The Foreign Service Journal, March 2003

Because he personifies the American values that Europe respects and admires the most, the Europeans consider Powell an excellent contact in the Bush administration and — rightly or wrongly — regard him as the Cabinet member who pays more attention to the concerns and priorities of the Atlantic allies and European Union countries. Of course that is in any case the role of a secretary of State, or foreign minister, as Europeans say. Nevertheless, in the first two years as the chief of U.S. diplomacy, Powell has gained great esteem and consideration in European public opinion, which credits him with having rounded the corners of a number of decisions made by the administration. Used to considering itself the main ally of the United States, a role nourished during the long winter of the Cold War, Europe is now afraid to lose its pre- sumed centrality in the American foreign policy equa- tion. European concerns are well founded: the United States is now the sole superpower, and does not need Western Europe to counterbalance the Soviet foe. Moreover, after the events of September 11, 2001, new threats have shown up — in particular, the threat of international terrorism and the danger posed by countries possessing weapons of mass destruction and encouraging their proliferation. American attention has obviously shifted from the traditional areas of priority interest — Europe and Far-East Asia, Russia, China, the Middle East and the Gulf — to new areas like Central Asia (including Afghanistan), the Indian subcontinent, Southeast Asia, and the Horn of Africa. As a result, Europeans feel increasingly overlooked. Secretary Powell mitigated European concerns regarding a new unilateralism when the United States began to censure a range of international agreements previously accepted and in which, in some cases, they themselves had been for a long time the leading par- ticipants: the ABM Treaty (denounced in order to pro- ceed with the antimissile defense program); the U.S. military presence in the Balkans; the commitment to the International Criminal Court; the Kyoto protocol for the reduc- tion of global warming. The proof of Powell’s ability to build a political consensus on the American position and to assemble a wide alliance came after the ter- rorist attacks of Sept. 11: within a few weeks, the secretary of State coordinated the creation of an international coalition against terrorism, which has been successful in Afghanistan and continues to oper- ate to rebuild the country, on one side, and to oppose the reorganization of the al-Qaida terrorist network, on the other. New Policy Imperatives In the European view, two important choices of the Bush administration carry Powell’s fingerprint: the decision to bring the crisis with Iraq to the United Nations, marked by the president’s speech at U.N. headquarters on Sept. 12, 2002; and the vision of two states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side, each one independent and secure in their borders. But the focus on the fight against terror and, then, the effort to thwart the danger posed by countries like Iraq has certainly forced Powell to modify a number of foreign policy priorities he had already started to define. This change has occurred at the expense, at least appar- ently, of Africa policy, which was supposed to receive a specific input by Powell; and at the expense of the Middle Eastern dossier, in which Powell became deeply involved, after an initial phase of study from a distance. Now, after the exceptional phase of the reaction to the terrorist attack, another exceptional phase, charac- terized by the confrontation with Iraq, limits the view of American foreign policy, preventing the U.S. lead- ership from seeing the development of other dossiers, that nevertheless are moving — North Korea, Iran, the relations between Syria and Libya, and especially the Middle East. This is a point of concern in Europe. As far as European affairs are concerned, U.S. foreign policy seems to favor the enlargement process of the two main regional organizations: the Atlantic alliance, which has already decided to expand to 26 countries, with the inclusion of seven new entries; and the European Union, which is ready to accept ten newmembers. These 38 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 3 F O C U S If Europe’s mistrust of the Republican administration has been overcome or diminished, it is because of Colin Powell. Giampiero Gramaglia is Washington bureau chief for the Italian news agency ANSA.