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

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FOCUS: CHANGES AT STATE

DEPARTMENTS

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PAY FREEZE: FAIR SHARE?

To the Editor:

I take strong exception to AFSA's decision to urge its members to oppose the 1994 federal pay freeze contained in the president's economic program.

I'm as quick as the next person to defend pay comparability and resist victimizing the federal work force. However, I think present circumstances are different. After years of playing around with freezes and sequesters and self-delusion on revenue issues, an administration has put forward a proposal which attempts to distribute fairly the burden of reducing the federal deficit. It may not be a perfectly balanced proposal—indeed, there's probably some disagreement about what "perfectly balanced" means. But it does hit hardest at those most able to pay, and it does include general revenue increases and expenditure cuts which will affect the whole population.

More importantly, if everyone whose ox is being gored gets an exemption, there will be no package left—and the whole country will suffer. With those stakes, I'm willing to take my lumps

Teresita C. Schaffer
Colombo, Sri Lanka

To the Editor:

We, the undersigned American-citizen employees of the U.S. Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, applaud the president's efforts to reduce the federal deficit and assure him of our support for those efforts. At the same time, we must express our concern over the plan to freeze the wages of U.S. government employees, to delay locality pay, and to limit future pay raises. For many years the salaries of government employees have lagged behind those of their peers and counterparts in the private sector. The 1990 pay reform law was designed and enacted in order to correct that long-recognized deficiency beginning in 1994.

As American citizens we are more than willing to accept a fair share of the burden in order to reduce the national debt. In that regard we stand ready to pay such increased income and other taxes as may be required to achieve that worthy goal. The steps the president has proposed, however, will have a harmful impact on a dedicated group of workers that has suffered from years of below-inflation-rate pay increases and pay freezes. Moreover, under the plan he has outlined, the government employee would suffer the double jeopardy of reduced income coupled with increased taxes.

We do not ask to be exempted from sacrifice. We do, however, ask that the president use his position as the senior U.S. government employee to ensure that the sacrifices required to achieve the goal of reducing the federal deficit are shared equally by all American citizens.

59 employees of Embassy Buenos Aires
Tom Young, coordinator

FOREIGN COMMAND

To the Editor:

Stanley Meisler's piece on peacekeeping in the February *Journal* was interesting but way off in one statement that was key to his argument: "The United States has never assigned a single unit of soldiers to serve with a peacekeeping force under someone else's command." Wrong. Since the spring of 1982, the United States has assigned one infantry battalion and one support battalion to the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai Desert of Egypt. The MFO supervises the security provisions of the Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt. The MFO includes 10 other nations and has been commanded in the field by two Norwegian generals, one New Zealander, and, at present, one from The Netherlands. American infantry battalions have been drawn from divisions of the U.S. Army.

Admittedly, the MFO supervises a formal peace treaty, not a ceasefire, armistice, or some other state short of real peace. There has never been a real danger of hostile action and, therefore, of casualties connected with MFO service. No other peacekeeping organization is in our enviable boat, it is true. Nevertheless, U.S. troops *are* under foreign command, and over the years the army has gained an enormous amount of experience in multilateral operations in a wide variety of specialties and across the rank structure from private to colonel. If the army's personnel computers are properly programmed, this expertise can be tapped for future UN service.

While Meisler is historically correct that the United States has resisted putting troops under UN command, I suspect that the trend already is reversing. This is particularly the case, I believe, if one adds an adjective and describes "competent UN command." It is no secret in peacekeeping circles that there have been UN commanders who had little or no experience in leading troops at formation levels and none whatever in conducting hostilities at any level of intensity. The United States probably will ease into placing troops under UN command by first doing so in benign environments and, where this is not possible, by insisting on experienced leaders from experienced armies. It is also likely that the United States will prefer to begin by using non-combattant units, such as the medical and rear area logistics elements, as it enters the wider world of peacekeeping.

Wat T. Cluverius IV
Director General
Multinational Force and Observers
Rome

IGNORANT EXAM

To The Editor:

I have read with interest the article by Edward Peck and the description of the oral exam process (November

1992 *Journal*) and Perry Shankle's views ("Letters," January 1993), in which he makes the point that "no one is saying that the quality of officers coming into the service is less than first rate."

Most other foreign services, at least of major powers, place serious academic demands on applicants, e.g., the possession of a first-class degree and competence in at least one foreign language. We have, for various reasons, chosen not to screen in that fashion. When I looked at the exam several years ago, I was struck by its greatly reduced scope. In history, only two questions supposed a knowledge of events predating the Franco-Prussian War. A more recent example was even worse.

This change in standards may have something to do with the description of the examination process as "job and performance related." I do not think one has to be entirely in the camp of Allan Bloom and his thesis of the closing of the American mind to believe that diplomats need a far greater range and depth of knowledge than the current exam assumes.

I fear that if we still, indeed, are getting officers with a first-rate education, it is not because we test for it, but because a sufficient number of people still find the Foreign Service an attractive career. This is too trusting of fortune, and, especially over the long term, not insurance enough.

Gerald Scott
Nairobi

NOTHING IMPROPER

To The Editor:

George Gedda's article, "Minefield Nicaragua" (February *Journal*) is an objective presentation of the issues raised regarding the Nicaraguan Exile Relocation Program (NERP) and the nominations of Mike Kozak and me. The article reveals the problems of allegations presented without evidence and efforts to respond constrained by classification. So I want to address my friends and colleagues who read the *Journal*. Mike Kozak and I did nothing improper and have been confident that, if we were given the opportunity to answer questions in either open or closed hearings, we could have answered every question fully and satisfactorily. Unfortunately, we never had that opportunity.

In addition to the reported inspector general's finding exonerating us of any wrongdoing, former Secretary of State Eagleburger wrote the Senate on January 19, 1993 to present a set of basic facts for which he had secured declassification. He assured the Senate that there was "no hidden agenda or improper intent on the part of the department" in the NERP program and that neither Kozak nor Sullivan "engaged in, urged, or condoned any questionable . . . improper . . . behavior." Secretary Eagleburger concluded with the hope "that basic American principles of due process and fairness would prevail."

I can only add my hope that, at a time when policy differences increasingly manifest themselves as allegations of misconduct, the *Journal* will always fulfill its responsibility to its readers and the Foreign Service to determine whether allegations have a factual basis.

Joseph G. Sullivan
Washington, D.C.

SOMALIS MISPERCEIVED

To The Editor:

I was distressed by some of the articles on Somalia in the February *Journal*. Let me explain.

It makes a difference when you serve in a country, and I served in Somalia from 1964-67. I think all foreigners shared with Somalis their frustration at their situation at that time. . . . We were all sympathetic to the Somalis' hope that its flag would one day represent a united republic: British and French Somalilands, the Ogaden, and the Northeast territory of Kenya.

LETTERS

In the years I was associated with Somalia, its president was changed twice in peaceful elections and its parliament three times. Hence, Somalia was at the time the only operating democracy in Africa. . . . In clan meetings the basics of English common law were practiced when elders settled disputes over livestock or family difficulties. . . . As a people both men and women are proud and volatile. The boys are raised to be warriors. The Somalis, then as now, were often desperately poor but they considered themselves the best looking folks in the world; probably true, as a matter of fact. In sum, they were a gay, lively people to live with.

Mohamed Siad Barre was then the head of the army and was simply a despicable man. The only time I ever saw our very sophisticated defense attache, Colonel Al Rosner, lose his aplomb was when he talked of Siad. When Siad took power a week after President Abderashid Ali Scermarke was assassinated in 1969, the dark days of Somalia began. The leaders of the previous regimes were imprisoned and often died in prison, most intellectuals who could, fled, finding jobs outside Somalia. This state of affairs lasted for more than 20 years and in the process Somalia as it had been was destroyed.

What bothers me is that some of the articles in the *Journal* portrayed the Somali people as whiners, manipulators or worse. Siad and his ilk were; the people are not. Somalis are a good and decent folk who came under the rule of a vicious tyrant. We have seen this happen in other parts of the world. But we do not, and should not, condemn a whole people. I recognize how hard it was for our people to work with the Siad regime and the people he put in office. But the Somali nomad or intellectual is an admirable person. I hope our help and the help of others will get the Somalis back to the path they were on before Siad. Somali democracy was an example to all in Africa.

Gordon R. Beyer
Lexington, Virginia

WHO IS TERRIFIED?

The Washington Times
February 3, 1993
By Frank Gaffney Jr.

A remarkably large number of [foreign policy] positions are being filled by serving Foreign Service officers (FSOs), former FSOs, or friends of the Foreign Service. It is truly frightening to contemplate that such individuals will occupy senior positions in every agency of the national security community at a moment of epic change and dynamism in the international environment. After all, the diplomatic corps prizes—and rewards—nothing so much as a status quo mentality. As a result, those under the influence of the Foreign Service typically are terrified at the prospect of change and will countenance almost anything, sometimes even rank appeasement, to avoid rocking the international boat.

FOREIGN SERVICE SKEPTICS

The Washington Times
February 1, 1993
By Andrew Schneider

The Clinton's Administration's vow that only qualified people will wear the red sash of an ambassador has raised eyebrows in a skeptical Foreign Service community.

"A president's best intentions may not be enough. One has to appreciate that there are political factors that always come into play," said Bill Kirby, president of the American Foreign Service Association.

During the past seven administrations, regardless of which party occupied the White House, about one in three ambassadorships has gone to a political appointee. . . . Jimmy Carter hit a post-World War II low on the statistic, with only 22 percent of his ambassadorships going to friends. In his second term, Ronald Reagan set a new high at 35 percent. In the first year of the Bush Administration, 34 percent of ambassadors were patronage appointments.

"The real issue is not career Foreign Service officer vs. noncareer," Mr. Kirby said. "The issue is qualifications."

CRITICAL APPOINTMENTS

The Christian Science Monitor
January 29, 1993
By Frank C. Carlucci and Sol M. Linowitz

Fewer than 200 of the 3,000 appointments President Clinton will be making will go to ambassadors. But those will be important choices. Ambassadors can and do make a difference, often a critical difference.

The myth persists that instant communications have made ambassadors superfluous and that the president and secretary of state can handle matters directly. This ignores the critical analysis and on-the-scene participation that only an ambassador can provide.

In his relationships with some 180 countries and numerous international organizations, he will need the best on-the-spot agents he can get if he is to maintain the kind of American leadership we will need in an increasingly complex world.

The myth persists that instant communications have made ambassadors superfluous and that the president and secretary of state can handle matters directly. This ignores the critical analysis and on-the-scene participation that only an ambassador can provide. Robert Strauss in Moscow and Robert Oakley in Somalia are only the most recent examples.

Any impression that an ambassadorial nomination has been made in return for financial contributions to the party in power corrodes public trust and our relationship with the country concerned. The bottom line must always be whether nominees, be they career or non-career, bring the requisite credentials to the task.

We suggest that [President] Clinton consider a technique used by President Carter, who put in place an advisory screening board that met in private to review lists of ambassadorial candidates. . . . It then agreed on a slate of three to five people for the president's consideration. . . . An advisory board would help ensure that qualified appointments will be made in an orderly and constructive way.

NEW CLOUT

The Washington Times
February 14, 1993
By Martin Sieff

Secretary of State Warren Christopher has moved quickly to increase the influence of career Foreign Service officers, a sharp contrast to the style of James Baker, who depended largely on a small group of trusted advisers.

Mr. Christopher's "administrative revolution" is being greeted warmly by career diplomats. The key to Mr. Christopher's effort is to reduce the influence of the secretary's own staff and to increase that of the various bureaus. . . . department sources said.

"There is a dramatic new operating style here," one department source

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said, and the professionals are "pleased as punch." The reforms are "signals of the value placed on the career people" by the department's new bosses, he added. . . . [Mr. Christopher] has implemented "a very systematic effort to push responsibility down to the bureaus, desk officers, and Foreign Service officers," the official said.

As part of the new approach . . . Mr. Christopher has made himself available every Saturday for briefings on key regions and issues. On Saturday, February 6, Mr. Christopher was briefed by young officials covering Russia and post-Soviet affairs, sources said.

The restructuring . . . was part of [Christopher's] goal of revitalizing the Foreign Service input into the policy-making process. . . . He eliminated a raft of positions at the deputy assistant secretary level, most of which had come to be staffed by political appointees. Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton played a major role in the administrative restructuring, department sources said. "Christopher and Wharton believe that we're the only superpower and that our desk people and local officials should have the confidence to demand top-level access," one source familiar with the reform said.

Mr. Christopher, in his four years as undersecretary of state under President Carter, had a mixed reaction on listening to Foreign Service officers. In shaping major policy initiatives, he heeded them closely. At the time, pro-Israel lobbyists, for example, complained that Mr. Christopher was basing his Mideast policy positions too closely on advice from the professional Arabists in State's Near East Bureau. But on human rights, the subject then closest to his heart, Mr. Christopher won a fearsome reputation for overruling or ignoring Foreign Service officers' advice. . . .

He eliminated a raft of positions at the deputy assistant secretary level, most of which had come to be staffed by political appointees. Deputy Secretary of State Clifton Wharton played a major role in the administrative restructuring, department sources said. "Christopher and Wharton believe that we're the only superpower and that our desk people and local officials should have the confidence to demand top-level access," one source familiar with the reform said.

TOP TIERS FILLED

The Washington Post, March 8, 1993

The State Department has rocketed into the lead in the race for the coveted New Regime Full Roster Award, to be given to the first agency to name candidates for all jobs above the assistant secretary level. State, in the mega-department category with about 33 such jobs, has filled all but 10. . . . State was able to move quickly despite the administration's ethnic, gender, and geographic—or EGG—diversity requirements. And this at a department that until recently was known more for officials with reversible names—Stapleton Roy, McGeorge Bundy, or Townsend Hoopes, for example—than as a center for women, minorities, and southwesterners. Of the 23 positions formally named so far, six went to women and three to blacks. What's more, just under half are current or former career Foreign Service officers from within the ranks, a tradition to which the other agencies don't have to adhere. ■

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DESPATCH

By Anne Stevenson-Yang

Teamwork

This issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* takes a look at the people and structures the president has put into place to develop and implement his foreign policy. The lead article, by former Under Secretary for Political Affairs David Newsom, introduces and analyzes the new foreign policy team, while David Callahan's article reviews the arguments for and against an independent Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

It will be some months yet before it is possible to draw conclusions about how profoundly the new team at the State Department and the new structures within which they are working will color the conduct of foreign policy. Secretary Christopher and Deputy Secretary Wharton have already set a style of management notably different from that of their immediate predecessors, but so far, the grand policy shifts for which some had hoped have not been forthcoming.

The State Department reorganization announced on February 5 set into place the broad outlines of a structure intended better to account for transnational issues while also increasing the efficiency of State's decision-making process. Key among the innovations were the proposed establishment of an under secretary for global affairs—the position for which former Senator Timothy Wirth has been nominated—and the reshuffling of issue areas under five under secretaries, to whom the assistant secretaries will report. Thus the department's organizational chart now branches into five clusters rather than stacking tier upon tier of bureaus each, as in a wedding cake, supported by a broader one below.

The plan would seem to allow for a greater lateral integration of the bureaus, bringing them structures in which regularly to review cross-cutting issues. The organizational tree aims to reduce the blinding profusion of issues handled by Political Affairs bringing together under "P" those matters that the State Department tends to regard as its core activities: crisis management and reporting and analysis, as well as conflict mediation and liaison with multilateral institutions. The plan eliminates a number of independent offices attached to the secretary or deputy secretary and drastically reduces the number of deputy assistant secretaries. Part of the purpose, Wharton said, is to reduce the number of intermediaries between the secretary and rank and file officers. "In the past," he said, "bureaus were sometimes underutilized and our talented professional staff was isolated from the seventh floor."

Drawing heavily upon an imaginative report by the State Department Management Task Force, *State 2000: A New Model for Managing Foreign Affairs*, the reorganization plan stopped short of many of *State 2000*'s recommendations. Environmental programs, for example, are being managed by the under secretary for global affairs rather than within the purview of the assistant secretary for economics, as recommended by *State 2000*. ACDA has retained its independence so far, although as of this writing it lacks a head and a mission. Consular affairs, which the *State 2000* authors recommended be under global programs, instead remains under management. More centrally, the reorganization plan does not reflect one of *State 2000*'s most ardently argued recommendations—that an Office of Strategic Planning and Resources coordinate an integrated foreign policy budget process.

As the operational details are worked out over the next several months, policymakers would do well to refer to the fascinating annexes to the *State 2000* report, which lay out the reasoning behind the report's recommendations. "State's Economic Role," for example, by Edward A. Casey Jr., discusses how promoting the U.S. economic stance abroad can be imbedded in the foreign policy process. "Repeated initiatives in the past to raise the profile of economic diplomacy have foundered on a lack of follow-up. We have not made the institutional and personnel changes necessary to demonstrate a permanent comitment to new directions in the department's work." To increase the importance of economic analysis and trade promotion effectively, Casey argues, State must hire officers with economic training, dropping an inch or two the veil officially draped over Foreign Service applicants' backgrounds. It must increase the senior economic leadership in each regional bureau.

Going beyond suggestions for structural change, there are many exhortations to "change the culture." George Moose's annex on "Multilateral Diplomacy" discusses the need to address the "attitude, organizational culture, and major flaws in the present policy development process." "Streamlining the Policy Process" reminds us that "seventh-floor principals should empower assistant secretaries, treat the bureaus as the workhorses of the department and make maximum use of personnel in the bureaus." Alphonse F. LaPorta, in his annex on support systems management, writes that, "The State-managed logistical support system should become more responsive and service-oriented through the devolution of program responsibility and resource management to geographic bureaus . . . "

State 2000 contains rich lodes of information and analysis to which State management will be able to refer for years to come. Although the broad outlines may be in place, this visionary report will be invaluable in efforts to calibrate the design. ■

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SPEAKING OUT

By Joe B. Johnson

Make Room for Democracy

While we were cutting the budget, a new foreign policy priority seems to have appeared on the spreadsheet: the promotion of democracy and free enterprise abroad.

Candidate Bill Clinton promised to make democracy, especially in the newly independent states, a geopolitical concern. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, addressing the North Atlantic Council on February 26, named "promoting democracy and free markets" as the "third pillar" of the new administration's diplomacy. He asserted: "It would be the height of folly to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to overcome communism and then refuse to invest in the survival of the new democracies that are emerging."

That line of argument has made democracy promotion a growth industry for some years now. Several different approaches to the problem can be discerned among the various programs administered by the State Department, the Department of Defense, the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Information Agency, and other public and private entities.

- Radio and television broadcasting, including "surrogate" news services like the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Marti, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, promote the free flow of information by carrying objective news to populations living under censorship.
- Training programs run by USIA and the Agency for International Development transfer American know-how to foreign lawyers, judges, and other agents of social change.
- The National Endowment for Democracy and a host of its private-sector kin provide direct help to political parties and independent media abroad.
- International and non-governmental organizations, some supported by the U.S. government, monitor and assist elections in transitional countries.

Support for freedom was a popular tick in last year's campaign speeches, and no wonder. The clamor for things American in the former Soviet Union and the sight of the "Goddess of Liberty"—inspired by our Statue of Liberty—erected by young Chinese activists would make any American proud.

- Exchange and information programs, perhaps the oldest way of spreading American ideas about government, have built cadres of foreigners with direct exposure to U.S. society.

Activities like these have burgeoned in recent years with little scrutiny and even less coordination. The crumbling of the Soviet bloc fired the popular imagination and gave rise to new State and USAID initiatives and to some very large private programs to provide information and training about American business and government methods. Support for freedom was a popular tick in last year's campaign speeches, and no wonder. The clamor for things American in the former Soviet Union and the sight of the "Goddess of Liberty"—inspired by our Statue of Liberty—erected by young Chinese activists would make any American proud.

There is reason to believe that Secretary Christopher's "third pillar" is more than a facade. His subcabinet appointments come from the National Democratic Institute (Brian Atwood and Harriet Babbitt), the U.S. Institute of Peace (Samuel Lewis), and the National Endowment for Democracy (Winston Lord), while the State Department's reorganization places a consolidated bureau for human rights and democratization prominently under the new under secretary for global affairs. Furthermore, at least one geographic bureau at State intends to add democratization to its regional affairs office's job description. Finally, Deputy Secretary Wharton's 90-day study of USAID will affect an agency that has been devoting significant funds to promoting economic and political reform.

At the Department of Defense, Secretary Les Aspin's new policy department will include an assistant secretary for democracy and human rights. The president's economic and budget plan will establish a Radio Free Asia even as it consolidates U.S. government radio broadcasting within the

VOA, eliminating Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty.

The administration may recognize the need to reorganize the existing, haphazard welter of efforts and give them a strategic vision before the new democracy bureaus grow out of control. There is already talk about a presidential review decision on democracy promotion, instructing the agencies involved to write down a grand design. That would require the administration to answer a number of basic questions:

- Can we judge which nations offer the brightest prospects to succeed as democracies? Shouldn't the taxpayer's investments in political reform go to the best risks?
- Can we agree on a methodology? For example, is it safe to say that the considerable resources devoted to monitoring the 1991 elections in Haiti were, to put it kindly, premature? Is a dollar spent on radio broadcasting to China more effective than a dollar toward exchange programs for Chinese students?
- What if pro-democracy efforts might harm other U.S. foreign policy interests, for example, the stability of a military ally? Shouldn't that be considered, or at least factored into the allocation of resources?
- Why should the American public support these efforts in the first place? Is it enough to say that democracies are rarely aggressors? For example, do we really believe that a free parliamentary system will make Ukraine more compliant with arms control agreements?

Overt promotion of democracy has taken place for decades under the USIA's exchange programs, now accepted as an integral part of U.S. embassies.

In fact, the reverse seems to be true.

Democracy-building has seemed exempt from critical scrutiny so far, but the programs are now big enough for a reality check: the National Endowment for Democracy at $30 million, Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union initiatives at about $50 million, and $30 million proposed to start up a Radio Free Asia on top of the already successful Voice of America China Service.

The first step to assess what information and exchange can do would be to look at our long record of experience. Overt promotion of democracy has taken place for decades under the USIA's exchange programs, now accepted as an integral part of U.S. embassies. Thousands of foreign leaders have gained direct exposure to the United States through the International Visitor Program, while the most promising students have resided at our universities under the Fulbright Academic Exchange Program or others like it. Through television dialogues, press articles, documents,

and books, and of course through the Voice of America, USIA has been purveying American ideas about everything—but especially government, society, and economics—since 1953.

USIA's programs have a subtly different *raison d'etre*, however: USIA's slogan is "Telling America's story to the world." They allow foreigners to look at us and draw their own conclusions. While information and exchanges have proven profoundly subversive behind the Iron Curtain and in China, they are not aimed explicitly against authoritarian regimes.

By law and by presidential directive, ambassadors have the authority and responsibility to direct and coordinate every aspect of those activities to maximize the potential results.

Some of the current programs are more intrusive. Radio Liberty reports Russian politics to Russians. By donating to democratically oriented political parties, NED takes sides within a society. Election monitoring intervenes in a country's political process, albeit with local government permission. All imply an interest on the part of the American taxpayer in how foreigners organize their societies.

Before expanding programs in today's budget environment, the administration would do well to compare these differing techniques and, above all, to set realistic expectations. Specifically needed is a methodology to determine where and when to use different programs, a rationale to prioritize competing demands on funding for democratization efforts, a coordinating mechanism that takes into account private efforts and—as President Clinton has pointed out—the initiatives of other countries, and, at bottom, a clear explanation of why the promotion of democracy serves the U.S. national interest.

At no time has the United States possessed more influence on the political course of nations. Never have American principles and experience been more relevant to human problems around the world. The promotion of democracy is important: too important to leave to chance or mere rhetoric. ■

Joe B. Johnson is a Foreign Service officer in USIA.



U.S. Special Envoy to Somalia, Robert Oakley, right, walks with local Somalis over a Bailey Bridge spanning a portion of the Juba River near Kissmayo, Somalia.

WIDE WORLD PHOTO

Reflections on Somalia

AN INTERVIEW WITH AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY

Editor's Note: Ambassador Robert B. Oakley was the president's special envoy to Somalia from November 25, 1992 to March 1993. Now retired and working with the Institute of Peace, as well as with his own consulting firm, Oakley had previously served as ambassador to Somalia in 1983-84. He is interviewed here by *Journal* editorial board Chairman Brandon Grove, Jr. who was director of the State Department's Somalia Task Force while Oakley was special envoy.

GROVE: Bob, you must be the first ambassador to go to a country without a government in a UN-sponsored humanitarian operation involving nearly 30,000 U.S. troops, with only vague instructions on what to do. How did you plan your mission, decide on priorities, and on your first moves in Mogadishu?

OAKLEY: It was done without much instruction—sort of played by ear. I left Washington on the afternoon of November 30 and spent an hour in very intensive discussion with the secretary general of the United Nations and his top assistants over what the United States was proposing and how it related to what the United Nations had been doing and had in mind for the future. Then I got on a plane for the UN Humanitarian Conference in Addis Ababa. I got the title "special envoy," because you can't be an ambassador to a country with no government. It was in Addis that you and I concluded that, rather than coming back to Washington, I should head for Mogadishu and get there ahead of the military.

We thought we could do some good preparing the way for the military to come in with as much understanding from the local leaders and as little hostility as possible. It occurred to me and to you all on the State Department side as sort of spontaneous combustion; we wanted to get there first in order to sit down and talk to them.

In Mombasa, I had a one day layover and learned more about the military plans. I also got a call from the embassy in Nairobi, greatly concerned

BY BRANDON GROVE JR.

about my going to Mogadishu at all, especially in advance of the military. I said that my mission was to do what was necessary to support the military. I didn't feel there was any great danger, so I was going to go.

Of course, we had had a political officer in Embassy Nairobi who was responsible for covering Somalia who had made periodic trips up there, as did a number of the personnel from the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) who were based in Nairobi. They assured me that there wasn't going to be any major security problem. Don Teitlebaum, who was the Somalia watcher in the embassy, went up ahead and started making contacts with Somali leaders and arrangements for a place to stay at the Conoco compound. When I arrived, there was a room and a bed, appointments were set, and we were off to the races.

GROVE: You're very modest, Bob. That was a decision of great courage on your part, to precede our Marines into the cities and pave the way. Were you apprehensive?

OAKLEY: Let's talk for a minute about Mogadishu itself. Talking to Aideed and Ali Mahdi separately, I made the point to them that public expressions of support for the United States had been welcomed, and I hoped that they would translate these public expressions into a major positive effort to generate support amongst their own followers for the U.S. effort, in particular the Marine Corps, when they arrived. I encouraged them to call meetings of their party apparatus and to use their radios to put the word out that the Americans were coming as friends of Somalia and the Somalis. I pointed out to them that it would certainly be to their advantage and ours that this start as a harmonious relationship, particularly since, if it didn't, there was room for accident. Having seen what the U.S. military had the power to do in Desert Storm—and they had all learned by heart that lesson—we didn't want any accidents and they shouldn't want any. They readily agreed.

I had one security man with me. Others argued for a group of people from Special Forces or something. I said no, we didn't want to project that sort of image.

I sent Don Teitlebaum to Baidoa the day before I got there, to test the water but also to make sure that the proper civic groups were available. When we got there we met with a large, large group—women, elders, religious leaders, professionals, and all the different political groups. We met all of them and explained that the U.S. and UN were there to work with everybody and that I assumed none of them wanted to see the repetition of the Siad Barre period, when one group felt it could dictate what all Somalis could do.

This was a very interesting meeting that went on for a very long time and set a precedent for advance trips to other regions. One of the sheiks expressed concern that Islam in Somalia was temporarily at a weak point, and we might be encroaching by trying to impose Christianity or other foreign ideologies upon the Somalis. I assured him that I had some service in Islamic countries and could not agree with him that Islam would ever be weak. Moreover, we certainly would not do anything to try to impose foreign beliefs on the Somali people. Then I turned to the representative of the Catholic Relief Services, and I said: "Here's the CRS. I'm sure you'll find that they'll be working with you and not working against you." Indeed, within a couple of weeks the CRS was repairing a couple of mosques in the Baidoa area to make the point that this was a humanitarian, not an ideological mission.

The only place where I was a little bit nervous, quite frankly, was in Bardera, because that was way up in the interior, there had been an awful lot of fighting up there, and after Kissmayo to the south and Baidoa to the east of Bardera had been occupied by Marines, we were nervous that a lot of the really bad actors who had gotten out of town had converged on Bardera. There had been a lot of fighting up there between different groups. The Aideed army had gone in at one stage and been pushed back out by the SNF, people who were to some degree carryovers from the Siad Barre period. It was a very nasty environment. So I was a bit nervous, but my nervousness was moderated because I had a forward air controller with me courtesy of General Johnston, and there were F-14s flying overhead. Therefore I wasn't really too apprehensive.

I'm sort of a fatalist. I tried to figure out what I thought made sense and behave accordingly. I really felt that presenting a friendly and yet firm figure to the Somalis, along with relying on their awe of the U.S. military, would be sufficient to deal with the problem. However there were also outstanding security details from State Diplomatic Security plus Marines to protect all of us.

GROVE: It had been some eight years since you last served in Somalia. What struck you most when you came back under those extraordinary circumstances?

OAKLEY: Obviously, the tremendous human misery which Somalis had inflicted upon themselves or had inflicted upon them by very selfish leaders in an all-out struggle to oust Siad Barre and then to fight for national power as his successor. The tremendous reawakening in a highly emotional, negative way of the old clan loyalties, which had not been nearly so dominant when I was there and which added impetus to the very bloody competitiveness and struggle for power. And, of course, the physical destruction and the destruction of anything that you could call a government.

GROVE: Once you were on the ground, how did you determine what staff you needed?

OAKLEY: I determined it by a sense of feel, apart from talking to Bob Houdek and talking to you and others back in Washington and looking at the likely requirements. Already you all had, very correctly, identified the need for a political adviser for General Johnston. That was John Hirsch, who was also my deputy, and he came up at once from Johannesburg. I got instructions in Addis from the task force, with a preliminary list of people, which turned out to be just right.

It was, I think, Bob Houdek who said, "What about adding Bob Gosende, who knows a lot about a broad scope of USIA activities?" and we were able to get him. Gosende has now replaced me as special envoy to Somalia. Then we identified a couple of other people from

USIA to help avoid the gap between the political and the military by explaining things to the Somalis. Where the politics on the ground are off or they're not conceived properly at the outset, you can have terrible trouble. We did this in one way to ourselves in Vietnam, we did it another way in Lebanon. The Marines and I agreed from the beginning on the necessity of the right political-military mix.

One of the things we wanted to get right was the public information aspect. Because Somalia is an oral society, and since there was nothing but mimeographed pamphlets that passed for newspapers, and each of the so-called warlords had his own radio station, we felt it was absolutely essential that we have some authoritative voice. So the Army sent out psychological operations (psyops) people from Fort Bragg who did a very good job and who set up both a radio station and a newspaper, which printed 20,000 copies, all in the Somali language. We wanted to match this with people from USIA who understood the best way to get across to the Somalis what we really were up to. In that way we wouldn't inadvertently create problems through a lack of understanding.

We figured we needed a very good admin man, and we got Wayne Bush, from Nairobi, one of the best I've ever seen. We had the great cooperation of the Conoco local manager, Raymond Marchand. Fortunately they even had a satellite telephone at their compound Later on we had great communicators who could work miracles. We also had a succession of wonderful secretaries, one at a time, to support the entire operations.

The final thing we had were the assets of OFDA. They had been working the relief side, and in Operation Provide Relief [relief flights from Mombasa to Somalia] had been cooperating with the military very very closely.

We chose three political officers, because we felt we were going to need them as political advisers in the field, not for the traditional functions of political reporting from the capital, but people who would actually be able to go out—find out what was happening in the field—but above all provide advice on how to handle the local political situation to the military commanders in particular areas around the country. That turned out to be absolutely essential. Before long, the Australians, Belgians, Canadians, as well as the Americans were saying, "Hey, we need one of your political officers here, we need one of your political officers there. We're having trouble getting our local council to meet." Or, "We're having trouble figuring out who the good guys are and who the bad guys are." So we had the unusual experience—the last time I've seen this was in Vietnam—of political officers working alongside the military out in the field.

GROVE: What was your daily routine? How was morale?

OAKLEY: We very quickly became, Brandon, a remarkably cohesive, dedicated single team—military and civilian, working together for a unified purpose. We all stayed in the Conoco compound, which had two houses. As the "big chief" I had the luxury of the only single bedroom. Everybody else had to either double or triple up. We were fortunate in that we inherited from Conoco two good cooks, and they were able not only to prepare good meals, but to get out into the local market and scrounge. We were able to get good Somali rock lobster once in a while. Also the Navy ships offshore provided us with some things, so we didn't suffer at all from the food point of view.

It was a full, seven-day-a-week, 12-hour-a-day operation. The first thing that had to be done on the humanitarian side was to set up a coordinating center, and the military, the U.S. Marine Corps, plus OFDA brought in the right people plus the right equipment, including computers, so that we had a sort of a war room there for humanitarian purposes with information coming in on activities of more than 40 different organizations all over southern Somalia. There was a coordinating meeting at 0800 every morning chaired by Philip Johnston, the president of CARE who was on loan to the United Nations to be the relief coordinator for Somalia.

The people from USIA, after they got through working with the psyops people in the morning, would go out to meet with lawyers' groups, women's groups, teachers, sports groups, and any number of neglected areas of community activity and neglected community leaders. We wanted to bring all of them back into the mainstream and see what we could do to promote this type of activity. Within three months there were a national women's conference under UN auspices, a jurists' association, a championship soccer match with 30,000 spectators and not a single incident. All of this was started by our team. Then we had frequent military coordination meetings. So everyone was very busy, running in one direction or another, but every evening at 6:30 we'd come together for a staff meeting. Everyone made that who was in town. We'd go around the room and report on the day's activities and try to figure out what we needed to do the next day.

The one thing that we did for recreation was jogging over at the huge American Embassy compound on the outskirts of town, where the military headquarters was located. About five o'clock a lot of us would end up going over there for a walk or a jog for about 30 minutes before finishing up the day. After dinner we had cables and telephone calls for Washington, reporting on developments.

GROVE: Did you eventually have the feeling that you were becoming something like a normal embassy?

OAKLEY: We didn't want to become a normal embassy. We didn't want to encumber ourselves with all the minor details, and fortunately Washington was understanding enough to oblige us. John Hirsch and I, in our earlier service in Somalia, remember very clearly when the United States suddenly found that Parkinson's law had prevailed. At that moment of truth, instead of the embassy's being in a very small building on the corner of the main drag in downtown Mogadishu, we had this huge compound on the outskirts of town, and the number of people expanded to fill up the compound. The United States ended up sometime before the evacuation with 400 people there. That projected a signal to the Somalis of much greater United States involvement and a much higher level of national interest than was in fact the case.

GROVE: Looking back, what do you wish you had done differently?

OAKLEY: Collectively, we didn't do as well as we could in providing for the protection of the relief agencies and the non-governmental organizations. During the period prior to the arrival of U.S.-led forces, they had to rely upon any local security they could get, and they ended up getting caught in a protection racket. They would hire local guards with guns and cars. As it turned out these guards were really elements of the warlords' militia who had been seconded to the NGOs and other relief agencies.

After we arrived the first person to be killed, one of the relief workers, Sean Devereaux down in Kissmayo, was killed because UNICEF laid off some people. The local guards who were fired arranged for Devereaux to be killed. At one point in Kissmayo, when there had been some trouble in town, security guards from Medecins sans Frontieres (Belgian branch) had fired on the Belgian military. So the Belgian and U.S. military said okay, no more armed guards. Well, the people from Medecins sans Frontieres were so terrified at the thought of firing or even disarming these guards, given what had happened to Sean Devereaux, that they closed down temporarily. They'd been paying 87 guards $200,000 a month in dollars—an immense sum. This is indicative of what was going on.

GROVE: What was the hardest thing for you to do?

OAKLEY: The hardest thing was to restrain myself in trying to give advice to our military friends. Like most Foreign Service officers who've been around, you think you have the answers to all questions. You tend to think the military does things too much by the rules, and they lack flexibility—but I discovered there was in fact a lot of flexibility as well as some very good reasons why the military operates according to the book. Very quickly we established a good working relationship, but it was difficult, at least for a while.

It was good to see how the military culture and the humanitarian culture somehow meshed. In the beginning, most of the humanitarian agencies and NGOs said, "No, no, no, don't bring the military in here." But then it became clear that the military had a tremendous commitment, not just to protecting humanitarian operations but conducting them themselves—repairing orphanages and schools, digging wells, repairing irrigation systems, handing out food to kids, assisting medical workers, etc.

GROVE: Do you think the United States is doing the right thing in Somalia?

OAKLEY: I really do think so, Brandon, because I don't believe that there was any hope that the Somalis could have saved themselves. They had somehow lost all balance and reason. They had locked themselves into this paroxysm of killing and competitiveness and looting, which is the dark side of their nature. When we got there and Ali Mahdi and his group met with Aideed and his group, I felt there was genuine relief that this thing had stopped. But it was also clear that they never would have been able to stop it themselves. Even if the people at the top had wanted to stop it, too much blood had flowed, the emotions were up too high. The rivalries and ancient animosities had been exacerbated by killings, so that it required something like a blanket of foam on a fire—you couldn't do it with a garden hose, as the UN had been trying to do with a more conventional peacekeeping operation.

I think we're also doing the right thing by turning it over to the United Nations but providing a tremendous amount of support. Admiral Jon Howe [deputy national security adviser to President Bush] is going out for six months as the UN special representative [replacing Ambassador Kittani]. The UN force commander will have a U.S. deputy and lots of U.S. military participation. I think the third step would be for the secretary-general to replace Admiral Howe after six months with a non-American, while U.S. military participation is cut way back. It's sort of a three-phased operation—the United States goes in, then we turn it over to the United Nations, then the third phase will be a much more normal United Nations operation.

GROVE: When do you think the last American soldier will leave?

OAKLEY: I don't know when they'll *all* leave, because our role is invaluable. I don't believe this operation could have been put together by any other way than the United States military's taking the lead, because we had the right connections with so many different foreign countries whose military establishments are used to working with the United States. The admiration for the United States as the military superpower, particularly after Desert Storm, was very important to the other military establishments agreeing to come in and cooperate. We're going to retain some specialists, I think, in logistics and communications and things of that sort, but I think we'll be able to remove our combat forces fairly quickly. I don't think that there will be a need for a Rapid Reaction Force on the ground for longer than—I don't know—two months, once the UN actually takes over.

Let me say a word here about the incredible dedication and discipline, as well as humanitarian concern, of our men and women in uniform. Many of them were on their third long foreign operation in a little over 2 1/2 years, away from home and family. They were in a totally alien environment, one which was very dangerous. But they acted with great restraint, actually firing at Somali bandits who seemed threatening only one or two times for each 100 times they could have done so within the rules of engagement. The number of Somali casualties has been very small, as has been the number of American and foreign casualties.

GROVE: Finally, Bob, a different kind of question. What does your experience in Somalia suggest about what retired FSOs have to offer?

OAKLEY: Well, you might have found an on-duty FSO who could have done this. However the State Department has recognized that you have a sort of ready reserve of people who can take on short assignments of this nature without taking someone out of a line position. Phil Habib used to do it regularly. So I think from that point of view it makes a lot of sense.

GROVE: Bob, thank you very much. ■

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

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

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

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The Clinton Admin and the

BY DAVID D. NEWSOM

The coming of a new administration in Washington inevitably raises concerns in the Foreign Service; the advent of the Clinton Administration is no exception. Foreign Service officers ask: What will be the influence of the foreign affairs agencies? How will policies and processes affect career opportunities?

From the service standpoint, there will be pluses and minuses, but, perhaps, more pluses. In the final analysis, the position and influence of career professionals will depend not only on the formal decision-making process but also on personal relationships within the government, the ultimate roles of new policy centers, and the ability of the career service to adapt to a new team and a revised foreign policy agenda.

At the time this article was written the future was clearest with respect to the State Department. Major appointments were still pending for both the U.S. Information Agency and the Agency for International Development. The new deputy secretary of state, Clifton Wharton Jr., has been charged with studying the organization of the economic assistance function; pressures for change in the functions and organization of the post-Cold War Agency for International Development can be expected in both the Executive and Congress. USIA's basic mission is likely to continue. The possibility of change in the area of public diplomacy is currently focused on the

istration Foreign Service

future role of the Voice of America and the radios under the Board for International Broadcasting, Radio Liberty, and Radio Free Europe.

Governing by committee

For foreign policy generally, a new decision-making process has been created, centered in the White House, reflecting the president's interests and the multi-dimensional nature of today's problems. The primary organ of the system is a Principals Committee, under the chairmanship of the national security adviser and including the secretaries of state and defense, the director of central intelligence, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, and the permanent representative to the United Nations. A Deputies Committee under the chairmanship of the deputy national security adviser includes the deputies of the principals and representatives of the vice president and the new National Economic Council.

At the assistant secretary level, the State Department will chair most interagency working groups dealing with foreign policy issues. The exceptions will be groups responsible for intelligence, arms control, and crisis management; these will be under National Security Council staff chairs. Conscious of over-sized State representations in policy committees in past administrations, the new team will limit State attendance to the relevant assistant secretary, one other officer, and a rapporteur. Views from within the department will be solicited in advance of the interagency sessions through an internal process directed by the assistant secretary.

Transition planners believed that the effectiveness of the department in the new policy process would be enhanced by streamlining the structure and giving more responsibility to the assistant secretaries. The inauguration of a new administration provided a unique opportunity to do so.

Transition planners believed that the effectiveness of the department in the new policy process would be enhanced by streamlining the structure and giving more responsibility to the assistant secretaries. The inauguration of a new administration provided a unique opportunity to do so. The Department of State has grown during the past several decades, succumbing to pressures from Congress, constituent groups, politics, and an expanding foreign policy agenda. One result has been a trend to push decisions to higher levels, lessening the authority and reducing the satisfaction of lower-level officials. This problem was particularly apparent in the Bush Administration, where key policy issues became the province of a small group of officials around the secretary of state. As one source stated it, "the sixth floor was severed from the seventh floor, and the secretary was not well served as a result." Ideas for change were available in *State 2000*, a report of a Management Task Force of departmental (including Foreign Service) officials released in January 1993.

Clearing the pipeline

Current changes have three objectives: first, to move functions, including those of several of the ambassadors-at-large, from the seventh floor to the bureaus. Second, within the bureaus, more authority will be given to country directors and office directors; with this in mind the number of deputy assistant secretaries is to be substantially reduced. The third objective is to create clear pipelines of communication to the secretary through the under secretaries. The hope is that a more clearly defined relationship with the assistant secretaries will also permit a reduction in the staffs of under secretaries and the seventh floor duplication of bureau functions.

Under the new plan, an effort will be made for the first time to assign responsibilities for specific bureaus to under secretaries. The under secretary for political affairs, still the No. 3 position in the department, will oversee the six geographic bureaus and International Organizations (IO). The Political Military Bureau (PM) will, on the new chart, be under the under secretary for arms control and international security affairs (A) and will assume responsibility for non-proliferation matters. The under secretary for management will be responsible not only for the normal personnel, administrative, and security bureaus, but also for Consular Affairs.

A strengthened economic organization and a new under secretary for global affairs reflect revised foreign affairs priorities. The Bureau of Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs (EBA), now assigned to the under secretary for economic, business, and agricultural affairs (E), will have additional functions, as recommended in the *State 2000* report, including a consolidated International Communications and Information Policy (CIP) office and a new Office of Business Facilitation.

The Global Affairs (G) position is designed to embody the foreign affairs dimension of domestic and foreign issues of special concern to the president. Four reorganized bureaus are the responsibility of the new under secretary: Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL); Oceans, Environment, and Science (OES); Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); and Narcotics, Terrorism, and Crime (NTC).

The president's ear

The success of any formal arrangement of a cabinet organization, measured by its influence in interagency decision-making, depends on the talents and experience of its senior personnel. Centering the policy machinery in the White House is inevitable and not only because of the leadership style of the president. Today's scope of foreign-related problems extends well beyond traditional diplomacy. Nevertheless, the State Department is likely to be a significant player because of the new team being assembled.

As the history of other administrations has shown, the influence of a secretary of state depends heavily on his closeness to the president.

As the history of other administrations has shown, the influence of a secretary of state depends heavily on his closeness to the president. Secretary of State Warren Christopher clearly has the respect and confidence of President Clinton. He brings, as well, experience in the all-important relationship with the Congress. Further, because Christopher and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake worked closely together both in the Carter Administration and in the campaign, the tension that has sometimes marked the State/NSC relationship should be minimized.

Deputy Secretary of State Wharton is a distinguished educator with strong experience in administration and development work who comes from a Foreign Service family. Peter Tarnoff, under secretary for political affairs, brings to his job not only a previous Foreign Service career, but also the experience of the executive secretary position. His appointment restores the tradition of having a foreign affairs professional occupy the No. 3 position in the department. Former Senator Tim Wirth, designated as under secretary for global affairs (as of early March, only Wharton and Tarnoff had been confirmed), brings the strengths of former associations and a demonstrated interest in the subjects of his new jurisdiction. Brian Atwood, another department and Foreign Service veteran with excellent connections in Congress, is slated to become the under secretary for management. Joan Spero, a business executive who was in the U.S. mission to the United Nations in the Carter Administration, is to take on the increasingly important position of under secretary for economic affairs, and Under Secretary for Security Affairs-designate Lynn Davis, recent vice president of Rand Corporation, is a respected expert on national strategy.

Participatory decision-making

Inevitably, members of the Foreign Service will express disappointment that more senior appointments are not falling to their colleagues. Of the five geographic assistant secretaries whose appointments have been announced, only three are active Foreign Service officers and one of these has been continued from the previous administration. Such a mix has been a pattern since the Carter Administration when, to a greater extent than before, political and ideological factors were introduced into State Department appointments, including those at the deputy assistant secretary level. This same pattern was followed in the Reagan years. President Gerald Ford's administration was the last in which the under secretary for political affairs and all of the geographical assistant secretaries were active members of the Foreign Service. The Carter Administration was the last to retain the incumbent under secretary for political affairs, a position that at times in the past has been immune from electoral changes. To a greater degree than two decades ago, senior positions in the department are expected to reflect diversity, politics, and constituencies as much as expertise in foreign affairs.

The approach of the Clinton Administration, however, appears different in key respects from the Reagan and Bush administrations. Secretary Christopher has made clear his desire to involve the whole department in decision-making. In his remarks to the department on January 25, he said, "The greater resource we have, of course, is the people—all of you here in this room and in the posts around the world. You bring expertise and ideas and energy. I want to work with you. . . . To me, that means the entire building—not just the seventh floor but the entire building, all the floors and all of our posts around the world."

The new team, in addition, has kept in place career chiefs of mission around the world, in most cases, apparently, for the duration of their terms, and has continued Foreign Service officer Edward Djerejian in the key post of assis-

tant secretary for Near Eastern affairs. Christopher, who chaired the committee to select State nominees for ambassadorships in the Carter Administration, is familiar with the problems and pressures of the process. Without committing himself to percentages, he referred to the "higher numbers" of political appointees in recent administrations and promised "a discussion between the president and myself and others when he picks his targets." Christopher's emphasis was on "qualifications that extend beyond campaign participation and will require some real expertise with respect to the appointment." The Clinton Administration has already demonstrated its awareness of career talent by the appointment of career Ambassador Thomas Pickering as ambassador to Moscow.

The strain of power

How the process will ultimately function depends not only on appointments, but on how the relationships stand the pressures of governing. Even the closest of pre-government or campaign friendships can be strained in the interplay of ambitions, power, and ideas that can be part of policy-making. This interplay could be complicated by adjustments among significant centers of power that are emerging in the new administration, both within and outside the department. The degree of demonstrated cohesion and collegiality exhibited in the ultimate relationship among these power centers will determine whether the Clinton foreign policy team is seen as one divided against itself or united in a common goal.

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The creation of the ambassador-at-large for New Independent States and the appointment of a close friend of the president, Strobe Talbott brings echoes of past tensions between special advisers on Soviet affairs, the European bureau, and the embassy in Moscow. Former Senator Wirth could see his mandate of new, priority issues in terms that would conflict with more traditional bureaus and other cabinet departments.

On many issues, challenges will come from outside the department, not the least of which will be that of the Defense Department. The interests of the secretary of defense, former Congressman Les Aspin, in issues that range over foreign affairs is well known; his congressional office was a fount of papers on international issues for many months before the election. He has, furthermore, announced plans to reorganize the office of the secretary of defense in ways that will enhance its capacity to be informed and active in foreign affairs. He will be assisted by an experienced Foreign Service officer, Frank Wisner. The potential challenge to the State Department's role stems not only from the new Defense secretary's interests and the Defense reorganization, but from the reality that questions on the deployment of U.S. forces bear directly on the U.S. capacity to be influential in critical foreign affairs issues; Bosnia is the prime example.

A further challenge comes from the new National Economic Council (NEC). Most observers of the foreign policy process have long seen the need for a greater melding of political and economic decision-making. The lines between the two diplomatic disciplines have become increasingly blurred. The NEC will have a parallel structure to that of the NSC. State will be represented by the under secretary for economic affairs. But the introduction of an additional body into the process will inevitably bring adjustment problems. State's capacity to be influential in such a council, dominated by trade and economic interests, remains to be seen.

Openness

The ultimate influence of the State Department—and of the Foreign Service within and beyond it—will depend finally on how its members are seen as serving the interests of the president. The new agenda and a secretary of state seemingly more inclined to use the full resources of the department should give members of the Foreign Service fresh opportunities. To seize those opportunities, however, a career service that has seen its elite identified by success in political analysis and strategic negotiation will need to adapt to an agenda more economic and scientific than ever before and to demonstrate its professional support for the structures and priorities of a new administration.

Its members will also need to take note of three themes in recent statements of the Secretary of State. Christopher spoke of the need for the department to avoid parochialism, to have an "American desk." He emphasized the need for "confidence and trust" and "loyalty and discipline." To those assembled on January 25, he said, "I start with a strong disposition to have confidence and trust in the people of this building. We can communicate ideas about our policies only if people will have the discipline and character to realize that it is quite often communicated in confidence and not to go beyond the building."

To some in the Foreign Service this admonition will raise issues of reporting crafted to meet domestic political sensitivities and of past discouragement of frank talk. But the sensitivities of elected political leaders and their appointees are real. Some invariably harbor suspicions toward those career officials "who have not been in the campaign." But with a Clinton Administration desiring to conduct more open government, the Foreign Service has an opportunity to demonstrate its capacity. Its ultimate role and influence, however, will depend on how its members can adapt to changed priorities and balance the professional obligations of the diplomat with the political needs of a new administration. ■

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The Orphaned Agency

With the U.S.-Soviet arms race called off, ACDA is fighting for its life

BY DAVID CALLAHAN

During 12 years of Reagan/Bush rule, few agencies within the national security establishment fared as badly as did the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). In the early Reagan era, ACDA was marginalized in an administration that tended to be skeptical of arms control. Under President Bush, ACDA was left out of the loop, as Secretary of State James Baker conducted arms control negotiations with just a few close aides. By the early 1990s, there was widespread agreement that ACDA was a rundown and ineffectual agency.

ACDA is housed in the oldest part of the State Department, and its director occupies the grand wood-paneled office that once belonged to Secretary of State Dean Acheson. In the past, ACDA has been at the center of some of the most important diplomatic negotiations of the 20th century, a major player in the high-stakes game of U.S.-Soviet arms control. But as the post-Cold War era began, the glory days of this 30-year-old agency, created in 1961 by President John F. Kennedy, appeared to be coming to an end.

Today, ACDA is fighting is for its life. Two major reports on reorganizing the national security establishment have called for the agency to be abolished and its functions folded into the State Department. Last fall, the transition team working on State Department matters for President-elect Clinton backed this idea. While no action was taken to abolish ACDA during Warren Christopher's initial reorganization moves in early February, many observers believe that ACDA is living on borrowed time. Clinton's failure quickly to appoint a high-profile director to ACDA is widely seen as a move that heralds the agency's abolition.

Two major reports on reorganizing the national security establishment have called for the agency to be abolished and its functions folded into the State Department.

The current travails of ACDA are ironic, to say the least. During more than a decade of neglect and abuse, many believed that a Democratic administration was the best hope for the agency's salvation. Now, in yet another example of how the Cold War's end has turned the politics of national security upside down, it is freshly anointed Democratic officials who are leading the attack on ACDA.

Whether this attack will ultimately succeed remains to be seen. ACDA has strong supporters in the arms control community and on Capitol Hill who make a compelling case for keeping alive an independent advocate for arms control in the executive branch. This view may yet prevail at the White House. Plans for folding ACDA into State remain poorly thought out and would fail to insure that arms control issues will receive adequate attention in the new administration. Moreover, while everyone agrees that ACDA has problems, the challenge of rejuvenating the agency is by no means insurmountable. With organizational changes and strong White House backing, ACDA has the potential once again to become effective.

Mission accomplished?

With a staff of barely more than 200 people and a minuscule budget, ACDA has not become a target of reorganizers

because of its bureaucratic bloat but because it is seen as both anachronistic and ineffectual.

When ACDA was founded, at the height of the superpower rivalry, it was hard to imagine an agenda of more pressing importance than that of bettering relations with Moscow and bringing the nuclear arms race under control. ACDA would symbolize the U.S. government's commitment to this goal. The agency would conduct arms control research, formulate policy, serve as the backstop in negotiations, help implement agreements, and inform the public about arms control. Most crucially, perhaps, ACDA would be what one of its directors would call a "bureaucratically independent conscience." Whereas other agencies would always have goals that might be higher on their agenda than arms control, ACDA would be a permanent instutional advocate for arms control.

...the original mission of ACDA is far from completed. While it is true that the big superpower negotiations are over, there is still "a lot on the arms control agenda." Besides dealing with the issue of non-proliferation, there is a huge amount of work to be done in regard to the implementation of chemical and biological weapons agreements and START I and START II.

Many now believe that ACDA's mission has been accomplished. The traditional centerpiece of the arms control agenda—extended negotiations with the Soviet Union over nuclear weapons—has essentially been wrapped up, the argument goes. Not only is there a diminished need for a separate agency to handle the wide range of technical questions that arise in negotiations, but many also believe that the need for an institutional advocate of arms control has evaporated. Since nobody disputes the merits of arms control, a bureaucratic conscience is no longer seen as necessary. Bringing arms control back into State is viewed as an obvious adjustment to the post-Cold War era.

Were ACDA a first-class agency, it might now be on firmer ground, but ACDA is widely regarded as mediocre. ACDA is seen as "doing grunt work; it's not making a major contribution that couldn't be made in other parts of the government," says Michael Krepon of the Stimson Center. It is also perceived as being "chock full of professionals who lack distinction, who don't hold their weight. The job could get done elsewhere."

The 2000 model

The leading blueprint for ACDA's elimination is contained in a report released in January by the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Management. "The era of prolonged, painful, and highly politicized arms negotiations with a superpower adversary is over," says the report *State 2000*. "The bureaucratic resources needed for such negotiations have markedly diminished." The report suggests that ACDA be abolished and its responsibilities given to a new Bureau for Proliferation and Arms Control. In addition to absorbing ACDA, this bureau would also take over the proliferation and arms control issues currently handled by the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs. Another bureau called Security Policy and Operations would be responsible for the many other matters that PM now handles. Both bureaus would report to the under secretary for arms control and international security, a post now occupied by former RAND analyst Lynn Davis.

Already, State's leadership has taken steps toward implementing the recommendations of *State 2000*. Until recently, proliferation issues were handled at State by a variety of offices, but mostly by the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES) and by a special ambassador for non-proliferation issues. That work has now been centralized in an enlarged PM. Once ACDA is shut down, PM will simply be split in half, creating the two separate bureaus.

Second thoughts

Supporters of ACDA, and there are many, reject nearly every argument made for killing the agency. To begin with, arms control experts like Jack Mendelsohn of the Arms Control Association argue that the original mission of ACDA is far from completed. While it is true that the big superpower negotiations are over, there is still "a lot on the arms control agenda," Mendelsohn points out. Besides dealing with the issue of non-proliferation, there is a huge amount of work to be done in regard to the implementation of chemical and biological weapons agreements and the two new strategic arms treaties with the Soviet Union, START I and START II. There are also new arms control challenges looming on the horizon, including the negotiation of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the regulation of conventional arms transfers. Finally, "we still have all this excruciating discussion on what to do with SDI and the ABM treaty," notes Mendelsohn. "The old agenda, which people say is wrapped up, ain't wrapped up, and when it is wrapped up there will be new problems."

Supporters believe that only an independent advocate for arms control within the government can be relied upon consistently to push the pro-arms control viewpoint. State, for example, might allow concern for its ties with foreign nations to override efforts to limit conventional arms transfers, while Defense might let consideration for weapons contractors intervene. ACDA, in contrast, would come at the issue solely from an arms control perspective, with no other interests at stake. Says Krepon, whose Stimson Center recently released a report on the future of ACDA that suggested preserving the agency: "You are always going to have people sitting

around a table saying, 'We should allow country X to have access to this dual-use technology because otherwise somebody else will do it and we will lose whatever leverage we have to moderate country X's behavior."

By folding ACDA into State, the arms control position would no longer have a permanent voice in NSC policy deliberations. "State will have a voice," says Mendelsohn, "but arms control will have to make it to the top of the State Department before it has a voice at the NSC. You'll have a lot of issues that are won and lost in State and won't actually come to be debated at the high level."

The Stimson Center report suggests that it would be possible to eliminate ACDA and still insure that arms control receives adequate attention, but this would require a reorganization plan going well beyond what is envisioned in *State 2000.* Although the report does envision that the under secretary for arms control and international security would concentrate on proliferation and arms control issues, he or she would be simultaneously dealing with foreign defense relations and with arms control issues.

According to the Stimson Center, abolishing ACDA would require establishing an under secretary exclusively for proliferation and arms control. There would also be a need for one or more special ambassadors in this area, since the under secretary could not be expected to manage his or her bureaucratic responsibilities as well as engage in much overseas diplomacy. Finally, the Stimson Center plan would compensate for ACDA's demise by beefing up the On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) and giving it semi-autonomous status. Currently, OSIA is located at the Pentagon and deals strictly with verifying arms control agreements. The Stimson Center plan would widen OSIA's mandate and give it a substantial research budget.

Saving ACDA

Supporters of ACDA readily acknowledge that the agency has problems, but they attribute them to ACDA's years of marginalization under two unsympathetic presidents. "The power of a small agency like ACDA is derivative," notes Jack Mendelsohn. "It comes from the fact that the White House chooses to invest the agency with some prestige and power." Such prestige might derive from the appointment of a prominent director who has the full support of the president and secretary of state.

The most thorough independent study yet done on ACDA has suggested rejuvenating the agency. That report, entitled "New Purposes and Priorities for Arms Control," was prepared by a panel of past and present officials set up by the State Department's inspector general to satisfy a request from Congress. The panel was chaired by retired Ambassador James Goodby, a former chief U.S. delegate to the conference on Disarmament in Stockholm and currently a distinguished fellow at the United States Institute of Peace. Working through last summer, the panel interviewed more than 300 experts about both the future of ACDA and possible alternative arrangements for managing arms control in the State Department. Goodby and some of the other panel members began this enterprise inclined to believe that perhaps the time had come to eliminate ACDA.

This view changed during the course of their work. The panel was particularly worried that State would not be able to attract and retain the technical personnel needed to manage arms control. "The basic culture at the State Department is dominated by the Foreign Service," Goodby says, and State has "never succeeded at building a career ladder for technical personnel." Goodby and other panel members also came to share concerns about State's conflict of interest in some arms control areas.

A stay of execution?

Abolishing ACDA is easier said than done. The agency was created by legislation, and congressional action would be needed to terminate it. Authorization from the Hill would also be required to set up a new arms control bureau in State. It now appears unlikely that the Clinton Administration will put forward such legislation this spring. Instead of risking a fight with Congress, State's leadership may pursue a more gradualist strategy. The effort to bolster PM's arms control capabilities will continue while ACDA is left to twist in the wind without a director of any stature, or perhaps without a new director's being appointed at all. After a year or so of this treatment, the agency would be dead in practice if not on paper. "Who would stay in such circumstances? How could you recruit good people?" asks Goodby. Once ACDA has been gutted, it will be easier to kill it altogether.

By all accounts, President Clinton is a leader who prefers policymaking processes that assure a broad spectrum of opinion. Rejuvenating ACDA would be the best way to achieve this goal in the arms control field. Both the Goodby report and the Stimson Center study recommend a variety of steps for getting ACDA back on its feet. Among these are, first, the appointment of a high-profile arms control expert to lead ACDA who clearly has the confidence of the White House. It should be understood that this person will, as specified in ACDA's charter, serve as the principal adviser on arms control issues to the president and secretary of state. Second, the ACDA director should be clearly designated as the government's coordinator of non-proliferation issues. Reflecting this, ACDA should be given a lead role in interagency deliberations on export controls. Third, ACDA's staff must be strengthened in a number of areas, including multilateral and regional arms control and economic issues that relate to defense spending and conversion. Rebuilding ACDA's technical staff cannot be done overnight, and in the interim, personnel from other agencies should be reassigned to ACDA on a temporary basis.

If Clinton is truly committed to a sound arms control policy, he should thwart the plan to eliminate ACDA and personally involve himself in the selection of a director for the agency. He should then insure that the new director has regular access both to himself and to Warren Christopher and that the director has adequate resources for rebuilding a demoralized but critical institution of the U.S. government. ■

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afsa news

Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1990

by Colleen Fallon
Staff Attorney

AFSA has received many inquiries from members regarding implementation of the Federal Pay Comparability Act of 1990 (FEPCA). Since not all of the guidelines for the implementation of FEPCA have been formulated, information now available is incomplete, but the following background should be helpful.

The intent behind FEPCA, as outlined in its legislative history, was to provide agencies with additional flexibility to address serious recruitment and retention problems occurring in the federal government workforce. In May of 1990, a Government Accounting Office (GAO) report comparing 1988 federal salaries with pay in the private sector showed the private sector paying on average 24 percent more than the government in 90 percent of the cases. Agency officials complained about difficulties in hiring the staff needed to carry out their programs. Recruiting and retaining quality employees has been both difficult and costly. FEPCA is the product of a bipartisan legislative and executive effort to remedy the negative effects of the pay disparity existing between the federal and private sector.

It is designed to modify the current GS–including FS–schedules, which adjust pay for white-collar federal employees on a uniform nationwide basis (the cost-of-living adjustment or COLA). Under FEPCA, annual adjustments would be based on two factors: the Employment Cost Index (ECI) minus 0.5 percent, and a locality adjustment, which would vary according to location.

The department has obtained an executive order that includes the Foreign Service in interim geographic pay adjustments, so employees now assigned to New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles are currently receiving an 8 percent pay adjustment.

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is now formulating the remaining regulations, principally those dealing with provisions for implementation of locality pay. The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) is conducting a survey to determine the exact localities that will be affected and the rates that will apply. An official determination of where locality pay will apply is not expected until December of 1993.

Since the president may deem adjustments inappropriate if economic conditions necessitate it, payments under FEPCA are considered discretionary. In his February 17th speech, President Clinton proposed deferring implementation of the remaining FEPCA provisions until 1995. It is possible that further delays could be recommended.

Membership drive under way

AFSA's annual spring membership drive was mailed to non-members in State, USAID, USIA, and FCS last month. The success of this campaign depends on you, the members, to actively recruit your colleagues. Remind them that AFSA is the voice of the Foreign Service. AFSA's ability to represent each segment of the Foreign Service depends upon individual members participation.

With the new administration seeking to cut federal spending, an active voice representing your professional interests is of vital importance. While we recognize the need to accept responsibility for a fair share of budget reductions and burgeoning national debt, this is not the time to weaken the Foreign Service–the inevitable consequence of the combined pay freeze and tax hike. Now is the time for AFSA vociferously to defend the need for a dedicated, respected diplomatic corps. Each member increases the strength of our voice, in Congress, in the media, with the public, and with management.

Last year's tremendously successful membership drive enabled AFSA to achieve our goal of more than 10,000 members. As the newly elected bargaining agent for USIA, we hope to duplicate that success with the 1993 drive.

Please invite your non-member colleagues to support their profession by joining the only association specifically established to safeguard and advance the professional interests of the career Foreign Service. Post reps should also provide AFSA materials to prospective members and encourage them to become active members of their overseas chapter. For more details contact AFSA's membership department at 2101 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20037 or call (202) 625-7153.

State EER form revised

By Julie Smithline
Member Services Representative

The Employee Evaluation Form (DS Form 1829) has been revised this year. The revisions, made in consultation with AFSA, were prompted by two considerations: legislation on language proficiency, and senior officer performance pay. The department decided to clean up other loose ends as well. The following is a summary of the changes in the EER form.

The revision on language proficiency was needed to respond to the Simon Amendment of 1990 that requires "an assessment of the employee's effectiveness in using, in his or her work, a foreign language or languages tested at the [S-3/R-3] level or above, in cases where the supervisor is capable of making such an assessment." This requirement had not been implemented despite having been enacted several years ago and has now been added as a sixth competency in section II of the EER form. In the second revision the department proposed adding an additional page for EERs on Senior Foreign Service officers in order to provide more credibility for Senior Performance Pay. AFSA appreciated management's concern, but we opposed this proposal on the grounds that an additional page would require additional effort and would result in repetitious reporting. AFSA and management agreed to a substitution page (thereby not increasing the length of the report). When recommending an employee for performance pay the rater is required to use specific criteria (listed in the instructions) in preparing the narrative evaluation of the performance competency groups.

An additional revision was the inclusion of a Data Summary and Submission Control sheet. This page will be a tearoff sheet for PER/PE's use, facilitating the recording of general information. The other EER pages essentially remained the same, other than a few administrative changes to facilitate the processing of the EERs.

While we realize that this revision comes at the end of the rating period, both management and AFSA felt that to delay further compliance with the Simon Amendment would not be viewed favorably by Congress. AFSA's goals in its negotiations with the department over the new form were to keep the changes minimal, to maintain the space available for narrative reporting, and to avoid redundancy and additional time in preparation. The State Standing Committee and the Senior Officers Association were fully involved. We feel the changes were prudent in light of the circumstances.

USAID Retiree Lunch

A USAID retiree lunch will be held on May 7 in conjunction with Foreign Service Day. The lunch is scheduled for noon at the AFSA Club. Reservations may be made by calling 703-370-0210.

Speakers Bureau seeks home-leave speakers

The AFSA Speakers Bureau is proving to be extremely effective at spreading the word about the Foreign Service's central role in defending America's global interests and promoting democratic and free-market values. In the last six months, AFSA speakers have addressed well over 60 audiences across the country and at least a dozen more programs are scheduled. Most of our speakers thus far have been drawn from the ranks of AFSA retirees, of whom more than 120 from all over the United States have volunteered to speak.

The upcoming home-leave cycle affords an excellent opportunity to augment this talent pool with some active-duty officers who can bring a measure of immediacy to presentations on fast-breaking international issues. If you are planning home leave this summer, we would be eager to arrange for you to speak on your areas of expertise–and about the Foreign Service–to groups in your home communities. By thus taking a day (or even a few hours) out of your home leave, you would make a valuable contribution to AFSA's vital mission of building domestic constituencies and recruiting the finest, most diverse talent for the Foreign Service.

If you would like to volunteer to speak during home leave, please contact Outreach Coordinator Gil Kulick. We'll take it from there.

AFSA joins smoke-free task force

Although an Executive Order to ban smoking in federal and GSA-controlled buildings has not yet been signed, it appears to be only a matter of time before the ban is in place. The present agreement between AFSA and the Department of State expires in June of this year and would not be nullified by an Executive Order. AFSA has, however, agreed to renew negotiations on smoking during this interim period. In view of the results of the recent EPA study on the dangers of passive smoking, AFSA is committed to ensuring that a safe and congenial workplace is available for all Foreign Service employees.

Management has invited AFSA to participate in the Smoke-Free Workplace Task Force, which we have accepted. This task force will decide upon the policy, the means of implementation, and the time frame for a smoke-free workplace. AFSA's inclusion will facilitate the implementation of a well planned program, which we hope will include assistance to those who wish to stop smoking as well as some accommodation for those who cannot or do not wish to stop smoking. We recognize that in pursuing this aim, we are unlikely to be able to satisfy everyone.

1993 AFSA scholarships announced

By Michael Dailey
Scholarships

The chairman of AFSA's Committee on Education, Robert H. Miller, is pleased to announce the establishment of two perpetual scholarships and one new annual scholarship for the 1993-94 academic year. Additionally, one perpetual scholarship has been further endowed and two annual scholarships have received renewed commitments.

Philip Charles Habib Memorial Scholarship

The perpetual Philip Charles Habib Memorial Scholarship was established thanks to the generosity of the many friends of Phil Habib. As stated in a cable from the secretary of state to all posts, "the nation owes Phil a great debt of gratitude for his successes as the president's Middle East envoy, under secretary for political affairs, assistant secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, ambassador to Korea, and the many other trouble-shooting missions he undertook .... He epitomized the best and brightest in the Foreign Service and set a standard of excellence that has characterized the career Foreign Service." Ambassador Habib passed away May 25, 1992 in France.

Albert E. Carter Memorial Scholarship

The perpetual Albert E. Carter Memorial Scholarship was established with a generous contribution made by Dorothy S. Carter, wife of the late Mr. Carter. Albert Carter was a 1933 graduate of the University of Chattanooga and worked as a commercial artist before beginning a career as a journalist for several newspapers. He entered government service as a senior economic analyst on the Board of Economic Warfare before he finally joined the Foreign Service. Mr. Carter served in Costa Rica, Uruguay, Chile, Panama, Germany, and Paraguay, and ended his Foreign Service career in 1969 as a member of the Board of Examiners. Mr. Carter passed away August 18, 1992.

John N. Gatch Jr. Memorial Scholarship

The annual John N. Gatch Jr. Memorial Scholarship has been established with the generous contributions made by family and friends of John N. Gatch Jr. who passed away December 21, 1992. After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II, Mr. Gatch graduated from Princeton University and joined the Foreign Service in 1947, serving in Baghdad. Later posts included Warsaw, Tripoli, Hong Kong, Beirut, and Bahrain, where he established the first U.S. embassy in newly independent Bahrain. Mr. Gatch retired from the Foreign Service in 1975 and made his residence in Bethesda, Maryland. The John N. Gatch, Jr. Memorial Scholarship will be awarded at least for the next two academic years.

John Campbell White Memorial Scholarship

Mrs. Tapley Bennett, daughter of late Ambassador John Campbell White, has further endowed the John Campbell White Memorial Scholarship, a perpetual scholarship which has been responsible for providing financial aid scholarships to needy students for over 25 years.

Robert J. Yost Memorial Scholarship

Mrs. June Yost, wife of the late Robert J. Yost, and family have renewed their commitment for a second year by providing funding for another annual Robert J. Yost Memorial Scholarship.

James L. Holmes Memorial Scholarship

Mrs. Donna Mae Holmes has renewed her commitment to the AFSA Scholarship Fund for a fifth consecutive year through the annual James L. Holmes Memorial Scholarship.

AFSA Scholarships Director Gail Volk receives a check from Donna Mae Holmes for the James L. Holmes Scholarship

LOCAL HOLIDAYS AND ANNUAL LEAVE

The 3 FAM 433.3(a) regulation ends with the clause, ". . . or annual leave." AFSA determined, after research and meetings with management, that the phrase had been added in error. Management has agreed to delete the phrase and official notification of the change should be distributed shortly.

A gift of $1,000 or more will name a scholarship in the year it is given, while a gift in the amount of $10,000 or more will qualify the donor to name a scholarship in perpetuity. Our deepest thanks to all those who have given to these scholarship funds.

Agreement reached on skill code regulations

By Deborah M. Leahy
Member Services Representative

AFSA and the department have concluded negotiations on the regulations governing Skill Codes and Occupational Categories (3 FAM 150). The regulations will now provide specialists who have served excursion tours in other specialties with the mechanism to apply for a skill code change. In addition, these regulations and those providing the mechanism for generalist skill code changes now allow the director general, in exceptional circumstances and on a case by case basis, to permit conversion into skill codes that are not specifically in deficit.

One further change is found in the environment, science and technology officer (EST) category (3 FAM 155). The new regulations have expanded the EST skill code to include qualified employees at the FS-03 grade. We expect these new regulations to be implemented in the near future.

Employees with questions about 3 FAM 150 should contact AFSA's Member Services Department at (202) 401-6405.

AAFSW gives first Lesley Dorman Award

Deputy Secretary of State Clifton R. Wharton Jr. addressed the March 9 general meeting of the Association of American Foreign Service Women (AAFSW) and presented the first Lesley Dorman Award.

The program, a celebration of the 15th anniversary of the Family Liaison Office, focused on the challenges facing Foreign Service employees and families in the 1990's.

In addition to Deputy Secretary Wharton's remarks, a panel made up of Director General Genta Hawkins Holmes, Family Liaison Office Director Maryann Minutillo, and AAFSW President Christine Shurtleff spoke to the group of about 200.

The deputy secretary and all the panel members touched on a common theme: the contributions of FLO and AAFSW to Foreign Service employees and families, and to the Foreign Service itself.

Deputy Secretary Wharton, the son of a Foreign Service officer, compared the Foreign Service of the 1930s to that of today. Then, there was no FLO to listen to the concerns of family members. There were no CLOs overseas--now there are 150. There were no bilateral work agreements, which allow many spouses to work while overseas–now there are more than 110. Wharton applauded the work of the Family Liaison Office, pointing out that FLO has taken a lead role in emergency evacuation assistance.

At the conclusion of the meeting, Wharton presented the Lesley Dorman Award for sustained, outstanding service to AAFSW to Patricia Ryan. Lesley Dorman was president of AAFSW in 1978 and directed the Forum Committee survey that resulted in the report on the concerns of Foreign Service spouses and the opening of the Family Liaison Office. In addition, she has held several positions on the board and continues to represent AAFSW and family-member training programs at the Overseas Briefing Center (OBC), giving a realistic picture of both the old and new Foreign Service.

Patricia Ryan is a past president of AAFSW. For many years she has been the AAFSW legislative liaison representative, ensuring the visibility of Foreign Service family concerns on the Hill–especially in the area of protection for divorced Foreign Service spouses.

Patty Ryan (left) receives the first Lesley Dorman Award for outstanding service to AASFW from past president Lesley Dorman

legislative*news*

By Rick Weiss
Congressional Liaison

In March, Congress moved into authorization, appropriations, oversight, and budget hearings. Before legislative decisions can be made, the Clinton Administration budget, due by April 5, must be received by Congress. Moreover, Congress awaits testimony from executive branch witnesses, who are unavailable because they are awaiting their confirmation hearings. Senior appointee nomination papers were not even submitted to the Senate by the White House during February.

While Congress argues about budget deficit numbers, more spending cuts and increased taxation as a result of the Clinton economic plan, the legislative branch is also discussing the second major issue–the Health Care Reform package to be presented in May.

For U.S. government employees, the "shared sacrifice" and "individual contribution" to reduce the deficit is twofold: for Foreign Service personnel, a pay freeze, no COLA adjustment in FY94, and no locality pay adjustment in FY94, and in addition, Foreign Service employees will pay more in federal taxes. Furthermore, the Clinton administration has announced a minimum 3 percent cut in administrative costs for each department and agency in FY94 and a reduction of 4 percent of its civilian personnel positions. At least 10 percent of the reductions should come from SES, GS-15 and GS-14 level or equivalent.

Congress has followed President Clinton's executive reductions in announcing staff reductions of 5 to 7 percent for the current calendar year and pay freezes are being implemented.

The Berman subcommittee on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee has commenced hearings on the State Department Authorization Bill for FY94 and FY95. The initial hearings focused on structural reorganization of the foreign affairs agencies; the second series of hearings will be the personnel needed to work on global issues: population, technology, environment, refugee, trade, and economic issues.

The Leahy subcommittee on Foreign Operations of Senate Appropriations has focused on the reorganization of USAID. That committee will be holding a hearing-a-week through June on the various programs and proposals to restructure foreign aid.

In other congressional actions, the Hatch Act amendments are being addressed in March Senate hearings. On March 4, the House voted 333 to 86 to liberalize the Hatch Act to allow federal workers to engage in partisan politics as long as they do so on their own time. Retained is the prohibition on running for federal and state offices.

AFSA hosts energy conference

AFSA will sponsor a symposium on *Energy, the Environment, and the World Economy: Critical Linkages for the 1990s* at the Department of State on April 8.

The conference will seek to identify the policy options and trade-offs facing the Clinton Administration as it searches for a viable and constructive energy policy for the 1990s.

Four panels will focus on the following questions:

- How will environmental concerns, the drive for energy security, and the challenges of the global economy affect U.S. energy policy in the 1990s?
- How will NAFTA alter the energy outlook in North America?
- How will exploration for and development of new sources of energy in the former Soviet Union, China, Southeast Asia, and other new energy areas affect American foreign policy and the U.S. economy?
- What new opportunities will the quest for ecologically sound energy development present to American entrepreneurs in the 1990s?

Former Senator Timothy E. Wirth will be the featured luncheon speaker. Conference participants include C.J. Silas, chairman and CEO of Phillips Petroleum Company and chairman of the American Petroleum Institute; Helga Steeg, executive director of the International Energy Agency; Nelson Hay of the American Gas Association; General Richard L. Lawson of the National Coal Association; Ambassador Richard T. Kennedy, former special advisor to the secretary of state for nuclear energy; David L. Swanson of the Edison Electric Institute; Richard H. Mantzke, president of Chevron Overseas Petroleum; Edward L. Morse, publisher of *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly,* Rogelio Gasca, Mexico's under secretary of Energy; David Oulton, a senior Canadian energy official; Jeffrey Seisler of the Natural Gas Vehicle Coalition; Allen J. Lenz of the Chemical Manufacturers Association; and senior energy officials of the departments of State, Energy, and Commerce and the Environmental Protection Agency.

The symposium will be the 16th AFSA-sponsored conference since November 1989. BENS (Business Executives for National Security) will cosponsor the program, which will be financed by grants from the American Gas Association, the National Coal Association, the Edison Electric Institute, Aramco, Arco, BP, Caltex, Chevron, Exxon, Hunt Oil, Oryx Energy, Pecten International, Pennzoil, Phillips, Statoil, Texaco, and Unocal.

Foreign Service Day is May 7, 1993!

Open Forum

Proposed pension cuts adversely affect survivors

As a close observer of pension issues for the past 15 years, I was astonished to see in the *Vision of Change for America,* a proposal to cut survivors' benefits in the federal pension system. In the late 1970s, the President's Commission on Pension Policy starkly illuminated the dreadful inadequacies of private sector pension systems. During the Reagan Administration, the Grace Commission proposed to alter the federal system to be as inadequate as the private system, rather than to improve private pension plans! As many know from living abroad, our patchwork system of care for the elderly is at the bottom of the index among the advanced industrialized societies.

Despite the "greedy geezer" stereotype, 25 percent of persons over 65 who live alone subsist below the poverty line, according to the 1990 census. Women over 65 are 70 percent more likely to be poor than men, according to the House of Representatives Select Committee on Aging. The poverty levels for the elderly increased from 1991 to 1992.

It is generally calculated that one person living alone requires 70 percent of a couple's income to continue at the same living standard. So the current calculation of the survivor's benefit as 55 percent of the base pension, undiminished by the deduction at retirement, already presupposes a drop in living standard. The current proposal to recalculate the survivor's benefit at 55 percent of the reduced pension would further erode this standard.

Clearly, the vast majority of these surviving wives cannot take steps to increase their income because of age and sex discrimination, even supposing them physically able to hold employment. While Civil Service survivors are equally adversely affected, there are further unique financial issues facing Foreign Service widows.

First, most of today's Foreign Service survivors are women. Until 1972, Foreign Service women employees had to resign if they married so the male spouse is a more recent phenomenon. Second, the Foreign Service widow served most of her life under a system which rigorously discouraged her from holding a job, even if one were available at post. Furthermore, she was required to donate substantial hours both to furthering U.S. policy aims by connecting with host-country decision makers and to enhancing post morale by voluntary activities in the Foreign Service community.

While the 1972 Wives Directive recognized the independent and private nature of the Foreign Service spouse, employment issues in an age of two-income families continue to be salient. The old-time diplomat from a well-to-do family has given way to a group much more broadly representative of America, with members from all walks of life. To meet minimum family goals such as home ownership and college

education for their children, most spouses today need to work. However, in the context of long-term mobility, all employment must be short-term and each transfer means starting over yet again, usually at the bottom. Since over 30 percent of Foreign Service spouses have educational credentials beyond a bachelor's degree, the loss to family income over a life-time is significant. Therefore, the accumulation of funds to supplement retirement income is constricted.

Federal pensioners are not indifferent to the needs for financial sacrifice from all segments of the population. Employees fortunate enough to be in the upper income bracket will pay increased tax. All federal pensioners will pay the proposed energy tax as well as the concomitant price increases in all products reflecting their energy cost component. Federal retirees, who have already seen their health care benefits increase as much as 300 percent since 1986, will pay a share for the badly needed changes to expand medical services to all Americans.

The current proposals target a uniquely vulnerable group which has a limited constituency and in the case of the Foreign Service survivor this attack is especially indefensible given the family sacrifices exacted during a career in the Foreign Service.

Patricia Burns Ryan
AFSA and Legislative Liaison
Association of American Foreign Service Women

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HELPING RUSSIA REFORM

BY THOMPSON R. BUCHANAN

Developments in the former Soviet Union, notably in Russia, have more potential for derailing the domestic program of structural reform, for which the Clinton Administration was elected, than any other foreign policy issue. If the new administration is not to be thrown off course, it must understand the extraordinary complexity and protracted nature of the revolutionary change under way in Russia and help the American public to accept it. The administration must also accept that the United States has only a very limited ability to affect what happens in that continent-sized country, which spans 11 time zones and a rainbow of ethnic minorities. If the U.S. government is to make any impact, its diplomatic and foreign-aid strategy must be carefully crafted to meet the economic, social, political, and psychological conditions of contemporary Russia.

"See? I already taught it to sit!"

The administration will need to beware lest America's traditional missionary zeal to help other countries share our democratic values distort its perception of what is happening in Russia and how these developments affect our national interest. The pace and extent of modernization will be determined primarily by the outcome of Byzantine political struggles in Moscow and throughout the Russian Federation over which the United States has no control. Washington will need constantly to distinguish between heated oratory that it may find distasteful and disturbing and concrete actions that have serious implications for U.S.-Russian relations. We should assume neither that a more democratic, market-oriented Russia will be a natural friend nor that a more authoritarian, socialist-oriented Russia will inevitably be our enemy.

American security interests will be seriously affected by the process of economic reform in Russia only if economic chaos leads to civil war or the emergence of a chauvinist, militaristic, anti-Western regime. Otherwise, it does not seriously matter whether the pace of reform is radical or incremental, whether the government is efficient or laggard in breaking up its monopolies and privatizing its industries, or what the balance is at any one moment between state and private-run enterprises. It may matter to individual Americans trying to do business in Russia, but not to American security interests.

Having an understanding of the role of government in the development process and less paranoia about "socialism" than some of his predecessors, President Clinton is well placed to create a long-term framework for relations with Russia—one that is sensitive to political realities and not

focused on economic criteria valid largely in a free-enterprise economy. The hard fact is that no one knows how Russia is to make its "great leap forward" from communism to capitalism, condensing in a few years the process of building democratic, free-market institutions that took centuries in the West. The problem is not one of greasing the rusty gears of a West European economy with a Marshall Plan. Rather, the challenge is to perform a transplant operation in which we do not know whether our new value standards, institutions, and work ethic may not be rejected by the body politic.

THE HANDS-OFF APPROACH

How the Clinton Administration addresses the issue of modernizing Russia will go far to determine the tone of U.S.-Russian relations. Our attitude should be one of partnership on a very long journey of trial and error—not to impose our vision of the Good Society on Russia, but to improve life for the Russian people in ways they consider helpful. If we are perceived to be a concerned, friendly country without an ideological axe to grind, we will be more successful in addressing the problems in our relationship, which will inevitably arise.

Americans need to put development in a longer perspective and not overreact to each zig or zag in Russia's unfolding revolution. To minimize the danger of unpleasant surprises, however, the incoming administration should remain agnostic regarding the future direction of Russia and what this may mean for American national interest. The future is murky. We cannot be confident that whoever rules Russia will be a democrat, that efforts under way to create some form of federal or confederal structure will succeed, that ethnic and economic centrifugal forces may not tear this huge land apart, or that the resulting threat to reduce Mother Russia to her early Muscovite core might not ignite the civil war that all Russians dread.

The unpredictability of the situation in Russia is an added reason for avoiding the mistake made so frequently by past presidents of becoming too emotionally committed, and correspondingly identified with, the political future of a specific Russian leader and his policies. At the same time, it is important to develop a relationship of respect and dialogue with whoever leads Russia. To this end, we should continue to treat Russia as a great power, without condescension, not stinting those symbolic actions and personal touches that provide a psychological boost in hard times. The Russian leader needs to be treated, however, as someone who is cooperative with the United States for his own hard-headed national reasons and in no way someone we can take for granted.

Nowhere is it more harmful for a politician to be considered a "tool of foreign interests" than in Russia, particularly at this crucial moment when Russia's whole identity is the subject of bitter debate. The other republics of the former Soviet Union have achieved a sense of national identity with their independence. Among Russians, however, there is no agreement regarding the future role and even the boundaries of a truncated Russia, which has lost its imperial mission. Moreover, the struggle for the soul of Russia has reignited in more vitriolic form the 19th century debate between those who would like to see Russia develop along Western lines and those who believe that Russia has unique institutions, history, and spiritual qualities that demand a more traditional, autocratic, Eurasian orientation. Inevitably, conservative nationalists question the patriotism of politicians and programs that receive a warm Western blessing. However monetarily sound, former Prime Minister Gaidar's "shock therapy" program of economic reform not only proved to be unrealistic politically, but it was judged by many to have been imposed on a weakened Russia by Western politicians and bankers; some even argued that the motive was to destroy Russia as an industrial power and global competitor. Let the pain that serious reform will inevitably inflict on Russia be clearly the product of decisions made by Russians, not Americans.

Americans need to understand that there is an inherent contradiction between democracy, the will of the majority, and radical reform in a country where probably the majority of the population has serious reservations about the implications of reform for their personal future. In this sense, Yeltsin fits the pattern of the reforming tsar in Russian history, trying to push through radical reform with the help of a small urban elite in a fundamentally conservative country. But he lacks the powers of a tsar to impose reform. He is just as hamstrung as any democratic politician by competing vested interests, parties, and personalities. Much of the hinterland of the Russian Federation is also asserting its independence of Moscow, whether it is in tax policy or the pace of local reform. Traditional Russian attitudes are beginning to make themselves heard, after having been silenced by the breathless changes imposed on Soviet society by democrats in their initial euphoria.

Our attitude should be one of partnership on a very long journey of trial and error—not to impose our vision of the Good Society on Russia, but to improve life for the Russian people in ways they consider helpful.

Yeltsin, the politician, has found himself whipsawed between the demands of his foreign critics, who have linked economic assistance to implementation of radical "shock therapy," and his domestic critics, who accuse him of allowing the West to impose a disastrous economic policy on Russia. If Yeltsin is to survive, he cannot base his policy on support of the "radical left" democratic reformers. He must reach out and create a centrist coalition of industrialists and politicians, military leaders and academicians who understand the need for market reform and modernization of

"The secret of capitalism is to think BIG."

Russia's institutions but who differ with Gaidar regarding the pace and individual elements of his reform program. Unsure of his support in the country, sharing some of the concerns of his critics regarding Gaidar's program, Yeltsin backed down under pressure from a broad-based centrist coalition in the December Congress of People's Deputies and agreed to a compromise, brokered by the Constitutional Court, that respected the constitution. While purist economists deplore the compromise and subsequent dilution of aspects of Gaidar's program by his successor, Chernomyrdin, Americans would be wiser to view this reaching out to a centrist coalition as a small step on a road to constitutional government that will have many turnings. In the short term, Yeltsin has chosen political reality over fiscal responsibility.

WORST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS

Gaidar would argue that his program was sabotaged by the central bank and the industrial lobby. The controlling political perception, however, is that "shock therapy" impoverished the population to a point where old women were forced to sell vodka on the street to survive, and many professionals must work two jobs to keep their heads above water. An estimated 80 percent of the population have incomes below the poverty level. More important, radical reform was seen to threaten the survival of an industrial base, which was Russia's pride: the product of Five Year Plans that made possible her victory in World War II and her emergence as a superpower. No one argues the need to phase out uneconomic plants, but how can this be done when much of Russian industry is uneconomic by Western standards and of no interest to foreign investors? America was unwilling to see Chrysler or the S&Ls go belly up. Russians fear that the withdrawal of subsidies from huge company towns like Magnitogorsk will throw millions of workers on the street. They will lose not only their jobs but the social safety net, which these industrial conglomerates provide, of housing, medical and other services, and food, at a time when Moscow has still not developed a Western-style substitute.

For the indefinite future, Russia will live in the worst of all worlds, trapped between a command economy that no longer functions and a market economy that is not yet in place, and which many fear and do not understand. Russia has the advantage over most other developing countries of possessing a large, educated population, increasingly organized in vested interest groups that are determined to protect their newly acquired freedom of expression and action. Unfortunately, Russia has also inherited more psychological obstacles to the creation of a market economy than most developing countries, including a communal tradition that scorns "selfish individualism," private property, and the profit motive, and a Soviet-induced association of capitalism with exploitation and unemployment. Tolerance and compromise, essential elements of democratic government, continue to be regarded by many Russians as signs of weakness and lack of principle. A government of institutions and laws remains abstract for many Russians, for whom the "little father" who will rule them justly still has appeal.

Only the "red-brown" coalition on the far right is nostalgic

for an old-style autocrat. Paradoxically, it is westernized democrats who argue that a powerful executive or even an authoritarian leader is essential if modern reforms are to be imposed on Russia. The conservatives in parliament are most opposed to giving the president "dictatorial powers" and are fighting to impose a parliamentary system in which the president would be essentially a figurehead, with parliament naming the prime minister and his cabinet. In part, the opposition to strong presidential rule is an issue of power, but it also reflects hypersensitivity, for obvious historical reasons, to any domineering personality. This sensitivity, combined with the disputatious, anarchic streak in the Russian character, makes the emergence in the next few years of stable political parties capable of parliamentary leadership very problematic.

This argument about how Russia should be ruled continues to produce political gridlock on both the national and the local levels. While it is hard to build an organized opposition in a country so politically fractured, it is equally difficult to create a firm, centrist coalition that will work with a president or a prime minister to modernize Russia at a pace and in ways that are politically acceptable to the nation. Impatience with the gridlock and corruption of present-day Russia has reinforced the attraction for many Russians of the Chinese and "Asian tiger" models of authoritarian development, which give priority to economic over political reform. Gorbachev is blamed for having reversed these priorities, opening a Pandora's box of nationalism and democracy, which has destroyed the Russian empire without putting a viable alternative in its place.

In peering into the future, Americans should not forget that Russia remains, in many respects, a developing nation, undergoing the trauma of modernization that China, South Korea, and other Third World states have experienced in their separate ways. In all these countries we witness a pull and tug of varying violence between democratic institutions struggling to be born and an authoritarian leadership determined to impose its vision of progress on the nation. This is, at least, one of the several Russias the Clinton Administration should be prepared to deal with. How America can assist this convoluted process of modernization without playing into the hands of the anti-Western opposition will challenge the creativity of the new administration.

STRATEGY OF ASSISTANCE

Structure. At the outset, the new administration must conceptualize a strategy of aid to Russia that is realistic, both financially and tactically, given the Russian realities.

Next, it must develop a structure that can impose order on the proliferating assistance programs, governmental and private, to help implement the aid strategy. The idea of creating an "aid tsar," either in the White House or the State Department, is attractive. By its very pretension, however, creation of an aid tsar risks misleading both the American and Russian people into believing we can do more than is really possible.

The administration will need to develop some objective monitoring mechanism to determine whether our aid strategy is effective and which projects work or should be scrapped. A small, mobile group of Russian-speaking inspectors, independent of any agency like the Agency for International Development or the Peace Corps and located in Moscow, could report directly to the ambassador and the senior aid coordinator in Washington.

To tighten control and cut administrative costs over time, steps should be taken to centralize all agencies involved in aid programs in Russia in our unused, "bugged" chancery building in Moscow in place of their expensive offices rented around town.

Coordination. Donor countries frequently lose patience with the Russian bureaucracy and try to circumvent it. They have money to spend but cannot find projects to support, because the Russians have not learned how to work up a project for funding. As we have learned in other Third World countries, however, working with the host government on developing feasible projects is an essential part of the modernization process. In the winter of 1992, doctors from the Centers for Disease Control learned the hard way that, if they wanted a program to get off the ground, it had to respond to a felt need on the Russian side and must have been endorsed by all the key bureaucratic players in this land of consummate bureaucrats.

One way to avoid working at cross-purposes with the Russian bureaucracy is to maintain close contact with the Russian Humanitarian and Technical Assistance Commission that has tried, often with difficulty, to carry out its mandate of coordinating foreign aid coming into Russia, deciding what is most needed and where. It is in our interest to help the commission operate more efficiently. Working with the commission, aid administrators should also try to ensure that there is some rational division of labor, both in type of project

and its location, between the many donor nations. Our allies sometimes hesitate to share information about projects in which they have a commercial interest. Some mechanism is needed, however, in the field, whereby aid administrators can share experience and avoid duplication and conflict.

Philosophy of aid. We should have no illusion that the West is going to determine the future shape of Russia. As one Englishman wrote last winter in a Moscow publication: ancient Russia with its "idiosyncratic history [will] . . . in the end create its *own* solutions, but for that it needs time." Many Russians would like, for example, to prove Western economists wrong and demonstrate that there is a "third way" possible, amalgamating the best of capitalism, socialism, and Russian values—a sort of social democracy *a la russe.* We should not close our minds to their self-vision.

The Englishman also warned that "bullying and coercion of Russia will get the West nowhere." This would be true even if the West were prepared to undertake a program on the scale of the Marshall Plan in Russia. As it is, the $24 billion offered by the West provides us with precious little leverage with which to move gargantuan Russia where it is unwilling to go itself. Bonn has made disappointingly little impact on the former East Germany with $200 billion. We may let the International Monetary Fund dictate the terms of its aid to Russia, with its sometimes irritating "papa knows best" attitude. Our own posture, particularly given our likely resources, should be more modest: "Tell us what your priority problems are, and we will see how we may be able to help you."

The fact that many Russians fear (and some hope) that America under Clinton will be too absorbed with its own economic problems to help Russia in any substantial way means that expectations will have become more realistic on the Russian side. It will make it easier for the administration to convince Moscow that our major contribution must be through advice, training, and technical assistance, not huge outlays of money.

Given the limitation of our resources, we must decide how we can make maximum impact in each of the areas where we decide to devote financial or human investment. To avoid frittering away our aid on projects scattered across mammoth Russia, we should seek to create small "islands of success" that will encourage emulation by energetic individuals in different parts of the federation. We could choose, for example, to build on the program of privatization being pushed by the International Finance Corporation in Nizhniy Novgorod, a large defense center where there is a dynamic, young leadership. One could imagine adding a model farm tied to a grocery outlet, or a model hospital to the small private operations already in operation, each to be presented as teaching models for replication.

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GIVING PROFIT A BAD NAME

The time is past when reforms could be imposed nationwide across Russia; local officials now resist taking orders from the center. Even though the breakdown of central authority has strengthened conservative fiefdoms, local Tammany Halls, throughout the country, energetic individuals will be found, regardless of political philosophy, willing to experiment if change appears to be in their interest. We must accept the reality, therefore, that change will come about incrementally, erratically and spottily across the Russian Federation. There is a generation gap in adapting to change, and local officials, at widely different points on the learning scale, must be exposed systematically to new ways of doing business.

Russians need to assimilate new ideas not only over time but also over space: there is a danger in widening the gulf too abruptly between pockets of democratic reform and the surrounding neighborhood. The leveling instinct, to drag down the more prosperous rather than trying to elevate the less successful, has always been a destructive trait of Russian character.

Unfortunately, democracy and capitalism have become synonymous with blatant corruption for many Russians, for understandable reasons. Most "entrepreneurs" are not creating new wealth by productive activity but are profiting from the acquisition and resale at exorbitant profit of state assets. In some instances, managers have closed down an operating plant because they have found it more profitable to buy and sell state property, depositing their capital abroad and repatriating the foreign exchange to buy up Russian assets at low prices. We should understand the strong support that Yeltsin has for his announced drive to clean up the Mafia and remove "enforcers" from the streets where they control sales and prices. To minimize the danger that this anti-corruption campaign will also snuff out genuine businessmen, American specialists will need to work closely with the police and legislators, helping them refine legislation on fair business practices.

AID PRIORITIES

The military. For almost the first time in Russian history, the Russian military has lost the prestige and leverage for resources provided by confrontation with a major enemy. It is vital to American security interests that the now shrunken and demoralized Russian military find a new identity under civilian leadership. This requires a reassertion of discipline over free-wheeling Russian officers, who support the ultra-right "patriots" in their goal of restoring the Russian empire and back separatist moves by Russian minorities in Moldava.

Building on the cooperation already developed with

civilian and military leaders, the incoming administration must try to convince the Russians that America's priority aim is to lighten the burden of armaments and increase security for all states, not to exploit Russia's weakness to impose a position of permanent military inferiority upon her. To this end, it must address the perception among many Russians that the START II agreement was one-sided, forcing Russia to dismantle its major weapon, the SS-18s, without requiring any comparable reduction in American ballistic missile submarines. American protests over Russian arms sales to neighboring Iran, coming on the heels of U.S. arms sales to important American clients, have also played into the hands of nationalist critics of Yeltsin's foreign policy.

The Clinton Administration should assume that:

- It may well end up paying more to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus for implementation of START I and II and the storage and destruction of nuclear weapons than it anticipated, but it will be a small price to pay for maintaining forward momentum in our arms control programs.
- Russia will continue to use arms sales abroad to keep some defense plants operating and to pay for conversion of others. In particular, it will wish to implement arms agreements with key neighbors like China. If the U.S. government wishes to dampen Russian arms sales in the Third World, it will have to return to a more consistent global policy of conventional arms limitations, supplementing the policy of nuclear non-proliferation. Restraining conventional arms sales should be more feasible in the post-Cold War world. This will require, however, that the U.S. government discourage sales by its own arms merchants, as well as purchases by Third World clients of our economic aid programs.

There are some specific initiatives that the Clinton Administration might take to assist the Russian military. There has been a demoralizing slash in the living conditions of Russian military families returning from Central Europe and the Baltic states, with some still living in tents. We have a unique capacity for erecting housing quickly, ranging from emergency Quonset huts to mobile homes and prefabricated houses. A priority program to house distressed military families would be politically wise and, with appropriate incentives from the U.S. and Russian governments, could open the door to the huge housing market in Russia to American construction companies. It is time for action, not further discussion of this project.

The demobilization of thousands of Russian soldiers poses a serious unemployment threat. At a time when Russia's infrastructure is falling apart, one of the most tangible ways to make the Russian population see some benefits of reform would be to mend the streets and sidewalks, clean up urban litter, and beautify rundown cities. The Soviet military was used, inefficiently, on urban construction projects. With our experience with the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) and more recently CETA, we could assist the Russian military in organizing a Renovation Corps focused on the theme of nation-building, in which infrastructure renewal would be combined with specialized training to provide draftees with modern, market skills.

Helping consumer industries. It is unrealistic to assume that privatization and foreign investment can resolve in any reasonable time frame the horrendous problem of huge, polluting, industrial white elephants, with their millions of workers. In this chicken-and-egg dilemma, it will require a vigorous market economy to absorb the workers from these industries. But putting the market in place at a time of high subsidies to uneconomic plants is a very slow process. Only the Russian government can determine, however, the pace at which it is politically feasible to squeeze out specific industries by withdrawing their subsidies.

To assist the Russians with their industrial dilemma, the administration should, of course, encourage Russian legislators and bureaucrats to improve the climate for foreign investment. We should also pursue an aggressive training program in enterprise management and modernization in fields of special Russian concern. But, most important, we need to understand that Russian industrial modernization, like U.S. development in the 19th century, will be fueled primarily by the demands of a huge, domestic consumer market, once it can find sources of start-up capital. The challenge for U.S. aid strategists is to devise programs that will help promote the consumer industries that will create the jobs and capital and provide the tax revenues for future growth.

Most Russian consumer industries, including the more efficient spin-offs from defense plants, will not produce goods up to world standards for many years. Like many new industries in developing countries, they will also probably agitate for import protection. If asked to help, our primary concern should be to diversify production to make it more competitive and to improve its quality. We should not be inhibited by ideological prejudice from providing, for example, pollution-control equipment or managerial training to plants that still receive state subsidies.

SEED MONEY STRATEGIES

There is a maze of training programs being offered in Russia by foreign governments, private groups and international organizations. There is no systematic link, however, between these programs and onward employment. Unless we bridge this gap, we risk exacerbating existing frustration on the part of our trainees. The writer was impressed in visits last winter to two cities with defense industry by the importance placed by both civilian and military managers on establishing small industries to soak up unemployment and meet consumer needs. More imaginative efforts are needed so that prospective entrepreneurs can have an opportunity to run their own businesses. But how to provide them with seed money and have some control over how they use it?

One approach could be to create regional development banks, where retired American bankers might be stationed with discreet veto power over unwise loans, and the authority to recruit technical expertise to assist industries receiving loans to start off on the right foot. Primary responsibility for extending loans, however, should be left with the Russian bankers in training. Given the dollar exchange rate, the cost



In Yeltsin's footsteps

of providing small industry ruble loans should be within the means of the industrialized world.

Some of the 56 American cities that have "sister" relationships in the Russian Federation might be encouraged, through tax incentive, subsidized transport, or other forms of stimulus, to become active sponsors of small local industries in their sister city. They have often been active in humanitarian and exchange programs but have not generally ventured into technical assistance. Retired businessmen, farmers, doctors, et al. could be encouraged to use their expertise and second-hand equipment to sponsor a shoe factory, a grocery store linked to a local state or private farm, or a local hospital, for example. The cost need not be great, and there would be a personal commitment and follow-through often lacking in bureaucratic programs.

FEDERALISM OR BALKANIZATION?

For all their faults, the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and Soviet empires kept a leash on historic, ethnic hatreds. American interests are directly affected by whether the states of the former Soviet Union can get on with the painful process of nation-building within accepted international boundaries, or are doomed to suffer through a phase of dangerous, infantile nationalism. Being an honest broker in situations of serious ethnic and nationalist tension is a thankless task. But the global consequences of serious conflict within the Russian Federation or between Russia and its new commonwealth (CIS) neighbors are too serious for the West to adopt a policy of passive non-intervention. Conflict could trigger a nuclear disaster, not to mention a refugee and human rights crisis that would dwarf that of Yugoslavia.

The West's influence is obviously limited, but it must do whatever it can to accelerate the processes of reconciliation and restructuring already under way.

Western officials should use every opportunity to express concern and support for CIS efforts to develop peacekeeping mechanisms and bridge the economic barriers dividing CIS states. Where appropriate, aid projects should encourage cooperation between CIS neighbors and discourage separatist approaches.

Unless Yeltsin moves with more determination to set up a genuine federal structure that grants substantial self rule to the separate autonomous republics and economic regions—in fact, not just on paper—the Russian Federation faces a serious risk of either disintegration or civil war to restore the union by force. Too many Russians still seem to believe that it is possible to govern Russia from Moscow. It would be appropriate for President Clinton to discuss this problem with Yeltsin and to suggest that America has unique experience that may be helpful to Russia in combining unity with diversity over a vast, ethnically divided land. Specifically, we should expand our efforts to bring officials from all across Russia together to examine how our federal, state, and city officials cooperate in resolving specific problems, which the Russian side will have selected for study.

A major cause of tension between Moscow and its outlying regions appears to be a lack of systematic dialogue between central and local officials. U.S. assessment teams last year detected lack of interest on the part of rival ministries in sharing information that remains highly compartmentalized. Here too, we can discreetly discuss better ways of doing business, including assisting officials to set up computer, fax and conference call links, to exchange vital information and just "keep in touch."

Should separatist sentiment (e.g. in Siberia and the Far East) develop irresistible momentum, the West, through perhaps the United Nations, might need to encourage a peaceful, Czech-style divorce, to avert civil war. Meanwhile, however, the United States and its allies should be seen to be

doing whatever they can to make the federation work, lest we lend credence to nationalist accusations that we are promoting the final destruction of Russia.

REFUGEES, EMIGRATION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The single most explosive issue in the former Soviet Union is the situation of the more than 70 million people living outside their ethnic homelands, notably the 25 million Russians concentrated in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and the Baltic states. Pressures on these people to move back to a home many never knew could be catastrophic, creating frightful problems of assimilation and unemployment and consequent pressures to escape, legally or illegally, to a West that is becoming increasingly hostile to immigration. Here again, our influence is marginal, but the stakes are too high for us to remain passive.

To the small extent that we can provide an economic incentive to people to remain where they are in the CIS (as Bonn is attempting with the Volga Germans), it is in our interest to do so.

Our goal should be to remove the Russian-minority issue as a pretext for Russian chauvinists to try either to bully CIS governments or to snip off parts of CIS states where there are large Russian minorities.

Through intern and exchange programs and work contracts, either at home or abroad, we can provide some safety valve for unemployed Russian professionals and scientists, including weapons specialists who might otherwise seek work in unstable Third World states. For political reasons in Russia, we need to be sensitive to the charge that we are promoting a brain drain. For our own domestic reasons also, we need to take firm measures to see that Russians who come to America are not encouraged to seek asylum but to return to Russia.

As part of its human rights policy, the Clinton Administration will wish to address the fears of discrimination and persecution that are driving the exodus of minorities, particularly Russians, from Central Asia and the Baltic states. Already upwards of 1 million Russians have returned to the federation. Local antipathies are hard to address, but we can, at least, tie extensions of foreign aid to serious efforts by local governments to protect their minorities. This is a particularly sensitive issue in the Baltic states where the population insists that the Russians are "occupiers" and a Fifth Column, not a legitimate national minority. In the perception of some Russians, Americans speak out vociferously on the issue of human rights in Russia only when the perceived victims are Jews. Nothing would do more for the American image in Russia than to have American representatives at international conferences speak out loudly in defense of Russian minorities. Our goal should be to remove the Russian-minority issue as a pretext for Russian chauvinists to try either to bully CIS governments or to snip off parts of CIS states where there are large Russian minorities.

Human rights zealots will be tempted to complain of behavior in Russia and other CIS states (bureaucratic harassment, brutality, ethnic discrimination, etc.) that they would consider regrettably normal in a Third World state, forgetting that Russia remains, in many ways, an undeveloped country. The challenge of the Clinton Administration will be to distinguish clearly between actions by local officials that the government cannot reasonably be expected to control and flagrant violations of human rights, like ethnic cleansing, for which Moscow must be held responsible. It would be sad if human rights were to become again a major source of friction with a post-Communist Russia.

The present emigration psychosis is as much psychological as it is economic in origin. It is fed by the apparent ease of emigrating, legally or illegally—a fact that needs to be addressed. Our refugee legislation, which presumes that Jews and certain categories of Christians will suffer persecution if they remain in the former Soviet Union, both contributes to this psychosis and exacerbates social tensions. Orthodox and non-religious Russians often resent that they are not offered the same opportunity to be resettled in the United States that is offered to Russian Jews. The latter, in turn, seize on any perceived symptom of anti-Semitism to justify to U.S. officials —and even to themselves—their desire to leave Russia. The possibility that the United States may face a major outpouring of ethnic Russians fleeing famine or civil war makes it imperative to return to the even-handed policy of the 1980 Refugee Act, which made no distinction based on race or religion between applicants for refugee status. At least ethnic Russians should be given equal opportunity to qualify for entry to the United States under any special program that may need to be created, in consultation with our European allies, to deal with an emergency exodus of people from Russia and other CIS states.

Meanwhile, with humanitarian and perhaps housing assistance, we may be able to ease the transition of refugees returning to Russia so that they do not try to move on to the West.

A NEW VOICE

For a brief period, the Bush Administration was able to count on almost automatic support from a Russian government visibly anxious to please. Clinton will not be so fortunate. Russia has already begun to speak with a distinctly independent, Russian voice on issues like Iraq. In his speech to senior officials of the Russian Foreign Ministry on October 27, 1992, Yeltsin made plain his feeling that Russian foreign policy, and his controversial foreign minister, Kozyrev, have been too timid in standing up for Russian national interests. In part, his remarks were tactical, to protect his flank from attacks on his foreign policy by right-wing "patriots," but they

were also the remarks of a tough, emotional politician, who resents what he senses is a lack of respect by the West for a Russia that has made too many concessions without adequate reciprocity.

The chauvinist right in Russia has not yet found a charismatic leader capable of challenging Yeltsin, and reversing the generally pro-Western thrust of his foreign policy. Many of the ingredients, however, that brought an irrational leader to power in Weimar Germany are present in traumatized Russia today. Support for the UN has become a key plank in Yeltsin's foreign policy, but ultra-rightists oppose UN intervention in Bosnia. They see a worrisome precedent should Russians in Moldava or the Baltic states undertake their own policy of "ethnic cleansing," and they are trying to drive a wedge between Yeltsin and the West on the issue of Slavic solidarity. While the lunatic fringe accuses Yeltsin of being part of a global Masonic Zionist plot to destroy Russia, some latter-day Slavophiles envisage an alliance between a reconstituted Russian empire and nationalist forces in Western Europe against the "decadent consumer civilization" of America. This "patriotic" demagoguery has thrown the democrats on the defensive. Fortunately, even conservative nationalists recognize that it would take a bloody civil war to force newly independent states like Ukraine back under Russian rule.

Deprived of Kiev, the city that gave birth to Rus, the Russians must find some other meaningful identity for their gigantic Federation. Writing in the fall, 1992, issue of *Foreign Policy* Russia's ambassador to Washington, Vladimir Lukin, spoke of the need for Russia to develop a "restrained, democratic nationalism, a kind of mature patriotism . . . [that] is new in Russia's long history." He warned, however, that this sort of mature nationalism cannot develop "in an environment of national humiliation." He appeared particularly concerned lest the United States try, once again, to ring Russia with hostile states, starting with Ukraine and the Baltics, which would be disastrous for the democratic evolution of Russia. We can share Lukin's hope of seeing Russia play a positive, stabilizing role, helping to promote a "Europeanized Germany" rather than a "Germanized Europe," containing ethnic rivalries and Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, and preventing the emergence of any dominant power in the Far East.

Lukin is, of course, correct in his belief that the best barrier to resurgent Russian imperialism will be a return to pride in a Mother Russia that has taken control of its economic destiny and is playing a positive, respected role in international affairs. But these goals will not come easily for a country so divided within itself over human values and future policies.

The Clinton Administration should have no doubt, however, regarding the determination of the Russian people to modernize their state, at their own pace and in their own way, with or without Western aid. The watchwords of the administration must be not only patient helpfulness but also quiet vigilance. Washington will need to revise the assumptions on which current policy is postulated should the Russian military invade a neighboring state, with or without government approval (excluding moves to crush separatist activity within the federation), should Russia initiate a massive rearmament program that went beyond the badly needed modernization of its armed forces, should Russian officials seek once again to lower a curtain of secrecy around their military and other programs, or should Russia replace its policy of cooperation with the United States by efforts to build a coalition of states, particularly in the Third World, directed against "American hegemony."

HELPING HAND

Ambassador Lukin asked that America give Russia the benefit of the doubt, not necessarily siding with Moscow on contentious issues but "playing the role of facilitator of good relations between Russia and its neighbors." In addition to providing patient understanding and discreet council, when asked, there are some concrete actions that the administration might take to help Russia play the positive role in world affairs to which it aspires.

By perhaps adjusting our naval posture in the area of Japan, or by other means, we could try to defuse the confrontation over the Northern Territories, making some staged withdrawal from the four disputed islands more acceptable to Russian public opinion and large-scale aid to Russia more acceptable to the Japanese public.

To facilitate Russian military withdrawal also from the Baltic states, we might examine the utility of a Nordic security conference, in which we would explore with the Scandinavians, Balts, and Russians arms limitations in the Baltic region.

A serious effort should also be made to involve Russia in the development of an enlarged peacekeeping role for the United Nations, to include the earmarking of Russian troops.

In a myriad of small ways, the Clinton Administration has an opportunity to try and convince the Russian leaders and people that America is, indeed, a good neighbor, and would like to help Russia become, in Lukin's words, "an integral member of the democratic community." Cooperative relations should not be postulated, however, on Russia's becoming in our lifetime a western-style democracy. We should be content to watch the yeast of democracy and freedom work slowly, in its Russian way. Our long-term partnership must be based simply on respect for each other's efforts to become better than we are and on the need to preserve peace between us and to strengthen peace throughout the world. The ultimate decision—whether Russia earns its place as a responsible power in the family of nations, or, again in Lukin's words, "remains outside it and poses a threat to itself and the rest of the world"—is one that only the Russian people can make. ■

Thompson R. Buchanan worked on Soviet affairs in the State Department's intelligence area from 1948-55 and in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs from 1968-70. He served three tours in the Soviet Union, the last as consul general in Leningrad. Since retirement, he has prepared analyses for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, interviewed refugees in Moscow for the Immigration and Naturalization Service in 1990-91, and helped the embassy with humanitarian relief in 1992.

Foreign Service Cookbooks: A Slice of Life

By Ann Luppi Von Mehren

Editor's Note: *With this article, the* Foreign Service Journal *inaugurates an occasional column on cooking and recipes and what food reveals about foreign cultures. Written by guest contributors, the column will explore foreign cultures and Foreign Service life through food. This column looks at a group of cookbooks written by Foreign Service spouses.*
The author, a former editor of the Foreign Service Journal, *remembers spectacular dining growing up in a Foreign Service family in Pakistan, India, and Canada.*

"What! one may perhaps say, yet another work on cookery? For some years now the public has been inundated by a flood of writings of this kind."

—From *Le Manuel des Officiers de Bouche*, 1759

The Schlesinger Library on the History of Women in America at Radcliffe College is interested in collecting cookbooks published by American women while serving at posts abroad." This advertisement ran in the *Foreign Service Journal* in 1989-90. Curious to find out the purpose of collecting these cookbooks and what had come from the ad, I recently visited the library in Cambridge, Massachusetts. I learned that scholars are increasingly studying cookbooks to trace undiscovered aspects of women's lives and the social history of communities. But I was disappointed to find fewer than 20 cookbooks produced by overseas American women's community groups in the library's collection.

To the curators of the library, these cookbooks can open a window not only on how Americans eat and entertain abroad but on highly distinct subcultures formed by women stuck in some often obscure part of the world. The library is not seeking "yet another recipe for Grape Nuts pudding," said Barbara Wheaton, honorary curator of the culinary collection. The Foreign Service cookbook represents a tradition of a population of women."

The 1972 Directive on Wives, which changed the traditional status of Foreign Service spouses by barring their mention in the employee's efficiency report, marks a watershed that is appreciable in the cookbooks. For example, the American Women's Club of Djakarta cookbook of 1969 includes a foreword by the "wife of the charge d'affaires," most likely a formality, since the chief of mission's wife was frequently honorary president of an association, and lists contributors by "Mrs. (husband's name)," as does *Savoir Fare*, the American Women's Club of Brussels 1966 cookbook, which is even dedicated to "our long-suffering husbands." The references to marital status and dedications to husbands disappear or become less pronounced in the 1970s.

The cookbooks can also be read to determine whether the overseas community was attempting to recreate America or acclimate to the foreign post. About half the cookbooks in the collection reflect in varying degrees an effort to bring home the best of local cooking. Foreign Service people usually get to eat the finest local



cuisine by dining with the leaders of the host country. Such access enables members of the Foreign Service to acquire experiences of "considerable authenticity," Wheaton believes, not only about the host country's food but also about the lives of the people. Exposure to the "best food" also allows Foreign Service women to bring into the published record the high cuisine of their host country.

The most complete effort in this genre is *Cooking In Morocco*, a production of the American Women's Association of Rabat. Originally edited by Jan Cusick, it was revised in 1977 by Helen Kindler Behrens, who wrote a cooking/entertaining column for the *Foreign Service Journal* years ago. The cookbook is entirely Moroccan cuisine and includes extensive descriptions of Moroccan life, food, cookware, and spices.

The American Women's Club of Djakarta cookbook offers a good balancing act between the two strategies, incorporating both multinational recipes and an extensive Indonesian section. The book also includes an "Indonesian Tips" chapter that gives a good idea of how the post earned its hardship differential (a pinch of salt to a gallon of boiled drinking water eliminates the flat taste; store local beef in the fridge 24-48 hours before freezing to improve quality; use crushed papaya leaves to tenderize meat; saturate mattresses with clean gasoline and place in sun till fumes are gone to eliminate bedbugs; a bar of soap in a stored suitcase prevents mustiness, and so on for five pages).

Hardship posts may inspire the most comprehensive cookbooks, because life there requires an overseas community to find and exchange lore. Posts with more amenities may not need as much to jell into a community or to get guidance on local markets and foods. *The International Cookery Book for India*, produced by the United Nations Women's





Association in New Delhi in 1972, "was guided in our choice of recipes by those whose ingredients are available in India." Likewise the sole criterion for recipes in *Unto Kariska Somalida/ Cooking in Somalia*, the 1971 American Women's Club of Mogadiscio's cookbook, was "the availability in Mogadiscio of all the required ingredients." This period piece leads with Somali recipes, some with anecdotal commentary evocative of a bygone era. "Somali-style goat" contributed by "Bruna Stahnke instructed by Jama Yusuf" was perhaps a nod to Stahnke's locally hired cook and if so a rare original credit. *From the Crocodiles*, produced in 1981 by the International Women's Club of Kaduna, Nigeria, lists Hausa *maganar kasuwa* or "words of the market" to enable the user to live off the local economy. The Bamako Community Liaison Office produced *What's Cooking* in 1988, and it begins with a paean to "the versatile mango" and highlights Mali's as well as other African nations' cuisine. Distinguishing a non-hardship post, the Benvenuto Club of Milan chose a businesslike approach—the cookbook includes advertisements from local shops.

Many of these books include recipes for "playdough," paints, clay, and other American kids' stuff. Recipes for cleaners and play materials and, indeed, food offer help not on how to be the ideal housewife but on how to live a full community life in the Foreign Service. One book that has extensive household and family-life tips is *How To Cope In Karachi*, by Mary Thomas Sargent, which she introduced as "a batch of suggestions, recipes, and ideas about how to run a happy house." Phyllis Kane also turned to writing about her culinary pursuits overseas far from American convenience, with *Notes from an American Kitchen In Dakar*, a book-length essay on French cooking Senegalese-style.

Some groups stick simply to gathering up and sharing the contributors' favorite dishes. But several cookbooks offer their multicultural mix of recipes for the use of the host country as well. *What's Cooking in Rio*, from the Fundacao Escolar Pan Americana, gives recipes in both English and Portuguese; a Mexico City American Women's Group project, *El Cookbook*, has English and Spanish versions of each recipe.

Since American women overseas frequently dedicate part of their time to charitable works in the host country, it is surprising that a number of these cookbooks fail to mention their purpose. The Rio book noted it is the product of "a group of international volunteer women who wish to make a contribution to Brazil, and who have chosen to concentrate their efforts in the field of primary education, where the need is so great." Mexico City used its proceeds to aid its scholarship fund. The *American-Hindi Cook Book* was compiled by the American Women's Club of New Delhi, which allowed the Indian Adult Education Association to reprint it to raise funds.

Other relevant information is missing from the history these books could tell, sometimes even the date of publication or names of contributors or especially the cookbook committee's members. No mention of the vital role and character of that Foreign Service

institution, the commissary, is on record in any book, although many of them offer recipes that clearly rely on commissary stocks—Campbell soups, Jello, Skippy peanut butter, and other 20th-century staples. Some books make no mention of local markets at all. The ad that ran in the *Foreign Service Journal* asked that contributions be accompanied with contextual materials so that potential researchers might better understand the communities these books represent. However, it appears that only Mary Thomas Sargent provided an explanatory letter with *Rico—A Cook Book*, done by the Women's Club of Tegucigalpa, describing how the book was put together and pasted up on her kitchen table. The library particularly wants information about the community and the voluntary association, such as contemporaneous newsletters.

Undoubtedly there have been hundreds of these cookbooks produced over the years, but the message that a library wants them must not have gotten out. It may be difficult to let go of your favorite cookbooks, but consider donating them, along with descriptions of the community each came from, for posterity's sake. Along with explanatory letters and supporting documentation accompanying gifts of cookbooks, the library will also consider accepting contributions of menus and guest lists from memorable functions arranged by Foreign Service spouses, with accompanying explanations about the historically significant occasion (e.g., a presidential visit or treaty signing), which would be stored in hanging files in the archives and made available to historical researchers. Manuscripts are not collected. Queries or donations should be directed to:

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

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INSURGENTS TAKE MADRID

DESPATCH FROM THE U.S. MINISTER TO SPAIN WASHINGTON IRVING TO SECRETARY OF STATE AD INTERIM HUGH L. LEGARE 1843

In the decades following the Napoleonic Wars, Spain was wracked by instability, civil war, and revolution. American author Washington Irving was U.S. minister in Madrid through several years of this tumultuous period. The following dispatch describes the siege and capture of Madrid by General Ramon Maria Narvaez, overthrowing then-regent Baldomero Espartero. Narvaez remained in power for eight years, holding sway over Queen Isabella II, who was just 13 years old when Irving penned this report.

Madrid, July 22, 1843
Sir:

Since the date of my last despatch Madrid has been in a state of siege. The insurgent troops from Leon and old Castile under General Aspiros took a position on one side while a superior force under General Narvaez, who had managed to out maneuver or out march the Regent's generals, invested it on the other. They had brought no artillery and evidently calculated on a cooperation from within, expecting that a *pronunciamento* would take place and the gates be thrown open to them: or at least that the city being defended mainly by the national guard would soon surrender. In this expectation they were disappointed. The militia behaved admirably. Martial law was proclaimed on the 10th inst. On the 12th the whole population seemed under arms, and 20,000 men, well equipped, were at the orders of the Captain General of Madrid. The gates were barricaded, batteries planted commanding the approaches to the city, trenches digged and breastworks thrown up in the principal streets, troops stationed in the houses on each side to fire from the upper windows and every preparation made to defend the city street by street and step by step; and to make the last stand at the palace.

For three days and nights the siege continued with much skirmishing about the gates; the city holding out in the hope of relief from troops . . . which were known to be on the march for the capital. Aware of their approach, the besiegers repeated their demands to surrender, with threats of a general attack and of rigorous terms in case the place were carried by storm. . . .

Apprehension that, should the city be carried by storm, the lives of the youthful queen and her sister might be endangered by the defense being pushed to an extremity, and the palace used as a citadel, the diplomatic corps addressed a note to the government, urging the utmost caution with respect to the safety of the royal children and offering to repair in person to the palace and be near the queen at any moment their presence might be deemed useful. This offer was respectfully declined.

Two days since, the besieging troops, finding the advancing forces of the regency were near at hand, drew off to a distance of two or three leagues, where they took up a position. . . . Tidings are incessantly expected of a battle decisive of the fate of the capital.

July 23. The question is decided. The armies met yesterday morning; a few shots were exchanged when a general embracing took place between the soldiery, and the troops of the regency joined the insurgents. . . . The city was overwhelmed with astonishment. The members of the cabinet resigned their positions, . . . the municipal authorities have taken the management of affairs and have sent out deputations last evening and this morning to treat for terms. The last deputation has not yet returned. The main point of difficulty is the demand of Narvaez that the whole national guard be disarmed. This may occasion some trouble and some scenes of violence. Narvaez, however, has the power at present to impose his own terms, but will doubtless be influenced by leading men of his party within the city, who will be cautious not to exasperate the populace.

I consider this blow as decisive of the political fortunes of the Regent. Other troops from various points are marching upon the capital, where the insurgents will soon concentrate a force of between 30,000 and 40,000 men. The insurrection is too wide and general to be quelled by any troops the Regent can collect. He is at present in Andalusia, seeking it is said to bring that rich province into obedience. Others think he is desirous of making his way to Cadiz, from whence, in case of extremity, he may embark and save himself by sea. On hearing of the single defection of the army and the capture of the capital it is thought he will either resign or endeavor to leave the kingdom.

I shall keep this despatch open until the last moment, to give any further tidings that may arise.

I am Sir,
Very Respectfully
Your obedient
Washington Irving

Editor's Note: *This historical dispatch and explanatory note were provided to the Journal by Peter D. Eicher, who is assigned to Geneva as counselor for political and specialized agency affairs at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.* ■

BOOKS

Tale of Tragedy

TRAGIC MOUNTAINS: THE HMONG, THE AMERICANS AND THE SECRET WARS FOR LAOS, 1942-1992

By Jane Hamilton-Merritt, Indiana University Press, 1993, $29.95 hardcover, 448 pages

Reviewed by Robert H. Miller

Tragic Mountains is the tale of a people, the Hmong, from the mountains of northeastern Laos, condemned by geography, history, and fate to struggle for their existence against a succession of hostile forces much larger and more powerful than the Hmong themselves. It is indeed a tragic tale, with its beginnings in the mists of history.

The Hmong people migrated centuries ago out of southern China, pushed by the southward expansion of the Han peoples. From their acquired homeland in the mountains of northeast Laos, over the centuries the Hmong have had to defend themselves against enemy tribes, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, the Lao, the French, the Americans, and the Thai. The French and Americans have gone, but the others remain for the rest of time.

In modern times, these struggles have divided the Hmong against themselves: some sided with the Vietnamese against the Lao, some with the Lao against the Vietnamese, some with the Vietnamese against the French, some with the French against the Vietnamese, some with the Lao and the Americans against the Vietnamese, and some with the Vietnamese against the Lao and the Americans.

Now, after the departure of the French and the Americans and the victory of the Communist regimes in Hanoi and Vientiane, once again the Hmong find themselves caught between the Lao, the Vietnamese and the Thai—often tracked down and persecuted by the first two for their earlier alliances, and forcibly rebuffed by the Thai, who have already been burdened by too many refugees from Cambodia and Vietnam.

Adding to this tale of sadness and tragedy, the Hmong's former allies in war—France and America—have abandoned them in peace, leaving them to their fate at the hands of their new masters, the Lao and Hanoi regimes. Both these regimes have brought drastic, inhuman punishment against them, killing them, torturing them, and perhaps worst of all, soaking them in showers of "yellow rain," a poisonous chemical that has led to much illness and death among them. As the author points out, despite the mass of evidence of this chemical warfare, no one in the world community has pressed charges against the Laotians or Vietnamese.

Jane Hamilton-Merritt has based this tale of woe on meticulous, painstaking research over many years. When most American journalists were seeking the pot of gold in Vietnam, where many made fame and fortune, Hamilton-Merritt was among the very few who chose to focus on the first American crisis in Indochina—Laos—and to stay focused on it.

Jane Hamilton-Merritt has based this tale of woe on meticulous, painstaking research over many years. When most American journalists were seeking the pot of gold in Vietnam, where many made fame and fortune, Hamilton-Merritt was among the very few who chose to focus on the first American crisis in Indochina—Laos—and to stay focused on it. She spent years recording the fate of the Hmong in the mountains of Laos, in the refugee camps of Thailand, and in the resettlement communities in the United States. She gained their trust, interviewed many of them, heard their tales of heroism, whether for the French, later for the Americans, and still later for themselves after the French and the Americans had left. She saw the hurt of misplaced trust, their alienation and confusion as refugees in a strange and indifferent America, and their unassuaged sense of abandonment by a great people to whom they gave their trust and, many of them, their lives.

Reading this well-written, thoroughly documented story gives one the feeling of viewing the Vietnam War through the wrong end of a telescope positioned in the war's furthest corner, the mountains of Laos; one gains a "Hmong-ocentric" view of that war. Such a narrowly focused view parallels many others of the Vietnam war—that of the South Vietnamese who gave their trust to the United States and fought unsuccessfully with it to prevent the worst from happening; successive Lao regimes, which did the same; Cambodians who found themselves in the same sinking boat; and in all three countries, mountain minority peoples who for centuries have been oppressed by the far more populous, more homogeneous, more economically developed peoples of the lowlands.

The United States indeed bears a heavy responsibility for all this during its war in Indochina. It bears responsibility above all, for believing, and leading others to believe, that it could not help but win against a small, fanatical regime that embraced an oppressive, totalitarian ideology. But the United States first of all bears that responsibility to its own people, who are still dealing with the trauma, the costs, and the losses of that unsuccessful war. At the same time, Americans should not overlook the fact that, despite its failures in Indochina itself, the United States' larger objective in fighting that war was realized: the rest of Southeast Asia has been left able to

follow its own paths to independence, to developing political institutions; and the ASEAN region's economies are growing at rates envied by the rest of the world.

All this, of course, is small comfort to the Hmong and the many others who lost that war with us but cannot go home as we could. I cannot help but wonder what would have happened to them, however, if the United States had not been tempted to fight the cause of freedom in that part of the world. Would the Hmong be better off today? Or would they have continued to be persecuted by the Lao, by the Vietnamese, and by the Chinese, as they had been for centuries before Americans had ever heard of Indochina (or before America even existed)?

Hamilton-Merritt has written a gripping tale that needed telling, and her work is indeed prodigious. But it is a tale with many morals, not the least of which is that the Hmongs are not alone by any means in their betrayal and suffering; moreover, their betrayal and suffering can be laid at many doorsteps over many decades in a corner of the world where external powers have been by no means alone in applying force to achieve their national goals.

Robert H. Miller's posts in the Foreign Service included that of ambassador to Malaysia.

A Storage Place for Thought

Conflict and Crises: A Foreign Service Story

By Roy M. Melbourne, University Press of America, 1993, $38.50 hardcover, 300 pages

Reviewed by Daniel Newberry

There should be nothing incongruous about calling Foreign Service officer Roy Melbourne's memoir a splendid "commonplace book." A commonplace book, for the uninitiated, is a time-honored literary tool—now falling into disuse—that lends itself to reference, in the words of *Benet's Reader's Encyclopedia*, "as a storage place for thought, or as a collected miscellany of arguments on any given theme."

Roy Melbourne's themes are the changes and chances of a Foreign Service professional life. In Melbourne's case that life spanned 35 years of active duty and continued on into retirement. Since he turned in his badge in 1972, Melbourne has been teaching and lecturing on international relations at Newberry College, Duke University, and on the University of Pittsburgh's Semester at Sea.

The selection and arrangement of his miscellany reflect a teacher's outlook. Although arranged in chronological order, Melbourne's entries set side by side some engaging personal notes about his living arrangements and recreations, enough of the day's topical headlines to set his own professional activities in context, and cogent, instructive notes about the foreign policy issues or operations in which he was absorbed from assignment to assignment.

Melbourne's themes are the changes and chances of Foreign Service professional life.

The substantive chunks of *Conflict and Crises* have more to do with the way American foreign policy is conducted than with what its objectives should be. Melbourne was an early Cold Warrior, even before being one was fashionable or official. He scarcely mentions the Vietnam War. His readers should not look for searching analyses

of American foreign policy objectives.

Where *Conflict and Crises* excels is in the recurring diagnoses that Melbourne brings to bear on the program management and planning features of each of his Foreign Service posts. His enduring concern is "professionalism," and therein lies the unique value of Melbourne's book for *Foreign Service Journal* readers. Younger readers will discover that many contemporary service problems have been around for a long time.

Older readers will no doubt find many of Melbourne's commentaries resonate with their own experiences. Older readers too are more likely to enjoy the gossipy content sprinkled throughout the book. Melbourne identifies the good guys and gals and pours praise on them. He targets the bad guys without naming names, but every Foreign Service old-timer will be able to guess who is being skewered.

For the non-Foreign Service reader there are episodes of privileged insight. Roy Melbourne was in Bucharest in 1945 when the U.S. government still thought it possible to have free elections in a Romania occupied by the Soviet Army. He was in Kobe, Japan, during the lead-up to Pearl Harbor. After being interned and subsequently released, Melbourne was in Istanbul deeply involved in sifting intelligence reports coming out of the Nazi-occupied Balkans.

Melbourne was in Tehran when the CIA mounted the counter-coup that drove out Mosadegh and restored the Shah. Melbourne was charge d'affaires in Baghdad in 1962 when Baathists overthrew and murdered President Qasim. During the Biafra war in Nigeria, Melbourne chaired an interagency task force for humanitarian relief. At the Foreign Service Institute in 1965 and 1966 Melbourne was in position, as dean of the School of Foreign Affairs, to impart to others the fruit of three decades of devoted and courageous professionalism.

This was by no means a commonplace career, even though it was not crowned with an ambassadorship. There are muted notes of chagrin about that, but Melbourne does not dwell on it. The implicit message in *Conflict and Crises* is that the Foreign Service offers a uniquely satisfying arena in which to exercise one's patriotism, intellectual curiosity, and a conviction that there is always a way to do a good job even better. The corollary is that the service, with all its faults, is so organized and staffed that there should never be an excuse for anyone's being bored anywhere. Foreign Service recruiters would do well to put Melbourne's book high on suggested reading lists.

Daniel Newberry is a retired Foreign Service officer.

Inside Rowan

BREAKING BARRIERS, A MEMOIR

by Carl T. Rowan
Little Brown & Co., 1991, $22.95 hardcover

Reviewed by Jack H. Shellenberger

Carl Rowan's just-published bestseller on the world of Thurgood Marshall, *Dream Makers, Dream Breaker*, rekindles an interest in not only the subject but the author of that work. There is a lot of breakage in both men's lives.

Rowan's memoir, now two years in print, is essentially an angry if not outraged recitation of what the writer endured during decades of involvement in public affairs.

Those of us who have been regular viewers of the talk show "Inside Washington," and its forerunner, "Agronsky and Company," or readers of his syndicated column will find Rowan's memoir consistent with his persona as a sometimes sardonic, occasionally avuncular, but mostly critical commentator on the establishment, the power brokers, the elites, and the icons.

Yet, as his book makes clear, Carl Rowan himself, by the time he reached 30, was a nationally recognized, award-winning Midwestern journalist, an African-American icon-in-the-making whose origins included a rat-infested home in rural Tennessee, laundry soap as toothpaste, newspaper in the outhouse, and survival fare of beans and wild rabbit. World War II and, more specifically, the Navy V-12 program educated Rowan and commissioned him an officer and a gentleman. Today's gays in the military issue comes to mind as Rowan recalls a 1944 aside by a senior military man: "This integration will blow up the first day a Negro officer walks into a ship's wardroom."

The Rowan book is colloquial, studded with pungent quotes, most of them his own, most of them indignant, many ribald.

His writings on civil rights brought Rowan national recognition and a State Department invitation to lecture in India for three months. "My eyes got bigger than doughnuts when I read that if selected I would be paid expenses plus $723 per month. 'Good Lord,' I said to [my wife] Viv, 'that's more money than double my [Minneapolis] *Tribune* salary!'"

In the event, Rowan got the *Tribune* to continue paying half his salary during his sojourn. It went well beyond three months and well beyond India to Southeast Asia and garnered him, *inter alia*, the title, "Foreign Correspondent of the Year."

With John F. Kennedy's election, Rowan unexpectedly found himself offered and accepting a high public affairs post at "the State Department plantation," where he quickly showed "that I was not a tame black who would bend meekly to the white establishment." He challenged and memoed and bucked to Kennedy's reported perverse glee.

Any who have been at the fringes of an LBJ overseas swing will relish Rowan's inside account of then Vice President Johnson's circus-like foray through Asia, and recall his pique at being the odd man out at the White House.

But although the stage of this memoir is peopled by many of the world's celebrated, the narrator moves among them and delivers the punch lines. A 1963 example: "I walked into the Oval Office...'Good morning, Mr. President

[Kennedy]. I just came to see if I can convince you not to send press rules to Viet Nam that will get you in a lot of trouble.' 'Now Carl,' he said, "isn't that a bunch of s—?'" Rowan responded, "'When this telegram leaks and your ass is in a sling, you won't think it's a bunch of s— —.'"

Colloquies of this sort abound, whether at State or during Rowan's brief tenures as ambassador to Finland and director of USIA, the former at the instance of JFK, the latter at the urging of LBJ.

His departure from government service had to do with both principle and profit. He felt that Johnson was using him, and there were those munificent offers from Westinghouse, *Readers' Digest,* and the *Chicago Daily News.*

So Rowan once again grazed in domestic pastures taking up, notably, the Martin Luther King-FBI imbroglio, a lament over the Reagan years, and the resurgence of racism. His accounts of these topics are no less outraged, but his penultimate chapter, entitled, "The Shot Heard Round My World," reveals Rowan at the nadir of his by-now familiar vexations. Here he was president of the prestigious Gridiron Club (bastion of Washington's journalistic elite), a national public figure, when "fate came close to wiping out every honor I ever received and destroying me personally."

Fearing for his own and his wife's safety, Rowan shot and slightly wounded a teenaged intruder at their Northwest Washington home. The ensuing nightmare having to do with gun registration and court proceedings and a drumfire of media bashing shook this man as had nothing before in his eventful life.

But all that is five years in the past and, like much else in the memoir, thoroughly regurgitated, giving Carl Rowan another wind to take up matters of moment, Thurgood Marshall being just one of them. ■

Jack H. Shelleuberger is a retired USIA Foreign Service officer.

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Depleted by the Draft

Editorial Columnfrom the *Foreign Service Journal*, April 1943

Some months ago we remarked upon a change being wrought in the Foreign Service by the circumstance that a larger number of Foreign Service officers than ever before were moving through the mill of the Department of State. The origin of this movement was purely fortuitous, an immediate consequence of the war.

On the other side of the medallion we have the very considerable number of officers still interned by our enemies, of officers reassigned while in process of being exchanged and who thus have not been permitted to come home since their release from enemy internment, and of officers stationed in critical areas who can ill be spared from their posts of duty.

The demands upon our Service, whether in the field or here in the department, have never before been so heavy; and the Service, quietly and anonymously, schooled by experience to face emergencies thus far has managed somehow to meet these demands.

The awkward feature in all this is that the demands go on increasing while the Service is wearing down numerically. The draft so far restricted the department's field of recruitment that examinations and the Foreign Service school had to be suspended many months ago. Its reserves of younger officers have been exhausted.

For this acute crisis no solution is at present in sight. There can be no solution, in fact, without a fuller and more general understanding of the vital importance of maintaining and, if possible, strengthening this corps, painstakingly built up over the years and for which there will presently be an even more pressing need when we set about erecting the edifice of the new peace. It has appeared of late that a prevailing and shortsighted tendency might further handicap it by releasing from the draft only those officers who are actually on posts abroad and thus, for the sake of two or three dozen recruits, deprive the Department of State of as many valuable experts in key positions. The lack of realism and perspective is patent when it is pointed out that in our entire Service, here and abroad, we have only 850 officers of all ages. ■

FOREIGN SERVICE QUIZ

Balkan Basics

1. Up until 1990, the Balkan States numbered five. Name them.
2. Name a) the four states that broke away from Yugoslavia in 1990-91 and b) the two that remain in the rump Yugoslav Federation.
3. What is the predominant language of Montenegro?
4. Name the principal seaports of the five original Balkan states.
5. What is the total population of the former Yugoslavia? Of those, how many people identify themselves ethnically as a) Serbs, b) Croats, c) Muslims (Bosnians)?

1. Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Yugoslavia
2. a) Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Slovenia b) Montenegro, Serbia
3. Serbo-Croatian
4. Durres, Albania; Varna, Bulgaria; Piraeus, Greece; Constanta, Romania; Split, Yugoslavia.
5. Total: 24.2 million, of which Serbs-9.7 million; Croats-5.3 million; Muslims-1.9 million

Contributed by Gil Kulick

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

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