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



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President's Views

The Verdict Is In: State's Woeful Underfunding Threatens Transformational Diplomacy

By J. Anthony Holmes

If you look back over my columns for the past two years, you will note that I've taken some pretty strong positions about how diplomacy generally, and the State Department and USAID in particular, have been short-changed in the federal budget. This has been true for many years and continues right up through the FY 2008 request that Congress is dealing with presently. This penury is a short-sighted, penny-wise and pound-foolish approach to national security. Quite simply, the United States cannot be a superpower on a shoestring.

On June 5 the Foreign Affairs Council, a nonpartisan grouping of 11 organizations committed to diplomacy and supporting the Foreign Service, released its independent assessment of Secretary Rice's management of the State Department. In evaluating its conclusions and recommendations, it is important to understand that the FAC is the consummate insiders' group and includes the retired princes of the Foreign Service. Inveterate sniping at Secretaries of State is not what the FAC is about. Instinctively it seeks the middle ground and consensus positions, bending over backward to be balanced and include all points of view. AFSA is one of the FAC's members, but the report itself was researched and written by two retired ambassadors and AFSA's role was minimal.

The FAC report's key judgment is that the fundamental ability of the State Department to do its job has been severely compromised by its failure to get the resources it needs. This funding shortfall is most acute in terms of personnel, which the report identifies as being 1,100 positions below what is required by Secretary Rice's signature "transformational diplomacy" initiative. It also concludes that the lack of funding for programs is a huge weakness that further jeopardizes the TD initiative.

"In the first two years of Secretary Rice's stewardship almost no net new resources have been realized," the FAC report states. Making up for this shortfall, its key finding concludes, "will require the aggressive and sustained personal involvement of both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, both within administration councils and with Congress."

The FAC report highlights the profound but widely unrecognized impact the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have had throughout the State Department, both overseas and in Washington. The "vacuuming up" of personnel resources gained during Colin Powell's Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, as well as considerable discretionary financing, have placed great strain on the department.

On an issue of particular importance to AFSA members, the FAC report decries the 18.6-percent pay cut that Foreign Service personnel take when serving overseas and calls on the Secretary to "engage in a full-court press to win over Congress" to eliminate it.

Regarding foreign assistance and USAID, the report calls for a strengthening of the agency's capacity to develop and implement policy at the same time that the administration is reforming the allocation process.

In a clear effort to be balanced and give credit where it is due, the FAC report notes that significant management progress has been made during the past two-and-a-half years in several discrete areas. It focuses on achievements in the Bureau of Consular Affairs, the Foreign Service Institute and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, as well as in the areas of information technology and public diplomacy. It lauds several new initiatives, particularly those related to strategic planning, harmonizing State and USAID management activities overseas, and integration of the State and USAID budgets.

The bottom line, though, is that the State Department's leadership has clearly not understood that to achieve its goals, it must get far more resources for diplomacy — and to do that the Secretary herself must be much more involved in the effort. The department spokesman tried to parry criticism in the media's coverage of the FAC report by protesting that Sec. Rice is already very involved. The point, though, is that regardless of what she has done up to now, it is going to take far, far more of her time and energy to actually succeed. The alternative is that transformational diplomacy disappears in 18 months. ■

J. Anthony Holmes is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.



LETTERS

No Longer Sleep-Inducing

I have subscribed to the *Foreign Service Journal* for 46 years. For most of that period, it tied with *State* magazine as dull reading, amounting to little more than another cheerleader for the Department of State. The most interesting section to me was the obituaries.

However, in the past several years, the magazine has started to focus on substantive issues, presenting dissenting views as well as coverage of State Department policies. I have particularly appreciated the recent articles by Dennis Jett, who consistently presents the contrarian view.

It takes courage for an organization as conformist as the Foreign Service to dissent. I applaud the *Journal* and hope it will continue to provoke thoughtful debate of foreign policy issues.

Thomas J. O'Donnell
FSO, retired
Tucson, Ariz.

A "Volunteer" Assignment

Given the level of interest in the State Department's evolving assignment process, allow me to share my experience with the summer 2007 bidding cycle.

I returned from Tokyo with my family less than two years ago, having determined that our preteen children's educational needs could be best met in the Washington area. With that in mind, I bid only on domestic positions, and in November 2006 I accepted an offer of "bureau leading candidate status" for a position in the East Asia and Pacific Bureau. EAP's offer came with a reminder that, "as far as EAP is concerned, the BLC is a firm commitment by both you and the bureau… [However,] HR/CDA does not recognize BLC status as a formal, binding job offer or acceptance."

In January, I was informed by my career development officer that I was on a list of FS-2 officers who would not be paneled until the department had filled a number of most-difficult-to-fill, high-priority assignments. She said I was being actively considered for positions in Khartoum and Afghanistan, and should know very shortly whether I would be asked to volunteer for one of them.

While Afghanistan, like Iraq and an expanding number of other posts, is a one-year unaccompanied tour, Khartoum is a two-year "limited-accompanied" tour (i.e., no children). In my case, the only difference between an unaccompanied post and a limited-accompanied post is the length of the assignment.

I talked this over with my wife, and we decided that if I were to take an overseas assignment now, I should go to an Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team. It looks like useful and interesting work, the benefits package is not unsubstantial, and I'd be home a year earlier than if I went to Khartoum.

I confirmed with my CDO that volunteering for a one-year assignment in Afghanistan would get me off the hook for Khartoum. Then, a few days later she told me that, "despite ongoing efforts, the department has been unable to find a volunteer to fill the 02 position in Khartoum. The time has come to consider volunteering for this assignment. We respectfully urge you to consider the Khartoum position, and provide a response by COB Wednesday, Feb. 21."

My response? I volunteered for Afghanistan. That is how the assignment process works today.

John Wecker
FSO
Washington, D.C.

Preserve Diplomatic History

AFSA President Tony Holmes was spot on in his column on the American Diplomacy Center in the May *FSJ*. I also applaud Under Secretary Nicholas Burns' initiative to incorporate a module on diplomatic history into future A-100 curricula.

The diplomatic museum concept has been around for at least 12 years, yet very little has happened. In the meantime, the Marine Corps built a snazzy museum at Quantico and, I hear, the Army is about to break ground on a new museum at Fort Belvoir. What is it that prevents the State Department from making this happen? A museum at State is a great idea and long overdue, particularly for an institution that suffers a lack of public support.

Coincidentally, the Military Assistance Command–Vietnam/Civil Operations for Revolutionary Development Support program, known as MACV/

CORDS, held a 40-year reunion just as the May *Journal* was published. (For those unaware of our diplomatic history, CORDS was the PRT equivalent during the Vietnam War.) We invited participants to display any memorabilia that they had from their experiences in that war. There was enough to mount an entire display of that era in a museum of diplomatic history. But it won't be there 20 years from now.

The same is probably true for every area of the world, for every post. The longer we delay, the more will be lost. If the department cannot fund completion of the museum, at the very least it should arrange for a small staff of archivists and conservators who can collect and safeguard donations of materials relevant to the museum until it can be built and staffed. Retirees are dying every day and many families would welcome a place where these pieces of history could be preserved.

Let's get this done.

Douglas R. Keene
FE-MC, retired
McLean, Va.

Floating Exchange Rates Are Key

I'm sure most of us are sympathetic to the arguments for free trade and open economies put forth by Eric Trachtenberg in "Saving Globalization from Itself" (April *FSJ*). However, while the theory of free trade presupposes neutral exchange rates, in today's world two major trading countries, China and Japan, and a number of lesser ones maintain undervalued exchange rates by accumulating foreign exchange reserves. Their private sectors generate an excess of foreign exchange earnings; if these governments stopped taking this foreign exchange off the market, their currencies would quickly rise to a non-undervalued level.

LETTERS

Undervalued exchange rates provide an artificial price advantage that increases exports and attracts investment. The costs are largely borne by countries with cleanly floating exchange rates; in particular, the member states of the European Union, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the U.S. The loss of jobs and investment in these economies is real, but the growing protectionism that Trachtenberg decries is a misguided response to it. And, if the underlying problem is not corrected, the backlash will worsen.

The answer is, in theory at least, rather simple: negotiate through the International Monetary Fund an exchange-rate regime in which countries are limited in their foreign exchange reserves to a specified percentage of their gross domestic product or foreign trade. Countries could build reserves up to a point, but the U.S. and like-minded countries would no longer be the patsies for those whose manipulation is disrupting the world trading system. Creating such a regime will, of course, require long and hard bargaining, as well as the support of those like Trachtenberg who have been slow to recognize that free trade requires freely floating exchange rates to distribute its benefits evenly.

Malcolm H. Churchill
FSO, retired
Washington, D.C.

NATO Is Obsolete

Many thanks for the insightful features on Russia in the April *Foreign Service Journal.*

With the Soviet empire and system gone, where does the current Russian-American friction originate? In my opinion, the question has one answer: the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We created NATO to preserve a weak Western Europe from further onslaught by the Red Army after the defeat of Nazi Germany. After World War II, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics constituted an empire of which the czars could only have dreamed. The Soviets even pushed national boundaries to the west. But the Soviet dream and integrated empire dissolved with the end of the Cold War.

In my opinion, with the termination of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of the Soviet Empire's threat to Western Europe, the need for NATO ended, too. Just think of the savings if NATO were abolished! Yet, based on some unexplained infatuation, we have insisted not only on its continued existence, but its expansion. For what purpose, you might ask if you were Russian? Who is the enemy of NATO? Would we be pleased if someone organized our former empire against us?

Since an expanded NATO stuck a finger in the Russian eye, is it any wonder that the Russians look to support nations such as Iran?

To address Moscow's legitimate concerns, we could disband NATO — especially now that we have helped puff up former Soviet satellites as our allies. Or we could convert it into a European organization without our participation. Whatever we do, we need to move boldly to integrate Russia more fully and firmly into Europe. At the same time, we should reduce our military role there. Why not stress Europe for the Europeans and concomitantly strengthen an alliance between those nations and the Organization of American States?

Sheldon Avenius
FSO, retired
Miami, Fla.

New IRS Rule Hurts the FS

I appreciated the April *AFSA News* article "Foreign Earned Income — Important Change in IRS Rules," and I was flattered that it employed the

very example I had submitted to AFSA showing the cost to a Foreign Service officer and his or her teacher spouse. The tax hike in that example amounted to $3,745 this year!

However, I was deeply disappointed that it was presented simply as a fait accompli. Where was AFSA when this rule change was under discussion? What is it doing now to try to roll it back?

Having been the one to discover this nugget for AFSA, I would also like to be the one to name it. I propose we call it the "Hammer the Foreign Service Rule." (I originally had in mind a word other than "hammer," but this is a family magazine.) After all, in households where both earners can use the Foreign Earned Income Exclusion, the change is negligible. It really only hurts families in which one earner living abroad is earning a government salary and the other is earning a non-government salary. The revenue gain to the government must be insignificant in the context of our overall deficit, but a huge portion of the gain must come from Foreign Service families.

You have disseminated the news. Now, let's see some action.

George N. Sibley
Deputy Chief of Mission
Embassy Antananarivo

Handling Mail

I am writing to mention a mail problem that perhaps other FSOs have encountered. As we have moved from post to post, we have been at pains to send change-of-address notifications to all our correspondents, in particular to federal and local offices: IRS, OPM, Social Security, local tax offices, etc. Nevertheless, in several cases official letters have been addressed to our current or earlier home addresses that were never delivered or forwarded to post. In two cases these were notices of tax or mortgage payments due that we were unaware of until we discovered that a lien had been placed on our home for payment delinquency.

We got the matters straightened out, but there has to be a way to avoid this kind of unpleasantness. Merely sending change-of-address letters doesn't seem to do the job. I am wondering if others have suffered similar annoyances, and what a remedy might be. ■

Stuart G. Hibben
FSO spouse
Bethesda, Md.

CYBERNOTES

Passports: "Woefully Inadequate Planning and Resources"

On June 8, the Bush administration was forced to ease the requirement, in effect as of January, that Americans traveling by air to and from Canada, Mexico and the Caribbean must carry passports (**www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/jun/86241.htm**).

Part of a broader package of immigration rules spurred by the 9/11 attacks, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative was to be implemented in phases, with air travelers first. Land and sea travelers to Western Hemisphere destinations will require passports as of January 2008.

But by early June the plan had run amok as thousands were being forced to cancel or delay long-planned holiday trips because they still had not received passports they had applied for months before.

"I do not believe the current implementation plan is realistic and have serious concerns regarding how the department failed to anticipate and prepare for the increased demand," Senator George V. Voinovich, R-Ohio, ranking member of the Oversight of Government Management Subcommittee told Sec. Rice in a June 7 letter (**http://voinovich.senate.gov/public/index.cfm**). "Summer travel is not a new phenomenon. Notwithstanding the department's use of mandatory overtime and the hiring of additional personnel, it is clear that the existing planning and resources are woefully inadequate."

Voinovich said the volume of calls to his office from constituents seeking passport assistance had increased from 76 calls in the whole of 2006 to 1,000 in the first five months of this year.

In March and April, the State Department set new records for passport production, issuing more than three million passports in two months. This year, it expects to process about 18 million passports, some 30 percent more than the 12.1 million processed in 2006.

As of mid-May, one of the 13 regional U.S. passport agencies had a backlog of 90,000 cases. Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Maura Harty says the department hired 145 people in May to work on the backlog, and would hire 400 more this quarter.

The relaxation of rules in effect until September allows travelers to board their vacation flights with a government-issued ID and a State Department receipt showing they had applied for a passport. But it does not address the schedule for land and sea travel implementation. The Department of Homeland Security insisted that this provision would go into effect in January 2008. But by late June Congress had moved to force its postponement until June 2009.

Sen. Voinovich is also backing a measure to create a nationwide secure driver's license program for cross-border travel and delay the WHTI implementation until a test of the pilot program in Washington state is complete. It would also require the Secretary of State to certify that adequate passport staff are in place, and make low-cost alternatives to passports, such as passport cards, available in early 2008.

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Passport Services Ann Barrett says the State Department will make the less expensive, more convenient passport card available next spring.

Action on Iraqi FSN Visas

On June 20, the eve of World Refugee Day, a bipartisan group of senators, led by Sen. Edward

50 Years Ago...

Many of the Foreign Service's troubles over the last few years were at least partially the result of the almost total lack of public understanding of what the Service is and does. In a recent *New York Times* article commenting on congressional cuts in the department's budget, James Reston listed as one of the reasons the fact that "Little has been done by the administration itself to dramatize the great achievements and contributions of the career Foreign Service to the security of the nation."

— Editorial welcoming the announcement of a forthcoming CBS television series on the Foreign Service, "Silent Service," that would reach 20 million viewers, *FSJ,* July 1957.

CYBERNOTES

Kennedy, D-Mass., and Sen. Gordon Smith, R-Ore., introduced legislation outlining a comprehensive approach to the spiraling Iraq refugee crisis (**www.theirc.org/news/senate-bill-iraqi-refugee-crisis-0621.html**). The measure is addressed, in particular, to the plight of those Iraqis who work or have worked with the U.S. in Iraq. Another reminder of their unique vulnerability came in late May, when an Iraqi couple working for the U.S. embassy were kidnapped and murdered.

"America has a special obligation to keep faith with the Iraqis who now have a bulls-eye on their back because of their association with our government," said Kennedy, chair of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration and Border Security.

The bill, S. 1651, would create a new special category of applicants for refugee status for those who have helped the U.S. in Iraq and set up a mechanism for processing applications in Iraq and the surrounding countries. The measure also directs the Secretary of State to place a "Minister Counselor for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons" in Embassy Baghdad, with authority to refer people directly to the U.S. refugee resettlement program.

A month earlier, on May 24, the U.S. Senate unanimously approved legislation, S 1104, to increase the number of special immigrant visas allotted in the next two years to Iraqi and Afghan nationals who have served as translators or interpreters for the U.S. effort. The bill was co-sponsored by Senators Richard Lugar, R-Ind., and Edward Kennedy, D-Mass. A similar measure passed the House earlier. It authorizes 500 visas per year for 2007 and 2008. To date, the limit has been 50 per year, and there is a nine-year backlog of cases.

> American Realism is an approach to the world that arises not only from the realities of global politics but from the nature of America's character: From the fact that we are all united as a people not by a narrow nationalism of blood and soil, but by universal ideals of human freedom and human rights. We believe that our principles are the greatest sources of our power. And we are led into the world as much by our moral ideas as by our material interests.
>
> – Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Economic Club of New York, June 7, *www.state.gov.*

In a statement welcoming passage of the measure, Sen. Lugar reported that he had written to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice last July, "encouraging her to develop a policy to address these various situations" (**http://lugar.senate.gov/**). In January, Sen. Kennedy organized the first set of congressional hearings on the subject.

As we reported recently in this column (May 2007), some FS and military personnel in Iraq have been in the forefront of trying to get action on Iraqi refugee issue. And in June, *AFSA News* featured a story on a little-known department cable giving guidance on assisting Iraqis with U.S. government ties (p. 53).

Of course, the predicament faced by FSN employees is but a subset of the broader humanitarian crisis surrounding Iraq. By the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees' official count, as of June 6 the total number of refugees and displaced persons is 4.4 million. Half of them are internally displaced, and the rest have fled to Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Egypt.

Though the administration announced that 7,000 refugees would be resettled in the U.S. this year, to date only 69 have been admitted, according to Refugees International.

2007 Declared "Year of the Pacific"

At the Eighth Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders, convened at the Department of State on May 7, Secretary of State Rice declared 2007 the "Year of the Pacific" and promised a governmentwide effort to increase the U.S. role in support of regional stability, good governance and economic development in the Pacific region (**www.state.gov**). It was the first time the triennial meeting organized by the Honolulu-based East-West Center had taken place in Washington, D.C.

Besides a meeting with Sec. Rice, the 20 leaders from Pacific countries and territories, including Hawaii and the U.S. territories, heard from Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy Karen Hughes. Hughes announced the U.S.

initiatives: a new, regional public affairs office in Suva; expanded exchange and English-language programs; new grants focused on democracy, civil rights and the rule of law; and briefings and workshops organized by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative on securing duty-free benefits for Pacific states. Also under way is an effort to involve neighboring countries in the construction projects related to the relocation of 8,000 American troops from Okinawa to Guam.

On May 8 and 9, State hosted a Core Partners Meeting for countries and organizations with a strong interest in the Pacific.

Critics from the Pacific Islands and elsewhere have long urged greater U.S. involvement in the region. Indeed, such an article in the *FSJ* ("The Pacific Microstates and U.S. Security," November 2006) drew a prompt response from the State Department ("The U.S. *Is* Engaged in the South Pacific," January 2007).

Still, this level of interest from the U.S. is a new development, says Pacific Islands Development Program Director Sitiveni (Steven) Halapua of the East-West Center in Honolulu, which acts as the secretariat for the Pacific Islands Conference of Leaders (**www.pacificmagazine.net/news/2007/05/06/us-steps-up-pacific-islands-engagement**). But now that the Pacific island nations have Washington's attention, Halapua urges caution.

"How do we want this relationship to work?" he asks. "Will the U.S. control [the Pacific]? Are we just going to be beneficiaries, recipients? Or [will be be] players? … Pacific islanders have to think not about how much money the U.S. will give them; instead they need to think about what collaborative strategies [they can] develop to manage this relationship."

U.S.-India Civilian Nuclear Deal: A Dead Letter?

If not totally stalled, the nuclear agreement with India — billed by its promoters as a win-win for both countries — has certainly hit some snags.

One of the Bush administration's bigger and more controversial foreign policy projects, the deal would allow India to participate in nuclear technology trade and cooperation even though New Delhi has tested nuclear weapons and is not a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

Last December, Congress passed the Henry Hyde U.S.-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act, clearing the way for the historic deal. But at this writing, the first of three additional steps necessary to implement it has yet to be completed. That first step — negotiation of the so-called 123 Agreement that will formally spell out the terms of cooperation consistent with provisions of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act — also has to be cleared by Congress.

The Bush administration hoped to complete the deal, including final congressional approval, by the end of June. But Under Secretary of State Nicholas Burns' trip to New Delhi to wrap up the 123 talks at the end of May proved fruitless. Following a 10-minute meeting between President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh at the G-8 summit, both pronounced the agreement "doable," but agreed that more "tough negotiations" are necessary.

The talks are deadlocked over two issues: nuclear testing and fuel reprocessing. U.S. law states that nuclear trade will end if India resumes testing. But, though it has unilaterally declared a moratorium on the same, New Delhi refuses to relinquish its right to test and seeks an explicit guarantee that contracted fuel will contin-

Site of the Month: www.eyesondarfur.org

Eyes on Darfur is the latest project of Amnesty International USA to engage individuals in the effort to stop the humanitarian disaster in western Sudan. This is an innovative, informative and compelling site that aims to (literally) monitor people threatened with violence in remote locations.

Taking advantage of high-resolution satellite imagery and the image-analysis capabilities of an American Association for the Advancement of Science team, *Eyes on Darfur* offers "before" and "after" looks at more than a dozen villages in Darfur that have been marauded by the Janjaweed militia and focuses on another dozen villages that are in danger. Accompanying each photo or series of photos is a report on what has happened or is happening in the village, including some first-hand accounts and, in some cases, videos.

The site also offers a conflict analysis, a report on the international response and avenues for becoming involved in the campaign to bring peace.

ue to be delivered even if it conducts another test. In addition, India wishes to retain the right to reprocess U.S.-supplied spent fuel without seeking Washington's permission.

Besides the 123 Agreement, India will have to attain approval from the Nuclear Suppliers Group to amend some of the group's guidelines and also conclude a separate agreement with the IAEA on safeguards.

More than three years in the making, the deal was aimed at removing the single largest obstacle to a strategic relationship between India and the U.S. — namely, the technology denial regime established by Washington following India's first nuclear test in 1974.

That trade embargo failed to keep India non-nuclear. Yet it was maintained at the cost of better relations with the world's largest democracy in a sensitive area of the world, says Ashley Tellis, a Carnegie Endowment for International Peace fellow who has been a key player in the initiative.

The agreement faces strong opposition in both the U.S. and India. Nonproliferation advocates in the U.S. warn that it totally undermines the NPT, the world's central enforcement structure, and will set off a new wave of proliferation.

In India, opponents argue that the agreement compromises both the thorium-based nuclear power program built up indigenously and the country's basic sovereignty, unnecessarily opening the door to U.S. political and economic interference. Reprocessing, which India can now do freely as a non-signatory of the NPT, is essential to produce plutonium to fuel the thorium reactors.

Both Washington and New Delhi, however, remain publicly confident that the deal will ultimately be completed. But as the Bush administration approaches its last year, and Congress becomes increasingly preoccupied with electoral calculations, it is less clear when that may be.

Besides the major daily press on the American side, *Arms Control Today* (**www.armscontrol.org**) tracks the issue. For background, see the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's South Asia program at **www.ceip.org**. To follow this issue from the Indian side, read the *Hindustan Times* (**www.hindustantimes.com**). ■

This edition of Cybernotes was written and assembled by Senior Editor Susan Maitra.



SPEAKING OUT

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Can Science Help?

BY KRISTIN M. LORD

America's sinking global image threatens U.S. national security, according to a host of nonpartisan reports. Yet, according to the Government Accountability Office, the State Department's 887 public diplomacy officers — the very group of public servants most directly tasked with reversing this trend — are overworked, overburdened with administrative work, and too few in number. They also rotate frequently in many key countries, which inhibits their ability to build deeper and more extensive networks.

The task of public diplomacy officers — to promote both tactical and strategic public diplomacy interests of the United States — is both vital and enormous. It is also enormously hard.

Meanwhile, America's standing in the world continues to erode in the eyes of foreign publics. A February 2007 BBC World Service poll found that only 29 percent of citizens in 18 countries believe the United States plays a mainly positive role in the world, down from 36 percent last year. Public attitudes declined most sharply in countries previously positive toward the United States.

For instance, only 38 percent of Poles now view America's role in the world as mainly positive, down from 62 percent a year ago. In India that percentage declined from 44 percent to 30 percent; and in Indonesia, from 40 percent to 21 percent. Given these challenges, the State Department's hard-working public diplomacy officers would undoubtedly welcome additional support.

S&T cooperation allows the United States to engage in a public diplomacy of deeds, not words.

Fortunately, our diplomats have excellent but undertapped resources right in their own department. The State Department's Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs works on issues that are tailor-made to engage foreign publics: health, water, pollution, conservation and clean energy. OES also oversees 15 environment, science, technology and health hubs worldwide in countries including China, Chile, Ethiopia, Jordan, Mexico and Nepal.

In addition, the State Department's Office of the Science and Technology Adviser to the Secretary works cooperatively with the global scientific community and engages scientists and engineers from Iraq to Brazil, and from India to Egypt.

The power of science and technology to engage foreign publics was evident at the U.S.-Islamic World Forum co-sponsored by The Brookings Institution and Qatar's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February. Though the tone of many sessions was quite contentious, the session on S&T (which I co-convened) was not only positive but filled with representatives from the United States (including OES Deputy Assistant Secretary Reno Harnish) and the Islamic world who were eager to work together on tangible initiatives that will advance common interests.

Leading with Our Strong Suit

Of course, OES and STAS have more to offer than extra bodies to march into the war of ideas. They also have numerous strengths that may be less obvious to PD practitioners, who historically have focused their attention on culture — not science — as a tool of public diplomacy.

First, engaging with foreign societies on issues of science and technology is playing to our strength. Zogby International's polls consistently indicate that science and technology represent the most respected aspects of American society among citizens of Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. Indeed, in the same surveys favorable views of S&T outrank American freedom and democracy, people, movies and TV, products, education and policies.

Second, S&T cooperation is an area where foreign countries — including those with predominantly Muslim populations — eagerly wish to engage with the United States. American newspapers may not have mentioned the first S&T agreement between the United States and Algeria, but it was front-page news in Algiers.

Third, S&T cooperation offers a

framework for engagement that is outside the realm of contentious, highly politicized matters of foreign policy. Virtually every country in the world needs to find solutions to challenges posed by pollution, infectious diseases, declining biodiversity and carbon-producing energy sources.

Fourth, social science research shows that the best way to improve relations between groups is sustained and meaningful contact to address common problems. Issues of science, technology, environment and health fit this bill exactly. Addressing global challenges together, as partners, will help to remedy the challenges themselves — and it may also improve broader international relationships.

Fifth, the scientific enterprise is already global and engages a network of individuals linked by common interests, not ideology, ethnicity or nationality. Thus, science and engineering offer a promising foundation on which to build stronger bonds.

Sixth, S&T cooperation allows the United States to engage in a public diplomacy of deeds, not words — an approach recently endorsed by Under Secretary of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes. At a time when America is distrusted even by the populations of allied countries, tangible acts that reflect our values are an invaluable way to achieve U.S. public diplomacy goals. S&T cooperation, with its focus on strengthening the human potential and institutional capacity necessary for education, scientific inquiry, health care, innovation and economic opportunity, speaks to what we stand for as a nation.

A Comprehensive Systemic Approach

Finally, the scientific enterprise reflects values Americans embrace: meritocracy, transparency, the competition of ideas, accountability and the need to engage in critical thinking. Tackling these important issues directly may seem politically motivated, patronizing or even subversive. Addressing them in the context of science is more constructive and less political. After all, these values are already embraced by the global scientific community, not just Americans.

These programs offer benefits for education, health care and economic opportunity, and they speak to what we stand for as a nation.

Important as they are, OES and STAS are far from the only sources of S&T cooperation in the U.S. government. Other functional bureaus in the State Department — such as the Bureau of Economic, Energy and Business Affairs — have valuable expertise and relationships in this area. And numerous other federal agencies engage in S&T cooperation and outreach to foreign publics.

As a 2005 Brookings Institution report observed, nine U.S. government agencies — ranging from USAID and the Department of Health and Human Services to the National Science Foundation and the Environmental Protection Agency already maintain extensive programs to engage foreign scientists, engineers and doctors.

Moreover, organizations outside the federal government — professional societies, corporations, think-tanks, research organizations, laboratories and universities — work on literally thousands of initiatives that engage foreign publics and civil-society groups.

Deeper and more focused engagement with these organizations in the United States and overseas would benefit American public diplomacy.

But first things first. U.S. diplomats can accomplish much with few additional resources simply by engaging the State Department's S&T experts in the critical task of public diplomacy. Such cooperation affords rich opportunities for positive engagement with foreign societies, but its full potential remains untapped. ■

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

FS KNOW-HOW

Helping a Colleague Cope with the Death of a Loved One

BY JOAN B. ODEAN

Almost all of us in the Foreign Service have gone through the experience of losing loved ones while living vast distances from home. My father was seriously ill during my tour in Germany and died the day after I arrived at my next post in Tel Aviv. Both my mother and sister passed away while I was living in Oslo. And most recently, my mother-in-law died while I was here in Ottawa.

At some posts, the love and care I received from colleagues carried me through the waves of grief in a cocoon of comfort and security. But at other embassies, barely anyone acknowledged my loss, making a difficult period even more sad and isolating.

I have often said that the Foreign Service is a wonderful career — until a family member gets ill or dies. Then this has to be the worst job in the world. In most cases, the vast geographic distance from a relative who is ill or dying exacerbates our worry, making us almost crazed with concern.

Nearly 15 years later, I can still vividly remember trying to give my mother as much support as I could through daily calls as my father's illness dragged on and on. I would hang up the phone after listening to another report of his slipping away by inches, and sit stunned in emotional exhaustion.

If any of you reading this have not suffered this experience yet, you will at some point. Death is a part of life. And so I would like to offer a few pointers from my own experience on what to do when a colleague loses a close friend or family member — especially while serving overseas.

> *Don't worry about finding the right words to acknowledge a colleague's loss. Just express your sympathy and say you're there for him or her.*

Acknowledge your colleague's loss. It is not easy for most people to do this — what are the correct words to use? Fortunately, it doesn't matter. You do not have to be Shakespeare or a trained grief counselor. The important thing is that you explicitly recognize the loss that is causing your colleague pain, and you are there for him or her. Period.

What is the worst thing that can happen? Either the co-worker you are consoling will mumble some acknowledgment in embarrassment and turn away, or might shed a tear or two. Can you handle that? Remember: This is not about you. It is about giving comfort to another human being who is experiencing the same pain that you have already felt, or will suffer in the future.

Let me add that I am probably one of the most stalwart, businesslike people you could ever encounter. (I don't even keep any personal pictures on my desk.) I believe that we are to focus on professional issues while at work, and personal matters should remain at home. However, I also realize that these lines of distinction blur for those of us in the Foreign Service and living overseas, away from family and friends back home. So it is unavoidable that one must turn to colleagues in a way that would not happen if living in the U.S.

When a relative of mine died and a colleague at post said a simple word of comfort and put a hand on my arm while passing me in the hall, his sincere act of caring brought tears even to my eyes. They were tears of simple gratitude that another human being took the time to acknowledge the pain I was experiencing. Is it so onerous for you to be one of those caring people? The impression you might make on a colleague in need of human contact may be far greater than you ever imagined.

Notify the community liaison officer at post if you learn that the loved one of a colleague or spouse has died. The CLO is trained to jump into action for embassy staff in need — by organizing dinners to be delivered to the home of someone who is frantically trying to pack to fly out for an unexpected trip home, helping to handle paperwork to depart post, etc. If nothing else, he or she will put a

notice in the post's weekly newsletter about the passing of the loved one. That, hopefully, will explain to colleagues why you are perhaps unusually subdued for a few days at work, and might encourage them to offer you a few words of comfort.

If a colleague's spouse has suffered a loss, don't just pass a message. Of course you should express condolences to your colleague at work. But take five minutes to call the spouse at home — or, if that is too uncomfortable for you, at least write a note. The spouse may be suffering even more than you realize because he or she is isolated at home in a strange country without the distractions of work in an embassy and the support of friends from home. A phone call will be all the more welcome under those circumstances.

Offer your services even if you don't know the person well. Besides expressing your sympathy, offer to cook a meal (or have one delivered) or help with chores. Or stop by for a chat. It's only 30 minutes or so of your time — surely you can spare that for another human being in need.

Next time you're on home leave in the U.S., buy a handful of sympathy and get-well cards. Being old-fashioned, and raised in the South to boot, I find e-mails just one step above doing nothing. They are fine for quickly acknowledging a piece of sad news, but follow up with something more personal and heartfelt. A greeting card provides a ready-made message when you may not be able to find the words yourself.

Don't make things complicated. I'm a firm believer that expressions of condolence are a personal issue. Don't pressure co-workers to give money for flowers or take up a group donation to a charity. But do, for heaven's sake, acknowledge the death of a colleague's loved one — don't ignore it. True, most people in that situation will realize that the oversight is not intended as a personal affront. But trust me when I testify that it will also not go unnoticed by the person experiencing grief.

As I said, I was raised in the South. When my mother passed away unexpectedly, I was on mid-tour home leave from Oslo. She became ill suddenly and was gone in a week. There is no way in the world I could have gotten through that shock without her friends. To this day, I still recall being lifted up and carried by the helping hands of a large group of comforting women — through the funeral, burial, closing a large house within two weeks and putting it on the market, etc. They knew I could never repay their acts of kindness, but that wasn't the point. Nor was my case an isolated incident — they did these things again and again for others in need.

In this day and age of ever-increasing isolation from other humans, the loss of a loved one — particularly when one is far from home and away from close friends — is definitely a time when business colleagues need to step up to fill the void.

Remember: It's not about you. It's about the person hurting, who needs the comfort of fellow humans during a difficult period. If ever the Golden Rule applies, it is to situations like this. ■

Joan B. Odean, an office management specialist, joined the Foreign Service in 1985 and served for two years. Since re-entry to the Service in 1992, she has served in Geneva, Bonn, Tel Aviv, Oslo, Moscow and Washington, D.C. She is currently in Ottawa.

Needed: A New Nuclear Contract

The nuclear "haves" should offer meaningful incentives to the "have-nots" to forgo such weapons.

By James E. Goodby

In 1993 and 1994, I led an interagency delegation on several missions to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to help these countries dismantle their nuclear arsenals and tighten controls over fissionable materials. The agreements we negotiated reduced the chances that the weapons systems they had inherited when the Soviet Union collapsed could be sold or stolen — a threat our experts identified as one of the most serious the United States faced.

Building on that success, the United States has done fairly well in helping to secure nuclear materials at civilian sites overseas, although it is still a work in progress. But we have not done nearly enough to control those associated with military nuclear programs. And it is from such enterprises that the device that could level an American city could be procured by al-Qaida.

Recall that it was not that long ago that Dr. A.Q. Khan was finally caught after many years of running a highly successful and profitable nuclear black market from Islamabad. And it is quite possible that Pakistan is not the only country harboring such profiteers. So our only hope of safety is to persuade other countries to get rid of most, if not all, of those weapons, in parallel with similar reductions in our own nuclear arsenals. In fact, we have that obligation under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which mandates negotiations on nuclear disarmament.

When President Ronald Reagan called for a world free of nuclear weapons more than 20 years ago, he was criticized by people here and abroad who thought that our security and that of our allies depended on nukes, in accordance with the Cold War doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction. Even today, in many ways we have not moved far beyond that mind-set.

But Reagan was right. Promising security, these weapons generate insecurity. As a deterrent, they are useless against terrorists. And in the post-9/11 era, any successful counterterrorism policy and any nuclear nonproliferation policy worth its salt must deal with the most serious potential sources of nuclear terror: the new weapons that are being built, the ones already stockpiled, and the fissionable materials that can be used for such weapons.

Ronald Reagan may not have foreseen the utility of deep reductions in nuclear weapons as a nonproliferation tool in an age of terrorism. But his ideas about abolishing all nuclear weapons did lead to elimination of a whole class of nuclear weapons systems and started a downward trend in U.S. and Soviet/Russian holdings of strategic nuclear weapons. Actions like these are directly responsive to the political needs of governments that might be inclined to forgo nuclear weapons. And they should be part of a new nonproliferation bargain between the nuclear "haves" and the "have-nots."

A Third Miracle?

It was a miracle that we survived the bitter hostility of the Cold War without a nuclear weapon ever being fired in anger after 1945. And we have all lived through a second miracle of the nuclear age: the peaceful end of the Cold War. No one imagined, let alone predicted, that a superpower armed to the teeth with nearly 40,000 nuclear weapons could collapse as a centrally organized state, while the police power that safeguarded its nuclear weapons disintegrated — and no nukes would be stolen or used, even at the height of the chaos.

Now we need a third miracle, one that will bring the world safely through the new medievalism that has appeared in the 21st century — and do so without a nuclear weapon having been detonated in one of the world's great cities. But for that to happen, the next administration must make a fresh start in its nuclear thinking. President George W. Bush is correct in saying that the nexus between radicalism and technology is where the gravest threat to international security lies. But his administration's policies have failed to get at the root of the problem.

From the beginning of the nuclear era, the U.S. government recognized that in the arena of nuclear weapons, it has no permanent friends, only permanent interests. The United States opposed both British and French acquisition of nuclear weapons. Eisenhower had to deal with the seductive logic of preventive war

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James E. Goodby entered the Foreign Service in 1952 and retired from government service in 2001 with the rank of career minister. His long diplomatic career included tours as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (1974-1977) and Bureau of European Affairs (1977-1980); ambassador to Finland (1980-1981); chief negotiator for nuclear threat reduction agreements (1993-1994); special representative of the president for the security and dismantlement of nuclear weapons (1995-1996); and deputy to the special adviser to the president and Secretary of State for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (2000-2001). Ambassador Goodby is currently a research affiliate at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a senior fellow (nonresident) at The Brookings Institution. He is the author of At the Borderline of Armageddon: How American Presidents Managed the Atomic Bomb *(Rowman & Littlefield, 2006) and* Europe Undivided *(U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1998).*

because it was clear that the Soviet Union, when it reached "atomic plenty," would be able to inflict massive damage on the United States. Launching an attack on Chinese nuclear facilities, possibly in cahoots with the Soviet Union, was seriously discussed during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The Clinton administration gave thought to an attack on North Korean nuclear facilities. Yet each American president decided against preventive war. Diplomacy, and time, eventually became the preferred tools of Washington policymakers from both parties in the effort to control proliferation.

The Bush administration tacitly acknowledges that it has adopted a selective counterproliferation policy: the "good guys" are entitled to have nuclear weapons, while the "bad guys" are not.

The one major exception to that approach, of course, was the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which the current administration justified on the basis that Saddam Hussein was developing nuclear weapons. The subsequent debunking of that rationale, coupled with the catastrophic results of our intervention, underscored what previous American presidents had concluded, and all the world now sees: preventive war has very limited utility as a nonproliferation tool. It is not likely to be used for that purpose again anytime soon.

Can America Make a Difference?

The Bush administration's nuclear policies have followed a neoconservative prescription, centered on the proposition that neither the United States nor other current nuclear weapon states have any obligation to scale back their arsenals to levels lower than they have unilaterally determined they need. In fact, agreements that limit the freedom of choice of the United States and other democracies in military matters are held to be dangerous and should be avoided.

In line with this logic, the Bush administration has consistently played down the idea of linkage between the levels of nuclear forces held by the United States and decisions made by other nations regarding acquisition of nuclear weapons. In Washington's view, global agreements have little effect on what governments actually do; instead, regional considerations dictate major defense decisions.

It is true that regional rivalries drive arms buildups, but that is not the whole of the story. The exercise of American power and influence, by itself, cannot stop nuclear proliferation, but it can help to create a climate of international opinion in which rolling back nuclear weapons programs and capabilities is a realistic option.

There is good reason to believe that a mix of pressure and incentives can work. American pressure on Brazil — and on Germany, which was providing it with technical support — stopped a full fuel-cycle program from being activated there during the Carter administration. American pressure on Kazakhstan and Ukraine during the George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations led these countries to accede to the NPT and send nuclear weapons to Russia for dismantling. South Korea, too, had a nascent nuclear weapons program until it was abandoned under U.S. pressure.

As such examples demonstrate, our influence has made a difference. But to have any chance of success today, a renewed American campaign to reverse the trend toward more nuclear weapons in more hands must be backed by an indisputable commitment to reducing the salience of nuclear weapons in world affairs. Otherwise, it lacks legitimacy and is unconvincing.

Re-examining Nonproliferation Strategy

The Bush administration's conceptual contributions to counterproliferation — its preferred description of its goal — have mainly addressed denial of access to, and interdiction of, nuclear materials. It has had some successes — the Libyan decision to renounce major weapons programs, for example. But the administration's overall policies have had the pernicious effect of actually *encouraging* nuclear proliferation.

The administration tacitly acknowledges that it has adopted a selective counterproliferation policy. In simple terms, the "good guys" are entitled to have nuclear weapons while the "bad guys" are not. For the good guys, there are no sanctions for proliferation; in fact, there are rewards for acquiring nuclear weapons, as the

case of India shows. Conversely, for the bad guys the obvious enmity of the United States, coupled with the stigmas of disrespect and inequality, represent incentives to acquire nuclear weapons.

The cases of Iran and Iraq should be warnings against such cronyism in nuclear matters. Three decades ago, the West supported Iran's nuclear aspirations when Shah Pahlevi was in charge, and helped create the very program it now opposes. Later, Washington furnished Saddam Hussein with intelligence information while he was fighting a war with Iran and secretly trying to develop his own weapons of mass destruction.

The next administration will have to re-examine this strategy, and consider alternative options. It could:

- Explicitly endorse the selective approach that the current administration has adopted (i.e., focus only on preventing hostile nations from acquiring nuclear weapons), or
- Accept that nuclear proliferation by some states, both friendly and hostile to the United States, is inevitable, and essentially give up the struggle to prevent it (or, at least, give it a low priority among our national interests), or
- Strike a new deal between the nuclear "haves" and the "have-nots," recognizing that the status quo is clearly not working.

There is a rational argument in favor of both the first two strategies. U.S. influence has limits, and proliferation issues must contend with other national security interests for priority. (This is the thinking behind the Bush administration's civilian nuclear deal with India, for instance.) But their common, and fatal, defect is that they offer no way to avoid an increasingly nuclear-armed world. Complacency regarding the consequences of such a development is as unwise as it is dangerous.

The military consequences alone would be daunting. The predictability that has been built into the international system will give way to increasing uncertainty and worst-case assumptions. Loss of control over atomic weapons by unstable governments, or their deliberate

transfer, will feed a black market in nuclear materials. Sooner or later, the wider availability of such weapons will lead to their use in combat between nations, or to attacks on major population centers by terrorists.

Then there are the economic and social consequences of a nuclear arms race to consider. There would be an exponentially greater availability of nuclear weapons for terrorists, meaning that borders must be made entry-proof for any illicit cargo. This would require significantly more intrusive police and intelligence activities. Their effects on all aspects of life in the United States would be stifling, and the economic effects are likely to be very severe.

The most serious potential sources of nuclear terror are the new weapons being built, the ones already stockpiled and the fissionable materials they use.

Difficult though it would be, the alternative of negotiating a new nonproliferation contract is far superior to the alternatives. Undeniably, the NPT has helped deter some nations that were tempted to think about developing or keeping nuclear weapons, such as Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. Still, the handwriting on the wall tells us that the NPT is unlikely to remain an effective barrier against the creeping menace of nuclear terrorism, and that a new contract is needed to validate the basic bargain in stronger terms than the present treaty.

The new accord should, at least operationally, supersede two articles in the current Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. These are the undertakings by the nuclear weapons states to negotiate on nuclear disarmament (Article VI), and the right enjoyed by the non-nuclear weapons states to develop civilian nuclear power programs (Article IV) while refraining from using these programs to acquire nuclear weapons. Both articles have been neglected or abused by a number of countries. The commitment to negotiate on nuclear disarmament is no longer credible. Several countries have used civilian nuclear power programs to bring themselves to the threshold of building nuclear weapons.

Begin with Moscow

The world is veering dangerously toward losing the struggle to prevent proliferation. To reverse this, the United States will have to lead the way to a new nuclear contract, one that must be nearly universal. At the core of future U.S. policy should be a bold American vision.

In a Jan. 4 *Wall Street Journal* op-ed, former Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Sam Nunn — joined by several others, including the author of this article — endorsed "setting the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and working energetically on the actions required to achieve that goal."

The new agreement's nuclear disarmament clauses must be more than nice words about intentions, and must apply to all the nuclear weapons states, and probably the near-nuclear weapons states like Iran — not just Washington and Moscow, as in the past. But an understanding between the two nations that possess by far the largest arsenals is the place to begin.

If the United States and Russia are perceived as working together in a serious way to roll back the world's nuclear arsenals, that will help bring the other states possessing atomic weapons into the new structure. And that, in turn, will help secure the other half of the contract: a binding commitment by those states not possessing such weapons never to acquire them, buttressed by guarantees that nuclear fuel will always be available when needed.

A journey toward a world free of nuclear weapons has to start with the recognition that they are a drag on national security, not a boon, and that their use in any conflict should be the last resort, not the first. The case for prompt-launch, operationally deployed nuclear warheads is of declining persuasiveness in today's environment, where the "use it or lose it" rule of the Cold War era has little relevance in the U.S.-Russia relationship and none at all in the case of terrorist attacks. Indicative of the trends, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command has said that he would like to deploy a "precision global strike missile" for a fast response to a developing terrorist threat. But this would not be nuclear-armed; rather, it would be a conventionally

armed ICBM of the type already in the U.S. arsenal.

In the meantime, we can and should rely more on reserve forces, or what the administration calls the "responsive force." The treaty Presidents George Bush and Vladimir Putin signed in Moscow in 2002 stipulated that each country may retain up to 2,200 nuclear warheads five years from now, in 2012. Under the U.S. interpretation of the treaty, that ceiling refers only to warheads that are operationally deployed, many on missiles ready to be launched on short notice, or at bomber bases. Warheads held in reserve are not included, and there are thousands of them both in Russia and the United States available for reconstituting a much larger strategic strike force.

If the U.S. and Russia work together to roll back the world's nuclear arsenals, that will help to bring the other states with such weapons into the new structure.

Zero deployed nuclear warheads is a reasonable goal and could be accomplished, as a legal matter, simply by replacing "1,700 to 2,200" in the 2002 treaty with the word "zero." This move would allow our strategic forces to be more flexible and relevant to today's threats. For instance, in an environment verified as free of deployed nuclear warheads, conventionally armed missiles ready for prompt launch would become a feasible option.

This would also pave the way toward a world of "virtual" nuclear weapons states, where access to nuclear weapons is available, but only after a cooling-off period. From there, it should be easier to realize the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

Offer Incentives for Compliance

A key component of the new contract would be a determined effort to guarantee fuel supplies to those nations that agree to forgo the complete nuclear fuel cycle. This may have to be supported by other incentives, such as security guarantees and alternative energy supplies. It certainly will have to be accompanied by a means of disposing of spent fuel, a problem that no one has yet solved satisfactorily.

This package is essential to the whole contract, because nations like Iran and North Korea must be satisfied with nuclear fuel arrangements as part of their agreement to give up nuclear weapons programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency has this under urgent review. Approaches to this problem include a fuel bank managed by the IAEA, and multilaterally owned and operated uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities. Solutions to the spent fuel problem have been proposed by several private entrepreneurs and by the Bush administration via its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership.

A new global nonproliferation contract can do part of the job, but any U.S. nonproliferation policy review must also focus on regional issues. In the cases of both North Korea and Iran, it is likely that a serious and persistent U.S. diplomatic offensive could affect the outcome. The key is a comprehensive approach to security issues, not one that focuses narrowly on nuclear weapons programs. Most Korea-watchers believe that Washington has not negotiated seriously with Pyongyang since 2000, so they are encouraged by recent moves to overcome the impasse, which envisages a comprehensive political settlement in Northeast Asia. (See "Turnabout Is Fair Play," p. 30.)

Similarly, there are probably a few years remaining before Iran will be in a position to build a nuclear weapon. The United States can and should use this time to change the nature of its relationship with Tehran.

The stakes are very high. If the nuclear weapons programs of these two countries cannot be limited or stopped, the presumption must be that nuclear proliferation will accelerate around the rim of Asia, and elsewhere.

Ever since 1945, the U.S. government has recognized that in the arena of nuclear weapons, it has no permanent friends — only permanent interests.

The Real Challenge

It is true that U.S. nonproliferation diplomacy has not achieved all that it was potentially capable of achieving. Unfortunately, issues that seem to be more urgent frequently push nonproliferation to the bottom of the agenda. For instance, the perceived need to retain Pakistan's support in fighting terrorists has overwhelmed other concerns. Similarly, the perceived need to cultivate India as a strategic counterweight to China has trumped nonproliferation goals.

Sometimes, disagreement over how to achieve nonproliferation goals has created policy paralysis. For most of the current administration, Vice President Cheney and his allies have seen regime change as the basic answer in Iraq, Iran and North Korea, often overruling those who favor engagement. Those were the years the locusts ate, precious time lost in preventing nuclear proliferation.

If U.S. nonproliferation policy is to be successful, it will have to enjoy a consistently high priority, and not be shunted aside whenever a passing crisis erupts.

American public opinion is supportive of an internationalist policy, including partnership with other countries. Poll after poll shows this. But because those opinions are not held intensely, no politician need ever fear punishment for what he or she does or does not do about foreign policy issues. And except in the case of war, as we are now seeing in Iraq, it is rare that any sizable percentage of the American people identify any foreign policy issue as among the most important the nation faces.

Given all the other issues that clamor for attention, our leaders — Republicans and Democrats alike — are not likely to urge an all-out diplomatic offensive against nuclear proliferation. It will probably not happen until we Americans fight as hard for it as we do for domestic priorities. But is not the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons worth the effort? ■

U.S. POLICY: INTERLOCKING AND REINFORCING ELEMENTS

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S MULTIFACETED APPROACH HAS CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO PREVENTING FURTHER NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROLIFERATION.

BY CHRISTOPHER A. FORD

President Bush has long regarded the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as the major national security threat of the 21st century. His administration has built its response to that danger around a broad strategy of active nonproliferation, counterproliferation and defenses. Our approach has not been wedded to the conventional wisdom of the past, however. Rather, from the start we have combined the best elements of effective multilateralism with innovative new approaches.

For example, while treaties are a critical element of the overall nonproliferation regime, we believe it is vital to employ a "layered defense" of reciprocally reinforcing elements. Indeed, without an ancillary web of individual and joint international efforts and commitments to support nonproliferation goals, the treaties might quickly become dangerously hollow — empty formalisms incapable of affecting the behavior of those countries whose decisions it is most important to shape. Nevertheless, treaties help establish the overall norms toward which each tool in the international community's toolkit is directed.

Far from the "unilateralism" decried by our less-informed critics, we have made multilateral efforts the centerpiece of our approach to the seminal WMD challenges that face the world today: Iran and North Korea. The role of the United Nations Security Council in addressing the continued refusal of a state to comply with its obligations was codified in the International Atomic Energy Agency Statute half a century ago. On that basis, we have involved the Security Council in compliance enforcement to help meet the challenge presented by Iran's continuing contempt for its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, its disregard for its safeguards obligations, its refusal to comply with its obligations under Security Council Resolutions 1696, 1737 and 1747, and its provocative and destabilizing actions in pursuit of capabilities that would enable it to produce fissile material usable in nuclear weapons.

We have also turned to the Council to respond to North Korea's most recent provocations — which it has done, for instance, with Resolution 1718. And we have turned to diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the "P-5 plus one" Iran negotiations and the Six-Party Talks on North Korea) to develop ways to resolve these crises. Iran has been offered generous terms to abandon its enrichment and reprocessing activity, and North Korea agreed in February 2007 to a plan for the elimination of its nuclear programs and return to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and nuclear safeguards. Both countries need to be held to the terms of their obligations and commitments, but it cannot be said that we have been anything but

deeply committed to peaceful, diplomatic and multilateral methods.

We have also led the way in finding innovative approaches to using key institutions such as the Security Council. Resolution 1540, for instance, which requires all states to prohibit and prevent WMD proliferation, institute effective export controls and enhance security for nuclear materials in their territory, represents another example of effective multilateralism. Built upon the Council's authority under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, this resolution — like its predecessor, Resolution 1373, which is structured similarly but aimed at terrorism — can powerfully complement the full range of options.

The United States has also lent enthusiastic direct support to the IAEA safeguards system, both through voluntary contributions and diplomatic efforts. We have promoted universal adherence to the IAEA's Additional Protocols, which strengthen the ability of the agency's inspectors to detect undeclared nuclear activities. In addition, we proposed the creation of the Committee on Safeguards and Verification, a new institution dedicated to finding ways to improve the IAEA safeguards system.

New Initiatives

The United States has also developed new approaches to advancing nonproliferation goals. The Proliferation Security Initiative, for instance, has been instrumental in increasing the costs and risks to proliferators without setting up yet another international bureaucracy. It has enhanced nonproliferation, counterproliferation, compliance enforcement and deterrence by improving coordination in the employment of existing national and international authorities. It is truly a new model of multilateral cooperation based upon shared interests and perspectives and an informal, flexible mode of implementation.

There have been more PSI successes than one can discuss publicly, but a key one was the October 2003 interdiction of a shipment of illicit centrifuge equipment bound for Libya. That action began the unraveling of the infamous A.Q. Khan nuclear proliferation network and helped catalyze Tripoli's pathbreaking final decision two months later to renounce the pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and dismantle its WMD programs. We then worked with our British allies to enable Libya to eliminate its weapons development and long-range missile programs.

This unprecedented success is a prime example of our commitment to nonproliferation and counterproliferation goals. It represents an historic example of a full-scale "rollback" of active WMD-related programs that did not occur within the context of regime change. Coming after years of deep isolation growing out of the international community's concern about the Qadhafi regime's support for terrorism, human rights abuses and interest in weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, Libya's return to the international community illustrates how relations with a rogue proliferator can be turned around by policies that induce it to make a wise strategic decision to abandon the pursuit of WMD. Today, as Tripoli increasingly reaps the benefits that naturally accrue from having a more normalized relationship with the major powers, that example is one from which rogue states such as Iran and North Korea should learn.

Finally, the United States has sought to apply all the elements of our own national power to combat WMD proliferation. Our multifaceted effort has encompassed the imposition of economic sanctions against proliferator entities pursuant to U.S. laws and executive orders, as well as the investment of billions of dollars to remove nuclear warheads and proliferation-sensitive materials from Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. That has helped draw down the former Soviet strategic arsenal, improve security for nuclear materials and prevent illicit transfers of WMD-related goods and materials.

In addition, we are taking steps to shape the incentive structure facing proliferators around the world by developing missile defenses, both on our own and in cooperation with friends and allies around the world. This is an important nonproliferation step, inasmuch as the purpose of these efforts is not only to defeat rogue states' missile attacks should they occur, but also to deter proliferation by making it clear to would-be proliferators that they may not be able to deliver their weapons by means of ballistic missiles — and that they should therefore reconsider the pursuit of such capabilities. Missile defenses are an important component of the world's nonproliferation toolkit.

In the context of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty regime, the United States has sought to shape the calculations and influence the behavior of both current and

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aspiring proliferators through a mixture of carrots and sticks — that is, through an overarching emphasis upon enforcing compliance coupled with efforts to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power. It is in this interplay of incentives that one can see the underlying rationale of our approach to the seminal nuclear nonproliferation issues of today: diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Iran, the pursuit of North Korean nuclear dismantling, strengthened IAEA safeguards, assured nuclear fuel supply mechanisms, and a stop to the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.

Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology

The so-called "P-5 plus one" countries — the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Russia and Germany — have made a generous offer to Iran that involves both support for additional light-water reactors and the provision of assured nuclear fuel supplies for peaceful power generation. In return for all this, Tehran needs to end its provocative and destabilizing pursuit of enrichment and reprocessing capabilities, and cooperate fully with the IAEA in order to restore the international community's shattered confidence in its peaceful intentions. This diplomatic offer, which remains on the table, underlines the point that Iran is not merely a lawbreaker violating Articles II and III of the NPT, contravening its IAEA safeguards obligations, and ignoring the requirements imposed by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It is also rejecting its best opportunity actually to achieve — through peaceful international nuclear cooperation — precisely the objective it claims to have: the development of a significant civilian nuclear power generation program.

Iran is a very special and very problematic case, but this intertwining of elements in the diplomatic negotiations encapsulates some broader themes. For those that abandon — and in the future avoid — proliferation-risky behavior, there is the opportunity to share in the enormous benefits that atomic power and international nuclear cooperation can bring to mankind. Pres. Bush has

made clear the U.S. government's support for ensuring that states that decline to pursue proliferation-sensitive nuclear fuel-cycle technologies can have reliable access to nuclear fuel supplies and an expanding role in peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Toward that end, three years ago he unveiled a bold proposal to create a new framework for nuclear energy: a safe, orderly system to field civilian nuclear plants without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation. The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership involves developing and deploying advanced, more proliferation-resistant civilian nuclear-energy systems, including reactors that are designed specifically to meet the needs of developing countries, and providing assurances of fresh fuel and spent-fuel management to states that do not pursue enrichment and reprocessing programs. We are, in other words, committed to both energy and security.

In conjunction with the GNEP, we believe it is very important to develop a mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel. Together with the U.K., France, Germany, the Netherlands and Russia, we have circulated a proposal to IAEA members for such a fuel supply program, along with a U.S. reserve of nuclear fuel that could be drawn upon to back it up. And this isn't just talk: we are already in the process of converting more than 17 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from our own defense programs into low-enriched uranium to help create such a reserve. In the long run, we envision the creation of a fuel leasing system, in which the supplier takes responsibility for the final disposition of spent fuel — whether this occurs in the fuel-cycle country that has produced it or elsewhere. We also welcome discussions on the possibility of an IAEA-overseen fuel bank as a supply of last resort.

Especially in this era of increasing worries about the environmental costs and long-term availability of fossil-fuel supplies, these initiatives hold enormous promise, and deserve broad support and participation. Our GNEP initiative envisions a future in which countries around the world could receive the benefits of having civilian nuclear power, including a reliable supply of reactor fuel, without undertaking the significant and vastly expensive infrastructure investments needed for enrichment, recycling and disposal facilities.

Because sensitive nuclear technologies have weapons applications, it is essential that all of these forward-leaning and ambitious programs be conducted in ways that protect against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. For that reason, we urge the universal adoption of the IAEA Additional Protocols, which provide IAEA inspectors with long-overdue information and rights to access, increasing their ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. These measures should become the new "floor" of safeguards protection, and Pres. Bush has called for them to become a qualifying criterion for nuclear trade. We also believe that the safeguards system can sometimes require enhanced access and additional transparency measures when a country has been noncompliant.

A Universal Partnership

At the most basic level, the entire edifice of peaceful nuclear cooperation and benefit-sharing since the NPT's inception is premised on strict adherence to the obligations that form the essential core of the treaty. This requires that all NPT parties demand rigorous compliance. Participation in a world of peaceful nuclear benefit-sharing — a world of cooperative development of civilian nuclear power and of civilian nuclear trade and assistance across a wide range of economically, scientifically and medically vital areas — can and should be widely available, but such projects should occur within a complete safeguards framework. Recipients of such benefits should eschew capabilities and behavior that create unnecessary proliferation risks.

One of the foundations of our approach is that countries that violate their nuclear nonproliferation obligations need to restore international confidence in their peaceful intentions as a precondition for engagement and partnership in the exciting and expanding world of shared nuclear technology benefits. In order to accomplish this, a country may need to abandon capabilities acquired in the course of violating its NPT and IAEA safeguards obligations. Such capabilities must be regarded as having been "tainted," and may need to be abandoned if the world is to regain trust in that country's peaceful nuclear intentions.

This is what we and our British allies asked of Libya in helping that country implement its brave and historic commitment to give up its WMD. It is also what we have asked of North Korea in making clear our requirement that it dismantle its entire existing nuclear program — for essentially no part of that program was undertaken for a legitimate, peaceful purpose.

So it is hardly surprising that if Iran wishes to partake in the wide range of nuclear cooperation and assistance being offered it and escape the adverse consequences of

its intransigence to date, it should abandon the enrichment and reprocessing capabilities which have been tainted by its own behavior. Such abandonment, I should reemphasize, need come at no cost to the peaceful use of nuclear power. Tehran's negotiating partners do not insist that it dismantle the Bushehr reactor and forsake development of a peaceful nuclear energy program. Indeed, Iran's surest and most effective route toward civilian nuclear power generation is through acceptance of the generous terms it has been offered and a course change with respect to its fuel-cycle activities.

It is upon the future of these intertwined dynamics of adherence to nonproliferation obligations and the peaceful use of nuclear technology that the fate of the NPT itself rests. The safety and security of all nations depends upon rigorous nonproliferation compliance, state-of-the-art safeguards and proliferation-resistant technologies. These measures create the assurances of safety needed for nuclear benefit-sharing and a viable international market in civilian nuclear goods and services. After all, it is clear that technology possessors cannot and should not share their knowledge and experience with non-possessors if doing so would not be safe, or would be inconsistent with their nonproliferation obligations. Article IV of the NPT calls for the "fullest possible" exchange — but such steps must not violate the treaty nor contribute to nuclear proliferation. Such compliance is the foundation upon which benefit-sharing necessarily rests.

This is a time of great stress upon the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and there is no shortage of voices suggesting that it is doomed. That need not be the case, however. By taking a multifaceted approach to advancing nonproliferation goals — one that complements and reinforces treaty regimes with a variety of less traditional formal and informal methods — we believe we have contributed significantly to the international community's success in helping prevent further nuclear weapons proliferation. There is obviously much left to do, but such approaches provide a way to help address the challenges that remain. ■

TURNABOUT IS FAIR PLAY

WASHINGTON HAS PUT THE BRAKES ON NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM BY OPTING FOR TALKS.

BY LEON V. SIGAL

Call it the shock of recognition. It took a nuclear test to put the United States back on the road to reconciliation with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea — the only road to disarming that Pyongyang might be persuaded to take.

In a commendable about-face last October, President Bush accepted North Korea's longstanding offer to suspend its production of plutonium by shutting down and sealing its reactor, reprocessing plant and a factory to fabricate fuel rods, halt construction of a larger reactor and allow inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to verify these moves.

In doing so, Bush rejected the counsel of the "irreconcilables" in Washington and took his first steps toward ending enmity with Pyongyang. He authorized U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill to meet directly with his DPRK counterpart in Beijing and Berlin; promised to free up suspect North Korean hard-currency accounts in a Macao bank; supported the resumption of shipments of heavy fuel oil suspended in 2002; promised a meeting between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and North Korean Foreign Minister Park Ui-chun; and pledged to relax sanctions under the Trading with the Enemy Act and take Pyongyang off the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

Bush thus put the brakes on a North Korean nuclear program that had threatened to set off an arms race in Northeast Asia, erode U.S. alliances in the region and jeopardize his most significant foreign policy achievement — continued accommodation with China.

Unrestrained nuclear arming would intensify pressure from right-wing Republicans, who want to confront China for not bringing North Korea to its knees. It would also sow doubts in Tokyo and Seoul as to whether they can rely on Washington for their security. That could revive nuclear ambitions in Japan and set off an arms race with China and Korea.

Washington can coax Pyongyang farther down the road to disarmament by sustaining direct diplomatic give-and-take. By negotiating as Clinton once did, Bush legitimated deal-making with North Korea as a bipartisan foreign policy, making it easier for his successor to follow in his footsteps.

Irreconcilables like John Bolton and Robert Joseph, who had long fought to prevent Amb. Hill from meeting, let alone negotiating, with the North, immediately pounced on the deal. They argued that it failed to stop Pyongyang's uranium enrichment program, dismantle its plutonium facilities, or deal with the seven-to-nine bombs' worth of plutonium the North is believed to have.

Yet delaying a freeze to seek a more demanding deal would have given Pyongyang time to generate plutonium for additional nuclear devices, adding to its bargain-

ing leverage. That is why the president was right to rebuke Bolton publicly for his criticism of the agreement.

Pyongyang's Point

Pyongyang's basic stance is that if Washington remains a foe, it will seek nuclear arms and missiles to counter that threat; but if Washington ends its enmity, then it will not pursue nuclear weapons.

If it were up to the hardliners in the Bush administration, however, Washington would never put Pyongyang to the test. These ideologues equate diplomatic give-and-take with rewarding bad behavior. They insist the DPRK is determined to arm, or else is engaged in blackmail to extort economic aid without giving up anything in return. In fact, it has been doing neither. It has followed a strategy of tit for tat — cooperating whenever Washington cooperates, and retaliating when Washington reneges or fails to honor its agreements — in an effort to end mutual antipathy. It is still doing so.

Up to now, the only way for North Korea to make the fissile material it wanted for weapons has been via its plutonium program at Yongbyon. Yet the North halted reprocessing in the fall of 1991, some three years before signing the Agreed Framework, and did not resume reprocessing until 2003. It also shut down its fuel-fabrication plant before signing the accord, having made enough fuel rods for at most 15-to-17 bombs' worth of plutonium-laden spent fuel, and only recently refurbished that plant.

The North exercised some restraint on missiles, as well. The only way for it to perfect ballistic missiles was to test-fire them until they worked. Yet it had conducted only two medium- and longer-range missile tests of its own in the 20 years prior to the fireworks of last July 4.

With that history in mind, it is instructive to review the sequence of events that led up to the Bush administration's October 2006 turnaround.

The U.S. Reneges

During the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks in August and September 2005, under pressure from South Korea and Japan to seek a negotiated solution to the nuclear dispute, Pres. Bush authorized U.S. negotiators to meet directly with the North Koreans for sustained discussion of their concerns. Isolated at the talks, Washington grudgingly accepted a joint statement that incorporated the main goal it was seeking, a pledge by Pyongyang to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs."

When an earlier draft of that accord was circulated by China before the second round of talks in February 2004, Vice President Dick Cheney had intervened to turn it down with the words, "We don't negotiate with evil. We defeat it." The ink was hardly dry on the Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement when the irreconcilables struck back, getting Washington to renege on the accord and hamstringing U.S. diplomats.

The very day Washington agreed to respect Pyongyang's right to nuclear power and "to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactors" it had promised in 1994 but never delivered, it announced it was disbanding KEDO, the international consortium it had set up to provide the reactors.

On Sept. 19 the United States also pledged "to take coordinated steps to implement" the accord "in a phased manner in line with the principle of 'commitment for commitment' and 'action for action.'" Yet immediately thereafter, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice insisted North Korea had to disarm first and implied that the "appropriate time" for discussing the reactors was when hell freezes over: "When the North Koreans have dismantled their nuclear weapons and other nuclear programs verifiably and are indeed nuclear-free ... I suppose we can discuss anything."

Pyongyang reacted sharply. "The basis of finding a solution to the nuclear issue between the DPRK and the U.S. is to wipe out the distrust historically created between the two countries. A physical groundwork for building bilateral confidence is none other than the U.S. provision of light-water reactors to the DPRK," a Foreign Ministry spokesman said. "The U.S. should not even dream of the issue of the DPRK's dismantlement of its nuclear deterrent before providing LWRs, a physical guarantee for confidence-building."

Even worse, having declared in the September 2005 agreement that they had "no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons," and having pledged to "respect [North Korea's] sovereign-

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ty"— diplomatic code for renouncing military attacks and regime change — administration officials began sounding their old refrain: "All options remain on the table."

Worst of all, instead of going for the jugular by testing Pyongyang's stated willingness to abandon nuclear arms, Washington's irreconcilables showed an unerring instinct for the capillaries. They capitalized on a Treasury Department investigation of money-laundering at the Banco Delta Asia in Macao to pressure North Korea. The Treasury Department was right to stop North Korean counterfeiting of U.S. currency and other illicit activities; but its action convinced skittish bankers to freeze North Korean hard currency accounts around the globe — some containing ill-gotten gains from illicit activities, but many with proceeds from legitimate foreign trade.

How much that curtailed trade is unclear, but even if it did, it was a strange way to encourage economic reform. To Pyongyang it looked a lot like regime change.

North Korea Retaliates

Far from giving Washington leverage, the financial measures provoked Pyongyang to retaliate. For over a year it refused to return to the Six-Party Talks while seeking to resolve the BDA issue bilaterally. When Amb. Hill tried to pursue direct talks in November 2005, he was kept from going to Pyongyang unless the North shut down its reactor first, which assured that no talks took place. On March 7, 2006, in New York, North Korea proposed a U.S.-DPRK bilateral mechanism to resolve the banking and money-laundering issues, but Hill was kept from pursuing the offer. He was also kept from direct talks with the North's Kim Gye-gwan in Tokyo on April 11-12. Kim was blunt at a press briefing afterward. "Now we know what the U.S. position is," he said, adding: "There is nothing wrong with delaying the resumption of Six-Party Talks. In the meantime, we can make more deterrents."

Besides warning Washington, Pyongyang opened talks with Tokyo. Instead of sustaining the talks, however, Japan's ruling coalition introduced legislation on April 28, 2006, to implement the sanctions that the Diet had previously authorized.

Within days, Pyongyang began preparations for missile tests. When Beijing sent a high-level mission to Pyongyang to press the North to call them off or face sanctions, Kim Jong-il made the Chinese cool their heels for three days before seeing them, then went ahead and tested anyhow, knowing it would affront its ally. The tests of seven missiles, including the Taepo-dong 2, on July 4, 2006, did just that, prompting China to vote for a U.S.-backed resolution in the U.N. Security Council condemning the tests and threatening sanctions.

Undaunted, North Korea immediately began preparations for a nuclear test, which it conducted on Oct. 9, 2006. It was demonstrating in no uncertain terms that it would not bow to pressure — from the United States or China. Only U.S willingness to end enmity could get it to change course. That message was lost on most, but not all, of Washington.

The United States reacted by pushing a resolution in the U.N. Security Council authorizing sanctions. Having warned the North in July 2006, Security Council members (China included) had little choice but to impose some sanctions, lest they undermine their own credibility.

After years of huffing and puffing but failing to blow Kim Jong-il's house down, U.S. irreconcilables claimed that with China's support for sanctions, they finally had Pyongyang where they wanted it. But when the Bush administration took office in 2001, the North had stopped testing longer-range missiles, had one or two bombs' worth of plutonium and was verifiably not making more. Six years later it had between seven and nine bombs' worth, had resumed testing missiles, and had little reason to restrain itself from nuclear testing or, worse, generating more plutonium. Is that where the hardliners wanted North Korea?

It was not where President Bush wanted the DPRK. He was ready to negotiate in earnest and settle for shutting down the nuclear facilities at Yongbyon as a first step. He authorized Hill to hold a series of direct meetings with Kim Gye-gwan.

The Turnaround

At the first meeting, on Oct. 31, 2006, in Beijing, Hill agreed that "we will find a mechanism within the six-party process to address these financial measures." That led the North to announce it would return to the Six-Party Talks. On Nov. 28-29, Amb. Hill met Kim again in Beijing to lay out what he would seek in the talks, but the first meeting of the Financial Working Group made no progress. Neither did the December round of talks a few days later.

The turning point came at the third bilateral, in Berlin, when Hill and Kim concluded a memorandum of

understanding that was the basis of the Feb. 13, 2007, joint agreement. The North pledged to shut down and seal its Yongbyon facilities within 60 days and readmit IAEA inspectors to conduct "all necessary monitoring," in return for a U.S. promise to resolve the financial issue within 30 days and supply 50,000 tons of heavy fuel oil.

Some in Tokyo likened the abrupt turn of events to the "Nixon shock" of 1971, when President Nixon announced he would visit China and then took the United States off the gold standard without advance warning. When Japan balked at contributing its share of heavy fuel oil without progress on the issue of the DPRK's abduction of Japanese citizens in the 1970s, South Korea agreed to supply all of the first tranche. It remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Abe Shinzo will stick to his tough stance, using the North Korea threat to justify new assertiveness abroad and placate right-wingers in his own party who insist that "Japan can say no" — to the United States, as well as China. It also remains to be seen whether or not Japanese voters will support his new direction.

Resolution of the Banco Delta Asia issue delayed implementation of the Feb. 13 joint agreement until late June. The Treasury Department's insistence on barring the bank from transactions with U.S. financial institutions irritated Beijing and made bankers everywhere reluctant to accept transfers of North Korean funds from BDA or unfreeze its accounts without Washington's okay. Treasury's effort to save face by getting Pyongyang's pledge to use the funds "solely for the betterment of the North Korean people, including humanitarian and educational purposes" proved a further embarrassment when Western firms objected, arguing that some of the funds were theirs and not the North's to disburse.

The Next Phase

To Pyongyang the dispute was not about money, but about Washington's failure, once again, to keep its word. If the United States could not even resolve the financial issue, how would it ever provide more convincing proof of its non-hostile intent?

That is the key to the next phase of negotiations. The most urgent need is to restore inspectors' control over the North's reprocessed plutonium, in whatever form it now exists. Assuring a verifiable halt to the uranium enrichment program is not as pressing, because U.S. intelligence estimates that the North cannot produce much highly enriched uranium until the end of the decade. Pyongyang had offered to put some plutonium back under inspection in an earlier round of the Six-Party Talks, but what reciprocal U.S. steps it may want in return are not yet clear.

A critical first step to addressing enrichment will be what the IAEA calls an initial declaration from Pyongyang, a list of all its nuclear facilities, fissile material, equipment and components. The Feb. 13 accord provides for the list to be "discussed" — negotiated — starting in the initial phase, with a complete declaration due in the next phase.

Once that list is cross-checked against what U.S. intelligence has already ascertained, elimination could begin. Irreconcilables may try to use the declaration to play "gotcha," seizing on any omissions as conclusive evidence of North Korean cheating and grounds for breaking off talks. Because that would put the plutonium freeze in jeopardy, it would be preferable to seek further clarification in negotiations.

Inasmuch as dismantling a nuclear reactor can take years, the joint agreement speaks of "disabling" all existing nuclear facilities in the next phase. Disabling the reactor and reprocessing plant could make it time-consuming and difficult for the North to resume their operation.

Disarming Strangers

What are the U.S. terms of trade for the declaration and the disabling? The Feb. 13 joint statement cites two steps to improve relations: "advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act" to the North and "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state sponsor of terrorism."

As Bush administration officials have testified, North Korea has not been implicated in any known acts of terrorism since 1987. However, it still harbors aging Japanese Red Army Faction terrorists who hijacked an airplane in 1970, though it has tried to repatriate them to Tokyo without success. More importantly, the whereabouts of Japanese citizens abducted in the 1970s have not been adequately accounted for. Thus, removing the designation without some resolution of that issue could harm U.S. relations with Tokyo.

In any case, Washington has many ways to relax sanctions and could simply put the North in the "not fully cooperating" category on terrorism. But Pyongyang will likely insist on full removal in order to isolate Japan and push it to resume negotiating in earnest. If Tokyo does not do so, Pyongyang can raise the stakes by conducting more missile tests, perhaps of its new IRBM.

Another way of demonstrating non-hostile intent is for the United States to provide direct aid. The Feb. 13 accord links the "complete declaration" and disabling of the reactors to receipt of "economic, energy and humanitarian assistance up to the equivalent of one million tons of heavy fuel oil." Although the North allowed South Korea to supply an initial shipment of heavy fuel oil, it will insist on U.S. participation in future energy aid.

Further steps will doubtless require much more substantial improvement in relations with the United States. The DPRK seeks full diplomatic recognition, but U.S. policy dating back to the Clinton administration conditions formal ties on the resolution of other issues, among them the North's missile programs and human rights. In the meantime, there are other ways to provide at least a token form of recognition. The Sept. 19, 2005, joint statement suggests one: negotiating "a permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate separate forum."

President Bush has held out the possibility of signing a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War, once the North eliminates its nuclear programs. Politically, that would be a major step to improve relations. Militarily, however, a peace treaty would hardly be worth the paper it is written on unless it reduced the risk of inadvertent war on the peninsula. The only way to accomplish that is to get rid of the North's forward-deployed artillery and short-range missiles or redeploy them out of range of Seoul. That is unlikely if the North were to eliminate its nuclear arms, leaving the forward-deployed artillery and short-range missiles as its ultimate deterrent.

As an interim step to a peace treaty, peace agreements, though militarily less meaningful, may be a politically useful way to proceed. Such agreements signed by the United States, the DPRK and the ROK — the three countries with armed forces on the peninsula — could provide for confidence-building measures, like hot lines to link military commands, advanced notice of exercises or an "open skies" arrangement allowing reconnaissance flights.

The North has long sought replacement of the Military

Armistice Commission, set up to monitor the cease-fire at the end of the Korean War, with a three-party "peace mechanism." This could be a vehicle for resolving disputes like the 1996 shooting down of a U.S. reconnaissance helicopter that strayed across the DMZ or the repeated incursions of North Korean spy submarines, as well as for negotiating confidence-building measures.

Much attention has been paid to verification, and the irreconcilables have made the most of it. They have been pushing for intrusive inspections — what a top State Department official once dismissed as a "national proctological exam" — in hopes that North Korea would resist, deadlocking talks. Other officials have devised a better way to proceed. Instead of negotiating to inspect all the items on North Korea's initial declaration, they sought the dismantling of facilities and removal of nuclear material and technology on the list. Only then would the right to inspect "any time, anywhere" be invoked to clear up anomalies. When the issue came to a head in the State Department in 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell sided with those who gave primacy to elimination over inspection.

As an interim step to a peace treaty, peace agreements, though militarily less meaningful, may be a politically useful way to proceed.

The irreconcilables insist Pyongyang will never live up to its pledge, made in the September 2005 round of the Six-Party Talks, to abandon "all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs." How can they be so sure?

The fact is, with the possible exception of Kim Jong-il, nobody knows. And the only way for Washington to find out is to proceed, reciprocal step by reciprocal step, in sustained negotiations to reconcile with Pyongyang in return for its disarming. ■

NUKES IN RUSSIA: SITUATION TERRIBLE, BUT MUCH IMPROVED

THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM HAS HELPED RUSSIA AND OTHER STATES SECURE THEIR AT-RISK MATERIALS AND FACILITIES.

BY BOB GULDIN

On Nov. 23, 1995, a group of Chechen separatists placed a crude "dirty bomb" containing a mixture of radioactive cesium 137 and dynamite in Moscow's Ismailovsky Park. But instead of detonating the bomb, they informed a national TV station about its location. This incident, occurring in the midst of the first Chechen War, was intended as a warning to President Boris Yeltsin. The message was, "Keep up your campaign in Chechnya and you may face terrible consequences. We can strike at your center."

For the rest of the world, the incident carried a message, too: "Terrorism with nuclear materials is not just a bad dream. It can happen." While the Chechens apparently thought they could achieve greater political impact with a widely publicized threat than an explosion, they reminded the world that even with little technological sophistication, one can plant fear in a great city.

The incident also served as a warning sign of how serious the dangers of nuclear theft, terrorism and proliferation are in Russia and the former Soviet Union. That was especially true in the 1990s, when the collapse of the old Soviet dictatorship led to chaos and disorder in many sectors of society, including the military and the nuclear industry.

But even today, when that disorder has largely subsided, the risks are extremely serious. Russia continues to host a vast array of nuclear materials: weapons, both deployed and dismantled; production complexes; nuclear power plants; waste storage sites; research reactors; and radiological power sources in remote locations. Not all of these can be used to create weapons, but radioactive material itself can contaminate large areas.

Speaking about the Russians, Rose Gottemoeller, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, tells the *Foreign Service Journal*, "They've got way too much fissile material spread around. Some of these facilities are huge, and they have fissile materials spread everywhere." (Gottemoeller was deputy under secretary of defense for nuclear nonproliferation at the Department of Energy under President Clinton.)

Graham Allison, the director of Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a highly regarded expert on terrorism, also sees a vast potential for problems in Russia. Allison wrote recently, "If a nuclear terrorist attack occurs, Russia will be the most likely source of the weapons or material — not because the Russian government would intentionally sell or lose weapons or materials, but simply because Russia's 12-time-zone expanse contains more nuclear weapons and materials than any other country in the world, much of it vulnerable to theft or sabotage."

But Matthew Bunn, a senior research associate at the

Belfer Center's Project on Managing the Atom, points out that "there is potential nuclear material in more than 40 countries, some of it well secured and some of it poorly secured. This is a global problem, not one limited to Russia."

Deepening the concern about Russia is the fact that "in some of these facilities, they don't even know what they have," notes Laura Holgate, vice president for Russia/New Independent States programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a Washington NGO widely considered the premier source of information on nuclear proliferation. (Holgate previously managed the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program at the U.S. Department of Defense.)

Especially in Russia's research centers, abandoned nuclear materials from decades' worth of experiments are simply "put in some container and put off in a corner," says Holgate. "The notion that there will be perfectly traceable and preserved records of every gram [is] just not reasonable."

In addition to Russia itself, six former Soviet republics — Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Latvia, Georgia and Uzbekistan — have nuclear facilities that concern proliferation experts.

Three of those — Belarus, Ukraine and Kazakhstan — also once had Soviet nuclear weapons stationed in them. But by 1996 all those weapons had been removed to Russia, and most have been dismantled.

However, those three countries have civilian research reactors containing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to build nuclear bombs. Various organizations, including NTI and DOE, are working with the three governments to make the facilities safer; for example, by getting them to convert to low-enriched uranium, which can't be used for weapons.

"Potatoes Were Guarded Better"

As troubling as things are now, every expert we talked to agreed that conditions were far worse in the early and mid-1990s. Siegried Hecker, co-director of Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation and emeritus director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, first visited Russia as a DOE representative in 1992. "The situation was truly alarming," he tells the *Journal*, "especially in terms of their naval fleet — submarines, icebreakers — as well as their civilian institutes. The actual physical security [had] collapsed, so the threat was very, very high."

The horror stories from that period are numerous. In one instance, a thief entered a facility through a hole in a fence, snapped the padlock, retrieved nuclear materials and was able to leave without being detected. The theft might not have been discovered for weeks if the perpetrator had not been sloppy and left the padlock lying in the snow. When the identity of the thief was discovered months later and he was put on trial, the prosecutor concluded that — in a phrase that has become famous among proliferation experts — "potatoes were guarded better."

Conditions were even worse in the non-Russian areas of the former Soviet Union, because they had never had operational responsibility for managing nuclear materials. That had always been Moscow's job. According to experts at Harvard's Belfer Center, when civil war broke out in Georgia, scientists at one nuclear facility in Tbilisi that housed 10 kilograms of highly enriched uranium took turns guarding it "with sticks and garden rakes." There were simply no security guards.

A principal reason for the collapse in security was that the old Soviet system was predicated on the existence of a closed society, not a fragile, crime-ridden market economy. As Matthew Bunn of Harvard observes, "In the Soviet Union, the whole point of the security controls was to keep American spies out — they weren't focused on theft."

Bunn adds, "The old closed society of the Soviet Union meant that you could have lower security at the perimeter of nuclear facilities." If someone did manage to smuggle some nuclear material out of a nuclear facility, what were they going to do with it? It was almost impossible to meet with foreigners without being detected. There was no way to leave the country without the KGB detecting it. Some analysts called the dictatorial state "the second line of defense" for nukes, but that protection disappeared with the Soviet collapse.

While the situation has improved considerably in the last 15 years, Russian nuclear safeguards still have some very serious flaws.

A revealing article on the weak "culture of security" surrounding Russian nuclear facilities highlights the reality that technical fixes can only achieve a limited amount if the human element is deficient. Published in the Russian journal *Nuclear Control* in 2003, the piece by Igor

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Bob Guldin, a Washington-based writer, was editor of the Foreign Service Journal *from 1998 to 2001, and was previously editor of* Arms Control Today.

Goloskokov, who was then deputy general director of a massive nuclear complex in Siberia, discusses a plethora of problems with the forces that guard nuclear installations:

• Security routines are still based on procedures of the old Soviet GULAG system of the 1940s and 1950s, which the Ministry of Internal Affairs refuses to update.

• During training exercises in which mock terrorists attempt to breach defenses the attackers are usually successful, yet the guards' tactics remain unchanged.

• Corruption is widespread and endemic — for instance, night-vision goggles are kept in the commandant's safe so they won't disappear.

• Guards are ineffective and poorly trained, often patrolling without any ammunition in their guns.

• Pay is low and funds are in short supply.

Moreover, the old Soviet system of keeping track of nuclear materials was sloppy in the extreme. Matthew Bunn said that at some sites, any difference between input and output was defined as "losses to waste." In effect, theft was ruled out as a possibility. Those rules persisted for many years after the disintegration of the USSR.

Technical fixes to the security of nuclear facilities can only achieve a limited amount if the human element is deficient.

Militants and Mafiyas

The weakness of Russia's nuclear security measures wouldn't be of such concern if it weren't for the fact that it faces a capable and desperate foe: the Chechen nationalist movement. Fighting for the independence of their small province, Chechen militants have shown time and again that they can form armed detachments of more than 20 fighters, deceive and overpower Russian guards, and seize poorly guarded facilities and hold them for several days.

Simon Saradzhyan, an editor at *Moscow News*, examined the threat of Chechen nuclear terrorism in a 2004 discussion paper for Harvard's Belfer Center. He pointed out that as the Chechen fighters lose hope of beating the Russian forces by conventional or guerrilla warfare (and they have been losing in recent years), "committing a catastrophic nuclear terrorist attack will become an even more appealing option for them."

Gottemoeller confirms that when she was a DOE official working on nonproliferation programs between 1997 and 2000, "I would meet with Russian facility directors and security people. They would comment to me that their biggest nightmare was a truckload of Chechen terrorists pulling up at the gates and shooting their way into the facility — and then either exploding a truck bomb next to the reactor that would cause radioactive material to be dispersed, or stealing fissile materials." And Allison points out that Chechen forces are reported to have contemplated seizing a nuclear research reactor in Moscow, and have obtained small quantities of radioactive materials on several occasions.

Researchers at Harvard's Managing the Atom Project concluded in their comprehensive report, *Securing the Bomb 2006*, that "Russia remains the only country where senior officials have confirmed that terrorists have carried out reconnaissance at nuclear warhead storage facilities. In late 2005, Russian Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev ... confirmed that in recent years 'international terrorists have planned attacks against nuclear and power industry installations' intended to 'seize nuclear materials and use them to build weapons of mass destruction.'"

Chechen militants are not just a concern for Russia. From the viewpoint of U.S. security, the situation is made more grave by the probability that al-Qaida has ties to Islamist radical separatists in Russia's North Caucasus region and has had Chechen members. Adds Bunn, "Some Chechen factions are known to have close ties to al-Qaida. By some accounts, the Chechen leader Khatab (who was Jordanian) may have been sent to Chechnya by bin Laden."

Allison states that there are definite links between Chechen and jihadist forces, and that Chechen militants have received funds from al-Qaida. As he comments, "While the Chechens' target of choice for their first nuclear terrorist attack will surely be Moscow, if the Chechens are successful in acquiring several nuclear bombs, their al-Qaida brethren would be likely customers."

Saradzhyan of *Moscow News* emphasizes that the Chechen militants are more dangerous because of the "corruption and ideological conversion of law enforcement officers," who frequently steal weapons, fuel and

other military equipment. Saradzhyan also cites case after case in which Russian policemen — usually from non-Russian nationalities and Islamic backgrounds — have "gone over to the other side" and begun to help Chechen or Islamic militants. Russia's well-known "mafiyas" (gangsters) also play a role in bribing, threatening or coercing guards or employees at nuclear facilities.

Terrorist and criminal groups are also displaying an increasing tendency to merge and cooperate. As Alexander Ovchinnikov, head of the anti-organized crime directorate of the Interior Ministry, said in 2002, "The trend of organized crime groups merging with terrorism- and extremism-oriented groups is gaining strength."

How does the Russian leadership react to this worrisome state of affairs? With blithe, hollow reassurances that all is well. During a 2004 visit to Washington, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov announced that "It is impossible for Moscow's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and nuclear fuels to fall into the hands of terrorists."

Perhaps the most authoritative U.S. assessment of the situation, an April 2006 report to Congress by the Director of National Intelligence, concluded: "Undetected smuggling of weapons-usable nuclear material has likely occurred, and we are concerned about the total amount of material that could have been diverted or stolen in the last 15 years. We find it highly unlikely that Russian or other authorities would have been able to recover all the material likely stolen."

That said, proliferation experts think it's quite unlikely that terrorists would gain access to an intact nuclear weapon, in part because weapons are much better guarded and are difficult to smuggle. A much more likely scenario would be theft of highly enriched uranium, which can be assembled into a weapon without great technical difficulty.

Another troubling possibility is that terrorists or other bad actors could assemble and explode a "dirty bomb," which presents a very different problem than a true nuclear weapon. As Gottemoeller comments, "You could have major panic among the population, major problems

with radioactive materials spread around." In addition, Gottemoeller says that Russia finds it difficult to lock up radiological materials, because they are used for medical and industrial purposes in thousands of locations.

After 15 years of progress in Russia, the counterproliferation experts and pursestring holders are moving on to other challenges.

Why Hasn't Disaster Struck?

Given the abundant nuclear material scattered around the former Soviet Union and the dangerous people who'd like to get their hands on it, it's logical to ask, "Why haven't we seen a nuclear 9/11 yet, either in Russia or the West?"

The answer, says Bunn, lies partially in the practical difficulties. Potential thieves most likely are afraid of getting tricked or cheated by their partners in crime. And, of course, there's always a risk of getting caught. The Russian federal security police, the FSB, have established a stronger presence than in years past. It's also hard to make the connection with the end-user: "There's no 1-800-Osama number you can call."

Beyond that, he notes, "The world owes a great debt to the patriotism and dedication of the Russians who have been in the nuclear industry." Through months and years of economic turmoil, infrastructure decay and payless paydays, the scientists and engineers have, for the most part, kept their dangerous charge out of the wrong hands. And while democratic freedoms have waned under Putin, the re-establishment of strict order is good for nuclear safety. So is the fact that security forces and nuclear scientists are getting paid regularly, which was often not true in the 1990s.

Another enormously important factor has been the assistance and active intervention from the United States and other Western countries. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program has helped Russia and other states make rapid and valuable strides toward securing their at-risk materials and facilities.

Cooperating to Reduce the Threat

The United States began taking this issue seriously in 1992, shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Two senior senators, Sam Nunn, D-Ga., and Richard Lugar, R-Ind., joined together to sponsor the bipartisan bill that has become the cornerstone of U.S. efforts to reduce the proliferation threat in the former Soviet Union.

Most observers believe that Nunn-Lugar and related programs have been one of the smartest, most cost-effective approaches to protecting U.S. security devised in recent decades. (Note: The terms "Nunn-Lugar" and "Cooperative Threat Reduction" officially apply only to Defense Department programs, though they are often used more broadly.)

At present, three U.S. Cabinet departments have significant roles in counterproliferation efforts. The Department of Defense has worked principally with the Russian Ministry of Defense on weapons-related threats. The Department of Energy, including its National Nuclear Security Agency, has worked both with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (known as Rosatom) and its defense ministry. The State Department has supported a range of programs, including export controls and re-employment for thousands of Russian nuclear specialists whose skills could otherwise be used in unfortunate ways. In all, there have been dozens of cooperative nonproliferation programs sponsored by the United States over the last 15 years.

In part, the programs have been successful because the Russian government has taken the risk seriously and been willing to accept advice and technical assistance from its former adversary. Gottemoeller notes that the Russians have allowed U.S. personnel into "sites that, in the Cold War years, we would never have gotten within 100 miles of. They have taken some risks, in a national policy sense, in letting foreigners become involved in protecting their nuclear materials and their warheads."

She adds that this year, "We are completing the work with the Russian Navy, including warhead storage sites. [And] there are ongoing projects with the Strategic Rocket Forces and with the Russian Air Force."

Interestingly, the cooperative threat reduction program continues, even when there are rough patches in other aspects of our relations with Moscow. "Even now, which is a very bad time in the U.S.-Russian relationship, they are continuing to support the cooperation," Got-

temoeller said in April. "They see it as a very serious security issue, and obviously they believe it's in their interest to pursue it."

U.S. programs have also tackled the issue of finding employment for scientists and engineers formerly employed in the Soviet WMD complex. It's estimated that in 10 closed nuclear cities, the Soviet government employed more than 150,000 scientists and engineers. (There were another 65,000 specialists in biological weapons and 6,000 chemical weapons experts.)

The United States, through the State Department, has funded Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev. These have been largely successful in providing scientists with short-term incomes, but have been less successful in finding meaningful productive work for the scientists. A program with similar goals run by the DOE, called Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention, is reported to have supported 16,000 specialists from 180 institutes for a time, with participation from private companies and the U.S. national laboratories.

According to William Tobey, deputy administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation at DOE's the National Nuclear Security Agency, the risk of nuclear scientists going astray is also reduced by the improved situation in Russia. "The Russian nuclear industry is undergoing significant growth," Tobey tells the *Foreign Service Journal*. "They've announced ambitious plans for reactor construction, and that has fueled the demand for nuclear technicians."

The NNSA and Rosatom also signed an agreement in April designed to make sure that the Russians sustain the security upgrades after the United States phases out its assistance, which will probably happen over the next few years.

Overall, the United States can point to impressive success in its counterproliferation efforts. Says Gottemoeller, "We've made an enormous investment but it's been a valuable investment. We have managed in historical terms to prevent a huge catastrophe, the uncontrolled breakup and dissipation of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. A lot of that stuff

could have been sold or stolen."

Gottemoeller is quick to caution that we can't "guarantee that every single warhead is safe and secure and will not ever fall into the wrong hands. I can't prove a negative." But it's still a great success story, she says.

Bunn emphasizes how essential it is to sustain the effort. He tells the *Journal*, "If Russian and other recipient countries don't put in place the resources, organizations and incentives to maintain high security after U.S. assistance phases out, we will end up losing the large investment we've made. It's an urgent threat, not just to our security, but to their security as well."

Progress on cooperative threat reduction was spurred in 2005, when President Bush and President Putin signed an agreement in Bratislava to put deadlines on the completion of certain tasks. Among those is improving security at warhead storage sites in Russia, a responsibility assigned to the NNSA.

"We've completed work at roughly 75 percent of the sites," says Tobey, the top nonproliferation official at that agency, and "the work is ahead of the original schedule that we set out." Under the Bratislava Agreement, that work is supposed to be completed by the end of 2008, which coincides with the end of the Bush administration.

An interesting side-note: According to Tobey, 10 percent of the electric power generated in the United States is fueled by former Soviet weapons. That's half of America's total nuclear power generation.

Hecker, who helped start the DOE programs in the 1990s, says that the NNSA programs are good as far as they go — but they don't go far enough. Those gains don't "mean that Russian plutonium and highly enriched uranium have a modern, comprehensive safeguards system. They're not adequately protected in the long run." In addition, notes Hecker, the Russian systems of "control and accounting" — i.e., keeping careful track of their nuclear materials — are still terribly inadequate. "The reactors and research facilities are very high on my list of the Russian threats."

The problem, NTI's Holgate explains, is that the research reactors often contain highly enriched uranium, which is the ideal raw material for amateur bombmakers. It can be easily handled and worked with, and it can be assembled into a "gun-type" nuclear device, the design for which is robust and relatively well understood.

What's Been Accomplished So Far

- More than 6,900 nuclear warheads deactivated
- More than 600 intercontinental ballistic missiles dismantled
- 30 nuclear submarines destroyed
- 83 percent of Russian facilities storing weapons-usable fissile materials received security upgrades
- 285 metric tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled nuclear weapons blended down to non-weapons-usable low-enriched uranium
- More than 4,000 former Soviet weapons scientists redirected toward sustainable and peaceful work

Credit: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2007 study, "25 Steps to Prevent Nuclear Terror: A Guide for Policymakers"

Lower Priority for Russian Nukes?

After 15 years of progress in cooperative threat reduction work with Russia, the counterproliferation experts and pursestring holders are getting ready to move on to the next big challenge. Lugar (until January the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) has been very protective of the program that bears his name, and now he is looking to expand its scope.

In 2004, the law was changed to permit Nunn-Lugar programs to operate outside the former Soviet Union, though that provision has gone almost unused. And Lugar announced in February that he would ask for $100 million in Fiscal Year 2008 to respond to the threat of biological weapons. He also sponsored a bill that passed in 2006 to stop the proliferation of conventional weapons, such as shoulder-fired missiles, worldwide.

But on the administration side, the FY 2008 budget requests for nonproliferation programs at the three main WMD counterproliferation agencies — DOE, DOD and State — are all down from 2007 requests, by 5 to 19 percent.

These datapoints may well mean that the heyday of Nunn-Lugar is coming to a close. Perhaps all the low-hanging nukes have been picked, and some key players have decided it's time to declare victory and go home. The remaining tasks — and there are plenty — would be left to the Putin regime and its successors, which hopefully can be trusted to take care of Russia's own security needs.

Perhaps that's OK. Hecker, a veteran observer of the proliferation scene, today counts Russia as the number-four proliferation threat in the world — after Pakistan, North Korea and HEU reactors around the world. "Russia is still very high on my list," he said, "but it's not the highest." ■

ACTIVISTS AND ANALYSTS: THE ROLE OF NGOS

NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OFTEN DO NOT GET MUCH RESPECT, BUT THE GLOBAL NONPROLIFERATION REGIME WOULD BE THE POORER WITHOUT THEM.

BY MARK FITZPATRICK

There is no doubting the influence and relevance of nonproliferation and disarmament-related nongovernmental organizations. Three of them have received the Nobel Peace Prize in recent years, most notably for the promotional work that led to the 1997 Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling and production of anti-personnel landmines. That convention was widely hailed as the triumph of an emergent "global civil society."

NGOs play many useful roles: incubators of ideas, policy advisers, collectors and purveyors of information, facilitators of dialogue, monitors of government activity and doers of good deeds. But generally they can be categorized as either activists or analysts, with broad areas of overlap. It is a rare analyst whose conclusions are not coupled with policy suggestions, but the most respected groups take no institutional policy stance: e.g., The Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Council on Foreign Relations and the Stimson Center. The Center for American Progress, on the other hand, is clearly aligned with the Democratic Party, thereby giving a partisan edge to the nonproliferation pronouncements of Senior Vice President Joseph Cirincione.

Particularly in America, NGOs also supplement academic institutions by acting as holding pens for out-of-office politicians and otherwise out-of-work bureaucrats where they can continue to contribute their expertise and hone their policy views. Former U.N. Ambassador John Bolton is at the American Enterprise Institute, former Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation Robert Einhorn leads the nonproliferation program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and former NSC Senior Director for Nonproliferation Gary Samore is director of studies at the CFR, to name just three.

The power of NGOs, including their ability to irritate governments, largely derives from the public pressure they can mobilize. Indeed, influencing decisions at the national level is the quintessential NGO role. At their best, informed and caring groups generate public awareness and educate all sides. At their worst, they are biased, unrealistic and unmindful of the larger picture.

The irritation level only rises when NGOs seek a participatory role in deliberations on international treaties. Because private groups lack the legitimacy and accountability expected of sovereign governments, decisionmaking in national security matters is properly limited to nations. Smaller nations that lack capacity on technical issues such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty are often all too willing to accept ghostwritten speeches and even diplomatic talking points from NGOs eager to

channel their positions directly into diplomacy. A former U.S. diplomat tells the story of how representatives from several Non-Aligned Movement countries, during bilateral consultations with the U.S. prior to the 1990 NPT Review Conference, used almost identical briefing notes provided by Parliamentarians for Global Action.

Despite such concerns, many multilateral conferences recognize the relevance of NGOs and accord them a speaking role, albeit usually limited to a half-day session. But even this limited role is viewed suspiciously in some quarters. "Who are these individuals, community spokespersons and NGOs?" asked Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs Senior Fellow Gerald Steinberg in a critique last year. "Who chooses, funds and legitimates their claims to speak for others?" He noted that the NGO participants from Egypt, Palestine and North Africa at a conference of parties to the Ottawa Landmine Convention a few years ago all echoed a single position, parroting the views of their governments.

Resistance to the role of NGOs becomes most intense when such organizations advocate policies that seem to support a national adversary — for example, when the Brussels-based International Crisis Group in early 2006 suggested that Iran be authorized to maintain small-scale enrichment facilities, despite the joint policy of Washington, London, Paris and Berlin opposing any uranium enrichment in Iran. Nonetheless, such policy advocacy is all part of the proper give-and-take of public debate in democratic societies.

NGOs can also be differentiated between those that toil for profit and those who do not. Most organizations involved in the nonproliferation arena have nonprofit status. Laudable work is also performed, however, by consulting firms such as SAIC, where former Arms Control and Disarmament Agency official Lewis Dunn hangs his hat when he is not advising U.S. government agencies or sharing his wisdom on the academic and international conference circuits. Political risk consultancies such as the Eurasia Group also contribute thoughtful analysis to the public policy milieu on proliferation problem countries.

To implement the many congressionally mandated programs aimed at securing "loose nukes" in the former Soviet Union, the executive branch relies heavily upon firms in the for-profit sector. Consulting organizations such as Booz Allen Hamilton provide much of the actual "boots on the ground" American oversight and advisory services to Russia and other governments involved in the multibillion-dollar effort.

Think-Tanks and Blogs

Think-tank NGOs play a key research and policy formulation role. Nonproliferation and arms control work by Alexei Arbatov at the Moscow Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace helped persuade the Russian government to put nuclear arms reduction issues back on its security policy agenda. CSIS and many other American think-tanks undertake unclassified research tasks in the field of nonproliferation for the CIA and other government agencies. Some nonprofit think-tanks, such as the Institute for Defense Analyses, only work for government contracts, operating some of the 36 "federally funded research and development centers."

Several think-tanks have carved out a special niche in distilling and providing nonproliferation-related information to the public, breaking through intelligence classification constraints. Information that is screened by independent think-tanks is also more credible. The Institute for Science and International Security, headed by physicist David Albright, has nearly cornered the market in its analysis of satellite imagery of suspect nuclear sites and its almost instantaneous explanations of reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency. ISIS often discloses important but sensitive information that the U.N. nuclear watchdog is constrained from releasing except to member-states.

Some NGOs perform a beneficial role by publicizing information papers for all delegates before and during multinational meetings. In reporting on U.N.-related arms control meetings, the London-based Acronym Institute serves as a repository of institutional memory. NGOs also host useful informal gatherings. Diplomats find value in "working the crowd" at retreats held in Annecy, France, like the ones co-sponsored by the Monterey Institute of International Studies' Center for Nonproliferation Studies prior to annual NPT conferences.

In the blog sphere, www.armscontrolwonk.com, run by Jeffrey Lewis of the New America Foundation, represents one of the best sources of instant technical analysis and insights about proliferation-related events. Less

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wonky, but still targeted to the inside-the-Beltway community, is the *Global Security Newswire*, a daily compilation of nonproliferation-related news on the Web site of the Nuclear Threat Initiative (also available as a daily listserv). The NTI Web site also hosts the databases compiled by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, which bills itself, without exaggeration, as "the most comprehensive open-source data resource in the world on nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and missile proliferation developments." Although the data have gaps (the chronology on nuclear and missile developments stops in 2002, for example) and the citations are not completely accurate, the CNS databases are the best resource for students researching proliferation problems.

A useful resource for nonproliferation aficionados is the weekly "nuclear calendar" compiled and circulated by the Friends Committee on National Legislation, a Quaker-affiliated lobbying group. Published each Monday morning that the U.S. Congress is in session, the calendar provides a weekly update of national and international events concerning nuclear weapons, disarmament and nonproliferation, including congressional hearings, NGO seminars and multinational conferences. A glance at any week's listing is a salutary reminder of how much intellectual activity is devoted to nonproliferation topics, particularly in Washington. Attending all the interesting seminars and presentations listed in the nuclear calendar could almost be a full-time occupation by itself. It is a shame that most executive-branch officials find little time to participate in such events.

Several NGOs monitor nuclear activity worldwide. This January, when Georgian authorities announced the details of a sting operation last year that caught a small-time Russian sausage smuggler trying to peddle 100 grams of highly enriched uranium, the Natural Resources Council drew on its database to conclude, tentatively, that the isotopic mix of uranium particles in the smuggled goods was of Russian origin. In 1999, to bridge the gap between open-source and government-supplied informa-

Several groups have carved out a special niche in distilling and providing nonproliferation-related information to the public.

tion on nuclear trafficking, researchers at the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University established a database on incidents of nuclear smuggling. When the lead researchers moved to the University of Salzburg in 2004, the information moved with them. The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, run by Gary Milhollin, operates a compilation of suspected buyers of proliferation-sensitive products.

Some NGOs have taken on an explicit role in monitoring international conventions. Landmine Monitor, established in 1998 by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, has become the de facto monitoring mechanism for the U.N.'s Mine Ban Convention. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons, a U.N. body, have a formal agreement to share unclassified information. When it comes to verification (as distinct from monitoring that can contribute to verification), however, advocacy NGOs simply do not have the impartiality and objectivity required for the job.

Making Things Happen

NGOs typically operate by seeking to motivate states to take certain decisions or actions. Some groups transcend this function by taking it upon themselves to carry out the action they are seeking.

In addition to its informational role in raising public awareness, the Nuclear Threat Initiative — founded by Ted Turner and former Senator Sam Nunn in 2001 — also undertakes actions to reduce the spread of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, including by financing programs to secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. Largely funded by Turner and Warren Buffett, NTI was recently described by the *New York Times Sunday Magazine* as perhaps "the most ambitious example of private dollars subsidizing national security."

When a U.S. effort to remove highly enriched uranium from a nuclear reactor site in Serbia ran aground on bureaucratic obstacles over lack of legal authority to undertake associated expenses, NTI stepped into the breach and provided $5 million. This served as a catalyst for legal and policy changes to allow Russia to accept the highly enriched uranium and blend it down to a harmless alloy. That effort has now paid off in other successful U.S. efforts to remove nuclear material from civilian reactors around the world.

Last year, NTI put up $50 million as seed money for a major new proposal to fund the creation of an international nuclear fuel bank that countries could draw upon for a guaranteed supply of enriched uranium to power nuclear reactors, thereby obviating any need for them to develop sensitive enrichment technologies themselves. Without uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing technology, key to producing nuclear material, the nuclear energy on which a carbon-choked, globally warmed world must increasingly depend need not present a proliferation risk. Several countries are grappling with how to make fuel-supply mechanisms attractive for potential users and commercially viable for suppliers.

Track II Events

NGOs carry out a particularly useful function in serving as facilitators of dialogue between states or non-state actors for whom direct dialogue is impossible or constrained. Such Track II dialogues (as distinguished from "Track I" direct government-to-government talks) have become a staple of the nongovernmental community. The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs won the Nobel Prize in 1995 for their work bringing technical expertise to security issues in the Cold War in ways that allowed the U.S. and USSR to continue a dialogue that was otherwise blocked. Many NGOs seek today to bridge the similar gaps that have prevented direct discussions between the U.S. and countries such as North Korea and Iran.

The University of California's Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation was one of the first to establish a quasi-annual set of Track II meetings involving foreign and defense officials and academics from the countries that later came together to form the Six-Party Talks on denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. The Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue is still active, convening most recently in April 2006. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye-Gwan

participated, although Hill at that time was not allowed to have substantive discussions with Kim.

On some occasions, North Korea has refused to participate in Track II events, even when they offer a face-saving way of engaging with counterparts. When Pyongyang does want to participate, the National Committee on American Foreign Policy and the Korea Society have sponsored seminars in New York that provide a venue where North Korean diplomats can have informal talks with U.S. counterparts.

The U.S.-U.N. Association has provided a setting for influential members of the Washington policy community to meet with Iranian officials and academics, as has Carnegie's Moscow Office. The Nixon Center, in conjunction with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Geneva Center for Democratic Control of Armed Forces, organizes sessions in Geneva for U.S.-Iran dialogue. In the past two years, however, Iranian government officials have refused to attend such events unless American officials do so as well.

By contrast with Democratic administrations, Republican administrations tend to be more inclined to discount the views of NGOs. This is because the bulk of the activist organizations lean toward the other end of the political spectrum, approaching nonproliferation from a disarmament perspective. They and the organizations to which they belong adhere strongly to the original bargain of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty: namely, that non-nuclear weapon states gave up any pursuit of nuclear weapons in exchange for the five original nuclear weapon states agreeing to disarm eventually. The disarmament advocates argue that the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, by modernizing their own nuclear arsenals, lose the moral authority to demand that Iran and North Korea forgo dual-use nuclear technology.

Keeping Activists at Arm's Length

"NGO outreach" is an established part of the State Department's public diplomacy. Before major multilateral forums, the State Department (and formerly the

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency) traditionally holds informal discussions with interested NGOs, particularly those that can be expected to be active on the margins of the meetings or writing about them. By explaining administration policies, these consultations can help influence organizations that, in turn, influence the wider public at home and abroad. Public servants do not usually like to admit it, but they also have something to learn from the observations of NGO experts, many of whom have more years of experience and deeper subject-matter expertise than their government counterparts.

Because many disarmament activists are seen as adversaries, however, the Bush administration has at times tried to keep them at arm's length. This inclination is generally shared by the civilian bureaucracy at the Pentagon, which in recent years has had a disproportionately powerful voice in the formulation and implementation of U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. In the run-up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference, for example, key Department of Defense officials saw little reason for the State Department to work with NGOs that did not support the White House's positions.

With National Security Council support, the State Department ultimately was able to include a dozen mainstream NGOs in the outreach effort. But DOD opposition and the time wasted in seeking interagency agreement on the details of the outreach effort resulted in a truncated schedule and some organizations being knocked off the list of invitees because they were considered to be too vehement in their criticism. This was a missed opportunity, because informed criticism is better than the ill-informed variety.

That the Pentagon has such a strong say in the bread-and-butter work of Foggy Bottom has been a recurring sore point for State Department bureaucrats. During the first term of the current administration, Powell-Rumsfeld clashes played out daily in the trenches manned by the Nonproliferation Bureau. That bureau was always at a disadvantage because of the Pentagon-origin of the majority of the NSC gatekeepers dealing with proliferation issues, and because of the strong ideological views of most of the political appointees working those issues at State. The current leadership of the now-named International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau, it must be said, is more willing to engage with critics, who have praised its recent openness.

Both Sides of the Spectrum

In drawing up the list of invitees to the 2005 NGO outreach effort, the office in charge was encouraged to create "balance" by including nonproliferation groups from the right side of the political spectrum. This was easier said than done, however, because of the relative paucity of nonproliferation experts at that end.

Most of the conservative NGOs involved in nonproliferation campaigns approach the issue from a regional perspective, and become expert in proliferation matters mainly because the regimes of concern to them pursue nuclear and chemical weapons. Patrick Clawson, deputy director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, is an economist who frequently comments on Iran's nuclear program.

Nonproliferation NGOs on the right side of the political spectrum often combine an avowedly anti-nuclear perspective with a deep distrust of totalitarian and radical Islamic regimes. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Center, run by former Defense Department Deputy Assistant Secretary for Counterproliferation Henry Sokolski, is one of the most prolific advocates of this stripe, bringing a strong technical reputation to the role.

A concern about nuclear terrorism unites U.S. NGOs across the political spectrum, from the Center for Defense Information on the left to the Heritage Foundation on the right. In fact, nuclear nonproliferation in general is the "unified field theory" for NGOs and governments around the world, with few exceptions. Apart from those countries trying to join the nuclear club and their defenders, nearly all countries and all parts of the political spectrum agree on the need to stop the spread of atomic weapons. Debates continue on how much attention to give to the arsenals of the acknowledged nuclear weapon states, but there is no disagreement on the danger of additional states — much less non-state actors — getting the bomb.

U.N. Disarmament Research Institute Director Patricia Lewis pithily summed up the role of NGOs when she told an audience heavy with such do-good organizations at a nonproliferation conference in Berlin this March: "We have to pay attention to NGOs — no matter how irritating they are to governments." They often do not get much respect, but the global nonproliferation regime would be the poorer without NGOs. ■

A Career of Management Excellence: Joan M. Clark

Last month AFSA recognized the retired ambassador's many contributions to American diplomacy and her lifetime of public service.

By Steven Alan Honley

On June 28, Ambassador Joan Margaret Clark received the American Foreign Service Association's award for Lifetime Contributions to American Diplomacy, in recognition of a distinguished 44-year career.

Born in Ridgefield Park, N.J., on March 27, 1922, Ms. Clark attended Katharine Gibbs School in New York City before joining the Foreign Service as an administrative assistant in 1945. She spent the first five years of her career in Berlin; her other overseas posts were London, Belgrade, Luxembourg and Valletta.

Commissioned as a Foreign Service officer in 1957, she spent the bulk of her Washington, D.C., assignments in administrative and personnel work. Among many other accomplishments, she helped set up the Foreign Service Institute's first management tradecraft course, and later established an MBA course for administrative officers at Columbia University.

From 1979 to 1981, Ms. Clark served as ambassador to the Republic of Malta. Upon returning to Washington, she served as director general of the Foreign Service until 1983, focusing on implementation of the 1980 Foreign Service Act. She then spent the final six years of her diplomatic career as assistant secretary for consular affairs, helping make machine-readable visas a reality, before retiring in 1989.

Amb. Clark has been chairman of the Senior Living Foundation since its inception in 1994, and is on the board of directors of the American Foreign Service Protective Association. A longtime member of Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired, she was DACOR's president from 1997 to 1999. She is also a member of the American Academy of Diplomacy.

Her many previous honors include the Department of State's Superior Honor and Distinguished Honor Awards, the Luther I. Reprogle Award for Management Improvement (1975), the President's Honor Award (1983) and President's Meritorious Award (1990), and the Director General's Cup, which she received in 2003.

Foreign Service Journal Editor Steve Honley interviewed Amb. Clark at AFSA on April 23.

FSJ: *First of all, congratulations on your award for lifetime contributions to American diplomacy, which places you in the same company as such career diplomats as Morton Abramowitz, Richard Parker, Tom Pickering and Larry Eagleburger, to name some past winners. What would you say have been your strengths as a diplomat?*

JC: That's a difficult question to answer! I'm not sure I have that many strengths, other than in the management area, and the fact that I enjoy working with people.

FSJ: *Management is an important Foreign Service function that doesn't always get the attention it deserves.*

JC: No, it certainly doesn't.

FSJ: *What drew you to that kind of work?*

JC: I was always very fortunate in the bosses I had, beginning in Berlin and continuing thereafter. I learned from them how important it is to keep up morale, and that one of the ways you do this is to have a smooth operation of support for all your people and for your local employees.

FSJ: *When did you first decide you wanted to join the Foreign Service?*

JC: I wanted to do something to help with the [World

Steven Alan Honley, a Foreign Service officer from 1985 to 1997, is the editor of the Foreign Service Journal.

War II] war effort, though the fighting in Europe had just ended by the time I was accepted. But I didn't particularly want to go into the military because, being an independent type, I prefer to be able to have an exit!

FSJ: *What was the process for joining the Foreign Service at that time? Did you take a standardized exam?*

JC: No, I filled out an application for employment and sent it to Washington.

Within a few months, I was interviewed by a representative of the Department of State in New York City. I arrived in D.C. on July 4, 1945, and was sworn in the following day as a $1,800-a-year clerk.

FSJ: *Did you have any input into where you went on your first assignment?*

JC: Not formally. They did ask me if I'd be interested in going to Chungking, China, where they had an opening. I said I realized I was available for worldwide service, but I didn't think I'd like the climate in Chungking since I had talked with a number of pilots who had flown there for Pan American Airways, where I was working at the time. Then they asked me what I thought of Berlin, and I just repeated that I was available for worldwide service. I got assigned to Berlin and arrived there on Sept. 14, 1945.

FSJ: *What was it like living and working in Germany right after World War II ended? Did you have to help set up an embassy, or was a facility already in place?*

JC: The mission was under U.S. military command at that stage, subject to their regulations; in fact, we all had to wear a uniform. This was also true for the British and French.

FSJ: *Did you speak German at this point?*

JC: No, I didn't. I was selected because I was young and healthy.

FSJ: *Did you have very many dealings with your counterparts from other countries?*

"When you do administrative work, you can see results. It doesn't get lost."

— Amb. Joan Clark

Left: Ambassador Joan Clark today. Right: In Berlin, 1945.

JC: My boss, Loyd Steere, the deputy director of the Office of Political Affairs, attended the meetings of the Allied Kommandatura, comprised of the United States, United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, and they governed the city of Berlin. Mr. Steere thought it would be very educational for me if I went along to those meetings, took a few notes and saw what was going on. It was indeed fascinating because I was able to observe first-hand the Soviets, the French, the British and, of course, the Americans interacting. It gave me a real window on history.

FSJ: *But otherwise, most of your contacts were within the mission?*

JC: Yes, except that we were very social in the evenings and moved around freely. In fact, up until the middle of November 1945, we would occasionally meet a number of the Russians at various functions.

FSJ: *Had you spent any time overseas before this?*

JC: My parents were English immigrants to the United States, and they sent me to secondary school back in England for two years, from 1937 to 1939. (They felt I needed some discipline!) I returned to the States just before Hitler invaded Poland.

FSJ: *So you were already accustomed to being on your own, which I guess is good training for the Foreign Service. Did you know any diplomats growing up?*

JC: No, though I remember my mother used to comment that she thought diplomats must lead very interesting lives.

FSJ: *You were in Berlin for how long?*

JC: My assignment was for two years, but the ambassador asked me to stay on, which I was happy to do. I remained a secretary in the political section, but during my second tour I worked for the director, James W. Riddleberger. Both he and my first boss, Loyd Steere, had served in the U.S. Embassy in Berlin before World War I, so they brought a lot of experience and history to their work.

When the U.S. High Commission was set up in 1949, Mr. Riddleberger became political adviser to General Lucius Clay and then later to the High Commissioner, John McCloy. In addition, the headquarters moved to Frankfurt in 1949, so I spent my final months there.

FSJ: *After five years in Germany, what was next for you?*

JC: I came back to the department in 1950 as a secretary in the office handling aviation issues in the Economic Bureau. That led to an assignment in London as an economic assistant doing civil aviation reporting in the Civil Air Attaché's Office, from

1951 to 1953. Then I spent the next four years in Belgrade as an administrative assistant to Mr. Riddleberger, who was the new ambassador to Yugoslavia.

The Trieste crisis broke a few days before I was scheduled to arrive in Belgrade. Since the troops of Italy and Yugoslavia were massed on each side of their borders, it was decided that I should enter Yugoslavia from Austria. When I attempted to cross into the country, I was turned back by Customs because the proper papers for my car had not been obtained.

FSJ: *You left Belgrade in 1957?*

JC: Yes. I came back to Washington. Later that year I was commissioned as a Foreign Service officer and shortly thereafter assigned to the Personnel Operations Division in the section handling assignments.

FSJ: *How did that come about?*

JC: This sounds strange, but I was walking through the corridors one day and saw the name "Findley Burns" on the outside of a door. He had come to inspect Belgrade while I was there, so I stopped in to say hello to him. He asked what I was doing, and I told him I was waiting for Personnel to assign me. He said, "Well, how about giving Personnel a whirl?" That sounded good to me, so that's where I went.

After two years in Personnel, I became a post management officer in the Bureau of European Affairs. I mainly handled the Benelux countries, but also covered Jamaica, British Guyana and several other colonies.

FSJ: *Did you feel like you had found your calling at that point?*

JC: Yes, I really liked what I was doing. When you do administrative work, you can see results. It doesn't get lost.

FSJ: *Did being a female FSO pose particular challenges during your time in the Service? If so, how did you overcome them?*

JC: No, absolutely not. I never felt discriminated against at any time dur-

ing my 44 years in the Foreign Service.

FSJ: *Did some of your female colleagues feel differently?*

JC: Yes, some had problems on that score. But I think that's an individual point of view. And, of course, it depends a lot on your immediate supervisor.

FSJ: *What was your next overseas assignment?*

JC: I spent five years in Luxembourg, from 1962 to 1967. It was a small embassy, and I was the administrative officer, consular officer, and jack-of-all-trades. Luxembourgers are lovely people, so it was a very good and interesting tour.

Despite being a small post, we had our share of major meetings and visitors: one was a visit by Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson, and the other was a NATO ministerial meeting. Because our motor pool consisted of two cars, it was necessary to arrange for additional transportation. Therefore, we called upon the commanding officers of the two nearby U.S. Air Force bases, in Bitburg and Spangdalem, Germany. They were most helpful in sending a sergeant with enough men and cars to run a motor pool.

FSJ: *Then did you come back to Washington?*

JC: I was transferred to D.C. to develop a management course for the Foreign Service Institute. I worked with an outside consultant to design the content and line up speakers. Both the under secretary for management at the time and his predecessor recognized that administrative work was a side of the Service that had been neglected. After all, we were a big business handling millions of dollars. In addition to the FSI administrative course, we also established an MBA program at Columbia University.

Then my former boss, Findley Burns, who had become a deputy assistant secretary of State for management in the Latin American Bureau, asked me to work in his office. I began by taking an informal inspection tour of the region, visiting six countries in a row: the Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.

FSJ: *All your overseas assignments were in Europe. Was that a deliberate choice?*

JC: No, I guess you could say it was fate. I was tapped for just about all my Foreign Service assignments by people I'd already worked for, and I got to see most of the world during my career. I am very happy about where I served.

FSJ: *What were some of the issues you handled as ambassador to Malta from 1979 to 1981?*

JC: Oddly enough, Valletta was the one post in Europe that I had never visited before being chosen as ambassador. It was a small embassy, but I liked that. I've always advised junior officers, "If you can get a small post, do it. You get to do everything there, whereas at larger embassies, you can end up in a small niche." In a small country like Luxembourg, for instance, you get to know a number of the citizens.

As for issues, we had a very interesting prime minister with whom to deal, Dom Mintoff. He was quite upset with the United States because he always wanted the president or the Secretary of State to pay a visit, and that hadn't happened. At one time, he had been close to Libyan President Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi, but that relationship started to cool during my time there. After Mintoff took office, he no longer allowed the Sixth Fleet to stop in Malta.

Still, even though Mintoff's government basically ignored us and our British counterparts, there was no real crisis during my time there. The Maltese are lovely people, so I had an interesting and good two years there.

FSJ: *Tell me about your time as director general of the Foreign Service. What were the key personnel-*

related issues at that time?

JC: I was DG for about 16 months, from 1981 to 1983. As you can imagine, during that period implementing the Foreign Service Act of 1980 dominated the agenda.

FSJ: *And what was your final Foreign Service assignment?*

JC: I served as assistant secretary for consular affairs from 1983 to 1989. Resources are always a problem for everyone in the State Department, but Consular Affairs needed to find money to introduce machine-readable visas, as well as for the automation of all the passport agencies. The fees for consular services were always collected by the Treasury Department, and when the federal budget came over to State, there was always this hassle about how much money each bureau would be allotted.

I've always been a great believer in talking to people up on the Hill about our needs. As head of CA, I worked closely with the judiciary committees on the Hill, which I knew were concerned about border controls — an issue that's still very much with us today, of course. At that time, we had an interesting system in this country: those holding foreign passports filled out the I-94 immigration form, which had two sections. As visitors entered our country, one section was collected. However, there was no formal U.S. government passport control at a number of exit points to collect the second section of the form upon their departure. As a result, upon their arrival in their home countries, some conscientious tourists would send the second part of the form to our embassies. We, in turn, would send them to the INS.

"I've always been a great believer in talking to people up on the Hill about our needs."

As further insurance against visa fraud, my bureau decided to move to machine-readable visas. I assigned one of the consular officers, who was a whiz with computers, to work with others to develop a proposal. We took that plan up to the Hill and got them to earmark $4 million for CA to implement it.

FSJ: *I'm guessing your colleagues around the department weren't too thrilled with that!*

JC: Yes, especially H (the legislative affairs folks) and M (the management bureau). Someone called me up to say they were going to take the money away, and I said, "I think you better check the legislation."

FSJ: *Since retiring from the Foreign Service in 1989, you've been heavily involved with the Senior Living Foundation. How did that come about?*

JC: The American Foreign Service Protective Association started getting inquiries from various people who had hit hard times, but there wasn't anything that could be done for them. Salaries and pensions were relatively low for a long time, especially for spouses of deceased annuitants. So John Shumate, who was and still is the executive vice president of the organization, talked to Findley Burns and rounded up some other people, including me, to set up the Senior Living Foundation. I became the chairman of the Foundation's Board of Directors in 1994, a position I still hold.

FSJ: *What kinds of services does the foundation provide for retired Foreign Service personnel?*

JC: The Senior Living Foundation is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) tax-exempt organization established to assist retired members of the American Foreign Service, including secretaries, communicators, widows and divorced spouses, who are physically and/or emotionally unable to cope with the changes that occur with aging. Some examples of the aid that the foundation offers include: hearing aids, home health care, transportation to medical appointments, groceries, prescription drug costs, durable medical equipment such as wheelchairs, basic living expenses and senior living facilities. We also provide information and guidance about how to draw on community, State, federal and private resources.

A growing number of colleagues need more extensive support, such as home health care, medications and basic living expenses. The foundation provides temporary and one-time assistance grants as they are needed, in addition to accepting each case for a lifetime commitment.

FSJ: *How often do you do fund-raising for the foundation?*

JC: We send out appeals twice a year, but if someone contributes in the spring, we don't ask them for more money in the fall. If there's one thing that drives me up the wall, it's organizations that hit you up for more money a week after you send them a check!

FSJ: *How would you say diplomacy has changed since your days in the Foreign Service? Are you optimistic about the future of the profession?*

JC: We're getting a group of really fine young people these days with a lot more work experience in various organizations, including NGOs, before they come into the Service. Quite a few of them have studied, worked or lived abroad with various organizations. Of course, that means retention now is an even greater problem than before, because private industry is much more remunerative. For married couples, especially those with children, a lot depends on their family situation. Some Foreign Service children take to life overseas like ducks to water, while others have real problems. With the growing number of unaccompanied posts, more families are being separated for long periods of time.

FSJ: *Whenever you talk to bright young people today, college graduates, do you recommend the Foreign Service to them as a career?*

JC: I don't have many opportunities to do that these days; but yes, I've always recommended a diplomatic career.

FSJ: *What changes do you think are needed to the FS personnel system to ensure that the Service has the abilities, outlooks and organizational structure to effectively discharge its role in the active promotion of U.S. interests abroad?*

JC: An ongoing problem is that some Foreign Service personnel have the view that if they take a couple of years out for hard-language study or other long-term training, it may slow their promotion to the next grade. I believe there is some truth to that fear, because job performance is what selection boards look at. I don't have a solution to offer for that problem, but it is a dilemma that needs to be addressed. We clearly need lots more officers to take total-immersion courses in Chinese, Japanese, Arabic and so forth.

FSJ: *What are your thoughts about the "transformational diplomacy" concept?*

JC: I really don't know enough about the details to comment. But one aspect of it that doesn't seem to have gotten much attention is the idea of posting more officers outside the embassy in these countries. That's all well and good, but if they're based out in the boondocks, are they really going to contribute to Washington's understanding of how the host government, which is centrally located, operates? And will they have any effect back in the capital?

FSJ: *Any final thoughts?*

JC: I feel very highly honored to accept this award. However, in all honesty, I would not be standing here today if it were not for all the support I received throughout the years from the various supervisors, staffs and offices, both Foreign Service and Civil Service personnel, who served with me.

FSJ: *Thank you very much.* ■

Coming in September ...

Look for profiles of the AFSA Dissent Award winners and the AFSA Performance Award winners in the next issue of the *Foreign Service Journal.*

Honorees include:

Ronald Capps, who challenged U.S. policy on peacekeeping in Darfur and proposed more active U.S. involvement in preventing genocide there in 2006; and

Michael Zorick, who questioned U.S. policy toward Somalia. His astute analysis of the complex socio-political situation there has proven prescient.

And more...

Showdown at the National Day Buffet

Those who work harder to get ahead lack imagination and sufficient devotion to the truly meaningful things in life.

By Brian Aggeler

"Clarissa would eat her own young to get ahead," Dwayne the Security Officer whispered, sipping his beer. The circle of fellow American diplomats huddled around him at the Slovenian embassy's National Day reception nodded agreement. "I mean, *if* she ate. Well, and if she *had* any children."

Milt the Management Officer was naturally cautious, so he added, "And also if that sort of thing were actually rewarded in a career sense. You'd want to check the promotion precepts."

Oggie the Political-Economic Officer filled his mouth with greasy phyllo pastry and declared: "Gentlemen, any stooge can try to do more work to get ahead — seems to me that only demonstrates a lack of imagination and insufficient devotion to those things that are truly meaningful in life. Buffets, for example."

Deftly balancing his buffet plate on the bulge of his belly, Oggie wiped his oily fingers on a croissant and pushed it into his mouth. "The greater challenge is to see just how *little* you can do. People think inactivity at work just happens and, in most cases, they're probably right. If you get an e-mail asking you to do something and just wait long enough, sure enough you'll eventually see another that says it's all been handled."

This story by Brian Aggeler is the winner of the Journal*'s 2007 Foreign Service fiction contest. Other winning stories will appear in future issues of the* FSJ.

Ernie, a gangly first-tour officer, shook his head. "But that's not hard — you just don't do anything."

Oggie scooped a small mountain of smoked salmon into his mouth. "Sometimes, Ernie, it takes a little more than that. Sometimes getting *out* of doing something like, say, writing a cable or an info memo can take more e-mails, more work arguing, than the memo itself." Oggie swallowed the salmon and put a handful of olives in his mouth, then put down his plate so he could gesture with both hands. "This may seem counterintuitive, Ernie, but it's really the principle that's at stake; once you give up and just do what you're asked, you've started down a very slippery slope."

From out of the crowd Clarissa marched up to the group with a hard smile frozen on her face, revealing small, sharp teeth. Dwayne gasped and blew beer out his nose as everyone straightened their posture. Clarissa's red hair sprouted back from her face like flames as she leaned into the group and hissed: "Mingle!" The group scattered into the reception crowd, seeking foreign counterparts to engage and looking nervously back at Clarissa.

Clarissa Finks-Elbow had spent most of her career on the State Department's seventh floor, routing important papers to important people in an important way. She had come to her posting as deputy chief of this small embassy to check the boxes of overseas and management experience needed to continue her ferocious gallop up through the diplomatic ranks.

Tucked in a prosperous corner of the Alps, the country was disappointingly stable. It lacked any burning disputes with its equally placid neighbors and was not likely to produce a coup, border conflict or other career-advancement opportunities. So Clarissa focused her considerable energies on impressing her boss with her impeccable management of the embassy.

Clarissa's boss, Ambassador Anastasia Burnbottom, was a political appointee, a friend of the First Lady who had inherited a nacho-cheese sauce fortune. The ambassador was given to folksy and often opaque sayings like "We've got to put the sheep down where the cats can get at them," and "We'll cross that bridge when the cows come home." Linguistic foibles aside, the ambassador ran a tight embassy and soon discovered that Political-Economic Officer Ogden Pizzler Fitzmore was not actually doing any work. She admonished Clarissa several times a week: "That Oggie's the slow dog on the totem pole!"

Oggie was, in fact, given very few responsibilities. Once, in the absence of more senior types in the embassy, he was sent to sign the condolence book at a friendly embassy on the death of their beloved monarch and punctuated his entry by signing his name with a smiley face on the letter "I."

When Clarissa pressed Oggie to write the required reports, he assigned them all to his locally-engaged assistant. Jean-Rudolf wrote only in the passive voice and compensated for the fact that English was not his native language by sprinkling his writing with a zesty dose of obscenities. This was particularly distracting in his drafts of documents like the Trade Practices Report.

So Clarissa did what she had always done with an unresponsive colleague: she simply did Oggie's work herself. This did not impress the ambassador, who even put the need for Clarissa to get some productivity out of Oggie in her evaluation as an "area for improvement."

Studied sloth had taken him far, and he would not be driven out of it by the likes of Clarissa Finks-Elbow.

Clarissa was stricken by this unexpected notation of a genuine shortcoming — in earlier evaluations her "areas for improvement" had included "Needs to share more of her deep policy knowledge with less-gifted colleagues" and "Should take more opportunities to demonstrate her brilliant public diplomacy skills, as well as her show-stopping high-kicks." The last time Clarissa had ever been anything less than the best at anything was when a junior high gym coach had questioned her commitment during a dodgeball game. Clarissa had taken the criticism as a challenge and went on to attend a prestigious liberal arts college on a rare and coveted dodgeball scholarship. She would not be defeated by Ogden Pizzler Fitzmore.

Oggie, however, was not moved by Clarissa's threats that her evaluation of his performance might be less than entirely complimentary. His evaluations had always been mixed and he doubted she could best the previous supervisor, who had observed that Oggie had "great potential if he would bring to his work the passion he reserves for baked goods," or the one who noted more frankly that Oggie "added trouble, multiplied ignorance and divided attention."

These mixed reviews had not prevented him from enjoying assignments to Paris, Sydney and a variety of other sought-after posts. He was never the first choice for a given job but, if he waited long enough, eventually one of the preferred candidates would invariably fall ill, be hit by a meteorite, or find that his career could benefit from a stint in Baghdad. All other suitable candidates having secured positions by then, Oggie would get the job by default. Studied sloth had taken him far, and he would not be driven out of it by the likes of Clarissa Finks-Elbow.

This simmering low-intensity conflict escalated at the embassy's weekly country team meeting. Pyles, the regional medical officer, was giving a lengthy and particularly graphic description of a waterborne disease rampant at his last posting. Though contracting the disease was a remote possibility within 1,000 miles of the embassy, it was still enough of a concern to the RMO to warrant extensive description. "The DCM there had it in his middle ear, which is why the playing of 'Bohemian Rhapsody' still causes him loose motions."

Milt raised his hand. "Doc, I have a question: when you say all extremities are covered with weeping pustules, what exactly do you mean?"

The ambassador stopped him. "Milt, I think that's more druthers than we can chew." She turned to Clarissa with a saccharine calm that indicated a follow-up scream was being held in reserve. "Deputy dear, what's the latest on that sauce subsidy démarche?"

"We're still trying to schedule it with the Ministry of Sauces and Savories, Ma'am." Clarissa shot a look across the table at Oggie, whom she had asked to set up the meeting. He shrugged and mouthed "Jean-

Rudolf?"

The ambassador banged her fist on the table. "Folks, this issue of sauce subsidies is vitally important. Cheese sauce is the glue that holds our country together — and I don't mean Bechamel or other such subversive 'condiments,' but sauce packed in a can by decent people and nourished with the blood of patriots. Well, no actual blood in the can itself, or not more than FDA-approved levels, anyway.

"We all know that there is not a cuisine on this Earth that wouldn't benefit from the addition of a savory nacho-cheese sauce — and what kind of tyranny denies equal access to all sauces of similar viscosity? Sauce does not flow from the barrel of a gun, and that's where we come in!"

The ambassador panted, her face red. The country team members stared in silence. "Well, dammit, how much clearer can I be?" The team remained silent. "I want to see a report that the sauce démarche has been delivered!"

Clarissa stole another look at Oggie's pad and saw he was drawing a smiling cow eating a huge banana split.

Clarissa cleared her throat. "You'll have the report tomorrow."

The trap had to be set carefully. Clarissa had to take Oggie by surprise with a clearly-defined task that he could not delegate to Jean-Rudolf. And when Oggie failed to do it, Clarissa would give him a written reprimand — proof of her supervisory skills and perhaps even the first step to getting Oggie transferred to another post.

That evening at the Mongolian National Day reception, Clarissa found Oggie near the buffet. He was regaling the Brazilian defense attaché with his expert knowledge of the movie, "The Poseidon Adventure," gesturing with a handful of mutton skewers. "Let me be clear; the original is superior in every way to the remakes," Oggie pulled the chunks of meat from one skewer into his mouth and deployed another with his free hand. "And that's not just because of the great Roddy McDowall. I know what you're thinking: how did Roddy do 'Poseidon' the very same year he worked his incomparable magic in

'Conquest of the Planet of the Apes'? All I can say is that giants walk among us." The Brazilian, who did not speak English, nodded uneasily.

Clarissa pulled Oggie aside. "I need you to take notes at a meeting I'm having now with the vice minister of sauces and savories."

Oggie whisked a handful of dumplings from a passing tray into his mouth. "We can't really do it here."

"I've already asked the Mongolian ambassador. He said we could use one of his side rooms."

Oggie pushed a cream-filled croissant into his mouth and looked around, sensing danger. "Maybe Jean-Rudolf should come."

"He's not around. I need you to do it."

Oggie swallowed the croissant and gnawed slowly on another mutton skewer, considering his options. The trap was becoming clear.

"I don't have a pad to take notes." Clarissa held up a pad and a Skilcraft pen. Oggie took them and followed Clarissa, with only enough time to snatch a handful of cream puffs as they passed the dessert table.

Clarissa led Oggie into a room decorated with an array of silver-framed photos of the Mongolian ambassador grinning with presidents, prime ministers, the Secretary of State, the Pope, the Bee Gees and someone who appeared to be Charo. Clarissa closed the door. The vice minister and his notetaker sat in a pair of chairs and Clarissa and Oggie sat opposite them. Oggie cradled his belly between his legs and opened the notepad with one hand while sucking the last of the cream puffs from the fingers on his other hand.

Clarissa had memorized the intricacies of the sauce démarche and delivered the points without notes while the vice minister nodded and his assistant scribbled on a pad.

After her presentation, the vice minister cleared his throat and thanked Clarissa for her comprehensive and clear statement of the U.S. policy. He then launched into his own exhaustive list of reasons he could not accept the U.S. position. He noted the percentage change in subsidy levels, touching on the sensitive issue of emulsification of various sauces, and detailed the socio-economic impact of the proposed budget for sauce subsidies.

With daring swoops into the subjunctive, she finished by citing the recipe for the country's most revered national dish.

Clarissa nodded thoughtfully, while Oggie scribbled busily in his notebook, not even looking up. He turned over a new page even before the vice minister's notetaker, and Clarissa allowed herself to savor the feeling of victory that she had at last forced Oggie into performing an actual task. Then, out of the corner of her eye, she saw that Oggie was not writing anything. He was doodling. The picture was of a young woman who looked very much like herself being menaced by Darth Vader and Godzilla.

The vice minister went on at length regarding the projected national budget, and possible dates for debate on the relevant legislation. Oggie scribbbled and turned the page in his notebook. Clarissa stole another look at Oggie's pad and saw he was drawing a smiling cow eating a huge banana split.

When the vice minister had finished his rebuttal, Clarissa parried. She cited the potential benefits to both countries of better sauce exchanges, drawing on detailed figures from his own ministry. She switched into the vice minister's language, fluently expounding on the long history of friendship between their peoples. With daring swoops into the subjunctive, she finished by citing the recipe for the country's most revered national dish and quoted their greatest poet's patriotic paean to the dish's sauce and the hope for humanity such divine sauce represented. Both the vice minister and his assistant nodded with approval. Clarissa looked over and saw Oggie coloring in a picture of an enormous sandwich with wings.

"You make a compelling case, Ms. Finks-Elbow," the vice minister smiled, wiping away a tear. "I will take your argument to my minister. You have convinced me: our path to the future is certainly paved with sauce."

Clarissa smiled winningly and shook hands as the vice minister and his assistant left. Then she turned to Oggie and the smile disappeared. "I'll need a draft of the cable reporting on this meeting tomorrow morning. And I want your draft to include all the details: that means all the dates and numbers and *everything* the vice minister just gave us." Oggie nodded. Clarissa took a step closer, so her angular face was just inches from Oggie's round visage. "Use your notes!" she snarled, then stomped out of the room.

The next morning, Clarissa got to her desk earlier than usual to draft her letter of reprimand for Oggie. She was almost finished, ready to send a copy to the ambassador, when an e-mail from Oggie popped up on her screen. She considered what his excuses might be for not having the

cable, dismissing all of them. Then she opened the message.

And there was the draft cable. Still, she knew he couldn't possibly have all the details from the meeting. After all, he hadn't taken a single note. As she read the report, her jaw dropped lower and lower. All the details were there, all the numbers from the vice minister, all the dates, even the more eloquent foreign-language points from her own presentation. It wasn't in the passive voice. There weren't even any obscenities.

That evening Ernie found Oggie working through the buffet at the Belgian National Day reception. "To arms, young Ernest!" Oggie exhorted him. "I favor robust engagement: skirmish only briefly with the lighter appetizers before we take on the heavy meat and gravy items."

"I saw the cable on sauce subsidies," Ernie said accusingly. Oggie heaped his plate with French fries and dolloped them with mayonnaise. "You wrote it. You just did the work. What about all you said about the principle … about doing whatever it takes to get out of doing the work?" Ernie continued, tears welling in the corners of his eyes. "I *believed* in you!"

Oggie piled gravy-covered beef on top of the fries, then scooped a chunk into his mouth. "I didn't write anything," he chewed. "The ministry guy who took notes at the meeting is a buddy of mine, and he was nice enough to share his report of the meeting."

"Translated into English?"

Oggie swallowed the beef and pushed a baguette into his mouth. "Turns out he's a big 'Poseidon Adventure' fan, too. I lent him my copy. Special edition, very rare."

Clarissa walked up with a glass of champagne and a satisfied smile. "The ambassador was very pleased with the results of the sauce démarche. It seems we have opened a new era of sauce-based cooperation — perhaps even a model for an enhanced bilateral relationship." Oggie nodded and chewed. A glob of brown gravy dropped from his chin onto his brown coat sleeve.

Clarissa took a deep breath. "Ogden, the ambassador also said the cable on the démarche was …" she choked slightly and downed the champagne. "It was well-written." She flushed, her eyes darting from side to side. "Oh, there's Ambassador Leotard. I have to engage him on an urgent biofuel issue. Excuse me." She darted past Oggie and Ernie into the crowd.

Ernie stared after her in wonder. "She didn't even tell us to mingle."

Oggie swallowed another chunk of beef and popped a handful of mayonnaise-soaked fries into his mouth. "Come on, Ernie. This buffet's not going to eat itself." ■

DS Rides the Iron Rooster

To deliver diplomatic pouches securely while complying with Chinese restrictions, staff from the Seoul Regional Diplomatic Courier Hub travel by train to Beijing.

By James B. Angell

Beijing, one of our nation's most critical missions, is in special need of a consistent means of secure delivery of diplomatic pouches. However, the People's Republic of China forbids diplomatic couriers from coming planeside to secure the transfer of classified material from the cargo hold to cleared Americans.

The only way to comply with that restriction on air transport would be to purchase three seats for each courier: one for the traveler, the other two for the pouches. But that obviously isn't a viable option given the amount of classified material involved and the expense.

Instead, staff from the Seoul Regional Diplomatic Courier Hub periodically fly to Hong Kong and take a 24-hour, 1,400-mile train journey north through the heart of the country to Beijing aboard what author Paul Theroux famously called "the Iron Rooster." (See p. 62.) These trips are a lifeline for the embassy and its constituent posts.

James B. Angell, a diplomatic courier officer, is the officer-in-charge of the Seoul Regional Diplomatic Courier Hub. Since joining the Foreign Service in 1993, he has served in Frankfurt, Bangkok (twice) and Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. government.

The Chinese restrictions on diplomatic pouches are strictly enforced: no single piece can weigh over 100 kilograms or exceed a cubic meter in size, and no single load of classified material can weigh over 1,000 kilograms. Customs and immigration officials in Beijing await the diplomatic couriers with a scale and measuring tape. (Because no passenger stops take place between Hong Kong and the Chinese capital, the Beijing West station is the nation's frontier.) If any of these restrictions are violated, the pouches must remain at the station with cleared American guards for 48 hours until the international train returns to Hong Kong.

The Journey Begins

Just departing Kowloon Station with 45 heavy classified pouches is no easy task. They are first off-loaded onto carts and pushed into the crowded terminal, then squeezed through narrow train doors and along tight corridors before being jammed into four bed compartments. With one bed left free for the accompanying diplomatic courier, the other three beds are tightly packed with four large bags apiece, with one large pouch under a fold-down table and two stacked atop it, blocking most of the view out the window. A normal classified load requires three diplomatic couriers in neighboring compartments, spelling each other for bathroom breaks or visits to the dining car. While the scenery out the windows is certain-

ly intriguing, 24 arduous hours of cramped travel amidst chain-smoking Chinese makes one yearn for fresh air and a simple bed.

The rail line connecting Kowloon to Guangzhou (originally known as Canton) was begun by the British in 1906 and completed in 1911. The spectacular mountainous terrain of Hong Kong's New Territories forced Italian engineers to bore over a mile of tunnels along its 22-mile course to the border at Shenzen. The remaining 89 miles of track to Guangzhou were a special challenge because of the need to avoid numerous burial grounds and to bridge several broad rivers draining into the Pearl River. The wide, flood-prone rivers are filled with sampans and rice barges, while well-tended gardens and rice paddies border the rail. The original steel bridges, now a hundred years old, are still in use as they span the broad water barriers.

The smog was so thick on one trip that the phrase "Dantean hell" kept entering my mind.

The myriad skyscrapers coupled with the heat and congestion of Guangzhou are much like Bangkok, but the pollution covering the entire Pearl River Delta is far worse. In fact, the smog was so thick on one journey the phrase "Dantean hell" kept entering my mind. After a 30-minute stop to detach the Hong Kong engine and attach a Chinese diesel, the international train lurches out of the station, ready for its long run to the capital far to the north.

Rivers and Mountains

The 138-mile section of line from Guangzhou to Shaoguan, much of which follows the picturesque Bei Jiang River (North River) Valley, was completed in 1915. Outside of Guangzhou the farming appears to be mostly private plots, with every available bit of land beautifully

All photos were taken by the author.

Private plots between Shenzhen and Guangzhou.

This map shows the route of the Kowloon-to-Beijing train trip taken by U.S. diplomatic couriers.

China has one of the largest rail transport networks in the world. *Riding the Iron Rooster: By Train Through China*, Paul Theroux's travelogue, brought attention to China's rail system in 1988. "Iron rooster," it so happens, is a literal translation of the Chinese word for train.

Today, with about 20 principal domestic routes and a total length of 47,200 miles, the system ranks third behind Russia (52,800 miles) and the United States (143,000 miles). It is, however, the busiest railway network in the world, moving 24 percent of global rail traffic with just 6 percent of the world's tracks.

The Chinese railway system is comprehensive, spanning the nation. Despite various problems, it is being expanded, upgraded — and increasingly connected to the rest of the world. The controversial line linking China with the autonomous region of Tibet and its capital, Lhasa, was inaugurated in July 2006. The highest-altitude railway in the world, its construction involved significant engineering challenges.

The soaring need for both freight and passenger transport throughout the country continues to fuel the expansion that began in earnest during the 1950s. According to the country's long-term plan, the Ministry of Railways of China will add another 10,500 miles of track by 2010, as well as some double-tracking and electrification. By 2020, the system is expected to comprise some 62,000 miles. — *Susan Maitra, Senior Editor*

organized into rows of banana, papaya, lettuce and beans interspersed with rice paddies and ponds full of snow-white ducks. Each section of farmland is meticulously tended, with the locals squatting and weeding their precious crops by hand.

Further north, the Bei Jiang Valley and spectacular Ta Yuang Ling Mountains combine to create the most scenic portion of the journey: a mixed forest of bamboo and pine borders the track, while tea plantations ascend steeply from the shores of small lakes. Then, endless terraced rice paddies of light green with grazing water buffalo under towering peaks race past, broken only by the occasional bleak brick town.

North of Shaoguan, the mountains and river form a natural barrier that put a halt to the northen progress of the line until 1929, when the Chinese Ministry of Railways built a substantial steel bridge across the perennially swollen river and started work high upon the steep banks of the North River Valley. This extremely rugged section of track was completed in 1933 as far as Lechang, but it would be another three years before the Canton-Hankow Railway, linking Hong Kong with the Wuhan (formerly known as Hankow) railhead and points north, was completed. The mostly flat northern section of track from Wuhan to Beijing was built by Belgian engineers in the early part of the last century.

North of the Chang Jiang (Yangtze), one is truly in another country: the stereotypical China of vast collective farms.

The international train follows modern track and passes through a number of tunnels (some several miles long) through the mountainous terrain north of Shaoguan. On the opposite bank, the original 1933 track, crumbling from disuse, snakes along sheer cliffs and spans narrow chasms over classic arched bridges.

Downtown Guangzhou.

The original track had one tunnel 466 yards in length: a major engineering feat for the time. The monsoon flooding of late spring 2006 created landslides that ripped the old rail from its precarious bed, leaving long sections of track hanging in mid-air above the raging waters, as if awaiting a troupe of trapeze artists.

The terrain levels off as the canyon route through high peaks nears its headwaters. There, under dragon-tooth mountains, nestle scenic brick villages with harvested rice stalks stacked in dried paddies in the shape of a Shriner's fez. This portion of the journey is quintessential China: rice-farming communities in mist under jagged peaks beside a winding river that flows south. Over the pass in Ping Shi, beside the headwaters of the northward-flowing Xiang River, the stunning scenery is full of karst spires towering above an idyllic mountain valley.

Darkness typically falls by the time the train goes north of Ping Shi, but under a full moon a number of glistening lakes fill the valleys between high mountain ranges. The Chang Jiang (Yangtze), too, is crossed at night, its watercraft flickering like fireflies.

Some 200 miles upriver, the Three Gorges Dam is nearing completion. This $25 billion, mile-long behemoth will be the largest hydroelectric dam in the world. The waters of the world's third-longest river will create a reservoir 300 miles in length. It will also displace some 1.3 million people; indeed, the reservoir has already submerged hundreds of mines, factories and waste dumps, creating environmental challenges on a huge scale. Construction of the dam is already completed and it is slated to begin generating electricity in 2008.

Rural and Urban

Awakening north of the Yangtze, one is truly in another country: the stereotypical China of vast collective farms. (Fifty percent of the Chinese population is engaged in farming.) This central region of China is very similar to the American heartland: both are covered in corn and wheat. In the height of summer, endless amber waves of grain and corn as high as an elephant's eye stretch to a western horizon of dry, craggy mountains. Unlike in America, however, the decrepit dirt-path townships grow and tend their corn and

Top of the pass near Lechang.

wheat with little machinery and supplement their diets with private plots along the rails. It's a labor-intensive landscape, with the multitudes bobbing up and down in an ocean of grain, hoeing alongside ancestral burial sites with white stone crowns.

Out the train window after harvest one can see thousands of people cleaning the fields and burning brush but, again, few machines of any kind. During the autumn, miniature harvesters can be seen working the fields and commuting along two-lane roads to their next job, but they're the only farm machinery of note, apart from the odd tractor. (They are even used to harvest the winter wheat.) Otherwise, the nation seems to be fed by hand. In the fall the harvested corn is dried on the roads and rooftops of every village, turning central and northern China into "Big Yellow" instead of "Big Red." It is also a landscape of rows, be it corn or trees: conformity rules the land.

It's a labor-intensive landscape, with the multitudes bobbing up and down in an ocean of grain.

Every hundred miles or so, the train passes through a teeming city with one gleaming skyscraper and a huge coal-fired electric plant beside the tracks. The vast majority of apartment buildings in these sprawling cities are somewhere between First and Third World as far as living conditions go, but there are brand-new apartment blocks under construction for the burgeoning middle class, along with the occasional new superhighway soaring over the tracks as well. The interior is not, however, the architecturally dynamic China of Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou, but a more decrepit and impoverished land, often covered by a thick haze of pollution.

The Final Leg

Although Americans surveyed the northern train route from Wuhan (Hankow) to Bejing in 1896 and 1897, they failed in their bid to build the track: the Chinese government awarded the concession to the Belgians. Strong British protests at losing this concession to Brussels won them the contract to build the Kowloon-Guangzhou (Canton) sector in the south.

The British had built an 80-mile

section of line as early as 1896, from Lukouqiao to Baoding, which the Belgians naturally incorporated into their track. The Belgians also made use of an 11-mile section from Lukouqiao to the Qianmen Gate in Bejing, built by the French during the international military occupation brought about by the Boxer Rebellion of 1900. The whole Wuhan-Beijing section of standard-gauge track comprises 817 of the 1,400 total miles of the Kowloon-to-Beijing rail line.

One of the more intriguing parts of this route is the crossing of the Huanghe, or Yellow River, just north of Zhengzhou. Due to an elevated river bed in relation to the surrounding terrain, the Yellow River is known as "China's Sorrow": 4,300 years ago, the Yellow flooded central China for 13 years, and such epi-

Due to the massive flooding it has so often caused, the Yellow River is known as "China's Sorrow."

sodes eventually led the Chinese to begin building dikes 2,500 years ago. The worst flood in human history occurred in 1887, when the waters of the Yellow River covered 50,000 square miles, killing 900,000 people and leaving two million more homeless. The Belgians rose to the engineering challenge of spanning these unruly waters in November 1905 by using screw piles to bridge the shallow, mile-wide river, allowing them to reposition the bridge if it substantially shifted course during the annual floods.

Bordering the south side of the river are multiple forested peaks crowned with temples and a Mount Rushmore work-in-progress. Sculptors are carving two massive heads of Yandi and Huangdi from one of the peaks in Di Yi Jing. The rock faces of the two legendary Han kings stand 106 meters high and are topped by two fluttering red flags.

The first imperial court of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-A.D. 220), Xi'an (originally Changsha), home of

Typical rural brick village with pervasive smog in central China.

the terracotta warriors, is about 250 miles upstream. The second capital of the Han (25-220) was on the Yellow River, in Luoyang, just 50 miles upstream from the site of the massive heads. The immense rock faces gaze sternly north across the Huanghe and over the vast grain fields in the direction of their ancestors' home, Anyang, capital of the Shang Dynasty (1700-1100 B.C.): one of the four great civilizations of the ancient world.

The international train passes through this cradle of Chinese civilization 100 miles north of the Yellow River, where Chinese script first appeared on inscribed oracle bones around 1300 B.C. Over 100,000 pieces of bone and tortoise shell have been unearthed — historic and linguistic resources that will last generations.

Ancestors were consulted through the bones, mostly shoulder blades of cattle and water buffalo or turtle shells. The bones were heated until they cracked; then the cracks were interpreted. The entire process of divination — the question asked, the answers given and, occasionally, the verification of the answer in events that unfolded — was inscribed on the bone.

This has left an invaluable record of the geographical and political organization of the Shang state as well as the evolution of Chinese script. Also excavated in Anyang were the famous Shang bronzes. With their distinctive anamist "taotie" motifs, they are among the oldest and finest bronze vessels in the world.

At Journey's End

The landscape north of the Yellow River is mostly flat, with the jagged, bone-dry Taihang Mountains filling the western horizon until obscured by the horrific pollution of the capital. Arriving in Beijing after such a journey, one feels a mixture of relief and anxiety: relief that the cramped confines of the train will soon be history, but anxiety about whether the painstaking preparation of each diplomatic pouch and its associated paperwork will ensure the success of the mission. If the authorities in Beijing find any discrepancies with either the paperwork or the diplomatic pouches, they will deny the entire classified load entrance into China.

So far, the Seoul Regional Diplomatic Courier Hub has a 100-percent success rate delivering top-secret material to the Beijing mission. After two nights in the capital, the diplomatic couriers reboard the train with the post's dispatch for the 1,400-mile return trip to Hong Kong. Trips along this classified lifeline will no doubt increase in frequency in support of the fast-approaching Beijing Olympic Games of summer 2008. ■

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AFSA NEWS

American Foreign Service Association • July-August 2007

2007-2009 AFSA GOVERNING BOARD

AFSA ELECTION RESULTS

The AFSA Election Committee announces the following results for the 2007 AFSA Governing Board election. The new board will take office July 15. A total of 2,830 ballots were cast in the election. The committee thanks all of the candidates and members who participated in this important process.

President	John Naland
State VP	Steven Kashkett
USAID VP	Francisco Zamora
FAS VP	Undetermined
FCS VP	Donald Businger
Retiree VP	Robert W. Farrand
Secretary	F.A. "Tex" Harris
Treasurer	Andrew Winter
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	David Firestein
	Michael Guest
	Jim McRea
	Nick Pietrowicz
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	Sandy Robinson
	Daphne Titus
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USAID Rep	Michael Henning
FCS Rep	Stephen Anderson
FAS Rep	Eric Trachtenberg
IBB Rep	Al Pessin
Retiree Reps:	Herman Cohen
	Harry Geisel
	Howard Jeter
	David Passage ❑

JOSH

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COUNCIL REPORT ASSESSES SEC. RICE'S FIRST TWO YEARS

AFSA Press Conference Draws Major Media Coverage

BY SHAWN DORMAN

A June 5 press conference was held at AFSA to release the Foreign Affairs Council's interim assessment of Secretary Condoleezza Rice's tenure managing the State Department. The two-year assessment finds that management improvements in some areas have been overshadowed by the failure to obtain net new personnel and financial resources. It concludes that major new resources are necessary to fill existing personnel vacancies and to empower the Foreign Service to implement Secretary Rice's signature "transfor-

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Inside This Issue:

CONSTRUCTIVE DISSENT AND OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE HONORED

AFSA Award Winners Announced

The American Foreign Service Association is proud to announce the winners of the 2007 AFSA Constructive Dissent Awards and the Outstanding Performance Awards. The awards ceremony was held on June 28 in the Benjamin Franklin Diplomatic Reception Room at the Department of State. Each award winner received a certificate of recognition and a prize of $2,500. All winners were selected by the AFSA Awards and Plaque Committee.

Ambassador Joan M. Clark was selected for the 2007 AFSA Award for Lifetime Contributions to American Diplomacy. Former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger presented the award at the ceremony. Amb. Clark served as director general of the Foreign Service and assistant sec-

Continued on page 76

AFSA NEWSBRIEFS

Life in the Foreign Service

BY BRIAN AGGELER

AFSA Welcomes New Executive Director

AFSA is pleased to announce that John P. Mamone has joined the association as the new executive director. He was treated to an unusual first day on the job on June 1, witnessing all-hands ballot-counting to determine the results of the 2007 AFSA Governing Board election.

Mr. Mamone comes to AFSA with over 20 years of association management experience. He has served as chief financial officer and executive director for several organizations. He is a certified public accountant and a certified association executive. He is a native of the Washington, D.C., area and a graduate of Georgetown University. As executive director of AFSA, Mr. Mamone plans to focus on member service, strong financial management and proactive outreach and communications.

Susan Reardon, who served as AFSA's executive director for 14 years, moved on in February. Legislative Affairs Director Ian Houston served as interim executive director for the four months following Ms. Reardon's departure. At its June meeting, the AFSA Governing Board commended Mr. Houston for doing an outstanding job.

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V.P. VOICE: **STATE** ■ BY STEVE KASHKETT

PTSD and the Foreign Service

There are many consequences to sending unarmed civilian employees of the U.S. government into active combat zones, as we are doing in Iraq. One of these consequences, a growing incidence of post-traumatic stress disorder within the Foreign Service, is just beginning to come to light. Preliminary results from a survey launched by the Office of Medical Services suggest that PTSD may afflict some 40 percent or more of our people returning from assignments in war zones. This is comparable to the level of PTSD reported for the U.S. military.

Foreign Service members, while accustomed to serving their country overseas under extremely difficult conditions, are not soldiers and are not trained for combat. Yet in Iraq, they are often directly exposed to conditions of war with which they may not always be well-prepared to cope.

Foreign Service members assigned to our embassy in Baghdad experience frequent incoming fire in the Green Zone and sleep in vulnerable aluminum trailers. Foreign Service members assigned to regional embassy offices and Provincial Reconstruction Teams in other parts of Iraq often live on U.S. military Forward Operating Bases in combat areas and work entirely in a "red zone" environment. Those who will be assigned to several newly created Embedded PRTs, known as "EPRTs," will be embedded with mobile combat units of the U.S. military in hostile areas. All of our members assigned to Iraq are exposed to attack, including from the dreaded improvised explosive devices that have killed so many U.S. soldiers, when they make any move outside of their compounds. Many have lost Iraqi and American colleagues. Most have witnessed violence beyond the normal experience of civilians.

Not surprisingly, some of our members who have returned from these postings have complained of symptoms that are clearly associated with post-traumatic stress disorder. We at AFSA have been in contact with — and are trying to speak out on behalf of — many of our members who are struggling to readjust to civilian life. The symptoms they have described to us have included difficulty in sleeping, nightmares, lack of concentration, feelings of depression, thoughts of suicide and bodily harm, and inability to cope with work in their onward assignment after Iraq.

It is imperative for the Department of State to take steps immediately to better prepare employees for deployment to war zones, to help them cope with what they will undergo while posted in a war zone, and to deal with any problems they may experience afterwards. Many of our members, upon returning from Iraq, have commented that they had little opportunity for proper counseling before, during or after their assignments. Some felt they were penalized for raising their concerns about PTSD by having their medical or security clearances suspended.

This should not happen. Counseling should be thorough and mandatory for everyone so that no one can be stigmatized for participating in it. People should not have to "self-diagnose" for post-traumatic stress disorder in order to get help. We should make it easy for them to get support and the treatment they need.

Foreign Service members are by nature tough, adaptable individuals, accustomed to difficult hardship postings and used to putting up with adverse situations without objection. We are therefore concerned that many who are suffering from post-traumatic stress may not be coming forward out of fear of being labeled as "complainers." They also fear retaliation for speaking out.

We call upon the State Department leadership to act right away to address this urgent problem. We are pleased that State has launched a survey to determine the extent of these problems that date back to 2003, but we cannot wait for a full analysis. People need help now. AFSA urges Medical Director Larry Brown and Director General George Staples to ensure that special attention is focused on the needs of civilian employees who are sent unarmed into these war zones.

The State Department must accept the long-term responsibility for the mental health of employees whom it places in harm's way. We owe this to our colleagues who have volunteered for these most dangerous postings. ❑

On June 19, Steve Kashkett testified at the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia hearing, "Working in a War Zone: Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Civilians Returning from Iraq."

V.P. VOICE: **USAID** ■ BY FRANCISCO ZAMORA

Welcome to the Department for Global Development



Alas, poor USAID, the Cinderella of the U.S. government. Born out of the need to regularize and consolidate foreign assistance and initiated by the good works of her father, the Marshall Plan in Europe, she is also known as Development. She has never been invited to sit at the table of government with her sisters, Defense and Diplomacy. After more than 40 years of working in the most difficult countries of the world, doing good deeds and cleaning up messes sometimes made by her stepsisters, she still is not considered a full member of the family.

It's true that in an attempt to make her more respectable and cooperative with Diplomacy, a younger version of Development — the Office of Foreign Assistance, known as "F" — now lives at the State Department. But her place in the household is still and always has been clear: to be subservient. After all, her stepsisters, who don't really understand her, don't want her to get any fancy ideas about going off to the ball on her own. They want to make sure they clear off on anything that she does.

Like an orphaned stepsister, Development has never been invited to sit at the table with her sisters, Defense and Diplomacy.

But now, a new idea has come along. What if Development were emancipated to become an equal partner? In fact, how about creating a Cabinet-level Department for Global Development? This idea was presented by The Brookings Institution, a respected think-tank, in its recent publication, "Security by Other Means: Foreign Assistance, Global Poverty, and American Leadership." In it, a thorough analysis of four alternate modalities for foreign assistance supports the rationality of establishing an independent USAID-type organization.

Brookings presents these four options: 1) *Increase coordination.* This is a short-term fix and is especially bad for morale. It makes aligning policy and operations more difficult. 2) *Make USAID an implementation arm of the State Department*, expanding what began with creation of the F Bureau. We all know how well that has gone! USAID has been neglected in favor of Diplomacy, decisionmaking is overly centralized and confusion reigns about who is responsible for what. Operational budgets have been cut to the bone, making it highly possible that many missions will be closed. Talk about being a stepchild! 3) *Merge USAID into State.* Does anyone remember the Jesse Helms fiasco with USIA and ACDA? This option would certainly hurt morale, independence, stature and disrupt aid programs around the world, as roles are redefined. Short-term political gains would trounce long-term development. This option would only exacerbate the current situation that exists in F.

Finally, there is Option 4: *Set up a newly empowered Cabinet-level Department for Global Development.* The advantages are obvious: A clear mission for foreign assistance, a boost in morale and purpose that would attract and maintain talent and finally make development an equal member of the U.S. government household, completing the three-Ds concept of Defense, Diplomacy and Development. Folding all aid programs into such a department would do much to reinforce the original purpose of USAID, which was to rationalize the many disparate programs that existed in the 1950s and are mirrored today by the Millennium Challenge Corporation, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, the President's Malaria Initiative, development assistance, emergency humanitarian assistance and other such initiatives.

This new department would not just be another International Development Cooperation Agency, established in 1979, which some of you remember. IDCA was intended to be a coordinating mechanism, but it never really got off the ground and was eventually abolished. In contrast, the Department for Global Development would have to have real authority under which to operate.

My Cinderella analogy may seem trite, but the concept of a truly independent Cabinet-level department makes sense. The last few years of the F Bureau experiment have been disastrous to our true mission. The risk of a total breakdown is frighteningly real. Numerous USAID missions worldwide are now being targeted for closure, and morale has reached historic lows.

It will take brave and visionary leaders to guide us down a new path, but I believe our Foreign Service officers, Civil Service colleagues, Foreign Service Nationals, contractors and the broader development community (NGOs, foundations, universities, etc.) would all welcome this shift and do everything to make the new department successful.

We must make sure that Defense, Diplomacy and Development are all appreciated for their unique contributions to world peace, progress and safety. Although they must cooperate with each other, none of them should be subservient to the other two. Higher-level policy direction should come directly from the chief executive and Congress. There is no better time to start the process than now. ❑

LETTER TO SECRETARY RICE

AFSA Requests Briefings on Iraq and the FS

On May 25, AFSA sent a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to express concern about the deteriorating security conditions in Baghdad's International Zone and to request a meeting and briefings on measures being taken to address security and other issues relating to Iraq service.

Text of the AFSA Letter:

Dear Secretary Rice,

On behalf of the AFSA Governing Board and our members serving in Iraq, I am writing to express our continuing, grave concerns about security conditions in Baghdad's International Zone (IZ) and their impact on the ability of diplomatic personnel to do their jobs.

A significant number of Foreign Service members assigned to Embassy Baghdad have contacted us following recent incidents in the IZ, which have included a suicide bombing at the Iraqi Parliament and a marked increase in incoming fire, which have resulted in casualties among contractors and civilian employees under Chief of Mission authority. The deterioration of security conditions within the IZ has also been widely reported in the news media and acknowledged by military spokespersons in Baghdad. We are aware that recent missionwide security notices have instructed employees to wear protective gear at all times and have prohibited employees from "congregating" outside reinforced buildings.

These developments raise serious questions about whether diplomats can operate effectively in that highly insecure and restrictive environment, as well as about the appropriateness of current staffing levels. Madam Secretary, as I am sure you know, there are reasons why every other embassy and consulate around the world has security "tripwires" that, once crossed, trigger automatic drawdowns of staff. Diplomats can do their jobs only if they can move about freely and have access to key interlocutors at all levels of government and society.

AFSA requests the following:

• A briefing on what additional measures can be taken to address heightened risks within the IZ;

• A debriefing from Pat Kennedy on his findings regarding security and Foreign Service staffing levels at Embassy Baghdad, following his recent visit there; and

• A meeting with you at the earliest opportunity to discuss, inter alia, the concerns of our members serving in Iraq.

Thank you.

Respectfully yours,

J. Anthony Holmes, AFSA President

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Who Knew We'd Be So Popular?

Serious Competition for *FSJ* Editorial Board Slots

There were 36 applications for the six openings on the *Foreign Service Journal* Editorial Board. This is a record-high level of interest. Editorial Board members are volunteers who attend a monthly luncheon meeting to review article submissions, select upcoming focus topics and deliberate on the direction of the magazine.

High-Stress Outbrief Program

AFSA was pleased to hear that the Foreign Service Institute and MED are partnering to offer a new one-day High Stress Assignment Outbrief Program, MQ-950. The program is mandatory for all employees serving 90 days or more in Iraq or Afghanistan, and is highly recommended for any employee returning from a high-stress or high-threat post.

The creation of this program represents enhanced efforts by the State Department, with strong encouragement from AFSA, to reach employees who may suffer from post-traumatic stress disorder. (See AFSA State Vice President Steve Kashkett's column on p. 71, "PTSD and the Foreign Service.")

As stated in the unclassified cable announcing the program, State 56401 (sent April 26), the objectives are to ensure that: the department understands and appreciates the full range of difficulties officers encounter in taking on hazardous assignments; officers transition as easily as possible back into their personal and professional lives and onward assignments; employees understand the dynamics at play regarding coming back from a high-stress assignment; employees are empowered to understand their own decompression and share that understanding with their family members and friends.

LETTER TO SECRETARY RICE ON OVERSEAS COMPARABILITY PAY

AFSA Urges Secretary to Push for End to Pay Inequity

In its continuing efforts to work with the administration and Congress to eliminate the growing overseas pay disparity for the Foreign Service, AFSA sent a letter to Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on May 11 urging her to reach out directly to Congress. The current base-pay reduction for Foreign Service employees below the FS-1 level upon starting an overseas assignment is nearly 19 percent. This serves as a disincentive to overseas service, especially during a time when the Foreign Service is being asked to accept greater danger and hardship in overseas postings.

The text of the letter follows:

Dear Madam Secretary,

You may be aware that AFSA takes advantage of the department's annual Foreign Affairs Day to invite our retired members to come to Washington one day early to join us in meetings on Capitol Hill. So last week, AFSA coordinated a series of meetings with the offices of Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer, Chairman Joseph Biden, Senator Lugar, Chairman Tom Lantos, and Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen. Beyond these key decisionmakers, we also connected with a total of 29 separate congressional offices on a direct constituent basis. Our message was simple and clear: securing more international affairs resources and ending, once and for all, the growing pay disparity between Washington and overseas service.

Since January, AFSA has worked actively towards our goal of achieving pay comparability in this session. We feel strongly that a legislative strategy must be implemented early to better avoid the inevitable challenges that arise during the end game of the process. We are already in mid-May, though, and so much remains to be done. It is clear to us that to maximize the likelihood of getting the legislation we need this year, your sustained personal engagement is needed. AFSA asks that you weigh in now with letters and phone calls to key senators and representatives. We certainly understand that you have an overflowing plate of vital issues. At the same time, in terms of the almost 14,000 active-duty Foreign Service employees, there is no higher priority than ending the pay disparity. This issue is one of basic equity and fairness to those who sacrifice to advance peace and stability around the globe.

We were gratified when you said in March: "Our nation has the finest diplomatic corps in the world and we're asking more of them today than ever before. All across the globe, the men and women of the State Department are serving honorably, far away from their homes, and very often far away from their families as well. In fact, many are on the front lines in some of the toughest places in the world, serving shoulder to shoulder with our men and women in uniform and risking their lives for the sake of our country." We believe that this strong message must be accompanied with practical suggestions to Congress to improve the lives of our diplomatic corps and their families. Your leadership in addressing comparability pay problems now will go a long way in achieving the end goal.

Thank you for defending the image and integrity of the Foreign Service and dispelling inaccuracies when they arise. We count on your support as we try to address this key issue.

Respectfully yours,
J. Anthony Holmes
AFSA President

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

BOOKFAIR Opens Oct. 13

Plan ahead! Save some time to attend the 47th annual BOOKFAIR of the Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide. BOOKFAIR opens on Friday, Oct. 13, and runs through Sunday, Oct. 21. It will be held in the Diplomatic Exhibit Hall on the first floor of Main State. In addition to secondhand books from all over the world, BOOKFAIR will once again feature the Art Corner, Collectors' Corner and an assortment of coins and stamps.

Seeking AFSA Post Reps

AFSA needs volunteers to serve as post representatives to help keep headquarters connected to the 70 percent of our membership posted overseas.

The authority and responsibilities of an AFSA post rep are spelled out in the AFSA Chapter Manual (**www.afsa.org/postreps/manual.cfm**). For more information, or if you don't know if your post currently has an AFSA rep, check in with the AFSA membership department at member@afsa.org.

Press Conference • Continued from page 69

mational diplomacy" initiative. Achieving these objectives will require the aggressive and sustained personal involvement of both the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of State.

Ambassador Thomas Boyatt, the FAC's president, presented the report at AFSA's press conference, supported by the report's editor, Ambassador Edward Rowell. Twelve media representatives attended the conference, including reporters from NPR, CNN, the *Los Angeles Times*, *USA Today*, Reuters and the Associated Press. Heavy nationwide media coverage resulted, including articles in the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, *Washington Times*, the *Federal Times* and the *Los Angeles Times*, among others. The AP and Reuters articles were picked up by *Government Executive*, the *Chicago Tribune* and at least 40 other papers nationwide. In addition, Amb. Boyatt was interviewed by CNN and Federal News Radio.

The FAC is a nonpartisan umbrella group of 11 organizations concerned about the processes of diplomacy and the leadership and management of the people of the Foreign Service and State Department. Members include AFSA, which supplied administrative support for the project; the American Academy of Diplomacy; Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide; the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training; the Association of Black American Ambassadors; the Business Council for International Understanding; the Council of American Ambassadors; the Una Chapman Cox Foundation; the Nelson B. Delavan Foundation; Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired; and the Public Members Association of the Foreign Service, USA. Funding was provided by the Cox Foundation and the Delavan Foundation.

"Managing Secretary Rice's State Department: An Independent Assessment" is the third biennial assessment by the FAC. The study outlines progress as well as problems relating to the management of the State Department. The personnel shortfall highlighted in the report was the hook for most of the media coverage resulting from the press conference. Several articles highlighted the part of the report that links worsening morale to the 18.6-percent cut in base pay that State's entry-level and mid-level officers take when departing Washington for an overseas assignment, the overseas comparability pay issue that is a top priority for AFSA.

Questions asked by the press focused on Iraq and morale. Amb. Boyatt was urged to compare Sec. Rice to former Secretary Colin Powell, and challenged to give each a grade for management performance. Amb. Boyatt replied that Sec. Powell had achieved an A grade, while Sec. Rice "has the potential" for an A. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack called the report "armchair quarterbacking," but agreed that the State Department does need more personnel.

The personnel shortfall highlighted in the report was the hook for most of the media coverage resulting from the press conference. Questions asked by the press focused on Iraq and morale.

The key findings of the FAC are described in the report's executive summary: "Between 2001 and 2005, 1,069 new positions and significant program funding increases were obtained through the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative. Since then, all of these positions/people have been absorbed by assignments to Iraq, Afghanistan and other difficult posts. Today, some 200 existing jobs — most overseas — are unfilled and the additional 900 training slots necessary to provide essential linguistic and functional skills do not exist.

NATALIE TAGGERT

FAC President Thomas Boyatt speaking at the June 5 press conference held at AFSA headquarters.

"In the first two years of Sec. Rice's stewardship almost no net new resources have been realized. 'Job One' for State Department management is to obtain the 1,100 new positions needed to move the Foreign Service from where it is to where it needs to be in the context of Sec. Rice's highest priority — her signature 'transformational diplomacy' initiative. Achieving this objective will require the aggressive and sustained personal involvement of both the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, both within administration councils and with Congress. They will have the Foreign Affairs Council's support."

AFSA has distributed copies of the report to all members of Congress and selected staffers; additional leading media representatives who were unable to attend the press conference; selected think-tanks, policy centers and universities; and other public and private sector individuals and institutions. The report is posted on the AFSA Web site, at www.afsa.org. ❑

Award Winners • Continued from page 69

retary of the Bureau of Consular Affairs. She also served as ambassador to Malta, and in Berlin, London, Belgrade and Luxembourg. Following her retirement from the Foreign Service, she has served as chairman of the Board of Directors of the Senior Living Foundation, a position she has held since its inception in 1988. She is also a member of the Board of Directors of the American Foreign Service Protective Association.

Look for the interview with Amb. Clark on p. 49 of this issue. Please see the September issue of AFSA News *for coverage of the awards ceremony and profiles of all of the other award winners.*

AFSA would like to thank everyone who sent in a nomination or served on a panel this year. We place great importance on these awards, which serve to recognize the intellectual courage and outstanding achievements of our Foreign Service colleagues. AFSA also thanks the director general for co-sponsoring the annual awards ceremony, which is open to any employee wishing to attend.

Congratulations to all winners and runners-up for this well-deserved recognition. ❑

Constructive Dissent Awards

AFSA's Constructive Dissent Awards recognize individuals in the Foreign Service who have the courage to speak out and challenge the system from within. For over 30 years, AFSA has been honoring members of the Foreign Service who have the intellectual courage to question the status quo and take a stand, no matter the sensitivity of the issue or the consequences of their actions. They demonstrate the willingness to question conventional wisdom and offer alternatives to current policy.

Six strong nominations were received for the William R. Rivkin Award for a mid-level Foreign Service officer. The Rivkin family, which funds this award, decided to present $2,500 to two separate winners for demonstrating the courage to challenge the system on an issue of U.S. policy related to their work:

• **Ronald Capps**, currently serving as an analyst in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was selected for challenging the U.S. government's policies on peacekeeping in Darfur and putting forward his proposals for more active U.S. involvement in preventing the genocide there in 2006.

• **Michael P. Zorick**, currently chair of the African Regional Studies Program at the Foreign Service Institute, was selected for demonstrating courage by challenging U.S. policies in Somalia, while serving in Kenya. His astute analysis of the extremely complex socio-political situation has since proven to be correct.

The runner-up for the Rivkin Award was **Thomas C. Daniels**, for his efforts to improve U.S. counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan, in spite of the fact that it meant challenging the accepted wisdom of an important program carried out by another agency.

There were no winners this year in the other three categories for Constructive Dissent: the Tex Harris Award for specialists, the W. Averell Harriman Award for a junior officer and the Christian A. Herter Award for a Senior Foreign Service officer. The few nominations that were received in two of the categories did not meet the criteria, according to the judges who reviewed them, and no nominations were received for the Herter Award.

Outstanding Performance Awards

These awards recognize exemplary performance and extraordinary contributions to professionalism, morale and effectiveness. This year's winners are:

• **Margaret W. Baker**, Embassy Tel Aviv, was selected as the winner of the Delavan Award, which recognizes extraordinary contributions to effectiveness, professionalism and morale by an office management specialist. The runner-up is **Robyn Davis** of Embassy Guatemala City.

• **Linda Lockwood**, Embassy Pretoria, received the M. Juanita Guess Award for outstanding service as a community liaison officer assisting American families serving at an overseas post. The runner-up is **Jennifer Mauldin** of Consulate General Chennai.

• **Judith Marquardt**, Embassy Yaounde, received the Avis Bohlen Award for her outstanding accomplishments in volunteer service to advance the interests of the United States and foster positive relations with both the American and foreign communities at post. The runner-up is **Gabriela Christiansen** of Embassy Guatemala City.

AFSA honored two individuals with special awards of appreciation:

• **Faye Barnes**, who is retiring from a position as the coordinator of customer service at the Office of Retirement.

• **Robert J. Wozniak**, who is stepping down as chairman of the AFSA Election Committee, after almost a decade in that role.

2007 AFSA MERIT SCHOLAR WINNING ESSAY

A Drop in the Ocean

BY EMMA CUNNINGHAM

What we are doing is just a drop in the ocean. But if that drop was not in the ocean, I think the ocean would be less because of that missing drop.

— Mother Teresa

Our bus smelled like incense. Red velvet curtains hung from the dingy windows, and I could hear the rattling motor. I was half-asleep after our flight to Calcutta, but I still felt the dry heat of India and the dust being stirred up from the road as we drove along. We stopped outside a garishly decorated hotel. Through the dark I could see figures lined up, sleeping on the sidewalk. Some had rickshaws, dogs and mosquito nets. Some had nothing. It was unlike anything I had seen before, and I felt a twinge of guilt as we dragged our suitcases up the stairs of the hotel to our air-conditioned rooms with hot showers and soft mattresses.

Every morning for the next week, we worked at an orphanage run by the Sisters of Charity, founded by Mother Teresa. Blind, mentally and physically disabled, uncontrollable, violent ... each of the orphans was essentially helpless. There was no introduction, no instructions, no orientation. The sister in charge of the children was too busy changing one boy's soiled underwear while pulling another boy off a bookcase. She breathlessly explained that they had very few volunteers that week.

We later learned the harsh reality. Young men and women traveling through India find the idea of service appealing and come to the orphanage. They last for a day, maybe two. It's not the "warm, fuzzy, feel-good" service they are looking for.

After our first day, part of me understood why they wouldn't want to go back. I was frustrated and disappointed. The previous service I had done had tangible results. There was a gratification that made the hard work worth it. There was no gratification from these orphans. I felt as if I hadn't been able to make a difference.

There are some things we'd rather not see. At first, I found poverty, disability and helplessness that I didn't want to comprehend. I felt a complete sense of powerlessness. As a group sent to Calcutta to do "hard-core service," we had felt powerful, important, ready to take on the forces of illness and poverty. We were the bringers of hope and love and strength.

By the end of the first day, I doubted whether I had the ability to bring any of those things to the orphans. I could not heal their wounds, undo their malnourishment, give them money to end their poverty, or find them homes. Over the next few days, I realized that true service is knowing this, and trying to do it anyway. I found strength in thinking that even though I got hardly any reaction from the orphans, I might be helping them somehow.

In the big scheme of things we volunteers did little to change the lives of the orphans. For a week we may have brought them a little more happiness, but in the end, poverty and disability win. Initially, I thought our purpose in Calcutta was to fight these forces, to help those who have no one else to help them. I was wrong. If our competition was poverty and disability, then we had already lost. The orphans and sisters would go on with their lives after we were gone, as they did before we arrived. But this realization doesn't make our service any less important.

The true purpose of our trip was to learn from what we had seen. If India changed us enough that we became more aware of the effects of poverty in the world, then it has served its purpose. If India made us encourage other people to go to Calcutta, or find a way to do service, then it has served its purpose. If you can change one person's life for one second, then that should be enough. But if you can allow the people you are serving to change you, then you will find that it lasts for a lifetime. ❑

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Home Exchange Program for Retirees Is Online

AFSA has recently become the Web host for the Foreign Service Retiree Home Exchange Program. This program was privately established in 1996 to enable Foreign Service retirees, spouses and widows who are members of AFSA, DACOR, USIAAA or retired foreign diplomat associations, to enjoy travel experiences in the United States and around the world at reasonable cost, by sharing their homes.

Members of FSRHEP — you do have to join to participate — have access to four categories of home-stay options:

1) Home Exchange: Two parties negotiate directly the exchange of their homes.

2) Home Visiting: Owners provide a guestroom and bathroom for a reasonably short, specific time to be arranged directly by the parties.

3) Reasonable Rental: Parties agree on a modest rent.

4) Home Sitting: Owners list their home as available for housesitting for specific time period(s).

Members of FSRHEP may access all listings and may post one or more listings of their own. All communications will take place between the parties involved, including reference checks, exchange of photographs, etc.

AFSA hosts the program but does not vouch for any individual postings. Participants are not committed to any exchange, visit or rental simply because their properties are listed in the directory. However, they should acknowledge each request they receive in a reasonable time.

You can sign up for this program online at **www.afsa.org/retiree/hep.cfm**. There is a $25 registration fee. If you have any questions, please contact Yvonne Thayer at **homeexchange@afsa.org**.

2007 AFSA Merit Award Winners

AFSA is proud to announce the 26 Foreign Service high school seniors selected as the 2007 AFSA Merit Award winners. These one-time-only awards, totaling $28,500, were bestowed on May 4. AFSA congratulates these students for their academic and artistic achievements. Winners received $1,500 and honorable-mention winners received $500. The best-essay winner and the community-service winner each received $250 for those awards. Judges were individuals from the Foreign Service community.

This year, 65 students competed for the 15 Academic Merit Awards. They were judged on their grade-point average, SAT scores, essays, letters of recommendation, extracurricular activities and any special circumstances. From the Academic Merit Award applicants, the committee selected a best-essay winner (Emma Cunningham) and a community-service winner (Elizabeth Burns).

Sixteen students submitted art merit applications in one of the following categories: visual arts, musical arts, drama or creative writing. Applicants were judged on their submission, letters of recommendation and essays. Erica Wickman was selected as the Art Merit Award winner for her musical arts submission, a clarinet performance. Sarah Medeiros and Estrella Pittman were selected for Art Merit Award honorable mentions for their creative writing and visual arts submissions, respectively.

AFSA has established six academic merit named scholarships to date, and these awards are bestowed on the highest-scoring students. The recipients of these scholarships were: Yannik Pitcan, for the Association of the American Foreign Service Worldwide Scholarship; Maxwell Chang, for the John and Priscilla Becker Family Scholarship; Jason Meer, for the John C. Leary Memorial Scholarship; Elizabeth Aloisi and Hannah Skop, for the two Joanna and Robert Martin Scholarships; and Andrew Keith, for the Donald Spigler Memorial and Maria Giuseppa Spigler Scholarship.

In addition to the merit scholarships, AFSA bestows between 50 and 60 financial aid scholarships each year. For the 2006-2007 academic year, 53 students received financial aid scholarships totaling $125,000.

For more information on the AFSA Scholarship Program, or how to establish a named scholarship, contact Lori Dec at (202) 944-5504, or dec@afsa.org. Please visit our Web site at www.afsa.org/scholar/.

Academic Merit Winners

Elizabeth Aloisi – daughter of Jonathan Aloisi (State) and Wenyi Shu (State); graduate of Hong Kong International School; Joanna and Robert Martin Scholar; attending the University of Virginia, with no declared major.

Katherine Aloisi – daughter of Jonathan Aloisi (State) and Wenyi Shu (State); graduate of Hong Kong International School; attending the University of Virginia, with no declared major.

Paul Armstrong – son of Alina and John (State) Armstrong; graduate of Richard Montgomery High School, Rockville, Md.; attending the University of St. Thomas, majoring in international business.

Derek Carey – son of Debra Henke (FAS) and Stephen Carey; graduate of Yorktown High School, Arlington, Va.; attending Johns Hopkins University, majoring in chemistry and biology.

Maxwell Chang – son of Stephanie Salmon and Michael Chang (State); graduate of James Madison High School, Vienna, Va.; John and Priscilla Becker Family Scholar; attending the University of Southern California, majoring in chemistry.

Sarah Haviland – daughter of Patricia and Andrew (State) Haviland; graduate of Oakton High School, Vienna, Va.; attending the University of Virginia, majoring in biology/pre-med.

Sonia Jarrett – daughter of Ann Yen and Kenneth Jarrett (State); graduate of Shanghai American School; attending Cornell University, pursuing a liberal arts degree.

Andrew Keith – son of Jan (State) and James (State) Keith; graduate of South Lakes High School, Reston, Va.; Donald Spigler Memorial and Marie Giuseppa Spigler Scholar; attending the University of Virginia, majoring in engineering.

Susannah Kroeber – daughter of Deborah Seligsohn (State) and Arthur Kroeber; graduate of the International School of Beijing; attending Brown University, majoring in microbiology.

Jason Meer – son of Richelle and Jeffery (State) Meer; graduate of Montgomery Blair High School, Silver Spring, Md.; John C. Leary Scholar; attending Duke University, majoring in public policy/economics.

SHAWN DORMAN

Scholarship Winners Honored

Here are the 2007 AFSA Merit Award winners who were able to receive their awards in person at the May 4 reception. From left: Jason Meer, Erica Wickman, Andrew Keith, Sarah Haviland, Paul Armstrong and Chair of the AFSA Committee on Education Amb. C. Edward Dillery.

PMA Funds AFSA Scholarship Winner

On May 3, the Public Members of the Foreign Service Association presented the AFSA Scholarship Fund with a check for $3,900 in honor of their 39th anniversary. The funds will go toward an AFSA financial aid scholarship that is bestowed to a junior or senior majoring in international relations.

PMA has made an annual scholarship donation to AFSA for the last 15 years totaling $44,000. Pictured here, at PMA's annual luncheon on May 3 are, from left: PMA President Betty Dukert, 2006-2007 PMA Scholarship recipient Joshua Lanzet, PMA Scholarship Coordinator Nick Franhouser and Amb. C. Edward Dillery.

Emma Cunningham – daughter of Leslie and James (State) Cunningham; graduate of Hong Kong International School; attending Princeton University, majoring in engineering. Emma is also the winner of the AFSA Best Essay Award.

Grace Dawson – daughter of Latha and William (USIA-retired) Dawson; graduate of Rockbridge County High School, Lexington, Va.; attending The College of William and Mary, majoring in international relations or geology.

Jonathan Elliott – son of Angela and William (USAID-retired) Elliott; graduate of George C. Marshall High School, Falls Church, Va.; attending the University of Virginia, majoring in engineering.

Yannik Pitcan – son of Grace Kennedy-Pitcan and Clyde (State) Pitcan; graduate of Lake Howell High School, Winter Park, Fla.; Associates of the American Foreign Service Worldwide Scholar; attending Harvard University, majoring in mathematics.

Hannah Skop – daughter of Sandra and Arthur (State, retired) Skop; graduate of James Madison High School, Vienna, Va.; Joanna and Robert Martin Scholar; attending the University of Pennsylvania, majoring in linguistics.

Art Merit Winner

Erica Wickman – daughter of Phyllis and Stephen (State) Wickman; graduate of McLean High School, McLean, Va.; attending The College of William and Mary, with no major declared.

Academic Merit Honorable Mention Winners

Benjamin Beede – son of Emma Yuan Beede and Christopher (State) Beede; graduate of International School of Beijing; attending Tufts University, with no major declared.

Caitlin Fennerty – daughter of Heather and John (State) Fennerty; graduate of American Embassy School, New Delhi; attending St. John's College in Santa Fe, majoring in English.

Graham Hardt – son of D. Brent (State) and Saskia Hardt; graduate of St. Andrew's School, Nassau, The Bahamas; attending Yale College, majoring in religious studies or international studies.

Stephanie Lloyd – daughter of Elaine (State) and Thomas (State) Lloyd; graduate of International School of Beijing; attending The College of William and Mary, majoring in political science.

James Randle – son of Joyce and James (IBB) Randle; graduate of Yorktown High School, Arlington, Va.; attending American University, majoring in international studies.

Margaret Summers – daughter of Colien Hefferan and Hollis Summers (State); graduate of Thomas Jefferson High School for Science and Technology, Alexandria, Va.; attending The College of William and Mary, with no declared major.

Art Merit Honorable Mention Winners

Sarah Medeiros – daughter of Amy (State) and John Medeiros; graduate of Milton Academy, Milton, Mass.; attending Franklin & Marshall College, with no declared major.

Estrella Pittman – daughter of Lisa (State) and Stephen Pittman; graduate of International School of Beijing; attending Westmont College, majoring in liberal studies.

Community Service Winner

Elizabeth Burns – daughter of Lisa Carty (State) and Bill Burns (State); graduate of The Anglo-American School of Moscow; attending Duke University, majoring in public policy.

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

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

BOOKS

Embarrassed at the Flattery

Charm Offensive:
How China's Soft Power
Is Transforming the World
Joshua Kurlantzick, Yale University Press, 2007, $26.00, hardcover, 320 pages.

REVIEWED BY DAVID REUTHER

When Japan modernized in the late 19th century, world powers were those countries with colonies — a club that it and the United States joined by 1898. In contrast, China was a semi-colony and did not even have a Western-style Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

A century later, Beijing is amassing power by deftly wielding trade incentives, overseas business investments, cultural and educational exchanges, and well-placed aid projects. Journalist Joshua Kurlantzick draws on numerous vignettes, public opinion polls and quotes from human rights organizations as he chronicles Chinese initiatives in Africa, Asia and South America.

Despite its title, however, *Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World* is as much about America as the PRC: specifically, the fact that over the past couple of decades, Washington has crippled or abolished the programs and bureaucracies that once made it the world's leading exponent of soft power. Indeed, Kurlantzick could be describing the very successes that were once the hallmarks of USIA (Chapter 4) or USAID (parts of Chapters 5 and 8). Instead, the rise of ideology has made American practitioners see international politics as a struggle not of interests, but of principles — leading to an erosion of American democratic values and influence.

Kurlantzick sees diplomacy as a zero-sum game, in which the U.S. has been bleeding popularity and influence around the world while China has been gaining both.

But in Kurlantzick's view, the PRC isn't just another large and growing market economy responding to the systemic forces any other nation-state faces, selecting policies that any other state might use, or copying the economic and foreign policies those nations that modernized first. No, China is *evil*. Everyone knows, he intones, that it is exporting its environmental problems, poor labor standards and shaky corporate governance regulations far and wide. Even its aid, given with few if any strings, undermines World Bank standards.

How has a country with such terrible human rights and immigration problems, detailed by numerous NGOs, become able to challenge the dominant position of the U.S. in world affairs? By using American-style soft-power programs. So ultimately, this book is an appeal to the U.S. foreign policy elite to return to those policies.

That point is a valid one, well worth consideration. Regrettably, it is overshadowed by the author's almost palpable fear and loathing of Beijing. This is not a book that compares Chinese aid programs with (unquestionably altruistic) American, German or Japanese programs. Instead, they are characterized without discussion as "opaque," and dismissed as "tied to policy goals." (Translation: "The end justifies the means.")

The book freeze-frames on June 1989 as the current status of the country's domestic structure and assumes the China of Tiananmen Square will remain the China of tomorrow. Conveniently, this assumption saves us the effort of having to look for change in Chinese civil society. We can therefore comfortably assume that a political party we label communist will not change, even as it recruits business mavens and intellectuals. Nor should we notice that every country in Asia with which the U.S. economy has run a trade deficit evolved in a democratic fashion: e.g., postwar Japan, Taiwan and Korea. These are all unspoken variables of more interest to academics than journalists.

Simplistically, Kurlantzick portrays diplomacy as a zero-sum game, in which the U.S. has been bleeding popularity and influence around the world while China has been gaining both. He asserts that authoritarian leaders around the world hail China as the prime example of how to maintain

their grip on power while enriching their societies. However, Kurlantzick and others who present this argument skip over the inconvenient history of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, another Leninist party that maintained authoritarian control until economic and social changes swamped its dikes. Nor is there any acknowledgement here that economic modernization *preceded* political liberalization in Korea.

Fortunately, however, we need not concern ourselves with such trifles. For Kurlantzick, China will never change.

David Reuther, a retired Foreign Service officer, recently served as AFSA's vice president for retirees. He frequently lectures and writes on China and East Asia.

The Race to the Top

Globalization and Labor Conditions: Working Conditions and Worker Rights in a Global Economy
Robert J. Flanagan, Oxford University Press, 2006, $45.00, hardcover, 260 pages.

REVIEWED BY JAMES PATTERSON

Stanford University economist Robert J. Flanagan acknowledges that "Critics associate globalization with a particularly unsavory package of working conditions and labor rights: low wages, long work hours, unsafe and abusive conditions, child labor and suppression of collective representation." Yet while anecdotal evidence of such conditions is widely reported, it is counterintuitive that global labor rights would deteriorate in the midst of an international movement toward free trade and economic growth.

In *Globalization and Labor Conditions: Working Conditions and Worker Rights in a Global Economy*, Flanagan seeks to square such charges with Adam Smith's contention that free trade among nations benefits both nations and workers. He rigorously examines various data sets on world labor conditions, focusing on three mechanisms associated with globalization: free trade, international migration and the growth of multinational companies.

His conclusion is that those phenomena do not produce lower wages, longer work hours or unsafe and unhealthy labor conditions. In fact, they enhance labor conditions rather than degrading them. Nor does he find any evidence indicating labor markets are likely to deteriorate if these trends continue. To the contrary, globalization has produced labor conditions consistent with economic growth for countries trading freely, leading to increased wages, standardized hours and safer working conditions.

Flanagan then turns to the four international core rights of labor, set and enforced by the International Labor Organization of the United Nations for member-states: freedom of association (the right to organize), nondiscrimination, limitations on child labor and abolition of forced labor. Consistent with economic theory, he finds that these rights improve due to globalization and its associated economic growth. And where abuses do occur, they hardly represent a policy of discrimination.

Even so, critics often claim that the United States violates these basic rights. For example, foreign automakers locate their plants in the Deep South, where workers distrust unions. But this is hardly a violation of a right to organize. Similarly, Flanagan finds no indication that U.S.-based multinational firms locate plants in foreign countries with the intent of benefiting from child labor. In fact, unskilled child labor is more likely to disrupt work schedules and production plans than to benefit a company, removing any incentive to resort to it.

Forced labor is another area where the United States comes in for criticism, due to the fact that some prisoners perform work as part of their sentences. Yet prison work performed under government supervision is exempt from the ILO's definition of forced labor.

In any case, Flanagan sees such conventions as mainly symbolic, as shown by the fact that nations with strong labor standards already comply. He also declares that he finds that national labor standards are more effective than ILO conventions.

In response to international labor abuses, the United States has threatened and, on occasion, imposed trade sanctions to improve labor conditions in foreign countries. Flanagan strongly opposes sanctions as a policy tool, for they generally worsen conditions.

Because the author writes dispassionately on this controversial subject, eschewing assumptions and ideology for careful examination of the empirical data, *Globalization and Labor Conditions* offers sensible analysis and policy implications. Anyone seeking a serious assessment of this thorny facet of the global economy would do well to read this book.

Jim Patterson, a former Foreign Service officer, is an economist and freelance journalist. His work has appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle, New York Times, The Hill, *the economic magazine* Choices *and the* Foreign Service Journal, *among other publications.*

The Muslims Are Coming!

America Alone: The End of the World As We Know It
Mark Steyn, Regnery, 2006, hardcover, $27.95, 224 pages.

REVIEWED BY DAVID T. JONES

As its title suggests, *America Alone: The End of the World As We Know It* is a rant. It is clever, articulate and well-argued, and often relieved by humor, albeit of the gallows variety. But it is still a rant and, as such, has its limitations.

Commentator Mark Steyn's exegesis has several themes:

• A demographic decline of unparalleled dimensions in the West is generating unimagined problems.

• The demands in Europe for social services and supporting institutions have created a "Eutopia" that is unsustainable, given demographic decline and the disinclination of their populations to work productively.

• The challenges to European states from their unassimilated and alienated Islamic minorities are distorting traditional politics and will lead to the establishment of a "Eurabia" within the lifetimes of those now being born.

• There is no such thing as a "moderate Muslim." Spokesmen for Islamic attitudes (e.g., Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad) have made their hostile intentions crystal-clear. The only question is whether they will became capable of acting on them.

Steyn suggests that European elites are so enamored by the multicultural myth as to be unable to distinguish between the virtues of Western societies and the negatives of the existential challenge from Islamism. In his view, instead of an "immigrant problem," "youth problem" or even a "terrorist problem," what the West has is a "Muslim problem." And no act of accommodation will prove sufficient to counter the intimidation already present in Europe.

To cite just a few recent incidents: Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh was murdered for a study of Muslim women; the Somali-Dutch parliamentarian Ayaan Hirsi Ali was effectively driven into U.S. exile for her criticism

of Muslim culture; and the gay mayor of Paris was stabbed by a homosexual-hating Muslim. Such events induce the kind of fear that kept most Western media from reprinting the Danish cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad that had caused such an uproar in Islamic states.

Steyn concludes that passivity in response to provocation will not be regarded as societal restraint, but capitulation. Thus, there will never be a need for Muslim military conquest of Europe; victory will come as the consequence of a thousand acts of minor accommodation, each ostensibly trivial but corporately conclusive.

Steyn ultimately turns to the United States for what hope is possible. It is not that we are unaffected, but that we remain capable of a level of innovative resistance no longer present in Europe. Our failure to act, "imperial understretch" and reluctance to spread ideals such as self-reliance and decentralization (rather than just exporting culture) are damaging.

Although replete with anecdotes, *America Alone* has nary a footnote and no bibliography. Steyn seeks to browbeat readers through shrillness rather than argumentation. Demography is *not* destiny, regardless of Muslim birthrates, and even Steyn acknowledges that these rates will probably fall — but not before Muslims become the dominant element of many European countries. More damaging, he fails even to flag the possibility that technology will sustain productivity at levels that will permit declining and aging populations to live comfortably without massive immigration.

One might compare Steyn with the late Oriana Fallacci, recalling her vivid volumes on the perils of rising Islamic culture in Europe. But where Fallacci was volcanic in her rhetoric, Steyn at least controls the temperature of his concern over the Islamic challenge. The long war against ideological/terrorist Islam will be fought the hardest way: on our home front. The challenges will be disguised in hues of grey and will often appear trivial in their dimensions, but will still be necessary to recognize and rebuff. ■

Retired Senior Foreign Service officer David T. Jones is a frequent contributor to the Journal.

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

REFLECTIONS

How Many Guns Does a Vice Consul Rate?

BY FRED DONNER

Before entering the Foreign Service, I was an Air Force officer for five years, and later spent 10 years at the Defense Intelligence Agency. So I am keenly aware of both sides of the diplomatic-military interface, which is so important for the new "expeditionary" Foreign Service.

Soon after I arrived at DIA, I was asked, in apparent seriousness, if I knew how to send a message to an embassy slugged "so the ambassador would not see it." After assuring my questioner that there was no such provision in cable traffic, I suggested using a postage stamp to route the communication directly to the intended recipient. I also had occasion to explain the differing approaches to foreign policy of State (building the bilateral linkage), Defense (regional alliances and power vacuums) and the White House (domestic electoral impact).

Frequently, I had to remind my military colleagues that a common perception of the Pentagon at State is of a culture entirely dependent on viewgraphs (admittedly, that was 20 years ago), and was called upon to explain State jargon (e.g., "corridor rep") and other diplomatic lingo and acronyms.

Now I have the opportunity to inform my State friends of a fascinating aspect of military protocol. All of you know that the U.S. armed forces render 21-gun salutes to our president, the heads of foreign governments and reigning royalty. But how many guns do Foreign Service officers rate?

The origin of gun salutes is buried in antiquity.

The origin of gun salutes is buried in antiquity, but current practices were standardized by the late 1800s. Diplomatic and consular officers have always been recognized on a par with equivalent military officers — not surprising considering that, until the beginning of the 20th century, they were often uniformed government officers. The preponderance of consular salutes is a remnant of the days when consulates in port cities, rather than an embassy or legation in a national capital, were often the most active foci of diplomatic work. So how many guns does a vice consul rate?

American and foreign ambassadors, high commissioners and special diplomatic representatives with "authority equal to or greater than that of an ambassador" rate 19-gun salutes in the nations to which they are accredited. They also receive four ruffles on the drums and four flourishes on the bugles, followed by their national anthem. Among U.S. Cabinet members, only the Secretary of State qualifies for this salute. The others get the same number of guns, ruffles and flourishes, but a march replaces the national anthem. All Cabinet undersecretaries rate 17 guns, four ruffles and flourishes, and a march.

American "envoys extraordinary" and "ministers plenipotentiary," and their equivalents accredited to the U.S., rate a 15-gun salute, three ruffles and flourishes, and a march. American "ministers resident" receive 13 guns, two ruffles and flourishes, and a march. A chargé d'affaires rates 11 guns, one ruffle and flourish, and a march. Career ministers or counselors of embassies and legations rate no guns, but do get one rendering of ruffles and flourishes and a march.

Back to our basic question: a consul general — or a consul, vice consul or deputy consul general, when in charge of a consulate general — rates 11 guns, one ruffle and flourish, and a march. A consul, or a vice consul who is in charge of a consulate, gets seven guns, but the music has stopped now — there are no ruffles, flourishes or marches. A vice consul, when serving as the only representative of the U.S. in his or her assigned district (and in charge of neither a consulate general nor a consulate) gets five guns, and no music.

U.S. military organizations and ships, whether on U.S. or foreign soil or water, may fire reciprocal salutes to equivalent foreign ranks in appropriate circumstances, and foreign military units and ships may similarly recognize U.S. equivalents.

By now the astute reader will have noticed some glaring omissions in the Foreign Service ranks rendered military honors: First, second and third secretaries of embassies and legations rate no military honors at all. Eat your hearts out, political officers! ■

Fred Donner, a Foreign Service officer from 1980 to 1985, served in Manila and Washington, D.C. His "Overland from China" appeared in the April 1985 FSJ.

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

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