The Foreign Service Journal, January-February 2021

THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL | JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2021 43 4. Expect the unexpected. The Boy Scout motto, “Be Pre- pared,” is just as good advice for diplomats as it is for scouts. When I arrived in Tunisia in September 2009, I did not expect that Ben Ali would bow to overwhelming popu- lar pressure and flee the country a mere 16 months later. Two class- mates in my ambassadorial seminar may well feel the same way when they look back at their own experi- ences, one during the devastating earthquake in Haiti in January 2010 and the other during the “triple disaster” in Japan in March 2011. Events can always take an unex- pected turn, and as diplomats, we must adapt quickly and effectively. 5. Seek as many different perspectives as possible. The Romanian ambassador in Tunis confidently told me shortly after unrest started to spread that Ben Ali was “toast.” He had witnessed the downfall of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife 21 years before and saw the writing on the wall for Ben Ali and Leila Trabelsi, his widely reviled wife. (Their flight to Saudi Arabia saved them from the Ceausescus’ violent end.) In another example, a first-tour officer within the embassy was an expert in assistance programs, and creatively advanced sensible proposals for U.S. support to post–Ben Ali Tunisia. Sourcing different per- spectives can offer unexpected foresight and an inventiveness for how to tackle events going forward. 6. Make security your top priority. The loss of life during the Tunisian revolution was awful and avoidable, but it did not approach the number who died after Ceausescu fled Bucharest in December 1989, and is much less horrific than the death count that mounts in Syria to this day. Moreover, protests in Tunisia did not have any anti-American overtones (indeed, protestors chanted, “Yes, we can,” and held up signs reading “Game Over”), and the U.S. embassy was not a target in the lead-up to Ben Ali’s fall. Security was nonetheless our primary concern. We had to balance the realities of the situation (i.e., the lack of animus directed against the United States as a nation or Americans individually) with a sensitivity to the uncertainties of the situation and the different experiences and expectations of our staff. Too many of us had lost col- leagues during previous assign- ments, so we took security seriously well before December 2010. Our regional security officers had been diligent about scheduling drills on a regular basis, and we made sure everyone participated. The Foreign Service Institute led a crisis man- agement exercise for us the month before demonstrations began, which not only helped us diagnose and remedy potential communica- tions issues but also helped solidify cohesion in the Emergency Action Committee. As the protests intensified, we kept senior security leaders in Washington fully informed; they, in turn, came up with creative solutions to meet our security needs and did not overreact by mandating the ordered departure of embassy personnel, which proved to be unnecessary. We conducted town hall meetings with embassy staff (with a special focus on the concerns of our Tunisian colleagues) and with the American community. We paid particular attention to the international school, which so many embassy dependents attended, and we were fortunate that our defense attaché was an active and respected member of the school board. 7. Anticipate Washington’s needs. Understanding Washington is essential for managing its infa- mous 4,000-mile screwdriver. Credibility can only be earned over time, but the frustrating nature of the Ben Ali regime impeded clientelism. Thanks to our deputy chief of mission’s extensive experience on the State Department’s seventh floor and innate feel for its operations tempo, we succeeded in feeding Washing- Ambassador Gordon Gray addresses the Independence Day reception at U.S. Embassy Tunis on March 20, 2011. U.S.EMBASSYTUNIS