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


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

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*Cover and inside illustrations by Ben Fishman*

*Special thanks to the following people for use of their personal Vietnam photos: Harold E. Meinheit, William J. Cunningham, Robert A. Powers, Bill Bach, John R. Campbell, John Marks, Gilbert H. Sheinbaum, Bob Myers, Shep Lowman, Richard Thompson and Joel Rochow.*



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


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# PRESIDENT'S VIEWS

## *A Better Performance on Security for Americans Overseas*

*BY MARSHALL P. ADAIR*

The President's FY 2001 budget request includes $1.07 billion for embassy security, almost double what was requested in FY2000. That is good news.

This is a substantial increase in the priority given to protecting Americans overseas. Secretary Albright and senior State Department management fought hard for it. We commend them for their leadership and their effectiveness. It will make a difference to the safety of thousands of official Americans overseas, and will enhance the efficacy of our foreign policy overall.

There is still a long way to go. The total request is still more than $300 million short of what Adm. William Crowe and the Accountability Review Boards recommended as an annual appropriation for 10 years. Combined with the $800 million shortfall in FY2000, we will be almost one year behind what Crowe recommended by the end of FY2001.

We face some important challenges. In this election year, Congress will try to compress its appropriations work into a shorter than usual season. While there is some welcome optimism about surpluses in Congress, there is also a strong political imperative to cut taxes and tightly control spending. AFSA will continue to urge both Congress and the administration to increase FY2001 funding to the full $1.4 billion recommended.

*The new budget request for security is almost twice that for FY2000.*

There are important differences between the administration and Congress on funding for infrastructure work. At the urging of State's Foreign Buildings Office, the administration has requested advance appropriations of $3.35 billion over four years beginning in FY2002. Congress, however, argues that money can only be appropriated for that which is executable in the appropriation year. This difference must be bridged.

There is also room for improvement in State and FBO procedures. This building campaign will severely challenge State Department capabilities, particularly when other major projects are added to it. While FBO has made substantial improvements in recent years, it will probably have to shift more project management to the private sector to meet this challenge effectively. The report by the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel may offer the department an opportunity to secure broader backing for such changes.

Finally, continued support over time — at least 10 years — is essential. This will require a stronger commitment from both the administration and Congress to logistical support for diplomacy. On Feb. 10, President Clinton issued a statement stressing a sustained commitment to maintaining a high level of security readiness, allocating $14 billion over the next 10 years. We cannot take this pledge for granted.

It is important to stress that funding these investments should not be in competition with other foreign affairs responsibilities, but in support of them. I often encounter concern from my Foreign Service colleagues that we will pay for security at the expense of diplomatic programs; or that we will emphasize security to the point of building fortresses and isolating ourselves. These important concerns must not weaken our determination to enhance security.

Ultimately, funding for all parts of the international affairs accounts must increase. It is now 41 percent below the levels of the mid-1980s, and the gap between military and non-military spending is still growing. In 1950, 39 percent of the national budget went to defense, and 17 percent to non-military international affairs. In 2000, 16 percent goes to defense and 1 percent to international affairs. Diplomacy is no less critical to national security today than it was in 1950. It is time to reverse this trend, and appropriate the funding our national security interests require. ■

---

*Marshall P. Adair is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.*

# LETTERS

### Destructive Criticism

The letter to the editor in the January 2000 *Journal* ("Tobacco, USAID and Malawi") from Frank Giarrizzo reiterates the inaccuracies and erroneous conclusions that appeared in the November 1999 *FSJ* article, "Support for Tobacco Trade: Up in Smoke." Giarrizzo's assertions of an "unholy alliance between the tobacco industry, the Africa Division of USAID and the U.S. State Department" are baseless and absurd.

Giarrizzo claims wrongly that "famine" in Malawi is "donor-managed". In another letter in the January 2000 *Journal*, Verne Newton, deputy assistant administrator in USAID's Bureau for Africa, notes that data from credible sources such as the Harvard Institute for International Development, the World Bank and the International Food Policy Research Institute prove inaccurate Giarrizzo's statement that Malawi's "hungry season" has lengthened.

Giarrizzo's summation of my comments during his February 1998 meeting with me at the U.S. Embassy in Lilongwe as "We do tobacco" misrepresents the content of our conversation. At that time, smallholder tobacco farmers were only one of many groups that benefited from USAID Malawi's agricultural programs. USAID Malawi subsequently ceased all support for tobacco farmers.

The organizations comprising the U.S. mission in Malawi (State Department, USAID, CDC and Peace Corps) engage in a myriad of activities in support of our primary goals, including: safeguarding the interests of U.S. citizens; strengthening Malawi's fledgling democracy; and promoting Malawi's economic development and integration into the global economy. We also strive to help Malawi combat the scourge of HIV/AIDS — a pandemic of crisis proportions that endangers the nation's hard-earned democratic and socio-economic gains. While we always welcome constructive criticism of our activities, groundless claims and unfounded attacks serve only to distract from the important tasks at hand, and thereby do a disservice to the very people the critics are trying to assist.

*A. Ellen Shippy*
*Ambassador*
*U.S. Embassy Malawi*

### Check the Facts

In the February *FSJ*, the "Clippings" column extrapolated from a Nov. 14, 1999 broadcast of *60 Minutes* on U.S. assistance to the rule of law in Haiti. Unfortunately, many of the distortions and inaccuracies in the original story are repeated and even amplified in your rewrite.

The *Journal* casts a negative light on USAID in Haiti and unfairly disparages the reputation of our firm, Checchi and Co. Consulting, Inc. Had you checked the story with Checchi or USAID (both located in Washington), you might not have run it.

The distortions begin with the assertion that "most of the people the program interviewed" stated that the "U.S. has not gotten very much for its money in Haiti."

Only one person on the program expressed that view, a disaffected former Checchi subcontractor who, as a competitor on a subsequent USAID procurement in Haiti, had an interest in criticizing Checchi's performance.

Contrary to the impression conveyed by the *60 Minutes* piece and your clipping, Checchi's contract did not entail improving prison conditions or the functioning of the Haitian penal system. Our goal was greater efficiency and accountability in the judicial system. We did support the provision of legal aid to detainees at 10 prisons, including the National Penitentiary, under a small grants program. At their high point, these services reached 434 prisoners, 23 percent of the total prison population at the National Penitentiary. Your clipping says that a subsequent USAID investigation found "only 3 percent [of prisoners] had received lawyers through [Checchi's] legal aid program ... ." This is incomplete and misleading because the investigation took place approximately eight weeks after Checchi's legal assistance activities had ended, and the percentage

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

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

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we reached had previously been "much higher," as *60 Minutes* made clear.

Similarly, the *Journal* badly distorts the situation involving technical assistance provider Jim Smith. You state that Checchi's former subcontractor called Smith our "top man" in Haiti. Smith was never Checchi's chief of party in Haiti. He was taken on as a midlevel administrator to complete work that he had begun for another USAID contractor. Still, *60 Minutes* referred to Smith as "a top executive," an inaccurate term but one that does not translate into "the top man." The *Journal* also implies that Checchi waited four months to remove Smith after learning of his disbarment, but in fact Checchi requested Smith's resignation three days after receiving this information.

The *Journal* did not check the basic facts of the story with either Checchi or USAID, and it did not even report accurately on the *60 Minutes* broadcast. When the *Journal* uses a pre-existing story that contains highly damaging material, harmful to individuals and organizations, it should be obliged to check sources and facts. That another news organization publishes inaccuracies does not give the *FSJ* license to repeat them, particularly when, as in this instance, the *FSJ* edits and even rewrites the material. The *Journal* failed to exercise due care in this case, thus falling short of basic standards of journalistic professionalism.

*Patricia McPhelim*
*Vice President*
*Checchi Consulting*

### A Different Jim Smith

Your article in the February "Clippings," entitled "Haiti: Five Years Later," has caused me considerable difficulty personally, as well as disturbed me by its potential for misinterpretation. The writer strongly criticizes efforts in that country of an AID-funded administration of justice reform team led by Checchi & Co. consultants. As part of his complaint, the author states that the team's "top man, Jim Smith, has been disbarred from ... California ... following conviction on several felonies..." without identifying Smith further.

I also am a "Jim Smith" (James F. to be exact) and was quite active in the justice reform field before retirement. I served as AID chief in Bogota, Colombia, from 1984 to 1992. I am an attorney, but have never been disbarred nor have I ever committed any felony, much less in California. The linkage of my name — without sufficient discriminating identification — to misdeeds in the very field for which I received accolades, is extremely embarrassing, harmful and potentially costly.

*James F. "Jim" Smith*
*Tucson, Ariz.*

### Sticking with It

I agree with Phyllis Oakley ("I Would Do It All Again," *Foreign Service Journal*, December 1999). We both entered the Foreign Service — for the first time — in 1957. Even then I heard about low morale and poor management. I returned to the FS 16 years later, after having been forced to resign because of marriage, and heard the same complaints. They still have validity.

Management at State still needs improvement. Staffing is grossly inadequate for our obligations as a world power. Work environments are poor. Moving remains a dreadful hassle at best and a horror at worst. The vagaries of an FS career can be devastating, especially as TIC deadlines approach, and dedication is not necessarily rewarded by the system. Families have to share in the commitment to the FS because of travel, long hours and unaccompanied assignments — only one in my case.

Although the Foreign Service can be a tough commitment, it is a great experience. I have recommended it as a career. Perhaps satisfaction with this career depends on the personal expectations and needs of people entering it. I wanted a public service carcer and I am a foreign affairs "junkie." I have spent most of my career amazed that I could be paid to work on such fascinating issues, meet so many interesting people and learn so much about the rest of the world. Yet, there are also days when I mutter that I cannot be paid enough to do this job.

However, given the chance, I, too, would do it all again.

*Eleanore Raven-Hamilton*
*Senior Adviser*
*Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement*

**Ridiculing Religion?**

"Shipping Bibles to Afghanistan," by R.T. Davies, featured in the February issue, caused me misgivings about the *Journal*.

The intended moral of the story is evidently the ambassador's knowledge of the Bible in dealing with Christian proselytizers, based on biblical familiarity acquired from being a bishop's son. (The article is subtitled "A Foreign Service parable in which a Christian proselytizer meets an American ambassador brought up on the Word.") What it really shows is the superficiality of the ambassador's biblical knowledge, or perhaps his analytical weakness, when he quotes Matthew 6:5 and 6, here in a modern translation: "Whenever you pray, do not be like the hypocrites; for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, so that they may be seen by others. But whenever you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you."

The quote has to do more with ostentation in individual prayer than with corporate worship. Therefore, the passage the ambassador quotes can in no way excuse non-attendance at church, of which he is accused in the story.

If the ambassador's purpose was to reprove the man's proselytizing, the passage reveals the ambassador to be ignorant of Matthew 28:19, in which Jesus commands his followers: "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them

in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit." This is known as the dominical commandment.

My main misgiving, though, regards the article's holding of Christian missionaries up to ridicule; indeed, this seems its whole point. Not only is this unfair to the devotion of so many whom I at least have encountered overseas, it displays extraordinary insensitivity to Christian sensibilities, even while calling for sensitivity to the sensibilities of others. Perhaps, along with being credited with the *FSJ*'s recent good articles, the editors and Editorial Board should account for their acceptance of this one.

*Rev. Theodore L. Lewis*
*FSO, retired*
*Germantown, Md.*

### Buchanan, Illustrated

As a dues-paying member of the American Foreign Service Association, I would like to know your criteria for selecting and approving Dave Arkle's illustration of Pat Buchanan dressed in the Roman collar of the Catholic Church on the cover of the January 2000 issue of the *Foreign Service Journal*. I noticed that none of the other four presidential hopefuls were depicted in clerical garb so I'm wondering why you equate Buchanan with Catholicism.

The illustrations of Bush, Gore, Bradley and McCain seem to poke fun at, if not mock, these men based on their previous occupations or causes. Why did you feel it was necessary to mock Buchanan's religion? If the *Journal* continues in this Catholic bashing, please refund my membership immediately.

*Robert F. Grech*
*Asst. Regional Security Officer*
*U.S. Embassy Kingston*

### Footnote to a Footnote

In his letter concerning Turks and Armenians in the Ottoman Empire (February *FSJ*), Zofar Gali displays more good intentions than historical accuracy in describing the political climate which provoked the Armenians to "armed insurrection" and the Turks to react so savagely. The *FSJ* article which, in his words, "necessitates a footnote," depicted the heroism of American diplomats, singling out Leslie Davis during World War I. Gali wished "to shed light on the historical circumstances in which Davis

operated," but his "footnote" requires yet another.

Gali makes no distinction between the Ottoman Turkey of Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Young Turks who deposed him in 1908, and therefore fails to differentiate between the two quite separate massacres. The first in 1895-6 by the sultan employed Kurdish troops (to absolve Turkish soldiers of any crimes) and resulted in the murder of some 250,000 Armenians. Their "crime " was their growing restlessness manifest in other parts of the Ottoman Empire — because of heightened persecution: high taxes, prohibition to speak Armenian, exclusion from testifying in Turkish courts, and the ban on bearing arms. True that until then, Armenians and Turks lived "peaceefully" together, but tolerance did not mean equality.

Then came the three pashas, Talaat, Enver and Djemal — the so-ealled "Young Turks," who, while maintaining the nominal trappings of Ottomanism, proclaimed a revolutionary program based on a constitution. The Armenians ecstatically supported what they considered a new era for their two-million-strong nation in Anatolia. But their hopes were dashed when, in 1915, the Young Turks began a program of "purification" to cleanse Turkey of all alien elements. Operating behind the curtain of World War I, the Young Turks released from prison murderers, rapists and robbers and then organized them into eriminal bands with orders to pillage and destroy the Armenian nation. They almost succeeded, wiping out close to 1.5 million.

The present Turkish government is certainly not responsible for what happened 85 years ago, but only for denying the historieal truth, as it vehemently eontinues to do.

*Edward Alexander*
*FSO, retired*
*Bethesda, Md.* ■

# CLIPPINGS

*"When I was coming up it was a dangerous world and we knew exactly who the they were. It was us versus them and it was clear who them was. Today, we're not so sure who the they are, but we know they're there."*

— GEORGE W. BUSH, QUOTED IN THE JAN. 29 ECONOMIST MAGAZINE

## BALKAN DISASTERS: IS MONTENEGRO NEXT?

Increasingly tense Serbian-Montenegrin relations are the focus of the Jan. 31 issue of *Montenegro Watch*, the Open Society Institute's bulletin reporting on political, economic and security issues in that country. While the Washington-based publication presents a round-up of news clips and does not take overt editorial positions, its latest edition does highlight the hardening of attitudes in Belgrade and Podgorica (the capital of Montenegro) over Montenegro's status within the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The thrust of the coverage is that Montenegrins are no longer willing to settle for autonomy and the Serbs are unlikely to let their neighbor secede from the federation without a fight.

For example, one item traces the evolution of Montenegrin president Milo Djukanovic's views on independence. Djukanovic began disassociating himself from Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's government over two years ago, but until recently his emphasis was on achieving greater autonomy for Montenegro within the federation. Now he is stepping up the pressure on Belgrade, *Montenegro Watch* reports, citing his warning in a late January CNN interview that unless the Serbs soon accept a proposal that redefines Montenegro's status within Yugoslavia, it will be forced to pursue independence from the rump Yugoslav republic by the end of 2000.

Some of his compatriots have already gone further down that road, like Zarko Rakcevic, president of the Social Democratic Party of Montenegro and a member of the ruling coalition: "The FRY [former Republic of Yugoslavia] is now in the past for us and the proposals for the redefinition of relations between Montenegro and Serbia are already dead."

For its part, Serbia remains as intransigent as ever. Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Vojislav Seselj said on Jan. 29 that he, President Slobodan Milosevic and all parties within the country's ruling coalition are convinced that "the Montenegrins voting for independence at a referendum is an impossibility." But if they do go ahead, *Montenegro Watch* notes a warning by Col. Ljubomir Stojadinovic, a former Yugoslav Army spokesman, that the federal authority might intervene forcibly if it loses all other means of exercising even formal control over Montenegro.

Such threats are only reinforcing Montenegrin determination to press ahead, however. In the CNN interview, Djukanovic summed up the consequences of allowing Milosevic to get away with suppressing democracy in Montenegro: "Then we'll have a single unified Yugoslavia as the last dictatorship in Europe. I hope it's not just Montenegro that is against this."

## NOT JUST "CONTEMPTIBLE"

Language maven William Safire included this anecdote in his Feb. 6 column in *The New York Times Magazine*. "Some years ago, a State Department spokesman denounced as contemptible an article of mine sneering at some feckless action of the then-Secretary. An alert reporter followed up with, 'Don't you mean contemptuous?' To which the quick-thinking diplomat replied, 'That, too.'"

# CLIPPINGS

## FORMER ENVOY BANNED IN BELGRADE

A former Canadian ambassador to Yugoslavia told the Canadian Broadcasting Company's "Radio As It Happens" program that he was not allowed to speak with any officials in his country's embassy in Belgrade during a recent visit, due to his outspoken criticism of NATO's 1999 Kosovo bombing campaign.

James Bissett was Canada's ambassador to Yugoslavia from 1990 until 1992, when the current Liberal government came to power in Ottawa. On Jan. 10, he published an article in the *Toronto Globe and Mail* accusing NATO of misleading the public about the reasons and consequences of the bombing campaign. He wrote that there were approximately 2,000 casualties in Kosovo up to the NATO bombing — but asserted that NATO bombing killed more than 2,000 Yugoslavian civilians. Bissett also said more than 800,000 ethnic Albanians fled Kosovo after NATO bombing started, compared with 200,000 who were displaced prior to the military campaign.

In late January, Bissett returned to the Yugoslavian capital to speak to a Serbian writers conference. When he contacted the embassy to set up appointments, an official told him that neither the Canadian nor local staff were allowed to speak with him, on orders from Ottawa.

Queried by CBC Radio, Canadian Foreign Affairs Department spokesman Jim Wright confirmed that officials in Ottawa had indeed instructed the Belgrade embassy staff not to talk to Bissett, but said this was because they were fully occupied with supporting a humanitarian mission that was visiting Belgrade at the same time. But he noted that Bissett's public comments had been used by the Milosevic government for propaganda and said his visit could also be used by the Yugoslavian government, which Wright described as a "pariah regime."

## FROM AMBASSADOR TO MR. NORMAL

Ken Adelman's "What I've Learned" column in the January 2000 *Washingtonian Magazine* features an interview with former ambassador and long-time AFSA activist and Governing Board member Bill Harrop. Although the bulk of Adelman's questions relate to retirement, Harrop also reflects on his nearly 40-year-long diplomatic career, particularly his final posting as ambassador to Israel.

A six-time ambassador, Harrop makes clear that he still resents the way his career ended in 1993. In line with U.S. policy, he had been urging his Israeli contacts to privatize and open up their economy so they would not be so dependent on American aid. But when he made the same recommendations in a public presentation to an economic organization in Tel Aviv, the ensuing publicity caused a congressional firestorm and prompted the Clinton administration to ask for his resignation.

After retirement, Harrop "initially felt undernourished without the daily adrenaline of diplomatic cables, top-secret intelligence and other information." So how did he handle his withdrawal symptoms, Adelman asked? By spending half the morning poring

## 50 YEARS AGO

"There is nothing sacred about either the State Department or the Foreign Service; they are administrative mechanisms to serve the national interest. They can and should be altered from time to time to remedy their deficiencies and to improve their effectiveness."

— *FRANK SNOWDEN HOPKINS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE, WRITING IN THE APRIL 1950* **FSJ**

# CLIPPINGS

*"The guerrilla wins if he does not lose; the conventional army loses if it does not win. Guerrilla wars are about winners and losers, not about compromise."*

*— HENRY KISSINGER*

over newspapers and magazines, until he could accept "no longer being at the cutting edge of information." Harrop does, however, still closely follow developments in Israel, the Middle East and Africa via the Internet and other sources and is active in numerous foreign affairs groups such as AFSA.

Harrop acknowledges, "The competitive juices I felt in the midst of negotiations or in the rough-and-tumble of bureaucratic jostling...gave an exhilaration I don't feel now." But he definitely does not miss the social whirl, which he considers the worst side of diplomacy. "After six years, I still wake up and think, Wow there's no national day reception tonight, no dinner party today, no cocktail party."

## CORRECTION

The January issue of the *FSJ* failed to mention that the article, "Breaking the Cycle of the 20th Century" by Ralph Buultjens, was based on Buultjens' 1998 Nizer Lecture for the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs, copyright 1999 Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. ■



*Year End Roundup of*

# Foreign Service Authors

The *Foreign Service Journal* plans to publish a list of recently published books by FS authors in an end-of-the-year special section. FS authors who have had a book published by either a commercial or academic publisher in the last two years (1998-2000) should send a copy of the book, along with a press release or backgrounder with information on the author, to:

Ani Stoyanova,
Assistant Book
Review Editor,
*Foreign Service Journal*,
2101 E Street, NW,
Washington, D.C. 20037.
*(No self-published or vanity press books, please.)*

# SPEAKING OUT

## *Why They Stay In*

*BY NIELS MARQUARDT*

I have an upbeat response when I hear dirges about the demise of the Foreign Service. As director of entry-level personnel for the Foreign Service since August 1998, I have witnessed a period of record-breaking hiring of new junior officers and FS specialists. Where some see crisis, I see opportunity. And, based on the quality of new employees, I see new life and a strong future for the Foreign Service.

I am writing largely in response to two recently resigned junior officers who wrote an article entitled "Why We Got Out" in the December *FSJ*. Their complaints struck a sympathetic chord with me in some ways. I remember firing off a self-satisfying fare-thee-well letter to the Peace Corps many years ago. But I also found their list of wrongs about embassy Mexico City to be typical of frequently heard negative opinions, which I believe are mostly untrue. I am especially skeptical because I made a trip last April to Mexico and talked with junior officers there myself.

First, statistics show that junior officers are not leaving the Foreign Service in large numbers. On average, only 20 junior officers have left the Foreign Service each year for the past six years. In 1999, the authors were two of only 18 junior officers who resigned worldwide. During that same period, 313 new junior officers were hired. In 1998 the State Department hired 224 JOs; 280 more will be added this year. Few organizations in the public or private sectors can point to such loyalty among their new recruits.

*Statistics show that junior officers are not leaving the Foreign Service in large numbers.*

The Foreign Service does have staffing shortages, as the situation in Mexico City illustrates, but these are due to insufficient hiring in the budget-crunch years of the early 1990s rather than any increase in resignations or attrition. Moreover, the authors' reasons for resigning — profound dissatisfaction with the profession — were unusual. Most JOs resign because of irreconcilable "lifestyle" issues: spouses or partners with personal or professional reservations about a transient lifestyle, better pay in the private sector, a desire to return to graduate school and so on. Attrition among junior officers is a healthy mechanism for both the Foreign Service and the officers who leave. Neither the profession nor the lifestyle is for everyone; what surprises me is how few JOs leave for any reason.

A recent study on the State Department by the McKinsey Group entitled "The War for Talent" certainly makes clear that even difficult professional and lifestyle issues are on the table for discussion and remedy. The study revealed significant disparities between the attitudes and expectations of the current generation of new hires and those of current management. These disparities will need to be addressed if the State Department wishes to remain a competitive employer. I know of many posts — including Mexico City — where the McKinsey findings have generated worthwhile modifications in the way that junior officers are treated. For example, many posts are rotating JOs more to enhance their career development and provide them more variety, offering them more opportunities to do reporting and more temporary duty assignments at other posts.

I have gotten to know personally more than half of the 1,000-plus JOs currently on the State Department's payroll. Mexico City and other posts I have visited with serious consular workloads are far along in helping themselves by introducing new management policies that are part of the Consular Bureau's "Best Practices" program. This program of innovative management approaches speaks well of State's commitment to improving working conditions and providing good public service, all in a taxpayer-friendly manner.

So to my second point: The notion that the situation in Mexico City is an example of State department's "unmanaged" nature is contradicted by the facts. Most of the problems in

the non-immigrant visa unit in Mexico City can be traced to the crushing and rapidly increasing workload. The number of NIV applications increased 80 percent in two years, from fewer than 800,000 in FY97 to almost 1.4 million in FY99. The expected FY00 level is 1.8 million. Much of the increase is the result of congressional mandates for which no additional resources were allocated. On top of these increases, immigrant visa applications for all of Mexico almost doubled, from about 67,000 in FY97 to more than 130,000 in FY99.

Faced with the avalanche that resulted from the recent amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, the State Department and Embassy Mexico City didn't just ask more of their junior officers. Instead, staffing was increased. The total number of consular officers devoted to NIV work in Mexico tripled from 40 in FY97 to 120 in FY00. This was accomplished by creatively mixing junior officers, civil servants and other added personnel. The number of locally hired employees devoted to NIV work across Mexico was also increased from 43 to 207. None of this would have occurred without vigilant, energetic management in the consular and administrative sections in Mexico City and in Washington.

In addition, Embassy Mexico City reconstructed the non-immigrant visa pavilion to provide better working space for employees and to create a more efficient flow for the thousands of visa applicants who pass through it every week. Eight additional consular sections have been renovated throughout Mexico since 1998.

Other innovations also make consular work in Mexico more pleasant and efficient. A computerized appointments and home delivery system for visas has reduced the traditional four-to-six-block-long line of visa applicants. For the first time in years, consular employees on their way to work don't have to negotiate a snaking throng of visa applicants, many of whom have spent the night on the sidewalk. The new system also allows post management to control in advance the number of daily applicants, match staffing to demand, reduce applicants' waiting time, and reduce stress and improve attitudes on both sides of the interviewing window.

When I visited Mexico City, I held a meeting for all junior officers, but neither author of "Why We Got Out" chose to attend. During the meeting, I found great appreciation for recent changes in the consular section. I stand by my observation at the time that the JOs' morale — with the explicit exception of that of the authors — was positive and improving. Much of the credit goes to good management at post and particularly to increased staffing to meet surging demand. The JOs also appreciated ongoing renovation projects, including major improvements to residences for entry-level officers in Mexico City. A further reason for the improving morale was the focussed, hardworking, professional attitudes of the JOs themselves. Most understood the challenge before them, saw that help was on the way and did their best under the circumstances.

Most JOs today are working very hard doing consular work. This is because, as in Mexico, most of State's entry-level workload is in the consular area. Every new officer is asked to do a minimum of one year of consular work, but each is also offered the opportunity to work in at least one other cone during the first two assignments. Many opt voluntarily for more than one consular tour, because they appreciate that the skills they develop are valuable over a long-term career.

In reading literally thousands of junior officers' performance ratings, I have noted the following skills and

traits particularly exhibited by those doing consular work: decisiveness, foreign language ability, ability to perform under pressure and under a deadline, courtesy, good judgment, the key diplomatic skill of saying "no" in a way that both sticks and does not alienate, supervisory skills across cultural and language barriers, ability to innovate, stamina, and self-discipline, among others. Those are some of the same attributes the State Department seeks in its deputy chiefs of mission and deputy assistant secretaries.

Many issues raised in the December *FSJ* have merit. But I also believe that those issues are receiving serious attention. The question of nepotism, for example, presents particular challenges. There are no easy answers to the dilemma of having to choose — as was the case in Mexico — between full staffing and the issues raised by tandem couples. There are, in fact, no easy answers when managing a staff as large and diverse as the Foreign Service.

When I wrote my own "why I got out" letter so long ago, I had no idea what it was like to manage people and organizations. I have come to realize that State's worldwide management challenges are, simply put, phenomenal. But I have also seen that State's responses to these challenges are often phenomenally creative — often more creative than we admit to ourselves. No doubt State will face huge new problems in the new millennium. But I am happy to report that we have recruited some truly outstanding junior officers who will be responsible for coming up with solutions to those future challenges, and those JOs are staying in the Foreign Service in record numbers. ■

*Niels Marquardt, an FSO, is director, entry level personnel, in the Office of Career Development and Assignments, Bureau of Personnel.*

# THE HEART AND MIND OF USAID'S VIETNAM MISSION


Ben Fishman

MOST USAID PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM, INCLUDING STATE FSOS, LABORED IN OBSCURITY. HERE ARE SOME OF THEIR STORIES.

*BY MARC LEEPSON*

During the Vietnam War, the U.S. set out not only to win military victory, but also to "win the hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese. This second, equally important campaign to bolster popular support for the South Vietnamese government against the Viet Cong centered on assistance and development programs worth billions of dollars to the war-torn country. The program was directed by a government agency designed to aid underdeveloped countries — the U.S. Agency for International Development — but its soul for the most part was molded in the minds of military men and spymasters like William Colby, who would later serve as director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

From his perch as Saigon CIA station chief and later as the second director of the Civil Operations and Rural

Development Support Program, Colby was highly influential in the war effort. Early on, he was a strong proponent of the "hearts and minds" strategy of which USAID was to be an important component. The CORDS initiative epitomized Colby's conviction that the war would be won or lost not on the battlefield, but in the struggle for the loyalty of the South Vietnamese people.

In hindsight, Colby blamed the loss in Vietnam on failure to implement this strategy. The "major error of the Americans in Vietnam was insisting upon fighting an American-style military war against an enemy who, through the early years of the war, was fighting his style of people's war at the level of the population," he wrote in his 1989 book on Vietnam, *Lost Victory*.

Throughout the war, USAID, which stayed in Vietnam until the fall of Saigon, designed and implemented a wide array of American development and assistance programs in South Vietnam, of which CORDS was perhaps the best known.

### Present At The Creation

U.S. assistance to South Vietnam pre-dated the establishment of USAID by some six years, beginning shortly after the nation came into being in May 1954. The International Cooperation Administration and the Development Loan Fund, which had been created to implement the Marshall Plan in post-World War II Europe and then to administer similar economic assistance to other regions, jointly administered the program. The two groups began steering American non-military foreign aid to the fledgling South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem in June 1955. Initial funding went for land reform programs and for training South Vietnamese police forces and intelligence services in anti-guerrilla tactics.

President John F. Kennedy signed the Foreign Assistance Act into law in 1961, just before the U.S. began to escalate its involvement in Vietnam. At the same time Kennedy also issued an executive order establishing the U.S. Agency for International Development as an independent federal government agency that received its foreign policy guidance from the secretary of State. Whether the timing of USAID's founding was coincidental or not, this reorganization marked the beginning of large increases in American foreign aid, both to South Vietnam and worldwide.

***Between 1962 and 1975, South Vietnam received by far the largest portion of USAID economic assistance.***

Previously, the bulk of U.S. overseas aid had gone in lump sums to central government accounts, which left the funds vulnerable to diversion and mismanagement. The new agency provided assistance in the form of smaller loans and grants and targeted long-range plans to build up the economies of less-developed countries. Specifically, it concentrated on the areas of health, agriculture, population planning, education and energy.

The USAID effort in Vietnam, which was but one of many poor countries around the globe, took on something of a showcase quality. Between 1962 and 1975, South Vietnam received by far the largest portion of USAID economic assistance. In 1967 alone the agency's budget allocated more than $550 million out of its worldwide budget of more than $2 billion for a nation of some 17 million people.

To demonstrate American commitment to shoring up democracy in South Vietnam, between 1961 and 1972 (when it began winding down its assistance), USAID established countless self-help projects, schools, health clinics, hospitals, highways, hydroelectric facilities, industrial centers and farming cooperatives. The agency also sent thousands of agricultural experts, doctors, nurses, teachers, engineers, intelligence agents, and civilian advisers. For example, more than 700 American physicians served tours in USAID-built South Vietnamese hospitals.

During roughly the same period, the agency also ran the extensive Commercial Import Program, worth billions of dollars. USAID supported Vietnamese importers who ordered foreign goods through the CIP, paying for the purchases in South Vietnamese currency.

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*Marc Leepson, who served with the U.S. Army in Vietnam, is arts editor and columnist for* The VVA Veteran, *the newspaper published by Vietnam Veterans of America. His latest book is* The Webster's New World Dictionary of the Vietnam War.

That money then went into a fund at the National Bank of Vietnam, which the South Vietnamese government used to finance development projects and cover operating expenses.

USAID was also instrumental in helping settle hundreds of thousands of refugees, in promoting land reform and in administering the amnesty program (known as Chieu Hoi, or "open arms") that encouraged Viet Cong to desert and join the South Vietnamese cause.

### Unlikely Bed Partners?

In 1967, much of USAID's work was melded into the new military- and CIA-dominated Civil Operations and Rural Development Support Program, which became probably the most famous component of its presence in Vietnam. The CORDS program was the brainchild of Robert Komer, President Lyndon Johnson's special assistant for pacification in Vietnam. In that position, Komer was responsible for the government's non-military efforts to "pacify" Viet Cong-controlled areas and return them to South Vietnamese government control.

CORDS brought into one program all of the diverse counterinsurgency programs run by the military, USAID and the CIA. Under CORDS, USAID personnel worked in conjunction with American and South Vietnamese military and CIA personnel throughout the country, setting up programs designed to win Vietnamese peasants over to the South Vietnamese government's cause and to destroy support for the Viet Cong. In particular, CORDS helped the South Vietnamese develop and then support a national police force and local militias known as the Regional and Popular Forces.

Included in CORDS was the controversial Phoenix program, which was designed to eliminate the rural Viet Cong infrastructure. Under Phoenix, which began in July 1968, South Vietnamese and American pacification intelligence operatives gathered information on suspected guerrillas and then worked to capture, convert or kill them. That program ended in 1972.

A few USAID people — most notably John Paul Vann, who was a development officer from 1965 to 1967 and a CORDS adviser from 1968 to 1971 — gained notoriety during their tours of duty in Vietnam for their outspoken criticism of U.S. policy. Others, such as current U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Richard Holbrooke, who was a USAID province adviser in Vietnam in 1963-64, achieved prominence well after the war.

***USAID's entire mission in the war has been notably underreported in the vast body of Vietnam War literature that has been published since 1975.***

Most of those who worked for USAID in Vietnam, however, labored in relative obscurity. Moreover, even after the war, their stories were not widely disseminated. Indeed, USAID's entire mission in the war has been notably underreported in the vast body of Vietnam War literature that has been published since 1975.

### The POW

Take, for example, the amazing story of Mike Benge, who first went to Vietnam in 1963 as a volunteer with International Voluntary Services, the forerunner of the Peace Corps. Working under a USAID contract, Benge specialized in education and agriculture.

"USAID had a very big rural school program, building usually one- and two-room schoolhouses out in the rural areas," Benge said in an interview. "I was working on that, going around and checking the construction of them to see if they met up to specs. I also was making sure we had teachers who had gone through a teacher training program, and getting books and other supplies out to them."

Benge was posted in the Central Highlands city of Ban Me Thuot. He worked primarily with the Montagnards, the predominant ethnic minority tribal group in the region, translating and teaching. "We were translating some of the primers into the Rhade language [the language of the Montagnards], using Rhade to ease them into Vietnamese, which was the main language being used in the schools."

From Ban Me Thuot, Benge was transferred to Kontum Province where he set up a demonstration farm and agricultural training center. He then went back to the Central Highlands, where he continued his work with the Montagnards. Among other things, Benge taught at a USAID-built technical-vocational education center.

In 1965 he was hired by USAID and held jobs as provincial representative in Kontum, Phu Yen Province and Ban Me Thuot. At the later post, as the civilian adviser to the South Vietnamese province chief, Benge was in charge of all non-military matters. Benge's team, among other things, dug wells, put in a new telephone system, built a new airport and many miles of roads, and installed electric generating systems. They also rebuilt a hospital and built a new teachers training college for ethnic minorities.

At the mission's height in 1967 Benge was in charge of some 65 Americans, including a 45-member military civic action team. The civilians under his command included education, agricultural and refugee advisers.

***"The North Vietnamese had a B-40 rocket launcher pointed at me, plus their [rifles], and said, 'Surrender,' which I did."***

***— Mike Benge, USAID worker held as a POW for five years.***

The pivotal moment in Mike Benge's Victnam tour came on Jan. 28, 1968, during the first attack of the Tet Offensive. When Ban Me Thuot came under attack by a battalion of NVA regulars, Benge frantically tried to arrange the evacuation of his USAID team. While doing so, he was captured by a squad of North Vietnamese Army troops.

"The North Vietnamese had a B-40 rocket launcher pointed at me, plus their [rifles], and said, 'Surrender,' which I did," Benge said. "I was held for five years."

Benge became one of a handful of USAID and State Department employees who were POWs in Vietnam. He was taken to a prison camp in South Vietnam, and then was moved to another camp in Cambodia where he was held in a cage for a year. He was moved again to a hospital POW camp in Laos, and finally to North Vietnam, where he eventually was incarcerated in the infamous "Hanoi Hilton."

"In North Victnam they locked me up in a black box. I was there for a year. It was about six by four feet with the walls painted black, the doors closed," Benge said. "I spent 27 months total in solitary confinement — one year in a cage, one year in a black box."

Benge was released in January 1973 along with the other American POWs held in Hanoi. He was credited with saving the lives of 11 USAID personnel in Ban Me Thuot and received the State Department's highest award for heroism and another for valor for his conduct in the prison camp.

### The Future U.N. Ambassador

Richard Holbrooke joined the U.S. Foreign Service in 1962 shortly after graduating from Brown University. He studied Vietnamese and went to Vietnam in May 1963 where he served for six years in several posts. After a brief initial stint in Saigon, Holbrooke became a USAID provincial representative in the Mekong Delta. He was 22 years old.

"I was assigned first to USAID's office of Rural Development, headed by a young man named Rufus Phillips who was a protégé of [legendary CIA man] Ed Lansdale," Holbrooke said in Kim Willenson's *The Bad War: An Oral History of the Vietnam War* (1987). "At 22, I found myself in charge of the Strategic Hamlet Program in Ba Xuyen, a province of 600,000 people, where the Bassac River meets the South China Sea. The capital was Soc Trang. There was an American military advisory group there, and a division advisory group."

About a third of Ba Xuyen province was controlled by the Viet Cong, Holbrooke said, and about a third was controlled by the South Vietnamese government. The rest, he said, "was a gray area." That situation was at odds with what was reported to Saigon and Washington. "There was a profound gap between what Washington had been told about this province, listing 400,000 people under government control, and the real situation, which was far shakier than that," he said.

Holbrooke said he was "outraged" by the misreporting and "raised questions" about it. But he continued to believe in his mission. "I did not draw the conclusion that something was wrong with our effort; I only drew the conclusion that there was something wrong with our reporting and that you have to seek truth from facts," he said. "It never occurred to me in the year 1963 that the United States could lose a war. How could it?"

### The Doctor

Beale Rogers was typical of the many American doctors who volunteered to go to Vietnam to work for

USAID. In 1967 the New York physician took a leave of absence from his practice and signed up for a two-month stint in a USAID-run program administered by the American Medical Association.

"They were recruiting physicians to go and work among the civilian population," Rogers said in Harry Maurer's *Strange Ground: Americans in Vietnam, 1945-1975, An Oral History* (1989). Rogers volunteered, he said, because he saw "the prospect of a great adventure, a very useful kind of adventure [and because] I was going to be working with people who were in great need."

***"It never occurred to me in the year 1963 that the United States could lose a war. How could it?"***

***— Richard Holbrooke***

He went to work in a hospital in the Mekong Delta town of Phu Vinh. "I was told before I went there that it was a secure area, but I quickly learned that wasn't so." Rogers said. "There wasn't the intensity of the war in the north, but the possibility of injury and death and tension of war was there. [But] I never saw anything happen. I only saw the results of it in the hospital."

Rogers lived in a U.S. military compound with several other USAID personnel, including a U.S. Navy lieutenant commander, a civilian agricultural expert, and a police lieutenant, all of whom worked with Vietnamese counterparts. USAID, he said, "was new to me, and it was impressive. I was so impressed with these people who went out there eager to accomplish something. And with their frustration at [often] being thwarted by the system."

He was put to work immediately in the hospital, working with several American military doctors and medics along with three Vietnamese doctors and a dozen Vietnamese nurses. Rogers worked exclusively with civilian patients. "I let it be known that I wasn't going to treat soldiers," he said. "That was the responsibility of the military. I was there on a people-to-people program. My main ward was for women and children and elderly civilians. On this ward, 25 percent had legs blown off."

Rogers had mixed feelings about the experience. "I came home having done I don't know how many operations, saved a few lives, comforted a few," he said. "But as to doing anything lasting, I'm not ever sure how my presence was received as far as doing my country any good. Did they think about it? Did they say, 'That great United States did this for us?' Or did they say, 'Why isn't it doing more?' Did they make any connection to the United States at all? I don't know."

### The Agricultural Expert

Mike Korin spent nearly seven years in Vietnam, from 1967 to 1973, working for the U.S. Department of Agriculture on loan to USAID. He spent two years in the city of Tam Ky in Quang Tin Province, where he shared an office with USAID civilian doctors and construction experts, U.S. military civic affairs specialists and a Vietnamese professional and support staff.

Korin worked there on a wide range of development activities, including rice production, and fisheries, forestry and irrigation systems development. "My work was with Vietnamese government officials," he said in an interview, "representing different agencies and providing USAID resources to help fund those activities."

Korin said the experience was, in most respects, a positive one. "It was exciting. We felt a sense of accomplishment," he said. "But there was also a certain degree of frustration because there was a lot of fighting going on in the province, including attacks on the provincial capital."

The main problem in Korin's area was the large number of refugees. "It made things difficult," he said. "People were constantly being routed out of their villages and their villages were being burned down either by the bad guys or the good guys. People were put into refugee camps. It was very difficult for the people."

Korin was based in Saigon during his last four years in Vietnam. He was among nearly 200 USAID agricultural experts in the country at the time. His Saigon office was made up of about two dozen American USAID agriculture professionals involved in land-reform programs. Korin traveled throughout the country working on the Montagnard land reform and land-to-the-tiller programs, which paid landlords to give land to peasant farmers.

He saw a good deal of the war. "I was shot at a number of times. I was rocketed. I was close enough to see the fins on our allied planes' 500-pound bombs as they

fell through the air to the targets which were a few hundred yards away," he said. "I had a 50-caliber machine gun rake the room I lived in while I was in it in Tam Ky. I drove over roads where there were land mines. I had vehicles that followed me blown up."

Korin, as is the case with most former USAID personnel, has positive things to say about the Vietnamese he worked with. They "were generally effective, appreciative and hard working," he said. Korin praised the "enthusiasm and commitment" of his Vietnamese contacts from the "lower levels all the way up to the senior ministry level officials. They worked very hard. They were committed to it all. There were just other factors that led to the turn of events."

***"My main ward was for women and children and elderly civilians, 25 percent [of whom] had legs blown off."***

***— Beale Rogers, USAID doctor in Vietnam***

### The CORDS Man

Sidney Chernenkoff was part of one of USAID's largest efforts in the Vietnam War, the CORDS program. Chernenkoff quit his job with the Bank of America in San Francisco in 1966 to sign up with USAID. After spending six months in Hawaii taking language training and courses in Vietnamese history, culture, politics and community development, he arrived in Vietnam in March 1967. He spent the next four years there.

Chernenkoff's first posting was as deputy district adviser in the town of Tuy Phuoc in Binh Dinh Province near the city of Qui Nhon. He and other USAID personnel worked with an American army team of 10 men whose job was to advise the local Vietnamese district chief on military matters, including recruitment, training and deployment of the Regional and Popular Forces (the local militia).

"My job on the civilian side was working with refugees," Chernenkoff said in an interview. "We had programs with funds to finance the construction of bridges, schools and roads."

After 18 months in that job, Chernenkoff transferred to the capital, where he worked in the CORDS Evaluation Branch, also known as "Pentagon East." He spent the rest of his tour traveling throughout South Vietnam to evaluate different CORDS programs.

"The Evaluation Branch was 50 percent civilian, 50 percent military," Chernenkoff said. "This was the group that reported to [CORDS head] Robert Komer and then later to William Colby, who replaced him. We did studies based on our field experience and our facility with the language."

During his four years in Vietnam,s Chernenkoff worked with hundreds of American USAID and CORDS personnel, virtually all of whom were committed to the paeification effort. "What struck me was that I would meet someone I never knew who was working in a district on the other side of the country and we would come to the same conclusions about things," Chernenkoff said. "Most of us thought that what we were doing was worthwhile and we were having some impact."

On the other hand, he said, many USAID people worried about what would happen in Vietnam after the American troops left. "We had a lot of questions" about South Vietnam "after U.S. troops were pulled out," he said. Most USAID people, Chernenkoff said, believed that the South Vietnamese far too often relied too heavily on American military power as well as on American help in non-military areas.

"The more we did for the Vietnamese, the less they did for themselves," he said. "That wasn't true in all cases [however]. There were a tremendous number of dedicated [Vietnamese] people."

### In Retrospect

What impact did the massive USAID effort in Vietnam have on the war's outcome? As is the case with nearly every aspect of the nation's longest war, there are starkly differing opinions about the answer to that question. Some believe that non-military programs had little or no place in the war. Others contend that if the decision-makers who shaped American policy during the nation's longest and most controversial overseas war had paid more attention to the non-military component of our strategy, its outcome might have been more favorable.

Another opinion holds that what USAID did in Vietnam could not overcome the fatally flawed American military strategy of fighting a limited war. "We had some good [USAID] programs and we had some bad programs," Mike Benge, the former POW, said. "We were there for the right reasons. We just did a lot of wrong things," he said. "The military was fighting the war to lose."

Chernenkoff agreed with that assessment. "My view is that [the U.S. military] and USAID didn't lose the war," he said. "Our policy was flawed."

***"Most of us thought that what we were doing was worthwhile and we were having some impact."***

***— Sidney Chernenkoff, USAID development officer in Vietnam***

Others point to the immense problems involved in working on pacification programs in a country that is involved in a shooting war. "USAID programs are not built to dig wells and duck bullets at the same time," said David Reuther, a Foreign Service officer who served in Thailand during the Vietnam War.

What can be said with certainty is that USAID played an important role in the war effort. "USAID administrators were a large part of the U.S. mission in the Vietnam War," noted Richard A. Hunt, a U.S. Army Center of Military History historian and the author of *Pacification: The American Struggle for Vietnam's Hearts and Minds* (1995). "They had a seat at the [policy-making] table in Saigon with the military and the CIA."

USAID personnel, Reuther added, "were highly motivated, believed in what they were doing, thought they doing good things, and by and large worked with South Vietnamese counterparts who were also motivated and good. Of course, the whole thing went to hell. But not because of lack of trying." ■

# FROM DIPLOMAT TO DISSIDENT: A STATE DEPARTMENT ODYSSEY


Ben Fishman

A SELF-DESCRIBED "FALLEN FSO" RECOUNTS THE IMPACT OF VIETNAM ON HIS DIPLOMATIC CAREER — AND WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THAT ENDED.

BY JOHN MARKS

The *Foreign Service Journal* published the first article I ever wrote in December 1971, during the height of the Vietnam War. At that time, some 20 percent of the FSO corps, including me, had served in Vietnam. My article, entitled "Vietnamization of the Foreign Service," drew on my experiences and those of my colleagues to assess the impact of the conflict on the career we had chosen. For me, this question was intensely personal. The year before, the war had knocked me off the linear path of a State Department career and I had resigned from the Foreign Service.

Now, as I reread my *FSJ* article and look at my Vietnam slides for the first time in 25 years, I am carried back to a time when the Foreign Service faced intense division over the war.

I entered the Foreign Service in 1966 as an inexperienced 22-year-old, fresh out of college. I joined because I wanted to do something meaningful with my life — to do well by doing good. When posts were handed out to my A-100 class, I was assigned to what *Time Magazine* had just described as "Swinging London." I was overjoyed at the idea of starting my career in a grand old European capital.

***I was one of the few members of my generation who went to Vietnam to avoid the draft.***

### To Vietnam With Enthusiasm

It turned out that was too good to be true. Four days before I was supposed to sail to England on the USS United States, my draft board reclassified me 1-A. I did not want to go into the military, but State Department personnel officers said that there was little chance I could win a deferment as a diplomat in London. My best chance to stay out of uniform, they advised, would be to accept an assignment to the pacification program in Vietnam. In that capacity, I would be detailed to USAID as one of the first of about 350 FSOs who would eventually serve in what later became the CORDS, the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support program. As I wrote in the *Journal* in 1971: "During the middle '60s, USAID conducted extensive recruiting campaigns throughout the United States in a search for sufficient volunteers. These campaigns invariably fell short of their goals, and after 1966 increasing numbers of FSOs were assigned to USAID to fill the gap."

I reluctantly agreed to be reassigned, and I thus became one of the few members of my generation to have gone to Vietnam to *avoid* the draft.

Arriving in Vietnam in August 1966, I was still motivated by John Kennedy-era enthusiasm for government service, and I did not yet have strong views about Vietnam policy. I wound up in Xuan Loc, a dusty provincial capital about 50 miles east of Saigon, as an adviser to the local government. I was responsible for "new life development" — a catch-all effort to improve South Vietnamese government responsiveness to popular needs. With no training except three weeks of Southeast Asia area studies, I stepped into duties that included resettling refugees, helping the local hospital get U.S. medical supplies, dispatching helicopters on humanitarian missions and coordinating with U.S. military forces.

Early in 1967, I launched a pig project in a village that the South Vietnamese government had recently taken back from Viet Cong control. With a USAID warehouse to back me up, I offered to provide gravel, cement and roofing to every peasant who built a pig sty — and to put a pig in each completed sty. The peasants were initially skeptical. But after I helped build the first sty and gave away the first pig, about 20 Vietnamese joined this "self-help" effort. Then, one night the Viet Cong attacked the village with little opposition from government militia. By morning, most of the village had been burned down, the people who had cooperated with us had been killed and all the pigs had been carried off. Needless to say, I was devastated.

Over time, I came to see the failure of the pig program as emblematic of U.S. involvement in Vietnam. Despite our good intentions and massive intervention, the South Vietnamese government was unable to provide adequate security or to function effectively.

I was becoming increasingly disillusioned with U.S. policy on the grounds that I did not think it was working well. Nevertheless, I still thought that somehow, if better tactics were used, the American side could win. I did not yet question whether the U.S. should be in Vietnam.

### Working Within The System

In 1967, the Johnson administration took away control of the pacification program from USAID and gave it to the Pentagon. So after a year in Xuan Loc, I was transferred for the final six months of my tour to Saigon, where I worked at U.S. military headquarters as a plans and programs officer. Although I had the protocol rank of a mere 2nd lieutenant, my new boss and the other colonels seemed to listen to me because I had on-the-ground experience in the countryside.

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*John Marks, who describes himself as a "fallen FSO," is president of Search for Common Ground in Washington, D.C. and the European Centre for Common Ground in Brussels.*

This was a time when very senior U.S. officials were making optimistic public statements, claiming they could "see the light at the end of the tunnel." That view came crashing down in January 1968 when, during the Tet offensive, communist forces launched coordinated attacks on Vietnamese cities and even penetrated the U.S. embassy compound. Fighting was everywhere in Saigon, and I could not get to work. For a week, I was on the roof of my apartment building, with camera and binoculars, watching the war play out across Saigon.

***With no training except three weeks of Southeast Asia area studies, I did everything from resettling refugees to coordinating with U.S. military forces.***

In March 1968, I returned to Washington for an assignment in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. The very day of my return, President Lyndon Johnson announced that he would not run for re-election. The U.S. seemed caught up in a cultural revolution, at the core of which was opposition to the war. In this heady atmosphere, I became convinced that not only was U.S. policy in Vietnam ineffective, it was wrong.

So while I served in INR, first as an analyst of Belgian and French affairs and then as staff assistant to the director, I was a dove, working inside the system to end U.S. involvement in Vietnam. In November 1969, while a nationwide "moratorium" — a series of anti-war demonstrations — was taking place, I was in upstate New York recruiting college students for the State Department. I was so keen to show opposition to my employer's position on the war that I fashioned a black sock into an armband, which I wore as I talked to students about Foreign Service careers.

During this period, I was one of a small group of junior officers granted a meeting with Secretary of State William Rogers to urge changes in U.S. policy. I remember well being ushered into the secretary's grand office on the seventh floor and sitting down to chat. In response to our concerns, he talked mainly about his Navy service during World War II. I came away convinced that he was disconnected from my reality. Afterwards, a senior colleague told me how fortunate I was, because in all his years in the Foreign Service he had never met a secretary of State.

For me, the last straw was the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in April 1970. I felt personally abused because a few months earlier I had been part of a White House study group that had gone to Vietnam and written a relatively pessimistic report. It seemed that our group's honest conclusions were being used to help justify expansion of the war into a new country. I felt I could not, with good conscience, continue to work for the Nixon administration, even as an opponent within the system. However, I lacked the courage to resign immediately, unlike my colleagues Anthony Lake — who later became President Bill Clinton's first national security adviser — Roger Morris and William Watts. I quit four months later, after I found a position as executive assistant to Sen. Clifford Case of New Jersey. Case opposed U.S. involvement in the war. My job was to get Congress to pass the Case-Church amendment which would, in 1973, finally cut off funding for American military operations in Vietnam.

Looking back now, while I still believe the United States made a huge mistake in getting involved in Vietnam, I also realize that I was wrong to have focused almost exclusively on the U.S. side of the war and not to have taken into account that communist victories in Southeast Asia would result in massive violations of human rights, particularly genocide in Cambodia.

### Enter "John Claymore"

In 1971, the *FSJ* agreed to publish my article on "Vietnamization of the Foreign Service." As was true in most senatorial offices, Sen. Case had a rule that staff members could not write for publication — except under his name. I decided to get around this by using a pseudonym. I chose John Claymore. A claymore is a type of landmine, and at that time in my life, I was very angry and wanted nothing more than to have an explosive impact.

The author's biography attached to the article explained: "John Claymore is the pseudonym of a former FSO who served in Vietnam. The primary reason for his resignation from the State Department was disagreement with U.S. policy on Southeast Asia. He is

not using his real name because of a limitation on publishing in his current job, but he would be glad to correspond or meet with anyone interested in discussing his article."

A few days after the article appeared I got a call from Benjamin Welles, a *New York Times* reporter who covered the State Department and who was the son of Franklin Roosevelt's under secretary of State, Sumner Welles. My cover had been blown. Someone — presumably not at the *Foreign Service Journal* — had told Welles that I was John Claymore. While I was concerned that I might get into trouble with the senator, I could truthfully state that I had had nothing to do with Welles's discovery of my identity. I was also thrilled that my article was going to be at the center of a *New York Times* story. (And the good-hearted Sen. Case forgave me almost immediately.)

***Even after a year in Vietnam, I still thought that the American side could win. I did not yet question whether the U.S. should be there at all — but I soon would.***

Welles wanted to know more about the following passage in the article: "Many [FSOs in Vietnam] served in proto-combat roles with command responsibility. While not participants, they received reports of war crimes and what often seemed like the unnecessary loss of human life. Some were faced with the moral dilemma of how far they should go in exposing incidents they knew to be wrong.

"One FSO currently serving in Washington possesses a file of documented atrocities, including photographs. He has written extensive reports on these apparent war crimes he investigated in Vietnam. As far as he knows, no action has ever been taken to punish the guilty. Because he is a supporter of

the president's Vietnam policy, and because he fears the effect on that policy of additional war crime controversy, he has not chosen to make his information public. He also is undoubtedly aware of the negative result disclosure would have on his career prospects."

The FSO in question had entered the Foreign Service in my A-100 class. I knew that, unlike me, he would not be thrilled by the *New York Times*' interest, so I decided to safeguard his identity. (I still do, even after he has risen to the rank of ambassador.) Still, I told Welles everything else I knew about the incident. I suppose that in other times I might have remained completely quiet to protect a colleague. In 1971, however, how one felt about the war seemed of overriding importance.

***During the Tet offensive, I spent a week on the roof of my apartment building with camera and binoculars watching the war play out across Saigon.***

I talked to Welles just before the Christmas holidays, and Washington soon shut down. I kept checking the *New York Times*, but no article appeared. Then, on Dec. 29, 1971, the *Los Angeles Times*' George McArthur wrote a piece from Saigon entitled "U.S. War Atrocity File Alleged." The article began:

"A semiofficial publication of the U.S. State Department this month rather casually presented the charge that an American diplomat now serving in Washington has a file of documented U.S. atrocities in South Vietnam about which nothing has been done. (In Washington, a State Department spokesman said that the department is not currently trying to identify the author or obtain more details on the atrocity allegations.)

"The unsubstantiated charges of atrocities in a semiofficial publication which obviously reflects the sentiments of a broad segment of State Department officers raised hackles among military men. 'Let them put up or shut up,' one staff officer snorted."

This *Los Angeles Times* article was inaccurate in two respects. First, the *FSJ* is not and never has been a publication of the State Department, either officially or semi-officially. Second, I had not written that Americans had committed the atrocities. In fact, I had already told the *New York Times* that the perpetrators were South Koreans.

### The Fallout Continues

The *Los Angeles Times* did not identify me, but the next day the *New York Times* did, when Welles's article finally appeared under the headline: "U.S. Diplomats in Vietnam Said to Face Moral Issue." I had negotiated with Welles that the article would describe me simply as "a foreign policy consultant to Congress" and that it would not mention Sen. Case. Welles wrote:

"State Department sources said that the alleged atrocities were investigated by the Department and were also reported in the United States press on Jan. 12, 1970. They are said to have concerned the South Korean "Tiger" Division, one of two South Korean infantry divisions serving in Vietnam, and not United States forces. A Pentagon spokesman said that officers in its Southeast Asia section had not been able to obtain the current issue of the *Foreign Service Journal* and thus could not comment."

The matter probably would have died there if the State Department's Vietnam Working Group director, Josiah W. Bennett, had not written a letter in the February 1972 *FSJ*, in which he said about my article: "Concerned that this account might convey a misleading impression of the conduct of one FSO and of Foreign Service attitudes generally, I looked up the file on the matter. I found that the alleged atrocities do not involve American troops, as one might infer from reading the article, but Korean forces in Vietnam. The files show that the Department of State took action on the reports it received from various sources regarding these alleged atrocities and that MACV [the U.S. military command], along with our Embassy in Saigon, sought to get to the bottom of the allegations and have corrective action taken.

"The files also show the FSO referred to by Mr. Claymore did far more than write reports on incidents that came to his attention in the field. On his return to Washington, he took a prominent part in the Department's efforts to follow up on these and similar reports."

The *FSJ* graciously gave me the right to reply in the same issue, and I wrote: "I would agree with Mr.

# AFSA NEWS

American Foreign Service Association • April 2000


LEGISLATIVE UPDATE ■ By Ken Nakamura, Director of Congressional Relations

## The FY2001 Budget Fight

On Feb. 7, President Clinton sent his FY 2001 budget request to Congress, starting another budget and funding cycle. The $1.8 trillion dollar budget request contains a $22.75 billion request for foreign affairs, and a supplemental request of $1.65 billion for Colombia, Kosovo and Southeastern Europe, and debt reduction for the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative. The proposed budget is about 2 percent higher than FY2000, if the one-time funding of the $1.8 billion Wye River/Middle East peace package is included, 11 percent higher without Wye. Foreign affairs funding still stands at about 1 percent of the overall budget.

### State Budget

Within the overall State Department portion, the embassy security funding request increased from $568 million to about $1.07 billion, international peacekeeping increased from $498.1 million to $738.7 million and the capital investment fund, to meet the needs identified in the Overseas Presence Advisory Panel report, increased by $17 million.

Funding for embassy security is in two parts of the budget request for State. Within the Diplomatic and Consular Programs account, the worldwide security upgrade increased from $254 million to $410 million. Part of this is the

Continued on page 6


Courtesy of the George Bush Presidential Library

Distinguished guests helped inaugurate AFSA's first Foreign Service exhibit, which opened at the George Bush Presidential Library on February 21. From left to right: Texas A&M President Ray Bowen, 75th Anniversary Director Louise Eaton, retired Ambassador Sheldon Krys, former First Lady Barbara Bush, former President George Bush, Foreign Service Director General Skip Gnehm, and AFSA President Marshall Adair. Front and center is Sadie (Millie's daughter). Story on page 3

*This Issue in Brief:*



MOBILIZING OUR MEMBERSHIP

## Grassroots Initiatives Under Way

In political campaigns, grassroots support helps determine who succeeds.

"The whole idea behind grassroots is to influence the political environment in which Congress and the administration operate," says Ken Nakamura, AFSA's legislative affairs director. AFSA's legislative concerns include increased funding for embassy security and the overall foreign affairs budget, FS personnel issues, and FS retiree issues.

While members of associations often lobby Congress, certain laws restrict government employees from lobbying Congress. Specifically, active-duty AFSA members can not use government resources, such as letterhead or telephones to contact their representatives, or lobby

Continued on page 5

# AFSA NEWS BRIEF

## Progress on Allowances

AFSA has convinced State management to raise the Miscellaneous Expense Portions of the Home Service Transfer Allowance and Foreign Transfer Allowance. Employees without families now get $500, up from $350, and employees with families get $1000, up from $700.

AFSA also convinced State to raise the wardrobe allowance for a two-zone transfer—from $250 to $450 for employees without family, from $450 to $750 for employees with one family member, and from $600 to $1000 for employees with more than one family member.

Finally, AFSA got State to increase the transportation allowance for evacuees with family members from $10 to $15 a day for employees with one family member and from $10 to $20 a day for employees with more than one family member.

## *AFSA News* Adds Features

In this issue, *AFSA News* launches a "Q & A" column. Retiree Liaison Ward Thompson and Labor Management Specialist James Yorke will serve as alternate authors of this monthly column. Periodically, we will also publish "On the Web" to let you know what's happening on AFSA's web site at www.afsa.org. We've also revived "Inside the FS Community," which will appear every other month.

We look forward to hearing your comments on these new features. In addition, we welcome your letters to the editor on issues published in *AFSA News*. Because of space limitations, letters should be no longer than 200 words, and are subject to editing. If you want to submit a letter to the editor or any news of interest to the FS community or news related to an AFSA member, you may send a fax to Rita Colorito, *AFSA News* editor at (202) 338-8244 or an e-mail at colorito@afsa.org.

## "Life in the Foreign Service" Seminar

**Registration required, only first 50 accepted, R.S.V.P by April 14, 2000**

**What:** Three hour-long sessions relating to topics of particular interest to Foreign Service Employees
- Insurance Options
- Financial and Tax Planning
- Real Estate/Property Management

Enjoy a panel approach with ample time for questions.

**When:** Saturday, April 29th
8:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m. Refreshments will be provided

**Where:** AFSA Headquarters,
Foreign Service Club
2101 E St., N.W.
(across from State Dept.)
Washington, D.C. 20037
Registration: $10 AFSA Members,
$75 Non-AFSA Members

Registration forms available in all AFSA offices. For further information call Chrissy Spaulding at (800) 704-2372 ext. 525.


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PROMOTING THE FOREIGN SERVICE

# Presidential Library Exhibit Opens



Exhibit goers learn about the Foreign Service.

To enhance the understanding of the critical role played by the Foreign Service in the daily lives of all Americans, the 75th Anniversary Committee decided the celebration should spread across the country. It proposed paying tribute to FS men and women through a series of photo exhibits to be showcased at presidential libraries nationwide.

The first exhibit opened on Feb. 21 at the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum in College Station, Texas. President and Mrs. Bush toured the exhibit accompanied by AFSA President Marshall Adair, State Director General Skip Gnehm, retired Ambassador Sheldon Krys, and 75th Anniversary Director Louise Eaton. Some 250 students and FS retirees attended the opening.

To further educate exhibit goers, AFSA, the Bush Presidential Library Foundation, and the Bush International Center sponsored a seminar, "The U.S. Foreign Service: Careers of Challenges and Opportunities." Panelists included Adair, Gnehm and Krys. In opening remarks, Bush urged students to consider joining the Foreign Service. He praised the knowledge, dedication, professionalism and skill of the FSOs who kept him from "falling on his face," during his time as ambassador to the United Nations and as director of the liaison office in Beijing. Bush also said that as vice president he was appreciative of the briefings he received from overseas posts when he would visit or attend funerals of foreign leaders.

At a reception following the program students and FS retirees had the opportunity to meet with the panel participants. Adair also met with several students who were interested in internships in Washington

Texas A&M University, on whose campus the Bush Library is located, declared the opening of the exhibit as Foreign Service Day. A second parallel photo exhibit opened on February 22nd at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library in Atlanta. President Carter will visit the exhibit on March 22nd.

V.P. VOICE: **USAID** ■ BY FRANK MILLER

# Hints for Completing AEFs

An April 1999 AID notice informed FSOs that AFSA and AID had negotiated new precepts that are to be used by rating officers, appraisal committees and selection boards to establish work objectives, evaluate performance, and determine tenure for the current rating cycle. The new precepts identify six skill areas that FSOs are expected to demonstrate at each grade level. You can download the skills matrix from the human resource web page.

An AEF that demonstrates you met the standard for your grade should be eligible for a "B" ranking on your report card. An AEF that documents that you demonstrate potential to meet the standards at the next higher level should make you more competitive for promotion and may result in an "A" ranking. An AEF that demonstrates you are not meeting the standards of your class would result in a "C" ranking.

It is now time for FSOs to start preparing self-assessments for their rating officers. Take each work objective and describe how it was met and what skills were utilized in reaching results. Don't waste time on process; focus on results. What difference did you make? Your work objectives must be in your span of control. If there were barriers that may have affected your performance explain them. Make sure you give examples of the skills you demonstrated in meeting objectives. At least one sub-skill area under the six skill categories must be described in each AEF.

It is important to show cross-sector skills in describing your accomplishments. The boards are looking for FSOs who can think and work "outside the box" and can see the "big picture." Do not limit your scope of performance and interest to a narrow technical or programmatic field. Most FSOs participate in teams that cross technical fields. Describe your contribution to team efforts and your impact on results. Show your professional growth.

When your AEF is given to you, carefully review it to ensure that it meets all the requirements. All work objectives must be addressed. Failure to meet a work objective that was within your span of control could result in a low ranking. Moreover, make sure the description of your skills meets the standards for your class.

If you believe that the AEF contains errors of fact, errors of omission, inconsistencies or falsely prejudicial statements, bring this to the attention of your rating officer and your appraisal committee (AC). If your rating officer refuses to correct discrepancies, document your case and take it to your AC. Your AC must make the changes you requested or document in writing why they disagreed with your request.

As a final hint, I strongly encourage you to fill out the employee comments section. This section provides the boards with another dimension of your performance. The boards reported that employees were able to significantly overcome poorly written evaluations and improve their rankings with their own comments. In your comments, be positive, not defensive. Provide examples of professional growth—how you broadened your skills and knowledge of agency programs.

Note that I failed to mention the dreaded areas of improvement section. This section has been dropped. Amen.

V.P. VOICE: **STATE** ■ BY JOHN NALAND

# Defending the Foreign Service

Earlier this year, AFSA raised its voice to protest the assignment of a Civil Service employee to a DCM position. In so doing, we received an unexpected response from some AFSA members. While most members intuitively understood what was at stake and why it was our duty to speak out, some members were upset at AFSA. They argued that we were wrong because 1) this was an enormously talented person and 2) it was only one assignment. One remarked that "We have all seen FSO DCMs who were real turkeys, so why not give this gifted civil servant a try?"

In replying, I made the following points:

- AFSA's objection had nothing to do with the civil servant in question. In fact, because we learned of this through a vague rumor at the last minute instead of a friendly head's-up from personnel or the regional bureau, we set our position before we even learned the civil servant's name.
- It is AFSA's institutional role to speak out when we see threats to the Foreign Service. Asking why we worry so much about things like this is like asking the Cuba desk why they worry so much about Fidel Castro.
- AFSA can not defend the Foreign Service in general without defending it on a case-by-case basis. This "only one assignment" is but a single frame in a never-ending movie. Two years ago management intervened to secure a principal officer position for State's chief financial officer. AFSA, a U.S. Senator, and the *Washington Post* raised a ruckus. Although the assignment went through, State did wait two years before issuing the next challenge. Remaining silent this time would have only encouraged more frequent challenges.
- The Foreign Service is under constant pressure. The percentage of political ambassadorships reached 36 percent last fall. Some in Congress and elsewhere depreciate our unique role, arguing that anyone can do our jobs or that our jobs need not be done at all ("close embassies and have Washington e-mail foreign governments directly"). Sending someone with no overseas experience to be a DCM only reinforces the view that there is nothing special about the FS. It sets a terrible precedent that the administration taking office next January may be tempted to follow.
- AFSA must object to sending someone with no overseas service to be the DCM of a busy embassy that manages a difficult bilateral relationship. The FSOs passed over for that job each had decades of apprenticeship. DCM is the quintessential FSO job and a prerequisite for being an ambassador.
- Finally, AFSA believes that the process by which this assignment was made violates the terms of a 1996 agreement establishing procedures for filling FS jobs with non-FS people. AFSA, as the guardian of the rules that we have negotiated, cannot remain silent while State ignores even one established procedure lest we put all our hard-won checks and balances in jeopardy.

AFSA's objection had nothing to do with the civil servant in question.

As always, I welcome member input. Contact me at NalandJ@state.gov or by fax at 202-647-0265.

DEDICATION RECOGNIZED

# Lutz Receives FSI Award

At the end of a course at the Foreign Service Institute, students evaluate their professors. In the case of adjunct faculty member Carol Lutz, positive student evaluations led her to receive FSI's Adjunct Faculty award.

FSI's Political Training Division nominated Lutz, AFSA's senior labor management specialist, for the award, citing her help with some of the division's most important training priorities over the last several years.

Four times a year, Lutz collaborates with three colleagues to conduct a half-day seminar on mediation, one of the core modules of FSI's Negotiation Art & Skills course. The seminar introduces students to the critical skills of a mediator and then enables them to practice those skills in realistic role-play scenarios.

"Ms. Lutz not only delivers a presentation, but she also coaches the students during their role-play exercises to provide on-the-spot feedback and steer them in the right direction," says AFSA member Bob Hopper, FSI's director of political training. "Students find this segment one of the most useful and applicable during this five-day course."

Negotiation skills don't come naturally for most people, says Lutz. "I think this course is valuable because it teaches those skills, and I'm appreciative to the Foreign Service Institute for offering the course."

Lutz has considerable experience as an alternative dispute resolution practitioner. In addition to her work with AFSA, she mediates Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) disputes for the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights and arbitrates legal malpractice and fee disputes for the D.C. Bar Attorney-Client Arbitration Service. She also worked with the State Department's Dispute Resolution Specialist and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service to teach an EEO pilot mediation course at the institute.

Grassroots • Continued from page 1

Congress on government time. They also can not lobby Congress in their official capacity, only as private citizens.

Instead, AFSA focuses its grassroots initiatives on retired members and a dozen local FS retiree groups nationwide. "These retiree associations provide the Foreign Service community with a grassroots safety net," says Ward Thompson, AFSA's retiree liaison and outreach director.

If it wasn't for FS retiree assistance, Senate Resolution 217—the Foreign Service Day Resolution—may never have passed. "It was tough getting it co-sponsored, right down to the wire," says Nakamura.

To pass a resolution, 51 senators must approve it, 20 from each party. Members of the Foreign Affairs Retirees of Northern Virginia, working with Maryland colleagues, had secured 50 co-sponsors. Then, Vernon Merrill, head of the Washington state organization of FS retirees, moved to action, getting his members to sign and send two dozen letters in support of the resolution to Sen. Patty Murray. The final signature from Murray passed the resolution.

"Our goal is to make grassroots leaner," says AFSA President Marshall Adair, "We want our members to take initiative, but we will provide guidance on issues." To do so, AFSA is rejuvenating its Legislative Action Network of members who are interested in lobbying Congress and actively supporting AFSA issues. The list, which was started five years ago, is being updated.

"Congress needs to know what the Foreign Service looks like, and they need to hear from us," says Adair. Because Congress is more apt to pay attention when an issue is backed by many constituents, AFSA works with the Coalition for American Leadership Abroad (COLEAD), an organization of 40 non-profits concerned with promoting active U.S. engagement in international affairs.

On important issues, such as the FY2001 budget for foreign affairs *(see story pg. 1)*, COLEAD organizes group sign-on letters to Congress and sends model letters to grassroots groups and national organizations, such as the National Peace Corps Association, the Fulbright Association and the United Nations Association. They in turn send the letters to their members to sign and send to Congress. COLEAD has a web site, www.colead.org, which provides information about foreign affairs funding, major speeches and model letters to Congress. "Uniting the foreign affairs community to work together across the country is, perhaps, the most urgent task to ensure we do not abandon our international responsibilities," says Harry C. Blaney, COLEAD president and FSO retiree.

The backbone of any grassroots effort is getting the message out. "It's important to keep the issues on the radar screen," says Nakamura.

Retirees lead the effort through AFSA's Speaker's Bureau, which provides lecturers for schools and organizations. "We want to talk to anyone in America who is interested in the Foreign Service," says Thompson, adding that many FS colleagues are requesting speakers for groups to which they belong, such as Kiwanis and Rotary clubs.

For more information on AFSA's Legislative Action Network and the Speaker's Bureau contact Ward Thompson at 800-704-2372 ext. 528; on COLEAD contact Harry Blaney at 800-704-2372 ext. 519.




**The 35th annual Foreign Service Day will be celebrated Friday, May 5, 2000. Invitations with further information will be sent only to those who request them. To receive an invitation, send your name, address and telephone number to: Special Events Coordinator, PER/EX-Room H1103 SA-1, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20522-0108. If you have any questions, telephone (202) 663-3600.**

LETTER TO THE EDITOR

# For the DOD Record

In his February *President's Views* column, Marshall Adair correctly identified the long-term weaknesses in the Foreign Service's attention to and success with training its employees. Comparing us to DOD, vastly better at training its people—at all levels and in all fields—is reasonable as long as we bear in mind three key differences.

The first, mentioned by Adair, is college credits for courses. DOD has made major efforts to connect courses to civilian education, both undergraduate and graduate. The benefits of this approach, to the government and the individual, are so evident that it is depressing to admit that we have never taken the required steps.

A second is the military's inclusion of long-term training slots in projections of personnel needs. This provides the trainees and, in glaring contrast to our approach, reduces the pressures from future bosses to fill the position now, and training be damned. We have become accustomed to lengthy underlaps in assignments; DOD revels in extensive overlaps, with training included.

Lastly, in our defense, it's important to remember that in peacetime, the military trains for war. In wartime, training falls to the bottom of priorities. For the FS, however, there is no equivalent to peacetime/wartime. Foreign relations never shut down.

Without question, we could do a significantly better job of training officers and specialists. AFSA can well spend some time and effort on that worthy cause.

*Edward L. Peck*
*FSO, Retired*

Budget 2000 • Continued from page 1

We will be almost one year behind schedule in improving embassy security by the end of FY2001.

inflation-adjusted carry-over of personnel costs from the FY99 reaction to the bombings in east Africa. It also includes $66 million to continue the perimeter security upgrades programs and $16 million for 162 additional security professionals.

The second part falls in the Embassy Security, Construction, and Maintenance account, formerly known as the Foreign Buildings account. The request for the regular part of this account is $431.6 million: In FY2000, the appropriation was $425.7 million. The real change is in the Worldwide Security sub-account. The FY2001 request is for $647.6 million, up from $313.617 million appropriated in FY2000.

According to State's *Budget in Brief*, this amount includes $450 million to support the next tranche "of security driven projects," as well as design and/or construction of facilities in Cape Town, Damascus, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Sofia, and Yerevan. This funding will allow State to acquire five to eight additional sites. The total also includes $50 million for the construction of new on-compound facilities for USAID in Kampala, Uganda, and Nairobi, Kenya, $134 million for further perimeter security studies and $13.6 million for other recurring costs. Finally, the administration requested $3.35 billion in advanced appropriations for capital projects for FY2002 to FY2005.

Nevertheless, the $1.07 billion requested for embassy security falls short, by more than $300 million, of what Admiral Crowe recommended as an annual appropriation for the next 10 years. Combined with the $800 million shortfall last year we will be almost one year behind schedule in improving embassy security by the end of FY2001.

### Foreign Assistance

Under the Title II Bilateral Economic Assistance, the development aid request increased by 10.7 percent, from $1,934.7 million to $2.14 million, including major increases for international family planning, AIDS in Africa, and new environment programs. Within the Title II account, the Economic Support Funds request decreased from $2.8 million to $2.3 million as did the assistance request for the former Soviet Union and the Newly Independent States from $836 million to $830 million.

SEED funds request for Eastern Europe and the Baltics increased from $533 million to $610 million. The request for Export and Investment assistance (Ex-Im, OPIC, TDA, etc.) increased from $635.8 million to $844 million. Debt reduction for the HIPC initiative received a 113 percent request increase from $123 million to $262 million.

The counter-narcotics aid for Colombia increases more than seven-fold if combined with the FY2000 supplemental request for Plan Colombia, and

the FY2001 request. These funds cover purchases of helicopters, training and equipment for the Colombian military, interdiction, economic development, and alternative employment and resettlement programs.

USAID's Operation Expense account, which is the personnel account, is less than impressive. Except for State's security funding for facilities in Uganda and Kenya, the USAID request went from $519 million to $520 million.

The overall budget request increases, though welcome, are still insufficient for the expanded needs and mission of diplomacy. AFSA continues its efforts to convince the administration and the Congress to treat the International Affairs account as part of a national security budget. There is a real cost to be paid when we lack in diplomatic readiness.



## Address Changes?

Summer transfer season is almost upon us. If you know your onward assignment, send it to AFSA now and note the day it takes effect. You can update your address via e-mail to member@afsa.org, by telephone (202) 338-4045 ext. 525, with an insert card in this issue of the *FSJ*, or by postcard to AFSA, 2101 E St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037.

Submitting an address change will affect all your AFSA mailing, including the *Foreign Service Journal*. To ensure more efficient communication with our members, AFSA is now collecting e-mail addresses. Be sure to include your e-mail address on all correspondence.

V.P. VOICE: **PUBLIC DIPLOMACY** ■ BY J. RILEY SEVER

# "Morale Is In the Eye of the Beholder"

During a recent discussion of morale in the Foreign Service, a senior management official, who had recently returned from visiting posts overseas, exclaimed that morale was high. An AFSA representative disputed this by citing e-mails, letters and phone calls of complaints from FSOs on various issues. Considerable debate ensued over who had the best "take" on Foreign Service morale.

It's natural that senior officials won't hear all the complaints that employees share with their union, nor does a union hear often from satisfied employees. It is also true that for many FSOs morale is only high in hindsight. That's why we hear so many references to "the good old days."

If you asked me what it takes to generate high morale, I would mention the following: challenging work; talented and professional colleagues; salaries and benefits competitive with those in the private sector; predictable promotion opportunities; a transparent bidding and assignment system; benefits and allowances reflective of changes in inflation as well as in the private sector; a safe work environment; a supportive environment for our families and dependents; and, most importantly, public recognition that FS work has worth.

Although the FS certainly offers challenging and rewarding work as well as a highly professional corps of colleagues, we are woefully lacking in meeting the other criteria.

To begin with, surveys consistently show that all federal workers are underpaid compared to the private sector and that this disparity is particularly true for FS salaries. While promotion opportunities have increased recently, there is no system in place to avoid TICing out large numbers of officers, should the government reduce the foreign affairs budget as it did a few years ago. In regard to the bidding and assignment system, I have met few FSOs who think it is transparent or fair. In addition, many FS allowances and benefits haven't been revised since the 1980s and haven't kept pace with inflation.

The FS also continues to fail at supporting our families. As families become more dependent on dual incomes and more spouses seek their own careers, a lack of employment for spouses overseas is a growing problem. The failure of many overseas schools to keep pace with the American curriculum has increased challenges for FSOs with children. Finally, the failure of the FS to keep pace with changes in American society with regard to the acceptance of extended families and unmarried partners further complicates a career which seems to regulate your personal as well as your professional life.

As for a safe work environment, funding for overseas security continues to be inadequate, while the current administration and Congress blame each other for not providing the necessary resources.

The fall of the Soviet Union and technological advances have led many Americans, and even Congress, to question the need for diplomats or even embassies. This lack of public support is disheartening to all FSOs.

Considering the above factors, it's impossible to believe that the Foreign Service has high morale. I suspect what the management official found in overseas posts was a high level of dedication among FSOs and this should not be confused with high morale. The Foreign Service has a long way to go before anyone would ever consider these "the good old days."

# INSIDE THE FS COMMUNITY

## Join Retirees in Florida

The Foreign Service Retirees Association of Florida, over 700 members strong, invites you to join its ranks. The association meets for four luncheons and one banquet a year throughout the state. Membership is $15 a year for couples and $10 for individuals. For more information write to Membership Chairperson Miriam Belcher, Foreign Service Retirees Association of Florida, Salvia Court, Homosassa, Fla., 34446, or call Chairman Irwin Rubenstein at (954) 474-2949.

## Byrnes Receives Mayor's Award

Hope Byrnes, wife of retired FSO Paul Byrnes, recently received the Mayor of Sarasota's (Fla.) Award for Community Service. Mrs. Byrnes' community involvement includes serving as a member of the American Legion Auxiliary Sarasota Post 30; chairing the volunteer committee of the Sarasota Opera Guild; and editing the Asolo [Theatre] Guild Newsletter. She serves as president of the Sarasota Sister Cities Association and is a member of the Florida All Media Executive Roundtable.

From left: Mollie Cardamone, mayor of Sarasota, Fla., presents Hope Byrnes with the Mayor of Sarasota's Award for Community Service.

## AAFSW Web Site Expanded

The AAFSW has added resources on its web site at www.aafsw.org. A new feature, "Foreign Service Toolkit," offers links to U.S. government publications and websites. The "Member Activities" and "Newcomers" pages feature information on how you can get involved. The "Cyberspouse" page has new links for




amateur web developers, including a list of web sites owned by FS family members. You can also add your own business or personal web page.

In addition, you can subscribe to AAFSW's virtual newsletter by filling out the form on the "What's New" page or by sending a blank e-mail message to aafsw-update-subscribe@eGroups.com.

## Looking for Foreign Affairs Information?

If you want to know how diplomacy was conducted by US officials throughout history, contact the Foreign Affairs Oral History Program based at the Foreign Service Institute. The archives contain in-depth interviews with more than 700 retired American diplomats and consuls who were posted to more than 200 posts abroad, who discuss their experiences and perceptions of diplomacies of their time. Some interviews cover diplomacy that occurred as far back as the 1920s. The majority of interviews focus on the post World War II period.

Transcripts can be read at the Special Collections Room of the Lauinger Library at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. Individual transcripts may be obtained by writing to: Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, 4000 Arlington Blvd., Arlington, Va., 22204 or by calling (703) 302-6990. Each transcript is $15 and is loaded on to a diskette. For more information contact Charles Stuart Kennedy, director of the program at (703) 302-6990.

## Foundation Assists FS Seniors

Since 1991, the American Foreign Service Protective Association (AFSPA) has provided information and assistance to retired FS personnel (including surviving or divorced spouses) through the Senior Living Foundation of the American Foreign Service. The foundation helps defray the costs of home health care, senior housing facilities, long-term care insurance or other senior services that contribute to health and security.

It was not until the late 1980's that those who composed the greatly expanded Foreign Service of the post-World War II era began to reach "old" age. AFSPA became involved in finding a solution to senior living problems after it received an increasing number of inquiries from its members—colleagues, ex-spouses and surviving spouses—who were in precarious financial situations, were deteriorating physically or mentally and/or had few options available to them.

To date, the foundation has received more than 1500 donations from AFSPA members and various corporations. The foundation accepts tax deductible gifts and is a 501(c)(3) charitable organization. To find out how you can help, contact: The Senior Living Foundation of the American Foreign Service 1716 N Street, NW Washington, DC 20036-2907 Tel: (202) 887-8170 Fax: (202) 833-4918.

# Q&A

WITH RETIREE LIAISON
WARD THOMPSON

**Q: How will my health care cost and coverage change when I enroll in Medicare?**

A. Medicare comes in two parts — A and B. Part A is hospital insurance. If you were a federal employee on January 1, 1983, you and your spouse or survivor are eligible for premium-free Medicare A on turning 65 (see next question). Most others may purchase Part A, but the cost (currently $301 a month or $331.10 per month if enrolling after age 65) is too high to make it worthwhile for anyone who already has FEHB (Federal Employees Health Benefits). Part B, medical insurance, covers visits to doctors and related services. It is available to all Americans, including all federal annuitants, on the same basis — a monthly premium, currently $45.50 (plus 10 percent for each year one delays enrolling after 65). Medicare coverage is good only for health care in the United States.

After you enroll in Medicare A and/or B, Medicare becomes the primary payer for hospital and/or medical care. That means that your claims will be filed (usually by the provider) with Medicare, which will pay its normal coverage, which is subject to deductibles and co-insurance, and then pass the remainder of the claim to your FEHB plan, which is the secondary payer.

Your FEHB plan usually will pay all of the rest of the claim, waiving deductibles and co-payments normally applied by a fee-for-service plan like Blue Cross or the Foreign Service Benefit Plan. Exception: Beginning in 2000, most fee-for-service plans stopped waiving the co-payment for prescription drugs for annuitants covered by Medicare, which they had been doing even though Medicare has no drug coverage. For other medical care, these plans will waive the co-payment and the deductible if the health care provider accepts Medicare assignment.

Example: If you are 64 now and go to your doctor for a routine visit, your FEHB fee-for-service plan would pay for the visit after you satisfy a calendar-year deductible and you make a co-payment. If you are 65 and have Medicare B, Medicare will pay 80 percent of the cost (once the annual $100 deductible is satisfied) and your FEHB plan will pay the rest, with no deductible or co-pay. You will continue to pay your FEHB premium, as well as the Medicare B premium, but your out-of-pocket expenses will be reduced.

If your FEHB carrier is an HMO, which might not have any co-payments for any participant, the difference under Medicare will be less noticeable.

If your FEHB carrier is an HMO, which might not have any co-payments for any participant, the difference under Medicare will be less noticeable.

**Q: What will change if I do not enroll?**

A. Your FEHB coverage will continue as before. If you have a claim for hospitalization after you turn 65, you may be asked by your FEHB carrier either to enroll in Medicare A or to certify that you are not eligible for premium-free Part A. Also FEHB benefits for participants 65 and older who do not have Medicare are affected to some extent by Medicare law. In most cases, this will be to your advantage, since the law limits what providers can charge even to those who do not have Medicare and FEHB. Co-payments are based on what Medicare prescribes.

For more information on healthcare, see "The Federal Employee Health Benefits Program and Medicare" at **www.opm.gov/hr/insure/mcare/MHBO1.htm** or contact Ward Thompson at (800) 704-2372 ext. 528 or at thompsonw@afsa.org.

V.P. VOICE: **RETIREES** ■ GUEST COLUMNIST HARRY CAHILL

# Jobs for Retirees

When the new AFSA Board took office, we faced a number of troublesome issues. One problem was the increasingly serious work force shortages in the State Department. Another was the large number of able retirees who wanted to keep active, but who had no opportunity for meaningful work. The much publicized Foreign Service Reserve Corps had raised expectations a few years ago, only to crash and leave a residue of cynicism.

The board concluded that the two problems might solve each other. Vacancies both in Washington, D.C. and overseas could be filled if the Foreign Service could develop a viable way to bring our alumni back on board as WAEs (when actually employed) or contractors. The naysayers quickly pointed out that this was impossible. "It can't be done," they said. One alleged barrier was the reluctance of Diplomatic Security (DS) to give clearances to retirees. In addition, each bureau in State allegedly did not want to hire outsiders because it had its own stable of favored people.

Both allegations proved untrue. We conferred with DS officials who control the clearance process and found them very cooperative and positive. Explaining how the current executive order facilitates rehiring, they specified the few key steps that offices should follow to rehire annuitants. They emphasized that each applicant case is handled on an individual basis and that clearances can be obtained without undergoing rigidly imposed long waiting periods.

Having advanced on this front, we then met with executive directors of geographic and functional bureaus and learned that their need and desire to rehire qualified retirees are overwhelming. We shared the information obtained from DS with the bureaus and the views obtained from the bureaus with DS, demonstrating that we were all marching on the same road. As a result, our retirees can now join the march column.

We have also contacted small liberal arts colleges, discussing how our alumni can serve as visiting professors to augment faculty in international affairs courses. In December and January, our first "VPs" went forth to the campus successfully.

Our AFSA program is structured to help provide part-time work in four areas: (1) jobs at State and overseas posts, (2) teaching in colleges, (3) lecturing in Elderhostel sessions, and (4) public speaking on international affairs in various fora. AFSANET will also continue to post job opportunities in the public and private sectors. In February, we sent a questionnaire to all AFSA retirees to ascertain interest and obtain needed biographic information for a database, which will be maintained at AFSA headquarters.

With your participation and interest, AFSA is opening the road back for Foreign Service retirees.

For more information contact AFSA Retiree Liaison Ward Thompson at (202) 944-5528 or thompsonw@afsa.org.

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Bennett that the FSO who compiled the file did everything possible inside the State Department to see that justice was served. His persistence was remarkable within the system. The existence of the file — mentioned in my article and confirmed by Mr. Bennett — underscores the fact that there was official American knowledge of Korean atrocities. I would be grateful if Mr. Bennett or anyone else in the State Department could explain to me how the identification of the guilty as Koreans makes their war crimes any less heinous or regrettable." No reply was forthcoming.

***I was so keen to show opposition to the war that I fashioned a black sock into an armband, which I wore while I talked to students about Foreign Service careers.***

On Feb. 13, 1972, Ben Welles wrote a second article for the *New York Times* — this time about the exchange of letters in the *FSJ* — entitled "Letters Raise Question of U.S. Responsibility for Allies' Atrocities." By then, Welles had managed to learn the date and place of the massacre, along with specific details. There had been a death toll of 60 to 80 civilians, he reported, and "many of the dead were found with powder burns — indicating execution at point-blank range."

### A Generation Gap

The controversy that erupted around my article supported one of the basic points I was trying to make — namely, that "Vietnam is different. Serving [there] is not like serving elsewhere. It meant a violent breaking away from the traditional diplomatic life and an exposure to the realities of war.

"Vietnam has undoubtedly sharpened the genera-

tion gap between young and old FSOs. In some of the junior grades, a disproportionately large number have been to Vietnam. Almost all return with a healthy skepticism, often bordering on contempt, for the Foreign Service. One recent returnee says, 'Vietnam is where you learn that your elders aren't what you thought they were.' Another describes Vietnam as his 'final disillusionment with the Foreign Service as an institution.' He says 'he can no longer take the Service at its word,' and he goes on to mention the lack of integrity in the reporting process he saw in Vietnam.

"Yet this same officer feels that his own and his colleagues' disillusionment with the Foreign Service bodes well for the future of the American diplomatic establishment. He believes Vietnam has created a new, skeptical type of diplomat able to work more effectively within the foreign affairs bureaucracy than the old striped-pants set. Shorn of the mythology of protocol and cocktail parties, these new skeptics see themselves as 'operators' who know how to infight. The emphasis in Vietnam was on doing things whether inside or outside the system. If Vietnamese officials would not feed hungry refugees, the FSO usually found a way to get the job done himself."

Having left the service, I cannot be sure to what extent FSOs who served in Vietnam continued to be entrepreneurial infighters. My impression, however, is that at least a few, such as Richard Holbrooke, now U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and Frank Wisner, a former under secretary of State and Defense and a four-time ambassador, became especially good at proactive behavior.

A classic example of Vietnam-era FSOs showing courage under bureaucratic fire occurred in 1975. As the South Vietnamese government was falling, Lionel Rosenblatt and Craig Johnstone pushed successfully in Washington for creation of an interagency task force to rescue Vietnamese who might be in danger because of their ties to the U.S. government. Still, they still felt that the U.S. mission in Saigon was not doing enough to honor its obligations to individual Vietnamese. Although specifically told by senior officials not to go, they took leave and flew off to Saigon. Disregarding the risks, both to their careers and their safety, they managed to put several hundred Vietnamese on flights out of the country. When they returned to Washington, they thought they would be disciplined or fired. Instead, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger called them into his office to honor them.

***I was thrilled that my* Foreign Service Journal *article was going to be at the center of a* New York Times *story.***

I very much admire such behavior. At the same time, I will never forget that when I resigned, another of my A-100 classmates, who later became an ambassador, told me in all seriousness that an FSO should not have policy views. My sense is that his perspective also persists.

### The Road Not Taken

As for me, I have few regrets about having left the Foreign Service. I went on to co-author a best-seller, *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* and write *The Search for the Manchurian Candidate*. These books reflected my strong opposition to a foreign policy that included covert manipulation and intervention. But as the 1970s were ending, I realized that my work, first in battling against the Vietnam War and then in taking on what I considered to be the abuses of the intelligence agencies, had become largely defined by what I was against. I made a decision that, rather than continue to tear down the old system, I would try to help build a new one. Influenced by a series of personal growth workshops, I gradually became immersed in the practice of conflict resolution.

I reinvented myself as a "social entrepreneur" — still with that "can do" spirit learned in Vietnam — and founded Search for Common Ground in 1982 and the European Centre for Common Ground in 1995. These organizations share a vision of transforming how the world deals with conflict by moving from adversarial, win-lose approaches to non-adversarial, win-win solutions. Together, they have grown into the largest NGO in the world working in conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

I still stand by the conclusion I wrote to my 1971 *FSJ* article: "The Vietnam War may someday come to an end. But many Foreign Service officers, and perhaps the service as a whole, will never be the same again." ■

# An **INVITATION** for **SUMMER FICTION**

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# ADVISE AND DISSENT: THE DIPLOMAT AS PROTESTER


Ben Fishman

PROTESTS OVER VIETNAM FROM FSOS DIDN'T END THE WAR—BUT THEY DID LEAD TO THE OPEN FORUM AND THE DISSENT CHANNEL.

*BY DAVID T. JONES*

Popular images of the Vietnam War don't usually include Foreign Service officers protesting in pinstriped suits or carrying placards with familiar anti-war slogans outside the diplomatic entrance at State. "Hell, no, we won't go" might not have rolled off the lips of FSOs, but nevertheless, many diplomats staged their own protests deep within the drab corridors of State, using cable traffic from overseas and other tools to wage bureaucratic guerrilla warfare against American involvement in Indochina during the 1960s and 1970s.

For young FSOs of the period, dissent over U.S. policy in Southeast Asia reflected self-interest. By June 1968, every unmarried male junior officer who had not performed active duty military service was automatically sent

to Vietnam for his first Foreign Service tour, whether or not he had requested the assignment. To make matters worse, many FSOs received assignments as development officers, administering USAID programs and helping the Vietnamese set up self-help projects in the provinces, often with little or no security against Viet Cong attacks. As a result, they were killed in Vietnam and neighboring countries in numbers totally unprecedented for the diplomatic profession. Between 1960 and 1975, 36 members of the Foreign Service died in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

***Until 1972, State refused to acknowledge the scope of its losses in the war, permitting rumors to run rampant among FSOs.***

Moreover, in a still inexplicable personnel decision, the department waited until 1972 to acknowledge the scope of its losses in the war, permitting rumors to run rampant. Most American diplomats knew at least one FSO who had died in Vietnam, so suspicions about true casualty totals only fanned fears among junior officers and depressed morale throughout the Foreign Service. One effect of this crisis of confidence quickly became obvious: In 1968 alone, 266 FSOs, 80 percent of them junior officers, resigned from the Foreign Service, while only 103 JOs entered — a drop of more than half from the previous year, when 219 new officers joined the service. Although not all the resignations can be attributed to disagreements about Vietnam policy, there is little doubt that the war was one of the main underlying factors for this massive exodus.

### How Not To Handle Dissent

Vietnam was hardly the first case of widespread policy dissent within the State Department. Even though it occurred two decades before the Vietnam War, the "Who lost China?" controversy still represents the prime example of a diplomatic disaster caused by the failure of State Department policymakers to heed dissenting views from better-informed representatives in the field.

The Truman administration's post-World War II decision to continue backing Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists well after it became clear that Mao Tse-tung's Communists were going to win control of China was understandable, but also extremely short-sighted. The lack of reliable information about Beijing's capabilities and intentions fostered hysterical visions of "Red China" overrunning U.S. military forces throughout East Asia. Many historians believe that this panic, in turn, led to strategic blunders which unnecessarily prolonged the Korean conflict and would eventually lead the U.S. to stumble blindly into the Vietnam swamp. Conversely, though the years have thinned their ranks, there are still some historians who insist that the dissenters to U.S. China and Vietnam policies, if not active traitors, severely undercut their government's position and thereby brought about the very outcome they had predicted.

But instead of learning from the debacle and utilizing the expertise of its China hands to minimize the damage done by that miscalculation, the State Department panicked. In the wake of witch hunts launched by Republican Sen. Joseph McCarthy of Wisconsin in the early 1950s, State not only retaliated against the "old China hands" but generally cracked down on dissent throughout the Foreign Service.

It would take until 1967, when it could no longer ignore the growing disenchantment among FSOs over U.S. involvement in Vietnam, for State to acknowledge the value of listening to diverse points of view and begin moving to institutionalize its handling of dissent.

### The Open Forum

Like the American public they represented overseas, 1960s-era FSOs tended to be idealistic and were predisposed to support U.S. policy. Many had either entered the service in the spirit of President John F. Kennedy's call — "Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country" — or thought of their profession in those terms. As a consequence, resistance to the war within the Foreign Service was slow to develop and tended to be passive, at least during the 1960s.

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*David Jones is a retired senior FSO and a frequent contributor to the* Journal.

(It is worth noting that the pages of the *Foreign Service Journal* during this period contain few references to Vietnam, and even fewer negative ones.) And as with any organization, there was also a significant minority who may not have supported the president's position on Vietnam on the merits but decided to live with their misgivings either out of loyalty or for the sake of career advancement.

***"Open Forum was a steam valve, not a steam turbine."***

***— William Marsh, former Open Forum panel member***

As the U.S. military commitment to Vietnam grew, more officers began resigning outright, as noted above, but most dissidents simply evaded assignment to Southeast Asia as best they could. By the late 1960s, however, a critical mass of officers had genuinely come to believe that U.S. policy in Vietnam was wrong, ineffective or both. Their growing defiance and their willingness to speak out in an organized manner prompted the State Department to create a mechanism that would channel and control the growing dissatisfaction with Southeast Asia policy.

In 1967, largely at Secretary of State Dean Rusk's instigation, the Foreign Service created its first-ever bureaucratic mechanism for gathering the views of the rank-and-file, the Open Forum Panel. Drawing on his academic background, Rusk reportedly conceived of the OFP as a potential seedbed of fresh thinking by younger officers. Inaugurated in August 1967, the OFP began with 10 self-selected junior- and mid-level officers who would serve terms of 12 months each. The panel had a mandate to "review all suggestions submitted and select those worthy of further consideration." By December 1967, the OFP's mandate had widened to generate new ideas and serve as a general conduit for the views of junior officers on personnel and administrative matters, as well as policy.

During the first year of its operation the Forum received 150 submissions, but only 10 addressed policy and just one questioned the U.S. role in Vietnam. So far as policy contributions were concerned, the new forum was not a hotbed of dissent. As William Marsh, a now-retired FSO who was one of the first panel members, put it, "Open Forum was a steam valve, not a steam turbine."

In 1969 the OFP repeatedly considered the idea of approaching Secretary of State William Rogers, both with their general concerns about Victnam policy and their perception that dissent over such policy was being suppressed within the department. Nothing came of this initiative, however, partly because members were reluctant to embarrass Rogers with further illustrations of State Department dissent, but mainly because it was already becoming apparent that National Security Council Director Henry Kissinger was running U.S. foreign policy, not Rogers. (At least one group of JOs did meet with Secretary Rogers to discuss Vietnam policy, but that meeting was apparently not connected to the OFP initiative. See "From Diplomat to Dissident: A State Department Odyssey" on page 28.)

The panel members eventually came to the conclusion that no obvious untapped reservoir of "deep think" among new officers existed, as most of the submissions the OFP had received dealt with personnel or administrative concerns. In addition, it is not certain that most FSOs even opposed the war at this point.

### Cambodia

The most spectacular single instance of policy dissent within the Foreign Service over Vietnam occurred completely outside the parameters of the Open Forum process, as then-Under Secretary for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson describes in his 1984 memoir, *The Right Hand of Power*. Although none of them had ever served in Southeast Asia, a group of 50 FSOs sent a letter to Secretary of State William Rogers in April 1970 protesting an anticipated U.S. invasion of Cambodia designed to relieve North Vietnamese pressure on Saigon and Phnom Penh. In his book, Johnson acknowledges the legitimacy of the officers' substantive complaint, but he faults their tactics in circulating multiple copies of the letter to secure additional signatures, which led to its leak to the media. Making matters worse, the letter hit the news just as the U.S. military assault was taking place in Cambodia.

Johnson received a 2 a.m. phone call from President Richard Nixon, who, spouting abuse and expletives, demanded that the offenders be fired immediately. With the tacit approval of Secretary

Rogers, who recognized that creating 50 martyrs wouldn't stimulate public support for an already controversial policy, Johnson obfuscated to protect the group from White House wrath. On another front, the American Foreign Service Association Governing Board addressed a letter to President Nixon, assuring him of the Foreign Service's "full loyalty and support." Although the board also used the letter to call for openness and "candid communication within the Department of State," the pledge of loyalty was a controversial and divisive action all the same.

### Alternative Approaches

By this point it was clear that while Foreign Service regulations permitted the submission of alternative political opinions by embassies, there was no effective way for individual officers to dissent. There were no assurances that their careers would not suffer, much less any prospect that their views would be taken seriously.

Good-faith efforts within the department to fill this gap continued on an ad hoc basis. For many years, the Open Forum circulated a classified in-house publication featuring a selection of articles by FSOs, but that has been discontinued. The panel now places emphasis on stimulating policy discussions, chiefly through its speakers series, which is unclassified but off the record, and is looking into the possibility of creating a classified e-mail exchange.

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research tried another approach. INR is where much of the dissent over Vietnam was concentrated, because it received the widest range of data and because it encouraged analytical thinking and consideration of worst-case scenarios. After considerable discussion between junior officers and senior officials within INR, in June 1970 the bureau authorized an internal publication, *Viewpoint*, as an outlet for "thoughtful, creative, new analysis" that could be circulated among government agencies without being misinterpreted as an official State Department statement. Only one issue appeared at the time and then the idea died. In 1993, INR revived *Viewpoint*, which Thomas Fingar, the INR deputy assistant secretary for analysis, says now runs around 50 articles a year, mostly written by a small number of geographic analysts with sometimes esoteric views.

On a parallel track, in 1968 AFSA instituted two awards for dissent by junior- and mid-level officers; the following year an award was established for senior officers. Of the eight winners who received the awards in the first three years, four were honored for work in Southeast Asia. All but one of the honorees, however, seem to have been recognized for creatively advancing U.S. policy interests rather than dissenting from them. For example, the 1969 award was given to John Paul Vann, a former military officer with a reputation for criticism of Vietnam policy, only after he switched positions following the Tet offensive and began advocating more forceful prosecution of the war effort.

Such well-intentioned efforts were clearly not enough to address the growing disaffection within the Foreign Service, however. The fact that 50 FSOs were willing to take their protests over U.S. policy to the media constituted but one symptom of a more serious malady.

### Channeling Dissent

To address these concerns, Under Secretary for Management William Macomber, with the support of Secretary Rogers and Deputy Secretary Elliott Richardson, launched a five-month study in 1970 involving 13 task forces. That study ultimately yielded over 500 recommendations in a report entitled "Diplomacy for the '70s," known in shorthand as the Macomber Report.

Like studies before and since, this one recommended "a climate more conducive to creative thinking is essential if the Department and the Foreign Service are to continue to attract and hold the best young people." Southeast Asia and Cambodia were barely mentioned in the Macomber report. If anything, it deliberately avoided criticism of existing administration policy. For example, while one task force included biting thumbnail critiques on each postwar secretary of State, there was no comment on sitting Secretary of State Rogers. This same task force lambasted Sen. Joseph McCarthy for stifling State Department creativity, but avoided discussion of Vietnam dissent. The one substantive comment on Vietnam was, "...Secretary [Rusk] did not welcome dissent on the Vietnam issue and had little time to encourage creative thinking in other areas."

Still, the report urged the establishment of "a general principle ... that officers who cannot concur in a

report or recommendation submitted by the mission are free to submit a dissenting statement."

As a result of this and other recommendations, the State Department revised the Foreign Affairs Manual in February 1971 to give FSOs the explicit freedom to dissent. After further internal discussions throughout 1971, the secretary of State's Policy Planning Staff was selected as the office designated to handle individual dissents. Both the Open Forum and INR offered to play a role in overseeing the handling of dissent within the State Department, but their overtures were rejected by State management.

***State learned perhaps the most valuable lesson of all from its internal debate over Vietnam: Ignoring dissent only exacerbates problems.***

In October 1973, however, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger issued his own guidance about dissent. He said the dissent should be heard, but also expected "that all officers ... will keep dissenting views in the channels provided for," and observed that "expression of differing views will of course be subject to the ambassador's control." Kissinger's less than wholehearted welcome of contrarian views may help account for the fact that the dissent channel, once it was established, did not stimulate an immediate burst of cable traffic protesting the war.

Nor was Vietnam or Southeast Asia the subject of most messages. Only one dissent message was submitted in 1971 and it was about the Middle East. Of the nine message submitted in 1972, four were about East Asia, but there is no way to be sure that any of them addressed the Vietnam War. In 1973 there were only four dissent messages and none of them touched upon East Asia.

That pattern has continued since Vietnam. In the almost 30 years of its existence, the Dissent Channel has received over 250 messages, ranging from a high of 30 in 1977 to a low of 3 in 1997. Of the first 200 messages from 1971 to 1991, about 50 addressed "general," non-foreign-policy topics such as housing allowance policy. None of the other 150 or so messages can be credited with reversing existing policy; instead, at best, the dissenting viewpoint may have received some senior level consideration. During the past decade, annual totals of contributions have averaged in the single digits.

Officers in the field also have the option of including a dissenting opinion on an embassy telegram, while those in the department can take a footnote on interagency intelligence assessments indicating their disagreement with the consensus. These dissents (which require senior-level clearance) come from INR, not the individual drafter, but some of them are easily identified with an individual analyst, whose credibility may carry considerable weight with other agencies.

### Lessons Learned

While disagreements about the U.S. role in Vietnam were the most readily identifiable stimulus for the establishment of the Dissent Channel, it is also true that societal fury about the war never manifested itself in the Foreign Service. While State Department officials periodically wage fierce internal policy debates, most of these battles have been fought over questions of U.S. national interest more than ideology or personality (though those factors are often important as well). No matter how adroitly the Foreign Service handles such controversies, some officers will always resign over policy differences. Others will avoid implementing disagreeable policies by seeking transfers. Still others, probably a majority of the corps, will express their opposition and then faithfully execute policy.

But while State is open to contrasting policy views, not many FSOs use official dissent channels. Some believe that the strict legal protections available to dissenters are very thin if an ambassador or deputy assistant secretary is irritated. A more mundane explanation might be that no issue has galvanized American society, or the Foreign Service, in the way the Vietnam War did 30 years ago.

Whatever the explanation, when State decided — however reluctantly — a generation ago to institutionalize dissent, it helped defuse the inevitable tensions policy disagreements generate. And in opting for greater tolerance of divergent views, State has learned a valuable lesson from the debate over Vietnam: No matter how irritating dissenters may be, ignoring them can be hazardous to an agency's health. ■

# LEAVING SAIGON: AN FSO'S LAST DAY IN VIETNAM

Ben Fishman

HELICOPTERS FLEW THE LAST U.S. OFFICIALS OUT OF SAIGON 25 YEARS AGO. ONE FSO RECALLS THAT HARROWING DAY.

BY RICHARD S. THOMPSON

The impact of massive explosions only a few miles from my villa in Saigon awakened me abruptly. It was 4 a.m. on Tuesday, April 29, 1975. Even half-asleep, I instantly knew that North Vietnamese forces, which had been steadily approaching the capital over the past several weeks, had begun shelling Tan Son Nhut Airfield just north of town. I also realized that this bombardment probably signaled the beginning of the final American evacuation that the embassy had been planning for weeks. I had already sent my family to Bangkok several weeks earlier, and had packed my household effects for shipment.

For the past two weeks, each morning when I went down to breakfast, there had been several solemn-faced Vietnamese waiting in my living room. Some I knew; others had been referred by third parties. As I ate,

apologizing for the discourtesy, each would eome to the table to tell me why he or she would be in danger in the event of a communist victory, and would hand me a list of family members who should be evaeuated and a contact telephone number or address.

When I arrived at the embassy a little later each morning, I would type a brief cover memo for each list with my assessment of the merits of the request, and pnt them in the in-box of Shep Lowman, chief of the Internal Political Affairs Unit. He and his staff would sort through the requests and each night would pick np those selected for evacuation and take them to Tan Son Nhut Airport for departure on American aircraft.

***Just a few days after I first arrived in Saigon in 1968, the embassy was attacked and almost blown up.***

On my last morning in Saigon, however, no one was waiting to greet me when I came down to breakfast. I was alone except for Nguyet, one of the maids on my household staff, who served me breakfast. I speculated that the Vietnamese were no longer seeking me out because they had also heard the bombardment of Tan Son Nhut, and decided the U.S. government could no longer help them.

Preparing for work, I pnt on my best dark blue, tropical weight, pinstriped snit. I might as well take my best snit ont with me, I thought, since most of my wardrobe would be left behind. I also packed a small black bag I had purchased in the market a couple of weeks before, taking necessities such as cotton clothing, a toilet kit and a towel which would (and did) keep me eomfortable aboard my evacuation ship. When I got into my car, I placed the small bag against the passenger side door, where my Vietnamese gate guard couldn't see it and become alarmed as I drove out the gate of my compound.

### Signs And Portents

As I drove the few blocks from my house to the embassy, a modern concrete structure with a helicopter pad on the roof, I reflected on my long association with Vietnam, and how the end of my time in country was mirroring the turmoil and uncertainty I had experienced npon my arrival in Saigon in January 1968, following 42 weeks of Vietnamese language training.

Just a few days after I reported for duty to the political section, the embassy was attacked and almost blown np by a Viet Cong sapper unit as part of the famons Tet offensive. I could hear the nighttime attack from my apartment a few blocks away, and arrived at the embassy the next morning to find the bnilding damaged but not penetrated, and the bodies of guerrillas still lying near the entrance. This was my welcome to almost four years of service in the embassy political section, including considerable travel in the provinees with many exciting and sometimes anxions experiences.

In 1972 I was assigned to the Paris Peace Talks, where I had a front-row seat for the final negotiations that resnlted in the Paris Agreement on Vietnam of January 1973. Under this agreement American troops were withdrawn and our POWs were released, although snbstantial American aid to the Repnblic of South Vietnam eontinued. In 1974, Ambassador Graham Martin asked me to return to Saigon, which I did, along with my wife and three children. As chief of the External Political Affairs Unit of the Political Section, my job was to work with the South Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs to defend the position of the Republic of Vietnam and the United States in international organizations and ensure that Saigon, not Hanoi, represented the country.

The first part of that last Saigon tour was quite pleasant, with few hostilities and growing prosperity among the Vietnamese. President Nixon had given South Vietnamese President Ngnyen Van Thieu strong assurances of a forceful U.S. response if Hanoi violated the Paris Agreement. After Nixon resigned in August 1974, however, the North Vietnamese became less fearful that renewed aetivity on their part would arouse such a response, and stepped up their infiltration of the South.

On Jan. 7, 1975, Northern forces captured the capital of Phnoc Long Province only 75 miles north

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*Richard Thompson is a retired Foreign Service officer who served in Aruba, Curaçao, Niamey, Saigon, Paris and Algiers. Until March, he was AFSA's coordinator for professional issues.*

of Saigon. When there was no American reaetion, North Vietnam deeided to move ahead as soon as possible, accelerating its original plans for victory in 1976.

The capture of the mountain provincial capital of Ban Me Thuot on March 10 by three North Vietnamese divisions not even known to be in the area sparked general agreement in the American mission, at least at the working level, that a North Vietnamese victory was near. (Nevertheless, I suspect embassy reporting to Washington remained more sanguine for a time.)

***One Japanese diplomat had some harrowing experiences before his government was able to pluck him from a freighter. This made him quite a celebrity in his diplomatic service.***

In the following weeks large areas of South Vietnam were abandoned to the communist forees, and the Saigon government's confused efforts to withdraw South Vietnamese units to more defensible positions merely resulted in the dissolution of these units as effective fighting forces. North Vietnam was able to concentrate its forces at any loeation it desired and thus achieve overwhelming superiority over the thinly spread South Vietnamese forces.

With North Vietnamese military forces rapidly elosing in on Saigon, President Thieu resigned, hoping his departure would facilitate negotiations, and was succeeded by Viee President Tran Van Huong. The commmnists continued to demand an entirely new administration and an end to all U.S. involvement in Vietnam. After some hesitation, on April 27 the National Assembly recommended that full presidential powers be conferred on General Duong Van Minh (commonly referred to as "Big Minh"), who was considered more acceptable to the communists.

Normally the Internal Affairs Unit of the embassy would have reported on events in the assembly, but they were busy helping endangered Vietnamese — including many of my breakfast visitors — leave the country. Since I had reported on the assembly during earlier tours of duty in Saigon, I was pressed into action. I was concerned that legislators would be angry at the Americans for abandoning them, but they greeted me warmly as an old friend and explained to me what they were doing. As far as I know they all remained in Saigon and took part in the April 27 debate. They took very seriously their role under the constitution of the Republic of Vietnam, and did not want to leave while this constitution was still in force. I was deeply impressed by their loyalty. But once they had recommended the appointment of General Minh, an action totally outside the scope of the constitution, they felt the constitutional basis of the Republie of Vietnam had been destroyed. They therefore had no further responsibilities and were free to leave the country.

These final days in Saigon were both surreal and poignant. On one occasion I was enjoying an elegant lunch with my friend Bud Merick, a reporter for *U.S. News & World Report*, in the top floor restaurant of the Caravelle Hotel. As we were being served by an elderly, French-trained waiter, we could clearly see a bridge across the Saigon River about three miles away that had been the scene of skirmishes, and thick black smoke rising from the U.S. embassy warehouse on the other side. We joked that this smoke might be coming from my household effects, which had only recently been packed for shipping. It was only several months later that I learned my goods had in faet made it out of Saigon in the last commercial shipment.

In these last days there were two schools of thought about the likely final seenario. Ambassador Martin, based at least in part on the advice of the Polish and Hungarian delegates present in Saigon as part of a eommission to oversee the Paris Agreements, still believed the North Vietnamese might voluntarily stop short of capturing Saigon. Instead, he anticipated that the eommunists would negotiate a coalition government which they would dominate, but which could be portrayed as falling within the terms of the 1973 agreement. Such an arrangement would pave the way for a continued American presence in Saigon, international recognition and foreign assistance.

Saigon-based CIA Hanoi-watcher Frank Snepp was the chief proponent of the competing school of thought on the endgame. His contacts with Vietnamese communist intelligence sources convinced him that Hanoi's aim was indeed the military seizure of Saigon and the South. (Snepp's *Decent Interval* is a fascinating account of the last days of the American mission in Saigon.) This more hard-boiled prediction proved to be correct.

***I told my maid that the Americans were evacuating and she should take anything in the house she wanted because I would not be back.***

During these final weeks the embassy had been doing its best to reduce the number of Americans (U.S. government employees, their family members and private citizens) in Vietnam, so that as few people as possible would have to depart by helicopter in a final evacuation. To the great distress of Ambassador Martin and Washington authorities, however, on some days the tally would actually increase as Americans came to Saigon to ensure the departure of their Vietnamese relatives and friends, especially those they thought would be in danger.

Even though the embassy staff was steadily shrinking I had remained because I had a role in the final evacuation plan: I was responsible for liaison with certain embassies that had already decided they would leave at the same time we did with American assistance.

### Hard Decisions

My memories of that last day are a series of somewhat disconnected scenes:

When I arrived at the embassy, I found that

employees were barred from parking in the embassy compound and were instead being directed to a lot across the street. This was a significant signal that the evacuation was about to get under way: The parking area inside the compound would be needed as an additional helicopter landing pad. (Later that day, a tree in the embassy parking area was cut down, removing the last obstacle to helicopter flights.)

The walled and protected area of the embassy bounded approximately two acres. The rectangular block of the embassy and separate consular buildings faced Unification Boulevard and formed one complex. Behind this was another grouping including some administrative buildings and a swimming pool, with a back gate. The large Vietnamese crowds that had been gathering around the embassy for weeks seeking entry to the United States soon completely blocked access to the entrance nearest the consular buildings as well as the back gate.

***During an elegant lunch at a French hotel, we saw thick black smoke rising from the U.S. embassy warehouse on the other side of the river.***

During the night many Americans and Vietnamese, plus a sprinkling of other nationalities, had been brought into the compound, which already contained several thousand people by the time I arrived. Upon arrival, many simply abandoned their cars in the street, so the block in front of the embassy quickly began to resemble a haphazard parking lot full of luxury vehicles. A company of armed Marines in fatigues manned the perimeter, and entry and exit became very difficult.

Upon entering the embassy, I quickly learned

from Joe Bennett, the political minister-eounselor, that evacuation was indeed the order of the day. Since we had already worked out detailed plans for assisting our diplomatic colleagues to depart, my main task was to notify them that the evaeuation was about to start. For several weeks the embassy switchboard had been almost constantly tied up with incoming ealls, and I thought I might have to visit the embassies in person to deliver the alerts. But for whatever reason, our telephones were eerily quiet this morning, and I was able to eomplete the notifieations in a few minutes.

***Ambassador Martin remained at the embassy as long as possible because he felt a strong sense of duty to evacuate the maximum number of Vietnamese.***

A diplomat from the Japanese embassy arrived early in the day in his ambassador's ear to discuss the evacuation. Before he eould leave, Vietnamese trying to get in the gates surrounded the compound, and he was unable to depart. After consulting his embassy by telephone, he decided to remain in our compound and leave with us. But when we boarded an evacuation vessel that night, we learned the U.S. Navy had received orders, based on Philippine desires, that only Amerieans could travel to the Philippines, and all other nationalities must be placed on freighters with the Vietnamese refugees and taken to Guam. I heard later that this Japanese diplomat underwent some harrowing experiences before his government was able to locate him and pluck him from a freighter, which made him quite a celebrity in the Japanese diplomatic service.

Early in the day my maid, Nguyet, phoned me, erying, saying she was frightened because the gate guard at my house had fled. It was difficult for me to speak because I was crying too, but I told her the Amerieans were evacuating and she should take anything in the house she wanted because I would not be back. Later my chauffeur, Mot, ealled and we arranged to meet at a secluded iron gate to the embassy, where I handed him three months severance pay to distribute to each member of the household staff. I was too choked up to say a word, but we shook hands through the bars.

At one point, a group of distinguished American newsmen arrived at the back of the compound seeking to get in. Beeause of the erush of humanity it was impossible to open the gate, so the journalists with some difficulty were directed to climb a pile of sandbags. From there, the Marines helped them, one-by-one, over the gate. Other American journalists deeided to remain in Saigon and were able to ehronicle the North Vietnamese takeover the next day.

Later, someone brought to me a somewhat disheveled young Vietnamese man with whitewash marks on his clothing from where he had climbed over the embassy wall. Nguyen Trong Nho was a member of the lower house of the Vietnamese National Assembly and a friend of mine. In his student years he had been active in protesting against the government of South Vietnam, earning the nickname "King of Street Demonstrations." (It sounds better in Vietnamese.) More recently he had been in the democratic opposition to President Thieu. His family had left the country earlier and he was seeking to join them. To my sorrow, all I could do was give him my emergency food supply — a large jar of peanuts — and wish him well.

At one point I was near the consulate gate when someone in the crowd outside beckoned to me with a discreet gesture. He was a Vietnamese whom I had first known slightly as a eolonel, and who had thereafter been promoted to general. He was considered honest (not a universal trait in the South Vietnamese military) and able, and a friend of the Americans who had worked with him. He told me his family was already out of the country, and asked for my assistance in gaining entry to the eompound. It was possible for the Marines to let someone in without being foreed to shoot people to get the gate elosed again, but it was always dicey. I checked with higher authority in the embassy for permission to let him in, but was told the compound was too full to do so, since there was doubt as to whether all those already in the compound could be taken out.

Destruction of classified material was an important aetivity. The corridor outside the communications center gradually filled with shredded paper. We had been

told some time ago to reduce our files for just this eventuality, so I had just a handful of paper left. I went up on the roof where a young Foreign Service officer, perspiring in the sun and wearing protective gear over his ears, was presiding over a cylindrical machine which produced a loud, high-pitched scream. This machine did not just shred paper but ground it into tiny bits. I threw in my handful, including an address finder with a list of my Vietnamese contacts and their phone numbers — definitely not something I wanted the communists to have — and it disappeared in one shriek.

***When my turn came about 9 p.m., I walked up the narrow iron ladder to the helicopter pad on the roof and boarded the plane with my bag.***

### The Evacuation Begins

Once the tree in the parking lot had been felled, everyone began asking where the helicopters were. The hours seemed to drag on interminably, but finally they began coming about 3:30 p.m., landing alternately in the parking lot and on the roof. The CH-46 and CH-53 helicopters could carry 50 or more people on each trip; once the shuttling operation began, the number of people taken out was impressive.

The embassy was not the only evacuation point on that last day. Military helicopters extracted large numbers of people from the defense attaché's compound near Tan Son Nhut. Helicopters from Air America, the CIA proprietary airline, performed heroic service in picking up people from a number of locations. Some evacuees were taken by bus to board boats in the Saigon River.

The afternoon and evening wore on with the almost constant roar of helicopters pervading the embassy. At first most of the passengers were drawn from the crowds in the compound, but as time went on the evacuation of Americans in the embassy building began, starting with the lower floors.

I was on the fourth floor. When my turn came at about 9 p.m., I walked up the narrow iron ladder to the helicopter pad on the roof and boarded the plane with my small bag. We were strapped into narrow canvas seats along each side, and could see out small windows beside us. As the plane lifted higher, tracers brightened the sky in all directions. The tracers illuminated periodic bursts of anti-aircraft fire directed at us, but as we had been assured would happen, they fell short of our altitude.

The North Vietnamese forces had reached the outskirts of Saigon, but now they were pausing to let the Americans get out before resuming their advance. To the east the extensive logistical base at Long Binh, now abandoned, was burning brightly. Forty-five minutes later we landed on the USS Denver in the South China Sea.

This vessel was a landing pad dock, which meant it had a helicopter pad on the deck and a hold containing small boats. The stern of the boat was a large gate, and when it was lowered the boats could sail out. Americans arriving from Saigon remained on the Denver, but Vietnamese and other nationalities were taken below and put on the boats, which took them to freighters destined for Guam, a 10-day trip, where refugee camps had been established. We were told the Philippines had directed that only Americans be brought to their country. This triage was unfortunate, since the other nationalities included individuals such as the Japanese diplomat mentioned before and a French mother and daughter, who certainly would not have caused any immigration problems for the Philippines. I believe that eventually these persons were plucked from the refugee stream before the freighters left the area.

As we landed at night I had only been dimly aware of other vessels in the vicinity. When I came up on deck the next morning, a beautiful sunny day, I found a vast armada of American naval power stretching to the horizon. Interspersed with the naval vessels were the freighters for the Vietnamese refugees.

### An Era Passes

The American evacuation by helicopter finally ended in the early hours of April 30, 1975, after the planes' crews had extended themselves far beyond any margin of safety. Ambassador Martin had remained at the embassy until the last possible moment because he felt a strong sense of duty to evacuate the maximum number of Vietnamese. Finally President Ford

ordered him to leave. Once he had departed, the Marines gradually pulled out, leaving the embassy to the crowds in the surrounding streets.

For four days the U.S. naval task force lay off the coast to take on refugees. The first day a cloud of helicopters arrived, bringing the members of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force based in the Delta south of Saigon, along with their families. As the planes landed on the nearby aircraft carrier USS Enterprise, the passengers quickly got off and the helicopters were shoved overboard, because there was no room to park them. The captain of the USS Denver allowed us to watch through a large pair of mounted binoculars on the bridge, so we had front row seats as successive waves of boats brought out more refugees.

***We will never forget those Vietnamese who believed in and worked for democracy, and whose hopes were ended when America withdrew.***

Another morning we all gathered at the rail when someone spotted a naked Vietnamese woman swimming around the stern of a nearby freighter. A small boat approached her, but somehow could not get her on board. Then a rope was dropped from the freighter's railing, perhaps 80 feet above the water, and she managed to tie it around herself and was slowly pulled up. When she reached the railing and was helped over, a cheer arose from our group. This was not prurient interest, but a welcome to the triumph of the human spirit.

Life on the ship was uneventful. The hospitality of the U.S. Navy was excellent. When the executive officer of the Denver found I had the equivalent rank of a military officer, he offered me a stateroom on the deck where my peers were gathered. I thanked him but declined the honor, since these staterooms were sweltering and my bunk in the bowels of the ship was deliciously cool.

On the fifth day after leaving Saigon, we set sail for Subic Bay in the Philippines, arriving the next afternoon. We were processed in a gym, and then flown to a naval air station near Manila. From there we were bused to the embassy. After a night in a hotel, I flew to Bangkok the next day and was reunited with my family.

Ambassador Martin was harshly criticized at the time for not beginning the American evacuation sooner. Some officials in both Saigon and Washington even went so far as to claim he had been negligent. There is no doubt the final departure was marked by considerable confusion and disorder, and many endangered Vietnamese were left behind. But it must be kept in mind that the situation had to be handled very carefully to avoid our being physically attacked by our erstwhile allies as we left. Some Vietnamese were threatening to hold Americans hostage in the event of an evacuation to ensure they, too, were taken out. Lower ranking officials such as I were allowed to pack and ship our household effects during the final weeks, but the top embassy officers, and especially the ambassador, had to avoid any move in this direction for fear of starting a panic. In the end, all Americans who wanted to leave were able to do so. I believe Ambassador Martin was vindicated by the final result.

The United States became involved in Vietnam at a time when we considered ourselves engaged in a worldwide competition with a monolithic communist enemy seeking world domination. There were active communist insurgencies in all of Vietnam's neighbors, and in 1965 a communist coup attempt in Indonesia almost succeeded. The introduction of American combat troops into Vietnam that same year received widespread public and press support.

As I mounted the steps to the helicopter 10 years after American troops first came to Vietnam, the United States had positive relations with both the Soviet Union and China, who had serious differences with each other. With the obvious exceptions of Cambodia and Laos, Vietnam's neighbors were set on non-communist paths. With these shifts in the world strategic situation, Vietnam became of much less importance to the United States. But those of us who spent years of our lives there will not forget the attractiveness, intelligence and energy of the Vietnamese people. Nor will we ever forget those Vietnamese who believed in and worked for democracy, and whose hopes were ended when America withdrew. ■

# Tito's Yugoslavia: Simmering Signs of Ethnic Tension

Brotherhood and Unity was the party line in Yugoslavia, but an American diplomat foresaw conflict between Croats and Serbs.

*By J. Chapman Chester*

Under Comrade Josip Broz Tito, president of Yugoslavia from 1953 to 1980, the party line was "*Bratsvo i Jedinstvo*," Brotherhood and Unity, and any manifestations of ethnic separatism or nationalism were ruthlessly suppressed. While the government in Belgrade, as well as the Communist Party, maintained a delicate balance among the various ethnic groups and provinces (called republics), the common goal was generally understood to be a united Yugoslavia. Only the "old generation" — those old enough to remember World War II or the era that preceded it — favored such concepts as Croatian or Slovenian nationalism. Such people were not only discredited, but their numbers diminished by attrition as they departed this earth.

That party line was the recognized conventional wisdom. It was especially popular with Serbs, many of whose families had suffered grievously at the hands of their Croatian "brothers." They had everything to gain from the unity concept, since they were the dominant group in terms of numbers.

Although American diplomats tended to be skeptical of most government-sponsored propaganda, I think it is fair to say that most accepted the unity theme as valid and in accordance with Yugoslav national aspirations. That was less so in Zagreb — for good reason. While Serbs tended to play down the ethnic differences — "we are all Slavs, speak the same language with very minor variations, and have a similar Christian heritage," and so forth — the Croats would whisper into one's ear that they were "different" — the product of Western civilization, unlike the Eastern or Byzantine Serbs who, it was strongly implied, were clearly inferior in many respects. These sentiments were shared by Slovenes, except that they considered themselves superior to both Serbs and Croats. And, indeed, although small in number, Slovenes were the most productive of all Southern Slavs. During the early 1960s, these views were not proclaimed loudly or forcefully, but softly and subtly. Only those of us who served in Croatia were exposed to such heresy.

Realistically, the Yugoslav experiment never had a lot going for it: Created after World War I as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes under the Karadjordjević monarchy, the country underwent its first crisis in the 1920s when the Croatian Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radić was shot to death in the national *Skupstina* (parliament) by a Serb who evidently did not appreciate the man's remarks. Every year on All Saints' Day much of Zagreb marched up to Mirogoj Cemetery to place flowers on Stjepan's grave.

By the time World War II came along, resentments had reached such a peak that the independent state of Croatia was proclaimed, under Nazi sponsorship, led by the Croatian Fascist leader, Ante Pavelić, the *Poglavnik* (maximum leader). The Croatian leadership of that era — aided and abetted by a substantial element of the Catholic clergy, an endless embarrassment to the Vatican

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*J. Chapman "Chips" Chester, a former FSO, served from 1962 to 1964 as head of the consular section at the Consulate General in Zagreb, then a regional capital in Tito's Yugoslavia. His memoir,* From Foggy Bottom to Capitol Hill, *from which this piece is excerpted, has just been published by Arlington Hall Press, an imprint of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. Chester also served in Munich and Blantyre, Malawi (as DCM) before pursuing a second career as a foreign affairs specialist for the House Foreign Affairs Committee.* 

— then proceeded to commit hideous atrocities against Serbs living in Croatia, including chopping off heads with axes and burning people in churches.

Indeed, the wartime excesses of Croatia's Fascist militia, the Ustashi, had the effect of persuading many non-communists to support the partisans under Marshal Tito. The partisans at least were made up of all ethnic groups and were actually fighting valiantly against the German invaders. By contrast, the Serbian Chetniks, although honorable royalists attempting to defend their country against the Germans, spent more time trying to wipe out the Tito Communists, at times even with tacit German approval and assistance. The Chetniks, moreover, were a strictly Serbian force representing primarily Serbian interests.

Finally, when the carnage of World War II ended, there was an understandable desire to embrace the concepts of peace, brotherhood, and unity — a new "all-Yugoslav order," so to speak. It was a noble idea, but did not last very long.

### Unflagging Nationalism

A hint that perhaps Croatian nationalism was not yet an anachronism — confined exclusively to the "old" generation of Austrian-influenced citizenry — emerged at the Zagreb opera house, after an evening of Zrinsky, a heroic opera with stirring musical and dramatic themes. In its last act a Croatian count, Zrinsky, after numerous patriotic arias and crescendos, walked out of his castle to face certain death at the hands of the Turkish invader, in a futile but martyred attempt to defend the Croatian homeland. As the music swelled into the final climactic scene, it brought forth from the audience chauvinistic emotion from the depths of the Croatian soul.

> **"Nasa Zastavá *(Our Flag)*," *the students shouted, meaning the Croatian flag.***

After one memorable performance, a chant arose from the cheap seats in the gallery, occupied almost exclusively by students. Some appeared not to have even reached university age, but clearly all were members of the postwar generation. "*Nasa Zastavá* (Our Flag)," they shouted, meaning the traditional Croatian flag in lieu of the hammer and sickle. After much commotion, a short squat official and member of the Zagreb People's Committee waddled onto the stage like a duck and shook his forefinger at the young demonstrators, scolding them severely. This led to further shouting and booing plus a few undefined objects being thrown onto the stage. After what appeared to be a standoff, the authorities relented, hoisted the well-worn Croatian flag, and everyone departed after a highly emotional confrontation.

Americans who witnessed this scene felt unanimously that Croatian chauvinism was alive and well in the hearts of the young, even if mostly just below the surface. Our colleagues in Belgrade, however, did not fully appreciate our reporting of this incident to Washington. They feared that we

were presenting a "parochially distorted" picture of youthful fervor and suspected we were politicizing a purely antiestablishment student protest.

Within a year or two after my summer 1964 departure, a Zagreb university campus rebellion of sorts broke out, supported by a female Communist Party politician of Croatian origin. It was summarily suppressed by Tito, who sent in federal troops to quell the disturbances. No further trouble arose for some time, but discontent was clearly simmering.

### Resurrection at Glina

Local ethnic tensions came to the fore on another occasion where I briefly became the center of attention. One of the Ustashi's worst wartime atrocities had taken place in the Serbian village of Glina. Although physically located within Croatia, Glina, like many of its neighboring townships, or selos, was populated almost exclusively by Serbs. Glina lies in the southern border area of Croatia known as Krajina.

During World War II Ustashi forces rounded up all of Glina's Serbian residents — men, women, and children (most of the men were away, either fighting or captured by Germans), locked them in the local Orthodox church, and burned the entire structure to the ground. No one inside the church survived. This example of the Ustashi's grislier crimes managed to capture the special attention of the Serbian community worldwide. After the war, Serbian émigrés in Canada and the United States raised funds to build a new church on the original site. When construction was completed, numerous Serbian dignitaries assembled from home and abroad for a solemn dedication ceremony. Present were the ranking

Orthodox bishop of Yugoslavia; several high-ranking government officials, also representing the national League of Communists of Yugoslavia; selected leaders of the Serbian émigré community from Canada and the United States, most of whom were strongly anti-Tito but had been permitted to enter Yugoslavia for 24 hours just to attend this ceremony; and myself, representing collectively the American consulate general in Zagreb and the U.S. government.

A large feast followed the dedication in the equivalent of the village hall, as was the custom on Serbian religious or secular occasions. Only the VIPs and village elders were allowed inside, while the villagers lined up around the building to catch as much as possible of the long-winded speechmaking. As the rhetoric proceeded, it occurred to me that each of the speakers in turn was acting in a highly restrained manner, especially for the normally emotional Serbian representatives. The bishop, realizing that the party was granting him "absolution" on this occasion, was careful in his remarks to stay away from the subject of religion. Likewise, the party officials did not press the Communist cause. The émigrés were especially careful not to press their luck, as they still needed government permission to exit the country. No one, I suddenly realized, had mentioned the word "God," even though we were all involved in consecrating a church.

Although I must confess that I am not very religious, I decided to make the most of this opportunity: when my turn came to make a few appropriate remarks, I ended with the words "*Bog s vama* (God be with you)." That brought down the house — indeed, the entire Glina community. These were apparently the words everyone wanted to speak but felt constrained from doing. I was under no such restraint. Even the party members present had to recognize my success: an official who had been notably solemn and unobtrusive during most of the speechmaking smiled at me for the first time and in effect conceded: "You pulled a fast one on all of us here today, congratulations." As I shook hands with him while surrounded by well-wishers, I in effect told him: "Thank you, my friend, but you see, sometimes 'God' can help you more than the League of Communists of Yugoslavia."

***Despite the Tito party line, ethnic differences were just as apparent within the party as in the real world outside.***

Within the hall, everyone except the party officials cheered lustily, and outside I was mobbed by well-wishers all the way to my consular Jeep. Never, in my memory, have I been the subject of so much adulation by so many. It was clearly a case of pent-up emotion which I had been able to release with three brief words (and banal ones at that).

### Soccer SNAFU

Despite the Tito party line, ethnic differences were just as apparent within the party as in the real world outside. "Brotherhood and Unity" was without doubt an ennobling concept, but it had little relevance to "Yugoslav" reality. No better example comes to mind than a soccer case.

One day I received a call from a relatively high-ranking official in the Executive Council of Croatia, requesting an urgent meeting on a matter of "considerable sensitivity." The official wanted to bring along several of his colleagues, to which I readily agreed. When the group eventually arrived in my antechamber, they resembled a Grade B spy film scenario — with raincoats turned up in the back, hats pulled down over their faces, and dark glasses everywhere. I realized that something of monumental importance was about to happen.

The leader of the delegation asked me if he could speak "in confidence." I responded, "By all means, but it is my understanding that most of what is said here is recorded by your people. That surely would not be a problem for you!" Raucous but slightly nervous laughter followed. After a few more pleasantries and some Slivovitz, the spokesman came to the point:

"We have, Gospodin (Mr.) Konsul, information from our informants in Belgrade (read Croatian spies) that an international football (soccer) exhibition tournament is to take place in Philadelphia, Pa., next spring." I had not known about it, but said I hoped the Yugoslavs might be invited to participate. "We have been invited, Gospodin Konsul, but those bastards (the actual word used) in Belgrade told the Americans that the best Yugoslav team was the *Crvena Zvezda* (Red Star) team from Belgrade, and you know, Gospodin Konsul, that our Croatian *Dinamo* team just won the national championship!" I did know that important fact, as it was virtually impossible to live in Croatia and be unaware of the republic's football prowess, especially when they were winning. I quickly reassured my Croatian friends that I would rectify

***While those of us who served in Zagreb were more aware of ethnic tensions than were our colleagues in Belgrade, this was merely a matter of degree.***

this misunderstanding and keep them closely informed of the results. They all breathed a sigh of relief.

One phone call to Belgrade confirmed the fact that the USIS officer in charge of "exchanges" was a bookish sort of fellow who knew nothing about soccer. He promised to take my complaint up to the "highest level" if necessary and would definitely not send a second-rate team to Philadelphia. The Belgrade soccer officials — caught with their pants down, so to speak — assumed a dog-in-the-manger attitude: if the Red Star team could not go, no one would go. And that was the final outcome.

I will not attempt to analyze the reasons for Yugoslavia's recent breakup and its lapse into civil barbarism. I would only conclude with two rather obvious comments: First, while those of us who served in Zagreb were more aware of ethnic tensions than were our colleagues in Belgrade, this was merely a matter of degree. And, none of us, it is fair to say, ever predicted the extent of the calamity that has befallen the people of Bosnia, southern Croatia, and Kosovo. Any Western observer who claims otherwise is less than credible. ■







# BOOKS

## THE VIEW FROM BUCHANAN'S HEAD

**A Republic, Not An Empire: Reclaiming America's Destiny**
*Patrick J. Buchanan, Regnery Publishing Co., 1999, hardback, $29.95, 437 pages.*

BY EDWARD MARKS

*We've taken up the white man's burden*
*Of ebony and brown;*
*Now will you kindly tell us, Rudyard,*
*How may we put it down?*

Patrick Buchanan's new book is a long argument for returning United States foreign policy to the days of enlightened self-interest in pursuit of vital national causes. He argues vehemently that such a return would not be isolationist, because the United States has always played an active international role and because the isolationist versus internationalist debate is a phony argument trumped up by Wilsonian idealists.

In support of his ideas, he peppers his book with delightful quotations like the above, which appeared in the *New York World* following the Spanish-American War. Buchanan believes that the "Splendid Little War" combined with Wilsonian global idealism to tempt the United States into an imperial role that violates fimdamental American principals.

In Buchanan's view, the United States fulfilled its Manifest Destiny with the Alaska Purchase in 1867. That the U.S. somehow missed out on picking up Canada is a loss we can deal with, he says, and Mexico, however tempting as a territorial morsel, was better left alone, because America's destiny was to populate empty land and not rule "alien peoples." Obviously, Native Americans do not figure in his historical analysis.

President James K. Polk gets Buchanan's nomination for most under-appreciated Ameriean president for his handling of the Mexican-American War, beeause the war allowed America to pursue its vital interests abroad, while at the same time avoiding permanent "entangling alliances." Buchanan more or less approves of the attempts of President Herbert Hoover to moderate the naval arms race and reintegrate Germany into the world community following World War I. He certainly approves of taetics the U.S. used in conflict with the USSR, because the Soviets threatened American existence. He gives President Ronald Reagan the highest marks for "the most successful foreign policy of the 20th eentury."

Buchanan's views of what constitutes U.S. national interests will eause agitated reactions. For example, he argues that U.S. involvement in the two world wars produced results that weren't good for U.S. interests: destruction of bourgeois Germany following World War I and leveling of Germany following World War II, which, he says, destroyed Stalin's most natural opponent.

Though Buchanan's eomments are often trenchant, they also carry a whiff of "America Firstism." Although he discusses the unhealthy influence of ethnic pressure groups on foreign policy, it is interesting that he doesn't toueh on Irish-Americans and their influence on Northern Ireland policy. In his last chapter he reviews the current world situation and provides eapsule analyses based on his own policy recommendations.

It is easy to see why this book has raised hackles. Buchanan's approach and writing style are those of a contrarian university lecturer out to enrage his colleagues and enthrall his undergraduate audience. His tone is breathless and spirited and his historical analysis is enough to cause many a reader to sputter. Nevertheless, *A Republic, Not An Empire* should not be dismissed as Know Nothing ranting. Many Americans share Buehanan's worldview; he is not alone in warning about imperial temptations or in arguing that NATO expansion does not serve real U.S. interests.

I liked Buehanan's basic thesis that American foreign policy ought to be based on this nation's republican charaeter, eschewing imperial ambitions. But how is 21st century republican America served by 19th century interpretations of 18th century principles? Democratic principles and America's unavoidable status in the world eould easily imply an

increasingly multilateral approach in an increasingly interdependent world.

If he were running for president, perhaps Buchanan could bring himself to see this point of view. On the other hand, he may be a sincere reactionary.

*Edward Marks is chairman of the* Foreign Service Journal *Editorial Board.*

## FINLAND'S COLD WAR POLICY

**On the Finland Watch: An American Diplomat in Finland During the Cold War**
*James Ford Cooper, Regina Books, 1999, hardcover $37.50, softcover $19.50, 389 pages.*

BY ROBERT RINEHART

In *On the Finland Watch*, James Ford Cooper has produced both a memoir of his long and eventful diplomatic career and a history of postwar Finnish foreign policy and U.S.-Finnish relations. Drawing on research in Finnish and American archives, interviews, his own recollections and a solid grasp of Finnish history, he recounts how he and other U.S. diplomats analyzed issues and reported on developments in Finnish public life during the Cold War. The result is a very readable and interesting memoir, but also a profoundly instructive diplomatic history.

Cooper, who served two tours in Finland, first as political counselor from 1976 to 1979, then as deputy chief of mission from 1984 to 1986, first wrote his book for a Finnish-language publisher. When it was released in Finland in 1998, it drew significant attention and made Cooper a participant in the debate among Finnish historians reluctant to deal with the legacy of Finnish President Urho Kekkonen, who stepped down in 1982 after 26 years in office. Finnish historians had been reluctant to take up Kekkonen's Soviet policy until the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Cooper takes on this "Finnish dilemma," a term used to describe the contradictions in Finland's relations with its Soviet neighbor. If Finland was to survive as an independent, democratic, Western-oriented country after World War II, it had to establish a new and compliant relationship with its "hereditary enemy," Russia. If such a relationship assured Finland's independence, it also placed restrictions on it.

***Were Finland's compliant relations with the Soviet Union truly necessary for its survival?***

Cooper points out that the U.S. supported Finland's independence and "credible neutrality," but also asks how much cooperation with the Soviets was really necessary to maintain them. He argues persuasively that Kekkonen's good relations with the Soviets came at an immense cost for his country, because Kekkonen used the "Moscow card" for domestic political purposes and, in the process, distorted Finland's political institutions.

Still, as historian John Lukacs has observed, Finland emerged from the Cold War with its independence and democratic institutions intact, perhaps because of the way it dealt with the Soviets. And, as a Finnish colleague commented to me after reading *On the Finland Watch*, "Naturally, we applied different standards to our relations with Russia and America. Russia and America, after all, were very different countries." Today, thankfully, Finland, a European Union member state, is not likely to be left to its own devices again.

The second component of Cooper's book is a diplomatic memoir. He quotes at length from reports to Washington prepared by him and the embassy staff to illustrate how important informed and carefully articulated diplomatic reporting is to the formulation of foreign policy. Aware of his book's intended Finnish audience, he explains in detail the American embassy's organization and the American system of politically appointed ambassadors, a system with which he finds fault. Cooper also acknowledges the importance of the 44 weeks of Finnish-language and Nordic area studies training that he and his wife Magda received at the Foreign Service Institute. For just about any diplomatic assignment, a good knowledge of the language and an awareness of the history and culture of the country are essential, he says, a sentiment that most diplomats would support.

*Robert Rinehart is chairperson of the Nordic and Baltic Area Studies Programs at the Foreign Service Institute.* ■

# FSJ's Guide to Property Management

**See our online resource page at www.afsa.org and click on Marketplace**

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|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Executive Housing Consultants | 301 951 411 | Info@executivehousing.com | executivehousing.com | DC, MD, NoVa | Call for more information | | 58 |
| Executive Lodging Alternatives | 703 354 4070 | finder5@ix.netcom.com | None | NoVa | Call for more information | | 60 |
| J.P. Properties | 703 938 0909 | jpprop2@aol.com | foreignservicehomes.com | NoVa | Call for more information | | 61 |
| Manor Services | 202 363 2990 | nortont@erols.com | None | DC, MD, NoVa | 1/2 month's rent | 8% monthly rent | Classifieds |
| McGrath Real Estate Services | 703 709 2264 | mcgrath@flash.net | mcgrathrealestate.com | NoVa | Call for more information | | March 62 |
| The Meyerson Group | 301 657 3210 | jlmtink@aol.com | None | DC, MD, NoVa | Call for more information | | 58 |
| MGMB Inc., Realtors | 202 362 4480 | mgmbw@digizen.net | mgmb.baweb.com | DC, MD, NoVa | 1st month's rent | 8% monthly rent | 63 |
| No. Virginia Homes and Property Management | 703 934 8860 | harlandstine@northernvahomes.com | northernvahomes.com | NoVa | 3/4 month's rent | 8% monthly rent | 59 |
| Peake Management | 703 448 9652 | lindsey@peakeinc.com | peakeinc.com | NoVa | Call for more information | | 63 |
| Promax Management | 703 642 5683 | promax@erols.com | None | NoVa | Call for more information | | 17 |
| Property Specialists | 703 247 0350 | Propspec@nvar.com | propertyspecialistsinc.com | DC, MD, NoVa | Call for more information | | 62 |
| Prudential Carruthers | 703 522 5900 | dipprop@earthlink.net | None | DC, MD, NoVa | Call for more information | | 61 |
| RHR Properties | 301 654 1400 | rhrprops@aol.com | None | DC, MD, NoVa | Call for more information | | 58 |
| Realty Group, Inc. | 202 544 8762 | realtygp@erols.com | dcproperty management.com | DC | Call for more information | | Classifieds |
| Stevens Property Management | 703 476 8451 | spmreston1@juno.com | None | DC, MD | Call for more information | | 63 |
| Stuart and Maury | 301 654 3200 | susanbader@stuartandmaury.com | stuartandmaury.com | DC, MD | Call for more information | | 58 |
| WJD Management | 703 684 0800 | wjd@clark.net | wjdpm.com | NoVa | Call for more information | | 59 |
| Washington Mgmt. Services | 202 462 7212 | wms@wmsdc.com | wmsdc.com | DC, MD, NoVa | 1st month's rent | 9% month's rent | 63 |

*(1) District of Columbia, Maryland, and/or Northern Virginia.*


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| Property | Telephone | Web Address | Email Address | Location | Amenities[1] | House-keeping | Accepts Pets | Minimum Stay | Accommo-dations | Style[2] | Dist. to State | See Page |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Alexandria Suites Hotel | 703 370 1000 Ext. 7150 | Alexandria suites.com | alexandria suites@erols.com | NoVa | SP, FC | Daily | Yes w/dep. | 1 day | 1,2 bedrooms | HR | 8 miles | 7 |
| Avalon Bay Corporate Apartment Homes | 800 890 8706 410 772 3737 | Avalonbay.com | acah@avalon bay.com | DC, NoVa | SP, FC, TC, CC, DC | Optional | Yes | 30 days | 1,2,3 bedrooms | GS, HR, TH | Varies | 4 |
| Columbia Plaza | 202 293 2000 | rent.net/direct /columbiaplaza | none | DC | CC | No | Cats Only | 3 mos. | 1,2 bedrooms Efficiencies | HR | 1 block | March 45 |
| Crystal Quarters | 703 920 9596 | crystal quarters.com | home@crystal quarters.com | NoVa | SP, FC, CC | Weekly | No | 7 days | 1 bedroom | HR | 3 miles | March 56 |
| FARA/Executive Club Suites | 703 739 2582 | Dcexeclub.com | cathy@ dcexeclub.com | NoVa | SP, FC, CC | Daily/ Weekly | Yes | 1 day | 1,2 bedrooms | GS | 7-8 miles | 25 |
| Georgetown Suites | 202 298 7800 | georgetown suites.com | sales@george townsuites.com | DC | FC, CC | Daily | Yes w/dep. | 1 day | 1,2 bedrooms | LR | 15 min. walk | 45 |
| National Temporary Apartments | 301 495 8927 | Nationaltemp oraryapts.com | joy@nationaltem poraryapts.com | DC, NoVa, MD | SP, FC, TC, CC, PG | Weekly | Varies | 30 days | 1,2,3 bedrooms Efficiencies | GS, HR, TH | Varies | 53 |
| Oakwood Corporate Housing | 703 212 2605 800 888 0808 | Oakwood.com | imessano@ oakwood.com | DC, NoVa, MD | SP, FC, TC, CC, PG | Weekly | Varies | 30 days | 1,2,3 bedrooms | GS, HR, TH | Varies | 9 |
| The Remington | 202 223 4512 800 225 3847 | Remington -dc.com | remnc3333 @aol.com | DC | None | Weekly | Yes w/dep. | 1 day | 1 bedroom | HR | 2 blocks | 10 |
| Smith Corporate Living | 703 769 1362 888 234 7829 | Smithliving .com | dawn.mendel@ charlessmith.com | DC, NoVa | SP, FC, TC, PG | Weekly | Varies | 30 days | 1,2,3 bedrooms | GS, HR | Varies | 57 |
| The Virginian Suites | 703 522 9600 | virginiansuites .com | tvagm@erols .com | NoVa | SP, FC, CC, PG | Every 2 days | Yes w/dep. | 1 day | 1 bedroom Efficiencies | HR | 2 miles | 15 |

*(1) SP-swimming pool, FC-fitness center, TC-tennis courts, CC-conference center, DC-daycare, PG-playground.*

*(2) GS-garden style, HR-high rise, LR-low rise, TH-town homes.*

# REAL ESTATE

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# Real Estate


# POSTCARD FROM ABROAD

## *In Mexico, Welterweights Have Wings*

BY PAUL BERG

Years of struggle in that unclean, take-no-victories daily deadlock called the United States government interagency process had made me hungry for some honest fighting. Something with fists and blood. Something with winners and losers and rules.

I thought I had found it Saturday nights at 7 in the Coliseo, deep in the unsafe heart of Mexico City's Centro Histórico, in the upper tier, amid gamblers, sweat and curses and dirt and smoke and honest catharsis when your boy lands a KO in the fourth. Men — and sometimes mama, too — came from grimy barrios to watch beloved sons "El Maníaco," "El Tigre" or "El Guero" battle it out.

Maybe it was an old man's blind chutzpah, but I wanted to become one of those brute young men who turn life's metaphorical challenges into live confrontations. Then, one moonless night, when I was robbed of $200 at knifepoint, I discovered that I didn't know how to throw a punch.

Before the welts on my face had healed, I found myself searching for a trainer at the Gimnasio Nuevo Jordan, home of Mexico's greatest fighter, Julio Cesar Chávez. "Treat me like a muchacho off the street," I begged ex-prizefighter Jacopo Ojeda. A barrel-chested, 55-year-old, rock-hard molder of champions, Ojeda was dubious. He recognized unpromising physical material. But I like to think he also saw the eyes of an eager, malleable boy peering out at him from my too-well-fed diplomat's body.

*The Nuevo Jordan is four floors of dirty, striving, serious machismo.*

Learning to box meant developing technique through repetition. Training reminded me of Great Aunt Frieda's piano lessons when I was five, a humiliating memory. Both Aunt Frieda and Ojeda favored the occasional use of corporal punishment to prod the slow learner. The main difference between boxing and piano lessons, though, is that after two hours of boxing your body feels wonderful.

The Nuevo Jordan is four floors of dirty, striving, serious machismo. On weekday nights, the old brick firetrap is jammed with young men off the streets hoping to earn fame through their fists. The Virgin of Guadeloupe smiles down on them benevolently from a fluorescent perch.

I tried to imitate the way Mexican boxers cross themselves while casting her a silent glance as they step into the ring, an attempt to divorce myself from a stern Lutheran boyhood.

I had developed a deep admiration for Mexico's refined, relentlessly masculine esthetic. Yet I was puzzled by the apparent effeminacy of the clouds of grinning cherubim and seraphim floating through the murals of hundreds of Mexico's baroque churches. This mystery was solved at the Jordan, where the tough, young, punching lightweights had the same faces. I began to think of them as welterweights with wings, of seraphim who pack a punch.

These baby-faced bantamweights with iron fists left some memorable bruises when we began to spar. Pedro left the nick under my right eye, Jaime the almost-busted rib. Pedro went on to win some nice little purses in minor U.S. bouts. Jaime went back to selling fruit juice at a street stand.

Nine months at the Jordan were not enough time for Ojeda to turn me into a champion, but they toughened my body and quickened my mind. One happy Sunday I bloodied Lalo's ugly pug nose with a series of well-aimed jabs, compensating for years of abuse by high school bullies. A jubilant Ojeda exulted, "If you stay in Mexico one more year, I'll put you into a professional match." For one brief moment, I had satisfied my mentor. And myself.

It was not to be. In real life my hair whitens and my paunch thickens. In my fantasies, though, I will always be one of Ojeda's boys, a callow brawler from the barrio learning the discipline necessary to become a champion. ■

*Paul Berg is an FSO serving in Hanoi. The stamp is courtesy of the AAFSW Bookfair "Stamp Corner."*


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