailed.

—GEORGE GEDDA

Waltzing with a Dictator. *By Raymond Bonner. Times Books, 1987. $19.95.*

Raymond Bonner, a former *New York Times* foreign correspondent and award-winning author, has contributed an extraordinary, relevant analysis of the near-destruction of Philippine democracy under Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos. Among the first and best in the current avalanche of Philippine books, Bonner's illuminates American policy misperceptions and misguided intentions in this country from 1965 to 1986. *Waltzing with a Dictator* traces in fascinating detail the relationship between five U.S. presidential administrations and the Marcos regime. Based on previously classified government documents, statements of key officials, and views of opponents, victims, and collaborators, the book sheds fresh light on U.S. acquiescence in the implementation of martial law in 1972. He recalls the infighting and the cost of meaningful dissent within the foreign policy bureaucracy. He recounts the life—and assassination—of Benigno Aquino, the ascendancy of President Corazon Aquino, and the threat of the New People's Army. He reviews the lifestyle of Imelda Marcos, the relationships she forged with U.S. officials, and the final days of the Marcos dynasty.

Writing with flair, Bonner quickly dispels any notion that American foreign affairs are an arid game played by bland wimps in pinstripes. The American players range from Henry Byroade, "the John Wayne of ambassadors," to Richard Holbrook, "infinitely ambitious and infinitely egotistical." On the Philippine side he portrays Ferdinand and Imelda as masters of illusion, cunning manipulators, consumed by power and greed—in the end emperors without clothes; or clothes, with no emperor. Americans were especially fooled. President Johnson, Secretary Kissinger, and World Bank President Robert McNamara were all smitten by the Marcos charm.

Bonner gives several explanations for the United States' misperceptions, misjudg-

ments, and misreactions to the Philippine situation, including the judgment that the high price of dissent tends to discourage all but the most courageous from challenging the conventional wisdom. "It is considered more appropriate for a Foreign Service officer [who disagrees] to work within the system, dutifully carrying out orders of the president he serves, than it is to resign."

Bonner concludes: "It's not a moral imperative which says don't embrace dictators; it is hard, cold *realpolitik*. If that wasn't clear before, it should be after Marcos."

—LEE STULL

Evolving European Defense Policies. *Edited by Catherine M. Kelleher and Gale A. Mattox. Lexington Books, 1987.*

Nuclear Planning in NATO: Pitfalls of First Use. *By Daniel Charles. Ballinger, 1986.*

Watershed in Europe: Dismantling the East-West Military Confrontation. *By Jonathan Dean. Lexington Books, 1987.*

Three generations of authors have written on the changing consensus underlying NATO strategy in Europe. Former Ambassador Jonathan Dean, now arms control adviser for the Union of Concerned Scientists, has provided the broadest, most thoughtful look at the subject, but Charles and Kelleher/Mattox also raise issues important to the American foreign policy debate.

Charles's book is unfortunately subtitled. A research associate with the Federation of American Scientists, he has written a concise description of NATO's first-use *strategy*—how it is supposed to operate, and the ambiguities inherent in it. "It seems probable," he writes, "that NATO itself does not know what specific Soviet military moves...would convince its leaders to authorize nuclear first use." The book may strike Foreign Service readers with access to classified NATO material as oversimplified, but it is far more satisfying than preceding books on the subject, in two respects: it is clearly written, in English, not jargon, and it avoids the shrill tone of much of the first-use strategy debate. Indeed, his conclusion that NATO needs to improve its management of nuclear forces in crisis or war, but "should never be confident of its ability adequately to exercise this control," is rather muted—and the better for it. There are no villains in his discussion of nuclear policy.

Kelleher and Mattox's book offers articles on the defense of western Europe by both academics and journalists (Stephen Szabo and Elizabeth Pond, among them), divided topically (new technologies, burden-sharing, etc.) and by country. Only West Germany, Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway are dealt with directly, with the Federal Republic receiving the lion's share of attention. Pond's article on Bonn's West- and *ostpolitik* is an especially lucid analysis of the developments of the past 15 years. The editors' conclusion that "the future clearly holds change for the alliance" is supported by their contributors' snapshots of western defense issues in the mid-1980s. Whether that change can be "steered within controlled limits and with a clear range of preferred outcomes" remains to be answered.

Finally, Dean draws on his personal involvement with European security over the past 30 years to examine the range of issues and institutions involved in the security debate. Dean correctly notes that the breakdown of the western defense consensus in Europe "is not exclusively a left-wing phenomenon" and recognizes that superficially extra-European issues—U.S. policy in Nicaragua, for example—are taking their toll on the Europeans' attitude toward their American ally. Most importantly, he concludes that "despite the strong...forces ...supporting continuation of the status quo in Europe, there will also be continuing pressure for dismantling a confrontation regarded by many Europeans as increasingly nonfunctional and obsolete." Dealing with these pressures will be a major task of American diplomacy in the years to come, and a familiarity with the issues raised by these books is a good place to start tackling the job.

—EDWINA CAMPBELL

If you would like to review a recently published book, please send biographic material, including areas of expertise to the JOURNAL at 2101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

PERIODICALS

By MICHELLE MAYNARD

"The U.S. Foreign Affairs Structure in A Changing World." *By David D. Newsom. Washington Quarterly, Summer 1987, Volume 10, No. 3.*

The apparent failure of recent policies has many asking whether the United States' 40-year-old foreign relations machinery is appropriate in today's world. Newsom argues that the reason for the seeming lack of success lies outside the institutional framework. Rather, the United States has raised expectations it could not meet. Also, while circumstances abroad largely dictate the success or failure of our initiatives, tensions within the Washington foreign affairs structure have both reflected and aggravated our problems. One result of this institutional confusion is that foreigners frequently wonder at the multiplicity of voices that constantly compete in the expression of official U. S. policy.

Several factors contribute to the size and complexity of our foreign affairs machinery: the creation of government agencies as a symbol of action in meeting new issues; the rhetoric that surrounds these creations; the continued debates over basic operational philosophies; the constant tinkering with the machinery; congressional oversight; and the reluctance of presidents to choose sides in internal fights.

As U.S. involvement in international affairs expanded after World War II, the Department of State either declined to accept responsibilities or was deemed inappropriate for an operational role. New agencies were created to implement programs and, in the years since, these agencies have expanded, resulting in power and turf struggles. The inevitable diversions were exacerbated when the national foreign policy consensus broke down and conflicting views of the U.S. role were fought over in public, in Congress, and the bureaucracy.

Newsom notes that, however cumbersome it may be, the bureaucratic structure has served the nation well. In recent years, the U.S. role in the world has leveled off, its economic power diminished and its resource base overtaxed. But can the machinery cope with further changes in international circumstances? Perhaps the present system is too elaborate for the United States' diminished role in the world. The author sees congressional and budgetary pressures, responding to events at home and abroad, altering the machinery further. Coordination

was easier in an age of consensus, but it is up to the president and his advisers to make—and effectively communicate—the choices that can lend more coherence to the foreign policymaking process.

"Misunderstanding Terrorism." *By Jeffrey D. Simon. Foreign Policy, Summer 1987, No. 67.*

Simon writes that our current policy on terrorism is based on the wrong premises, because in most cases vital U.S. interests are not threatened. Therefore, he concludes, Washington should not devote so much attention to the problem.

Since the 1979 embassy takeover in Iran, the perception—more than the reality—of terrorist threats has increased to the point where our national interest is considered at stake with each incident. The media have contributed to the widened notion of threat, but it is still the president who takes the lead in molding public opinion. Labeling terrorism a "crisis" automatically heightens the perception. Terrorism can be considered a threat to national security only in extreme cases: when it weakens defense, undermines the stability of friendly or neutral countries, or directly threatens vital interests. Every incident, however, does not require a response or merit being treated as a test of national nerve. An effective counterterrorism policy requires policymakers to put incidents into the overall context of national security.

Policymakers raise the stakes in the conflict by expecting that terrorism can be beaten. Placing the problem so high on the national agenda and then failing to deliver a solution plays into the miscreants' hands. Increased publicity gives terrorists a more significant position in international affairs than their actions or capabilities warrant. At times, terrorism has so dominated American foreign policy, that it has paralyzed our policies and strained relations with our allies.

The diversity of terrorist incidents precludes designing a single doctrine to meet the threat, Simon concludes. We must determine which acts deserve the attention of the highest levels of government. The United States should respond militarily only when it is warranted, when it will work, and when it is consistent with long-term security concerns.

"Covert Action and Open Society." *By Gregory F. Treverton. Foreign Affairs, Summer 1987, Volume 65, No. 5.*

The Iran-contra affair raises the question of whether the United States should, and whether it is able, to conduct major covert operations. Treverton asks under what circumstances—and how—secret operations can be made to square with an open democracy.

In all likelihood, covert operations will become known, and the United States will be judged for having undertaken them. Practical lessons raise moral issues that are not unique to covert intervention but are often obscured by the presumption that operations will remain secret.

Given that, Treverton asks, "Why not act openly?" To do so, however, is neither an easy nor a complete substitute for covert action. It requires a level of influence in the politics of a foreign country that is uncomfortable for Americans. It is also easier for the CIA to get money from Congress secretly than for another institution to get it openly—even if the purposes of the two are similar.

The circumstances in which opting for a major covert operation makes sense are increasingly rare. In deciding whether to go ahead, prudent policymakers should ask themselves a careful series of questions. The most obvious is "What happens when the operation becomes public?" Also, "What if the first intervention does not succeed?" And, "What signal will be received, by whom, and with what result?"

Americans possess a historical ambivalence between the high moral view and the feeling that international politics is a dirty business. Though our actions often belie our words, we believe that nations should not interfere in the internal affairs of their neighbors and that our external behavior is an important example to the world. At first glance, the Iran-contra affair suggests that the paradox of covert operations in a democracy cannot be managed. The lesson from the Iran-contra incident, Treverton concludes, is to let the CIA handle such operations. Only it, and not the White House, has both the expertise and accountability to carry them out.

"Let it Sink." *By Charles Krauthammer. The New Republic, August 24, 1987, Volume 197, No. 8.*

The United States stays in the United Nations for a variety of bad reasons, writes Krauthammer. Many criticize the UN for its financial problems and label it a "spy nest." The UN has failed, however, in a more significant respect: in its principal role as a peacekeeper. It has degenerated to the point where it is corrupting, wasteful, and self-defeating for the United States to stay in.

Krauthammer sees the UN's adding to international conflict in several ways. Membership in the body has become an important badge of sovereignty for many developing countries. The sovereignty it creates, however, is artificial and causes many small countries that, at best, would have only regional foreign policies, to have global ones. At the same time, the UN undermines its one guiding principle of universal respect for sovereignty by giving legitimacy, propaganda support, and official diplomatic

recognition to selective "national liberation movements."

If the UN does not keep peace, what then does it do? The author's answer is that it provides three services. First, the UN is, in Jeane Kirkpatrick's words, a "turkish steambath," where weak Third World countries can ventilate their resentments. Second, it provides the developing countries with a lobbying forum. Last, by controlling the flow and content of resolutions, the UN's permanent Third World majority acts as a moral agent, articulating what comes to be called world public opinion.

The current U.S. role of oppositionist easily becomes one of damage limitation, and that means making necessary compromises. Moreover, Krauthammer notes, it is wasteful because we can find far better use for the money in bilateral contexts. It is self-defeating because our continued presence gives the United Nations legitimacy. It is time for the United States to withdraw and allow it to sink, he concludes.

"Immigration and Foreign Policy—New Rules of the Game." *By Nathan Glazer. The National Interest, Summer 1987, Number 8.*

Domestic considerations almost exclusively determine immigration policy. Glazer suggests that, increasingly, policymakers will have to factor in foreign policy and recognize our immigration policy's impact on international relations.

The entire thrust of the immigration debate over the last 10 years has been how to respond to illegal entry; legal immigration is not at issue in this reform. The new immigration act maintains the tradition of responding to domestic concerns, fears, and interests.

While foreign policy considerations have dominated our refugee policy since the end of World War II, they have rarely affected our immigration policy. But during the congressional debates on the new reform, Mexico protested that its interests were not being taken into account. This foreshadows the increasing importance of foreign considerations.

A possible solution to this would be for the United States to provide economic assistance to countries from which immigrants come. There are two problems with this approach. First, we do not know how to do it. And second, even if we did, would we be willing to spend the money and exert the political pressure that might improve the economic circumstances?

Until now, the United States has been spared the most extreme effects of immigration on foreign policy. Glazer concludes that foreign policy considerations should indeed come into play at some point because immigration problems can no longer be solved solely by domestic means.

Michelle Maynard is a historian at the Department of State.

DIPLOMACY

Crossing Agency Boundaries

By ANDREW L. STEIGMAN

As a name, the Foreign Service of the United States has a reassuring sound. It conjures up a mental picture of a single body of disciplined troops, based in (or perhaps the same as) the State Department, selflessly representing the U.S. government abroad. Yet the image, as we know, is a mirage. That solid-sounding Foreign Service actually encompasses six separate services in five different agencies—one each in State, AID, USIA, and Commerce, and both the Foreign Agricultural Service and the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service in Agriculture—and each is very protective of its independent existence. The legislative root of the problem lies in Section 203(b) of the Foreign Service Act, which reassured agencies fearful of State Department domination that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed as diminishing the authority of the head of any agency authorized by law to use the Foreign Service personnel system." Under this protective umbrella, the five agencies have kept firm control of the bottom-line decisions for their distinct services.

One very predictable result has been a depressing amount of turf-battling and parochialism as agencies jockey to gain status and rewards at each other's expense. While much of the struggle takes place behind a bureaucratic curtain, it sometimes spills over into the public arena. Agriculture, for example, went to Congress some years ago to override State Department objections to counselor titles for its senior FAS personnel overseas, and Commerce has eyed a similar approach for minister-counselor titles. The competition can become even more heated (and visible) when the glittering prizes of senior positions are involved. An example is the complaint in the 1986 annual report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy that USIA officers don't get their fair share of ambassadorial and deputy chief of mission appointments. Foreign service officers who work for USIA, the report contends, have qualifications comparable to those of their State colleagues, but they are "seven times less likely than State Department officers to make ambassador" and are similarly disadvantaged in winning DCM posts. While the report is accurate as far as it goes, its authors do not know (or prefer not to acknowledge in print) that they are, in effect, trying to claim

State Department positions for officers who work for another agency and another Foreign Service.

So long as there is not a single Foreign Service of the United States, the State Department will continue to hire and promote its FSOs on the basis of its total number of positions, including the deputy chief of mission and chief of mission slots on which USIA has cast a covetous eye. Thus, it becomes a zero-sum game: every one of these positions surrendered to an officer from another agency potentially means one more senior State Department FSO walking the halls in search of a job, with the inevitable negative impact on promotion opportunities all down the line. Yet it need not be zero-sum. It would seem a relatively simple solution to require that any exchange be in reasonable balance. For every State Department position made available to an officer from USIA, for example, let USIA make available a position of comparable interest and responsibility to a State Department officer. If a USIA officer goes to a DCM slot at the O-1 level, let USIA find a good O-1 job for a State Department officer. And include good overseas positions on the USIA list to ensure that the exchange is balanced fairly.

Although this concept of fair exchange is regrettably absent from the Advisory Commission report, agency personnel offices have tried on several occasions to facilitate exchanges. Past discussions between State and USIA have stumbled over the latter's reluctance to offer much in trade at the senior level beyond a handful of hard-to-fill Voice of America management positions in Washington. Part of the USIA argument has been that State Department officers lack the specialized experience to handle senior public affairs officer and deputy positions abroad. However, efforts to overcome this objection by preparing State officers for senior USIA jobs (and USIA officers for senior State positions) through a formal mid-level exchange program have never gotten off the ground. They have foundered on such complications as USIA reluctance to reserve appropriate positions for exchanges, mis-matched assignment cycles, and the reluctance of State FSOs to venture into out-of-agency assignments.

What is true for the State-USIA relationship applies with even greater force to other possible exchanges among the several Foreign Services. Except for FAS and APHIS, whose highly specialized work has no real parallels in the other four services, there is sufficient functional overlap among State, USIA, AID, and Commerce to envisage more extensive exchanges than currently take place. FCS, for example, was staffed at its inception with a substantial number of holdover State FSOs, but Commerce has since made a deliberate effort to reduce these numbers in order to build its own FCS cadre. With AID, as with USIA, efforts by State to establish a formal exchange program never progressed beyond desultory discussions, foundering on a seeming reluctance by AID management to set aside positions for cross-agency staffing.

Despite the absence of formal programs, some FSOs do serve across agency lines. Every year, a number of USIA officers are recruited by State for departmental slots in the public affairs field, and a smaller number of State Department officers are actively sought by USIA for VOA positions that attract few USIA bidders. (The current numbers are ten USIA officers at the State Department, and six State Department officers at USIA—of whom four are with VOA.) Overseas, however, where the USIA claim to State Department slots has been most strongly pressed, almost nothing is being done in a structured way to cross-train officers for senior positions. There were, for example, no USIA positions identified for State Department bidders in the 1986–87 circular on out-of-agency assignment opportunities (though USIA has since indicated interest in State bidders on about a dozen mid-level PAO slots at hard-to-fill posts). In consequence, only rarely are State Department officers assigned overseas across this particular bureaucratic boundary; the only two this year are a mid-level entrant who found a branch public affairs job with no USIA bidders and a member of a tandem couple.

In the other direction, the State Department has been only slightly more generous with its positions. Five USIA officers are currently in the kinds of jobs specifically demanded by the Advisory Commission—one as chief of mission and four as DCM. In addition, one USIA officer is running a consulate-general, and two others hold slots at lower ranks. Given the pressures on State Department positions, however, an unbalanced exchange even on this small scale will be hard to sustain. The Advisory Commission's plea for more chief and DCM jobs is likely to fall on deaf ears unless USIA is more forthcoming in the future. For more USIA officers to get high-level State Department slots overseas, more State Department FSOs will have to be given access to comparable public affairs jobs. If USIA feels these jobs require prior experience, then there should be a mid-level exchange program to provide that experience—and at the same time to improve the qualifications of USIA officers for the State jobs they seek.

The Foreign Service may still be a long way from the unity that its name implies, but the separate services might do wonders for their reputation and their effectiveness if they stopped hiding behind Section 203(b) and looked for ways to work more closely together. State and USIA, which hire FSOs of comparable backgrounds and qualifications through a common exam process and whose functions most closely overlap, could be the most promising place to start.

Andrew L. Steigman, former deputy assistant secretary for personnel in State, currently serves on the JOURNAL's Editorial Board.

CLIPPINGS

Cover-up

"Visiting an archeological dig at the Sea of Galilee, Thomas Pickering, American ambassador to Israel, noted there is a converse relationship between archeology and diplomacy. 'In archeology you uncover the unknown. In diplomacy you cover the known.' " *David Grogan in People Weekly*

Checkbook Diplomacy

"State Department sources say the U.S. ambassador to Rwanda is being relieved following complaints he allegedly wrote more than $15,000 worth of bad checks abroad, even to the department itself. Before his appointment in 1985, John Upston Jr.—now unreachable on vacation in France—was State's coordinator for Caribbean affairs, a post that did not exist earlier and has since been abolished. Career diplomats, not displeased by the episode, resent the use of small African countries as a 'turkey farm' for ambassadors selected mainly for their conservatism." *Newsweek, August 3*

Immunity Deficiency

"A Saudi Arabian teenager, who left the USA in 1983 after being accused of raping a 15-year-old, is back—living across the street from the young woman who accused him of the crime.

"And there's nothing anyone can do to prosecute him. The reason: diplomatic immunity.

"That's the charge Chuck Ashman and Pamela Trescott, authors of *Diplomatic Crime*, make this morning on NBC's Today show....Ashman will petition Congress to drop immunity in criminal cases for diplomatic employees and relatives....

Trescott, his wife, ran up against diplomatic immunity in August 1981. Her home next door to the Dominican Republic chancery was burglarized by thieves using a ladder, and 'simply because the foot of the ladder was resting on a diplomatic property, the police couldn't do anything,' said Trescott." *USA Today, June 15*

"Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) is widely suspected by State Department professionals of trying to impose his conservative views on the Foreign Service by blocking the ambassadorial nominations of career diplomats whom he suspects of liberalism.

"His latest targets have been Richard

Viets, named as ambassador to Portugal, Nicholas Platt (Philippines), and Melissa Wells (Mozambique). The senator's attempt to block their approval by the Foreign Relations Committee moved George Vest, director general of the Foreign Service, to an unusual expression of displeasure toward a powerful senator.

"All three career diplomats have 'top-notch' credentials....If a person has a long and very well-known and distinguished career,' Vest said, 'you have one [Senate] hearing only, because life in the Foreign Service is an open book. In each of these cases, more than one hearing was called for at the instigation of Helms.' "

Jack Anderson, August 18

More on Bugs

"And what about 'Soviet technical infiltration' of the new building of the U.S. embassy? The intensity of the current outcry notwithstanding, no proofs were furnished overseas to confirm it. By contrast, only recently samples of special equipment planted in the Soviet institutions in the United States, including offices and residential quarters of the new embassy compound of the USSR, were demonstrated....At a news conference in Washington, journalists were shown American eavesdropping devices 'in their natural state' and were given the opportunity to see for themselves where and how they had been installed by 'master craftsmen' for the U.S. secret services."

Izvestia, July 10

"President Reagan met with his top national security aides yesterday to discuss embassy security problems....The National Security Planning Group session was held to discuss three recent reports on security problems at both the new and old Moscow embassies, as well as the larger problem of State Department personnel and management of embassy security.

"So far the findings in one of the reports—conducted by a panel of experts under the direction of former Defense Secretary James Schlesinger—has been released publicly. Mr. Schlesinger recommended rebuilding the top floors of the new Moscow chancery and constructing a separate building for secure U.S. diplomatic activities.

"Melvin Laird, another former defense secretary, recently concluded another embassy security review by a four-member panel of experts, although its final report remains secret. Officials familiar with the report said it criticizes former U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman and other State Department officials for recent security breaches in Moscow.

"A third study, by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, 'picks up where the Laird commission left off' in terms of criticizing State Department security policies, according to one official familiar with the report.

" 'The intelligence community's position is that you can talk about security all you want, but unless security and personnel are handled outside the State Department, the problems will remain,' said the official. 'Foreign Service officers know very little about security.' "

Bill Gertz in the Washington Times, July 29

"Schlesinger contended that the United States should never have permitted the Soviets to cast concrete parts for the American building away from the site—a procedure that allowed the Soviets to implant the electronic listening devices. He suggested that future construction be done by American workers using materials prefabricated in the United States. He blamed the State Department and other government agencies for recognizing the problem so late."

Time, July 13

"The Foreign Buildings Office is responsible for acquisition or construction of all American diplomatic installations abroad. Last year the House Committee on Government Operations examined FBO's building projects and found that its incompetence often has 'resulted in substandard design, poor contracting procedures, shoddy workmanship, inadequate management, lengthy delays, and major cost overruns.' From Khartoum to Hong Kong to New Delhi, examples of mismanagement abound.

"In Moscow FBO appears to have surpassed itself. Reporting to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after examining the unfinished embassy, investigators John Ziolkowski and David Keaney commented: 'Common sense would tell the average American citizen that it would be foolish to allow a U.S. embassy to be designed and constructed by the Soviets.' Yet that is precisely what happened."

John Barron in Reader's Digest, June

Government unto Itself

"One of the most ludicrous things I've seen in recent weeks is the series in the *Washington Post* complaining about the hardships of the poor put-upon Foreign Service. This is really laughable—and the joke is on the American people. The truth is that the Foreign Service is a government unto itself, coolly contemptuous of any elected president, and of Ronald Reagan in particular. It views the conduct of foreign policy as its private affair, with any intrusion by the elected government bitterly resented....

"If you've ever wondered why U.S. policy on arms control, or Mozambique, or communist China is essentially the same under Reagan as it was under Jimmy Carter, take a look at the Foreign Service. We've got the same people in the State Department now as then, and they administer the same policies—in direct defiance of the elected president."

Stanton Evans on WGMS-FM, May 6

ETCETERA

The new embassy building in Moscow under construction.

An Essay In Quotes

By JAMES S. PACY

To help us better understand the present security situation in the Soviet Union, we should look to the past. Below is a series of quotes that illustrates the continual problem of diplomatic security in the Soviet Union. The problem is not new, but has been an integral part of U.S.-Soviet diplomacy since the beginning of formal relations between the two countries.

"[The Norwegian ambassador] knew that we had discovered a Russian bugging system in our embassy. He told me they had made a similar discovery and asked me how many microphones we had found. I told him: exactly 19. They had 23....I commented jokingly that that's the way it should be because they belong to NATO and, apart from that, their embassy building is bigger than ours."

—Diary entry from May 15, 1956, by Veljko Micunovic, Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow 1956–58 and 1969–71, in Moscow Diary, *Doubleday, 1980, p. 50.*

"It was specially difficult to keep a cypher secure at St. Petersburg, because all the embassies were of necessity obliged to employ Russian servants and subordinates in their households, and it was easy for Russian police to procure agents among these."

—Otto von Bismarck, Prussian ambassador in St. Petersburg 1859–62, in Memoirs, Vol. I, *Howard Fertig, Inc., 1966, p. 252.*

"We are continually surrounded by spies both of high and low degree. You can scarcely hire a servant who is not a secret agent of the police."

—James Buchanan, U.S. minister in St. Petersburg 1832–33, in James Buchanan's Mission to Russia, *Arno Press and The New York Times, 1970, p. 339.*

"Shakespeare said, 'Suspicion...haunts the guilty mind.' Spying on the part of the authorities was so common as not even to be thought of as spying. Our butler was an 'official' butler and so, of course, we knew that he had to report on us from time to time. He was so intelligent, such a willing worker and I liked him so much that I wanted to help him. To this end I would leave letters devoid of any actual importance lying on my desk over night so that he might photograph or copy them."

—Elisabetta Cerruti, wife of the Italian ambassador in Moscow 1927–30, in Ambassador's Wife, *George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1952, pp. 74–75.*

"It was a great honor to be quartered in the Hotel Moskva.... 'Only once,' [said the Russian protocol official] 'have we made an exception and allowed any outsiders in the Moskva. That was last month during the forcign ministers' conference when the city was so crowded that we had to billet a few Americans of General Marshall's in the best hotel. You will be occupying the same rooms.' I knew then that my career as a Russian recording artist was about to begin."

—Nicholas Nyaradi, with the Hungarian embassy in Moscow 1946–47, in My Ringside Seat in Moscow, *Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1952, pp. 19–20.*

"Quivering with excitement, the technician extracted from the shattered depths of the [Great Seal of the United States that hung on the wall of my study] a small device, not much larger than a pencil, which, he assured me, housed both a receiving and a sending set, capable of being activated by some sort of electronic ray from outside the building. It represented, for that day, a fantastically advanced bit of applied electronics."

—George F. Kennan, U.S. ambassador in Moscow 1952, in Memoirs 1950–1963, Pantheon Books, 1971, pp. 155–156.

"The opinion also prevails that ministers are constantly subjected to a system of espionage, and that even their servants are made to disclose what passed in their households, their conversations, associations, etc."

—Neill S. Brown, U.S. minister in St. Petersburg 1850–53, in a dispatch of January 28, 1852.

"In the Soviet Union, length of duty was generally limited to two years because of ever-present pressures. These included indifferent housing, physical surveillance, and constant bugging of conversations by various types of concealed devices."

—Jacob D. Beam, U.S. ambassador in Moscow 1969–73, in Multiple Exposure: An American Ambassador's Unique Perspective on East-West Issues, *W.W. Norton, 1978, p. 227.*

"No one who has served in Moscow can ever be quite the same person again....The pattern of life in the Soviet Union would be incredible if it did not exist. Only those who have watched its processes as they unfold before their eyes can realize how incredible it may appear to be, and yet they can testify that it exists. Those who have had this experience may be pardoned if they think that, among themselves, they can speak a language and carry thoughts which no one who has not shared that experience can fully understand."

—Lord Strang, with the British embassy in Moscow 1930–33, in Home and Abroad, *Andre Deutsch, Ltd., 1956, p. 60.*

"[Upon U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933, the first American embassy there] differed from American missions in other countries in its preoccupation with security. While [the first U.S. ambassador, 1933–36, William C.] Bullitt was enamored of the Russian people, he realized that the Soviet police would do everything they could to learn our secrets. At his urging, Moscow became the first American embassy with Marine guards. In the beginning, the six Marines performed little guard duty because of the chaotic nature of our operation, and they found feminine companionship, as they had in other countries. One day as I sat in the lobby of the [temporary embassy at the] Savoy Hotel, a highly painted Russian woman walked up to the desk and said she wished to go up to Sergeant O'Dean's room. The Russian room clerk looked at her suspiciously and asked, 'Why do you want to visit Sergeant O'Dean?' She replied airily, 'I am his Russian teacher.' A few months later, after embassy offices were moved to the Mokhavaya Building, security was tightened."

—Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. ambassador to Moscow 1953–57, in Witness to History 1929–1969, *W.W. Norton & Co., 1973, page 20.*

10-25-50

Foreign Service Journal, October 1977: "[In the Service], the job of the moment can be totally fascinating, and yet the next job can, to use the California idiom, be a 'real bummer.' The writer's own abbreviated experience is certainly not unique: a most interesting department job in the early Kennedy administration, two exotic and challenging overseas postings (Bolivia and Guatemala), and a return to Washington to a totally futile and boring assignment. One is reminded of Fred Allen's comment on his career as a radio comedian, 'It is a treadmill to oblivion.' And so, for the unwary, can the Foreign Service be."

Hovey C. Clark

Foreign Service Journal, October 1962: "The Senior Seminar was started three years ago, primarily to meet the needs of the Foreign Service for senior training....The seminar runs for a full academic year and is designed to prepare senior officers for the highest positions of responsibility in policy recommendation and execution, coordination, planning, and administration at home and abroad. In many respects it parallels the courses given at the war colleges. In speaking at the graduation exercises of the first seminar President Eisenhower said, 'I should like to voice my own tremendous interest in this school and my support for the idea that a few of our officers should be taken out from the normal activities of their offices no matter where they are and be given this opportunity.' President Kennedy received the third seminar in April of this year and added his own endorsement of this type of training."

Carl W. Strom

Foreign Service Journal, October 1937: "[A Foreign Service officer] thought that the Service should always welcome the presence in it of a certain number of chiefs of mission appointed from outside the Service. This would tend, in his opinion, to infuse new ideas and new methods into an organization which needs to fight ceaselessly from becoming ingrown and bureaucratic. The important consideration is the quality of the men the president turns to for his outside appointments. The only valid cause for disappointment is when outsiders are appointed who do not measure up."

George H. Butler

10-25-50 records excerpts from previous issues with an eye toward how much things have changed—or how they have remained the same.

HAD A BOOK PUBLISHED RECENTLY?

The JOURNAL is starting a new section, "By Our Readers," which will give a short description of books published by our Foreign Service readers. If you have had a book published recently, send us a copy, including price, publisher, and date of publication.

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BOOKFAIR

The 27th annual AAFSW Bookfair will be open in the Department of State Saturday, October 24, to Monday, October 26, and Thursday, October 29, to Saturday, October 31. The hours will be 10 a.m. to 4 p.m. daily.

Family Night begins at 5 p.m. on October 23, and the cafeteria will be open. The location is the 23rd Street entrance, upper and lower levels. The proceeds of the Bookfair benefit AFSA/AAFSW Merit Awards and charitable projects in the Washington area.

The Art of Diplomacy

Ellsworth Bunker mixed solid realism and subtle impressionism on his negotiating palette

Christopher J. McMullen



"The victories of diplomacy are won by a series of microscopic advantages—a judicious suggestion here, an opportune civility there, a wise concession at one moment and a farsighted persistence at another—of sleepless tact, immovable calmness and patience that no folly, no provocation, no blunder can shake." So observed British statesman Lord Salisbury. Ellsworth Bunker's own formula for successful mediation was characteristically more straightforward: "You start from the premise that you are all reasonable people, and then you just keep at it."

In a diplomatic career that spanned 27 years and seven presidents, Bunker applied this simple formula with unparalleled success. His victories were achieved with little fanfare, through a combination of tact, patience, and perseverance. He had the canny ability to find a solution that allowed the most intransigent side to have its way, while enabling the loser to save face.

What accounted for Bunker's remarkable record as a diplomat? His successes seemed as much a product of his character as his negotiating style. A sense of inner security that allowed him to pursue a solution without his own ego becoming part of the equation was derived in large measure from the circumstances of his birth and upbringing. His ancestors settled in Boston in the early colonial period, and at the time of Ellsworth's birth in Yonkers, New York, in May 1894, his family had already established a prosperous business in the Latin American sugar industry. His character was forged by the Victorian values of his generation—devotion to hard work and service to the nation. Graduating from Yale in 1916 with a degree in history and economics, Bunker joined his father's sugar company. He began a 35-year business career by hand trucking raw sugar on a Yonkers dock, then spent the next 13 years in the operations end of the firm. Bunker's business background and negotiating sessions with labor unions certainly provided valuable experience, later applied in his diplomatic career. Moreover, his success in commerce gave him the self-confidence to pursue less orthodox approaches without the fear of failure.

In the mid-1920s, while attending to one of the family's sugar concerns on the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Bunker was kidnaped by Mexican rebels. He was eventually released after his father smuggled a ransom of silver to his son's captors. It was Bunker's first taste of revolutionary politics in Latin America, a region where he later was to play a vital role in promoting U.S. interests.

Throughout the 1930s, Bunker steadily expanded his business interests, overseeing sugar operations in Cuba, Mexico, and Puerto Rico. He was the acknowledged dean of the American sugar industry when President Truman tapped him at the age of 56 to serve as the U.S. ambassador to Argentina.

Like other businessmen-statesmen of his era, Bunker was propelled from Wall Street to Washington by a sense of noblesse oblige. He came from the liberal eastern establishment that dominated American foreign policymaking through the Vietnam war. He was not, however, a member of the inner circle of policymakers—the so-called "Wise Men" who crafted the containment policies of the Pax Americana. Bunker was later recruited to implement their policies, and he soon became a key player at critical junctures in postwar diplomacy. Unlike fellow members of this elite coterie, Bunker was not an Atlanticist. In fact, he served in only one post north of the tropics. Most of his diplomatic career was spent in the Third World, safeguarding American interests in the midst of European decolonization and the Cold War. Dean Acheson once remarked that Bunker was not like some diplomats "who put on a sari and splash around in a rice paddy." He

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It was in Buenos Aires that Bunker first displayed the traits that were to become his trademarks—patience, tact, and toughness

was able to sympathize with the plight of Third World leaders without being seduced by their charisma.

When Bunker was dispatched to Argentina in the spring of 1951, U.S.-Argentine relations were at a historic low. Juan Peron was defiantly challenging the United States, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson wanted someone who could blunt his anti-American broadsides without exacerbating tensions. Ellsworth Bunker, with his fluency in Spanish and his Latin American business experience, seemed to fit the bill. Bunker was instructed to avoid any action that would either aggravate or appease the dictator—a policy that he termed "masterful inaction." Describing Bunker's superb implementation of this policy, Acheson noted in his memoirs:

> Successive ambassadors had approached Peron either with a challenge to combat, which they lost, or bearing gifts, which they lost also. We had proposed that [Bunker] treat him with aloof correctness, initiating nothing, giving nothing without a *quid pro quo* in hand, debating nothing, and by seeing to it that any harm to our interests was met by one to his. In no time Bunker, icily cold, meticulously correct, hard as a rock in negotiation, had won the respect of Peron.

It was in Buenos Aires that Bunker first displayed the traits that were to become his trademarks—patience, tact, and toughness. While firm in his official dealings with Peron, he seized upon opportunities that would improve his personal relations with the Argentine *caudillo*. In the fall of 1951, Peron's wife, the immensely popular Evita, was gravely ill with cancer. The Argentine public was not aware of the gravity of her condition, however, which was officially described as anemia. At the personal request of the dictator, Bunker helped arrange for a prominent American cancer specialist to fly in secretly to operate on Evita. In the highly personalistic world of Latin politics, Bunker's discreet assistance in this critical matter won him the dictator's lasting gratitude. Though he departed Buenos Aires after only one year, Argentine officials were comparing him with the highly popular Norman Armour, one of the most accomplished American diplomats of modern times.

Bunker had three more ambassadorial assignments: Italy (1952–53); India (1956–61); and Vietnam (1967–73). In Vietnam, Bunker's negotiating skills proved invaluable in bringing a reluctant South Vietnamese government into the Paris peace process. But his diplomatic expertise was put to best use in the trouble-shooting assignments that he tackled in the 1960s and in his role negotiating the Panama canal treaties. On three separate occasions, Bunker was called out of retirement to mediate disputes in the Third World that threatened U.S. security interests. In each instance, he demonstrated tenacity, flexibility, and creativity in striking compromises that allowed each party to attain its minimum objectives and at the same time preserved American interests. He was a shrewd pragmatist who approached highly charged diplomatic problems with an eye toward what would best serve U.S. interests.

In March 1962, President Kennedy asked Bunker to serve in a "private" capacity—under U.N. auspices—to mediate a dispute between the Dutch and Indonesians over West Irian. When the Dutch withdrew from Indonesia in 1949, the issue of control over West Irian was to have been resolved within one year. Various negotiating efforts had collapsed, however, and Indonesian President Achmed Sukarno was now pressing the issue militarily. It appeared that war might break out over this primitive country that had few natural resources but was of great symbolic importance to the Indonesians. President Kennedy viewed the dispute as a colonial issue and was unwilling to assist the Dutch militarily. Such a move might alienate America's Asian allies and could provoke a confrontation with the Soviets, who were backing Sukarno.

When he took on the mediation assignment, Bunker was told that the two sides were so close in their positions that it would take only a week to work out a settlement. Instead, it took six months of tedious negotiations to find a formula that averted a disastrous war and at the same time preserved Dutch pride.

THE INDONESIANS held all the high cards, militarily and politically, while the Dutch, based halfway around the world, had no bargaining leverage. Bunker's method of attaining the basic requirements for the Hague is instructive. When the initial round of secret talks broke down because both sides clung to unrealistic positions, Bunker put forth a comprehensive formula that contained the minimum requirements of each side: The Indonesians would ultimately gain control of West Irian, while the Dutch would be permitted a face-saving transfer to the United Nations. Failing to win support for this plan, which he believed was fair, Bunker decided to appeal to world opinion. In going public with the proposals, Bunker generated

pressure on both sides to compromise. The Dutch, who correctly viewed the proposals as a fig leaf for their surrender of the territory, were outraged and accused Bunker of using "shock treatment." Despite their protests, the Dutch finally acknowledged that unless they were willing to go to war over West Irian, Bunker's formula offered the best terms they could expect.

Up to the final hours of negotiations, the situation remained extremely delicate. Bunker's adroit handling was especially crucial during the final phases, when the Indonesians kept escalating their demands, apparently in an effort to humiliate the Dutch. At one point the Indonesian ambassador—who was not a member of the negotiating delegation—arrived at the secret talk site in Middleburg, Virginia, and asked for the floor. He then launched into a long and vitriolic diatribe, demanding that the Dutch "capitulate." His intervention was so rude and at variance with the tone of the talks that both sides were embarrassed and wondered what he was trying to achieve. At that point Bunker stepped in and saved the day. Throughout the speech, he had sat rocking in his chair, gazing at the ceiling, impatiently pressing his pencil into the table. After a few moments of awkward silence, Bunker sat up, tapped his pencil on the table, and said: "Gentlemen, shall we now proceed with our business?" The air was cleared and an incident that could have sunk the talks was quickly forgotten.

A successful conclusion of the dispute was finally reached after six months of protracted negotiations. The West Irian negotiations illustrate the classic Bunker technique of reaching a workable solution that reflects the realities of the situation. In essence, for the Dutch, Bunker made the inevitable bearable.

IN HIS CLASSIC study of diplomacy, Francois de Callieres observed that an effective negotiator "must appear as an agreeable, enlightened, and far-seeing person; he must beware of trying to pass himself off...as a crafty or adroit manipulator. [Instead] the negotiator must ever strive to leave an impression upon his fellow diplomatists of his sincerity and good faith." One of Bunker's greatest attributes as a diplomat was his integrity. This ability to inspire trust with his interlocutors was a key element in his successful mediation of a dangerous dispute between Egypt and Saudi Arabia over Yemen.

In the spring of 1963, the Kennedy administration was trying to avert a potentially disastrous war between a U.S. ally, Saudi Arabia, and a Soviet client state, Egypt. King Faisal was supporting the royalist forces in the Yemeni civil war, while President Nasser was supporting the rebels. The conflict had become a matter of *sharaf*—a type of honor highly important to the Arabs—and neither Faisal nor Nasser was willing to make the first move toward disengaging. Washington was particularly concerned about the stability of the Royal House of Saud and wanted to find a formula that would allow the king to extricate himself gracefully from the Yemeni quagmire.

Beginning his diplomatic career in his late 50s, Bunker takes the oath of office as ambassador to Argentina from protocol head John Simons and Latin America assistant secretary Edward Miller Jr.

While publicly calling for a simultaneous disengagement, the United States was of necessity pressing Faisal harder than Nasser, over whom it had little leverage. Bunker's personal style and the tactics he employed in his discussions with the two leaders enabled him to win their confidence. In his meetings, Bunker stressed the pressure that the United States had exerted on the other side, and only then proposed a concession to his interlocutor. This tactic was especially important with Faisal, who believed that he was bearing the brunt of American pressure. Bunker also mixed inducements with disincentives. On the one hand he offered military assistance to Saudi Arabia in return for an agreement to disengage from Yemen. On the other, he made it clear that there were limits to American support if Faisal continued his intervention.

An idiosyncratic feature of Bunker's *modus operandi* was his tactic of omitting from his

In the Dominican crisis, Bunker appealed over the heads of the two contending factions. This created public pressure compelling both sides to concentrate on the merits of his proposal

formal proposals those points that were most sensitive to his interlocutors. In the case of Nasser, Bunker did not include in his written proposal the element of simultaneity (resolved by Nasser's later agreement to an initial token withdrawal of forces from Yemen). In the case of Faisal, he did not include any restrictions on the activities of the Yemeni Royal family inside Saudi Arabia (resolved by a carefully phrased clause in the final agreement). In both instances, Bunker argued orally and successfully on these critical points. His informal approach to these delicate issues had the psychological effect of placing the requests outside of the formal, state-to-state framework of the negotiations and instead made it appear as a personal appeal to make his task easier.

Another technique used to attenuate the points of contention between the two parties employed certain calculated ambiguities in the language of the proposed agreement (such as the use of the word "suspension" in connection with Saudi aid to the Yemeni royalists, a word that Nasser understood to call for "cessation"). An additional factor in the success of the mission was the low-key manner in which Bunker conducted the talks. Since there were no press briefings and no leaks of negotiating positions, both sides were able to maneuver—and retreat from insupportable positions—without the glare of publicity.

After two months of arduous shuttle diplomacy throughout the Middle East, Bunker crafted an agreement that preserved the patina of compromise but perforce favored the more intransigent Nasser. Just before signing the agreement, which involved a token withdrawal of Egyptian forces from Yemen, simultaneous with nearly complete Saudi disengagement, Faisal turned to Bunker and said: "I don't trust Nasser but I trust you, and that is why I go along with this agreement."

IN A THIRD trouble-shooting mission, the Dominican crisis of 1965, Bunker demonstrated a willingness to take risks to solve a seemingly intractable problem. In this instance, President Johnson had come under intense domestic and international pressure to withdraw U.S. Marines from the Dominican Republic, where they had been dispatched to prevent a civil war from developing into a "second Cuba." After several diplomatic missions failed to resolve the crisis, Bunker was sent to the Republic in June 1965 with a sweeping mandate from both President Johnson and the Organization of American States, where he was serving as the U.S. representative. After consulting with various sectors of Dominican society, Bunker realized that no magic formula could bridge the differences between the rebel and loyalist forces. He decided, therefore, to risk a bolder, less orthodox course of action to break the stalemate.

In his "Declaration to the Dominican People," Bunker appealed over the heads of the two contending factions. As he had done earlier during the West Irian dispute, he created public pressure compelling both sides to focus on the merits of his proposals. It also brought more moderate forces into the dialogue. At the same time, he proposed a nationalistic diplomat-businessman, Hector Garcia Godoy, as president of a provisional government that would arrange for democratic elections. This move undercut both the extreme right and left.

Meanwhile, Bunker slowly chopped away at what he called the "underbrush of minor problems." This created the impression of real progress, which in turn generated some momentum in the negotiations. At every step in the mediation process, he quietly exerted calibrated—though not necessarily equal—pressure on both sides to narrow the issues to their essentials. With the stronger loyalist forces he used U.S. economic aid as leverage to gain concessions; to prod the weaker constitutionalist forces, he held out the unspoken threat of military pressure.

Bunker's imperturbability in the face of intense pressure enabled him to extract key concessions from his interlocutors. Commenting on this characteristic, a journalist once observed that the diplomat had "an abstracted manner, and a way of focusing on a middle distance between himself and whomever he is talking to. The effect is to create a kind of emotional antechamber where ultimatums dwindle to demands and demands into requests." By early September, Bunker had gotten both sides to agree to the creation of a provisional government, thus clearing the path for a final resolution to the crisis. He remained in the Dominican Republic, serving as an adviser to the provisional president, until the June 1966 elections finally restored political order. When he left Santo Domingo in July, the leader of the rebel forces declared: "I have the respect for [Bunker] that I have for my own father." The leader of the loyalists agreed.

In 1967, Bunker replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as envoy to Saigon. After six grueling years of managing the vast American war effort in Vietnam, he once again retired to his 600-acre farm in Vermont. However, in 1973, he was called upon to revive the stalled Panama

Canal treaty negotiations. When he assumed the post as the chief U.S. negotiator at the talks, Bunker recognized that any solution to the controversial canal issue would have to enjoy bipartisan political support in Washington in addition to being acceptable to the Panamanian government. Thus he set about developing a negotiating strategy that took into account domestic political sensitivities, legitimate Defense Department security concerns, and long-standing Panamanian demands. He realized that Pentagon support would be crucial in winning Senate ratification. After sounding out the military's views, he concluded that the continued U.S. right to defend the canal was a *sine qua non* for Pentagon and congressional acceptance of a new treaty.

Bunker's approach to this complex mediation effort reflected his sensitivity to the peculiar problems of negotiating with Third World nations. In crafting and winning support for what became known as the Kissinger-Tack principles—which were to serve as a framework for subsequent negotiations—his tactic was to trade off concessions on symbols in exchange for concessions on the substance of certain issues. For example, he agreed to eliminate the clause contained in the 1903 treaty that granted rights in perpetuity to the United States. This clause was the greatest source of irritation among Panamanians, who viewed it as an affront to their sovereignty. In return, Bunker won their approval to vaguely worded assurances that the United States would continue indefinitely to play a role in the canal's defense. The vagueness of Bunker's language on this point was deliberate. U.S. defense of the canal was one of the most contentious issues, to be dealt with only after others had been resolved and the negotiations had gained momentum. Bunker again recognized the importance of a symbolic act to assuage Panamanian nationalism and improve the overall atmosphere of the talks and prodded Secretary Kissinger to fly to Panama in February 1974 to sign the principles.

Despite considerable progress in the negotiations in late 1974 and early 1975, bureaucratic infighting between the Pentagon and State Department foiled the negotiator's initial goal of completing a draft before the 1976 presidential campaign hit full stride. Under White House instructions to avoid discussion of any politically sensitive issues, Bunker decided to soft-pedal the high-level negotiations until after the elections; in the meantime, he returned to the trenches to work out some of the technical details. This maneuver sustained the momentum of the process during a difficult period and facilitated progress later when the political climate improved.

Bunker shakes hands with General Francisco Caamano Deno, chief of the rebel forces in the Dominican Republic, before discussing the terms of the peace.

Throughout the negotiations, Bunker used his bargaining chips sparingly, relinquishing ground only when he believed that it would advance the U.S. position in more vital areas. While he generally stayed within his mandate, which was much broader than most diplomats even dream about, Bunker at times would push to the outer limits of his instructions to avoid a stalemate. He also used his own discretion in deciding when to drop maximal demands that were untenable. After a year of trying to secure the unobtainable—"residual defense rights," for instance—Bunker finally conceded that Panama could not accept, politically or psychologically, the presence of U.S. troops on its soil after American control of the canal ended. However, concessions such as this were invariably conditioned upon Panamanian agreement to give ground in another area.

AFTER THE elections, President Carter gave top priority to securing a new treaty, which he hoped to push through the Senate before the 1978 congressional elections further politicized the issue. When the final round of negotiations began in February 1977, a number of details still had to be worked out on issues in the canal zone: the status of U.S. military forces; jurisdiction over lands and waters; and technical questions about the administration and operation of the waterway itself. The two major un-

Bunker, chief Panamanian negotiator Romulo Escobar Bethancourt, and Ambassador Sol Linowitz read over a draft of the proposed canal treaty.

resolved issues, however, were the termination date for U.S. control and continued U.S. rights to defend the canal after the new treaty came into force.

Bunker and his new co-negotiator, Ambassador Sol Linowitz, were pressing for a 20-to 50-year period before termination of American jurisdiction, while Panama was demanding complete control by the year 2000. Panama also was opposed to giving any rights to the United States to defend the canal once operational control had passed on. To break this stalemate, the negotiators proposed a two-track approach—one treaty would guarantee the permanent neutrality of the waterway, another would give Panama complete control by December 31, 1999. This was a deft move, since it separated the issue of security—which was foremost in the minds of the U.S. military and Congress—from the secondary issue of sovereignty.

On the critical issue of guaranteeing the canal's permanent neutrality, Bunker offered a "compromise" that gave Panama the task of defending the waterway from internal threats, while the United States retained responsibility for defending it against external threats. This formula ostensibly split the issue and gave equal responsibility to eabch party, but in reality it was a face-saving device that masked a major concession by Panama. In return for granting the United States the continued right to defend the canal, Bunker acceded to Panama's demand for control by the end of 1999. In this adroit maneuver, Bunker had linked the two most controversial issues in a single solution.

Bunker's strategy throughout the negotiations was to concede on the symbols of sovereignty that Panama had emphasized from the start, while ensuring that the United States retained the permanent right to defend the canal. His successful implementation of this strategy was essential in winning Pentagon and congressional support for the new treaties, which were signed in September 1977, after 13 years of negotiations.

PERHAPS THE MOST striking aspect of Bunker's personal style was the simplicity of his approach to complex negotiations. A Foreign Service officer who served him as an aide described this trait: "He avoids excessive intellectualization. When he feels he has the problem in its essentials, he just goes on from there until everyone is worn down." While Bunker certainly demonstrated patience and tenacity in his mediation efforts, he was equally capable of using bolder tactics when the most obvious approaches failed. The West Irian and Dominican Republic negotiations represent the best examples of his willingness to take calculated risks to break an impasse.

Bunker never engaged his ego in negotiations, so he was able to walk away from a bad deal. This quality—the ability to accept the possibility of "failure"—was a psychological source of strength that generally guaranteed him success. Another factor was his modesty and willingness to rely on the suggestions of savvy subordinates. Throughout his diplomatic career he effectively employed the skills of talented Foreign Service officers, many of whom later became distinguished diplomats in their own right. He did not see himself as a virtuoso performer practicing what George Ball has aptly referred to as "showbiz diplomacy." Bunker also eschewed gimmicks and ruses that might achieve a short-term victory but would make it more difficult to secure a lasting and workable solution. His business background provided valuable experience. As Sir Harold Nicolson once said, diplomacy is founded on "the sound business principles of moderation, fair-dealing, reasonableness, credit, compromise, and a distrust of all...extremes."

Since diplomacy is not a science, but an art, it is impossible to say whether the tactics that Bunker employed in mediation would be successful for a different person in a different context. His unique style certainly complemented his negotiating tactics. Nevertheless, as a man who served under Bunker in Vietnam once observed, an important lesson that can be learned from the late diplomat's career is that "an honest, straightforward, decent, and truthful man makes a successful negotiator." □

Jet-Age Vagabond

No permanent ties,
Possessions in government boxes,
And a succession of places to call home
One by one;
Foreign service child.

My birthplace no longer exists
In name.
A post-natal nightmare,
While I hold citizenship in a nation
Foreign to me.
I envied my portrait,
The American Family: popular, steady, secure.
Then I experienced suburbia,
Well-oiled like clockwork—
My private Beethoven symphony.
I realize now how special it is
Growing up,
A jet-age vagabond.
Seven schools and countless friends,
And three continents
Called home.
I need to see them all again.
Again, again.
One more taste of heroin so sweet.

—DARIA H. STEIGMAN



Entity

There is no identity
Being
The Ambassador's Daughter.
Rather,
A prize possession.
They lined up to invite me to their parties,
Sight unseen.
If I'd believed their glamourous fawning
Today still
I'd be the belle of the ball
Dancing on a false stage.

Out of His spotlight
I grew up,
Measuring worth on a personal scale.
While ever caught up
In empty lives,
They remind me of children
On a merry-go-round
Seeking status from brass rings.

—DARIA H. STEIGMAN

Attentat

Gray stones painted with scarlet blood.
Too many shouts, too much noise.
Fire etching tight patterns on the wall.
The Police, masters of a slow ballet, move silently through a sea of fear.
Exposed bone, an obscene debris, is covered by a plastic sheet.
Sirens scream on empty streets, speeding to a rendezvous with flame while strobes record nameless death, burning it indelible on the brain.

—HOWARD R. SIMPSON

STANDING AT THE CROSSROADS

Revealed as a moral force at the hearings, Secretary Shultz now has the mandate to make his mark

JIM ANDERSON

LIKE A FLASH of summer lightning, George Shultz's appearance before the Joint Select Iran Committees illuminated the man, his philosophy, and his methods. The nation saw a dignified, angry secretary of state, loyal to his president, but deeply troubled by the White House machine that routinely manipulated and shielded Ronald Reagan. The nation also saw a secretary who had allowed himself to be systematically undercut. He was clearly distressed at how the intelligence community had gone far beyond its traditional role and had begun forming policy, a dual function that guaranteed both defective intelligence and policy. Placing blame was not the crux of his testimony, however. The secretary wanted to put the system right, repair the delicate balance between the branches of government, and restore the concept of effective responsibility.

What Shultz revealed about himself and the decision-making system of the administration was not new. But his bravura appearance before the joint committees supplied the kind of detail and color that he had previously concealed.

According to close associates, George Shultz is a calm, methodical man who has organized the upper levels of the State Department to suit his outwardly relaxed style. He begins his working day with a glance at the important overnight cable traffic, and then has a series of 15-minute meetings with three different groups, starting at 8:30. First he meets with his closest advisers, including Executive Assistant Charles Hill, Under Secretary for Political Affairs Michael Armacost, and Executive Secretary Mel Levitsky. Then he has another session with one of the five geographical bureaus—a different one for every day of the week—and then a third meeting with a functional bureau (Narcotics Control, Politico-Military, for example). As one participant describes it, Shultz does little talking at these meetings, preferring to let the conversation move around the room, while he listens, and his assistants take notes. Actual decision-making is reserved for smaller groups. Not only is that neater, it is also a way of cutting down on authoritative leaks. This is the basic system by which he gives the bureaucracy its marching orders, although there are special meetings called by Levitsky on Shultz's orders for topical issues or crises.

Ever methodical, Shultz keeps a careful paper trail. "He has a sense of history," one of his aides says. "Maybe he wants to write a book someday." Frequently, at the end of the day, he winds up in front of the fireplace in his 7th-floor office, or the more formal 8th-floor reception area, sitting in an easy chair, wearing a sweater, reading cables and sipping a Manhattan.

Characteristically, the controlled rage shown by Shultz in his Capitol Hill appearance was not impromptu; the appearance had been preceded by months of careful preparation—mainly by Charles Hill, who prepared hundreds of detailed answers to possible questions on hand-written legal pads for the secretary to study. On the basis of this meticulous foundation, it was Shultz's deliberate decision to go public this one time with the story of his relationship to the president and to the president's men.

What Shultz said on his first day of testimony jibed with the account of administration methods given by his predecessor, Alexander Haig, and by former Office of Management and Budget Director David Stockman. Shultz described the president as a man routinely manipulated by his staff to defend positions he doesn't understand or believe. All these accounts portray the higher levels of policymaking in the administration as a sort of playpen where the bigger kids take toys away from the smaller. The teacher, meanwhile, is busy making appearances before the PTA.

In a way, the decision-making structure de-

Opposite: Secretary Shultz at the Iran-contra hearings. Excerpts from his testimony appear on following pages.

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scribed in Shultz's testimony—coming from a current member of the cabinet—was the most devastating of all. He apparently realized belatedly how damaging his first day's description was, and on the second day tried to shore up the president's image, but the damage had already been done. Was this a rare miscalculation? Or was it, as one of his close aides says, a deliberate ploy to make his point about the White House way of doing things, and yet remain a loyal aide.

A SIGNIFICANT FACT about the way Shultz runs the State Department is that there are few surprises, so few that the reporters who travel aboard his Boeing 707 wryly refer to the plane as the "Stealth Aircraft." The things that he says and does are generally so predictable and repetitive—in a word, boring—that the Shultz story routinely drops off television and word-processing screens. Wire-service reporters refer to the secretary as "Mr. Insert," because their stories about him often wind up as the optional paragraph in the White House story.

If Haig was the Joe Theismann of the Reagan administration's diplomacy—always shooting his mouth off and going for the long-yardage bomb—Shultz is the John Riggins—plowing straight ahead, even with a couple of tacklers hanging from his legs. However, after five years on the team, Shultz's scoring record has not been impressive, perhaps because he keeps running into his own blockers, or because the coach seems to be more interested in giving half-time interviews than in exercising leadership. The coming season is going to be critical for him. Shultz believes a superpower's foreign policy works best when it is predictable, when other countries know that what they see is approximately what they get. He is not much interested in the nuances and contrivances of the diplomatic tradition. As he once said, "Don't tell me there's an agreement in principle. That's just saying we can't agree." When surprises happen—such as the news of the diversion of the funds to the contras, or Iran arms deliveries—Shultz can become very, very angry. The laid-back style disappears, and he grows red in the face, thumping the table for emphasis.

It is not good to be on the receiving end of that anger. A young State Department employee named Spencer Warren found that out when he decided to make a personal, unauthorized effort to push the 1986 contra-aid bill through Congress. After working in the Reagan-Bush campaign, Warren was hired, at



Shultz meets with Regan, Reagan, and Poindexter at the Reykjavik summit. Ordered to sell the results of the historic meeting, the secretary still managed to disarm its more harmful provisions.

the orders of the White House, to work on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff as a speech writer and designated thinker. As a policy-level official, Warren was one of the few permitted to see a Top Secret "NODIS" telegram from Ambassador Frank Ortiz in Buenos Aires. It described how a congressional delegation led by House Speaker Tip O'Neill had criticized administration policies in a meeting with Argentine President Raul Alfonsin. Thinking that the speaker's indiscretion would turn the House vote against him on the contra-funding vote, Warren leaked the cable to the *Washington Times* and the Evans and Novak column. The aide was quickly fingered as the culprit by department security, summoned to an interrogation, where he confessed, and was then escorted to the C Street entrance and relieved of his building pass, the Foreign Service equivalent of having your military insignia torn off.

This summary punishment, at Shultz's order, can be contrasted with his more benign treatment of Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary for inter-American affairs. Abrams admitted in his testimony to the joint committees that he misled a congressional panel about the soliciting of funds for the contras from Brunei. When asked to fire Abrams by leading members of Congress, the secretary said Abrams was doing "a sensational job" and he had no intention of firing him. The common strain of these two incidents reveals an important element of Shultz's character: He is unswerving in his insistence on loyalty—upward and downward — and adherence to the chain of command and responsibility. Abrams, whatever else he did, obeyed that code. Warren did not.

I once asked Shultz, in an informal moment, if he did not think that the nation would have been better served by a strategically placed leak, which might have exposed and stopped the Iran arms sales before they blossomed into their full folly. He looked at me in astonishment, as if I had suggested that the remedy to the federal deficit might be a switch to Soviet-style socialism. He barked a one-word answer: "No."

ALTHOUGH IT IS not in the oath of office, every secretary of state knows that he will be measured by the standards set by Henry Kissinger, who began the apparently unshakeable tradition of personal involvement through the diplomatic

dramas that have come to be known as shuttles. That unspoken tradition was one reason that Alexander Haig spent the spring of 1982 flying back and forth across the Atlantic, trying to head off the Falklands war. And that was one reason George Shultz found himself flying to Lebanon the following spring, in an attempt to negotiate a withdrawal of the Israeli and Syrian forces from that country and bolster the eroding U.S. influence in the Middle East.

The trip was an effort to get the United States back on the scoreboard, to remain a key player in the region, despite the damaging impact of the Israeli invasion. During the shuttle, Shultz, a former labor mediator, used some basic contract-negotiating techniques, including the deliberate introduction of an artificial deadline. Another technique was his insistence that the United States, while playing a mediation role, could not be a party to the contract. The deal would be between the Israelis and the Lebanese, with the United States acting only as broker.

Shultz's mistakes in this effort were in believing that the Syrians could be dealt out and that the central Lebanese government could speak for the riven, battered collection of contesting factions within the country. Lack of information might have been behind those errors; an important portion of the CIA's Middle East bureau had been blown up in the first truck bombing of the American embassy in Beirut the month before. The dearth of knowledge about Lebanon led to the delusion that a reasonable-sounding agreement would hold together when subjected to the turbulence of the religious and factional strife of Lebanon.

Seen from the front cabin of his aircraft as it shuttled back and forth between Beirut and Israel, the contract that Shultz engineered seemed viable. But, as Philip Habib, special envoy in the region at the time, later explained to a symposium at the Middle East Institute, the Syrians played a clever waiting game, ostensibly going along with the Lebanese-Israeli troop-withdrawal negotiations and then destroying the deal when they were militarily strong enough to do so. Shultz stopped in Damascus after the negotiations to inform President Hafez Assad about his hard-won arrangements. Assad then subjected him to a five-hour tirade which the secretary, characteristically, described as "clearly not support." This attempt to follow the Kissinger pattern was an expensive, painful lesson for Shultz. He endured another painful experience—one that shook the former Marine deeply—when a truck-bomb blew up the Marine barracks at the Beirut international airport in late 1983. Reacting bitterly to the chain of setbacks and tragedies, the secretary thereafter exhibited an abiding mistrust of the Arab world, and an almost visceral distaste for the Middle East entanglement. This repugnance led to a virtual vacuum of American leadership in a region where the United States would soon again be drawn into military involvement. It also led to a change in the views of the American Jewish community about Shultz. When he first arrived, he was seen as something of a bogey-man, because of his many business contacts with the Arab world. Today, one influential Jewish lobbyist describes him as the best friend as secretary of state that Israel has ever had in Washington.

With the coming to power of Mikhail Gorbachev and a more stable, forward-looking leadership in the Kremlin, Shultz turned his attention to the possibility of an arms control agreement. This became another area of continuing frustration—a battle between Reagan political appointees who operated from an ideological agenda to seek superiority over the Soviets, and career professionals who believed that a workable contract on arms control involved concessions on both sides. The debate was fought out by the usual playpen rules. Shultz, siding with the professionals, was unable to get the president's attention until arms control took on public relations overtones and became the centerpiece of a summit.

THE REYKJAVIK SUMMIT can be examined by future historians as a case study in how diplomatic disasters come in on little cats paws, and also as a total aberration in Shultz's careful, private way of doing business. Not only was he a major party to an impulsive, impromptu negotiation that nearly succeeded in dissolving NATO, he was also an apparently enthusiastic participant in the unprecedented national campaign to sell the results, even while working to undermine the unfavorable parts of the outcome.

In the space of two frantic days in Iceland, Reagan and Shultz proposed a deal in which all strategic nuclear missiles would be eliminated within ten years; in a five-year interim period, half of all ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and strategic bombers would be removed from the superpower's arsenal. The proposed deal was not consummated only because the Soviets insisted that the U.S. strategic defense initiative be scrapped as well. When he appeared before the press in Reykjavik, the secretary looked exhausted, apparently devastated by a summit that had broken down in the final hour. But, after receiving presidential march-

"In the State Department...I have never worked with more able and dedicated people....Public service is a very rewarding and honorable thing, and nobody has to think they need to lie and cheat in order to be a public servant or to work in foreign policy. Quite to the contrary. If you are really going to be effective...you have to be straight-forward, and you have to conduct yourself in a basically honest way....Trust is the coin of the realm. Everybody in the government, certainly anybody who works for me, should know that they must not lie and must not mislead. Nobody has to get my permission to tell the truth—they must tell the truth."

"As you know, the Congress doesn't treat the State Department very well when it comes to appropriated funds. And not only have we historically taken a beating but we've been cut brutally...and I think in a manner that is not in the interests of the United States....We have to look at [foreign aid] as in our interests....Why don't we call it a United States aid bill? It's all for our interests."

Standing next to two Marines, the secretary arrives in Lebanon. The attack on the corps' headquarters at the Beirut airport deeply affected the former Marine and deepened his mistrust of the Arab world.

ing orders to portray the summit as a great success, Shultz became part of the sales staff. He sold it relentlessly, talking to every group that would book him. Shultz was a supersalesman, but he could not help injecting his own common sense, which had the effect of a used-car salesman's confiding to the customers that "Today's Special" has a defective transmission. It was clear that the Reykjavik arrangement had serious problems, most important that it would de-link United States and European defenses.

AS PART OF the sales blitz, Shultz noted at the National Press Club that the elimination of strategic nuclear weapons would require a large increase in the number of western conventional forces, in order to counter the Soviets' numerical advantage in Europe. Conventional forces, he pointed out, are expensive; he did not make the further point that they are costly in political terms, since they involve armed forces gathered through universal conscription. Incredibly, this was an idea that had not apparently occurred to anybody in the heady atmosphere of the Iceland summit.

In November, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made a sudden rescue trip to Washington to remind the president that the summit results would destroy NATO—not to mention her Conservative government. Implicit in her remarks was the picture of an American administration that didn't seem to know what it was doing.

During the Thatcher visit, a TV news report shows Shultz at Camp David, talking to White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan. The secretary was not invited to the Camp David meeting, and looked weary, as well as a bit silly, wearing his burgundy-and-gold stocking cap—he was instead bound for the Redskins game. He was seen trying to pass a piece of paper to Regan, who refused it. Shultz's testimony at the hearings revealed that this was his attempt to get a note to the president warning him about the National Security staff rogue operation and the intention to trade the terrorists who had bombed the U.S. embassy in Kuwait, as well as the Marine barracks, for concessions on the U.S. hostages in Lebanon. He finally got his message through to the president by going around Regan, but this appeared to be one of Shultz's low points as secretary of state.

Shultz continued to subtly undermine the parts of the Reykjavik arrangement that he didn't like. In a speech in Chicago, he killed the ten-year elimination period by raising the idea of a residual "insurance policy" of nuclear missiles. The clumsy and illogical wording of the speech, according to officials who worked on it, was an accurate reflection of a hasty, paste-up process of reconsidering—and thus ultimately reversing—a proposal that Shultz decided would not be acceptable to U.S. allies. The ten-year elimination has now disappeared from the U.S. draft for a strategic arms treaty on the table at the Geneva talks.

SHULTZ REVEALED in his testimony that he resigned as secretary of state three times and was talked out of it each time by the president. It is symptomatic that each of the resignations was triggered by a conflict with the White House staff. Reagan was either unaware of the disputes or chose to remain removed from them until forced to come to grips with the strife. It is not news that the White House staff is the cross that each secretary of state must bear. What is interesting to learn is that such a master of the governmental process as George Shultz had to go to such extreme lengths to prevail over middle-level White House apparatchiks such as Jonathan Miller, who denied Shultz the right to use a presidential aircraft. Another time he resigned to protest Robert McFarlane's going on a diplomatic mission without his knowledge. More recently, Shultz submitted his resignation over the administration's sweeping plan to force all employees to take lie detector tests. (In fact, lie detector tests are given to State Department employees suspected of security breaches. Shultz objected to everybody, including himself, being routinely obliged to have them.)

Shultz's revelation that he had resigned three times raises a further question that goes to the heart of the way he operates: why didn't he resign when faced with evidence of a far more egregious violation of his trust? He did not explain that decision, even when pressed by Michael DeWine (R-Ohio), who suggested it would have been the right thing to do. A response can be deduced, however, from his other testimony and behavior. As the Iran arms-contra funding story began to unroll in all its awful detail, Shultz came to the conclusion that the president was not only misinformed, but also manipulated by National Security Adviser John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey. As the secretary put it, "They were trying to use his undoubted skills as a communicator to have him give a speech and give a press conference and say these things and in doing so he would bail them out."

As an example of the internal disinformation campaign, Poindexter told Reagan that there was a noticeable reduction in Iranian support of terrorism in 1986. The State Department knew differently, but the information was not getting to the president. Deputy Secretary John Whitehead took the unprecedented step of going public with the State assessment in congressional testimony, to the intense annoyance of the White House.

Shultz saw himself involved in a guerrilla war with the NSC staff, trying to get the facts to a president who either didn't know or didn't care. Although he was prepared to resign over relatively minor issues when he felt he could be easily replaced, he decided to endure a larger humiliation when the viability of the administration appeared to be at stake. He apparently saw himself as the Last Honest Man. "I frankly felt that I was the one who was loyal to the president, because I was the one trying to get him the facts so that he could make the decision." In his testimony, Shultz described life in the trenches of Washington in martial terms, where nothing is ever settled and no adversary ever gives up. He once said the difference between State and Treasury—he has headed both—is that nothing ever ends at the State Department. "It's a fight all the way, all the time," said Shultz at the hearing. He sometimes tells the story of his wife's knee surgery last year, with the surgeon coming out to say that the operation was a total success and that his wife would be up and walking in six weeks. "Oh, boy," Shultz told him, "Would I love to have such a definitive outcome in the things I do." To Shultz, the disinformation was an illustration of what happens when the people running an operation are also the ones supplying the information. The intelligence tends to reinforce the policy, even when both are wrong-headed. At the hearings Shultz proposed a radical solution to cure what he describes as a conflict of interest at the White House, where a powerful, self-contained NSC staff controls information, operations, and access to the president. He proposed having each member of the Cabinet work in the White House (actually the Old Executive Office Building), where they would develop a presidential point of view because of their geographic and personal proximity to the president. Day-to-day operations of the agencies would be taken over by deputy secretaries. Such a system, he believes, would physically and symbolically remove the wall

[redacted]

"It is very frustrating...and we wish we could find the answers to how to get them out, but I don't think the answer is to give the hostage-takers what they want in terms of things like releasing the murderers who are being held in Kuwait. That is not an answer; that is not a bright idea....We are not going to pay ransom or do other things that are against our policy. The minute you do that, what you do is expose the vast number of Americans who are traveling around to a greater risk because those who take hostages see that it pays."

"The efforts to get out the hostages that were held on that TWA plane were basically...done under the president's direction right out of my office and with very professional work by our people in the field....A key was our contact with President Assad and Syria... [Chargé] April Glassby...was just great, and she is a little-known, but I think, genuine heroine of that whole effort, and she's a Foreign Service officer."

Shultz meets with Middle East negotiator Philip Habib and Lebanese President Amin Gemayel. The secretary's faith in the ability of the Beirut government to control the fractious country doomed his peace plan.

between the president and the Cabinet. At the same time, it would reduce the NSC monopoly on information and access.

A less radical remedy has been installed since the Iran hearings, a direct result of the abuses. National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, a former Foreign Service officer and deputy secretary of defense, reportedly has a close working relationship with both Shultz and Caspar Weinberger. He is said to have an agreement with Chief of Staff Howard Baker that neither one of them will meet with Reagan without the other's being present. When Shultz and Weinberger meet with the president, both Baker and Carlucci will be there. The system is designed to ensure that no major national security initiatives can be launched without the responsible senior officials being aware of them.

Shultz came out of the Iran hearings as a towering figure—one legislator described Shultz's testimony as not only the high point of the hearings, but of his 11 years in Congress. With such standing, the secretary has the best chance to institutionalize the reforms that he would like to see, and try to prevent Reagan from becoming a lame duck in terms of foreign policy. Another, more personal reason against resignation may be the near-certainty that he would be replaced by somebody more ideological. One of his advisers frames the question in pointed terms: "Do you really want to see Jeane Kirkpatrick as secretary of state for the next 16 months?"

The betting is that Shultz will remain unless he suffers another major setback that indicates he has clearly lost the confidence of the president. Shultz was recently asked, How does he know that there are not other issues where he was undercut? "I can't certify that there are not other things," he said, "but I don't think so." Shultz is first of all a pragmatist who realizes that power flows downward in Washington. As he said during his testimony, "When the president hangs out his shingle, he gets all the business."

IN FIGHTING the political-bureaucratic wars, Shultz appears to have neglected one important State area—personnel. This, ironically, could turn out to be the most lasting and damaging remnant of his tenure. Shultz has presided over the State Department during a period of nearly unprecedented

politicization of foreign policymaking. The number of political ambassadors has grown from 25 percent at the beginning of the Reagan administration to 40 percent today. Walking the halls of the State Department building appears to be an increasingly common occupation for ambassadorial-level Foreign Service officers.

Part of the problem is that the White House has an ideological kinship with right-wingers such as Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), especially on such issues as aid for the contras. Helms, who has blocked the nominations of Melissa Wells (for Mozambique) and Richard Viets (for Portugal) for more than a year, is also useful on other issues, such as the Bork nomination and defense budget issues, and he is expert on trading his votes. One of Helms's influential staff members says that the "careerists" (his denigrating word for Foreign Service officers) "have no greater right to these jobs than anybody else." Another Capitol Hill staffer, a former Foreign Service officer sympathetic to those Helms describes as careerists, says, "We have been hearing this for months and have been trying to bring it to an open fight, which I think we could win. But what help have we been getting from George Shultz? Nothing. Zero."

Another appraisal of a Shultz shortcoming comes from a European ambassador much involved in trade and economic matters. The ambassador, remaining diplomatically anonymous, says, "We used to deal with the State Department on such things. But Shultz has given it up and has surrounded himself with people who aren't terribly aggressive. We now deal with the special trade representative, or the White House, or Commerce, or Treasury. We sometimes never see [Under Secretary for Economic Affairs] Allen Wallis until the final deal has been cut." One of Shultz's aides says that the reason has more to do with the congressional mandate, giving the lead in such negotiations to the special trade representative, than it does with the personality of Shultz or Wallis. But the official concedes that the secretary has surrounded himself with like-minded, nonabrasive, congenial people like Wallis, Michael Armacost, and Legal Counsellor Abraham Sofaer.

If the assessment is correct that Shultz has not energetically pushed to have the best people around, and if he has allowed many choice spots to go to White House pets rather than Foreign Service professionals, then the infighting in this administration may turn out to be one of the more significant and expensive struggles in the history of the Foreign Service. If it does come about that the Foreign Service has been debased while George Shultz was engaged in other struggles, it could be a lasting stain on his legacy.

GEORGE SHULTZ came to the office in a situation analogous to the one faced by Gerald Ford: part of his job was to heal the scars left by his predecessor. That he seems to have done. Until the Iran arms story came along, it appeared that he was the major influence on the president in terms of foreign policy—indeed, the only member of the government with any lasting influence in that field. Then came the scandal; he seems to have used it to strengthen his position and to try to bolster a president whose biological/political clock is rapidly running down.

The secretary—not to mention the administration's foreign policy—stands at a crossroads. He now has the stature, the leverage, and the mandate. What he does not have are the results. The administration has drawn blanks in Africa and the Middle East; relations with China and the Soviet Union have remained stable, but mistrustful. It has been "people power" that has toppled unpopular regimes in Haiti and the Philippines, though the administration seeks to claim some credit for the changes; history has not yet rendered judgment on whether the U.S. roles in those upheavals will outweigh the previous role in keeping the corrupt regimes in power. The most likely area for the unqualified success that has eluded him thus far is in arms control, particularly in an agreement eliminating United States and Soviet medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe. But the administration's yearning for a success is so palpable that the Soviets may decide to withhold a deal, or at least to bargain so hard that a workable arrangement will not be ratificd. Then, too, there are conservatives in the Senatc and in the administration who never met an arms control agreement they liked, and they will see Shultz as the enemy within.

Shultz understands very well the basic rule of cabinet secretaries: they work for the president, through the president, and with the Congress. If Ronald Reagan is traumatized into a kind of political catatonia by recent events, Shultz will be helpless. If Congress becomes paranoiac and self-righteous about all administration actions, he will also find it impossible to realize his potential. In the spirit of the old Chinese curse, it's going to be an interesting time. □

"I think there are a lot of things to be learned [such as] the importance of separating the function of gathering and analyzing intelligence from the function of developing and carrying out policy. If the two things are mixed in together, it is too tempting to have your analysis and the selection of information that's presented favor the policy that you're advocating. [The intelligence agencies] have to serve me. They are not my competitor. I am their client."

"We have this very difficult task of having a separation of powers that means we have to learn how to share power. Sharing power is harder, and we need to work at it harder than we do. But that's the only way."

"Advancing our values is one of the essential ingredients of our foreign policy. The value of freedom, of democracy and the rule of law...provides other people a chance to live under conditions that are more decent, but it also makes the world more secure....The credit belongs to the attraction of the idea of freedom....The basic idea of freedom is the revolutionary idea, whether you are talking about political organization...or economic organization."

THE JOURNAL

Moving from Mokhovaya Street

Capitalism has its side effects when Marxists move the Moscow embassy's household effects

R.T. DAVIES

THE OUTSIZED Stars and Stripes flying a few hundred yards away over the main gateway to the chancery was not calculated to soothe the breast of Joseph Stalin when he gazed north from the Kremlin. It was from the pedestal of a column of this building that George F. Kennan had made a brief speech to a cheering crowd of Muscovites on VE Day in 1945, an act the dictator had neither forgotten nor forgiven.

It was not surprising, therefore, that during Kennan's later term as ambassador to the Soviet Union, Stalin ordered the Americans to move out of the building on Mokhovaya Street, which had served as our chancery since shortly after diplomatic relations were established in 1933. The British were also told to move.

Stalin died in early 1953, and a short time later the Foreign Ministry told the British and us that, if they liked, they could stay on where they were. The Brits had dragged their feet, looking interminably at one building after another, as the ministry tried to find them alternative accommodations. They accepted the recision and, to this day, remain in their compound overlooking the Moscow River and the Kremlin. Months earlier, however, we Americans had accepted a recently completed apartment complex on Chaikovsky Street and begun to adapt it for use as a combined chancery and staff residence. Plans for moving were far advanced. So we rejected the offer to remain at Mokhovaya.

Shortly before the new ambassador, Charles E. Bohlen, arrived in April, the move had begun. Jim Garvey, Dave Klein, Phil Valdes, and I, as junior Russian-language officers, were assigned to work full-time with the moving crews furnished by Byurobin, the Foreign Ministry's office for supplying services to foreigners. The move began at seven on a rainy Monday morning. This proved to be a portent, for it rained steadily during the next month, with brief intervals of sunshine. Five brigades of *chornorabochiye*—"black, or dirty, workers"—and five ZiM trucks reported to the courtyard at Mokhovaya, while three brigades reported to the building on Chaikovsky Street. Each consisted of eight men, led by a *brigadir*, or straw boss, who worked no less hard than any of his seven mates. They were all dressed in padded blue jackets, denim trousers, knee boots, and billed workmen's caps.

Of the 64 men who came to work that Monday, several stick in my mind. The senior *brigadir* at the receiving end, on Chaikovsky Street, was Kolya, who jury-rigged a block and tackle on the roof of the 10-story building, by means of which our safes and filing cabinets were hoisted up to the 9th and 10th floors.

One of Kolya's workers at Chaikovsky was an older man, who must have been in his 70s. His colleagues told us that he had been a colonel in the Czarist army during World War I. He was called *Stary master*—"the old master artisan." *Stary master* was a powerful old man and would tackle any job that came along. Kolya kept an eye on him, however, and tried to spare him the heaviest burdens.

Since the elevators at both Mokhovaya and Chaikovsky were too small to take electric refrigerators, these were carried down the stairs of one building and up those of the other on the back of a man in a sling that passed over the shoulders. I once saw *Stary master* hoist onto his back a refrigerator off a truck at Chaikovsky and start toward the door of one of the stairwells. Kolya caught sight of him and quickly sent another man to take the appliance. Then he roughly called *Stary master* over and gave him something else to do, saying, "I thought I told to you stick with this job here. What's the matter, you deaf?"

The senior *brigadir* at Mokhovaya was Dyadya Vanya, a Hero of Socialist Labor. Dyadya Vanya was perhaps 45 or 50, about five and a half feet tall, and might have weighed 150 pounds sopping wet. Yet he could carry a Frigidaire on his back down six flights of

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A retired Foreign Service officer, the writer was a junior political officer at the embassy in Moscow from 1951–53.

The "new" Moscow embassy building on Chaikovsky Street.

stairs, bent nearly double to keep its legs from catching on the step behind, help heave it onto a truck, and then run back to make sure his boys were on the job. All the workmen had a very affectionate, but healthy, respect for Dyadya Vanya. After we had moved the safes, I stood in awe of him.

THERE WERE SOME 45 safes and filing cabinets in the embassy, ranging from one weighing about three tons down to quarter-ton safe-filing cabinets. These were on the third, fourth, and fifth floors of Mokhovaya and had to come down the marble stairs. We had one day—a Saturday—in which to move them all. By the time they were scheduled to go, only two brigades—16 men—were still working at Mokhovaya. To move some 40 metric tons of safes in one 10-hour working day, each man would have to shift about 550 pounds an hour. Dyadya Vanya was unimpressed with the difficulty of the project. "We'll manage," he said.

We started with the three-ton safe. Dyadya Vanya had his *rebyata*—his boys—prize it away from the wall with crowbars. Then he turned to one of the crew. "Get the threads, Vasya," he said. Vasya went down to the courtyard and returned with a 40-foot length of manila cable, about 4 inches in diameter. The safe was then tipped on its side and the "threads" slipped under it, so that it rode on runners of rope. With 16 men pushing and pulling and Dyadya Vanya giving the cadence—*riz, dva, poshol*; *riz, dva, poshol*—the safe began moving, three inches at a time. Once they got it onto the marble stairs, it went much more easily, the danger being that it would start sliding and couldn't be stopped. In an hour, we were down in the courtyard. Beams were laid up to the truck bed and the safe was pushed and pulled onto the ZiM, the normal capacity of which was supposed to be no more than a ton-and-a-half. At one point in the ascent of the safe, the truck's front wheels were nearly a foot off the ground. But finally, the three-tonner was aboard and the ZiM lumbered off to Chaikovsky.

After a 10-minute break—the fabled *perekur*—the boys went back for the other 44 safes and filing cabinets. All of them were out of Mokhovaya by late that afternoon.

In addition to the office equipment, 40 apartments full of furniture, plus the personal effects of the occupants, had to be moved out of Mokhovaya. I estimated an average of a half ton per apartment of canned and bottled goods, including a certain quantity of strong spirits. Among the household goods, most of which were only loosely packed in open boxes, were silver trays, cigarette boxes, radios, and alarm clocks—then priceless possessions in the Soviet Union. A number of our colleagues had expressed their fears about the safety of these goods. At the beginning, therefore, an American officer rode on each truck. But as the first apartments were reassembled at the new building and nothing turned up missing, the practice was abandoned. I know of only one article that was lost, a bottle of Cook's American champagne.

The workmen were clearly struck by the luxury of Mokhovaya, which, as a result of overcrowding, American visitors were inclined to compare with the poorer sort of apartment house in Greenwich Village. Impressed though the Soviet workmen may have been, they took it very much in stride.

I was constantly surprised by the intelligence and breadth of knowledge

of these men. Electric mixers, automatic can openers, electric razors, and the like did not exist in the USSR, yet these laborers of rudimentary education figured out what they were and speculated accurately about how they worked. They also had a shrewd understanding of the western world, despite the misinformation with which the Soviet press was filled.

During one of the infrequent sunny interludes, we were taking a break in the courtyard. A box from one of the apartments was sitting nearby, waiting for a truck to return from Chaikovsky. On top was a can with a label displaying three sleek, fat, red tomatoes. One of the men said, "That's a beautiful label on that can. Practical, too. One look and, boom, you know what's inside. Why don't they do that here? Our labels don't have pictures, just words. And they're all alike, no matter what's in the can."

One of the others replied, "In America, everything isn't made by one ministry, like here. In America, there is no Ministry of Food Industry, and lots of companies compete against one another. So each one has to try to make his product better—and more attractive—than his competitor's." All agreed that it would be good to have such competition in the Soviet Union, too.

There was no sense at all of *partiynost'*—"partyness," or political awareness—among these men. At the beginning, they were wary and appeared to know, in a vague sort of way, that Americans were supposed to be enemies of the Soviet Union, but they did not seem to know, nor care to know, why this was so.

As we worked together, the initial reserve vanished. They asked us about the working hours, wages, and living standards of laboring people in the United States and seemed never to have read a word of the virulent anti-American propaganda that then filled every medium of mass communication in the USSR; it was, after all, still the very height of the Cold War.

Once, at the end of a *perekur*, Dyadya Vanya gave the signal to return to work. "Come on," he said, "this isn't getting the job done." "Yes," said a younger worker with mild sarcasm, "forward to the victory of Communism!" I said, "Yes, forward, but it's not Communism we're serving here; it's capitalism." There was a brief, shocked silence. Then everyone roared with laughter. I think it was the first time they had identified us as the "capitalists" about whom so much was made in party propaganda.

The attitude of these men towards Soviet officialdom, including their supervisors from Byurobin, was that of "them" and "us." They talked of the *nachal'stvo*—what class-conscious American workers used to call "the bosses." Like good working men everywhere, these Soviet "black workers" were in league against "them" and covered up for each other. This was true of the *brigadir*, as well. Everyone in Soviet society outside their own ranks was regarded as "them," as apart from and inimical to day laborers. Towards the police, the attitude was one of unconcealed hostility and fear.

As we worked together, the initial reserve vanished. They asked about the working hours, wages, and living standards of laboring people in the United States

As the job drew towards its close, the laborers began to ask half jokingly when we would have the *novosel'ye*—the housewarming—at Chaikovsky. We talked this over among ourselves and decided to chip in and buy the makings for a first-class housewarming. Two brigades had already been withdrawn as the volume of work diminished, and Dyadya Vanya's two at Mokhovaya were to leave at the end of work that Saturday. Four brigades were working at Chaikovsky. So we set the housewarming for Saturday afternoon. There would be 48 Russian workmen and four or five Americans, together with any Byurobin supervisors who cared to attend. We bought five cases of Polish vodka, totaling 60 liters, three cases of Canadian rye whisky, and three of Crimean *portveyn*, about 22 gallons altogether, or, roughly, better than three pints of something for each. We imagined that would be enough. We got 10 kilograms of black bread and five kilos each of sausage and cheese, or slightly less than a pound of food per capita. We set all this up in one of the shop rooms in the service compound at Chaikovsky.

SATURDAY CAME. It was the eighth anniversary of VE Day, eight years since George Kennan's remarks to the cheering Muscovites. Early that morning, Ambassador Bohlen came over to Mokhovaya, now completely empty, to see the embassy insignia removed. When the ambassador had left, Dyadya Vanya's brigades set about cleaning up the debris—all that was left of 18 years of American occupancy. During our first *perekur*, I told Dyadya Vanya about the housewarming and invited him and his brigades to hop on the last truck of the day, which would carry us, our tools, and whatever we had salvaged from Mokhovaya, over to Chaikovsky.

Dyadya Vanya had been one of the most vociferous proponents of a housewarming, so I was taken aback when he met the invitation with a worried frown and obvious hesitancy. He finally said he would talk it over with the boys and let me know. I waited apart while a small *veche*, or conclave, was convened. Shortly, Dyadya Vanya came back to say that they all felt it would be "inconvenient" for them to go to Chaikovsky for a housewarming. The *nachal'stvo* would be there, he said. I said, well, what about all the vodka, whisky, wine, bread, cheese, and sausage we had waiting there for them. Dyadya Vanya's face took on a pained expression. It was time for another *veche*. This consultation had a more animated character. Some bolder spirits were willing to risk the trip. The party of caution was still strong, however. Finally, Dyadya Vanya came back to say the consensus was they had better not go, but could I bring their share of the consumables over to Mokhovaya?

At lunch time, I took an embassy car over to Chaikovsky and brought back one third of the victuals and drink. We put these in an empty room and told Dyadya Vanya he was in charge of distribution. That afternoon, mem-

bers of the Mokhovaya brigades slipped discreetly into the room and secreted the bottles and foodstuffs about their persons, under their capacious quilted jackets, so as to conceal their booty from the militiamen who still stood guard at the entrance. Shortly before 5:30, they departed, well heeled.

When Dyadya Vanya and his two brigades had gone home, I took the last truck to Chaikovsky. Phil Valdes had just invited Kolya, the senior *brigadir*, and his men to the housewarming. Like Dyadya Vanya, Kolya was abashed when confronted with the reality of that which he had rhetorically urged so strongly. Three Byurobin supervisors were present in the courtyard at Chaikovsky—they were hard to find during the workday, but usually showed up at its end—and Kolya felt it would be impossible for his brigades to accept our invitation until they had left. Phil was able to talk the supervisors into joining the festivities, and the workmen gradually followed them.

For about 10 minutes, everybody stood around, genteelly sipping vodka and nibbling at the food, like participants in a Sunday-school picnic. Then two of the supervisors withdrew and, surprisingly, went home. The third, who had come over from Mokhovaya, drank heartily and was soon well on his way to nirvana. The workmen relaxed and the real housewarming began. They now insisted upon drinking toasts with us. First, we had to fill our glasses and theirs in accordance with the Russian norm—above the brim—so that the liquid is kept from running over only by surface tension. Our guests began to sample the wine and the whisky, which immediately became *viska*, a feminine noun.

I wish I could remember it better than I do. I *do* remember that the party was a huge success. We ran out of bread, cheese, and sausage within 20 minutes and had to send out for more. Our stock of potables diminished at an alarming rate. Within half an hour, everyone was drunk. I *do* remember *Stary master* proposing a toast. He said, "Mister Devis, I fought the Germans in the First World War and I fought the Germans in the Second World War. Today is VE Day. Let us drink to the end of *that* war and to the end of *all* wars! Above all, there must never be war between Russia and America! Let there be no more war!"

We all drank to that with enthusiasm and everyone reassured *Stary master*, "Don't worry, there won't be any war." *Stary master* was now weeping freely. He threw his arms around me and kissed me three times, full on the mouth. At the moment, my sole reaction was that *Stary master* badly needed a shave, a chronic condition with him. Later, I wondered whether this was not the "kiss of peace," which Russians exchange at Easter, when they greet each other with the salutation, "Christ is risen," and the reply, "He is indeed risen, the Prince of Peace."

It wasn't long before the vodka, whisky, and wine were almost gone. One of our local employees suggested we might have a problem getting some of our guests out the gate and past the militiamen. *Brigadir* Kolya agreed it was time to call a halt. "If we don't," he said, "they'll start dancing." Kolya sent the men out arm in arm, so they could steady each other. Everyone was able to navigate except five who had collapsed, including *Stary master*.

As we stood swaying in the bright sunlight of the courtyard, debating what to do, the wives of embassy officers watched disapprovingly from the balconies of Chaikovsky, while, from the windows of a neighboring apartment house, Russian women looked on with no less censorious expressions on their faces.

Kolya and Lyova, a local employee, said it was essential that the five who had passed out should be kept out of the hands of the police, lest the housewarming become a matter of official record. We put them all in the panel truck and Sergeant Roy "Dusty" Rhodes, the garage supervisor, drove it out of the courtyard. Karl Sommerlatte, the general services officer, went along, as did *Brigadir* Kolya, who said he had to see *Stary master* safely home. Because of his past, *Stary master* was a "socially inimical element" and could under no circumstances afford to be arrested. Kolya and *Stary master* were dropped off at a subway station and the other bodies were taken to our neighborhood sobering-up station, where Sommerlatte paid their 30-ruble fines in advance.

KINGS IN THE Russian land are baby boys and drunks. Drunks are tolerated as nowhere else—or were, before Mikhail Gorbachev. Vodka provided relief from harsh workaday realities and cloaked with impunity the occasional blowing-off of steam. In those days, the state took good care of its topers. First, it sold them vodka. Then, when the spirit had done its work and the imbiber was out cold in the gutter, the militia would come along and take him to the *vytrezvitel'*—the sobering-up station, where he could sleep it off or be brought around by cold showers and draughts of hot coffee or tea. For this, he was charged 30 rubles, or $7.50 at the official rate.

In unloading the panel truck, we discovered that one of the comatose workmen had a bottle of Cook's American champagne in an inside pocket of his quilted jacket. We could only assume that, while in his cups, he had recollected where it was and decided to take it along. Karl tried to make sure the officer in charge of the sobering-up station would return it to him.

On Monday morning, Kolya's four brigades were back to a man to finish up the odds and ends of the job. None seemed any the worse for wear.

Towards the end of our work at Mokhovaya, I was reminiscing with some of the men of Dyadya Vanya's brigades about our weeks together. Finally, I said, "What a shame that we shall probably never see each other again." An older man, a peasant from south Russia, said immediately, "Don't say that, Mister Devis. Where I come from, we have a proverb: 'Even the mountains come together, and how much more likely it is that men should meet again.' " One of the younger workmen laughed. "That's silly," he said, "how can the mountains come together?" The old peasant looked scornfully at him. "The rain washes the rock and soil off the mountains, it runs into the rivers, and the rivers carry the silt and sand to the sea," he said.

But I have never seen any of them again. □

PEOPLE

Foreign Service Juniors Awarded AFSA/AAFSW Scholarships

The AFSA COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION has announced the list of Financial Aid scholarships for academic year 1987–88. Once again the committee expresses deep appreciation to all those who have supported the scholarship programs with their generous contributions, and in particular AAFSW for its continued interest and efforts on behalf of Foreign Service juniors with funds raised at the annual Bookfair.

This year, two special scholarships are given in honor of Meryl Steigman and Bill Littlewood, volunteers who have worked tirelessly for many years in support of the Bookfair. Their citations from AAFSW read as follows:

> Meryl Steigman's contributions to Bookfair over the years have covered the complete gamut of volunteer work, from book collecting to Bookfair director in 1984 and 1985. She has inspired the whole Steigman family to become involved with every aspect of this annual project to raise scholarship money. Meryl's energy, spirit, and competence demonstrate Bookfair volunteerism at its finest, and we applaud her deep dedication to the Foreign Service.
>
> Bill Littlewood's interest in stamp collecting began in his childhood and remains a consuming interest today, to the great benefit of Bookfair. The Stamp Corner has grown tremendously under his direction and year-round efforts, and he has recruited and inspired a committee of dedicated and talented volunteers. His wife, Bente, chaired the 1986 Bookfair. In honoring Bill, we also honor another committed and enthusiastic Foreign Service team.

The names of the recipients of these 1987–1988 awards, the individual scholarships they have received, and the colleges and universities which they will attend are listed below.

Applications for the two scholarship programs, Merit Awards and Financial Aid grants, are available for eligible dependent children of career American Foreign Service personnel by writing now to the scholarship administrator, AFSA, 2101 E Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037. Merit Awards, based on academic excellence, are limited to high school students who will be graduating in 1988. The Financial Aid grants are for full-time undergraduate study in the United States, and are awarded solely on need.

The AFSA Committee on Education members include Claude Ross, chairman; William Ford, AID; Monica Greeley, AAFSW; Mark Mohr, State; David Smith, State; William Weinhold, USIA. The scholarship programs administrator is Dawn Cuthell.

Financial Aid Grants 1987–1988

Alexandra Aber, *Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, University of Rhode Island*
Frank N. Allegro, *Charles B. Hosmer Memorial Scholarship, Florida State University*
John A. Allegro, *Marcia Martin Moore Memorial Scholarship, Tallahassee Community College*
Rebecca M. Archer, *Ernest V. Siracusa Scholarship, University of California at Los Angeles*
Allison J. Aschman, *AAFSW, Bloomsburg University*
Denise K. Aschman, *Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, East Stroudsburg University*
Consuelo Barrett, *Harry A. Havens Memorial Scholarship, University of Lowell*
Terrence M. Barrett, *AAFSW, Curry College*
Kara J. Beveridge, *Charles and Jane Stelle Memorial Scholarship, Laramie County Community College*
Colette V. Cabral, *AAFSW, New York University*
Edward A. Cottrill, *William Benton Scholarship, Mary Washington College*
Katheryn L. Cottrill, *AAFSW, University of Virginia*
Joseph L. Covey, *Edward T. Wailes Scholarship, Virginia Military Institute*
Anthony E. Farago, *AAFSW, Abilene Christian College*
James M. Farrell, *Hope Rogers Bastek Memorial Scholarship, Keene State College*
John M. Farrell, *Neil Tardio Scholarship, Lyndon State College*
Anita L. Flood, *Robert Woods Bliss Scholarship, Providence College*
Pauline R. Flood, *Mary Kennedy Healy Memorial Scholarship, Catholic University*
Mathhew A. German, *AAFSW, University of Maryland*
Elena A. Gravelle, *AAFSW, Seton Hall University*
Daryl W. Harrison, *John Campbell White Memorial Scholarship, Allegheny College*
Ruth A. Hirsch, *AAFSW, Shenandoah College and Conservatory of Music*
Gregory J. Hohm, *C. Montague & Frances Pigott Scholarship, University of Dayton*
Teresa M. Hohm, *Beirut Memorial Scholarship, University of Dayton*
Thomas J. Hohm, *Vietnam Memorial Scholarship, Virginia Tech*
Christopher J. Holguin, *John Foster Dulles Memorial Scholarship, New Mexico State University*
Rudolph J. Holguin, *William Benton Scholarship, New Mexico State University*
Bruce F. Hoof III, *Arthur B. Emmons Memorial Scholarship, Portland State University*
Robin T. Johnson, *Betty Carp Scholarship, Reed College*
Karen L. Kalla, *Clarke W. Slade Memorial Scholarship, Evergreen State College*
Allan Kassebaum, *Jefferson Patterson Scholarship, Old Dominion University*
James L. Kassebaum, *AAFSW, Radford University*
David B. Kelly, *Edward T. Wailes Scholarship, University of Colorado*
Terri L. Kelly, *AAFSW, University of Maine at Machias*
Elizabeth N. Lee, *David K. E. Bruce Scholarship, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill*
Linda W. Leung, *AAFSW Scholarship honoring Willam Littlewood, University of Rochester*
Dennis C. Lincoln, *Mark Mattran Memorial Scholarship, Worcester Polytechnic Institute*
Douglas R. Lincoln, *Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, Louisiana State University*
Pamela M. Lincoln, *Wilbur J. Carr Memorial Scholarship, Franklin Pierce College*
Patrick W. Loomer, *Landreth M. Harrison Memorial Scholarship, Sarah Lawrence College*
Karen M. Lowe, *AAFSW, Asbury College*
Teressa-Anne Manapol, *AAFSW, Trinity University, Texas*
Vivynne L. Martindale, *Walter J. Stoessel Jr. Memorial Scholarship, Johns Hopkins University*
Nicole A. Mason, *Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, Fisher Junior College*
Dale W. McMindes, *Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, John Brown University*
Marlene R. McMindes, *Robert and Florence Macaulay Memorial Scholarship, John Brown University*
Duncan Raleigh Miller, *AAFSW, University of Wisconsin*
Mamie M. Mutchler, *Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, Duke University*
Robin M. Nelson, *AAFSW Scholarship honoring Meryl Steigman, University of Utah*
Claudia G. Nenno, *Theodore A. Xanthaky Memorial Scholarship, Brown University*
Nicole A. Neuser, *AAFSW, Salem College*
Lana S. Patterson, *AAFSW, Samford University*
Matthew A. Peters, *Adolph Dubs Memorial Scholarship, Seattle University*
Tisha M. Pryor, *H. Freeman Matthews Memorial Scholarship, Eugene Lang College*
R. Michael Rhoades, *AAFSW, Auburn University*
Jon R. Roth, *Lowell C. Pinkerton Memorial Scholarship, California State University, San Bernardino*
Henry P. Sieloff, *Gertrude Stewart Memo-*

rial Scholarship, Old Dominion University

April E. Skinner, *AAFSW, Medical College of Virginia Commonwealth University*

Calvin L. Skinner, *Gertrude Stewart Memorial Scholarship, Hampton University*

David Stutz, *AAFSW, Northwestern University*

Gregory J. Taylor, *AAFSW, University of Rhode Island*

Tamara K. Thompson, *AAFSW, University of Oregon*

Julie E. True, *Jacq Bachman Siracusa Scholarship, Pomona College*

Diego R. Vazquez, *Oliver Bishop Harriman Memorial Scholarship, Providence College*

Juan L. Vazquez, *Timberlake Scholarship, University of Southern California*

Jeffrey T. Villinski, *Julius C. Holmes Memorial Scholarship, Macalester College*

Michele T. Villinski, *AAFSW, Carleton College*

Robert J. Volciak Jr., *Howard Fyfe Memorial Scholarship, Pennsylvania State University*

Daniel A. Webb, *AAFSW, LeTourneau College*

Karen D. Womack, *William Benton Scholarship, Northwood Institute*

Michael A. Womack, *Selden Chapin Memorial Scholarship, Central Michigan University*

Deaths

JOHN PROCTOR MCKNIGHT, a retired Foreign Service officer, died on July 24 in Naples, Florida. He was 79.

A native of North Carolina, Mr. McKnight was graduated Phi Beta Kappa from Davidson College and also received an honorary doctorate of letters. He became an Associated Press foreign correspondent and later joined the Foreign Service as an officer with USIA. During his assignment in Rome, he published a book on the Vatican entitled *The Papacy*, for which he received the Mayflower Society Award. Mr. McKnight was also appointed to the National War College in the late 1960s.

He is survived by his wife, Mary Jane McKnight of Naples, Florida, four nieces, and two nephews.

JANE C. DALE, wife of former Ambassador William N. Dale, died on July 23 in Durham, North Carolina. She was 70.

Mrs. Dale was born in Omaha, Nebraska, and was graduated from Smith College in 1938. She began a teaching career, which continued for many years until she and her husband retired. She accompanied her husband to assignments in London, Paris, Ankara, Tel Aviv, and Bangui, where she taught at the national university. In later years, Mrs. Dale painted and wrote poetry, some of which was published in the *Atlantic Monthly* and the *Christian Science Monitor*.

Mrs. Dale is survived by her husband, and three sons, William N. Dale Jr. of Portland, Maine; Bernard C. Dale of Hillsborough, North Carolina; and Nelson C. Dale of Boston.

JULIA GOLDSCHMIDT, wife of Foreign Service Officer Michael A. Goldschmidt, died of complications from a bone marrow transplant for cancer on June 30 in Washington, D.C. She was 31.

A native of Santa Rosa de Copan, Honduras, she married Mr. Goldschmidt in 1980 when he was posted there. Subsequently, she accompanied him on assignments to London and Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, where she worked in the consular sections of those posts. In the past year, she was an executive secretary with MCI Corporation and a student at Northern Virginia Community College in Alexandria, Virginia.

Ms. Goldschmidt is survived by her husband, two sisters, and a brother. Any donations may be made to the American Cancer Society.

S. HOUSTON LAY, a former legal adviser for the State Department and retired navy commander, died August 4 in LaJolla, California. He was 75.

Mr. Lay's assignments included Frankfurt, Bonn, Berlin, and Athens between 1946 and 1962. He left the State Department and became a member of the law firm of Rose, Stansbury, Albright, Mason, and Lay. In 1966, Mr. Lay taught at the California Western Law School in San Diego. His publications, including *New Dimensions of Law of the Seas*, *Direct Broadcast Satellites*, and *New Dimensions in Air Law*, earned him a listing in *Who's Who in America*.

Mr. Lay is survived by his son, Sam, of Huntington Beach, California.

ANNUAL MEETING

of the

American Foreign Service Association

October 16, 1987
12 noon
Dean Acheson Auditorium
Department of State

All members are invited to attend.

Any AFSA member who does not have a State Department pass should contact Sue Schumacher at 338-4045, as soon as possible, to arrange for entry into State.

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—*Domestic Postings*—

AFSA NEWS

AID Standing hits flaws in agency notices

AFSA's AID Standing Committee has been concerned that the agency is issuing notices in a hasty manner that "therefore do not accurately reflect the underlying document or agreement reached with AFSA."

A case in point, the committee said, is the March 9 notice "Policies and Procedures Pertaining to Time-in-Class, Limited Career Extensions, and Promotion into the Senior Foreign Service." The committee determined that the notice did not convey essential elements of the agreement reached during bargaining.

When the committee approached management with its complaint, AID responded: "The agency appreciates AFSA's concern...and recognizes that AFSA would probably have written it differently. However, the agency accepts full responsibility for the sufficiency of the notice." The committee therefore issued the notice as an AFSA REDTOP, dated July 7. Copies are available from AFSA. If the problem continues, the committee said, it will continue to issue notices through AFSA channels to keep members informed.

Pay study shows 24% salary lag

The average federal worker lags nearly 24 percent behind his or her private-sector counterpart, a study by the Office of Personnel Management shows. The discrepancy between the two sectors ranged from 22 percent at the lower grades to 29 percent at the highest, comparable to FS-1.

The annual study is required by the Pay Comparability Act of 1970, which also requires the president to apply its recommendations in preparing the federal budget unless there is a financial crisis or other national emergency. The last time a president did not waive the recommendation, however, was 10 years ago.

The actual increase is likely to range somewhere between 2 and 3 percent.

Officers meet Secretary Shultz

AFSA President Perry Shankle and Vice President Evangeline Monroe met briefly with Secretary Shultz in his 7th-floor office in August. They congratulated the secretary on his testimony before the congressional Iran-contra committees and discussed a framework for mutual cooperation on professional issues.

Helms bill would limit diplomatic immunity coverage

A bill that would fundamentally alter the extent to which diplomatic privilege is extended to foreign diplomats in the United States has drawn sharp criticism from AFSA. The proposed law, introduced by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina), would deny immunity to family and support staff of foreign diplomats who are found to traffic in drugs, drive recklessly, or commit violent crimes against U.S. citizens. The senator's intent is to prevent immunity from being used as a shield for criminal activity.

When Defense Secretary Weinberger called for similar changes last year, in an effort to make prosecution of terrorists easier, AFSA agreed that immunity should not be used to protect criminals but noted that changes that weaken the protections provided by immunity would adversely affect American diplomats posted in countries where standards of due process are not as strong as in the United States.

Diplomatic immunity is based upon a system of reciprocity. AFSA contends that the actions the United States takes against members of foreign missions will be an invitation for foreign governments to take similar actions against American diplomats and their families abroad.

The Department of State has taken a similar position. Chief of Protocol Selwa Roosevelt told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that this measure would give other governments the license to respond in a manner that may exceed the breadth of the Helms bill. Roosevelt also testified that similar legislation, passed in other countries as a retaliatory measure, may be interpreted more broadly by those governments.

It is AFSA's position that passage of this legislation would subject American diplomatic families and personnel to legal and political systems that often differ radically from our own, placing American diplomats and their families at the mercy of hostile foreign governments.

Furthermore, AFSA notes that there currently exist several remedies for victims of acts perpetrated by foreign diplomats. The State Department may declare an individual persona non grata, appeal to the embassy to waive his or her immunity, or ask the nation involved to compensate the victim. Additionally, foreign missions are now required to insure their drivers for liability, and the State Department is empowered to revoke the licenses of foreign diplomats who prove to be reckless drivers.

AFSA has brought its concerns to the attention of members of Congress. AFSA has notified Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D-Rhode Island) and other members of the panel of the flaws in the bill. AFSA believes management should undertake measures that address public concerns and maintain the integrity of diplomatic immunity for our staff and families. AFSA has developed its own immunity proposal to counter Helms's. For more on this issue, see the ASSOCIATION VIEWS.

Annual Meeting to be held October 16

AFSA's Annual Meeting will be held at noon on October 16 in the Dean Acheson Auditorium of the State Department. All members are invited to attend.

Members who do not have a department pass should call Sue Schumacher at 338-4045 several days in advance to arrange entry into State.

Post reps invited to meet board while in D.C.

The new Governing Board would like to invite all AFSA post representatives to call on them while in Washington on leave or temporary duty. The board can brief representatives on the professional and labor-management issues facing the Foreign Service and hear the concerns of members in the field.

In the board's first week in office, Post Rep Jim Carter of Manila and Ted Strickler from Geneva called on President Perry Shankle and State Vice President Evangeline Monroe.

The board is working on a few ideas concerning the post representative system. It would like to encourage reps to visit their representative and senators while in town. It is working on a briefing book to that end. It is also looking into the feasibility of regional annual meetings of post reps to exchange ideas.

One year after law is passed, hostages still waiting for pay

AFSA has taken action to seek State Department implementation of compensation measures created in a law passed one year ago that is intended to benefit former hostages, victims of terrorism, and their families.

Since August 1986, legislation has provided for the compensation of federal government employees, citizens, nationals, and resident aliens of the United States rendering personal service to the government, who have been held against their will overseas. The Victims of Terrorism Compensation Act was enacted to compensate those who are captured or detained abroad due to hostile action resulting from the individual's relationship with the government. Those persons who qualify, and who were held captive between November 4, 1979, and January 21, 1981—the period of the Tehran embassy takeover—are eligible to be given $50 per day; all other payments to captives shall be at least one half of the world-wide average per-diem rate.

The act also provides for payments to many captives and family members for educational expenses. Compensation is available for the death or disability of captives, and for certain medical or health expenses relating to death or disability. Any benefit provided to captive employees may also be provided to a family member who is held hostage.

Under the act and Executive Order 12598, the power to prescribe regulations to implement these provisions is vested primarily in the secretary of state. The act provides, however, that such regulations shall take effect no later than six months after the act was signed into law, which was more than a year ago.

AFSA has taken great interest in this matter . However, AFSA has not received any notification that the implementing regulations have been promulgated. We have written to the State Department and AID asking why they have delayed in the implementation of the statute.

Panama embassy attempts to stick employees with surcharges

The U.S. embassy in Panama has unilaterally established a new policy regarding utility surcharges that will place an unconscionable burden on personnel stationed at that post. The proposal requires that employees in government-leased quarters incur the costs for all electricity costs exceeding a specific ceiling. The result will be a drastic reduction in the pay of Foreign Service employees in Panama. It has been calculated that a family of two may be forced to spend as much as $350 a month in surcharges, which in certain cases would entail more than a third of an employee's monthly income.

The exorbitant energy costs in Panama appear to be a result of gross overcharging by utilities. A study is being conducted to verify widespread indications that electricity costs in diplomatic quarters are far higher than those charged in the rest of Panama City. The situation is exacerbated by the nature of post housing, which tends to be poorly constructed and inadequately insulated for the hot climate.

The new utility policy was originally intended to go into effect on July 1. Employees were not informed of this change until June 16, however, and no consultations were held with the AFSA chapter at post. During the intervening period, the AFSA representative repeatedly requested meetings with embassy officials to discuss the surcharge proposal. Finally, after the intervention of AFSA in Washington, a meeting was set up on July 22 between the ambassador and the AFSA representative. The chief of mission announced two days later that implementation of the new utility policy would be postponed until at least October 1.

Although the employees have gained a reprieve, it is only temporary. As of this writing, embassy officials show no signs of abandoning the surcharge proposal, and AFSA is continuing its efforts to prevent implementation. Protests to management have as yet yielded no results; reliable sources have speculated that the State Department may view Panama as a test case.

GAO finds for employee in State Department underwithholding

AFSA recently assisted a State Department employee who appealed an agency notice requiring him to pay $1700 in back health insurance premiums. The department had failed to adjust the employee's withholding when he upgraded his coverage in 1983.

In making the claim, the employee cited an administrative error on the part of a regional payroll center. The employee also claimed financial hardship and that he had been unaware of the discrepancy and could not have discovered it with reasonable diligence. The employee appealed to the General Accounting Office through the Consolidated Payroll Division. CAPS recommended the GAO grant the waiver.

The GAO found negligence in the employee's not verifying his earning and leave statement but concluded an error on the part of the payroll center overrode this. Claims of this nature for under $500 can be decided by the department without involving the GAO. Waivers can be granted where no intent to defraud is found and where the waiver would not be detrimental to U.S. interests.

Pell receives honorary plaque

Outgoing AFSA President Frank Young (right) presents an honorary membership to Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Claiborne Pell at the AFSA Awards Ceremony. Young praised the chairman's long time interest in Foreign Service professional issues.

State Standing Committee
A Busy Agenda Ahead

By Evangeline Monroe, *State Vice President*

Last year, disagreement among AFSA's State officers and constituency representatives nearly tore the organization apart. The disagreement centered on what to do about the separation from the Service of large numbers of the first cohort of O-1s to open their window as candidates for the Senior Foreign Service. This year those who believed that only the accelerated selection out of seniors could save the 0-1s and permit flow through for others may be gratified, as fewer seniors receive limited career extensions. The fact is, however, that there is little reason to be pleased at the new configuration of the Service and the loss of some of its more successful officers. Painful as involuntary selection out is, however, it is only one of the problems facing AFSA and the Service today. Equally serious is the poor repute of the Service in Congress and our vulnerability to budget cuts. On another level, but also important, are new proposals by management that may further accelerate the trend toward more specialists at the expense of generalists.

One of the first steps taken by the new AFSA leadership has been to begin a series of calls on key legislators and staffers. The problems of the Moscow embassy dominate the Hill's view of the State Department. Even Secretary Shultz's impressive testimony during the Iran-contra hearings does not appear to have reassured the Service's critics. The loss of the talents and experience of large numbers of O-1s and seniors has further eroded congressional confidence in the department's ability to manage its own affairs. One positive element in this criticism is some congressional interest in taking a closer look at the way the Foreign Service Act has been implemented.

AFSA, and in particular its State Standing Committee, plan a multi-faceted outreach program to provide the public and the Congress with a better understanding of the Service. The AFSA staff has begun work on fact sheets to be included in a briefing package for use by AFSA members. The fact sheets will include information on the foreign affairs budget; a demographic profile of the Service; a comparison of our Service with those of other countries; a description of and problems associated with Foreign Service life; and a discussion of security issues. AFSA also plans to resurrect a series of issue-oriented luncheons to bring together congressional staffers and AFSA members. Some post chapters have already provided names of legislators for AFSA's data bank of congressional contacts. One chapter urged that members who have had Pearson assignments on the Hill should be included in the data bank.

The primary task of the new State Standing Committee will be to develop alternatives to Service management. Subcommittees on Promotions and Selection Out and Performance Evaluation have begun to assemble data. Other committees will consider Assignments, the Cone System, Staff Issues, and Tandems. The plan is to avoid divisiveness by concentrating on factual analysis. At the same time, AFSA will be prepared to make constructive suggestions should Congress hold hearings on the Foreign Service Act.

The State Standing Committee has also been engaged in countering the amendment to the act proposed by Senator Jesse Helms (R-North Carolina) that would have the effect of denying Foreign Service families and staff diplomatic immunity [see related article]. Other issues under consideration are major reorganizations involving information management and diplomatic security. Management's plan to improve the delivery of information by establishing a new bureau of Administration and Information Management will probably result in even more specialists, and AFSA will want to be certain that generalists and specialists already involved in information management are not penalized by the reorganization. Management is being pressured by Congress to reorganize diplomatic security once again, and AFSA will have to be vigilant to avoid losing basic rights for the employees as a result of the reorganization. Given probable changes in the way diplomatic security programs are implemented, management's proposal to restrict grievance procedures and limit an employee's right of access to his or her file is particularly worrisome.

We have a busy agenda ahead; your comments and participation will be most welcome.

Managing Your Money
An Update on the New Tax Law

By Sabine Sisk, *Director of Member Services*

Unless you file your taxes using one of the federal short forms—1040EZ and 1040A—you can expect to spend much more time completing your tax return for the current year than has been the case. According to the Internal Revenue Service, the complexity of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (the title "Tax Simplification Act" was wisely dropped early on) required a total revision of current tax forms. These should be printed about the time you read this. For the first time, tax packages that include all forms will be mailed to every taxpayer for whom the IRS has an address, some 90 million people. Many tax experts have concluded that the majority who receive these packages—along with complex instruction sheets—will run, not walk, to the nearest accountant.

To give you a running start, the following are highlights on some of the new forms affecting Foreign Service personnel. None of the forms is shorter than five pages (including instructions).

Home Mortgage: Anyone who took out a home mortgage after August 16, 1986, for a purpose other than buying a house must file a new and complicated form 8606, which comes with worksheets and instructions. This includes refinancing, or taking out a second mortgage or home-equity loan. If the outstanding debt on a house is greater than the original cost and if loan proceeds are used to pay for other than educational or medical costs, the calculations become even more complex.

Passive Investments: Another complex form which takes an hour or more to complete and covers five pages concerns "passive" investments such as certain real estate not actively managed. Fortunately, not many Foreign Service employees will be affected. For example, if you rent your U.S. home while overseas you would not be considered a "passive" investor, as long as you keep some control over the lease, rental income, repairs, etc., even if you retain the services of a property manager.

IRAs: A third form aimed at ensuring compliance with the new restrictions on the deductibility of IRAs will take some time to figure out and complete. As we reported in the November 1986 issue, IRAs will no longer be deductible for Foreign Service employees or their family members, unless the adjusted gross income is less than $25,000 single or $40,000 married. Employees with income up to $10,000 above those limits can

continue making a reduced amount of deductible contributions (more on this when we receive IRS instructions). Ineligible employees may continue to make taxable IRA contributions, and the new form is designed to allow separate reporting of non-deductible IRAs, to ensure that you won't pay taxes again when you withdraw your contributions after retirement.

The IRS is also rewriting its form on miscellaneous and business expenses to clarify that only 80 percent of the cost of business meals and entertainment can be deducted. Look out for more detailed tax news in upcoming issues of AFSA NEWS.

ORE Deductions: As we reported in the November issue, employees who are subject to the five-percent reduction of salary as their share of official residence expenses are in danger of losing their tax credits for the reduction, at least for 1987.

Several hundred Foreign Service employees occupy official residences at posts abroad and at the United Nations, and must contribute five percent of gross salary to be applied toward OREs. Under IRS Revenue Ruling 84-86, these mandatory salary deductions are excludable from income under Section 119(a) of the tax code. The State Department, however, has never implemented the ruling and continues to include ORE contributions as taxable income on W-2 forms.

Until passage of the 1986 Tax Reform Act, affected officers were not disadvantaged, since the IRS permitted full credit as an adjustment to income. Under the new law, however, only 80 percent of employee business expenses are deductible, and only to the extent they exceed two percent of adjusted gross income.

AFSA asked the department last November to stop including the five-percent salary withholding as gross income. State recently replied that for budgetary reasons, it would not implement the necessary payroll changes until 1988. AFSA therefore has requested the IRS to issue a ruling authorizing eligible employees to report as gross income the amount on their W-2 form, minus five-percent, which employees can attach to their tax return. We have not yet received a reply and will keep you posted.

Residences Owned Overseas: AFSA has heard from several posts that IRS representatives have asked the embassy to provide information on employees who own their residence at post and receive a housing allowance. The IRS argues that where the tax-free housing allowance is used to offset expenses on the personally owned house, mortgage-interest and real-estate-tax deductions would not be allowed.

This action is based on a 33-year-old, seldom-observed section of the tax code that contains a provision disallowing deduction of mortgage interest "if the deduction is allowable to a claim of income that is wholly exempt from taxes." The IRS apparently never focused on this provision until recently, when changes in the new tax law, the congressional mandate of closing loopholes, and the hiring of thousands of additional IRS employees provided new impetus to pursue this particular issue.

The new tax law added to the existing restriction a new provision that "no deduction shall be denied...for interest on a mortgage...by reason of the receipt of a) a military housing allowance, and b) a parsonage allowance." The IRS interprets this to exclude everybody else, and only legislative changes would bring the Foreign Service on par with the military and ministers exemption. AFSA has discussed such a special exclusion with the State Department and sympathetic Capitol Hill staffers. We have regretfully concluded that we cannot muster the necessary support in Congress at this time.

Not all is lost, however. Expenses, such as interest and taxes, above the amount received from a housing allowance remain deductible. In addition, all interest and real estate taxes are fully deductible where the employee does not use a housing allowance to offset expenses. This invariably applies upon transfer from the post where the residence was purchased.

Know Your Legal Rights

When Your Property is Lost or Damaged

By Susan Z. Holik, *AFSA General Counsel*

Foreign Service employees are often faced with the loss of or damage to property. The most important thing an employee can do to protect his or her valuables is to carry private insurance, with provision for obtaining the replacement value of the item. Otherwise, the exclusive remedy against the government for loss of or damage to personal property incident to service is to make a claim under the Military Personnel and Civilian Employees' Claims Act.

There are significant limitations on compensation under the Claims Act. An employee may be reimbursed only for the actual value of the item at the time of its loss, damage, or destruction; the value of loss of use, interest, carrying charges, inconvenience, or other such expenses are not reimbursable. Nor does the act cover damage to real estate. To make matters worse, the Federal Tort Claims Act is inapplicable to claims arising in foreign countries, and the exclusivity of remedy under the Claims Act precludes employees from taking advantage of the Foreign Service grievance procedure.

The employee or an authorized agent or representative may file a claim to recover the value of the property. Agents or representatives must have a power of attorney. An employee may receive up to $25,000 for losses occurring from a single incident; if violence directed against the U.S. government is involved, the limit is $40,000. A schedule for maximum amounts payable per item may be found in 6 FAM 310. A claim must be filed within two calendar years from the date of the loss or the date damage occurred, unless the claim arises during time of armed conflict; or if the property remains in storage after the expiration of legal entitlement to government storage at government expense, then the claim arises at that time. Claims may be filed for loss due to fire, disaster, theft, transportation, hostile action, the negligence of government employees, and the like.

An employee should file his or her claim using Form DS-1620. State Department and USIA employees should report the claim at post and submit it to State's Office of Operations. AID employees should report a claim to the agency's Office of Management Operations. Each post should have an administrative officer who can assist employees in the preparation of claims.

All claims will be investigated by the department or AID, as appropriate. It is important that the employee have evidence supporting his or her claim. Save copies of travel orders, receipts, cancelled checks, insurance statements, photographs, or other documents showing acquisition, possession, or value. Claimants should also obtain statements and copies of official reports (e.g., a report by a post security officer) indicating the facts and circumstances surrounding the loss or damage.

If the department denies a claim or the employee is dissatisfied with its settlement, the only recourse is reconsideration by the Office of Operations. Under the Claims Act, the decision is not appealable in a grievance action or a lawsuit. Reconsideration may be had upon establishing that an error was made or presenting new evidence that was previously unavailable. A request for reconsideration should be made within six months from the date the claimant receives notice of the disposition of the claim.

This is one of an occasional series of articles that will attempt to look at Foreign Service legal issues in detail. Questions on this particular topic, as well as suggestions for future articles, are welcome.

Galbraith Discusses USIA's Future

"Dollars spent on diplomacy are some of the most crucial dollars spent in terms of national security and the defense of the United States," observed Peter Galbraith, professional staff member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to an overflow crowd of more than 100 USIA staffers at a lunch-time lecture sponsored by AFSA's USIA Standing Committee in late July.

Speaking on "The Future of USIA," Galbraith pointed out that the agency has seen a significant increase in funding from fiscal years 1981 to 1987, "a long-overdue recognition of the importance of public diplomacy,...perhaps the key component of diplomacy." The Foreign Relations Committee has supported the administration's efforts to increase funding for USIA, he continued, but proposed FY 1988 funding ($777 million) is less than the current fiscal year and is some $160 million less than the president's request. "These reductions do not reflect a lack of support...but rather the problems of dealing with the current budget crisis," he concluded.

Galbraith pointed out that the committee provided "full funding at last year's levels for on-going operations...but put a hold on all new construction on the capital account," such as Voice of America radio construction. He felt that this was preferable to a 10-percent reduction-in-force, an alternative proposal forwarded by the budget committee. Galbraith expressed hope that this decline in funding could be reversed.

The staffer then went on to address the "allocation of those resources, those programs the Congress views as most important." One priority is educational and cultural exchange programs. In 1981 committee Chairman Claiborne Pell (D.-Rhode Island) sponsored legislation, later enacted, to double real funds for exchange programs over a four-year period; that increase has been largely achieved. The chairman, Galbraith said, believes that exchange programs are "the single most effective long-term means in promoting U.S. national security issues....A free society is its own best advertisement."

Another priority is the Voice of America. The committee has consistently supported administration efforts to increase funding for the Voice, ascribing particular importance to VOA and to Radio Liberty/Radio Free Europe as "beacons of hope to people behind the Iron Curtain." However, Galbraith continued, "as we look to VOA in the future, I think we have to ask some questions about its mission. Short-wave in many parts of the world is becoming an out-dated technology," and VOA is competing with an increasing number of other radio broadcasters. "We must see where we should be concentrating our efforts and where we should be competing with local stations."

A third area of concern is USIA's Worldnet. "TV programming has witnessed an explosive growth over the past few years...but the question the Congress has is simply, 'Is it watched?' To devote significant resources to that kind of activity is a question that concerns the Foreign Relations Committee," Galbraith said. Other television issues include the ease, and possible illegality, of pickup of Worldnet programs in the United States, and U.S. newsmakers' need to reach interviewers overseas when many foreign correspondents are based in Washington.

Fourth on Galbraith's list is the role of the Foreign Service officer. "The officer in the field is the single most important asset the United States has," he stated. The growth of the agency's budget since 1981, however, has not been accompanied by a growth in FSOs serving overseas. Some 1042 officers served overseas that year, but in 1986 only 1040 officers served abroad. Washington headquarters employment, on the other hand, increased from 3000 to 4000 in the same time. "When you increase the number of people in Washington and don't increase the number of people abroad...instead of doing the work of representing the United States, the FSO finds himself confronted with increased reporting requirements. It would seem wise to have more people abroad, maybe fewer here."

Foreign Relations Committee staff member Peter Galbraith painted a broad picture of the future of public diplomacy at an event sponsored by AFSA's USIA Standing Committee.

The committee questioned the usefulness of USIA international exhibits, said Galbraith, and made drastic cuts in this area. He explained that the committee wondered "if the United States should be participating in international expositions, or might such exhibits better be produced by the private sector."

Galbraith provoked much comment by concluding with "an idea that has been kicking around" as to the organization of public diplomacy. He stressed that no proposals have been forwarded, but admitted that some legislators are taking a look at the long-term future of public diplomacy. Some have suggested that exchange programs might be improved if they were split off from USIA and administered "for example, within the context of the Smithsonian Institution...to avoid the problem of using the exchange programs to promote, even subtly, U.S. policy." Galbraith felt that there was an inevitable element of politicalization that could creep in under the current system. "The danger is that good scholars won't participate in a program that might be perceived to have political ends." In another area, he noted, "Some also argue that VOA and RFE might best operate as independent corporations."

Finally, Galbraith suggested, "the information part of policy is so important that perhaps it ought not be in a separate agency, but ought to be part of the State Department." He suggested an under secretary for information comparable to under secretaries for political affairs and economic affairs. Galbraith stressed that no such plan had been proposed, but that these ideas might affect the agency five years from now. He recognized that such concepts might not be popular with an agency reorganized only 10 years ago, and a lively question period confirmed this view.

Austrian honored for scholar work

Sheila Austrian, USIA representative on AFSA's Committee on Education, receives a certificate of appreciation from committee chairman Anthony Ross prior to her departure to Ankara.

RETIREMENT NEWS

USIA Alumni Association—An essay on how it all began

By Lawrence J. Hall

At a Foreign Service Day reception on the eighth floor, Barry Zorthian put on his pensive look and asked:

"Why don't we do something like this?"

"I guess we could," I replied, polite but non-committal.

Two weeks later, Barry asked, "What have you done about our idea to hold an annual party for USIA retirees?"

"Well," I said, weighing several possible answers, "maybe we had better get a group together to talk over the idea." Both of these encounters took place in May 1980. A week or so after the second one I telephoned about 20 agency retirees and proposed a luncheon meeting in early June to discuss the idea of holding some kind of reunion and setting up a continuing organization. Many calls later I had agreement from a total of 15 persons for a lunch on June 2 at Adam's Rib. Besides the two of us, they were Burnett Anderson, Lee Brady, Dick Erstein, Gordon Ewing, Bob Lincoln, Ed Nickel, Dan Oleksiw, Frank Oram, Gene Rosenfeld, Ed Schechter, Lew Schmidt, Bill Weld, and Mike Weyl. There is a note of irony in the name of the restaurant selected. As anyone can plainly see, there were no women present. I cannot explain why that was so and accept full responsibility for the oversight.

The luncheon, which involved a last-minute shifting of tables to create a configuration allowing equal shouting opportunity, produced quick agreement on the idea of organizing an alumni group for social purposes. There was some dissent over whether it also should play an active role in monitoring the operation of the agency. While only a minority favored quite an active role in this regard, virtually all agreed that one function of the organization should be to keep in close touch with the agency and follow its course as interested members of the family. More specifically, the group decided to sponsor a dinner for agency retirees and to work toward setting up a permanent organization if there seemed to be sufficient interest.

An organizing committee of volunteers was created—Erstein, Lincoln Nickel, Rosenfeld, Schechter, Schmidt, Weld, Zorthian, and me. We asked Lew Schmidt to draft a statement of purpose for the projected organization. During the summer and fall of 1980 the committee met a few times and added two members, Elinor Green and Charlie Hardin. Time, place, and price of the reunion dinner were agreed upon. Lists of names were inveigled from the agency, largely through the efforts of Dick and Gene. Telephone callouts sampled retiree interest in the project. We selected the National Press Club ballroom for the site because it offered adequate space (we guessed we would need room for up to 300) and the right price.

The time was fixed at May 1, 1981, because of its proximity to Foreign Service Day. We sent a letter to all concerned explaining the project and soliciting checks. We also placed notices in the *Dacor Bulletin,* the JOURNAL, the *USIA Agency World,* and in Mike Causey's column in the *Washington Post.* Many additional contacts were made by telephone and letters from committee members. Last, we sent special invitations to all former directors and deputy directors. Between meetings much of the organizing work was carried out by Gene and Dick, who called on other members of the committee when the need arose. At one committee meeting in April, Burnett Anderson was named master of ceremonies for the dinner. By that time we had received more than 260 paid acceptances.

When the night of the dinner rolled around, all committee members and many additional recruits, including spouses, were pitching in—greeting guests, directing traffic, affixing name cards, and helping out in general. We had arranged for two head tables on the ballroom stage, with 12 places at each for the honored guests and a few committee members. However, a steady trickle of unexpected arrivals who seemed to warrant special treatment resulted in a series of quick trips to the tables to wedge in a few more chairs and place settings. By dinner time, knee room was tight.

In the invitation to Director Wick, I had asked him if he would kindly deliver a short talk on the state of the agency, say about 20 minutes' worth. He willingly complied. Unfortunately, by the time he was introduced, the party had been underway for more than an hour. We had decided on a buffet rather than a served dinner. As it turned out there were only two serving points, so the lines were long and slow. Meanwhile the bars were flourishing. The decibel level rose exponentially, and the director's words were lost in the happy roar.

At a committee meeting about two weeks after the dinner we determined that the total attendance was more than 425. At the same meeting an interim executive committee was named to draft the ground rules, including arranging for articles of incorporation. It was this group that ironed out details of membership, communications, organization, programming, finance, agency liaison, and other matters essential to a permanent association. By the fall of 1981, we had 1550 names and addresses. Membership eligibility was expanded to include anyone who had been an employee of the agency, its predecessors, or of the advisory commissions (or who had served temporarily with any of them), and widows and widowers. Some board members resigned, soon to be replaced by Mary Painter, Virginia Hall, and Mike Weyl.

One of the last acts of the interim board was to set the first luncheon for November 13, with David Gergen, then director of communications at the White House, as speaker. Shortly before that event, the first board of directors of the USIA Alumni Association was elected. To nobody's surprise, they were the same as the interim board. USIAAA was off and running.

Senior editor commended

JOURNAL Senior Editor Frances G. Burwell receives a certificate of appreciation from Editor Stephen R. Dujack at a party held in her honor. Burwell resigned after six years at AFSA to become coordinator of the Women in International Security program at University of Maryland.

President's Comments

The Importance of Professionalism

By Perry Shankle

During these first few weeks since the election we've been working to restore AFSA's rightful place as a professional organization. If anything can be read from the election results (besides apathy, a conclusion proved by the low turnout), and based on what members have been saying to Evangeline Monroe and me, it is that AFSA should commit itself to the issues of professionalism.

The Foreign Service is an organization of professionals. We strive for the highest standards of professional excellence in the conduct of our responsibilities. We know this and we are proud of it, but I am afraid others, not only Senator Helms and his supporters, but our friends as well, see us otherwise. Our reputation is suffering, and we have serious image problems. Even the Iran-contra hearings, which highlighted for all to see the dangers in turning foreign policy decisions and negotiations over to amateurs and zealots, did not, unfortunately, drive home the point that the professionals of the Foreign Service should have been listened to. Secretary Shultz made these points in his statement before the select committees, but unfortunately they were lost in the shuffle.

We obviously have our work cut out for us. We have work to do with Congress, among opinion leaders, in the media, and with our own leaders, even in our own agencies. AFSA is, of course, a trade union, and a good one. We represent our members' interests aggressively and, I am convinced, well. I am committed to AFSA's union work; without it management would eat us up. But we must do all we can to reassure our political leaders, Congress, and everyone else that the national interest is well served by a strong, adequately funded, and properly staffed Foreign Service. We are the ones who do the job out there, and we do it best. This means all of us, communicators, secretaries, technicians, specialists, generalists—whatever we are called on staffing patterns. We are professionals, and our country is best served by well-trained, highly motivated professionals working in pursuit of our country's interests, together with and in support of our political leaders, and it is this rather simple and basic message we have to spread.

Your suggestions and anything you can do to help will be greatly appreciated.

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

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

Chrysler LeBaron Coupe

Plymouth Sundance

Dodge Dakota

As an active member of the Diplomatic Corps, you're entitled to special pricing through Chrysler's 1987 Diplomatic Purchase Program. You can choose from a complete line of Chrysler, Plymouth and Dodge cars, as well as Dodge trucks, vans and wagons. New for 1987 are the Chrysler LeBaron Coupe, Plymouth Sundance and Dodge Dakota.

Chrysler LeBaron Coupe boasts a sleek new skin, a sumptuous interior and a high-torque fuel-injected engine for heart-pounding performance. It is beauty...with a passion for driving.

Plymouth Sundance is truly the unbelievable American. Combining the absolute latest in American technology with painstaking attention to minute detail, Sundance quality is designed to rival *anything* out of Japan.

Dodge Dakota is America's first mid-size pickup. Ever. With optional 4-wheel drive and payload capability up to 2000 pounds, there's not much you can't do in a Dakota.

For full details on these and the rest of the Chrysler line, Foreign Service Personnel in the U.S. should contact: **Diplomatic Sales Office, Chrysler Corporation, P.O. Box 1688, Detroit, MI 48288. Those stationed overseas: Telex 845-942543-OMSC-CH. Attn: Diplomatic sales.** Or both can simply mail the postage-paid reply card in this magazine.

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