The Foreign Service Journal, January 2003

administration’s Middle East policy. Or consider a less inflammatory topic. I witnessed several years of so- called trade friction in bilateral rela- tions with Japan as a press officer here in the early 1990s. During that contentious era, U.S. negotiators engaged in pitched closed-door talks while we in USIA’s Tokyo office fought battles for public opinion in sector-specific areas as diverse as rice, cars and car parts, and semiconduc- tors. It was not difficult to find American academics and journalists who decried the Clinton administra- tion’s insistence on setting “numerical indicators” in bilateral trade agree- ments, which many of them con- demned as “managed trade.” In that atmosphere, I did not feel it would have been responsible to invite a speaker, even a prominent one, who would take such a position at the same time that our negotiators were in town trying to sell the opposite view. Had we sponsored such individuals, the Japanese press, already hostile to our position, would have had a field day highlighting yet another American who belittled our stance, deeply embarrassing us. On the other hand, during my first tour with USIA in Budapest, when Hungary was still part of the Soviet bloc, I often hosted speakers who pub- licly disagreed with various aspects of U.S. foreign policy. But these were moderate individuals who understood and appreciated the official view, even as they articulated positions more or less at variance with it. At home, the public platform given by the First Amendment to such disparate opinions helps us bet- ter understand and refine our poli- cies. That approach can work over- seas, too — within the limits sketched out above. For example, members of Congress from the political party not holding the White House accept the traditional restraint on criticism of the presi- dent when they travel overseas. This is not merely a matter of patriotism. The rationale for free speech at home is that it sharpens public debate, which helps refine and improve public policy. But foreign- ers do not necessarily contribute to domestic public policy discussions, so the value of free speech overseas should properly be balanced with the national interest of building sup- port for U.S. foreign policies. Such a balance will certainly work to our long-term diplomatic advan- tage. In the communist bloc, I received no end of compliments — often expressed in a tone of amaze- ment — that the U.S. government would sponsor and host the voices that criticize it. And I am sure that is still the case when we send our “dissi- dents” to China today. Both through what the speakers say, and also through the very nature and scope of our public diplomacy programs, which should welcome a diversity of views, we set a valuable example for such regimes. In any country, more- over, this diversity of speakers also provides invaluable credibility to our work. Handling Ourselves Shortly after the Sept. 11 attacks, a young embassy colleague returned from a conference on terrorism and S P E A K I N G O U T 16 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / J A N U A R Y 2 0 0 3 I want us to fashion an approach to public diplomacy worthy of a confident, democratic superpower. TEN TOP REASONS TO JOIN DACOR (Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired) 10. Guest rooms at less than half of per diem 9. Sunday musicales with rising stars 8. Annual conference on key issue or country 7. Receptions for A-100 classes and new ambassadors 6. Scholarships for Foreign Service dependents 5. Top lecturers on foreign affairs and culture 4. Reasonable dues half off for active duty personnel 3. Memorable venue for private or representational functions 2. Five blocks from State 1. Congenial collegiality in an elegant, historic home Richard McKee, Executive Director 1801 F St., NW Washington, DC 20006 202-682-0500 dacor@dacorbacon.org www.dacorbacon.org