The Foreign Service Journal, March 2007

its continuing, enormous cost to the American and Iraqi people, the Arab public cannot see any justification for the war in the name of democracy. Last year’s parliamentary elections and the ratification of a new constitu- tion in Iraq have neither diminished the insurgency nor the intense ill feel- ings and hatred that Iraqis and Arabs in general harbor against the United States. Not only are they cynical about the United States and contemp- tuous of it, but they reject the notion that democracy “American style” should be shoved down their throats with a gun. Still, regardless of their specific national identity, Arabs and Muslims do not reject democratic reforms in principle. On the contrary, tired of despotism, corruption and human rights abuses by those in power, they seek some political reforms — as long as these reforms correspond to their values and are adopted at a pace con- sistent with the social make-up and political conditions of their respective communities. Pursue Gradual Change Because the Arab states have much in common — religion, lan- guage and history — and the Muslim world shares a strong bond with them, there are four core measures that can and must be pursued in the region to effect democratic reforms. Those reforms, in turn, will promote progress and stability in place of vio- lence and political turmoil. But the Western world, especially the United States, must facilitate them not through coercive regime change but through a long-term commitment and investment in the region, based on a careful consideration of each coun- try’s unique political, social and tradi- tional environment. Due to their long history of sub- mission to authoritarianism — during which Islam was (and, to a great extent, remains) a dominant factor — and because of tribalism and sectari- anism based on religious or cultural orientation, most Arab and Muslim societies prefer gradual rather than radical reform. Another complicating factor that needs to be taken into account is the traditional loyalty to the family and to the tribe, which natural- ly erodes the importance of such prin- ciples of democratic government as advice and consent and majority rule. In country after country — e.g., Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Morocco — most people say they want slow and incremental change to reduce resis- tance to democratic ideals, eventually win over skeptics, and prevent a seri- ous backlash that could stifle future progress. (Sitting governments natu- rally perceive such reforms as a threat to their power base and tend to react harshly against them.) Gradualism allows these regimes to be part of the reform process pre- cisely because they can control events better once they realize that reforms provide hope, especially to the young, and, as such, are a prerequisite for maintaining public calm. The West must stop the practice of encouraging the people of the Middle East to rise up against their own gov- ernments, a step the Bush administra- tion has often advocated. In the con- text just described, such a policy is not simply counterproductive; it is dan- gerous. The Shiites in Iraq still remember how, left to their own devices after they rose up against Saddam Hussein in 1991, they endured horrible persecution. The U.S. overthrow of Saddam, accompa- nied by pushing democracy down the throat of Iraqis during the second Iraq War, has similarly proven a dismal fail- ure. Iraq, with its long tradition of sec- tarian conflict and tribalism, was not and is not ready for an American- style, democratic form of govern- ment. The Iraqis should have been given a much longer transitional peri- od in which to adjust to the regime change and to build in its place a civil society anchored in strong democratic institutions. But even if Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds had all adopted the principles of political pluralism, democracy still would not have blos- somed in Iraq, or anywhere else for that matter, according to Mr. Bush’s timetable. However, the United States and its allies should still offer help and guidance along with other incentives, essentially allowing each country to develop its own home- grown form of democracy. Provide Economic Incentives The United States, along with the European Union and Japan, should offer most Arab regimes economic incentives in exchange for democratic reform. These rewards should not, however, be offered government-to- government with no strings attached, for the money may well end up in pri- vate accounts in Swiss banks. Instead, the money should fund sustainable projects through various international agencies and nongovernmental organ- izations. The idea is to ensure that local communities are involved in the 62 F O R E I G N S E R V I C E J O U R N A L / M A R C H 2 0 0 7 Any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power.