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President's Views

Iraq: A Place for Professionals

By John Limbert

It is altogether fitting that we have devoted this issue of the *Journal* to Iraq and what has happened there. The Iraq question is difficult and divisive, as you will see in the Speaking Out column by John Brady Kiesling (p. 13), one of our colleagues who resigned because of disagreement with our actions there. Iraq will be at the center of our national political debate for a long time to come.

For the Foreign Service, particularly our active-duty and retired colleagues in State and USAID, Iraq has also been an opportunity to demonstrate once again that we are ready to serve our country under the toughest conditions. In fact most of us needed no such opportunity, having already proven ourselves in such settings as Beirut, Jerusalem, Kabul, Nairobi, Port-au-Prince, Lagos, Khartoum, Bangui and Monrovia. Such places, with their accompanying isolation, family separations and dangers, are unfortunately becoming more and more the norm of our careers. They may sound exotic, but the realities of living and working there are anything but glamorous.

Staffing our mission in Iraq means more of the above for more of us. As it has already, it will continue to demand the best from the Service. Specifically, working there will require of us:

> *Our work in Iraq is just more evidence of why we are proud of what we do and why we do not tolerate cheap shots from those who would question our professionalism and our devotion to service.*

• **Self-sacrifice.** Service in Iraq is sweaty, tedious and dangerous. The hours are long and the distractions are few. An assignment there will disrupt family life and, at the end of the day, will bring few rewards beyond the satisfaction of having served the American people under difficult and dangerous conditions. Will you get a promotion or a dream assignment out of Iraq service? Maybe, but don't count on it.

• **Experience and Expertise.** Iraq is difficult and complicated. The inter- and intra-communal disputes are the stuff of major headaches. Even among fellow Arabs, Iraqis have the reputation of being fractious, proud, violent and difficult to rule. Hume Horan's article in this issue shows just how vital experience, patience and understanding are in helping Iraqis rebuild their society. We will also need Middle East expertise and Arabic and Kurdish language skills in a quality and quantity that we have not required before.

• **Resourcefulness.** There's no rule book for Iraq. Service there will require the maximum in improvisation, creativity and imagination. For a long time communication was via satellite phones (that worked only outdoors) and via personal Hotmail and Yahoo accounts. Those constraints placed a high premium on self-reliance and initiative. For example, what do you do when a dissident group of Shia from the hawzah (seminary) has occupied part of a government ministry for which you are responsible? The FAM isn't much help! And how do you build an effective team made up of Iraqis, members of the regular military, reservists, Foreign Service personnel, contractors, and officials from multiple agencies of the U.S. government? Very carefully.

From AFSA's point of view, our work in Iraq is just more evidence of why we are proud of what we do and why we do not tolerate cheap shots from those who would question our professionalism and our devotion to service. Our colleagues — active-duty, retired, specialists, generalists and civil servants — are working side by side with the U.S. military and with like-minded Iraqis in carrying out the mission of rebuilding Ambassador Horan's "shattered mosaic." They deserve our (and the public's) full support and respect. ■

John Limbert is the president of the American Foreign Service Association.

An Invitation for Summer Fiction

Once again the *FSJ* is seeking works of fiction of up to 3,000 words for its annual summer fiction issue. Story lines or characters involving the Foreign Service are preferred, but not required. The top stories, selected by the *Journal*'s Editorial Board, will be published in the July/August issue; some of them will also be simultaneously posted on the *Journal*'s Web site. The writer of each story will receive an honorarium of $250, payable upon publication.

All stories must be previously unpublished. Submissions should be unsigned and accompanied by a cover sheet with author's name, address, telephone number(s) and e-mail address.

Please also note the following:

- Authors are limited to two entries.
- Entries will only be accepted by e-mail (preferably in the form of Word attachments and with the text copied into the body of the message).

Deadline is April 1. No fooling.

Please send submissions (or questions) to Mikkela Thompson, *Journal* Business Manager, at thompsonm@afsa.org.

Art by Mikkela Thompson



LETTERS

Disincentives for Iraq Service?

Thank you to all State Department personnel serving in Iraq in spite of many disincentives.

In 1994, tight budgets led to a reduction in hardship and danger pay allowances for almost all posts, while life became increasingly "unpleasant" at these posts, resulting in fewer bidders. In contrast, Washington, D.C., locality pay grew and grew, and is now over 14 percent, an added deterrent to bidding on *all* overseas posts, especially hardship posts.

On Jan. 11, Senior Foreign Service personnel assigned overseas were slated to receive what appears to be a 14 percent permanent salary reduction. This may be corrected by press time. (*Editor's note:* It has been corrected. See update in *AFSA News.*)

Added to the potential financial disincentives noted above are questions about promotions and onward assignments for those who serve in Iraq. Might service in Iraq be viewed "unkindly" by future promotion boards considering the disdain of some (perhaps many) FSOs toward President Bush and the Iraq War? Will those who serve in Iraq be rewarded with choice NEA Bureau assignments like Khartoum or Algiers? Are they silly to hope for onward assignments to Canberra, Berlin, Rome, Brussels or Paris?

Employees respond to the incentive system of their employer, and at present it is unclear what the State Department is doing to create incentives for Iraq service. I understand that even interns are being sent to this war zone: Is this to enable State to claim more "bodies" in country?

I encourage Secretary Powell to clarify whether those who serve in Iraq will receive at least equal promotion and assignment opportunities as those who chose to avoid service at our most important diplomatic post.

Peter Rice
FSO, retired
Sarasota, Fla.

Broadcasting to Iran

Thomas Dine mentions Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty's important new focus on broadcasting to Iran, Iraq and Afghanistan ("Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: Today and Tomorrow," January 2004). As such, RFE/RL has a potentially significant role in U.S. public diplomacy toward countries that Dine says "are now on the front line of the U.S.-led war against terrorism."

But while broadcasts to Iraq and Afghanistan persist with the traditional RFE/RL fare of news and information to adult audiences, broadcasts to Iran have taken a different direction. In December 2002 the Broadcasting Board of Governors, which oversees all U.S.-sponsored broadcasting abroad, abruptly terminated RFE/RL's Persian Service, which had been mandated by Congress in 1998. Its focus on human rights and political development in Iran, and Persian cultural programming, modeled on a National Public Radio format, had won many loyal listeners among students and leaders seeking change. Though this influential listenership rivaled in size that of the 60-year-old BBC Persian Service, the BBG decided that the nature of the target audience was less important than absolute numbers of listeners, and that the way to build audience numbers was to go after Iran's huge youth population.

The new radio service, Radio Farda, aims to attract Iran's youths with a computer-generated mix of current American and Persian pop music, with occasional short features of special interest to young people. The format gives secondary place to serious news and information. Though Dine reports that news content averages eight hours daily, in reality most of it is in hourly 10-minute segments spread out over 24 hours, with zippy headlines and swoosh sounds meant to appeal to young people. It is modeled after the Voice of America's Arabic-language Radio Sawa, perhaps in the mistaken view that Iranian youths are as anti-American as their Arab counterparts. They most certainly are not, nor do they lack access to any amount of Western rock music. In any case, the new format has turned away much of the Persian Service's more mature and influential listeners, who disdain the pop music and truncated reports.

The switch to a pop music format reflects the perception, expressed to me by the BBG consultant who dictated the Farda format, that Iranian young people (like many elsewhere) lack sufficient tolerance for serious discussion and information. That simply is not the case. As an Iranian author who frequently visits Iran told NPR last year, "this radio program has a lot of music and does sort of news bites ... [but] has come under some criticism because Iran right now is at a

stage in which it is a highly politicized environment, and young people are actually more interested in talking about politics than Britney Spears."

At least some of the popularity the BBG claims for Radio Farda can be attributed to initial curiosity surrounding it and, more importantly, to the fact that it is broadcast over a powerful medium-wave transmitter that had not been available to the Persian Service (which had to broadcast on short-wave). But if rock music does in fact succeed in attracting big numbers of Iranian youths, it must be asked if this best serves the needs of U.S. public diplomacy and whether this effectively aids democratic development in Iran. Of course we should be glad if some Iranian youngsters who tune in for entertainment also catch some serious content, but we should lament the loss of the more serious audience (including politically active students) who are much more likely to bring about democratic and human rights reforms. Because of their wish to maintain a consistent format, the BBG rejected arguments that the station carry programming that could serve both audiences at different times. "Older" audiences, the BBG maintains, can still tune in to Voice of America Persian, a point that ignores the latter's rather different broadcast purpose.

Finally, an Iranian-born professor in Washington, who returned from a visit to Iran this January, reports that he heard several times there the comment that the sudden and inexplicable change in U.S. broadcasting reinforces the belief that U.S. foreign policy is whimsical and unreliable. In contrast, Iranians say, the BBC's Persian Service has maintained its high broadcast standards for nearly 65 years.

Stephen C. Fairbanks
Alexandria, Va.

(The writer was the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research's political analyst on Iran from 1987 to 1998. From 1998 to 2002 he was the director of RFE/RL's Persian Service.)

Out of Step on Death Penalty?

Your October issue on the death penalty would leave the impression that we are totally out of step with civilized world opinion. It therefore came as a surprise to me to find that public opinion in Britain, Australia and perhaps other Western countries is not as uniformly anti-death as their governments' policies would suggest.

A recent poll of British voters found that 62 percent back the death penalty for child murders and 54 percent back it for the killing of an adult or child — not much different from U.S. public opinion. The Conservative shadow Home Secretary recently got headlines for backing the restoration of the death penalty for serial murders. A recent poll in Australia also found substantial public sentiment for restoration of the death penalty.

David Ewing
Portsmouth, N.H.

Substantive or Functional?

I have been pleased to see so many of my specialist colleagues take the time to write to the *Foreign Service Journal* with their experiences and thoughts about the status of specialists in the Foreign Service. I hope that senior management is reading and taking note. My experience leads me to believe that not much will change, because the "generalists" have too much turf to protect. Let's hope I'm wrong.

Here is an anecdote I find relevant regarding relations between "substantive officers" and the rest of the generalists. My wife and I were leaving FSI on the shuttle bus one day several years ago and sat down in front of two gentlemen. While not trying to eavesdrop, we could not help but overhear what they were saying. Their conversation

went something like this:

"Did you see the promotion list?"

"Yes, and did you see that 'so-and-so' made it into the Senior Foreign Service?"

"I did. You know, I just don't understand why the department wastes SFS positions on admin types."

My wife and I knew the "so-and-so" who was promoted, so we found the conversation quite funny. It was a perfect example of how our political and economic cone "colleagues" view management and consular officers. Just imagine what they must think of the lowly specialist.

Another illustration: I was serving in Guangzhou, China, where the consular section processed all of the immigrant visa applications. Several people on the embassy shuttle we rode to and from work each day bandied about the term "substantive officer" when talking about themselves. After listening to this, one of the junior officers commented that if political and economic officers were to refer to themselves as "substantive officers," then admin and consular types should refer to themselves as "functional officers," because they actually *do* something. The term "substantive officer" disappeared from the conversation after that suggestion.

Kenneth R. Yeager
Contracting/Executive Officer
Regional Procurement Support Office
Frankfurt ■

CORRECTION: Due to a production error, a line was inadvertently dropped from George Gedda's article, "Latin America: Back on the Radar Screen?" (January *FSJ*, p. 57). The full sentence should read as follows: "Honduras and El Salvador each dispatched 360 troops to assist the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq, while Nicaragua sent 120." (The article is posted on our Web site, www.afsa.org.)

CYBERNOTES

Diplomats Challenge Guantanamo Detentions in Supreme Court

Nineteen retired diplomats have joined a lawsuit now before the U.S. Supreme Court challenging the Bush administration's Guantanamo Bay detention system. Approximately 660 prisoners from over 40 countries have been held for more than two years with no charges filed against them, no recourse to counsel and their every activity controlled by officers of the executive branch of the U.S. government.

> They had [chemical and biological weapons] stockpiles, they fought the Iranians with it, and they certainly did use it on the Kurds. But what everyone was talking about is stockpiles produced after the end of the last (1991) Gulf War, and I don't think there was a large-scale production program in the 1990s.
>
> — David Kay, former head of the CIA's Iraq Survey Group, Jan. 23, *reuters.com*

In November, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal on behalf of detainees who claim they should have the right to civilian court review of their detention. A D.C. Court of Appeals had earlier held that the plaintiffs — 12 Kuwaiti, two British and two Australian nationals — have no recourse in U.S. courts because their location in Cuba puts them out of the U.S. judiciary's jurisdiction.

"The rulings have not gone unnoticed abroad," the diplomats state in their "friend of the court" brief. "Governments and international organizations have taken offense. Other nations have seen in them a license to incarcerate their own citizens and others with impunity."

The diplomats argue that the Guantanamo system is causing grave problems in America's foreign relations. What is at stake, they say, is America's greatest diplomatic asset and that which has made the U.S. an exemplary model for others — namely, the constitutional promise that no person may be denied liberty by arbitrary government action.

The Bush administration designated the Guantanamo detainees "unlawful combatants" in the war on terrorism. They are therefore not entitled to protection under the Geneva Conventions as prisoners of war, and according to the laws of war could be held until "the end of hostilities," as Human Rights Watch explains in a background review (**http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/09/usdom6917.htm**).

Site of the Month: www.jpl.nasa.gov

If you find yourself annoyed with the current political quagmires or just with humans in general, then make travel arrangements with NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory at **www.jpl.nasa.gov**, a user-friendly site filled with fun facts about Mars. Aside from preplanning dream vacations on the Red Planet, astronomy buffs can follow the progress of the twin rovers, Spirit and Opportunity, and search for signs of life by investigating the many hi-resolution images of the Martian landscape.

Should digital images of Mars not tickle your fancy, a "bird's-eye" view of Earth, our cozy solar system and the rest of the final frontier are also at your fingertips. The site is rich in background information on the science and technology of space exploration for both the layman and expert, and also features events such as online lectures on biology, physics, and computer science. There is a lively kids' section too.

Each section contains updates about new discoveries and a comprehensive multimedia presentation. For example, in the Solar System portion, you can "ride along with three of NASA's most exciting robotic missions, or build your own exploratory spacecraft" by clicking on the "Solar System Experience" tab under Multimedia. Before building your spacecraft, you may also brush up on your interplanetary navigational skills by reviewing the "Basics of Space Flight" under the Education tab on the main page.

JPL, managed by the California Institute of Technology for NASA, undertakes the robotic exploration of the solar system for NASA and manages the network of telescopes on the ground and in space studying distant galaxies and learning more about the origins of the universe. JPL also manages the NASA satellites monitoring and studying planet Earth.

— Dwijen Jaydev Mehta, Editorial Intern

CYBERNOTES

The administration is planning to try detainees before specially constituted military commissions.

In a related development, five uniformed military lawyers assigned to defend Guantanamo prisoners have also filed a brief with the Supreme Court (**www.nytimes.com**). In their 30-page brief, the lawyers argue that President Bush has created "a legal black hole." The military brief does not take a position on the issue of denial of habeas corpus to people detained at Guantanamo, but contends that if they are put before a tribunal as now envisioned, the president will have overstepped his constitutional authority as commander-in-chief.

On Jan. 14 the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights (**www.humanrightsfirst.org**), representing Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and a broad array of nongovernmental legal and human rights organizations, also filed an amicus brief arguing, among other things, that the Constitution does indeed entitle the Guantanamo detainees to due process (**http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/14077_freiman_proofs.pdf**).

A brief on behalf of 175 members of the British Parliament has also been filed with the Supreme Court.

Internet Voting Pilot Abruptly Canceled

On Feb. 5 the Defense Department abruptly cancelled plans that would have enabled 100,000 of the estimated six million American voters living abroad to cast their votes online in the 2004 presidential election.

The Secure Electronic Registration and Voting Experiment, or SERVE, is a congressionally-mandated program developed by the DOD's Federal Voting Assistance Program (**www.fvap.gov**). Expanded from a successful pilot project that involved less than 100 voters in 2000, SERVE was ready to roll with seven states and 50 counties on board and a dedicated Web site (**www.serveusa.gov/public/aca.aspx**).

Still under development, SERVE functions in much the same way as e-commerce systems, with layers of security including secure military servers, digital certificates and dual-key encryption schemes.

"The department has decided not to use SERVE in the November 2004 elections," said a DOD spokeswoman (**www.nytimes.com**). "We made this decision in view of the inability to ensure legitimacy of votes, thereby bringing into doubt the integrity of the elections results."

Two weeks earlier, several members of an expert panel set up by the Pentagon to review the project had issued a report concluding it should be halted. "There really is no good way to build such a voting system without a radical change in overall architecture of the Internet and the PC, or some unforeseen security breakthrough," the report's authors argue.

Written by four of the 10 panelists, the report was at first dismissed by the Pentagon as a "minority report." Five of the six other panel members, polled informally, did not recommend closing. Another outside reviewer termed the report the "professional paranoia of security researchers."

The decision memorandum from Deputy Defense Secretary Paul D. Wolfowitz stated that efforts would continue to find ways to cast ballots electronically for overseas Americans, and that testing and development would continue with SERVE.

The Strategic Stakes in Africa

Africa's strategic significance for U.S. foreign policy was highlighted in late January, on the eve of renewed six-party talks in Beijing over North Korea's nuclear weapons program, by the news that Pyongyang has offered ballistic missile technology to Nigeria (**www.allafrica.com**).

Nigeria's spokesman Onukaba Ojo

50 Years Ago...

If Foreign Service officers themselves are inert or indifferent to the practical needs of an effective Foreign Service and especially to their standing with the American community, even the most sympathetic Secretary of State and the most kindly departmental staff will not be able to develop conditions most of us would want to see prevail.

— Amb. Robert Murphy (Remarks at the January 1954 AFSA Luncheon), *FSJ*, March 1954.

quickly stated that Abuja's talks with Pyongyang should not worry Washington. "I'm sure that Nigeria is not dreaming of nuclear weapons at all, just missile technology," he said. Nigeria and North Korea have cooperated in the defense sector for years. Nigeria, which provides 7 percent of America's oil, is Africa's most populous country and its military is the most powerful in West Africa.

But, as former U.S. ambassador to South Africa and Nigeria Princeton Lyman points out in a critique of U.S. Africa policy in *Foreign Affairs* (January-February 2004), Nigeria is also a country on the verge of blowing apart, as a result of "a potent mix of communal tensions, radical Islamism, and anti-Americanism [that] has produced a fertile breeding ground for militancy." And Nigeria is just the "most troubling" of a number of cases from South Africa to countries in West and Central Africa that are becoming incubators for terrorism.

In "The Terrorist Threat in Africa," Lyman, now director of Africa Policy Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations (**www.cfr.org**), and co-author J. Stephen Morrison, director of the Africa Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (**www.csis.org**), urge a fundamental correction in U.S. Africa policy. The heart of the problem, the authors say, is the failure to appreciate the fact that U.S. interests in Africa are not only humanitarian but also fundamentally strategic in nature.

Following the bombings in Dar es Salaam, Nairobi and Mombasa, the Bush administration declared the greater Horn of Africa a front-line region in the global war on terror, and what could prove to be a ground-breaking settlement of the devastating civil war in Sudan is still apparently on track.

But Lyman and Morrison state that the administration has failed to recognize the other, less visible threats on the continent, and instead "reflexively defines conflicts and crises in Africa in narrow humanitarian terms — as it did with Liberia in the summer of 2003." In addition, budgetary concerns have been allowed to "trump" vital support for multilateral peace operations and even antiterrorism programs, and place support for economic and social development in Africa in jeopardy.

The authors also suggest that bureaucratic obstacles to a coherent Africa policy in Washington, such as the State Department's separation of North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, need to be addressed. ■



SPEAKING OUT

U.S. Diplomacy and Other Sacrifices

BY JOHN BRADY KIESLING

A new vice consul quickly learns on the visa line that people tell us what they think we want to hear. When I was a diplomat, foreigners politely agreed with U.S. policy. They lied, but they meant well. Now that I am a dissident, my interlocutors take a much less polite view of the U.S. role in the world. I must summon up my former Foreign Service colleagues by face and name to remind myself of what I once knew instinctively: that even the most ambitious and unscrupulous of us work for a benevolent superpower.

My new dissident friends shake their heads at the notion of American benevolence. But they are wrong. Nearly a year has passed since March 20, 2003, a year that has blown to hell any illusion that we had launched our remaking of Iraq based on a rational, selfish, cost/benefit calculation of American interests. Was it an innocent mistake? Efforts to predict the costs — Army Chief of Staff Eric Shinseki's honesty about the troop levels needed to maintain security in Iraq, attempts by Congress to coax out of the White House even a sketchy estimate of occupation expenses, INR's analyses of the likely Iraqi and world reactions to an invasion — all were stifled brutally enough to show the administration's foreknowledge that accurate accounting would render the war too costly. But the war was launched nevertheless.

That decision would suggest that the people who ordered the war put their own political or bureaucratic interests above the interests of the American people they were sworn to serve. To confound that logic, the Bush administration has made a rhetorical leap. No longer are Americans foreign policy "realists" bound by sterile calculation. Now we are heavily-armed Wilsonian idealists, doing battle with a paean to universal democracy on our lips.

After 9/11, though diplomacy became more vital than ever to American security, our reaction left little room for allies.

While still an FSO in Athens, I made myself deliberately offensive to an invited pundit from the American Enterprise Institute. I told him in October 2002 that no one who had ever spoken to Arabs or been involved in U.S. democracy-building efforts could possibly believe that America had the capability forcibly to democratize Iraq and then Iran and Syria at any cost we could afford. I said he and his friends who advocated this war were living in a dream world. He disagreed, more politely than I deserved, but at least obviously.

What is less obvious is the State Department's own view. Perhaps those of us who had winced at the anger and humiliation of our Middle Eastern interlocutors assumed America's lack of standing there didn't matter, that experience elsewhere had confirmed our prowess at democracy building. Or perhaps those of us who had tried with little success to inculcate free elections among our docile new friends in the former Soviet bloc believed it would be easier in Iraq at gunpoint? No, the State Department had ample expertise to know — even if it was a lonely and unrewarding knowledge — that Iraq would be an expensive fiasco. We chose, however, to keep saying what the president wanted to hear.

Newt Gingrich complained last summer that U.S. diplomacy failed to convince our allies because we were disloyal to President Bush. The opposite is true: because we were loyal to the president and our careers, we failed the American people. Repackaging the administration's populist rhetoric for foreign audiences is a safe bureaucratic strategy. It is not enough, and it never was, to lead a skeptical planet. Did any of us warn the president that the mantle of "Leader of the Free World" does not come automatically with the office? He will never wear that mantle now, not on a planet convinced, as the polls show, that the character and ideology of George W. Bush make the world a

Repackaging the administration's populist rhetoric for foreign audiences is a safe bureaucratic strategy — but not enough to lead a skeptical planet.

crueler and more dangerous place.

We undervalue to our detriment the skills required for successful diplomacy, and the time they take to learn. Over 20 awkward years, I built the relationships with foreign diplomats, journalists and politicians that allowed me to feel I was earning my pay. As I rose in the ranks, the outlook seemed bleaker. I thought we were swindling ourselves with our mantra of "management" over diplomacy. Should the Foreign Service really exchange its role as the overseas eyes and ears and brains and voice of America for a modest subsistence as concierge? Five years remained in my promotion window. I was too lazy or proud to learn the open assignments game properly, but not stellar enough to coast along without it. And so I was looking forward to being posted to Kabul via Dari-language training, and to one more posting before retirement at age 50.

Once the Bush administration took the reins, instructions to posts challenged the agreeable notion I had formed under George Bush the elder and Bill Clinton, that America was the leader of an evolving international system based on rules we our-

selves had written and blessed. Our betrayal of the International Criminal Court was a shameful blot on American history and an unmistakable sign that George W. Bush had rejected his father's nobler vision. His populism was read by me as cowardice, but by the world as arrogance.

After 9/11, though diplomacy became more vital than ever to American security, our reaction left little room for allies. The arrival of a new U.S. ambassador confirmed this change of attitude. He understood Greece as well as he thought he needed to, and showed himself adept at the contemptuous posturing that buys tennis dates with Defense Secretary Rumsfeld.

The Path to War

In the late summer of 2002 came the certainty that we had embarked on war with Iraq. The neoconservatives surfaced to reassure unhappy ordinary conservatives, for whom loyalty to allies meant something, that the U.N. is an organization by and for corrupt wimps, and that international legitimacy is for sissies too squeamish to wield power. We liberals had no equivalent fiction to comfort us — history makes brutally clear the trajectory of power politics based on ignorance and contempt for foreigners.

My draft Dissent Channel message seemed futile sent from Athens. I was not the type to instigate insurrection. So I wrote myself off as a time-serving coward. Then Diplomatic Security's pink-slip crackdown saved me. I had been careless enough at times over my career: classified documents left in out-boxes, an unlocked safe or hard drive. But lies had been told about my commitment to security, and the injustice festered. My ambassador made clear that my fight to keep my security clearance was purely my own. In a moment of clarity — or wounded vanity, if you

Efforts to predict the costs of the war were stifled brutally enough to show the administration knew an accurate accounting would render it too costly.

prefer — I recognized that I had something better to fight for than a career.

My finest compliment came from a Greek Foreign Ministry official. He gave a copy of my resignation letter to his 12-year-old son, because he wanted the boy to recognize the dignity of a profession that sometimes demanded such gestures. I was surprised — European diplomats seldom drop the mask of cynical careerism. Support from American colleagues was less surprising. We still have faith in our calling.

I wish that I had had the bureaucratic skills to do something meaningful within the system. That would have been heroic, and the Foreign Service needs its heroes. Ours are now engaged feverishly across Iraq. They will do some good, but the stakes for us and for the warring Iraqi factions are too asymmetrical. My friends will return, I hope, prepared to tell the truth about the limits of U.S. power.

There is a Washington bureaucratic universe in which American omnipotence is not just a dangerous fantasy. There, the solution to every problem is a budget line, a wiring dia-

gram, a stream of targeting data, and someone's electoral calendar. In that brutally competitive universe, foreigners are playing cards of limited value. In that universe, the Iraq war was a triumph of power politics. I am not qualified to say when and how the State Department lost the bureaucratic struggle for the president's ear. We lost, and we chose to be good losers.

In the Real World

But there is also a real universe, a more subtle one, in which the real, permanent interests of the American people must be defended. In this universe, humiliation and powerlessness are a cause of terrorism, not its cure. Here, when we put forth our power, states go catastrophically limp, as Iraq went limp. In this universe, where we cannot truly democratize or profitably blackmail even the most servile client state, it is not the State Department but America that has suffered a costly defeat in Iraq.

Global threats require global alliances. Sacrificing allies to domestic politics is bad policy. The State Department used to fight and occasionally win policy battles in the corridors of Washington on behalf of our allies. Perhaps my limited experience misleads me, and we do not really crumple at each jeer of "clientitis." But even by the crudest ancient measure of power, the ability to help our friends and harm our foes, we have failed to reward British Prime Minister Tony Blair for his loyalty to us. Much less can we reliably identify our friends in Iraq and bolster them against our foes.

Any respect for the Foreign Service is earned by accurate understanding of the real universe and honest recommendations about real human beings. By admitting the obvious about Iraq, we make ourselves stronger. We cannot adopt

I am not qualified to say when and how the State Department lost the bureaucratic struggle for the president's ear.

Saddam's methods, or even Sharon's, at a price America is willing to pay. Without security, all our well-meaning reconstruction will be swept away. Let us learn from history that no one will successfully govern Iraq until they are armed with the legitimacy that comes from driving us out.

Our protection in speaking the truth is the vision and integrity of the president. When that protection fails us, the most we can hope is that some of the cost of misusing U.S. diplomacy will be borne by those responsible for it. But there is no valid option of ceding our expert judgment to others less qualified, or speaking less than the truth about the planet. ■

John Brady Kiesling entered the Foreign Service in 1983, serving in Tel Aviv, Casablanca, Washington,Yerevan and Athens (twice), the second time as political counselor. He resigned from the Service in February 2003 in protest of the impending war with Iraq. A writer and lecturer, he is currently a visiting professor of Hellenic studies at Princeton University.

Need to Sound the Alarm About Something?

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Writers are encouraged to take strong stands, but all factual claims must be supported and documented. Submissions should be approximately 1,500 words in length and should be sent via e-mail to journal@afsa.org.

IRAQ, ONE YEAR LATER: EDITOR'S INTRODUCTION

BY STEVEN ALAN HONLEY

On Wednesday evening (U.S. time), March 19, 2003, the United States began "Operation Iraqi Freedom" by bombing a building in which Saddam Hussein was thought to be hiding. The dictator's regime crumbled almost instantly (though it took nearly nine months to capture him), and the initial euphoria over the ease of his overthrow led President Bush to declare an end to "major hostilities" on May 1.

Lamentably, it has become all too clear that military victory was just the beginning of the struggle in Iraq, notwithstanding the Bush administration's assurances. As we go to print in early February, American deaths have already exceeded 500 and continue to inch up almost daily, and we have pumped many billions of dollars into the effort. Most worrying of all, the overall security situation remains unsettled just as the Coalition Provisional Authority prepares to turn over power to the Iraqi Transitional Administration on July 1 — the date Embassy Baghdad is scheduled to open its doors.

Our coverage actually begins with this month's Speaking Out column, "U.S. Diplomacy and Other Sacrifices" (p. 13), by John Brady Kiesling, who likely needs no introduction to most *FSJ* readers. In this column, he discusses the factors that underlay his February 2003 decision to resign from the Foreign Service in protest of the Bush administration's drive to war. (Two other FSOs who did the same, John Brown and Ann Wright, contributed Speaking Out columns of their own to our September 2003 issue, which you can read by going to www.afsa.org.)

Among many provocative observations Kiesling makes, perhaps this one merits especially close attention: "I am not qualified to say when and how the State Department lost the bureaucratic struggle for the president's ear. We lost, and we chose to be good losers."

That bureaucratic struggle is at the heart of an article that originally appeared in the *New York Times* Sunday magazine last November, the bulk of which we reprint in this issue: "Blueprint for a Mess" (p. 22). Journalist David Rieff concludes that "The lack of security and order on the ground today is in large measure a result of decisions made and not made in Washington before the war started, and of the specific approaches toward coping with postwar Iraq undertaken by American civilian officials and military commanders in the immediate aftermath of the war."

Rieff documents just how perceptive and well-informed State's analysts were about what was likely to follow U.S. intervention. The Future of Iraq Project drew on a wide range of

expertise, both within the Foreign Service and elsewhere, to correctly predict most developments of the past year. In particular, the panelists urged beefed-up security to counter the wave of criminal activity in the period immediately following the overthrow of the Ba'thist regime. They also warned of the inherent difficulty of establishing democracy in a deeply riven society with no experience of power-sharing.

David Rieff documents just how perceptive and well-informed State's analysts were about what would follow U.S. intervention in Iraq.

The Coalition Provisional Authority has been grappling with these and many other thorny issues, first under Gen. Jay Garner and then Amb. Jerry Bremer. Amb. Hume Horan, who worked at the CPA (along with many other dedicated personnel from State and elsewhere) for six months last year, gives us his assessment of the post-Hussein era in "Restoring A Shattered Mosaic" (p. 29). He is considerably more optimistic about the country's prospects than many commentators, though he is careful to acknowledge the many obstacles that lie ahead.

One of the Bush administration's justifications for going to war has been the conviction that Iraq's democratization would serve as a model for its neighbors and the larger Arab world. But the Carnegie Endowment's Marina Ottaway offers a decidedly cautionary answer to the question, "Can the United States Export Democracy to Iraq?" (p. 38).

The administration's main rationale for attacking Iraq, however, was its supposed possession of weapons of mass destruction and intent to use them against American interests. However, no Iraqi WMD stockpiles have yet turned up, and David Kay, who resigned on Jan. 23 from his position as head of the U.S. effort to find the weapons, has testified to Congress that "We were almost all wrong." President Bush has now backed an independent review of the intelligence regarding Iraq's alleged WMD, though just how it will be conducted remains to be worked out.

For an insider's perspective on what the intelligence community was reporting about the situation in Iraq prior to the war, we offer Greg Thielmann's "From Intelligence Analyst to 'Citizen Watchdog'" (p. 44). Thielmann, a 25-year Foreign Service veteran, was acting director of the Strategic, Proliferation and Military Affairs Office in State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research when he retired in September 2002. He paints a damning picture of how the adminstration exploited "the fear of a nation still traumatized by 9/11 with unjustified speculations that Iraq could have nuclear weapons within months, and ominous warnings that the first smoking gun could be in the form of a mushroom cloud — assertions that had no basis in the sober assessments of intelligence professionals."

Many critics of the current administration's handling of Iraq, both within State and elsewhere, have cited the damage done to U.S. relations with allies and, indeed, much of the world. Egyptian journalist Khaled Abdulkareem gives us a view of what that has meant in the Middle East in "Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Arab Reaction" (p. 50).

Ultimately, no matter how one assesses the administration's record in Iraq over the past year, it will soon be largely up to State, USAID, and the other foreign affairs agencies to make U.S. policy there work. That will be no easy task, but fortunately, the many Foreign Service professionals who have volunteered for duty in Iraq have already been demonstrating the requisite dedication and creativity. We are therefore pleased to conclude our coverage with some of their stories in "On the Ground" (p. 54). ■



Adam Niklewicz

Steven Alan Honley is the editor of the Foreign Service Journal. *An FSO from 1985 to 1997, he served in Mexico City, Wellington and Washington, D.C.*

BLUEPRINT FOR A MESS

Adam Niklewicz

THE WAR IN IRAQ WAS A TRIUMPH OF PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTATION, BUT THE POSTWAR SITUATION IS A MESS. HERE'S HOW IT HAPPENED.

BY DAVID RIEFF

Historically, it is rare that a warm welcome is extended to an occupying military force for very long, unless, that is, the postwar goes very smoothly. And in Iraq, the postwar occupation has not gone smoothly. …

Despite administration claims, it is simply not true that no one could have predicted the chaos that ensued after the fall of Saddam Hussein. In fact, many officials in the United States, both military and civilian, as well as many Iraqi exiles, predicted quite accurately the perilous state of things that exists in Iraq today. … What went wrong is that the

voices of Iraq experts, of the State Department almost in its entirety and, indeed, of important segments of the uniformed military were ignored. As much as the invasion of Iraq and the rout of Saddam Hussein and his army was a triumph of planning and implementation, the mess that is postwar Iraq is a failure of planning and implementation.

The Iraqi National Congress became not simply an Iraqi exile group of which Chalabi was a leader, but a kind of government-in-waiting with Chalabi at its head.

Getting in Too Deep with Chalabi

In the minds of the top officials of the Department of Defense during the run-up to the war, Iraq by the end of [2003] would have enough oil flowing to help pay for the country's reconstruction, a constitution nearly written and set for ratification and, perhaps most important, a popular new leader who shared America's vision not only for Iraq's future but also for the Middle East's.

Ahmad Chalabi may on the face of it seem an odd figure to count on to unify and lead a fractious postwar nation that had endured decades of tyrannical rule. His background is in mathematics and banking, he is a secular Shiite Muslim, and he had not been in Baghdad since the late 1950s. But in the early 1990s he became close to Richard Perle, who was an assistant secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, and in 1992, in the wake of the first Gulf War, he founded the Iraqi National Congress, an umbrella organization of Iraqi opposition groups in exile.

In the mid-1990s, Chalabi attended conferences on a post-Hussein Iraq organized by Perle and sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. There he met a group of neoconservative and conservative intellectuals who had served in the administrations of Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush, including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, who later formed the core group that would persuade President George W. Bush to go to war with Iraq. …

In the mid-1990s Chalabi fell out of favor with the CIA and the State Department, which questioned his popular support in Iraq and accused him of misappropriating American government funds earmarked for armed resistance by Iraqi exile groups against Saddam Hussein. He remained close with Perle and Wolfowitz, however, as well as with other neoconservative figures in Washington, including Douglas Feith, a former aide to Perle. … Chalabi lobbied senators and congressmen to support action against Saddam Hussein, and a coalition of neoconservatives, including Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and Perle, sent a letter to President Clinton calling for a tougher Iraq policy. Together they succeeded in persuading the Republican-controlled Congress in 1998 to pass the Iraq Liberation Act, signed into law by President Clinton, a piece of legislation that made regime change in Iraq the official policy of the United States.

After George W. Bush assumed the presidency, Chalabi's Washington allies were appointed to senior positions in the defense establishment. … (Wolfowitz, Perle and Chalabi all refused or did not respond to requests to be interviewed for this article.) …

Planning began not only for the war itself but also for its aftermath, and various government departments and agencies initiated projects and study groups to consider the questions of postwar Iraq. …

Chief among these agencies was the so-called Office of Special Plans, set up after Sept. 11, 2001, reporting to Douglas Feith in the Pentagon. It was given such a vague name, by Feith's own admission, because the administration did not want to have it widely known that there was a special unit in the Pentagon doing its own assessments

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David Rieff is an American writer and policy analyst. His early work concerned Third World immigration to the United States. More recently, he has covered wars and humanitarian emergencies in the Balkans, Central Africa, Central Asia and the Caucasus. He is the author of six books, and a frequent contributor to The New York Times, The Atlantic Monthly, Los Angeles Times, *and* Foreign Affairs. *He is a contributing editor to* New Republic *(Washington),* Los Angeles Times Book Review, *and* Letras Libres *(Mexico City).* *The article excerpted here was originally published in* The New York Times Magazine *on Nov. 2, 2003,*

of intelligence on Iraq. "We didn't think it was wise to create a brand-new office and label it an office of Iraq policy," Feith told the BBC in July.

… Chalabi provided the Office of Special Plans with information from defectors ostensibly from Saddam Hussein's weapons programs — defectors who claimed to be able to establish that the Iraqi dictator was actively developing weapons of mass destruction.

Through such efforts, Chalabi grew even closer to those planning the war and what would follow. To the war planners, the Iraqi National Congress became not simply an Iraqi exile group of which Chalabi was a leader, but a kind of government-in-waiting with Chalabi at its head. The Pentagon's plan for postwar Iraq seems to have hinged, until the war itself, on the idea that Chalabi could be dropped into Baghdad and, once there, effect a smooth transition to a new administration. …

Shutting Out State

In the spring of 2002, as support for a war to oust Saddam Hussein took root within the Bush administration, the State Department began to gather information and draw up its own set of plans for postwar Iraq under the leadership of Thomas Warrick, a longtime State Department official who was then special adviser to the department's Office of Northern Gulf Affairs. This effort involved a great number of Iraqi exiles from across the political spectrum, from monarchists to communists and including the Iraqi National Congress.

Warrick's Future of Iraq Project, as it was called, was an effort to consider almost every question likely to confront a post-Hussein Iraq: the rebuilding of infrastructure, the shape Iraqi democracy might take, the carrying out of transitional justice and the spurring of economic development. …

There were a number of key policy disagreements between State and Defense. The first was over Chalabi. While the Pentagon said that a "government in exile" should be established, presumably led by Chalabi, to be quickly installed in Baghdad following the war, other Iraqis, including the elder statesman of the exile leaders, Adnan Pachachi, insisted that any government installed by United States fiat would be illegitimate in the eyes of the Iraqi people. And the State Department, still concerned that Chalabi had siphoned off money meant for the Iraqi resistance and that he lacked public support, opposed the idea of a shadow government. The State Department managed to win this particular battle, and no government in exile was set up.

There was also a broader disagreement about whether and how quickly Iraq could become a full-fledged democracy. The State Department itself was of two minds on this question. One prewar State Department report, echoing the conventional wisdom among Arabists, asserted that "liberal democracy would be difficult to achieve" in Iraq and that "electoral democracy, were it to emerge, could well be subject to exploitation by anti-American elements." The CIA agreed with this assessment; in March 2003, the agency issued a report that was widely reported to conclude that prospects for democracy in a post-Hussein Iraq were bleak. In contrast, the neoconservatives within the Bush administration, above all within the Department of Defense, consistently asserted that the CIA and the State Department were wrong and that there was no reason to suppose that Iraq could not become a full-fledged democracy, and relatively quickly and smoothly.

But Warrick, who has refused to be interviewed since the end of the war, was, according to participants in the project, steadfastly committed to Iraqi democracy. Feisal Istrabadi, an Iraqi-American lawyer who also served on the project's democratic principles group, credits Warrick with making the Future of Iraq Project a genuinely democratic and inclusive venture. Warrick, he says, "was fanatically devoted to the idea that no one should be allowed to dominate the Future of Iraq Project and that all voices should be heard — including moderate Islamist voices. It was a remarkable accomplishment."

In fact, Istrabadi rejects the view that the State Department was a holdout against Iraqi democracy. "From Colin Powell on down," he says, "I've spent hundreds of hours with State Department people, and I've never heard one say democracy was not viable in Iraq. Not one."

Although Istrabadi is an admirer of Wolfowitz, he says that the rivalry between State and Defense was so intense that the Future of Iraq Project became anathema to the Pentagon simply because it was a State Department project. "At the Defense Department," he recalls, "we were seen as part of 'them.'" …

The Future of Iraq Project did draw up detailed reports, which were eventually released to Congress last month and made available to reporters for *The New York Times*. …

But the Defense Department, which came to oversee postwar planning, would pay little heed to the work of the Future of Iraq Project. Gen. Jay Garner, the retired Army officer who was later given the job of leading the reconstruction of Iraq, says he was instructed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to ignore the Future of Iraq Project.

Garner has said that he asked for Warrick to be added to his staff and that he was turned down by his superiors. Judith Yaphe, a former CIA analyst and a leading expert on Iraqi history, says that Warrick was "blacklisted" by the Pentagon. "He did not support their vision," she told me. And what was this vision?

Yaphe's answer is unhesitant: "Ahmad Chalabi." But it went further than that: "The Pentagon didn't want to touch anything connected to the Department of State." None of the senior American officials involved in the Future of Iraq Project were taken on board by the Pentagon's planners. …

The memory of this looting is like a bone in Iraq's collective throat and has given rise to conspiracy theories about American motives and actions.

Too Little Planning, Too Late

The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance was established in the Defense Department, under General Garner's supervision, on Jan. 20, 2003, just eight weeks before the invasion of Iraq. Because the Pentagon had insisted on essentially throwing out the work and the personnel of the Future of Iraq Project, Garner and his planners had to start more or less from scratch. Timothy Carney [a former ambassador to Haiti and Sudan], who served in ORHA under Garner, explains that ORHA lacked critical personnel once it arrived in Baghdad. "There were scarcely any Arabists in ORHA in the beginning" at a senior level, Carney says. "Some of us had served in the Arab world, but we were not experts, or fluent Arabic-speakers." According to Carney, Defense officials "said that Arabists weren't welcome because they didn't think Iraq could be democratic."

Because of the battle between Defense and State, ORHA, which Douglas Feith called the "U.S. government nerve center" for postwar planning, lacked not only information and personnel but also time. …

Although ORHA simply didn't have the time, resources or expertise in early 2003 to formulate a coherent postwar plan, Feith and others in the Defense Department were telling a different story to Congress. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Feb. 11, shortly before the beginning of the war, Feith reassured the assembled senators that ORHA was "staffed by officials detailed from departments and agencies throughout the government." Given the freeze-out of the State Department officials from the Future of Iraq Project, this description hardly encompassed the reality of what was actually taking place bureaucratically.

Much of the postwar planning that did get done before the invasion focused on humanitarian efforts — Garner's area of expertise. …

Garner told me that while he had expected Iraqis to loot the symbols of the old regime, like Hussein's palaces, he had been utterly unprepared for the systematic looting and destruction of practically every public building in Baghdad. In fairness to Garner, many of the Iraqis I spoke with during my trips were also caught by surprise. …

One reason for the looting in Baghdad was that there were so many intact buildings to loot. In contrast to their strategy in the first Gulf War, American war planners had been careful not to attack Iraqi infrastructure. This was partly because of their understanding of the laws of war and partly because of their desire to get Iraq back up and running as quickly and smoothly as possible. They seem to have imagined that once Hussein fell, things would go back to normal fairly quickly. But on the ground, the looting and the violence went on and on, and for the most part American forces largely did nothing.

Or rather, they did only one thing — station troops to protect the Iraqi Oil Ministry. This decision to protect only the Oil Ministry — not the National Museum, not the National Library, not the Health Ministry — probably did more than anything else to convince Iraqis uneasy with the occupation that the United States was in Iraq only for the oil. "It is not that they could not protect everything, as they say," a leader in the Hawza, the Shiite

religious authority, told me. "It's that they protected nothing else. The Oil Ministry is not off by itself. It's surrounded by other ministries, all of which the Americans allowed to be looted. So what else do you want us to think except that you want our oil?" …

For its part, the Hawza could do little to protect the 17 out of 23 Iraqi ministries that were gutted by looters, or the National Library, or the National Museum (though sheiks repeatedly called on looters to return the stolen artifacts). But it was the Hawza, and not American forces, that protected many of Baghdad's hospitals from looters — which Hawza leaders never fail to point out when asked whether they would concede that the United States is now doing a great deal of good in Iraq. The memory of this looting is like a bone in Iraq's collective throat and has given rise to conspiracy theories about American motives and actions. …

The Troops: Too Few, Too Constricted

On Feb. 25, the Army's chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, warned Congress that postwar Iraq would require a commitment of "several hundred thousand" U.S. troops. Shinseki's estimate was dismissed out of hand by Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz and other civilian officials at the Pentagon. … Shinseki retired soon afterward.

But Shinseki wasn't the only official who thought there were going to be insufficient troops on the ground to police Iraq in the aftermath of the war. The lack of adequate personnel in the military's plan, especially the military police needed for post-conflict work, was pointed out by both senior members of the uniformed military and by seasoned peacekeeping officials in the United Nations secretariat.

Former Ambassador Carney, recalling his first days in Iraq with ORHA, puts it this way, with surprising bitterness: The U.S. military "simply did not understand or give enough priority to the transition from their military mission to our political military mission." …

The planning stages of the invasion itself were marked by detailed preparations and frequent rehearsals. Lt. Col. Scott Rutter is a highly decorated U.S. battalion commander whose unit, the Second Battalion, Seventh Infantry of the Third Infantry Division, helped take the Baghdad airport. He says that individual units rehearsed their own roles and the contingencies they might face over and over again. By contrast, the lack of postwar planning made the difficulties the United States faced almost inevitable. "We knew what the tactical end state was supposed to be at the end of the war, but we were never told what the end state, the goal was, for the postwar," Rutter said. …

Rutter's view is confirmed by the "After Action" report of the Third Infantry Division, a document that is available on an Army Web site but that has received little attention. … As the report's authors note: "Higher headquarters did not provide the Third Infantry Division (Mechanized) with a plan for Phase IV. As a result, Third Infantry Division transitioned into Phase IV in the absence of guidance." …

Without a plan, without meticulous rehearsal and without orders or, at the very least, guidance from higher up the chain of command, the military is all but paralyzed. And in those crucial first postwar days in Baghdad, American forces (and not only those in the Third Infantry Division) behaved that way, as all around them Baghdad was ransacked and most of the categories of infrastructure named in the report were destroyed or seriously damaged.

Some military analysts go beyond the lack of Phase IV planning and more generally blame the Bush administration's insistence, upon coming into office, that it would no longer commit American armed forces to nation-building missions — a position symbolized by the decision [later reversed] to close the Peacekeeping Institute at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pa. …

Neglecting ORHA

In his congressional testimony before the war, Douglas Feith described Gen. Garner's mission as head of ORHA as "integrating the work of the three substantive operations" necessary in postwar Iraq. These were humanitarian relief, reconstruction and civil administration. Garner, Feith said, would ensure that the fledgling ORHA could "plug in smoothly" to the military's command structure on the ground in Iraq. But far from plugging in smoothly to Central Command, ORHA's people found themselves at odds with the military virtually from the start.

Timothy Carney has given the best and most damning account of this dialogue of the deaf between ORHA officials and the U.S. military on the ground in Iraq in a searing op-ed article in the *Washington Post* in late June. ... Carney stressed the low priority the military put on ORHA's efforts. "Few in the military understood the

urgency of our mission," he wrote, "yet we relied on the military for support. For example, the military commander set rules for transportation: we initially needed a lead military car, followed by the car with civilians and a military vehicle bringing up the rear. But there weren't enough vehicles. One day we had 31 scheduled missions and only nine convoys, so 22 missions were scrubbed."

More substantively, he added that "no lessons seem to have taken hold from the recent nation-building efforts in Bosnia or Kosovo, so we in ORHA felt as though we were reinventing the wheel." And doing so under virtually impossible constraints. …

The lack of respect for the civilian officials in ORHA was a source of astonishment to Lt. Col. Rutter. "I was amazed by what I saw," he says. "There would be a meeting called by Amb. Bodine" — the official on Garner's staff responsible for Baghdad — "and none of the senior officers would show up. I remember thinking, this isn't right, and also thinking that if it had been a commander who had called the meeting, they would have shown up all right."

Carney attributes some of the blame for ORHA's impotence to the fact that it set up shop in Saddam Hussein's Republican Palace, where "nobody knew where anyone was, and, worse, almost no one really knew what was going on outside the palace." … Larry Hollingworth, a former British colonel and relief specialist who has worked in Sarajevo and Chechnya and who briefly served with ORHA right after Baghdad fell, says that "at the U.S. military's insistence, we traveled out from our fortified headquarters in Saddam's old Republican Palace in armored vehicles, wearing helmets and flak jackets, trying to convince Iraqis that peace was at hand, and that they were safe. It was ridiculous."…

As the spring wore on, administration officials continued to insist publicly that nothing was going seriously wrong in Iraq. But the pressure to do something became too strong to resist. Claiming that it had been a change that had been foreseen all along (though it had not been publicly announced and was news to Garner's staff), President Bush replaced Garner in May with L. Paul ["Jerry"] Bremer. Glossing over the fact that Bremer had no experience in postwar reconstruction or nation-building, the Pentagon presented Bremer as a good administrator — something, or so Defense Department officials implied on background, Garner was not.

But the Shiites soon demonstrated that they were interested in political as well as religious autonomy.

Bremer's first major act was not auspicious. Garner had resisted the kind of complete de-Ba'thification of Iraqi society that Ahmad Chalabi and some of his allies in Washington had favored. In particular, he had resisted calls to completely disband the Iraqi Army. Instead, he had tried only to fire Ba'thists and senior military officers against whom real charges of complicity in the regime's crimes could be demonstrated and to use most members of the Iraqi Army as labor battalions for reconstruction projects.

Bremer, however, took the opposite approach. On May 15, he announced the complete disbanding of the Iraqi Army, some 400,000 strong, and the lustration of 50,000 members of the Ba'th Party. As one U.S. official remarked to me privately, "That was the week we made 450,000 enemies on the ground in Iraq."

The decision — which many sources say was made not by Bremer but in the White House — was disastrous. In a country like Iraq, where the average family size is six, firing 450,000 people amounts to leaving 2,700,000 people without incomes; in other words, more than 10 percent of Iraq's 23 million people. The order produced such bad feeling on the streets of Baghdad that salaries are being reinstated for all soldiers. It is a slow and complicated process, however, and there have been demonstrations by fired military officers in Iraq over the course of the summer and into the fall.

Ignoring the Shiites

It should have been clear from the start that the success or failure of the American project in postwar Iraq depended not just on the temporary acquiescence of Iraq's Shiite majority but also on its support — or at least its tacit acceptance of a prolonged American presence.

Before the war, the Pentagon's planners apparently believed that this would not be a great problem. The Shiite tradition in Iraq, they argued, was nowhere near as radical as it was in neighboring Iran. The planners also seem to have assumed that the overwhelming majority of Iraqi Shiites would welcome American

forces as liberators — an assumption based on the fact of the Shiite uprisings in southern Iraq in 1991, in the aftermath of the first Gulf War. American officials do not seem to have taken seriously enough the possibility that the Shiites might welcome their liberation from Saddam Hussein but still view the Americans as unwelcome occupiers who would need to be persuaded, and if necessary compelled, to leave Iraq as soon as possible.

Again, an overestimation of the role of Ahmad Chalabi may help account for this miscalculation. Chalabi is a Shiite, and based on that fact, the Pentagon's planners initially believed that he would enjoy considerable support from Iraq's Shiite majority. But it rapidly became clear to American commanders on the ground in postwar Iraq that the aristocratic, secular Chalabi enjoyed no huge natural constituency in the country, least of all among the observant Shiite poor.

The Americans gravely underestimated the implications of the intense religious feelings that Iraqi Shiites were suddenly free to manifest after the fall of Saddam Hussein. Making religious freedom possible for the Shiites was one of the great accomplishments of the war, as administration officials rightly claim. But the Shiites soon demonstrated that they were interested in political as well as religious autonomy. And although the Americans provided the latter, their continued presence in Iraq was seen as an obstacle to the former. …

The Next Steps

Whether the United States is eventually successful in Iraq, even supporters of the current approach of the Coalition Provisional Authority concede that the United States is playing catch-up. … And the more time passes, the clearer it becomes that what happened in the immediate aftermath of what the administration calls Operation Iraqi Freedom was a self-inflicted wound, a morass of our own making. ■

Restoring a Shattered Mosaic

Adam Niklewicz

A veteran FSO who served in Baghdad for six months following the war explains why he is optimistic about Iraq's future.

By Hume Horan

On April 9, 2003, Baghdad fell to the forces of the Coalition Provisional Alliance — to the Third Infantry Division and the U.S. Marines, to be precise. Just a month later, I arrived in Baghdad with Ambassador Jerry Bremer — who succeeded Gen. Jay Garner as the country's administrator and, in Amb. Bremer's case, as President Bush's personal representative in Iraq. I was named a senior adviser to Amb. Bremer at the Coalition Provisional Authority. I continued in that capacity until the end of November, dealing mostly with religious and tribal issues.

In his pioneering survey of Middle Eastern history, *Caravan*, Carleton Coon describes the region as a "mosaic" of peoples — a congeries of languages, ethnicities, and religions that extend back from the present nearly three millennia. Such was the case in Iraq (the classical Mesopotamia), with its Shiite Muslim majority (perhaps 60 percent of the population), plus Sunni Muslims (about 20 percent), Kurds (around 15 percent), and smatterings of Turkomans and Christians. Of Baghdad's Jewish community, whose ancestors had lived in Mesopotamia since the 6th century B.C., and who in modern times held leading roles in commerce, banking and medicine, fewer than a dozen remained.

The Iraqi mosaic had been shattered long before Jerry Bremer assumed command of the CPA.

Lamentably, this Iraqi mosaic had been shattered well before Jerry Bremer assumed command of the CPA. Although the Sunni minority had already dominated Iraq for almost 400 years by the time the infamous Ba'th Party assumed full power in 1968, it was when Saddam Hussein seized absolute power in 1979, that Sunni rule took a truly Hitlerian turn. Power in the Middle East is traditionally accompanied by favoritism and abuse, but Iraq set new standards on both counts. Under Saddam these presumptions were given steadily greater force by his total command of the tools of modern technology and coercion.

Accordingly, Jerry Bremer did not just have to put Humpty Dumpty together again. He has had to reassemble a myriad of ill-fitting, damaged, mutually antagonistic fragments into something resembling a working egg.

Life at the CPA

As representative of the chief occupying power, Jerry Bremer's position under international law is like that of a chief of state. These days, the "letter of authority" that ambassadors receive from their president reads like the fine print on the back of an airline ticket. Bremer's, however, resembles that which George Washington gave his ministers. Barely one page long, it essentially says, "You have my full confidence and support. Go out there, tell me what you need, and do your best for our country." And in Bremer's case these are not only words. He has held weekly teleconferences with President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and frequently travels back to Washington to meet with the president, senior members of the administration and the Congress. His requests for resources have been promptly and generously met.

Bremer and his British colleague soon had at their command a cadre of over a thousand American, British and Australian experts. Meals in the cavernous mess hall of the Republican Palace were opportunities for thumbnail seminars. You might sit with the new head of Baghdad's garbage disposal program — a dynamic sanitation engineer (and grandmother) from California — or a former dot-com millionaire who had decided doing pro-bono work would be more interesting than starting a new company. His job was to sort out winners from losers among Saddam's state-owned enterprises. Or your lunch companion might be a U.S. Special Forces major with a scholar's knowledge of the Qur'an and Iraq's tribes, or a brilliant British intelligence agent, plus every sort of expert in power generation, community development and human rights. And on trips to regional centers, such as Hilleh (near Babylon), Kirkuk (in Kurdistan) or Ramadi (in the "Sunni Triangle"), you'd meet inspiring, courageous colleagues working closely with local Iraqis while facing danger every day. Our Kirkuk representative moved out of her house when it was attacked by rocket-propelled grenades. The U.S. base she moved into was itself attacked by mortars the next day.

The atmosphere of the CPA was unique. "Morale" was high despite arduous living conditions. Baghdad proved that if good people are given first-class leadership, an important mission and sufficient resources, morale will take care of itself. All of these elements, and especially leadership, were abundantly present. True, living condi-

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tions were Spartan: the most senior people shared four-man trailers, others were packed into available empty spaces that resembled troopship bays in their crowding and lack of privacy. After the Rashid Hotel was bombed, some of its refugees kept mattresses in broom closets, and at night slept on CPA office floors. Yet despite the external threats, a 14-hour or more work day, and a 6.5-day workweek, we knew we had an opportunity to try to do something important for our country — one that might not come again. (That said, I would have been happy to see even more State Department Arabists hasten to be "present at the creation.")

Jerry Bremer had to reassemble a myriad of ill-fitting, damaged, mutually antagonistic fragments into something resembling a working egg.

As for the WMD issue, frankly, it seemed non-germane to us. We all wished the estimable David Kay good luck, but were ourselves fully busy with each day's crises. And as our devoted human rights investigators brought forth fuller accounts of Saddam's mass graves, "Operation Iraqi Freedom" was seen by us as necessary, justified and even overdue.

Siamese Twins

Central to the CPA experience and its ultimate success will have been the Authority's "Siamese twin" relationship with the U.S. military. Our military headquarters (Joint Task Force 7) were co-located in the palace with Ambassador Bremer. Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez sat immediately to Bremer's left at the daily staff meeting.

Speaking as a former draftee into the infantry, and as an FSO who has worked closely with the U.S. military in several assignments, it would exhaust the *Oxford English Dictionary* to describe my admiration for the soldiers with whom I worked. Our officers and enlisted personnel were smart, proficient, enterprising, disciplined, stoic and enduring. In the early morning, I'd see them load up into their solar ovens, aka Humvees, and head off for a 12-hour day of patrols. In mid-June, our office temperature hit 100 F, while outside it reached 122 F in the shade! When I asked a senior officer how our people could endure these conditions, he laconically answered, "They're young, strong, drink a lot of water, and adapt."

Our female soldiers were great "change agents." The sight of a female soldier, behind a 40-mm. grenade launcher, her blonde pony tail showing under a Kevlar helmet, made a wordless but eloquent statement about the U.S.A. Once, coming out of a meeting with a local ayatollah, I found the female MP in my security detail surrounded by a worshipful crowd of Iraqi girls. Had Iraq been a Catholic country, word might have spread: "Our Lady of Fatima has been sighted in northwest Baghdad."

At night, the enlisted men would use my "enabled phone" for calls to the United States. Only a stone could remain unmoved by these conversations. I'll never forget the sergeant who broke the news to his wife that his unit's duty had been extended for six months. Her distress was audible throughout the office. His mild response, was, "Honey, you don't have to shout. I hear you just fine." Then he listened for a long while. Finally, he said gently, and with great seriousness, "Honey, you know what my job is here and I'm going to do it. But don't worry. We've got the best platoon in the company. We look after each other. And, honey, please think of all the money we're saving. And you know what? When I come home, I'll buy you that car."

Actions Taken, and Not Taken

Jerry Bremer took charge convincingly. Less than a week after his arrival in May 2003 he transformed the future of Iraqi politics by dissolving the Iraqi Army and the Ba'th Party. Of the eleven degrees of "Ba'th-hood," those members in the top five were excluded from further government employment (with limited opportunities for appeal). Both decisions have been criticized, but such criticism is wrongheaded and ahistorical.

First of all, it is worth noting that well before Bremer acted, the Iraqi Army had already doffed its uniforms, (mostly) thrown away its weapons, and melted back into the civilian population. To us at the CPA it would have undercut our own war effort had we immediately called Saddam's army back to work. And what would the U.S. public have said? In time, matters changed. Since then, we have, first slowly, and now with increasing speed, begun to re-establish an Iraqi security force. To some degree our hand has been pushed by a changing time frame, but the Army's initial dissolution gave us a chance

to make a fresh and certainly less tainted job of rebuilding.

The dissolution of the Nazi — I mean Ba'th — Party in "Operation Round-Up Ready" has also been described as an error. There is talk about valuable talent purportedly lost to the "New Iraq" because the state will be denied the services of certain school headmistresses or hospital administrators. Those affected supposedly joined the party under duress, or for nonpolitical reasons. These claims are often factually wrong, and in any case are not germane. We had to seize the moment and move fast to root out a profoundly rotten governing structure. Flowers may well have been lost along with the brambles. Revolutions are not nuanced, and that is just what we were trying to carry out in the first few months of the CPA. (Shiite leaders, on the other hand, believe the CPA has been too forbearing in its pursuit and punishment of former Ba'this.)

The Ba'th Party's structures, however, extended too far, and too deep, into Iraqi society to be sufficiently eradicated by the CPA. Our first efforts in this regard, though, will have helped any new Iraqi government over some of the most painful early stages of political purification. In the end, it will be up to the Iraqis to see de-Ba'thification through to whatever extent they wish or deem necessary.

Regrettably, two other important measures are likely to be delayed. One is the thoroughgoing rationalization of Iraq's inefficient economy and agriculture. Of several hundred Saddam-era government-owned enterprises, only a minority could survive in an open market economy. Allowing Adam Smith to have his way, however, would throw innumerable urban workers out on the street. Something similar is true of agriculture: Iraq used to grow its own food, and was among the world's leading exporters of dates. Saddam, though, was more concerned with control than productivity. Iraqi farmers became accustomed to guaranteed, subsidized agricultural inputs, and a guaranteed market (at inflated prices) for their crops. Meanwhile, Iraq came to import 60 percent of its foodstuffs. Date exports were negligible. Today, Iraqi farmers would be crushed by "globalized" competitors. The CPA does not want a wave of "Okies" moving from their abandoned farms into Baghdad and other cities. Accordingly, it seems likely that Iraq's economy and agriculture will both, for the time being, be spared the surgeon's knife.

A second is the CPA's reluctance to confront the challenge of certain radical Shiite clergy. Iraq's Shiites have traditionally been led by "grand ayatollahs," who have traditionally preferred a moral and pastoral role over direct involvement in politics. The current leader of Iraq's Shiites is Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Of Persian origin, Sistani survived the Saddam years due to his great prestige, and more importantly, by avoiding direct conflict with the Ba'thi government. Some colleagues of Sistani's who were almost as august, but more "political," did not. One was executed by having nails driven into his skull, another by having acid injected into his brain.

The attitude of the grand ayatollahs toward the CPA was, in the main, discreetly welcoming. Increasingly, though, these quietists are being challenged by younger, less erudite, and more radical junior clergy and would-be clergy. Their leader, Muqtada al-Sadr, has scant religious qualifications, but bears an honored name. He is also a prime suspect in the murder of a religious rival, the son of Sistani's mentor, Grand Ayatollah Abd al-Majid al-Khoi. Justice for him will probably come — if ever — at the hands of a future Iraqi administration. It would seem as if action now against him, by the CPA, would be too inflammatory. He and his followers will cause trouble for the CPA and any future Iraqi government.

The Governing Council

In July 2003, Jerry Bremer appointed a 25-person "Governing Council" as a first step toward a future sovereign government of Iraq. The appointment of its members followed months of negotiations with various Iraqi constituencies. The process was similar to a college admission's office putting together a balanced class of good performers. The GC includes a Christian, five Kurds, 13 Arab Shiites, and five Arab Sunnis. Twenty-two of its initial members were men, and three were women. The council was given substantial power, including such tasks as drawing up the 2004 budget, overseeing the ministries, and rebuilding the military.

A second step was the announcement on Nov. 15 that the council, in consultation with Amb. Bremer, had decided on "the process to form a constitutional convention to draft a permanent constitution" and to set out a new timeline by which the CPA will transfer sovereignty by July 1, 2004. Prior to that, the Governing Council is to draft a "fundamental law" in consultation with the CPA, specifying a Bill of Rights, and a timetable for drafting and ratifying a permanent constitution. Elections for a permanent

Iraqi government were set for Dec. 31, 2005; meanwhile, a Transitional Assembly, a substantial expansion of the GC, would begin to govern Iraq as of May 31, 2004.

Looking ahead, the transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis on July 1 will not and cannot change. That is an action which once announced, cannot be recalled by a serious, major participant in world politics, such as the U.S. The modalities outlined above, however, whereby Iraqis implement their sovereignty, may change. Concessions may have to be made to the demand of Grand Ayatollah Sistani that the new government be chosen by direct elections. The CPA maintains that because Iraq lacks an electoral law, defined electoral constituencies, and a current census, there isn't time enough to organize direct elections. Security could be a problem, too. Various compromises may be offered, some perhaps involving the United Nations. But many Iraqis, and not just the CPA, believe Iraq's political future would be off to a bad start were it to begin with major concessions to an unelected churchman — who himself may be influenced by the voices of younger, radical rivals.

"Operation Iraqi Freedom" was seen by us as necessary, justified and even overdue.

Looking ahead, we may intend a certain kind of sovereignty for Iraq: one that is sovereign, indeed, but where, at the same time, coalition forces are welcome, human rights are respected, and the political system is democratic. These codicils to Iraq's independence are all worthy, but either a country is independent or it is not. In the coming months it may be hard to direct into responsible channels the exuberant dynamics we have loosed.

Arab politics has a term: "Muzaayadah," or "overbidding;" i.e., whatever your opponent says or offers, go him one better. As July 1 nears, there will be elbowing and

high-sticking, as parties and individuals try to position themselves advantageously by appeals to Iraqi nationalism. I can foresee the "Green Zone," Baghdad's four square miles of heavily guarded real estate that house the CPA headquarters and other facilities, becoming the irritation to Iraqis that the "Canal Zone" was to the Egyptians. Egyptian demagogues used the "Zone" issue to silence their moderate opponents, and eventually, the Egyptians nationalized the canal.

The interval between the transfer of sovereignty to the Transitional Assembly and the establishment of the new, permanent Iraqi government could be a time of risk and instability. The Governing Council will be gone, and the TA, an untried body, must run the country, draft a constitution, conduct a referendum, and then make way for national elections and a legitimate, elected new Iraqi government. This process has many, many moving parts. It can easily go wrong. Prominent moderates on the council, such as Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaei, Iyyad Allawi, Ghazi al-Yaqir and Adnan Pachachi, will have their hands full. The assassination of Dr. Aqila al-Hashimi — a brilliant woman scholar diplomat, a Shiite, and a descendant of the Prophet, was a loss to peace. She has not yet been replaced.

Iraq is short on homegrown leaders. Saddam saw to that. One nonetheless hopes that the former exiles now on the GC may fuse their acumen and international experience with the legitimacy of domestic religious leaders — and thereby create a more workable basis for governance than that of most Middle Eastern nations. Iraq's Shiites should ignore their extremists and seize the "pretty good deal" that we have offered them. They should remember the tragedy that befell their community after the early 1920s, when they shunned participation in the British-controlled administration of Mesopotamia.

Reasons for Optimism

I believe the near future for Iraq looks good. As long as Saddam Hussein, a sort of human trapdoor spider, eluded capture, Sunnis could continue to hope to return to power. And the Shia — despite all our assurances — could not really believe that "He whose name must not be mentioned" might not somehow re-emerge. But now that he has been apprehended, there is no chance at all for a Ba'thi restoration.

Saddam's capture shows the success of our strategy toward the Sunni terrorists. We have correctly begun from the premise that there is little we can do to reconcile their community to the loss of power and privilege they enjoyed for four hundred years. Many Sunnis did not like Saddam — but even to them, he was a bulwark against the Shiites and the Kurds. Our policies of firmness are making the point to Sunni leaders that fruitless resistance is more costly than grudging compliance. As this message is comprehended, it will be time to offer "nation-building" inducements. As for the argument that our policies stimulate Sunni humiliation and anger, Iraqi Shia, at least, would point to the nearest mass grave.

The Iraqi and foreign terrorists, meanwhile, lack strategic advantages: They have no foreign refuge, and the cities from which they operate are scattered across a flat, open tableland. There are no jungles in Iraq. Iraqi Sunnis are surrounded by 20 million hostile or indifferent Shiites or Kurds. Meanwhile, as we painstakingly process lots of information, and develop valuable, actionable intelligence, our superior training and weaponry will grind down the opposition, and discourage its supporters. Wars are never won by periodic suicide bombings.

Responsible Sunni leaders should urge their community to come to terms soon with the new reality (although threats from radical elements won't make such a policy easy). The opportunity for a "smoother merge" with the rest of Iraq's population is surely greater while the CPA and the U.S. Army can act as referees, than it will be after July 1. Thereafter, Iraq's Shia, who have been astonishingly non-vengeful up to now, might be prompted to make their superiority in number more emphatically felt.

The Longer Term Is Up to the Iraqis

The Iraqis will not be ready for the challenge of independence. Saddam left a deep psychological imprint upon his subjects. It would take almost a generation of mandate-style colonialism to detoxify their politics and their psychology. But alas! There are no political dialysis machines. And the U.N.'s mandate commission is out of order. A body that can barely handle the former West Irian could not deal with a challenge so many times greater. After July 1, though, we'll honestly be able to say to ourselves, and to the world, that we left Iraq freer than we found it, that we showed an altruism that may be incomprehensible to the peoples of the Middle East, and that we gave the Iraqis a new chance to plot their destiny and make their own mistakes.

After July 1, there will be much that we and the Iraqis must work at together. Our continued military presence

and our economic support will give us influence — but can also become the object of hostility and opposition. We must be adroit diplomats and sensitive to Iraqi nationalism, lest we reawaken memories of CENTO and the Baghdad Pact. But we can continue our close "technical cooperation" in every field, especially the military and security. We can offer help in drafting a constitution, and (especially when oil revenues pick up) we must steadily push the new government toward honesty, transparency and performance. In Sudan, after the 16-year dictatorship of Muhammed Gaafur al-Nimeiry was overthrown in 1985, the head of the opposition said to me, "Democracy is a sacred cow, but if that cow does not produce milk, it will be slaughtered." And sure enough, when Sudan's democratic government proved to be no more effective than Nimeiry's, another military man seized power two years later.

The transfer of sovereignty to Iraqis on July 1 will not and cannot change. But the modalities may change.

But even with our best efforts, what happens in Iraq will depend on the Iraqis themselves. Privately, quite a few of them would like to see the U.S. occupation go on for another year, or two, or longer. But such hopes are unrealistic. And were they not, a prolongation of the U.S. administration would be immaterial to Iraq's success or failure. Success or failure in development depends more on what the recipient brings to the process, than anything that a foreign power can confer. On the one hand, there is Korea, and Singapore, and Germany, and Japan. On the other, are more countries than one cares to name. At an African post I once asked my able USAID director what "flagship" project we could show off to a visiting Cabinet officer. The director sadly advised that despite more than 20 years of substantial U.S. aid, there were none.

The bad prognostications may indeed come to pass: Iraq's future administrations may find themselves overwhelmed by corruption, regional separatism and sectarian strife. If that happens, given the reality of the development process and current international circumstances, we couldn't have done anything about it in the first place. But whatever happens, Iraqis will be better off than they were before. Nothing can ever be as bad as Saddam.

Despite the external threats, a 14-hour or more work day, and a 6.5-day workweek, we knew we had an opportunity to try to do something important.

Pessimists might ponder the "Glorious 13th of July." On that day the new Governing Council took its first decision: it declared April 9, the day of Baghdad's fall to coalition forces, a national holiday. That night, I wrote to Jerry Bremer: "What a marvelously brave, anomalous, self-respecting, confident gesture by an Arab government! Imagine, an Arab nation celebrating the defeat of its former regime by an Anglo-American-Australian coalition! Have years of suffering and exile made the new government of Iraq less sensitive, less allergic to confronting the baloney that has passed for political consensus in the Arab world for more than a half-century? After the sticks and stones of the mass graves at Hilleh, what should the Governing Council care about harsh words from their Arab 'brethren'?

"From now on the Iraqis have the moral high ground. No other Arabs 'will have their number.' To me, for a day at least, it is as if the sun has broken through the cloud bank of reflexive, defensive BS that blankets the political and intellectual life of the Arab world."

The Impossible Dream?

Even partial success by a future Iraqi government,

moreover, could be of very great consequence for the region and the world. Iraq's new leaders may have learned something from the harsh schooling of the past half-century. These leaders, furthermore, and especially the Shiite laymen on the Governing Council, and their spiritual mentors in Najaf, are more intellectually open to the modern world than are their Arab Sunni counterparts almost anywhere else. Neither the Shiite leaders nor the Kurds are contaminated by that distemper toward the West that is so common among active Muslim religious elements in Riyadh, Cairo, London, Paris, and almost everywhere else. No Crusaders filled Hilleh's mass graves. In my conversations, the topic of Israel almost never arose; Palestinians were dismissed as toadies of Saddam. Fellow Arabists will understand the impact such an omission of the Arab world's favorite "compulsory figures" had on me.

The CPA's work proves that if good people are given first-class leadership, an important mission and sufficient resources, morale will take care of itself.

Nor do I see any prospect of Iraq lurching toward some sort of Khomeini-like theocracy. The Iranian experiment is discredited among most Iraqi Shiites, and those who for nine years fought against Iran under Saddam won't change sides now. Accordingly, one can hope that even a halfway stable and moderately democratic Iraq will eventually establish cooperative relations with a more democratic Iran.

And then to hope further, might those two states, together with Israel and Turkey, shift for the better the strategic, military and intellectual climate of the Middle East, and help other Arabs and Muslims to rejoin not the Western, but the modern world? ■

Can the United States Export Democracy to Iraq?



Adam Niklewicz

Struggling to implant a democratic system in Iraq, the U.S. is being forced by political reality to make significant concessions.

By Marina Ottaway

In a word, no. The United States cannot "export democracy" to Iraq. It may set in motion a political process eventually leading to a more open political system in Iraq, but only if it gives up the idea of exporting a ready-made democratic system. The political reality of Iraq has been slowly but relentlessly driving home this basic truth.

At this writing, the high expectations of exporting democracy to Iraq evident at the beginning of the war have been progressively whittled down. The United States is still struggling to implant a political system based on

democratic institutions and values, but is being forced by reality to make significant concessions. Before examining this in more detail, it is useful to review the building blocks of "democracy" as we know it.

Values are difficult to export because they change slowly and unevenly.

The Architecture of Democracy

The political system we call democracy has three major components: institutions, values, and a balance of political forces. The institutional design of democracy is well-known and seemingly easy to pass on to other countries. In a democratic system power resides in the political institutions, not in individuals — in the presidency rather than the president. Thus, power cannot be monopolized by an individual and it cannot be inherited. Competitive, open elections determine who occupies positions of power. As an additional guarantee against tyranny, power is not concentrated in one institution but divided among three sets of institutions designed to counterbalance each other.

This institutional design has been exported many times, for example, by the United States to the Philippines, Germany and Japan, as well as by France and Britain to all their former colonies. But in most cases the exported institutions did not take root — Germany and Japan, always invoked as examples, are notable because they are the exception, not the rule. The democratic institutions France and Britain sought to implant in their colonies before giving them independence rarely survived, with India being the most notable exception.

Part of the reason for the failure of exported institutions is the absence of appropriate values to underpin them. Values are difficult to export because they change slowly and unevenly. It took the United States almost two centuries after the Declaration of Independence to institute full civil and political rights for all its citizens. But in the meantime, it had functioning democratic institutions. Separation of church and state, another fundamental principle of democracy, in reality remains contested terrain to this day in the U.S. Given its own history and present tensions, the idea that the United States can easily and quickly export democratic values lacks realism.

But the most challenging problem for those who would like to see democracy become a major American export product lies in the political requirements for democracy to flourish — in particular, the existence of a balance of power among countervailing forces. The United States has tried at times to alter the balance of power in other countries. During the Cold War, for example, the U.S. provided funds to anti-communist parties and supported friendly strongmen. More recently, it has sought to influence the outcome of elections in some countries by supporting social organizations within civil society that purportedly aim at getting out the vote and monitoring elections but, in reality, try to mobilize voters against the incumbent regime. Support for NGOs and democratic parties helped defeat Slobodan Milosevic in Yugoslavia in 2000, for example. But the impact of such intervention is often short-lived, as the resurgence of radical nationalism in Yugoslavia three years after the defeat of Milosevic shows.

The Challenge in Iraq

At first glance, designing democratic institutions for Iraq would appear relatively easy. There is no longer an entrenched incumbent government to oppose reform; on the contrary, with Saddam gone and the Ba'th Party disbanded, the country presents an institutional vacuum ready to be filled. Furthermore, Iraqi political parties agree on the basic principles of elected institutions and separation of powers. Contrary to the expectations of many observers, the most vocal champions of electoral democracy in Iraq at this point are Shia and Sunni clerics — above all Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has challenged the United States' current transition plan because it does not call for an elected transitional assembly.

Institutional consensus breaks down, however, on the issue of federalism. Few argue that Iraq should not have a federal system. But the United States and many Iraqis, particularly westernized former exiles, believe that federalism should be based on states that are sim-

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ply geographic subdivisions, like the present 18 provinces, not territories to which particular ethnic or religious groups lay a claim. The Kurds, on the other hand, view federalism as a system that would guarantee the autonomy of Kurdistan, which they see not as another administrative subdivision of the country but as the homeland of the Kurdish nation. The Coalition Provisional Authority has already been forced to accept that the Kurds will retain their present de facto autonomy for the time being, realizing that unless the Kurds get what they want, the entire transition process would stall. Thus, agreeing on a permanent design for the federal system is the major institutional challenge Iraq faces.

A tension is emerging in Iraq between the ideal of democracy based on individual rights and a system that gives de facto recognition to group rights.

Some democratic values are accepted, at least in theory, by all major political players. No significant party openly contests the proposition that all citizens, including women, should have equal rights, and that political and civil liberties should be safeguarded. In practice, however, these democratic values are challenged by the determination of some political players to root the state in Islam and by the creeping practice of group representation that has become the norm under the American occupation.

The issue of the relation of Islam to the state is a delicate matter in Iraq. Although some Iraqis, and certainly the United States, would prefer a secular state, it is a foregone conclusion that the constitution will have to recognize that Iraq is a Muslim country. Such recognition will open up the question of whether Islamic law, the sharia, should underpin the entire legal system of modern Iraq. How much the country will be dominated by Islamic values rather than democratic ones is a question that will be determined much more by election results than by what is written in the constitution. The fact that some Shia clerics have already emerged as major political figures and Sunni clerics have responded by organizing their own shura council shows that there will be a complicated relationship and much tension between democratic and Islamic values in Iraq.

Political Facts of Life

Finally, a tension is emerging in Iraq between the ideal of democracy based on individual rights and a system that gives de facto recognition to group rights. This is an issue that has received insufficient attention to date, but that is likely to become more prominent in the future because group representation and group rights have become a fact of life under the American occupation. The United States rejects the concept of group rights and fights against the inclusion of any provisions implying recognition of group rights in any international convention or agreement. However, in trying to introduce some semblance of representation for Iraqis under the occupation, the United States turned to a form of group representation. The Governing Council has been meticulously crafted to provide representation for all ethnic and religious groups (and at least a token presence for women), as have local and provincial councils.

Such an ethnic and confessional balancing act may have been inevitable under the circumstances, but it has created a precedent that may have lasting consequences for Iraq. Already, Iraqi politics is discussed even in the United States in terms of the size of ethnic and religious groups rather than the strength of political parties. For example, commentators invariably suggest that elections in Iraq would lead to Shia domination, because the Shia represent about 60 percent of the population. Yet the fact that there are many political parties in Iraq, including several Shia Islamist parties and at least at least one Shia secular party, does not figure in most discussion of probable election outcomes.

But the most difficult obstacle to democracy in Iraq is neither institutions nor values, although both pose considerable challenges. Rather, it is the balance of power. Is there a sufficient array of political forces to ensure that the country will not fall again under the control of one strong man or one political party? The considerable number of parties in the Governing Council and outside it, coupled with the emergence of

civil society organizations that will multiply rapidly as foreign funding becomes available, suggests a healthy pluralism capable of supporting democracy and preventing any one group from imposing its will on the others.

But political parties and organizations of civil society are not the only, and possibly not even the major, political forces in Iraq. Kurds have their own state apparatus, complete with an army. Individual clerics wield considerable power, and so do tribal leaders. Some of the parties and some of the clerics, furthermore, have their own armed militias. Nobody has any clear idea how much support any of the players would receive in free and fair elections, and how much power they would be able to exert by nondemocratic means, be it the issuing of fatwas (religious edicts) or the force of arms. Thus, while political pluralism is undoubtedly a characteristic of today's Iraq, this pluralism is not a guarantee of democracy.

Nobody has any clear idea how much support any of the players would receive in free and fair elections, and how much power they would be able to exert by nondemocratic means.

Changing Course

U.S. plans for exporting democracy to Iraq have evolved considerably since the occupation. In the early phase, even before the war started, the United States envisaged exporting democracy as a ready-made system, in a process analogous to that used in Germany and Japan after World War II. Under a protracted American occupation, American experts would draft the constitution, build up the institutions, and start the process of economic restructuring. When sovereignty was returned to Iraq, at least two years after the beginning of the occupation, Iraq would have a well-designed, functioning system in place.

Because Americans envisaged a lengthy occupation, Iraqi participation in the running of the country was extremely limited in the first months after the war. The CPA and the military's civil affairs teams concentrated their institution-building efforts largely at the local level, setting up councils in all major towns and, somewhat later, in all provinces as well as in neighborhoods of the larger cities. With no power and no revenue of their own, except what they received in small grants, the councils were essentially advisory groups that provided an Iraqi presence alongside the American occupation authorities. In June, the CPA also started discussing the creation of a national-level Iraqi Advisory Council with similar, limited functions.

Events soon forced a rethinking of the initial plan. With opposition to the U.S. occupation mounting, the Bush administration decided it had to grant Iraqis a greater role immediately, and that it had to speed up the formation of a credible Iraqi government to which sovereignty could be returned. As a first step, the Advisory Council was renamed the Governing Council in an attempt to reassure the population that Iraqis were beginning to take responsibility for the running of the country. At the same time, the Bush administration devised a new plan for accelerating the formation of an Iraqi government.

In September, the administration announced that a constitution would be adopted within six months, and that elections would be held in the summer of 2004, allowing the formal return of sovereignty to Iraq well ahead of the U.S. presidential elections. While the CPA still believed that American experts should play a major role in writing the constitution, to help export democratic institutions to Iraq, it also tried to increase Iraqi participation in the process. Toward that end, it asked the Governing Council to form a committee that would devise the process for writing the constitution.

The committee could not agree on a process, however, and furthermore concluded that the writing of the constitution would require at least one year. This led the Bush administration to change tack again, reaching an agreement with the Iraqi Governing Council in mid-November on yet another plan for transferring sovereignty to an Iraqi government. Three aspects of this plan are noteworthy. First, it was negotiated with the Governing Council, an unprecedented recognition that the U.S. could no longer unilaterally announce plans for Iraq as it had done until then. Second, it proposed a two-stage process to

arrive at a democratic system in Iraq. Third, despite the previous setbacks, the plan still aimed at exporting a U.S.-designed democratic system to Iraq.

The Revised Plan Meets Reality

The first stage of the envisaged process includes the writing of an interim constitution (called first Basic Law, then Fundamental Law, and, at the time of this writing, Transitional Administrative Law), and the formation, perhaps through regional caucuses, of a transitional assembly that would, in turn, choose an interim government. At the end of the first phase, in June 2004, the United States would officially restore the sovereignty of Iraq. The second stage, between March and December 2005, includes the election of a constituent assembly, the approval by that assembly of a permanent constitution, a nationwide process of consultation on the proposed constitution, its approval in a referendum, and, finally, the election of a national assembly.

Compared to previous plans dictated by the United States, the agreement proposed a much more democratic process. Nevertheless, several factors indicate clearly that the Bush administration still hopes to be able to export to Iraq a political system of its own design. Amb. Jerry Bremer, the head of the CPA, made it clear, for example, that the United States would play a major role in writing the interim constitution, embedding in it essential institutions and values the permanent constitution would have to respect. Thus, by the time the elected constituent assembly drafted the permanent document, the major issues would already have been decided. In another indication that the United States intended to use the writing of the interim constitution to export a ready-made system to Iraq, a number of American experts on constitutional law and democracy were hired to work as consultants to the CPA after the plan was announced.

Finally, the timetable set out in the agreement left no doubt that the permanent constitution would be largely written before the constituent assembly was elected: the plan only allows a paltry nine months between the election of the constituent assembly in March 2005 and the election of the new national assembly by December 2005. This is certainly not adequate time to write a constitution, hold a true national consultation about it, submit it to a referendum, put in place the new electoral system required by the constitution and, finally, organize elections for a national assembly.

It is now clear that the United States cannot use a prolonged occupation to impose the system it favors, as it did in Germany and Japan.

Since the agreement was reached last November, the plan to impose on Iraq the institutional model of democracy and the values favored by the United States has been dashed again by the reality of the balance of power in the country. The idea of a U.S.-style federal system composed of 18 provinces has been undermined by the Kurds' insistence that Kurdistan must maintain the autonomy gained during the 1990s. The U.S. was forced to accede to this demand by the realization that unless it did so, the entire transition timetable, and possibly the entire plan, would be in jeopardy. While the recognition of an autonomous Kurdistan is supposedly just an interim measure, it will probably be impossible to reverse in the future.

The balance of power has also forced a so-far-unsuccessful process of negotiations between the CPA and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has no official role but does have a substantial following, and threatens to undermine the transition plan by insisting that even the transitional assembly must be elected. Finally, the balance of power in the country has already made it a foregone conclusion that the interim constitution will have to recognize a special place for Islam in the Iraqi state, another departure from the secular model the U.S. would like to implant there.

It is now clear that the United States cannot use a prolonged occupation to impose the system it favors, as it did in Germany and Japan. It is equally clear that the United States does not have strong, pro-democracy partners with whom to work, as it had in Germany; it does not even have a cooperative, weakened authority figure, as the Japanese emperor proved to be. The exiles on whom the United States initially counted for implanting democracy in Iraq are struggling to establish their legit-

imacy and their political network in a country from which they have been absent too long. This makes the idea of exporting a ready-made model of democracy, unrealistic in any country, particularly far-fetched in Iraq.

Setting an Example

But renouncing the impossible goal of exporting a ready-made set of institutions and values to Iraq does not mean giving up on the possibility of helping nurture a more open political system there. While it still has a large degree of control, the U.S. can try to implant in Iraq the idea that the formation of a political system must be the result of a process of consultation and negotiation among the major political forces. In this sense, it is good that the CPA has been forced by reality to recalibrate its expectations of exporting its vision of democracy to Iraq and is itself negotiating and compromising on major political issues.

Finally, the balance of power in the country has already made it a foregone conclusion that the interim constitution will have to recognize a special place for Islam in the Iraqi state.

Ready-made constitutions and institutions imposed from the outside rarely survive the encounter with the reality of political power. The political systems that survive are those that represent a compromise between lofty political principles and political reality, as the U.S. Constitution does. If the United States can start a process leading to compromise, it will make more progress in moving Iraq in the direction of democracy than if it had succeeded in imposing even the best-written constitution. ■

FROM INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TO "CITIZEN WATCHDOG"

Adam Niklewicz

INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS WERE MISUSED, BOTH BY THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP OF THE CIA AND BY THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF THE COUNTRY — NOT THE OTHER WAY AROUND.

BY GREG THIELMANN

It all started with a sentence in *The New York Times*. In his column on May 30, 2003, Nicholas Kristof quoted a remark I had made to him in an earlier phone conversation: "The al-Qaida connection and the nuclear weapons issue were the only two ways that you could link Iraq to an imminent security threat to the U.S., and the administration was grossly distorting the intelligence on both things." By the end of that day, I had received a barrage of interview requests from television, radio and the print media, from American and foreign entities.

Two factors combined to create such an intense level of press interest in hearing the views of an obscure former mid-level State Department official. Even as the U.S. military rapidly established control over the Iraqi battlefield, it was beginning to become clear that the situation in Iraq was not unfolding the way the Bush administration had led the American people to expect. There were no "weapons of mass destruction," but there was continuing armed resistance to the Anglo-American occupation of Iraq, resulting in an ever-lengthening list of American dead and wounded. While there were anonymous voices from inside government whispering about how intelligence had been distorted to justify the war, the public had previously seen no names attached to these accusations.

While the U.S. intelligence community has much to answer for, the buck should stop with the president.

As a 25-year veteran of the U.S. Foreign Service, I was not a stranger to encounters with the public and with the press, but most of my work during those years was in the classified realm and most of my advice and analysis was for official consumption only. I had internalized a professional code of conduct designed to protect the sources and methods used to acquire intelligence secrets and to encourage frank and open policy deliberations inside government. I was concerned about inadvertently stepping over the line in discussing subjects dealing with classified information. I was worried about being imprecise in describing the timing of events or the language used in analyses — particularly since I no longer had access to my chronological files or to relevant official documents. The possibility that I would unfairly characterize the work of esteemed colleagues or superiors also weighed heavily on me.

Greg Thielmann entered the Foreign Service in 1977, specializing in arms control and security issues during his 25-year career. In his last tour, before retiring from the Service in September 2002, he was acting director of the Office of Analysis for Strategic, Proliferation, and Military Issues in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. He is now writing and lecturing on the use of intelligence in defense and foreign policy.

Speaking Out

The week following the reference to me in *The New York Times*, I was quoted in a ground-breaking story in *Newsweek*, bannered on the cover with the words: "Iraq's Weapons: How Bush Hyped the Threat." While I declined many of the subsequent media requests, I gradually became more comfortable explaining the reasons for my criticism of the administration's justification for the war. In June 2003, I was interviewed by Bill Moyers for his "Now" program on PBS. In July, I participated in a press conference sponsored by the Arms Control Association, laying out my thoughts on the relative culpability of the political leadership and the intelligence community in misleading the public about the threat from Iraq. Within the next few weeks, I had long discussions with the staffs of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In October, I appeared on PBS's "Frontline" ("War, Truth and Consequences"), CBS's "60 Minutes II" ("The Man Who Knew") and in Seymour Hersh's *New Yorker* article, "The Stovepipe."

In spite of my growing confidence in being able to handle unanticipated questions from the press, I was nonetheless taken aback when a Colombian radio reporter asked why I had waited so long to go public with my story. If I had had information contrary to the administration's account, he implied, did I not have a moral obligation to present it while the war could still have been prevented? My defensive and unconvincing response led me later to ponder the question in a more rigorous way.

I reflected on my initial surprise and anger at the statements made by Vice President Cheney to the VFW in August 2002 and President Bush to the U.N. General Assembly in September. Just as I was leaving government, the administration seemed to be abandoning all scruples in exaggerating the nature of the Iraqi threat to the American people. The president and his aides were exploiting the fear of a nation still traumatized by 9/11 with unjustified speculations that Iraq could have nuclear weapons "within months" and ominous warnings that the first smoking gun could be

in the form of a mushroom cloud — assertions that had no basis in the sober assessments of intelligence professionals.

President Bush announced to the world the interception of high-strength aluminum tubes bound for Iraq in a way that implied there was no doubt the tubes were headed for Saddam's nuclear weapons program. The truth was that the destination of the tubes had been debated intensely within the U.S. government for months. Both the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and the Department of Energy, based on the analyses of the most knowledgeable experts at the national laboratories, judged these particular tubes unsuited for use in centrifuges to enrich uranium, and concluded that they were more likely intended for the casings of conventional artillery rockets — an assessment subsequently proven to be correct. The National Intelligence Council and White House spokesmen acknowledged differences of opinion in response to press inquiries, but publicly minimized the significance of the official INR and DOE institutional assessments as merely the views of "some analysts."

Just as I was leaving government service in the fall of 2002, the administration seemed to be abandoning all scruples in exaggerating the Iraqi threat.

Even as the path to further progress on the enforcement of U.N. Security Council resolutions was reopened with the return of U.N. inspectors to Iraq in November, the administration ratcheted up its rhetoric. In his 2003 State of the Union address, President Bush publicly endorsed a British report on Iraqi attempts to procure uranium ore from Africa even though Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet had warned the White House by telephone and memorandum against using it three months earlier. In spite of the widespread doubts about the report that I remembered from INR's internal analysis early in 2002, the classified National Intelligence Assessment on Iraqi WMD in October of that year cited the report as key evidence that "Iraq had begun vigorously trying to procure uranium ore and yellowcake." The White House chose to publicize this dubious report some three months after the intelligence community had finally received the supposedly confirmatory source document, which was quickly recognized as a forgery when provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The resigning director of the U.S. Iraq Survey Group, David Kay, has implied that intelligence analysts were almost entirely responsible for public misunderstandings about Iraq. I believed then and believe now that the intelligence professionals were misused both by the senior leadership of the CIA and by the political leadership of the country. While the U.S. intelligence community has much to answer for, the buck should stop with the president who provided a polemic rather than an honest assessment to the American people on an issue of war and peace.

The last straw for me was the failure of the executive branch (and the Congress) to require from the intelligence community an updated assessment of Iraq's weapons programs following the reinsertion of U.N. inspectors. By the time the U.S. launched its attack on Iraq, the International Atomic Energy Agency had already exposed the forgery used to sustain the African uranium story. It had already concluded definitively that the aluminum tubes were not being used in Iraq's nuclear weapons program. U.N. inspectors on the ground had already been able to resolve ambiguities about the nature of some suspicious new construction at suspect sites detected by national technical means. And the inspectors were in the process of reversing Iraqi violations of U.N. restrictions on missile development. But a dormant nuclear program and a dismantled missile program were not what the administration needed to lead the nation to war. After all, Iraq's nuclear program — as the seed of the only real "weapon of mass destruction" — was the centerpiece of its campaign to raise the alarm about the urgent necessity of military action.

Trust but Verify

Once I had retired from the Foreign Service in September 2002, I did what I could to expose the serial distortions the administration was disseminating. I contributed information to a *U.S. News and World Report*

cover story, "Decision Time," in the Oct. 14, 2002 issue, agreeing to allow some of my comments to be quoted on the record. I wrote to Sen. John Warner, R-Va., chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, in response to his public comment that we had to trust the president on Iraqi WMD. Identifying myself as a constituent who had had access to the data in question, I urged him to heed Ronald Reagan's advice — "trust but verify" — when assessing President Bush's characterizations of the intelligence. And at the end of the month, I delivered an address to my alma mater, Grinnell College, urging that the U.S. government find its way back to "an honest discussion of issues, without deception." I warned that "if we attack Iraq without U.N. authorization, we will not receive the 80 percent of war costs from foreigners we did last time; U.S. taxpayers will foot the entire bill and the continuing costs of military occupation as well."

The last straw for me was the failure to obtain an updated assessment of Iraq's weapons programs following the reinsertion of U.N. inspectors.

In January 2003, I submitted a draft op-ed piece to the *Washington Post*, arguing that the administration's conflation of all three unconventional weapons categories under the "WMD" rubric was being used to scare people with mushroom clouds when the most troubling evidence involved the much less threatening chemical and biological weapons programs. After Secretary Powell's speech to the U.N. Security Council in February 2003, I wrote to my home state's principal newspaper, *The Des Moines Register*. I pointed out the "non-barking dog" in his speech, which the press seemed not to have noticed: Powell had not so much as mentioned the "uranium

from Africa" bombshell released by the president just eight days earlier. I concluded in my proposed article that for the Secretary of State to leave this out of an 85-minute elaboration on the evidence against Iraq had to mean he was rejecting its validity. Neither op-ed was accepted, however.

Unfortunately and ironically, the atmosphere during the lead-up to war was not propitious for good investigative journalism. The press was busily embedding itself in the U.S. military and discussing how the war was to be pursued. The 24-hour news channels were ramping up their ad campaigns for coverage of the war with martial music and dramatic footage of our forces in the field. Congress had already gone through an unwelcome vote on the issue in October 2002, and most members were not inclined to do so again. By February 2003, the advancing war was entering the stage when any questioning of the president was interpreted as withholding support for our troops. And the temperature in Iraq was rising daily.

Unfortunately, the atmosphere during the lead-up to war was not propitious for good investigative journalism.

Still, it was my hope that the passage of a strongly-worded U.N. resolution in November and the subsequent return of U.N. inspectors would obviate the need for military action, making such action politically unviable for the president. When, only weeks before the invasion, the U.N. succeeded in forcing Saddam to destroy his inventory of al-Samoud short-range ballistic missiles, which had demonstrated a range in excess of that allowed by U.N. restrictions, I felt that a critical corner had been turned. Surely the president would not proceed in the face of an increasingly tight inspections regime and the absence of Security Council support for an immediate

attack. But I was wrong, because I did not fully understand that, for the president, the WMD issue was an excuse rather than a real reason for war.

I remember wondering as I headed home to Arlington from the State Department on my last day as a Foreign Service officer what the future would hold during my upcoming "personal sabbatical." I would never have imagined that a year later, I would be heading to San Francisco to receive the 2003 "Citizen Watchdog Award" from the Center for Investigative Reporting for speaking out on distortions by government.

For President Bush, the WMD issue was an excuse rather than a real reason for war.

The Center described me as "the first member of America's intelligence community with active knowledge of the (Iraqi unconventional weapons) case to come forward and publicly question the way intelligence was used to make the argument for war." My acceptance remarks included these words: "I came of age in the era of the Vietnam War — a war based on official deceptions. The failure of several administrations to speak honestly to the American people about Vietnam cast a long shadow over the 20th-century history of the United States. …

"At the beginning of a new century, and at the end of my own career, I witnessed how the Bush administration consistently distorted the intelligence information available to it in order to justify an attack on Iraq. … However beneficial the removal of Saddam Hussein proves to be for the Iraqi people, I believe the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq has weakened U.S. national security and has weakened American democracy. While making the best of a circumstance abroad we cannot undo, we must also seek to restore the integrity and credibility of our own government at home. Our democracy cannot otherwise flourish." ■

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM: THE ARAB REACTION

Adam Niklewicz

THE WAR AGAINST IRAQ HAS GREATLY EXACERBATED AN ALREADY WIDESPREAD MISTRUST OF THE U.S. IN THE ARAB AND MUSLIM WORLDS. HERE IS THE VIEW FROM EGYPT.

BY KHALED ABDULKAREEM

It is already one year since the U.S. military invasion of Iraq kicked off. The U.S. occupation forces are still in Iraq. And so is the resentment of those forces in the rest of the Arab world. A lot has changed since President George Bush gave the go-ahead for the unprecedented U.S. military occupation of an Arab country. There have been some changes for the worse, while admittedly there have been some good developments for the Iraqis, depending on who is talking. The one sure change for the worse, however, is the way the majority of Arabs and Muslims view the U.S.

In the weeks and months before the March 19, 2003, invasion, dubbed "Operation Iraqi Freedom" by Washington, the Bush administration's assertion that Iraq was determined to produce weapons of mass destruction and still possessed such weapons was touted to justify the war against Iraq. These claims were met with skepticism in the Middle East, where America's decades-old pro-Israel attitude had already undermined trust.

Now the worst-case scenario has presented itself. As Iraq's WMD program gradually moved from what Washington painted as an unquestionable fact to a fiction in the eyes of many, and a deliberate fabrication in the eyes of others, that which Arabs and Muslims both believed and feared has proved true: the world's only superpower was lying.

And if the world's superpower was lying in its justification for invading Iraq, this line of thought goes, it must be lying now while running Iraq and reshaping its future. And it may lie again to justify another invasion of any country apparently hostile to U.S. policies, countries such as Syria or Iran perhaps.

Simply put, the war against Iraq has greatly exacerbated an already widespread mistrust of the U.S. in the Arab and Muslim worlds.

A Growing Debate

While anti-war sentiments predominate in most Arab countries (with the exception of Kuwait), the past months have witnessed a growing debate on what happened, why it happened and what may happen to the Arab region in the coming years. After all, Iraq has always been a key Arab player.

Egypt, the most populous Arab country, saw massive anti-U.S. demonstrations in the run-up to the war. Organizing a rally in Egypt is not a free pass, whatever the cause. The Egyptian government puts tough restrictions on the expression of angry sentiments in public. Aware of the degree of anger during and after the war, however, the government allowed anti-war demonstrations — to avoid a worse, anti-government explosion. At one point, the ruling National Democratic Party organized anti-war demonstrations of its own as proof that the government's sentiments were with the people.

At one point, the ruling National Democratic Party organized anti-war demonstrations of its own as proof that the government's sentiments were with the people.

A year later, opposition to the war on the streets of Cairo is still intense. True, no massive demonstrations have been organized recently in the Egyptian capital, but the U.S. occupation of Iraq remains a sensitive subject for the public.

We do not find this clear consensus, however, among the elite. The Egyptian political scene has witnessed a tense clash between the liberals, who tacitly, and sometimes openly, backed the use of force in Iraq, and the leftists, nationalists and Islamists who vehemently opposed the war. "While keen on expressing its opposition to military action, the Egyptian government always drives the point home that Saddam Hussein's regime is to blame for the regional complications," says Hazem Mounir, an Egyptian journalist. "[And] liberals, on a massive scale, maintain that removing Saddam Hussein from power was impossible without outside intervention."

The war critics dub the war a flagrant American attempt to control oil resources in the Gulf region, reshape the Middle East according to its terms and serve Israeli interests. The high-sounding moral ideals of the Bush administration have never made sense or carried weight among the war critics in Egypt, or for that matter in the Arab and Muslim worlds at large.

What About Reform?

"One year after the invasion, there has not been a lot of change on the political stage in Egypt vis-à-vis the U.S. presence in Iraq," says Mounir, who works in the Cairo Bureau of the London-based *Al-Hayat*, a leading Arabic-language newspaper. "There is no daylight among politicians and commentators of different ideologies on the need to end the occupation." Mounir,

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however, says that the government, backed by some liberals, believes that elections should be held and Iraqi political structures put in place before U.S. troops leave. Those against the war from the very beginning want to see U.S. troops out immediately.

Some American pundits, along with top U.S. officials, argue that the occupation of Iraq may lead the way for a dramatic change in the Arab world toward democracy. Their belief is that the U.S.-led effort to draft a new constitution, hold free elections for a democratic government in Iraq and ensure respect for women will serve as a model for the rest of the Middle East. In the view of a prominent analyst associated with the call for reform in Egypt, however, it is having the opposite effect, stymieing the cautious moves toward reform already under way.

"Since the Iraq occupation, various political forces, including the Muslim fundamentalists, the nationalists and the professional associations, have developed a high sensitivity toward reform," says Abdel-Moneim Sa'id, director of the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, a leading semiofficial think tank in Egypt.

Sa'id says that the reforms are now seen either as a response to U.S. dictation or as a conscious move toward adopting the U.S. model of political and social reform — and both are unpopular among Egyptians.

Official Caution in Yemen

From the Arab world's most populous nations to Yemen, one of the poorest countries in the region, sentiment toward the continued U.S. occupation of Iraq is almost the same, though details of context differ. Yemen, which has had first-hand experience in what it means to take positions in regional conflicts, kept quiet on March 19, 2003. During the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis, Yemen had stood against the use of force against Iraq, and what was perceived as a pro-Saddam position had its price.

"Things were different this time," says Nabil al-Sofe, editor-in-chief of the Yemeni weekly *Al-Sahwa*. "This was due to the loss of one million Yemeni jobs in the Gulf states after the 1990-91 crisis, deterioration of Yemen's relations with its rich Gulf neighbors, the heavy blow suffered by the Yemeni economy and the worsening of living conditions," he explains.

The state-run media in Yemen were given stringent instructions to follow a clearly drafted line in covering developments in the war against Iraq. It was forbidden to refer to the U.S. military invasion as a "U.S. occupation of Iraq" or to describe Iraqi civilians killed in the war as "victims." At the same time, Yemen's Satellite Channel was to stay away from talking about any of the Arab countries contributing to the war, such as Kuwait or Qatar.

Even though Yemen was busy arranging for elections as the war in Iraq began, the invasion did not appear high in the run-up to the April 27, 2003, polling. And Yemen's Ba'thists, believed to be aligned with Saddam, did not get even one seat.

"Because the media in Yemen is extremely partisan, every group paints the war according to its politics," says al-Sofe. "Nationalists carry on with their fiery anti-American position, while the government-run media are suffering from a scandal because of the conflicting state instructions."

The Palestinian and Syrian Responses

For better or worse, the Palestinians are always in the spotlight. Despite attempts by the Palestinian Authority to disassociate the Palestinian cause from Saddam during the Iraq War, there were some pro-Saddam rallies in the Palestinian Territories.

"The invasion of Iraq has been a shock to the Palestinians. Saddam Hussein was known for his declared backing for the intifada and overt support for the Palestinians," says Rami Almeghari, editor at the Palestinian State Information Service. The pro-Israeli public relations machine used reports of Saddam's financial support for families of Palestinian suicide bombers, referred to in the region as martyrs, to demonize the Palestinians as "terrorists."

Though the Palestinian Authority has been extremely cautious in dealing with the war and reacting to the developments on the ground, Almeghari says, the Palestinians draw a similarity between the tactics of the U.S. occupation forces in Iraq and the Israeli occupation forces on their own soil.

Elsewhere, apart from the Iraqis themselves, the Syrians are most directly affected by the continued U.S. occupation of Iraq. Caught between the Israeli army occupying the Golan Heights in the west and the U.S. occupation army in Iraq to their east, the Syrians cannot help but think of both armies as one enemy.

"Every day that passes with the U.S. forces remaining in Iraq, negative sentiments of the Syrian people toward the U.S. move up. The people have no doubt now that the U.S. is simply serving the Zionist blueprint in the region, and that American calls for democracy are nothing but a Trojan horse," says Nabeel Saleh, a Syrian journalist.

According to Saleh, the worst-case scenario for the Syrians is the possibility that a civil war will flare up in Iraq: memories of the ferocious civil war in neighboring Lebanon are still very much alive.

Religion is back strongly on the scene, as is indicated by the fact that the number of women deciding to wear the Islamic headscarf (hijab) is on the rise.

Meanwhile, Kuwait, which has been granted the status of a non-NATO strategic ally of the U.S., stands out in stark contrast to this portrait of anger and mistrust. During the war, Kuwaitis staged pro-war rallies in the streets, while other Arabs shouted anti-U.S. slogans. In the months after the war, the Kuwaitis did not care to discuss whether or not the war was justified given that no weapons of mass destruction had been found. Instead, they are busy attacking pan-Arab nationalists, ridiculing members of the anti-occupation camp as "Saddam's orphans" and openly aligning themselves more with the U.S.

Liberals Isolated

Amid fears of future U.S. military adventures in the Arab region, people across the Arab and Muslim worlds have a heightened sense of their identity. Religion is back strongly on the scene, as indicated by the fact that the number of women deciding to wear the Islamic headscarf (hijab) is on the rise. Many Muslims are struggling against attempts to modernize the school curricula out of deep-seated fear that the Bush administration is behind the called-for changes in the educational systems to reduce the presence of religion in Muslim societies.

The war against Iraq has given rise to a heated debate between the Western-oriented liberals, who support the war and advocate U.S. policies, on the one hand, and the nationalists, Islamists and leftists, who have long-standing doubts about the "war on terror" and the invasion of Iraq.

For their part, liberals in the Arab world have taken the shock and anger over the Iraq War to signify the region's weakness and are calling for a distancing from many of the traditional values, nationalist ideals and Islamic teachings revered by the sweeping majority. "Arabs must stop dwelling in the past. They should reinvigorate their societies by shaking the rule of dictators, by modernizing Islam, by revitalizing the forces of enlightenment. America, despite its flaws, has helped the Iraqi people to get rid of the most brutal regime," says Said Ghazali, a Palestinian journalist resident in East Jerusalem.

"Few of the commentators, who are university academics, ex-generals and top former officials, have pointed to our own ailments. We only blame others. It is the fault of the West; it is the fault of the U.S. neo-conservatives; it is the fault of the Jewish lobby. At times we seem to revel in the role of persecuted and occupied victims," Ghazali wrote in *The Independent.*

Such voices appear in some electronic publications and newspapers in the Arab world, but they are not popular among Arabs and Muslims at large. In many cases, the proponents of such views cannot make them in public or on TV screens, but instead confine themselves to limited audiences.

The war in Iraq, meanwhile, has boosted the popularity of a prominent Egyptian writer, Fahmy Howeidi. Howeidi recently wrote a series of articles in *Al-Ahram* titled "Feud In Iraq," in which he accuses the U.S. of trying to divide Iraqis along sectarian and religious lines as part of a "divide-to-rule" strategy.

If anything, the U.S. invasion of Iraq has further fueled mistrust toward the U.S. among Arabs and Muslims. Coupled with a growing resentment of American policies, this lack of trust is not going to be rectified by launching U.S.-funded TV and radio stations to give the U.S. a facelift. Rather, there is a real need for a deep understanding of the region's grievances, a true desire to bridge gaps with Arabs and Muslims, and concrete moves toward a dramatic change in U.S. policies in the Middle East. That sounds like a far-fetched expectation. It's unavoidable, however. ■

ON THE GROUND IN POSTWAR IRAQ

Adam Niklewicz

FOREIGN SERVICE PERSONNEL AND THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS WHO HAVE SERVED IN POSTWAR IRAQ SHARE SOME OF THEIR EXPERIENCES.

Editor's Note: We recently sent an AFSANet message inviting Foreign Service personnel (and their family members) who have served in Iraq since the war to recount their experiences there. Some of their responses describe the physical, logistical and other challenges they have faced, and how they overcame or worked around them to do their jobs. Others focus on the texture of daily life in postwar Iraq. But they all exemplify the best traditions of the Foreign Service. Our thanks to all who shared their stories.

— Steven Alan Honley, Editor

Training for Baghdad

To help rebuild Iraq, what was the best training to work at Jay Garner's Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance? Arabic language? Certainly helpful, since many of Iraq's English-speaking civil servants, given their past associations, were looking for other employment. Iraqi history and area studies? Also useful, given the baffling duplication of political groups and the fog of ethno-religious politics, in which alliances change daily and outside powers back rival groups simultaneously. And don't forget about combat training: the chic fashion wear in Baghdad was a flak vest and Michael Dukakis-style helmet.

The chic fashion wear in Baghdad was a flak vest and Michael Dukakis-style helmet.

But all the above missed the essentials of coping with life in Baghdad in the earliest days of the ORHA: an Iraqi society that found itself without moorings after decades of rigid dictatorship; and staff living conditions that violated all standards of health and decency. What was the best training for that? For me, it was my experience over 20 years before: spending 75 days as an embassy political officer on the streets of post-revolutionary Iran in the summer and fall of 1979; and then spending 444 days, beginning Nov. 4, 1979, in the Ayatollah Khomeini's jails as a hostage, or "guest," of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Those first 75 days were the best of my 30 years in the Foreign Service. The next 444 were the worst. But they were both excellent preparation for Baghdad in the spring of 2003. In that first period I had to work in a society where all the certainties — for better or worse — of a regime that had once seemed invulnerable were gone. In both cases, nothing fixed had yet replaced the earlier, harsh system, and ordinary citizens, now able to talk freely for the first time in their lives, saw both enormous new possibilities and dangers. The immediate question both in Tehran in 1979 and Baghdad in 2003 was: "Now that the tyrant is gone, what will become of us?" The larger question was, and is: "Now that we are masters in our own house, which of us shall be masters and in what kind of house?"

Iran in 1979 and Iraq in 2003 were settings a Foreign Service officer dreams about. There were no congressional delegations to care for, no receptions to attend, no briefing memos to prepare, and no embassy housing committees to serve on. There was only the reality of competing social and political visions, and the certainty that when you went out the door you would never encounter what you expected. But whatever you did encounter, it would make your head hurt, and put maximum strain on your ingenuity, inventiveness, patience and sense of humor.

So much for my training time "on the street" in Iran. The rest of my time there, spent doing hard time in the cells, was much less fun, but still excellent preparation for Baghdad 24 years later. It taught me how to cope with bugs, bad food, senseless rules, infrequent showers, sweaty roommates in close quarters, poor sanitation, dirty clothes and isolation from the outside world. In both situations I became a pack rat, hoarding precious objects such as plastic spoons, paper, detergent, candles and matches.

Baghdad in April and May 2003 and Tehran in the summer and fall of 1979 were not entirely the same. But much of what we saw in Iran — the uncertainty, the hopes, the new possibilities and the anxieties — we saw among our Iraqi friends 24 years later. I also learned, once again, that one can survive bad food and bad smells, and that even an infrequent shower can be a joy to be recalled and savored for days.

— *John Limbert*
Amb. Limbert is president of the American Foreign Service Association.

Diplomatic Maneuvers

When I signed on as Senior Coalition Adviser to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, I understood that my job would be to go to the ministry, take the elevator up to the minister's office, find out who was in charge and take it from there. The reality was very different. Daily life in Baghdad combined elements of a backpacking trip and prison camp. It took three days just to link up with military civil affairs officers who could physically get me to the ministry. We found the main building systematically burned and looted by departing Saddam loyalists, who had stripped the outbuildings of all windows, furniture and electrical and plumbing fixtures. Windblown documents served as ground cover.

An affable young Iraqi materialized out of the rubble and identified himself as Hamid from Protocol. Hamid agreed to get word to as many ministry employees as possible, and we would all meet back at the ministry in two

days. Soon after Hamid departed, I had second thoughts. Had I set up an ambush? To my relief, two days later 150 employees, not an ambush, were milling around as I arrived. We found in that group the nucleus of a small steering group to run the ministry.

Gaining control of Iraq's 69 diplomatic posts abroad was my highest priority. High-ranking Ba'thists and Iraqi intelligence operatives stationed abroad still controlled significant resources. I worked with the steering group on a simple message calling on heads of diplomatic missions to cease representing Iraq, to secure all files, passports and money, and to return to Baghdad within 30 days. The biggest challenge was the almost complete lack of communications equipment. After a young employee typed the message in Arabic on his laptop, we rescued some usable official stationery from the rubble, and printed the message at Baghdad's version of Kinko's. We brought the message, typed and signed by the senior Iraqi in the ministry, back to the palace, which had the only working scanner in Iraq. Then we e-mailed the scanned message to the Iraqi embassies in Amman and Damascus who, in turn, forwarded it to other Iraqi posts around the world. Finally, we set up a Hotmail e-mail account for the Foreign Ministry that became the main channel for communicating with Iraqi posts abroad.

The immediate question both in Tehran in 1979 and Baghdad in 2003 was: "Now that the tyrant is gone, what will become of us?"

Three-quarters of the Iraqi ambassadors elected to return, a pleasant surprise. One day in early June, I interviewed in rapid succession the returning Iraqi ambassadors from Tripoli, Tehran and Damascus. All were eager to cooperate even though they knew they would not keep their jobs. The others, with one or two exceptions, quietly disappeared.

Throughout this adventure I was blessed with superb assistance from retired FSO Allen Kepchar, Lt. Col. Alex Sonski, Amb. Radu Onofrei from Romania and Jacqueline-Lawson Smith from the British Foreign Office. But the real credit for our success must go to our Iraqi colleagues, individuals of great skill and character. One in particular, Akila al-Hashemi, is engraved forever in my memory. Akila accepted an appointment as the first woman on the Ministry Steering Group in early May. In June, she ably led an Iraqi delegation to a U.N. donors meeting in New York. In July, she was one of three women appointed to the Iraqi Governing Council. In September, assassins took her life. Having known her and many Iraqis like her during my brief stay in Baghdad, I am confident that Iraq can and will emerge from the nightmare of Saddam's rule.

—David J. Dunford
Amb. Dunford is a retired FSO in Tucson, Ariz.

George Farag

Iraqis in Najaf gather to read about Saddam Hussein's capture.

Saddam's Arrest: Reactions from Najaf

Over the past few months there have been few events of greater significance on the international political scene than the capture of Saddam Hussein. Rather than discussing where I was or what I was doing when the arrest took place, however, I prefer to discuss two experiences that shaped my opinion regarding the impact of this event on the people of Najaf, Iraq.

The capture of Saddam Hussein is particularly important in the holy city of Al-Najaf due to the vast and brutal devastation he wrought there after the Persian Gulf War. Evidence of this are the mass graves located in the northern section of Najaf and an area close to the Imam Ali Shrine, which Hussein leveled after the 1991 intifada.

Daily life in Baghdad combined elements of a backpacking trip and prison camp.

The day after Saddam's arrest I spent most of my time in the Sahn, the market surrounding the Imam Ali Shrine. If there was any location in Najaf for one to gauge the reaction of the people to this dramatic event, this was the place. Walking in the Sahn, I observed a familiar sight. Large groups of people were gathered at the wall of the shrine. Under normal circumstances there are vendors selling pictures of the Imam Ali or sadinet al sahn (assistant custodians of the shrine) while engaging in public discussions. However, this gathering appeared different. Everyone was closely huddled, staring at the wall of the shrine, and remaining uncharacteristically quiet. I joined the group to steal a look at what was of particular interest. As I approached the wall I realized that there was a newspaper clipping of Saddam's arrest taped to the shrine and the people crowded around were reading it. The article contained photos of the bearded and haggard Hussein with a detailed description of his arrest (see photo, p. 56).

The group stared at the pictures and read the article in disbelief and shock. There were no animated discussions or wild cheering as one may have imagined there would be. People were not chanting "death to Saddam" or similar slogans. Instead there was complete silence and what appeared to be great reflection on the historic event.

At this point I bought falafel sandwiches and had lunch with a friend, Hassan, at his sibha (prayer bead

shop) in the Sahn. As we ate and conversed, an acquaintance of his named Waleed entered. He had been a military participant in the intifada against the former regime. The conversation quickly focused on Saddam's arrest. At the end of our conversation, Waleed offered to show me how he celebrated the arrest of Saddam. I followed him into a building located on one of the smaller streets in the shrine area. I had reservations about entering the building with this perfect stranger, but it constituted a rare opportunity for me to witness a segment of Iraqi society inaccessible to CPA personnel.

Surprisingly, there were no animated discussions or wild cheering in Najaf at the news of Saddam's capture.

On the second floor there was a tiny, two-room apartment. He led me into one of the rooms and above the bed I noticed a strange, large hole in the ceiling. He then confessed that it was in this space that he hid illegal weapons and secret documents since the intifada. He had promised himself that he would uncover and dispose of those items once Saddam was captured, and he kept his promise the night of the arrest. There was a definite sense of pride as he showed me the hiding place. "The next time I fix the ceiling it will be for good," he exclaimed.

The images that the world witnessed on various news programs in early December echoed the unhampered celebration that took place in some Iraqi streets following Saddam Hussein's capture. But the more somber reactions I was fortunate enough to witness in Najaf that afternoon also symbolize the patience, dedication and pride of the Iraqis.

— *George Farag*
Public Affairs Officer, CPA
Najaf, Iraq

"U.S. Consulate Mosul"

The day after the Iraqi Army capitulated to U.S. Forces in northern Iraq (April 8, 2003), the forward and advanced operating bases for the 10th Special Forces Group and their support personnel were relocated to Mosul International Airport in Mosul, Iraq. As we convoyed to the airport, Iraqis were cautiously observing the U.S. forces moving into their city. It was easy to see they were waiting to see what we would do as an occupying force.

After our troops set up the airport as their primary base, it became the unofficial American consulate in Mosul.

My first impression upon arriving at the airport was that there had been a military battle there. Trash and debris were everywhere and most of the windows were broken. I learned, however, that the destruction was caused by Iraqis looting and vandalizing property after the Iraqi Army and the police force abandoned their posts and their duties. Security was an issue throughout the city because gangs of looters were roaming the city, stealing and destroying property. Some entrances to neighborhoods were barricaded and people stood guard at informal "checkpoints."

The following day, I went out with a Special Forces team to translate for them as they selected a building to use as their "team house." The Iraqis were very curious to see real live Americans. Every time we stopped, a crowd would quickly form around us asking questions. They seemed willing to help in any way they could. The Iraqis soon realized the "evil Americans" (according to Saddam's regime) were actually friendly and concerned about the rebuilding of Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi citizens. Whenever American military vehicles traveled through the city, soldiers would usually get smiles, thumbs-up signs and waves from the Iraqis — especially the kids and teenagers.

After our troops set up the airport as their primary base in the city, it became the unofficial American consulate. Iraqis began to come to the gates requesting everything from visas for the United States to telephone calls to relatives in other countries. Generally, the common concerns at this time were security from looters, jobs, repairing utilities and availability of gas.

A public affairs campaign was immediately put into action in the form of television ads that discouraged Iraqis from civil disobedience and encouraged them to set up their own system of government and go back to their jobs. But the difficulty with going back to work was that no one wanted to leave their homes and families unprotected from looters. Also, the banks had all been looted and there wasn't money available to pay salaries.

Many Iraqis claimed to have information regarding WMD sites, the location of personnel in Saddam's regime and locations of weapons caches, as well as information on a huge variety of other topics they felt American military personnel might consider important. Several of them even offered information in exchange for American citizenship.



Herminio Cardona

U.S. Marine Vanessa Cardona and her father, retired FSO Herminio Cardona, meet in Camp Doha, Kuwait, in April 2003.

Residents soon began selling cigarettes, candy and soda to U.S. soldiers in front of the gates. This was beneficial for both parties and helped build rapport with the Iraqi people.

But they became impatient within days of the American occupation because there was no immediate improvement in the quality of life for most people. Unfortunately, the Pentagon spent so much time planning and implementing a highly successful military campaign that it didn't plan how to immediately implement strategies that would have made it clear what the Americans planned to do to improve the quality of life for Iraqi citizens as promised. Nor did the Pentagon have an immediate plan of action for dealing with Saddam's loyalists or with Ba'th Party members. And the coalition missed the opportunity to negotiate early with those who are driving the insurgency against security forces in Iraq today.

But whether the occupation of Iraq was justified or not is immaterial at this point. The challenge is to provide a stable environment for the fledging Iraqi government until it can function securely. For until it becomes certain that the insurgency has failed to intimidate the new political leadership, Iraqis will be afraid to offer assistance to coalition forces or the Iraqi police and security forces for fear of reprisals.

America has promised repeatedly that the occupation of Iraq will result in a better life for Iraqi citizens and will lower the threat of terrorism in the world. If America does not maintain its presence in Iraq until the new government is secure, both of our promises will be unfulfilled. The whole Arab community — in fact, the entire world — is watching.

— *John Malas*

A veteran Army interrogator and Arabic linguist, John Malas was part of a Department of Homeland Security team attached to the 10th Special Forces Group in northern Iraq during April and May 2003. He is married to Jennifer Harrison, a Foreign Service secretary currently working in the Diplomatic Courier Office in Frankfurt.

A Birthday Celebration

I am a retired FSO who served both as a political analyst in State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research and as an information management technical specialist in the Bureau of Information Resource Management. Before that, I spent seven years in the Army, and then served as

an Army Counterintelligence Special Agent in the Maryland Army National Guard.

My daughter, Helga Vanessa Cardona-Perez, joined the Marines straight out of high school, completing basic training and combat training before completing intelligence specialist training. Her intelligence class was accelerated to graduate three weeks early so they could be shipped out to Kuwait with the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Once there, she volunteered to go into Iraq with the 1st MEF invading force of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

When the war began, I could not stand watching the war on MSNBC from home while my daughter was in harm's way. So I looked for employment in Kuwait to be near her, and was fortunate to find an opportunity as a contractor with ITT Systems, serving with the 11th Signal Brigade at Camp Doha. At that time, Vanessa was stationed with the 1st MEF at Camp Commando, also in Kuwait.

As a result, on April 28, 2003, my daughter and I were able to get together for a few precious hours to celebrate her 19th birthday (see photo, p. 60). I thank the Marines for adequately training my daughter so that she could return from Iraq in one piece. I also can't thank enough her chain of command for taking her to Camp Doha to visit with me on her first birthday away from home.

I also want to mention that my son Ivan is an Army medic stationed at Ft. Drumm, N.Y., and will be going to Kandahar this year. And my brother Victor, a sergeant first class, is an explosives ordinance disposal expert now serving in Afghanistan.

I never pressured, or even encouraged, my children or my younger brother to follow in my footsteps. But I am honored and extremely proud of their decision to serve our country.

By the way, my daughter, now a lance corporal, is returning to Iraq later this year for a second tour of combat duty.

— *Herminio F. Cardona*
Cape Coral, Fla. ■



BOOKS

Democracy: For Better or Worse

The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad
Fareed Zakaria, W.W. Norton, New York, 2003, hardcover, $24.95, 286 pages.

REVIEWED BY ELIZABETH CLARK

The publication of Fareed Zakaria's *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* is an important event. Zakaria, *Newsweek*'s enormously influential foreign affairs editor, takes as his ambitious goal answering the questions, "Is democracy taking hold abroad?" and "How well is democracy doing here in America?". The answer in both cases is, he laments, "not well."

Zakaria's views on sequencing democracy-building, meticulously detailed here, have become conventional wisdom among foreign affairs professionals and commentators. Thomas Friedman, for instance, recently endorsed in one of his own columns Zakaria's consistent message that "elections should come last," after a moderate center has had time to emerge and "sink roots, learning to use tools of the institutions of liberty: a functioning judicial system, a free press, free speech, economic reform, civic institutions and multiple political parties." To that list *The Future of Freedom* adds reaching a specific level of per-capita GDP ($6,000 for a failure-proof democracy).

Yet Zakaria is anything but clear in describing what a functioning democracy is like. At one point, he declares that democracy represents "as broad a dispersal of power as possible." But elsewhere he says that "The Western model of government is best symbolized not by mass plebiscite but the impartial judge."

> *Zakaria leaves the reader wondering how the process of democratization should work.*

He also repeatedly refers to "democratically elected regimes" without distinguishing between elections that meet international standards, involving broad criteria beyond election-day performance, and fraudulent, rigged elections. Zakaria sees the absence of free and fair elections in the "limited" democracies he praises — Jordan, Singapore, Malaysia and Morocco — as a minor flaw. Indeed, he also refers to Malaysia as an unqualified democracy.

Nor does the confusion end there. In recoiling from elections as a slippery slope to mob rule and the plebiscite, Zakaria leaves the reader wondering how the process of democratization should work. What is the mechanism that will keep a "liberal autocrat" liberal if he does not have to fear being put out of power peacefully in fully democratic elections? Why would multiple political parties develop? Why would judges stay incorruptible? What would sustain an effective free press? To be fair, the author seems to recognize the point. After praising Russian President Vladimir Putin as a "liberalizing autocrat," he admits: "There is always the possibility, of course, that Putin, or more likely one of his successors, will turn out to be a bad czar and use his enormous power for less noble goals. It has happened in the past." Indeed.

No analyst of global democratization believes that elections by themselves create a fully functioning democracy. However, Zakaria's election-phobic approach to democratic development means that he does not explore the more fruitful model of "do it all at once" democratization. This is the model that the U.S. has actually had to follow in Bosnia, Afghanistan, Haiti and Iraq, and for which there is a body of precedent (well analyzed in the 2003 Rand study, "America's Role in Nation Building"). Blaming "premature democracy" or the policy of "encouraging elections" misses other, more likely targets for democratic failure. Problems in Bosnia may have had more to do with over-elaborate institutional design of the Dayton Accords than early elections per se. Furthermore, "elections first" is probably a better description of the successful democratization of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe, whose eagerness to get into the E.U. forced compliance with democracy requirements — most crucially, fully free and fair elections.

Despite such shortcomings, *The Future of Freedom* contains many far-ranging and rich insights on fostering political change. In his long, illuminating section on the pathologies of Islam Zakaria makes timely arguments for

inclusion of fundamentalists (not terrorists) in the mainstream of political life. Here his step-by-step approach makes eminent sense: "get the politics and economics right (and) culture will follow."

As for America, Zakaria clearly sees the recent gubernatorial recall in California as democracy run amok. His remedy, however, is to insulate decision-makers from democracy and resuscitate the old "power elite," with its sense of public service, probity and willingness to exercise authority — a remedy that seems quixotic in the age of Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat.

Elizabeth Spiro Clark, a longtime member of the Journal*'s Editorial Board, was a Foreign Service officer from 1980 to 2000. A former fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy's International Forum for Democratic Studies, she is now an associate at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University.*

Bolivia: Timely Insights

Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective
Merilee S. Grindle and Pilar Dominago, eds., Harvard University Press, 2003, $24.95, paperback, 424 pages.

REVIEWED BY DAVID BOYLE

On Oct. 17, 2003, Bolivian President Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada resigned in the face of massive and violent protests, touching off the most serious challenge to constitutional democracy in Bolivia in the last 21 years. For many, the government's fall was a surprise. It should not have been, say the authors represented in *Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective.* The book contains 13 papers delivered at a 2002 conference at Harvard marking the 50th anniversary of the 1952 Bolivian Revolution, plus two chapters by the editors introducing and summarizing the material.

Representational democracy in Bolivia has never succeeded in putting down roots. Indeed, the most enduring legacy of the 1952 Revolution was the creation of a state only tenuously connected to the population and too weak to resolve bitter social divisions.

That is not to say that Bolivia did not undergo as profound a transformation as Mexico had decades earlier, and Cuba would experience only a few years later. The short period from 1952 to 1956 saw the adoption of universal suffrage, agrarian and educational reform and the nationalization of mines. Indigenous groups entered the mainstream of society and the role of the state expanded significantly, particularly in the economy.

Yet post-revolutionary Bolivia was still seriously flawed. The three most insightful contributors to this collection, Juan Antonio Morales, Eduardo A. Gamarra and George Gray Molina, provide a range of explanations for what went wrong. Morales maintains that the new government adopted a state-led model for economic growth that resulted in dismal economic performance from 1952 to 1995 and left the private sector near death. Policy decisions over-emphasized wealth redistribution, isolated the country from trade and capital, and fueled corruption and paternalism.

Gamarra argues that Bolivian society never completely accepted the idea of representative democracy in 1952, and since then has shown widespread disdain for the traditional parties and the National Congress. Political parties exist as mere extensions of the state, fail to represent citizen interests, and are unable to build a national consensus on what good government means. Gamarra suspects the system will be unable to address the crises the nation will face in the coming years — coca cultivation, economic stagnation, indigenous demands — and Bolivia will therefore face a prolonged period of social conflict.

Molina agrees that the future of Bolivia does not lie with the traditional parties but with emerging grass-roots organizations that oppose the constitutional system. He cites approvingly a series of reforms begun in 1993 that redistributed power from the federal level to the local level. As a result, the old system of national state patronage was dismantled, and political power fragmented along territorial lines. Molina, in fact, says Bolivians have never developed a shared set of secular doctrines necessary to create a nation. His account is essentially descriptive. His point is, whether you like it or not, the old system is breaking down. For him, the revolution did not create a nation, and the increased pressure of contemporary social conflict will further weaken the state.

None of this is good news for overburdened desk officers following Bolivia or for Embassy La Paz. But the book is very good news for those interested in deepening their understanding of Bolivian politics and society. The authors debunk myths, prowl forgotten corridors of revolutionary history, and skewer anyone foolish enough to disagree with them. It is hard to imagine a more timely or helpful analysis of what is taking place in Bolivia today. ■

FSO David Boyle has served in Lagos, Malabo and Washington, D.C. He is currently desk officer for Bolivia in the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs.

In Memory

Clark H. Billings, 68, retired FSO, died Dec. 18 at his home in Hickory, N.C., from malignant mesothelioma caused by asbestos.

Mr. Billings was born Dec. 25, 1934, in Bent County, Colo. After a five-year tour in the U.S. Navy at sea and in London, he joined the predecessor agency of USAID in 1961. During his 29-year career with USAID, Mr. Billings served 22 years overseas in Ethiopia, Tanzania, South Vietnam, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Most of his work was in the program office, but he also served tours in the USAID/W training office, in the liaison office for ASEAN in Manila and in the community development office in Manila. He retired in 1990.

Mr. Billings was evacuated from Saigon on April 29, 1975, by helicopter from the embassy rooftop. He was involved several times in relief efforts when natural disasters struck, and received several honor awards.

Following retirement, Mr. Billings worked as a consultant to the USAID regional office for the South Pacific and with USAID/Jamaica, before returning to Washington to work for three years in the USAID/W Bureau for Europe and the New Independent States.

Mr. Billings is survived by three daughters, Tamara Guerrero of Fredericksburg, Va., Christine Billings of Burke, Va., and Trang Billings Estagassy of Seattle, Wash.; a brother, James Ross Billings of Tucson, Ariz.; a sister, Nancy Gerlock of Cannon City, Colo.; and two grandchildren.

Ellis V. Glynn, 83, retired FSO, died Oct. 10, 2003, at his home in Colorado Springs, Colo., where he had resided for 23 years.

Mr. Glynn was born in Long Island, N.Y., on Feb. 18, 1920, the only child of James Edward and Nellie (Scannell) Glynn. He joined the U.S. Navy in 1942 and was trained as a naval aviator and machinist mate. Assigned to the Pacific Theater aboard the *USS Bataan*, Ellis flew with the 47th Torpedo Bomber Squadron, where he earned the Navy-Marine Corps Medal, the Bronze Star Medal, and the Purple Heart.

In 1946, after recovering from wounds, Mr. Glynn was selected as the chauffeur for a U.S. delegate to the United Nations, Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt. While serving as Mrs. Roosevelt's chauffeur, he met Dorothy Jean Mackey of Erie, Pa., then a secretary for the U.S. delegation to the U.N. They were married in March 1948.

Mr. Glynn joined the Department of State in 1948. During his 32-year career as a Foreign Service officer, he only accepted one assignment to the United States, serving less than two years in Washington, D.C. His overseas assignments included Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uruguay, Israel, Taiwan, Trinidad & Tobago, Chile, Panama, Belgium and Colombia. He retired to Colorado in 1980.

In Colorado, Mr. Glynn continued his public service through countless hours of volunteer work. He assisted at Meals on Wheels, the Olympic Training Center and Penrose Hospital. He also honed his skills in his lifelong hobbies of trout fishing and gourmet cooking.

Dorothy Mackey, his wife of 34 years, succumbed to cancer in 1984. Three sons survive: Steven Glynn of Simi Valley, Calif., and Douglas Glynn of Denver, Colo., both born in Sri Lanka; and Mark Glynn of Huntsville, Ala., born while Mr. Glynn and his family were assigned to Montevideo. His 10 grandchildren will also miss Mr. Glynn. A memorial service was held Oct. 15 in Colorado Springs.

Frank P. Kelly, 66, retired FSO, died Dec. 19 of cancer in Martinsburg, W. Va.

Born Aug. 5, 1937, in Jersey City, N.J., Mr. Kelly graduated from Jersey City State College and served in the U.S. Army (101st Airborne) from 1961 through 1964.

He joined the Foreign Service in 1964, serving as a consular officer in Bordeaux, Paris, Beirut, Okinawa and Santo Domingo. Mr. Kelly retired in 1986. Following retirement he engaged in consulting work and was a full-time grandfather.

Mr. Kelly is survived by his former wife Joan Kelly of Silver Spring, Md.; his daughter Teresa Frazier and grandson Michael Frazier of Martinsburg, W. Va.; two brothers, Bill Kelly, a retired FSO, of Sevierville, Tenn., and Michael Kelly of Whitehouse

Station, N.J.; and a sister, Patricia De Lorenzo, of Woodridge, N.J.

Patricia (Pat) Giuntini Loh, 50, Foreign Service specialist, died Dec. 6 in a car accident in Lima, Peru.

Patricia Loh joined the Foreign Service in January 2001 after a successful 25-year career in the private sector as a chemist, quality engineer and computer/network specialist. Her love of travel and discovery inspired her to make this dramatic career change at an age when less adventurous souls are winding down and planning for retirement.

Mrs. Loh's first posting was to Kuala Lumpur, where she served as information management specialist officer from July 2001 until May 2003. In September 2003, she was posted to Lima, where she served with honor and distinction until the tragic accident.

In an unprecedented tribute, the Embassy Lima computer server room has been dedicated to her memory. The memorial plaque, with an engraved photograph of Mrs. Loh, contains this testimonial: "Pat was the kind of person who brightens any room. Her warmth and humor were extended unreservedly; she brought with her an infectious laughter and joy of life. She possessed a rare intelligence combined with common sense and a down-to-earth understanding that is all too difficult to find in this world. She was a great friend and invaluable colleague to whomever she touched. And now she will be greatly missed."

Patricia Loh was born Jan. 7, 1953. She was a graduate of St. Anthony's School in West Harrison, N.Y., Good Counsel Academy in White Plains, N.Y., and attended the University of Bridgeport, in Bridgeport, Conn., where she graduated with a degree in chemistry.

Besides her beloved husband of 25 years, Anthony Loh Jr., Patricia Loh leaves behind her parents, E. Robert Giuntini of White Plains, N.Y., and Elizabeth Giuntini of West Harrison, N.Y.; a sister, Maureen Jarvis of Katonah, N.Y.; two brothers, Reverend Robert J. Giuntini of Huntington, N.Y., and Daniel Giuntini of Somers, N.Y. Twelve young nieces and nephews and one grand-nephew will miss their warm and fun-loving aunt.

A celebration of Patricia Loh's life was held Dec. 12 at the McMahon Funeral Home in White Plains, and a funeral mass took place on Dec. 13 at St. Anthony's Church in West Harrison. In lieu of flowers the family requests that donations be made to the World Wildlife Fund or The Nature Conservancy.

Ronald Howard Pollock, 80, a former USAID official, died Dec. 14 at his home in Sun City, Ariz.

Mr. Pollock was born May 30, 1923, in Waterville, Ohio, to Benjamin and Mary (Barnes) Pollock. He graduated from Grand Rapids High School in Grand Rapids, Ohio, and earned a bachelor of science degree in agricultural education at Ohio State University. He earned advanced degrees in agricultural economics and agricultural business and marketing.

After serving in the U.S. Army during World War II, he began his career in 1948 working as a vocational agriculture instructor at Pettisville High School in Pettisville, Ohio. In 1951, he became an assistant professor in the Ohio State University College of Agriculture, followed by the position of business manager.

In 1967, Mr. Pollock joined the Foreign Service as a USAID project officer in New Delhi. Assignments in South Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, and the Philippines followed. He retired in 1988 as an agricultural officer in New Delhi.

Mr. Pollock's 1947 marriage to Rosemary Jeffers ended in divorce. In March 1976 he married Tran Thi Nhu Quynh, who survives him.

Also surviving are three daughters, Mrs. Richard (Sue) Keys of Yuba City, Calif., Mrs. Matthew (Angia) Pfirsch of Findlay, Ohio, and Ms. Lynn Morrison of Columbus, Ohio; a son, James David Pollock of Lancaster, Ohio; a brother, John D. Pollock of Whitehouse, Ohio; 12 grandchildren; and one great-granddaughter.

A son, Ted Lee Pollock, a brother, James Pollock and a sister, Virginia Hartsook, preceded him in death.

Mr. Pollack's body was donated to Science Care, Inc. for research and organ donation. Memorials may be made to the Pulmonary Fibrosis Foundation, 1440 W. Washington Blvd., Chicago, IL 60607 or Vista Care Hospice Foundation, c/o Chris Burris, 4800 N. Scottsdale Rd., Suite 3500 Scottsdale, AZ 85251.

Clifford J. (Patrick) Quinlan, 81, retired FSO and a founding member of AFSA Upper Midwest, died Oct. 27 in Edina, Minn.

A native of Minnesota, Mr. Quinlan graduated from the University of Minnesota with a B.A. cum laude in

international relations in 1948. He received his B.S. in Foreign Service from Georgetown University in 1949. He served in the U.S. Army Air Force from February 1943 to November 1945.

Mr. Quinlan, known as "Pat," joined the Foreign Service in 1950, and during a 30-year career served in Europe, Africa, South Asia and the Middle East — his area of specialization. His A-1 class was trained as Kreis Resident Officers for Germany (local governing persons who were then replacing Army officers in such positions), and Mr. Quinlan was posted to Frankfurt. In 1951 he was transferred to Berlin as a commercial specialist. He was posted to Karachi as a consular and political officer in 1953, then returned to State in 1956 to follow Berlin affairs. Two years later, he was sent to Kaduna as principal officer.

In 1962, Mr. Quinlan was detailed to study Arabic at the FSI in Beirut. After graduating in 1964, he served in Yemen, Egypt, Turkey, Oman, Libya, and in the Department of State as public affairs officer for the Middle East. Mr. Quinlan was principal officer in five of his ten posts abroad, and was responsible for opening three of these. Other "at home" assignments included on-loan duty at the Office of Economic Opportunity in Washington, D.C. (1970-1972) and diplomat-in-residence at Oakland University in Rochester, Mich. (1978-1979).

In 1979 Mr. Quinlan was assigned as an adviser on Middle East affairs in the U.S. Mission to the U.N. in New York, where he was actively involved in negotiations to free the American hostages in Tehran.

In 1980 Mr. Quinlan retired and moved back to Minnesota, where he was a constant voice for diplomacy. He taught Elderhostel and University of Minnesota Extension courses, and was a contributing commentator on radio and TV newscasts. He was a free-lance columnist for the *Minneapolis Star Tribune*, *St. Paul Pioneer Press*, *Edina Sun Current*, and the *Washington Report on Middle East Affairs*.

Mr. Quinlan was a founding member of AFSA Upper Midwest, and an active member of the Minneapolis-St. Paul Committee on Foreign Relations, the United Nations Association of Minnesota, the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee, Middle East Peace Now, and Interfaith Peacemakers of Edina. A vigorous advocate of closer cooperation between the U.S. and the Arab world, Mr. Quinlan also participated in the Upper Midwest Consortium for Middle East Outreach.

Mr. Quinlan received the Department of State Meritorious Honor Award. "In recognition of his outstanding efforts on behalf of the Arab-American Community," he received the Alex Odeh Award from the Minnesota Chapter of the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Committee.

Mr. Quinlan is survived by his wife Louise, sisters-in-law, nieces and nephews. He was preceded in death by his parents, a sister, Margaret, and brother, Robert.

David M. Ransom, 65, retired FSO, former ambassador and Middle East specialist, died Dec. 4 in New York City after a heart attack.

Ambassador Ransom was born in St. Louis and accompanied his father on Air Force assignments early in his life. He was a 1960 graduate of Princeton University, and received a master's degree in international affairs at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies in 1962. He then served three years in the Marine Corps.

In 1965, Amb. Ransom joined the Foreign Service. He was posted to Tehran in 1967 as a consular officer, and a year later detailed to the FSI Arabic language school in Beirut. In 1969 he was transferred to Jeddah as a consular and economic officer, and in 1970 he returned to State. Fluent in Arabic, Mr. Ransom was thrice posted abroad as deputy chief of mission: to Sanaa (1975-1978), Abu Dhabi (1983-1985) and Damascus (1985-1988). He was ambassador to Bahrain from 1994 to 1997.

During his career Amb. Ransom was assigned to the National Security Council staff (1973-1975) and to the Defense Department as director of the Near East, South Asia and Africa division (1978-1982). His honors include the Defense Department Distinguished Service Medal, the Defense Superior Service Award and two State Department Superior Honor Awards.

Amb. Ransom retired from the Foreign Service in 1997, and founded an international consulting firm that worked with investment and other projects in the Middle East. He was an adjunct scholar at the Middle East Institute in Washington, and a frequent lecturer on Middle East topics. Amb. Ransom combined a great affection and deep cultural empathy for the peoples of the Middle East with a tough-minded attitude toward U.S. national security interests.

As board vice chairman of the Rock Creek International School in Washington, Amb. Ransom played a

key role in creating the school's Arabic-English program.

He was a collector of Middle Eastern carpets, an expert swimmer and diver, an avid gardener at his home in Washington, and an energetic farmer on his West Virginia property.

Survivors include his wife of 38 years, Marjorie Marilley Ransom of Washington; three daughters, Elizabeth Ransom of Washington, Katherine Ransom-Silliman of Falls Church, Va., and Sarah Ransom of New York; a brother, Clifford Ransom II of Baltimore; and two grandsons. The family requests that in lieu of flowers, donations be made in Amb. Ransom's memory to the Arabic program at the Rock Creek International School.

J. Robert Schaetzel, 86, career State Department officer and former ambassador, died of pneumonia Nov. 7 at his home in Bethesda, Md.

Born in Holtville, Calif., Amb. Schaetzel graduated from Pomona College and moved to Washington in 1942 as an analyst with the Bureau of the Budget. He joined the State Department in 1945 as a special assistant in the Office of International Trade Policy, later moving to the Office of the Special Assistant for Disarmament and Atomic Energy and the office of the under secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In 1962 he became deputy assistant secretary of State for Atlantic affairs.

As U.S. ambassador to the European economic communities from 1966 to 1972, Mr. Schaetzel worked to strengthen U.S.-European relations. Based in Brussels, he represented U.S. interests in negotiations with the European Iron and Steel Community, the European Economic Commission and the Euroatom Supply Agency. During this time he developed a reputation as a sharp-tongued diplomat who sought to draw

the attention of policy-makers to pressing issues involving trade in steel, textiles and agricultural products.

Following retirement, Amb. Schaetzel continued work to deepen America's relationship with the European Community: he believed there were few things that mattered more for the U.S., and for Europe as well. He wrote a book on U.S.-European relations, *The Unhinged Alliance: America and the European Community* (Harper-Collins, 1975). He was president of the Jean Monnet Council in Washington, and a consultant to the Brookings Institution and the General Accounting Office.

During this period, Amb. Schaetzel took on another commitment, working to strengthen government public service. In 1986, he was a prime mover at the Brookings Institution in taking steps to address what he called a "quiet crisis" in the federal public service. A year later he became board chairman of the privately funded National Commission on the Public Service, and recruited then-retiring Federal Reserve Board Chairman Paul Volcker to become its head. In 1990, the commission published its findings in "Leadership for America: Rebuilding the Public Service," a report that stands as a continuing stimulus for positive change.

Amb. Schaetzel frequently wrote opinion pieces on international economics for the *Washington Post*, and was a fellow of the American Academy of Diplomacy and the National Academy of Public Administration. He was a member of the Cosmos Club and the Council on Foreign Relations.

Survivors include his wife of 59 years, Imogen Spencer Schaetzel of Bethesda, Md.; two daughters, Wendy Lesko of Kensington, Md., and Ann Schaetzel of Brooklyn, N.Y.; and four grandchildren. ■

Send your "In Memory" submission to: FSJ, Att: Susan Maitra, 2101 E Street NW, Washington DC 20037, or e-mail it to FSJedit@afsa.org, or fax it to (202) 338-8244. No photos, please.

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AN INVITATION FOR SUMMER FICTION

Once again the *FSJ* is seeking works of fiction of up to 3,000 words for its annual summer fiction issue. Story lines or characters involving the Foreign Service are preferred, but not required. The top stories, selected by the *Journal*'s Editorial Board, will be published in the July/August issue; some of them will also be simultaneously posted on the *Journal*'s Web site.

The writer of each story will receive an honorarium of $250, payable upon publication.

All stories must be previously unpublished. Submissions should be unsigned and accompanied by a cover sheet with author's name, address, telephone number(s) and e-mail address.

Deadline is April 1. No fooling.

Please also note the following:

- Authors are limited to two entries.
- Entries will only be accepted by e-mail (preferably in the form of Word attachment and with the text copied into the body of the message).

Please send submissions (or questions) to Mikkela Thompson, *Journal* Business Manager, at Thompsonm@afsa.org.

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REFLECTIONS

The Peace Table

BY JOHN BUZBEE

My house in Jerusalem overlooks the Peace Forest, which is not particularly peaceful. Not that there are open hostilities, although the booms in the night make me wonder at times. But you don't get the sense that the Peace Forest is working to bring together Israelis and Palestinians. So I have begun to rely on a more modest symbol of intercommunal harmony. A few months ago, shortly after I arrived here, I was walking to work down Hebron Road and passed a wrought-iron furniture store with attractive table bases, minus tabletops. A few weeks later, I was shopping for pottery on Nablus Road when I noticed some nice tile tabletops. I decided to marry the two. It did not immediately occur to me that the wrought-iron store was Israeli and the tile store was Palestinian, but when it did, the project became in my mind the Peace Table.

At first I was charmed by the idea. But almost as quickly I imagined a string of complications: endless shuttle diplomacy between the table store and the tile store, arguments over who was responsible for what, boycotts and curfews and a self-destructive cycle of furniture madness. I envisioned that I'd pay too much for a table that would collapse in acrimony. But, what could an American diplomat do except forge ahead?

Sometimes I try to imagine Jerusalem as a normal city, with ATM muggings instead of bus bombings.

The tile guy was delighted to sell me the tile, but he declined to build the tabletop. It might not fit, he said; better that the table people make the top. And to my surprise the table guy pleasantly agreed. He told me it would be ready in five days, so I expected two weeks at best. But five days later, he called. I picked up the Peace Table, and it now has a place of honor on my balcony.

The bigger issue — peace in Jerusalem — is proving more elusive. Sometimes I try to imagine Jerusalem as a normal city, with ATM muggings instead of bus bombings, gang wars instead of God's wrath. Give it the kind of low-level urban anarchy that passes for normal in less biblical places, and it would be an easier place to get used to. But it would not be Jerusalem.

At night I'll sit on my balcony, set a bottle of wine — occupied grapes from the Golan Heights — on the Peace Table, and look out past the Peace Forest to fireworks exploding on the horizon. There's a startling amount of fireworks in Jerusalem, from both Arab and Jewish neighborhoods, for weddings and bar mitzvahs and any other excuse. I cannot imagine how people in this city get entertainment from booms in the night. But they do, and many nights from my porch I can see fireworks, soaring and exploding bouquets of red, green and blue.

And then sometimes there's a sharp retort, but no colorful bouquet in the sky, just a thudding echo that reminds me of deer season in the woods at home. And twice since my arrival I've heard a thunderous boom rumbling down the wadi (dry riverbed). There was no light, only silence, and then the sirens, one after another screaming toward the latest bombing until their warbling echoes converged in a bestial wail.

Jerusalem teeters between anguish and epiphany. Catch it on an upswing, and it is a delightful place — concerts and plays, cafes and restaurants, kids in the park, all backlit by the orange-pink limestone buildings that glow every evening at dusk. But then it topples back into madness. It is a special place. To live here is to hope that it will become a little less different, a little less special, a little more peaceful. Meanwhile, perhaps I'll invite the tile guy and the table guy over for a drink. We can sit around the Peace Table and watch the fireworks exploding in the sky. ■

John Buzbee joined the Foreign Service in 1998. He has served in Riyadh, Tunis, Jerusalem and Washington, D.C. He is now in Iraq on TDY. The stamp is courtesy of the AAFSW Bookfair "Stamp Corner."

AFSA NEWS

American Foreign Service Association • March 2004

Annual Report 2003

2003 PRESIDENT'S REPORT

NO SCAPEGOATS, NO MONKEY BUSINESS

On Jan. 22, we ended the year of the goat and began the year of the monkey. The past year brought much that was positive for AFSA members. There were those, however, who seemed to see 2003 as the year of the scapegoat, and blamed the Foreign Service for whatever made them unhappy about American foreign policy. Mr. Robertson would "nuke" us and Mr. Gingrich would "re-educate" us. AFSA would have none of it. Our responses have made a simple point: we need no one to give us lessons in courage, devotion to duty and patriotism.

FINANCIALLY SOLID

AFSA is a financially sound organization that spends about $3 million per year. While increasing our services to members we have built operating reserves and an endowment to support our awards and scholarship programs. AFSA's operating reserve as of the end of 2003, thanks in part to a recovery in the stock market, was valued at $1,043,600. This is in addition to the debt-free headquarters building at 21st and E Streets N.W. The AFSA Scholarship endowment is valued at $4,474,042 and the Sinclaire Awards Fund at $375,590.

AFSA'S PUBLIC FACE: A BETTER *JOURNAL*

We can be very proud of the success of the *Foreign Service Journal*. There is more advertising income — check out the full-page color ads in recent issues — and the articles are superb. I would especially note the September issue devoted to Foreign Service specialists and the lively debate that those articles provoked. Some of the best writing in the *Journal*, in my opinion, appears in the "Letters" section. Please keep writing us.

It was also a very good year for AFSA outreach: the Speakers Program, media placements, Elderhostel, and the Essay Contest explained the importance of U.S. diplomacy to record numbers of audiences and participants nationwide. AFSA also launched its all-new edition of *Inside a U.S. Embassy*, which is nearing 20,000 copies sold worldwide.

MEMBERSHIP

Our membership is at an all-time high of about 12,500. Among our active-duty constituencies, FCS takes the prize with a membership rate of over 80 percent. USAID membership is about 75 percent and State membership stands at 70 percent. Retirees, with about 3,700 members, are the second-largest constituency. New Foreign Service employees are signing up in record numbers. At our most recent recruiting lunches for new generalists and specialists, over 90 percent have joined AFSA.

John Limbert

BREAD AND BUTTER

None of us are in this business for the money, but AFSA did make progress on improving benefits. Our largest step forward was securing passage of the law allowing Foreign Service employees serving overseas to benefit from tax exemptions on sale of a principal residence. Passage of this law came after years of work by AFSA and our military colleagues. AFSA has also been pushing a complex of related issues involving locality pay and Senior Foreign Service pay and performance. These are a tough sell in today's political climate in Washington, and in meetings we encounter persistent confusion between base pay and allowances and differentials. Much of our work is educational, explaining two realities:

• First, the gap between base pay in Washington and overseas is growing, and that increasing inequality is affecting the Service's ability to staff its most difficult overseas posts.

• Second, differentials and allowances serve a different purpose from base pay. For example, employees at many of our most difficult posts receive no COLA, yet current laws have them taking a cut in base pay, with accompanying cuts in TSP, retirement and survivors' benefits.

AFSA has been pushing other legislative fixes, including restoring prescriptive relief, implementing the PIT buy-back, and changing the low-ranking requirement. These changes are all in the Fiscal Year 2004 and 2005 State Department authorization bills, which are stuck in the law-making process. We will keep pushing these, but there are no guarantees of immediate success.

AFSA has been active in promoting the interests of retirees, providing counsel and assistance to retirees with annuity and benefit problems. AFSA convinced the Retirement Office to apply more transparent and humane procedures in annuity overpayment cases. AFSA has also increased its focus on legislative and regulatory actions that could affect retiree benefits, particularly health benefits.

THANKS TO ALL

Kudos to all of our committee and board members — VPs, representatives, and others — for their hard work. Post representatives and members in the field are providing vital support through messages that help us make our case with management, the media and the rest of the government. Your impressive support to the legislative action fund, the scholarship fund, etc., is vital in helping us fight for you. Special thanks also go to AFSA's superb professional staff members who produce the *Journal*, deal with the media, run the office, maintain membership lists, keep us solvent, and who provide representation, advice and grievance counseling. Well done. □

AFSA Annual Report 2003

YEAR IN REVIEW

January

The first recipient, Scott Behoteguy, left.

AFSA presents the first-ever AFSA National Alumni Service Awards to 12 AFSA retirees in recognition of their outstanding efforts to promote American diplomacy.

The second installment of the *Foreign Service Journal*'s series profiling the various foreign affairs agencies spotlights the U.S. & Foreign Commercial Service.

Retirees in California inaugurate an Elderhostel program on the Foreign Service in Ventura County.

Nine FS employees receive the Sinclaire Language Awards for superior achievement while studying a "hard" language. The 2003 awards are given for the study of Albanian, Estonian, Greek, Korean, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish.

AFSA writes to the State Department concerning untimely processing of Thrift Savings Plan contributions, and State management takes action to fix the problem.

AFSA expresses concern that tenure boards are taking too long to publish results and issue letters of advice, and the department responds with steps to ensure that the boards' work would be completed faster.

February

AFSA Communications Director Tom Switzer arranges a video-conference for a senior Asia expert to explain U.S. policy on North Korea to 30,000 households in northern New York via a regional cable network.

To ensure that specialist career candidates undergo the same termination procedures as generalists in the event the decision is made to seek to terminate a candidate's appointment, AFSA asks the department to change the Foreign Affairs Manual. The department agrees.

We inform the department of changes in the Office of Personnel Management's regulations for the payment of overtime to DS agents in training at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and ask that they be implemented immediately. Most agents receive overtime back pay by year's end.

AFSA conducts an extensive survey on the implementation of the Members of Household policy and forwards results to the Under Secretary for Management.

The newly renegotiated collective bargaining agreement for the Foreign Agricultural Service is put into effect.

Florida retirees present three weeks of Elderhostel programs on the Foreign Service.

March

The State Department Resource Management Bureau, in response to urging by AFSA, completes computer upgrades enabling it to offer a full range of annuity allotments to retirees.

AFSA successfully negotiates in favor of the establishment of a regional senior commercial officer position in El Salvador.

AFSA reaches agreement with State management on the procedures and safeguards for placing certain security-record information before the promotion boards for FS-2s and above.

Office Director for the Office of Brazil and Southern Cone James J. Carragher speaks to the International Associates as part of AFSA's corporate membership program.

Labor management staff help AFSA post reps address safety and health issues at a post where the chancery is undergoing extensive renovation.

AFSA submits testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding the Millennium Challenge Account proposal.

The House of Representatives passes H.R. 1307, the "Military Tax Fairness Act," which contains changes to the capital gains tax exemptions on the sale of a principal residence without including the Foreign Service. The Senate then amends the bill to include the Foreign Service — an addition for which AFSA has pushed hard. The Senate passes the new version and sends it back to the House.

Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Grossman and Director General Ruth A. Davis speak at the launch of AFSA's 2003 edition of *Inside a U.S. Embassy*.

April

AFSA successfully negotiates the implementation of a long-term language training pilot program at FCS, which begins in July 2003.

AFSA successfully negotiates an important change with FCS to allow officers the flexibility to select Temporary Duty or Permanent Change of Station status for long-term full-time training.

AFSA proposes to State management measures to protect employees from SARS, and successfully obtains modification to the authorized departure rules for China to allow single parents or either member of a tandem couple to take their children to a safe haven in the U.S. at government expense.

The association successfully seeks adjustments to entry salaries for several Diplomatic Security agents who entered the Basic Special Agents Course in August 2002.

AFSA's outreach department arranges a panel of AFSA board members and staffers to explain Foreign Service careers to some 100 students at Georgetown University.

AFSA President John Naland hosts a graduation reception for colleagues completing the Job Search Program prior to retiring from foreign affairs agencies.

AFSA submits testimony to the House Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations Subcommittee urging adequate funding for the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative, embassy security and protection of soft targets.

We successfully intervene with management to resolve several knotty USAID travel and transportation issues.

May

AFSA submits testimony to the Senate Commerce, Justice and State Appropriations Subcommittee urging adequate funding for the DRI, embassy security and protection of soft targets.

We succeed in getting AFSA personnel-related provisions into both the House and Senate versions of the State Department authorization bill (Senate S. 925 and House H.R. 1950).

AFSA successfully negotiates the implementation of the Service Needs Differential concept, persuading FCS to endorse current State Department guidelines.

AFSA Annual Report 2003

YEAR IN REVIEW

AFSA reviews new discipline regulations for the foreign affairs agencies' and proposes changes. Final agreement is reached in September.

On Foreign Affairs Day, Secretary of State Colin Powell, USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios and AFSA President John Naland unveil six additional names of Foreign Service employees added to the AFSA Memorial Plaque.

Retiree Liaison Ward Thompson attends a meeting of the Foreign Affairs Retirees of New England and presents National Alumni Service Awards to its founders on the organization's 20th anniversary.

Continuing its series profiling the various foreign affairs agencies, the *Journal* marks the 50th anniversary of the U.S. Foreign Agricultural Service.

Seattle-area retirees launch the first Foreign Service Elderhostel program in Washington state.

AFSA President John Naland meets with Foreign Service retirees and major media in Houston and San Antonio, Texas.

June

AFSA discusses proposed measures to protect soft targets overseas during a meeting at the Overseas Building Office.

Negotiations are successfully concluded on proposals sent in May by AFSA to State management urging amendments to the State Department's procedural promotion precepts for the 2003 promotion boards.

The *Journal* celebrates AFSA's 30 years as a union with articles by Tom Boyatt, Tex Harris, Hank Cohen, Ted Wilkinson and Ken Bleakley.

AFSA USAID persuades the Foreign Service Grievance Board to order the reinstatement of an untenured USAID employee who had been selected out. The decision plows new ground. USAID seeks reconsideration. The board reconfirms, but USAID refuses to comply. A struggle between board authority and the agency's is now under way.

AFSA negotiates changes to the USAID evaluation skills matrix, Annual Evaluation Form and updated guidance.

Bonnie Brown joins the AFSA staff as Retiree Affairs Coordinator.

AFSA holds its annual awards ceremony. Secretary Powell presents the Award for Lifetime Contributions to American Diplomacy to former Secretary of State George P. Shultz. Awards for constructive dissent are presented as well as three awards for extraordinary contributions to effectiveness, professionalism and morale.

July

AFSA's FCS VP serves as moderator for a commercial diplomacy course organized by the Business Council for International Understanding at FSI for new DCMs and principal officers.

AFSA urges its membership to write members of Congress to support legislation that would protect the prescription drug benefits of retired employees in the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan.

Again, AFSA seeks a change in the per diem regulations for FS personnel in long-term training at FSI.

AFSA State VP Louise Crane addresses the DCM and Principal Officer Course at FSI.

The outgoing AFSA Governing Board — whose president, John Naland, faithfully served AFSA for four years as State VP and then president — is given a fond farewell. The new Governing Board, led by Amb. John Limbert, takes office.

AFSA successfully recruits for membership 80 percent of new entrants joining the USAID Foreign Service.

August

Secretary Powell presents awards to the winners of the 2003 AFSA National High School

Essay Contest, which drew 550 entries.

After over four years of negotiation and consultation, AFSA and FCS agree to a new management planning and performance appraisal system policy and promotion precepts that will dramatically change the evaluation procedures in FCS.

After several negotiating sessions, State management agrees on a pilot program for a new EER form for FS-1s and above.

Retiree Coordinator Bonnie Brown informs the State Department of errors it had made in calculating lump-sum payments for annual leave upon retirement. The department then recalculates payments for annuitants who had been underpaid.

AFSA urges the House Ways and Means Committee to favorably consider a Premium Conversion Bill (H.R. 1231) that would permit retirees to pay health insurance premiums with pretax earnings.

AFSA's newly-expanded Web Marketplace attracts more than 4,000 hits monthly. The most requested pages include: schools, books, extended-stay housing, real estate, and property management.

AFSA meets with the National Treasury Employees Union to discuss shared interests regarding locality pay for those posted abroad.

State Department officials brief AFSA on State's capital security cost-sharing proposals. AFSA considers the implications for USAID and Commerce.

AFSA rebuts attacks on American diplomacy made by Newt Gingrich via placement of articles and interviews by senior diplomats in major media, including *Foreign Policy* magazine, *The Washington Times*, NBC News, Fox News and NPR.

September

AFSA files comments in an Equal Employment Opportunity proceeding, opposing a proposed rule that would exempt employers from provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, thereby permitting them to reduce or eliminate health insurance for Medicare-eligible retirees.

AFSA Annual Report 2003

YEAR IN REVIEW

D.C.-area retirees present the Elderhostel week in Northern Virginia, the 50th there since the AFSA-sponsored program began in 1996.

AFSA arranges for a distinguished group of retirees to explain U.S. diplomacy to audiences at Johns Hopkins University's prestigious "Evergreen" professional education program.

AFSA intercedes on behalf of several State employees whose EERs had not been written or submitted in a timely manner.

Discussions are held between AFSA and management officials in the Diplomatic Courier Service addressing ongoing issues affecting traveling couriers.

Over 100 university and college career centers purchase *Inside a U.S. Embassy* following AFSA mailing.

October

The *Journal* wins an Award for Publication Excellence certificate in the category of printed four-color magazines and *AFSA News* wins an award in the annual report category.

The annual AFSA Elderhostel week at the Chautauqua Institution in New York draws a record 200 participants.



AFSA meets on Capitol Hill with House International Relations Committee staff to discuss the State Department 2004 authorization bill.

AFSA meets with the Senate Government Affairs Committee regarding status of new language in the Defense Department authorization bill conference. AFSA also meets with Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff to discuss progress on the State Department authorization bill and offer assistance.

A joint press conference is held with the Uniformed Coalition urging the House and Senate to enact the Military Tax Fairness Act provisions.

AFSA meets with Donald Reid, Senior Coordinator for Diplomatic Security, concerning the handling of security clearances and related issues.

The association concludes an agreement with the State Department on the requirement for hardship service in order to qualify for promotion to the Senior Foreign Service, with waivers in certain medical circumstances.

AFSA agrees to the department's proposed incentive packages for service in Iraq and Afghanistan.

November

On Nov. 11, President Bush signs H.R. 3365, the "Military Family Tax Relief Act," providing special tax considerations for the Foreign Service and the military in exempting the capital gains tax on the sale of a principal residence.

AFSA President John Limbert speaks at the annual meeting and banquet of the Foreign Service Retirees Association of Florida in Jacksonville.

Retiree Liaison Bonnie Brown meets with State's legal, retirement and financial staff concerning measures to prevent future overpayments to annuitants and measures to ameliorate the effects of overpayments. She receives assurances that the monitoring of calculations and communications with retirees will improve.

AFSA Governing Board members and staff receive a briefing from Diplomatic Security on Iraq service. AFSA expresses the concerns of members and seeks better preparation for those assigned to Iraq.

Rep. Frank Wolf, R-Va., Chairman of the House Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Subcommittee, meets with AFSA to discuss our concerns regarding the omnibus appropriations package and other issues.

AFSA collaborates with USAID management on the USAID Workforce Planning Working Group and other working groups, and successfully persuades management to offer an Immediate Benefit Plan to USAID employees in 2004.

USAID AFSA continues an ongoing exchange with USAA over its denial of eligibility to FS personnel serving in USAID, FAS, FCS and IBB.

USAID AFSA creates and presents to management a matrix that lays out the benefits disparity between USAID and other foreign affairs agencies. AFSA hopes the matrix will serve as a catalyst for movement on the issues listed.

December

As part of AFSA's mid-term bargaining agenda with FCS, we succeed in persuading FCS to endorse the new FAM guidelines on the Member of Household Policy.

AFSA proposes changes to the time-in-service/time-in-class rules for State generalists who convert from specialist at the mid-level. We also propose changes to HR records to take into account the special circumstances affecting employees who are called up for military service.

We successfully contest Human Resource decisions to deny two temporary quarters allowance extension requests.

AFSA meets with Senate Government Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Service staff to discuss the impact on the Senior Foreign Service of the DOD authorization bill. The measure would freeze an existing discrepancy in SFS remuneration because of the lack of locality pay for those serving abroad.

AFSA meets with the Senior Executive Association's general counsel to discuss the impact on SES and SFS of the DOD authorization provisions eliminating locality pay and the freezing of salary levels as of Jan. 11, 2004, and to seek an (ultimately successful) joint approach to our common problem.

The *Journal* sets an all-time record (for one month and for one year) for advertising, both in pages sold and total advertising revenue. In spite of a relatively difficult year for the advertising industry, the *FSJ* increased gross sales by more than 10 percent in 2003.

AFSA hosts the last of 28 recruitment luncheons in 2003 for new generalists and specialists: a full 85 percent of all new hires join AFSA.

AFSA hosts three retirement champagne toasts for retiring members and welcomes 256 new and rejoining retired members.

Membership reaches 12,474 by year's end.

AFSA assists hundreds of employees from State, USAID, FCS, FAS and IBB during 2003 with administrative issues, grievances, discipline cases, security investigations and security clearance matters. □

AFSA Annual Report 2003

Staff

Finance and Administration

Jay Mallin

- Accounting
- Financial Management
- Staff Recruitment & Supervision
- Building Administration
- Board and Committee Support

From left: Controller Kalpna Srimal, Executive Director Susan Reardon, and Accounting Assistant Steven Tipton.

Foreign Service Journal

Jay Mallin

- Editing
- Writing
- Design
- Advertising
- Subscriptions and Sales

Advertising & Circulation Manager Ed Miltenberger, Senior Editor Susan Maitra, Associate Editor Shawn Dorman, Editor Steve Honley, and Business Manager Mikkela Thompson. Not pictured: Art Director Caryn Suko Smith.

Labor Management

Jay Mallin

- Negotiations
- Protecting Benefits
- Grievance Counseling
- OIG & DS Investigations
- Member Inquiries
- Informing the Field

Front row, from left: General Counsel Sharon Papp, Grievance Attorney Harry Wilkinson, Labor Management Office Manager Christine Warren. Back row, from left: Grievance Attorney Charles Henderson, Labor Management Attorney Zlatana Badrich, Labor Management Specialist James Yorke, and USAID AFSA Office Manager Asgeir Sigfusson. Not pictured: Senior Labor Management Advisor Doug Broome.

Outreach Programs

Jay Mallin

From left: Congressional Affairs Director Ken Nakamura, Executive Assistant Austin Tracy, Retiree Liaison Bonnie Brown, and Director of Communications Tom Switzer. Not pictured: Professional Issues Coordinator Barbara Berger and Elderhostel Coordinator Ward Thompson.

Public Outreach

- Speakers Bureau
- Elderhostel
- Memorial Plaque
- Foreign Service Day
- Diplomats Online
- AFSA Awards
- *Inside a U.S. Embassy* Book

Congressional Affairs

- Lobbying
- Tracking Legislation
- Hill Testimony
- Grassroots Campaigns

Retiree Services

- Member Inquiries
- Retiree Newsletter
- Retiree Directory

Member Services

Jay Mallin

- Member Recruitment
- Post Reps
- Insurance Programs
- Address Changes
- AFSANET
- AFSA Web Site

Membership Director Janet Hedrick and Administrative Assistant Ana Lopez. Not pictured: Membership Representative Lindsay Peyton.

Scholarships

Mark Bums

- Financial Aid
- Merit Awards
- Art Merit Awards
- Committee on Education

Scholarship Administrator Lori Dec.

AFSA Annual Report 2003

Governing Board

Front row, from left: Louise Crane (State VP), Bill Carter (USAID VP), John W. Limbert (President), Cynthia Efird (State Representative), Stan Zuckerman (Retiree Representative), David E. Reuther (Retiree Representative), Alex Belida (IBB Representative), Ray Maxwell (State Representative).

Back row, from left: Gil Sheinbaum (Retiree Representative), Danny Hall (Treasurer), Tex Harris (Secretary), Charles Ford (FCS VP), Bill Crawford (FCS Representative), Ted Wilkinson (Retiree Representative), Thomas Olson (USAID Representative), Scot Folensbee (State Representative), Jim Wagner (State Represenative) Not Shown: George Jones (Retiree VP), Pamela Bates (State Representative), John Sullivan (State Representative).

Jay Mallin

The Foreign Service Journal *Editorial Board*

Jay Mallin

From left: William Jordan, Carol A. Giacomo, Judith Baroody (Chair), Laurie Kassman, Tatiana Gfoeller and Ted Wilkinson (Governing Board Liaison). Not pictured: Mark W. Bocchetti, Stephen Buck, Hollis Summers and Bill Wanlund.

www.afsa.org

The total number of visitors to the AFSA site increased dramatically in 2003. The popularity of AFSA's national essay contest and book, *Inside a U.S. Embassy*, drew approximately 40,000 non-Foreign Service visitors. AFSA's Web site offers an excellent opportunity to introduce the public to the valuable role members of the Foreign Service play in serving their country.

Additionally, AFSA Web site statistics indicate that visitors to our site are downloading greater quantities of information, viewing more pages and returning to our site more frequently. The AFSA Web site is providing Foreign Service members with content-rich information as well as serving as a resource for many non-Foreign Service visitors.

AFSA encourages all members to visit the AFSA Web site at www.afsa.org and to sign up for the AFSANET listserve designed to provide updates on items of interest to the foreign affairs community.



AFSA Annual Report 2003

Membership by Constituency



Membership by Function



Total Membership 1990 to 2003



AUDIT REPORT for AFSA

AFSA's audited financial statements for 2003 will be available on the AFSA Web site (www.afsa.org) on May 14.

Budget in Brief

INCOME	$
Dues	1,780,000
Foreign Service Journal Advertising	439,000
Insurance Programs	25,000
Legislative Action Fund	40,000
Publications and Other	41,500
Professional Programs and Outreach	252,810
Scholarships	340,954
TOTAL	2,919,264

EXPENSES	$
Membership Programs	1,000,911
Foreign Service Journal	697,651
Legislative Affairs	173,297
Professional Programs and Outreach	341,807
Scholarships	338,505
Administration	354,645
Contributions to Endowment and Reserves	12,448
TOTAL	2,919,264

AFSA Annual Report 2003

AFSA in 2003: By the Numbers

18	Number of one-week Elderhostel programs on the Foreign Service
49	AFSA articles and letters placed in newspapers around the nation
90	Number of students who received AFSA scholarships
137	AFSANETs sent in 2003
177	Members serving as post and bureau representatives
256	New retiree members
550	Students participating in AFSA's High School Essay Contest
978	Foreign Service new hires who joined AFSA
7,687	Subscribers to the AFSANET Listserve
12,474	AFSA members at year's end
19,000	Number of copies of *Inside a U.S. Embassy* sold
20,250	Attendees at AFSA speaker programs nationwide
32,000	Dollar amount AFSA-PAC contributed to members of Congress
472,013	Dollar amount of advertising in the *Foreign Service Journal*
2,919,264	Dollar amount of AFSA's budgeted income

Benefits of AFSA Membership

LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: AFSA negotiates the regulations affecting employees' careers. We work to make the Foreign Service a better place in which to work, live and raise a family. Our network of AFSA post representatives provides on-site assistance to overseas members.

CONGRESSIONAL ADVOCACY: AFSA is your advocate before Congress on issues affecting the careers of active members and the annuities of retired members.

OMBUDSMAN: We work to resolve member problems with pay, allowances, claims, annuities, health care, and many other issues.

VOICE OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE: As the professional association of the Foreign Service since 1924, AFSA works to strengthen our profession and is ever vigilant for threats to the career Foreign Service.

GRIEVANCE REPRESENTATION: AFSA's legal staff provides hands-on assistance with grievance proceedings when your rights are violated.

OUTREACH: AFSA communicates the views of the Foreign Service on professional issues to the news media and directly to the general public.

FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL: Our monthly magazine offers provocative articles that will keep you current on developments in the foreign affairs profession.

AFSA NEWS: AFSA's monthly newsletter, published inside the *Foreign Service Journal*, highlights issues affecting your daily life.

AFSA WEB SITE: Online member area including member directory and member forums.

AFSANET: Regular e-mail updates keep you current on issues of importance to the Foreign Service community.

LEGAL SERVICES: We offer free legal advice and representation on employment issues, including security and OIG investigations, discipline cases and security clearance proceedings.

INSURANCE PROGRAMS: You can choose among competitively priced insurance programs designed for the Foreign Service community, including professional liability insurance, accident, dental and personal property/transit.

RETIREE SKILLS DATABASE: Our online database lists AFSA members who are available for jobs, college teaching, and speaking engagements in a wide variety of areas.

AFSA SCHOLARSHIPS: Approximately 100 merit and financial need scholarships are granted every year to Foreign Service family members. Since 1926, AFSA has awarded approximately $4,450,000 in scholarships.

AFSA AWARDS: This unique awards program honors constructive dissent and outstanding performance.

RETIREE NEWSLETTER: This bimonthly newsletter is exclusively for retired members.

DIRECTORY OF RETIRED MEMBERS: This invaluable annual listing, by state, of contact information for retired members is provided to all retired AFSA members.

MAGAZINE DISCOUNTS: AFSA members are eligible for special discounts on subscriptions to major foreign affairs journals.

ESPRIT DE CORPS: We work to build a sense of common cause and professional pride among all Foreign Service members — active and retired; officer and specialist; entry-level and veteran.

AFSA MEMORIAL PLAQUES: Established in 1933, and maintained by AFSA, these plaques in the Truman Building lobby honor members of the Foreign Service who lost their lives overseas in the line of duty. □

AFSA Core Values

The American Foreign Service Association

Established in 1924

MISSION

To make the Foreign Service a more effective agent of United States international leadership.

VISION

We work to make the Foreign Service a better-supported, more respected, more satisfying place in which to spend a career and raise a family.

– **RESPONSIVENESS:** We listen to our members and actively promote their interests.

– **EFFECTIVENESS:** We act with a sense of urgency, get results, and make a difference.

– **INTEGRITY:** We demonstrate openness, honesty and fairness in everything we do.

– **EFFICIENCY:** We carefully expend our resources where they can have maximum impact.

– **COMMUNITY:** We foster teamwork, respect each other, and enjoy our time together.

– **COURAGE:** We encourage responsible risk-taking in order to achieve results.

– **PATRIOTISM:** We are faithful to the grand and enduring ideals that gave our nation birth.

– **EMPOWERMENT:** We trust each other to give our best efforts guided by these core values. □

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

SFS Salaries Adjusted to Include Locality Pay

Last month, we reported grave concern that the new Senior Executive Service salary reform coming into force on Jan. 11 threatened to freeze the salaries of all Senior Foreign Service employees at current levels, leaving SFS employees in Washington with a base pay including Washington locality pay and those serving overseas without locality pay. The result would have severely penalized SFS colleagues serving overseas, sending exactly the wrong message about overseas service to the Foreign Service.

We are happy to report that an executive order – the work of the State Department (with support from AFSA), in cooperation with the Office of Personnel Management and the Office of Management and Budget – was signed by President Bush on Jan. 23. It authorized the adjustment of the base salaries of all SFS member, serving domestically as well as overseas, to include Washington locality pay.

The adjustment to SFS salaries to include locality pay is good news for SFS employees. But in creating what is essentially a two-class salary system overseas, the SFS salary reform highlights the need to make adjustments for all FS employees overseas. SFS employees overseas now get locality pay, but the rest of the FS employees do not. Locality pay for *all* overseas FS employees continues to be Issue Number One for AFSA.

Securing an equitable implementation of the SES salary reform for the SFS was the result of a tremendous effort by many people, requiring extensive knowledge of how federal pay is structured, considerable legal expertise, extensive contact with employees within OMB and OPM and lots of legwork. It also required an intensive effort on the part of the State Department leadership to persuade OMB and OPM to support the change.

Most of the key people involved in this effort were Civil Service employees exhibiting the best qualities of the "one team" vision – working for the department, not for narrow self-interest. AFSA would like to thank the department employees in Human Resources and the Office of the Legal Advisor who did the legal research, called on their network of contacts in OPM and OMB, and made the case for us. They are: Assistant Legal Adviser John Kim and Karen Johnson in the Legal Adviser's Office of Employment Law, Bill Mullican and Sally Mavlian in HR's Resource Management and Organizational Analysis Office, Laura Hall in HR's Policy Coordination Office and especially Deputy Assistant Secretary of Human Resources, Linda Tagliatatela. We also wish to thank Under Secretary for Management Grant Green, Director General W. Robert Pearson and Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Human Resources Ruth Whiteside for their consistent leadership on this issue. Finally, the actual paperwork and processing of the pay changes required incredible efforts by the staff of the HR Bureau's Executive Office and the Charleston Regional Financial Center. Thanks to the staff of those offices as well.

Briefs • Continued on page 11

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GAINING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DIPLOMATIC READINESS FUNDING

AFSA Augments Outreach Efforts in 2003

BY TOM SWITZER, DIRECTOR OF COMMUNICATIONS

AFSA greatly augmented its national outreach efforts in 2003 aimed at broadening and deepening public support for funding for diplomatic readiness. One of our most effective outreach elements is our **Speakers Program**, which deployed 405 Foreign Service speakers in 2003 (compared to 110 speakers in 2000) to explain the importance of U.S. diplomacy for American national interests to an audience of more than 20,000 in 41 states and Washington, D.C.

The venues ranged from world affairs councils and universities to local community-service organizations, "town meetings," churches and high schools. Former Assistant Secretary for Middle East Affairs Richard Murphy enthralled attendees at a regional Great Decisions seminar in New Jersey with his keen analysis of regional issues. Other outstanding speakers were Amb. Grant Smith, Stephen Buck and Stephen Dachi, who elicited glowing reviews from attendees at John Hopkin's prestigious "Evergreen" adult education series for their presentations on U.S. policies in South Asia and the Middle East. They also impressively described the attractions and challenges of careers in the Foreign Service, including insightful consideration of family issues.

AFSA speakers addressed other topics including: counterterrorism, democratization in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe; U.S. initiatives in Latin America, Africa, and Asia; United Nations peacekeeping; international environmental concerns; population and migration issues; and human rights.

We provided speakers with talking points and issue updates, as well as promotion material for AFSA's excellent new book, *Inside a U.S. Embassy*. Speakers stressed the critical role of diplomacy in advancing America's vital security and economic interests around the globe. They also encouraged audience members to contact their congressional representatives to request increased funding for U.S. diplomatic readiness. Moreover, speakers reached out to talented youth — especially minority-group members — to encourage them to consider Foreign Service careers.

AFSA also effectively deployed **video conferencing** to several regions of the country that lack retiree speakers. A high point of the initiative was Asia expert Robert Warne explaining U.S. policy on North Korea to a town meeting in upstate New York that reached some 30,000 households via a regional cable network. Video conferencing is an inexpensive, convenient outreach tool, which we plan to increasingly utilize to reach wider audiences nationwide.

"AFSA speakers explained the importance of U.S. diplomacy to an audience of more than 20,000 in 41 states and Washington, D.C."

AFSA's **media outreach** efforts were also intensive in 2003. We placed — either directly or through AFSA retirees — 49 op-eds, letters-to-the-editor, articles and press releases advocating increased public and congressional support for U.S. diplomacy in leading media entities including the *Washington Post*, *The New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Los Angeles Times*, *Houston Chronicle*, *Government Executive*, *Federal Times*, Associated Press, NPR, and CNN.

Among our better efforts was the heaviest **media coverage** ever arranged for AFSA's annual awards ceremony held in June at the State Department, which included six network TV cameras and some 30 journalists from major media. The result was in-depth treatment of this event via some 43 media outlets nationwide, including NBC, CNN, ABC, CBS, Associated Press, and NPR.

AFSA also orchestrated an intense media campaign to counter the tendentious charges against U.S. diplomacy leveled last year by Newt Gingrich, Pat Robertson and other critics. We arranged for highly effective rebuttals by Ambassadors Thomas Boyatt, Richard Holbrooke, Bruce Laingen and others to be placed in leading national media including NPR, NBC, Fox News, and *Foreign Policy* magazine.

AFSA outreach efforts have placed heavy emphasis on counterterrorism efforts in the aftermath of 9/11. We have deployed more than 250 AFSA retiree experts on Middle East and South Asia issues for speaker and media programs nationwide, all of whom were able to emphasize the vital role played by U.S. diplomacy in the ongoing struggle against terrorism. The director of the State Department's Office of Public Liaison thanked AFSA for these efforts, since many U.S. government officials were constrained by policy sensitivities from speaking publicly. We also held frequent discussions concerning AFSA issues with the more than 35 diplomatic correspondents attached to the State Department's press office, as well as with senior editors and bureau chiefs of national media based in Washington.

These outreach programs have promoted three important AFSA goals: broadening the Foreign Service constituency, enhancing public awareness of global affairs and the key role of the Foreign Service and diplomacy, and activating the AFSA retiree constituency by involving it in significant programs that draw on their backgrounds and skills in telling our story to audiences nationwide.

If you want to be involved with AFSA outreach, contact me at Switzer@afsa.org or call toll-free (800) 704-2372, ext. 501. □

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Continued from page 9

Foreign Affairs Day Set for May 7

Foreign Affairs Day, the annual homecoming for retired State Department employees, will be held this year on Friday, May 7. As is customary during this event, there will be a brief ceremony at the site of the AFSA Memorial Plaques to honor those members of the Foreign Service community who have lost their lives overseas in the line of duty or under heroic or inspirational circumstances.

The event offers a great opportunity to see old friends and catch up on doings at Foggy Bottom. Mark your calendars now so you can join AFSA for this important event.

AFSA Foreign Affairs Day Reception

AFSA plans to hold its annual reception during this year's Foreign Affairs Day. More details will follow in the April *AFSA News*. AFSA invites all participants to enjoy another opportunity to relax and mingle with former colleagues at the conclusion of the day's events.

JOSH

AFSA's Day on the Hill

On May 6, 2004, AFSA will again lead a group of retired Foreign Service personnel to visit their senators and representatives on Capitol Hill. Please join AFSA to support the Foreign Service, our foreign affairs agencies and American diplomacy. Look for more information in next month's *AFSA News* and in your Foreign Affairs Day mailing.

Briefs • Continued on page 12

V.P. VOICE: **STATE** ■ BY LOUISE CRANE

Our Abusive Ambassadors

Recently three political ambassadors "fired" their career Foreign Service Office Management Specialists. In two cases, the OMSs were locked out of their embassies, denied access to department e-mail, refused admittance to their offices, and otherwise humiliated. In the third case, the OMS begged to serve in another OMS slot within the embassy in an effort to save her family from having to move and change schools once again. She even volunteered to go on leave without pay to stay in the country so that her husband could keep his assignment to post. Her request was curtly rejected on the ground that the ambassador didn't want her or any member of her family around. Her husband's assignment was cancelled along with hers.

Despite such abuse of authority, I have nothing against political ambassadors. I have worked for many and found they all made distinguished contributions to American diplomacy. In fact, they can be good leavening for the career Service. They taught me greater respect for lawmaking and the role of the Congress. Among those who headed embassies where I was stationed were Edward Korry (Chile), Otto Reich (Venezuela), Michael J. Mansfield (Japan), Walter F. Mondale (Japan) and Thomas S. Foley (Japan), gentlemen all. Not one of them ever spoke in a disrespectful tone toward any member of his staff. I remember meeting Amb. Reich's elderly mother and congratulating her on her son's good manners. He spoke as graciously to the chambermaid as he did to the First Lady.

> A personnel system that does not help those subjected to capricious firings is not a system that engenders devotion and loyalty.

But I must speak out about those political ambassadors who do not treat employees with respect, the ones who are apparently not concerned about the disruption involuntary curtailment causes to the lives of employees and their families, not to mention the department and the personnel system, much less the financial cost to the department and ultimately the taxpayers.

AFSA protested each of these involuntary curtailments. We have urged the department to tighten the training it provides political appointees, to remind them of the ethics rules, advise them to treat their career staff with respect, warn them of the cost to the department and the government when staff are curtailed for reasons no weightier than whimsy.

AFSA represented the OMS employees in these three cases, helping to ensure good onward assignments. It wasn't always possible to prevent a damaging EER from being filed, and in one case, it proved impossible to get any EER at all. But to its great credit, the department did move quickly to prevent long-term damage to the careers of these OMS employees.

What is the point of these horror stories? They are meant as a cautionary tale for those of you who are in a leadership position at an embassy or hope to be in one. Treat all employees with respect. If your ambassador doesn't, seek a solution that will be better than an involuntarily curtailment. A personnel system that does not help those subjected to capricious firings is not a system that engenders devotion and loyalty. The Foreign Service needs loyal and devoted members who subscribe to the creed of worldwide service: We will go where we are needed and once there, we will do our best to serve this great nation. □

V.P. VOICE: **USAID** ■ BY BILL CARTER

A "Split" Decision on Accomplishments

Serious runners know what their "splits" are supposed to be for each lap around the track. As AFSA VP, I have just completed my first quarter mile, which makes it an appropriate time for some honest stock-taking and examination of the split time — or in USAID lingo: a self-assessment. USAID AFSA began last July to define its "invest in the employee" agenda, and attempted to broadcast it widely to management and members. Thus far, progress on specific elements of the agenda has been disappointing and limited. We have experienced the most success in helping individual members resolve an array of problems mostly unique to them. However, on the broader issues that affect larger segments of the membership, our accomplishments have yet to materialize. Let's review some of the areas where we've been frustrated and will seek to improve our split over the next quarter and beyond:

GRIEVANCES: AFSA had hoped that mediation and dispute resolution could be used as effective techniques in labor relations and as a means of avoiding wasteful, time- and money-consuming cases. And why not, since USAID encourages the use of these very same techniques by recipient countries? However, USAID seems to be reluctant to self-medicate. Management has shown no willingness to resolve cases before they fester and erode morale. One case is particularly unfortunate, because it involves a blatant injustice. Even though the Foreign Service Grievance Board has ruled twice in favor of the employee, management remains recalcitrant.

BENEFITS: AFSA has developed and circulated a matrix highlighting the disparity in benefits between USAID and other foreign affairs agencies. Management gives lip service to implementing many of the benefits, but even the simplest and least expensive have not been acted upon. There always seem to be sufficient funds to cover up plaques, hold expensive conferences and implement reblocking, but not for student loan repayment programs, spousal language training and other programs that employees of other agencies enjoy.

TRANSPARENCY IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT GROUP ASSIGNMENTS: There have been instances where current Service members have been passed over for senior positions in favor of candidates outside the Service. Expressions of interest from qualified officers were ignored in a mystery-shrouded decision-making process. The cynicism and decay in morale caused by this seem to be cavalierly ignored. These decisions also have an impact on the promotions and career development of officers in the lower ranks, because they can thwart opportunities.

TENURE: This year final tenure decisions dragged out far longer than was necessary, causing many candidates anxiety for several months, while their careers and futures remained in limbo. Repeated AFSA requests for speedier issuance of tenure decisions to avoid the personal turmoil went unheeded.

USAA: USAA informed AFSA in a letter that USAID (and FAS and FCS) FSOs were no longer eligible to join USAA because its mission statement did not explicitly state that it was involved in national security. This seemed like an easy matter to fix: We sent USAA the new joint State-USAID Strategic Plan, in which our mutual efforts on national security are explicitly stated in a comprehensive document. Yet we remain without a resolution.

The first lap is over and admittedly progress is not what had been hoped, but the race is not over yet. We expect better splits for the next three laps. □

AFSA NEWS BRIEFS

Continued from page 11

9/11 Commission and Consular Questions

In late January, the 9/11 Commission held public hearings in Washington on border and transportation security. Some sessions focused on visa issuance and included testimony from former Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs Mary Ryan and the current Assistant Secretary, Maura Harty. Amb. Ryan reviewed the pre-9/11 situation, noting that fewer consular employees were asked to do more. One commissioner agreed that this was the equivalent of "doing more with nothing." Amb. Harty specified the numerous changes implemented to visa processing systems after 9/11. She characterized the department's visa work overseas as the "forward-based defense of the United States."

Seeking Closet Comedians

Given the overwhelming heaviness of the current international situation, we are seeking to lighten the mood with some Foreign Service humor (it's not an oxymoron!) on these pages with a new occasional feature, "From the Lighter Side." Brian Aggeler — whose monthly cartoon is a popular feature in both *State* magazine and *AFSA News* — is surely not the only one out there with a knack for seeing humor in the unique way of work and life in the Foreign Service.

We encourage any Foreign Service member with a reasonable ability to draw or write to share a cartoon, joke or other humorous commentary with us. All submissions will be seriously considered. Send your non-returnable humor to us by mail: AFSA News, AFSA, 2101 E St. NW, Washington, DC 20037; by fax: (202) 338-8244; or by e-mail: afsanews@afsa.org. □

FROM THE FIELD

AFSA State VP Attends Manila Conference

In January, AFSA State VP Louise Crane attended the Bureau of East Asia and the Pacific Entry-Level Conference in Manila. She reports that it was an excellent conference and she was impressed by the entry-level professionals assigned to Embassy Manila who handled all the details. "They and their EAP colleagues reinforced AFSA's conviction that the rising generation of Foreign Service employees are a credit to the nation they serve," she says.

Crane met with AFSA members in Manila and had an opportunity to speak individually with many of the entry-level employees who attended the conference. She also stopped by the embassy in Tokyo to meet with the AFSA representative and AFSA members at post.

Employees who met with Crane expressed concern about several issues. First, the entry-level employees want to do away with the nomenclature "junior officer" and the "generalist" and "specialist" labels. AFSA agrees, and prefers more inclusive terms. A major concern of many entry-level employees is the lack of spousal employment options. Equitable treatment for Members of Household was another concern. Most people seem pleased with the department's policy, but there are additional issues, such as health insurance and employment. Some of these require changes in legislation, but on those that do not, AFSA will try to make the argument for additional benefits.

Crane summed up her impression of morale in the field as follows: "It is clear that most entry-level employees are pleased with the way the department treats them. They know the world is a difficult and dangerous place and they do not complain about those conditions of service. They are being supervised well and trained well. They believe their work is appreciated. They are enthusiastic and content with their choice of the Foreign Service. That is a tremendous vote of confidence in the department's management and its managers." □

Q&A

Retiree Issues

BY BONNIE BROWN, RETIREE ACTIVITIES COORDINATOR

Q: Are dependent children entitled to survivor annuities in the event of the death of a parent employee or retiree?

A: In order to qualify for a survivor annuity under the Foreign Service Act, a child must be financially dependent on an employee or retiree at the time of death. The child must also be unmarried, under age 18, or under age 22 and a full-time student (at least 12 credit hours), or over age 18 and incapable of self-support because of a disability that occurred before the age of 18. Children who qualify include legitimate children, adopted children, stepchildren who lived with the employee or retiree at the time of death, and recognized natural children. Children are entitled to survivor benefits regardless of whether or not there is a survivor spousal benefit.

Q: How are the benefits calculated and paid out for surviving children?

A: The benefits are statutorily determined by Section 806(c) of the Foreign Service Act and adjusted each year to reflect the change in the cost of living. The amount of benefits depends on the number of surviving children and whether or not there is a surviving spouse. Annuity benefits payable under FERS/FSPS, which reflects full participation in Social Security, are reduced by the amount of Social Security survivor benefits attributable to the deceased parent. Benefits are generally paid to the surviving parent or the person who has the care and custody of the children. If the surviving spouse qualifies for survivor benefits, the children's benefits will be included in the monthly payment sent to the spouse.

An unmarried participant in good health who does not have a former spouse entitled to a survivor benefit can also elect to provide a survivor benefit under Section 806(f). However, this would be very costly, reducing the retiree's annuity by as much as 40 percent.

Q: Are children's survivor benefits automatically awarded?

A: No. The surviving parent or person responsible for the eligible children must complete an Application for Death Benefits Form and submit a death certificate as well as a birth certificate for each child to the Retirement Office. In the case of a permanently disabled child, the parent or guardian must also submit a statement from MED attesting to the child's disability.

FERS/FSPS dependents must also apply for Social Security benefits and provide the Retirement Office with a copy of the award letter. The surviving parent or guardian is also responsible for informing the Retirement Office when the child is no longer eligible for Social Security or annuity benefits. This is particularly important because Social Security benefits can significantly reduce a FERS/FSPS benefit. Since Social Security benefits for children generally end at age 19, the unreduced FERS/FSPS benefit would be fully payable from age 19 to 22 as long as the child is unmarried and a full-time student.

Q: Under what circumstances can a surviving child continue to be covered under the Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan?

A: A child's health coverage under the FEHBP will continue if the deceased employee or retiree was enrolled in a self-and-family plan, the child is unmarried, and at least one family member is eligible for a survivor annuity. FEHB coverage will continue until age 22. Health benefits coverage can continue after age 22 if the person is unmarried and is incapable of self-support because of a disability that is expected to last more than one year. A child who loses eligibility for coverage may qualify for Temporary Continuation of Coverage under the FEHBP. □

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Please send submissions (or questions) to Mikkela Thompson, *Journal* Business Manager, at thompsonm@afsa.org.

Art by Mikkela Thompson